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The Sociology of Religion

B RYA N T U R N E R

INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCI-

OLOGY OF RELIGION
sociology. A number of social and cultural
changes in the Victorian period created the
intellectual context within which the sociologi-
Religion refers to those processes and institu- cal study of religion began to flourish in the
tions that render the social world intelligible, late nineteenth century. In particular empirical
and which bind individuals authoritatively into evidence drawn from reports from Africa and
the social order. Religion is therefore a matter Australia by colonial administrators, mission-
of central importance to sociology. To write aries and amateur anthropologists fired specu-
sociologically is inevitably to work within a lation about the origins of religion. The theory
particular tradition that has in advance identi- of animism suggested that ‘primitive mentality’
fied certain issues and themes that are salient in was a flawed attempt to understand Nature in
the definition of social phenomena. The fact the absence of experimental science.
that a classical sociological tradition has already While this interest in primitive religion
defined the field in advance appears to be was overtly located within an emergent social
particularly important in the case of religion science of comparative civilizations, the covert
(O’Toole, 2001; Robertson, 1970). In this over- theme in these Victorian inquiries into primi-
view of the sociology of religion, I pay consid- tive society was in fact the growing ambiguity
erable attention to the legacies of Émile and uncertainty of the role of the Christian
Durkheim and Max Weber, who defined the church within a social and cultural environ-
principal issues within the field, with respect to ment which was itself increasingly secular and
the analysis of the sacred and charisma. Within where intellectual debate was dominated by
this tradition, I take the study of institutions to the assumptions of natural science and Social
be our primary concern, partly as an analytical Darwinism rather than theology. While these
strategy to affirm that our topic of inquiry is early contributions to sociology and anthro-
not with individuals or persons. If we define pology probed the beliefs and practices of
sociology as the study of institutions, then reli- primitive cultures, they were equally, but more
gious institutions have been a central preoccu- obliquely, an investigation of the role and
pation of sociologists. Indeed, the study of nature of Christianity within a society where the
religious phenomena, including magic, ritual moral and social authority of the church was
and myth, was an important feature of the being steadily undermined. Anthropological
intellectual origins of both anthropology and fieldwork inevitably raised relativistic problems
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 285

about the truth of religious beliefs in primitive adopting an evolutionary view of religious
society and as a consequence they inevitably beliefs, assumed along with Engels that religion
raised relativistic questions about the rational- would evaporate once exposed to ‘critical criti-
ity and validity of Christian mythology. These cism’ and scientific socialism. The social crisis of
tensions between science and religion in Britain Victorian Britain that produced the sociology of
were beautifully illustrated in Mrs Humphrey religion included the erosion of Christianity, the
Ward’s novel Robert Elsemere, in which Else- political threat of working class socialism and
mere’s faith is gradually compromised and the intellectual threat of Social Darwinism and
finally undermined by his exposure to the evolutionary thought (Burrow, 1966).
relativistic theme of anthropological research, Nineteenth-century theories of economic
resulting in his transition from Unitarian belief to industrialization provided the foundations of
humanistic scepticism to socialism (MacIntyre, early theories of secularization. It was assumed
1969). that the transition from rural to urban society,
The rise of the anthropology and sociology or from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, with the
of religion should also be seen against the growth of industrial capitalism, had destroyed
background of the dominance of natural sci- the social and moral basis for the church’s
entific thought in the second half of the nine- authority over society. The social and historical
teenth century, namely a mode of scientific development of Europe was conceptualized
thinking that was shaped by an evolutionary chronologically into separate ages of faith
paradigm. Charles Darwin’s theories of evolu- and ages of secularity. For writers like Claude
tion and natural selection were translated into Saint-Simon, the ‘feudal-theological system’
a general theory of society in Social Darwinism, was gradually being replaced by a new social
within which Christianity was simply an aspect order based upon the industrial classes and
of social evolution. Christianity as a religion positivistic science. In the industrial-scientific
had no particular or privileged position in system, the government of human beings
cultural evolution. Social Darwinism, with its would be transformed into the administration
emphasis on conflict and struggle as the motors of things. He predicted the rise of a new religion
of evolutionary adaptation, provided a general based on humanism and science that he called
social theory of historical development and the New Christianity. For Auguste Comte, in
social differentiation. Karl Marx integrated his positivistic and humanist philosophy,
political economy and social Darwinism into medieval society, which was characterized by
a powerful theory of history and social forma- the dominance of the Catholic Church and by
tions, in which the stages of the mode of militarism, would be replaced by a new social
production were linked together into an evolu- system in which scientists and industrialists
tionary chain from primitive communism, would occupy the dominant social roles. He
through feudalism, to capitalism and socialism. anticipated the creation of a religion of human-
While Marx’s philosophy of history was ity which replaced the derelict Christianity of
a product of this combination of social his period (Wernick, 2001). In the sociological
Darwinism and political economy, his analysis writings of Herbert Spencer, the separation of
of religion was based upon a critique of Hegel’s military from industrial society had become
idealism and Ludwig Feuerbach’s sensualism a common assumption of dissenting liberals.
(Turner, 1991). In Marx’s theory of ideology, The collapse of the old military-theological
religious beliefs were representations of the system created a crisis in social organization
particular economic conditions of specific modes and individual consciousness; especially for the
of production. Thus, Roman Catholicism was social establishment and conservative thought.
well suited to the political and economic struc- While the sociology and anthropology of
tures of feudalism, whereas the individualistic religion was sharply divided into a variety of
beliefs of Protestant Christianity were seen to be competing theories, there was a core of assump-
an expression of the possessive individualism tions about the nature of religion and science
of competitive capitalist economies. Marx, which provided the underlying framework in
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286 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

