SOFT POWER WITH CHINESE

CHARACTERISTICS

This book examines the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to improve

China’s image around the world, thereby increasing its “soft power.” This soft,
attractive form of power is crucial if China is to avoid provoking an international
backlash against its growing military and economic might.
The volume focuses on the period since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012,
and is global in scope, examining the impact of Chinese policies from Hong
Kong and Taiwan to Africa and South America. The book explains debates over
soft power within China and delves into case studies of important policy areas
for China’s global image campaign, such as film, news media and the Confucius
Institutes. The most comprehensive work of its kind, the volume presents a
picture of a Chinese leadership that has access to vast material resources and
growing global inf luence but often struggles to convert these resources into
genuine international affection.
Soft Power With Chinese Characteristics will be invaluable to students and scholars
of Chinese politics and Chinese media, as well as international relations and
world politics more generally.

Kingsley Edney is a lecturer in Politics and International Relations of China

at the University of Leeds, UK. He is the author of The Globalization of Chinese
Propaganda: International Power and Domestic Political Cohesion (2014) and co-author
of Environmental Pollution and the Media: Political Discourses of Risk and Responsibility
in Australia, China and Japan (Routledge, 2017).

Stanley Rosen is Professor of Political Science at USC at the University of

Southern California, USA. His publications include Chinese Politics: State, Society
and the Market (2010, co-edited with Peter Hays Gries) and Art, Politics and
Commerce in Chinese Cinema (2010, co-edited with Ying Zhu).

Ying Zhu is Professor of Cinema Studies at the City University of New York,
USA, and Director of the Center for Film and Moving Image Research at Hong
Kong Baptist University. Her recent publications include Two Billion Eyes: The
Story of China Central Television (2013) and Television in Post-Reform China: Serial
Drama, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market (2008).
“Provides astute analyses of the Chinese government’s efforts to employ soft
power as a component of national strategy, alongside coercive actions that
undermine the efficacy of these efforts.”
Professor June Teufel Dreyer, University of Miami

“This is the book on the issue of China and soft power that scholars in the field
have been waiting for – and one specialists in other areas can benefit from greatly
as well. Particularly appealing is how truly global and robustly interdisciplinary
it is. The editors did a great job of lining up contributors from four continents
and many fields and subfields of the humanities and social sciences, and then
shaping the chapters into a nicely coherent set of works that speak to rather than
past one another.”
Professor Jeffrey Wasserstrom, co-author of China in the
21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know
SOFT POWER
WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
China’s Campaign for Hearts
and Minds

Edited by Kingsley Edney,

Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu
First published 2020
by Routledge
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© 2020 selection and editorial matter, Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen
and Ying Zhu; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu to be
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For Andy, whose wit, wisdom, and gentle caring
I took for granted until it was too late.
—YZ
For XYB.
—SR
For Otis.
—KE
CONTENTS

List of tables and figures ix

List of contributors xi
Preface xvii
Foreword xix
Joseph Nye

Introduction 1
Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

PART 1
Debating China’s soft power strategy 23

1 Projection of China’s soft power in the new century:

reconstruction of the traditional Chinese world order 25
Suisheng Zhao

2 The end of China’s rise: consequences for PRC

debates on soft power 45
Daniel C. Lynch

3 Ironies of soft power projection: the United States and

China in the age of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping 63
Stanley Rosen
viii Contents

4 Vessels of soft power going out to sea: Chinese diasporic

media and the politics of allegiance 81
Wanning Sun

5 The battle of images: cultural diplomacy and Sino–Hollywood

negotiation 100
Ying Zhu

6 Branding as soft power: brand culture, nation branding and

the 2008 Beijing Olympics 117
Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

7 A decade of wielding soft power through Confucius

Institutes: some interim results 133
Falk Hartig

PART 2
China’s global soft power under Xi Jinping 149

8 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 151

Zhan Zhang

9 The evolution of Chinese soft power in the Americas 171

R. Evan Ellis

10 The Sino–African relationship: an intense and long

embrace 188
Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

11 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 207

Gilbert Rozman

12 China’s soft power over Taiwan 223

Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

13 Familiarity breeds contempt: China’s growing “soft

power deficit” in Hong Kong 241
David Zweig

14 How East Asians view a rising China 262

Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

Index 285
TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables
8.1 Comparison of the soft power concept 154
13.1 Students’ views on individual rights and freedom in the
Mainland (%), 2009 246
13.2 Strength of identity as a citizen of the People’s Republic
of China, 2007–2015 248
14.1 Selected country correlations of favorable perception of China
and the United States 272
14.2 Preferred models for future development in East Asian
societies 276
14.3 Preferences over the Chinese versus the US models in
East Asian societies 279

Figures
8.1 European favorability toward China, 2006–2016 152
12.1 People’s views on the speed of cross-strait exchanges 230
13.1 Hong Kongers’ satisfaction with Beijing’s rule of the mainland,
1993–2014 249
13.2 Level of satisfaction with PRC government’s rule of Hong Kong,
1993–2013 249
13.3 Distrust in the HKSAR government and Beijing central
government (%) 250
14.1 Which country has the most inf luence in Asia now? 267
14.2 Perception of Chinese and US inf luence on the region 269
14.3 Perception of Chinese and US inf luence on their own country 270
x Tables and figures

14.4 Positive perception about the impact of China on the region 271
14.5 Perceived democratic distance and favorable perception of
Chinese and US inf luence 274
14.6 Support for economic openness and favorable perception of
Chinese and US inf luence 275
CONTRIBUTORS

Janet Borgerson is Senior Wicklander Fellow, Institute for Business and Pro-
fessional Ethics, DePaul University. She works at the intersections of philoso-
phy, business and culture. She earned a B.A. (Philosophy) from University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, and M.A. and Ph.D. (Philosophy) from University of
Wisconsin, Madison, completing postdoctoral work at Brown University. Her
research has appeared in a broad range of journals, such as European Journal of
Marketing, Philosophy Today and Sociological Review, and she is co-author of From
Chinese Brand Culture to Global Brands: Insights from Aesthetics, Fashion and History
(2013). She has served as Malmsten Visiting Professor at Gothenburg University,
Sweden, Research Fellow at University of Auckland, New Zealand, and Visit-
ing Professor at Walailak University, Thailand, and at the Shanghai Institute of
Foreign Trade.

Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Political Sci-

ence at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan
University. He specializes in politics of Greater China, East Asian political econ-
omy and democratization. He has been the Coordinator of Asian Barometer
Survey, a regional network of surveys on democracy, governance and develop-
ment covering more than 17 Asian countries. Among his recent English publi-
cations are How East Asians View Democracy (2008), Citizens, Elections and Parties
in East Asia (2008), Dynamics of Local Governance in China During the Reform Era
(2010) and Democracy in East Asia: A New Century (2013).

Kingsley Edney is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations of China at

the University of Leeds. His research examines the international implications of
China’s contemporary ideology and propaganda. He is the author of The Glo-
balization of Chinese Propaganda: International Power and Domestic Political Cohesion
xii Contributors

(2014) and co-author of Environmental Pollution and the Media: Political Discourses of
Risk and Responsibility in Australia, China and Japan (2017). His work has also been
published in Pacific Review, Journal of Contemporary China and Australian Journal of
International Affairs.

R. Evan Ellis is a Research Professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army
War College Strategic Studies Institute with a focus on the region’s relationships
with China and other non–Western Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational
organized crime and populism in the region. Dr. Ellis has published over 250
works, including China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (2009), The
Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America (2013), China on the
Ground in Latin America (2014) and Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America
and the Caribbean (2018).

Antonio Fiori is Associate Professor of History and Institutions of Asia at the

University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor at Korea University in Seoul. He
has been a visiting scholar at the United International College (Zhuhai, PRC),
the East-West Center (Honolulu, USA), and Kyujanggak Center for Korean
Studies (Seoul National University, Korea). He has published widely in the fields
of inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s domestic and international affairs and
China’s foreign policy. His latest co-edited book, titled The Korean Paradox:
Domestic Political Divide and Foreign Policy in South Korea, was published by Rout-
ledge in June 2019.

Falk Hartig was until recently a postdoctoral researcher at Goethe University in

Frankfurt. He is the author of Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Rise of the Confucius
Institute (2016) and has published articles in Politics, International Studies Review,
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Journal of Communication Management and the
Asian Studies Review, among others. His research focuses on international politi-
cal communication and China’s communicative engagement with the world.

Min-hua Huang is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Director

of the Fu Hu Center for East Asia Democratization Studies, College of Social
Science, National Taiwan University. Before joining the National Taiwan Uni-
versity, Professor Huang worked at Shanghai Jiaotong University, Texas A&M
University and National Chengchi University. He was also a visiting fellow at
the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution (2014–2015).
His recent publications include “The Sway of Geopolitics, Economic Interde-
pendence and Cultural Identity,” Journal of Contemporary China (2015) and “The
Internet, Social Capital, and Civic Engagement in Asia,” Social Indicators Research
(2017).

Dalton Lin is Assistant Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs,
Georgia Institute of Technology, and Executive Editor of the website, Taiwan
 Contributors xiii

Security Research (http://taiwansecurity.org). Before joining Georgia Tech, he

was a postdoctoral research fellow at Princeton University with the Princeton-
Harvard China and the World Program. His current research interests center
around explaining contemporary China’s behavior in the international system
and regional countries’ responses to it. His previous work on Taiwan has been
published in Survival, the Diplomat and other journals.

Jie Lu is Professor of Political Science at Renmin University of China in Beijing.

Previously he taught at American University in Washington, DC. He was also
a Visiting Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute in Singapore. His research
has focused on local governance, institutional change, public opinion and politi-
cal participation in Greater China and East Asia. His writing includes “Revisit-
ing the Eastonian Framework on Political Support: Assessing Different Measures
of Regime Support in Mainland China,” Comparative Politics (2019); “Revisiting
Political Wariness in China’s Public Opinion Surveys: Experimental Evidence
on Responses to Politically Sensitive Questions” with Xuchuan Lei, Journal of
Contemporary China (2017); and a book, Varieties of Governance in China: Migration
and Institutional Change in Chinese Villages (2014).

Daniel C. Lynch is Professor of Asian and International Studies at the City Uni-
versity of Hong Kong and a former Associate Professor of International Relations
at the University of Southern California. He is the author of three books published
by Stanford University Press, including China’s Futures: PRC Elites Debate Econom-
ics, Politics, and Soft Power (2015). Lynch is also the author of numerous journal
articles, including “Is China’s Rise Now Stalling?” The Pacific Review (2019).

Stanley Rosen is Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern

California, specializing in Chinese politics and society. The author or editor
of eight books and many articles, his most recent books include Chinese Politics:
State, Society and the Market (2010) (co-edited with Peter Hays Gries) and Art,
Politics and Commerce in Chinese Cinema (2010) (co-edited with Ying Zhu). He
is the co-editor of Chinese Education and Society, a frequent guest editor of other
translation journals and an associate editor of Global Media and China. Professor
Rosen has escorted 13 delegations to China for the National Committee on US–
China Relations and has consulted for the World Bank, the Ford Foundation,
the United States Information Agency, the Los Angeles Public Defenders Office
and a number of private corporations, law firms and US government agencies.

Gilbert Rozman is Editor-in-Chief of The Asan Forum, an online journal on

international relations in the Indo-Pacific region, and the Emeritus Musgrave
Professor of Sociology at Princeton University. Rozman is a Northeast Asianist,
who does research on national identities and bilateral ties in China, Japan, Russia
and South Korea. He also edits an annual volume on security, national identity,
economic regionalism and North Korea for the Korea Economic Institute.
xiv Contributors

Jonathan Schroeder is the William A. Kern Professor in the School of Commu-

nication at Rochester Institute of Technology in New York. His Ph.D. is from
the University of California, Berkeley. He has published widely on branding,
communication, consumer research and identity. He has held visiting appoint-
ments at London School of Economics; Wesleyan University; Göteborg Uni-
versity; University of Auckland; Bocconi University, Milan; Indian School of
Business, Hyderabad; Stockholm University; and Walailak University, Thailand.
He is co-author of From Chinese Brand Culture to Global Brands: Insights from Aes-
thetics, Fashion and History (2013).

Wanning Sun is Professor of Media and Communication Studies at the Univer-

sity of Technology Sydney (UTS), Australia. She is best known for her research
in a number of areas, including Chinese media and cultural studies, rural-to-
urban migration and social change in contemporary China, soft power, pub-
lic diplomacy and diasporic Chinese media. Wanning is the author of a major
report “Chinese-Language Media in Australia: Developments, Challenges and
Opportunities” (2016). She is currently leading an Australian Research Coun-
cil Discovery Project “Chinese-Language Digital/Social Media in Australia:
Rethinking Soft Power” (2018–2020). Wanning is the editor of two Routledge
volumes on media, communication and Chinese diaspora (2006, 2016).

Zhiyan Wu is Assistant Professor at the School of Management, Shanghai Inter-

national Business and Economics University. She has a B.A. in English from
Beijing Foreign Studies University, an M.Sc. in International Management and
a Ph.D. in Management from University of Exeter, UK. She has published in
Advances in Consumer Research, Journal of Brand Management and Marketing Theory.
She is co-author of From Chinese Brand Culture to Global Brands: Insights from Aes-
thetics, Fashion and History (2013).

Zhan Zhang is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow of China Media Observatory

(CMO), Institute of Media and Journalism (IMeG) at Università della Svizzera
italiana (USI), Lugano, Switzerland. She is also the Program Coordinator of
Master of Media Management. She publishes in the field of media narrative
analysis, strategic communication, media diplomacy and international news, as
well as Chinese media studies. She is the co-founder and international direc-
tor since 2014 of Europe-China Dialogue: Media and Communication Studies
Summer School.

Suisheng Zhao is Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Coop-
eration at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. A
Campbell National Fellow at Hoover Institution of Stanford University, Associ-
ate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington Col-
lege in Maryland, Associate Professor of Government and East Asian Politics
at Colby College in Maine and Visiting Assistant Professor at the Graduate
 Contributors xv

School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at University of

California–San Diego, he is the founder and editor of the Journal of Contemporary
China and the author and editor of more than a dozen books and several dozen
articles on Chinese nationalism, Chinese politics/political economy, Chinese
foreign policy, US–China relations, Cross-Taiwan Strait relations and East Asian
regional issues.

Ying Zhu is Professor of Cinema Studies at the City University of New York
and Director of the Center for Film and Moving Image Research at Hong Kong
Baptist University. She has published eight books, including Two Billion Eyes:
The Story of China Central Television (2013), Television in Post-Reform China: Serial
Drama, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market (2008), and Chinese
Cinema during the Era of Reform: The Ingenuity of the System (2003). Zhu is a recipi-
ent of a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (2006), an Ameri-
can Council of Learned Societies Fellowship (2008) and a Fulbright (China)
Senior Research Fellowship (2017).

David Zweig is Professor Emeritus, Hong Kong University of Science and Tech-
nology. He is also Director of Transnational China Consulting Limited, Vice-
President of the Center on China’s Globalization (Beijing) and CEO of an NGO
called China–California Heart Watch. He lived in the Mainland for four years
(1974–1976, 1980–1981, 1986 and 1991–1992) and in Hong Kong since 1996.
He was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard and has a Ph.D. from University of
Michigan. He is the author or editor of 10 books, including Internationalizing
China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (2002) and Sino–U.S. Energy Tri-
angles: Resource Diplomacy under Hegemony (2015).
PREFACE

This has truly been a long-term effort involving multiple editors and a large
number of authors all working together in order to produce a single, cohesive
volume. It was spring 2014 when Ying first brainstormed with Stan about a pos-
sible project on soft power, be it a special journal issue, a co-authored book or
an edited book volume. In an email to Stan dated April 16, 2014, Ying wrote,
“I’m open to an edited volume so long as it does not take years.” Sure enough,
the effort has taken more than five years to come to fruition. Along the way we
collected expert contributors who brought new ideas. The most valuable asset
we “collected” was Kingsley, who came aboard in the second half of 2015, a
year into Ying and Stan’s on-again, off-again attempt to jump-start the project.
A meeting in Beijing between Ying and Kingsley in summer 2016 solidified the
joint editorship. Kingsley helped to kick the project into higher gear.
Life interfered, particularly for Ying, who lost her husband and life partner
to illness in October 2016. As Ying mourned her personal loss, the project per-
sisted, thanks to Stan and Kingsley who harnessed new contributors as several
others moved on, partly as the result of the glacial speed at which the project
had been traveling. We are particularly grateful to those contributors who were
present at the origin, and kept the faith, keeping whatever private misgivings
they might have had to themselves. Our publisher also remained enthusiastic,
and we would particularly like to thank Stephanie Rogers at Routledge for her
help and encouragement along the way. At times we questioned the continuing
relevance of the soft power concept in this rapidly evolving world. As China and
the United States wrestle for power and inf luence around the globe it is reassur-
ing to see Joseph Nye, in his foreword to our book, arguing that soft power, and
the ability to shape and disseminate the popular narratives that generate it, are
more important than ever. When he was originally asked to contribute a fore-
word in November 2014, Joseph had the foresight to agree only on the promise
xviii Preface

from Ying that we would deliver a timely book on China and soft power. Despite
the passage of time and the changes in international politics we have witnessed
over the last five years, we hope the book lives up to our expectation of contrib-
uting something useful to the ongoing scholarly dialogue concerning China’s
trajectory and inf luence.
Ying, Stan and Kingsley
FOREWORD
Joseph Nye

Three decades ago, there was a widespread belief that America was in decline,
but I disagreed with that analysis. After I assessed American military and eco-
nomic power resources, I realized that something was still missing. Power is the
ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants and that can be accom-
plished by attraction as well as coercion or payment. I introduced the concept of
soft power to suggest that a nation’s power does not rely solely on the hard power
of economic strength and military force, but also attraction—“the universalism
of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and insti-
tutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power
[and that] these soft sources of power are becoming more important in world
politics today” ( Nye, 1990, p. 33).
Five years ago I again took issue with what had become a widespread view
that the American century was over ( Nye, 2015). Most recently, the cover and
six articles in the July/August 2019 issue of the inf luential journal Foreign Affairs
went even further, asking “What Happened to the American Century?”, with
most of the contributors suggesting, as Fareed Zakaria put it, that the death
of “American hegemony” was largely self-inf licted, although many noted, as
I had in 2015, that the rise of China posed a set of new problems that had not
been faced in American competition with the former Soviet Union (Zakaria,
2019). America’s role in the world had changed, but as much because of the
rise of nativist populism at home as the rise of China abroad. I would argue, in
the current competition between China and America, that public diplomacy in
the form of soft power is more important than ever. In today’s world the most
compelling story transmitted and accelerated via cyberspace triumphs as the abil-
ity to disseminate the story and shape people’s perceptions becomes ever more
crucial. But soft power need not be a zero-sum game. If the United States and
xx Foreword

China wish to avoid conf lict, a rise of Chinese soft power in the United States
and American soft power in China is a joint gain. Unfortunately, that is not the
current policy direction. The US government has retreated from investing in
public diplomacy based on credibility and opted instead for military and eco-
nomic coercion. Indeed, President Trump’s budget director and chief of staff
Mick Mulvaney once said that he wanted a hard power budget, not a soft power
budget. Polls show that American attractiveness and soft power have declined
considerably since 2017.
I was interested in 2007 when President Hu Jintao told the 17th Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party that China needed to invest more in soft
power. That is a smart strategy. As a country’s hard economic and military
power grow, it may frighten its neighbors but can soften its image by attrac-
tion. China’s leaders remain clearly focused on presenting a more “favorable”
picture of their country to the outside world. At his first national meeting
on propaganda and ideology in August 2013, newly inaugurated president
Xi Jinping instructed China’s propaganda workers to find new ways to “tell
China’s story well, and properly disseminate China’s voice.” In November
2014 at a foreign affairs work conference, Xi emphasized that China “must
raise our country’s soft power, telling China’s story well.” In pursuit of this
objective, China has committed significant material resources into dissemi-
nating its views globally via the expanded presence of state-run media. The
international arm of China’s state-owned broadcaster, China Global Televi-
sion Network, now broadcasts in at least 140 countries with 70 bureaus, while
state-owned China Radio International broadcasts in 65 languages from more
than 70 stations worldwide. China Watch, an English-language supplement
offered with monetary incentives by China’s state-run newspaper China Daily,
is currently inserted into about 30 daily newspapers around the world, includ-
ing The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The Daily Telegraph. The
unilateral retreat of America’s soft power under President Donald Trump has
opened the door for China to step in and advocate a different set of rules,
but compromise on an agreed rules-based international order can help both
countries to deal with transnational challenges such as financial stability, cli-
mate change and pandemics. Both countries need to learn that soft power can
help them learn the importance of power with as well as over others. Which
version of soft power prevails will determine the world we live in. Instead of
images of a new Cold War, the United States and China should see their rela-
tionship as a cooperative rivalry, with as much emphasis on the cooperation
as on the competition.
While the concept of soft power has been written into official doctrine
for more than a decade, the “new era” in China calls for a reappraisal of the
soft power framework within the China context as we observe a new phase
in China’s soft power development, which this book attempts to do. As the
only significant challenger to US primacy, China now represents the most
 Foreword xxi

important international test case for the practice of soft power. The volume
presented here is a timely addition to our understanding of soft power in theory
and practice.

References
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York:
Basic Books.
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2015. Is the American Century Over? Cambridge and Malden, MA:
Polity Press.
Zakaria, Fareed. 2019. “The Self-Destruction of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/
August, pp. 10–16.
INTRODUCTION
Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

China’s rising power is reshaping the global economic and political landscape.
This growth in power and status provides China with the opportunity to
become more actively involved in various forms of international cooperation
but also carries with it a serious risk of rising tension and even full-blown con-
f lict between China and other countries. China’s policy makers and strategists
are acutely aware of the need to encourage positive perceptions of their country
while minimizing negative responses to its growing military power and eco-
nomic inf luence. The goal of enhancing China’s “soft power” has been at the
heart of China’s efforts to shape international perceptions so that the world is
more welcoming and less fearful of China.
Under Xi Jinping China has entered what the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) calls a “new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Xi is consoli-
dating his personal power within the country while at the same time indicat-
ing that China will take on a more assertive role in shaping the international
order. Some of the country’s bilateral relationships have gone through periods
of volatility and escalating tensions as China has become more closed at home
and assertive abroad. Xi’s China nonetheless still allocates significant resources
to projects designed to enhance its attractiveness to foreign audiences. While
the concept of soft power has been written into official doctrine for more than a
decade, now that China is moving into this so-called new era there is a need to
reexamine China’s global “soft power” campaign for hearts and minds. What is
the current state of Chinese soft power strategy and practice under the leadership
of Xi Jinping? While China’s attempt to generate soft power has attracted inter-
national scholarly attention (e.g. Callahan, 2015; Edney, 2012; Rosen, 2012; Nye
and Wang, 2009; Cho and Jeong, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2006), and book-length
assessments of Chinese power now routinely include sections relating to China’s
soft power (e.g. Chung, 2015; Shambaugh,2013; Lampton, 2008), the rise of Xi
Jinping provides an opportunity to observe a new phase in China’s soft power
2 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

development. Our book makes the attempt in assessing the state of China’s “soft
power” under Xi.
Unlike hard power, which manifests through the use of coercion or incentives
to generate inf luence, soft power involves a country attracting and co-opting
others to admire and share its core interests. Soft power draws on resources such
as culture, values and exemplary foreign policy behavior to create an interna-
tional environment where others will be more inclined to cooperate and less
likely to oppose the state’s objectives ( Nye, 2004). The effectiveness of soft power
resources depends on context; just as the effectiveness of military force cannot
be accurately assessed without reference to the physical landscape in which that
force will be applied, soft power cannot be understood without reference to the
social context in which it operates (Nye, 2004, p. 12). When the concept of soft
power first emerged in the 1990s it was primarily used to analyze the foreign
relations of the United States, but since then it has been applied to a number
of other countries, including Japan (Otmazgin, 2008; Watanabe and McCon-
nell, 2008), India ( Wagner, 2010), Canada ( Potter, 2009), and, of course, China.
China in particular appears to be extending its global inf luence even as its rivalry
with the United States intensifies, presenting us with a crucial opportunity to
explore the concept of soft power in greater depth.

The Chinese articulation of soft power

China’s leaders have taken the idea of soft power very seriously—perhaps more
so than the leaders of any other major state—and soft power has been widely
debated by Chinese foreign policy analysts, media and communications experts,
and commentators in a number of other fields ( Li, 2009). Although the soft power
concept was introduced into China as early as 1992 with the Chinese translation of
Nye’s (1990) book Bound to Lead, and the first Chinese academic article on soft
power appeared in 1993 ( Wang, 1993), as Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu
note in their analysis of the China Academic Journals Database, the phrase only
began to take off after 2001 ( Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 426), the year the Chinese
media launched a “going global” project partly as a response to Western media
making inroads in China, and in part to allay anxieties over the “threat” from
China’s rise (Zhao, 2009, p. 248).1 More specifically, analyzing the same data-
base, Mingjiang Li has noted the increasing usage of the term from 1994, when
the database begins, to 2007. From 1994–2000, the term “soft power” appeared
in the titles of only 11 journal and periodical articles, increasing in the 2001–
2004 period to 58, followed by a large increase to 416 articles from 2005–2007
( Li, 2009, p. 24). Following the 17th Party Congress in 2007, where General
Secretary Hu Jintao emphasized the increasing importance of the promotion
of Chinese culture, both at home and abroad, the attention to soft power in the
Chinese media increased further (Hu, 2007), with a number of Chinese journal
articles specifically citing the importance of Hu’s speech as a spur to promot-
ing Chinese soft power abroad (Ni, 2008).2 The number of Chinese articles in
 Introduction 3

social science journals that reference soft power in their title jumped markedly
to 826 in 2008 and continued to rise steadily in subsequent years, reaching a
peak of 1,134 articles in 2012 before declining to fewer than 500 articles in 2018.
This did not indicate that soft power was becoming less important to Chinese
leaders, however, but rather that the concept had been incorporated into and
become an important component of Xi Jinping’s new China Dream discourse
(Callahan, 2015). Indeed, beginning with the inaugural issue of June 2016, there
is a bimonthly Chinese journal devoted to research on soft power edited by the
Institute of Marxism at Wuhan University and managed by the Ministry of
Education (Wenhua ruan shili yanjiu [Studies in cultural soft power]). Many Chinese
scholars from a range of academic disciplines have also published books on soft
power (e.g. Guo, 2014; Zhang, 2011; Li, 2010; Shu, 2010; Meng, 2009; Yi, 2009;
Han, 2008). As noted by the former CCP propaganda chief Li Changchun, “In
the modern age, whichever nation’s communication methods are most advanced,
whichever nation’s communication capacity is strongest . . . has the most power
to inf luence the world” (Farah and Mosher, 2010, p. 7).
Not surprisingly, given this recognition, the Chinese leadership has not been
satisfied with simply discussing the concept in abstract terms, but has invested
significant financial resources in an attempt to enhance China’s global soft
power. China has spent hundreds of billions of US dollars to expand the interna-
tional reach of its media outlets, organize major events such as the 2008 Olympic
Games and 2010 Shanghai Expo, launch hundreds of Confucius Institutes to
teach Chinese language and culture, host summits attended by world leaders
and sponsor forums on regional security and prosperity. In 2009 the Hong Kong
newspaper South China Morning Post reported that China was planning to allo-
cate 45 billion yuan to state media outlets such as CCTV-International, Xinhua
News Agency, China Daily, and China Radio International to improve their
international news coverage and global presence ( Wu and Chen, 2009). Fueled
by the injection of these funds, the CCP’s theoretical journal, Seeking Truth,
launched an English edition in July 2009 to “make the core values of the party
more understandable to Western societies, especially in theoretical and academic
circles there” (Shanghaiist, 2009). In September 2009, CCTV-International
launched a Russian-service channel that targeted 300 million viewers across the
former Soviet Union. “There is continuous bias and misunderstanding against
China in the rest of the world,” Zhang Changming, the then vice president
of CCTV complained as he unveiled the Russian channel, citing as evidence
“biased and untrue reporting about weather and food quality problems” leading
up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Zhu, 2012, p. 174). “One of the major goals
of the expansion of international channels is to present China objectively to the
world,” said Zhang, as quoted in Zhu (2012, p. 174). As Zhu discusses in her
book (2012), Chinese state media, particularly CCTV’s international branches,
are tasked with projecting a positive image of China to the world. More recently,
David Shambaugh (2015, p. 100) has claimed that China’s annual budget for
“external propaganda” is approximately $10 billion. The Chinese state has also
4 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

launched an effort for the country’s film and media industry to “tell China’s
stories.”
Promoting China’s soft power is a desire shared not only by foreign policy
strategists and nationalist citizens. Major financial interests are also at stake,
particularly for high-profile Chinese exporters who benefit from positive asso-
ciations with “brand China” and, conversely, suffer in countries where China’s
reputation is poor. Chinese state, corporate, elite and popular interests have con-
verged on the common urge to defend and explain China, and as the party line
and the bottom line converge to form a united front, the big corporations ben-
efit from state financial and logistical support for their global expansion. Major
corporations can emerge as effective tools for nation branding to generate soft
power. Just as Sony and Matsushita (Panasonic) have been among the representa-
tive faces of Japan, can Alibaba, Baidu or Tencent be the new face of China? The
high-tech summit in Seattle in September 2015 was in part an attempt to provide
high visibility for Chinese brands, interacting as equals with their American
counterparts. Huawei in particular has been at the forefront of the struggle over
brand China. The US government has labeled the communication technology
company a security threat due to its links to the Chinese state and has pressured
the other members of the Five Eyes intelligence network to prevent it from par-
ticipating in the building of new 5G communication infrastructure, with mixed
results.
In China’s quest for soft power the stakes are high and the potential conse-
quences are global. Reducing international fear and mistrust helps China achieve
goals in the short term by dampening resistance to its foreign policies and is vital
for smoothing China’s long-term path to a peaceful rise and avoiding becoming
trapped in security dilemmas with other states. Soft power also plays an impor-
tant role in China’s domestic politics by improving the internal legitimacy of the
CCP and confidence in China’s political system amongst its population through
increasing China’s international status. Appealing to the national pride of Chi-
nese citizens by demonstrating that foreigners admire and are attracted to China
is one of the main ways, alongside competent governance and fear of instabil-
ity, that the CCP attempts to build public support for its rule. Since Xi came to
power in late 2012 the domestic political environment has become significantly
more closed, with Xi now installed as indisputable leader for the foreseeable
future. Chinese foreign policy has become noticeably more assertive, particu-
larly in relation to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, but also in
the economic realm, where China has embarked on an ambitious campaign to
expand multilateral and bilateral investment through the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. Tensions with the United
States have risen, resulting in clashes over trade and maritime security.

The Chinese practice of (soft) power

This slide toward a more strongman personality and ideologically strict style of
authoritarianism at home and assertive foreign policy abroad, combined with
 Introduction 5

the ratcheting up of tensions with the United States, might well be viewed as an
indication that China is moving away from its previous soft power objectives, or
perhaps has even failed in its soft power mission. China appears no closer to solv-
ing the fundamental problem of how to cultivate an association with the kinds
of political values that resonate positively beyond its borders and overcome the
deep-seated suspicions of authoritarian states held by people in liberal democra-
cies. Even in the developing world it remains uncertain whether China’s political
values will be able to attract local partners in a way that transcends political expe-
diency or economic self-interest and generates a common bond that runs deeper
than platitudes about “win-win cooperation” (Suzuki, 2010). China ranked last
on a 30-country index of soft power released in July 2015 by a British political
consultancy and public relations agency.3 The index assessed countries on six
measures of reputation and inf luence—government, culture, education, global
engagement, enterprise and digital—after polling more than 7,000 people in 20
countries covering each region of the world. China ranked ninth on the culture
metric yet was held back in its overall ranking by a political system that curbs free
press and information access.4 The 2018 edition of the index had China three
places higher but, as Rosen argues in Chapter 3, the study’s methodology makes
it impossible for China to score highly due to the inbuilt bias against states that
are not liberal democracies.
Yet the reality is more complex than a narrow focus on China’s lack of appeal-
ing political values might imply. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 under-
mined confidence in the Western-led economic order, and illiberal political
movements have made significant gains in democracies in recent years. Although
mass public support for democracy still appears high in many countries, public
attitudes to the other pillar of Western international order—neoliberalism—
are more ambivalent (Allan, Vucetic and Hopf, 2018) and younger people in
democratic states appear to be increasingly disillusioned with liberal democratic
institutions (Foa and Mounk, 2017). The internal divisions within the Western
world, exemplified in 2016 by Britain’s vote to leave the European Union as well
as the election of Donald Trump in the United States, have been accompanied by
a resurgence of strongman politics and illiberal populism in places such as Tur-
key, the Philippines, Brazil, Poland and Hungary. These developments may not in
themselves make China appear more attractive, but they at least serve to reduce
the coherence and persistence of the liberal critique of China’s political system.
As the West appears divided and uncertain, China’s leaders have looked to
shore up belief in their own policies and political system at home. Xi Jinping
has spoken of “four confidences”—in China’s path (daolu), theory (lilun), system
(zhidu) and culture (wenhua)—that are fundamental to the “great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation” ( Xinhua, 2018). The CCP also continues to promote its
own concept of “socialist core values” to its citizens. Despite what seems to be a
persistent soft power weakness in the realm of values, China’s leaders appear to
have become less accommodating toward Western critics and more outspoken
in articulating their own political vision. Yet this push for greater belief in Chi-
na’s political path has not meant that the CCP is comfortable ignoring foreign
6 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

criticism, particularly when it touches on so-called core interests, such as Chi-

na’s territorial claims. Where does soft power fit in to China’s foreign policy
now that its ability to employ coercion or inducements to achieve its objectives is
greater than it has ever been? Strength and self-confidence have the potential to
generate attraction, but is China’s ability to persuade and attract others growing
alongside its material capabilities, or does the ease with which it can draw on
hard power resources undermine the effectiveness of its soft power? As the CCP
gains access to greater material resources, then new tools for coercion or induce-
ment also become available to those who aim to reshape China’s global image.
This can lead to the temptation to employ these harder options as an alternative
to soft power approaches, either to shut down unwanted public discourse or to
buy inf luence in foreign debates about China. This use of hard methods to shape
international discourse on China has been well documented in recent studies
of China’s “sharp power” or international inf luence operations ( Brady, 2017;
National Endowment for Democracy, 2017). China’s growing ability to use hard
power in the form of coercion or inducements to achieve its objectives has the
potential to undermine its soft power by reinforcing existing fears of those who
see China as a threat, even when its use of hard power is intended to shape for-
eign perceptions of China. However, one argument that comes out in some of
the articles in the soft power journal from Wuhan, as Daniel Lynch points out
in Chapter 2, is that the rise of an economically strong and politically f lourish-
ing China will stimulate a new trend in world development “toward a glorious
future of great universal harmony,” thereby providing a new model that will
replace the outdated pattern established by the Western powers who have created
the soft power concept simply to further their own agenda (Zhan, 2016, p. 51).
Close to home the CCP has a particularly wide range of tools for coercion or
inducement at its disposal. In Hong Kong, as David Zweig argues in Chapter 13,
the Party enjoys a significant structural soft power advantage from its network
of United Front organizations embedded in the territory. Yet Zweig claims that
increasing soft power is not necessarily an important goal for the CCP in Hong
Kong. Despite the clear risks of undermining the Mainland’s image in the eyes of
Hong Kong residents and further fueling localist politics, the CCP now appears
willing to employ coercive tactics to shut down the expression of undesirable
political ideas in cases where persuasion or inducements have failed. In the wider
world, Chinese responses to perceived insults that paint the country in a negative
light or to statements that contradict certain political truths have also employed
coercive tactics. In Chapter 3 Stanley Rosen notes that when a thin-skinned lack
of self-confidence is exposed by what is perceived to be insulting speech or the
behavior of foreigners, then China is only too willing to threaten the use of boy-
cotts and other coercive tools. While these coercive responses might achieve a
short-term goal, this can come at the cost of downgrading the bilateral relation-
ship. China’s hardline diplomatic performance in Norway, Sweden, Australia
and South Korea certainly defies the normative practice of soft power.
In the subtitle of Nye’s (2004) book on soft power he refers to it as “the means
to success in world politics.” Nye’s concept has been helpful in highlighting the
 Introduction 7

importance of the element of attraction for assessments of power in interna-

tional politics, but it is also unwise to consider a country’s soft power goals in
isolation from its broader power context. To claim that China’s leaders take the
development of soft power seriously is not to argue that presenting a pleasing
and attractive face to the outside world is their sole or even primary consider-
ation when making policy decisions. While increasing soft power has important
long-term strategic benefits, at times these may take a back seat to other more
immediate considerations such as national sovereignty and political and social
stability. Even when public opinion is taken into account when making deci-
sions about foreign policy the target audience often seems to be the domestic
population or the Chinese diaspora. China’s leaders desire inf luence over foreign
audiences, but soft power is not the only way to achieve this. The cultivation of
soft power is a long-term prospect, and we can expect China to be willing to
sacrifice some degree of attractiveness in order to enhance its immediate inf lu-
ence over crucial policy outcomes.
The relationship between material incentives and soft power also needs to
be examined more closely. China’s ambitious approach to international invest-
ment has significant potential to add to its attractiveness around the world, but
here, too, the picture is mixed. With recent commitments of $50 billion for
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, $41 billion for the New Develop-
ment Bank, $40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt and $25 billion for the
Maritime Silk Road, the total bill for China’s charm offensive on the economics
front is substantial.5 At times, China’s economic engagement with developing
regions such as Africa has generated tensions and drawn criticism from local
actors who fear a repeat of past exploitative colonial practices or are concerned
about an increase in corruption or unemployment. The Pew Research Center’s
2013 Global Attitudes Project survey showed that China struggled to gener-
ate soft power even in Africa and Latin America, where it has made substantial
investments in local economies (Shambaugh, 2015, p. 107); however, the spring
2018 Pew survey, which included Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa among its
25 countries canvassed, showed favorable ratings for China as high as 67% in
Kenya (17% unfavorable), 61% in Nigeria (17% unfavorable) and 49% in South
Africa (38% unfavorable) ( Pew, 2018). As Chinese investors have begun to buy
up property in cities such as New York and London and purchase iconic Western
brands, it has become clear that this mix of admiration and fear generated by
China’s newfound economic inf luence is a phenomenon that affects not only
poorer countries but the developed world as well. When investment occurs in
areas directly related to China’s international image, such as media companies,
this can also stoke fears. In Chapter 5, for example, Ying Zhu notes the back-
lash in the United States to the acquisition of US film assets by Chinese media
companies, most notably Dalian Wanda. Then there is also the question of the
sustainability of China’s economic growth model—the hotly contested “Beijing
Consensus,” which has been compared to the more familiar “Washington Con-
sensus”6—particularly with China’s stock market meltdown in the summer of
2015, the subsequent depreciation of the RMB and shrinking foreign currency
8 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

reserves, which affect China’s capacity to inject money into developing countries
and thus tarnishes China’s brand of economic miracle.
Things took yet another turn for China’s economy when Donald Trump
came to power. While Trump’s re-election campaign will drive his trade policy
with conf licting impulses, the trade war is slowing down China’s economic
growth. Back in May 2000, China was on course for membership in the World
Trade Organization (WTO), under which member countries are required to
extend preferential trading treatment to one another, or what the United States
calls permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). That required an act of Con-
gress. Business leaders stood nearly united in their support of the bill, arguing
that the vote would serve only to open China’s markets to US exports. They
were joined in that argument by George W. Bush who by then had locked up
his party’s presidential nomination. The bill passed the House by a vote of 237
to 197. The Senate approved it 83 to 15 in September. But there is now biparti-
san unhappiness about the way bilateral trade with China has turned out for the
United States. The opposition has come from all sides. Peter Navarro, a profes-
sor of economics and public policy at the University of California–Irvine at the
time and now the hawkish Trump China advisor, considered the passage of the
China PNTR the most destructive trade event in US history. Senator Bernie
Sanders once described PNTR as “not a good deal for American workers” and
led a bipartisan effort for China PNTR repeal in 2005. Sen. Sherrod Brown
(D-Ohio) predicted in 2016 with Trump clinching the Republican nomina-
tion that the fracture that began with the China vote could end up splitting the
GOP much like civil rights split Democrats in 1968. The legislation, as argued
by some, caused a series of economic and political earthquakes that helped usher
in Trump, the most anti-trade Republican candidate in modern history. Others
have made similar observations that suggested that PNTR with China “helped
create” Trump. In a hyperbolic Washington Post op-ed, written on March 21,
2016, Jim Tankersley asserted that the Republican establishment began losing its
party to Donald Trump on May 24, 2000, at 5:41 p.m., on the f loor of the House
of Representatives when three-quarters of House Republicans voted to extend
the status of PNTR to China. It is indeed the case that Trump built his insurgent
campaign in part on opposition to what he called a bad deal with China, which
helped him rally support from conservative voters. As Trump heads more deeply
into uncharted waters on his China trade policy, the effect on China’s growth
potential, an important component of its soft power and international inf luence,
remains uncertain.
While economic development and the subsequent wealth it generates can
produce its own attractive power that complements the potential of material
resources to shape behavior through the use of direct inducements, it can be diffi-
cult to disentangle the mechanisms of economic inducement from the ideational
attraction of soft power. Material resources do play an important role in the
development of soft power by providing the infrastructure for the transmission
of ideas and information to new audiences. China’s soft power can be enhanced
 Introduction 9

when credible actors such as media organizations or public figures are materi-
ally incentivized to reproduce the kind of narratives about China that the CCP
would like to promote and to suppress or downplay more critical perspectives.
In addition to the complex relationship between material resources and soft
power, we also observe an important, yet underexplored relationship between
the agents whose actions contribute to a nation’s soft power and the authorities
who aim to employ those actors in pursuit of a national soft power strategy. A
soft power version of the classic principal–agent problem ( Laffont and Marti-
mort, 2002), which involves a misalignment of interests between those who have
the authority to issue orders and those who have the responsibility to carry them
out, appears to be present even for authoritarian states such as China. In Chap-
ter 3 Rosen notes the sharp contrast between China’s approach to soft power, in
which the state plays a central and guiding role, and the US approach, in which
the state has tended to operate at a distance from the civil society actors that are
its most effective resource for the generation of soft power. Yet in Chapter 5
Ying Zhu notes that filmmakers can be unreliable partners for states wishing to
promote their desired images abroad. Hollywood studios have been a traditional
generator of soft power for the United States but their financial stake in the
Chinese market sometimes puts them at odds with some US lawmakers who
would like to see a more assertive expression of their political values on film.
Ideally, the CCP would like to make use of local actors to relay a positive nar-
rative of China as they will be more credible to their respective audiences than
the official voice of the Chinese state. In Chapter 4 Wanning Sun documents
this strategy of “borrowing a boat to go to sea” in the context of overseas Chi-
nese media organizations. Gaining inf luence over the diaspora communities in
Australia and New Zealand is certainly an interesting experiment in creating the
climate under which Chinese soft power can extend to the wider non-Chinese
public. Yet the effort can cause problems for the key players in places where there
is a significant ideological tension with China. In Chapter 12 Dalton Lin and
Yun-han Chu note that when individuals in Taiwan make positive statements
about China they are often labelled as “selling out” the island. This dynamic can
also be observed in Australia, where the CCP has attempted to shape public dis-
course on China by employing inducements in the form of money for academic
research and political donations to the major parties. This has led to a divisive
debate where those espousing a more positive view of China or warning against
overstating a “China threat” are labeled naïve or morally compromised by their
critics. In cases where defending China’s political system is already considered
ideologically suspect and there is an observable connection between the local
individual or organization speaking out in favor of China and a CCP-linked
counterpart on the Chinese Mainland, the CCP’s capacity and desire to provide
material inducements to shape its global image undermines the credibility of its
message.
At other times, officials or other agents may become overzealous in defending
China’s official position or even employ coercive tactics in ways that reinforce an
10 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

image of China as an authoritarian state that is intolerant of free speech. In 2014

Confucius Institute head Xu Lin oversaw the removal of pages from the brochure
of an academic conference in Portugal that her organization was sponsoring
because they contained references to a Taiwanese sponsor, producing accusations
of Chinese interference in academic freedom (Sudworth, 2014). More recently
a UK-based CCTV journalist was ejected from the 2018 Conservative Party
Conference and charged with assault after staging an angry intervention in a
panel on the effects of Chinese rule on freedoms in Hong Kong ( Weaver, 2018).
As Falk Hartig points out in his chapter on the Confucius Institutes, Xu initially
linked the Institutes to the development of Chinese soft power but later appeared
to downplay any connection between the organization and China’s international
power and inf luence. Yet despite this apparent sensitivity to how China’s cul-
tural or educational initiatives are perceived overseas, Xu’s actions in Portugal
indicate that the need to be seen to respond strongly to challenges to Chinese
sovereignty can at times override concerns about the reputational damage gener-
ated by such forceful interventions.
Finally, when analyzing China’s soft power it is important to consider the
factors that inf luence China’s attractiveness but have little or nothing to do with
Chinese policies or values. Global or even local events can shift the narratives
that are used to understand China’s actions for various audiences around the
world. The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 provided an opportunity for China
to be seen in a new light by those inclined to be receptive to its economic model
and, as Gilbert Rozman points out in Chapter 11, the emergence or decline of
particular perceptions of the Asian region in countries such as Japan and South
Korea have also shifted views of China held by their publics.

Book structure
This book assesses the current state of China’s soft power theory and practice
in a new period of Chinese assertiveness. As the contributions to this volume
demonstrate, Chinese soft power is complex, contradictory and diverse. China’s
experience appears to ref lect neither a smooth path to “peaceful development”
nor an inevitable drift toward conf lict with other states. China is large enough
and diverse enough to generate not only a powerful attractive pull but also a range
of negative responses, such as fear, anger or disdain. The first section of the
book takes a thematic approach to analyzing China’s soft power. Beginning with
an examination of the relationship between soft power and traditional Chinese
views of international order, academic debates over soft power within China, and
the soft power competition between China and the United States, the section
then closely examines four key areas where China’s “going out” policies have
aligned with its soft power strategy: news media, film, branding and education.
Suisheng Zhao, in “Projection of China’s Soft Power in the New Century:
Reconstruction of the Traditional Chinese World Order,” begins this section with
an exploration of the Chinese rediscovery and reconstruction of the traditional
 Introduction 11

Chinese world order in the 21st century. To calm fears of their neighbors, Chi-
nese leaders have claimed that China’s rise will be peaceful because its great
power aspirations are different from the imperialism and hegemony of the West-
ern powers. To bolster this argument China’s leaders and scholars have looked to
the traditional China-centered East Asian order, which they claim was character-
ized by a form of benevolent governance and benign hierarchy that was not only
unique but also more peaceful than its counterparts in other parts of the world.
Indeed, when scholars from the Peterson Institute for International Economics,
based in Washington, DC, visited China in late May 2019 during the “trade
war” with the United States, they were given a “50-minute non-stop lecture . . .
about this being a clash of civilizations” by a member of the Chinese Politburo,
who noted that the United States was a “Mediterranean culture,” based around
belligerence and internal division, thus explaining its “oppressive foreign policy”
(Magnier, 2019). In this context, although the concept of “harmonious world”
has received less emphasis under the current leadership, Xi Jinping has continued
to refer to China’s traditional order to project a peaceful image. However, Zhao’s
analysis shows that despite these attempts to present a harmonious world order
to China’s neighbors, Chinese leaders in fact perceive the world through a social
Darwinist lens and behave accordingly in order to maximize China’s power and
security and expand its inf luence and control within the Asian region. This gap
between the Chinese authorities’ professed ideals and the way they actually per-
ceive the world highlights the difficulty for China in identifying and promoting
political values that not only resonate internationally but also line up with the
behavior of the Chinese state at home and abroad.
In the second chapter, Daniel Lynch provides a detailed assessment of the
current state of academic debate over soft power in China. As China’s global
image has generally worsened over the last ten years, Lynch looks for evidence of
critical ref lection on the part of soft power scholars in China. Finding that they
appear increasingly willing to acknowledge the setbacks suffered by China in its
ongoing attempts to improve its soft power, Lynch nevertheless notes that Chi-
nese commentators tend to blame the West for these failures rather than ques-
tion China’s strategy or message. He identifies a resentful or hubristic optimism
toward soft power that seems to be based more on a sense of right or grievance
rather than evidence of likely success. Lynch links this optimism to Xi Jinping’s
campaign for greater self-confidence as well as confidence in China’s rising
material capabilities. However, he also notes that this confidence could end up
being misplaced and lead to greater frustrations if the economic growth stalls
or, alternatively, if China’s rising material wealth and propensity to employ its
material power in pursuit of its interests in fact undermines its soft power appeal.
Stanley Rosen, in “Ironies of Soft Power Projection: The United States and
China in the Age of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping,” highlights the gap between
the Chinese government’s massive investment in soft power and its poor results,
particularly in the United States. Rosen points out that the United States has
been relatively successful at cultivating soft power in China and throughout the
12 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

world despite a lack of government investment, the generally negative views of

US foreign policy, and the best efforts of the Chinese government to under-
mine American soft power. Rosen argues that US soft power has been successful
precisely because it is not linked to the American government, which makes it
easier for the Chinese public and audiences elsewhere to dissociate their negative
views of American foreign policy from their feelings of attraction toward Ameri-
can culture and society, whereas the Chinese promotion of soft power hardly
exists apart from the efforts of its government. Although favorability ratings for
the United States have declined in most of the world, in some cases drastically,
under the “America First” policies of President Donald Trump, there is as yet
no clear indication that China has benefited from this decline. In part this is
owing to an understanding that American culture and values are independent
from Trump’s initiatives, but also because soft power is not a zero-sum game
between China and the United States. Rather than China, the nations that now
score higher than the United States on soft power indices are Western European
countries, primarily Germany, France and Great Britain.
The news media is a key component of China’s strategy for turning its sizeable
economic resources into soft power. While most observers focus on the high-
profile f lagship publications and broadcast networks controlled by the Chinese
state, Wanning Sun’s chapter instead examines the often-overlooked yet cru-
cially important Chinese-language news outlets run by and for Chinese diaspora
communities around the world. The CCP aims to employ these news outlets as
part of its soft power strategy to reshape China’s international image. Through
a variety of links with these diaspora news outlets, ranging from content provi-
sion agreements to outright ownership, the Chinese authorities aim to use the
expertise, audience and reputation of these outlets for their own purposes. For
the CCP, gaining inf luence over the diaspora communities is an important pre-
cursor to extending its desired discourse about China to the wider non-Chinese
public, enhancing China’s image and attractiveness. Sun delves into the com-
plexities of these arrangements, pointing out that the agency of these diaspora
media entrepreneurs in negotiating the political economy of Chinese soft power
is often overlooked. At the same time, new media platforms such as WeChat have
altered the dynamics of soft power in diaspora communities by providing new
methods for the transnational transmission of discourse.
Film is another area where market forces and political values intersect. Ying
Zhu’s chapter, “The Battle of Images: Cultural Diplomacy and Sino–Hollywood
Negotiation,” examines how cinema has become a battlefield for competing polit-
ical and cultural values. At the same time, however, she also analyzes how com-
mercial interests complicate political and ideological posturing on both sides.
Zhu compares the context and terms of Hollywood’s Republican era triumph to
those of its repeat performance in the post-1995 Reform era to reveal historical
continuities and changes that do not appear in the standard historical accounts of
political and ideological contests, of international economic development and of
global expansion of media corporations, American and Chinese. She argues that
 Introduction 13

the history of Sino–Hollywood engagement is a case of political, cultural and

economic rivalry and co-optation. It is a grand negotiation between competing
cultural and economic values; developmental models, as well as nationalism and
exceptionalism; and a shifting global power dynamic playing out in the art and
artifice of filmmaking, distribution and exhibition.
“Branding as Soft Power: Brand Culture, Nation Branding, and the 2008 Bei-
jing Olympics,” co-authored by Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhi-
yan Wu, utilizes nation branding as a framework to explore the ways in which
brand culture research perceives pathways of Chinese soft power. They look
specifically at the case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony, which
is seen as an expression of China’s soft power—a cultural, consumer and strategic
branding event that showcases a sophisticated, yet earnest and nostalgic effort to
position China as a modern economic, political and cultural power with a long
historical and cultural legacy that will continue to inf luence global cultures.
They argue that branding practices involve a process of co-creation, through
which brand identities interact with “market myths.” Thinking about soft power
in this way highlights the importance of considering global cultural myths when
analyzing the Chinese authorities’ efforts to build an international brand for
China that resonates with target audiences around the world.
In “A Decade of Wielding Soft Power Through Confucius Institutes: Some
Interim Results,” Falk Hartig draws on fieldwork he has conducted at Confucius
Institutes (CIs) around the world in order to unpack the often intense debate over
the function and value of these high-profile examples of Chinese soft power gen-
eration. Despite the criticism that has been leveled at CIs by concerned scholars
in some Western countries, there is still strong global demand from universities
to host CIs. They remain a particularly attractive proposition for universities
seeking to internationalize and to gain access to China’s higher education mar-
ket. Nevertheless, Hartig shows that CIs are still significantly limited in what
they can achieve, both in terms of their practical operational resources as well
as their ability to reach target audiences in their host countries. His research
inside these organizations presents a rather less effective tool for soft power gen-
eration than is often assumed by critics, with one of the major problems being
the lack of suitable teachers. Resourcing issues are such that even a number of
CI directors hold the view that there are too many Institutes competing for the
available resources. He argues that reducing the overall number of Institutes and
providing the remaining ones with better funding and staffing is necessary if
their potential is to be fully realized.
To understand China’s contemporary pursuit of soft power and its global
implications, we have also sought to place Chinese soft power in comparative
perspective, examining China’s soft power projection in a variety of regional
contexts. Investigating a country’s soft power in abstract terms may help to
identify a general increase or decrease in its global inf luence, but it is of lit-
tle use when attempting to analyze the specific foreign policy problems that it
faces. Something that is a powerful source of attraction in the context of one
14 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

social relationship may be irrelevant or even repulsive in another ( Nye, 2004,

pp. 12–13). For this reason, the second half of this book is dedicated to in-depth
case studies of China’s soft power relationships with seven different countries
and regions around the world. Although it is impossible to address the entirety
of China’s global soft power efforts in detail, here we present a wide-ranging
account of Chinese soft power across a broad spectrum of case studies. These
include both the developed and developing world, China’s immediate neighbor-
hood in Asia as well as more distant audiences in Latin America and Africa.
Zhang Zhan’s chapter, “The Dilemma of China’s Soft Power in Europe,”
examines the impact and limitations of China’s soft power since the establishment
of a strategic partnership between China and Europe (EU and various European
countries) in 2003. As Zhang discusses, the partnership agreement resulted in
increased trade and economic cooperation between China and Europe, and thus
played a vital role as part of China’s soft power strategy in Europe. However, all
the efforts undertaken by the Chinese government—including public diplomacy
by Chinese ambassadors, the opening of European branches of some Chinese
state-owned media outlets, the purchasing of European media businesses such as
radio stations and cinemas by Chinese state-owned and private media companies
and the opening of large numbers (34% of the global total) of CIs—have failed to
significantly improve China’s image in Europe. Public opinion polls suggest that
European publics continue to have relatively “negative” perceptions of China
(in some cases the most “negative” global perception). Zhang analyzes some of
the main obstacles that have limited and continue to limit the effectiveness of
China’s public diplomacy in Europe: concerns regarding the lack of political
freedoms, human rights and credibility and transparency within China. The
study also points out another key obstacle that contributed to the contradiction
between an improving diplomatic relationship and worsening European public
perceptions—the problematic communication of Chinese authorities with inter-
national (European) journalists working in China, which pushed the journal-
ists into taking sides in negative coverage that eventually impacted the view of
overseas audiences.
In “The Evolution of Chinese Soft Power in the Americas,” Evan Ellis exam-
ines the Latin American response to China’s soft power, noting that much of
China’s attractiveness in the region is linked to a belief that it offers significant
economic opportunity. China presents an alternative model for development
and a political counterweight to Western-dominated international institutions
that is attractive not only to leftist regimes but also to moderate governments
that want to widen their range of foreign and economic policy options. Chi-
na’s investment in Latin America goes beyond commercial transactions to also
include funding for local elites and other inf luencers, such as journalists, politi-
cians and students, to visit and develop greater ties with China. Ellis notes that
while much of China’s attractiveness in the region stems from an expectation of
potential material benefits, rather than culture or shared values, this is not only
a product of actual economic exchange but is also driven by China’s image and
 Introduction 15

local beliefs about its future development trajectory in relation to the United
States.
Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen, in “The Sino–African Relationship: An
Intense and Long Embrace,” examine the history of China’s interactions with
Africa. Here, the interplay between economic and diplomatic objectives seems
particularly important, as mutual images are filtered through the lens of eco-
nomic cooperation and South–South solidarity. Yet Fiori and Rosen also point
out the importance of educational ties, the growing presence of Chinese media
and telecommunication companies in Africa and cooperation in areas such as
peacekeeping and health. While Chinese actors have not always escaped criti-
cism, the dynamic between China and developing states in Africa is rather dif-
ferent than between China and the West. In contrast to the West, Chinese actors
in Africa can often simply present themselves as preferable alternatives to other
foreign companies or organizations, rather than compete directly with well-
established locals. Moreover, as the authors note, the major speech on Africa in
December 2018 by former American National Security Advisor John Bolton,
where he essentially warned African countries that they needed to make a choice
between China and the United States in terms of funding models for develop-
ment, has greatly raised the stakes for African decision makers.
Gilbert Rozman looks at China’s soft power in Northeast Asia through a
comparison of South Korea and Japan. This comparison is instructive because
the two countries are viewed as opposites in the recent effectiveness of China’s
soft power. While negative views toward China have become more widespread
in Japan in recent years, the opposite has occurred in South Korea. Rozman
draws on media accounts, scholarly writing on bilateral relations and polling data
in the two countries in order to assess perceptions of China in Japan and South
Korea and subsequently build a framework with which to systematically compare
Chinese soft power. He looks at how China’s soft power fortunes have shifted
not only due to changes in China’s circumstances and behavior but also because
of how China fits into narratives of regional relations that have been dominant
in Japan and South Korea at various times. This highlights the importance of
considering how China’s identity might be framed in terms of the national nar-
ratives of countries that are the target of China’s soft power efforts, while being
aware that these narratives can and do change over time.
Staying in the region, Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu focus on Taiwan and the
question of China’s economic soft power. Lin and Chu question why China’s
offers of stability and prosperity since 2008, oftentimes sweetened by concessions
by the mainland, have failed to attract people in Taiwan. Making the important
distinction between forced and voluntary economic dependence they argue that
economic soft power is present where there is low potential dependence, which
is a decreasing function of the number of potential partners of economic integra-
tion, combined with high realized economic dependence. They use this inno-
vative theoretical framework along with data from the Asian Barometer Survey
to explain shifts in Taiwanese people’s attitudes to economic integration with
16 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

China. Lin and Chu’s analysis highlights how China’s soft power approach to
Taiwan maintains a coercive element that ultimately weakens its persuasiveness
for its Taiwanese audience. They argue that Beijing’s approach turns the logic
of soft power on its head by setting a hard political precondition—acceptance of
the reunification agenda—for the establishment of positive relations, rather than
first establishing the soft power resources that would generate sufficient attrac-
tion to make this a desirable proposition for the Taiwanese people. At the same
time, they note that a wide ideological gap between China and Taiwan makes
it more likely that Taiwanese who speak out in ways that are supportive of the
Mainland are suspected of attempting to “sell out” the island in pursuit of their
own personal interests.
David Zweig’s chapter, “Familiarity Breeds Contempt: China’s Growing ‘Soft
Power Deficit’ in Hong Kong,” examines how the rise of “localism” in Hong
Kong, which attempts to highlight divisions between Mainland China and
Hong Kong and between Mainlanders and Hong Kong residents, interacts with
recent calls to encourage Hong Kong youth to spend more time on the Main-
land as tourists or students in order to deepen their understanding of the PRC.
Using data from the Hong Kong Transition Project as well as the author’s own
surveys of Hong Kong students, Hong Kong students studying on the Mainland
and Hong Kongers working on the Mainland, Zweig examines the effects of
interactions with Mainland China on Hong Kongers’ attitudes toward Beijing.
Zweig finds that the identity gap between Hong Kong and the Mainland and
disaffection toward Beijing has increased since the 2008 Olympics. Although the
Mainland enjoys a clear structural advantage in its soft power efforts in Hong
Kong due to its use of United Front organizations and tactics, increasing soft
power is not necessarily the most important goal for the CCP in Hong Kong.
Finally, Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu’s chapter “How East Asians
View a Rising China” uses Asian Barometer survey results to examine how
China’s attempts to promote the economic benefits of its ambitious strategy of
“One Belt, One Road,” while at the same time taking a more assertive approach
to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, have been received in the region.
In some countries the attraction of China’s economic plans have neutralized
negative perceptions generated by territorial clashes. Overall, East Asians have a
broadly positive view of China but still express considerable admiration toward
the American model. They desire to maintain a strong American presence in
the region, but this is combined with the hope that they will not have to choose
sides in any future strategic competition between China and the United States,
a hope shared by African states as well. Surprisingly, when it comes to acting as
an economic model for the region China sits in third place, behind not only the
United States but also Japan.

Conclusion
China’s continuing emphasis on enhancing its soft power, backed by a commit-
ment of significant material resources, is taking place in a world in transformation.
 Introduction 17

In an ironic sense, Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power has returned to the place
where Nye began. In the preface to Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of Ameri-
can Power, where Nye introduced his concept in book-length form for the first
time, he begins by acknowledging that there is a widespread belief that America
is in decline and should reduce its external commitments. But Nye also notes
that whether or not the United States is in decline is the wrong question to ask,
instead arguing that the more relevant question is: “How is power changing in
modern international politics?” ( Nye, 1990, p. ix). He then goes on to note how
his thinking was stimulated by Paul Kennedy’s best-selling The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, where
Kennedy observes that US decline has been continuous, and argues that “the his-
torical record suggests that there is a very clear connection in the long run between
an individual Great Power’s economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as
an important military power (or world empire)” ( Kennedy, 1987, p. xxii, italics
in original). Kennedy’s book makes the basic point that economic resources are
necessary to support a large-scale military establishment, and also notes that in
the international system, both wealth and power are always relative ( Kennedy,
1987, p. xxii, emphasis in original). As the book’s subtitle suggests, for Kennedy
a nation’s power, and by extension its rise and fall, depends solely on the hard
power of economic strength and military force. Nye introduced the concept of
soft power to challenge that argument. Inf luenced by Robert Cox’s work on
the peaceful international orders established by Britain in the 19th century and
America in the 20th century, Nye (1990, p. 33) argues that “the universalism of
a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institu-
tions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power” and
that the resources that produce this soft, co-optive form of power are increas-
ingly important in international politics.
It is important to go back 30 years to the origins of the soft power con-
cept because the current international order and the intellectual arguments
introduced to explain the changes that have taken place strongly suggest that
Kennedy’s argument for the primacy of economic and military power has
resurfaced, albeit in a somewhat different form. To paraphrase Nye, is power
once again changing in international politics? The challenge China poses to
the United States and the American response to that challenge, as McClory
(2018, p. 12) calls the “growing swell of voices warning about the coming
collapse of the current rules-based liberal international order,” are at the heart
of this question. The rise of China, the use of sharp power by authoritarian
nations and the elevation of strong leaders in the United States and elsewhere
who are pursuing narrow nationalist agendas are all challenging the continu-
ing relevance of soft power. Yet even where material competition seems to be
intensifying, we can see the ongoing importance of images and attractiveness.
Reactions of governments around the world to Huawei’s bid for 5G leadership
are inf luenced not only by material factors such as national security and eco-
nomic efficiency, but also by questions relating to the trust and credibility of
both China and the United States. Huawei is China’s greatest global branding
18 Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen and Ying Zhu

success to date, but the US government is now engaged in a sustained effort

to rebrand it as the tool of a dangerous authoritarian power. The significance
of Huawei for China, both in terms of its material success in building a new
global telecommunications infrastructure and in terms of its intangible brand,
seems clear, but for now the company’s overall contribution to China’s power,
whether hard or soft, remains uncertain. Despite this uncertainty, it is crucial
to identify where forms of soft and hard power intersect and to continue to
explore their interaction in order to understand better the nature of contem-
porary power in international relations.
Recent commentaries on the potential transformation of the international
system highlight the role of China. As Nathan Gardels notes, if China were to
succeed in establishing a post-American world order, it would not be multi-
lateral, but would be composed of multiple bilateral relationships linked to the
Chinese core. In addition, following China’s “one world, many systems” per-
spective, it would not be based on a convergence of values as the American-led
world order has been, but on a convergence of interests (Gardels, 2018). Some
commentators in support of such a new world order have urged China to take
advantage of the demise of Nye’s version of soft power and replace it with a
new version, where soft power would be decoupled from its liberal ideological
basis. Eric X. Li suggests that China has succeeded precisely because it rejected
Western liberal values and that China’s success could become a model for a
Chinese version of soft power that is in many ways the opposite of Nye’s for-
mulation. As Li puts it, “you don’t have to want to be like us, you don’t have to
want what we want; you can participate in a new form of globalization while
retaining your own culture, ideology, and institutions” ( Li, 2018). Though
positing that soft power does not need to involve competition, and diverse
cultures, ideologies and institutions can coexist, China does advocate a differ-
ent set of rules rooted in the concept of hexie shehui (harmonious society) seen
as a new model of sovereignty in which individual subjectivities are under-
stood in relational, not autonomous, terms. The word tianxia (all under heaven)
helps justify China’s biopolitical power and its ambition to expand it across the
globe. Others accept the continuing relevance of soft power, but argue that
America’s illiberal turn under Trump—in effect a unilateral abandonment of
America’s soft power advantage—could benefit China if it formulated policies
that capitalized on these new opportunities. For example, as skilled work-
ers from around the world look beyond the United States to make a better life
for themselves, China could create a path for citizenship for some categories
of immigrants. With the United States foregoing participation in the Trans
Pacific Partnership, China could strengthen its position as the economic leader
of East Asia by bolstering regional trade and expanding its trade agreements in
that region ( Yan, 2017 ).
China has been at the forefront as the liberal international order and, by
extension, Nye’s concept of soft power, have been challenged by recent develop-
ments. The chapters in this volume are an attempt to understand not only how
 Introduction 19

China has tried to use soft power in pursuit of its foreign and domestic policy
goals, but also to offer some insights into the role that soft power may play in
future Chinese policy decisions with serious global ramifications.

Notes
1 Wang and Lu searched for “soft power” under three possible Chinese expressions: ruan
shili, ruan liliang and ruan quanli.
2 The emphasis on culture appears in Part VII of the speech to the Congress (“Promoting
Vigorous Development and Prosperity of Chinese Culture”).
3 Source: www.ejinsight.com/20150721-despite-huge-investment-china-ranks-dead-last-
soft-power/
4 The United States ranked best for education, culture and digital but was held back by
negative perceptions of its foreign policy.
5 It has amounted to US$1.41 trillion, according to Ray Kwong (www.ejinsight.com/
20150721-despite-huge-investment-china-ranks-dead-last-soft-power/).
6 Among a substantial literature on this subject, see the discussion entitled “debating the
China model of modernization” in Journal of Contemporary China, 19(65), June 2010,
particularly Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” pp. 461–477.

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PART 1
Debating China’s soft power
strategy
1
PROJECTION OF CHINA’S SOFT
POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY
Reconstruction of the traditional Chinese
world order

Suisheng Zhao

Once an ancient empire in East Asia, China began a steady decline in the 19th
century and suffered defeats and invasions by imperialist foreign powers. After
more than a century of struggle for rejuvenation, China has resurged in the
21st century to regain the glory it enjoyed two centuries ago. China’s rise has
included building tangible economic-military power and an attempt to raise
political-cultural power to enhance its statecraft. As a matter of fact, “The con-
cept of soft-power advocacy has made a strong impression in China” ( People’s
Daily Online, 2006) after Joseph Nye made the conceptual distinction between
hard and soft power. The utility of soft power has become one of the most
discussed topics in Chinese media and academic circles. In the meantime, the
Chinese government has surged in its investments in “soft power” diplomacy.
China has readily embraced the concept of soft power because, as Joseph Nye
indicated, “in a global information age, soft sources of power such as culture,
political values, and diplomacy are part of what makes a great power. Success
depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins” ( Nye,
2005). In particular, the concept offers a tool to ease the anxieties among some
countries in East Asia where China had a long history of cultural and politi-
cal dominance, about what sort of great power China is poised to be. China’s
military modernization and muscle-f lexing has produced mounting suspicions
and growing frictions in its relations with some of its neighboring countries
embroiled in territorial disputes. To calm fears of their neighbors, Chinese lead-
ers have claimed that China’s rise will be peaceful because its great power aspira-
tions are different from the imperialism and hegemony of the Western powers.
To support the claims, Chinese leaders and scholars have evoked China’s past as
a peaceful nation to project a benevolent governance and benign hierarchy of a
China-centered East Asian order that is purportedly unique and more peace-
ful than its Western counterparts. Some Chinese scholars even went so far as
26 Suisheng Zhao

to argue that imperial China resisted the temptation of expansion and won the
admiration of its neighbors. The collapse of the Chinese world order, therefore,
was a result of the clash of civilizations between the benevolent East Asian sys-
tem and the brutal European-centered nation-state system. China’s rise is thus to
restore justice in an unjust world and will bring peace and order to the region.
A connection between China’s imperial past and its contemporary peaceful rise
is thus established.
This chapter will start with an exploration of the Chinese rediscovery and
reconstruction of the traditional Chinese world order in the 21st century and
then place the Chinese reconstruction in the context of scholarly debate about
the traditional Chinese world order and particularly its critiques. The third part
examines the irony that while Chinese leaders have presented a harmonious
world order to its neighbors, they have adopted a social Darwinist worldview and
approach to maximize China’s power and security and expand its inf luence and
control over its neighborhoods. The conclusion looks at the gap between China’s
efforts at soft power projection and the results.

Reconstruction of the benevolent Chinese world order

World order is “an aggregate conception of dominant values, norms, and struc-
tures as well as of established patterns of actors’ behavior that give shape and
substance to international society at any given time” ( Kim, 1991, p. 4). The
modern world order began to acquire its present shape and definition more than
three centuries ago with the emergence of a nation-state system in Europe. The
principle of state sovereignty has provided the general framework from which
evolved specific state practices on war, peace, commerce and political competi-
tion. World order meant very different things to the Chinese prior to the com-
ing of the Western powers in the 19th century. John Fairbank and his colleagues
coined a concept of Chinese world order known as “a Sinocentric hierarchy”
to characterize imperial China’s relations with its East Asian neighbors (Zhao,
2015). The concept, which has become a conventional paradigm ever since, por-
trayed China as an Asian Empire with a self-sufficient agricultural economy
and workable bureaucracy, overshadowing other nations in the region, holding
a different world outlook from the West and maintaining an ethnically based
hierarchical regional order.
This Chinese centrality was based on the belief of “China being internal,
large, and high and the barbarians being external, small, and low” ( Yang, 1968,
p. 20). The concept of legal equality or sovereignty of individual states did
not exist. All countries arranged themselves hierarchically around the Chinese
emperor known as the Son of Heaven (天子). China’s central position was mani-
fested in a highly sophisticated tributary system, a term John K. Fairbank started
using in the 1940s, that was, in effect, the only institution for international rela-
tions in the region ( Fairbank and Teng, 1941, pp. 135–148). Imperial China
considered other countries its cultural inferiors, in recognition of which they
 Projection of China’s soft power 27

were expected to appear in the Chinese capital, make obeisance to the emperor
and present tribute.
Although the tributary system sometimes embarrassed the tributary states and
bore a heavy cost to China, it was described as valuable for both the tributary
states and the tribute receiver. For tributary states, the presentation of tributes
enabled them to trade with China through the legalization of controlled trade
along their frontiers (Ch’en, 1968, p. 161). Politically, the tributary states received
validation of their political power from the Chinese emperor in the form of pat-
ents of office and investiture. This was a valuable technique for the establishment
of legitimacy by local rulers. The Chinese court also benefited from this system
as the tribute received from neighboring countries was the ritual that acknowl-
edged the superiority of the Chinese culture, recognized the greatness of the
Chinese civilization, and acknowledged the existence of Chinese authority and,
consequently, the inviolability of China’s frontiers. Economically, China was
able to trade with its neighbors for items necessary without admitting China’s
dependence on these items of trade with the barbarians, thereby preserving “the
myth of China’s self-sufficiency” (Mancall, 1963, p. 30).
China’s centrality was regarded as a function of its civilization and virtue,
particularly the virtue of China’s rulers. As Lucian Pye suggested, “the Chi-
nese, with their Confucianism, created an elaborate intellectual structure of an
ethical order which all enlightened peoples were expected to acknowledge and
respect” ( Pye, 1985, p. 41). The Chinese world order, therefore, was as much
as an ethical as a political phenomenon. Harmony internationally and domesti-
cally was the product of the emperor’s virtue and the highest goal of a Chinese
society. Thus, the Chinese emperor’s superior position exhibited through proper
conduct, including ceremonies, gave one prestige among others and power over
them. In the Chinese world order, hierarchical power relationship, therefore,
was by definition more “moral” than in the West (Mancall, 1963, p. 31).
The prospect of China’s reemergence as a great power in the wake of the
21st century has led to a rediscovery of the benign Chinese world order by
Chinese leaders and scholars. Assuring the world of China’s peaceful devel-
opment, President Hu Jintao in his September 15, 2005, speech at the United
Nations General Assembly presented the concept of harmonious world, which
was derived from traditional Chinese thinking that “harmony” was at the core
of dealing with everything from state affairs to neighborly relations ( Liu, 2009,
p. 479). After President Hu made the presentation, a China Daily story made it
clear that the concept was part of China’s soft power projection because the ideas
of taking the peaceful development road and building a harmonious society and
a harmonious world help resolve doubts on China’s rapid development ( People’s
Daily Online, 2006). Another article in China Daily confirmed that

China hopes to dissolve the misconception of its development as the ‘China

threat’ by making its traditional value systems known to the world. . . .
Once they come to know the Chinese people better, they will find out that
28 Suisheng Zhao

harmony is an essential part of Chinese tradition and a country that values

harmony poses absolutely no threat to the rest of the world.
(China Daily, 2006)

Since coming into office, President Xi Jinping has enthusiastically pushed

Chinese officials, journalists and scholars to tell the so-called China story to the
world as part of China’s soft power offense. President Xi has become obsessed in
citing Confucian classics and using Chinese history to explain China’s domestic
as well as foreign policy positions. He even went so far as to speak in Beijing as
he hosted leaders from India and Myanmar that “China does not subscribe to
the notion that a country is bound to seek hegemony when it grows in strength.
Hegemony or militarism is not in the genes of the Chinese” ( Reuters, 2014).
President Xi repeated in another occasion that the deepest spiritual desire of a
nation has to be found from “the genes’ order (基因测序) of inherited national
spirit (薪火相传的民族精神).” The pursuit of peace, concord and harmony (和
平、和睦、和谐的追求) has been deeply rooted in the spiritual world of the Chi-
nese nation and the blood of the Chinese people. China’s unswerving pursuit
of peaceful development represents the peace-loving cultural tradition the Chi-
nese nation has inherited and carried forward over the past thousands of years.
He cited Confucian wisdoms such as “A warlike state, however big it may be,
will eventually perish” (国虽大,好战必亡), “Peace is of paramount importance”
(以和为贵), “seek harmony without uniformity” (和而不同), “replace weap-
ons of war with gifts of jade and silk” (化干戈为玉帛), “bring prosperity to the
nation and security to the people” (国泰民安), “forming friendships with neigh-
bors” (睦邻友邦), “achieve universal peace” (天下太平) and “Great Harmony of
Tianxia” (天下大同) to prove his point. He asserted that “China was long one of
the most powerful countries in the world. Yet it never engaged in colonialism
or aggression. The pursuit of peaceful development represents the peace-loving
cultural tradition of the Chinese nation over the past several thousand years, a
tradition that we have inherited and carried forward.” He thereby proclaimed
that “the Chinese nation is a peace-loving nation” (中华民族是爱好和平的民族)
( Xinhua News Agency, 2014).
As part of the rediscovery effort, Chinese scholars have reconstructed the
Chinese world order. Portraying the Chinese order as a self-centered tributary
system (自我为中心的朝贡体系) and the etiquette system of the heavenly dynasty
(天朝礼治体系), one Chinese scholar found that Imperial China produced an
open hierarchy as the foundation of the East Asian international system (东亚国
际体系的原始形态) (Guo, 2014). A traditional Chinese term, Tianxia (all-under-
heaven, 天下), based on Wangdao (the royal ethics, 王道), has emerged as a
uniquely “Chinese normative principle of international relations in contrast with
the principles of sovereignty and the structure of international anarchy which
form the core of the contemporary international system” (Carlson, 2011, p. 89).
In his book, All-Under-Heaven System (天下体制) and many articles, Zhao Tin-
gyang, a Chinese philosopher, describes Tianxia as a universal system inherited
 Projection of China’s soft power 29

from the Zhou dynasty about 3,000 years ago (Zhao, 2005). Designed to create
the compatibility of all peoples of all nations, Tianxia presupposes the Oneness
of the universe (天下归一) as the political principle of “inclusion of all” in the
world. Tianxia commits to the Oneness as the intact wholeness that implies the
acceptance of the diversities in the world where nothing is left out and no one
is treated as an outsider (Zhao, 2006, pp. 29–41). This is a world order with the
emphasis on harmony defined as reciprocal dependence, reciprocal improve-
ment or the perfect fitting for different things. Guanxi (reciprocal relationship)
thus became the organizational principle of the Tianxia system (Zhao, 2009,
pp. 5–18). The Tianxia system, maintained by cultural attraction and ruling by
virtue, is embodied in the Chinese ideal of perpetual peace. Notably different
from the aggressive empires that existed in other places, imperial China was
more concerned with establishing itself as an everlasting power than with the
plight of endless expansion because of the unaggressive and adaptable character-
istics of the Chinese culture (Zhao, 2014, p. 128). Qin Yaqing of Beijing Foreign
Affairs University also states that

the core of the notion of Tianxia revolves around the idea of a “Chinese
system.” . . . Tianxia is where nature and humanity intersect, a space where
political authority and social order interact. . . . Order is always intrinsic
in the system envisioned by the notion of Tianxia. Within the Tianxia
system, structure is hierarchical because only such an arrangement could
sustain its stability and harmonious order. Order could only be achieved
when there is a clear stratification of classes and there is likewise an orderly
relationship between them.
(Qin, 2011, pp. 42–43)

Tianxia is thus presented as a world system in contrast to the anarchic West-

phalian system, which is regarded as conducive to discord and war. Chinese Social
Sciences News (中国社会科学报) published a special session in 2014 to discuss
the differences between the Tianxia system and the contemporary international
system dominated by Western powers. Zhang Chi-hsiung of Taiwan’s Aca-
demia Sinica suggests that Tianxia was a harmonious world system expressed
by the following equations: all-under-the-heaven = the Chinese world =
center + periphery = Chinese + barbarians = we race + they race = kingdom +
tributary = China + tributary = suzerainty + tributary states = Chinese world
empire = tributary common community = China-centered common community >
East Asian common community. The China-centered hierarchical order was a
Tianxia common community (天下共同体), in which the center protected the
periphery and the periphery subordinated to the center (中心保护周边，周边藩
屏中心), forming a pattern of interdependence, co-existence and co-prosperity
between China and its four frontiers of neighbors (形成中国与四邻互相依赖、共
存共荣的格局). China never interfered in the internal affairs of tributary states.
Nationality, autonomy and kingdom self-governance were developed. The
30 Suisheng Zhao

traditional East Asian international system, therefore, maintained stability for

more than 2,000 years (Chang, 2014).
Royal ethics (王道) is used to explain why the perpetual peace of Tianxia
was created and maintained. Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University led a project
on China’s pre-Qin political thoughts, which determined that ancient Chinese
thinkers advised rulers to rely on ethics (道), benevolence (仁) and morality
(德) to win the world (取天下), and to take a defensive posture (非攻) using
benevolent government (仁政) to rule the world (治天下) ( Yan, Xu, et al., 2009).
Citing ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi, Yan distinguishes three types of eth-
ics in ancient China: royal ethics (王道), hegemonic ethics (霸道) and tyranny
(强道). Royal ethics focused on peaceful means to win the hearts and minds of
the people at home and abroad. Tyranny—based on military force—inevitably
created enemies. Hegemonic ethics lay in between: frequently indifferent to
moral concerns, it often involved violence against non-allies but did not cheat
the people at home or allies abroad. Royal ethics would win in any competition
with hegemony or tyranny ( Yan, 2011). Xing Qi, Vice President of the Chinese
Cultural Promotion Society (中国文化促进会), claimed that royal ethics played
an invaluable role in the stabilization and prosperity of the Chinese cultural
ring (中华文化圈) because the starting point of royal ethics was an internal holy
process (内圣) rather than an external imposition to reach a harmony between
human and nature. The highest level of royal ethics is to achieve the external
royalty (外王), in which the emphasis is to avoid hegemony in handling relations
and reach harmony among different peoples, nations and civilizations. Harmony,
in this case, is not uniformity, but rather seeking common ground while preserv-
ing differences (和而不同) ( Xin, 2011). Wei Zhijiang of Zhongshan University
in Guangzhou even argues that the Chinese world order created an East Asian
security system guided by royal ethics and etiquette (礼制), which was widely
shared by the vassal states ( Wei, 2014).
Many Chinese scholars have portrayed imperial China as a peaceful state,
working within the premise of royal ethics. What sustained the political centrip-
etal forces of the surrounding regions was morality, not coercion. The ancient
Chinese rulers developed a very prudent and defensive strategic culture and
tried hard to arrive at their objectives without using force (不战而屈人之兵).
Rulers were very cautious to wage just wars (义战) based on moral rather than
material interests. The clear difference between just and unjust wars was the
motivation of the war and its effect on civilians. People’s support was the most
important standard to measure whether or not a war was just. The ultimate goal
of just wars was not only to punish the war criminals but also to reestablish the
universal moral ethics of “unity and harmony of heaven and human beings” ( Liu,
2014, p. 562). Two Chinese military scholars, therefore, generalize the following
three paradigm differences between the imperial Chinese and the Western state-
crafts: “justice” versus “interests,” “human factors” versus “weapon factors” and
“stratagem” versus “strength” (Zhang and Yao, 1996, pp. 209–221).
 Projection of China’s soft power 31

In comparison with Western imperialist countries that used coercive power

to build colonies, the Chinese world order was thus more civil because it caused
the tributary states to admire China without using force. In the traditional Chi-
nese world, the relations among countries were in harmony based on benevo-
lent governance (仁治). East Asian countries shared the Chinese cultural ideals
and values that emphasized peace (和), harmony (合) and a middle way (中庸)
( Xiong, 2013). Quoting Tang Emperor Li Shiming who said that “although
China has been regarded superior and barbarians inferior since ancient time(s),
I love them all the same” (自故皆贵中华，贱夷狄，朕独爱之如一), one Chinese
scholar even went so far as to claim that “Emperor Li emphasized equality among
all nationalities more than one thousand years ago, showing the open-minded
Tang ruler in foreign relations” ( Li, 2012). With the emphasis on etiquette and
trade, the tributary system “forged the common ground for Imperial China and
its surrounding regions, and served as the foundation for exchange and coordi-
nation between the two sides.” Emphasizing benevolent governance, etiquette,
peace and denying the imperialistic nature, imperial China and its relations with
surrounding regions were far more advanced than the colonialism of Western
countries. Yet some Chinese scholars have argued that the root of all troubles in
Chinese diplomacy today is China’s lost opportunities for expansion because of
being pedantic and caring too much about morality and principles. “The sur-
rounding countries should be grateful for China’s benevolent governance, and
that the imperial order should be re-established, yet they don’t like moderation
and self-restraint as part of the imperial tradition” ( Yu, 2014, p. 1183).

The scholarly debate on the Chinese world order

This type of reconstruction of the Chinese world order and its disintegration
is obviously a narrative that serves China’s foreign policy and strategic objec-
tives rather than ref lecting on historical facts. In fact, there has been an emerg-
ing scholarly debate about whether imperial China was uniquely benevolent.
Some Western scholars have accepted the Chinese reconstruction and argue that
the benign Chinese world order as more peaceful than the European system
and China’s reemergence has, therefore, created an opportunity to reshape the
Western-centric world order. Martin Jacques published a book in 2009 with a
sensational title, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and
the Birth of a New Global Order, which argues that China is a “civilization-state,”
inheritor of the oldest continuous history in the world, whose underlying cul-
tural unity and self-confidence were without equal. Long before the West, its
rulers created the first modern bureaucracy, imbued with a Confucian outlook,
controlling domestic subjects more by moral education than force, and organiz-
ing adjacent regions into a consensual tributary system. As it rapidly reassumes
its traditional place at the center of East Asia, the old tributary system would
resurface in a modern form, contemporary ideas of racial hierarchy would be
32 Suisheng Zhao

redrawn and China’s age-old sense of superiority would reassert itself. China’s
rise signals the end of global dominance by the West and the emergence of a
world which it would come to shape in a host of different ways and which would
become increasingly disconcerting and unfamiliar to those who live in the West
( Jacques, 2009).
David Kang’s (2010) book argues that although China was the unquestioned
hegemon in the region, the tributary order entailed military, cultural and eco-
nomic dimensions that afforded its participants immense latitude. Because the
tributary system played a positive role in maintaining stability in East Asia and
in fostering diplomatic and commercial exchange, China engaged in only two
large-scale conf licts with its principal neighbors, Korea, Vietnam and Japan,
from the founding of the Ming dynasty in 1368 to the start of the Opium Wars in
1841. These four states otherwise fostered peaceful and long-lasting relationships
with one another ( Kang, 2010). In an earlier book, he criticized those schol-
ars who downplayed the role of political cultures and suggested a rising China
would be a destabilizing force in the region. He instead argued that China’s rise
had brought about more peace and stability than at any time since the Opium
Wars of 1839–1841. East Asian states had grown closer to China because certain
preferences and beliefs were responsible for maintaining stability in the region
( Kang, 2007).
On the other side of the debate, William A. Callahan criticizes the Fair-
bank paradigm as an “idealized version of a hierarchical Sinocentric world order
with the Chinese empire at the core and loyal tributary states and barbarians at
the periphery” (Callahan, 2011, p. 6). Peter Perdue labels the tributary system
a myth, which endured because it ref lected the political concern of the time.
Many of the scholars writing with Fairbank in the 1960s were émigrés from
China and, in opposition to prevailing views that China was merely another
totalitarian Communist state during the height of the Cold War, they argued
for China’s distinctive history as a long civilized society, with the implication
that the current Communist direction might be temporary, and that long-term
historical trends would prevail. Although the paradigm now serves useful pur-
poses for those who endorse and predict the coming hegemony of China in Asia,
Perdue argues that there is a “scholarly consensus” that “there was no tributary
system” and “historians who investigate the actual conduct of foreign relations
by Chinese dynasties have, by now, nearly uniformly rejected the validity of this
concept” ( Perdue, 2015). To prove his point, Perdue cites the contribution by
Mark Mancall in the Fairbank volume that “the concept of the tribute system
is a Western invention for descriptive purposes. . . . The Confucian scholar-
bureaucrat did not conceive of a tribute system (there is no Chinese word for
it) as an institutional complex complete within itself or distinct from the other
institutions of Confucian society” (Mancall, 1968, p. 63).
Indeed, there is not a Chinese term accurately corresponding to the English
term. The closest terms in Chinese are 进贡 (pay tribute) and 朝贡 (pay respect
and tribute), but neither of them implies an institutionalized relationship. A
 Projection of China’s soft power 33

Chinese scholar, therefore, distinguishes the tributary (朝贡) system from what
he called the patriarchal-vassal (宗藩) system. Tributary relations were not insti-
tutional and were often conducted on a case-by-case basis in more or less equal
footing between imperial China and the tributary states for the purpose of
trade. Only was the patriarchal-vassal system institutionalized and maintained as
a part of hierarchical monarch relations (君臣关系). The Chinese emperor treated
local rulers not as equals but as vassals, which accepted the canonization (册封)
of the Chinese court. The vassal states had to pay tributes regularly, following the
rituals defined by the Chinese court. During the Ming and Qing periods, there
were three vassal states that had institutionalized tributary relations with China:
Korea, Annam (Vietnam) and Ryukyu. Nepal, Laos, Burma and other Southeast
Asian states only had irregular tributary relations with China ( Wei, 2014).
A Thailand scholar’s study of diplomatic documents (letters) exchanged between
the Qing court and the Siamese (Thai) court in the 1780s found that although
Siam responded to the tributary system, it did not accept the Chinese perception
of world order. In Siamese letters to the Chinese emperor, the Siamese court
preserved its identity as an independent kingdom equal to the Qing court. When
the tributary missions arrived in the Chinese port, Guangzhou, the Chinese
officials edited the letters in their translation to comply with the Chinese hier-
archical concept before presenting them to the Chinese emperors. The Chinese
letters from the Qing court to the Siamese court, written in hierarchical terms,
were similarly edited in translation and arrived in the Siamese court as diplo-
matic documents exchanged between two equal rulers. Examining the Siamese
tributary articles and the Chinese imperial gifts, this study found that the major
role played by the tributary missions was commercial. Through imperial gifts
from China, Siam received certain luxuries and commodities unavailable locally,
whereas China acquired goods and medicines. Since trade with China was vital
to the Siamese, they were willing to trade through the tributary system, but the
Siamese court never accepted the canonization from the Qing Court (Manomai-
vibool, 2014).
In this case, Perdue’s criticism of the tributary system as a myth makes sense
because most of the tributary relations were more ritualistic than substantive.
But his f lat rejection of the existence of the tributary system went too far.
Odd Arne Westad presents a more balanced view suggesting that “there was
no overall ‘tributary system’” and that the tributary relationship was one of a
variety of ways imperial China conducted foreign relations. He found that the
Qing operated in three distinct spheres of foreign affairs in the 19th century:
Central Asia, where the theme was expansion; coastal Asia, where the theme
was trade tribute; and Russia, where the theme was diplomacy. Recognizing
the existence of “a Sino-centric system, in which Chinese culture was central to
the self-identification of many elite groups in the surrounding Asian countries,”
Westad raised the critical question—what if Chinese centrality was maintained
mostly by cultural superiority or coercive power? His study revealed that “The
dramatic Qing penetration of Central Asia is a story of intense conf lict and,
34 Suisheng Zhao

eventually, of genocide.” His evidence was the Qianlong emperor’s expedition

in the 1750s into the Zungharia, a mighty khanate led by Mongols, covering the
territory between western Central Asia and the Mongolian heartland, down to
the Tibetan borders. After having defeated Zungharia in battle, the Qianlong
emperor ordered his army to kill all of the Zunghar elite whom they could
lay their hands on. “Then he incorporated most of eastern Zungharia and the
minor Khanates to its south into China, creating one region that Qianlong,
triumphantly, referred to as China’s new frontier (Xinjiang)” ( Westad, 2012 ,
pp. 9–10).
Indeed, warfare was a constant in imperial China that was often in disunion
or under foreign invasion. Prior to the Qin dynasty, China was divided into
many small warring kingdoms fighting wars to balance power. After the estab-
lishment of the first Chinese dynasty by the Qin emperor, the geographical scope
and military power of the Chinese empire began to expand immensely. China’s
ruler during the Yuan dynasty, Kublai Khan, expanded the empire by military
expedition, stretching across Central Asia, Burma and Vietnam. In 1263, Kublai
Khan made Korea his vassal and aspired to the conquest of Japan. His f leets twice
reached the shores of Japan in 1274 and 1281 but were shipwrecked by typhoons,
which were to become legendary in Japan as the kamikaze, or “divine wind”
( Buss, 1964, pp. 34–35). The last Chinese dynasty, Qing, expanded to unprec-
edented size, nearly doubling in land from the previous Ming dynasty mostly
through military force.
It is from this perspective that Peter Perdue’s study claims that the China of
today is a product of the vast conquests of the Manchu rulers, who defeated the
Zunghar Mongols, and brought all of modern Xinjiang and Mongolia under
their control, while gaining dominant inf luence in Tibet ( Perdue, 2010). Per-
due argues that the techniques used by the Ming and Qing dynasties to legiti-
mize their rule over their subjects and to claim superiority over rivals were not
radically different from those of other empires. Citing the comparative history
studies that pointed to substantial similarities of the Ming and Qing to the
Russian, Mughal and Ottoman imperial formations, or even to early modern
France, Perdue suggested that the concept of “colonialism” (殖民主义) could be
usefully employed to describe certain aspects of Qing practice ( Perdue, 2015).
The emerging literature on Chinese strategic culture since the 1980s has also
documented that the Chinese empire was maintained as much by military force
as by virtue, even though Confucian teachings, of harmonious rule through the
civilized power, stated to the contrary. Viewing war as a central feature of inter-
state relations, imperial China used military force as strategically and constantly as
other empires. Alastair Iain Johnston’s study of Ming dynasty classics reveals two
sets of Chinese strategic culture. One is a symbolic or idealized set and the other
is an operational set. The symbolic set is based on Confucianism—that conf lict
is avoidable through the promotion of good government and the co-opting of
external threats. When force is used, it should be applied defensively, minimally,
only under unavoidable conditions, and then only in the name of the righteous
 Projection of China’s soft power 35

restoration of a moral-political order. The symbolic set, for the most part, is
disconnected from the operational decision rules governing strategy and appears
mostly in a discourse designed, in part, to justify behavior in culturally accept-
able terms. The operational set assumes that conf lict is a constant feature of
human affairs, due largely to the threatening nature of the enemy. In this zero-
sum context, the application of violence is highly effective for dealing with the
enemy. This operation set, in essence, argues that the best way of dealing with
security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force ( Johnston, 1995).
Chinese decision makers have internalized this ideationally based strategic cul-
ture that has persisted across vastly different interstate systems, regime types,
levels of technology and types of threat ( Johnston, 1996).
Imperial China had to use military force to defend and expand the empire
because its territorial domain, defined loosely by its cultural principles, was not
always accepted by its neighbors. Following the policy of fusion and expansion
(融合扩展), whenever imperial China was powerful, it always tried to expand
it frontiers and territories (开疆扩土) by claiming suzerainty over its smaller
neighbors. The expansion, however, often met with resistance. Although Viet-
nam, Korea and Burma became the vassals of the Middle Kingdom, they refused
to be fused (融合) into the Chinese empire. Mongols, Tibetans and other Cen-
tral Asian peoples accepted Buddhism and Islamism rather than Confucianism.
Never shy about military conquest to sustain the illusion and sometimes the
reality of imperial power, the Chinese empire had to deploy various instruments
of persuasion and coercion, including the art of statecraft or using one neighbor
against another, awarding those who were obedient and chastising those who
were defiant. Such practices worked successfully when the empire was unified
and strong. When the empire was weak and divided, the neighbors in turn con-
quered it.

The clash of civilizations and social Darwinism

Although some scholars have criticized the Chinese world order as a myth
and an idealized version of imperial China, many Chinese scholars still insist
that imperial China was a uniquely benevolent and peaceful empire with war
employed only as last resort for defensive purposes. Rejecting the comparabil-
ity of the Chinese empire with other empires, some Chinese scholars criticize
Western historians such as Peter Perdue and Odd Arne Westad as writing a
“New Qing History” (新清史) that describes the Qing dynasty as having an
expansion tendency similar to other empires at the time (具有与同时代的其
他帝国类似的扩张倾向). Their works are not welcome in China because their
“findings” violate (有悖于) the Chinese positon that the Kangxi emperor’s West-
ern expedition (康熙西征) was aimed at maintaining the unity of the multiple
nationalities. Chinese scholars have regarded Perdue and some other Western
historians who endorse the China threat theories as having tried to discover the
aggressive and imperialist characters of ancient Chinese history to demonstrate
36 Suisheng Zhao

the unavoidable connection between today’s China and its imperial characters
in history ( Lu, 2012).
Looking at imperial China as uniquely benign and the Chinese world order
as stable and peaceful, some Chinese scholars have come to see the collapse of
the Chinese empire as a result of the clash of civilizations that led to the cen-
tury of humiliation. China was not only forced into the international system
dominated by European powers where it lost its tributary states, but was also
treated unequally and suffered in the hands of imperialist powers. Accepting the
statement by Lowell Dittmer that “The Sino-Western conf lict in the nineteenth
century was not so much an international conf lict as it was a system-to-system
conf lict, a mismatch between Western nationalism and Chinese culturalism”
( Dittmer and Kim, 1994, p. 249), Chang Chi-hisung went further arguing that
“the primary course for the collapse of the East Asian order were the clash of the
principles of international orders between the East and the West” (东西方国际秩
序原理的冲突). He lamented that as the tributary states, managed by the Vassal
Affairs Department (礼部藩属), were lost and became colonies of the Western
powers, imperial China was downgraded (降为) from the Tianxia royal dynasty
(天下皇朝) to a sovereign state (主权国家) and reluctantly to advocate (不得已乃
改倡) the sovereign equality (主权平等). Imperialist powers defeated China by
force and then repudiated the Chinese benevolent governance. A treaty system
(条约体制) was formed through international law and unequal treaties while the
Chinese world order principles and the status it knew were completely repudi-
ated and eventually extinguished (Chang, 2014).
Indeed, the process through which China was forcibly drawn into the
European-dominated international system was through the demise of the Chi-
nese world order, a process of “China’s struggle to resist aggressive European
expansion, to adjust itself to the changing international realities, to meet its
problems without totally abandoning its imperial tradition, and finally to accept
slowly and gradually, though sometimes reluctantly, some of the European stan-
dards, institutions, rules and values” (Zhang, 1991, p. 16). This process took
several centuries. China’s defeat in the 1840 Opium War was a heavy blow to
the Chinese sense of superiority and led to the collapse of the Chinese world
order. In the 60 years after its humiliating defeat, the Qing government was
forced to sign numerous treaties with foreign powers. This began a transition
from the old tributary system to a treaty system. The Chinese empire was forced
to enter into “the Eurocentric family of nations” ( Fairbank, 1968, p. 258). The
new treaty system affirmed the principle of diplomatic equality between China
and its treaty partners. The first decade of the 20th century was the end of tran-
sition from the Chinese world order to a modern nation-state system. China no
longer constituted a world unto itself, but was part of the greater world, a unit in
the anarchical international system. After the long and sustained resistance, the
Chinese world order collapsed, giving way to an international order defined by
Western powers.
 Projection of China’s soft power 37

Ironically, however, while the wars, unequal treaties, and territorial losses
suffered by China during the century of humiliation were the painful road that
the Middle Kingdom walked into the modern nation-state system, the Chinese
quickly embraced the concepts of territorial sovereignty and became a zeal-
ous defender of its sovereign rights. Embracing the Western concepts of legal
equality and territorial sovereignty, the Chinese political elite moved to vigor-
ously defend Chinese national and territorial sovereignty against foreign inva-
sion. When China began to accept the idea of equality among nation-states and
struggled to defend its sovereignty, however, the world had come under the
domination of imperialist powers that did not treat weak nations as equals. This
was a social Darwinian world in the eyes of many Chinese elites. The status of
a nation-state was determined by its economic and military strength. China
was stagnant and weak and therefore had to fight for a status equal to other
nation-states.
Coming to recognize a social Darwinian world in which the status of a
nation-state was determined by its economic and military strength, Chinese
intellectuals and political leaders have become die-hard realists who believe
that international politics is a struggle for power and have sought to maximize
China’s security by expanding inf luence and control over its immediate neigh-
borhoods, and in some cases, far beyond. The world is unjust and unfair only
in the sense that China was stagnant and weak and therefore had to suffer and
be humiliated in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. The collapse of the
China-centered East Asian order was because China’s strength (实力) was not
strong enough to defend its existence. China has to follow the iron law (铁则)
of the strongest survival (强者生存) and the weakest eliminated (弱者淘汰) to
become the strongest again (Chang, 2014).
Emphasis on territorial sovereignty thus characterized much of China’s think-
ing of international relations in the 20th century, and this has continued into
the 21st century even as many of the originators of that system have begun to
move away from strong views on state sovereignty. China’s efforts to establish
diplomatic recognition with other countries of the world on a reciprocal basis,
and to participate in the United Nations and other world organizations with
the condition of non-interference of domestic affairs, speak to an insistence on
the absolute nation-state sovereign. China’s political leaders have all shared a
deep commitment to overcome humiliation, secure redress of past grievances
and achieve a position of equality with all other major powers. That is why a
persistent theme of Chinese foreign policy has been to win back the territories
lost during the country’s time of internal disintegration and humiliation by other
powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. China’s rise in the 21st century has rein-
forced this social Darwinist thinking of international relations.
Translating its wealth into a stronger military and more assertive regional pos-
ture, China has behaved increasingly as a typical muscle-f lexing great power–
seeking dominance in the Asia-Pacific and expanded interests by advancing its
38 Suisheng Zhao

territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. Core interest (核心利益),
a new term in China’s foreign policy vocabulary, has suddenly become fash-
ionable and appears more frequently in Chinese statements. Obviously chosen
with intent to signal the resolve in China’s sovereignty and territorial claims
that it deems important enough to go to war over, core interest is defined as
“the bottom-line of national survival” and “essentially nonnegotiable” (Chen,
2011, p. 4). While China’s official statements on the sovereignty and territorial
integrity used to refer almost exclusively to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang issues
( Wu, 2012, p. 393), Chinese leaders have expanded the core interest issues to
include territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. Taking an unusu-
ally strong position to assert its sovereignty in these disputed waters, Beijing
repeatedly attempted to prevent Vietnamese vessels from exploring oil and gas
while it sent Chinese oil rigs to disputed waters with Vietnam, deployed ships
to blockade the Philippines garrison on a contested shoal and rejected Manila’s
bid for International Court of Justice arbitration, and scaled up land reclama-
tion of “island-building” on the disputed reefs in the South China Sea. It also
sent law enforcement ships and fighter jets to challenge the status quo of the
Japanese administration of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands following the
Japanese government’s decision to nationalize some of them, and declared an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
as well as the greater part of the East China Sea, including the Socotra Rock (also
known as Ieodo or Parangdo), which has been effectively controlled by South
Korea but claimed by China as the Suyan Rock.
China’s social Darwinist view of international relations, in this case, is in con-
trast to its reconstruction of the benign Chinese world order and has been a
liability in its diplomacy. In response to China’s rise in the 21st century, a West-
ern scholar raised a controversial question: “Are Westerners ready to adjust to the
Chinese civilization’s re-emergence as one of the main sources of global order?”
(Gosset, 2006). He did not give a definite answer at the time, but one may find
some important clues by looking at the evolving Chinese view of the world order
after China’s entry into the modern international system. It is from this perspec-
tive that June Teufel Dreyer wrote that “Supporters of the revival of tianxia as a
model for today’s world are essentially misrepresenting the past to reconfigure the
future, distorting it to advance a political agenda that is at best disingenuous and
at worst dangerous.” She also points to the contradiction that the Chinese govern-
ment has accepted these principles yet zealously defends its sovereign prerogatives
even as it makes efforts to educate the world on the virtues of a Confucian Great
Harmony and its supporters advocate following a somewhat nebulously defined
Chinese model ( Dreyer, 2015). One Korean scholar also points out that while
Choson Korea was China’s tributary state with independence in domestic affairs
and diplomacy assured in the Chinese world order, the Qing court attempted
to legally incorporate it as part of China’s territory by international treaty in
the 1880s but ended in failure. As a continuation of such expansionist policy,
Republican Chinese textbooks and historical geography regarded Choson Korea
 Projection of China’s soft power 39

and other tributary states in East Asia as recently lost Chinese territories. Such an
“expansionist territorial imagination” has come back and gained ground in China
as it is reemerging as a great power ( Yu, 2014).

Conclusion
The reconstruction of the traditional Chinese world order is only one tool in
the growing Chinese soft power tool kit. Sometimes known as “public opinion
warfare,” the projection of China’s soft power includes establishment of more
than 500 Confucius Institutes on university and secondary school campuses
around the world, massive investments in setting up English-speaking China
Central Television bureaus around the world, f looding major newspapers with
China Daily inserts, establishment of a Chinese government scholarship fund for
foreign students to enroll in Chinese universities for year-long studies, high-
visibility projects such as the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo, and pro-
viding a national development model, the Beijing Consensus, as an alternative to
the Washington Consensus.
With all these efforts and investments and extensive branding campaign, China
has improved its soft power capacity, especially after President Donald Trump
came to office in the United States. The annual Soft Power 30 Index published
in July 2017 showed the US score falling nearly 10% from 2016, dropping from
the first place to third, while China was up to 25th from 28th. One author of
the Index commented that “While ‘America First’ has translated into less global
leadership for the US, China has emerged an unlikely champion for globalization
and environmentalism” ( Liu, 2017).
While pockets of positive views regarding China can be found around the
world, China’s image has ranged between mixed and poor among all the major
international polls for almost a decade. A May 2017 survey by the ASEAN found
that more than 73% of correspondents had little or no confidence that Beijing
would do the right thing in contributing to global peace, security and gover-
nance (PressReader, 2017). Although US global inf luence has dropped due to
President Trump’s “American First” policy, it still holds much more soft power
than most countries, including China. A Chinese scholar admitted that China
might one day overtake the United States in the size of the economy but may
never overtake the United States in inf luence and leadership in the world ( Xue,
2015). Another Chinese scholar found that China faced predicaments in devis-
ing an international discursive power, known as missing international discursive
power (国际话语权缺失). China had never played a world leadership role in his-
tory. The traditional Chinese system (华夏体系) was only an East Asian system,
not universal, and cannot automatically transform into modern discursive power
( Wang, 2015). Until China develops values that appeal universally, it misses one
of the core features of global leadership.
Beijing’s overreliance on its economic prowess as the key diplomatic instru-
ment reveals the short of credible normative power. Despite its rising economic
40 Suisheng Zhao

prowess and growing military might, China’s efforts to use economic ties to
inf luence other states’ behavior have only achieved limited success. Money can-
not buy loyalty. Inf luence does not simply derive from a country’s coffers. While
closer economic ties are important, they are hardly sufficient to build strong
political and strategic trust between countries—especially those with conf lict-
ing security interests. China’s efforts to project soft power often fail to resonate
abroad partly because China displays little empathy with the sensitivities of those
living beyond its borders ( Jonquieres, 2016).
As a result, China’s neighbors have hardly been convinced that China’s rise
is peaceful and China’s great power aspiration is necessarily different from the
imperialism and hegemony of Western powers. It is difficult to find any of Chi-
na’s neighbors who want to live under China’s shadow or are keen to accept a
Chinese-dominated regional order. China’s rising power itself, in fact, has moti-
vated some of its neighbors to pursue balancing activities, including realign-
ment with the United States and with each other.
As for causes of the gap between China’s efforts at soft power and the results,
one study lists imbalance of resources, legitimacy concerns of its diplomacy and
lack of a coherent agenda as three major factors hindering its efforts to project
its soft power effectively (Gill and Huang, 2006, p. 26). Another study points to
a blind spot in China’s exercise of soft power as “the absence of Chinese non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) on the international stage, which deprives
China of a crucial soft power tool, hampers its public diplomacy, weakens the
credibility of the messages it seeks to send out, and reduces the amount of feed-
back” ( Lu, 2007). Still another study suggests two major factors that have con-
strained Beijing’s ability to project its soft power. One is the gap between an
increasingly cosmopolitan and confident foreign policy and a closed and rigid
domestic political system. The other is the constant tensions between its multiple
foreign policy objectives and the still nascent soft power resources. From this
perspective, it claims that “soft power remains Beijing’s underbelly and China
still has a long way to go to become a true global power” (Huang and Sheng,
2006, p. 41). While all these factors are important, one scholar made a powerful
explanation for the particular reason of the failure; that is, China’s more asser-
tive behavior toward its neighbors—in the South China and East China Seas
and along the Indian–Chinese border—and its continuing military buildup has
undercut its “peaceful rise” narrative with countries in the region and with the
United States. Combined with the strategic uncertainties that arise from China’s
system of closed decision-making, Beijing’s hard power policies have created a
dynamic in which its soft power efforts have been less effective than they might
otherwise have been (Schmitt, 2014).

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2
THE END OF CHINA’S RISE
Consequences for PRC debates on soft power

Daniel C. Lynch

In the years following Xi Jinping’s assumption of power in 2012, the vaunted

Chinese powerhouse economy finally began to sputter and skid. Most immedi-
ately relevant for the PRC’s soft power, imports from foreign partner countries
plummeted by 13.3% from 2013 through 2016, while export growth during
the period remained f lat ( National Bureau of Statistics, 2017 ). Both exports
and imports recovered brief ly during 2017–2018 as a consequence of unsustain-
able debt-driven stimulus ( National Bureau of Statistics, 2018), but then export
growth leveled off again and imports tanked from mid-2018 through mid-2019
as the PRC’s traditional levers for stimulating the economy faltered just as China
got hit by US President Donald Trump’s tariff war.
Simultaneously, the Chinese labor force was rapidly shrinking. This debili-
tating process began in 2013 and would continue indefinitely for decades into
the future, with 23% of the labor force projected to be lost by 2050 (“China’s
Working-Age Population,” 2016). In other countries in which the working-age
population declined inexorably (after 1960), the average annual GDP growth
rate was only 1.5% (Sharma, 2016). To continue rising in relative power terms,
China would have to maintain a GDP growth rate significantly higher than that
of the United States, which hovered around 2% from the early 1990s until the
mid-2010s, but then increased to nearly 3% during the first two years of the
Trump administration. In other words, China would have to perform much,
much better than the countries in Sharma’s post-1960 database that it resembled
demographically. By the mid-2010s, China’s rise was in crisis—even if most
outside observers remained largely unaware of the significance of this dramatic
turn of events ( Lynch, 2019).
Inside China, the inescapability of this slowly gathering storm—the mount-
ing threat to the PRC’s continued economic rise—was already well understood
46 Daniel C. Lynch

by most Chinese economists as early as 2008. They openly discussed the threats
to the country’s economic dynamism and the failures of the CCP leadership
to address them in publication after publication, using sharp and occasionally
even mocking language ( Lynch, 2015, pp. 20–67). This raises an important
question: Did gradually increasing recognition of these inescapable economic
realities induce a mellowing in the Chinese discourse on soft power—a reduc-
tion in the hubris often seen in Chinese discussions of soft (and hard) power
during the years of the “new assertiveness” after 2008? Were Chinese com-
menters on the soft power dimensions of international contestation adjust-
ing the tone and content of their analyses to bring them into line with—and
adapt to—the inescapable new material realities discussed frankly by Chinese
economists?
The answer is: “not exactly.” On the one hand, Chinese writers did become
increasingly willing to acknowledge that China was not competing success-
fully with the West, and especially the United States, specifically for relative
soft power in the narrow sense of the term—a concession, perhaps, to the
scarcely deniable reality (as ref lected in public opinion polls) of a worsening
in the PRC’s image in most parts of the world after 2008. On the other hand,
many Chinese writers soon began arguing confidently that they had discov-
ered the reason for China’s poor soft-power performance, and this critical
factor was something that it was within China’s capacity to change. The criti-
cal factor was simply that the “US-led West,” through its media, telecommu-
nications, Internet, and computer empires, exerted hegemonic control over
the world’s f low of discourse, and twisted the content of that discourse against
China. But fortunately, because of China’s growing relative material might,
the PRC could, many writers argued, begin to use its material agency to wrest
control of discourse power from the West and then use that discourse power
to reshape information f lows to convey the “truth” about China, thereby
automatically increasing its soft power. For these and similar reasons, most
Chinese writers continued to express a high degree of ultimate confidence in
the sustainability of China’s relative rise, whether in hard or soft power, and
they showed little to no concern that there might be something fundamen-
tally unattractive or fatally f lawed about the Chinese system that limits its soft
power potential.
There is one caveat in asserting this interpretation. While the writing in
recent years—including the articles discussed below—appears superficially to
be positive and confident, it cannot be said with certainty that the analysts
truly hold such thoughts or else instead are simply following orders to express
optimism. At various points during 2012–2017, and then especially after the
official promulgation of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era” at the 19th Party Congress (October 2017),
General Secretary Xi demanded that the Party and the nation “consolidate
self-confidence in taking the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics;
 The end of China’s rise 47

in our theory and institutions; and in our culture. Cultural self-confidence

is the most basic, the deepest, and the most enduring force” (quoted in Xiao
Bo, 2016, p. 112). Because of the inescapable linkages between culture and
soft power, and because of the intense repressiveness of Xi’s “New Era,” Chi-
nese soft power specialists must certainly worry that expressing pessimism
about the PRC’s soft power potential would leave them open to the charge
of lacking self-confidence or even being dangerously, perniciously nihilistic.
Consequently, it cannot be said with certainty that when Chinese soft power
specialists express ultimate optimism they genuinely believe it. On the other
hand, they do typically offer elaborate explanations for why they think opti-
mism is warranted, even if sometimes their explanations lack logical consistency
or fall short on details. The Chinese assessments are worth examining to gain
insight into PRC elite thinking about the linkages between material and ide-
ational power in the international relations of the 21st century.

Discourse power
An analyst named Bian Qin—an evidently inf luential social-media figure iden-
tified simply as “a female writer traveling in France”—provides the most com-
prehensive explanation of the discourse power dynamic in an article published
in World Socialism Research, a journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS). Arguing that “the world’s f low of discourse vitally affects the prospects
for survival of our nation and civilization,” Bian contends that China “must
meticulously plot and strategize [to increase power over the f low], knowing our-
selves and knowing the enemy” ( Bian, 2016, p. 78). She finds that the age of
colonialism has left a world in which the West still controls most significant
discourse—through the mass media, but also, evidently, less public networks—
and uses its power to exalt Western civilization while demeaning others, espe-
cially China. To extricate China from this subaltern position, Chinese people
must (1) recognize that the struggle will be long and arduous, because the West’s
control over discourse (through which it disseminates perniciously anti-Chinese
values) is intricate, comprehensive and tight; and (2) recover their civilizational
self-confidence—the Xi Jinping goal—which also will not be easy because the
West circulates values that belittle and marginalize Chinese civilization. “The
power to manipulate [global] public opinion lies not only in making oneself look
good, but also in maligning and smearing the other . . . , from beginning to end,
a war” ( Bian, 2016, p. 79).
Bian is concerned that Chinese people will assume blithely that rising material
power will lead automatically to rising discourse (and, consequently, soft) power.
This is not the case; and indeed, there is a real threat that China could develop
economically only to melt and disappear into the Western world system, having
no voice and taking a subservient role—much like Japan became rich after World
War II but remains a second-class world citizen when it comes to discourse and
48 Daniel C. Lynch

the articulation of values. This is not an acceptable ultimate outcome for the rise
of China. The PRC must actively use its material power to seize control over the
f low of the world’s discourse ( Bian, 2016).
Bian initially struggles to explain who, exactly, it is in the West manipulating
the f low of discourse, or whether the manipulation occurs as a not-necessarily
intended consequence of structural factors. But eventually she hits upon an
anthropomorphized power source: “the invisible hand.” One reason the power
to control discourse is so critically important is that the state or civilization
that controls it can also control the world economy, insofar as “the f low of
discourse not only determines how much a shirt, for example, will be valued,
but also how much a piece of art will be valued, or even how much an indi-
vidual human being will be valued.” In this we can see how the West stacks
the deck against China: “The fact that ‘made in China’ products are valued
less highly than products of comparable quality made by foreign countries is
a function of the operations of the ‘invisible hand’ that controls the world’s
f low of discourse.” Bian finds that the invisible hand “can, over many years,
use the exchange of information (including false information) to turn a coun-
try’s products into utterly valueless items—a kind of invisible plundering that
even the gods don’t know about and the ghosts cannot detect” ( Bian, 2016,
p. 79). She gives as an example women’s handbags. China produces handbags of
exactly the same quality as the famous French handbags that so many people pay
large sums of money to buy, she says. And yet consumers will not pay equally
high prices for Chinese-made handbags because they are “brainwashed” to
esteem Western products while sneering at those produced by China ( Bian,
2016, p. 80).
Bian is arguing against a so-called free f low of information and individualist-
rationalist notions of a global marketplace for exchanging ideas, images and
information. She is, in effect, mocking the invisible hand metaphor to suggest
that there really is a hand: a source of agential power “out there,” controlled by
the West (perhaps its “elite stratum,” a term she uses at various points in the
essay) and wielded actively to structure the arenas in which ideas, images and
information are exchanged to pursue the interests of Western states and Western
civilization, invariably at the expense of China, but also other countries and
civilizations. She is rejecting the idea that individuals and groups in a denational-
ized world society might freely and autonomously and validly decide that “prod-
ucts” ranging from Chinese handbags to Chinese political practices are relatively
undesirable. Bian is in effect suggesting that the only way such a decision would
be possible is if the assessor is brainwashed, and that they would reach a very
different conclusion if only they could liberate themselves from the vice-grip of
Western (especially US) discourse power.
Renmin University’s Wang Yiwei, a professor in the School of International
Studies, agrees that (1) “soft power is regarded as one of China’s highest-level
strategic concerns,” and yet that (2) soft power as a concept is problematic because
it intrinsically privileges the United States—after all, the concept was invented
 The end of China’s rise 49

in the United States by an American ( Joseph Nye), who was using the concept to
reassure Americans that their international importance and relative power were
not declining after the Cold War when in fact they were ( Wang, 2016, p. 12).
Writing in the second issue of a new journal devoted to the subject, Studies in
Cultural Soft Power, Wang argues that the soft power concept is “deeply steeped
in American exceptionalism and the notion of manifest destiny . . . , [claiming
that] America is eternally right, America stands at the foot of God, America
stands on the right side of history, and America is the world’s unique and special
exception” ( Wang, 2016, p. 11). By definition, therefore, China cannot compete
with America for soft power, because the concept itself is US-centric. Trying to
compete with the United States for soft power would only “damage our Three
Self-Confidences”: confidence in the road of socialism with Chinese character-
istics, Chinese theory and institutions, and Chinese culture, as called for by Xi
Jinping.1
To Wang Yiwei, the significance of China’s rise is that it blows the compara-
tively shallow and loaded (because it is US-centric) soft power concept out of the
water. “China’s rise is a civilizational renaissance that subverts the West-centric
world view. The consequence of the rise of China will be that the [claimed]
universal will become the local; the sacred will become the vacuous; and the self
will become the other” ( Wang, 2016, p. 14). Not just any rising country would
be able to “decenter” the West so profoundly in world history and international
relations. In effect, only China could do it: “In today’s world or even the his-
tory of humanity, not many countries have had the qualifications to pronounce
themselves as special [cheng ziji wei tese]. China’s specialness surpasses the unique
characteristics of other countries, [and] to emphasize China’s specialness is to
realize China’s self-confidence, self-awareness, and particular burdens” to his-
tory ( Wang, 2016, p. 14).
The burdens are big indeed. Wang argues that just as China absorbed and
transformed Buddhism and Marxism in the past, so today—or in the near
future—the rising PRC will absorb “Western universal values” and repackage
them for inclusion in a new and less parochial category he calls “the common
values of the human race” (renlei gongtong jiazhi ) ( Wang, 2016, p. 15). The com-
mon values of the human race will include—in addition to “Western universal
values”—Chinese Confucian values, insofar as the success of China’s rise will
also mean “the realization of the Chinese national spirit,” but not in a narrowly
nationalistic sense because “the specialness of China originates in China but
belongs to the world” ( Wang, 2016, p. 15). Consequently, the success of China’s
rise will equate to great successes for the human race as a whole, because the rise
will bring about “the realization of perpetual development for all of humanity,
in which all civilizations and all development models can complement each other
insofar as each is beautiful in its own way; and the realization of a perpetually-
peaceful, collectively-prosperous world of harmony” ( Wang, 2016, p. 15). Wang
ties the argument together with a final bow to Xi Jinping by asserting that the
“China Dream,” an early Xi Jinping concept, “brings opportunity, happiness,
50 Daniel C. Lynch

and hope to the world—and it can be an inexhaustible source of Chinese soft

power in the future” ( Wang, 2016, p. 15). But not at the present, because the
West still exercises control over the world’s f low of discourse.
Curiously, then, Wang belittles and mocks the concept of soft power when
examining the international relations of today, but considers that the concept
will become valid and important after China’s soft power levels exceed those of
the United States. His reasoning seems to be that everything in a world in which
China is not at the top and in the central position is of dubious legitimacy. But
once China’s recentering in world history and international relations is com-
plete, concepts such as soft power take on a new meaning as the universalism
formerly claimed by the West becomes local; the sacred as asserted by the West is
exposed as vacuous; and the West generally evolves into a civilizational other to
the world center which is China.

Going on the offensive

Studies on Cultural Soft Power, the journal in which Wang Yiwei published his
almost chiliastic article, is edited at Wuhan University, the site of a “summit
forum” on soft power bringing together “several dozen first-line specialists” to
launch the journal on June 6, 2016 ( Xiao, 2016). Wuhan University is also the
home institution of Professor Liu Ying, who teaches at the university’s Institute
of Marxism. Funded by a grant from the PRC Ministry of Education in the
special category of “Research into Building an Academic Discourse System with
Chinese Characteristics,” Liu published an article in 2017 consistent with the
discourse-power-as-fundamental theme, but she presented the West-dominated
world as more challenging to China—the struggle as more cutthroat. She argued
that the time has come for China to go on the offensive.
Liu states straightforwardly that “we don’t want simply to keep a low profile”
(tao guang yang hui )—thus rejecting the Deng Xiaoping injunction to behave cau-
tiously in international affairs (although Liu did not use Deng’s name). “We don’t
want simply to concentrate on material construction. We want to “have some-
thing to say” that manifests the real China. We don’t want simply to have an
economic national rise. We also want to have a national rise in discourse” for
the purpose of “controlling and directing the course of China’s rise” ( Liu, 2017,
pp. 162–163).
The reason Liu regards this as necessary is that the rise of China has reached
the stage in which the world’s competing civilizational power centers will battle
to determine the rise’s meaning. The civilization that controls the world’s f low of
discourse will define what the risen China is and implies. “If China doesn’t speak
[that is, take control of the processes of defining China’s rise], others will speak
for it. If China doesn’t manufacture its own national image, others will manu-
facture one for it” ( Liu, 2017, p. 163). Moreover, the image that the (Western)
others will manufacture will be negative and false. This is clear from the current
 The end of China’s rise 51

“main global melody” concerning China’s rise as manufactured by the West. The
main global melody includes the following themes: China will collapse; China
is an energy, economic, environmental, soft-power, ideological, military, and/or
food threat; China is a bully; China is arrogant; China is not democratic; China
does not respect human rights; Chinese people do not have freedom; China is
an irresponsible power; and more—almost any combination of which can be
trotted out (by the Western forces, or people, that control discourse power) at
any time to twist and distort the world’s understanding of China, causing the
image of China to depart from Chinese reality. This harshly dissonant main
melody is, moreover, intentionally composed and performed to inf lict pain on
China and to vanquish it in the great struggles of international relations. “Using
Western standards to cut China down to size, using Western interests to judge
and evaluate China, using Western ‘authority’ to articulate China—this is dis-
course hegemony operating according to the logic of thuggish domination, and
discourse competition according to ‘the law of the jungle’” ( Liu, 2017, p. 164).
Under the circumstances, China has no choice but to fight back—nothing less
than the meaning of its national rise is at stake, and this is of critical importance
to all of humanity.
The image of China that must replace the Western caricatures and stereotypes
can be found in the real China, the China as ref lected accurately in the Chinese
“self-perception.” The key elements of this real China, as perceived correctly by
the Chinese people, include that: China is a civilized great power with 5,000
years of a brilliant history; China is a robust power that has been tested in mul-
tiple wars and crises but never collapses, always re-emerging as a pillar of the
world in the East; China is a “great power that fulfils its responsibilities”; China
is a country in which all the nationalities are united; China is a country possess-
ing a pluralistic culture whose elements all integrate harmoniously; China has a
clean and un-corrupt political system; and China is economically dynamic and
culturally vibrant, increasingly easy to get along with internationally, and burst-
ing with hope and liveliness ( Liu, 2017, pp. 161–162).
Liu will probably appear to most foreign readers as a constructivist—and even
a disingenuous constructivist calling for the propagation of “alternative facts”
and outright fabrications. But she does not present the contest (or “war”) as
a struggle over who will define reality cynically. She presents it instead as a
struggle between those (“the Chinese people”) who articulate objective truth
versus hegemonistic Westerners who propagate malicious fabrications. “Inside
the arena of international discourse competition, the discourse itself has long
since been polluted by state power. Factual reality is no longer important . . .
Western countries monopolize discourse power [and] block international audi-
ences from directly perceiving the real China” ( Liu, 2017, p. 163). Liu under-
scores her own fact-based reasonableness by acknowledging that even despite its
enormous accomplishments, China has problems. The problems, however, are
not fundamental—and they are the problems identified by the Chinese people, not by
52 Daniel C. Lynch

the West. These problems are conceived and assessed within the Chinese ide-
ational universe, and so they are contained:

We must realize that China’s problems are not so numerous or serious that
they can drown out China’s successes. Elevating discourse self-confidence
is not to ignore China’s problems. Rather, it is to affirm China’s successes
while directly confronting the problems and simultaneously rejecting the
West’s discursive tarnishing of China’s reputation.
(Liu, 2017, p. 166)

Liu additionally perceives that the image of a rising China that China has the
right and responsibility to construct must be an image that is “understandable
and recognizable for international [especially Western] audiences” (Liu, 2017,
p. 165). The image must resonate with international audiences because China’s
rise is an event not only in Chinese history, but also in world history. Or even
more: China’s rise is relational and communicational, because it cannot have
meaning even to Chinese people unless it also has meaning (a positive mean-
ing, as shaped by the CCP) to foreign audiences. This means, practically, that
“it would be useless to try to claim that everything is good in China,” because
all countries have problems. “Formulations such as ‘Tibet has been an integral
part of China since ancient times’ and ‘hurt the feelings of the Chinese people’
are treated as empty slogans by international audiences.” China must summon
the self-confidence and the intelligence to exert power over the world’s f low
of discourse, but not bludgeon it in an ultimately self-defeating way. A useful
slogan might be to “take what the self fabricates as the core, and what the other
fabricates as the ancillary” ( yi zisu wei zhu, tasu wei fu) ( Liu, 2017, pp. 165–167).
Evidently, China will become the chief subject or actor in the world’s future
history—particularly insofar as defining China is concerned—but the West can
still play—even must still play—an important supporting role as a kind of subal-
tern “other” to dominant China.

The “China solution”

The West will also, it would appear, play minor roles in the search for solutions
to developing countries’ problems and global problems as China moves into the
central world position. In his speech marking the 95th anniversary of the CCP’s
founding on July 1, 2016, Xi Jinping offered “the China Solution” (this is the
official English-language translation of “Zhongguo Fang’an”) for consideration
“as the world searches for a better social system” in the aftermath of the 2008–
2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a massive failure of Western “solutions.”
Han Qingxiang and Huang Xianghuai, two scholars with the Central Party
School’s Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Research Centre,
set about explaining the China Solution in a January 1, 2017, article in Seeking
Truth (Qiushi ) (Han and Huang, 2017). They spend three full pages explicating,
 The end of China’s rise 53

but in the end, the China Solution boils down to a negative; that is, a rejection
of the “Western model” as universally valid. In contrast, “the China Solution is
a solution that stresses China’s distinctive characteristics and respects the world’s
diversity”—a solution that stresses not imposing one country’s values on other
countries, but that could nevertheless serve as a new developmental standard and
model in an age in which the West has so obviously failed ( Han and Huang,
2017, p. 20). “China’s success in reality expresses the success of a set of values
[and] a spiritual inheritance different from the package of values associated with
Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism” (Han and Huang, 2017, p. 20). Foreign
countries can be expected to find the China Solution inspiring and then chart
their own developmental courses in a non-Western, non-universal direction, but
somehow—albeit vaguely—consistent or aligned with China’s.
Note that in such articles—addressed primarily (it would appear) to audiences
of social scientists, journalists and Party propaganda cadres—there is little to no
attention given to the practical/logistical challenges associated with promoting
the “China Solution” or more broadly China’s discourse power. There is instead
an embedded, unexamined materialist assumption that the economic rise will
eventually lead almost automatically to what might be called an “ideational rise”
(encompassing both discourse and soft power). Ideational power is obviously
considered critical, and yet is often treated implicitly as derived from material
power. CCP leaders must still exert agency to realize it, but rarely are the dif-
ficulties associated with deriving ideational from material power examined—
other than perfunctorily.
In a colorfully worded article published in the third issue of the new jour-
nal Studies in Cultural Soft Power, Zhan Dexiong sounds conceptually similar
to Han and Huang (above) as he presents Western discourse power as caging
Chinese (and foreign) minds. “It can be said that everything we think and do,
the opinions that we express, have all—consciously or unconsciously—been
inf luenced by the West, to the point that we normally use Western standards to
judge right and wrong” (Zhan, 2016, p. 50). Just as the initial successes of reform
and opening in the 1980s and 1990s might have allowed China to start claiming
some discourse power, America tried to rope the PRC into the so-called world
mainstream, which was actually a stream directed by, and serving, the United
States. “To achieve this objective, the West wrapped its values in the cloak of
‘universal values’. . . . But if we had admired and worshipped the West, we would
have become the West’s spiritual slaves” (Zhan, 2016, p. 51). As with Han and
Huang of the Central Party School, Zhan finds the GFC to be a critical turning
point in world history paving the way for the China Solution (although Zhan
uses the term “model”) to take center stage. “We can say with certainty that
an economically-developed, politically-f lourishing China that treats humanity
with concern and speaks with reason will lead the trend of world development,
breaking off from the West’s well-worn old path to proceed toward a glorious
future of great universal harmony. The road will be long and uneven, but the
future belongs to us” (Zhan, 2016, p. 52; emphasis added).
54 Daniel C. Lynch

Although here Zhan presents China as already launched on a developmental

course that will result in an inevitable vanquishing of the West with its universal-
ist claims, leading to a China-centric world harmony, his main thrust—as a prac-
ticing journalist—is to argue that success will not come automatically and that
the CCP-controlled media must begin to tell the “China story” more effectively.
Journalists and other media professionals have a responsibility to educate them-
selves in the “principles” that distinguish China from the West—and then to
communicate those principles in their reporting and programming. Zhan offers
four such distinctions (ironically, in the light of distinction 2, binary distinctions)
for consideration:

1 Whereas the West emphasizes individuals selfishly seeking profits, China

emphasizes acting for the community and the common global good, with
the result that China can help lead the world out of the “vicious cycle of pur-
suing profits above all else,” which produced the disaster of the GFC (Zhan,
2016, p. 52).
2 “In terms of thinking methodologies, Westerners easily slide into ‘if it’s not
black, it’s white’ absolute binaries—viewing themselves as civilized, others
as barbaric, themselves as democratic, others as authoritarian, . . . and play
zero-sum games . . . [But] China, since ancient times, has always under-
stood the principle of harmony and the unity of opposites. Consequently, we
[Chinese] seek both-sides-win and the-community-wins solutions” (Zhan,
2016, p. 52).
3 Whereas the United States seeks hegemony and a Pax Americana, “China
promotes the notion of everyone under Heaven belonging to one big family
and forming a community of common destiny” (Zhan, 2016, p. 52).
4 On the question of domestic political systems—critical models for pos-
sible emulation—“Western-style democracy” centers on “money politics,
corrosive party struggles, and pathologies of decision-making that impede
the government’s smooth functioning.” In contrast, “China promotes a
democratic centralism that takes the people as the foundation and that
skillfully balances the relationship between freedom and discipline—not
a perfect system, but one that clearly manifests a potent vitality” (Zhan,
2016, p. 53).

So transparently could these critiques of the West be applied to China that at

first glance it might seem as though Zhan is offering an elliptical criticism of the
contemporary PRC. But the overall triumphalist tone of his essay—including
his proclamation that “the future belongs to us”—suggests instead that either he
believes in his assertions fervently and/or he wants his readers to believe in them.
The possibility of a personage in the propaganda xitong offering even an ellipti-
cal criticism of China’s system in the era of Xi Jinping, and in a new soft power
journal, is remote.
 The end of China’s rise 55

A message to Party members

Zhan’s use of a bombastic tone and his somewhat careless argumentation possibly
ref lects the more popular nature of his broader audience of media professionals.
Adopting a more sober tone—but delivering essentially the same message—is
Fudan University professor Su Changhe (of the School of International Relations
and Public Affairs), writing in the journal Party Construction, and thus aiming his
message at CCP cadres.
Su posits the chief problem to be China’s need to fight for a degree of discourse
power commensurate with its rising level of material power so that it can offer
the world fresh ideas about governance and a compelling new model of devel-
opment. As ever, China’s chief obstacle is said to be the United States, which is
using its “power to guide and inf luence the operation of international organi-
zations, the authoring of international rules of the game, and the maintenance
of international norms and order-maintaining institutions”—what Su calls “the
invisible superstructure of international relations”—to contain China and block
its rise (Su, 2016, pp. 28–29). Su makes three recommendations to Party mem-
bers for increasing China’s discourse power under such hostile circumstances.
First, reject the two deleterious tendencies of mindlessly pursuing integration
into the international realm and wholeheartedly embracing the so-called inter-
national rules of the game to push through domestic reforms. Passively “fusing
into the systems that other people lead” may produce short-term benefits but
only at the cost of becoming dependent on those others (i.e., the US-led Western
countries) in the long run. In a worst-case scenario, fusing into the systems that
other people lead “could even produce the effect of China ‘becoming social-
ized’” into international norms, a prospect which Su considers to be anathema
(Su, 2016, p. 29). “The ultimate objective in great power competition is to see
which power can incorporate the others into its international system, and thereby
‘socialize’ those other powers” (Su, 2016, p. 29). Because China is a responsible
and law-abiding country, Su does not propose trying to destroy existing norms
and institutions. Some international regimes it can accept:

However, as to those arrangements that are obviously unreasonable in their

treatment of the majority of countries, and those that fail to ref lect the
international power structure [now that China has risen in material power
terms], plus those still-in-the-making to address new global challenges
such as the Internet, the environment, the deep seabed, the polar regions,
outer space, and artificial intelligence, China must step forward to play a
far more active role, ref lecting its own perspectives.
(Su, 2016, p. 29)

Second, change the Chinese default mode from “passively accepting” the
inf luence of international norms to “moving actively to shape” the norms to
56 Daniel C. Lynch

make them consistent with PRC interests. By norms, Su means a deeper con-
struct than international regimes. He means discourse power. He gives as an
example the culture of the scientific research world, which he believes devalues
the accomplishments of Chinese scientists. Su contends that the CCP should
work actively to change the culture of the scientific research world to the point
that, for example, Chinese academic journals will become more respected than
Western journals—as a ref lection of Chinese scientists’ tremendous real-world
accomplishments (Su, 2016, p. 30). However, Su does not explain exactly how
this ambitious goal might be achieved. Su also contends that the world’s discur-
sive realm—the realm where values are created and propagated—must be made,
in the course of China’s material rise, consistent with the reality of China’s com-
plex greatness. Using discourse power, the CCP must make international relations
legitimate to the Chinese people (not the other way around), and the only way to
achieve this objective is to change international relations to the point that the
Chinese people can clearly see that the international realm recognizes and exalts
China’s myriad accomplishments.
Third, and more concretely, increase discourse power to reshape (although
not hegemonically) international norms and institutions to better serve Chi-
nese businesses and other actors who have already “gone out” to places like
Africa and Latin America. At present, when Chinese entities need services
abroad, they sometimes lobby the Chinese government to provide them, but
they also lobby foreign governments. This is embarrassing and can cause nega-
tive consequences for Chinese nationals. The CCP must take the initiative to
remake the playing field so that the services Chinese entities demand while
abroad can be provided more easily or even automatically (Su, 2016, p. 30).
The outside world must be made safer and more convenient for Chinese enti-
ties and individuals—and this will ultimately be in the interests of the outside
world itself.

Evidence of the current weakness of Chinese discourse power

Three articles from 2014 published by the neibu (internal-circulation-only) jour-
nal Leadership Reference —directed (as with Party Construction) at CCP elites—
illuminate how the limitations of Chinese discourse power can have real-world
consequences in the everyday politics of CCP efforts to inspire awe.
The first article laments the lackluster consequences of a CCP initiative
to use Confucian Classrooms to teach Mandarin to primary and secondary
school students in Thailand, a key target country in the CCP’s quest to increase
PRC inf luence over Southeast Asia. Zhou Fangye, a researcher at the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences National Institute of International Strategy
(the organization’s official English-language name), complains of “the prob-
lems existing in the promotion of the Chinese language in Thai elementary
and middle schools” (Zhou, 2014, p. 45). The problems stem not from active
Thai resistance to the Chinese initiative; instead, they result from the Thai
 The end of China’s rise 57

side not being impressed enough to implement the instructions of the Chinese
“Confucius Institute Headquarters” (Han Ban) other than perfunctorily. Zhou
complains that the Thai side exercises too much control over the language
programs and will not follow through even on its own initiatives. Rather than
implement serious language training programs, Thai teachers and administra-
tors content themselves with offering an occasional special program or some
simple conversation classes once or so a week. Zhou argues that unless the
Confucius Institute Headquarters steps up and starts asserting greater control
over the direction of the Confucian Classrooms, Thai schoolchildren will sim-
ply not be learning Mandarin.
Yet Zhou acknowledges that Thai schoolchildren have very little incentive
to learn Mandarin, because—as he reports—Thai people are not finding that
studying Chinese for a few years is increasing their competitiveness (or their
children’s competitiveness) in the job market. Unless and until that happens,
goading the Thai teachers and administrators into taking Chinese language
study more seriously is not likely to make much of a difference (Zhou, 2014,
p. 47). Thai people—including the parents of the schoolchildren—seem to
consider Chinese-language study to be amusing but not essential, in contrast
to English, which they regard as critically important for their children to
succeed.
A second example comes from Hong Kong—not “international,” but still, for
many purposes, a part of the “outside world.” “Interior” (neidi ) Chinese people
must constantly battle the problem of having a negative image in Hong Kong
because of the bad behavior of a few—despite the PRC’s economic rise, which
has benefited the Hong Kong economy (Mainlanders believe) enormously. Jiang
Shenghong, of the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences School of Public Opinion
Research, addresses this problem in a 2014 Leadership Reference article, analyzing
“the network public opinion spawned by Mainland children urinating on Hong
Kong streets” ( Jiang, 2014). Consistent with the many other articles in effect
blaming outsiders for having a negative impression of China—a problem that
could be rectified by increasing the PRC’s discourse power—Jiang argues in
his neibu article that the sharp criticism in Hong Kong only ref lects the jealousy
of Hong Kong people aroused by the contrast of dynamic Mainland economic
growth with Hong Kong stagnation. In their insecurity, Hong Kong people
allow emotion to overcome rationality, insofar as “people from any part of the
world might possibly face situations in which they must let children urinate in the
street” ( Jiang, 2014, p. 34). Instead of recognizing the normality of this situation,
Hong Kong people—especially “the media” and “Internet opinion leaders”—
choose to distort and sensationalize it, whereas instead they should explain it
carefully to their compatriots so that Hong Kong people will feel warm, friendly
and welcoming toward Mainlanders even as their children relieve themselves in
the street ( Jiang, 2014, p. 34).
Sometimes Hong Kong media and Internet opinion leaders even go so far as
to report an incident of public urination as a far more serious incident of public
58 Daniel C. Lynch

defecation, thereby “causing society to become disharmonious” ( Jiang, 2014,

pp. 35–36). The significance of this issue for soft and discourse power is that if
the CCP (or “China”) could control the f low of discourse—as called for by other
authors—the “normal” acts of public urination could be defined and defended as
such and no one would look seriously askance.
While the public urination problem as exacerbated by the media and Inter-
net opinion leaders may seem to be trivial, a Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences World History Task Force warned in a third Leadership Reference article
that the long-term consequence of allowing negative images of China to cir-
culate in the world’s communication networks could be serious threats to PRC
sovereignty. The task force (whose individual members are not identified) calls
for the CCP actively to guard against the maligning of China’s reputation in
(particularly) the Western media, or else the PRC could eventually lose ele-
ments of its sovereignty—just as the Qing lost sovereignty over China’s 19th-
century judicial system as a result of slanderous Western rumor-mongering
about Chinese jurisprudence. The distorted impressions that resulted from
the rumor-mongering were used to strengthen Western imperialist calls for
establishing extraterritoriality in China (Chinese Academy, 2014, p. 29). To
avoid a similar calamity in the 21st century, the CCP should mobilize people of
Chinese ancestry in foreign countries to publish op-ed pieces and make media
appearances in which they refute negative assertions being made about China
in the global communication networks (Chinese Academy, 2014, pp. 30–32).
The task force members seem to think that ethnic Chinese people in foreign
countries will be quick to take umbrage when their ancestral land is vilified
but more effective in rebutting the negative imagery than citizens of the PRC
itself.

One slightly dissenting voice

Overwhelmingly, the Chinese writing on soft power is realist, in IR theory
terms, imagining a world of fierce contestation between China and the West,
particularly the United States. But one writer who, to a degree, rejects a real-
ist ontology is Wang Lili, an associate professor at the Renmin University of
China’s National Development and Strategy Research Institute. Writing in the
aftermath of Brexit and of Donald Trump’s election as US president, Wang con-
tends that China’s rise is now threatened by anti-globalization forces in the West.
Within this context, the CCP must mobilize Chinese energies to play a critical
role in working with like-minded foreigners to wage a new and unanticipated
struggle to save globalization from the atavistic forces trying to destroy it ( Wang
Lili, 2017). Instead of scheming to take advantage of US and Western political
disarray to advance China’s relative position, the CCP should, in Wang’s view,
“urgently make use of public diplomacy to strengthen mutual understanding,
dialogue, and cooperation” with those Americans who understand globalization’s
importance “so that a foundation can be built for mutual trust” ( Wang Lili, 2017,
 The end of China’s rise 59

p. 45). Wang finds this effort to be “a time-critical practical responsibility”—and

she offers some earlier statements of Xi Jinping made in different contexts to
buttress her case.
Wang seems to be arguing against the many Chinese analysts who berate and
malign the West and portray China as locked in a mortal struggle for civi-
lizational survival with particularly the United States. But what is especially
significant about her article is that she presents China as already possessing
the power and the agency to play a primary role in saving globalization. She
shares with her more cynically realist counterparts an evident confidence in the
robustness of China’s rise. Western anti-globalization movements may threaten
the rise, but China need not be a passive victim. China has the power—soft and
otherwise—to turn back the tide, or at least to contribute critically to an inter-
national effort to turn back the tide. Working with pro-globalization groups
in the West, China can do more than save itself; it can help save the world
from what Wang regards as some of its own worst tendencies ( Wang Lili, 2017,
pp. 46–47).

The outlook: look out?

All of the Chinese writers surveyed for this chapter assert a potency for the
PRC—a capacity to transform the international system—that the economic,
demographic and environmental data strongly suggest may not be warranted.
The data also suggest that the disconnect between the Chinese analysts’
expressed self-confidence (in addition to the “mass” self-confidence encouraged
by Xi’s China Dream campaign) and material reality can only be suppressed
from conscious awareness for so long: how long is not clear, but the capital f light
of 2014–2017 (eventually contained by use of capital controls) suggests that many
PRC citizens already understand the situation for what it is. Possibly the ana-
lysts, too, understand the situation, and express self-confidence only because the
Party Centre has effectively ordered them to do so. But either way, encouraging
excessively high expectations about how glorious China’s future can be or how
profound China’s international inf luence can become risks encouraging popular
and elite expectations to depart from realistic possibilities. This is important,
because only rarely in other times and places has the frustration of rising and/or
excessive expectations ended well.
These emerging contradictions point to the precise significance of the sort
of articles analyzed in this chapter. The question posed at the beginning was
whether the Chinese economic slowdown of the mid-2010s and beyond (which
looks likely to dissolve into substantially slower long-term economic growth)
has affected the optimistic hubris of CCP discourse concerning China’s rise that
characterized the period of the new foreign policy assertiveness after 2008. This
is not the same question as whether the slowdown has affected popular thinking
on China’s rise. The question, rather, concerns the expressed self-confidence
of the CCP leadership, as ref lected in the discourses its propaganda apparatus
60 Daniel C. Lynch

articulates directly and through the intellectuals and journalists the Party pres-
sures (even more so, it would appear, under Xi Jinping than under his immedi-
ate predecessors) into shaping their research and writing to comport with CCP
objectives. The answer seems clearly that the Party and those working under
its guidance are continuing despite the economic slowdown and likely end of
China’s relative rise to express an optimism bordering on hubris regarding the
soft power dimension of China’s imagined comprehensive ascent. This optimism
is in a sense an angry or resentful optimism to the extent that writers complain
China should already have a higher level of soft power than it actually does have
relative to the United States and the broader West. What keeps China down,
they complain, is behind-the-scenes, illegitimate Western manipulation of the
levers of discourse power, which shadowy Western actors use to malign China’s
reputation.
The weakness in most of this Chinese writing is that the academic and
journalistic figures supplying the analyses and thereby conveying the official
Xi-ist optimism do not explain how, exactly, China will eventually surpass
the US-led West in soft power. They suggest by implication that China’s con-
tinually increasing relative material power will somehow—automatically, in
effect—transform first into discourse power and then into soft power. But
there is no evidence this has been happening so far—indeed, there may be a
negative relationship between rising Chinese material power and the PRC’s
levels of soft power (partly because more Chinese material wealth may make
the country seem more fearsome to outsiders). Why should this tendency now
change? Even more pointedly, the economy has now slowed to the point that
it seems quite clear China’s rise relative to the United States has stalled. The
CCP-guided analysts’ failure to confront this material fact is the chief weak-
ness in their assessments. If they implicitly assume the economic rise will even-
tually solve the soft power deficit automatically, their optimism will prove
profoundly misplaced if, in fact, the economic rise in relative terms is over.
The Chinese analysts—and those members of the general public they do man-
age to inf luence—would suffer from the frustration of rising expectations
being nurtured under the “China Dream” rubric. The CCP would then have
to contend with a whole new set of vexing challenges in governance, domestic
and international.

Note
1 Xi’s Three Self Confidences became Four Self Confidences in July 2016 (Gan, 2017).

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62 Daniel C. Lynch

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3
IRONIES OF SOFT POWER
PROJECTION
The United States and China in the age
of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping

Stanley Rosen

Ten years ago, in an article examining China’s soft power deficit compared to
Western nations, the Deputy Director of the General Administration of Press
and Publications noted pessimistically that the United States held 43% of the
soft power in the world, while the European Union accounted for another 34%.
Excluding Japan and Australia, China and the rest of Asia was limited to less
than 4% ( Jiang, 2010). While the methodology that produced these striking
conclusions can be questioned since soft power is notoriously difficult to mea-
sure, the Chinese concern with their own lack of success was clear. A decade
later and several years into the presidency of Donald Trump, the evidence of
the decline of the American image internationally is overwhelming. Writings
by scholars, journalists and political pundits appear uniformly to agree that the
actions of President Trump have severely damaged America’s strong advantage
in soft power—getting what you want through attraction and persuasion rather
than coercion and payment—particularly in relation to its competition with a
rising China, which has been investing heavily in promoting its own brand as an
alternative to the United States. The results from the spring 2017 Pew Research
Center Global Attitudes Survey are especially striking. When respondents in 37
countries were asked about their confidence in the American president to do
the right thing in world affairs, comparing the results Obama received at the
end of his presidency with Trump’s results, only two countries—Russia and
Israel—had more confidence in Trump. The gap was particularly large in West-
ern European countries, Japan and South Korea, Canada and Australia ( Pew
Research Center, 2017).
Given these results, the two questions of most current interest are: (1) What
are the longer-term implications of the damage inf licted on American soft power
by the Trump presidency? (2) Has China has been able to reap the rewards from
the American decline and, if so, are China’s gains sustainable?
64 Stanley Rosen

China has, to be sure, made efforts to fill the vacuum created by Trump’s
“America First” policy, with President Xi Jinping’s January 2017 speech at the
Davos World Economic Forum promoting China’s belief in globalization and
win-win strategies a clear response. Even with Trump attending the 2018 Davos
Forum to reassure investors that “America first doesn’t mean America alone,” and
in the absence of Xi, the subsequent reporting suggested that “the geopolitical
momentum [still] lay with Beijing, not Washington” ( Bradsher, 2018). Moreover,
as some leading Chinese international relations theorists had suggested, China
has moved to expand a “green card” program to provide permanent residency to
“high end” foreigners (Ives, 2017; Yan, 2017), precisely when the United States
has moved to restrict its H-1B visa processing lottery for skilled foreign workers
( Yu, 2017). The Pew survey provides compelling evidence that China is indeed
catching up. The number of nations in which the United States holds a competi-
tive advantage in favorability over China has halved over the last few years, from
25 to 12; whereas the United States once had a 12-point lead over China in terms
of a global median, by 2017 that lead had shrunk to 2 points. Regionally, China
is particularly well liked in Latin America and the Middle East, while the United
States scores higher in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
Other surveys, however, suggest that while the United States has indeed fallen,
China’s rise has been rather less dramatic. For example, the annual Portland
Soft Power 30, which uses a more complex methodology, shows that while the
United States fell to number 4 by 2018, after a 2016 ranking as number 1, and
is now surpassed by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, China came in
at number 27, down two places from 2017, and well behind leading democra-
cies in Western Europe, North America and East Asia ( Portland Soft Power
30, 2018). In addition, the annual Gallup poll of 134 countries, taken one year
into the Trump presidency, shows how closely the American decline is tied to
its president. The median global approval rating of the job performance of US
leadership stands at a new low of 30%, down nearly 20 points from the 48%
approval rating in the last year of President Obama’s administration, and four
points lower than the previous low of 34% in the last year of President George W.
Bush’s administration. However, it is useful to note that the approval rating for
China’s leadership was only 31%, the same figure as in 2010, and there has been
little variation in recent years; indeed, the high for China was 37% in 2008, the
year of the Beijing Olympics. By contrast, German leadership, at 41%, scores far
higher than the United States or China (Gallup, 2018).
As I will suggest, using additional data and evidence to be discussed below,
the current decline of the American image under President Trump notwith-
standing, there are compelling factors that will make it difficult for China to
surpass the United States in the generation of soft power. However, as I will also
note, despite a good deal of rhetoric and a great deal of expense, China may in
fact be less interested in soft power than is commonly suggested, and has shown,
even in the absence of soft power, an ability to inf luence other nations, if not to
do what China desires, at least to not do what they abhor.
 Ironies of soft power projection 65

First, it has been well documented that American soft power has been success-
ful in China and elsewhere despite the indifference of the US government, while a
massive Chinese governmental effort at a cost of over $10 billion a year in support
of its “go abroad” (zouchuqu) strategy, while certainly enjoying some success, has
been less effective in the United States and most countries outside the Third World.
What is striking, however, is that American soft power has been notably successful
in China—and throughout the world—despite the lack of soft power promotion
by the American government, a strong aversion to American foreign policy and
the belief that such foreign policy is designed to keep China weak and maintain
American hegemony, and Chinese government efforts to impede the American
success. American government neglect of soft power promotion is due, in part, to
the nature of the American political and electoral systems, and in part to the belief
that America is strong enough to do as it pleases with or without approbation from
outside its borders. When the bipartisan Bowles-Simpson Commission came up
with proposals to stem the burgeoning federal budget deficit, the cuts were con-
centrated in areas the American public already questions, for example the State
Department and America’s foreign operations, not entitlements, military expen-
ditures or changing the tax system, where the real money is located. As one Con-
gressman told Joseph Nye, the academic who coined the term soft power in 1990,
“You are right about the importance of combining soft power with hard power, but
I cannot talk about soft power and hope to get re-elected” (Nye, 2002, 2004, 2011).
The cuts in funding to the Voice of America China programs—what one critic
called “unilateral disarmament”—have been widely reported and lamented ( Bosco,
2012). WikiLeaks has released cables from the American Consulate in Shanghai
pleading for government support for the American pavilion at the Shanghai Expo,
warning that “the US business community . . . is not enthusiastic about a ‘national’
pavilion that must be 100% funded by the private sector.” On the verge of inform-
ing the Shanghai authorities that the Expo would have to go forward without
US participation, American diplomats warned Washington that in addition to the
inevitable damage to US–China relations, “the damage to the US public image
will be global” ( WikiLeaks, 2008). In the end, the $61 million funding was pro-
vided by around 60 multinational corporations, resulting in a pavilion whose most
visible attribute was a series of product placements leading, according to a recent
documentary film, to a serious loss of face for America among Chinese and foreign
visitors (Chow, 2018). Seen in this context, the Trump administration’s announce-
ment that the State Department’s budget would be cut by 31%, while dramatic and
eye-catching, was in a sense an extension of the long-standing emphasis on hard
power over soft power (Harris, 2017). What Trump has done is to move from the
American government’s benign neglect to active sabotage of soft power.
If it seems ironic that American soft power has been successful in China and
elsewhere despite the indifference of the US government, it is equally ironic
that the massive Chinese governmental effort has made only limited inroads in
the United States and most countries outside the Third World. However, there
is an explanation for this seemingly surprising outcome. American soft power,
66 Stanley Rosen

it could be argued, has been successful precisely because it is not linked to the
American government, whereas the Chinese promotion of soft power hardly
exists apart from the efforts of its government. Chen Shengluo, a Chinese aca-
demic who does surveys on university student attitudes toward the United
States and other countries, noted the existence of “two Americas” in the minds
of Chinese students, a “hegemonist” America on the international stage and
an America in which a high level of development has been achieved at home
because of its values and social system (Chen, 2003). American culture could
succeed in China (and elsewhere) only because the students (and foreign publics)
could accept this separation. Indeed, when the NATO-led US bombed the Chi-
nese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in May 1999 during the war in Kosovo,
the Chinese media tried to link the hegemonist United States with the cultural
United States, asserting that everything from American blockbuster films to the
promotion of human rights and globalization, not to mention “Western civiliza-
tion” more generally, was part of a deliberate conspiracy by America to control
the world. This approach was highlighted in an award-winning series in Beijing
Youth Daily (Beijing qingnian bao) ( Rosen, 2003).1 Surveys done in China soon
after the bombing strongly suggested, however, that such governmental efforts
were unsuccessful, that popular disillusionment toward US culture was short-
lived (Zhao, 2002).
Several months after Trump’s inauguration the 2017 Pew survey in effect
acknowledged this separation between government and popular and political
culture, with the results suggesting continuing support for Americans, Ameri-
can culture and civil liberties. For example, while showing widespread disap-
proval of Trump’s major policy proposals and his personal characteristics, 65% of
respondents in the 37 countries “liked” American music, movies and television
(29% did not); 58% held a favorable view of Americans (26% did not); and 54%
said the US government respected the personal freedoms of its people (39% dis-
sented) ( Pew, 2017). The clear unpopularity of Trump among most Americans
was a likely contributing factor in the willingness to isolate him from overall
views of the United States. Joseph Nye noted that he doubted the decline in the
American image is likely to persist over the long term, unless Trump gets the
United States into a major war, or if he gets elected to a second term and damages
the American system of checks and balances and America’s reputation as a demo-
cratic society (Osnos, 2018). Indeed, there are early warning signs of the latter.
The Pew survey showed that slightly more people disliked American ideas about
democracy than liked them (46% to 43%), with a larger percentage suggesting
opposition to American ideas and customs spreading to their own countries (54%
opposed, 38% in favor).
Second, and equally important, despite the large investment China has made
in getting its message to the outside world, China’s highest priority remains
domestic, the maintenance of political and social stability within China. They
have repeatedly demonstrated, with the arrests of human rights lawyers and activ-
ists, harsh policies affecting Uyghurs and Tibetans and their retaliation against
 Ironies of soft power projection 67

countries such as Norway, the Philippines, France, South Korea and Canada,
that a bad press outside China, or even a reputation as a “bully,” is an acceptable
price in their hierarchy of values. William Callahan, in arguing that China uses
soft power more for domestic policy—to promote legitimacy—than for foreign
affairs, has called this “negative soft power” (Callahan, 2015).
Further evidence that soft power, which takes a considerable time to generate,
is not China’s primary goal can be seen in behavior that the National Endow-
ment for Democracy, in assessing the overseas activities of Russia and China, has
characterized as “sharp power,” where the attraction of culture and values associ-
ated with soft power is replaced by attempts to coerce and manipulate opinion
abroad, particularly in democratic societies ( National Endowment for Democ-
racy, 2017; Nye, 2018). However, while the term is recent, China’s use of sharp
power is not new, albeit the most recent methods to manipulate public opinion,
as the revelations and pushback from Australia suggest, are more covert. After
a series of media reports on China’s efforts to interfere in Australian politics, in
part through the funding of local politicians by Chinese-born political donors,
Australia’s prime minister Malcolm Turnbull introduced a series of proposed
laws to curb foreign inf luence. The Chinese Embassy reacted by railing against
the “typical anti-China hysteria in media accounts,” noting that the criticism
of China has “unscrupulously vilified the Chinese students as well as the Chi-
nese community in Australia with racial prejudice, which in turn has tarnished
Australia’s reputation as a multicultural society,” in effect taking a criticism of
Chinese Communist Party covert activities and conf lating it into an attack on
all Chinese (Cave, 2017). Within China, the media made it clear that Australia,
which relies heavily on Chinese trade and investment, as well as the tuition stu-
dents pay at Australian universities, was only harming itself in terms of Chinese
public opinion. This view was advanced in the results of an online poll where
Chinese netizens were asked to choose the “least friendly country to China in
2017.” As China’s Global Times noted, Australia won “in a landslide,” followed by
India, the United States, Japan and South Korea (Global Times, 2017). Done at
different times, of course, the poll would have found a different rank order, and
other countries equally high on this list. Although no such survey was done at the
end of 2018, it is likely that the primary enemy would then have been Canada, as
a result of the detention of Meng Wanzhou, the daughter of the founder of Hua-
wei, and its chief financial officer, and for 2019 it presumably would have been
the United States, as a result of the Sino–American “trade war.” It is precisely
this sensitivity within China to the image of the country that is portrayed over-
seas, and the retaliation, or threat of retaliation, against those countries that are
deemed to have offended China, that shows a continuing lack of self-confidence
and which remains a major obstacle to its soft power ambitions.
This apparent contradiction—the commitment of extensive resources to pro-
mote China’s soft power, while prioritizing other goals such as political and social
stability, along with the willingness to sacrifice short-term soft power in order
to defend China’s honor—becomes more understandable in Chinese official and
68 Stanley Rosen

academic writings on soft power. Most authors exude strong self-confidence in

the inevitability of the increase in China’s soft power as the country’s economic
and international status continue to rise, suggesting that were it not for the con-
tinuation of the long history of American and Western policies to deny China
its rightful place in the world, using their control of global media, China would
have already succeeded. As with the United States, the argument goes, Chinese
soft power will f low from the recognition of China’s hard power (Shen, 2017), a
point that is also emphasized in Daniel Lynch’s chapter in this volume.
Indeed, China is correct about the importance of global media not under
their control but, as noted above, their own target audience is primarily domestic
and their intention is to avoid negative reporting, particularly on sensitive sub-
jects. Thus, a Wall Street Journal reporter was the latest journalist to be expelled
from China for reporting on an Australian investigation of the activities of a
cousin of Xi Jinping, leading to strong condemnation by the Foreign Corre-
spondents’ Club of China ( Wee, 2019). This also explains their reporting on
the unrest in Hong Kong, where they have compared protestors to Nazis and
cockroaches, and tools of foreign forces, while inf laming nationalist sentiment
by the selective airing of videos showing images of violence from protestors.
Facebook and Twitter have removed hundreds of accounts they determined were
“state-backed,” and Twitter has now forbidden state-run media outlets from pay-
ing to get their tweets promoted so they appear prominently in users’ timelines.
At home this strategy appears to be highly successful, but outside China, where
diverse sources of information are available, their efforts appear to have backfired
( Yuan, 2019).
That said, the competition between China and America is not a zero-sum
game where China automatically gains when the United States loses nor, as we
have seen under President Trump, does soft power directly follow from hard
power. As then Defense Secretary James Mattis noted, in decrying the loss in
American soft power while giving an impromptu speech to American troops in
Jordan in August 2017, despite America’s widely acknowledged “power of intim-
idation,” the United States has lost the “power of inspiration” ( Betley, 2017). In a
similar manner, the economic and military rise of China, and the increasing use
of China’s sharp power, has been intimidating but at least in the democracies of
the world, it has not been inspiring.