the late nineteenth century for the analysis of understanding of the functional significance of
religion (Marrett, 1909; Tylor, 1891). The first rituals.
assumption was that rationality, defined oper- Interpretations of the intellectual origins of
ationally by the methods of experimental sci- the sociology of religion have contrasted the
ence, was the guiding principle of industrial sociological emphasis on collective rituals with
society. Truth was produced by the evidence psychological theories of individual cognition.
made available to human reason by the inter- In Theories of Primitive Religion, E.E. Evans-
vention of experimental science. Positivistic Pritchard (1965) distinguished early psycho-
science was the unambiguous benchmark for logical approaches, starting with R. de Brosses’s
the evolution of civilization, a benchmark that theory of fetishism and theories of the soul
neatly contrasted the primitive mentality with in the work of E.B. Tylor, Max Müller and
the modern mind (Levy-Bruhl, 1923, 1985). J.G. Frazer from the sociological theories of
In primitive religion, individuals were thought Émile Durkheim, Robert Hertz, Henri Hubert
to make sense of their natural environment and Marcel Mauss. Frazer’s (1935 [1890])
through a system of magical and erroneous The Golden Bough was characteristic of specu-
beliefs. The emphasis was upon the cognitive lative reflections on the evolutionary and com-
apprehension of reality by isolated individuals parative significance of mythology. In a definitive
who were quaintly perceived as ‘ancient overview of the early tradition, William J.
philosophers’. The second assumption was that Goode (1951), in his Religion Among the
human history was characterized by an evolu- Primitives, distinguished between animistic–
tionary scheme in which societies passed through manist theories which were particularly influ-
a series of definite and necessary stages from ential among the English anthropologists,
simple to more complex forms. Within this naturalistic theories which were embraced by
evolutionary scheme, humanity passed from writers like Müller (1997 [1892]), psychoana-
primitive magic and fetishism through religion lytic theories which were developed by
to contemporary science. Third, along with Sigmund Freud in his Totem and Taboo (1950),
the assumptions of the dominant system, indi- and sociological interpretations of religion in
vidualism was taken to be the primary moral the work of Smith, Durkheim and Mauss.
and political characteristic of an advanced Although these nineteenth-century theories
civilization. of religion were influential, they have come
Although these evolutionary theories were under extensive intellectual criticism, which
designed to understand primitive cultures, laid the foundation of modern approaches
they represented a major intellectual challenge to religion in anthropology and sociology.
to Christianity. One significant problem for Theories of animism–manism and naturism
Protestant intellectuals was how to explain the shared, as I have indicated, a common set of
differences between primitive rituals such as a assumptions – the centrality of the individual,
communal meal and Christian practice such positivism, natural science as an exclusive par-
as the Eucharist. One solution was to appeal to adigm of rationality, and evolutionism, which
evolutionary theory itself in order to argue were challenged in Durkheim’s The Elementary
that Protestantism was the most highly evolved Forms of the Religious Life (1961 [1912]).
religion, and that its rituals and beliefs were Durkheim rejected any discussion of the truth
essentially abstract propositions that could or falsity of religious belief as simply mis-
be justified by rational argument. Christian placed: ‘there are no religions which are false.
theology attempts to express religious truths All are true in their own fashion, all answer,
through abstractions that have replaced the though in different ways, to the given condi-
concrete metaphors and ideas about actual tions of human existence’ (Durkheim, 1961:
relationships. This solution was adopted by 15). The task of sociology was to discover ‘the
W. Robertson Smith, whose Lectures on the ever-present causes upon which the most
Religion of the Semites (1997 [1889]) were par- essential forms of religious thought and
ticularly important for Durkheim’s sociological practice depend’ (Durkheim, 1961: 20). The
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 287

individualistic definitions of religion in interpreted religion as a collective classification

animism were too specific, because belief in of reality. The implications of Durkheim’s
spiritual beings was not universal to religions. approach are that religion involves a special
For example, Theravada Buddhism is non- type of knowledge that is embedded in collec-
theistic. Durkheim defined religion as a ‘uni- tive practices that are reinforced by shared
fied system of beliefs and practices relative emotions. The Elementary Forms of the
to sacred things, that is to say things set apart Religious Life had three distinctive aims. The
and forbidden – beliefs and practices which first was to study a simple religious system,
unite into one single moral community namely Australian totemism, in order to
called a Church, all those who adhere to them’ understand the elementary forms of religious
(Durkheim, 1961: 62). Cognitive approaches life. The second was to study elementary forms
such as Tylor’s minimalist definition of reli- of thought such as the distinction between
gion as belief in spiritual beings, by concen- sacred and profane, and finally to establish
trating on the individual’s rational generalizations about social relations and
apprehension of the world, failed to draw classification in all human societies.
attention to the emotional and performative Primitive Classification Durkheim and
character of religious practices, and the oblig- Mauss (1963 [1903]) clearly anticipated the
atory nature of involvement in religious insti- more complex and complete presentation of
tutions. Durkheim, along with R.R. Marrett, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
William McDougall and Arnold van Gennep, (1961[1912]). Both publications attempt soci-
rejected Frazer’s ‘intellectualist psychology of ologically to understand forms of classifica-
religion’ in which the primitive community tion, especially forms of religious classification
was composed of a collection of discrete minds that divide the world into the sacred and the
directed at a rational evaluation of nature profane. Durkheim’s intention was also to give
(Ackerman, 1987). Unlike the intellectual a sociological account of the fundamental forms
beliefs of philosophers, belief in the sacred or structures of consciousness.
character of the totem was not a voluntary or The basic argument exhibits the classic
private option. Durkheim also dismissed features of Durkheim’s sociology. We cannot
Müller’s naturism as merely the vision of understand forms of consciousness by a study
nature of modern city-dwellers. In traditional of the consciousness of separate individuals.
societies, nature was more likely to be seen as More specifically, we cannot grasp the nature of
regular and monotonous, and totemic objects thought through a psychological study of the
are often far from awe-inspiring. Durkheim’s contents of human minds. The social comes
sociological perspective laid the foundation before the individual, and thus to understand
for subsequent approaches to the sacred, espe- consciousness (or classification) we need to
cially in the French tradition of the work of study its social forms: ‘it is enough to examine
Marcel Mauss (2001 [1902]), Robert Hertz, the very idea of classification to understand
Henri Hubert, Roger Callois and René Girard that man could not have found its essential ele-
(1988 [1972]). Durkheim’s approach also con- ments in himself … Every classification implies
tributed fundamentally to the social anthro- a hierarchical order for which neither the tangi-
pology of Robert H. Lowie (Murphy, 1972) ble world nor our mind gives us the model’
and Mary Douglas (1966, 1970). (Durkheim and Mauss, 1963: 7–8). It is the
social divisions of society that provide the divi-
sions of classification, and so the first logical
DURKHEIM ON CLASSIFICATION,
categories were social. However, the force of
KNOWLEDGE AND RELIGION
these categories depends on their affective
force. Thus ‘for those who are called primitives,
a species of things is not a simple object of
Durkheim took the decisive steps towards a knowledge, but corresponds above all to a cer-
genuine sociology of religion in which he tain sentimental attitude. All kinds of affective
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288 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