China’s constraints in its soft power competition

with the United States and other actors
The most familiar and visible area of American success of course is cultural,
although cultural soft power is only one dimension, with some surveys measur-
ing soft power along economic, human capital, political and diplomatic dimen-
sions, in addition to culture ( Bouton and Holyk, 2011). Then Secretary General
Hu Jintao, in an internal speech in October 2011 at a Central Committee ple-
num, focused on the cultural as he railed against the penetration of Western
 Ironies of soft power projection 69

culture into China, noting that the West and China were engaged in an “esca-
lating war” in which China must respond to the “strategic plot” to Westernize
and divide the country, with the ideological and cultural fields seen as the “focal
areas of [the West’s] long-term infiltration.” As he concluded, in contrast to the
strong culture of the West, the international inf luence of Chinese culture “is
not commensurate with China’s international status” ( Wong, 2012). However,
it is important to understand that the problem suggested by General Secretary
Hu goes well beyond the success of Hollywood films at the Chinese box office,
or the popularity of Lady Gaga and Beyoncé in China or, as one Chinese book
title put it, “We don’t have Avatar” (Han, 2011).2 As it seeks to compete with
American, European, Japanese and South Korean soft power throughout the
world, particularly beyond the other authoritarian systems, the constraints China
faces ref lect, most fundamentally, the nature of the Chinese political system,
Chinese government policies, and the continuing inf luence of traditional Chi-
nese culture.
Robert Cain, in analyzing why South Korea, despite its smaller size and more
limited state investment, has a far greater global cultural impact than China,
pointed to five reasons (Cain, 2012). First, China has invested in hard assets
such as production and post-production facilities, but not in the kind of training
that would nurture creative talent. Second, the political regime has remained
deeply antagonistic toward true artistic expression. Third, Chinese storytelling
emphasizes the collective over the individual, while American blockbusters suc-
ceed by emphasizing heroes or even anti-heroes who succeed by ignoring the
rules. Fourth, censorship tends to be unpredictable, with government suspicion
and interference possible at every stage, stif ling creative and innovative ideas.
Fifth, the educational system emphasizes obedience to authority and discour-
ages idiosyncratic expression (Cain, 2012). Other analysts have noted that Chi-
nese soft power “lacks credibility,” that the projection of soft power needs to be
matched by deeds (D’Hooghe, 2011). Massive state funding cannot compensate
for the fact that China lags far behind in those areas Joseph Nye has identified
as most important for soft power projection: a dominant culture and ideology
close to prevailing norms, credibility enhanced by domestic and international
performance and access to multiple channels of communication, which enables
the framing of issues. While China is addressing some of this deficit, particularly
with regard to expanding its communication channels, the state’s self-imposed
limits on what can be communicated remain a serious obstacle.
A good example of South Korean success in an area where China should be
well placed to succeed was the soap opera My Love from Another Star (lai zi xing-
xing de ni ), which reportedly garnered over three billion views online despite
the fact that it was never broadcast over any of China’s major television net-
works. It led to soul-searching by Chinese officials, becoming a hot topic
for discussion at the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) meetings in Beijing. One CPPCC delegate
suggested that “it is more than just a Korean soap opera. It hurts our national
70 Stanley Rosen

dignity” ( Wan, 2014a). When another South Korean drama, this time with a
military theme, Descendants of the Sun (taiyang de houyi ) again dominated the
ratings and trending topics on Weibo, China’s version of Twitter, the response
from Chinese officialdom was more forceful and direct. The Ministry of Public
Security warned via their Weibo account that “watching Korean dramas could
be dangerous, and may even lead to legal troubles,” citing some real-life cases of
domestic violence, divorce and plastic surgery, all of which it related to an obses-
sion with Korean dramas and accompanied with photos of similar incidents from
various Korean television series ( Tan, 2016). Politburo Standing Committee
member Wang Qishan, also a big fan of House of Cards, had noted in reference to
earlier dramas, that “Korean drama is ahead of us,” while also pointing out that
“the core and soul of the Korean [soap] opera is a distillation of traditional Chi-
nese culture; it just propagates traditional Chinese culture in the form of a TV
drama,” ironically suggesting that South Korea is better at presenting Chinese
culture than China itself ( Wan, 2014a). Wang’s comments suggest that this (and
similar) Korean family dramas may be indirectly enhancing China’s soft power.
This is reminiscent of an earlier debate over the DreamWorks blockbuster Kung
Fu Panda films, where some in China sought to vilify and boycott the first film
because it had co-opted for its own profit two important symbols of Chinese
culture, pandas and martial arts, while others felt that it was respectful to those
symbols and even helped promote Chinese culture to a global audience. Indeed,
as I have argued elsewhere, examining the dialogue and the reception within
China of Kung Fu Panda, 2012, and other films, Hollywood quite consciously
does a better job of promoting Chinese soft power than China’s own film indus-
try ( Rosen, 2011).
Nevertheless, there remains a concern, even a fear, of foreign cultural imports
which are too successful in China, as the Ministry of Public Security’s warn-
ings about Descendants of the Sun indicated. More importantly, following the
line of reasoning suggested above, culture and soft power more generally are
subordinate to other, more important values, particularly politics. Thus, when
South Korea agreed to deploy the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense) missile system against the threat from North Korea, despite strong
Chinese objections over the impact on China’s own missile deterrent system,
Song Joong Ki, the star of Descendants, was one of many Korean celebrities and
K-pop groups prohibited from appearing on Chinese television, giving concerts
or attending public events, with many netizens quoted in the Chinese media in
support of the Chinese government’s position (Chheda, 2016).
Arguably, another example of this phenomenon may be the American televi-
sion series House of Cards, which had great success since the first season began to
be streamed by Sohu, roughly a Chinese equivalent of Netf lix, in March 2013.
The first season had 24.5 million Chinese views, with the largest proportion
coming from government employees and Beijing residents. The release of season
two in February 2014 received more than nine million views in its first weekend,
ranking number one among American shows streamed by Sohu, beating out
 Ironies of soft power projection 71

The Big Bang Theory. As the official Xinhua News Agency acknowledged, “A
large number of our country’s senior leaders in government and enterprises and
opinion leaders also highly recommend this show” ( Wan, 2014b). Perhaps it is
not surprising that China’s leaders would find this show appealing. Wang Qishan,
who seems to spend a fair amount of time watching foreign TV programming,
was reported to “attach great importance” to protagonist Kevin Spacey (Frank
Underwood in the show) as majority whip in the House of Representatives,
since his role is to “maintain party unity” ( Wertime, 2013). China’s ambassador
to the United States, Cui Tiankai, in noting that he had watched two seasons
of the show, suggested that it exposes the disadvantages of American bipartisan
politics and “embodies some of the characteristics and corruption that is present
in American politics,” where “many things can never be accomplished because
the interests of each party are of the greatest importance” (China Envoy, 2014).
While China was merely a peripheral part of season one, mentioned only when
a billionaire with close personal ties to the president is speaking Chinese on his
cellphone in the pursuit of his business interests, season two had a politically well-
connected and corrupt Chinese businessman as a major player. In addition to
increasing the show’s popularity in China, it also led to an interesting debate, as
with Hollywood films, over whether the show represents a “victory” for Chinese
soft power (Zhu, 2014). Those who argue in favor of such a conclusion point to
a telling and smirking aside to the audience from Underwood, after his political
machinations have landed him the vice presidency, that he is now only a heart-
beat away from the top without getting a single vote, adding for emphasis that
“democracy is so overrated,” a line that could have been written in Zhongnanhai.
Season two also showed the arrival of China on the world stage, with the power of
a Chinese protagonist to inf luence American politics at the highest level.
However, although House of Cards—a favorite of then President Obama as
well—clearly reveals a political system that is highly corrupt and often dysfunc-
tional, it is not self-evident that the show enhances Chinese soft power. Indeed,
one possible reason for the show’s popularity is that the (fictional) Washing-
ton portrayed is much closer to Chinese politics than it is to American poli-
tics. The line about not getting a single vote—after all, Frank Underwood was
elected multiple times to Congress in his district in South Carolina—applies
much more to politicians in China than to politicians in the United States. The
corrupt Chinese businessman is closely connected to his political patrons at the
top of the political system, very reminiscent of Bo Xilai and his financial back-
ers. Several Chinese viewers, no doubt tongue in cheek, suggested in Weibo
postings, “How could the American Ministry of Propaganda have allowed this
show to be broadcast?” (China Digital Times, 2014). The program also reveals
the complicated nature of the American political system, with its checks and
balances between the executive and the legislature, the critical role of the press
as a watchdog on government corruption and malfeasance, and the interaction
between the representative and his or her constituency, represented most force-
fully by the tragic character of Peter Russo and his working-class constituents in
72 Stanley Rosen

Philadelphia. As will be noted below, surveys in China have shown that among
elite university students, the American political system is seen as far better than
the Chinese political system in combatting corruption, in part because there is
surprising admiration for the separation of powers; by contrast, there appears to
be skepticism that a one-party authoritarian system with no institutional checks
on its power can police itself. It would be interesting to do a similar survey on
the reception of House of Cards in China to see whether this positive assessment
of the American political system has been reinforced or negated by the show’s
revelations.
Ironically, the freedom to create shows of this nature, or even films such as
Kung Fu Panda, which features this iconic symbol of China as fat and lazy when
he is first introduced to the audience, is particularly frustrating to China’s own
filmmakers. At a meeting of delegates from the culture and entertainment indus-
try at the CPPCC, Chinese censorship was cited as one of the key reasons why
a program such as House of Cards could never be produced within China. Film
director Feng Xiaogang noted that while he waits for a film to go through the
“examination and approval system,” his “heart trembles,” while another enter-
tainer said that “my wings and imagination are all broken” as a result of the
vetting process ( Wan, 2014b). One recent example of this phenomenon which
attracted worldwide attention was the withdrawal—for “technical reasons”—of
the latest film from Zhang Yimou, China’s most prominent filmmaker, at the last
minute from the 69th Berlin International Film Festival in 2019. This led to the
entire jury appearing onstage to make the announcement and express their great
disappointment over this decision, and to media throughout the world openly
speculating on the possible reasons for this decision, ranging from the subject
matter—the Cultural Revolution—to the new role of the Communist Party’s
Propaganda Department in the entertainment sector. From a soft power perspec-
tive, this familiar lack of transparency is counterproductive to the enhancement
of China’s global image (Qin, 2019).
The continued success of American cultural products in China is likely to
be tested by the deteriorating relationship over trade and other issues that has
marked the regimes of Presidents Trump and Xi, as anti-US sentiment has soared
in Chinese official media and online discussions. However, such sentiment did
not dampen the enthusiasm for viewing the final episode of HBO’s Game of
Thrones. After Chinese authorities blocked HBO in 2018 over an episode in
which John Oliver mocked Xi Jinping on his comedy show Last Week Tonight,
the only official channel showing Game of Thrones was Tencent Video, which
postponed showing the finale because of a “technical issue.” After the “postpone-
ment,” which in effect was a cancellation, “online Chinese fans were in uproar”
(Zhang, 2019). Many viewers turned to pirated versions of the final episode,
noting that Tencent edited the content for violence and “lewd content” anyway,
and demonstrating once again how Chinese youth could compartmentalize the
“bad America” (foreign policy) and separate it from the attractions of American
culture, albeit both aspects are included in Nye’s definition of soft power.
 Ironies of soft power projection 73

House of Cards and Game of Thrones are also good examples of Robert Cain’s
point, noted above, that American blockbusters often feature heroic or anti-
heroic individuals fighting against the system while in China the emphasis is
placed on the collective over the individual. His point was strikingly evident
in the response within China to Chinese writer Mo Yan’s success in winning
the 2012 Nobel Prize for Literature. As the first “mainstream” Chinese writer
to be accorded such an honor, which has also eluded scientists who are citizens
of the PRC, it was not surprising that Mo Yan’s victory was front-page news.
However, while Mo noted that it was an individual prize and suggested that it
was unlikely to have a lasting impact on Chinese literature or even the popu-
larity of his own works, local officials in his hometown of Gaomi in eastern
Shandong province emphasized the value of the prize for the larger community
( Tam, 2012). Within a week they announced plans to spend 670 million RMB
($107 million) to transform Mo Yan’s home village into a “Red Sorghum Cul-
ture and Experience Zone,” and have local residents cultivate the red sorghum
that had already been proven to be unprofitable. As a local official noted to
Mo’s 90-year-old father, “Your son is no longer your son, and the house is no
longer your house” since your son is now the pride of China. “It does not really
matter if you agree or not” ( Xin Jing Bao, 2012; Moore, 2012; Link, 2012).
An official from the local tourism bureau explained that provincial authorities
ordered Gaomi to execute the tourism program regardless of how Mo Yan and
his family felt about it ( Li, 2012).
A rather similar situation applied in the case of tennis star Li Na, winner
of the French Open in 2011 and the Australian Open in 2014, after which she
retired. Her victory in France was celebrated with a picture of Li kissing the
trophy at the top of the front page of People’s Daily ( Renmin ribao, 2011). Her
victory at the Australian Open received much more international publicity, in
part because it was her last event before retiring, and in part because of her
widely acclaimed speech—in English—which demonstrated not only her lin-
guistic ability, but her sharp sense of humor. She thanked her agent, who “makes
me rich,” and her husband: “You’re a nice guy; also, you are so lucky to find me”
( YouTube, 2014). Indeed, after winning the French Open she secured endorse-
ments worth US$40 million, making her the third-best-paid female athlete in
the world. Given all the people she thanked, it was striking that she didn’t refer
to her time in China, prompting Xinhua to note that her success “would not
have been possible without her time on the national team” ( Economist, 2014).
What Xinhua did not report was her escape from the national team in 2002,
returning to the university and leaving tennis. She agreed to return only when
she was allowed to choose her own coach and retain 90% of her earnings, instead
of giving over 50% to the state. It was also striking to contrast the visual image
of a smiling Li opening a champagne bottle in Australia (Getty Images, 2014) to
the unsmiling picture of her, back home in China, receiving a reward of 800,000
yuan ($132,000) from a local official. Her 22 million followers on Sina Weibo
ensured that the latter picture went viral ( Economist, 2014).
74 Stanley Rosen

Such independent thought from Chinese athletes surfaced again during the
2016 Olympics when swimmer Fu Yuanhui went off-script during an interview
with a Chinese reporter to explain why her team came in fourth in the 4 × 100
medley relay. The reporter, noticing her bent over, hands on her midsection,
asked whether she was experiencing stomach pain. Li’s unexpected response was
that her “period started last night . . . so I’m feeling pretty weak and really tired.
But this isn’t an excuse . . . I just didn’t swim very well” ( Hollywood Reporter,
2016). It was not just Chinese netizens on social media who praised such candor;
the comments section following The Hollywood Reporter article was filled with
praise from Westerners who noted that Fu had become their favorite Olympian,
just as the comments on Li’s YouTube speech offered glowing praise for “their
favorite tennis player.” The spontaneity and individualism of Li and Fu vividly
demonstrate one of the major problems of Chinese soft power projection, the
inability to allow the individual to succeed and behave as an individual, apart
from the state apparatus that, in the official discourse, has created that success.
Given the rise of the middle class and a consumer society in recent years it
is perhaps not surprising to find individualism and other values associated with
the United States and the West gaining prominence in China. However, even in
the sensitive area of politics, China has faced a soft power deficit. For example,
an extensive survey done by Chen Shengluo found, to his great surprise, that
elite university students in Beijing had a decided preference for the American
political system over the Chinese system. In particular, as suggested above, they
admired the separation of powers. In his sample of 505 students at Beijing’s best
universities, 31.7% liked the separation of powers a great deal and 43% liked it
somewhat. When those who chose “so-so” ( yiban) are added, the total comes to
95.8%, with only 4.2% choosing “somewhat dislike it” and not a single student
choosing “entirely dislike it.”3 Chen interpreted these results as an indication
that the students felt the Party’s monopoly of power would never be able to
solve the problem of official corruption—the number one grievance in Chinese
society according to many surveys—and that the American system did a bet-
ter job in this regard (Chen, 2011). His findings are congruent with an earlier
internal government survey done among Chinese university students that found
well over 80% agreeing that Western visual culture products propagate Western
political concepts and lifestyles, but only 17% noting they “don’t identify with
them” (Rosen, 2010; Lingdao canyue, 2007).
The 2012 American presidential election and the political transition in China,
occurring at virtually the same time (November 6 and November 8), also offers
some valuable lessons on why American political soft power has been more suc-
cessful than its Chinese counterpart, which can be seen from the reaction of the
Chinese media and Chinese citizens to the operation of the two political systems.
While there was a virtual blackout in the Chinese media on the Chinese transi-
tion, and the focus on the American election included some discussion of the
familiar “China-bashing” that has been a feature of many American presidential
elections, the general public appeared to be less interested in the actual issues and
 Ironies of soft power projection 75

more excited by the process through which the candidates sought to attract votes
( Liu, 2012). In a rather similar manner, the 2016 American election was widely
discussed in China, with one Chinese observer who studied the election and the
Chinese reaction noting that her friends “are fascinated by the unprecedented
fierce competition among the candidates and by the fact that the so-called anti-
establishment candidates have gained so much popularity” (Zhang, 2016).
By contrast, despite public interest, politics in China remains off limits as a
topic of discussion and debate. It is instructive to examine the reporting on the
abolition of presidential term limits in China in 2018, with Western report-
ers treating the story as a turning point in the West’s understanding of China,
noting that “decades of optimism about China’s rise have now been discarded”
( Economist, 2018). China’s state-run media was extremely low-key, suggesting
that the repeal was one of a number of constitutional changes, an “adjustment,”
or “a perfecting of the term system for president.” By contrast, it was a major
topic on Chinese social media, with censors hard at work to remove the many
critical comments that appeared online ( Rosen, 2018).

Conclusion
More than 25 years ago, following the demise of Communism in the Soviet
Union and the Eastern bloc, Francis Fukuyama famously declared victory for
liberal democratic governments (Fukuyama, 1992). The rise of China, however,
has presented a very different challenge to liberal democracies. As David Run-
ciman argues in a recent book, the rival and bitterly opposed worldviews that
marked the central political contests of the 20th century have been replaced by
competing versions of the same basic goals: economic results and widespread
prosperity ( Runciman, 2018a, 2018b). As did Fukuyama, Runciman also sees
human dignity joining material satisfaction as an essential component for politi-
cal legitimacy, with the less ideological, more pragmatic Chinese Communist
Party far more successful in delivering dignity to the Chinese people than the
Russians had been.
That said, the disadvantage China faces in competing with American soft
power, I would argue, is closely related to the differences between the Chinese
and American dreams. As I have noted elsewhere, unlike the American dream,
which offers an individual success without reference to the nation or any collec-
tive force beyond his or her own efforts, the Chinese dream is more about the
nation than the individual, where individual dreams are expected to fit within
the larger narrative of a collective dream for China, and where self-sacrifice may
be necessary ( Rosen, 2014, 2017). In Runciman’s terms, the Chinese approach to
human dignity assumes a collective national dignity, which comes in the form of
demanding greater respect for China itself ( Runciman, 2018a). Even individual
achievements, as the Mo Yan and Li Na cases suggested, cannot be just indi-
vidual achievements, but must become part of this larger collective narrative of
a rising China, fully worthy of world respect. In a similar manner, when other
76 Stanley Rosen

countries disrespect or offend China, they must be confronted and punished.

The primary audience for these messages is domestic, to show the Chinese public
the overriding value of the state in supporting their achievements and defending
their interests. While this conf lation of the individual with the state is unlikely
to be appealing in developed democratic societies, the “Chinese model,” marked
by economic success and a rising middle class, resonates much better in countries
yet to make this transition, a conclusion that is supported by the high favorability
ratings China has received in many Third World countries.

Notes
1 The articles in this series included: “A Renewed Understanding of Human Rights”
(May 15); “A Renewed Understanding of Freedom of the Press” (May 16); “A Renewed
Understanding of National Strength” (May 17); “A Renewed Understanding of Glo-
balization” (May 18); “A Renewed Understanding of American Blockbuster Films”
(May 19); and “A Renewed Understanding of Western Civilization” (May 20). More
generally, a separate article was entitled “The Chinese Take Another Look at the United
States” (May 19).
2 Han addresses the different definitions and uses of soft power, including its role as a for-
eign policy and a cultural instrument (e.g., pp. 193–201).
3 Chen’s work of course cannot be published openly in China, but it has been internally
circulated among Chinese officials.

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4
VESSELS OF SOFT POWER
GOING OUT TO SEA
Chinese diasporic media and the politics
of allegiance

Wanning Sun

The experience of Chinese migrants across the globe is now redefined by a few
important developments, including China’s ascent as a global economic pow-
erhouse, China’s global media expansion and the newly articulated role for the
diaspora in China’s soft power project. Yet, despite this crucial role, the response
of the Chinese diasporic communities, not to mention the impact of these devel-
opments on the diasporic Chinese-language media, is little understood. Existing
work on soft power and Chinese media tends to focus on the actions of the Chi-
nese state, contributing to a general view that much of what China has produced
is in fact “propaganda offshore” under the guise of soft power initiatives ( Brady,
2008; Wang, 2011; Edney, 2014; Shambaugh, 2013, 2015). But we still do not
know if and to what extent China’s “media going global” strategy has been
effective. More specifically, how do China’s expansion and globalization of Chi-
nese media interact with specific diasporic Chinese media institutions and their
publics to produce new cultural practices among the Chinese diaspora? And do
these interactions produce a particular form of political allegiance, which trans-
lates into both concerted support for the CCP’s policies on core political issues
(such as the status of Taiwan) and voluntary participation in promoting China’s
foreign policy and international relations agenda (e.g., in relation to the South
China Sea)? This chapter seeks to answer these questions. It first analyzes how
the Chinese government justifies the reconfiguration of the diasporic Chinese
communities and their media in moral discourses and policy statements. It then
maps the patterns and strategies of the Chinese-language media in various global
destinations in response to China’s rise and its overtures of partnership. The final
section discusses how myriad political, economic, and cultural forces intersect
to shape the contour of Chinese-language media in Australia, and in doing so,
situating these global developments in a specific empirical context.
82 Wanning Sun

Reconfiguring the diaspora Chinese media

There is a general perception among Western media commentators—and, to a
lesser extent, Western scholars—that China’s going global initiative is motivated
by an ambition to conquer the world. This is in contrast to the discourse internal
to China, which is not one of power and inf luence, but of grievance. In other
words, rather than aiming to become an imperialistic power, China sees itself as
engaged in a necessary struggle for discursive decolonization. In pushing for this
agenda, Chinese political and intellectual elites are drawing moral and intellec-
tual strength from a number of sources, ranging from the collective memory of
the humiliation and subjugation China suffered at the hands of Western powers
in the 19th and 20th centuries, to the anti-Western populist sentiment enter-
tained by “nativists”—a cohort of writers who are “populists, nationalists, and
Marxists”—the twin of the “new left” (Shambaugh, 2013, p. 27).
In the opinion of these writers, China has been robbed of its rightful huayu
quan 话语权(“discursive sovereignty”) and has no voice in a world dominated
by the imperialistic media power of the West. One phrase that often appears in
many scholarly and official statements is xi qiang wo ruo 西强我弱 (“the West is
strong and we are weak”). Another frequently used phrase in justifying China’s
going global initiative is beidong aida 被动挨打(“being in the passive position and
often beaten up”). These phrases are so often used that they have taken on the
appearance of a self-evident truth. They capture a deep-seated sense of injus-
tice, which in turn provide important moral justification for China to contest
Western huayu baquan 话语霸权 (“discursive hegemony”). China’s soft power
initiative, of which expansion into the global media landscape is a part, aims to
increase China’s media presence globally, with the main purpose being to reduce
or even eradicate the “bias” and “prejudices” against China that are seen as per-
vasive in Western media. The overriding conviction that fuels this drive is that
China has been robbed of its rightful voice in a world dominated by the impe-
rialistic media power of the West, and China now must “overcome humiliation,
secure redress of past grievances, and achieve a position of equality with all other
major powers” (Zhao, 2009, p. 255).
In their search for strategies and pathways to address this discursive imbal-
ance, Chinese scholars appear to have identified four vehicles that could carry
the content of China’s international communication. The first two vehicles are
what Chinese scholars call vehicles of “direct communication” (zhijie chuanbo
直接传播). The first is the international arm of China’s state media organiza-
tions which are explicitly charged with the task of “external propaganda.” These
include the People’s Daily, China Daily, China Central Television (CCTV), China
Radio International (CRI), Xinhua News Agency, China News and the Foreign
Language Press, and more recently China Global Television Network (CGTN).
The second vehicle refers to Chinese media that lie outside the purview of the
state media’s external propaganda agenda. Given the de-territorial nature of com-
munication technology and its diverse pathways of communication, these media
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 83

may nevertheless be crucial in shaping the world’s perception of China. This

category includes the Chinese Internet, social media and the commercial sector
of the Chinese media. Together with tourists, students and business individuals,
this media sector contributes to the “expanded domain of external propaganda”
(da wai xuan 大外宣, literally “bigger circle of external propaganda”). The third
vehicle is foreign correspondents in China who produce their own reporting
on China based on their interviews and investigations in China, whereas the
fourth vehicle is the international media per se. The third and fourth are vehicles
of “indirect communication” ( jianjie chuanbo 间接传播). In other words, they
are potential carriers of media content about China based on information they
gather from the Chinese media (Chen, 2011), but in reality they seldom do.
So far, one important strategy of expansion involves some key state media
players signing formal content deals with the state or commercial media of for-
eign countries, mainly in Asia, Africa and, to a lesser extent, South America.
These tend to be countries that are non-Western, non-liberal democratic states,
and that have a strong state media presence under an authoritarian, in some cases
former Communist, regime. Usually lacking correspondents to report on China,
these countries rely on international news services for coverage of China (Cook,
2013). These countries appreciate the assistance China gives to their national state
media in the form of technical and infrastructural support, professional training
and exchange of journalists and media content (Gagliardone, Repnikova and/
Stremlau, 2010). Although too early to tell, preliminary research in Africa is
pointing tentatively toward the emergence of a Chinese “news-gathering para-
digm that stands in stark contrast to the West’s traditional view of the media”
(Farah and Mosher, 2010). There are also signs of more positive coverage of
China globally as a result of its closer engagement in Africa ( Kurlantzick, 2007;
Wasserman, 2011). Indeed, in many respects this kind of partnership with over-
seas organizations is a much more direct and effective way of reaching audiences
abroad.
However, if China has relatively greater success in embedding its media con-
tent in the mainstream media in some countries, there is widespread skepticism—
even distrust—regarding the credibility of Chinese state propaganda among the
publics in Western nations. To make it more difficult, these countries do not
allow Chinese satellites to broadcast directly into their territories. To tackle this
problem, China needs the assistance of a third party that has the appearance
of autonomy from the Chinese government. Acutely aware of the myriad dif-
ficulty of reaching the West as well as the importance of securing of the dia-
sporic Chinese communities, the Chinese government deems it logical to utilize
ethnic Chinese communities and their media enterprises as platforms to access
overseas Chinese audiences and, through them, mainstream Western society.
No longer considered by the CCP as somewhat disloyal, unpatriotic, and thus
less “Chinese,” migrants of Chinese descent are now reconfigured as both the
target and vehicles of China’s soft power agenda. Policy thinkers are clearly rec-
ognizing the fact that diasporic Chinese could be a crucial intermediary and a
84 Wanning Sun

key node in global communication serving to relay China’s external propaganda

content. Chinese-literate migrants outside China constitute the largest demo-
graphic component of the international audience for Chinese media content.
Additionally, in comparison with Western media, Chinese-language media in
the diaspora have been found to be much more willing and compliant partner in
China’s going global project ( Jin, 2009; Sun, 2014). A metaphor, Jie chuan chu hai
(借船出海), which can be translated literally as “to borrow someone’s vessel to
go out to sea,” is used frequently by Chinese policy makers. Diasporic Chinese
are now viewed as vessels that can carry China’s message to enter the symbolic
space of the mainstream West in a “roundabout” way.
There has been a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese government to
mobilize diasporic Chinese support. Since 2001, operating under the auspices
of the State Council of China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), the
China News Service (CNS), China’s official news agency for external com-
munication, has hosted a biennial International Forum of Chinese-Language
Media. In 2013, the new director of the OCAO, Qiu Yuanping, used the sev-
enth forum to explain Chinese President Xi Jinping’s concept of the “China
dream.” The concept, Qiu said, was created to encourage not only the citizens of
China but also all overseas Chinese. “The same ancestry and affection shared by
the Chinese media worldwide are the foundations of their solidarity, inf luence,
credibility, and right to free speech.” She also hoped that the Chinese media
abroad would publish objective reports on China and become “storytellers of real
Chinese stories” (China News Service, 2013).

Media, migration and the Chinese diaspora: a global view

As one of the most established “ethnic” identities in relation to mainstream soci-
ety, diasporic Chinese communities in the West have for a long time been well
equipped with their own Chinese business organizations, Chinese language
schools and Chinese-language media—often dubbed as the three pillars of any
sizeable Chinese migrant community. The social and cultural roles of these global
diasporic Chinese-language media were clearly identified and well acknowl-
edged. First, Chinese-language press bridges the Chinese migrant communities
and their host societies, communicating crucial economic, legal and educa-
tional information—the policies, rules and regulations of the host country—to
Chinese-speaking citizens and residents. Second, it gives voice to community
leaders, who advocate to the government and mainstream public on behalf of the
political, economic, social and cultural interests of Chinese communities in their
host societies through the actions of community leaders. Third, the Chinese-
language press is a vital means of maintaining migrants’ command of the mother
tongue—in most cases Cantonese in earlier decades—through regular exposure
to Chinese-language cultural products, and in doing so, they facilitate the iden-
tity formation of ethnic subjects in multicultural societies (Sun, 2006; Sun and
Sinclair, 2016). Fourth, since most Chinese-language newspapers were owned by
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 85

and catered to Cantonese-speaking migrants from outside the People’s Republic

of China (PRC), they were mostly critical of the Chinese government and its
communist ideology. In other words, the production and the consumption of
this press was a means of marking a different Chinese identity, one which dis-
tanced the diasporic Chinese community from its mainland counterpart. Despite
internal differences, it is safe to say that traditionally these Chinese-language
media outlets have maintained a guarded—if not hostile—distance from Com-
munist China.
The Chinese-language migrant media, like other ethnic media in the host
society, had for many decades existed in the marginal space that is often described
in the English-speaking world as the “ethnic media.” It was discrete from the
Chinese-language media in the Chinese societies on the one hand, and main-
stream media of the host society on the other. There also seemed to be a clear
boundary—geographic, cultural and political—between the Chinese media that
is mostly confined to media landscape of the PRC and the diasporic Chinese-
language media outside China.

Early formations of the diasporic Chinese media

There is a long and well-documented history of the Chinese-language press in
the Chinese-speaking migrant communities outside Chinese societies of Hong
Kong, Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. One such key media insti-
tution which embodied the global diasporic Chinese media network prior to
the rise of China is the Singtao Daily. With its headquarters in Hong Kong, and
boasting a long history and a global circulation. Singtao has been considered a
key icon of the “global Chinese media network” which predates the arrival of
the PRC migrants in many countries and which maintains independence from
the political inf luence of the PRC. Singtao was established in 1938 by the famous
Aw family in China’s Fujian Province, who migrated to Rangoon, Burma, in
the second half of the 19th century. The Aw family prospered largely thanks to
its production of the Tiger Balm, but the entrepreneurship of the Aw family did
not stop at producing a household medicine. In 1938, Aw Boon Haw launched
Hong Kong’s first Chinese daily, the Singtao Daily (Singtao means “new island”
in Cantonese), thus launching the long and tortuous career of the global Chinese
newspaper with the longest history.
Mr. Aw finally passed on the business of running the Singtao Daily to his
daughter, Sally Aw Sian, also known widely as the “tiger girl.” During her tours
in the United States, Sally Aw discovered a deep cultural need among Chinese
migrants in English-speaking cities for Chinese-language news and informa-
tion. No less entrepreneurial than her father, she decided to expand her father’s
newspaper business by publishing overseas editions, starting with New York in
1965 and gradually extending to many cities globally, including San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Toronto, Vancouver, London, Sydney and Auckland—and major
cities of the PRC. The Singtao Group now has more than 20 offices across the
86 Wanning Sun

globe, publishes 16 daily editions that are distributed in more than 100 cities
worldwide and employs in excess of 2,100 staff. It has also recently set up a new
international center in New York that coordinates all the overseas offices in
international reporting ( Ko, 2013).
While Singtao Daily is a media conglomerate extending its inf luence from
Hong Kong outwards, there is also World Journal, which represents the Taiwan-
based United Daily News Group’s overseas expansion into North America that
began in the mid-1970s. The North American diasporic Chinese media were
thus segmented by place of origin: migrants from Taiwan read the World Journal,
while those from Hong Kong read Singtao. They were also internally stratified
along socioeconomic lines. For instance, although both Singtao Daily and Ming
Pao were based in Hong Kong and both were available in North America, the
latter was considered to be close to an elitist newspaper catering to middle-class
businesspeople, many of whom were young, educated professionals and execu-
tives with a higher income (So and Lee, 1995). This old diasporic mediasphere
was not just limited to print media. Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB), a
Hong Kong–based provider of Chinese television, has been a major broadcaster,
producer and international distributor of television in the Chinese-speaking
world since the 1970s (Curtin, 2007; Wong, 2009).
However, despite the well-documented entrepreneurial spirit of the Singtao
Group and its vital role in developing a global Chinese-language media network
in the major cities of the world (Sun, 2005), it clearly did not think it would be
profitable to extend its business to many far-f lung corners of the world, which
were also host to Chinese migrants such as Africa and South America. Apart
from geographical isolation and lack of local communication infrastructure, the
most obvious reason for global Chinese media networks’ lack of interest in devel-
oping their presence in these locations has been the size of the Chinese commu-
nity there: it was simply too small to warrant their business expansion. In fact,
Chinese migrant communities in many locations which were not covered by
this global network—Europe (Gong, 2016; Dai, 2016; Chong, 2016), Southeast
Asia (Hoon, 2006; Chua, 2006; Lim and Luan, 2006; Nyíri, 2016), Africa (Sun,
2016b), South America (Stenberg, 2016) and the Caribbean (Sinanan, 2016)—had
created their own indigenous Chinese language press, which served the needs of
the Chinese communities in a particular host country.

China’s rise, para-diaspora and new developments

Since the 1990s, and gathering pace within the first decade of the new mil-
lennium, a few developments have conspired to fundamentally and irreversibly
transformed the functions and nature of the diasporic Chinese media land-
scape. The first is the exponential growth in numbers of the Chinese-speaking
outbound migrants. Also growing is the population of Chinese sojourners—
temporary migrants who plan to return home rather than settle permanently in
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 87

their host countries—outside China, due to the growing presence of the People’s
Republic of China in business, resources, property investments, education and
international tourism. This growth following China’s rise has fundamentally
changed the demographic composition of overseas Chinese communities. The
second development is a full-scale push for the globalization of Chinese media
and culture in recent years, especially since the 2008 Beijing Olympics ( Hu and
Ji, 2012; Zhao, 2013; Sun, 2014). In response to the overtures for collabora-
tion from the Chinese state media, diasporic Chinese media organizations have
developed myriad location-specific strategies as a means of ensuring financial
viability. The myriad forms of collaboration between Talentvision of Fairchild
Media Group and CCTV, China’s official national TV, is an example of how
diasporic Cantonese television negotiates China’s rise, changing migrant demo-
graphics and migrants’ changing allegiances in its content production and pro-
gramming ( Kong, 2016).
The third development is the growth of a new Mandarin-language media
sector—including print, radio and television—which is owned by, and caters to,
Mandarin-speaking migrants, some of whom still have significant business inter-
ests in China. While some came to Australia around the Tiananmen Incident
in 1989, others migrated to Australia only a few years ago. It is for this reason
that “para-diaspora” (Sun, 2002) may be a more accurate term to describe this
first-generation migrant cohort. This sector now exists alongside the traditional
Cantonese-language mediascape. For instance, the rapid growth and conglom-
eration of the Mandarin-language radio in many capital cities in Australia is
largely due to the entrepreneurship of former PRC migrant Tommy Jiang, who
maintains close political ties with China (Gao, 2006). His conglomerate CAMG,
which now has a global presence in and beyond Australia, not only seriously
threatens the viability of existing Cantonese radio, but also significantly reshapes
the global Chinese media landscape which previously was dominated by Can-
tonese-speaking and Hong Kong–based companies (Sun, 2014).
Parallel to and simultaneously impacting on these developments is the pro-
liferation of technological platforms and modes of content distribution in the
past decade or so—particularly the growing use of digital and social media such
as WeChat (the Chinese equivalent of WhatsApp or Facebook). Rapid changes
in the ways in which news and information is produced, distributed and circu-
lated have significant implications for the diasporic Chinese landscape. On the
one hand, legacy media forms—radio, television, newspapers—can be equipped
with an extensive and interactive online presence, thus enabling those dispersed
Chinese readers who live outside metropolitan areas to access their news content,
as well as be exposed to the advertising of services and businesses that is part
and parcel of the content provided by these media (Sun et al., 2011a). On the
other hand, and this is more crucial, is the proliferation of the online-only news
and media outlets run by mostly Chinese students studying abroad and young
migrant entrepreneurs from the PRC and catering mostly to Mandarin-speaking
88 Wanning Sun

migrants of the host country. Publishing in Chinese and circulated via WeChat,
this online news sector caters to the location-specific content needs of the Chi-
nese community in the host country, be it Australia, the United States or the
United Kingdom.
The consequences of these developments are profound and wide-ranging.
The diasporic Chinese mediasphere has become complex and intricate. The
collective diasporic Chinese identity is becoming further deterritorialized and
refashioned in multiple and contradictory ways, and this is being played out
in a wide range of global and local contexts. On the one hand, the distinction
between the Chinese state media and diasporic media is increasingly blurred.
On the other hand, what had existed as parallel universes between various dia-
sporic nodes have been linked by the ubiquitous use of social media, in particu-
lar WeChat, as a platform of distribution and circulation. These developments
constitute the complex context in which we address the question regarding the
efficacy and impact of China’s soft-power-through-diaspora initiatives.

Chinese-language media in Australia: challenges ahead

The size and demographic composition of the Chinese migrant community in
Australia has changed dramatically over the past two decades, making the PRC
the most common overseas birthplace for Australians after the United Kingdom
and New Zealand. China has surpassed Japan to become Australia’s biggest trade
partner, in terms of both imports and exports. This means that China is one of
only two countries, along with the United Kingdom, that not only have seen
large numbers of migrants settling in Australia but also have proven to be crucial
to Australia’s economic survival.
Australia’s economic dependence on China on the one hand, and its per-
ceived incompatibility with China in terms of political, ideological and cultural
values, on the other hand, is the root of a prevailing feeling of fear and anxi-
ety that many Australians have about China. This is most vividly demonstrated
by the press conference in May 2017, given by Dennis Richardson, Australia’s
outgoing Defence Secretary, the most senior public servant in the Australia’s
Ministry of Defence. In his last address to the Australian media, Richardson
said that China is spying on Australia, and that the Chinese media in Australia
is controlled by China, and that thereby China, while crucially important to
Australia, is not to be trusted. Richardson also made it clear that Australia’s alle-
giance should continue to be with the United States, although it needs to be on
friendly terms with China. He succinctly summarized Australia’s position vis-à-
vis China and the United States as “friends with both, allies with one” ( Riordan,
2017). Australia’s current prime minister, Scott Morrison, also once described
the United States as a “friend” and China as a “customer” (Zhao, Fang and Rob-
ertson, 2019). In December 2018, the Australian government passed the Foreign
Inf luence Transparency Scheme, legislation which was believed to target Chi-
nese-Australians ( Walsh and Fang, 2019). Increasingly, the difference between
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 89

China and the United States/Australia is framed in terms of a civilizational and

ideological clash. In the words of Jocelyn Chey, a veteran China scholar, Austra-
lia is in danger of falling “into the Huntington trap” (2019). Against this com-
plex and fraught geopolitical backdrop, the Chinese-language media in Australia
presents itself as an apposite case study to explore China’s soft power initiatives,
Australia’s “Sinophobia” ( Evans, 2019) and their impact on various diasporic
Chinese communities.

History of Chinese migration to Australia and changes

in the Chinese-language media sector
Migration from China to Australia started from the earliest years of British
occupation of the continent, until the early 1950s, when migration from China
all but ceased. These links were halted for a generation or more before formal
diplomatic relations were established between Canberra and Beijing in 1972.
Over this interval, the historical pattern of migration to Australia by people of
Chinese descent shifted from China to Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya/Malay-
sia, Taiwan and elsewhere as Canberra progressively eliminated racial categories
of immigration exclusion. At this time, citizens of China were excluded from
the expanded immigration intake not on grounds of race but because they lacked
formal channels for migration and mobility between Australia and China.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, migration from the Chinese mainland
resumed and grew in significant numbers, largely as a result of the start of eco-
nomic reforms in China in the late 1970s and the implementation of its open-
door policy in relation to study abroad. After issuing a series of temporary visas
to Chinese students in Australia following the Tiananmen incident on June 4,
1989, the Australian government finally decided in 1993 to allow 45,000 Chi-
nese nationals in Australia who had arrived prior to or soon after the Tiananmen
incident to settle in Australia permanently. This decision signaled the beginning
of the demographic shift from Huaren (华人) to Zhongguoren (中国人) in Austra-
lia’s Chinese migrant community. The former refers to pan-Chinese identity of
people from various diasporic places outside China, whereas the latter refers to
migrants from the PRC.
After the Tiananmen incident, China resumed its course of economic reforms
and its commitment to an open-door policy on trade, investment and outbound
migration. The tide of going abroad, having started in the early 1980s, gained
further momentum. Like a number of Western countries, such as Canada, Ger-
many, Japan and New Zealand, Australia quickly identified language education
as a new market segment. Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, China
has remained a leading source of migrants to Australia in the Skill category
( DIBP, 2015). Moreover, there has been a steady shift away from Hong Kong/
Macau and toward mainland China as the major source of skilled migrants from
the China/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macau region. As a direct result of Australia’s
greatly expanded intake of mainland Chinese migrants since the early 1990s,
90 Wanning Sun

Australia has seen a rapid and considerable increase in the size of its Chinese-
speaking population. The estimated number of ethnic Chinese living in Aus-
tralia in 1996 was 343,523; however, this number has increased significantly in
the past ten or so years. According to the 2011 census there were about 866,200
Australian residents claiming Chinese origin, and as many as 74% of them were
the first generation of their family to move to Australia (Sun, Fitzgerald and
Gao, 2017).

Chinese media expansion and Australian responses

In recent years, China’s state media have made significant inroads into Austra-
lia’s media landscape via a number of pathways, including: (1) increasing the
number of offshore correspondents for major state media organizations such as
Xinhua, Economic Daily, CCTV, and People’s Daily; (2) securing business deals
with mainstream English-language media organizations such as Fairfax to carry
Chinese state media content, or entering partnership agreements with main-
stream media such as the ABC’s AustraliaPlus.cn partnerships with China Daily,
Beijing TV, CNTV and the Shanghai Media Group; and (3) expanding partner-
ships and content sharing with existing Chinese migrant media. While the first
two pathways are relatively straightforward and small in scale, the third pathway
is more extensive. Partnership with PRC media manifests itself in myriad forms
and channels, many of which are more demonstrative of diasporic Chinese com-
munity and individuals’ entrepreneurship than their allegiance to the PRC.
One form of partnership is embodied by Kingold, a company which is owned
by billionaire property developer and investor Chau Chak Wing. Kingold, in
partnership with the Guangzhou-based Yangcheng Evening News Group, owns
the Australian New Express Daily (Xin Kuai Bao 新快报), one of the four nation-
ally circulated Chinese-language dailies in Australia. Kingold Media also pub-
lishes Fortune Weekly (Cai Fu Yi Zhou 财富一周) and Lifestyle Monthly (Shenghuo
Yuekan 生活月刊). Xin Kuai Bao therefore is an example whereby an Australian
Chinese language media outlet is in fact a “sister paper” of a daily Chinese paper
of the same name in Guangzhou.
Another form of partnership is exemplified by the story of the Austar Media
Group (CAMG). Owned by Australian citizen and former PRC national Tommy
Jiang, CAMG was previously known as Austar International Media Group
(AIMG). For 17 years after its first incarnation as Chinese-language radio sta-
tion 3CW in Melbourne, AIMG grew to be a media conglomerate consisting
of Chinese-language radio stations in several major Australian cities (but not
including Sydney); several Chinese-language periodicals, weeklies, and newspa-
pers; and a range of businesses and services in the field of cultural exchange and
other areas. Riding on China’s going out initiative and soft power push through
international media expansion, CAMG, now a global media having presence in
South America, Southeast Asia as well as Australia, is instrumental in bringing
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 91

the state-owned international broadcaster China Radio International (CRI) to

Australia as well as other countries, thereby enabling the content of China’s state
media to enter the mediasphere of a foreign country in a more roundabout kind
of way. In doing so, CAMG exemplifies another form of partnership: a diasporic
Chinese media entity owned by a former PRC migrant lends itself as the vehicle
of China’s media going global initiative.
The third form of partnership may involve a diasporic media institution which
takes sponsorship from a PRC-based media organization. For instance, Nan Hai
Media Group in Australia, which, established in 2011, specializes in publishing
Chinese-language media and hosting artistic and cultural performance troupes
from the PRC. Nan Hai also signed a partnership deal with Tencent, WeChat’s
parent company in China, and became WeChat’s official representative in the
Oceania region. The company claims to have partnerships with the China News
Agency, Bank of China and Air China.
The most invisible yet most insidious kind of partnership between diasporic
Chinese-language media and the PRC media is in the form of content reproduc-
tion. This strategy is particularly attractive to those formerly Cantonese media
organizations which are cash-strapped and keen to capitalize on the demographic
change in the Chinese community and exploit the Chinese media’s going global
initiatives for purposes of expanding readership. The Chinese Newspaper Group
(Aozhou Zhongwen Baoye Jituan 澳洲中文报业集团) is one of them. Estab-
lished in 1986, it claims to be the only privately owned company in Australia that
specializes in publishing in Chinese. Its portfolio consists of nine publications in
some of Australia’s major cities, as well as websites, tablet and social media offer-
ings, including the online news website www.1688.com.au and property website
www.ozhouse.com.au. Its mastheads include the Daily Chinese Herald (Aozhou
Ribao 澳洲日报).
China’s global media expansion is indeed motivated by China’s own political
ambition. However, as these examples suggest, this process has at the same time
also provided business opportunities for Chinese migrant entrepreneurs. Fol-
lowing these partnership initiatives, the landscape of Chinese-language media in
Australia is much more dynamic and competitive. There are now four paid daily
Chinese newspapers in Sydney, namely, Singtao Daily, Australian Chinese Daily,
Daily Chinese Herald, and New Express Daily. The latter three papers are locally
produced and distributed, unlike Singtao Daily, and have a much shorter history.
In addition to these three dailies, Singtao Daily also jostles with around 20 free
and paid weekly and monthly newspapers and magazines, not to mention myriad
local radio and television stations. All of these legacy media now have extensive
online presence.
What has further complicated the media landscape is the emergence of a
vibrant online-only Chinese language news sector in Australia. These online
publications have a subscription account with WeChat, which enables their con-
tent to be delivered to mobile devices such as the smartphone and iPad. These
92 Wanning Sun

are mostly comprehensive websites with a news and current affairs component.
Some—such as SydneyToday.com—are owned by locally based Australian
Chinese media companies; others are subsidiaries of China-based companies.
Such websites are usually owned, operated and staffed by young, mostly student
migrants from the PRC with Australian university degrees in IT, business or
media. Mostly financed through advertising revenue, these online media provide
news and current affairs in Australia, in addition to a wide range of information
across all aspects of everyday life. The news and current affairs component fea-
tures stories—both serious and f lippant—about mainstream Australian society
and Australia’s Chinese community.
These media outlets mostly do not generate news content from their own
in-house journalists, but instead translate news and current affairs from a wide
range of media outlets, while providing links to the original stories. Their
sources of news range from Chinese state media on the one hand, and Aus-
tralia’s English-language mainstream media on the other. They usually do not
feature serious op-ed pages, but the editors do pay close attention to hot-button
issues that concern the Chinese community. News from China tends to be light
and soft nature, usually eschewing serious and politically sensitive topics. While
these young media practitioners are not interested in simply being mouthpieces
for China’s propaganda, they are nevertheless staunchly nationalistic in favor of
China. This means that while their websites usually avoid politically sensitive
news about China, they may effectively give voice to the opinion of the Chinese
community on certain controversial issues where China may be in conf lict with
Australia. They may also be effective tools for mobilizing the Chinese commu-
nity over controversial issues that threaten to strain Australia–China relations
(Sun, 2016a).
Most of the print media outlets are struggling to survive in an environment
of dwindling audience, lack of cash and resources and threat of irrelevance in the
age of the Internet. Generally speaking, these outlets have little discursive inf lu-
ence in the mainstream host society. But the new online digital/social media
sector may have a different prospect. Unlike the traditional ethnic print media,
the Chinese digital/social media sector has become a f luid and dynamic space
where information and opinions routinely interface with mainstream English-
language media, PRC media and user-generated content from individual social
media users. While individual WeChat subscribers can repost links to stories
from these online media, the latter organizations—as well as mainstream English
media—themselves rely on user-generated material as a source for news sto-
ries. The involvement of Chinese digital and social media in the organization of
protests in Melbourne and the mainstream English language media’s coverage
of the protests—discussed below—is a good example. As a result, the audience
for this content could be mainland Chinese, mainstream Australians, diasporic
Chinese in Australia or transnational Chinese in other parts of the world. This
sector indeed brings actual and potential opportunities for China’s state media
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 93

to reach Western audiences, but it remains to be seen if and how this sector plays
the expected role of the “vessel.”

Evidence of shifting allegiance

The Chinese-language media institution that stands to benefit most from China’s
media expansion and Australia’s changing Chinese demographics is the Singtao
Daily. Following its success in the North America, the launch of the Australia
edition in 1982 coincides with the first phase of Sino–British negotiations over
the future of Hong Kong. Singtao’s stance toward China was critical, and this
is evidenced not only in its coverage of the future of Hong Kong, but also the
future of China per se. The newspaper’s critical coverage of the Tiananmen
incident of June 4, 1989, is also a telling example of its anti-CCP position. The
Singtao Group changed ownership in 2001, and due to the new owner Charles
Ho’s close connection with the Chinese government, there have been wide-
spread predictions of a shift of political allegiances. This view was put to the
test in Singtao’s response to another key issue that affected the future of Hong
Kong: the July protests in 2003 about the controversy surrounding the proposed
introduction of an anti-subversion amendment to the Hong Kong Basic Law.
In contrast to its editorial stance during Thatcher’s first visit in 1982 and in the
week of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Singtao published three editorials on
this matter during the massive anti-government protests in early July 2003, and
these editorials are often cited now by Hong Kong’s media watchers as some of
the earliest indications of Singtao’s shift toward a pro-government position. The
ultimate proof of Singtao’s editorial stance so far has been its coverage of the 2014
Umbrella Movement—a pro-democracy student- and scholar-led movement in
Hong Kong. The largest and the most sustained pro-democracy movement in
Hong Kong to date, this protest took place between late September and Decem-
ber 2014, when university students and some academics occupied Central Hong
Kong to protest against the Chinese government’s refusal to let Hong Kong resi-
dents nominate their own candidates to run for the position of chief executive.
Throughout this period of more than two months, Singtao was mostly critical of
the pro-democracy students and championed for stability and social order, which
was the official position of central government in Beijing (Sun, 2019).
Singtao Australia has traditionally positioned itself as a middle-class news-
paper, targeting middle-aged and older readers who have a sizeable disposable
income. In recent years, it has experimented with various initiatives in order to
attract younger, Mandarin-speaking readers. For example, it has shifted its print-
ing style from vertical (top-to-bottom, right-to-left) to horizontal (left-to-right)
to make it more reader-friendly to PRC readers. It also ensures that any uniquely
Cantonese words and expressions are translated into Mandarin for the Australian
edition. In addition, Singtao has formed several partnerships with PRC media.
For instance, starting in 2002, the Australian edition of Singtao Daily has been
94 Wanning Sun

carrying one page of content from Wenhui Daily, a popular and long-standing
newspaper based in Shanghai.
Both scholarly research and media commentaries have pointed to a discernible
shift in Chinese language migrant media from a mostly critical to a mostly sup-
portive stance in their coverage of China, the Chinese government and issues and
topics that are considered to be politically sensitive in China. More important,
sensitive news stories involving issues such as Tibet and Falun Gong are com-
monly dealt with through omission. For instance, Australia’s Chinese-language
media were mostly silent on the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square inci-
dent (Sun 2016a). In contrast, official visits to Australia and the PRC embassy by
China’s leaders, and the various initiatives and Chinese community activities of
China’s consuls general in Australia receive premium and welcoming coverage in
the Chinese-language papers (Sun et al., 2011a, 2011b). Also, through their trans-
mission of radio content from CRI, Australia’s Chinese-language radio stations
report positively on key political events in China such as the National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party (Sun, 2014).
While it is important to distinguish between toeing Beijing’s Party line and
expressing pro-China nationalistic sentiment on the part of the diasporic Chinese
individuals, it is equally important to note that Chinese-language media, espe-
cially online and social media, are playing an increasingly crucial role in align-
ing diasporic sentiment with China’s foreign policy and international relations
agenda. This is especially the case when the mainstream media of the host society
is expressing and pandering to anti-Chinese, and even racist views of China.
On occasions where tensions run high between the Australian and Chinese gov-
ernment, media and publics over controversial issues such as Tibet, Taiwan and
China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors, WeChat and online Chinese media
were also instrumental in mobilizing and coordinating pro-China public opin-
ions. For instance, China’s state media criticize the United States and Australia
for meddling in the South China Sea dispute, whereas the mainstream Australian
media criticize China for its aggressive behavior in asserting sovereignty rights in
the region. A high-profile rally in Melbourne on July 23, 2016, to protest against
The Hague’s verdict on the South China Sea, is a case in point. Widely reported
in both state Chinese media and Chinese media in Australia, the rally involved
169 Chinese community organizations, 15 Chinese-language media organiza-
tions and some 3,000 participants. The event was also covered live on yeeyi.
com, a very popular online Chinese news service in Australia, and relayed by
some other similar news websites. According to the organizer, Li Hai, and a few
participants, the main purpose of the rally was to raise awareness among the Aus-
tralian public of the “fact” that the Americans were behind The Hague verdict,
and to urge Australians not to toe the American line. They were also concerned
that the Australian public should not be manipulated by “misinformation” about
the South China Sea issue and The Hague verdict. The rally was planned, orga-
nized, coordinated and promoted mostly online and via social media. Mainstream
English-language media not only covered the protests but noted the role of the
 Vessels of soft power going out to sea 95

Chinese media in the organization of the event. Situations such as these may allow
mainstream Australian audiences to hear the points of view of the Chinese com-
munity. At the same time, it can also heighten Australia’s awareness of the China’s
growing inf luence in Australia, further fueling, rather than addressing, a general
sense of anxiety and fear about China.

Conclusion
In view of China’s rise and its soft power initiatives, the inevitable question is
whether emerging diasporic Chinese positions are able to maintain their ideo-
logical and political distance from the PRC. Or, to put it in another way, whether
these media outlets have become platforms whereby PRC migrants’ ideological,
political and cultural allegiance to China is expressed and maintained. This dis-
cussion, particularly in the Australian context, seems to point to the latter. It is
fair to say that the Chinese-language media now not only functions to ref lect
their own cultural and economic interests as member of a migrant community
in a host society, but more important, it also plays a part in advocating China’s
political and economic interests. That said, it is also safe to say that, despite
the demonstrated potential of the new digital Chinese media sector to play the
expected role of the vessel, so far, the diasporic Chinese media and its audiences
exist more as targets and less as vessels of China’s going global agenda.
However, as this discussion also shows, the reasons for this shift are manifold
and more complex than usually imagined. A general view that much of this sec-
tor has now been bought off, taken over, owned or directly controlled by China’s
propaganda authorities is simplistic, and insufficient alone to account for these
complexities. Closer to the truth is the fact that the going global expansionist
initiatives of the Chinese state media have dovetailed with the business acumen
of elite Chinese migrants in these locations. Across the board, the Chinese-
language media in diaspora have had to shift their business strategies in order
to cater to this Mandarin-speaking cohort, thereby sustaining the viability of
their businesses. The arrival of Chinese-speaking migrants from the PRC has
not only injected a much needed boost to their dwindling audiences, but it has
also become a source of resources and skills that are desperately needed to revive
a declining media environment. Seen in this light, an increasingly pro-China
stance is as much about the need to adopt new business strategies as it is about a
change of heart in political terms. In one way or another, diasporic Chinese are
practitioners of “f lexible citizenship,” defined as the cultural logics of capitalist
accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond “f luidly
and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions” (Ong, 1999,
p. 6). Their partnership with China is motivated as much by a desire to take
advantage of the opportunities that come with China’s economic power as it is
by a willingness to identify with the CCP’s policies and positions.
It is also important to realize that the diasporic Chinese community, existing
in the margins of the host society, often have to make choices in terms of their
96 Wanning Sun

allegiance. As the Australian case indicates, too often, individuals in this com-
munity are confronted with conf licting and competing perspectives on Australia
and China, or other relevant global affairs. The tensions and dilemmas facing
individuals from the Chinese migrant community become a source of cultural
anxiety, frustration and alienation. Their current experience of being politi-
cally and racially singled out for their PRC background and association by the
mainstream media of the host society may, ironically, further foster pro-China
nationalism. While this discussion testifies to China’s success in harnessing dia-
sporic Chinese communities, it also makes it clear that this success has aroused
a high level of fear and anxiety among the publics in the countries that host
them, thereby pointing to the Chinese government’s lack of success to reach the
other—and more elusive—target audience: the mainstream public in the global
West. This paradoxical outcome begs the question as to whether China’s going
global strategy has been in fact “cost-effective” in both political and economic
senses.

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5
THE BATTLE OF IMAGES
Cultural diplomacy and Sino–Hollywood
negotiation

Ying Zhu

Hollywood dominated China’s film market during the Republican era (1912–
1949), taking up to an 80% share. The Communist victory in 1949 and the out-
break of the Korean War in 1950 led to an official ban on Hollywood films
in 1950. The ban lasted until 1994 when, amidst declining domestic film out-
put and theater attendance, Chinese policy makers reopened the market to an
annual quota of ten imported films. Predictably, Hollywood blockbusters pre-
dominated. The imports generated huge revenue, instantly restoring Chinese
audiences’ theatergoing habit and subsequently revitalizing China’s domestic
film production (Zhu, 2003). Hollywood has been a regular fixture in China
ever since, spurring simultaneous rejection, repulsion, admiration, emulation,
competition and coercion. Rejection and repulsion for perceived offenses against
China’s image, admiration and emulation for the sheer allure and market prow-
ess of Hollywood pictures, competition and coercion for Hollywood’s global
dominance and, lately, a new determination to draft Hollywood into the service
of promoting China’s global image.
Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, China is desperately seeking soft
power—“soft power” being the au courant term (the term that Xi himself uses)
for an older idea about using cultural sex appeal to win friends and inf luence
people. Cinema was routinely employed as a form of culture-driven persuasion in
Soviet Russia, and numerous European countries have actively cultivated their
national image in film. In the United States, of course, soft power is more or
less synonymous with Hollywood, including film, television and popular music.
Indeed, Mike Medavoy, the Shanghai born veteran Hollywood producer, co-
authored a book with political strategist Nathan Gardels in 2009 (American Idol
After Iraq: Competing for Hearts and Minds in the Global Media Age) arguing that the
United States should let its entertainment industry instead of its military forces
pursue America’s goals in the Middle East.
 The battle of images 101

Hollywood, with its vast market penetration, has indeed done an exceptional
job in spreading American culture and values around the globe, triggering cul-
tural and economic anxieties in its export destinations, leading to national film
policies intended to protect cultural image and limit domestic market erosion.
China has a long history in molding culture and art in the service of national
interest. When it comes to Hollywood imports, Chinese government policies
and censorship during both the Republican and the PRC era have exercised
image controls, monitoring and shaping what could and should be said about
China. This chapter compares the context and terms of Hollywood’s Republi-
can era China triumph to those of its repeat performance in the post-1994 era,
and the subsequent expansion of a powerful Chinese film market, to suggest
historical contingencies, and the continuities and changes in an ongoing Sino–
Hollywood dynamic with competing political, cultural and economic interests
on and off screen.

Banning of “character-assassination” films

In 2014, the controversy surrounding James Franco-Seth Rogen’s The Inter-
view, a rowdy comedy about the assassination of the North Korea’s supreme
leader, triggered a diplomatic crisis. In June 2014, the North Korean govern-
ment threatened action against the United States if the film were to be released.
North Korea’s UN ambassador declared that the movie was an act of war against
North Korea: “To allow the production and distribution of such a film on the
assassination of an incumbent head of a sovereign state should be regarded as
the most undisguised sponsoring of terrorism as well as an act of war” ( Reuters,
2014). In other statements, North Korea threatened a “resolute and merciless”
response if the United States didn’t ban the film. Columbia delayed the film’s
release from October to December and reportedly re-edited the film to make
it more acceptable to North Korea. In November, the computer systems of
the studio’s parent company Sony Pictures Entertainment were hacked by the
Guardians of Peace, a group with ties to North Korea, as per FBI claims. The group
also threatened terrorist attacks against cinemas that dared to show the film.
Major cinema chains opted not to release the film, leading Sony to release it for
online rental and purchase on Christmas Eve, followed by a limited release at
select cinemas the next day. In a press conference, President Barack Obama said
that he thought Sony had made a mistake: “We cannot have a society in which
some dictator in some place can start imposing censorship in the United States. I
wish they’d spoken to me first. I would have told them: do not get into the pat-
tern in which you are intimidated” (Stacey, 2015). On December 27, the North
Korean National Defense Commission released a statement accusing President
Obama of forcing Sony to distribute the film. The film was released on iTunes
on December 28.
The Interview debacle was viewed by some career international relations experts
and film historians with whom I consulted in private as the US government’s
102 Ying Zhu

failure in exercising due diligence over Hollywood and Sony’s failure in rein-
ing in a reckless and tasteless exercise in farce. In the past, the US government
actively provided guidance to Hollywood on matters concerning national inter-
est. For example, in the 1930s, the failure of the United States to join the League
of Nations after World War I, and the “Neutrality Acts” and general isolationist
climate of the interwar period, led to America’s isolationist policy toward East
Asian conf licts. Moreover, Hollywood’s interest in gaining a foothold in both
the Chinese and Japanese markets meant that no direct reference or allusion to
Japanese military aggression against China could be shown in pre–Pearl Harbor
Hollywood films (Chung, 2006). After the Pearl Harbor attack and the sub-
sequent entrance of the United States into World War II, Hollywood became
openly anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese. The Bureau of Motion Pictures of the
Office of War Information (OWI) regulated the political content of wartime
Hollywood films, directly inf luencing the representations of Asian allies as well
as enemies (Chung, 2006). Fast forward to 2014, given the hostile nature of
the US–North Korea relationship, and the fact that Hollywood has no market
stake in North Korea, even though an assassination tale does not immediately
threaten America’s national interest it still defies international norms. North
Korea’s demand to cancel all screenings, burn all the prints, formally apolo-
gize and promise not to do it again is not necessarily unusual. Many countries
have made the same demand in protesting Hollywood’s perceived insensitivity
to their domestic situations. China in particular has been vocal in calling out
Hollywood for its “China-humiliating” films.
Although most Hollywood films sailed through China with few challenges
during Hollywood’s golden age, its China-themed films by contrast ran into
repeated roadblocks since the mid-1920s, a time when China’s nationalist and
anti-imperialist sentiment ran high amidst Western military aggression, lead-
ing to complaints about Hollywood’s representation of China and Chinese on
screen that kept on recycling time-honored stereotypes in the likes of Fu Man-
chu, the bandit, the warlord, the houseboy and the laundry-man. Public senti-
ment echoed the elite’s view concerning Hollywood’s China stereotyping, and
a number of popular protests erupted in the 1930s and 1940s against Hollywood
films such as Welcome Danger (Clyde Bruckman & Malcolm St. Clair, 1929), East
Is West (Monta Bell, 1930), Shanghai Express ( Josef von Sternberg, 1932), The Bit-
ter Tea of General Yen (Frank Capra, 1933) and The General Died at Dawn (Lewis
Milestone, 1936). Welcome Danger, Harold Lloyd’s first talkie set in San Francisco
featuring stock Chinese characters stealing, robbing and kidnapping their way
around Chinatown, triggered a strong reaction in China and among the Chinese
American community in the United States. Upon learning the film’s setting
of Chinatown, the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco immediately contacted
Paramount, requesting that the Consulate be consulted during the production.
When the film premiered in the United States on November 22, 1929, the Chi-
nese Consulate received complaints from the local Chinese Chamber of Com-
merce expressing concerns that the negative depiction of Chinese would harm
 The battle of images 103

the relationship between white and Chinese people. Deputy Consul-General Li

Zhaosong (李照松) promptly dispatched a letter to the San Francisco mayor on
November 26, urging the mayor to have the film banned. The mayor’s inter-
vention led to the cutting of a scene at a Chinese household where opium was
discovered. Paramount Studios further promised not to make films that would
be detrimental to China and Chinese Americans.
As recounted in Wang Yiman (2014), just as the Chinese Consulate in the
United States considered the matter successfully resolved, the film caused a stir
when it debuted in China. During a February 22, 1930 screening at Shanghai’s
Grand Theater, US-trained dramatist Hong Shen was so offended by the film that
he interrupted the screening to plead for the audiences to walk out and demand
their money back. Hong was detained by a Shanghai foreign policeman, who told
him that the film was a farce and shouldn’t be taken literally. Hong was not amused
and saw no humor in Chinese being made fun of ( Wang, 2014, p. 191). Hong’s
detention led to a public protest that quickly snowballed into a campaign against
“China-humiliating films.” The local Shanghai Censorship Committee reacted
swiftly, issuing an order for the Grand Theater to immediately halt all screen-
ing of the film. The Committee took out a public announcement in a Shanghai
newspaper the next day, urging Chinese audiences to boycott the film. On Febru-
ary 24, the Committee ordered newspapers to cease running ads for the film and
demanded that the two theaters screening the film “apologize to the public, dis-
continue and burn the film prints” ( Wang, 2014, p. 192). Theaters were requested
to submit all Paramount films for censorship approval and to stop showing films
featuring Lloyd, who was then enormously popular in China. The KMT govern-
ment contacted the Chinese consulate in San Francisco on March 22, seeking an
apology from Lloyd. Lloyd initially demurred, explaining that “Why, all countries
have bad men, but that doesn’t mean a whole race is bad” ( Wang, 2014, p. 192)
and that “If we start apologizing, who’ll we have left to poke fun at?” ( Wang,
2014, p. 192). Lloyd’s response led to a nationwide ban on the film on March 31,
essentially pushing the film out of circulation except at a few theaters in foreign
concessions. Lloyd eventually backed down as the financial stakes turned high.
On May 29, he telegraphed the Chinese consul-general in San Francisco to offer
“sincere apologies” and to reassure the “Chinese authorities of his admiration for
the Chinese people, civilization and culture” ( Wang, 2004, p. 193). The Shang-
hai Film Censorship Committee responded by resuming reviewing his films for
approval and eventually lifting the ban on his films by the end of September. The
Welcome Danger incident led to a joint manifesto of Chinese theater and cinema
professionals denouncing Western imperialism and its smear campaign demonizing
China and Chinese. The ban on Welcome Danger in 1930 led to the KMT govern-
ment to bar all films with negative Chinese and China images from being released
in China. Universal’s East Is West (Bell, 1930), Paramount’s Shanghai Express (von
Sternberg, 1932) and The General Died at Dawn (Milestone, 1936), Columbia’s The
Bitter Tea of General Yen (Capra, 1933) and MGM’s China Seas (Garnett, 1935) all
became casualties of the KMT censors.
104 Ying Zhu

The Good Earth and the KMT’s Ban on Hollywood’s

“China-humiliating” films
Dorothy B. Jones, who served as chief of the film reviewing and analysis section
of the US Office of War Information (OWI) during World War II, observed that
the Chinese government did not begin to take active measures at the policy level
to safeguard its national image until the 1930s. As she notes, prior to the 1930s,

the Chinese as a people had not yet developed any appreciable degree of
nationalism and were more concerned with family affairs than with mat-
ters having to do with the Chinese people as a nation. . . . By the early
1930s, however, when China began to take her place in the community
of nations and to build up a functioning foreign service which could put
her more closely in touch with other countries of the world, the Chinese
government began to express itself with the manner in which China and
Chinese customs and people were being portrayed in American motion
pictures.
( Jones, 1955, p. 5)

Yet nationalism in China emerged as early as the late 19th century, a time when
Western military powers and modern ideas shook the foundation of ancient Chi-
nese civilization. China’s defeat in the Opium Wars (1839–1860) and later by the
Japanese in 1895 led to early nationalist efforts to save the country from disinte-
gration and humiliation at the hands of Western powers. Chinese cultural elites
lobbied for tough film censorship against “China-humiliating” films starting in
the 1920s. But years of civil war in China made it impossible for a centralized
effort at regulating film content. A film censorship apparatus at the national
level was able to emerge only after the KMT consolidated its political control in
China. Upon taking control of China in March 1927, the KMT established its
central government in Nanjing on April 18. On May 15, 1928, the party con-
vened a meeting of China’s higher education, during which the susceptibility of
youth to the inf luence of cinema, particularly foreign films, was addressed. On
August 18, 1928, the Party’s Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Department estab-
lished a Drama and Cinema Review Committee to issue an order that requested
all films be submitted for review and approval before being released for public
screening in Shanghai. The committee was renamed Shanghai Film Censor-
ship Committee on September 12, 1929, to regulate film contents, including
rooting out American films that “insulted China.” The Committee became the
first censorship body with legitimate political authority to regulate cinema. The
Committee successfully handled the case of Welcome Danger, Harold Lloyd’s first
talkie set in San Francisco that featured stock lowlife Chinese characters steal-
ing, robbing and kidnapping their way around Chinatown. In January 1931,
the KMT formally established the National Film Censorship Committee, for
the first time putting the control of film regulation in the hands of the central
 The battle of images 105

government. The National Film Censorship Committee was to ensure that the
Chinese film industry would serve to advance the party’s national reconstruction
project, and as such, film contents that deviated from this core mandate would
be eliminated.
It is worth noting that the KMT’s active political intervention in the nation’s
cultural affairs shared similar tenets and pedigree with its archenemy, the CCP;
both were trained by the Soviets. In the early 1920s, when the Western powers
continued to consider the Beiyang Government as China’s official government,
thus refusing to recognize the KMT’s newly established Guangzhou govern-
ment, the KMT turned to the Soviet Union for support. Soviet advisers includ-
ing Mikhail Borodin, a prominent agent of the Comintern, arrived in China in
1923 to help reorganize and consolidate the KMT along the lines of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, thus establishing a Leninist party structure
that lasted well after the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan. The Soviets advised the
KMT on mass mobilization techniques and Chiang Kai-shek was sent by the
Party to Moscow for military and political training in 1923. In 1924, at its first
Party Congress in Guangzhou, the KMT adopted Dr. Sun’s “Three Principles
of the People” political theory: nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood.
The KMT’s governing structure was highly centralized under one-party rule,
which aimed to facilitate the Party’s total control of China’s political, economic,
military and cultural affairs. Chiang remarked that “Unity of Thinking is the
most important thing” and that “it will be difficult to build up China if there is
not a unified thinking” (Chiang, 1928). Unity of thinking refers to the adher-
ence to the Three Principles of the People, of which nationalism was the most
salient and seen as the galvanizing force behind the popular support for the
KMT. The KMT’s cultural policy encouraged arts and literature that elevated
China’s global standing. As in the Soviet Union and indeed in the United States
where cinema was seen as a tool for cultural propagation, the KMT paid close
attention to cinema as a vehicle for agitprop for the Party’s Three Principles of
the People.
The government restructured the National Film Censorship Committee in
March 1934 and renamed it the Central Film Censorship Committee (CFCC).
In addition to inspecting imported films, the CFCC strengthened its oversight
on films shot in China by foreign studios. It promulgated “Regulations and Pro-
cedures for Foreigners Making Films in China,” which stipulated that foreigners
attempting to make films in China must first submit scripts to the Film Script
Inspection Committee for review. Once the script was approved, they then had
to apply for a production license. A commissioner from the CFCC needed to be
on site for supervision if necessary. Finally, the studio had to obtain an export
permit from the CFCC before screening the film overseas. The convoluted
approval process of The Good Earth (Sidney Franklin, 1937), an adaptation of
Pearl Buck’s novel of the same name about the tribulations of a Chinese family
in a rural village in early 20th century China, offers a glimpse of how Chinese
censors interacted with Hollywood studios.
106 Ying Zhu

When the book came out in 1931, elements of its story capturing religious
fundamentalism, racial prejudice, and gender and sexual oppression made the
Chinese cultural gatekeepers and KMT officials uneasy. The book was black-
listed in China but went on to win the Pulitzer Prize in 1932 and was quickly
adapted for a Broadway play back in the United States. The Broadway play
intrigued MGM production’s head, the wonder boy Irving Thalberg who paid
$50,000, a record-breaking amount at the time, to secure the book’s screen
rights. The Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles was alarmed upon learning the
news and quickly dispatched Vice Consul Kiang Yiseng to MGM to obtain
assurance that the screenplay would steer clear of any objectionable elements
including opium, banditry, squalor, foot-binding and superstitions. When the
production started, Thalberg wanted to send his film crew to northern China
for location shooting. Chinese regulators rejected the idea. The studio turned
to Willys Peck, the US Counselor of Legation at Nanjing for help. After several
failed attempts at persuading Chinese censors, Peck resorted to name-dropping,
hinting that the project had the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
MGM also solicited the US State Department to lobby for Chiang Kai-shek’s
support. Chiang reportedly sent a telegram to the KMT Film Censorship Com-
mittee encouraging a green light (Chung, 2006). Perhaps the Chinese censors
realized that MGM would make the film with or without their approval, that
images of a real China would be better than what Hollywood might come up
with in its backlot in the San Fernando Valley, and that some control over the
filming process would be better than none, so the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Nanjing granted permission in December 1933 for the MGM crew to enter
China. The KMT’s Publicity Department nonetheless demanded various modi-
fications to the script including changing the title to disassociate the film from
the controversial novel and adding a prologue stating that the film did not fol-
low exactly the text of The Good Earth. The studio rejected the title change
but reaffirmed its willingness to accommodate reasonable modifications to the
original story. The movie script was more sympathetic to China than the novel
had been. The Chinese government further demanded that representatives from
the NFCC be present during production in China and in the United States. The
United States strongly opposed hosting a Chinese censor in Hollywood for fear
that it might encourage similar demands from other nations. It also feared that
the censor could pass Hollywood trade secrets on to China’s own film industry
and that such an arrangement would make MGM more susceptible to the KMT’s
propaganda effort. The concern about trade secrets speaks volumes about the
competitive nature of national film industries. At the time a minor studio relying
on low-risk products appealing to independent and overseas distributors, MGM
had to make sure that the final product would be completed to everybody’s
satisfaction, and thus consulted the Chinese every step of the way to ensure the
cooperation of the Chinese government and secure a China release.
China’s unusual demand of an in-house censor sent a chill to Hollywood,
prompting studios to voluntarily consult with the Chinese consulate on all future
 The battle of images 107

China-related projects. The Chinese consulate was able to monitor Hollywood

production and frequently alerted Nanjing for preemptive measures against
“anti-Chinese” films even before prints were made available for review. So
much so that Frederick Herron, the foreign manager of the MPPDA, complained
frequently about the Chinese consul’s meddling, calling the Chinese diplomat
a “little whippersnapper” (Chung, 2006, p. 95; Herron, 1936). Throughout the
MGM–China negotiation, Peck mediated between Chinese government cen-
sors and MGM representatives and regularly forwarded documents to the sec-
retary of state in Washington to report progress and solicit instructions. MGM
eventually settled on a compromised approach allowing the Chinese to send in
a traveling instead of resident censor at the expense of the studio. MGM fur-
ther agreed to exclude contents deemed insulting and to insert a “foreword” to
distance itself from the original novel. It also agreed to submit for the Chinese
approval footage taken in China before shipping it back to America. On their
part, the Chinese showed their good faith by lending their army for the filming
of war scenes and by eventually allowing footage to be sent back to the United
Sates without local inspections. In return, MGM “reduced the viciousness of the
Chinese characters including the uncle and cousin, and toned down the sexual
dimension of the Lotus character,” a Chinese temptress who seduced the main
character and ruined his family ( Xiao, 2002 , p. 281). Thalberg’s initial pledge for
an all-Chinese cast was quickly dropped as MGM needed its star Paul Muni to
carry the film so needed to cast him in the leading role as the Chinese patriarch.
The anti-miscegenation rules in Hays Code prevented non-white performers
being casted as partners in a marriage to white performers so the idea of casting
the Chinese American actress Anna May Wong as the wife to Paul Muni’s char-
acter was also dropped. Thalberg died before the production was completed. The
film opened in the United States to sensational response and was posthumously
named Thalberg’s “last great achievement.” The Good Earth passed the Chinese
censors in January 1937 and was released in China with only deletions of a few
scenes depicting poverty and violence. Ironically, although the film successfully
passed both the US and Chinese censors in 1937, when MGM submitted it for
broader overseas release in 1943 the hyper-cautious US Office of War Informa-
tion (OWI) objected to the film’s references to slavery and concubinage, which
it deemed offensive to Chinese sensibilities. To secure China’s support in the US
military campaign against the Japanese, OWI encouraged Hollywood to empha-
size the nobility of the Chinese people and to not portray them as “backwards
illiterates.” US national interests dovetailed with Chinese national interest dur-
ing the Pacific war, albeit at the expense of The Good Earth.