elements combine in the representation … it is French anthropologists had concentrated on

this emotional value of notions which plays the the generic nature of religious and magical
preponderant part in the manner in which symbols and customs, German sociology arose
ideas are connected or separated. It is the dom- from a specific concern with the historical role
inant characteristic in classification’ (Durkheim of Christianity in Western society, and with
and Mauss, 1963: 85–6). the organizational forms of Christian institu-
We may re-state their argument as claiming tions. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
that the authority of a classification system Capitalism, Weber (1930 [1904–5]) analysed
receives its force from classificatory systems the relationship between Protestant beliefs
that are collective, and which are sustained and the individualistic and secular culture of
by a shared emotional life. However, this emerging capitalism. In The Social Teaching of
argument raises the obvious question about the Christian Churches, Troeltsch (1931 [1912])
modern society, namely what happens to the developed a contrast between sect and church
authority of classificatory systems where the as a model of organizational development and
force of collective emotions is diminished by change in Christianity, a model which used
the secularization of religious systems? This Weber’s analysis of charismatic breakthrough
question was anticipated very directly in their (Weber, 1966).
thesis: ‘Thus the history of scientific classifica-
tion is, in the last analysis, the history of the
MAX WEBER: SOCIOLOGY AND THE
stages by which this element of social affectiv-
SECULARIZATION DEBATE
ity has progressively weakened, leaving more
and more room for the reflective thought of
individuals’ (Durkheim and Mauss, 1963: 88).
Thus the collective and emotional character of Sociology has been specifically concerned to
classificatory practices in modern societies has understand the origins and development of
broken down, and there is more indeterminacy modernity, and it has seen religion as a crucial
and uncertainty because individuals can become component of the social process of moderniza-
more reflexive and classificatory principles are tion. This interest in religion and modernity
contested. had three distinctive components: the impact
Durkheim’s sociology of classification was of religion on economic norms and behaviour;
the basis of his sociology of religion, in that the contribution of religions to the develop-
religion is a method of apprehending reality in ment of political regimes such as democracy;
terms of the force of the classificatory princi- and the consequences of religion for cultural
ple: sacred/profane. His approach also antici- development broadly conceived.
pated a major theme of the secularization Weber’s sociology involved the study of the
thesis, which is concerned with the bases of economic and political ethics of the world reli-
social order in societies where the traditional gions (Weber, 1966). Weber was concerned to
force of classificatory schema have collapsed. understand whether Christianity, as a cultural
Although the secularization debate has a deci- precondition for rational economic behav-
sively historical framework, Durkheim’s analy- iour, could ultimately survive capitalism and
sis of classification was typological rather than whether the democratic ethos of secular insti-
historical. Durkheim’s pragmatist and func- tutions would eventually undermine the hier-
tionalist account of the social consequences archical notions of charismatic authority that
of religious practice neglected the historical underpin ecclesiastical organizations. Weber’s
dimensions of religious institutions, especially sociology was characterized by the theme of
the organizational structures and roles of the fatefulness of Western institutions, namely
ecclesiastical organizations. Ernst Troeltsch how values can be self-destructive (Turner,
and Max Weber developed these historical 1996). For example, religious asceticism was
aspects of religion in the German tradition of self-defeating in producing the spirit of capi-
the sociology of religion. Whereas British and talism, which came eventually to negate
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 289

Christian spirituality. Weber also thought the involved religious functionaries in power-
modern power politics that was made possible sharing. Thus, the dialectic of sacred and
by the separation of religion and politics in profane can be seen paradoxically as a force
Christianity would corrode the tradition of that assisted the rise of the modern citizen
Christian brotherly love. While historians have (Weber, 1958). This dialectic is not peculiar to
disputed the validity of Weber’s historical soci- Western culture; similar arguments can be and
ology of religions, his sociological questions have been made about the relationship between
about religion, politics and economics have Buddhism and society, specifically between
proved to be extraordinarily productive and the monastic order and the secular state. In
imaginative. Buddhist legend, King Asoka was both con-
In his introduction to Weber’s The Sociology queror and Buddhist monk.
of Religion, Talcott Parsons (1966) argued that This interweaving of religion and politics,
Weber’s sociology of religion was concerned to brotherly love and violence constituted the tragic
understand the social leverage that religion has vision of Weber’s sociology. Politics requires
exercised over processes of social change. This authoritative methods for the distribution of
social leverage is an effect of the strength and resources and must resort to coercive means to
tenacity of the division between the sacred and establish order. In the last analysis, politics is
the profane, or between religious ideals and the about the prudent use of force in society to
world. The confrontation with the world pro- preserve order. For Weber, religious institu-
duced a range of different soteriologies or doc- tions are channels of symbolic (charismatic)
trines of salvation. These soteriologies in Weber violence that coerce behaviour through sacred
hinge critically around the dichotomy between force, while political institutions require secular
asceticism and mysticism. Asceticism was par- force. While political institutions must exert
ticularly important in the rational response of violence, religious communities are based on
Protestantism to the control of sexuality and ‘brotherly love’ and therefore politics and reli-
money, but this-worldly soteriologies are not gion must exist in a state of mutual tension.
peculiar to Christianity. For example, within Paradoxically, they are both required for the
the Abrahamic religions, politics and religion creation of social order.
have remained in a dialectical tension, and this The core feature of this theory is the expli-
tension has played a creative role in the devel- cation of the historical role of charisma in
opment of democratic politics as an urban human societies. Weber employed a theory of
form of participatory politics. Because the charismatic breakthrough to understand the
Abrahamic religions shared a universal notion secular dynamic of authority and leadership in
of justice, they have the potential to function as social institutions. His main intention was to
a powerful critique of earthly politics. compare and contrast three types of authority:
The doctrine of the church as a community charismatic, traditional and legal-rational. In
free from coercion provided a powerful con- Economy and Society (Weber, 1978: 241), the
trast to the state which Weber (1978) famously term charisma is ‘applied to a certain quality of
defined as an institution that has a monopoly an individual personality by virtue of which he
of violence within a given territory. The church is considered extraordinary and treated as
as a parallel society provided normative crite- endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or
ria by which bad government could, in princi- at least specifically exceptional powers or qual-
ple, be evaluated. The church provided a ities’. Traditional authority involves the accep-
public space within which concepts of justice, tance of an implicit rule that expresses a
equality and community (or brotherhood) custom, namely an established pattern of belief
evolved as components of a theology of politi- or practice. Finally, legal-rational authority is
cal institutions. However, the association of the typical of bureaucracies in which formal con-
church with this world exposed the religious duct is underpinned by procedural norms.
community to corruption and co-optation. These forms of authority are in turn modes of
For example, the rise of the national church compliance. Tradition depends on compliance
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through empathy; legal-rational authority central to Weber’s sociology of religion.