Transformers and film censorship during the CCP era

The dynamic between Hollywood and China has changed significantly since
Hollywood returned to China in the mid-1990s. The Chinese film market has
expanded rapidly in recent years, with predictions that it will overtake North
108 Ying Zhu

America as the world’s largest film market in 2020. China can break or make a
film. In 2016, the Hollywood film Warcraft (Duncan Jones), with a price tag of
$160 million, was a critical and financial f lop in the United States. Yet it racked
up $156 million in its first five days in China. Now, a sequel to Warcraft could
conceivably be made solely for the Chinese market. What does that have to do
with China’s image building? The Hong Kong martial arts film star turned Chi-
nese cultural ambassador Jackie Chan made the connection when he remarked
that “Warcraft made 600 million yuan (£64 million) in two days. This has scared
the Americans. If we can make a film that earns 10bn yuan (£1bn), then people
from all over the world who want to study film will learn Chinese, instead of
us having to learn English” ( Lee, 2016). The great leap forward from the power
of the Chinese box office to the propagation of the Chinese language suggests
that economic power can confer cultural power. The expansion of the Chinese
film market has Hollywood fawning to Chinese regulators and audiences with
sanitized film images of China and Chinese. While Sino–Hollywood coopera-
tion during the Republican era was perceived as friendly and harmless, and was
facilitated by the US government, Hollywood’s new compromises are viewed
through a harsher lens. Hollywood is being called out for promoting the Chinese
government’s interest at the expense of Western cultural principles, a trend that
has alarmed broader US media interests and the government.
In the summer of 2014, Transformers 4: Age of Extinction (Michael Bay) set a
Chinese box office record, selling over $300 million worth of tickets against a
$244 million US take. With its numerous Chinese product placements, gener-
ously featured Chinese landmarks and cameos by Chinese pop stars, Transform-
ers 4 serves as an interesting example on what localizing can deliver at little to
no cost to the studios. The Chinese paid to have their products and landmarks
shown and Chinese stars eagerly appeared in minor and incoherent roles in the
film. Transformer 4 ’s Chinese collaborators provided efficient production assis-
tance and a brilliant marketing campaign in China for Paramount. But jubilation
over the film’s earnings was dampened by jeers from major news outlets in the
West that the film was yet another example of Hollywood pandering to China,
joining other recent instances: The Martian (2015) made sure that the China
National Space Administration played a prominent role in a life-saving rescuing
mission; Iron Man 3 (2013) inserted a scene of doctors played by major Chinese
movie stars discussing surgery on the superhero and thus showcased China as a
savior of the world civilization; Mission: Impossible III (2006) expunged a scene
of Shanghai featuring underwear hanging from a clothesline that the Chinese
regulator deemed primitive and portrayed China as “a developing country;” the
remake of Red Dawn (2012) originally featured Chinese soldiers invading an
American town but digitally changed the invaders to North Koreans during
post-production as a precaution to fend off anticipated China grievances.
From Welcome Danger and The Good Earth to these more recent films, the power
of screen images to shape perceptions and values has been on both the Chinese
and US governments’ radar. While the concern for the Chinese during China’s
 The battle of images 109

Republican era had to do with image building and protection, the new goal is to
draft Hollywood into the service of promoting Chinese soft power. How is Hol-
lywood faring under this pressure? The picture is not entirely clear. Let’s return
to Transformers 4 as an example. Critics of Transformers 4 were dismayed over its
perceived pro-Chinese-government message. The film takes familiar jabs at the
CIA and depicts a timid White House beholden to both the military–industrial
complex and vapid high-tech evangelicals. Juxtaposed against this we see a
Chinese state led by an upright-looking Chinese defense minister determined
to save Hong Kong from an alien robot attack. Many Western commentators
worried that the Chinese Communist Party comes across as the good guy. The
Guardian (Child, 2014) called the movie “sinister,” as it showcased an autocratic
political system as more functional and humane than Western democracy. The
Financial Times (Shone, 2014) lamented that the Chinese military appears more
efficient and disciplined. It is indeed the case that Michael Bay included the Chi-
nese military under pressure from his Chinese partners. Yet the Chinese defense
minister gets only a few perfunctory shots as he vows to scramble China’s fighter
jets to defend Hong Kong. No Chinese fighter jets ever appear and no Chi-
nese government action is shown. Instead, it is left to a few renegade Americans
from Texas to drop into the Far East and save the human race. As Zhu noted
(2014), the film perpetuates the myth of triumphant American individualism and
exceptionalism. Positive or not, the Chinese on the screen, including the upright
defense minister, are reduced to sidekicks and bystanders. Variety gets it wrong
when it declares that “Transformers is a very patriotic film” but that “it’s just Chi-
nese patriotism on the screen, not American” (Cohen, 2014). By portraying a
Texan who comes to the rescue of China and the world, Transformers 4 displayed
American supremacy at its most potent. Critically, the film was panned by most
major film reviewers in the United States and United Kingdom—The Telegraph
called it “spectacular junk” (Collin, 2014). But the record number of Chinese
captivated by this “spectacular junk” constituted another victory for US popular
culture, or soft power.
One counter-strategy for the Chinese is to absorb Hollywood talent to make
a China story instead of a Hollywood story with token Chinese elements, and
this has led to a new co-production model matching Chinese investment and
talent with major Hollywood stars, unlike the old co-production model with
Hollywood investment and cheap Chinese labor. These films can bypass quota
restrictions for imports, guarantee China releases and improve the percentage
of box office receipts US companies can collect to about 40%. That became the
strategy in a 2016 Sino–Hollywood co-production, the epic fantasy adventure
film The Great Wall (Zhang Yimou), about a group of European mercenaries
who come to China in search of black powder but wind up joining the Chinese
imperial army in defense of the Great Wall against a horde of monstrous crea-
tures. Shot on location in China with a budget of $150 million and featuring
a China-centric story with an English screenplay developed by seasoned Hol-
lywood screenwriters, the film was at the time the biggest Sino–Hollywood
110 Ying Zhu

co-production. Directed by China’s most recognized filmmaker, Zhang Yimou,

it stars Matt Damon, Korean boy band megastar Lu Han, Hong Kong veteran
Andy Lau and well-known Chinese actors and actresses. Despite much antici-
pation in both Hollywood and China, the film came out to overwhelmingly
negative reviews in China, though the official media insisted on being posi-
tive and went so far as to crack down on negative reviews. The response in the
West was hardly more encouraging, particularly when it became embroiled in
Hollywood’s “whitewashing” controversy. To criticism that the film features a
white hero in an essentially China story, Zhang Yimou explained, “If we didn’t
have Matt Damon, if we didn’t speak English in the film, then it would just be a
purely Chinese film” (Qin, 2017). Matt Damon was mocked by Jimmy Kimmel
in his 2017 Oscar opening monologue for giving up an Oscar-nominated role
in Manchester by the Sea (dir. Kenneth Lonergan, 2017) for a mercenary charac-
ter in a Chinese propaganda film, what Kimmel termed “a Chinese ponytail
movie.” “Spectacularly made with the director’s trademark of scale, order, color,
light, and rhythm,” the film suffers from anemic character and story develop-
ment (Zhu, 2017).
As Zhu commented in her ChinaFile/Foreign Policy conversation with Coonan
and Rosen (2017), the film is a Sino–Hollywood co-production run amok. Bur-
dened with a Chinese nationalist fantasy that displays Chinese military might
and pageantry at its most excessive, the film leaves little room for sophisticated
characters and human drama. Dwarfed by the gigantic Great Wall, the gun-
powder-crazed European mercenaries appear dumbfounded by the enormity of
China and Chinese culture. They are, in time, taught a moral lesson, chief ly by
the righteous Chinese female commander, on fighting for trust and honor instead
of gunpowder. The clichéd narrative fits the myth of Western barbarians being
tamed and enlightened by Chinese civilization on the benefits of patriotism and
bilateral action. It is as if the entire Western canon of medieval adventures did
not exist. In their eagerness, Hollywood and its Chinese partners concocted a
colorfully synchronized mass devoid of real feelings and imagination. The film
is a reminder that a big budget, star actors and excessive visual effects do not
magically translate into compelling stories, Hollywood or Chinese. The film did
little for Chinese soft power, but it did make money for some Chinese investors,
grossing $334 million worldwide against its $150 million production budget, but
it was reportedly a $75 million loss for Universal and led to a complete overhaul
of the leadership at Legendary Pictures, with the exit of Peter Loehr and Tom
Tull (McClintock and Galloway, 2017).
But there is also counter-measure two—the Chinese film industry is deter-
mined to manufacture its own globally aimed blockbusters that speak Chinese
and feature China’s own action hero. A year after the lukewarm reception of The
Great Wall, Wolf Warrior II (dir. Wang Jing, 2017), a Chinese version of Rambo:
First Blood featuring a muscular Chinese action hero fighting rebels and Western
mercenaries in a nameless African country where China is seen building hospitals
and providing humanitarian aid, grossed a whopping $854 million. It generated
a media buzz in Hollywood. Notably, when Rambo: First Blood was screened in
 The battle of images 111

China in 1985, the film’s raw action shocked Chinese audiences who had been
isolated from the vibrant global film scene during the Mao era. While many in
the West objected to Rambo’s fascist undertone, Chinese officials readily endorsed
the film’s plot of a wronged Vietnam veteran resisting the arbitrary brutality of
oppressive capitalist authorities represented by US army troops and officers, state
police and a sheriff wearing a US-f lag shoulder patch. Chinese audiences were
in awe of the action sequences involving “helicopters, four-wheel-drive vehicles,
and big guns, the likes of which most Chinese viewers have never seen” ( Baum,
1985). Rambo made Sylvester Stallone an instant household name in China. It took
32 years for China to come up with its own version of Rambo, which featured a
Chinese rebel not against his own government, but against evil Western forces.
The martial arts star turned director and lead actor Wu Jing hired Joe and Anthony
Russo as consultants, Sam Hargrave as the stunt director and Joseph Trapanese as
the composer, who brought along a largely foreign sound unit. American actor
Frank Grillo starred alongside Wu as an antagonist. The mixture of action, comic
relief, some English dialogue and the participation of veteran Hollywood talent
as antagonistic forces worked wonders, and Chinese audiences responded favor-
ably to the film’s patriotism and to the relentless action provided by Wu. Wolf
Warrior II is not a co-production, but a Chinese production employing US talent
to showcase China’s largess in Africa and its newly amassed international power.
China no longer collaborates with Hollywood but simply purchases its expertise,
technology and talent to construct and sell China’s own story. As Bayles observed
(2018, p. 94), the film marked a shift from soft power of attraction and persuasion
to what Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig (2017) called “sharp power” that
“pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in
the targeted countries.”
But the ultra-violent Chinese film did not quite match Rambo for wider global
appeal. The jingoism cloaked as Chinese patriotism and the racist depiction of
the nameless and witless Africans are out of step with contemporary sensibili-
ties. The world is not thrilled to replace American saviors with Chinese saviors.
China’s answer to American jingoism failed to capture hearts and minds outside
China. Wolf Warrior II only grossed $2.3 million in the North America market
while its China box office accounted for 98.1% of the total gross. China needs
to consider what kind of power it wishes to project to the rest of the world via
its cinematic images now that it is capable of generating such images on its own
terms. Domestically, the film beat Hollywood imports at the box office, provid-
ing a boost to the Chinese film industry and a reminder that the domestic market
is lucrative enough on its own, never mind the global culture mission.

The turn to sharp power: from image building

to asset building
Recent years witnessed the acquisition of US entertainment assets by Chinese
companies, most notably Dalian Wanda, the Chinese media conglomerate led
by the real estate tycoon Wang Jianlin, whose Wanda Group acquired in rapid
112 Ying Zhu

succession big-league US film assets including AMC Theatres, the largest Ameri-
can chain, in May 2012 for $2.6 billion; Legendary Entertainment, one of Hol-
lywood’s biggest production companies, in January 2016, for $3.5 billion; and
Carmike Cinema, the fourth largest movie theater chain in the United States,
in November 2016, for $1.2 billion. Cash-strapped Hollywood welcomed the
infusion of Chinese investment. It is business as usual in the age of global merg-
ers and acquisitions, but Chinese firms are playing an increasingly prominent
role, replacing the Japanese in the late 1980s and the South Koreans in the late
1990s. US lawmakers have responded with alarm. To them, China’s expansion
into the United States is not a simple matter of a new East Asian power replac-
ing old ones—China poses an existential threat to Western liberal democratic
principles and norms. In 2016, members of Congress wrote to various agency
chiefs to express their concerns over Chinese firms’ encroachment on US media
assets, specifically citing Dalian Wanda. In a letter to the Government Account-
ing Office the lawmakers asked, “Should the definition of national security be
broadened to address concerns about propaganda and control of the media and
‘soft power’ institutions?” (Shaheen, 2016). The letter stated “growing concerns
about China’s efforts to censor topics and exert propaganda controls on American
media” and called for greater oversight of Chinese corporate purchases, includ-
ing movie theaters and studios ( Tartaglione, 2016). Representative Christopher
H. Smith, Republican of New Jersey, stated that “Beijing is increasingly confi-
dent that its version of state authoritarianism can be exported, though the Com-
munist Party’s efforts at ‘soft power’ outreach have little credibility or impact at
this point” ( Wong, 2016). “Would any movies favorably portraying the Dalai
Lama, Liu Xiaobo or Chen Guangcheng be greenlighted if they risked the loss
of Chinese investment—I don’t think so,” he added, naming three prominent
political adversaries of the CCP ( Wong, 2016). Wanda’s proposed $1 billion take-
over of the Dick Clark Production Company, the venerable producer of Golden
Globe awards, subsequently collapsed in March 2017.
By then the Chinese government and public sentiment had also soured on
Chinese firms’ outbound deals, which many see as part of the massive capital
f light scheme. Chinese companies have in recent years aggressively invested in
foreign companies as a way of moving money out of China amidst China’s tight-
ening anti-corruption campaign that has brought down ranking politicians and
big name business owners and frozen their assets. In July 2017, Chinese regula-
tors ordered Chinese banks to stop lending money to Wanda to finance the
conglomerate’s foreign acquisitions—six deals in particular, including Wanda’s
$3.5-billion purchase of Legendary Entertainment (Frater, 2017). But AMC,
with Carmike under its belt, was able to complete the pre-arranged acquisition
of Starplex Cinemas, Odeon & UCI and Nordic Cinema Group by July 2017,
making the Wanda-owned theater chain the largest in the United States and the
world, although the theater chain claimed that the funding for these acquisitions
did not come from Wanda. Concern about whether Hollywood is beholden to
China’s interests is at the core of the current relationship between Hollywood
 The battle of images 113

and the Chinese film industry. With Wolf Warrior II, the Chinese film industry
has demonstrated that it can now bypass Hollywood by poaching its talent and
technologies and replicating its formulas for its own purposes.
From The Good Earth to Wolf Warrior II, China’s image has witnessed a dra-
matic remake. China’s economic prosperity bought China unprecedented nego-
tiating power in dictating what kind of image can be constructed about China.
The use of the market as leverage for image building and protection existed
long before the current round of Sino–Hollywood negotiation. If the Chinese
have been insistent, Hollywood is equally con sistent. When Japan threatened to
reduce the intake of US movies late in the 1930s, US negotiators warned the
Japanese if that happened they might become the villains in American pictures
(Segrave, 1997). Meanwhile, Hollywood pledged its willingness to work with
the State Department to spread the American gospel abroad. In a speech deliv-
ered in London in October 1923 that outlined the international aims of the US
motion picture industry, Will Hays, the head of the Motion Picture Producers
and Distributors of America (MPPDA), proclaimed that the “Members of our
Association have taken . . . definite steps to make certain that every film that
goes from America abroad, wherever it shall be sent, shall correctly portray to
the world the purposes, the ideals, the accomplishments, the opportunities, and
the life of America” ( Trumpbour, 2002, p. 17). But the US State Department
was frequently unsure about the profit-driven Hollywood’s reliability in the
battle of ideas and thus exercised due oversight. For example, Gone with the Wind
was blocked from being screened in Germany by the US occupation authority
because of the film’s portrayal of slavery and racism.
When it comes to dealing with China, the interests of Hollywood and the
interests of US lawmakers do not always collude. Evidence of Hollywood pan-
dering to China such as changing a film setting from the old glory of Paris to
the new glory of Shanghai in Looper, or portraying Beijing as the land of promise
in The Karate Kid, are relatively insignificant in comparison to Congressman
Smith’s charge of Hollywood’s change of heart in steering clear of any politi-
cally charged movies such as a hypothetical Dalai Lama picture. Hollywood is
nothing but consistent in how it assesses the global viability of any film projects.
Despite earlier films such as Kundun and Seven Years in Tibet, which were criti-
cal of China’s Tibet policy, Hollywood was not out to smear China then and is
certainly not on a mission to rehabilitate China now. The Tibet-related pictures
came out in the 1990s when the newly opened Chinese market was relatively
insignificant to Hollywood. The market has changed and a few pandering plot
or location twists to penetrate China’s lucrative new market is nothing more than
“localizing strategy,” the playbook of an industry that has been acutely attuned,
from its inception, to what is permissible and indeed preferred in its vast export
destinations. The trend has only intensified in the last decade, with the majority
of moviegoers now living abroad, which accounts for up to 80% of Hollywood’s
box office income. As Zhu notes (2013), to maximize overseas distribution, films
must be rendered free from international offense. The more expensive the movie,
114 Ying Zhu

the more scrupulous the studios must be to ensure the avoidance of any potential
overseas hazards. To stay out of (financial) trouble, Hollywood has long modi-
fied, obfuscated and even eliminated content that is deemed inappropriate in an
effort to appease audiences of different cultural, religious and political persua-
sions. During the Republican era, a significant proportion of the correspondence
in the 1920s, 1930s and early 1940s between the Hays Office and China ref lected
American studio executives’ concerns about Chinese sensitivities, both cultural
and political. The depiction of China was sanitized to appease the Chinese state
and public, both hyper-sensitive to the country’s humiliations at the hands of
Western powers.
China’s Republican and PRC eras are vastly different, with the contours of the
world and the international balance of power radically altered between them as
China’s rapid economic growth in recent decades nurtured its ambition to spread
its cultural inf luence. The evolution of the Sino–Hollywood relationship ref lects
the shifting power dynamic between China and the United States, with China
emerging from an eager apprentice to a formidable competitor and partner who
wants market share as well as cultural inf luence. The Chinese film industry might
indeed fancy a day when it can overtake Hollywood as the global alpha dog in
box office and inf luence. But the Chinese film industry has yet to climb the cin-
ematic food chain in terms of prestige, aside from a few independent films play-
ing in overseas art houses, despite the red-hot market and even hotter investment
rush. The business of filmmaking is indeed booming in China, but not necessarily
the global appeal of Chinese cinema, or the officially sanctioned China stories,
whether narrated by Hollywood or by the Chinese film industry. Chinese block-
buster films have yet to overtake Hollywood productions in quantity, quality and
recognition. The world has yet to embrace Chinese cinema, judging by the limited
appeal of Chinese films globally and Hollywood’s continued status at the top of the
cinematic totem pole, at least box office–wise. At the core of the problem is the
clash of cultural values and divergent political systems and economic structures.
The gulf persists between the aim of substantial expansion of China’s soft power
by various means, creative and strategic/industrial and what actually comes across
in the films, which continues to overwhelmingly favor Western values and norms
represented by Hollywood in many places around the world. The proposition that
a few patriotic films utilizing Hollywood’s know-how will dramatically rehabili-
tate China’s international image remains a remote fancy.

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6
BRANDING AS SOFT POWER
Brand culture, nation branding
and the 2008 Beijing Olympics

Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

A brand culture approach opens up the concept of soft power by emphasizing

connections between branding and the promotion of existing cultural accom-
plishments and cultural heritage. Brand culture also offers insights into the ways
in which brands create new culture, including new practices, new rituals, new
notions, new objects and new imagery. We argue that in the context of the
Beijing 2008 Olympics, Chinese soft power branding models emerge, target-
ing market myths through historical and mythical Chinese culture paired with
modern technology; composing identity myths; and extending these to global
identity myths, thus, creating new forms and paths for soft power. We reimagine
soft power in relation to engagement with brands and branding. These engage-
ments inf luence the way people behave, perceive and interact with each other,
and these new configurations participate in the workings of soft power. The dis-
cussion of soft power and its relationship to branding provides distinctive insight
into China’s recent efforts to build global brands.
To clarify, in our understanding, the term brand does not refer only to a firm,
an organization or a simple logo, but primarily to material and symbolic forms of
communication. For example, brands, as communicative objects, embody values
or features of products, places and interactions in consumption contexts. Brands,
in this sense, foster imaginative engagement between brand actors, which serves
to create the differences between brand identity—what a corporate or organi-
zational entity hopes to communicate—and brand image—the meanings and
understandings that emerge out in the lived world.
Brands and related branding processes that include advertising, promotion,
event marketing and nation branding circulate at multiple intersections of media,
political and interpersonal discourses. We argue that brands co-create cultures,
including aspects of cultures that have an impact on the attitudes and the values
of consumers and of citizens, as well as on the ways in which nations appear
118 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

to the rest of the world. In other words, mediatized political discourse and the
“political effects” of media (Chouliaraki, 2005) come together in brands and
branding processes. From this perspective, China itself was the most evident and
notable brand of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics.
Despite the fact that sport remained a focus, the spectacular staging of the
XXIX Olympiad attracted the eyes of many who hoped for a glimpse of con-
temporary China, often obscured behind a veil of the past. The Beijing Olym-
pics, featuring the spectacular “Bird’s Nest” Olympic National Stadium built
for the Games, and record-breaking athletic performances—such as U.S. swim-
mer Michael Phelps’s unprecedented eight gold medals—as well as controversies
surrounding the development of the Olympic sites, crises within China over
contaminated consumer products, concerns about media access and simmering
political tensions, drew the attention of the world.
In this way, China effectively and efficiently employed the Olympics to enhance
the country’s “visibility and the salience of its marketplace on the world stage”
(Greyser, 2008, p. 1), in accordance not only with elite sport, modern facilities,
and advanced technologies, but also with cultural diplomacy and soft power. The
Beijing Olympics can be viewed as

important occasions to project China’s soft power—to inf luence the hearts
and minds of people in other nations through “attraction.” Following its
introduction into China in the early 2000s, Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft
power” gained immediate currency and prominence in China’s official,
academic and popular discourse, largely because it arrived at a time when
China tried to project a peaceful international image amidst perceptions of
a “Chinese threat.”
(Cao, 2011, p. 8)

The Olympics, and the spectacle of the Opening Ceremonies, has helped brand
many host nations; for example, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the 1988 Seoul
Olympics and the 2000 Sydney Olympics. In the case of the Beijing Games,
branding researcher Stephen Greyser wrote that “China’s ‘coming out party’
ref lects and signals its significance in sports, its magnitude as an economy, and
its power in global politics” (Greyser, 2008). As one article put it: “the 2008 Bei-
jing Olympic Games can be considered a tool in the soft power and international
communication strategy that China has been pioneering in recent years” (Chen,
Colapinto and Luo, 2012 , p. 188; see also Edney, 2008; Gold and Gold, 2008;
Liang, 2011; Zhang, 2010; Zhao, 2014). For example, media scholar Ying Zhu
argues that China Central Television (CCTV), which broadcast the Olympics
to its home market, functions as a tool of global soft power (Zhu, 2012). Some
researchers have downplayed the complex workings of soft power in this context
(Manzenreiter, 2010); however, we take a brand culture approach to soft power,
highlighting the ongoing co-creation and circulation of brands and cultures
( Wu, Borgerson and Schroeder, 2013).
 Branding as soft power 119

Of course, the Olympics itself is an iconic brand that gains much from top-
level athletes’ involvement and the infrequency, and thus anticipation, of the
event. Furthermore, Olympic sponsorship offers a host of branding opportuni-
ties for private companies (e.g., Madrigal, Bee and LaBarge, 2005). Olympic
events are held once every two years, and provide vehicles to express world union
and national pride, including appeals to the hearts and minds of viewers through
the tears, smiles and personal challenges of athletes and coaches. The Beijing
Olympics were popular: American television network NBC paid nearly $900
million for broadcast rights for the 2008 Olympic Games and attracted an aver-
age broadcast television audience of 30 million viewers each night. Millions
more watched on the NBC cable channels. Thirty million unique users visited
the NBC Olympics website and 6.3 million shared videos from the streaming
coverage (Carter and Sandomir, 2008).
We have argued elsewhere that brand culture approaches represent key
opportunities for the development of Chinese global brands (Schroeder, Borg-
erson and Wu, 2015). In this chapter, we explore the ways in which brand cul-
ture research perceives pathways of Chinese cultural diplomacy, and how the
Beijing 2008 Olympics Opening Ceremony facilitated a compelling example of
Chinese soft power. Soft power is often seen as the prerogative of governments
and nations. Branding, even nation branding, is generally understood as the
arena of marketing firms and development authorities. But this distinction has
evolved. As all manner of organizations, including corporations, universities
and sports teams, as well as individuals using social media, participate in brand-
ing, the way we understand the ability to inf luence and engage in so-called cul-
tural diplomacy shifts. The brand culture perspective suggests a re-examination
of the ways in which the Opening Ceremony’s themes targeted myth markets
by rejuvenating Chinese history and myth, and presenting historical stories
with advanced technologies. As a branding event that launched a new brand
China, the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony generates new insights into
China’s soft power.

A brand culture approach to soft power

Brand culture relates to diverse scenarios of cultural forms, not least of which
are new co-creations between branding and cultural forms. A brand culture
approach reveals that branding practices perform as, and engage with, other cul-
tural forms, such as, music, movies, sports, fashion and historical narratives. Thus,
brand culture sheds light on the diverse ways in which aspects of culture inform
and interact with global brands and global branding, such as how the Marlboro
cigarette brand strongly links itself to people’s impressions of what constitutes
the American West, but also bringing insight to Japanese global brands that in
fact do little to express “Japanese lifestyle” ( Iwabuchi, 2006). From these per-
spectives, branding no longer merely represents manipulative and hegemonic
corporate intentions or mandates for persuasion and consumer passivity: this is
120 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

‘soft’ branding, on a horizon of media and political discourses where brands

effortlessly ply the waters of soft power.
Research in brand culture focuses upon the co-creation and circulation of
brands and cultures, attending to the ways in which branding processes and
practices move beyond subsidiary roles to co-create culture. Brands share sto-
ries, build community and solve problems. Brands understood as cultural forms
ref lect, engage with, and alter, people’s ideologies, their lifestyles and their cul-
tural values. A brand culture approach directs our attention to a relational meta-
physics, wherein shifts and changes occur through repeated interactions between
various actors, including brands and consumers, across time and space. From
this perspective, an analysis of brand development draws attention to emerging
new knowledge around the co-creation and circulation of brands and cultures.
Schroeder and Salzer-Mörling discuss the roles that history and culture play
in branding, expanding recognition of research that taps into what they call
brand culture, a third realm of branding research in addition to brand image
and brand identity (Schroeder and Salzer-Mörling, 2006). In this sense, brand
culture involves “the cultural codes of brands—history, images, myths, art, and
theatre—that inf luence brand meaning and value in the marketplace” (Schro-
eder, 2009, p. 124).
In brand management contexts, it is widely agreed that culture and cultural
meanings can be perceived as resources upon which branding processes and prac-
tices can draw; and that cultural resources may suggest potentially productive
paths for brand development (Schroeder and Salzer-Mörling, 2006). For exam-
ple, Burberry draws upon cultural notions of British fashion, such as Saville Row
bespoke tailoring and punk style (e.g., Peng and Chen, 2012). A classic Chevrolet
campaign linked the automobile brand to American cultural icons: hot dogs and
apple pie.
However, a brand culture approach posits that the interaction of brands and
culture goes much deeper. Research on brand culture reveals that brands do not
only draw upon meaning resources from particular cultures and histories, but
that new cultural meanings and practices emerge and develop in relationship
to brands (e.g., Schroeder, Borgerson and Wu, 2015). Often, studies in inter-
national marketing and consumer research overlook the ways in which brand
development adapts to market conditions and, importantly, contributes to public
discourse. Although contexts and situations may be acknowledged to inf luence,
shift, if not determine, brand meanings, commonly lacking is a focus on the co-
creative power of multiple brand actors, including the brands themselves.
Following the brand culture approach, we understand the importance of
social, cultural and historical resources in undertaking branding, marketing and
consumer research. For example, the presentation of historical culture, or the
past, in marketing has been said to include two key understandings: (1) the prev-
alence of retroactivities is motivated by the consumers’ nostalgic and authentic
desires (e.g., Stern, 1992; Holbrook and Schindler, 2003), and (2) marketing the
past is a way of secularizing sacred historical, cultural and religious elements
 Branding as soft power 121

and beliefs to enhance marketing activities (e.g., Belk, Wallendorf and Sherry
1989; Eckhardt and Bengtsson, 2010; O’Guinn and Belk, 1989). Indeed, numer-
ous researchers indicate that meaningful insights into marketing contexts can
be acquired when they are treated as cultural texts, and the apparatus of literary
theory has been brought to bear on branding, advertising and marketing (e.g.,
Belk, 1986; Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982).
A brand culture approach to branding in the global marketplace depends
on different attempts to develop an informed historical and cultural analysis of
brands. Branding practices are grounded in various cultural perspectives, even
“myths,” including the archaeological, the political as well as other language-
based meaning. Further, global myths are targeted to build international brands.
Put simply, global brands call up a global myth. Aspects of a national mythic
landscape move into the global brand landscape, and this global myth entails
employing variously branded “products,” which could include distinctive antiq-
uities and tourist locations, but also recognizable symbols, values and aesthet-
ics, to produce identity discourses. Brand theorist Douglas Holt (2004) notes
that part of the work of branding is composing identity myths and extending
or reinventing these identity myths. In short, branding may engage knowledge
of the country’s main existing and emerging myth markets, and demonstrate
the cultural and political authority to address these market myths. At the same
time, consumer researchers Giana Eckhardt and Julien Cayla (2008) describe
the modernity of Asian branding, suggesting that in the Chinese case, it may be
valuable to engage the past as a strategic brand-signifying practice.
Cultural, ideological and political environments inf luence the process of
building brands, brand meanings and values. Many successful iconic Ameri-
can brands, suffused with culturally charged myths, attempt to provide facile
resolution to social and cultural contradictions ( Holt, 2004). More recently,
Chinese brand success in Eastern Europe has been explained as satisfying the
need for safety and authenticity in these regions (e.g., Strizhakova, Coulter and
Price, 2008; Manning and Uplisashvili, 2007). In other words, an analysis of
brand meaning derives not only from networks of users, producers and other
brand actors, but also from local and global events, such as definitive moments
in a nation’s history, consumer boycotts and anti-globalization movements. Fur-
thermore, as can be seen in Western brands’ impact on global culture, global
branding practices inf luence local culture ( Dong and Tian, 2009). Brands, brand
meanings and brand values can be understood as cultural, political and ideologi-
cal forms with the agency to alter the world.

Nostalgia, “authenticity” and branding

Global brand mythologies depend on targeting global cultural myths (Cayla and
Arnould, 2008). The Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony drew upon ancient
cultural history and deeply ingrained Chinese myths, and was profoundly depen-
dent on the masterly production of an apparent authenticity through modern
122 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

technology ( Wu, Borgerson and Schroeder, 2013). Sociologist Peter Berger

proposed that authenticity refers to identifying what is real in our lives (1973).
Branding research has shown that referring to aspects of historical culture in
branding campaigns can evoke authentic and nostalgic emotions (e.g., Holbrook
and Schindler, 2003; Stern, 1992).
Drawing these relationships out further, nostalgia has been described as an
authentic aesthetic response to the evocation of the past ( Jameson, 1991). Accord-
ingly, one could argue that brand authenticity refers to the search for the “real”
in brands. Thus, “the investment of historical culture into branding campaigns
can invoke nostalgia and feelings of being reconnected with an authentic past
[although] notions such as ‘authentic’ are contested—their apparent meanings sub-
ject to rethinking and contextualizing—the ways in which brands aim to achieve
such goals remain significant” ( Wu, Borgerson and Schroeder, 2013, p. 29).
In theory, nostalgia resides in every brand and aids marketing in every
product—for example, the fashion for old films, vintage clothes, parents’ music
and long forgotten recipes; the dominance of traditions and revivals in architec-
ture and the arts; schoolchildren delving into local history and grandparent’s rec-
ollections; and historical romances and tales of the “good old days” ( Lowenthal,
1985; Brunk, Giesler and Hartmann, 2018). Nostalgia transcends yearnings for
particular lost childhoods and scenes of early life, and embraces imagined pasts
never experienced by specific consumers, citizens or perhaps by anyone ( Hol-
brook and Schindler, 2003). In this way, fictional returns to previous times may
attract massive audiences.
Global brand mythologies develop when the global brand landscape absorbs
the mythic landscape. Within this landscape, branded products represent identity
myths in ways that seemingly unite global consumers ranging across diverse
contexts (e.g., Cayla and Eckhardt, 2008). Coca-Cola, for instance, enjoys a
mythic status both within the United States and beyond, which is to say for all
its mythic associations elsewhere in the world, it is no less, and perhaps even all
the more, mythic in the United States. In this way, Coca-Cola represents unity,
cultural strength and refreshing taste everywhere. A global myth thus reveals
differing relations to cultural anchors. Its myth status applies to cultures both
within and outside its origins.
The Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony targeted historical Chinese cul-
ture, an important myth market, in evoking audiences’ nostalgia and feelings
of authenticity: the darkened stadium with glowing red drumsticks, the intense
beaten reverberations of the “Fou” drum, the uniform movement enmeshed
the audience in the power of Chinese aesthetics and historical accomplishment.
Concepts of authenticity in the consumption context include indexical authen-
ticity and iconic authenticity (Grayson and Martinec, 2004). Indexical authen-
ticity refers to an object that has a factual and spatiotemporal link to history,
whereas iconic authenticity points out an object that is similar to original physical-
ity through the reproduction or recreation of the original objects. “Fou” is an
ancient percussion instrument of China with a 3,000-year history, similar to the
 Branding as soft power 123

Chinese drum described in the Lian Po and Lin Xiangru section of the Records of
the Grand Historian by Sima Qian in the Han dynasty.
The Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony presented iconic authenticity
through modern advanced technology. Reproduction or re-creation of the past
is, indeed, an artificial presentation in the present, no matter how truthfully
and precisely we preserve, authentically and properly restore, and deeply and
attentively immerse ourselves in past times; yet, iconic authenticity contributes
to understanding the past and creating fantasy modes of consuming national
identities.

Nation branding and soft power

One of the most direct links between branding and soft power occurs in so-called
nation branding, where nations construct strategic campaigns to brand themselves
as tourist destinations, cultural icons or sites of economic development. Further,
even the most non-strategic–seeming communication about a place can be used
and incorporated into soft power missions, the humblest rural practices harnessed
attractively for promotional purposes. In other words, an archaeological ruin or
unique folk art is also a resource for soft power; and, whereas tourist campaigns
and promotion of historical accomplishments may seem innocuous, straightfor-
ward communications, quite apart from soft power, we maintain that these often
are indiscernible.
A national culture may draw upon and promote historical accomplishments
in art, music, architecture, rituals, technology and so on to build national unity,
but also for foreign tourism, and in an effort to indicate authentic sights for
development, including economic development and exploitation. These com-
municative efforts form a foundation for articulating resources available for soft
power processes. In other words, branding practices and insights are used in soft
power processes; brands engage to create new cultural visions that themselves
become crucial in the pathways of soft power.
Historically, we can see the outcomes of promotional communications in
many nations, particularly around archaeological sites, like the Acropolis in Ath-
ens or the pyramids in Egypt, or more general cultural accomplishments, for
example the paintings of Renaissance Italy or the distinctive tea rituals of Japan
or Great Britain. Further, superiority uperiority in innovation, expertise or even
possession of natural wonders form a base for promoting a vision of countries and
continents to others around the globe (see Morgan, Pritchard and Pride, 2004;
Volcic and Andrejevic, 2011). Diverse European nations such as Ireland, Kosovo
and austerity-plagued Greece have had recent nation-branding attempts. In sum,
China is not alone in attempting to form its image in an international arena.
Nation branding resembles many aspects of soft power. For example, Kosovo
was branded as a new nation that recently came into being, hiring international
marketing firm BBR Saatchi & Saatchi to promote the tale of a young coun-
try joining the rest of the world. Promotional materials emphasized Kosovo’s
124 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

connections to Europe, its youthful and well-educated population and economic

opportunities for investment. Kosovo’s “launch” video featured romantic land-
scapes, children looking to the sky in wonder and a literal “launch” of the nation,
as yellow puzzle pieces are fitted together by enthusiastic youth, creating an out-
line of the nation that is then connected to cloud-shaped helium balloons that
lift the “nation” into the bright blue sky—reminiscent of countless destination
branding campaigns ( Prishtina WB, 2009).
As communications scholar Nadia Kaneva writes, “in its most expansive
articulations, nation branding refers to much more than slogans, logos, and col-
orful advertisements. Rather, it seeks to reconstitute nationhood at the levels
of both ideology and praxis, whereby the meaning and experiential reality of
national belonging and national governance are transformed in unprecedented
ways” ( Kaneva, 2012, p. 4). In 2010, Saatchi & Saatchi’s Kosovo “Young Euro-
peans” campaign won an M&M award—a global marketing award presented
yearly in London to “celebrate the creation and effectiveness of marketing strate-
gies coordinated and implemented across international borders”—for the Best
Nation and Place Branding category ( Prishtina WB, 2009). The project leader
for Saatchi & Saatchi reported: “The Kosovo assignment has been a wonderful
challenge for Saatchi & Saatchi because we are literally branding a new nation”
(Saatchi and Saatchi Global, 2010). In other words, these are not obscure, under-
the-radar practices; the combinatory practices of branding and soft power are
much more common than might be expected.
Thus, nation branding often intersects with cultural diplomacy. For example,
the Cold War of the mid-20th century dominated international relations. A
key tenet of Soviet Cold War propaganda maintained that the United States
lacked a distinctive or historically developed culture of its own. America was
characterized as obsessed with mindless, uncultured entertainments, trivial con-
sumer goods, and ephemeral distractions. To counter such assertions, the United
States deployed key cultural forces of modern design, abstract art and jazz—
holding up each as a symbol of consumer sovereignty, freedom, aff luence and
individual expression (e.g., Barnhisel, 2015; Belamonte, 2008; Castillo, 2010;
Fosler-Lussier, 2016). In the United States, individuals were understood to have
the freedom to make their own lives, in part thanks to their access to a wealth of
available resources, including affordable consumer goods and services. The “sov-
ereign,” or self-determining, choices they made among these available options
marked a key distinction within US–Soviet propaganda battles. In this way, con-
sumer culture occupied a central role on both sides of the Cold War cultural
diplomacy battles, and might be understood via the lens of soft power ( Borgerson
and Schroeder, 2017).
Whereas political theorist William A. Callahan argues that China uses soft
power more in domestic policy than in foreign policy (Callahan, 2015), we pro-
pose that a brand culture approach to Chinese soft power sheds light on the
complex modes where brands and soft power intersect in the international sphere,
as well as in China itself. Callahan understands recent incidences of Chinese soft
 Branding as soft power 125

power as negative, in the sense that China has used soft power opportunities to
say negative things (Callahan, 2015, p. 217). As many have noted, soft power
typically works thorough positive associations and responses to a country’s cul-
ture, political values and foreign policies ( Nye, 2004; Callahan, 2015). In the
sense that soft power has been considered a “weapon of mass attraction” rather
than an offensive of coercion or bombs, this strikes him as worth investigating.
We appreciate the dualities and distinctions that Callahan focuses on here,
however, we are less interested in parsing the details of Nye’s representation of
soft power than we are in revealing how soft power can be understood through
a branding lens. In short, we attend to the less noticeable, yet powerful, ways
in which culture, values and norms are co-created with brands and branding
practices and processes. As Chinese brands and branding events become more
amorphous and ubiquitous, whether for luxury brands, such as Shang Xia and
Shanghai Tang, that emphasize culture and heritage, or in global-scale promo-
tions such as the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony, recognizing these for
the soft power they wield is important. As Callahan remarks, “the 2008 Olym-
pics is taken as a key success for China’s soft power strategy because it presented
the PRC to the world as a country that is physically strong, technologically
advanced and deeply civilized” (Callahan, 2015, p. 218). We believe that the Bei-
jing Olympics and the Opening Ceremony accomplished a much more nuanced
set of outcomes than Callahan’s list suggests.

The Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony

The 2008 Beijing Olympics facilitated the growth of China’s historical culture
as a resource for global branding by offering the elaborate, theatrical and phe-
nomenally costly Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony. For China, “hosting
the Olympic games was imagined primarily as a symbol of the revival of China’s
historical greatness and a confirmation of China’s emerging status as a major
power on the contemporary world stage” (Zhu, 2012 , p. 240). We frame the
Opening Ceremony as an expression of China’s soft power—a cultural, con-
sumer and strategic branding event that showcases a sophisticated and attractive,
yet earnest and nostalgic effort to position China as a modern economic, political
and cultural power with a long historical and cultural legacy that will continue
to inf luence global cultures.
The 2008 Beijing Olympics are generally considered to have been the most
expensive in history, at an estimated cost of over $42 billion, playing a key role
in branding China to the world (Fowler and Meichtry, 2008). A cultural theme
was intentionally—and strategically—built in to staging the Games. For the Bei-
jing 2008 Olympics, a key policy recommendation from the People’s University
concluded,

On this basis, we cautiously propose that in the construction of China’s

national image, we should hold the line on “cultural China,” and the
126 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

concept of “cultural China” should not only be the core theme in the
dialogue between China and the international community in Olympic
discourse, but also it should be added into the long term strategic plan for
the national image afterwards.
(Brownell, 2009, p. 1)

The identity myths of a country are important cultural fabrications where

myths smooth over people’s identity anxieties and create their desired identity
(Holt, 2004). China, in the current era, desires to construct its identity in the
international arena. The Opening Ceremony, directed by Zhang Yimou, helped
China communicate an apparently authentic “Chineseness” ( Wang, 2013; Wu,
Borgerson and Schroeder, 2013), connected with an attractive lineage of his-
torical innovation, such as the four great innovations of ancient China (paper-
making, printing, gunpowder and the compass) and the old Silk Road trade
route. The performance also evoked China’s diverse cultures and subcultures,
helping to lay claim to all of these as part of a unified China. The presence of the
Chinese past in the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony facilitated building
China’s brand.
Further, the Opening Ceremony addressed Chinese identity anxieties around
authenticity and at the same time served to promote Chinese cultural soft power.
Interviews conducted during the Games revealed that the Ceremony stimulated
nostalgia for both Chinese and non-Chinese audience members through the pre-
sentation of historical culture ( Wu, Borgerson and Schroeder, 2013). Audience
members spoke of pride in China, especially around the performance of the old
Silk Road and the accomplishments of Chinese opera.
Not only was modern advanced high-tech knowledge explored in the per-
formances of “magnificent civilization,” seen in the sparkling Fou, the huge
movable scroll, the “athletic footsteps painting,” the movable printing and the
splendid Silk Road map, but the Opening Ceremony also brought the historical
Chinese culture into modern life, expressed in the “Glorious Time” section. In
the performances of “Magnificent Civilization,” the intense drumming gave
way to the whimsical, as dozens of ancient “Flying Apsaras” (mythical Bud-
dhist goddesses) soared across the stadium and made an illuminated replica of
the Olympic rings raised above the arena. “Flying Apsaras” are often depicted
in murals found in Chinese temples and grottos (e.g., the art of f lying apsaras
in Yuangang, Longmen and Dunhung Grottos in China), and refer to mythical
female spirits. Historically, Chinese Buddhist scripture defines “Flying Apsaras”
as the gods of heaven, song or music or as fragrant goddesses with sweet voices.
Mostly they are young girls with slim figures, plump faces, elegant manners
and gentle moods. The scriptures further suggest that generally they appear as
a group of girls f lying and dancing in the sky with ribbon f luttering elegantly
and beautifully in hand. The modern Chinese “Flying Apsaras,” modeled on the
ancient Chinese “Flying Apsaras,” refers to the exploration of outer space. The
space-suited figures soaring in space and Li Ning’s “walking in outer space” with
 Branding as soft power 127

the lighting of f laming cauldrons were the most notable performances to con-
nect the modern “Flying Apsaras,” and by extension Chinese historical culture,
to modern life, aspiration and achievement.
Indeed, the Opening Ceremony did not merely present China’s historical
culture, but also Chinese modernity, wherein China is able to employ advanced
technology to reveal historical Chinese culture, in short, Chinese people living
a modern life alongside long-standing traditions. For example, Wang Ning, the
executive deputy director of the Opening and Closing Ceremonies of the Bei-
jing Olympics told China Radio International that,

the technology and equipment used in this opening ceremony is very com-
plicated. More than 2,000 tons of equipment were used in the opening
ceremony, including [a] large amount of light-emitting diodes. An LED
screen 147 meters long and 22 meters wide at the center of the stadium
transported the audience into a Chinese dreamland. At the beginning of
the show, 29 colossal, footprint-shaped fireworks exploded along the cen-
tral axis of Beijing to symbolize the pace of the summer games. Sparkles
from the final footprint fell into the center of the stadium and “lit up” the
f loor, bringing out the shining Olympic “Dream Rings” on a huge LED
screen and proclaiming the arrival of the Olympiad. Beijing used a smoke-
less powder to reduce pollution from the 40,000 explosions.
( Yun, 2008)

Investing the Opening Ceremony with historical culture was a skillful use of the
imagination: imagining the past in branding tends to produce emotional engage-
ment. The performance demonstrated a Chinese identity of sincerity, hospitality,
friendliness and innovation, for instance, in the moment when the Fou beat-
ers started a thunderous welcoming ceremony and chanted a Confucian saying:
“How happy we are, to meet friends from afar!” ( Wu, Borgerson and Schro-
eder, 2013). In the section that showcased Chinese movable-type printing, 3,000
people, dressed as the 3,000 disciples of Confucius, each held an ancient Chinese
book (called Jian in Chinese and made by baboons) and chanted renowned epic
poems from the Analects of Confucius (“All those within the four seas can be con-
sidered his brothers”). These myths embrace romance, perhaps a Chinese desire
for a simple, peaceful life and harmonious relationships, and the Chinese spirit of
exploring and conquering nature. As media scholar Qing Cao states:

Soft power provides the Chinese elites with a useful conceptual frame to
develop a strategic approach to enhance China’s international standing,
dispel suspicions of the country’s wider roles and activities, and articulate
a Chinese vision of a world order inspired by Confucian values. Domes-
tically, soft power discourse creates a multiplicity of spaces whereby the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constructs fresh political identities
underpinned partially by traditional values, and envisages the revival of a
128 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

cultural China that the nation has long aspired to, since European colonial
encroachments centuries ago.
(Cao, 2011, p. 8)

In this way, historical Chinese culture functions not only for the Chinese, but
for Westerners as well, and the investment of historical Chinese culture in the
Opening Ceremony enables China to target a global myth.

Resistance to Chinese soft power: lessons from brand culture

These soft power branding efforts of the Beijing Opening Ceremony helped
create a vision for a new China. As Cao writes, “The most significant aspect of
soft power discourse in China lies in a broad consensus by the political and intel-
lectual elites that China’s traditional values provide a much needed ontological
and epistemological underpinning for the country’s future development” (Cao,
2011, p. 20; see also Edney, 2012).
Of course, the global marketplace is not without response or resistance. One
aspect of this may be seen regarding China’s manufacturing practices, which
include the copying, and the producing at a lower price, of products associated
with the authentic, local, craft and fine art traditions of other countries and cul-
tures in the world, such as glass in Southern Sweden, woolen cloth and Native
American souvenirs in the United States or beautiful paper goods from Italy.
From a brand culture perspective, there may be arenas in which China’s global
ambitions tread on the nation branding and authentic historical culture claims
of other nations. Ignoring these concerns may create greater foreign consumer
citizen dissatisfaction with Chinese soft power contentions of historically rooted
and authentic innovation and expertise—particularly in the face of local job loss,
as well as the dissolution of traditional craftsmanship with cultural ties. In other
words, in addition to global consumers holding the perception that Chinese
goods are cheap, or not made up to the standard of Western goods, a sense that
China has stolen aspects of other cultures’ pride and heritage may create a dam-
aging image for China even in the face of soft power efforts.
However, if people understand the origins of an object, or arena of goods and
expertise, as authentically linked to China—as communicated in the Beijing
Opening Ceremony, such as, early production of paper, or ink drawing and
painting, and facility with precision technology—this may ameliorate the feel-
ing that China has stolen these from elsewhere. In short, Chinese soft power
may invoke the resentment of the developed world for taking over production
of goods that had a local and national history of their own. In this sense, then,
China’s battle does not involve only convincing people that this technologically
advanced and historically rich country can produce quality. Indeed, no matter
how well China answers questions of quality, there will continue to be resent-
ment, as well as an emotional response to China as a whole (e.g., Ramo, 2007).
China may continue to prove that their craftsmanship and skills are as fine as
 Branding as soft power 129

anywhere else and that Chinese history harbors the innovation and brilliance on
display in the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony. However, if China contin-
ues to depend upon making things that have their apparent origins elsewhere,
China may be seen as stealing in the face of other countries’ attempts to nation
brand and honor their own culture histories and heritage. As long as the things
that China produces do not have their origins (of object use, skill in creating and
producing, as well as historical cultural meaning and design related to this) in
China, this resentment may simmer. Of course, these emotional responses may
not matter. Low price may win out regardless of how people feel about the dis-
sipating of national historic cultural practices and achievements, and this may
provide some ref lections on the limits of soft power on both sides.
It could be argued, however, that authenticity indeed will play a part in bring-
ing China and Chinese goods to global consumers in a more satisfying way, and
this is the provenance of soft power and brand culture: “projecting soft power is
not only strategically imperative in fending off China’s negative external por-
trayal, but morally preferable in extending China’s soft inf luence commensu-
rable to its growing international roles” (Cao, 2011, p. 20). If China focuses
upon authentically linked design, objects and themes, that is, those rooted in
Chinese aesthetics and history, China may be able to bypass this resentment and
communicate China’s own attractions in soft power. Chinese historical culture
can brand in such a way as to appeal to global consumers. In this, we believe
that consumers can feel a part of a different cultural experience, feel connected
in new ways and express their difference from typical Western ideals, styles and
designs ( Wu, Borgerson and Schroeder, 2013). As such, we see the co-creation
of brands and culture intersecting with soft power wherein China could build
positive associations and appease resentment.

Conclusion
A brand culture approach, which draws upon an interdisciplinary base to under-
stand brands and their role in culture, provides a distinctive and insightful per-
spective for understanding Chinese soft power. The Beijing Olympic Opening
Ceremony employed historical Chinese culture in conjunction with modern
technology to target the myth market, evoking consumer nostalgia and enabling
feelings of Chinese authenticity. Historical Chinese culture, displayed in the
Opening Ceremony, harnessed cultural codes of strength, equality and peace,
and offered both Chinese and non-Chinese viewers sacred elements and feel-
ings of wonder, themes constituting hopes and dreams for many in the midst of
difficulty, conf lict and war around the world. Furthermore, this Ceremony did
not merely present China’s past, but also envisioned contemporary Chinese life
infused with long-standing traditions.
The Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony created a myth market not merely
for the Chinese, but for non-Chinese people as well, in part by tapping into
long-held mythologies about China. As myth markets are derived from the gap
130 Janet Borgerson, Jonathan Schroeder and Zhiyan Wu

between what people hope and reality, the Opening Ceremony revealed themes
of world harmony—for humans and nature. Thus, the Beijing Olympics Open-
ing Ceremony contributed to the global myth market, the building of Chinese
global brands and the facilitating of soft power. As such, the Ceremony repre-
sents a large-scale soft power effort that signaled how China’s own conception of
its history plays in to its global economic and political ambition.
Soft power assumes many forms. Branding—often associated with com-
mercial ventures—intersects with soft power in several ways. Nation branding,
in particular, shares aspects with soft power, and provides a conceptual link
between governmental originated efforts and private initiatives. China’s staging
of the 2008 Beijing Olympics offers a cogent example of how the co-creative
powers of branding and culture intersect with an aim to promote a positive and
attractive vision of China outward to the world, as well as inward to the Chinese
people.

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7
A DECADE OF WIELDING SOFT
POWER THROUGH CONFUCIUS
INSTITUTES
Some interim results

Falk Hartig

Since 2004, Confucius Institutes (CIs) and their attendant Confucius Classrooms
are almost everywhere on the global stage. The non-profit CIs partner with
China’s Office of Chinese Language Council International (known as Hanban),
a Chinese and a foreign entity, normally universities. Their main function is
teaching Chinese language and culture. By the end of 2018 a total of 548 CIs
and 1,193 smaller Confucius Classrooms (mainly established at high schools and
associated to a Confucius Institute) have been established in 154 countries.
In the words of Chinese President Xi Jinping, CIs play “an important role
in promoting mutual learning between and among various civilizations in the
world and strengthening mutual understanding and friendship between Chinese
people and peoples of other countries” ( Xi, 2014). CIs address a mainstream pub-
lic audience that does not normally have specialist knowledge about China. The
programs consist mainly of language courses at various levels and a wide range
of cultural events such as exhibitions, film screenings and various talks.
Drawing on fieldwork at CIs in different parts of the world and critical
engagement with the growing literature dealing with them, this chapter aims
to unpack the often intense debate over the function and value of these high-
profile examples of Chinese soft power generation. Despite the criticism that
has been leveled at CIs by concerned scholars in some Western countries, there
is still strong global demand from universities to host CIs. They remain a par-
ticularly attractive proposition for universities seeking to internationalize and
to gain access to China’s higher education market. Nevertheless, this chapter
argues that CIs are still significantly limited in what they can achieve, both in
terms of their practical operational resources as well as their ability to reach
target audiences in their host countries. The chapter furthermore points to a
number of contested issues surrounding the CIs and finishes with some thoughts
about possible future scenarios for these institutes. Overall, I am of the opinion
that in order to use the limited potential CIs have, the number of CIs has to be
134 Falk Hartig

reduced so that a smaller number of CIs with proper funding and staffing can act
as a facilitator of China’s soft power.

Confucius Institutes—on everyone’s lips

Confucius Institutes frequently cause a stir in public and published opinion, and
have come to the increasing notice of academia in recent years both inside and
outside China. In the early years, only a few studies comprehensively engaged
with CIs ( Paradise, 2009; Gil, 2009; Yang, 2010). Normally the institutes were
only brief ly mentioned in China related international relations literature ( Lamp-
ton, 2008; Lanteigne, 2009; Friedberg, 2011). However, in most of these works
CIs are only mentioned in a few sentences and sometimes not even referred to by
the correct name (see, for example, Chan, 2008, p. 178, who refers to “Confu-
cian Institutes”).
In recent years, however, in parallel to the ever-growing number of CIs, we
see increasing academic interest in CIs: a considerable part of the relevant English
literature provides an overview, and discusses critical issues and the connec-
tion of CIs to China’s soft power ( Ding and Saunders, 2006; Gil, 2009; Ding,
2008; Starr, 2009; Paradise, 2009; Zhe, 2010; Siow, 2011; Louie, 2011; You,
2012; Ngamsang and Walsh, 2013; Pan, 2013; Yang, 2010; Zhou and Luk, 2016).
Another stream of research presents case studies of CIs in regions or individ-
ual countries (Hartig, 2016; Hubbert, 2014; Park, 2013; Stambach, 2014; Starr,
2009; Wheeler, 2014; Lahtinen, 2015) or studies dealing with questions of iden-
tity formation in CIs (Fallon, 2015; Schmidt, 2013). Another group of authors
approaches CIs from a higher education and language teaching perspective (Gil,
2009; Starr, 2009; King, 2013; Zhao and Huang, 2010; Yang, 2010), yet others
approach the topic from a business perspective (Lien et al., 2014) or look at West-
ern media reports about CIs ( Lueck, Pipps and Lin, 2014; Metzgar and Su, 2016).
Chinese publications discuss the relationship between soft power, image,
Chinese language fever (hanyure) and CIs ( Xu, 2006; Duan, 2008; Guan, 2012),
or focus on cultural components of CIs ( Nie, 2012). Others describe CIs and
Chinese language teaching for international students as a platform of China’s
public diplomacy (Han, 2011) and as a means to internationalize Chinese educa-
tion ( Liu, 2007) or present case studies of CIs in individual countries or conti-
nents (Shen, 2007; Chen, 2008). More recently Chinese scholars are interested in
how CIs are perceived in foreign countries ( Peng and Yu, 2016; Lin and Zhang,
2016; Zhou, 2015; Zhao, 2015).

The conceptual puzzle: Confucius Institutes and soft power,

public diplomacy and propaganda
What is puzzling though is the ambiguity regarding the conceptualization of
Confucius Institutes. Broadly speaking, CIs are described in three different ways:
first, they can be understood as an instrument of China’s soft power (Gil,
 A decade of wielding soft power through CIs 135

2009; Paradise, 2009; Park, 2013; Schmidt, 2013; Yang, 2010); second, CIs can
be understood as an instrument of China’s public and/or cultural diplomacy
(d’Hooghe, 2015; Hartig, 2016; Pan, 2013; Rawnsley, 2009; Wheeler, 2014);
and third, there is a line of scholarship that sees CIs as a “propaganda project”
of the Chinese leadership ( Brady, 2008, p. 172; Sahlins, 2015). I understand CIs
as one instrument of China’s public diplomacy which is used to communicate
with foreign publics in order to communicate certain narratives about the coun-
try, to shape its image and to, eventually, activate its soft power resources. As
this volume deals with China’s soft power, I will not replicate the debates here,
but want to highlight two aspects worth considering with regards to CIs that
resurfaced when reading most recent publications linking CIs to China’s soft
power efforts. One such study discusses the establishment of CIs as “a striking
example of how the government promotes soft power through cultural means”
(Zhou and Luk, 2016, p. 628). It aims to show that CIs fail to increase the soft
power of China because many countries regard them as a propaganda tool and
a threat to academic freedom and the local community. Zhou and Luk further
aim to show that China’s soft power is not so attractive in the eyes of receivers.
Another study similarly argues that “the capacity of CIs to spread China’s soft
power on a global scale is uncertain and systematically limited” ( Yuan, Guo and
Zhu, 2016, p. 344), while Xiao (2017, p. 46) comes to the conclusion that CIs
have been “successfully serving as a platform to promote China’s soft power”
around the world.
The first point that struck me during my fieldwork is that even though the
literature closely links CIs to soft power, it would, however, appear that people
in charge of CIs and the Hanban have a certain unease with the very term “soft
power.” As outlined in the introduction to this volume, the most senior leader-
ship in China did enthusiastically take up the concept during the Hu-Wen era.
In 2006, two years after the first CIs were established, Xu Lin, the director-
general of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, described CIs as the “bright-
est trademark of China’s soft power” ( Xinhua, 2006). In the following years,
however, there was a change in perception and attitude. Yang (2010, p. 238)
reports that “the Hanban officially denies its intention of soft power projec-
tion” and an official from the Chinese embassy in Germany told me in 2012
that Xu Lin “does not like the term soft power.” Xu herself later emphasized
that CIs “are not projecting soft power, nor aim to impose Chinese values or
Chinese culture on other countries” (quoted in Yang, 2010, p. 238). China, Xu
continues, “ just hopes to be truly understood by the rest of the world. CIs are
designed to be an important platform to promote Chinese culture and teach
Chinese language.”
According to two Chinese scholars I talked with, the reason is possibly that
although the discussion is about soft power, it still is a form of power which
may sound alarming to Western ears. Paradise (2009, p. 658) quotes a program
director at Hanban who makes a very similar point: “I don’t like soft power. I
think power is aggressive. We just do something all people like.” This perception
136 Falk Hartig

seemingly has not changed too much in recent years. While Xiao (2017) reports
occasional statements in which people in charge of CIs would clearly point out
that they do promote China’s soft power, a typical reaction would be that people
in charge “don’t view [themselves] as promoting soft power” ( Xiao, 2017, p. 33).
This is a fascinating observation which is clearly related to the issue of how
China is perceived in the world and how China wants to be seen. Certain voices
within China were and are very much aware of potential reactions and potential
unease in foreign countries, especially in the Western world. These voices are
aware that a China that appears too boastful and self-confident may only fuel
negative animosity toward China. They therefore argue the case for keeping
a low profile in rhetorical terms, and distance CIs not only from the notion of
soft power but also from broader strategic and foreign policy–related intentions
(Hartig, 2016).

The empirical puzzle: how to measure success?

The second aspect, the question of success, needs even more attention. It is com-
mon sense that soft power is “a contested concept” ( Rawnsley, 2016, p. 30) and
the question of how to measure soft power, or the success of any communicative
activity to wield soft power, is one of the most contested debates surrounding this
contested concept (McCloy and Harvey, 2016; Ji, 2017). The issue at stake here
is that soft power “depends more than hard power upon the existence of will-
ing interpreters and receivers” ( Nye, 2004, p. 16) and its effects “depend heavily
on acceptance by the receiving audience” ( Nye, 2004, p. 99). One of the most
fundamental limitations of soft power studies is the lack of “the whole process
involving not only the actor exercising soft power and the instruments used but
also the receiving agents in their socio-political, economic, and cultural contexts”
(Zhang, 2016, p. 6). This is very much the same with regards to scholarship deal-
ing with CIs: we still know much too little about the achievements of CIs. We
know about their aims and goals, we know about the practical issues, and we
clearly know enough about their credibility problems as they normally do not
touch upon sensitive issues such as the status of Tibet and Taiwan or what hap-
pened at Tiananmen Square in 1989. But we know too little about the audience
and how those people are affected or inf luenced by CIs. This point brings us to
the issue of measuring outputs in contrast to measuring outcomes (see Rawnsley,
2017, on this).

How to measure success: outputs vs. outcomes

With regards to aims and goals we have to acknowledge distinctions between
the official Chinese discourse explaining the existence of CIs and the (Western)
journalistic and academic interpretation of their existence. The official explana-
tion is ref lected in the mission statement put forward by the Confucius Institutes
Headquarters (n.d.) which notes:
 A decade of wielding soft power through CIs 137

As China’s economy and exchanges with the world have seen rapid growth,
there has also been a sharp increase in the world’s demands for Chinese
learning. Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain’s experi-
ence in promoting their national languages, China began its own explo-
ration through establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to
promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these
were given the name the Confucius Institute.

The Chinese explanation highlights the reactive approach in the sense that China
was, and still is, just meeting, or trying to meet, foreign demand with regards to
support for Chinese language teaching. It further points to the fundamental but
simple task of promoting Chinese language and culture via CIs. If we take these
aims as a benchmark to judge “success,” CIs are increasingly successful in intro-
ducing knowledge about Chinese language and culture to the world, as the ever
growing number of institutes and students indicates (Siow, 2011; Hartig, 2016).
As Lo and Pan (2014, p. 12) observe, if “outcomes are measured solely in terms
of quantitative leaps . . . the achievements of the CI project are very remark-
able.” According to Hanban, it is because of the “Confucius Institutes’ advocacy
and inf luence [that] the number of those who learn Chinese all over the world
exceeds 100 million” compared with about 30 million learners ten years ago
( Liu, 2014). Although one should treat those figures with caution, there can
be no doubt that there is increasing global interest in and demand for Chinese
language and culture, and CIs play an important role in satisfying this demand.
On the ground, however, it can be quite a challenge to actually satisfy this
still enormous demand abroad. The most pressing issue in this regard concerns
teachers at CIs, especially those dispatched from China. There is a growing
demand for teachers to fill the ever-increasing number of institutes, and there
is a shortage of teachers who are proficient in local languages. A related issue
concerns the teaching quality of teachers and inadequate teaching methods and
models which often do not meet the local needs and requirements. While those
issues can be found in developed countries ( Hartig, 2016), they are even more
pressing in developing countries, as research from different parts of Africa illus-
trates. From my conversations with dispatched Chinese staff it is clear that even
South Africa—notably different from other countries on the continent in terms
of its standard of living—has a rather negative image in China, which makes it
difficult for South African CIs to find teachers (Hartig, 2014). On the one hand,
teachers there mentioned harsh living conditions which include loneliness, poor-
quality food, and security concerns. On the other hand, they noted that when
they arrived they found South Africa better than expected: the clean air was one
positive aspect several Chinese teachers mentioned (Hartig, 2014).
Another practical problem concerns the question of teaching materials for
CIs in different parts of the world. Lo and Pan (2014, p. 522) note that a number
of materials sent from Hanban are considered “too boring to arouse readers’
interest.” Others echo this understanding and point out that textbooks used by
138 Falk Hartig

CIs are considered “problematic mainly for their intellectual simplicity vis-à-vis
language simplicity” ( Procopio, 2015, p. 117).
While it is relatively easy to affirm the official version that in quantitative
means more and more people get in to contact with Chinese language and cul-
ture simply because the number of CIs is still growing, it gets much more com-
plicated when we return to the question what impact those CIs can actually
have. As pointed out before, one may identify two broad approaches to analyze
CIs: the more relaxed approach understands CIs as an instrument of cultural/
public diplomacy with the assumed aim of activating or wielding China’s (cul-
tural) soft power and shaping China’s image. This avenue of engagement, which
might be labeled by critics as the “panda hugger” approach, does not necessarily
take issue with the desire of the country to present its nice and friendly face to
the world while ignoring the negative aspects. The more concerned approach
focuses precisely on these negative aspects and the resulting consequences for the
functioning of CIs. This understanding, which opponents may describe as the
“dragon-slayer” approach, emphasizes the potential of spreading communist ide-
ology and undermining academic freedom and integrity of host organizations,
and thus sees CIs as a propaganda device or as “academic malware” (Sahlins,
2015).
What these opposing approaches have in common is that they, other than
official Chinese statements, attribute more to CIs than the seemingly simple
dissemination of Chinese language and culture as they assume that CIs, in one
way or the other, are intended to shape people’s perception of what China is and
what it stands for. Eventually, then, CIs are understood as having the potential to
inf luence people and to engage in the often quoted battle for hearts and minds
( Nye, 2008). The fundamental problem, however, is that so far we know only
very little about the people who go there. We know, to a certain degree, why
people go to CIs and a number of reasons seem to be similar in different parts of
the world. The former Chinese director of a German Confucius Institute listed
three general reasons why people go to CIs. First, people go for work-related
reasons ( gongzuo xuyao), as they either already do or they want to do business
with China; secondly, because of cultural curiosity and interest (wenhua xuyao).
The third reason, strongly informed by the location of the Institute in an East
German city, is what the former director described as “special feelings” (teshu
ganqing) (CNPolitics, 2012). She noted that a lot of elderly people who lived in
the former German Democratic Republic come to the CI out of a certain attach-
ment with China due to the, at least assumed, ideological proximity to their
former country of origin. Having been at several lectures and discussions at this
CI, I can confirm this ( Hartig, 2016), even though this assumption ignores the
political reality that Chinese–East German relations were not as harmonious as
some CI visitors would assume (Slobodian, 2015).
While there might be a general interest in Chinese language and culture
( Wheeler, 2014; Hartig, 2016) or a desire to be intellectually challenged ( Wheeler,
2014), one obvious reason to engage with the Chinese language is clearly China’s
 A decade of wielding soft power through CIs 139

economic development and the desire to benefit economically by speaking Chi-

nese (Hartig, 2016; Yang, 2010). This is clearly one major reason for students in
Africa attending classes at CIs all over the continent ( Wheeler, 2014; Procopio,
2015; King, 2013; Stambach and Kwayu, 2017).
What we do not know properly so far, however, is how the receiving audience
interprets the messages CIs, intentionally or unintentionally, are communicat-
ing about China. There is some anecdotal evidence that students and visitors of
CIs decode the messages, or are aware of the awkward handling of so called “sen-
sitive” issues, as the ethnographic work by Hubbert (2014) and Stambach (2014)
vividly illustrates. But much more of such research is necessary to better judge
CIs. Doing this, however, would mean that scholars working on CIs would have
to actually talk to and spend time with those students, participants and visitors,
because as John le Carré has noted: “A desk is a dangerous place from which to
view the world.”
The problem, however, then would be twofold. First of all, in order to find
out what effect a CI actually can have on the perception of China it would be
necessary, in an ideal but artificial setting, to talk to people before they visit a CI
or before they even think about going. This would enable a comparison between
pre and post visits and would provide indications if and how CIs may contribute
to a certain perception of China. A related issue, and this is not limited to CIs,
but any instrument of public diplomacy in my understanding, is the simple but
crucial fact that those instruments potentially are only mainly preaching to the
already converted. Based on anecdotal evidence from CIs in Australia, Europe
and South Africa, I have the impression that people go to a CI if they already
have a certain positive interest in China or are at least open-minded enough
to go there. Someone who—for whatever reason—perceives China as the evil
empire will normally not visit a CI and change his or her mind.

The future of Confucius Institutes: possible scenarios,

challenges and perspectives
One of the most fascinating aspects of the CIs is the astonishing number and the
tricky issue of consolidation versus growth. In my understanding, this is one of
the most fundamental aspects, if not the single most important aspect, if we think
about possible future scenarios for Confucius Institutes, and I will discuss this
issue in some length in the remainder of this chapter.
For quite some time, international partners have called for Hanban to change
its attitude from a focus on quantity, ref lected in the growing number of CIs, to a
focus on quality. This seems crucial for sustainable development. In 2012 a local
Australian director told me that Hanban reassured the existing CIs that it would
start consolidating and no longer focus so much on numbers, “but apparently
they still keep producing them which is a contradiction to what they say at these
conferences.” This was clearly the case at the time and is still a valid observation
today, even though the growth has slowed down a bit recently.
140 Falk Hartig

During an interview in 2011, Xu Lin explained to me the rather awkward

position Hanban was in at that time: “Right now there are almost 300 applica-
tions from universities in 60 countries on my table, numerous applications even
have been submitted multiple times and I can’t tell who can get an institute and
who not.” Xu also admitted that when Hanban decides which applicant can have
a CI, “the question is not whether foreign partners meet the selection criteria,
but it is much more the case that we struggle to meet them in terms of resources
and teachers” (Hartig, 2016, p. 189). While this observation makes perfect sense,
the Development Plan of Confucius Institutes 2012–2020 nevertheless clearly states
as one major objective: “Develop Confucius Institutes steadily and Confucius
Classrooms vigorously. By 2015, establish 150 news Confucius Institutes, so that
the total number reaches 500” (Hanban, 2012, p. 8). This goal had been reached,
and overall there seems to be a certain slowdown in the growth rate, but never-
theless new CIs still appear. It is against this background that a number of inter-
national CI directors, some more direct and outspoken and others more indirect
and subtle, for quite some time already hold the view that there are too many CIs
and probably not all of the existing CIs will survive ( Hartig, 2016).
Looking at the existing issues and problems many CIs are facing, one pos-
sible scenario might be that Hanban, while not activity expediting the closing
of CIs, may look for ways to partially back down from its responsibilities in
terms of human resources and funding. While admittedly none of the follow-
ing thoughts have been articulated by Hanban officials, it seems worthwhile to
think about a possible “exit strategy” for the Chinese side. Based on impressions
and information gathered during three so-called Confucius Institute Confer-
ences1 and numerous interviews and conversations with people in charge of CIs
in different parts of the world, I would cautiously argue that the idea of so-called
Model Confucius Institutes (Shifan Kongzi Xueyuan) could pave the way for such
a partial withdrawal.
In late 2011, the Council of the CI Headquarters agreed on establishing “a
large number of model Confucius Institutes and Classrooms [and to] give [those
Institutes] pivotal support in areas such as the allocation of personnel and provi-
sion of equipment” ( N/A 2012, p. 13).2 During the 2011 CI Conference, the
plan was announced “to build 10 Model Confucius Institutes across the five
continents in 2012” ( Xu, 2012, p. 21). It seems, however, that this plan did not
work out because at the 2012 CI Conference the plan to create those Model
Institutes was again discussed. It was noted that Model CIs “shall aim to play
[a] model role, represent a wide range of areas, and have multiple types” ( N/A,
2013, p. 63), and the CI Headquarters was called upon to “establish a taskforce
and conduct special researches [sic] to decide on the number of model Confucius
Institutes and specify how to support model Confucius Institutes” ( N/A, 2013,
p. 63).
The topic gained much more importance within the CI universe during the
2013 CI Conference as Xu Lin in her closing remarks made explicit reference to
this idea. To achieve the goal of “realizing sustainable development in the next
 A decade of wielding soft power through CIs 141

ten years,” Xu Lin told representatives from CIs around the world, “we should
select some good Confucius Institutes as examples, as models” ( Xu, 2014, p. 65).
Xu noted two principle requirements for potential Model CIs: first, they should
have an independent teaching building of at least 2,000 square meters in f loor
space. She pointed out that there should be financial support from the Chinese
side, but she also made clear that Hanban “cannot promise that the Chinese gov-
ernment will fund an independent building for each of the CIs within the next
ten years. If you want to build a Model CI, you have to show that you are being
serious by at least procuring a plot of land for that purpose” ( Xu, 2014, p. 65).
The second principle requirement would be that Model CIs should focus on one
of the following core themes: (1) education, with an emphasis on teacher train-
ing, education and examinations; (2) research;3 (3) special aspects like tourism,
Chinese traditional medicine or business; (4) vocational and technical training
(Xu, 2014). Model Confucius Institutes, according to Xu, “should be about 20%
of the total number of institutes” (Xu, 2014, p. 65).
The most comprehensive information regarding the Model CI idea can be
found in an internal Hanban document entitled “Methods of Evaluating a Model
Confucius Institute in Europe (Draft)/Ou Zhou Shifan Kongzi Xueyuan Ping-
shen banfa (Cao’an),” probably distributed during the 2014 CI Conference.4 In
order “to run the Confucius Institute in a more scientific and better way in
its second ten-year development, one of the most important plans is to select
a certain proportion of outstanding Confucius Institutes as ‘Model Confucius
Institutes’” (CI Headquarters, n.d., p. 1).
The draft lists a number of prerequisites that CIs would have to fulfill in
order to be awarded the status of Model CI. Amongst other things, the CI should
have run for at least five years and it should have been awarded the title “Con-
fucius Institute of the Year” at least once (CI Headquarters, n.d., p. 1). It should
have established “at least 3 Confucius Classrooms and 5 Chinese language teach-
ing sites” and should have kept “long-term cooperative relations with at least 5
local government institutions, enterprises and/or non-governmental organiza-
tions” (CI Headquarters, n.d., p. 2). A prospective Model CI should have “at least
10 Chinese language teachers and volunteers dispatched by the Headquarters”
and the host institution should “have offered at least 5 full-time or part-time
members of staff ” (CI Headquarters, n.d., p. 2). The “benefits and privileges”
when being awarded include amongst other more technical aspects the follow-
ing: when a Model CI applies for programs with the Headquarters, it “enjoys
priority” compared to other CIs and it may apply for different extra funds and
special budgets (CI Headquarters, n.d., p. 6).
During that 2014 CI Conference, the selection criteria for Model CIs were
discussed and it was noted that selection criteria “must be transparent and there
should be different criteria for different continents” ( N/A, 2015, p. 59). It was
furthermore suggested that each Model CI should be evaluated every year
to determine “whether its standard of teaching and the level of its service to
the community have improved, whether it has gained support from the local
142 Falk Hartig

government and surrounding communities, and whether its courses are meet-
ing local needs” ( N/A, 2015, p. 59). The directors of Model CIs “should be very
experienced, and its volunteers and teachers should be passionate and commit-
ted. A Model Confucius Institute should excel in at least one area, be able to
maintain sustainable development and at the same time be able to bring in earn-
ings” (ibid.). Similar ideas were discussed one year later ( N/A, 2016).
The problem with all these statements, however, is that they are statements
of intent, and it remains somewhat unclear what the reality of Model CIs looks
like. This begins with the simple but telling fact that it is not entirely clear how
many CIs actually are Model CIs. During the 2015 CI Conference, 15 CIs from
around the world were selected as Model CIs, although there was a certain confu-
sion regarding this number. At least two of the awarded CIs noted that they were
chosen “as one of the 10 model Confucius Institutes out of 500 from 134 coun-
tries and regions” (Feehily, 2016; Hagewood, 2016). A US-based CI reported 20
Model Confucius Institutes (Hale, 2015), a Spanish CI correctly pointed out that
15 CIs around the world were given the award ( Universitat de València, 2015)
while another European CI referred to 14 award-winning CIs (Sofia Univer-
sity, 2015). According to the official website of the 2016 CI Conference, another
25 CIs were selected as Model Institutes last year.5 While the selection process
remains somewhat dubious, it is clear that being a Model CI presents selected
CIs the chance to obtain support from Hanban for new programs and compete
for increased additional funding (Hale, 2015; Hagewood, 2016). The CI at the
University of Hawaii, which was designated a Model CI in 2015, noted that this
“recognition comes with a one-time allocation of $1 million” ( Lau, 2015).
While it is thus obvious why CIs would compete for the status of Model CI,
this award—which is one of a number of honors which can be awarded to CIs
and their representatives—may be seen in a more strategic light as well. In my
understanding there is no way around reducing the number of existing CIs, and
how many CIs will eventually survive in the long run is unforeseeable. However,
to single out a number of Model CIs could perhaps be a first step to get rid of the
burden of supporting several hundred entities around the world financially and
logistically. Based on Xu Lin’s statement that roughly 20% of CIs should become
Model CIs, roughly 100 Model CIs would exist in the future. This figure, in
turn, would then roughly conform to the 100 CIs which Hanban had in mind
when the whole project started in 2004 (Hartig, 2016; Raine, 2009). It would be
much easier to find qualified teachers, manage logistics and fund these 100 CIs
rather than 500 CIs. Of course, this may not mean that the other 400 CIs would
be closed down by Hanban, but if personnel and funding are mainly provided
to the 100 Model CIs, the number of “normal” CIs not running very smoothly
could increase over the long term, and some might cancel their contracts with
Hanban.6 This, by the way, would also be a face-saving way to react to growing
criticism at home, where people do not understand why China has to co-finance
language courses for university students, especially at world-leading universities,
while schools in rural China still suffer from insufficient funding.
 A decade of wielding soft power through CIs 143

In conclusion it can be said that CIs are probably the most high-profile exam-
ple of Chinese soft power generation. Despite the criticism and concern in some
Western countries, there is still strong global demand from universities to host
CIs. They remain a particularly attractive proposition for universities seeking
to internationalize and to gain access to China’s higher education market. Nev-
ertheless, CIs are still limited in what they can achieve, both in terms of their
practical operational resources as well as their ability to reach target audiences in
their host countries. Those limitations are also clearly related to the credibility
issue that CIs, like other Chinese instruments of soft power generation, are fac-
ing. The question thus remains: how can they be successful in wielding China’s
soft power? One answer to this question is that Hanban should provide CIs with
more leeway to engage in more controversial topics; at the same time it will have
to find a way to stabilize financial support for the CIs which, in my understand-
ing, would mean reducing their numbers below the current level.