rests on rational argument; and charismatic Whereas Troeltsch had developed the idea of
leadership requires inspiration. church-sect typology, Weber constructed his
Charismatic authority is confronted by a analysis of religious authority around the idea
generic problem of succession with the death of virtuoso and mass religiousness. The virtu-
of the leader and charismatic authority is osi, both ascetic and mystical, are detached
consequently unstable. With the death of the from mundane constraints (typically of work
charismatic leader, the disciples typically dis- and reproduction) and in exchange for their
band, but occasionally alternative solutions for charismatic gifts (prophecy, visions and heal-
continuity will be developed. In the case of the ing) they receive tributes (money, food and
Christian Church, the charismatic authority of shelter) from the laity. The history of religious
Christ was invested in the church itself (as the institutions is the history of, more or less
body of Christ) and thus in the bishops who, unsuccessful, attempts to routinize the chan-
by their control over the ‘keys of grace’, enjoy nels of charisma through the official agencies
a stable vicarious authority. This ‘institutional- of the church. The institutionalization of these
ization of charisma’ becomes over time sacred powers also produced Weber’s view of
increasingly formal, bureaucratic and imper- the historical dynamic of church and state, in
sonal. Weber defined the ‘routinization of which the church strove to monopolize sym-
charisma’ in terms of the transformation of the bolic force, and the state to achieve a monop-
charismatic power of Christ into a set of formal oly of physical violence in a given territory.
procedures and bureaucratic rules. Charisma is When these two systems coalesced into
institutionally important in the definition of Caesaropapism, total power precluded any
different religious roles and patterns of organi- dynamic social change.
zation. For example, Weber distinguished Given the mundane needs and demands of
between the prophet who, as a charismatic fig- everyday life, only the virtuosi (the monks and
ure, has a personal call, and the priest who has priests) can fully embrace the religious com-
authority by virtue of his office in the church mandments and ritual practices that are
and his service in a sacred tradition. The required to achieve salvation. The laity are in
prophets, who may emerge from the ranks of this sense parasitic on the efforts of the elite to
the priesthood, are unremunerated, and there- seek out salvation on their behalf. It is for this
fore depend on gifts from followers (Weber, reason that the evangelical revolution of the
1952). eighteenth century, which through field
The institutions through which people gain preaching took religion to the people, brought
access to charismatic gifts have important about a profound political revolution. It began
implications for broader issues of social orga- the modern process of the democratization
nization and political power. Where the church of religion that overthrew the ancient division
was able to claim an exclusive monopoly of the between the religious elite and the masses
means of grace, then there was a rigid and (Sharot, 2001). In his visit to the United States
detailed hierarchy of authority between priests in 1904, Weber was obviously aware of the
and laity, and the hierarchies of earthly power elective affinity between capitalism and the
were a reflection of sacred hierarchies. The Baptist sects, but he did not grasp the full spir-
democratization of religious membership, itual implications of democracy for the
which has been characteristic of modern soci- American soul. This theme was powerfully
eties, contrasts sharply with the idea that developed by Alexis de Tocqueville (1968
authentic charisma is unequally distributed [1835–40]) in Democracy in America, for
through human societies or that some people whom voluntary associations such as religious
are constitutionally unmusical. The notion denominations were an essential component
that the stratification of religious charisma lies of democratic participation at the local or
at the foundation of the world religions was community level.
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AMERICAN DENOMINATIONS AND

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
alienated these executives from family and
community. Religion provided an anchor in this
fragile world of urban sprawl, consumerism and
The American War of Independence and the mobility.
framing of the Constitution specifically pre- While generational changes can explain
cluded the idea of an established church with a membership of the churches, sociologists of
special relationship to the state, and as a result religion regarded this enthusiasm for religious
denominational pluralism has been a funda- belonging as evidence of secularization, because
mental aspect of social and political life in the denominational loyalties appeared to have
United States. With every wave of migration, the more to do with social membership than with
settlers built their own churches and created a faith (Wilson, 1966, 1976). Indeed, much of the
dynamic mosaic of religious belief and practice. statistical evidence on religious commitment
This process was important in the building of demonstrated that orthodox belief and knowl-
national identity, since, while the church and edge of the Christian faith were declining
state were separate, religion became an impor- despite high levels of organizational involve-
tant foundation of social membership and iden- ment (Glock and Stark, 1965). Denominational
tity. Will Herberg (1955) developed the classic competition often meant that the demands
explanation of the relationship between religion, of religion were reduced in order to make
ethnicity and identity, in Protestant, Catholic, membership a comfortable experience. Peter
Jew in terms of a theory of generational loyal- Berger (1969) in The Social Reality of Religion
ties. First generation migrants to America clung and Thomas Luckmann (1967) in The Invisible
to the religion of their homeland out of sheer Religion argued that in modern society denom-
necessity. The second generation typically inational pluralism had come to resemble a
rejected the religious commitments of their par- spiritual marketplace in which the laity could
ents as they became acculturated in secular soci- pick and choose whatever beliefs and practices
ety, and became Americans. The third satisfied their individual needs. The result was
generation returned to religion as a form of the gradual erosion of orthodox belief and reli-
social membership and identity in a world that gious discipline. The religious supermarket was
was alienated by the new corporate culture and perfectly in tune with the cultural climate of
individualism. In short, people could retain the 1960s as an age of experiment and individ-
their religious identities provided everybody ualism (Edmunds and Turner, 2002). The
became American. Some critics of American growth of fundamentalism in the United States
religiosity have, however, argued that the has been in part a critical response to the spread
denominational label was bought at the cost of of liberal theology in the churches, to feminism
any content. President Eisenhower was alleged in education and secular culture in the media
to have remarked that every American should (Armstrong, 2001).
have a religion, and he didn’t care which one it The boundaries of popular religion are con-
was. Religion appeared to meld into secular cul- stantly redrawn under the impact of large
ture as a form of personal comfort. David postwar generations, facilitated by an expand-
Riesman (1950) in The Lonely Crowd analysed ing religious marketplace. It is impossible
the American personality as the other-directed therefore to understand religion in contempo-
character that depends on constant approval rary America without taking into account
and affirmation from others. In The Organization the impact of the ‘baby boomers’ (Roof, 1993).
Man, W.H. Whyte (1956) described the com- The culture wars of the postwar period radi-
pany executives of corporate America, who are cally reorganized the map of mainstream reli-
mobile, disconnected from their local commu- gion in North America. Denominational
nities and dedicated to personal achievement pluralism is a spiritual marketplace that, in
within the organization. These organizational the absence of an established church, stimu-
commitments encouraged conformity and lates organizational innovation and cultural
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292 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

entrepreneurship. The concept of a spiritual more liberals join conservative churches?