Notes
1 I attended the 6th and 8th Confucius Institute Conferences in Beijing in December 2011
and 2013 as well as the 9th conference in Xiamen in December 2014. These conferences
are internal gatherings where teachers and directors of CIs, presidents of host universi-
ties from around the world, as well as representatives of Chinese partner universities or
institutions, the education departments of related Chinese provinces, and Chinese enter-
prises involved in the construction of CIs come together to recall the past year and to
discuss future developments of CIs. Recent conferences were attended by about 2,000
CI-affiliated participants.
2 According to one European CI director, the idea was first circulated in 2011.
3 It remained—and still remains—unclear what research Xu Lin had in mind.
4 Those internal Hanban documents do not have any dates, and as I attended both confer-
ences in 2013 and 2014, I cannot reconstruct in which year this document was circulated.
5 http://conference.hanban.org/confucius/advanced-en.html
6 Seen purely from this point of view and ignoring the negative publicity, the cynic might
suggest that the closure of some of the CIs in the Western world may not present such a
dramatic headache to Hanban.

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lüe jianyi” [“10 Years of Confucius Institute: Statistics of Development, Analysis
of Achievements and Strategic Suggestions”], Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University
(Social Sciences) 16(1), pp. 38–44.
Zhou, Ying and Sabrina Luk. 2016. “Establishing Confucius Institutes: A Tool for Pro-
moting China’s Soft Power?,” Journal of Contemporary China 25(100), pp. 628–642.
PART 2
China’s global soft power
under Xi Jinping
8
THE DILEMMA OF CHINA’S
SOFT POWER IN EUROPE
Zhan Zhang1

Since the establishment of the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between

China and Europe (the European Union and several member states) in 2003,
the development of Sino–European cooperation has substantially contributed to
the change in the world economy and politics. The new economic ties increased
China’s trade with Europe and also helped several European countries hasten
their recovery in the aftermath of the Eurozone debt crisis. After the “17 + 1”
framework (formerly called “16 + 1” before Greece entered in 2019), created in
2012 to improve cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, a
more strategic framework—the Belt and Road (formerly called One Belt One
Road) Initiative—was introduced by Beijing in 2013 under Xi Jinping’s global
ambition to reconnect China with Europe as well as Central and West Asia.
However, such intensified economic benefits, together with other political and
cultural efforts in the past decade, did not result in a significant improvement
of China’s image in Europe. Ironically, European public opinion of China has
been the most negative in the world (Shambaugh, 2013), and according to the
Pew Research Center’s survey on global attitudes, favorability of China from the
main Western European countries even declined between 2006 and 2016 (see
Figure 8.1).
In order to understand the apparent contradiction between the growing
China–Europe cooperative interactions and the persistent European skepticism
of China, this chapter explores the differing perspectives of China and Europe
with regard to soft power. First, it elaborates Nye’s original concept of soft power
(1990) to identify the gaps between the Chinese and the European framing of this
enterprise. Second, it discusses the basic variance with regard to political-moral
values and the internal-to-external inf lexibility that limits China’s soft power
campaign in European societies. Third, it traces the main lines of the rollout of
Chinese soft power in Europe from both Chinese and European perspectives.
152 Zhan Zhang

70

60

50
Percentages

40

30

20

10

0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Years
UK France Germany Spain

FIGURE 8.1 European favorability toward China, 2006–2016

Finally, it offers critical insights and discussion of the main obstacles that have
limited China’s ability to attract European hearts and minds.
The chapter concludes by outlining future directions for understanding soft
power in both a Sino–European and a global context. The growing interdepen-
dence between China and Europe carries a good deal of weight on national,
regional and international issues, and it allows the two sides to merge their inter-
ests in the process of re-balancing and re-stabilizing dynamic global governance.
Such stability in motion becomes even more crucial in the face of today’s cri-
ses, and especially in the face of the escalated trade war between China and
the United States. Popular initiatives calling for greater protectionism and anti-
globalization movements are on the rise, placing the existing power structures
of the global economy and the established political order at risk. Thus, a well-
defined soft power projection between China and Europe is indispensable for
a growing European confidence in China’s contributions to global economic
development and to the new multipolar power balance currently in formation.

The discursive gap of the soft power concept between

China and Europe
Joseph Nye introduced the notion of “soft power” in 1990 as “the ability of
a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences
or define their interests in ways consistent with its own” (Nye, 1990: 168). He
identified the three resources a country’s soft power rests on, namely, its culture,
political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2006), and the types of countries that
would best succeed in projecting soft power: “countries whose dominant culture
and ideas are closer to prevailing norms; whose credibility is enhanced by their
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 153

domestic and international performance; and those with the most access to mul-
tiple channels to communication and thus more inf luence over how issues are
framed” ( Nye, 2002: 69). Based on these identifications, China had, and still has,
difficulties exerting significant soft power ( Nye, 2005, 2015).
China’s focus on enhancing its “soft power” grew significantly after the issue
was first documented in Chinese official discourse in 2007. During the 17th
National Congress of the Communist Party that year, Hu Jintao, the leader of
the fourth generation of Chinese leadership, made a keynote speech mentioning
“soft power” (“Hu Jintao’s report,” 2007):

We must keep to the orientation of advanced socialist culture, bring about

a new upsurge in socialist cultural development, stimulate the cultural cre-
ativity of the whole nation, and enhance culture as part of the soft power
of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and
interests, enrich the cultural life in Chinese society and inspire the enthu-
siasm of the people for progress.

Without specifying the other sources of soft power, Hu focused on the “inter-
nal” benefits that cultural soft power (by the Chinese government) brings to
the Chinese people and Chinese society. Following the 2008 Beijing Olympics,
which offered China a remarkable occasion to boost its national pride and image
to the world, the soft power notion was soon reframed with the goal of achieving
additional “external” benefits. With the goal of improving China’s international
image, Beijing began to invest enormously in its cultural industries and to push
Chinese state media going abroad (e.g., an investment of 45 billion yuan was
made in 2009) in order to strengthen China’s soft power (“Xi: China to promote
culture soft power,” 2014):

The country needs to build its capacity in international communication,

construct a communication system, better use the new media and increase
the creativity, appeal and credibility of China’s publicity. . . . The sto-
ries of China should be well told [i.e., by Chinese media in contrast to
the stories offered by “Western” media], voices of China well spread [i.e.,
through China’s own message channels], and characteristics of China well
explained [i.e., in line with the image that the Chinese government wishes
to share with the world].

Chinese soft power then shifted into a discursive interplay between internal and
external goals, which have been discussed in many scholarly works as entail-
ing important differences from Nye’s original notion of soft power as a sole
focus on international relations ( Li, 2008; Barr, 2011; Edney, 2012). Michalski
(2012) responded to China’s pursuit of its national interest and compared it with
the European perspective of soft power that serves to “reinforce the EU’s val-
ues, norms and principles on the global scene.” Although an internal focus can
154 Zhan Zhang

TABLE 8.1 Comparison of the soft power concept 2

Nye’s Soft Power Chinese Soft Power European Soft Power

Origin How the United (Using “morality” to) “Normative power

of the States should govern own state, Europe”
concept (smartly) lead the bring justice and virtue
world to the world (以德--治
国, 平天下).
Objectives To shape the To strengthen China’s To strengthen
preferences of cultural identity European countries’
other countries To improve China’s cultural prosperity
through appeal international image and integrity
and attraction (by offering China’s To promote European
To foster America’s voice) history, culture and
leading role in To promote China’s lifestyle
world politics culture and the To promote the EU’s
Chinese model regional integration
To be part of the model for
(multipolar) global (multipolar) global
governance governance
Resources Culture (pop culture Culture (language, Culture (language,
of the especially) heritage, history, tradition, history)
concept Political values nationalism) Political values
(freedom, China’s moral values (liberal democracy,
democracy, (socialist core values) rule of law, human
human rights . . .) Foreign policy (bonded rights . . .)
Foreign policy with trade agreements/ Good governance
economic cooperation)

be found both in the Chinese and European soft power efforts (see Table 8.1),
important differences still remain.
European soft power originates from the normative power of the EU, and it
deals with how the EU member states are linked to the shared European identity
(internally), and how this post-modern polity of regional integration could exert
pulls on other countries/regions (externally) (Manners, 2001; Michalski, 2012).
The Chinese origin of soft power could be traced back to Confucius, assert-
ing that a country’s inf luence and attractiveness is gained from how it governs
its own state under “morality/virtue” (de, 德). It is this “morality/virtue” and
the civilization achieved through self-governance that attracts others to follow.
No “external” efforts need to be made on purpose, but a world of justice and
virtue—the “Great Unity (tianxia datong, 天下大同)”3 —can be reached. As stated
in the Analects, “he who exercises government by means of his morality/virtue is
like the north polar star, which keeps its place and all other starts turn towards”
( yi zheng wei de, pi ru bei chen, ju qi suo, er Zhong xing gong zhi, 以政为德，譬如
北辰，居其所，而众星共之).4 Following this Confucian origin that guided the
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 155

Middle Kingdom to achieve its ancient civilization before the European Indus-
trial Revolution, Xi Jinping’s new leadership focused intensively on the inter-
nal construction of Chinese contemporary “morality/virtue” and nationalism
to unite the Chinese people. From a Chinese perspective, the external aspect
of soft power is only extended as a showcase of China being a modern socialist
nation that “boasts a grand civilization and is open and attractive to the world”
(Zhang, 2014).
Faced with a “national sense of apathy” ( Wu, 2011), “an ambiguous moral
sense” ( Lee, 2011) and a crisis in Chinese cultural identity (Shen, Liu and Ni,
2011), Xi introduced a full set of Chinese contemporary moral appeals—“socialist
core values”—to guide the Chinese people during the “social transition and
ideological turnaround in economic thinking” (Aukia, 2014). With his commit-
ment to “democracy,” “freedom,” “equality,” “justice” and the “rule of law,”
Xi adopted Western political language in order to foster a sense of commonal-
ity with the international community. However, the Chinese interpretations
of these values differ significantly from the meanings understood in the West.
“Socialist core values” operate on three levels: on the national level, it refers to
prosperity ( fuqiang, 富强), democracy (minzhu, 民主), civility (wenming, 文明)
and harmony (hexie, 和谐); on the social level, it refers to freedom (ziyou, 自由),
equality ( pingdeng, 平等), justice ( gongzheng, 公正) and the rule of law ( fazhi, 法
治); and on the individual level, it refers to patriotism (aiguo, 爱国), dedication
( jingye, 敬业), integrity (chengxin, 诚信) and friendship ( youshan, 友善) (Guo,
2014). The basic European respect for individual rights and freedom is not on
the individual level in the Chinese value system, but instead on the social level.
That means that freedom is not about one’s individual freedom, but is rather a
collective freedom for the group and society. Chinese moral values for individu-
als concern the contributions an individual can make to the nation (patriotism),
society (dedication) and other people (integrity and friendship).
Since assuming power in 2012, Xi pushed for a national education plan cover-
ing all schools and requested the Chinese media to strengthen self-discipline and
responsibility in spreading mainstream socialist values as the soul of soft power.
Children were taught to memorize the 24 characters celebrating the core values,
and these characters were also printed on stamps, painted on walls and adapted
into songs and square-dancing steps across China (Zhao, 2016). Xi declared that,
“Authorities should make full use of various opportunities to create circum-
stances for the values’ cultivation, and make them all-pervasive, just like the air”
(“China focus,” 2013). This full-range, top-down reinforcement on values about
“freedom” and “democracy” are in marked contrast to the European beliefs
regarding such values, and the different rhetoric and inferences of the values
inhibited China’s soft power in Europe. The internal-to-external inf lexibility
appeared in such a way that the harder the authorities sought to emphasize the
campaign internally, the more difficult it became to improve its image with
Europeans externally. What could have been a charm campaign for Chinese soft
power then resulted in a “charm offensive” ( Kurlantzick, 2008).
156 Zhan Zhang

The Chinese soft power rollout in Europe

Soft power is considered a part of “comprehensive national power” in China
( Keane, 2010). Components of Chinese soft power, according to Kurlantzick
(2006), include not only popular culture and public diplomacy, but also more
coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participa-
tion in multilateral organizations. Although the Chinese official discourse only
refers to the cultural aspects of soft power, in practice China embraced a mix of
diplomatic-economic efforts, political efforts and cultural efforts in projecting its
soft power. Beijing deliberately framed this mix as a “soft effort” in order to sus-
tain a healthy environment for deepening cooperation with European partners
and presenting something attractive to the European public; nonetheless, it was
perceived rather negatively in the European societies.

Diplomatic-economic efforts
One year after the establishment of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”
between the EU and China, the EU became China’s biggest trading partner in
2004, while for the EU, China is the second most important trading partner,
following only the United States since 2010. Highlighting the cooperation as
“multi-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered” (Shambaugh, 2013), the
EU and China have created a bilateral dialogue and cooperation in more than 50
areas and have more than 200 cooperative projects in operation (Zhang, 2011),
such as the China–EU Near Zero Emission Coal (NZEC) project in the area
of cooperation for climate change. Following the Eurozone debt crisis, China’s
outbound investment to Europe sharply increased from fewer than 7 billion
euros in 2008 to 35.1 billion euros in 2016 (Hanemann and Huotari, 2016).
That is around a five times increase, targeting a more diverse mix of sectors.
One of the most important factors that contributed to this increase was what the
Chinese have called “Premier Diplomacy” after Premier Li Keqiang made two
trips to Europe in 2014. Following these visits, many new contracts worth mil-
lions of euros were signed. Although a country’s successful economy can be an
important source of attraction (e.g., Nye, 2006), such practical focus of China’s
soft power on economic cooperation was instead mostly criticized as “all about
the power of money” ( Troyjo, 2015). Through these state visits to Europe by
high-level officials, China allowed economic cooperation to play a vital role in
engaging with European stakeholders. Nevertheless, the “power of money” did
not translate into economic attraction as China wished. Instead of being seen as
a friendly backup, China has been perceived more as an “economic competitor”
and “systemic rival” according to the most recent policy paper published by the
European Commission (2019).
While most of the Chinese capital f lows to the western part of the continent
(e.g., the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy), another platform was
created in 2012 for more direct cooperation with Central and Eastern European
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 157

(CEE) countries—the “16 + 1 framework.” Adding Greece as the 17th member

country in 2019 to this framework, China dispersed its “power of money” again,
with negotiations and investment in the 17 CEE countries, focusing especially
on transportation infrastructure projects. Furthermore, the ambitious Belt and
Road Initiative, which came out in 2013 as a demonstration of the global vision
of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” ( Jash, 2016), sought to reconnect China with
Europe through Central and West Asia, both to achieve economic development
and to promote the image of a powerful and benevolent China (Scobell et al,
2018). With 18 EU member states joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) and the establishment of the EU Connectivity Platform in 2015, the
interdependence between China and Europe for regional infrastructure projects,
trade liberalization, financial integration and policy agreements all deepened.
The new framework of soft power initiatives indicated China’s commitment
to enabling economic integration and regional cooperation with its European
partners. It is viewed positively in China as Beijing’s contribution to EU inte-
gration through easing the gap and tensions between the core and peripheral
areas (Shi, 2016). Europeans, however, remained skeptical about the intensi-
fied internal competition for the Chinese investments in Europe (Stanzel et al.,
2016), as well as Beijing’s strategy of using such interdependence to inf luence
EU policymaking on issues such as lifting the EU arms embargo or granting
China full market-economy status ( Pavlićević, 2016). Indeed, China is situat-
ing itself as a networking power to connect the developed and developing part
of the European continent, as it tries to balance its investment and connectivity
with different stakeholders in Europe. China had high expectations about its
relationship to the EU for a long time (Zhang, 2011), but the critical reaction
from the EU in response to the Eurozone crisis failed to satisfy such expecta-
tions. The slow process of EU constitutional development, which, in a European
understanding, demonstrates the strength of deliberative consolidation, was seen
as the weakness of the EU’s legitimate power in decision-making in the eyes
of the Chinese government. Consequently, China began to shift its focus from
working on a common EU approach to giving priority to bilateral cooperation
with individual European nations, and also expanded its pan-European strategy
to cover less developed areas that had been left out of the EU’s primary focus.
China’s diplomatic-economic outreach in Europe has become more complex.
Following the Brexit vote and the rise of right-wing parties, the escalating ten-
sions in the region about a possible disintegration of the EU caused Beijing to be
more aware of its strategic relationship with Brussels.

Political efforts
As D’Hooghe (2010: 7) pointed out, building political trust is “more prominent
in China’s public diplomacy in Europe than elsewhere in the world.” This is
especially important given that Europe is even more concerned about China’s
domestic (human rights) conditions than is the United States (Shambaugh,
158 Zhan Zhang

Sandschneider and Hong, 2008). It is therefore not surprising to see the Human
Rights Dialogue has been taking place between China and the EU since 2001.
During the meetings that take place twice a year, the EU is able to express
concerns about “what is happening in China regarding the rights of persons
belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, deprivation of liberty, and crimi-
nal and administrative punishment.” The strategic setting of these dialogues has
effectively avoided collision with the EU’s economic interests and political values
when dealing with China. As part of the gap in political and moral values divid-
ing Europe and China discussed above, the European concept of human rights
also highlights individual civil and political rights and follows the principle of
“non-interference,” while the Chinese concept of human rights attaches great
importance to collective rights, and China is “opposed to interfering in other
countries’ internal affairs on the pretext of human rights” (White paper, 1991).
Given the significant gap in principles and perspectives, the Human Rights Dia-
logues have delivered very few results.
Xi Jinping’s phrasing of “socialist core values” in line with certain “Western”
terms (i.e., democracy, freedom) can be seen as another political effort made by
Beijing. Although big gaps remain in understanding such values between the
Chinese and the Western context, it is still a big step forward to demonstrate
China’s attempt to “coexist” with the West on these universal contemporary
values. These political efforts did show Beijing’s willingness to acknowledge
European fundamental values; however, China’s openness to negotiate and deal
with such issues in real situations remains inconsistent, which feeds European
suspicions from time to time.
What’s more, the EU itself has been characterized as “the world’s first truly
postmodern international political form” ( Ruggie, 1993). It enables each mem-
ber state to partially “unbundle” territorial sovereignty and national identity in
order to generate the prosperity of a single European market and replace “Europe
of States” with “Europe of the Regions” (Anderson and Goodman, 1995). As
an alternative to nationalism since the foundation of Westphalian state system
from the 17th century, the EU’s new regional model offers a new shift to rede-
fine territorial politics in the face of a globalized world. However, China is still
in its phase of constructing and reinforcing nationalism as a rising country for
both territorial sovereignty and national identity. Therefore, when China stages
its modernization as a single state with fast growing power (especially, under its
one-party governance) in the European continent, where a new transnational
form of democracy and supra-state collectivities are in the making, mutual
acceptance is crucially conditioned by the different stages of political adaption.

Cultural efforts
China doesn’t like its international image crafted by the global media sphere.
From a Chinese perspective, the global dominance of Western transnational
media results in “a systematically, and maliciously, distorted account of Chinese
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 159

realities” (Sparks, 2010). Seeking to tell its own stories to the world, China had
no choice but to globalize its own networks in order to obtain “the most access
to multiple channels of communication and thus more inf luence over how issues
are framed” ( Nye, 2002). Under this specific goal of competing with well-
established Western media organizations that mostly are situated in the United
States and Europe, the Chinese “Big Four”—as China’s former minister of for-
eign affairs Yang Jiechi called Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television
(CCTV), China Radio International and China Daily —have all expanded their
European services.
Xinhua established its headquarters in Brussels in 2004, and now has 34
branches all over Europe. The multimedia center of the Xinhua Europe Regional
Bureau cooperates with the European News Exchanges providing special news
to target European audiences (“Multi-media reports,” 2012). A mobile app called
Xinhua Europe was also launched in 2014, offering users access to “a state-
of-the-art app offering fresh news, in-depth stories and images from Europe
and China” (“Xinhua launches,” 2014). CCTV began its early broadcasting of
two channels (CCTV-4 and CCTV-9) in the United Kingdom, Germany and
France in 2001, and now the English-language channel of CCTV-News (for-
merly CCTV-9) is available in 46 European countries, while CCTV-French
and CCTV-Spanish are also available in Europe. In January 2017, CCTV was
rebranded into China Global Television Networks (CGTN) for its international
service and digital presence. This is a strategic move to soften the “surveillance”
characteristic of CCTV from its literal meaning as “closed-circuit television”
for security purposes and to advance its messages on multiple digital platforms.
China Radio International signed agreements with European broadcasting com-
panies to provide packages of programming to be locally produced and aired
(i.e., the trilateral agreement with Propeller TV and Spectrum Radio in the UK
for a digital radio station in London) and also moved to print media, cooperating
with European partners on bilingual magazines (i.e., Cinitalia in Italy, Bursz-
tyn in Poland, and Opportunities China in the UK). China Daily established its
European Weekly edition in 2010, targeting European business executives who
have already established or are interested in seeking opportunities with Chinese
partners. With its specific focus on reporting business news, it reached a large
circulation by overtaking The Independent ( Rushton, 2013) and also won some
awards in the UK (i.e., “International Newspaper” Award in 2014).
China has thus inaugurated an impressive array of legacy media outlets to
expand its voice in Europe in recent years, although most Europeans do not
know of them. Only after 2014, Chinese media began to also embrace Western
social media by taking full advantage of an uncensored civil society, despite
the questions that Bishop (2013) posed: “Can you really win hearts and minds
when you are known as a country that blocks Facebook, Google, YouTube and
Twitter?”
The answer is ambiguous. Before 2014, for example, no Chinese media outlet
had more than 4 million followers on their Facebook page, but five years later,
160 Zhan Zhang

three of the “Big Four” have reached a fan community of over 65 million fol-
lowers on Facebook: CGTN (84 million), China Daily (79 million), and Xinhua
News (66 million), far surpassing well-known Western media outlets like BBC
News (49 million) and CNN (31 million).5 What’s more, according to statistics
from Socialbakers in September 2019, four of the top five fastest-growing media
pages on Facebook are Chinese state media (CGTN, Global Times, Xinhua Cul-
ture and People’s Daily), while CGTN is already ranked the number one media
outlet on Facebook in terms of followers, with YouTube (83 million) ranked
second.6
The Economist reported about the surge of Beijing’s approach on Facebook
(“China is using”, 2019), and mapped out the geographic origins of those
followers—mostly located in Southeast Asia, Latin America and especially Africa.
On this map, the entire European continent was colored grey (except Romania
and Albania), indicating that European Facebook users’ engagement with Chi-
nese state media remained low. This is true by looking at the very poor perfor-
mance of China Daily European Weekly in contrast with China Daily on Facebook.
Until September 2019, it has only 150 followers and likes.7
Such quantity of imbalanced growth certainly raises doubts of fraudulent
activities around these “popular” Chinese media Facebook pages. In March
2019, Facebook officially filed a lawsuit against four Chinese companies for sell-
ing fake Facebook and Instagram accounts and related offenses (Grewal, 2019).
This move by Facebook might push European web users even further away from
the Chinese media pages. The internal-to-external inf lexibility is evidenced
here again, that as long as such digital platforms are blocked in China, Europe-
ans, different from other global web users, will not find Chinese content distrib-
uted there enchanting.
The expansion of Confucius Institutes is another component of China’s cul-
tural soft power, as an attempt to promote Chinese language and Chinese cul-
ture, supporting local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitating cultural
exchanges (Guo, 2008). More Confucius Institutes have opened in Europe than
in any other region,8 but it is also the place where those institutes have received
the most vocal criticism. In September 2013, Université Lumière Lyon II and
Université Lumière Lyon III shut down their Confucius Institutes; in January
2015, Stockholm University, which built the first branch in Europe and the
second one in the world, also closed its Confucius Institute. Despite how careful
Beijing was in branding those institutes as non-profit and non-government orga-
nizations and encouraging those language centers not to act as overt purveyors of
the Party’s political viewpoints (“A message from Confucius,” 2009), the financ-
ing structure as well as the close relationship of the institutes to the Ministry of
Education and State Council Information Office still makes European partners
wary. In the end, Confucius Institutes in Europe remain primarily centers for
instruction in the Chinese language without offering much introduction to Chi-
nese culture or understanding of contemporary China. When certain sensitive
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 161

topics arise, according Hartig’s case studies in Germany (2010), the teaching staff
of the institutes “turn quiet or even silent.”

Limits of China’s soft power in Europe

In contrast to China’s effort, the growing interaction with European stakehold-
ers on multilevel cooperation, and the cultural expansion to ensure that Chinese
voices are heard in Europe, did not produce much change in European percep-
tions about China. Indeed, the favorability of China in many European coun-
tries even dropped over the last decade.
Based on data collected by the Pew Research Center, we could observe that
in the UK, France, Germany and Spain (see Figure 8.1), public perceptions
of China declined in comparison to the “honeymoon” period (2003–2006) a
decade ago. If we place the European attitudes toward China into a global com-
parison, we can see that as an entire region, Europe (mostly Western Europe)
has close to the most unfavorable view about China (54%, 22% higher than the
median of the world).
But interestingly enough, in another survey about people’s attitudes toward
whether China will or has already replaced the United States as a global
superpower, an average of 57% of European citizens believed in China’s supe-
riority (8% higher than the median of the world). This means that the Euro-
pean public sees China’s potential for growing into a world-leading force, but
they are not in favor of this development. In other words, Europeans agree
on the hard (military-economy) part of China’s power developments, but not
yet on the soft (economy-culture) part of China’s power attractiveness. Thus,
all the soft power efforts made in Europe seem not to have helped China
achieve its specific objective—improving its image. What, then, are the main
obstacles?

The ambiguous “seeds”

China wishes to promote its achievements and virtues in order to draw an attrac-
tive image through its own voice. But this “own voice” selects what China wants
to relate rather than to address the concerns of the European audience. This ideal
narrative that is in line with the Party script cannot satisfy the European audience,
which prefers a multilayered and uncensored discussion that ref lects a genuine
image of the changing Chinese society. By introducing “media mindsets” as the
fourth resource of soft power in connecting China with Europe, Zhang, Perrin
and Huan (2019) discussed that the Chinese tendency to whitewash problems and
form a clean and positive version of its image to avoid international critics is far
from the Western European audience’s habits and expectations of receiving mul-
tivoiced media messages that are designed to help citizens form different opinions
and critical understandings of socially relevant topics. As long as Chinese media
162 Zhan Zhang

crafts stories according to this mindset, it would lack credibility for European
hearts and minds, and eventually result in accentuated criticism and uncertainty.
The introduction of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Europe is another
example. As Godehardt (2016) commented, Chinese leadership intends to “provide
as little concrete information as possible” about the political labels behind the
Belt and Road concept, and always focuses on the “common benefits and eco-
nomic opportunities, but less on security threats and difficulties.” Zhang (2019)
reviewed the media coverage of the Belt and Road Initiative from mainstream
Western European media and pointed out the continuous skepticism around
news frames like “inclusiveness,” “sustainability” and “trade/debt diplomacy.”
She also pointed out that the Chinese media stories about the Belt and Road
Initiative failed to provide sufficient arguments in answering those doubts and
shifting such frames. Thus, the initiative remained empty without cohesive clas-
sification, practical guidelines or regulatory frameworks that would better match
better the expectations of European partners.
The EU rejected the granting of full market-economy status to China in
2016. What’s more, instead of formulating a unified EU policy toward the Belt
and Road Initiative, a new “EU–Asia Connectivity Strategy” was signed-off
in 2018 as a rival to the Chinese initiative for the EU’s engagement with Asia
under a “European standard.” This represented a clear sign that China’s “capi-
tal” power did not translate into “soft” economic attraction, and China’s state-
regulated market still raised deep concerns from its biggest trading partner.
The EU sees the importance of Asia, but it is clearly not ready to accept China
taking the lead in the Eurasian integration process. Especially given the rise of
protectionism, populism and anti-globalization in different European coun-
tries, China’s economic prosperity might make it even more difficult to attract
Europeans (especially to the right-wing parties and their supporters).

The visible “hands”

The Chinese government has been visible on all levels carrying out its soft
power campaign. Critics of the Confucius Institutes in Europe focus on the fact
that they are funded directly by the government, thus increasing the poten-
tial that the Chinese state might limit European academic freedom. The enor-
mous support from the “state” to Chinese state media also arguably impaired
the ability of these outlets to reach European audiences. For the Chinese, the
hands of “authority” may give the media credibility and accountability, but
in Europe (especially in North-Western Europe), media accountability is con-
structed on the basis of independence and deliberative public discourse where
critical opinions can be discussed overtly for the good of society. The more
assertive the role played by the “authority,” the less credibility the media has
with the audience. Knowing that the Chinese government propagates a less-
than-free model of journalism and media practice ( Farah and Mosher, 2010),
it is unlikely that Europeans will accept messages crafted by such visible hands
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 163

without resistance. The “soft” campaign, for both its domestic and international
performance, seems to be understood as the projection of “hard” authoritarian
power for European publics.

Lack of “media-soil” analysis

Hallin and Mancini (2004) divided the European media into three main systems
and discussed the complexity of the European media landscape located within
different cultural, social and political contexts. In a fragmented inter-regional
market such as Europe, media outlets face difficulties when crossing borders. It
is not easy to enter the European media networks due to their significant differ-
ences from one market to another, and the Chinese media products were not tai-
lored to recognize such variances when crossing borders in Europe. Instead, they
delivered the same content in different European language packages. In addition
to regional differences, the European market is characterized by social diversity
along various criteria such as age. Media content distributed on legacy (targeting
older audiences) or new media platforms (targeting younger audiences) should be
better customized, with considerations given to the national differences. Lacking
a specific strategy to tailor media content to specific audiences, the Chinese con-
tent may be “valued to a lesser extent by foreign audiences that lack the cultural
background and knowledge needed for full appreciation of the product” ( Lee,
2006). In this statement, the diversity of the European audience and markets
translates into a less standardized and predictable previous knowledge—which,
again, shows the incompatibility of perspectives and approaches to instruments
of China’s soft power.

Unnatural engagement with “media dynamics”

In today’s world, audiences can easily access information through multiple chan-
nels so that “it is no longer possible for political regimes to create alternative mes-
sages and thus preserve a level of nuance, local contextualizing and perhaps even
outright deception when they had to respond to challenging messages” ( Riley
and Hollihan, 2012: 61). On the one hand, what the Chinese media has been
doing is still creating alternative messages and sending symbolic counter-infor-
mation that is very easily identified as a state-owned voice. On the other hand,
the Chinese way of pushing forward such counter-information through social
networks and online activities are too aggressive both in speed and in quantity.
Therefore, even if the number of followers of Chinese state media surges on
Facebook, whether it brings in real engaged readers for the possible improvement
of China’s image overseas or is merely a boosted business of inf lated numbers
from “click farms” to just satisfy Beijing remains a vexing question.
Moreover, the daily news consumption by European publics is still cen-
tered on European (and American) information sources, but the communica-
tion strategies Beijing applies to the local bureaus of these international media
164 Zhan Zhang

organizations in China hasn’t significantly improved. Xi Jinping gave a speech

after his appointment as the Party leader in 2012 to encourage “foreign friends
from the press” to “make more efforts and contributions to deepen the mutual
understanding between China and the world.” But in 2014, the State Admin-
istration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television published Adminis-
trative Measurements indicating that Chinese journalists should not violate the
rules of passing on any critical information obtained in the course of their work
to any foreign media groups. The more constraints and pressures the foreign
media receive in China, the further the European audience may depart from the
Chinese messages, because such activities, from a Western perspective, cannot
but result in reinforcing the stereotype of “Chinese manipulation.”

Conclusion
China and Europe clearly need each other, for both the EU’s and the European
countries’ relations with China top their agenda of concerns, in particular with
reference to economic cooperation. Together, China and the EU generate more
than one third of the world’s economic output (Amadeo, 2017), and a healthy
Europe–China relationship matters greatly to the integration of the global econ-
omy, as well as the structural changes that are required urgently for the world’s
trading and financial systems. The presidency of Donald Trump in the United
States brought more uncertainty to the traditionally strong transatlantic relation-
ship as he backed away from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP). And the nascent trade war between the United States and China
is causing collateral damage to economies that are heavily dependent on trade,
including the EU. China’s Belt and Road Initiative might have the potential
to open new windows for deeper regional cooperation, but the challenges to
the rule-based Eurocentric model have not made cooperation easier within the
clouding investment environment of hampered business confidence. Situating
itself between the United States and China, Europe is arriving at its own cross-
roads, where both the danger of dis-integration of the EU and the danger of
cutting itself off from the contemporary quest for a new international order must
be faced ( Kissinger, 2014).
The world is drawn to China. As the second largest economy benefiting from
the globalization sparked by the West, and as the biggest socialist country offer-
ing an alternative model of growth and governance, China’s contribution to
global development is becoming more complex in an attempt to respond to dif-
ferent regional and global challenges. The rise of China—both in terms of its
hard and soft power—and the reception of and reaction to such a rise worldwide
unfolds at an especially important time. This chapter discussed China’s dilemma
in projecting greater soft power in Europe. The f lourishing economic coopera-
tion and China’s rising capital f low into the continent did not increase China’s
attractiveness to Europe, and neither did the efforts made by the Chinese gov-
ernment through its soft power campaign. Doubts and skepticism about China
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 165

still persist or even grow in Europe since the limits of China’s efforts to pro-
mote its soft power have worsened the shadows hanging over European minds.
A more pragmatic approach and a long-term socialization process is needed to
profoundly improve mutual understanding and, eventually, to improve China’s
image as both a grand civilization and an open and attractive society in Europe.
First, China’s image building in Europe should not be framed only accord-
ing to the Chinese media mindset (Zhang, Perrin and Huan, 2019) as a precise
selection of only the ideal elements of the nation that China wishes to showcase.
Nations should share their virtues but also their mistakes, since nations sometimes
earn more sympathy and credibility for their vulnerabilities than they win respect
for their strengths. Being open and clear to discuss both domestic problems and
China’s new economic-political framework in Europe, being confident to show
its resolution while also welcoming the criticisms that will help the nation along
on its path to improvement, would actually be more attractive than hiding the
problems or offering only ambiguous concepts. In Europe, where criticism is part
of the power game and strong leaders tend to encourage criticism while weak ones
suppress it, China’s soft power projection needs a thorough conceptual change.
Second, the “all-pervasive” involvement of the Chinese government into the
soft power campaign, both internally and externally, seriously constrained Euro-
pean impressions of China’s move to an open and attractive society. In 2016, sev-
eral privately held Chinese media companies acquired European companies (i.e.,
Tencent bought Supercell and Wanda bought Odeon and UCI). Huawei, being
the second-largest smartphone vendor in Europe, signed 28 out of 50 commer-
cial contracts for 5G with European operators (announced by its vice president
Hu Houkun in June 2019). But whether these private-sector companies will be
constrained by China’s central government in their overseas performance, and
how the new business models could open European media users’ minds for Chi-
nese content, platforms and technology, are still open questions.
Third, China should provide a variety of customized media products for
different markets and audiences across Europe, especially well-designed, user-
oriented online media products. Media organizations should expand to take full
use of what the Internet platforms offer, and the Confucius Institutes, Chinese
embassies/consulates, Chinese companies or other non-governmental organiza-
tions should all upgrade their web services and communication skills for direct
interactive engagement with European publics. The huge gap in number of
followers between China Daily and China Daily European Weekly on Facebook
indicated not only the conspicuously low interest from European web users in
Chinese content, but also the lack of interest and effort from Beijing to invest in
purposefully attracting a European audience. Kalathil (2017) argued that China
has been using its market power to inf luence Hollywood content in order to
shape global public opinion. No evidence can be found yet to prove such Sino–
Hollywood blockbusters would make a breakthrough into the European mar-
ket, but coproduction (with Hollywood or European partners) might become
a potential approach for the global reach of China’s soft power in the long run.
166 Zhan Zhang

Last but not least, and in fact arguably the most urgent goal, must be to
change the tension between the Chinese authorities and the international media
professionals based in China. Understanding that they are (and will always be)
the main channels for European audiences to get information from China, it
would be wiser to find a new cooperative mode to work together. As long as the
current mechanism is focused on restriction, isolation and monitoring, in the end
it will restrict the reach of China’s soft power and isolate the Middle Kingdom
from European hearts and minds.
Differences remain, and challenges lie ahead. But neither Europe nor China
should allow the differences or challenges to prevent them from addressing
their common interests—building a multipolar world (see Table 8.1), and
working together toward common goals. In his visit to Europe in early 2017,
President Xi Jinping spoke at the Davos Economic Forum. By openly show-
ing China’s commitment to trade and globalization, Xi responded to calls for
protectionism and limits on free trade, and sent a strong signal to Europe that
the world system is shifting from a unipolar world dominated by America to a
multipolar system where China and Europe could share their common goals.
Given the calls for American isolationism by President Trump, the vacuum of
the world leadership calls for other great players to step in. China aims at tak-
ing a leadership role in reducing free-trade barriers and improving conditions
in the global economy. How will the Europeans welcome China’s efforts to
spark global development? How will they react to the multipolar shift toward
a new power balance in the world’s economy and politics? China’s soft power
engagement in Europe will become more fruitful if European partners can
thoroughly understand the good reasons to engage with China in shaping the
future.

Notes
1 This chapter is made possible through the support from Professor Thomas Hollihan, my
postdoctoral supervisor at the University of Southern California. His insights and com-
ments greatly improved the work. I am also grateful to Professor Daniel Perrin from the
Zurich University of Applied Sciences, for sharing his wisdom from a European expert
perspective, which strengthened the manuscript. This chapter was accomplished dur-
ing my early postdoctoral mobility project that is funded by the Swiss National Science
Foundation.
2 The table is drawn by the author and is derived from the works of Nye (1990, 2002),
Wang (2017), Zheng (2010), Manners (2001), and Mickalski (2012).
3 The society in Great Unity (da tong, 大同) was ruled by the public, where the people
chose men of virtue and ability and valued trust and harmony. People not only loved
their own parents and children, but also secured the living of the elderly until the end
of their lives, let the adults be of use to the society and helped the young grow. Those
who were widowed, orphaned, childless, handicapped and diseased were all taken care
of. Men took their responsibilities seriously and women had their homes. People disliked
seeing resources being wasted but did not seek to possess them; they wanted to exert
their strength but did not do it for their own benefit. Therefore, selfish thoughts were
dismissed, people refrained from theft and robbery and the outer doors remained open.
http://ctext.org/liji/li-yun.
 The dilemma of China’s soft power in Europe 167

4 The Analects (lun yu, 论语, 475–221 BC) is a collection of sayings and ideas from Confu-
cius and his contemporaries. It is considered the central text of Confucianism.
5 The number of followers is accurate as of September 1, 2019, on Facebook pages including:
CGTN, www.facebook.com/ChinaGlobalTVNetwork/; China Daily, www.facebook.
com/chinadaily; Xinhua News, www.facebook.com/XinhuaNewsAgency/?brand_
redir=369959106408139; BBC News, www.facebook.com/bbcnews/; and CNN, www.
facebook.com/cnn/.
6 Socialbakers is an artificial intelligence–powered social media marketing website that
provides statistics for companies and brands. www.socialbakers.com/statistics/facebook/
pages/total/media/.
7 The number of followers is accurate as of September 1, 2019, on China Daily Euro-
pean Weekly’s Facebook page: www.facebook.com/China-Daily-European-Weekly-
196052993764057/.
8 Confucius Institute website, accessed by the author in March 2017: www.hanban.
edu.cn/.

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9
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE
SOFT POWER IN THE AMERICAS
R. Evan Ellis1

The abrupt switch in diplomatic recognition by Panama, the Dominican Repub-

lic and El Salvador from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during
2017 and 2018 ( Ellis, 2018a) following the end of the “diplomatic truce” that
had restrained the PRC from actively pursuing diplomatic relations with states
recognizing Taiwan highlights the growth and evolution of Chinese soft power
in the Americas (Fleischman, 2018). Not only did each of the three quickly move
to take advantage of the opportunity once the 2016 changes by the African states
of Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe made it clear that the “truce” was over,
but more strikingly, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama had tra-
ditionally been some of the closest partners of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere, linked by bonds of investments and commercial f lows, immigrant
communities and history (including a significant US expatriate and business
community in Panama, ref lecting the legacy of almost a century of US control of
the Panama Canal and the basing of military forces in the country). In each case,
the governments switched relations to the PRC virtually without consultation
with or notification of the United States and responded to US concerns over the
lack of transparency regarding new Chinese activities in the country with polite
but resolute defiance (“Panama Asks . . . ,” 2018).
The embrace by the region of political and commercial engagement with the
PRC, and its markedly cool tone toward the United States ( Johnson, 2018)
contrasts sharply with the situation in 2005 when, following Chinese Presi-
dent Hu Jintao’s November 2004 trip to the region with attention-grabbing
promises of massive PRC investment in Latin America, US policymakers testi-
fied before Congress that Chinese commerce and inf luence in the region was
dwarfed by that of the United States, and not a factor for immediate concern
(“China’s Inf luence . . .,” 2005). The leap in PRC engagement and associated
inf luence ( Piccone, 2016) has occurred in little more than a decade without any
172 R. Evan Ellis

of the traditional cold-war artifacts of military threat, such as the establishment

of exclusive alliances or basing agreements ( Ellis, 2011a). It illustrates the degree
to which the PRC position and that of the United States, has been transformed
through a relative change in soft power, and the associated importance of under-
standing it as a critical factor in the strategic dynamics of the region.
The nature of PRC soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean is differ-
ent from that of the United States ( National Endowment of Democracy, 2017 ),
although in many ways equal or greater in its magnitude and effects.
The term soft power was first popularized by scholar Joseph Nye in 1990,
and refers to the ability of a state to induce others to behave in its interests, albeit
not through coercion or even indirect threats ( Nye, 1990), but because relevant
authorities in those states believe that doing so is in their interests ( Nye, 2004).
Most discussions of soft power focus on the United States, as it relates to Latin
America or other regions, and highlight the identification by the relevant elites
with US objectives and values, particularly democracy and a market economy
( Nye, 1990). The vehicle for this soft power is often (albeit not exclusively)
through the inf luenced living or receiving some part of their education in the
United States or otherwise internalizing key values.
Parallel to the US concept of soft power, the Chinese have traditionally held
their culture in reverence, in part, for its ability to inf luence adversaries and
others with which they had to deal. Indeed, in the Chinese recollection of their
history, even successful invaders such as the Mongols ultimately became enam-
ored with the greatness of Chinese civilization and were transformed by and
assimilated into it ( Poo, 2005).
Today, the PRC organization Hanban funds Confucius Institutes ( Volodzko,
2015) and other projects to disseminate and promote Chinese culture (Isenberg,
2008), following the logic that such understanding will correspondingly spread
the inf luence of China, and open doors to its political, business and other agen-
das (“Another U.S. deficit . . . ,” 2011).
Ironically, despite evidence of the enormous amount of PRC soft power in
Latin America and the Caribbean, many Chinese scholars (see, for example, Liu,
2016) and others believe that the country lacks inf luence there (among other
parts of the globe) ( Eades, 2014), because so few of its residents speak Mandarin
Chinese, deeply understand or embrace the Chinese culture (Gao, 2017 ), or
because the PRC seemingly lacks the power that the United States does to rally
an international consensus around the values it represents ( Nye, 2012).
Such an assessment is, however, too pessimistic, because it measures Chinese
soft power in the region in a manner that overlooks its true bases for inf luence
there. By contrast to US soft power, which (as noted before) is principally based
on shared values, Chinese soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean is
more rooted in the expectation of benefits from the PRC.
Much of the take-off in interest in China by political leaders and businessmen
in the region was fueled by then Chinese President Hu Jintao’s proclamation
that the PRC trade with the region would expand to $100 billion and Chinese
 Chinese soft power in the Americas 173

investment in the region would double in the decade to come (“Hu hails . . . ,”
2004). President Xi Jinping similarly promised $250 billion in Chinese invest-
ment and $500 billion in trade with the region (Rajagopalan, 2015). In both
cases, it was arguably the plausible expectations, more than actual levels of trade
and investment, an analysis of its feasibility or potential implications, that drove
interest in the region, and to an extent, action by its business and political leaders.
Such expectations are arguably amorphous and differ among those holding
them, yet generally include hope for enrichment through access to the Chi-
nese market, and business opportunities from working with a Chinese part-
ner (which presumably has access to production capabilities and financing in
China). These hopes arguably help persuade Latin American business leaders
that the potential opportunities merit their investment of the significant time
and money required to establish the company in the PRC, or at least develop
contacts with Chinese business or other partners. They explain the monumen-
tal investments (some more successful than others) by internationally oriented
Latin American companies such as Maseca (including Bimbo bakery products),
JBS, Pollo Campero, Juan Valdez, Café Britt, Fogoncito and others to establish
themselves in the Chinese market, including the hundreds of Latin American
businessmen who pay thousands of dollars to attend trade fairs in China in the
hope of finding an appropriate buyer for their goods, a producer from which
they can import or other partner.
For Latin American and Caribbean students, the expectation of opportunities
in or with China is a motivator to spend the years required to learn the (very
difficult) Mandarin language and associated Chinese character set, as well as
Chinese history and culture ( Ellis, 2014a).
At the state-to-state level, PRC soft power ref lects beliefs about the sustain-
ability of Chinese economic growth and development, and to some degree,
political and military inf luence vis-à-vis the United States and other actors,
including the expectation that the PRC will be among the wealthiest and most
powerful nations on the globe ( Rines, 2016).
For state-level decision makers, in the commercial realm, expectations about
the future of China lead to the accompanying belief that the PRC will be able
to purchase significant amounts of the country’s exports if only the partner can
position its products adequately and solve other problems. China is similarly seen
as a source of loans for private and state-led development projects, investments in
commercial operations that will employ its people and produce tax revenues and,
possibly, facilitate or engage in transactions that produce lucrative side benefits
for the decision makers entering into them (from political credit, to commissions
and other business opportunities for family and partners of the businessman).
In examining the behaviors of Latin American politicians toward China,
expectations about future Chinese wealth and power and the opportunities it
could provide the country helps to explain respectable Latin American leaders
courting the PRC, including initiatives to establish diplomatic relations by Costa
Rica’s President Oscar Arias in 2007 (Casas-Zamora, 2009), Panama’s President
174 R. Evan Ellis

Juan Carlos Varela in 2017, Danilo Medina of the Dominican Republic in 2017,
and Salvador Sanchez Ceren of El Salvador in 2018.
For anti-US leftist regimes such as Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia, and the
previous government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Christina Fernandez de
Kirchner in Argentina, China’s soft power has a political, as well as an economic
component, with the PRC seen as an economic and political counterweight
to dependence on Western financial institutions and political ties. Indeed, for
such leaders, the success of the PRC demonstrates that development, wealth and
power can be achieved without submission to Western proscriptions regarding
open markets and pluralistic democracy ( Barker, 2017), and gives them an ally
for pursuing such a path.
Beyond such “populist socialist actors,” even the conservative governments
of more politically mainstream states such as Peru, Chile and even Colom-
bia see the PRC as a market, source of investment, financing, political and
sometimes military interactions that complements the pro-Western, pro-market
orientation of the government and gives the country additional options. As a
ref lection of these views, of the nine “strategic partners” that the PRC has estab-
lished in Latin America, only two (Venezuela and Bolivia) are leftist regimes,
and two (Ecuador and Argentina) have continued their strategic partnerships
with the PRC even after returning more politically moderate governments with
associated access to Western institutions, investors and capital markets.
As suggested previously, the driver of Chinese soft power is how the country
and its trajectory are perceived, although the reality of Chinese success may feed
those perceptions. Indeed, the Chinese appear to be particularly adept in allow-
ing partners to believe what they want, if such beliefs lead the partner to behave
in ways that support Chinese strategic or business objectives.
In understanding the vehicle of Chinese soft power in Latin America, by con-
trast to US soft power, expectations of individual benefits, rather than abstract
principles or value alignment, arguably play a greater role. As noted previously,
decisions by businessmen to seek Chinese partners may be driven by hopes for
lucrative deals. Reciprocally, decisions by scholars to tone down criticisms of
the PRC (Stone Fish, 2018) may be driven by a desire not to lose access to Chi-
nese colleagues, funded trips to the PRC or other privileges. Political decision
makers concluding deals with the Chinese may take into account side benefits of
those agreements, such as bonuses or business opportunities for family or friends.
Finally, the expansion of Chinese soft power arguably coexists with a persis-
tent lack of understanding of, and substantial mistrust for the Chinese ( Le Corre
et al., 2015). In an October 2018 poll, only minorities in three key Latin Ameri-
can countries surveyed (Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) had favorable opinions
toward the PRC ( Devlin, 2018). Far more than when dealing with the United
States, the calculus of political and corporate decision makers in Latin Amer-
ica includes an understanding that the PRC will aggressively, and sometimes
unfairly, seek advantage in their dealings, including cutting corners on contracts,
attempting to steal intellectual property and other bad behavior. The choice to
 Chinese soft power in the Americas 175

engage with the Chinese almost invariably ref lects a calculation by the decision
maker (whether or not justified) that they can manage the risk while securing
personal or collective benefit from the engagement.
The United States, for its part, has enabled the expansion of Chinese soft
power in the region, initially through its relative indifference, and most recently,
by alienating the region.
Prior to the US administration of Donald Trump, the relative lack of politi-
cal emphasis on the region by the US government, and limited investment by
US-based companies, allowed Chinese inf luence to expand despite the mistrust
of the PRC. Most recently, rhetoric and actions from Washington, including
degrading references to the countries of the region (Watkins and Phillip, 2018),
and policies to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and deferred immigration
actions (e.g., DACA) for immigrants from the region contribute to a perception
of the United States as hostile toward the people of Latin America, and indiffer-
ent toward regional challenges ( Holmes, 2018). Such negative perceptions of the
United States, in turn, help to take a lack of trust toward China off the table as a
factor mitigating the effect of Chinese soft power.

Evolution of PRC soft power

The balance of this chapter examines the ways in which Chinese soft power in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and its application, has evolved over the last
decade, with an emphasis on the expansion of the Chinese corporate presence,
cultural activities and shifting patterns of Chinese government engagement in
general.

Expanding effect of Chinese companies on the ground

The most significant driver in the growth of Chinese soft power in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean is the expanding presence of PRC-based companies in
the region, combined with their increasing effectiveness as local actors.
The initial growth of Chinese soft power in the region in the early 2000s was
driven principally by the lure of the PRC as a potential market for the region’s
exports, and as a source for loans.2 From the year prior to China’s 2001 ascension
into the World Trade Organization through 2017, PRC trade with Latin America
and the Caribbean grew exponentially from $12.0 billion to $278 billion (Direc-
tion of Trade Statistics, 2018), catapulting the PRC from a relatively insignificant
player, to the first or second trade partner for many Latin American countries,
although most PRC imports from the region were relatively low value–added
commodities ( Jenkins, 2015). Similarly, from 2005 through 2017, China’s two
major policy banks (China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank)
loaned an estimated $150 billion to the region, far more than Western institu-
tions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (China-Latin
America Finance Database, 2018). While such f lows were a significant motivator
176 R. Evan Ellis

for politicians and businessmen in the region to court the PRC ( Ellis, 2011b,
2014a), or avoid offending it (Stone Fish, 2018), the expanding trade and loans
contrasted with the relative absence of Chinese equity investment in the region,
and the associated activities of PRC-based companies there.
The relative lack of investment by PRC-based firms in the region began to
change in 2009 as a product of multiple factors, including the expansion of Chi-
nese demand, the maturation of PRC-based companies, the growth of supporting
legal and financial infrastructure and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009,
which created a financial liquidity crisis and associated opportunities for Chi-
nese companies to acquire billions of dollars’ worth of new assets in the region
through mergers and acquisitions, buying from Western entities who needed the
cash and competing with those which didn’t have it ( Ellis, 2014c). Multi-billion-
dollar deals such the $3.1 billion acquisition of Bridas in May 2010, Occidental
Petroleum (October 2010), the $3.1 billion purchase of the Peregrino field in
Brazil in May 2010 and the $7.1 billion purchase of Statoil’s holdings in Brazil by
Repsol in the petroleum sector five months later were but a few major examples
( Ellis, 2014c).
By 2017, Chinese firms had invested almost $114 billion in the region through
mergers and acquisitions, greenfield projects and other activities ( Dussel and
Ortiz, 2017), giving them important new opportunities for leverage as employ-
ers, generators of tax revenues and partners to local governments. Brazil was
the focus of almost half of that new investment, an estimated $55 billion in the
decade ending in 2017 (“Chinese companies,” 2018), including a broad range of
sectors from petroleum and mining to agriculture, to medical goods, technol-
ogy, and non-traditional finance, and expanding into construction and logistics
with the collapse of Brazil’s national champion in the sector, Odebrecht ( Ellis,
2017).
The new PRC commercial presence was associated with many difficulties,
including conf licts with workers (“Strike at Shougang . . . ,” 2018) and local
communities (“Protesta contra . . . ,” 2015). Similarly, while PRC companies
have often been less engaged than their Western counterparts in local communi-
ties and business circles ( Ellis, 2013), that has changed in recent years, as they
have gained more experience and confidence as local actors.
While there are important differences in the sophistication and level of engage-
ment of the Chinese, based on the nature of their business, and even among dif-
ferent companies in the same sector, and with Chinese businesses doing better
in areas such as telecommunications and autos where they have built a presence
gradually with local partners ( Ellis, 2014c), the sophistication of Chinese compa-
nies has generally increased, expanding their inf luence as local actors, magnify-
ing the effect of the expanding dollar value of that presence. Such improvements
have included PRC companies making better choices of local consultants and
partners, management of contractors and the integration of Chinese managers
and technical personnel with local workforces. They also include greater sophis-
tication by companies in outreach to and integration with the local community,
 Chinese soft power in the Americas 177

such as the successful negotiation by the mining firm China Aluminum Cor-
poration (CHINALCO) to convince 5,000 residents of the mining community
Morococha to relocate their entire town from its location on top of a copper-
rich mountain that the company planned to strip mine ( Poulden, 2013). It also
includes sponsorship by the telecommunications firm Huawei of local soccer
teams in Colombia (“Huawei . . . ,” 2015), Brazil (“China’s Huawei . . . ,” 2014),
Panama (“Huawei to sponsor . . . ,” 2015) and elsewhere (“Making connec-
tions . . . ,” 2015).
PRC-based companies also are increasingly effective not only in participating
in formal bidding processes, but also in wooing Latin American decision makers
to win contracts in competitive circumstances, particularly in streamlined acqui-
sition processes, such as public–private partnerships, both an expression of their
growing soft power, and something which expands it through the increasing
effectiveness and weight of Chinese companies as a part of the local community.
The award by Colombia’s government to China Harbour to construct a
road under the 4th Generation Highway program is one example of such self-
reinforcing soft power success ( Ramirez, 2015). Chinese firms have also made
gains in investment projects funded with their own equity capital, such as the
$4.2 billion Baha Mar resort in the Caribbean, whose local partner Sarkis Izmir-
lian was forced out in complex bankruptcy proceedings in a Hong Kong court
(Hartnell, 2018), and the $600 million North–South highway in Jamaica, where
China Harbour used their own capital to fund the project, in exchange for a
99-year lease on 1,200 acres of real estate from the Jamaican government, on
which the Chinese company will build luxury hotels ( Laville, 2015).

Cultural power
While experience in China and affinity with the Chinese language and culture
is not the most important driver of Chinese soft power in the region, as noted
previously, it is nevertheless rooted in China’s historical self-concept of how to
transform potential rivals and others into collaborators. This is something in
which the Chinese government invests considerable resources. The use of such
cultural and people-to-people diplomacy is explicitly spelled out in the PRC
November 2008 (“China’s Policy Paper . . . ,” 2008) and November 2016 (“Full
text . . . ,” 2016) white papers, which describe the nation’s intentions toward
Latin America and the Caribbean.
With respect to educational activities in the region, Hanban now has 39 Con-
fucius Institutes, plus 18 Confucius Classrooms in Latin America and the Carib-
bean, for the teaching and promoting of Chinese language and culture through
officially sanctioned instructors (“Confucius Institute . . . ,” 2018). There has
not been, however, much pushback against the Confucius Institutes in Latin
America as there has been in some parts of the United States ( Dodwell, 2018).
Perhaps more important, in the 2019–2021 China–CELAC plan for the region,
the Chinese government has committed to almost 6,000 scholarships for students,
178 R. Evan Ellis

journalists, academics and others to study in the PRC at the undergraduate and
graduate levels, as well as paid trips to the region by 1,000 Latin American and
Caribbean leaders (“China to offer . . . ,” 2014), with 200 members of the region’s
leading political parties to be hosted in China between 2019 and 2021 (“CELAC
and China . . . ,” 2018), in a manner similar to what the Chinese are doing in
Africa. Such exchanges are particularly important in shaping the region’s orien-
tation toward China over the long term. By rolling out the red carpet for funded
trips for current and future Latin American leaders and inf luencers in the PRC,
China garners the goodwill of the region’s senior decision makers, as well as
arguably opening up potential opportunities for Chinese intelligence services to
compromise them for later inf luence or intelligence collection operations.
With respect to scholarships for Latin American and Caribbean students,
because learning the Mandarin language and Chinese character set is a relatively
difficult undertaking, engagement in this area represents a long-term bond that
these young individuals are entering into with their Chinese patrons, and one
which positions those individuals for future positions of responsibility with their
governments and industry in dealing with China. This PRC investment is aimed
at gaining the goodwill of key future leaders in the region, who will be able to
speak with authority regarding the PRC and China’s internal affairs. Indeed,
many of the young technical staff supporting governments in Central America
and the Caribbean which have recently recognized the PRC gained their experi-
ence (and associated gratitude) while studying in the PRC.
With respect to journalists, the gratitude and positive image of China and
its government that the PRC is inculcating through its scholarships is likely to
persuade a portion of those journalists to cover the PRC in a more positive,
understanding way, or at least avoid expressing their concerns about China in an
excessively harsh fashion, in the interest of not being ungrateful to their benefac-
tors (“China ‘Buying positive . . .’,” 2018).
Yet beyond the persons in the region covering China in the news, the PRC
is also inf luencing news coverage of China in the region in other subtle ways,
such as providing free or discounted feeds from its news service to news out-
lets in the region which, by their nature emphasize positive stories and present
them through positive images of China’s leaders and the PRC itself (“China state
broadcaster . . . ,” 2016), as it has also done in other parts of the world.

PRC government engagement

Beyond the activities of its companies and the low-key work of its cultural diplo-
macy, Beijing’s increasingly bold pursuit and advocacy of its interests in Latin
America and elsewhere is a factor in both expanding and leveraging its soft power.
With the expansion of PRC wealth and power, and the confidence of China’s
new generation of leadership, the nation is far less deferential to the United
States in pursuing its interests in Latin America and the Caribbean than it was
just a decade ago. In addition to the active diplomacy of President Xi with four
multicountry trips to the region since assuming the Chinese presidency in March
 Chinese soft power in the Americas 179

2013, the PRC has expanded its official engagement through both bilateral and
multilateral vehicles.
Exercising soft power through multilateral engagement, China has designated
nine countries in the region as “strategic partners” (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay), a status which generally
comes with at least once-a-year meetings at the ministerial level to review the
status of and advance economic programs (and sometimes political cooperation)
( Xu, 2017). Ref lecting the compelling power of expected benefits, not even
Chile, with its strong institutions and generally conservative pro-West stance,
had a serious public debate before binding itself to the Communist government
of China through fundamentally the same “Comprehensive Strategic Partner-
ship” vehicle for economic and political coordination that ties the PRC with
the populist socialist regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia (“Spotlight . . . ,” 2016).
At the multilateral level, the PRC has chosen to work through the CELAC
forum (a body representing all nations of Latin America and the Caribbean,
but lacking a permanent secretariat), as its vehicle of choice for advancing its
roadmap for deepening its relationship with the region ( Ellis, 2015). By contrast
to the Organization of American States, at which the PRC has been an active
participant-observer since 2004, CELAC’s lack of a permanent secretariat has
made it ideal for the PRC to present its concept for gifts to and projects with the
region, in a fashion in which the region cannot effectively present a countering
“collective position” regarding what it wants from China.
While the attraction of Chinese imports, loans and investments are impor-
tant to explaining the region’s attraction with China, the explicit coordination
between the Chinese government, its companies and financial institutions is
critical in understanding how the PRC systematically develops, consolidates and
exploits that inf luence across the region. In particular, the Chinese government
plays a critical role in transforming the diffuse array of potential deals and inter-
ests in working with the PRC across economic sectors and other areas (including
the military, security and diplomatic engagement) into a series of Memorandums
of Understanding (MOUs) and agreements which formalize and facilitate the
achievement of those deals.3 The previously noted entry of Chinese companies
into the country which that infrastructure enables, in combination with coordi-
nating activities by both the companies and the government, in turn expands the
leverage of the Chinese government team.
For the Chinese government, participation in the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), established by President Xi Jinping’s government in 2013, and its explicit
extension to Latin America in 2018, has been an important component of mar-
keting engagement with the PRC on terms beneficial to Chinese economic and
strategic interests, as well creating the structures for doing so. The BRI, growing
out of the legacy of the wealth brought to China through its connection to the
heart of Western civilization via the Silk Road, ref lects the underlying, histori-
cally well-rooted concept of structuring trade between the China as the “Middle
Kingdom” and the surrounding nations of what were once considered the bar-
barian periphery, to ensure a f low of value to the imperial center.4
180 R. Evan Ellis

In Latin America and the Caribbean, as an illustration of soft power, the

attraction of the concept to so many governments of the region has contributed
strongly to the desire to link themselves to China as the presumed source of
wealth and development; indeed, seven states have signed up to participate in
BRI, although the region is not technically connected to the PRC in the actual
maps of the belt and road, and many of the new Latin American signatories such
as Uruguay, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, are not even on the
Pacific side of the continent. Given that Latin America and the Caribbean have
long lamented the need for greater interconnectivity among states of the region
to facilitate development, a handful of dissenting scholars have noted that the
BRI seems less about connecting the region together for its own development,
than tying it to China for the latter’s resource needs. As one scholar put it, “the
BRI is owned by China and is for China” (“The belt . . . ,” 2018), yet Latin
American and Caribbean states continue cueing up to be part of the project.
For the states joining, the enthusiasm to participate in BRI ref lects the com-
pelling nature of the promise to hook themselves economically and politically
into a particular set of economic and infrastructural relationships with the PRC,
whose opportunity costs in terms of other infrastructural and other relation-
ships are not clear. Moreover, that enthusiasm seems unabated by indications that
the cost of doing so is accepting certain conditions, giving PRC-based compa-
nies privileged consideration in operating the ports on their sovereign territory,
building the roads and railroads, and operating the mines, oilfields and other
commercial operations for transferring resources out of their nations to the PRC
at the lowest possible value-added point.
Beyond the impulse of nations in the region to commit themselves to the neo-
mercantilist BRI, as noted previously, China’s soft power in the region is high-
lighted by the willingness of nations of the region to rapidly switch diplomatic
relations to the PRC once Beijing decided to resume the diplomatic struggle with
Taiwan. At the same time, the building of those new relationships, which have
an economic component through the signing of MOUs and the entry of Chinese
companies and financial entities, serves to consolidate and expand that power.
With respect to the dynamics of the “war for diplomatic recognition” of the
nine states in the region still maintaining relations with Taiwan, the relatively
strong US diplomatic reaction to the surprise change in recognition by El Salva-
dor, coming in the wake of similar surprises from the Dominican Republic and
Panama ( Ellis, 2018b), appear to have given some of the countries of the region
pause in establishing relations with the PRC, yet important questions remain
about the intentions of most that continue to recognize Taiwan, particularly
Haiti and the three small Caribbean states in the Lesser Antilles that still recog-
nize Taiwan, and possibly Honduras ( Ellis, 2018b).

The question of PRC hard power

The detailed discussion of PRC soft power in the preceding sections of this chap-
ter does not imply that the PRC has a lack of relevant military and other hard
 Chinese soft power in the Americas 181

power assets, but rather, that for both cultural reasons, and due to changes in the
global environment, China finds it in its interest to rely more on its soft power to
achieve its commercial and other strategic objectives in Latin America.
At present, PRC inf luence in Latin America and the Caribbean is arguably
far greater than that of the Soviet Union at the height of its power during the
Cold War, despite the latter’s alliances with client states such as Cuba and Nica-
ragua and attempts to overthrow pro-US regimes, such as that in El Salvador,
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic (among others) through proxy wars and
political movements.
The difference between those actions by the Soviet Union, which received
substantial attention from Washington, versus the present Chinese behavior, which
has downplayed its military component, ref lect differences in PRC strategic
goals, as well as the greater level of global interdependence between the PRC, its
principal geopolitical rival the United States and the rest of the world.
Because the PRC principally seeks to order global value added in a way that
provides benefits, rather than impose a global political order, it is more interested
in the region’s compliance with f lows that serve its interests, than regimes which
formally serve and ally themselves with Beijing. In this framework, so long as
the United States does not directly threaten China and its interests militarily,
the PRC’s dependence on the United States as a market, financial partner and
source of technology gives it compelling strategic interests to avoid establishing
military bases and exclusive alliance agreements in the region that would alarm
the United States (even beyond the significant tension seen in the current trade
dispute) (Godbole, 2018), and could oblige a response by other actors, without
advancing specific Chinese interests.
Ironically, the greatest contribution of PRC military capabilities to its posi-
tion in Latin America is the promotion of Chinese soft power in the region.
Specifically, the growing size and capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), including long-range hypersonic missiles such as the DF-21D, capable
of putting US carriers and other surface ships at risk (Shimm, 2018), may help
to convince those Latin American states less than enthusiastic about US geopo-
litical dominance, that Washington, in the foreseeable future, may cease to be
the world’s unquestionably supreme military power, or at least, that the United
States is unquestionably capable of prevailing in a conf lict against the PRC in
its own back yard. Such shifting calculations, in turn, may convince a critical
handful of anti-US regimes that they can safely cooperate against the PRC, and
possibly even against the United States, particularly in time of a global conf lict,
if that conf lict does not appear to be going in America’s favor.
While the Chinese military is a vehicle for soft power as well as hard power,
not all Chinese non-military capabilities are soft power. If, as the National
Endowment for Democracy (2017) suggests, the alternative to soft power is
coercive power, then the PRC does clearly use its economic and other national
instruments to coerce Latin American states into doing its will (even while often
allowing them to save face while doing so). One very public example occurred
in 2010, when the Chinese government cut soy oil purchases from Argentina,
182 R. Evan Ellis

valued at $2 billion per year, presumably to punish the South American nation
for applying protectionist measures against Chinese products. While less explicit
than the US style of imposing “sanctions” on errant regimes such as Iran and
Venezuela, the Chinese economic pressure eventually obliged Argentina’s Presi-
dent Christina Fernandez de Kirchner to re-program a canceled trip to the PRC,
and without ever admitting a quid pro quo, agreed to purchase more than $10
billion in Chinese products and services in exchange for the restoration of soy oil
purchases ( Ellis, 2014b).

Conclusion
China’s substantial and growing soft power is fundamental to understand the
appeal of the PRC, and accurately assess its prospects for success as it engages
with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. The evolution of that
power and China’s application of it in Latin America, suggests the need for
adjustments by those who seek to understand the dynamics of Chinese engage-
ment in the region, as well as those seeking to devise appropriate strategies to
insulate democratic and free market institutions in the region from some of its
more corrosive effects.
For students of political science and international relations, the concept of
soft power applied in this chapter suggests the importance of a broad definition
centered not on the vehicles for that inf luence (such as culture), but on its char-
acter, with the inf luenced seeing alignment with the goals of the inf luencer as
within his/her own interests, or arising out of an internalized system of values
compatible with that of the inf luencer.
With respect to assessing the level of Chinese soft power in the Americas
specifically, and the effect of that soft power on outcomes, it is important to
recognize that PRC soft power is more reliant than its US counterpart (but not
exclusively so) on an expectation of benefits, and somewhat less reliant on value
alignment and cultural appeal.
Adequately measuring PRC inf luence also requires recognition that Chinese
soft power in the region is a function of perception, and where the nation may
be going in the future relative to the United States and other nations, rather than
merely a function of actual levels of PRC benefits or engagement.
Finally, Chinese soft power in the region does not exist in isolation, or in
competition with that of the United States, but in a multidimensional space with
a myriad of other actors from the European Union, Great Britain and Canada,
to India, Japan, Korea and Australia, to states in the Middle East and Africa,
among others. While the PRC arguably occupies an inordinate amount of the
region’s attention, those developing strategies to protect the region’s institutions
and democracy in the face of commercial and other temptations from the PRC
should consider the possible contributions of those other actors, not only as alter-
native commercial partners, but also as sources of norms, pressures and incentives.
 Chinese soft power in the Americas 183

Through all mechanisms by which it operates, it is also clear that Chinese soft
power is having a transformative effect on Latin America and the Caribbean, its
dynamics and institutions, and the strategic position of the United States within
the region. That transformation will be critical, not only for those who live in,
and study the region, but also to the United States, which not only finds itself in
a global competition with the PRC of expanding intensity, but which is insepa-
rably connected to Latin America by ties of geography, commerce and family.

Notes
1 The author is Latin America research professor with the U.S. Army War College Strategic
Studies Institute. The views expressed in this work are strictly his own.
2 One of the best-known early analyses by Latin American scholars regarding the potential
impact is Rodriguez, Blazquez and Santiso (2006).
3 As an example, the PRC and Panama signed a total of 47 MOUs in the brief 16-month
period from establishing diplomatic relations in June 2017 to President Xi’s December
2018 state visit to the country in areas from visas to extradition to port construction and
the funding of electricity infrastructure projects (Li, 2018).
4 Indeed, President Xi Jinping’s 2013 Belt and Road Initiative was first referred to as the
“New Silk Road” (see “A new Silk Road?” 2018).

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10
THE SINO–AFRICAN
RELATIONSHIP
An intense and long embrace

Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen1

A recent cover story in The Economist highlighted what the author called “The
New Scramble for Africa,” and noted that the continent “will increasingly be a
place where international rivalries play out” ( Economist, 2019a). In comparing
the investment of effort from different nations in Africa, China stood out and,
indeed, China’s success in Africa has already had the demonstration effect of
stimulating the interest of other aspirants. For example, between 2010 and 2016,
more than 320 embassies or consulates were opened in Africa, although China
still leads the pack with 52. In terms of trading partners with sub-Saharan Africa,
the European Union still leads with $156 billion in total merchandise trade, fol-
lowed by China with $120 billion. However, while the EU showed an increase
in trade of 41% from 2006–2018, China’s increase was 226%. Over that same
period trade between Africa and the United States declined by 45%, down to $36
billion, falling behind India into fourth place ( Economist, 2019a). Continuing
the contrast in engagement with Africa between the world’s two superpowers,
in the decade up to 2018, China’s top officials made 79 visits to Africa; President
Trump has never been there and has been overheard making disparaging com-
ments about the continent. The 2018 Forum on China–Africa Co-operation
(FOCAC) in Beijing, the origins of which are mentioned below, attracted more
African leaders than the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly.
Perhaps more so than virtually anywhere else, at least in soft power terms,
Africa has become a key battleground between China and the United States.
In a recent speech at the Heritage Foundation, US National Security Adviser
John Bolton laid out the new American strategy for Africa and contrasted it
with China’s policies, which he asserted “uses bribes, opaque agreements, and
the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and
demands,” further noting that China’s “investment ventures are riddled with
corruption, and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards as US
 The Sino–African relationship 189

developmental programs.” As with the One Belt, One Road strategic initia-
tive, the United States views China’s aims in Africa as part of their “ultimate
goal of advancing Chinese global dominance” ( National Security Council,
2018). However, what was most striking about Bolton’s comments was his focus
on US, not African, priorities, clearly stating that “every decision we make,
every policy we pursue, and every dollar of aid we spend will further US pri-
orities in the region.” Thus, he highlighted countering the terrorist threat and
eliminating “indiscriminate assistance across the entire continent,” particularly
noting that the United States would “no longer support unproductive, unsuc-
cessful, and unaccountable U.N. peacekeeping missions.” Not coincidentally,
as will be discussed below, China is the biggest contributor to peacekeeping
of the five permanent members of the Security Council, with as many as 80%
of their troops stationed in Africa, contributing to China’s positive image on the
continent.
It is helpful to contrast Bolton’s “America First” focus with China’s self-
assessment of its African initiatives. One intriguing way to do that is to examine
how Africa appears in Chinese popular culture which is marketed primarily, but
not exclusively, for China’s domestic market. Most striking in this regard is the
film Wolf Warrior 2, which in 2017 made over $850 million at the box office in
China, far more than any other film ever marketed there. The film deals with
China’s efforts to evacuate its citizens from a war zone plagued by a deadly virus
in an unnamed African nation, and shows China’s efforts to improve public
health in that country. In a scene which is clearly intended to generate domes-
tic public support for Chinese investment in Africa, a Chinese convoy, seeking
to evacuate not only Chinese but also endangered African citizens, has to pass
through a battle zone contested by both sides in a civil war. Once the rival
armies see the Chinese f lag, they stop fighting, yelling out approvingly, “It’s
the Chinese, let them through,” and the convoy is allowed to pass. By contrast,
the Americans and other foreigners have already departed without offering any
help, and the Chinese have to defeat a Western mercenary army, headed by an
American, before they can succeed. This ref lects the Chinese message, again in
contrast to Bolton’s presentation of the new American strategy that offers help
only to those countries which are serving American interests, that China takes
no sides in Africa, and will support policies that will benefit all Africans.
Because they “take no sides” and support whichever government is in office,
no matter how dictatorial, China has often been accused of ignoring the people
of Africa, so it is instructive to examine China’s image in public opinion polls.
Gallup has noted that all the major global powers earn their highest ratings in
Africa, and in their most recent survey, the median approval rating of Chinese
leadership was 53%, one percentage point higher than the United States, com-
pared to Chinese approval ratings of 34% in Asia, 30% in the Americas and 28%
in Europe ( Reinhart and Ritter, 2019). The most recent Afrobarometer poll of
36 countries found that 63% of Africans had a “somewhat” or “very” positive
view of Chinese inf luence, 56% saw China’s development assistance as doing a
190 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

“somewhat” or “very” good job of meeting their country’s needs and 24% cited
China as the most popular model for national development (behind the 30% who
chose the United States). Respondents pointed to infrastructure/development,
business investments and the cost of its products as the most important reasons
for the positive results, while political and social considerations were not impor-
tant factors affecting China’s image (Afrobarometer, 2016). A recent survey from
the Pew Research Center also found views of China across Africa “generally
positive,” with a 62% favorability rating in 2018, although only four states were
polled that year; however, over the last decade the average favorability rating was
66% ( Devlin, 2018). It is important to note that there are 54 nations in Africa,
so positive perceptions of China vary. For example, despite considerable Chinese
investment in Egypt and Algeria, in recent years both countries had favorability
ratings of China below 40%, and Ghana, which held the highest views of China
in the world in 2015 at 80% favorability, had dropped to 49% in 2017. Among
the factors cited for the decline of China’s image in some countries, the f looding
of low-quality Chinese goods on domestic markets and the lack of employment
opportunities created by Chinese investment have stood out.
Noting these generally positive survey results, the following sections will docu-
ment China’s initiatives in Africa in a variety of fields, in effect suggesting an
explanation for China’s favorable image, while also noting the critiques that have
questioned China’s motivations for these initiatives.

The development of China’s interest towards Africa

The Sino–African relationship, which has developed through different stages,
remained almost negligible during the first few years in the wake of the estab-
lishment of the PRC in 1949. Mao Zedong was too busy in stabilizing the coun-
try’s borders with neighboring countries and too occupied with reorganizing the
society to take into consideration the relationship with Africa. It was only with
the Asian–African Conference, convened in Bandung in April 1955 and rep-
resenting an important forum to condemn colonial oppression and every form
of underdevelopment, as well as to enhance economic and cultural coopera-
tion, that the two parties began to cooperate. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai gave
a speech at the conference on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,”
introduced with India the year before, and focused on the mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference
in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coex-
istence. The pragmatism of such an approach was particularly useful for China,
allowing them to offer immediate recognition to newly independent nations on
the basis of these principles, regardless of their political orientation or their ide-
ologies. China’s enhanced efforts were also stimulated by the attention to Africa
demonstrated by the United States and, above all, the split with the Soviet Union
in 1960 after a bitter ideological confrontation between Moscow and Beijing,
 The Sino–African relationship 191

which forced African movements to take sides, contributing to their further

division ( Yahuda, 1979).
The necessity to work hard to develop the so-called Bandung spirit, to
strengthen China’s policies in Africa and to promote the PRC’s anti-Soviet poli-
cies brought Zhou Enlai to visit the continent, from December 1963 to February
1964, putting forward the “Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic and
Technological Assistance to Foreign Countries,” which were designed to com-
pete simultaneously with the “imperialists” (the United States) and the “revision-
ists” (the Soviet Union) for Africa’s support, and the “Five Principles Governing
Relations with African and Arab Countries.” The first set of principles clarified
the Chinese intention to assist African countries by providing economic and
technical aid free of any conditions, with the economic support offered free (or
almost free) from any interest rates, with long repayment periods and accompa-
nied by technological transfer (Chinese Government, 1964). Moreover, the Five
Principles reaffirmed the struggle against colonialism and for non-alignment,
self-determination, non-aggression and respect for sovereignty. It was against
this backdrop that China decided to offer its support to various liberation move-
ments in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, concurrent with the
growing inf luence of the Soviet Union on the African continent.
China provided substantial foreign aid to Africa, in the form of interest free
loans, combined with the construction of several infrastructural projects, including the
1,860-kilometer Tazara Railway bridging Tanzania with Zambia, whose construc-
tion took five years, from 1970 to 1975, and was driven, at least in part, by China’s
need to facilitate its access to copper. This aid was important to African govern-
ments during difficult times, as Western donors were both reluctant to become eco-
nomically committed to such projects and averse to working in such remote areas.
Chinese foreign aid played a role in the establishment of diplomatic relations with
a number of African countries, and subsequent African support was instrumental
in enabling Beijing to assume the “China” seat at the United Nations, in October
1971, replacing Taipei. The support from 28 African countries—accounting for
34% of the General Assembly votes—was recognized by Mao, who admitted: “It is
our African brothers that carried us into the United Nations” (Li, 2012).
By the early 1980s, with the advent of Deng Xiaoping and the implementa-
tion of the reform and opening up policy, Africa lost much of its importance in
Chinese eyes and was to some extent marginalized as Beijing’s focus shifted to
its own modernization; while China had no intention to abandon the African
continent, economics had supplanted politics as the driving factor in the rela-
tionship. This was confirmed by the trip Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang made
from December 20, 1982 to January 17, 1983 to the African continent, where he
introduced the new “Four Principles on Sino–African Economic and Technical
Cooperation,” stressing that, in contrast to the earlier set of principles which
regulated the relationship in the 1960s and 1970s, the nature of engagement had
to become the mutual promotion of the two economies.
192 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

The 1990s, however, represented an important moment for the upswing of

Sino–African relations. In the aftermath of the military crackdown in Tianan-
men Square in June 1989, China became a pariah state, increasingly isolated
internationally and sanctioned economically, clearly demonstrating to the Chi-
nese leadership their value differences with the West. In order to oppose what
Beijing felt was an injustice, China turned its attention again to Third World
countries, including the African states which had expressed their support to the
Chinese government for its success in handling its internal problems. Therefore,
soon after Tiananmen, Sino–African relations f lourished, and Foreign Minis-
ter Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries between 1989 and 1992 in order
to seek political support, followed by other leaders. This led to President Jiang
Zemin’s national visit in 1997, during which he sowed the seeds for the establish-
ment of an organization based on friendship and cooperation between the two
actors, which would later become FOCAC.

Economics in command
Much of the soft power displayed by China in its engagement with African
countries is “economic.” Overall Sino–African trade has expanded tremendously
in the last two decades. Starting from a base of $10 billion in 2000, it had reached
a volume of $220 billion in 2014, growing on average, since 2001, by more than
31% a year, so that it now surpasses the United States in trade and investment
and has challenged the primacy of the European Union (Sutter, 2016, pp. 306–
310; Grimm and Hackenesch, 2017). Beijing has become the largest export des-
tination for several African countries, including the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Zambia and Angola, among others. If China is currently buying mainly
crude oil, copper and iron, confirming that its main interest is in Africa’s natural
resources, the quality of its exports has improved greatly, passing from primary
agricultural products, as in the 1950s, to mechanical, electrical and high-tech
items. Africa is considered as a huge potential market for Chinese products not
only by Beijing’s government, but also by private Chinese entrepreneurs ( Wang
and Zou, 2014); there are reportedly 10,000 Chinese businesses on the African
continent ( Economist, 2019a).
Beyond contributing to the anxiety of Western powers (Hirono and Suzuki,
2014), the expansion of China’s economic presence in Africa has been accompa-
nied by major political objectives, the most important of which has been gain-
ing support for its “One-China Principle” and marginalizing Taiwan. According
to some commentators, although the growth in trade relations between China
and Africa, as well as China’s investments, seem to be economically beneficial
to Africa, they nevertheless further the “underdevelopment” of the continent,
especially in terms of the limited involvement of African workers in infrastruc-
tural development (Zhao, 2014), or the inclination of the Chinese government
to subsidize Chinese companies, depriving African nations of benefits that might
otherwise accrue in terms of employment, technology transfer and the acquisition
 The Sino–African relationship 193

of working skills (Sutter, 2016). In turn, a number of African scholars and jour-
nalists, echoing the traditional Western critique that China is increasingly invest-
ing in Africa in order to gain access to natural resources, thereby exacerbating
the continent’s export dependency, and to cultivate the export market for Chi-
nese products, have started to criticize Beijing for its neo-colonialist attitude and
exploitative policies (Mbaye, 2011; Quinn and Heinrich, 2011). Thus, while many
African leaders have embraced China, societal forces have protested China’s trade
and resource-related activities, pushing other politicians to voice their grievances.
For example, the vocal objections of South Africa’s trade unions to China’s cheap
imports was a major contributing factor in President Thabo Mbeki’s decision to
restrict China’s textile exports (Cooke, 2009), and to his public assertion that
Africa would be “condemned to underdevelopment” if China develops a “colo-
nial relationship” with the continent such as that which used to exist between
Africa and the West (Mohan and Power, 2008). These protests, which sometimes
have turned violent against the Chinese community in some countries, have con-
vinced China that the voices of societal groups cannot be ignored in the pursuit
of its economic objectives. In response, Beijing has pursued policies that present a
less mercantile side to the African public by committing to investments in numer-
ous other fields, including education and the construction of schools and hospitals.
The results have been positive, despite some skepticism that the implementation
of these initiatives has limited their benefits to the general public (Fijalkowski,
2011; Kurlantzick, 2009). Thus, as noted above, surveys have suggested that the
popular perception of Chinese efforts in Africa is favorable (Afrobarometer, 2016;
Devlin, 2018; Reinhart, 2019).

Aid with Chinese characteristics

Chinese aid can be described as political and strategic rather than humanitarian,
intended to enhance China’s soft power charm offensive. Moreover, much of
China’s official financing is inherently more commercial than developmental,
and not categorizable as “foreign aid” as defined by Western donors. It is, how-
ever, an important resource for many developing countries, albeit critics note its
lack of transparency ( Xu and Carey, 2015).
Han and Zhang (2018) have described the development of China’s foreign aid
to Africa as unfolding in three distinct phases: solidarity (1955–1978), reform
(1978–2000) and comprehensive development (from 2000 to the present). The
first stage was characterized by free assistance, guided by the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence and, later, by the Eight Principles on Economic Aid. The
support was primarily intended for liberation movements; nonetheless, in that
period 36 African countries enjoyed 58% of Beijing’s total amount of foreign
aid (Li and Liu, 1996, p. 14). The second period—coinciding with the advent
of the reform and opening up policy—implied a shift in focus toward “mutual
benefit” and a more active economic cooperation. By 1990, Beijing had restruc-
tured its foreign aid programs as interest-free government loans were replaced by
194 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

guaranteed discount loans from Chinese banks, and aid grants were superseded
by joint ventures and other forms of cooperation (Sheldon, 2001). The greatest
success, however, was represented by the implementation of the so-called aid to
profit method, implemented by Chinese state-owned corporations, which dis-
covered the immense opportunities the “hopeless continent” could provide in
terms of resource acquisition and trade opportunities. The consequence was that
Chinese companies’ mobilization was hidden under the banner of aid. The
latest stage was a testimony to the economic success China had reached, as well
as its rise in the international arena. From 2000, with the adoption of its pro-
claimed “win-win” strategy, Sino–African relations strengthened, with FOCAC
playing a leading role.
While Brautigam (2009) notes that China’s aid and development assistance
can be seen in different sectors, more conventional aid usually takes the form
of soft loans and debt relief, rather than direct grants; China rarely gives cash
aid in any significant amount. Interest-free loans are used for public infra-
structure and industrial and agricultural production, while concessional loans
are employed mainly for supporting production projects and large-scale infra-
structure construction ( Kitano, 2016, p. 5). In the case of aid, as in many other
cases, China’s participation is shaped by its political and strategic interests, the
most important of which has traditionally been to convince African leaders to
take shelter under Beijing’s umbrella rather than rely on Western institutions,
and, later, to consolidate these relations with resource-rich nations. This model
was successful in Africa because it differs sharply from the Western approach,
which, originally, f lowed through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank and was tied to the implementation of Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs). This was the model that has become famous as the “Washing-
ton Consensus,” according to which the debt crisis was the result of excessive
government spending. The result was the proliferation of economic and politi-
cal conditionality attached to economic assistance provided by Western donors.
Beijing’s aid, on the other hand, is free of conditionalities and the promotion
of values like good governance, human rights, transparency and legality to be
implanted in the counterpart country. The only requirement for nations who
want to enter the “Chinese team” is the severance of ties with Taipei. As Sen-
egalese President Wade noted approvingly in 2008, “China’s approach to our
needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-
colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and nongovern-
mental organizations” ( Wade, 2008). In short, they can accept aid without being
accused of squandering it by not investing appropriately, such as building schools
and hospitals. China has no problem in supporting the construction of infra-
structural projects—such as sports facilities—which can hardly be considered
as development projects. In this way, however, Chinese support the acquisition
of domestic legitimacy by the African recipient government which, most likely,
will repay Beijing by signing more agreements. However, this massive inf lux of
finance aimed to sustain infrastructural investments creates, according to some
 The Sino–African relationship 195

observers, an instrument of “debt-trap diplomacy” that fosters economic lever-

age over recipients (Su, 2017; Bewley, 2018). As we shall see below, this critique,
emphasized in American warnings to African nations and raised more gener-
ally in describing China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative, has become a major
fault line in assessing China’s motivations in its policies for developing countries
( Brautigam, 2019; Economist, 2019b).
The Chinese model, defined as the “Beijing Consensus,” is a key element in
China’s economic soft power configuration, and represents a major challenge
to Western institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. Very often, Chinese
financing has been associated with securing natural resources, a procedure con-
figured as the “Angola model,” according to which China provides low-interest
loans to countries which rely on commodities like oil. In exchange for Chinese
financial aid, as in the telecommunications sector, Beijing requires that Africans
favor a Chinese service provider. Politically, China’s “non-interference” in the
domestic affairs of other countries and its open support of undemocratic “rogue
states,” thereby perpetuating their survival, combined with what some observ-
ers have described as predatory financing with “no strings attached,” has led to
accusations that Chinese policies have prevented the implementation of good
governance practices and anti-corruption reforms. The Angolan experience is
a case in point, since the government was able to resist IMF pressure for oil
revenue transparency because it was able to access an interest-free loan from the
Chinese EXIM Bank ( Lombard, 2006). Other observers, however, counter that
China has become a paradigm for modern development finance, its financing
model and its swift project implementation is exactly what developing countries
need in order to ignite their economies.

Educational initiatives to promote soft power

Whereas in the past African students used to opt for higher education institu-
tions in the United States or former colonial rulers, notably France or the United
Kingdom, this attitude has recently started to change, and China has become a
significant educational pole of attraction. This is one of the initiatives China has
taken to improve its image, and counter the growing suspicion that their only
real interest in the continent is economic.
China is also seeking to create a workforce capable of using Chinese high-tech
industrial products in Africa. With Chinese companies engaged in major infra-
structural development and with the success of IT companies such as Huawei,
the need for skilled African professionals is strong. Moreover, as future leaders
or members of the middle class, African students can be a crucial link between
China and Africa, representing a worthwhile investment in the long-term future
of the relationship, while promoting the internationalization of Chinese institu-
tions ( Liu, 2017; King, 2013).
This story of success in the field of education has been nurtured through a wide-
ranging system of scholarships and incentives paid by the Chinese government.
196 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

At the time of Mao’s death, in 1976, Beijing provided 144 scholarships to Afri-
can students; by 2015 that number had climbed to 8,470 ( Li, 2018). Even more
striking, at the time of the first FOCAC in 2000 there were fewer than 1,400
Africans studying in China; 15 years later this number had ballooned to around
50,000, a 35-fold increase ( Li, 2018). As these numbers indicate, the vast major-
ity of Africans who decide to study in China are self-financed, attracted by low
tuition fees and easy access to visas, unlike the long procedures required by
many Western countries. During the 2018 FOCAC summit, Beijing promised
to provide 50,000 scholarships for African students over the next three years,
along with other benefits, such as inviting 2,000 Africans to China for cultural
exchanges. Beijing’s proactive policies in the overseas education sector appear
even more attractive when contrasted with the declining opportunities in more
traditional destinations. Although France still maintains the lead among fran-
cophone Africans, China has become, as of 2017, the leading destination for
English-speaking African students (Nantulya, August 30, 2018) and represents
a valuable alternative in terms of cost and preferential treatment. While educa-
tional cooperation contributes to the promotion of mutual relations, a number of
concerns remain. Apart from problems of cultural adaptation, Africans studying
in China often complain about the low quality of education, language barriers
and consequent “segregation,” as well as being the target of racism ( Burgess,
2016). These difficulties, in Hauben’s words, “obstructs the promotion of Chi-
nese values, thus obliterating the soft power potential of Sino-African educa-
tional exchanges” (2013, p. 331). It is worth noting, however, that Africans who
study in China, unlike those who study elsewhere, tend to go back to their
native countries upon completion, thus contributing to national development
and avoiding a brain drain effect, as well as generating warm feelings toward
China (Sautman, 2006). In addition, some of those who go back to Africa were
put, or will be put, in positions of power and inf luence, suggesting that their
experience in China will make them well prepared to deal with Chinese busi-
nesspeople and officials, perhaps favoring the country which has invested in their
education (Li, 2018; Allison, 2013).
A f lagship instrument for China’s educational engagement with Africa has
been represented by the Confucius Institutes, which have rapidly spread across
the region, constituting another important instrument of attraction for African
students. Since December 2005, when the first one was inaugurated in Nai-
robi, 48 Confucius Institutes and 27 Confucius Classrooms located in 33 African
countries have been established, mainly to develop Chinese language courses
and provide information and services relating to Chinese culture. China has
already surpassed both the United States and the United Kingdom in the num-
ber of cultural institutions in Africa, although it is still lagging behind France
and its Alliance Française facilities. As in other countries, however, these efforts
to gain soft power have been controversial, with Confucius Institutes, as Har-
tig’s chapter in this volume suggests, sometimes facing harsh criticism for being
 The Sino–African relationship 197

“Trojan horses” set up for political reasons (Paradise, 2009), and contributing to
the marginalization of African culture, languages and identity.

The role of media to tell China’s story

Even though Chinese media was already active in Africa in the late 1950s when
ideological support was given to liberation movements on Chinese radio stations
broadcasting to Africa (Madrid-Morales and Wasserman, 2017; Üngör, 2009), its
recent expansion has become an integral part of the “going out” policy and an
attempt to counteract China’s perceived “demonized” international image pre-
sented by Western media ( Li, 1996), and is linked to Beijing’s broader economic
activities and to its changing foreign policy orientation. In 2008 the central gov-
ernment invested RMB 45 billion in order to pave the way for the “Big Four”
Chinese media actors, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI),
Chinese Central Television (CCTV) and China Daily to expand their overseas
operations. Action plans in 2012 and 2015 have followed the same path. As high-
lighted by Madrid-Morales and Wasserman (2017), this expansion has also meant
a gradual diversification, allowing Chinese corporations and state agencies to
be involved in five key areas: content production, provided by Xinhua, to many
African media houses; content distribution, mainly Chinese soap operas that have
become quite popular in many countries on the continent; infrastructure develop-
ment, largely supported by big companies like Huawei; professional training, mainly
offered by Chinese universities; and direct investment, such as the 20% acquisition
of South Africa’s Independent Media by a group of Chinese investors.
China’s state-led media have all established deep footprints on the African
continent following a strategy characterized by a series of interconnected ini-
tiatives. Xinhua’s long presence in Africa—in the 1950s and 1960s it provided
support for the news agencies of African liberation movements in various forms—
has expanded. In 2006 its Africa Regional Bureau in Nairobi took over the
production and distribution of French-language reports from the Paris Bureau
while, two years later, the China African News Service was officially launched.
In 2011 Xinhua started its CNC World, the English-language TV channel and,
responding to the massive growth of mobile devices in Africa, implemented an
Internet application called “I Love Africa” as a source of news in sub-Saharan
Africa, reaching millions of subscribers. Xinhua currently has more than 30
bureaus in Africa, with hundreds of local employees, and cooperates with the
local state news agencies on content sharing. In addition, it offers its reports to
all local media at little or no charge, acquiring an indisputable advantage over
its competitors in the West (Grassi, 2014). In 2006, another actor with a long
history of connections with Africa, CRI, launched its first overseas station with
its FM channels in three East African cities—broadcasting in English, Mandarin
and Swahili—and its AM channels covering Kenya ( Wu, 2012). In January 2012,
the state-run CCTV established CCTV Africa (now known as China Global
198 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

Television Network, CGTN), settling in Nairobi and becoming the largest non-
African TV initiative on the continent. Counting on a large crew of employees,
mostly Africans recruited from competitors, its objective was to compete with
giants like CNN by reporting primarily on developments in Africa. At the end
of 2012, the state-controlled English-language newspaper China Daily launched
Africa Weekly, from its offices in South Africa and Kenya. Last but not least, Star-
Times, a privately owned company founded in Beijing in 1988 and originally
focused on broadcasting services, became a major international player only
after it started its operations in Africa in 2002 ( Rønning, 2016). StarTimes
has activities that range from building broadcasting networks to distributing
signals and training personnel hired locally. Being identified by the Chinese
Ministry of Culture as a “cultural exports key enterprise,” as well as being the
only private Chinese company to obtain the authorization from the Ministry of
Commerce to participate in foreign projects in the radio and TV industry, has
enabled StarTimes to become a major actor in the media sector, receiving funds
from EXIM Bank.
This seemingly unstoppable expansion of state-sponsored media organizations
from an authoritarian country into Africa has raised concerns among some critics,
who fear it might prevent the consolidation of fragile or imperfect democra-
cies. China premises its media expansion into Africa on providing “positive
reporting” or “constructive journalism,” aimed at inf luencing perceptions of
Beijing by “advancing new ways of looking at Africa” (Gagliardone and Geall,
2014), a completely different focus in contrast to the role of independent watch-
dog media plays in liberal democracies. According to Beijing, this means showing
the positive side of Africa’s development and providing solutions to governance
challenges, instead of being hypercritical, as Western media tend to be. Some
analysts (Marsh, 2017; Wan, 2017), however, have tried to demonstrate that this
label of constructive journalism is mere rhetoric devoid of any substance, given
the fact that stories deemed harmful to Chinese economic or political interests
are filtered directly in Beijing, while “lighter” themes are left to the control of
African editors. Thus, analysts often question the level of autonomy and inde-
pendence African journalists retain when they have to cover aspects that are
considered “inconvenient” by Beijing, such as human rights violations, elections,
civil society participation or criticism of African dictators, like Mugabe or Al-
Bashir ( York, 2013).
Given its substantial investment, how successful has China been in extend-
ing its inf luence via media in Africa? Have they been able to convert economic
capital into symbolic and cultural capital ( Rønning, 2016)? Has China’s promo-
tion of itself met with a positive reception among African audiences? The avail-
able empirical research suggests a mixed picture, which is not surprising given
the variation across 54 African nations. While public opinion polls suggest a
more positive picture, one major effort that examined this question in various
parts of the continent concluded that, whether conceived in terms of an expand-
ing market, counter-hegemonic discursive struggles or soft power, despite some
 The Sino–African relationship 199

successes, Chinese media by and large had thus far been unsuccessful ( Wasser-
man, 2016).

China’s increasing footprint in telecommunications

As in other infrastructural sectors, China has emerged as one of the most piv-
otal actors in ensuring connectivity in the digital realm, thanks to its two Chi-
nese information and communications technology giants—Huawei (privately
owned) and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE)
(state owned)—who have come to dominate the African market, and continue
to extend their footprint. Both companies look at Africa as a lucrative target,
to the point that Huawei, which already generates 15% of its global sales on the
continent, has opened dozens of local branches and offices, hiring more than
5,000 employees, over half of whom are claimed to be locals (Tsui, 2016). The
secret behind this impressive success lies in the support provided by EXIM Bank
or China Development Bank (CDB); in substance, state-owned Chinese banks
provide loans on the condition that African governments buy equipment and
services only from Chinese companies. This modality, unknown to major inter-
national competitors like Ericsson or Nokia, has been observed several times; in
2008, for example, EXIM Bank offered a soft loan to Tanzania to improve its
telecommunications industry. According to that contract, the China Interna-
tional Telecommunication Construction Corporation (CITCC) was required to
carry out the project with Huawei ( Dreher et al., 2017). Another strategy lies in
export credits offered directly to Chinese companies, which use them to imple-
ment a project envisioned by a national government (Gagliardone, 2014). More-
over, the strong Chinese interest toward the African telecommunications sector
indicates a recalibration in its investment pattern, from an exclusive engagement
in extractive industries to an increasing inclusion of services such as finance,
banking and telecommunications, and manufacturing (Cissé, 2012).
When establishing operations in Africa, Chinese companies generally opt for
joint ventures with local network operators in order to gain a better knowledge
of a specific market in which they will operate, gaining access to information
that will enable them to tailor products and services to local realities faster and
with lower possible risk. Because of their importance in shaping China’s image,
when Chinese leaders visit Africa they make sure to include Huawei and ZTE
executives (Cooke, 2012), allowing them to have preferential access to local gov-
ernmental élites and build high-level relationships that can be important in gain-
ing inf luence and winning contracts.
Chinese companies, however, have also been the targets of intense criticism,
citing their lack of transparency, their insistence on “vendor-guaranteed” loans,
where state-owned Chinese banks provide loans on the condition that African
governments buy equipment and services only from Chinese companies, and
the adoption of corrupt practices (Malakata, 2012), to which both Huawei and
ZTE respond by stressing the importance of their corporate social responsibility
200 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

portfolios. The gravest allegation, however, concerns spying operations, like

inserting a backdoor on the servers of the African Union’s Chinese-built head-
quarters that allowed them to transfer data to servers in Shanghai. Beijing has
consistently dismissed these accusations (Maasho, 2018).

UN peacekeeping as a Chinese success story

UN peacekeeping activities have become an important aspect of Beijing’s foreign
policy, especially because they are strongly intertwined with soft power. China,
in fact, is currently not only among the world’s 12 largest contributors of troops,
but also the biggest contributor of peacekeepers among the five permanent mem-
bers of the UN Security Council (Zürcher, 2019). The African continent, in fact,
represents the most significant destination for Chinese peacekeeping contingents,
with its ten UN missions in Africa, most notably in Mali, Central African Repub-
lic, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur, constituting around 80%
of the 2,500 troops China deploys abroad (Zürcher, 2019). China not only con-
tributes personnel, but also medical expertise, transportation equipment, and
engineering and logistical specialists for UN operations (Ayenagbo et al., 2012).
China’s deep involvement in peacekeeping activities serves multiple pur-
poses. First, Chinese troops are strategically deployed in resource-rich coun-
tries, like the Democratic Republic of Congo (mining concessions), Sudan (oil
interests), South Sudan and Liberia (timber), or in countries where its greatest
economic and military interests are at stake ( Nantulya, 2019). Liberia started
receiving Chinese investments in 2003, along with engineers and medical per-
sonnel for UN peacekeeping operations, immediately after having broken with
Taipei. It was for this reason that the Liberian president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,
declared that the country would “never forget the friendship of Chinese peace-
keeping soldiers” (People’s Daily, February 1, 2007). Given that other countries,
including the United States, provide financial assistance but no troops, Sirleaf ’s
declaration confirms the effectiveness of Beijing’s soft power by means of its
involvement in peacekeeping operations. A second reason is China’s rising status
on the global stage. With many countries wary of its strategic intentions, Beijing
wants to demonstrate to the international community that it is seriously commit-
ted to contributing to the establishment of international peace and security by
providing a constructive role for the People’s Liberation Army. Third, Chinese
security forces gain substantial benefits in terms of experience, professionalism
and modernization by training alongside contingents from other nations. Finally,
it is worth noting that China sells more weapons in sub-Saharan Africa than any
other nation, accounting for 27% of the region’s arms imports from 2013–2017,
compared with 16% from 2008–2012 ( Economist, 2019a).

Public health as public diplomacy

China has also been active in providing assistance in the area of public health.
The practice of dispatching Chinese medical teams (CMTs) to Africa took shape
 The Sino–African relationship 201

in the early 1960s, when Beijing responded to the Algerian appeal to the inter-
national community for medical assistance in the wake of the liberation of the
country and the withdrawal of French medical staff. The intervention of these
medical teams proved efficacious in providing quality medical care in resource-
poor settings and promoted the idea that Chinese health diplomacy could foster
the sustainable development of African states’ healthcare infrastructure ( Youde,
2010).
China’s commitment has generated about 255 projects in health, popula-
tion and water and sanitation sectors in Africa with an investment of more than
$3 billion ( Lin et al., 2016) between 2000 and 2012. The most common form of
China’s health assistance is the dispatch of CMTs. In 2014, 43 of these teams were
at work in 42 different African countries, treating over 5 million patients, with an
estimated annual operational cost of between $29 and $60 million (Tambo et al.,
2016). Apart from deploying personnel, China intervenes by building clinics for
the local population, introducing Chinese traditional medical treatment (par-
ticularly acupuncture), donating pharmaceuticals, and providing equipment and
training to African health workers. Between 2006 and 2013, China financed 345
healthcare projects, at a cost of $764 million (Guillon and Mathonnat, 2017). It is
perhaps not surprising that the blockbuster film Wolf Warrior 2, mentioned above,
highlighted Chinese efforts in public health in Africa as a key theme.
Beijing has also responded to specific medical emergencies on the continent.
For example, between 2013 and 2016, when more than 11,000 people died from
the Ebola virus, China not only dispatched more than 1,000 medical professionals
to West Africa, but also provided $120 million in aid (Shan, 2016; Cheng, 2015).
The contribution to the fight against malaria is also particularly important, and
China has implemented various measures, including the distribution of Cotecxin,
the effective antimalarial drug produced in China (Huang, 2011). Ref lecting the
continuing debate over Chinese motivations, however, some observers have
seen such Chinese largesse more as a “low-cost” strategy to introduce Chinese-
made medication to the African market (Shinn, 2006).
China’s efforts are aimed at both the general population, who directly benefit
from the infrastructure built and the services provided, and at African leaders,
who can gain legitimation from their fellow citizens by cooperating with China
in the healthcare sector. From the Chinese point of view health assistance rep-
resents another means to strengthen its diplomatic relations with Africa, and
presumably help Beijing to gain favorable trading terms and access to necessary
resources (Thompson, 2005; Youde, 2010), even though the Chinese govern-
ment has consistently claimed that its health diplomacy is not linked to any
material benefits they expect to derive. The evidence of this “altruistic” attitude
should be seen, according to Beijing, in the fact that health aid to sub-Saharan
Africa is not limited to resource-rich countries. Nonetheless, as Li (2011) sug-
gests, China’s medical cooperation has indeed often corresponded to Beijing’s
diplomatic strategy, as in the case of Senegal, where CMTs began to arrive in
1975 but were withdrawn from 1996 to 2007, a period when relations were
severed.
202 Antonio Fiori and Stanley Rosen

Conclusion
As Africa becomes a focal point for international rivalries, particularly between
the United States and China, it is important to consider the comparative advan-
tages of the two antagonists in terms of soft power generation. China has long
made Africa a priority for both political—its 54 nations make up more than 25%
of the UN General Assembly and it always has 3 of the 15 non-permanent seats
on the Security Council—and economic reasons, with other nations belatedly
following China’s lead in recognizing the importance of the continent. At the
same time, under the Trump administration, the United States has moved in
the opposite direction, cutting funding for development and diplomatic pro-
grams, announcing a 10% reduction in troops in Africa and generally treating
the continent with at best benign neglect. For example, it took 18 months to
fill the top Africa job at the State Department ( Economist, 2019a). Neverthe-
less, alarmed at China’s worldwide ambitions for the Belt and Road and other
initiatives, Washington has asserted that in contrast to China’s self-serving poli-
cies, it is the United States that can best help African nations move toward self-
reliance. Bolton’s December 2018 speech portrayed the struggle between China
and the United States as a zero-sum game, noting that China was “deliberately
and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive
advantage over the United States” ( National Security Council, 2018), comments
that are reminiscent of the “Great Game” between Britain and Russia over Cen-
tral Asia in the 19th century. In effect, American policy seeks to compel African
nations to make a choice between China and the United States.
Early returns suggest that most nations will strongly resist making such a
choice, and that by its consistent engagement across a variety of policy arenas
China has become indispensable to these countries. As the former president of
Nigeria suggested, in responding to Bolton’s speech, China deserves credit for
transforming the image of the continent from “a problem to be solved to a com-
mercial prospect,” and that “the history of superpower rivalry in Africa is messy,
destructive and occasionally bloody,” and should never be allowed to happen
again; indeed, the very title of his op-ed indicates that such a policy is not con-
ducive to promoting America’s soft power in Africa, and that “the US is asking
African countries to choose sides at a time when many don’t have this luxury”
(Obasanjo and Mills, 2018). As Obasanjo cautions, while the United States can-
not compete with China in delivering low-cost infrastructure in exchange for
resources and contracts, or provide workers willing to labor in remote African
environments for low wages, American soft power in Africa is based on the
values they represent, particularly since two-thirds of Africans routinely prefer
democracy to any other form of government. The best way to compete with
China would be to make use of this comparative advantage by helping to improve
governance oversight, supporting greater transparency and vigilance over elec-
tions and funding scholarships for African students. Some of the other African
responses to Bolton’s speech have been far less polite (Maru, 2019) and suggest
that promoting a confrontational, Manichean struggle between good and evil is
 The Sino–African relationship 203

likely to be counterproductive for the United States; in short, China is not going
away, they have been welcomed in Africa and will be there for the long term.

Note
1 The chapter is the outcome of a joint effort by the two co-authors. In practice, though,
SR wrote the introduction and conclusion, while AF wrote all the remaining sections.

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11
CHINESE SOFT POWER IN JAPAN
AND SOUTH KOREA
Gilbert Rozman

China has tremendous economic power and rapidly expanding military power,
but it has had difficulty boosting its soft power. For neighbors long in China’s
shadow, soft power can include shared historical and cultural traditions, an image
of an emerging regional community and the promise of some sort of common
“Asian values.” Given the prevalence of US and Western culture and English,
efforts directed at expanding soft power also involve challenging the US cultural
hegemony along with spreading one’s own narrative on the past and on recent
policies (Shambaugh, 2015), by popularizing Confucius Institutes and encour-
aging the study of Chinese and the PRC outlook on the history of China and
of the earlier East Asian region under China. In the 1980s Japan placed priority
on expanding soft power, invoking shared culture, but it did not challenge the
international community, unlike China’s frontal assault on the US-led world
order. In the 2010s Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” has become the symbol of a
narrative about how China envisions itself at the center of a new, alluring, Sino-
centric order.
Basically, there are two types of approaches to spreading a country’s soft power.
One is the leadership model, setting one’s country on a path of exceptionality and
holding it up as worthy of awe and reverence. The other is the community model,
enticing others as a model partner in a wider endeavor. There can be a mixture
of the two or some alternation between them, projecting superiority as a paragon
of admiration and garnering respect as the champion of a common cause. As in
the 1980s case of Japan, but more so, China has transitioned rapidly from ear-
lier avid pursuit of multilateralism to undisguised insistence on its own regional
leadership.
Soft power comes from a combination of admiration, trust and high expec-
tations. In the case of Japanese and South Korean perceptions of China’s soft
power, there was potential for admiration of shared premodern culture and of
208 Gilbert Rozman

growing trust based on new interactions, but, most important, were expectations
about relations still on the horizon. These expectations depended not only on
projections of Chinese behavior, but also on anticipation of how one’s own coun-
try would benefit from it. I call this approach, centering on how another country
is perceived in light of thinking about what is essential to one’s own country’s
pride, the analysis of national identity gaps ( Rozman, 2013).
Chinese soft power in Japan reached a peak in the mid-1980s, was still rather
high in the mid-1990s, but fell in the late 1990s, mid-2000s and early 2010s. In
South Korea it reached a peak in the early 2000s and revived in 2013–2015, but
blows to it in 2004–2005, 2008–2010 and 2016 were successively more severe.
Here, I compare perceptions of China in the two, each sharing a Confucian
heritage but allied with the United States, concluding that as China’s hard power
grows, soft power matters less to it.

A framework for analysis of national identity gaps

Study of national identities has become commonplace since the 1980s, but the
way they impact bilateral relations has largely been examined from the point of
one or the other country. Those who examine South Korean anxieties about
China, as in the Koguryo controversy over China’s usurpation of the history of
a founding state of the Korean people, that came to the fore in 2004, explain
how the Koreans saw their national identity challenged ( Rozman, 2011). Many
who follow Chinese anger toward Japan discuss how this fits into the identity
being constructed from above by communist leaders, especially in the 1990s as
a replacement for the traditional communist narrative in disrepute ( Wan, 2013).
Much is said about an upsurge in revisionist historical thinking in Tokyo, espe-
cially under Abe Shinzo, and its deleterious impact on its relations with Seoul
( Rozman, 2016). In 2019 the costs of not addressing such historical gaps were
evident when Seoul so alienated Tokyo that relations were brought to a nadir.
Adding the notion of national identity gaps, I seek to cover both sides of a bilat-
eral relationship and to systematize the linkage between manifestations of iden-
tity on the domestic scene and the impact of national identities on international
relations.
The starting point for a systematic approach is to differentiate multiple dimen-
sions of national identity, making it possible to estimate how each is evolving and
how the other nation in a dyad matters for one’s own national identity. Doing
this for Sino–Japanese and Sino–South Korean relations allows a comparison of
soft power, too. As before, I differentiate six dimensions of national identity:
(1) ideology, which has a strong and growing place in Chinese national identity,
but also is visible in Japan’s revisionist thought and South Korea’s progressive
thought, and, less so, in opposing currents in each of these countries; (2) history
(temporal dimension), seen often in commentaries on bilateral identity disputes;
(3) a sectoral dimension—combining political, economic and civilizational iden-
tity, of which the last is most pertinent; (4) a vertical dimension, which refers to
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 209

state–society relations, including the impact of criticisms of Communist Party

restrictions on civil society, NGOs, and human rights; (5) a horizontal dimen-
sion, concerned with shared thinking on international society, regionalism and
the role of the United States in the world order; and (6) an intensity dimension,
or how strongly attitudes are held ( Rozman, 2012). As identities evolve—seen in
official discourse, media narratives and public opinion—this approach clarifies
soft power.
When we juxtapose perspectives on each of these dimensions in a pair of
countries we shift to consideration of national identity gaps, revealing whether
the divide between the way the two sides are looking at a dimension of identity
and evaluating the other side in that context is growing or declining. A narrow-
ing gap means more acceptance of the other; that is, finding its soft power less
problematic. Japan matters greatly for China’s national identity, and China also
matters a lot for Japan’s and South Korea’s identities, and its significance has been
growing in the most recent decades.
The comparisons center on three points in time: (1) when identity gaps were
least as China’s soft power peaked, (2) when gaps were growing as its soft power
fell and (3) in the late 2010s when the gaps were the widest since normalization
but narrowing somewhat at the end. Japan preceded South Korea in declining
perceptions of Chinese soft power. China has long enjoyed more soft power in
South Korea than in Japan. For each point in time, one can assess soft power—a
composite of identity gaps on multiple dimensions—in comparison to the pre-
vious period and to China’s other neighbor allied with the United States. Soft
power has ebbed since the early 2000s, and it had fallen earlier in Japan, but it
was later falling in South Korea fast.
China had apparently lost interest in soft power, first in Japan and more
recently in South Korea. This happened in stages with an interval of 5 to 10 years
found between the shifts toward these two countries. In 1987 the first-stage
shift occurred to Japan, and around 1997 a similar shift occurred toward South
Korea. In 1994 the second-stage shift occurred toward Japan, followed in 2004
toward South Korea. The third-stage shift came in two rounds: toward Japan in
2005 and, more fully, in 2011; toward South Korea in 2008 and, with full force,
in 2016. These dates are approximate, supported by shifts that are traced in the
sections that follow. Specifying the three stages, what affected the timing and
what accounts for China’s hardening position builds a foundation for drawing
conclusions about why the Chinese priority for soft power was decreasing and
for drawing comparisons that suggest why Japan and South Korea still diverge.
China’s image in South Korea and Japan improved from 2017, perhaps because
of hedging due to Donald Trump’s impact; it did not revert to earlier levels.
In the second half of 2017 Xi Jinping improved relations with Abe Shinzo, as
Japan was more forthcoming on Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, and with the new
leader of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, who offered assurances on some military
activities opposed by China. Both Abe and Moon sought improved ties: to gain
cooperation in pressing North Korea to change course, to bolster popularity at
210 Gilbert Rozman

home and economic ties and to hedge against unpredictable or even threatening
moves by Donald Trump, such as a preemptive military strike on North Korea or
the end to US trade deficits. Yet, Xi, too, saw an opportunity to take advantage
of the need for China’s help and of the Trump effect. To the extent the Japanese
and South Korean publics see a zero-sum relationship between Washington and
Beijing, Trump’s unpopularity could boost China’s soft power, but there was
little sign that China had a strategy to seize on this. Its domestic crackdown and
claims of historical justice did not serve this objective, even if Xi Jinping was
now claiming the mantle of globalization dropped by Trump.

Bilateral national identity gaps when Chinese soft power

was at a peak
China’s soft power peaked in Japan in the late 1980s, slipped in 1989, but remained
rather high in the first half of the 1990s. Its soft power rose from a low level in
South Korea in the late 1980s, kept climbing in the first half of the 1990s, and
then peaked in the early 2000s. Indicative of substantial soft power was a ten-
dency for Japanese and South Koreans to minimize gaps with China in ideol-
ogy, historical memory, their political and economic systems, the character of
state–society relations and plans to achieve regionalism. There was a tendency to
give China the benefit of the doubt, dismissing evidence to the contrary. While
events in China mattered, no less salient were expectations for one’s own coun-
try and how China figured into them.
Japanese officials and public opinion were enamored of China by the late
1970s and grew increasingly so to the mid-1980s. Normalization of diplomatic
relations in 1972 preceded Sino–South Korean normalization by two decades;
economic ties boomed from the end of the 1970s, a decade before the Sino–
South Korean boom began; and the feeling that the Chinese were looking to
Japan more than the United States as a model rose in the early 1980s, also a decade
before Koreans gained the impression their country was becoming a model.
Despite some widening of the gap in 1989, it was rather low during the early
1990s. Explanations center more on Japan’s identity than on China’s since the
gap narrowed while Mao’s Cultural Revolution was ongoing and remained far
lower than in Sino-US relations after the 1989 brutality. Explanations for rising
South Korean approval for China also offer testimony more to Korean identity
than to changes in Chinese identity since the events in 1989 did not lower opti-
mism, nor did rising Sino–US tensions, as China tightened some domestic con-
trols and grew more assertive. A positive image of China met an identity need
in nations that had chafed at the limitations of their status and pride during the
polarized era of the Cold War.
The rise in Chinese soft power can be attributed to three principal factors.
First, the bulk of media coverage of ongoing events in China was optimistic,
expecting better times to come: market openings, political reforms, international
cooperation and, above all, improved bilateral relations. Accelerated improvement
in bilateral ties overshadowed the impact of June 4th. Second, public opinion
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 211

was persuaded that China’s rise was taking place in a favorable regional and
international context, and it that it would lead to that context growing even
more so; economic and security expectations were high, international commu-
nism was collapsing and trade barriers were rapidly falling, but there was con-
fidence, too, in “Asian values” forged outside of China. China’s rise was widely
interpreted as beneficial in the struggle against the domination of US identity,
the pursuit of Asianism in some form and obsession with reconstructing histori-
cal memories and the quest for legitimacy for a unique model of state–society
relations and civilization. Japanese anticipated that China would fall in line with
the “f lying geese” and confirm Japan’s leadership in Asia; South Koreans foresaw
China endorsing its victory against North Korea and enabling reunification.
In the late 1980s Japan and South Korea were each experiencing a spike in
national identity. The news from China was filtered through that prism. The
two main forces were the rush of optimism from Japan’s “economic miracle”
and “bubble economy” and South Korea’s “democratization” and “economic
miracle” on the one hand, and the far-reaching impact of Mikhail Gorbachev’s
“new thinking” on the other. Even if China could not be expected to follow the
same path as the Soviet Union, its reforms along some of the same lines and its
susceptibility to economic blandishments from a neighbor poised to transplant
manufacturing and capital raised high hopes. There appeared to be a perfect fit,
which would enable each in its own way to realize its deepest identity aspira-
tions. Facing growing US pressure over protectionism, both states eyed China
for balance and for assistance in building a civilizational buffer.
The Hu Yaobang–Nakasone bond raised Japanese hopes that China would
not play the “history card,” while boosting youth exchanges with optimism about
the future. After Hu was purged in 1987 amid criticism of being too cozy with
Japan and after troubling 1989 images, satisfaction with Japan’s success in reestab-
lishing summit relations before others in 1991 and then with the emperor’s visit
to China in 1992 gave new impetus to China’s soft power. Negative feedback
was minimized because of high hopes for improving relations helping to realize
Japan’s own identity aims.
Jiang Zemin’s visit to Seoul in 1996 suggested that China was tilting its way,
not insisting on equidistance with Pyongyang. It appeared that economics was
taking command. Jiang sought joint historical criticism of Japan, to which Kim
Young-sam consented, as the Chinese sought joint opposition to Japan’s new
military posture in guidelines taking shape with the United States (Snyder, 2009,
pp. 88–89). In agreeing to China’s soft power on the history issue, South Koreans
revealed a longing for Chinese cooperation versus North Korea and a susceptibil-
ity to playing the “Japan card.” China’s low profile, following Deng Xiaoping’s
dictum of 1992, lulled South Koreans into complacency, ignoring the fact that
China’s policy toward Pyongyang opposed reunification on terms Seoul envi-
sioned and aimed to exacerbate rifts in Japan–South Korea ties (Huan, 1991).
South Korean confidence as North Korea suffered a debilitating famine and
became an international pariah led to the assumption that “unification of Korea
is inevitable. At the moment, chances for economically weak North Korea to
212 Gilbert Rozman

unify on its terms are extremely minimal” ( Lee, 1994, p. 109). The halo of Bei-
jing choosing Seoul while states were abandoning Pyongyang hung heavily over
South Korean thinking, echoed in positive thinking about Beijing not just as
an economic partner but also as a partner whose soft power would be given the
benefit of the doubt in feelings of friendship.
Why did China have such importance in balancing national identity? It had
served as the focus of national identity thinking historically. It is the neighbor-
hood behemoth, casting a deep shadow by its presence and by its distance in iden-
tity from the West. China was seen as vulnerable to leverage in order to achieve
one’s own national identity aspirations: Asianism for Tokyo after decades of awk-
ward fidgeting as part of the West, and reunification for Seoul after decades
stuck in hostility without any sense of normality. Gorbachev opened the door to
dreams long suppressed. Deng Xiaoping offered hope, too, and even his about-
face in June 1989 fueled such dreams. The wider gulf between China and the
United States seemed to offer room for Japan to play a bridging role and for
South Korea to serve as a model for an alternative path to development; both
anticipated that China’s new priority for Asian neighbors rather than the two
superpowers would put their country in the forefront.
As the international environment was changing from 1986, new Japanese rea-
soning about the great powers revealed unexpected distancing from the United
States, hopes for capitalizing in a big way on the transformation of the Soviet
Union and shifting expectations for Sino–Japanese relations ( Rozman, 1992).
The legacy of “friendship” for China—often seeing it through rose-colored
glasses—carried through a shift in rhetoric coming from China toward warnings
about the danger of Japan seeking to become a political and military great power.
Friendly feelings toward China slipped from high levels, but still predominated.
Because its future was indeterminate and it served Japanese ambitions, it loomed
like an opportunity. Guilt toward China, assuaged by massive economic assis-
tance to elicit appreciation, contributed to sympathy. Anti-Americanism was
transferred to pro-Chinese attitudes, while anti-Soviet attitudes (rising to the
late 1980s) had an impact, too. Expectations for regional leadership boosted
hopes for China, as Chinese brief ly toned down criticisms of Japan in the early
1990s. It was not just Japan that would rise; Japan was poised to lead an Asian
renaissance ( Tsunoyama, 1995). Economic complementarity would be boosted
by shared culture (Furuyama, 1994).
China was appealing for at least three reasons. Japanese confidence in the
“f lying geese model” of production networks operating under their country’s
management extended to the latest and biggest “goose,” which, as others, would
recognize the benefits of adhering to normalization agreements reached earlier
(1972, 1978) and leaving historical resentments on the sidelines in official rela-
tions. Japan’s ODA, the transfer of Japanese companies to China through high
FDI, and a sense that the West was trailing Japan in economic integration with
China, boosted anticipation. If more attention had been paid to Chinese sources,
especially internal ones that could be found with some effort, optimism would
have been restrained (Riben wenti ziliao).
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 213

Japan’s optimism rested on a view of Asian history minimizing the impact

of communism in China and Japan’s expansionist legacy in favor of traditional
culture conducive to consensus on “Asian values.” Japan’s hopes for “Asianism”
preceded the gravity of its own decline at a time of resentment against “gaiatsu,”
as if the US enemy replacing the Soviet Union was Japan rather than China.
Japan and South Korea also exaggerated the pressure coming from the United
States in light of accusations of protectionism, responding to US identity gaps by
minimizing gaps with China. The early 1990s saw idealism about a “kanji cul-
tural sphere” (Mizoguchi et al., 1992). Chinese soft power was seen as malleable.
Problematic aspects were dismissed as a fading legacy of communism, anger over
the past as declining with generational change.
Jae Ho Chung closely examined the transformation of relations between Seoul
and Beijing, including in the first half of the 1990s. In addition to booming trade,
South Korean investments and mutual visitors, Chung points to the salience of
feelings about China’s value in reducing the perceived threat from Japan. The
Japanese blamed South Koreans for naive feelings of closeness to China, but they
overlooked the way Japanese statements about history alienated Koreans and led
in that direction. These years were also marked by a lack of concern about a Chi-
nese military buildup and a prevailing sense after 1992 that Sino–North Korean
relations were on the decline (Chung, 2007).

Bilateral national identity gaps as Chinese soft power

was waning
China’s patriotic education campaign targeting Japan in the mid-1990s and dis-
regard of Korean opinion in a historical reassessment of the Koguryo dynasty,
which came into the open in 2004, served internal national identity objectives at
the expense of soft power. They tarnished the images of these countries, blaming
them in order to sharpen consciousness of a distinctive Chinese identity. Japanese
were calling more than ever before for an East Asian regional community, which
China’s leaders feared Japan sought to lead. South Koreans were anticipating
unification on their terms with an isolated, famine-stricken North Korea. The
Koguryo theme cast doubt on the legitimacy of a unified Korea encompassing
the northern part of the peninsula. Japan’s spike in identity in the late 1980s and
regional identity claims in the 1990s gave Chinese reason to denigrate it, draw-
ing on familiar war stories with warnings of their growing relevance. South
Korea’s spike in identity—the poster boy of Asian dynamism before recovering
from the Asian financial crisis with a Sunshine Policy to steer reunification and
regionalism—led China to undermine its legitimacy in regard to North Korea.
Worsening mutual images impacted China’s soft power in Japan, as Jiang
Zemin’s ill-fated visit in 1998 widened the identity gap. An effort was made
in China to reverse this impact—in 1999 “smile diplomacy,” which in 2003
turned into “new thinking”—but this was in vain given leadership priorities and
the aroused emotions of the Chinese public. Then came the 2003–2005 open
arousal of greater distrust. Japanese often drew the wrong lessons from lulls in
214 Gilbert Rozman

criticism, pining for positive messages about Japan as a modernization model (the
1980s), an economic benefactor (the 1980s–1990s), a bridge in new great power
relations (1990s) and a force for shared regionalism (the 1990s-2000s). In stages,
however, Chinese viewed Japan more negatively as pushing for regional political
power, akin to the prewar era; posing a cultural threat with its values; opposing
China’s rise as a threat; and succumbing to historical distortions to revive pre-
1945 militarism. Building identity at Japan’s expense reverberated in Japanese
distrust of China’s soft power. With uncertainty over the Asian financial cri-
sis and greater alarm about US assertiveness, China stressed the importance of
bilateral friendship or mentioned gratitude for Japanese ODA, but the Internet
had already emerged as a fountain of anger over such weakness ( Rozman, 2002).
“New thinking” came too late and with little top-down support, as the last gasp
of soft power versus Japan.
From the Chinese perspective, boosting soft power with Japan had many
benefits. It provided some balance against the United States, as China recognized
that the decline in the remaining superpower was not happening as fast as antici-
pated. It deterred Japan from a more active turn to the alliance while increasing
the chances for regionalism, which China sold to Japan as a “win-win.” There
were economic benefits. International relations experts in China anticipated
greater benefits if the “history card” were set aside with a more positive assess-
ment of postwar Japan and Japan’s big contribution to the ongoing rise of China.
Japan’s political power need not be of much concern either, as its turn to Asia
had the potential to open a big rift with the United States. Michael Green attri-
butes Japan’s persistence in expressing optimism toward China to the appeal of
a special relationship willing to minimize human rights concerns, to keep silent
over Taiwan, and to anticipate an Asian identity, which China in 1999, fearing
worsening Sino–US relations, had encouraged with a softer approach (Green,
2001, pp. 106–109).
With Bush’s unilateralism intensifying in 2002–2003, interest in using Japan
had risen. Yet, public negativity was too aroused, Koizumi’s visits to the Yasu-
kuni Shrine and close ties to Bush were too disturbing, and China’s distorted
narrative on Japan’s history and current affairs was too useful for legitimacy to
sustain “new thinking” (Cohen, 2005).
The Koguryo dispute shook Korean confidence in China, but the pull of
positive thinking could not be denied. President Roh Moo-hyun even suggested
that Seoul could become a balancer in Sino–US relations, as he raised hopes for
reunification with China in a supportive role. Yet, the seeds of distrust planted
when Koguryo hit the headlines grew in 2008 when China turned against Lee
Myung-bak over his foreign policy and spurred a sharp rise in writings blaming
civilizational differences.
Chinese publications on South Korea grew more critical, widening the iden-
tity gap. Sinocentrism crept into the story more and renewed support for North
Korea hinted at socialism as a factor. On the temporal dimension views of suc-
cessive periods in history grew more negative. Reacting to improved South
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 215

Korea–Japan relations, China sided with progressive opponents of Lee Myung-

bak (prior to Lee’s visit to Dokdo in August 2012), who said he was not vigi-
lant in dealing with the collaboration issue and the legacy of Japan’s occupation
( Rozman, 2012a). In civilizational clashes on the Internet, the Chinese charged
that South Koreans claimed Chinese civilizational achievements as their own.
Wang Xiaoling examined how South Koreans view China and Chinese view
South Korea as attitudes were turning more negative from 2008, asking, “Do
Chinese hate South Korea?” ( Wang, 2009). Saying that a majority do not, she
pointed to criticisms of “stealing China’s cultural legacy” as in the Koguryo dis-
pute and the advance showing by a Korean TV station of the Opening Ceremony
of the Beijing Olympics. Acknowledging limited public interest in China in the
“Korean wave,” she stressed, unpersuasively, that “hate Korea feelings” had not
been aroused at all by the Chinese government.
Efforts by Chinese academics to gain a better understanding of images of China
in Japan and South Korea offered guidance on how China can improve its soft
power. Distinguished from the sensationalist writing on Japan and even notably
in 2008–2012 on South Korea aimed at mobilizing public outrage, they straddle
a fine line between scholarship on a high plain and partisanship serving leader-
ship objectives.
A book by Wu Guangwei offers a broad historical sweep of images in Japan,
covering China at different points in time, stressing from the late 1990s the “China
threat” image. The main focus is on negative images, explained as serving the
goals of justifying military development in Japan, enabling it to escape from its
postwar system, following the United States in its containment policy, distract-
ing the Japanese public after years of stagnation and striving to block China from
growing stronger ( Wu, 2010. pp. 151–154). There is no attempt to treat China’s
responsibility or ref lect on Japan’s efforts to find common ground. The era of
neibu publications delving more deeply into foreign policy themes peaked in the
late 1980s, but it never allowed for a far-reaching assessment of policy mistakes
and succumbed to tighter controls.
Another Chinese book is forthright in detailing negative images in South
Korea of China, drawing on textbooks, survey data, a focus group study, and
interviews with experts. It makes a powerful case for improving soft power,
which Zhang Yunling’s introduction urges, emphasizing the need to look squarely
at how others view China and to strive hard, despite the difficulty, to forge a
friendly, respected image. The book is largely in line with his appeal, but its
explanations for Korean attitudes are one-sided, with no criticism of China’s
behavior. The authors stress the big impact of media on the public, but they
explain that fierce market competition leads to extreme coverage, as in the way
the Koguryo history dispute was handled, and they describe the South Korean
public as naturally very emotional and easily aroused, as well as rather ignorant
about the outside world. Its textbooks convey Cold War logic, taking the West-
ern viewpoint and treating China as the communist “other” in an ideological
approach on Tibet and Taiwan, as well as excessive coverage of periods such as
216 Gilbert Rozman

the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Analyzing surveys, the
authors conclude that South Koreans feel superior to China, but they are envi-
ous and do not want China’s development to succeed. Respondents also blame
Chinese for looking down on “little” South Korea. Convinced of South Korea’s
superiority, they are unwilling to accept China’s rise and, except for business
forces, are not optimistic about its impact. Viewing themselves as victims, they
transfer blame for their own faults to the “other.” The book recognizes a huge
gap between Chinese self-perceptions and South Korean views of China and
gives explanations rooted in history, culture and psychology, mainly subjective
in nature. It argues that time will be required for psychologically accepting Chi-
na’s rise. Coverage of bilateral relations as a factor is brief without any attention
to the forces that have mattered (Dong, 2011, pp. 41, 82, 190).
To strengthen Chinese soft power in South Korea, the book calls for more
economic development, so South Koreans will no longer continue to underesti-
mate China’s world rank and focus on disadvantages rather than on opportunities
in economic relations. Yet, the principal problem, as reported, is images of great
inequality, environmental damage and less complementarity between economies
as China becomes more competitive. To meet these concerns China would have
to do more than become an economic colossus to overcome its image problem.
A second piece of advice to China is to provide more positive signals about Sino–
South Korean relations since China is less trusted than the United States, Japan
and even Russia. The following lists in descending order what focus groups said
about the causes of perceived problems in relations: the Sino–North Korean alli-
ance (82% of respondents said China does not support reunification); divergence
over history, especially Koguryo; and the contrast in social systems, indicated by
those who are troubled by China’s socialist system.
A third problem covered at length but absent in advice on what is to be done
is the cultural gap, as seen in the adjectives selected by South Koreans to describe
Chinese, and in the mutual distrust aroused by what Chinese see as Korean
claims to have improved on Confucianism or to have invented cultural festivals
that Chinese regard as their own. Chinese are seen as dirty, arrogant, insensitive
to the feelings of others, and devious or calculating. No mention is made of how
arrogantly China’s leaders treat South Korean leaders or how little recognition
they give to the diversity of Confucianism. In his introduction, Zhang Yunling
warns that China cannot just stress the positive and improve its image. It must
have the self-confidence to look squarely at how others view it and recognize
that it can be seen as scary, a monster swallowing the world. The book, however,
does not develop the warnings raised by Zhang.

Bilateral national identity gaps as Chinese soft power

fell sharply
In 2010–2012 China upped its demonization of Japan. In 2016, it chose to
demonize South Korea. In each case, there were specific causes—a rammed boat
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 217

incident, the pretext of Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, the deci-
sion to deploy the THAAD missiles—but they served a larger purpose for Chi-
nese national identity.
The seemingly irreversible drop in Japanese views of Chinese soft power and
South Korean views of Chinese soft power came amidst conf licts over security.
Yet, the Chinese response to matters deemed for self-defense shocked the public
in Japan and South Korea. All dimensions of national identity were invoked by
the Chinese: warning of an ideological gap; blaming all eras in the other state’s
history; elevating the dispute into a civilizational divide; taking offense at com-
ments on state–society relations with consequences for foreign policy; insisting
that their neighbor is abetting unjust, US hegemonic designs; and also intensify-
ing the existing identity gap. For Japan, there has been little reprieve from this
onslaught, leading to little hope to repair ties, although the second half of 2017
began some amelioration. For South Korea, the downturn is too recent to know
if some reprieve is ahead: progressives are inclined to give China the benefit of
the doubt, given identity gaps with Japan and the United States and desperate
hopes for help with North Korea. Japan sees no way to work with China toward
regionalism in Asia and is left organizing states against China to salvage some
Asianism, while South Korea clings to ideas about cooperating to achieve its
reunification objectives, unwilling to contemplate what would be lost if the
identity gap worsens. Given the alarm over North Korea’s burgeoning threat and
the possibility of Trump taking military action as well as the uncertainty about
Trump’s Asia policies, both Abe and Moon saw a need to reach out to Xi Jinping,
who also saw an opportunity in late 2017 and may have decided that, as he cen-
tralized more power and Trump left a vacuum, he could try his hand at boosting
soft power backed by economic power. Yet, this did not signal a reversal of the
trends that had drawn concern.
Both Japan and South Korea were shocked by China’s disregard of soft power
appealing to their country, but the consequences were different. Fearing a full-
f ledged assault on their national interests and identity, many in Japan came to
see a “China threat.” In the case of Koreans, they tended to blame their own
government or, in the case of the Koguryo challenge, overzealous local Chinese
officials. Driving the debate on Korean identity, progressives have tamped down
alarm over China.
Charging that Abe Shinzo is remilitarizing Japan and breaking the status quo
in the regional order that has long existed, the Chinese justify China’s assertive
behavior as a defensive response to Japan’s new course. Since the late 1980s the
Chinese have warned that Japan has unhealthy ambitions to become a political
and military great power, forging a link between Japan’s past militarism and its
current intentions ( Rozman, 2013). The shift in 2004 from “smile diplomacy”
and then “new thinking” showing understanding of Japan and appreciation for its
post-1945 choices, to charges that Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were
linked to containment of China and fabrication of a “China threat,” accompa-
nied an effort to pressure Japan into Sinocentric regionalism in Northeast and
218 Gilbert Rozman

Southeast Asia. In 2009–2010 demonization of all dimensions of Japan’s national

identity preceded aggressive policies around its borders, with only minor restraint
in 2011 before resuming. There were softer interpretations of Japan’s nature and
intentions, as in the 2006–2008 thaw in relations, but they did not last. Since
2012 the drumbeat of criticism on identity themes has barely paused. The argu-
ment that Abe is driving Japan not only to revised memories about history but
also to a militarized foreign policy threatening to the rise of China has become
a mainstay in Huanqiu shibao, as well as on the Internet. Articles about Japan in
many journals of an academic as well as popular nature echo these sentiments
and amplify in this way alarm about the historical and cultural background of
Japan’s evolution.
A voice of “new thinking,” Ma Licheng wrote in 2015 about talk of reviving
it, saying that without Sino–Japanese reconciliation stability in East Asia is not
possible (Ma, 2015). He said that instead of each country only presenting its own
case and arousing people to behave emotionally, which intensifies the dispute,
helps Japan’s right wing to win, and thus makes China feel threatened, it would
be beneficial for China to convey an image of supporting peace and respecting
international law. Ma supports remembering two histories: the war calamities and
the reconciliation and cooperation as Japan’s postwar mainstream—government
and society—chose the path of peace and war responsibility, with the govern-
ment apologizing 25 times for the war from 1972 to 2008, as found in Chinese
reports. Ma looks back to the more benign statements of Chinese leaders in
2007–2008 for forward-looking ties. However, the Chinese are in no mood to
entertain such recommendations, and Ma’s voice is stif led on social media as
“pro-Japan.” The loss of soft power appears to matter little.
Unlike Japan, where the far right has persistently sought to shift national
identity in defiance of postwar opinion, South Korea has seen alternating calls
for identity to move in one direction or the other. If a strong consensus on iden-
tity matters versus Japan, China is treated more as an identity afterthought in
inverse relationship to identity swings toward the United States or tied to pros-
pects for ties to North Korea. Yet, the mood soured in 2016 as China punished
the nation for deploying THAAD.
Coverage of South Korea is more ambivalent, leaving the door open to find-
ing a way to overcome public suspicions. There is also a reluctance to acknowl-
edge realist attitudes, as if North Korea’s behavior or China’s military rise and
assertiveness are of little or no inf luence. Yet, criticism of national identity
themes comes with an element of possibility that they can be overcome. Japan is
no longer in play. South Korea is.
In January 2014, Chinese officials doubled down on the theme that Abe is
reviving militarism. The issue is less erroneous understandings of history and
more the rise of Japan as a military power bent on treating China as a threat
and joining with the United States in a containment strategy. If Chinese ana-
lysts treated Japan as well as China as a realist state, then they would establish a
foundation for diplomacy aimed at narrowing differences. By glorifying Chinese
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 219

national identity at the same time as they demonize Japan’s national identity, they
are arousing the public and making new attempts at diplomacy more difficult.
Discussion in Japan of the “China threat” has, arguably, been more muted than
that of Japanese “militarism” in China, and is generally couched in terms of the
need for dialogue to narrow differences. Given the Chinese literature on Japan,
there is little sign of a similar inclination unless political change is more drastic
in Japan than observers expect. Demonization is here to stay.
Chinese soft power has been much more successful in South Korea than in
Japan, as seen in 2013–2015 when Xi Jinping cultivated the image of a “hon-
eymoon” with Park Geun-hye. For progressives this followed from the priority
on reunification as well as autonomy versus the United States, but even for con-
servatives supportive of Park it was a response to wishful thinking that China’s
impact was mostly positive, that Sino–US relations were competitive but not
confrontational, that China is not the problem but part of the solution on secu-
rity and economic matters and that Japan is more likely to initiate a security con-
f lict than China. At the root of the problem is a divide between Japanese (mainly
conservatives) who regard China as the biggest threat to their aspirations for a
“normal Japan” and South Koreans (progressives most of all) who regard China
as more positive than negative in realizing their hopes for a “normal Korea.” The
two sides have perceived China through different prisms. Yet, offensive Chinese
moves since 2004 have kept dimming any Korean optimism.
The Genron NPO Poll 2016 sheds light on Chinese soft power in both Japan
and South Korea (Genron, 2016). As for soft power linked to expectations that
China’s inf luence in Asia will grow over the next decade, the percentage who
expect this to occur fell from the previous year from 60.3% to 51.9% in Japan
and from 80.0% to 71.2% in South Korea. The levels are still high, but a sense of
inevitability is falling. Another change was a sharp drop in both China (24.7%
to 18.0%) and South Korea (45.6% to 24.2%) in expectations that South Korea’s
inf luence in Asia will increase. China’s media has portrayed South Korea in a
negative light, as South Koreans note that poor relations with China (and Japan
and North Korea) and domestic problems make it vulnerable. Chinese who see
South Korea as a reliable partner fell from 56.3% to 34.9%; 25% more in 2016 see
it as unreliable. Koreans are still more hopeful about working with China as well
as the United States to achieve a peaceful regional order (27.8% vs. 14.0% percent
in Japan). Japanese worry about China’s intrusions into nearby seas and coercive
actions against the international community rose 20% from 2015. These opinion
polls in the summer of 2016 show deteriorating trust in China, while from late
2017 there were some signs of reversal in these trends.

Conclusion
Chinese social science has little interest in realist or liberal theory. It sticks closely
to constructivist theory, obsessed with national identity manifestations in politi-
cal thought as expressed by leaders and the national media. These writings accept
220 Gilbert Rozman

a top-down view of how identity changes and public opinion is reshaped. More-
over, their simplistic framework posits a sharp dichotomy between what others
would call pacifist Japan and what the Chinese see as militarist Japan. Finding
Abe a useful symbol of the linkage between right-wing extremism and real-
ist internationalism, they dispense with the latter as if it is only a byproduct of
nostalgia for pre-1945 national identity. Abe serves the narrative far better than
Hatoyama did in 2009. For anyone still hoping for common ground on strate-
gic issues, finding a pathway to put historical matters aside or reach an interim
agreement on certain symbols, such a Chinese understanding of Japan makes it
clear that a realist Japan is unacceptable.
China had a golden opportunity to capitalize on Japanese and Korean pro-
gressives’ aspirations for balancing dependency on the United States, pursuing
regionalism in Asia and affirming some version of “Asian values.” There was talk
in the early 2000s that in welcoming an “East Asian community” China would
prioritize soft power with “new thinking” appreciative of Japan and cultural
receptivity to newly popular Korean dramas at a time many Koreans trusted
China. Yet, in allowing the Koguryo issue to fester in 2004 and stif ling the
“new thinking” toward Japan before arousing massive demonstrations against it
in 2005, China cast soft power aside. Again, in a wave of demonization of Japan
and also of South Korea during the “culture wars” of 2008–2010, China paid no
heed to soft power. Finally, under Xi Jinping China has put even more effort into
vilifying its neighbors allied to the United States, doubling down on castigating
Japan and, in 2016, reversing course after the “honeymoon” with Park Geun-
hye for three years. The door has been kept ajar for South Korea in hopes that a
progressive president would change course, but it is closed for Japan.
South Korean responses to China’s efforts to find common cause against Japan
for historical transgressions and a growing drift to the right at times showcased
shared values and served China’s soft power—as in the early response to Abe in
2013—but when Xi Jinping carried this too far in the eyes of many Koreans in
a speech at Seoul National University in July 2014 there was a backlash. The
overlap of thinking about Japan was acknowledged in a joint statement by leaders
in November 1995 (Snyder, 2009, p. 186), and has generally served to keep the
gap narrower with China, but by early 2017 views of Japan had become more
favorable than those of China at a time of strained ties. Discarding soft power as
it wielded enhanced economic and military power, China has alienated Japanese
and South Koreans alike under the spell of a narrow version of Sinocentrism and
a polarized national identity opposed to Western identity, not only in the United
States but in Asian countries contaminated by “universal values.”
China’s soft power in Japan has sunk to an unprecedented low since the 1972
normalization of relations, while its soft power in South Korea had revived some
through 2015 before dropping sharply in 2016. The decline in both cases can be
attributed to a conscious decision in China that other objectives take priority. To
suggest altering the image in Japan by revived “new thinking” or in South Korea
 Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea 221

by capitalizing on the “honeymoon” image encouraged by Park Geun-hye, is

to invite censorship and demonization insistent on the opposite outlook. Geo-
politics may appear to take precedence, but charges that either of these countries
posed a threat to China, however persuasive to Chinese audiences, are concocted
with scant evidence. The Chinese public accepted that Japan has shifted to “mili-
tarization” and poses the greatest threat to start a conf lict in the Asia-Pacific
region (greater than North Korea by 6:1) ( The Asian, 2016, p. 22). Later, it was
persuaded that Seoul’s decision to allow the deployment of THAAD means it has
joined the United States in containing China.
The Trump impact on national identity gaps is worth a treatise of its own.
Suffice it to say that China found new reason to improve relations with Japan,
but the focus was economic and political rather than any buildup of soft power.
With Hong Kong demonstrations giving the Japanese a telling example of how
China was aloof to winning the trust of others, better ties did little to forge trust
in China’s model or its strategic intentions. In the case of South Korea, both Bei-
jing and Seoul were too preoccupied with maneuvering with Pyongyang to pay
much heed to narrowing their identity gap. Xi Jinping in 2019 visited Kim Jong-
un but not Moon Jae-in and continued to pressure South Korea over THAAD
and US alliance ties. Even with US soft power falling, China did little to boost
its own soft power in East Asia.
Since neither Tokyo nor Seoul sought conf lict with Beijing—both prioritiz-
ing North Korea’s threat—the explanation has to be sought apart from geopoli-
tics. China has in mind a different notion of soft power than is customary. It is
Sinocentric, demands deference and respect for China’s political and cultural
preferences, and excludes an orientation deemed “Western.” Viewing respect for
China and the United States in zero-sum terms, Chinese leaders decided that
friendly attitudes from Tokyo and Seoul are insufficient. There did not seem to
be any point wasting energy on boosting soft power except to the extent domes-
tic opposition there can overcome elite attitudes. Whether Xi Jinping, entering
his second term as the party leader in a strong position, is beginning to reconsider
how to use soft power, it is too early to determine and too late to reverse Japanese
and South Korean attitudes.

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12
CHINA’S SOFT POWER OVER
TAIWAN
Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

Between 2008 and 2016, in stark contrast to previous years, China downplayed
the forcible options in its toolbox for unifying Taiwan. Even though it by no
means forwent the possibility of achieving the goal by force, Beijing did empha-
size winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. In other words,
China tried to co-opt rather than coerce Taiwan into its unification agenda.
Moreover, the exchanges were often sweetened by extra concessions made by the
Mainland, in the hope that such “peace dividends” would earn the Taiwanese
public’s willing embrace of unification.
However, China’s experiment with the soft (i.e., non-coercive) elements of
its power seemed to lose traction in the end. The efforts to set a favorable agenda
toward greater cross-Taiwan Strait integration, through a flurry of bilateral agree-
ments in the period between 2008 and 2016, apparently backfired. As the term
of President Ma Ying-jeou, who was more sympathetic to the Mainland than
most Taiwanese politicians were, approached its end, China’s endeavors to bring
the island closer were met with a rising local identity that was exclusively Tai-
wanese, a large-scale youth-led protest against a service trade pact with China
that has since stalled cross-strait integration, and a return to office of the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Why did China’s offers of stability and prosperity in this period fail to attract
the Taiwanese people? The question has theoretical and practical implications.
Explaining conditions that contribute to the ebb and f low of Taiwan’s recep-
tiveness to China’s embrace helps advance our understanding of the sources and
limits of soft power in international politics. More important, drawing lessons
from this past soft power experiment helps clarify options for both Beijing and
Taipei in their future efforts to maintain cross-strait stability and answer the dis-
turbing question: could China again turn to hard power to deal with the island?
In this chapter, we focus on China’s paramount soft power resource over
Taiwan—its economic strength—and propose an argument to explain the variation
224 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

in China’s economic soft power attraction. Admittedly, economic strength situ-

ates in the gray area between hard and soft power. However, economic strength’s
mechanics of hard power—coercion—are distinct from its mechanics of soft
power—influence. Due to Taiwan’s asymmetric economic dependence on China,
the Mainland could use the threat of interrupting the relationship as a coercive
lever. However, as Jonathan Kirshner argues, this is not the only story, and Bei-
jing likely recognizes such exercise of economic power to be self-defeating of its
broader objectives of winning hearts and minds in Taiwan ( Kirshner, 2008, 242).
What Beijing tries to accomplish through its economic soft power attraction
takes place in the mundane—the political inf luence accruing to the bigger trade
partner that Albert Hirschman points out in his seminal work National Power and
the Structure of Foreign Trade. As Taiwan trades more with China in the process of
deeper economic integration, the constellation of interests in the Taiwanese soci-
ety might reshuff le. When more and more economic sectors in Taiwan rely on
China for their prosperity, a growing part of the Taiwanese society will develop
vested interests in a friendly relationship with China (Hirschman, 1980/1945;
Abdelal and Kirshner, 1999–2000). This can accrue political inf luence to Beijing
as societal interests in Taiwan aggregate through domestic political processes and
reshape how the island perceives its collective interests—it will place increasing
value on amicable relations with China and even see its interests as converging
with those of the Mainland.
In other words, through the normal business exchanges, Taiwan’s domes-
tic political coalitions and, in turn, the island’s perceptions of national interests
might be remolded, not by pressure but by economic incentives ( Hirschman,
1980/1945; Kirshner, 2008). Though such political inf luence derives from the
pull of China’s economic gravity instead of the attractiveness of values and cul-
ture that Joseph Nye emphasizes, it still operates through the logic of soft, not
hard, power: getting others to want what you want instead of forcing them to do
what you want them to do ( Kirshner, 2008, pp. 242–243; Abdelal and Kirshner,
1999–2000, pp. 120–121).1 Nye in fact does not rule out this type of soft power
when he claims that co-optive power includes the “ability to manipulate the
agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some
preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic” ( Nye, 2004, p. 7).
We argue China’s soft power work toward Taiwan through economic attrac-
tion seemed to have failed during Ma’s presidency because it has put the cart
before the horse. The logic of soft power starts from building up the attraction
of the wielding country’s soft power resources, and the attraction then leads to
soft power response from the receiving country as it willingly heeds the wielding
country’s preferences.2 China’s ultimate hope is that its soft power attraction will
lead to Taiwan’s soft power response, that is, embracing an agenda of unification.
However, Beijing so far has been demanding the island demonstrate this desired
soft power response, that is, committing to unification one way or another, before
the Mainland’s soft power attraction actually remolds Taiwan’s interests and pro-
duces the desired behavior. Furthermore, Beijing has been imposing its desired
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 225

outcome upon the island by obstructing Taiwan’s economic integration with

countries other than China—denying Taiwan the capacity to act autonomously
in the world to substantiate Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. The
demand and obstruction puts the logic of soft power upside-down. They make
demonstrating favorable soft power response an ostensible (and sometimes genu-
ine) political precondition for Taiwan’s access to China’s soft power resources.
They also make the desire for cross-strait integration seemingly a preference
imposed by Beijing. This blurs the line between attraction and coercion and puts
China’s sympathizers in an awful position—anyone who advocates for closer
relations with China is suspected of kowtowing to Beijing and selling out the
island. It thus becomes difficult to encourage soft power response in Taiwan. As
a result, despite the fact that China’s economic soft power is potentially mighty,
the soft power response it has produced so far remains meager.
In other words, we argue economic soft power must fundamentally come from
free exchanges and others’ voluntary, instead of forced, dependence on a coun-
try. Following this theoretical proposition, we expect the perceived rigidity and
urgency of China’s political precondition and the observed impediments from
the Mainland to Taiwan’s economic integration with others to have negative
impacts on China’s soft power attraction in Taiwan. Rhetorically, the timeline
and format of China’s unification agenda conveyed through Chinese leaders’
statements affect the Taiwanese public’s perception of its stringency. Behavior-
ally, how much China maintains its obstruction to Taiwan’s economic inte-
gration with trade partners other than the Mainland, in the name of its “One
China” principle, also reminds the Taiwanese people of the tightness of Beijing’s
political straitjacket. When Taiwan’s high trade reliance on China is put into the
context of grim prospects for economic integration with others due to Beijing’s
impediments, China’s economic pull to the island becomes forced dependence
imposed by the Mainland. Such forced dependence together with the perceived
political precondition breeds no affection but skepticism toward Beijing’s inten-
tion behind its economic offers and undermines Chinese soft power.
We use Taiwanese people’s attitudes toward economic integration with China
as a proxy for the underlying appeal of the Mainland’s economic soft power.
The premise is that the more people view Beijing’s interests as compatible with
their own, the more likely they would regard China’s economic prosperity with
affection instead of apprehension, and more likely they would favor economic
integration with China.
We argue that during President Ma’s first term, the hope that trade pacts with
China would open the door to economic integration with other trade partners
alleviated the Taiwanese public’s worries about forced dependence on the Main-
land and convinced people to embrace cross-strait integration. In addition, Bei-
jing’s explicit efforts to loosen the form and the urgency of its unification agenda
created an environment more conducive to Taiwan’s soft power response. How-
ever, seeing little progress on diversifying economic relations outside the Main-
land in Ma’s second term, Taiwanese people perceived the island’s condition as
226 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

remaining in forced high dependence on China. Furthermore, Chinese leader-

ship’s rhetoric hinted new urgency in the agenda of unification, raising anxieties
about the Mainland’s economic embrace in some parts of the Taiwanese society.
Such perception of forced dependence on the Mainland and heightened aware-
ness of China’s political precondition led to pushback against cross-strait eco-
nomic integration and undermined Taiwan’s soft power response.
In a nutshell, Joseph Nye carefully distinguishes soft power resources from
soft power responses3 and warns that having a soft power resource is only a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for producing soft power and changing behav-
ior (i.e., producing soft power responses) ( Nye, 2004, pp. 11–12). China’s soft
power work toward Taiwan is a good case in point that vindicates Nye’s caveat.
In what follows, we therefore first identify China’s potential soft power resources
that might produce Taiwan’s behavior of attraction, and then discuss when and
why the soft power resources lead to the desired outcomes or not.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses China’s poten-
tial soft power resources over Taiwan and justifies our focus on economic soft
power. The second section uses the results of the Asian Barometer Surveys and
polls conducted by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to illustrate the
general strength of Mainland China’s economic soft power attraction and the
ebb and f low of such attraction perceived by the Taiwanese public during Ma’s
presidency. The third section f leshes out our theoretical mechanisms. We con-
duct a comparative analysis of the attractiveness of China’s soft power during
President Ma’s first and second term to test our propositions in the fourth sec-
tion. The final section concludes by looking at implications for stability across
the Taiwan Strait.