supermarket was originally developed by Peter Why are the mainline churches such as the
Berger to describe secularization and the crisis Presbyterians and Methodist denominations
of plausibility in a religious context where in decline, while the more conservative
individuals can shop around to solve their spir- denominations such as the Southern Baptist
itual needs. The market for religious innova- Convention and the Assemblies of God are
tions is a response to massive social change in flourishing?
contemporary America in which an expanding Dean Kelley (1977) provided one classic
consumer culture has produced the self explanation for success in terms of a theory of
as the principal target of consumption. There the costliness of commitment. Kelley’s thesis is
was an ‘expressive revolution’ (Parsons, 1999), that the content of a religious message is less
in which personal identity was sought and important for success than the demands it
explored through a new subjectivity. In the places on its members. Costliness is measured
market place of seekers, five major subcultures by control over members’ lifestyles, the devel-
have been identified: dogmatists (for example opment of a strong church and the seriousness
fundamentalists and neo-traditionalists), of religious commitment. Kelley’s successful
mainstream believers, born-again Christians churches require a totalitarian and hierarchical
(including evangelicals, Pentecostalists and form of authority and homogeneous commu-
charismatics), metaphysical believers and seek- nities; such successful congregations are unlike
ers, and secularists (Roof, 1999). The baby- liberal religious groups that impose few sanc-
boomer culture promoted the idea of religion tions on their members. Kelley’s thesis has
as a personal quest. While Americans may been widely influential, but contemporary
invest less time in voluntary associations and research provides only partial support for
are less certain about traditional Christian val- the strong church thesis (Tamney, 2002).
ues than previous generations, they are signifi- Conservative congregations support a tradi-
cantly involved in spiritual searching that has tional gender division of labour and conven-
produced a deeper emphasis on self-under- tional gender identities; in a society that is
standing and self-reflexivity. As the baby- deeply divided over gender issues, such reas-
boomers mature they are moving out of the surance is psychologically attractive. Secondly,
narcissistic culture of the 1960s into a deeper, in a relativist culture, the certainties of religious
more serious quest culture. If traditional reli- teaching on morality are supportive. Finally,
gious cultures depended heavily on the conti- traditional religious orientations may serve to
nuity of the family as an agency of articulate political commitments around major
socialization, the transformation of family life issues relating to abortion, gay and lesbian
and the entry of women into the formal labour sexuality, education and the family. American
market have radically destabilized religious society is a spiritual marketplace in which the
identities and cultures. loyalty of congregations cannot be taken for
Within this marketplace, the conservative granted. Religion has to be sold, alongside
churches continue to have an important appeal other cultural products, and the religious mar-
(Smith, 2000). The reasons why conservative ket is volatile, with people moving in and out
Christian churches have been more successful of congregations in search of an appropriate
than liberal Christianity is somewhat obvious. niche.
Conservative Protestants have more children, Behind these developments in the American
and discourage contact with people who are religious marketplace stands the figure of
childless or divorced (Ammerman, 1987). Alexis de Tocqueville. His view of religion
People in conservative churches retain their was conservative in that religion in America
membership, because they want their children could exercise moral constraint over the masses,
to be raised through a religious education. but remain separate from the state, and hence
We can understand why people stay in conser- the dangers of revolutionary France could
vative churches, but why proportionately do be avoided (Wolin, 2001: 237–8). However,
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 293

Tocqueville was also struck by the importance communism. Catholicism exercised hegemonic
of association for democracy. Religious plural- moral leadership over the working class in
ism, an emphasis on self-realization and European politics (Gramsci, 1971). This social
voluntary association membership, and local and cultural hegemony has been closely associ-
responsibility are manifestations of the demo- ated with religious control over education, and
cratic revolution, and constitute a democrati- the dominance of the Catholic Church on the
zation of religion. The revolutionary assumption European right guaranteed that regional, party
that everybody has religious opinions and that and class divisions were often drawn along
all opinions are equally valid has produced the religious lines. This hegemonic influence
American religious marketplace, where priestly continued after the Second World War, when
authority and ecclesiastical hierarchy do not Catholicism played an important cultural and
find comfortable locations. In this sense, political role in relation to atheist commu-
Methodism with its commitment to the priest- nism. The Polish Solidarity movement and the
hood of all believers, lay participation, emo- revival of Russian Orthodoxy demonstrated
tional subjectivity and congregational autonomy decisively the capacity of religion to survive
was the harbinger of religious modernization, communism and to act as a platform of social
the logical outcome of which is a society in protest and national renewal. Irish national
which everybody has his or her own personal identity and republicanism have also been
religion. thoroughly merged within the Catholic tradi-
tion, and as a result the Protestant–Catholic
divide in Northern Ireland has remained an
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN EUROPE
obdurate fact of political life. In Spain, General
Franco, who came to power in 1936 following
his attack on the socialist government, was
By comparison with the United States, the decidedly Catholic and supported traditional
Christian churches in Europe have since the values against godless atheism. The collapse of
beginning of the nineteenth century been sub- the Franco regime following his death in 1975
ject to a profound process of secularization. has resulted in the rapid diminution of the
There is clear evidence of secularization in the public authority of the church in Spanish pol-
sense that membership of and participation in itics. With the end of the Cold War and the fall
Christian churches have declined (Wilson, of communism, Catholicism has played a
1976). However, religious identity continues to diminished role in the articulation of national-
play an important role in national identity and ism and national identity. Economic prosper-
consciousness, for example in Ireland and ity, growing multiculturalism and migration
Poland. In The Social Teaching of the Christian have brought about a partial divorce between
Churches, Troeltsch (1931) had argued that the state and church.
oscillation between church and sect that had In Protestant Europe, the relationship with
shaped much of European history had come to the state has been more remote, and hence the
an end with the final collapse of the universal political influence of the churches has been less
church. While sects continue to flourish, there is significant. While the Catholic Church resisted
incontrovertible evidence of institutional decline Protestant infiltration in France, Spain and
of mainstream Christianity (Wilson, 1970). Italy, the Protestant countries have been reli-
Within this general pattern of decline, there are, giously more diverse and Protestant churches
however, discernible differences between the have enjoyed a privileged rather than monop-
predominantly Roman Catholic and Protestant olistic social position (Robertson, 1970: 125).
regions and states (Martin, 1978). In the Lutheran traditions of Scandinavia, the
Catholicism, prior to political liberalization churches have been incorporated into the state,
in the late twentieth century, was central to the and religious functionaries were a component
expression of nationalism in continental Europe of the official bureaucracy. In Norway, the
and remained a major counter-weight to constitution both proclaims the existence of
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294 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