China’s soft power resources over Taiwan

Given that academic discussion of soft power has been covered in the Introduc-
tion, this chapter focuses on measuring China’s soft power in the practical cross-
Taiwan Strait relations. To operationalize Nye’s concepts of soft power resources,
we refer to the Soft Power 30 index composed by the consultancy firm, Portland,
as a benchmark. The Soft Power 30 index measures a country’s soft power by
its cultural, economic prowess, digital and diplomatic outreach, and political
and educational appeal. The index’s records have underlined that contemporary
China’s attractiveness to the world primarily comes from its economic potency,
apart from its cultural attraction.
More than any cases in the rest of the world, China’s soft power lure to Tai-
wan needs to mostly come from its economic strength rather than culture or
other resources. The island not only shares the same Chinese culture with Main-
land China but arguably preserves the culture more consistently—Taiwan was
spared from the destruction of traditional elements in the culture and soci-
ety that China suffered during the Cultural Revolution. Other than economic
and cultural attraction, China’s soft power allure to Taiwan is anemic in other
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 227

categories identified by the Soft Power 30 index. From Taiwan’s perspective,

China’s diplomatic outreach represents a zero-sum competition, instead of coop-
erative engagement, in the international community. Through its territorial
claim over the island, China’s illiberal political system poses a threat to Tai-
wan’s democratic society and contributes to what former President Ma Ying-
jeou called the “psychological distance” across the Taiwan Strait (Gracie, 2015).
Also, China’s schools are hardly Taiwanese youth’s top destinations for higher
education per se.4
Surveys by Taiwan’s United Daily News on young Taiwanese people’s attitudes
toward China vindicate the above evaluation. In 2016, 82.8% of respondents
regarded China as economically advanced, up from 53.6% in 2000. As a result,
40% of Taiwanese youth were willing to work in China in 2016, an increase
of 5 percentage points from the year 2000. These results of relatively high por-
tions of positive attitudes and upward moving trends revealed China’s soft power
attraction to Taiwanese youth based on its economic strength. However, in 2016,
only 11.5% of respondents were willing to immigrate to China (a drop of almost
7 percentage points from 2000) and only 18.7% were inclined to study there.
The reason for the contrasting outcomes may be summarized by a question in
the survey: when asked whether they thought the Chinese on the mainland
were civilized, only 15.8% of Taiwanese youth responded positively in 2016. In
2000, the ratio was in fact higher at 23.9%. In other words, apart from economic
potency, China’s soft power resources broadly lacked attractiveness in Taiwan
(UDN Survey Center, 2016).

Taiwan’s soft power attraction to China

As Nye points out, and analogous to the mechanics of Hirschmanesque inf lu-
ence,5 soft power resources often work indirectly by shaping a favorable policy
environment in another country that makes it easy or even natural to adopt
policies preferred by the country wielding soft power ( Nye, 2004, p. 99). To
paraphrase Nye, friendly foreign leaders may have more leeway if their publics
and parliaments have a positive image of the soft power–wielding country and
its policies ( Nye, 2004, p. 105). It follows naturally that whether a particular
asset is a soft power resource that produces attraction can be measured by asking
people’s opinions on the appeal of the resource and the attraction of the wielding
country’s policy goals through opinion polls ( Nye, 2004, p. 6).
However, if we measure China’s economic soft power over Taiwan by how
much China’s charm offensive has made the Taiwanese people re-embrace a Chi-
nese identity or the idea of unification—two indicators that are closely related
to China’s ultimate goals—China’s soft power experiment during Ma Ying-
jeou’s presidency had little positive effect. Surveys by Taiwan’s MAC showed
that between March 2008 and August 2016 Taiwanese people who supported
“immediate unification” or “the status quo for now and unification in the future”
had together stayed at around 10% of the population. That means China’s soft
228 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

power work had failed to co-opt more Taiwanese people onto its agenda (Main-
land Affairs Council, 2016). In addition, polls conducted by the Election Study
Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University showed that respondents who
had an exclusive Taiwanese identity had grown from 48.4% in 2008 to 59.3%
in 2016. Meanwhile, those who identified themselves exclusively as Chinese or
inclusively as both Taiwanese and Chinese had together decreased from 47.1%
to 36.6% ( Election Study Center, 2016). In other words, China’s soft power
work did not forge an identity in Taiwan that might be conducive to the goal of
unification.
That said, forging identity or promoting political integration sets a high
bar for soft power responses and should not be considered as the only yardstick
with which to measure China’s soft power. Intuitively, the prospect of jump-
ing on Mainland China’s economic bandwagon toward more prosperity should
impact people’s views on cross-strait economic integration. To move from hav-
ing a positive attitude toward economic integration to creating (or re-creating)
a common identity and/or an inclination toward political integration, however,
is a prolonged process—it took European Union member states several decades
from the early 1950s to build up a European identity. Therefore, using Taiwan-
ese people’s identity to measure the effectiveness of China’s recent economic
soft power work constitutes several conceptual leaps and may in fact hinder a
nuanced understanding of China’s soft power over Taiwan.
Given that China’s economic strength grew exponentially after the country
joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and that Ma’s election brought a
receptive leader into power in Taiwan in 2008, the PRC was able to fully experi-
ment with its economic soft power toward the island only recently between 2008
and 2016. We thus should realistically measure China’s soft power attraction by
Taiwanese people’s perception of China’s economic prowess in this period. In
the same vein, we should measure Taiwan’s soft power responses by the people’s
attitudes toward cross-strait economic integration, instead of political integra-
tion or identity. Therefore, we use the Taiwanese public’s opinions on vari-
ous facets of China’s economic strength and cross-strait economic integration as
proxies for the underlying appeal of the Mainland. The premise is that the more
people view Beijing’s interests as compatible with their own, the more likely they
would view the economic power of China and economic integration with the
Mainland favorably.
The focus on the Taiwanese people’s attitudes toward economic integration
also has an empirical basis. According to the Asian Barometer Surveys (ABS), in
2010 (the ABS Third Wave), 67% of Taiwanese people considered China as the
most inf luential country in Asia, and 82% of them thought China would be the
most inf luential country in Asia in ten years. In 2014 (ABS Fourth Wave), these
ratios stayed roughly the same at 63% and 80%, respectively. More strikingly,
67% of the Taiwanese respondents in 2010 and 63% in 2014 regarded China’s
impact on the region to be positive. Even though Taiwanese people were acutely
aware of the stark contrast between China’s illiberal political system and their
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 229

democracy,6 that did not prevent them from having a favorable view of China’s
regional inf luence.
Our discussion above and quantitative analysis of the ABS data in the literature
make it clear that it is predominantly China’s role as an economic locomotive that
drives the Taiwanese people’s positive perception of Beijing’s regional impact.
Correlation analyses based on the ABS Third Wave data found that, in East Asia,
people with greater perceived democratic distance between their country and
China were more likely to view China’s inf luence negatively. Meanwhile, people
with a more sanguine assessment of their domestic (both household and country-
wide) economic conditions were more likely to view China’s inf luence positively.
The latter opinions underlined the high-level interdependence between China’s
prosperity and individual neighboring countries’ economic prospects widely per-
ceived by the people in East Asia (Chu, Kang and Huang, 2014, pp. 409–413).
Therefore, the favorable perception of China’s regional inf luence held by the
majority of the Taiwanese people, in spite of the Mainland’s illiberal political
system and irredentist claim over the island, highlights China’s soft power attrac-
tion for Taiwan generated by its economic strength.
Figure 12.1 zeroes in on the Taiwanese public’s attitudes toward cross-strait
economic relations. Between 2008 and 2016, the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s
approach to cross-strait exchanges was “economics first, politics later,” which was
accepted by Beijing.7 The 23 cross-strait agreements signed during this period thus
focused primarily on economic issues, including the cross-strait Economic Coop-
eration Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the agreements on transportation,
finance, investment, tax, trade in services, etc. Therefore, the opinions surveyed
in this period primarily ref lected Taiwanese people’s attitudes toward institu-
tionalized economic exchanges and economic integration with the Mainland.
Figure 12.1 shows that when cross-strait exchanges stalled, as under Ma’s
predecessor Chen Shui-bian before May 2008 and under Ma’s successor Tsai
Ing-wen after May 2016, Taiwanese people became noticeably impatient about
the pace of cross-strait exchanges—significantly more respondents thought the
speed of cross-strait exchanges was too slow than those who thought it was too
fast.8 During the period of stable and constant progress of cross-strait economic
exchanges between 2008 and 2016, people’s attitudes showed another interest-
ing pattern. The Taiwanese public tended to feel an increasing need to put the
brakes on cross-strait economic integration in the lead-up to the conclusion of
major economic agreements. In contrast, during the hiatus after the signing of a
major agreement and before the emergence of new negotiations on the next one,
people switched attitudes and hoped to maintain the current pace of progress.
The uneven attitudes toward cross-strait economic integration provide empir-
ical leverages to investigate our propositions on Taiwan’s soft power attraction
to China. Such variation in attitudes was particularly noticeable around the time
of the crucial cases of the ECFA and the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
(CSSTA). In mid-2009 after Taiwan explicitly proposed to negotiate a cross-strait
trade agreement, gradually more and more people felt the need to slow down
230 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

May 20, 2008 June 29, 2010 Aug 9, 2012 May 20, 2016
60.0% President ECFA signed Taiwan and China President
Ma Ying-jeou announced they Tsai Ing-wen
took office planned to finalize took office
50.0% services trade agreement

40.0%

30.0%
Feb 22, 2009
June 21, 2013
MOEA announced
Services trade
Taiwan
20.0% agreement signed
is pushing for ECFA

10.0% Mar 2014

Sunflower
Movement
0.0%
Mar-08

Aug-08

Oct-08

Dec-08

Apr-09

Sep-09

Dec-09

May-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Apr-11

Sep-11

Nov-11

Mar-12

Aug-12

Nov-12

Mar-13

Jul-13

Dec-13

Mar-14

Jul-14

Dec-14

Mar-15

Jul-15

Nov-15

Mar-16

Aug-16
Just Right Too Fast Too Slow

FIGURE 12.1 People’s views on the speed of cross-strait exchanges

cross-strait integration, and the proportion peaked around the time the ECFA
was signed in June 2010. After that, the ratio of respondents who felt cross-strait
exchanges were proceeding too fast dropped, until August 2012 when Taiwan
and China announced their plan to finalize the CSSTA. Between August 2012
and the signing of the CSSTA in June 2013, the proportion of people wanting
to slow down cross-strait economic integration gradually increased. Then again,
after the signing of the CSSTA in June 2013, the larger trend was a decreasing
proportion of people who thought cross-strait exchanges were too fast, though
two significant deviations in survey results occurred in December 2013 and July
2014. We will explain the two deviations later, but the second deviation resulted
from a poll that still captured the aftershocks of the youth-led Sunf lower Move-
ment in March 2014.9 After the Sunf lower Movement, cross-strait economic
integration basically stagnated, and the proportion of people who thought the
speed of cross-strait exchanges was too fast dropped. Interestingly, the share of
respondents who wanted to speed up the exchanges gradually increased.
From the generally positive perception of China’s impact in the region to the
fact that, whenever cross-strait exchanges stalled, the Taiwanese public hoped to
see progress, we can observe China’s (economic) soft power attraction for Tai-
wan. However, whenever cross-strait economic integration indeed proceeded
ahead, Taiwanese people’s anxieties observably arose and worked counterpro-
ductively to China’s wish of producing soft power responses in Taiwan. The
anxiety eventually compounded with other sources of discontent with the Ma
administration to lead to the Sunf lower Movement and grind the progress of
cross-strait economic integration to a halt. The Sunf lower Movement sounded
the death knell for China’s soft power experiment under Ma Ying-jeou’s tenure.
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 231

The apparent outcomes of the experiment were reactions in Taiwan totally con-
trary to the soft power responses China would like to produce. So, what went
wrong with China’s soft power work toward Taiwan?

Political preconditions, forced dependence and Taiwan’s

anxieties about China’s embrace
China’s economic attraction so far has not been able to bring about Taiwan’s
soft power response that Beijing desires because China’s soft power work toward
Taiwan has been on a self-defeating path. The logic of soft power starts from
building up the attraction of the initiator’s soft power resources, which then
leads to soft power responses of the target in the manner that it willingly heeds
to the initiator’s preferences out of reshaped and converging interests or a sense of
affection ( Kirshner, 2008; Nye, 2004). However, China’s soft power operations
toward Taiwan have turned the whole logic upside down.
A historical survey of China’s soft power work over Taiwan makes it clear that
China has ostensibly put up a political precondition for its soft power options.
China’s soft power attempts toward Taiwan can be traced back to as early as the
“Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (the Message, hereafter), issued on Janu-
ary 1, 1979, when Deng Xiaoping held the reign. His successors, Jiang Zemin
and Hu Jintao, followed suit and had their Eight-Point Proposal in 1995 and Six
Proposals in 2008, respectively, to guide China’s peaceful unification agenda in
the following eras.10
From the Message to Hu’s Six Proposals, some noticeable trends in China’s
soft power work toward Taiwan emerged. First, China struggled to maintain
Taiwan’s sense of belonging to the Chinese nation. The Message was full of
emotional calls to Chinese national feelings, but Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao,
working against a backdrop of an emerging Taiwanese identity, had to resort
to more explicit cost-benefit calculation on the Taiwanese side. Second, and
related to the above trend, as China moved from an economic backwater to
an economic powerhouse and as Taiwan’s Chinese consciousness became more
and more remote, economic attraction featured more and more prominently in
China’s soft power work. Third and more important, against the backdrops of
Taiwan’s democratization and the emergence of indigenous voices of Taiwan
independence as viable political forces, the “One China” principle has become a
prominent precondition for the PRC to maintain a soft power course toward the
island. Jiang’s Eight-Point Proposal began by stating that insisting on the One
China principle was the precondition of realizing peaceful unification. Hu’s Six
Proposals also first and foremost emphasized that the position that Taiwan and
the Mainland belong to the same one China was a critical precondition of the
PRC’s soft power work. As Chinese leaders love to assert, the One China prin-
ciple is the basis of peaceful development of cross-strait relations.
In other words, accepting Beijing’s One China principle one way or another
is the apparent prerequisite for China’s soft power options to come into play.
232 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

Therefore, despite in reality China did not always, and certainly not across-the-
board, interrupt cross-strait economic relations even when a pro-independence
government ruled the island, China has nominally demanded Taiwan demon-
strate the desired soft power response, that is, committing to Beijing’s agenda of
unification (or the notion of one China), before the PRC’s soft power resources
build up their attraction. This precondition blurs the line between attraction
and coercion because when accepting China’s demands seemingly preconditions
access to soft power resources, anything that might build up affection looks like
carrots of enticement that can be forfeited to punish disobedience. The demand
also makes anyone who advocates for friendly attitudes toward China look like
a fifth column working for China’s interests. It thus becomes challenging to
encourage soft power response in Taiwan. In a nutshell, as Nye cautions in his
seminal work that having soft power resources is not a sufficient condition for
producing soft power response and that context is the key, China’s political pre-
condition has poisoned the context of China’s soft power attraction for Taiwan
( Nye, 2004, pp. 11–12).
Our argument of the counterproductive effects of China’s upside-down soft
power operation implies that it matters whether China rhetorically and behav-
iorally put up this One China political precondition at all and in what format the
political precondition was described and enforced. We should expect to see when
China is less rigid about its political precondition, its economic attraction is more
pronounced. On the contrary, when China intentionally or unintentionally
highlights its political objectives as preconditions, its economic strength creates
anxieties and resistance that are counterproductive to soft power attractiveness.
Accordingly, in rhetoric, how China states the urgency and priority of its
political aims in relation to cross-strait economic exchanges, and in what form of
the One China principle that Beijing asserts, would make a difference. The soft
power response that China looks for is Taiwan’s embrace of national unification.
If we view this political objective from a spectrum of formats, its softest end is a
very vague form of a Chinese nation where Taiwan has great latitude to decide
its relations with this Chinese nation. On the hardest end, it is unification on the
PRC’s terms where Taiwan has no options but to be deprived of any autonomy
and become a local administration of the PRC. China’s “One Country, Two
Systems” formula for unification, and the pre-2000 One China principle this
formula connotes, which stated “there is only one China in the world; the PRC
is the only legitimate government representing China; and China’s territory and
sovereignty cannot be separated,” is close to the hardest end. After 2000, Beijing
revised its One China principle to be “there is only one China in the world; both
Taiwan and the Mainland belong to this one China; and China’s territory and
sovereignty cannot be separated.” This is a softer form compared to the previous
one because becoming a part of the PRC is no longer the only form one China
can take. The KMT’s preferred term “1992 Consensus,” which states that there
is only one China, and the two sides each interpret this one China as they see fit,
is softer still. From the KMT’s perspective, the 1992 Consensus implies that two
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 233

governments now exist under the rubric of China, where the Republic of China
on Taiwan should enjoy the same full entitlements as the PRC on the Mainland
does, at least until the unification of the nation. The harder the format Beijing
conveys, the more rigid its political precondition is perceived in Taiwan.
In behavior, whether China relieves its constraint on Taiwan’s integration
with the rest of the world, measured by the island’s ability to negotiate free
trade agreements (FTAs) with third-party countries without China’s obstruc-
tion, will also impact Taiwanese people’s perception of the rigidity of China’s
political precondition. Economic integration typically encourages participating
countries to trade more with each other and leads the smaller economy to have
higher trade concentration, or dependence, on the larger one due to their huge
difference in economic sizes. Such dependence is natural and less threatening
when the smaller economy is free to pursue economic integration with the rest
of the world to balance the asymmetric dependence. For that reason, the attrac-
tion of economic integration with China needs to be put into the context of
Taiwan’s overall level of economic integration in the world. When China blocks
Taiwan’s pursuance of FTAs with other countries under the name of its One
China principle, economic integration with China turns into forced dependence
on China. Consequently, the co-optive power of economic integration can be
easily perceived as coercive power orchestrated through forced dependence and
thus court pushback.

Explaining China’s soft power (or lack thereof) over Taiwan

To empirically validate our arguments, we look into various opinion polls con-
ducted by Taiwan’s MAC. During its first term, the Ma Ying-jeou administra-
tion’s primary selling point of cross-strait economic integration was that a trade
agreement with China would open the door to trade agreements with other
countries. The majority of the Taiwanese public at that time bought the argu-
ment, which helped temporarily alleviate concerns about China’s political pre-
condition. According to a MAC poll in April 2009, 60.3% of Taiwanese people
agreed that signing the ECFA with China would help Taiwan’s efforts in reach-
ing FTAs with other countries (while 24.8% disagreed). In the same survey,
when asked right after this question (probably intentionally to cue the answer)
whether it was necessary to sign the ECFA, 70.0% of respondents answered posi-
tively, while only 23.5% responded negatively (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009).
The same question on the linkage between the ECFA and Taiwan’s chances on
other FTAs was asked again in a MAC poll in July 2010 (right after the ECFA
was signed), and 62.6%, an even higher percentage of respondents than that of
the previous survey, bought the idea that ECFA would help Taiwan negotiate
other FTAs (while 25.9% did not) (Mainland Affairs Council, 2010b). A related
question was asked in another MAC poll in April 2010, and 57.4% of Taiwanese
respondents agreed that cross-strait economic and trade exchanges and nego-
tiations would help Taiwan’s economic development in Asia and in the world
234 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

(while 27.8% disagreed) (Mainland Affairs Council, 2010a). In other words, the
prospect of more economic integration with the world subdued perceived politi-
cal constraints imposed by the Mainland and enabled the majority in Taiwan to
embrace cross-strait integration during Ma’s first term.
It is also noteworthy that during this period, in rhetoric, China was rel-
atively muted in asserting its political precondition of cross-strait exchanges.
Right after Ma’s successful election in March 2008, Hu Jintao told US Presi-
dent George W. Bush in a telephone conversation that “it is China’s consistent
stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and
talks on the basis of the ’1992 Consensus.’” The phone conversation was then
publicized by China’s official Xinhua News Agency in its English reports, indi-
cating that the press release was vetted by the authorities ( Xinhua, 2008a). As
discussed earlier, the 1992 Consensus was a much softer form of Beijing’s One
China principle. More significantly, Xinhua explicated the Consensus as that
“both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its defini-
tion,” a stand that the KMT emphasized but the CCP hitherto never endorsed.11
Mentioning the differentiated definitions was probably a signal too subtle, but
endorsing the 1992 Consensus was a gesture too significant to be ignored by the
Taiwanese public, and it showed Mainland China’s intention in general to down-
play its political precondition at that time. In addition, the PRC refrained from
mentioning the “One Country, Two Systems” formula for unification after Ma
took office, alleviating the Taiwanese public’s perceived rigidity and urgency of
China’s political goals. Beijing’s subdued rhetoric on unification, together with
the prospect of broader economic integration with the world mentioned above,
helped create an environment conducive to the Ma administration’s push for
cross-strait integration. The Taiwanese public’s embrace of Ma’s agenda, particu-
larly the ECFA, manifested Taiwan’s soft power response.
However, halfway through Ma’s second term, Taiwan had only made mar-
ginal progress on economic integration with countries other than China. The
argument that integration with the Mainland was a gateway to integration with
the world began to lose its luster. In December 2013, during the lead-up to the
(failed) ratification of the CSSTA, a MAC poll found that only 51.6% of Tai-
wanese respondents thought signing the agreement would help Taiwan reach
economic and trade agreements with other countries (while 28.6% thought oth-
erwise). In comparison with the time when the Ma administration was promot-
ing the ECFA in April 2009, this represented a drop of almost 9 percentage
points in the support of the agenda of using integration with China to open
the door to integration with the rest of the world, and the difference is statisti-
cally significant ( p < 0.001).12 It is also noteworthy that the drop was substan-
tial despite strong positive cues embedded in the survey question. The question
reads as follows: “In June this year, after signing the cross-strait service trade
agreement, Taiwan signed similar economic and trade cooperative agreements
with New Zealand ( July) and Singapore (November). Do you think signing the
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 235

CSSTA is conducive to Taiwan’s signing economic and trade cooperative agree-

ments with other countries or not?” Arguably, such a lead-in sentence should
strongly sway people’s responses positively, but the survey results still showed
lukewarm support for the idea. Correspondingly, the support for the CSSTA was
only 45.7%, while the opposition was not far behind at 40.4% (Mainland Affairs
Council, 2013).
Counterfactually, were China to allow Taiwan a freer hand in negotiating eco-
nomic integration with other countries, would the situation have been different?
In a MAC poll in July 2014, 59.8% of the respondents agreed that if Taiwan could
successfully negotiate economic and trade cooperation with other countries
and participate in regional economic integration, people’s confidence in cross-
strait economic and trade liberation would increase (while 22.2% disagreed).
In December 2014, the same survey question again got affirmative responses
from the majority (61.3% of respondents agreed while 20.2% disagreed). In other
words, people were mindful of Taiwan’s forced dependence on China. The dis-
appointing progress and dim prospect for economic integration with major trade
partners other than China became evident in Ma’s second term and brought back
the specter of Beijing’s political straitjacket. As our proposition expects, China’s
economic embrace created suspicion in this situation and discouraged Taiwan’s
soft power response that China desired.
Meanwhile, China’s rhetoric was not reassuring either. On the sidelines of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in October 2013, Chinese
President Xi Jinping told Vincent Siew, Ma’s envoy to the meeting, that the cross-
strait political divide must step by step reach a final resolution and could not be
passed on from generation to generation. Xi further asserted that the two sides
should begin equal consultations on political issues under the framework of one
China ( Xinhua, 2013). Xi’s statements raised eyebrows in Taiwan and height-
ened a sense of Beijing’s renewed urgency to push for its political agenda.13 The
resulting anxiety in Taiwan led to a jump in people’s desire to slow down cross-
strait integration, which was captured in a December 2013 opinion poll. The
sentiment explained the deviation mentioned in the earlier section in the gen-
eral trend of wanting to continue cross-strait economic exchanges. Also at the
APEC summit, Taiwan and Mainland China’s top officials in charge of cross-
strait affairs, the chiefs of Taiwan’s MAC and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office
(TAO), respectively, made their historic first meeting. That was followed by
the MAC minister’s first ever visit to Mainland China in February 2014. For
people who were wary of China’s political straitjacket, Xi’s statement at APEC
and the meetings between MAC and TAO were alarmingly hasty pushes toward
political negotiations.14 Together with Ma’s several remarks during this period
such as proclaiming that cross-strait relations were not “international” relations
in his National Day speech on October 10, 2013, which seemingly succumbed
to China’s political precondition, part of the Taiwanese society was galvanized
to utter opposition to further integration with China.15 These people grabbed
236 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

the opportunity of the KMT’s clumsy handling of the ratification of the CSSTA
and combined efforts with other forces dissatisfied with the Ma administration
for other reasons to instigate the Sunf lower Movement in March 2014. As one
interviewee said, the CSSTA was not the primary concern of the Sunf lower
Movement. Rather, it was a surge of anxiety about China’s political precondition
behind its economic embrace that set the movement in motion. The Sunf lower
Movement ground the ratification of the CSSTA to a halt and, more important,
brought China’s active soft power experiment during Ma’s presidency to an end.
To sum up, China’s lack of soft power over Taiwan resulted from its opera-
tion that put the political objective cart before the economic soft power horse.
To allow its economic attraction to fully develop into a soft power resource
and attract the Taiwanese public to embrace its agenda of cross-strait economic
integration and hopefully unification, China needed to downplay its political
precondition. Beijing also needed to refrain from using its One China principle
to obstruct Taiwan’s deeper economic cooperation with other trade partners.
However, China faced a dilemma in its charm offensive aimed at Taiwan.
China worried that were the Taiwanese government’s external legitimacy to be
strengthened by greater economic integration with other countries, the island
would be in a better position to resist the Mainland’s political agenda. Given
the CCP’s reliance on nationalist credentials for legitimacy, the ruling regime
in Beijing could not afford to be f lexible on its political precondition. There-
fore, China refused to give Taiwan a free hand to negotiate FTAs with the rest
of the world and frequently demanded political leaders in Taiwan recommit to
Beijing’s political prerequisite. Such conduct was counterproductive because it
highlighted the preferences and constraints that China imposed on the island.
It also fed the Taiwanese public’s suspicion of and resistance to China’s agenda,
undermining China’s soft power over Taiwan that might result from its eco-
nomic attractiveness.
The dilemma certainly ref lected China’s lack of confidence in its soft power
attraction for Taiwan, but more important, it ref lected the limit of soft power—
because it was “soft,” the outcome was much less certain than the exercise of hard
power. Given the heavy doses of nationalism that the PRC had been feeding
its population through patriotic education ( Dickson, 2004), the salience of the
Taiwan issue in the CCP’s conception of nationalism (Shirk, 2007, pp. 181–211),
and the reliance of the CCP on nationalism for its legitimacy (Garver, 2015,
pp. 349–351, 476–482), Beijing could not leave Taiwan’s unification with the
motherland simply to chance. China’s hesitance to count solely on soft power for
its work on Taiwan was thus understandable.

Conclusion
In this chapter, we argue that China’s soft power attraction for Taiwan gen-
erated by its economic strength is potentially mighty, but the soft power
response that China’s attraction has produced in Taiwan remains meager. We
 China’s soft power over Taiwan 237

attribute the lackluster outcome of China’s soft power work in Taiwan to

Beijing’s self-defeating operation of its economic soft power. China demands
the island show the preferred soft power response, that is, committing to a
form of one China acceptable to Beijing, before its soft power resources build
up attraction. This turns the soft power logic on its head and blurs the line
between attraction and coercion. When accepting China’s demands seemingly
preconditions access to soft power resources, anyone sympathetic to China is
suspected of selling out Taiwan, and this discourages instead of encourages
soft power response. Unfortunately, as long as the CCP regime on Mainland
China relies on nationalist credentials for its legitimacy, and as long as Taiwan
is an inextricable element of the CCP’s nationalist narrative, it is difficult for
Mainland China to let soft power fully develop in its relations with Taiwan.
Looking over the longer run, for the Chinese leadership, Taiwan’s eventual
political integration with the PRC is not an option but a core interest that
must be secured. That means, since the CCP cannot achieve this goal through
exercising soft power as long as it is unwilling to leave to chance an issue so
critical to its regime legitimacy, a return to hard power to handle cross-strait
relations is probably inevitable.

Notes
1 This is also different from the so-called sharp power, which refers to China’s use of
lucrative benefits to influence international views to the favor of China and suppress
expression of opinions that go against China’s interests. See Walker and Ludwig (2017).
2 In his seminal work, Joseph Nye calls a receiving state’s favorable response to the wield-
ing country’s soft power attraction “soft power behavior.” We use the term “soft power
response” in place of Nye’s “soft power behavior” to make the meaning a bit more
straightforward.
3 Just to remind readers again, in Nye’s original text, he uses the term “soft power behav-
ior,” but we use “soft power response” to make what we mean more straightforward.
4 Recent surveys in late 2017 and early 2018 showed that Taiwanese youth have become
increasingly willing to study in China, but the incentives came primarily from practical
economic considerations, such as job prospects in China and Beijing’s offers of pref-
erential measures. In other words, the attraction resulted fundamentally from China’s
economic strength, not quality of education per se. See UDN Survey Center (2017),
Lin (2018) and Peng (2018). The People’s Daily, in its overseas version, also attributed
this surging interest to China’s preferential measures for Taiwanese rolled out at the end
of February 2018. See Li and Niu (2018).
5 The term “Hirschmanesque influence” is adopted from Abdelal and Kirshner (1999–2000).
6 Taiwanese people’s perceived democratic distance between their country and China,
which was calculated by taking the difference between where one places Taiwan on a
ten-point scale of democratic development (where 1 represents “completely undemo-
cratic” and 10 “completely democratic”) and where one puts China on the same scale,
was among the greatest in East Asia. Data from Yun-han Chu, “How East Asians View
a Rising China,” presentation at Harvard University, September 2015, and Chu, Kang
and Huang (2014, p. 411).
7 The authors’ interview with a KMT party official working on this issue area during the
period.
8 The latest MAC survey outcomes in January 2017 maintained the pattern: 34.7% of the
respondents considered the pace of cross-strait exchanges too slow, while only 12.8%
238 Dalton Lin and Yun-han Chu

considered them too fast. The survey also showed the narrowest gap since March 2008
between those who thought the pace was just about right and those who thought it was
too slow (37.6% to 34.7%). For the first time, the difference was within the margin of
error (2.99%), further vindicating our argument that when cross-strait exchanges stalled,
the Taiwanese public became impatient about the pace. See www.mac.gov.tw/public/
Attachment/71191756591.pdf (accessed on February 15, 2017).
9 The Sunflower Movement was instigated in the first place by protests against the
attempted ratification of the CSSTA. The MAC conducted its March 2014 poll between
March 7 and 10, when the Sunflower Movement had not yet fully blown up.
10 To view the English version of the document “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,”
see http://german.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7943.htm (accessed on November 11,
2019). To view the English version of Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal, see Jiang
(1995). To view the English version of Hu Jintao’s Six Proposals, see Hu (2008).
11 In a typical tactic of distinguishing domestic audience from international audience, Xin-
hua’s Chinese report on the same phone conversation did not explicate that the two
sides agree to differ on the definition of one China. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/
tw/2008-03/26/content_7865604.htm
12 The p-value is based on a two-tailed z-test of proportions comparing the approval
percentages.
13 Observers in China, Taiwan and the United States in general considered Xi’s statement
as renewed pressure on Taiwan to engage in talks on political issues. See for example
Enav (2013), Areddy and Hsu (2013) and Ng (2013).
14 Authors’ interview with a senior DPP official.
15 Authors’ interviews, and see Chen and Hsu (2013) for contemporary analyses on the
rising disapproval of China’s political objective (i.e., unification), or in other words,
behavior contrary to China’s desired outcomes of its soft power work, in several survey
results.

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13
FAMILIARITY BREEDS
CONTEMPT
China’s growing “soft power deficit”
in Hong Kong

David Zweig

Hong Kong–Mainland relations as a special case

of soft power
In all other cases in this book, soft power refers to the acceptance of the social,
political, cultural and/or moral values of one state by officials or citizens of a
second state who, as a result of the former state’s soft power, accede to its foreign
policy preferences without coercion or the use of force.
In this chapter we are assessing the ability of China’s Central Government (CG)
to persuade the Hong Kong government (HKG), members of Hong Kong’s leg-
islature (Legco), and, most important, Hong Kong citizens residing in a region
of China whose norms and laws differ significantly from the dominant rules and
values in the national system, to accept the CG’s policies for Hong Kong and to
privilege the CG’s interests in Hong Kong without Beijing resorting to coercion.
Apropos to Nye’s argument for the international system (1990), the use of force,
or the exercise of coercive power in the Hong Kong–Mainland relationship,
would be extremely deleterious to the relationship for decades to come. Per-
suading Hong Kong people to accede to the policies of the Mainland and accept
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as their sovereign state, is the essence of
Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” strategy of allowing two separate
economic, political and legal systems to coexist in China (one in Hong Kong and
one on the Mainland) for a minimum of 50 years (until 2047).
Under “one country, two systems,” Hong Kong employs the “rule of law”
under an independent judiciary; it has its own legislature (Legco), where over
50% of legislators are directly elected by popular vote within geographic dis-
tricts; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has no official standing in Hong
Kong; and, Hong Kong maintains a capitalist system, as compared to the socialist
system on the mainland. Under Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” and
242 David Zweig

“Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong,” local people, not mandarins from
the Mainland, govern Hong Kong directly and are expected to make the key
decisions on their own.
Moreover, because “one country, two systems” was codified in the British–
Chinese Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, is registered as an international treaty
at the United Nations, and because the world is watching whether China keeps
its commitment to maintain a hands off policy for 50 years, Beijing is under
enormous pressure to limit its interference in Hong Kong’s society and polity.
Thus, unlike in the rest of China, Chinese officials, as of the writing of this
chapter, have not used force when Hong Kong citizens take to the streets in
massive, even violent, protests—actions that in the Mainland would trigger mass
arrests.
As Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC, the
CG is far better positioned to generate popular support from Hong Kong’s polity
and society for its policies in a way that one sovereign state trying to inf luence
another sovereign state simply cannot. The CG appoints the chief executive (CE)
of Hong Kong, who dominates Hong Kong’s “executive-led” system. The CG
can legally create and organize various pro-government groups, actively support
open political parties that favor its interests and even employ an official organiza-
tion in Hong Kong called the Central Liaison Office (CLO) to employ a “United
Front” strategy to promote its viewpoints, interests and soft power within the
territory ( Loo, Lo and Hung, 2019).
However, a massive “soft power deficit” has emerged in Beijing’s relation-
ship with Legco and with society. Legco houses a strong contingent of forces
opposed to most of the CG’s policies which has regularly voted down policies
and resorted to filibusters to complicate the passage and funding of legislation
favored by Beijing. More important this soft power deficit is due to the general
disaffection for, and mistrust of, the CG among large sections of the Hong Kong
population, particularly 18 to 30 year olds, but generally people under 40, con-
cerning numerous issues such as freedom of speech and assembly; an indepen-
dent judiciary; “national security”; the extent of pro-CCP content in the school
curriculum; the pace of democratization, including the selection of candidates
for the post of CE and the introduction of “universal suffrage” (one person-one
vote) for the CE and Legco elections; and the ability of the CG to keep its word
and grant Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy” without interfering in Hong
Kong’s affairs.
Three problems highlight the difficulty for the CG to enhance its soft power.
First, Hong Kong society has a pluralistic and democratic culture. Moreover,
citizens who participate in its vibrant civil society largely identify as “Hong
Kongers,” and not as “Chinese,” so they resist efforts by the CG and its agent
in Hong Kong, the CLO, to establish hegemony over Hong Kong society (Ma,
2007, p. 199).
Second, the CLO, the leadership in Beijing and the officials in the Mainland
who comment on Hong Kong policy are handicapped in their efforts to enhance
 Familiarity breeds contempt 243

the CG’s soft power because the natural mechanism to do so, the United Front
strategy, born of almost a century of communist experience in penetrating Chi-
nese societies, treats opponents as enemies, placing Beijing and a significant part
of Hong Kong society at loggerheads, with few measures available to reconcile
their differences ( Lam and Lam, 2013, pp. 301–325).
Third, other than trying to build its soft power by staying out of Hong Kong’s
affairs entirely, efforts at engagement with Hong Kongers, through cultural policy,
changing the public perception of the Mainland in the minds of Hong Kongers
through education or by offering progress on democracy, even if somewhat lim-
ited, are all seen as activities that contravene the “two systems” principle, under
which Hong Kongers hoped that the CG would let them run their own system,
while allowing them greater democracy.

Building soft power in Hong Kong: the United Front

Beijing mobilizes societal support for its norms in Hong Kong through various
mechanisms, the most important being its traditional United Front strategy.
Under the United Front, the CCP tries to mobilize non-communist allies or
friends within society who support its dominance (often by encouraging them to
join new organizations that local underground communists create), win over neu-
tral members of society who do not oppose their rule, and isolate, contain, if not
defeat, forces opposed to its hegemony over society ( Lam and Lam, 2013, p. 318).
The United Front strategy was implemented in Hong Kong before 1997 by
the Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee within the Xinhua News Agency
and, after 1997, has been coordinated by the CLO headquartered in Sheung Wan,
in Western Hong Kong Island. According to the 2014 State Council White Paper
on Hong Kong ( The Information Office of the State Council, 2019), the CLO is
an organ of the CG whose duties involve communication with the Office of the
Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA Garrison, both of
which are located in Hong Kong, promoting various exchanges and cooperation
between Hong Kong and the mainland, facilitating communication with leading
people in Hong Kong society and managing affairs involving Taiwan.
However, the CLO works under the CCP in Beijing. The CLO’s Coordina-
tion Department and its Social Group Liaison Department report directly to
the United Front Work Department, an organization under the Secretariat of
the CCP’s Central Committee in Beijing ( The Information Office of the State
Council, 2019). According to Torode, Pomfret and Lim (2014), the CLO uses its
broad networks, spanning grassroots associations, businessmen and politicians,
to help the HKG push through policies needing approval from a somewhat pro-
Beijing legislature. These have included partial democratic reforms in Hong
Kong and the multi-billion-dollar high-speed rail link to China. The CLO also
tries to improve the local press’s portrayal of China.
Yet numerous forces undermine Beijing’s ability to use a United Front strat-
egy to enhance its soft power in Hong Kong. Members of the Democratic Party,
244 David Zweig

one of the leading opposition parties, worry that very close ties between their
party and the PRC will undermine their party’s position at the ballot box ( Ho,
2014), as well as the determination of young democrats to fight for universal
suffrage ( Lo, 2010, p. 208). The Mainland still limits the role of the members of
the pro-democracy parties, known as the Pan-Democrats, in the 47 consultative
bodies affiliated with the HKG, filling the posts mostly with Beijing loyalists
( Lo, 2010, p. 215), and in 2015, it strengthened its control over Legco by having
its allies take the positions of chair and vice-chair of the most important com-
mittees, rejecting the past custom of sharing the posts with democratic members
( Bush, 2016, p. 141). Beijing still sees the various forces in Hong Kong through
Maoist lenses, comprising “friends and enemies,” limiting Beijing‘s ability “to
coopt the vociferous civil society groups in Hong Kong” ( Lo, 2010, p. 221).
Under its “politics of cooptation” ( Lo, 2010, p. 215), it grants certain Hong
Kong people positions in the national Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) or in provincial or municipal CPPCCs on the Mainland.
According to Loh (2010, p. 32), membership in these organizations obligates
individuals to support CCP leadership in Hong Kong. But while the CG hopes
that members of such organizations will enhance Beijing’s soft power in Hong
Kong, many Hong Kongers do not believe that these people represent Hong
Kong’s interests to the CG ( Loh, 2010, p. 33). Instead, they are only a transmis-
sion belt for explaining the CG’s views on issues to Hong Kongers.
The CG and the HKG try to build soft power and enhance patriotism through
propaganda ( Loh, 2010, pp. 36–38), such as sending Chinese heroes to Hong
Kong, through cultural performances, by criticizing foreign interference and
by trying to introduce a more nationalistic education curriculum. But national
education is also an important policy which must gain the support of legislators
and which needs the silent acquiescence of many educators and students in Hong
Kong; so whether the HKG and the CG can legislate it is an important measure
of Beijing’s soft power, and to date, the effort to introduce “national education”
has undermined the CG’s efforts to enhance soft power by triggering concerns
of ideological interference.

Misjudged efforts to build soft power: Beijing’s white paper

on “one country, two systems”
The CG’s “White Paper on Hong Kong,” issued in June 2014 ( The Informa-
tion Office of the State Council, 2019), tried to increase China’s popularity by
reminding the SAR’s citizens of the major contributions the CG had made to
Hong Kong’s economic development since 1997 as well as to demonstrate its
“comprehensive authority” over the territory.
The contributions listed in the section entitled “Efforts Made by the Cen-
tral Government to Ensure the Prosperity and Development of the HKSAR”
included assistance given during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when the
Hong Kong Stock Market came under attack; the Comprehensive Economic
 Familiarity breeds contempt 245

Partnership Arrangement or CEPA (June 2003), which gave Hong Kong profes-
sionals enhanced access to the Mainland economy before the rest of the world
under China’s WTO agreement; and the “Individual Visitors Scheme,” which has
allowed millions of Mainlanders to visit Hong Kong and according to Sung et al.
(2014) generated $27.2 billion in 2012, which was 1.4% of Hong Kong’s GDP.
While these policies did help Hong Kong, the white paper emphasized how
Beijing had assisted Hong Kong’s economy after the 2003 Sudden Acute Respi-
ratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, without mentioning that SARS had entered
Hong Kong via Guangdong Province and that Mainland officials had not warned
the HKG that such a dangerous disease was incubating across the border. Hong
Kongers laughed cynically at such a disingenuous perspective. The document
also reminded Hong Kongers of the assistance afforded to the SAR by the CG
after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The underlying message, therefore, was
that the CG delivered economic prosperity to Hong Kong, which Hong Kongers
themselves undermine by excessive politicization of policy decisions.
However, the document also cautioned Hong Kongers that the “one coun-
try, two systems” structure existed at the goodwill of the CG, striking at the
dominant perception (or perhaps misperception) in Hong Kong that Beijing was
legally bound by the Joint Declaration to maintain Hong Kong’s “high degree of
autonomy” and “two systems” for 50 years, and that Britain, as a cosignatory to
the Joint Declaration, had an obligation (and the right) to press Hong Kong’s case
with China and that China would respond. Instead, the document argued that
Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” was granted only at the bequest of the
CG and the Mainland’s parliament, and that Beijing, which had “comprehensive
jurisdiction” over Hong Kong, could limit Hong Kong’s autonomy as it saw fit.
The white paper challenged the “rule of law” and moved Hong Kong closer
to “one country” rather than “two systems.” It argued that Hong Kong judges
are public employees who owe their first loyalty to the state, not to the rule
of law, legitimizing the Chinese state’s interference in local judicial decisions.
Mainland legal scholars saw this aspect of the white paper as an unfortunate
point that was misunderstood. But this viewpoint triggered strong protests by a
large number of lawyers who insisted on protecting the independence of Hong
Kong’s judiciary, which is one of the key aspects of the “two systems” ( Lau,
Chiu and Yap, 2014) without which Hong Kong would lose much of its com-
parative advantage over cities, such as Shanghai, which cannot pull in Western
firms that prefer Hong Kong’s rule of law. In this way, the white paper under-
mined China’s soft power in Hong Kong, particularly among lawyers and other
professionals.

Promoting patriotism: sending Hong Kong students

to the Mainland
For much of the past decade, Mainland officials and the HKG have argued
that greater patriotism and understanding of China would lessen resistance
246 David Zweig

to the CG’s policies toward Hong Kong. So, in 2013–2015, the HKG sent
126,200 students to the mainland at the cost of $26.7 million (Zhao, 2015).
This perspective became particularly strong after the Umbrella Movement in
fall 2014 ( Lam, 2015). However, some Hong Kong parents saw these efforts as
“brainwashing,” and some Hong Kong schools eschewed any trips labeled with
terms such as “understanding our motherland” or that referred to “national
education.”
Does studying on the Mainland affect Hong Kong students? In 2009, with
funding from the Central Policy Unit of the HKG, I and a team of researchers
interviewed Hong Kong students studying in Hong Kong and on the Mainland
to assess whether studying in China affected the identity and attitudes of the lat-
ter group.1 Interestingly, many students studying in the Mainland had a parent
living or working on the Mainland, so they probably began with a more positive
view of China than most Hong Kong students.
Our students understood the limits on individual rights in China ( Table 13.1),
as 86.7% of Hong Kongers studying on the Mainland believed that individual
rights on the Mainland were either “much worse” (49.1%) or “slightly worse”
(37.6%) than in Hong Kong. Also, 68.5% of college students in Hong Kong felt
that individual rights in China were “much worse than in Hong Kong,” while
20.4% thought individual rights were “slightly worse.” Thus, while Table 13.1
shows that those Hong Kong students who study on the Mainland appear to be
less hostile than students in Hong Kong toward the Mainland, more than 85% of
Hong Kong students saw a deep chasm between freedom in Hong Kong and the
Mainland, regardless of where they studied.
In our face-to-face interviews, students expressed their views on the lack of
freedom in the Mainland:

In Hong Kong you’ll feel it’s more democratic. In the Mainland the media
is all controlled by the government. Besides, internet is strictly blocked
here. In Hong Kong, there is no website you can’t visit. You can also see
whatever movie you want without any omissions. The Mainland is com-
paratively reclusive.2

TABLE 13.1 Students’ views on individual rights and freedom in the Mainland (%), 2009

Location of Slightly better Same Slightly worse Much worse Total

HK students than HK* as HK than HK than HK

Mainland 0.9 12.4 37.6 49.1 100

Hong Kong 2.5 8.6 20.4 68.5 100
Source: Survey by Zweig’s team in Hong Kong, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, summer 2009.
Note: * Only one person selected “Mainland is much better than HK.” p > .05.
 Familiarity breeds contempt 247

A second student suggested that time on the Mainland may undermine Beijing’s
soft power:

Some of the students from HK have some antipathy towards the Main-
land. They feel life in the Mainland is somewhat depressed with not much
freedom. Like during the “Green Dam” incident [internet censorship soft-
ware], our impression of the Mainland deteriorated.3

Limits on Beijing’s soft power in Hong Kong: the question

of identity
The more Hong Kong people identify as ethnic Chinese and as citizens of the
PRC the more likely they are to accept Beijing’s legitimate authority to guide
Hong Kong. Unfortunately for China, Hong Kongers’ “Chinese” identity has
decreased since 1997.
Hong Kong people have multiple identities. But a survey by Hong Kong
University Public Opinion Program (HKUPOP) in December 2016 showed that
well over 60% of people in Hong Kong saw themselves as “Hong Kongers” (35%)
or “Hong Kongers in China” (30%), while only 37% of them saw themselves as
“Chinese in Hong Kong” (19%) or “Chinese” (18%), making “Hong Konger”
the largest single identity in the territory. Moreover, in June 2017 the same
research center found that only 3.1% of Hong Kongers under 30 felt that they
were “Chinese,” a 20-year low (HKU Poll, 2017).
According to the Hong Kong Transition Project, Hong Kongers in 2013
related much more to the outside world than they did to their Chinese identity,
and they strongly wanted to maintain that identity ( DeGolyer, 2014). This is not
surprising, since 27% of Hong Kongers under the age of 50 have lived overseas for
a minimum of one year. Thus, when asked to select among three identities which
they consider as most important to promote and protect—(1) China’s identity as
ruled by the CCP, (2) China’s historical and cultural identity or (3) Hong Kong’s
identity as a pluralistic and international society—only 4% selected the first, 31%
selected the second and 65% selected the final option. Such an orientation should
reinforce support for Western norms of democracy, democratic freedoms and
human rights, which inherently undermine the soft power of an authoritarian
state. Moreover, over 80% of those under 40 selected the third option.
In addition, between June 2007 and December 2015, Hong Kongers’ identity
as citizens of the PRC declined significantly ( Table 13.2).
While the strength of identity averaged 7.3 in June 2007, it had dropped to
5.95 in June 2014, on the eve of the Umbrella Movement and just after the State
Council’s white paper on Hong Kong. Thereafter, it continued to decline.
Looking forward, do Hong Kongers anticipate that after 2047 Hong Kong
should integrate more deeply into the Chinese polity and adopt the norms of the
Mainland? As of 2016, the answer was an emphatic “no.” Well over two-thirds
248 David Zweig

TABLE 13.2 Strength of identity as a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, 2007–2015

Date of Survey Sample Rating Standard Error No. of Respondents

Jan–Jun 2007 1,026 7.28 0.07 998

Jan–Jun 2008 1,012 6.84 0.10 932
Jan–Jun 2009 1,002 6.99 0.11 511
Jan–Jun 2010 1,004 6.38 0.12 515
Jan–Jun 2011 1,028 6.41 0.12 480
Jan–Jun 2012 1,001 6.12 0.13 501
Jan–Jun 2013 1,055 6.11 0.12 633
Jan–Jun 2014 1,026 5.95 0.12 653
Jul–Dec 2014 1,016 5.66 0.12 641
Jan–Jun 2015 1,003 5.87 0.13 625
Jul–Dec 2015 1,011 5.75 0.13 612
Source: www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/.
Note: The question read: “On a scale of 0–10, please rate the strength of your identity as a citizen of
the People’s Republic of China, with 10 indicating extremely strong, 0 indicating extremely weak,
and 5 indicating half-half.”

(69.6%) said that the “one country, two systems” principle should be extended
after 2047, another 17.4% said Hong Kong should become independent after that
date, and among those aged 15 to 24, nearly 40% demanded independence after
2047 (Cheung and Fung, 2016).4

Dissatisfaction with the Chinese government

Hong Kong citizens, since 1997, have usually blamed local political and economic
difficulties on the HKG. This view dominated, even though the CG controlled
the election of the CE and should have been ultimately responsible for his or her
actions. However, if Hong Kongers believe that Beijing is managing China well,
they could be more willing to accept its policies for Hong Kong, especially on
normative issues. Second, they could have separate views on Beijing’s manage-
ment of Hong Kong, feeling confident that despite concerns about how the CG
was running China, they could believe that the “one country, two systems” pol-
icy was working and the CG was not interfering too much in Hong Kong affairs.
Data from the Hong Kong Transition Project (Figure 13.1) show that on the
eve of the reversion of sovereignty (ROS) from Britain to China in 1997, Hong
Kongers were quite critical of how the CG was managing China; then, after the
ROS, Hong Kongers’ views on this dimension became more positive until 2009,
when dissatisfaction shot up precipitously.5 Similarly, from 1993 until the ROS,
Hong Kongers were quite dissatisfied with how Beijing was managing Hong Kong
affairs (Figure 13.2), but after the ROS, Hong Kongers became much more posi-
tive about the CG’s policies toward the HKSAR. Yet in 2009, negativity toward
the CG’s governance of both China and Hong Kong rose simultaneously, as the
level of dissatisfaction surpassed the level of satisfaction on both issues.
 Percentages
Percentages

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Feb 1993

100

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
FIGURE 13.1

FIGURE 13.2
Aug 1993 Feb 1994
Aug 1994 Feb 1995
Sept 1995 Feb 1996
July 1996 Feb 1997

Source: DeGolyer (2014).

Source: DeGolyer (2014).
Jan 1998 Jan 1998

1993–2014

1993–2013
June 1998
Jun 1998
Oct 1998
Oct 1998
July 1999

Satisfied
Satisfied
Jul 1999
Apr 2000
Apr 2000
Nov 2000
July 2001 Nov 2000
Apr 2002 Jul 2001
June 2003 Apr 2002

Years
Apr 2004 Jun 2003

Years
June 2004 Apr 2004
Dissatisfied

Dissatisfied
Aug 2004 Jun 2004
May 2005 Aug 2004
Nov 2005 May 2005
Nov 2006 Mar 2006
May 2008
Apr 2007
July 2008
Jul 2008
Don’t know

Sept 2008

Don’t know
Sep 2008
May 2010
Dec 2010 May 2010
Oct 2011 Dec 2010
Jan 2013 Aug 2012
Jan 2014

Level of satisfaction with PRC government’s rule of Hong Kong,

Hong Kongers’ satisfaction with Beijing’s rule of the mainland,
250 David Zweig

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0
8-13/6/2001

8-12/6/2007

7-11/9/2010

9-11/3/2012

6-12/6/2014
15/7/1997

14-15/4/1998

25/3/1999
16-19/7/1999

17-19/6/2002

13-18/6/2003

21-24/6/2004

20-23/6/2005

13-15/6/2006
6-12/12/2006

18-20/6/2008

16-21/6/2009

13-16/6/2011

5-13/12/2012
15-17/9/2013

19-25/8/2016
13-15/6/2017
7-8/6/2000
14-15/10/1997

12-13/10/1998

9-12/3/2015
13-15/12/1999

18-27/12/2000

17-19/12/2001

13-18/12/2002

20-23/12/2003

18-23/12/2004

15-19/12/2005

11-14/12/2007

23-29/12/2008

28-30/12/2009

10-15/12/2015
Years
Distrust in the HKSAR Government Distrust in the Beijing Central Government

FIGURE 13.3 Distrust in the HKSAR government and Beijing central government (%)
Source: Public Opinion Programme, University of Hong Kong (HKUPOP), www.hkupop.hku.
hk/english/popexpress/trust/trusthkgov/overall_dis/chart_poll/datatables.html.

DeGolyer, who ran the Hong Kong Transition Project for over 20 years,
emphasized this correlation, and its likely impact on political reform ( DeGolyer,
2014):

The strongest correlation of all is between satisfaction with the perfor-

mance of the PRC government’s rule of China and satisfaction with the
PRC government’s handling of SAR affairs. Few dissatisfied with one are
satisfied with the other. . . . They are closely tied, in respondent’s minds, to
each other. This is particularly important for constitutional reform as any
proposal coming from Chief Executive Leung will be seen as a proposal
approved by Beijing officials.

Thus, as we moved toward 2014, the year of the Umbrella Movement, the CG’s
ability to inf luence key policies on National Education and Constitutional
Reform f loundered.
Moreover, Hong Kongers greatly mistrust Beijing, and, similar to the previ-
ous two figures, a significant shift began after 2008, when support overall for
China peaked due to the Beijing Olympics (Figure 13.3). By 2013, distrust had
well surpassed the levels of 2003, at the height of the crisis over Article 23 and
the National Security legislation.

Soft power and competing perceptions of national security

The first significant popular action (or reaction) that highlighted Beijing’s lack of
soft power in Hong Kong after 1997 was the failure of the HKG to introduce
a National Security Law, which is mandated in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s
 Familiarity breeds contempt 251

mini-constitution. In 2003, the economic climate for introducing a policy that

constricted the freedoms of Hong Kong people was less than propitious. Hong
Kong was still suffering the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998),
which had suppressed housing prices in which many members of Hong Kong’s
middle class had invested their savings, and which led to significant unemploy-
ment. Also, in spring 2003, Hong Kong suffered a massive health epidemic,
SARS, to which the HKG’s response was slow and somewhat ineffective. By fall
2003, the people’s confidence in the HKG had reached a nadir of 16% from a
high of 73% in February 1997 ( Bush, 2016, p. 15).
Also, the HKG was extremely clumsy, in that it tried to force this change in
civil rights and freedoms down the throats of Hong Kongers. Despite a period
of consultation which ref lected quite negatively on the law, the HKG appeared
to be committed to introducing a policy based on Beijing’s unwarranted per-
ception that outside forces were actively trying to subvert China’s sovereignty
over Hong Kong. Thus on July 1, 2003, 500,000 to 700,000 people used the
sixth anniversary of the ROS to pour out their social grievances and political
concerns by marching through the streets of the city. The following July 1, an
estimated 350,000 marched again. As a result, the law was never introduced (and
still remains off the books as of this writing), while the CE, Tung Chee-hwa,
and his secretary of security, Regina Ip, who led the push for the policy, were
forced to resign.
The bottom line is simple: Chinese government officials are convinced that
Western powers will use the opportunity afforded by democratization to mobi-
lize civil society to undermine China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and, therefore,
its national security. But as Hong Kong people do not share Beijing’s concerns
about the delicate state of national security and sovereignty in Hong Kong, they
cannot accept policies that address China’s unwarranted concerns about national
security if those steps involve restricting their own freedoms.

National education policy: a strategy and an outcome

Miffed that Hong Kongers do not feel more Chinese 20 years after becom-
ing part of the nation, the CG believes that if Hong Kong young people
received a more positive picture of China’s historic reemergence as a great
power they would identify more with the Chinese nation and the CG’s con-
cerns with national security and sovereignty. Former CE, Tung Chee-hwa, has
long emphasized that Hong Kong youth need to understand Chinese history
better, because doing so would allow them to participate more willingly in the
economic opportunities emerging on the Mainland (Cheung, 2017, p. 3).
To remedy this lacuna in national identity, the HKG proposed a “National
Education” program, whereby civics courses in Hong Kong’s high schools would
present a more patriotic view of the Chinese system. But no single act of defiance
better demonstrates the CG’s deficit of soft power in Hong Kong than the protests
of 2012, which forced the Hong Kong government to withdraw another proposal.
252 David Zweig

Young Hong Kongers, in particularly high school students, refused to learn

the CCP’s narrative on China’s history, seeing it as propaganda, if not outright
“brainwashing.” Posters displayed at the protest site in 2012, when hundreds sat-
in outside Legco and some engaged in a hunger strike, similar to the protestors
in Tiananmen Square in 1989, complained about the efforts of the Mainland
to brainwash (xi nao) young people.6 Much of the resistance was triggered by
one-sided, pro-CCP and anti-capitalist, education materials proposed by a left-
ist Hong Kong academic. While his teaching materials had yet to be accepted,
students preferred a Western, and they believed more objective, narrative unen-
cumbered by Marxism. However, Western narratives of contemporary China
undermine the CCP’s and CG’s soft power in Hong Kong, as they focus on
the negative side of life on the Mainland and its lack of freedoms, as well as the
gap between the right to assemble, free speech and a free press, and the values
engrained in Hong Kong’s identity, versus the identity proffered by the Main-
land, which suppresses civil society, thereby reinforcing the importance of main-
taining “two systems.”
Ironically, although Hong Kong is part of China, neither the CG nor the
HKG can introduce a more pro-Mainland curriculum which could enhance
the CG’s “soft power.” In 2015, Fanny Law, a former deputy secretary of educa-
tion in the HKG, who was forced to resign from the government in 2002 for
interfering in academic freedom in Hong Kong, proposed that all incoming
schoolteachers spend a month on the Mainland to enhance their knowledge of
China and improve their ability to teach “national education” ( Lau and Zhao,
2015). But Law’s proposal was rejected by two prominent, pro-government poli-
ticians, Ho Hon-kuen, a member of the CE’s Executive Council, and by Bernard
Chan, a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress in Beijing. Chan
believed that

the local quality of education was more sophisticated [in Hong Kong]
than on the mainland, which was why so many mainlanders furthered
their education in the city, so it’s important for schools to make their own
choices. . . . In Hong Kong, most people do not accept having things
foisted on them. Hongkongers prefer to have an option.

Ironically, while in charge of education from 1998 to 2006, Law had overseen the
removal of Chinese history as a compulsory subject in senior secondary schools
making her responsible for children in Hong Kong growing up “ignorant about
Chinese history.”
Still, Carrie Lam, the new CE, has mentioned that she feels pressure to enhance
the sense of Chineseness among Hong Kong’s youth, and during his three-day
visit to Hong Kong in late June, early July 2017, the CCP’s general secretary and
Chinese president, Xi Jinping, “highlighted the need to enhance education and
awareness on the history and culture of the Chinese nation” ( Lau, 2017).
 Familiarity breeds contempt 253

Kidnapping the booksellers: a dramatic undermining

of soft power
The most troublesome event of the past several years to undermine China’s soft
power in Hong Kong was the kidnapping and arrest of five booksellers from
Causeway Bay Books, several of whom were transported into China ( Lian,
2016). One was kidnapped in Thailand; two were arrested while crossing the
border into China; and, most problematically, one was kidnapped in Hong Kong
and then mysteriously reappeared on the Mainland with no record of his hav-
ing left the territory. Two held foreign passports, but their overseas citizenship
was ignored by the authorities. Suddenly over one million Hong Kongers, who
hold foreign passports as insurance against running afoul of the CG, were wor-
ried about their safety as the pendulum was again swinging from “two systems”
toward “one country.”
The confession of one of the booksellers on Chinese television harkened back
to Stalinist trials of the 1930s and was shocking (Forsythe, 2016). While the
reason for these clear violations of the “one country, two systems” agreement
remains unclear, the CG has to date made no effort to explain this extrajudicial
behavior.
The booksellers created much of their own problem by shipping books into
China, rather than simply selling them to Mainlanders visiting Hong Kong; to
that extent, they engaged in illegal activities on the Mainland. So, the arrest of
two of the booksellers in Guangdong Province after they crossed the border is
less problematic. But the fact that unnamed officers from the Ministry of Public
Security in the Mainland crossed the border into Hong Kong and Thailand and
brought a citizen of a foreign country back to the Mainland dealt a major blow
to China’s position in Hong Kong, as it showed that public security bureaus in
China do not recognize the existence of a “second” system which functions
under the “rule of law.” Second, forcing the booksellers to confess their guilt on
Mainland television reinforced the hostility many Hong Kongers feel toward the
“communist system” to the north.

The failure of political reform, 2014–2015

Another indicator of the deficit of soft power has been the CG’s inability to
introduce its own truncated version of political reform into Hong Kong. While
some may believe that the CG never wanted to implement “universal suffrage,”
Beijing feels pressure to demonstrate its commitment to the Basic Law, which
stipulates such an electoral format (Basic Law, 1989).7 Thus, in 2007, then CE,
Donald Tsang, who had committed during the 2005 campaign for the post of CE
to resolve the issue of political reform on his watch, asked the NPC-SC, which
is ultimately responsible for constitutional reform in Hong Kong, to declare a
date for introducing universal suffrage. Under pressure, the NPC-SC accepted
254 David Zweig

universal suffrage for the CE election, but not until 2017, delaying the reform
for another 10 years; moreover, it did not stipulate the exact format of the nomi-
nation process, only that candidates would have to pass through a Nomination
Committee, which would be dominated by the pro-Beijing forces.8
Then, on August 31, 2014, after five months of “consultation,” the NPC-SC
established a severely restricted nomination procedure. That decision stipulated
that any candidate for CE would have to garner the support of 50% of the mem-
bers of the Nomination Committee if they were to be allowed to run in the CE
election. This proposal, which certified that no Pan-Democrat would be able to
vie for the post of CE, was juxtaposed to an extreme position that had emerged
from the Pan-Democratic camp in May–June 2014, which called for popular or
“civic nomination” and rejected the use of a Nomination Committee entirely,
even though the Basic Law stipulated it. By ignoring the Basic Law, the Pan-
Democrats totally rejected Beijing’s format for political reform.
Moreover, a survey commissioned by the Ming Pao newspaper in May 2014
found support for the Nomination Committee among the overall population
(51% support, 28% opposed), among people 30 or older, and among those with-
out a college education (55% to 26%). But due to its lack of inf luence in Hong
Kong, the CG could not garner sufficient support for its reform package among
college educated people under the age of 30 who opposed the plan, 48 percent
to 39 percent (Ming Pao, 2014).
The CG’s August 31, 2014, decision, and its courting of the business tycoons
of Hong Kong, all coming on the tail of the failed white paper on “one coun-
try, two systems,” reinforced the CG’s inability to attract Hong Kong’s middle
class to its side on political reform. The day before college students began their
class boycott to protest the August 31 decision, Xi Jinping met a delegation of
approximately 30 top Hong Kong businessmen in Beijing, and the photo of that
meeting appeared on newspapers across the territory. The juxtaposition of the
announcement of the class boycott and a meeting by the leader of China with
mostly anti-democratic capitalists says a great deal about the CG’s ability to mis-
play its hand. After all, the massive 2003 protest march of 500,000 and the forced
resignation of the Hong Kong capitalist Tung Chee-hwa from his post as CE had
shown the immense distance between Hong Kong’s middle class and the business
tycoons; yet the meeting in Beijing illustrated that the CG still thought that the
wealthy classes in Hong Kong could help with its cause.
After the Umbrella Movement of 2014 disbanded without garnering any
political concessions on the issue of the CE election and the August 31 proposal,
no Pan-Democratic party in Hong Kong could support the HKG’s political
reform package which the Hong Kong and Beijing governments had refused to
adjust. Had they supported it, they would have been pilloried by their supporters.
But, the CG had been forewarned that by establishing a threshold of more than
25% of the votes from the Nomination Committee for participation in the CE
election they were inviting social unrest (Zweig, 2014). Despite strenuous efforts
by the CLO to pry a few democratic legislators away from the opposition camp,
 Familiarity breeds contempt 255

and co-opt them into supporting the August 31 formula, the Pan-Democrats
in Legco remained united in their rejection of this constrained form of politi-
cal reform and in June 2015 voted down the reform package tabled in Legco,
foolishly believing that the CG would offer the city better terms (Zweig, 2014).
The CG, for its side, proved unwilling to promise Legco that its 50% threshold
would be softened in subsequent elections, reinforcing Pan-Democratic resis-
tance. Thus, despite a huge effort to promote a political reform package, that if
passed would have demonstrated the CG’s soft power, Hong Kong’s democracy
did not progress and the CG’s reputation suffered a serious setback.

Localism, independence and the total rejection of the

Mainland’s soft power
After the failure of the Umbrella Movement, “localism” strengthened among
young Hong Kongers. This movement’s goal was to maintain, if not intensify,
the barriers between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Importantly, while “nativ-
ism” around the world is predominantly supported by older citizens, who feel
threatened by the inf low of foreigners, localism in Hong Kong has taken root
largely among the younger sectors of the society ( Rebel, 2017), who are well
educated or politically aware, and do not necessarily take their cues from politi-
cal parties or exercise their will through elections; instead they are prone to civil
disobedience.
The growth of “nativism” and the rejection of closer links to the Mainland
manifested politically in the September 2016 Legco elections. In that vote,
15–17% of the Hong Kong electorate voted for six localist candidates who
directly opposed the CG and China, and refused to swear allegiance to, or rec-
ognize the legitimacy of, Beijing or the Hong Kong SAR when they took their
oath of office. Moreover, much of their support came from middle-class resi-
dents of private residential estates, rather than more working-class neighbor-
hoods, suggesting that Hong Kong’s middle class grants the CG little soft power
(Fung et al., 2016). In fact, as of 2017, 40% of people aged 15 to 24, and 24% of
people aged 25 to 39, wanted the CG to become a foreign government after 2047
( Bland, 2017, p. 103), preferring to establish an independent Hong Kong state.

The extradition bill and the failure of the CG’s Hong

Kong policy
Rather than use the relative tranquility in Hong Kong after the defeat of the
Occupy Central Movement to enhance the HKG and Beijing’s popularity in the
territory, in the following five years, the HKG tightened up the political system,
and, in concert with Beijing, engaged in policies that fed precisely into the con-
cerns of Hong Kongers, particularly younger people under 30.
Based on a ruling by the Standing Committee of the NPC, the six localists
who were elected were ejected from Legco for not taking the oath of office in
256 David Zweig

a serious enough manner, ending the Pan-Democrats ability to block unpop-

ular legislation. Several candidates for public office who had advocated “self-
determination” for Hong Kong after 2047 were denied the right to run, the
pro-independence Hong Kong National Party was banned in September 2018
and any discussion of independence was deemed treasonous. In April 2019, nine
people who encouraged Occupy Central were found guilty of creating a public
nuisance, a rarely used crime under British colonial law, and several of them,
including two professors, were sentenced to jail for 16 months. Also pending was
a National Anthem Law under which people who misbehave during the playing
of China’s “March of the Volunteers” could be fined $6,500 and sentenced to
three years in prison.
Still, the event that triggered another crisis was the decision of the CE, Mrs.
Carrie Lam, who had been elected in March 2017 by a pro-Beijing Electoral
Committee, to rush through a revision of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and
the Mutual Legal Assistance Ordinance in one fell swoop. The first would allow
Hong Kong to extradite citizens of a government with whom Hong Kong did
not have a treaty, such as the Mainland, without any due process in Hong Kong
where the accused could present their own case. The second meant that when
such requests were made, if the paperwork was in order, the “criminal’s” assets
could be frozen. Lam claimed that her decision was motivated by sympathy for
the parents of a Taiwanese woman murdered by her Hong Kong boyfriend who
had f led back to Hong Kong, which had no extradition treaty with Taiwan. At
this point in time, there is no proof that Lam was pressured by the CG to intro-
duce this policy, and while one must assume that the CLO and perhaps even the
HKMAO in Beijing approved of this effort, Lam probably saw this as a chance
to ingratiate herself with President Xi Jinping, as the new laws would help Bei-
jing to get its hands on a reported 300 Mainland financial criminals who were
safely ensconced in Hong Kong. It would also increase her support in Beijing for
a second term as CE.
As these revisions would lower the barrier between Beijing’s and Hong Kong’s
legal systems, which were supposed to remain separate under “one country, two
systems,” most Hong Kongers strongly opposed the policy and felt deeply threat-
ened by it. The local chambers of commerce, the legal community, profession-
als, academics, foreign consulates and foreign firms, were all in an uproar. From
January through late May, supporters and opponents of the bill jockeyed for sup-
port. But as the scale of opposition intensified, so did Mrs. Lam’s stubbornness.
From Lam’s perspective, opponents were ill-informed, and would realize that
after the bill was passed and no massive sweep of dissidents occurred, the bill was
no threat to Hong Kong’s “rule of law” and independent judiciary.
But surveys taken at that time show the level of opposition to the policy, the
lack of trust in Mrs. Lam and the continuing mistrust of the CG. One survey
was carried out by Hong Kong University’s POP on June 4, 2019, just five days
before the protest march of June 9, when an estimated one million Hong Kong
residents took to the streets, insisting that Mrs. Lam withdraw the bill ( POP,
2019). The survey asked whether people supported a policy that would allow
 Familiarity breeds contempt 257

Hong Kongers to be sent to the Mainland to face trial. On a five-point scale,

with 5 as totally opposed and 1 as extremely supportive, 60% selected 5, show-
ing that they were “extremely opposed” to this policy, while only 11% strongly
supported it. Moreover, if respect for the “inf luencing” territory’s institutions,
such as its legal system, is an important part of the development of soft power
within the polity that is the target of inf luence, the PRC clearly faced a huge
deficit in this aspect of soft power at precisely the time that Mrs. Lam chose to
try to lower those barriers. According to the same survey, 45% of Hong Kongers
were “absolutely” convinced that the Mainland lacked “fair legal procedures,”
while another 14% selected a 4 on the five-point scale. Thus in total, 59% of
Hong Kongers did not see judicial procedures on the Mainland as “fair” ( gong
ping). Similarly, 67% of Hong Kongers surveyed said that if the extradition pro-
cess were established, they would have no confidence in the “one country, two
system” policy. Clearly, Hong Kongers were unwilling to privilege the CG’s
concern about national security and sovereignty if it meant decreasing their own
freedoms or legal rights.
An effective measure of soft power would be the level of trust in the inf lu-
encing government, with the absence of trust increasing the difficulty of getting
the target government and/or its population from supporting its policies volun-
tarily. A survey taken July 24–26, 2019, asked 1,002 randomly selected Hong
Kong respondents what they saw as the source of disaffection among young
Hong Kongers ( POP, 2019). Results showed that 81% of Hong Kongers saw
the lack of confidence in the CG as the major reason for youth disaffection,
and 91% of youth aged 14 to 29 saw a lack of confidence in the CG as the most
important source of youthful disaffection. As of that date, 75% of Hong Kongers
saw the lack of confidence in “one country, two systems” as the major source of
the youthful disaffection, with 86% of 14 to 29 year olds feeling that way. Thus
Beijing did not have the authority to win support for the extradition law among
Hong Kong citizens.
Finally, we should assess the extent to which Beijing considered its need for
soft power as a reason that, as of the date of the writing of this chapter, the CG
had not called in the PLA garrison in Hong Kong to bring order during the
many weeks of violent protests. Most observers felt that it was concerns about
the views of foreign businesses, and perhaps foreign governments, as well as the
desire to demonstrate successful policy management and the continued role of
“one country, two systems” as a possible solution for Taiwan, that reinforced
Beijing’s cautious approach. But from the perspective of this chapter’s theme,
doing so would destroy any semblance of cooperation between the CG and a
significant proportion of the people of Hong Kong, further undermining if not
destroying Beijing’s soft power in the territory.

Conclusion
The CG has tried to enhance its soft power in Hong Kong since well before the
ROS in 1997. Employing numerous stratagems, mostly ref lective of the CCP’s
258 David Zweig

United Front strategy, it has tried to mobilize its supporters, neutralize the non-
committed segments of society and isolate opponents to its rule over Hong
Kong. But the first 22 years of Chinese rule show that although the CG can
get the HKG to do its bidding by introducing policies that increase economic
integration between HK and the Mainland and limiting political freedom in
HK, the CG has failed to increase its popularity, prestige or stature within HK
society; as a result, every effort to tighten political control has been met with
strong resistance, capping off in the summer of 2019 with the anti-extradition
movement, which suggests a total failure of the CG’s strategy of using the “one
country, two systems” policy to integrate HK peacefully into China’s system.
Over the years, the CG focused primarily on economics to consolidate pop-
ular support in Hong Kong. The white paper of June 2014 highlighted this
perspective. But that effort was frustrated from the start by the depth of the
populace’s “Hong Kong identity” and the overall absence of a “Chinese iden-
tity,” which undermined the CG’s soft power.
China’s soft power is also constrained by the differing perspectives among
many Hong Kongers and the CG over the “one country, two systems” policy. If
we view “one country, two systems” as a continuum, Beijing would like Hong
Kong to be situated closer to the “one country” end of that continuum, where
Hong Kong citizens would demonstrate a stronger “Chinese” identity, ebul-
lient nationalistic pride in the Mainland’s accomplishments under its post-1978
“reform and opening” policy, deeper sympathy for Beijing’s concerns about sov-
ereignty and national security, fuller appreciation for the contributions of the CG
to Hong Kong’s economic well-being since 1997, more entrenched opposition
to foreign values and external inf luences and greater love for the symbols of the
Chinese state, such as the national f lag, national anthem and national emblem.
The CG also assumes that the closer Hong Kong is to the “one country” edge of
the continuum, the easier it will be to govern this troublesome region without
resorting to physical coercion.
Hong Kongers, on the other hand, were hoping that the territory’s “system”
would become more liberal and democratic, or at least remain at the same point
on the “one country, two systems” continuum, and that the “one country,” China,
would look more and more like Hong Kong, rather than the Maoist system of
the pre-reform era. Thus, since 1997, Hong Kongers have resisted each and every
effort by Beijing to implant components of China’s “system” into the territory
and move HK closer toward “one country.” Particularly as the regime under Xi
Jinping, who came to power in 2012, is quite draconian, many Hong Kongers’
concerns about the intrusion of the CG have grown significantly. The “local-
ist” movement showed that familiarity breeds contempt, as efforts to enhance
political, ideological or legal controls since 2012 have led many Hong Kongers
to advocate withdrawing Hong Kong from China after 2047. Moreover, events
in 2019 blew the lid off the assumption that any peaceful reunification under the
CG’s terms was possible.
Notwithstanding the above analysis, some may question if Beijing takes the
enhancement of its soft power as a key component of its Hong Kong strategy.
 Familiarity breeds contempt 259

Given the CG’s priorities for Hong Kong, including economic, social and politi-
cal stability, non-interference by Hong Kong’s democratic forces in Mainland
politics, keeping Hong Kong as an outlet for Mainland overseas investment and
as a source of funds for its state-owned enterprises and deeper integration into
the economy of the Pearl River Delta—a strategy known as the Greater Bay
Area—the sacrifice of some soft power may be an acceptable price to pay to
achieve what the CG sees as higher ranked values.
Still, although Beijing prevented young post-Occupy politicians from gain-
ing seats in Legco after 2016 (Chung and Cheung, 2018), and shut down serious
discussion of independence after 2047, those victories loomed pyrrhic in light of
the continuing expansion of the localist, anti-China movement and the massive
explosion of anti-Mainland sentiment in the anti-extradition struggle. In light
of data showing the disaffection of Hong Kongers below age 30 toward Hong
Kong’s integration with the Mainland, Beijing would have been well advised to
engage these younger Hong Kongers and try vigorously to expand its soft power
within that segment of society, rather try to tighten control. Only in that way
could the CG increase its inf luence over the hearts and minds of the people of
Hong Kong.

Notes
1 Students came from 13 universities in Beijing and Guangdong Province, and 3 universities
in Hong Kong. We included top universities, such as Tsinghua and Peking universities in
Beijing and Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, as well as middle-ranking universities,
such as Jinan University in Guangzhou. Of the 219 Hong Kong students interviewed in
the Mainland, 98 were in Beijing, 86 in Guangzhou and 35 in Shenzhen. We also cre-
ated a control group of 159 students in HK. All data were collected through face-to-face
interviews.
2 Student No. 001 from Chinese University of Finance and Economics.
3 Student No. 003 from Peking University.
4 1,100 residents were surveyed in the summer of 2016.
5 Several factors might have driven the negative sentiment. First, was a post-Olympics
return to the more prevalent concerns and therefore a return to pre-Olympic scores.
Second, 2009 saw major protests in Xinjiang and a subsequent crackdown by Chinese
security forces.
6 The author’s personal observations and conversations with protestors at that time.
7 The Basic Law explicitly stipulates that the chief executive and all members of Legco must
be elected by universal suffrage, making universal suffrage a legal objective.
8 The 31st Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth NPC decided on December
29, 2007 “that the election of the fifth chief executive of the HKSAR in 2017 may be
implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the chief executive is selected
by universal suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR may be
implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal suffrage.”

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14
HOW EAST ASIANS VIEW A
RISING CHINA
Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu1

Over the past two decades, China’s increasing economic power, military strength
and political inf luence has been widely acknowledged in the world, particularly
in the region of East Asia. Overtaking the United States as the world’s largest
economy in real terms in 2014, a rising China poses serious challenges to US
hegemony in virtually every aspect (Christensen, 2015). In response, the Obama
administration’s strategic pivot to Asia clearly indicated America’s key interest in
consolidating its dominance in Asia, strengthening its alliance system with East
Asia, and upgrading its engagement with and possible containment of China’s
rise. The Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) men-
tioned China 23 times and concentrated on identifying the mounting threats
posed by China and pledged that the United States would push back against them.
Meanwhile, significant changes in China’s foreign policies, shifting from
Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “concealing our ability and biding our time” to Xi
Jinping’s more ambitious and assertive approach, have shown that Beijing now
vigorously seeks to play a leadership role in the region, enhance its inf luence over
the global agenda and prepare for a possible strategic showdown with the United
States and/or Japan. Nonetheless, the change of China’s foreign policy was not
a sudden event, but rather an incremental process which started from the 2008
Global Financial Crisis (caused by the US subprime mortgage crisis) and further
accelerated since 2012 when Xi Jinping rose to power as the top leader. China’s
strong economy and its robust performance during the Global Financial Crisis
gave Chinese policymakers a clear vision that the power gap between China and
the United States has rapidly narrowed. Some observers have predicted that if the
trend continues that the replacement of the United States by China as the world’s
dominant economic power will materialize in the foreseeable future (Subrama-
nian, 2011). A school of thought, led by prominent Chinese scholars such as Yan
Xuetong at Tsinghua University, also quickly emerged and called for China to be
 How East Asians view a rising China 263

prepared to become a responsible great power and argued that its power competi-
tion with the United States is inevitable ( Yan, 2011).
China’s East Asian neighbors, in view of the high stakes involved in their
inescapable geographic, economic or political connections with China, are keenly
aware of the activeness, vigorousness and assertiveness associated with such foreign
policy changes. The question of how East Asians view a rising China, therefore,
does not just make eye-catching headlines in news media but also has serious
implications for international relations in East Asia and even the world today.
Most media coverage and academic work has focused on how China and the
United States have deployed economic, political and even military tools for their
competition in East Asia. Clearly, f lexing their respective muscles plays a criti-
cal role in sending clear signals to each other in their strategic interactions by
demonstrating their capability and commitment. Showing off “hard power” also
generates valuable information for their East Asian audiences, who continuously
update their assessments and ref lect on their strategic options and responses.
Nevertheless, as Joseph Nye has famously argued, there is more than one way to
inf luence others’ behavior and achieve one’s goals. China and the United States
also are keen on “softer power” competition in East Asia, by winning the hearts
and minds of East Asians and, hopefully, getting East Asians “to want the out-
comes that you want” (Nye, 2004, p. 5).
Over the last decade, Chinese policy elites have increasingly recognized that
soft power and national image management are essential aspects of China’s for-
eign policy agenda. To pursue the peaceful rise/peaceful development policy in
Chinese grand strategy, Chinese leaders have sought to integrate Chinese hard
power and soft power to create a soft rise for China ( Wang, 2008, p. 257). Chi-
na’s charm offensive places emphasis on presenting itself as a responsible rising
power with a sincere and benign intention of contributing to a new regional and
global order with its vision of “harmonious world” and “the shared destiny of
human beings.” It has launched a public diplomacy campaign on a worldwide
scale through establishing hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world,
running 24-hour CCTV news channels in major languages and offering scholar-
ships for tens of thousands of international students.
However, despite its recent effort to prop up its soft power, most Western
observers remain doubtful that Beijing can convince the world that China is a
benign and benevolent power and attract others to Chinese culture, its way of
life and vision for the global community ( Kurlantzick, 2009; Nye, 2010). They
believe that China’s authoritarian political system could always be its liability and
that its mercantilist economic strategy still tarnishes it reputation (Shambaugh,
2015, p. 99).
Southeast Asia could be an important test site for China’s charm offense. On
the one hand, China has resolved to deepen the economic partnership with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by signing the first major free
trade agreement. China has become either the most important source of import
or the top export market for a great majority of ASEAN countries. Furthermore,
264 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

Southeast Asia is poised to benefit from the massive inf low of China’s soft loans
and foreign direct investments under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative
( Leverett and Wu, 2017). At the same time, China has been keen in expanding
its cultural ties with ASEAN countries as there exist very few ideological barri-
ers. By 2016 China had established 31 Confucius Institutes in Southeast Asia and
more than 500 scholarships for citizens of ASEAN countries to study in China
each year. On the other hand, the tug-of-war over political and economic inf lu-
ence between a receding American hegemony and an ascending China has been
felt strongly among the ASEAN countries, in particular, the heat of the escalat-
ing tension in the South China Sea. The anxiety has grown out of the worry that
they might be pressured to take a side.
And yet there have been few systematic investigations using public opinion
data to evaluate how its neighbors view a rising China. In this chapter, we uti-
lize the latest two rounds of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) to investigate
how Asian citizens evaluate the rise of China.2 Our survey shows that although
China’s economic pull is so strong, its distinctive post-socialist political system
no longer stands in the way of earning more respect among its democratic neigh-
bors. Our data also clearly show that Southeast Asian publics are not prepared
to take sides in the US–China strategic competition because they believe that
the benefit and cost of US inf luence and Chinese inf luence are not mutually
replaceable, nor incompatible. We begin our analysis with an overview of the
important developments in terms of the changing configuration of the strategic
competition between China and the United States in the region during this criti-
cal juncture.

China’s emerging global and regional strategy

under Xi’s leadership
Since 2012, Beijing has shown a clear break from its longstanding low-key for-
eign policy. Today, China does not just promulgate its peaceful intentions as an
ascending power and its willingness to contribute to the region’s stability and
prosperity, but also launches new initiatives of economic partnership and mecha-
nisms of regional integration and multilateral cooperation, hence actively foster-
ing new international order at both the global and regional level. Such distinctive
change was widely perceived as the result of China’s changing leadership from
Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, who has carried out a wide-ranging anti-corruption
campaign at home and become the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng
Xiaoping. Formally Xi still shares power with six other members of the Standing
Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) through a
scheme of collective leadership. He nevertheless has centralized decision-making
power over all important policy domains in his own hands and his confidence
about the bigger role Beijing could and should play in world affairs also ref lects
his strong leadership.
 How East Asians view a rising China 265

The policy turn of China’s global and regional strategy under Xi Jinping can
be summarized by the following narrative: we are witnessing a more resourceful,
more assertive, more ambitious and more aggressive China under his steward-
ship. To begin with, nowadays there are many more policy instruments as well
as the greater economic leverage at China’s disposal due to its rapid economic
development. According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s gross
domestic product (GDP) adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) reached
$17.6 trillion in 2014, surpassing the United States’ $17.4 trillion. The outf low
of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) also grew dramatically, topping $120
billion in 2015 and making China a net capital exporter. Furthermore, China
continues to be a major engine for global economy growth even as its economic
growth rate has slowed down. In 2016, China contributed an estimated 39%
of the annual growth in the world’s economy ( Roach, 2016). China is already
the top trading partner for most ASEAN countries. Under Xi Jinping, China
is embracing Southeast Asia with a renewed trade and investment push. Chi-
nese investment is transforming its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors like never
before, especially for the region’s frontier-market economies, such as Laos, Cam-
bodia and Myanmar ( Roman, 2016).
Another notable change in China’s international strategy lies in its greater
willingness to assert its demands, vision and policy objectives. China under
Xi is eager to promote the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation to the
world and to claim China’s global economic leadership among the developing
countries of the world. Most notably, China under Xi has made more explicit
demands on other countries to respect its core interests, in particular its ter-
ritorial integrity, including its sovereign claims over the East and South China
Sea, as well as its long-standing positions on Tibet and Taiwan. Beijing has also
become more assertive in playing an agenda-setting role with a much broader
regional and global scope, for instance by proposing a “New Model of Great
Power Relations” for Sino–US relations, peddling the initiative of Asia-Pacific
Free Trade Area through the APEC Summit and driving the agenda of the 2016
G20 Summit with its promotion of the “Hangzhou Consensus,” which was
intended to reorient the G20’s mission away from putting out fires to one of
spearheading measures that will encourage development and stability around the
globe on a long-term basis.
In a wide range of issues areas, China has undertaken ambitious new initia-
tives, something unthinkable just a few years ago. The launch of the One Belt
One Road initiative in 2013 has become the hallmark of Xi’s global strategy
with the ambition to reshape the region’s geopolitical and geoeconomic land-
scape ( Leverett and Wu, 2017). Many important strategic moves emanate from
the One Belt One Road grand strategy. They include enlarging and upgrading
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization through recruiting both India and Pak-
istan as new members and the launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) to channel financial resources into ambitious infrastructure projects
266 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

abroad. All these strategic moves entail China’s ambitious goals to rewrite the
rules of economic engagement and the parameters of globalization.
However, its rapid military buildup may also trigger negative views of China’s
rise. In particular, China has become visibly less self-restrained in f lexing its
muscles. The commission of its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, into the Chinese
Navy in 2012 signified Beijing’s commitment to strengthen its power projection
capability far beyond its coastal waters. China has also undertaken a more con-
frontational approach in handling the territorial disputes in the East and South
China Sea. For example, China conducts frequent military exercises in the area,
sends out China Coast Guard vessels to patrol in the disputed waters, and con-
tinuously enlarges the construction of manmade reefs in the name of providing
public services for international society. The PLA is also pushing for a grandiose
upgrade program for acquiring a range of cutting-edge weapon systems, from
anti-satellite missiles and stealth bombers to hypersonic glide vehicles. All the
above evidence indicates that China is resolved to counterbalance the Obama
administration’s rebalance to Asia and compete with the United States head-on
in military deployment.
All the above discussions indicate that the United States under the Obama
administration made some progress to thwart the trend of a declining US pres-
ence and inf luence in the region, but probably not enough to counterbalance
China’s growing inf luence in the military, political and economic spheres in
East Asia. The changing configuration in the region’s strategic landscape would
no doubt shape Asian people’s views toward China versus the United States, to
which we now turn.

How are China and the United States perceived

by East Asians?
Soft power is an important concept for explaining why a great power can achieve
its political inf luence more effectively through appeal and attraction rather than
inducements or coercion. From the sender’s perspective, Chinese leaders have
long understood the importance of how China is perceived by other countries
and have attempted to cultivate it for some time. Since 2004, China has invested
tremendous resources to conduct a public diplomacy campaign, even before
China’s rise was widely perceived as a hard fact. However, it is important to look
at the picture from the receivers’ side, since as Nye correctly pointed out, soft
power depends on willing interpreters and receivers. If the targeted receivers are
not aware of the sender’s messages, the soft power simply does not exist.
Many observers believe that while Asian people are increasingly cognizant
of China’s growing political and economic power, they are not necessarily per-
suaded by its stated foreign policy objectives and strategic intention, and much
less attracted by its political system. To verify this received view, we need scien-
tifically reliable public opinion data across Asian countries. Although a number
of cross-national survey projects, such as Pew Global Attitudes Survey and BBC
 How East Asians view a rising China 267

Global Scan, are in place they only cover a few Asian countries. The Asian
Barometer Survey (ABS) fills an important void in our understanding of the
phenomenon of China’s rise and its implications for policymakers. The Fourth
Wave of the ABS was administered in 14 East Asian countries and territories
based on country-wide probability sampling and face-to-face interviews. In its
most recent two waves, the ABS has incorporated a battery containing several
questions related to the rise of China. The results from this battery can help us
understand how citizens in the region view China in the context of its growing
economic inf luence and international stature.3
The first question regarding the rise of China is to ask the respondents “Which
country has the most inf luence in Asia now?” The answer set provides the fol-
lowing five choices: “China,” “Japan,” “India,” “United States” and “Others.” As
Figure 14.1 shows, in countries which are territorially adjacent (such as Myan-
mar) or culturally proximate to China (such as South Korea and Singapore) more
than 50% of people think China has the most inf luence in Asia for both Waves 3
and 4 of the survey. In about half of Southeast Asian countries (namely the Phil-
ippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and Malaysia), citizens continue to believe that
the United States has more inf luence in the region. However, more and more
Southeast Asians have recognized China as the most inf luential. Between our
two waves of the survey, this perception grew by a magnitude of at least 2% (in
Cambodia) and as much as 14% (in Indonesia), while in most countries the inf lu-
ence of the United States was perceived to be in decline. There was a particularly
dramatic change in Thailand, where the percentage perceiving that the United

ABS 3 ABS 4

31% 56% South Korea 67% 25%

21% 71% Hong Kong 66% 24%
21% 67% Taiwan 63% 23%
29% 61% Japan 61% 27%
13% 66% Mongolia 61% 9%
15% 69% Vietnam 60% 18%
Myanmar 57% 32%
33% 56% China 56% 31%
28% 60% Singapore 54% 29%
44% 42% Thailand 49% 19%
43% 36% Malaysia 42% 46%
41% 23% Indonesia 37% 37%
58% 26% Cambodia 28% 48%
65% 17% Philippines 22% 59%
34% 50% Overall 52% 30%

Wave 3 China Wave 3 US Wave 4 China Wave 4 US

FIGURE 14.1 Which country has the most inf luence in Asia now?
Source: Data from ABS 3 (2010–2012) and ABS 4 (2014–2016).
268 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

States has the most inf luence in the region declined from 49% to 19% in the con-
text of the worsening US–Thailand relationship following the 2014 coup and the
strengthening of Sino–Thai economic ties. Our data suggest that Obama’s pivot
to Asia policy did little to reverse the perception of the United States’ declining
inf luence. However, one can also argue that the decline could have been steeper
without the strategic rebalancing on Obama’s watch.
So far our data have shown that the rise of China has been recognized by
the great majority of East Asians. But the more important question is: do East
Asians welcome China’s growing inf luence? ABS Wave 4 includes two sets of
questions that ask respondents to evaluate Chinese and American inf luence in
terms of whether it does more good than harm, or more harm than good, with
reference to the region and to their own countries, respectively. If the reference
point is the region (see Figure 14.2), we find that American inf luence was gen-
erally perceived as more positive (average 73%), with the country breakdowns
ranging from 92% (Philippines) to 45% (Indonesia). On the other hand, evalu-
ation of China’s inf luence was not as favorable (average 56%) and highly polar-
ized: predominantly negative in Japan (11%), Vietnam (20%), Myanmar (28%),
and Mongolia (32%), predominantly positive in Cambodia (67%), Korea (75%),
Singapore (71%), Thailand (86%), Hong Kong (79%), Malaysia (75%), and Indo-
nesia (67%), and very much divided in the Philippines (41%) and Taiwan (55%).
This suggests that most Asians view the presence and inf luence of the United
States in the region as largely benign, but views of China’s inf luence are very
divergent. While many clearly regard China as an opportunity and welcome it,
some perceive it as a threat and regard its rise with apprehension. If the reference
point is changed to each respondent’s country (see Figure 14.3), we find similar
results: unanimously positive for the United States (above 60% in all countries,
average 79%) and very much polarized for China (varying from 20% to 94%,
average 58%).
In the ABS Wave 3, the same evaluative questions were also asked about China’s
inf luence, and it is interesting to examine the magnitude of change in popular
perception toward the impact of China on the region. As Figure 14.4 illustrates,
in most countries there was little change in popular views of China’s inf lu-
ence, with the exceptions of significant declines of favorable evaluations in the
Philippines (73% to 41%) and Vietnam (56% to 20%), and significant increases
in Thailand (68% to 86%) and South Korea (53% to 75%). The decline in the
first two countries is most likely associated with the escalation of territorial dis-
putes with China in the South China Sea, while the increase in the latter two
countries might be associated with the pro-China policy direction of the Thai
military government and President Park’s administration. In the latter case, we
have to bear in mind that the recent controversy between China and South
Korea over THAAD deployment might lead to a decline in positive evaluations
of China’s inf luence. Overall, Asians’ views of China’s inf luence over the region
are rather divergent and depend very much on the contextual dynamics within
each country.
FIGURE 14.2 Perception of Chinese and US inf luence on the region
FIGURE 14.3 Perception of Chinese and US inf luence on their own country
 How East Asians view a rising China 271

%
%
97
98
100%

%
%
86

%
%
82

75%

%
78

78
77

%
%
75
80%
%

73
%

%
71
71

%
68

67

67
59%
64

%
55%
%

56
60%

53

%
41

%
32%
40%

%
33

28

%
%
20
19
%
20%

11
0%

Wave 3 Wave 4

FIGURE 14.4 Positive perception about the impact of China on the region
Source: Data from ABS 3 (2010–2012) and ABS 4 (2014–2016).

The two important findings so far are the following: first, the rise of China
has been recognized by the great majority of East Asians and that China’s grow-
ing inf luence in the region is more intensely felt by countries that are geographi-
cally or culturally proximate to China. Second, there is great divergence among
East Asians regarding whether they welcome China’s expanding inf luence. In
the most general sense, Asian people acquire their view toward China on the
basis of the perceived risk and benefit brought by a rising China. For coun-
tries that are geographically non-adjacent and without territorial disputes with
China, the consideration is predominantly about the pros and cons of expanding
economic ties with China. For countries that are geographically adjacent and/
or geopolitically adversarial, the consideration might be more complicated and
more emphasis is placed on security and the geopolitical consequences of China’s
ascendance. Still for others, such as Taiwan and Korea, the myriad factors that
should be taken into consideration entail multidimensional calculations under
the constraints of competing objectives and acute trade-offs. We need to care-
fully interpret the meaning of these data with due consideration of each coun-
try’s historical past and contemporary contextual dynamics.

Ambivalent attitudes toward US–China strategic competition

The conventional wisdom in foreign policy circles tends to be that pro-US and
pro-China attitudes are mutually exclusive. But this might not be the case in the
Asia-Pacific region, even for those citizens whose countries are facing a potential
security threat from a rising China because for most East Asians the role of China
and the United States are not mutually replaceable.
In the following, we correlate the measures of favorable perceptions of China
and the United States in selective country samples and report the results in
Table 14.1. As can be seen, only Hong Kong and China show significant negative
272 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

TABLE 14.1 Selected country correlations of favorable

perception of China and the United States

Country Correlation

Hong Kong −.236**

China −.102**
Vietnam −.017
Philippines .009
Mongolia .021
Cambodia .023
Taiwan .033
Myanmar .125**
Japan .146**
Korea .224**
Singapore .284**
Indonesia .308**
Malaysia .314**
Thailand .408**
Note: Correlation coefficients between respondents’ view of
the nature of US inf luence and that of China, ABS Wave 4.

correlations between the two measures, which is perfectly understandable given

their roles as one of the contesting parties. For the following five countries—
Vietnam, Philippines, Mongolia, Cambodia and Taiwan—the correlations are
not significant, which suggests that most people do not make a sharp contrast
between the United States and China. For the remaining countries, including
Myanmar, Japan and Korea, the correlations are all significantly positive. It sug-
gests that many people take a benign view of both the United States and China
at the same time while other people might take a skeptical view toward both. In
a nutshell, for many Asians both the United States’ inf luence and China’s inf lu-
ence could be desirable (as well as compatible) at the same time. Assuming that
the nature of strategic competition between the two great powers in the Asia-
Pacific region is a zero-sum game might misrepresent what most countries in
the region think.
In most Asian countries, people welcome the strong presence of both simply
because the United States cannot replace China as the locomotive of economic
growth while China can hardly replace the United States as the ultimate guar-
antor of their country’s security. For more sophisticated Asian minds, Sino–US
competition could be beneficial and the balance of two great powers in the
Asia-Pacific region might be in their best interest. At the same time, in some
countries the popular backlash against globalization might lead to anger at both.
So it is also not difficult to understand why certain Asian people take a skepti-
cal view of both the United States and China. For people who are harmed by
economic opening, financial instability, and foreign competition, the United
States is viewed as the primary architect of this neo-liberal economic order while
China is the direct source of foreign competition.
 How East Asians view a rising China 273

What shapes East Asians’ perceptions of China

and the United States?
Asian peoples’ perceptions of the nature of China’s rise and its impact on the
region are determined by a multitude of factors, including contextual factors
and the respondents’ socio-economic status as well as political inclination. In the
following, we focus on two contextual factors with important policy implica-
tions. The first contextual factor is the perceived democratic distance, which is a
measure of the difference between the self-rated level of democracy in one’s own
country and in China (generally the lowest) or in the United States (generally
the highest).4 As shown in Figure 14.5, perceived democratic distance and posi-
tive perception of China’s inf luence are unrelated in 12 of the country samples
(Hong Kong and China not included), while there is a strong positive correla-
tion (r = .57, p = .06) between perceived democratic distance from the United
States and positive perception of US inf luence. This finding indicates that many
Asians still look to the United States as a model of democracy, and that this view
of American democracy is an important factor that affects whether the inf luence
of the United States is seen in positive or negative terms. In contrast, perceived
democratic distance makes no difference to whether the inf luence of authoritar-
ian China is viewed in positive or negative terms (r = .00, p = .99). This suggests
that China’s one-party authoritarian system is no longer an obstacle to winning
recognition and respect among East Asians.
Another important contextual factor is associated with the perception of eco-
nomic opportunity versus threat from China’s fast-growing economy. We mea-
sure this factor by taking the aggregated mean of supportive attitudes toward
economic openness. As Figure 14.6 makes evident, support for economic open-
ness is associated with positive evaluations toward US inf luence (r = .16, p =.62),
but negative evaluations toward China’s inf luence in the region (r = −.42,
p = .18), although neither finding passes the significance test. This indicates
that, along with democratic distance, economic rationality might be another
consistent contextual factor in swaying people’s perceptions of the favorability
of the impact of China and the United States in the region. Specifically, if the
outlier case of Japan is dropped, the negative correlation in the perceptions in
the China case converge back to a neutral effect as we saw in Figure 14.3 regard-
ing the democratic distance (r = −.04, p = .90), while the positive correlation in
the perception of the US case becomes slightly stronger (r = .22, p = .52). This
indicates that the appeal of China’s economy may be a mixed factor in shifting
people’s cognitive preference when assessing the impact of the two great powers.
However, it is clear that those who support economic openness do not necessar-
ily view China and the United States as strategic rivals in the Asia-Pacific region.

The competition over soft power

To effectively capture the essence of soft power, the ABS survey measures the
attractiveness of various countries as development models. Our respondents were
274 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

3.5
Myanmar 2014
3
Mongolia 2014
Perceived Democratic Distance

2.5 Cambodia 2015

2 Korea 2015
Taiwan 2014
1.5 Thailand 2014
Philippines 2014

1
Japan 2016
Vietnam 2015
0.5 Singapore 2014
Indonesia 2016
0
45% 55% 65% 75% 85% 95%
Malaysia 2014
−0.5

-1
Positive Perception of U.S.'s Influence on the Region

3.5

Taiwan 2014
3
Perceived Democratic Distance

Japan 2016

2.5
Thailand 2014

2 Korea 2015
Singapore 2014
Vietnam 2015
1.5

1 Philippines 2014
Malaysia 2014
Mongolia 2014
0.5 Indonesia 2016
Cambodia 2015
Myanmar 2014
0
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Positive Perception of China's Influence on the Region

FIGURE 14.5 Perceived democratic distance and favorable perception of Chinese and
US inf luence

presented with the following question: “Which country should be a model

for our country’s future development?” Options included “the United States,”
“China,” “India,” “Japan,” “Singapore,” “Others” (with detailed answers
recorded) and “We should follow our own model.” The basic logic is that if East
Asians volunteer to endorse any society as the model for their respective societ-
ies’ future development (without mentioning any of these societies’ military,
economic and political leverage over their own), it should be reasonable to argue
that the society they endorsed has quite effectively won their hearts and minds
 3.2
Japan 2016
Support for Economic Openness

2.7

Taiwan 2014
Korea 2015
Singapore 2014 Vietnam 2015
2.2
Philippines 2014

Thailand 2014 Myanmar 2015

Malaysia 2014
1.7 Mongolia 2014
Indonesia 2016
Cambodia 2015

1.2
25% 35% 45% 55% 65% 75% 85% 95% 105%
Positive Perception of U.S.' Influence on the Region

3.7
Support for Economic Openness

3.2
Japan 2016

2.7

Taiwan 2014
Korea 2015
Vietnam 2015 Singapore 2014
2.2
Philippines 2014
Myanmar 2015 Thailand 2014
Indonesia 2016 Malaysia 2014
1.7 Mongolia 2014
Cambodia 2015

1.2
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Positive Perception of China's Influence on the Region

FIGURE 14.6 Support for economic openness and favorable perception of Chinese
and US inf luence
Notes: Support for economic openness is the mean of q152 and q153, excluding 7, 8, 9 in Wave 3.
q168, q169 used in Wave 4, excluding 7, 8, 9. Individual country weights used.
Mean because Indonesia only asked q168 in Wave 4.
For Wave 3, positive image of the United States is based on those who chose the United States as
the most inf luential country in the region.
276 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Table 14.2 summarizes the
findings from the two waves of ABS surveys (2010–2016).
To make the information more accessible for our readers, we organized the
findings based on the consistency in the results of the two waves of surveys and
separated the 13 societies into two groups.5 Basically, we identified the mode
(which is the answer category chosen by the largest percentage of respondents) of
popular endorsement in each society for each wave and then compared the dif-
ferences between the modes. If the mode of popular endorsement in a society did
not change between the two waves of the survey, this society is labeled as a “con-
sistent follower”; otherwise, it is labeled as a “switcher.” As shown in Table 14.2 ,
in nine East Asian societies there is a consistent mode in their people’s preferred
models for future development; while in four societies there are some changes in
the modes of their popular preferences.

TABLE 14.2 Preferred models for future development in East Asian societies

China United States Our Own Japan Singapore

Consistent followers

Philippines 2010 7% 68% 0% 17% 6%

2014 6% 66% 1% 17% 8%
Cambodia 2012 20% 42% 5% 22% 6%
2015 15% 47% 3% 12% 3%
South Korea 2011 8% 39% 10% 23% 16%
2015 10% 47% 11% 10% 18%
Indonesia 2011 14% 26% 8% 35% 13%
2016 16% 17% 13% 34% 16%
Taiwan 2010 5% 15% 22% 31% 23%
2014 6% 14% 13% 31% 20%
Japan 2011 2% 19% 52% – 10%
2016 1% 21% 45% – 10%
Singapore 2010 13% 24% 38% 17% –
2015 17% 22% 36% 16% –
Myanmar – – – – –
2015 1% 10% 27% 23% 18%
Hong Kong 2012 7% 13% 25% 8% 43%
2016 23% 15% 23% 11% 24%
Switchers
Thailand 2010 16% 16% 46% 12% 8%
2014 23% 18% 8% 27% 13%
Vietnam 2010 22% 9% 42% 16% 10%
2015 2% 29% 6% 38% 19%
Malaysia 2011 14% 8% 34% 31% 11%
2014 21% 11% 17% 31% 17%
Mongolia 2010 10% 25% 29% 18% 8%
2015 8% 22% 16% 21% 11%
Source: ABS Survey Waves 3 and 4.
 How East Asians view a rising China 277

Among the consistent followers, the largest percentage of people in the

Philippines, Cambodia and South Korea identified the United States as their
preferred model for future development in both waves of the survey. The
endorsement rate was the highest in the Philippines (around 67%) and rela-
tively low in Cambodia (around 44%) and South Korea (around 43%). Japan
was consistently endorsed by the largest percentage of people in Indonesia and
Taiwan as their preferred model for future development and this enthusiasm did
not change much between the two waves of the survey: around 34% in Indo-
nesia and 31% in Taiwan. Meanwhile, for the largest percentage of people in
Japan, Singapore and Myanmar, none of the foreign societies claimed the largest
group of followers.6 Instead, “Our own model” won the hearts and minds of
the largest percentage of Japanese, Singaporeans and Myanmar people (around
49% in Japan, 37% in Singapore and 27% in Myanmar). The largest group of
Hong Kong residents embraced Singapore as a promising model for their future
development in both waves of the survey, although the percentage dropped sig-
nificantly from 43% in 2012 to 24% in 2016. Among the switchers, the largest
percentage of people in Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Mongolia preferred
“Our own model” in 2010 and 2011 (around 46% in Thailand, 42% in Vietnam,
34% in Malaysia and 29% in Mongolia), but the endorsement rate dropped sig-
nificantly in all four societies four or five years later (around 8%, 6%, 17% and
16%, respectively). In 2014 and 2015, the mode of popular preferences in Thai-
land, Vietnam and Malaysia switched and Japan was widely embraced by these
people as the model for their future development (around 27% in Thailand,
38% in Vietnam, and 31% in Malaysia respectively). Meanwhile, the largest
percentage of Mongolians endorsed the United States as their preferred model
for future development in 2016 (around 22%, just one percentage point higher
than that for Japan).
Clearly, the United States and Japan are the two major country models that
a large number of East Asians find attractive and are willing to embrace as the
model for their respective societies’ future development. As we pooled the two
waves of survey data together and used country-year as the unit of analysis, the
pattern is quite obvious: among the 25 country-year cases, (1) the United States
is the mode of popular endorsement in 7 cases, (2) Japan is the mode in 9 cases
(including Japan itself ), (3) “Our own model” is the mode in 5 cases and (4) Sin-
gapore is the mode in 4 cases (including Singapore itself ). It is worth noting that
in two cases—Hong Kong 2016 and Thailand 2014—China is quite close to the
most popular model. Overall, in none of the 13 East Asian societies polled in the
two waves of the surveys was China the most popular preferred model for future
development. Clearly the United States has the upper hand in this soft power
competition against China in East Asia. Even Japan and Singapore have done a
better job than China in winning the admiration of East Asians.
However, one should interpret the significance of the above findings with
due consideration of the varying level of economic development. China, the
United States, Japan and Singapore are not competing on a level playing field.
After all, it is very natural for Asian people to endorse the United States, Japan or
278 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

Singapore as a model for future development because the three are widely rec-
ognized as countries enjoying a high standard of living. It is unrealistic to expect
that people living in countries with very high per capita income will endorse the
Chinese model as China is still a middle-income developing country. The more
meaningful question to ask is twofold: first, whether the Chinese model can
attract a significant number of followers in countries that are still economically
lagging behind; second, whether the Chinese model has gained strength versus
the American model over time in these countries.
To pick up these interesting nuances and dynamics, we zoomed in on how
East Asians viewed China versus the United States as competing models for their
future development. Basically, we examined changes in the gap between popular
endorsement of the United States and China between the two waves of the ABS
survey. The results are presented in Table 14.3.
Similar to the approach used for presentation in Table 14.2 , we categorized
the thirteen East Asian societies into two groups: (1) East Asian societies show-
ing consistently higher popular endorsement of the United States over China
(or the other way around) between the two waves of surveys and (2) those with
the higher popular endorsement switching from the United States to China (or
the other way around) between the two waves of the survey. The former were
labeled societies with “consistent preferences” while the latter were labeled soci-
eties with “switching preferences.”
Overall, among the 13 East Asian societies, 11 have shown consistent popular
preferences as their people assessed the United States and China as distinct models
for their respective societies’ future development. More specifically, in the Phil-
ippines, South Korea, Cambodia, Japan and Mongolia, a much larger percent-
age of people repeatedly endorsed the United States than endorsed China as the
preferred model for future development. The difference in popular endorsement
ranges between 14 percentage points (in Mongolia) and 61 percentage points (in
the Philippines). In these societies the United States outperforms China consis-
tently and by a large margin in soft power competition.
Although the United States still beats China in soft power competition in
Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan, the popular endorsement gap is much
smaller. Furthermore, this endorsement gap shrank dramatically between the two
waves of the survey. In 2010 and 2011, the endorsement rate of the United States
in Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan outnumbered that of China by around ten
percentage points. Years later, the difference dropped significantly, particularly in
Indonesia (to around 1 percentage point) and Singapore (to around 5 percentage
points). In these societies, although the United States still enjoys more popularity
than China, its advantage clearly has been checked and weakened.
It is also interesting to see that in Malaysia and Thailand China did equally
well as or even better than the United States in winning their people’s hearts
and minds between 2010 and 2014. There was an increase in the percentage of
Malaysians and Thai people preferring China over the United States as the model
for future development between the two waves of the survey, increasing from
 How East Asians view a rising China 279

TABLE 14.3 Preferences over the Chinese versus the US models in East Asian societies

China > United States United States > China

Consistent preferences

Philippines 2010 • (61%)

2014 • (60%)
South Korea 2011 • (31%)
2015 • (37%)
Cambodia 2012 • (22%)
2015 • (32%)
Japan 2011 • (17%)
2016 • (20%)
Mongolia 2010 • (15%)
2015 • (14%)
Myanmar –
2015 • (9%)
Indonesia 2011 • (12%)
2016 • (1%)
Singapore 2010 • (11%)
2015 • (5%)
Taiwan 2010 • (10%)
2014 • (8%)
Malaysia 2011 ◦ (6%)
2014 ◦ (10%)
Thailand 2010 ◦ (0%)
2014 ◦ (5%)
Switching preferences
Hong Kong 2012 • (6%)
2016 ◦ (8%)
Vietnam 2010 ◦ (13%)
2015 • (20%)
Source: ABS Survey Waves 3 and 4.
Note: Percentage differences in parentheses.

6% to 10% in Malaysia and from 0% to 5% in Thailand. Although China still

was not endorsed by the largest percentage of people as their preferred model for
future development in the two societies ( Japan was the mode of popular endorse-
ment in 2014 in both cases), its charm offensive has paid off to some extent. In
Malaysia and Thailand the Chinese model has gained popularity probably for
following two reasons. First, China has significantly deepened its economic ties
with both countries and emerged as a major source of foreign investment and
as well as a major financial underwriter of their infrastructure projects. Second,
both countries have experienced democratic backsliding and clearly embarked
on a path of authoritarian consolidation and thus leaned closer to China in terms
of ideological distance.7
280 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

When it comes to East Asian societies with switching preferences, the stories
are quite complex as both China and the United States have made gains and
losses (without a clear-cut pattern). Hong Kong presents a rather interesting case.
Between the two waves of the survey, Hong Kong witnessed a switch from a
higher endorsement of the United States (a difference of 6%) as the preferred
model for future development in 2012 to a higher endorsement of China as the
preferred model (a difference of 8%) in 2016.8
Despite rising political activism among its youth in promoting direct popu-
lar election for the chief executive and some rising tension between Hong
Kong residents and mainland Chinese tourists, public opinion data suggest
that the Chinese model has gained popularity, jumping from only winning
7% of the respondents to 23% largely at the expense of the Singaporean
model whose popularity dropped from 43% to 24% between 2011 and 2016.
The fact that not many Hong Kong people embraced the American model
is probably due to a very practical reason: the overarching framework of
“One-Country, Two-Systems” precludes the possibility of adopting the US
democratic model. The Chinese model has gained popularity perhaps due to
the fact that China is expected to overtake the United States as the biggest
economy in the world in the near future and across the border Shenzhen has
been a showcase of technological innovation and industrial upgrading, some-
thing Hong Kong is lacking.
In contrast, the Vietnamese almost reversed their endorsement of China over
the United States as their preferred model for future development between the
two waves of the survey. In 2010, China defeated the United States by a margin
of 13 percentage points but in 2015 the United States outperformed China by a
margin of 20percentage points. Although the largest percentage of Vietnamese
people endorsed neither the United States nor China as their preferred model
for future development, clearly territorial disputes between China and Vietnam
have played a key role in dragging China down in the soft power competition
against the United States.
Similar to the message delivered by Table 14.2 , the evidence presented in
Table 14.3 suggests that the United States, at least for the time being, enjoys
the upper hand in Sino–US soft power competition in East Asia by securing
a higher endorsement rate than China in 19 out of the 25 country-year cases.
Nevertheless, this is not a static equilibrium but a dynamic and ongoing process
with both sides continuously making efforts and strategically adjusting policies
for the soft power competition. One interesting dynamic is worth noting: China
is narrowing its gap with the United States in Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan,
and consolidating gains or even furthering its advantage in Indonesia and Thai-
land, while the United States is reinforcing and expanding its advantage in the
Philippines, South Korea, Cambodia, Japan and Mongolia. In the battlegrounds
of Hong Kong and Vietnam, both sides made some gains while suffering some
setbacks.
 How East Asians view a rising China 281

By way of conclusion: policy implications

With the marked shift of the center of regional economic gravity from Japan
to China and an abdication of economic leadership by the United States under
Donald Trump, East Asia is destined to become one of the few regions in the
world where a non-democratic regional power dominates the agenda of regional
economic cooperation and perhaps the only region in the world where newly
democratized countries become economically integrated with and dependent
on non-democratic countries. As China’s economic pull is so strong, its distinc-
tive post-socialist political system no longer stands in the way of forming closer
economic ties with its democratic neighbors. A similar trend is taking place in
the steady deepening of economic ties between China and the newly democra-
tized Central and Eastern European countries. This also implies that the overall
regional political environment will become more hospitable for many authori-
tarian and hybrid regimes, such as Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia.
While the ideological cleavage is withering away, the conf lict over economic
openness might stand in the way because in virtually every East Asian society
the benefits and risks of economic integration with China have been unevenly
distributed. If China aspires to become a more respectable architect of regional
integration and champion of free trade, it will have to create a regional envi-
ronment more conducive to inclusive growth. Otherwise, growing economic
polarization will take its toll on domestic support for a pro-China coalition in
most of its trading partners. Chinese leaders also need to be aware of the sensi-
tivity of ethnic cleavages in Malaysia and Indonesia, where the ethnic Chinese
minority have been struggling with their fragile political cohabitation with the
Muslim majority.
Our data suggests that following Donald Trump’s swearing in as the President
of the United States, his country will still enjoy a reservoir of goodwill in most
of East Asia, even though his campaign rhetoric might have already reduced
somewhat the generally positive view of US inf luence in the region. The Trump
administration’s anti-Muslim propensity is likely to do the worst damage to the
American image in the places where the United States can least afford it: Malay-
sia and Indonesia.
His administration should not take the reservoir of goodwill for granted and
ought to be alarmed by the fact that perceptions of US inf luence relative to that
of China are not in his country’s favor. In our Wave 4 (2014–2016) surveys, the
Philippines was the only country where a majority of those questioned believed
that America had the most regional inf luence at that time. Regarding other
treaty allies, only 27% of the Japanese surveyed and 25% of Koreans thought
that the United States had the greatest inf luence. In this regard, his decision to
withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will only strengthen this
impression of American decline and withdrawal from the region.
US inf luence will still be more favorably perceived as long as Asians con-
tinue to identify America as their democratic model. However, this long-standing
282 Yun-han Chu, Min-hua Huang and Jie Lu

advantage for American soft power could be undermined by US foreign policy

under Trump, which runs the risk of squandering both America’s policy cred-
ibility and its image as an icon of liberal democracy in the eyes of Asian people.
Over the long run, however, the United States can still improve its image in East
Asia if it is able to improve its currently dysfunctional democratic system and if
it can serve as an economic alternative to China.
Our data also clearly show that East Asians are not prepared to take sides in
the US–China strategic competition because they believe that the benefit and
cost of US inf luence and Chinese inf luence are not mutually replaceable nor
incompatible. In fact a balance of two great powers in the Asia-Pacific region
might serve their interest best. If the United States under Donald Trump decides
to step up the containment game against China, he should not expect too much
support from Asian countries except Japan. All these countries are dependent on
China economically and recognize that China will always be their neighbor, and
therefore none would agree to be part of an effort to contain China. For better or
for worse, their citizens have already taken the view that China either is already
the most inf luential power or soon will be.

Notes
1 This chapter is based on the articles “Enter the Dragon: How East Asians View a Rising
China” and “Xi’s Foreign-Policy Turn and Asian Perceptions of a Rising China” which
appeared in Global Asia in September 2015 and June 2017, with the addition of new and
updated analysis and discussion. For other articles by the authors on this topic, see Huang
and Chu (2015) and Chu, Liu and Huang (2015).
2 The Asian Barometer Survey is a research network dedicated to democratic studies
through survey methodology. The network comprises 14 country teams. Its regional
headquarters is co-hosted by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica and the
Center for East Asia Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University. For the method-
ological details of the ABS, please refer to the project’s website: www.asianbarometer.org.
3 The ABS Wave 3 was administered between the autumn of 2010 and the spring of 2012
and the fieldwork of the ABS Wave 4 was implemented between the autumn of 2014 and
spring of 2016.
4 The perceived distance between China and one’s own country is calculated for each
respondent by taking the difference between where one places one’s own country on
a ten-point scale of level of democratic development (where 1 represents “completely
undemocratic” and 10 “completely democratic”) and where one places China on the
same scale.
5 The situation in China is quite unique, given our focus on the Sino–US soft power com-
petition in East Asia. A serious problem of social and political desirability bias is expected
among the Chinese respondents when probed for their preferred model for China’s future
development. Therefore, we dropped the China case in the following analysis.
6 There was just one wave of the survey completed in Myanmar in 2015.
7 Our survey data also revealed that in Thailand and Malaysia the perceived democratic
distance between China and their own country has closed up somewhat between the two
waves.
8 Actually, in 2016, Hong Kong residents were evenly divided in their endorsement of
China (around 23%), “Our own model” (around 23%) and Singapore (around 24%) as
their preferred model for future development.
 How East Asians view a rising China 283

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INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate a
table on the corresponding page.

“16 + 1 framework” 157 “Angola model” 195

“17 + 1 framework” 157 Arias, Oscar 173
1992 Consensus 232 , 234 Asian–African Conference of 1955 190
Asian Barometer Survey 16 , 264;
Abe Shinzo 208, 209 China’s regional inf luence 228 –229;
ABS see Asian Barometer Survey China’s rise in East Asian countries see
academic journals, Chinese 56 East Asian countries, ABS of China’s
Africa 83; as battleground between rise in
China and US 188 –189; China’s Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998,
top officials visits to 188; Chinese effects of 251
foreign aid to 191, 193 –195; liberation Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 4,
movements, support to 191, 193; 7, 265
new American strategy for 188 –189; Asianism 211–213, 217
telecommunications sector 199 –200; Association of Southeast Asian Nations
trading partners of 188; see also Sino– (ASEAN) countries: American
African relationship hegemony among 264; cultural ties
Africa Regional Bureau 197 with China 264; economic partnership
agents and authorities, relationship with China 263 –264; evaluation of
between 9 China’s rise 264
aid to profit method, implementation of 194 athletes, independent thought from
AIIB see Asian Infrastructure Investment Chinese 73 –74
Bank Austar International Media Group 87,
Air Defense Identification Zone 38 90 –91
Alibaba 4 Australia: Chinese migration to 89, 95;
All-Under-Heaven System (book) 28 diasporic Chinese media in 88 –95,
AMC Theatres 112 96; economic dependence on China
America see United States 88; media 88, 90, 94; inf luence over
“America First” policies 12 , 39, 64, diaspora communities in 9; politics of,
188 –189 China’s efforts to interfere 67; trade
American dream vs. Chinese dream 75; partner of 88
see also “China Dream” campaign authenticity, Chinese 121–123, 126, 129
286 Index

authoritarianism 4, 112; states 9 –10, 17, canonization, of Chinese court 33

54, 83, 198, 273, 281; systems 69, 72 , Caribbean, Chinese soft power in 171,
263, 273, 279 182 –183; Chinese scholars’ assessment
Aw, Sally Sian 85 of 172; cultural activities 177–178;
drivers of 174; expansion of 174 –175;
Baha Mar resort 177 political and economic component 174;
Baidu 4 political decision makers 174; PRC
“Beijing Consensus” 7, 39, 195 government engagement 178 –180;
Beijing 2008 Olympics 3, 117; Opening presence of PRC-based companies
Ceremony, soft power branding 175 –177; rooted in expectation of
efforts in 13, 119, 122 , 123, 125, 126, opportunities 172 –174; US vs. 172
127, 129 –130; projection of Chinese Carmike Cinema 112
soft power 118; spectacular staging of Causeway Bay Books, kidnapping of
118, 125 booksellers from 253
Belt and Road Initiative 4, 151, 157, 162 , CCP see Chinese Communist Party
209, 264; in Africa 195; in Europe 162 , CCTV see China Central Television
164; in Latin America 179 –180 CCTV Africa 197–198
Berger, Peter 122 CCTV-International, Russian-service
Bian Qin 47– 48 channel launch of 3
Big Four see Chinese “Big Four” CE election 254, 259n8
bilateral relationships, China’s 1, 18, 208, CELAC forum 179
223 censorship, Chinese 69, 72 , 101, 104, 107,
Bolton, John 15, 188 –189, 202 220
Borodin, Mikhail 105 Central and Eastern European (CEE)
“borrowing a boat to go to sea” strategy 9 countries, Chinese cooperation
Bowles-Simpson Commission 65 with 157
brand culture 117, 119; approach to soft Central Asia 33
power 118 –121, 124 –125; culture Central Film Censorship Committee 105
interaction with global brands 119; Central Liaison Office 242 –243, 254, 256
lessons from 128 –129; research 13, 120 Chan, Bernard 252
branding 119 –120; Asian 121; brand Chan, Jackie 108
culture approach to 121; history and Chang Chi-hisung 36
culture role in 120; social, cultural and Chau Chak Wing 90
historical resources for 120 –121; and Chen Shengluo 74
soft culture 117 Chey, Jocelyn 89
brands: authenticity 122; Chinese 4, Chiang Kai-shek 106
121, 125; co-creating cultures 117–118; Chile 179
as communicative objects 117; China: annual budget for “external
development analysis 120; meaning propaganda” 3; centrality 26,
120, 121; nostalgia 122 33; -centric world harmony 53;
Brazil: Chinese investment in 176; as civilization 47, 104, 110, 172 , 215;
strategic partner 179 contribution to peacekeeping missions
BRI see Belt and Road Initiative 189; economic growth of 7– 8, 57,
British–Chinese Joint Declaration on 59, 173, 265; emperors of 27, 34; and
Hong Kong 242 Europe 151, 152; firms’ outbound
Brown, Sherrod 8 deals, public sentiment against 112;
Bush, George W. 8 hardline diplomatic performance
6; -humiliating films, campaign against
Cain, Robert 69, 73 102 –103; jurisprudence in, Western
Callahan, William A. 32 , 67, 124 –125 rumor-mongering about 58; labor force
Cambodia: perception of China and in 45; leadership, approval rating for
United States in 267, 268, 272, 274, 64; political system, liberal critique
275; preferred model for future of 5; as preferred models for future
development in 276, 277–280, 279 development 277–280, 279; rise in 21st
CAMG 87 century 25; strategic culture in 34 –35;
 Index 287

trade with Africa 188; unification challenges associated with promoting

agenda, timeline and format of 225 53; reforms 53; rejection of “Western
China, image of: in Europe 14, 165; in model” 52; Su’s recommendations for
public opinion polls 39, 189 –190; increasing 55 –56; turning point paving
in real China 51; recognizable for way for 53
international audiences 52; in South Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Korea and Japan 209 World History Task Force 57–58
China, perceptions of: in Africa 189 –190; Chinese “Big Four”: expansion in Africa
attractiveness 10, 14; in Cambodia 197–199; expansion in EU 159 –160
267, 268, 272, 274, 275; on East Asian Chinese Central Government 241;
regions 268, 271–272 , 272, 274, 275, control over Legco 244; duties of
281; in EU 14, 151, 152, 161; in Japan Central Liaison Office 243; Hong
and South Korea 15, 207–208, 209 Kongers’ dissatisfaction with 248 –250,
China, rise of 32 , 164, 211; China’s 249, 250 ; political reform package
neighbors on 40; claim of peaceful 253 –255; “politics of cooptation” 244;
11, 25 –26; with economic-military propaganda to build soft power 244;
power 25; impact on US-centric soft support from Hong Kong’s polity and
power concept 49; main global melody society 242; “United Front” strategy
concerning 50 –51; negative views 242; “White Paper on Hong Kong”
of 266; peace and stability from 32; 244 –245, 258; see also Hong Kong,
relational and communicational 52; to Central Government’s deficit of soft
restore justice 26; in 21st century 37, power in
38; stimulating world development 6; Chinese Communist Party 1, 6, 12 ,
threatened by anti-globalization forces 16, 59, 243; attempts to build public
58; and “Western universal values” 49 support 4, 9; coercive tactics for
China African News Service 197 undesirable political ideas 6; criticism
China Aluminum Corporation of covert activities of 67; guard against
(CHINALCO) 177 maligning of China’s reputation 58;
China–CELAC plan 177–178 internal legitimacy of 4; message
China Central Television: Beijing Games aimed at cadres of 55 –56; role in saving
broadcasting 118; collaboration with globalization 58 –59; “socialist core
Talentvision of Fairchild Media Group values” 5; soft power in Hong Kong
87; expansion in Africa 197–198; 6; Su’s message to members of 54 –56;
international branches 3; launch of tools for coercion or inducement 6
European services 159 Chinese companies: aid to profit method
China Daily: article on China’s soft power implementation 194; establishing
projection 27–28; European Weekly operations in Africa 199; and
edition 159; fan community 198; individuals 56; in Latin America and
launch of Africa Weekly 198 Caribbean 175 –177; targets of intense
China Development Bank 175, 199 criticism 199 –200
“China Dream” campaign 49, 59, 60, 75, Chinese diaspora communities see
84, 207 diasporic Chinese communities
China Global Television Networks 159 Chinese discourse power see “China
China Harbour 177 Solution”
China International Telecommunication Chinese dream see “China Dream”
Construction Corporation 199 campaign
China News Service 84 Chinese empire 34, 35, 36
China Radio International 3, 91; Chinese foreign policy 4, 6, 31, 38, 81,
agreements with European 94, 262 –263; core interest issues 38;
broadcasting companies 159; expansion and domestic political system 40;
in East African cities 197 objectives and soft power resources 40;
“China Solution”: “China story” theme of 37
communication 53; current weakness Chinese government: coordination with
of 56 –58; distinctive characteristics 52 , companies and financial institutions
54; foreign countries on 53; logistical 179; engagement in Latin America and
288 Index

Caribbean 178 –180; importance of cinema 100; see also film market, Chinese;
BRI for 179; reducing soy oil purchases Hollywood; Hollywood films
from Argentina 181–182 CIs see Confucius Institutes
Chinese language: news outlets 12; CLO see Central Liaison Office
promotion, problems of 56 –57; radio coastal Asia 33
stations 90, 94; see also diasporic Coca-Cola, mythic status of 122
Chinese media coercion 6; power of economic
Chinese media: absence in Africa and instruments 181–182; tactics of 6, 9 –10
South America 86; anti-US sentiment common values, of human race 49
in 72; attention to soft power 2 –3; Communist Party see Chinese Communist
companies 7, 165; embracing Western Party
social media 159 –160; Facebook Comprehensive Economic Partnership
pages 160; global expansion 90 –91; Arrangement 244 –245
globalization of 81; “going global” Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 151,
project 2; NATO-led US bombing 156
of Chinese Embassy 66; push for Confucianism 35
globalization of 87; unnatural Confucius Institute Conferences 140, 143n1
engagement with “media dynamics” Confucius Institute Headquarters 56,
163 –164; see also diasporic Chinese 136 –137
media Confucius Institutes 207; achievements
Chinese Newspaper Group 91 of 136, 138; in African countries 196;
Chinese People’s Political Consultative ambiguity regarding conceptualization
Conference 244; on Korean soap opera of 134 –135; anecdotal evidence from
69 –70 139; case studies of 134; challenges
Chinese soft power 10, 17–18, 172; to satisfy global demand of 137;
campaigns 1; commitment of resources effect on people’s perception 138,
to promote 67– 68; components of 139; establishment of 39; in Europe
156; for domestic policy 66 – 67; 14, 160, 162; future scenarios for
factors hindering efforts to project 139 –140; global demand to host 13,
40; financial resources invested in 3; 133, 134, 137, 143; as instrument of
generation, function and value of 13; cultural/public diplomacy 138; issues
goal of enhancing 1, 7; Hollywood and problems faced by 140; in Latin
films impact on 70 –73; importance America and Caribbean 177; link with
of 4; improvement in 39; inf luence China’s soft power efforts 135 –136;
over diaspora communities 9; internal main function of 133; message
and external goals 153, 154, 155; interpretation 139; model 140 –142;
international scholarly attention 1; as propaganda device 138; reasons for
Korean drama impact on 69 –70; going to 138 –139; resourcing issues 13;
major obstacle to 67; mellowing in 46; in Southeast Asia 264; success of 137;
origin of 154; poor performance of 46; vocal criticism of 160, 162
projection of 39; promotion of 3 – 4, constructive journalism 198
12 , 65 – 66; reframing 153; in regional consumer culture 124
contexts 13 –14; resistance to 128 –129; co-optive power 224
in South Korea 208, 209; specialists corporations as tools for nation branding 4
46 –57, 58 –59; strategy and practice counter-information 163
1–2; see also Caribbean, Chinese soft Cox, Robert 17
power in; Europe; Japan, China’s soft CPPCC see Chinese People’s Political
power in; Latin America, Chinese soft Consultative Conference
power in; soft power CRI see China Radio International
Chinese state media 3, 95; content deals cross-strait economic integration 225,
with media of foreign countries 83; vs. 226, 228 –230, 233, 236
diasporic media 88; expansion in Africa cross-strait exchanges, Taiwanese people’s
197–199; expansion in EU 159; funds attitudes toward 229, 230
allocated to 3; investments 153 Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
Choson Korea 38 –39 229 –230
 Index 289

Cui Tiankai 71 in 273, 275, 281; inf luence in Asia

cultural diplomacy 119, 124; in EU 267, 267–268; perceived democratic
158, 159 –160; in Latin America and distance 273, 274; perception about
Caribbean 177–178 Chinese inf luence in 268, 269, 270,
cultural myths 13 271, 271, 272 , 272; perceptions of
cultural self-confidence 46, 47 China and US 271–272 , 272; policy
cultural soft power 68 –70 implications 281–282; Sino–US
culture 25 competition 272; welcoming Chinese
inf luence 268, 271
Daily Chinese Herald 91 East Asian societies, preferred models for
Dalian Wanda 7, 111 future development in 273, 276; among
Damon, Matt 110 consistent followers and switchers
“debt-trap diplomacy” 195 276, 277; basic logic of 274; China as
Deng Xiaoping 50, 191, 211–212 , 231, 277–280, 279; Japan as 277; Singapore
241, 262 as 277; United States as 277–280, 279
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 38 East China Sea, territorial claims in
diasporic Chinese communities 12 , 84 38, 266
diasporic Chinese media 95; vs. Chinese economic cooperation 15
state media 88; developments Economic Cooperation Framework
transforming 86 – 88; early formations Agreement 229, 233
of 85 – 86; location-specific strategies economic development 7, 8
87; North American 86; production economic openness in East Asian
and consumption of 85; reconfiguring countries 273, 275, 281
82 – 84; social and cultural roles of economic polarization 281
84 – 85; see also under Australia economic resources, link with military
Dick Clark Production Company 112 establishment 17
diplomatic recognition, efforts to economic slowdown, China’s 45, 59
establish 37 educational initiatives, in Africa 195 –197;
disaffection, toward Beijing 16 see also Confucius Institutes
discourse power 60; China’s need to fight El Salvador 171
for 55; civilizational self-confidence 47, empire, Chinese 34, 35, 36
50, 52; importance of controlling 48; ethical order, intellectual structure of 27
invisible hand metaphor 48; US-centric EU: and China 14, 156, 157–158, 159,
soft power and 48 –50; West’s control 160, 164; soft power 63, 153, 154; trade
over 47, 48, 51, 53, 54 with Africa 188
discursive decolonization, struggle for 82 “EU–Asia Connectivity Strategy” 162
discursive realm 56 Europe: audience in 161, 163; China’s
Dittmer, Lowell 36 soft power in 156 –162; international
domestic audience vs. international system dominated by 36; media in 14;
audience 238n11 perceptions of China 14, 151, 152, 161
Dominican Republic 171 expansionist policy, China’s 37–38
“dragon-slayer” approach 138 export credits 199
Dreyer, June Teufel 38 external propaganda 82 – 83

East Asia: community 16, 32 , 263; Facebook 159 –160, 163

international system in 29–30; US– Fairbank, John K. 26
China strategic competition in 263, Fairbank paradigm, criticism of 32
271–272 , 280; see also Japan; South favorability ratings 12 , 190
Korea; world order, Chinese Feng Xiaogang 72
East Asian countries, Asian Barometer film market, Chinese: expansion of 101,
Survey of China’s rise in: American 107–108; reopening for Hollywood
democracy 273; Chinese and American films 100; during Republican era 100;
inf luence 268, 269, 270, 271, 272 , 272; turning to sharp power 111–112; see also
competition over soft power 273 –274, Hollywood; Hollywood films
276 –280, 279; economic openness Five Eyes intelligence network 4
290 Index

forced dependence 225, 226, 233, 235 Hollywood: Chinese investment in 112;
Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Chinese stereotyping 102; maximizing
China 68 overseas distribution 113 –114;
foreign correspondents in China 83 pandering to China 108, 113; protests
foreign criticism 5 – 6 against perceived insensitivity of
Foreign Inf luence Transparency Scheme 102 –103; studios 9; US government’s
of 2018 88 guidance to 102 , 107; see also Sino–
foreign media, in China 164 Hollywood cooperation
foreign policy 7, 13; see also Chinese Hollywood films: ban on 101–103, 105–107;
foreign policy Chinese soft power promotion 71–73,
Forum on China-Africa Co-operation 188 109; performance in post-1994 era
“Fou” 122 –123 101; in Republican era 100; turning
Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, revision to sharp power 111; US soft power
of 256 promotion 100, 113
Fukuyama, Francis 75 Holt, Douglas 121
Fu Yuanhui 74 Hong Kong 6; anti-government protests
in 93; building soft power in 243 –244;
Gardels, Nathan 18 chief executive of 242; fall in people’s
global brand landscape 121, 122 confidence in 251; “high degree
global development, China’s contribution of autonomy” of 242, 245; level of
to 164 satisfaction with PRC government’s
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 5 rule of 248, 249; local people governing
global image, China’s 11, 72 , 100 242; Mainlanders criticism in 57; under
globalization 18; CCP role in saving “one country, two systems” strategy
58 –59; Xi Jinping on 64, 166; see also 241–242, 245, 258; preferred model for
diasporic Chinese media future development in 276, 277–280,
global marketplace 128 279; SAR of PRC 242; society 242;
global media 68; see also diasporic Chinese United Front strategy implementation
media in 243 –244; see also Legco
“go abroad” (zouchuqu) strategy 65 Hong Kong, Central Government’s
Gone with the Wind (film) 113 deficit of soft power in 16, 258 –259;
Good Earth, The (film) 105, 106 –107 causes of 242; failure of political reform
great power aspiration 11, 25, 40 253 –255; failure to introduce National
Great Wall, The (Zhang Yimou) 109 –110 Security Law 250 –251; kidnapping
Greyser, Stephen 118 of booksellers 253; misjudged efforts
Guardians of Peace 101 244 –245; “national education”
program 244, 246 –247, 251–252;
Hague, protests against South China Sea opposition parties and 244; question
verdict 94 –95 of identity 247–248
Hanban 135, 137, 139 –143, 172 , 177 Hong Kong, protests in: against August
handbags, Chinese-made and French 48 31 proposal 254; against extradition bill
“Hangzhou Consensus” 265 256 –257; reporting on 68
Han Qingxiang 52 Hong Kongers: attitudes toward PRC
hard power 6; in Latin America and 16; dissatisfaction with Central
Caribbean 180 –182; vs. soft power 2 Government 248 –250, 249, 250 ; efforts
harmonious world, concept of 11, 18, 27 at engagement with 243; identities
HBO, Chinese authorities blocking 72 of 242 , 247–248, 248; “localism”
healthcare projects 200 –201 among 255; membership in CPPCC
health diplomacy, Chinese 200 –201 244; mistrust of Central Government
hegemony: American hegemony 11, 25, among 242; opposition to extradition
65, 207, 262 , 264; Chinese 32 , 242; bill 256 –257; opposition to political
ethics of 30 reform package 254; students studying
Hirschmanesque inf luence 237n5 on Mainland 245 –247, 246, 251–252 ,
Ho, Charles 93 259n1; support for Nomination
Ho Hon-kuen 252 Committee 254
 Index 291

Hong Kong National Party, ban on 256 international brands, for China 13
Hong Kong Transition Project 16, 247, 248 international channels, expansion of 3
Hong Kong University Public Opinion international discursive power 39
Program 247 international norms 55 –56
Hong Shen 103 international orders, principles of 36
House of Cards (American television series) international relations 49 –50, 56
70 –71 Internet, Chinese 83
Huang Xianghuai 52 Interview, The (film), controversy
Huawei: bid for 5G leadership, reactions surrounding 101, 102
to 17–18; presence in Africa 199; investment, Chinese: in Africa 192–193;
security threat concerns 4; significance Chinese state media 153; to Europe 156,
for China 17–18; struggle over brand 157; in Hollywood 112; in infrastructural
China 4 projects of Africa 194 –195; in Latin
Hu Jintao 171, 172 , 231, 264; concept America 14
of harmonious world 27; Eight-Point investment, multilateral and bilateral 4, 7
Proposal 231; internal speech at
Central Committee plenum 68 – 69; Jacques, Martin 31
phone conversation with President Japan 15, 34, 47; expanding soft power
Bush 234; on promotion of Chinese 207; preferred model for future
culture 2; Six Proposals 231; speech on development in 276, 277–280,
soft power 153 279; as preferred models for future
human dignity, Chinese approach to 75 development 277
human rights, European and Chinese Japan, China’s soft power in 208, 209;
concept of 158 bilateral national identity gaps 210–219;
Human Rights Dialogue 158 China’s image 209; first-stage shift of 209;
Hu Yaobang–Nakasone bond 211 improved relations 209–210; second-stage
shift of 209; third-stage shift of 209
iconic authenticity 122 Japan and South Korea, national identity gaps
ideational power 53 of: falling Chinese soft power and 216–219;
identity gap, between Hong Kong and framework for analysis of 208–210;
Mainland 16 peaked Chinese soft power and 210–213;
illiberal populism 5 waning Chinese soft power and 213–216
imperial China: as Asian Empire 26; Jiang, Tommy 87, 90
central position of 26 –27; open Jiang Shenghong 57
hierarchy of 28 –29; patriarchal- Jiang Zemin 192 , 211, 231
vassal system 33; as peaceful state 30; Johnston, Alastair Iain 34
policy of fusion and expansion 35; Jones, Dorothy B. 104
as sovereign state 36; trade with its just wars 30
neighbors 27; tributary system 26 –27,
31, 32; warfare and military force 34 –35; Kaneva, Nadia 124
and Western statecrafts, paradigm Kang, David 32
differences between 30 Karate Kid, The (film) 113
imperialist powers 37 Kennedy, Paul 17
indexical authenticity 122 Khan, Kublai 34
indirect communication, vehicles of 83 Kingold Media 90
individualism, and Chinese soft power 73–74 Kirchner, Christina Fernandez de 182
“Individual Visitors Scheme” 245 KMT government 104 –105
Indonesia: perception of Chinese and US Koguryo controversy 208
inf luence on 268, 272, 274, 275, 281; Kosovo: branding of 123 –124; “Young
preferred models for future development Europeans” campaign 124
in 276, 277–278, 279, 280; sensitivity of Kung Fu Panda films, debate over 70, 72
ethnic cleavages in 281
inducement 6 Lam, Carrie 252 , 256
infrastructural investments, in Africa Latin America, Chinese soft power in 171,
194 –195 172 , 174 –180, 182 –183
292 Index

Law, Fanny 252 Mongolia 34; perception of Chinese

Legco 241; Pan-Democrats in 255; and US inf luence on 267, 268, 272,
September 2016 elections 255, 259; soft 274, 275; preferred model for future
power deficit in Beijing’s relationship development in 276, 277–280, 279
with 242 , 244, 255 Moon Jae-in 209
Legendary Entertainment 112 Morrison, Scott 88
Li Changchun 2 , 3 Motion Picture Producers and
Li, Eric X. 18 Distributors of America (MPPDA) 113
Li Hai 94 Mo Yan 73
Li Keqiang 156 Mutual Legal Assistance Ordinance,
Li Mingjiang 2 revision of 256
Li Na 73 Myanmar: perception of Chinese and US
Li Shiming 31 inf luence on 267, 268, 272, 274, 275;
Li Zhaosong 103 preferred model for future development
Liu Ying 50 –52 in 276, 277–280, 279
Lloyd, Harold 102 –103
“localism”, in Hong Kong 16, 255 Nan Hai Media Group 91
Looper (film) 113 National Anthem Law 256
Lu Yeh-Chung 2 national culture 123
Lynch, Daniel 6 national education plan 155, 244, 246 –247
National Endowment for Democracy 67
Ma administration 230, 234, 235 National Film Censorship Committee
‘made in China’ products vs. foreign 104 –105
products 48 national identity, dimensions of 208 –209;
Mainlanders, in Hong Kong 57, 245, 253; see also Japan and South Korea, national
see also Hong Kongers identity gaps of
malaria, fight against 200 –201 nationalism 4, 104 –105
Malaysia 276, 277–280, 279, 281 nation branding 13; and soft power
Mancall, Mark 32 123 –125
Mandarin-language media sector, nation-states, factors determining status
growth of 87 of 37
Mao Zedong 190 “nativism” 255
Maritime Silk Road 7 Navarro, Peter 8
Martian, The (2015) 108 NBC, broadcast rights for 2008 Olympic
material incentives, relationship with soft Games 119
power 7–9 neoliberalism 5
material power, and discourse power 47 New Development Bank 7
Matsushita 4 “New Model of Great Power Relations”
Mattis, James 68 265
Ma Ying-jeou 223, 227, 229, 233, 234 “New Qing History” 35
Mbeki, Thabo 193 news media see Chinese media
Medavoy, Mike 100 North American diasporic Chinese
media see Chinese media media 86
media accountability 162 North Korea 209, 217, 218; China’s policy
“media mindsets” 161–162 towards 211, 213; opposition to release
medical teams, Chinese 200 –201 of The Interview 101, 102
Meng Wanzhou 67 nostalgia 122
migrants, Chinese: community 86 – 88; NPC-SC 253 –254
deep cultural need among 85; Nye, Joseph 6 –7, 17, 18, 25, 48, 65, 66,
experience across globe 81; as target of 152 , 224, 226, 227, 232 , 237n2, 263
China’s soft power agenda 83 – 84
Ming and Qing dynasties 34 Obama, Barack 101, 262
Ming Pao 86 Occupy Central Movement, defeat of 255
Mission: Impossible III (2006) 108 Office of Chinese Language Council
Model Confucius Institutes 140 –142 International see Hanban
 Index 293

Olympics 118; see also Beijing 2008 Qin dynasty 34

Olympics Qing dynasty 33 –34, 36, 38
One Belt One Road initiative 265; see also Qin Yaqing 29
Belt and Road Initiative
“One-China Principle” 192, 225, 231–232 , Rambo: First Blood, Chinese version
234, 236 110 –111
“one country, two systems” strategy 232 , Red Dawn (2012) 108
234, 241–242 , 245, 258 “Regulations and Procedures for
online-only news and media outlets 87–88; Foreigners Making Films in China” 105
Chinese language sector 91–92 reporters, expelled from China 68
open-door policy 89 resource allocation 1–3
Opium Wars of 1839–1841 32 , 36 reversion of sovereignty 248
Organization of American States 179 revisionist historical thinking, upsurge
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 84 in 208
Richardson, Dennis 88
Panama 171 royal ethics 30
“panda hugger” approach 138 Rozman, Gilbert 10
Pan-Democrats 244, 254 –255 rules-based liberal international order 17
para-diaspora 87 Runciman, David 75
Paramount films, censorship of 102 –103 Russia 33
patriarchal-vassal system 33
peaceful development, pursuit of 28 Saatchi & Saatchi, Kosovo “Young
Peck, Willys 106, 107 Europeans” campaign 124
People’s Liberation Army 181 Sanders, Bernie 8
people-to-people diplomacy 177 scholarships, for African students 195 –196
perceived democratic distance 273, 274 scientific research world, changing
Perdue, Peter 32 , 33, 34, 35 culture of 55 –56
permanent normal trade relations Seeking Truth ( journal) 3
(PNTR), with China 8 Shambaugh, David 3
Pew Research Center: European Shanghai Cooperation Organization 265
favorability toward China 152, 161; Shanghai Film Censorship Committee
favorability rating of China 190; survey 104
on soft power 7, 63, 64, 66 sharp power 67, 68, 237n1
Philippines 281; perception of Chinese Siamese (Thai) court and Qing court,
and US inf luence on 268, 272, 274, letters exchanged between 33
275, 281; preferred model for future Silk Road Economic Belt 7
development in 276, 277–280, 279 Singapore: perception of Chinese and US
political preconditions 225, 226, 231–234, inf luence on 268, 272, 274, 275, 281;
236 preferred model for future development
political values 5, 11 in 276, 277–280, 279
popular initiatives 152 Singtao Australia 93
populist socialist actors 174 Singtao Daily 85 – 86, 91, 93
Portland Soft Power 30 64 Singtao Group 85 – 86, 93
“Premier Diplomacy” 156 Sino–African relationship 190, 202 –203;
pre-Qin political thought 30 African support in General
principal–agent problem, soft power Assembly 191; aid to profit method
version of 9 implementation 194; China’s
public diplomacy: campaign 263; in investments 192 –193; Chinese foreign
Europe 14; instrument of 135 aid 191, 193 –195; by early 1980s
public health initiatives 200 –201 191; educational initiatives 195 –197;
public opinion, pro-China 94 expansion of Chinese state media
Pye, Lucian 27 197–199; growth in trade relations 192;
infrastructural investments 194 –195;
Qianlong emperor, expedition of 34 protests of societal forces against
Qian Qichen 192 193; public health 200 –201; stages
294 Index

of development of 190 –191; support strongman politics 5

to liberation movements 191, 193; students, Chinese, attitudes toward
technical aid 191; telecommunications United States 66, 74
industry 199 –200; UN peacekeeping Studies on Cultural Soft Power ( journal) 50
activities 200; upswing of 192; “win- Su Changhe 54 –56
win” strategy 194 Sunf lower Movement of 2014 230
“Sinocentric hierarchy” 26 SydneyToday.com 92
Sino–Hollywood cooperation 13, 107–114
Sino–North Korean alliance 216 Taiwan 9, 180; anxieties about China’s
Sino–South Korean boom 210 embrace 231–233; cross-strait
Sino-Western conf lict 36 economic integration 226, 228 –230;
Smith, Christopher H. 112 forced dependence on China 225,
social Darwinism 37–39 226, 233, 235; MAC, opinion polls
“socialist core values” 5, 155, 158 conducted by 233, 234, 237n8;
socialization process 165 obstruction to autonomy of 225;
social relationships 14 preferred model for future development
Socotra Rock 38 in 276, 277–280, 279; soft power
soft loans 199 attraction to China 227–230; soft
soft power 9, 100, 119, 241; in abstract power response in 224, 228, 231–232
terms, investigating 13; application Taiwan, China’s soft power approach
of concept of 2; attention to, in to 236; co-optation of 223, 228;
Chinese media 2 –3, 25; challenging diplomatic outreach 227; economic
continuing relevance of 17; community integration 15 –16, 233; economic soft
model of spreading 207; concept power 223 –225, 228, 231; negative
comparison 154; cultivation of 7; vs. impacts on 225; objectives of 223;
hard power 2; hubristic optimism political inf luence 224; political
toward 11; increasing usage of term of preconditions for 16, 225, 226, 231–234,
2; leadership model of spreading 207; 236; prerequisite for 231; Soft Power
and nation branding 123 –125; Nye’s 30 index 226; trends in 231
concept of 6 –7, 17, 25, 48, 152 , 156, Taiwan, unification of 223, 236; Beijing’s
172; origins of 17; resources 2 , 152 , rhetoric on 225 –226, 232 , 234 –235;
172 , 226, 232; US-centric concept committing to 224; “one country,
48 – 49; see also Chinese soft power two Systems” formula for 232 , 234;
Soft Power 30 Index 5, 39, 226 on PRC’s terms 232; precondition of
Song Joong Ki 70 231–232; Taiwanese people on 227;
Sony Pictures Entertainment 4, 101 timeline and format of 225; urgency
South China Sea 4 in 226
South China Sea dispute: Australian Taiwanese people: attitudes toward China
media on 94; protests against Hague’s 227, 228; attitudes toward cross-strait
verdict on 94 –95; territorial claims exchanges 229, 230 ; attitudes towards
38, 266 economic integration with China 225;
Southeast Asia 263, 264 attitudes towards forced dependence
South Korea 15; deployment of American on Mainland 225 –226; perceived
THAAD missile system 70; global democratic distance 237n6; on signing
cultural impact of 69 –70; perceptions ECFA 233; support for CSSTA 234 –235;
of China’s soft power 207–208, youth’s willingness to study in China
209; perception of Chinese and US 237n4
inf luence on 268, 272, 274, 275, 281; Talentvision of Fairchild Media Group
preferred model for future development and CCTV, collaboration between 87
in 276, 277–280, 279; soap opera and teaching, at Confucius Institutes 137–138
dramas 69 –70; see also Japan and South telecommunications industry, of Africa
Korea, national identity gaps of 199 –200
Soviet Cold War propaganda 124 Television Broadcasts Limited 86
StarTimes 198 Tencent 4
state media see Chinese state media territorial claims, of China 6, 38
 Index 295

territorial sovereignty, concepts of 37 unity of thinking 105

Thailand: perception of Chinese and US universal suffrage, for CE election 253 –254
inf luence on 268, 272, 274, 275, 281; UN peacekeeping activities 200
preferred model for future development US–China competition 262 –263;
in 276, 277–280, 279; schoolchildren ambivalent attitudes toward 271–272 ,
in, and Mandarin 56 –57 280; difficulty of taking sides in 282
Thalberg, Irving 106, 107 US inf luence: in East Asian countries 268,
threat theories 35 –36 269, 270, 271–272 , 272; perception
Tiananmen Square incident 89, 93, 94 of 268, 272, 274, 275, 281; relative to
tianxia 28 –29, 38 China, perceptions of 281
Tibet 113 US political system: Chinese university
trade wars 8, 11, 164 students preference for 72 , 74;
Transformers 4: Age of Extinction 108, 109 depiction in American television series
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 71–72
withdrawal from 281 US soft power 11, 63, 281–282; and
tributary system 26 –27, 31, 32 –33, 36 Hollywood 100 –101; loss in 68;
Trump, Donald 5, 18, 39, 63, 68, 188, objectives and values 172; Pew survey
210, 281; “America First” policies of of 66; success of 12 , 65 – 66, 74 –75;
12; China PNTR and 8; presidential vehicle for 172
campaign 8; tariff war 45; unpopularity US–Soviet propaganda battles 124
among Americans 66; US foreign US–Thailand relationship 268
policy under 281–282; withdrawal
from TTIP 164 vassal states 33, 34
Trump administration: American Vietnam: perception of Chinese and US
image decline under 66, 281; anti- inf luence on 268, 272, 274, 275, 281;
Muslim propensity 281; emphasis on preferred model for future development
hard power 65; National Security in 276, 277–280, 279
Strategy 262; Pew survey on 66; State Voice of America China programs 65
Department budget cuts 65
Tsang, Donald 253 Wang Hongying 2
Tung Chee-hwa 251 Wang Jianlin 111, 112
Turnbull, Malcolm 67 Wang Lili 58 –59
tyranny 30 Wang Ning 127
Wang Qishan 70, 71
Umbrella Movement of 2014 93, 245 –246, Wang Yiwei 48 –50
247, 254 Warcraft (film), Chinese success of 108
Underwood, Frank 71 wartime, Hollywood films during 102
United Daily News Group 86 “Washington Consensus” 194
“United Front” strategy 242 , 243 WeChat 12 , 88, 91
United States 12, 39, 55; entertainment Welcome Danger (film) incident 102–103, 104
assets, Chinese encroachment on Westad, Odd Arne 33 –35
111–112; foreign policy 12, 65, 282; West: anti-globalization movements in
hegemony 11, 25, 65, 207, 262, 264; 5, 8, 121, 162; culture of, and China
image, decline in 54, 63 – 64, 65, 66, 281; 68 – 69; internal divisions within 5;
leadership, global approval rating of job products of, high prices 48; statecrafts
performance of 64; negative perception and imperial China, paradigm
toward Latin America 175; neglect of differences between 30
soft power promotion 65 – 66; under Westphalian system 29
Obama administration 266; opposition “White Paper on Hong Kong” 244 –245,
to 174, 181; pavilion at Shanghai Expo 258
65; as preferred models for future “win-win” strategy 194
development 277–280, 279; presidential Wolf Warrior II (film) 111, 113, 189
election and Chinese transition 74 –75; World Journal 86
security threat concerns of Huawei 4; world order, Chinese 11; benign hierarchy
trade with Africa 188 of 25, 26, 31; collapse of 26, 36; as
296 Index

ethical and political phenomenon 27; Economic Forum 64, 166; views on
hierarchical power relationship in 27; hegemony 28
reconstruction of 27–31, 39; scholarly Xinhua News Agency 3; launch of
debate on 31–35; view of 37–38 European services 159; presence in
World Trade Organization (WTO), Africa 197
membership of China 8 Xinjiang 34
Wuhan University 50 Xin Kuai Bao 90
Xu Lin 10, 135, 140 –141
Xi-ist optimism 60
Xi Jinping 11, 45, 46, 58, 59, 100, 151, Yangcheng Evening News Group 90
155, 158, 164, 173, 179, 262 , 264; Yan Xuetong 30
campaign for greater self-confidence
11; centralized decision-making power Zhan Dexiong 53 –54
of 264; “China Dream” campaign Zhang Changming 3
49, 59, 60, 84, 157, 207, 265; Zhang Yimou 72 , 110, 126
China’s global and regional strategy Zhao Tingyang 28
under 264 –266; “China Solution” Zhao Ziyang 191
52 –54; “four confidences” of 5; on Zhongxing Telecommunications
globalization 64, 166; as indisputable Equipment Corporation 199
leader 4; national education plan Zhou Enlai 190, 191
155; new China Dream discourse Zhou Fangye 56
3; obsession in citing Confucian Zhu Ying 7,118
classics 28; relations with Abe Shinzo Zungharia 34
209; rise of 1; on role of Confucius Zunghar Mongols 34
Institutes 133; speech at Davos World Zweig, David 6