religious freedom and recognizes the Evangelical Europe. In many European countries the for-
Lutheran religion as the official religion of the eign migrant community represents 10 per
state. In practice, the separation of church and cent of the host population. The most signifi-
state is recognized, despite the fact that the cant group, both in numbers and influence, is
cabinet has the right to appoint bishops. In the Muslim. There are 10–13 million Muslims in
United Kingdom, the Church of England func- Europe, and in Germany foreigners will make
tions as a national church with the monarch as up 30 per cent of the population by 2030.
head, but religious tolerance and pluralism Ageing populations and labour shortages in
have been accepted principles of British liber- the developed world will ensure that immigra-
alism. The political transition from a confes- tion and religion remain on the political agenda
sional state to religious pluralism has been of European societies. Migrants from Pakistan to
typical of English political gradualism in Britain, from Turkey to Germany, from the
which discriminatory laws against Catholics Middle East and North Africa to France, from
and Jews were pragmatically abandoned rather Indonesia to the Netherlands have produced a
than rejected explicitly by an assertion of reli- diasporic politics that has raised fears about the
gious freedom. While the devolution of powers impact of Islamic fundamentalism on cultural
to regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales and political institutions. In Germany, Turks and
has weakened the political significance of Kurds entered the labour market in the 1960s
the Church of England, Anglicanism remains and 1970s and these ‘guest workers’ now consti-
an important ingredient of the conservative tute a more or less permanent second genera-
vision of Englishness, but there are important tion, amounting to approximately 2 million
elements of cosmopolitanism among the people. While many of these migrants are secular,
English establishment that are not defined by Islamic organizations play an important part in
religion (Edmunds and Turner, 2001). their social and political organization. In France,
The political history of religion in Western there is a strong nationalist feeling that North
Europe was dominated by two issues, namely African Muslims cannot assimilate to the secular
church–state relations and the cultural divi- culture of the French republic. The hijab case
sions between Protestantism and Catholicism. (l’affaire des foulards) in 1989 caused a divisive
This historic pattern has been slowly broken by public debate over the desire of Muslim girls to
migration, the globalization of the European wear the hijab (headscarf) in state schools. The
economy and the emergence of multicultural French intellectual left regard secular schools as
politics. Postwar European economic prosper- important for personal liberation from religious
ity has combined with a greying population to ideology, while the right interpret the hijab as an
produce a multicultural society that has satis- attack on French national custom (El Hamel,
fied its labour market needs by encouraging 2002). In English culture, where there has been a
migrant labour. The working-age population historical tradition of distrust towards Islam, a
of Europe is declining rapidly and by 2030 it is fatwa against Salman Rushdie for his publication
estimated that the ratio of working taxpayers of The Satanic Verses in 1989 polarized British
to pensioners in Germany and Italy will drop public opinion, and reinforced the public per-
to below 1:1. In the UK the census report of the ception of Muslims as fanatics whose culture is
office of National Statistics has shown that in fundamentally incompatible with parliamentary
2001 there were more people over 60 years of democracy and liberal values. In recent legisla-
age than under 16 years of age. Young migrants tion there has been some accommodation to the
whose fertility rates are typically higher than beliefs and practices of other religions, such as
the host population have filled the gap the acceptance of customs relating to the wear-
between workers and the retired section of the ing of turbans by Sikhs, animal slaughter and
population. Economic dependency on foreign solemnization of marriages.
labour has drawn in significant numbers of Latin Christianity had created a common
non-Christian migrants, whose presence is religious and political culture in medieval
permanently changing the cultural map of Europe. The Reformation and the division of
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 295

Europe broke this dominant culture into inspiration from Weber and Durkheim, the
competing states with distinctive national reli- sociology of religion was primarily concerned
gions. The growth of nationalism in Europe had with the church-sect typology and the secular-
diverse consequences for the churches, but reli- ization debate. In the UK, Wilson and Martin
gious symbols, often combined with epic litera- dominated an empirical research tradition
ture and folk culture, have been indispensable while in the United States Berger, Luckmann
for the creation of nations as ‘imagined and Robertson provided an integration of the
communities’ (Anderson, 1983). Conservative legacies of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and
governments, against the threat of secular com- developed the sociology of knowledge around
munism, have often harnessed the political the theme of the social construction of reality.
vitality of religious symbols in nation forma- However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the soci-
tion. The collapse of communism as a signifi- ology of religion went into steep intellectual
cant atheist alternative to religious belief decline in Europe, and became marginal to
systems had important implications for mainstream sociology in the United States.
Christianity, but Islam has been ideologically There has been an important revival of the
constructed to fill the space left by communism. study of religion in contemporary sociology,
In addition to the growth of Islam, there has but with a different intellectual agenda.
been an important growth in sectarian and Fundamentalism and modernity, globalization
cultic religion. European governments have and inter-cultural conflict, religion and poli-
frequently attempted to curb the development tics, religious movements and ethnic identity
of such sects by legislative means; there is con- are the key issues for sociological analysis.
siderable public hostility to ‘new age’ groups, The debate about the clash of civilizations
Scientology and Jehovah’s Witnesses (Hamilton, (Huntington, 1997) has propelled the phe-
1995; Heelas, 1996). In 1995 the British Home nomenon of the sacred, especially the Islamic
Secretary refused entry to the Reverend Sun version of fundamentalism, into sharp politi-
Myung Moon, who had planned to enter the cal focus. Whereas religion was thought to be
UK to hold services for the Unification on the social margins in the 1980s, it is now
Church, and in Germany, the federal govern- regarded as a constitutive feature of modern
ment has identified 25 ‘sects’ that are seen to be social movements. In classical sociology, the
a threat to ‘democratic values’. These religious main issues were the impact of the capitalist
tensions of a multicultural society are now a economy on organized religion, and the capac-
persistent aspect of European politics, and are ity of organized Christianity to contain radical
an indication of the fact that the traditional working-class politics. In contemporary soci-
Protestant–Catholic division of European pol- ology, the issues are the place of religion in
itics has been further complicated by social globalization, the tensions between fundamen-
hybridity. Changes in the nature of the study of talism (in Judaism, Christianity and Islam)
religion as a European institution are thus and modernity, and the role of religion in pro-
reflections of the growth of global religious viding an ideological conduit for the frustra-
cultures (Robertson, 1992). tions and anger of alienated youth. There is
a dilemma for Islam and Christianity in that
their very success in addressing the secular
CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION:
issues of politics may compromise their capac-
GLOBALIZATION AND
ity to address the traditional issues of spiritual-
FUNDAMENTALISM
ity (Luhmann, 1984).
While mainstream Christianity declined in
Europe throughout the twentieth century, there
The sociology of religion had become during has been a significant growth of Pentecostalism
the 1960s and 1970s an important component and its charismatic penumbra, and approxi-
of mainstream sociology in both Europe and mately one-quarter of a billion people are
the United States. Drawing its intellectual adherents, or one in twenty-five of the global
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296 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

population. The growth of fundamentalism and about the assumption that fundamentalist
charismatic Pentecostalism are both aspects of movements are traditional, or indeed anti-
globalization (Martin, 2002). In Latin America modern. Pentecostalism is highly congruent
and Africa, Pentecostalism recruits among the with the voluntaristic and plural ethos of lib-
‘respectable poor’ whose ambition is success- eral capitalism, and appears to promote rather
fully to enter the modern world, and in West than reject the emotional individualism of late
Africa and Southeast Asia, it is most prevalent modernity. Similar conceptual problems arise
among the new middle classes, including the with the perception that Islam is a traditional
Chinese diaspora. Pentecostalism has also religion. In the popular press, fundamentalism
expanded among social minorities in Nepal, is normally equated with radical Islam, and
the Andes and inland China. While in Latin Islam is understood to be hostile to modernity.
America Pentecostalism functions as a religion Fundamentalism has a number of defining
of the oppressed, offering them hope, social themes. The emphasis on scripture requires a
inclusion and welfare services, in North literal belief in the inerrant nature of the fun-
America and Europe Pentecostalism has spread damental scriptures, and the quest for legiti-
through charismatic movements within the macy and authority by reference to those
existing churches and denominations. scriptures. There is an emphasis on seeing the
Pentecostalism can be interpreted sociologi- relevance of traditional scriptures to contem-
cally through a comparison with the history porary issues. In addition, there is a personal
of Methodism, which spread in the eighteenth quest for purity in an impure world, and an
and nineteenth centuries among the working attempt to reject the division between the
and lower middle classes. While its inclusive sacred and the profane. Fundamentalism
Arminian theology and emotional evangelism involves confrontation with the secular world,
proved attractive to the poor and the socially by violent means if necessary, and a world-
deprived, Methodist discipline, teetotalism and view that understands the modern world in
literacy helped the laity ascend the social ladder. terms of an endless struggle between good
In the United States, employers favoured and evil.
Methodist workers, who were hard-working The study of fundamentalism has therefore
and reliable (Pope, 1942). Contemporary become a major preoccupation of contempo-
Pentecostalism has similar characteristics. rary sociology of religion (Hassan, 2002). In
The ‘Pentecostal virtues’ include betterment terms of their core membership and leader-
through education, self-discipline and control, ship, fundamentalists are recruited from the
social aspiration, responsibility and hard work. educated but alienated urban social classes.
These technologies of the self produce socially They are frustrated science teachers, unpaid
mobile people, but Pentecostalism also offers civil servants, disillusioned doctors and under-
psychological liberation. There is an elective employed engineers. In short, fundamentalists
affinity between Pentecostalism, the spread of are recruited from those social groups that
liberal capitalism and ‘the expressive revolu- have failed to benefit fully from secular nation-
tion’ (Parsons, 1999). Pentecostalism, which alist governments and aborted modernization
as an organization is devolved, voluntary and projects. Their principal recruiting ground has
local, works within a religious market that been the new technological universities that
offers spiritual uplift, social success and emo- were built by nationalist governments as
tional gratification. Whereas Methodism aspects of the project of modernization. These
supplied the work ethic of early capitalism, technical students have been at the forefront of
Pentecostalism is relevant to the work skills the ‘Islamization of knowledge’ which has
and personal attributes of the postindustrial attempted to challenge Western systems of sci-
service economy, especially self-monitoring ence and humanities (Abaza, 2002).
and a refusal to accept social failure. This pattern of recruitment suggests that
The sociological study of Pentecostalism is fundamentalism is not a traditional protest
important, because it raises serious questions against modernity, but instead these social
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 297

movements are characterized by their selective movements are, often as an unintended conse-
approach to modernization and their con- quence, ushering in radical modernity. This
trolled pattern of acculturation (Antoun, interpretation of fundamentalism is perfectly
2001). Selective modernization refers to the compatible with the Weber thesis in which the
process whereby certain technological and Protestant sects were the reluctant midwives of
organizational innovations of modern society modernization. Political Islam, with its empha-
are accepted and others are rejected. The sec- sis on discipline, asceticism, hard work and
ond characterization refers to the process literacy, and its hostility to traditional Islam
whereby an individual accepts a practice or in the shape of the Sufi lodges, may also have
belief from another culture (the secular world) similar cultural consequences.
and integrates it into their value system (the Islam has been placed firmly on the agenda
religious world). One illustration of the of modern sociology of religion by the crisis in
process of selective modernization is the use international relations and the clash of civiliza-
of television and radio by fundamentalist tions. Political Islam is the consequence of the
Christian groups in the United States. Pat social frustrations resulting from the economic
Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network crises of the global neoliberal experiments of
(CBN) is now the third largest cable network the 1970s and 1980s. The demographic revolu-
in America, and funds the CBN University, tion produced large cohorts of young Muslims,
offering courses on media production tech- who, while often well educated to college level,
niques. James Dobson’s radio programme could not find economic opportunities to
Focus on the Family, which offers psychological satisfy the social aspirations that had been
advice and counselling services, is another inflamed by the rise of nationalist governments
example. in the period of de-colonization. Broadly speak-
Among Islamic radical groups, modern ing, we can identify four periods of Islamic
technology is also avidly embraced. In Beirut political action in response to the social and
the militant Hezbollah group has an informa- cultural crises that were associated with for-
tion network with mobile phones, computers eign domination and civil struggles. These reli-
and multiple-version website. Controlled gious movements that have critically attacked
acculturation is a common strategy of Jewish contemporary political and military weakness
and Muslim fundamentalists that involves appeal to the early community of the Prophet
physical separation between the religious and as a model of social order, and hence they have
secular world. In Israel, Jewish fundamental- been labelled ‘fundamentalist’. In
ists who have to take university courses in the nineteenth century, these reformist move-
academic settings that are secular and liberal ments which were hostile to both traditional
have negotiated special arrangements, for folk religion and the external Western threat
example to be taught by men. In Saudi Arabia, included Wahhabism in Arabia, the Mahdi in
fundamentalists have used distance learning the Sudan, the Sanusis in North Africa, and
techniques to avoid contact with women the Islamic reform movements of Egypt. The
who are thought to be immodestly dressed. second wave of activism came in the 1940s
Fundamentalist groups are not therefore wholly with the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in
opposed to modernity, and have adapted vari- Egypt, and the third movement began in the
ous modern technologies to improve aftermath of the Arab defeat in the 1967 war
their organizational and communications with Israel. It reached a crescendo with the
effectiveness. Iranian Revolution in 1978–9 and the Russian
Thus, fundamentalists are not traditional- incursion into Afghanistan. The contemporary
ists; on the contrary, they are specifically hos- wave of resistance commenced with the Gulf
tile to traditional religion, which in their view War in 1990, when the presence of American
has compromised the fundamental tenets of troops on Saudi Arabian soil created the
faith, and by embracing modern technology groundwork for the formation of Al-Qaeda
and organizational forms fundamentalist networks.
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The most influential interpretation of political despite the dramatically successful attacks by
Islam has been developed by Gilles Kepel Al-Qaeda on the United States in 2001. The
(2002) in his Jihad. His thesis is simply that the political opponents of radical Islam have been
past 25 years have witnessed both the spectacu- able to exploit the divided class basis of the
lar explosion of Islamism and its failure. In movement. For example, the fragile class alliance
the 1970s, when sociologists assumed that mod- between the young urban poor, the devout
ernization meant secularization, the sudden middle classes and alienated intellectuals meant
irruption of political Islam, especially popular that Islamism was poorly prepared to cope with
protests in Iran that were framed within Shi’ite long-term and systematic opposition from state
theology, appeared to challenge dominant authorities. Over time governments found
paradigms of modernity. These religious move- ways of dividing these social classes and frus-
ments forced women to wear the chador and trating the aim of establishing an Islamic
excluded them from public space. Although state within which the religious law or Shari’a
leftist intellectuals originally defined religious would have exclusive jurisdiction. Kepel
fundamentalism as religious fascism, Marxists considers the extreme and violent manifesta-
came to realize that Islamism had a popular tions of Islamism – the Armed Islamist Group
base and was a powerful force against colonial- in Algeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the
ism. Western conservatives were attracted by Al-Qaeda network – as evidence of its political
Islamic preaching on moral order, obedience to disintegration and failure. This collapse was
God and hostility to impious materialists, detonated by the military invasion of Kuwait in
namely communists and socialists. 1990, which was calculated to galvanize the
We can interpret Islamism in sociological Arab urban poor against the elites of the oil-
terms as the product of generational pressures rich states. The Iraqi attack destroyed the
and class structure. It has been embraced by Islamic consensus that the Saudis had estab-
the youthful generations of the cities that were lished, and the presence of American troops
created by the postwar demographic explosion encouraged the growth of dissident Islamic
of the Third World and the resulting mass exo- groups in the Saudi kingdom and elsewhere.
dus from the countryside. This generation was After the fall of Kabul in 1992, Muslim fighters
poverty-stricken, despite its relatively high were dispersed to other conflict regions such as
literacy and access to secondary education, Bosnia, Algeria and Egypt. In Bosnia they failed
but Islamism also recruited among the middle to insert Islamism successfully into the conflict –
classes – the descendants of the merchant a political failure made evident by the Dayton
families from the bazaars and souks who had Accords in 1995. In Algeria, extreme violence
been pushed aside by decolonization, and from against civil groups cut off their popular sup-
the doctors, engineers and businessmen, who, port, and the Berber population remained hos-
while enjoying the salaries made possible by tile to Islam. In Egypt, while radical groups had
booming oil prices, were excluded from politi- assassinated Sadat, they were unable to sustain
cal power. At the local level the ideological broad political support. In Afghanistan, the
carriers of Islamism were the young academics Taliban lost local and international support
and students, who were recently graduated through its brutality towards women and
from technical and science departments and opposition groups.
who were inspired by the Muslim ideologues By 1997 there was growing evidence that
of the 1960s. Islamic themes of justice and support for radical Islamism was on the wane.
equality were mobilized against those regimes Often with reference to human rights abuse
that were corrupt, bankrupt and authoritarian, and the need for democratization, the middle
and often supported by the Western govern- class and women’s groups who had been tar-
ments in the Cold War confrontation with the gets of religious controls challenged the politi-
Soviet empire. cal dominance of the conservative mullahs and
Islamism has failed to fill that gap, and polit- their followers. The election of President
ical Islam has been in decline since 1989, Mohammed Khatami in Iran with the support
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 299

of the middle classes and a generation born Jewish fundamentalism has played an impor-
after the revolution was achieved against tant part in re-shaping secular politics, and
the will of the religious establishment. In political Islam has been a major conduit of
Indonesia, a secular president, B.J. Habibie, was social and political protest against both corrupt
elected to replace Suharto, who had fallen from nationalist governments and Western domi-
office in 1998, having failed to cope with the nance. These intellectual changes in research
financial crises that had undermined the cur- focus in response to global political develop-
rency. Habibie was ineffectual and indecisive, ments have had the consequence of revitalizing
but he did not directly oppose the process of the sociology of religion as an important com-
social and political reform. In Algeria, the new ponent of contemporary sociology.
government of Abdelaziz Bouteflika included
both secularists and moderate Islamist leaders.
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