Exercise and Tests of the Police Power

Fabie v. City of Manila

Facts:
Ordinance No. 124 of the city of Manila, enacted September 21,1909, is an
amendment of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, enacted
June 13, 1908, relating to the issuance of permits for the erection of buildings.
hen the application, plans, and specifications conform to the requirements of this title
and of title eleven hereof, the engineer shall issue a permit for the erection of the
building... hat the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially ap- proved. One copy of all approved
plans and specifications shall be returned to the owner or his agent and one copy
shall be... retained by the engineer."
The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms a part
of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which is inclosed
between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero known as Tripa de
Gallina, and lying... within the corporate limits of the city of Manila.
On the 26th day of November, 1909, the plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain
from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa
house upon the property in question.
the purpose of the building was to serve as a guard... house in which watchmen
might be stationed in order to prevent the carrying away of zacate from the premises.
The appellant, the city of Manila, is a duly organized municipal corporation having full
power and authority to enact lawful ordinances for the protection and security of the
lives, health and property of its citizens.
Counsel for appellant insists that the ordinance in... question is a valid exercise of
the police power of the city, in that its sole purpose and aim is to effect these ends by
affording better sanitary regulations as well as increased facilities for protection to
property from loss by fire.
Issues:
The permit was denied by the city authorities on the grouncj that the site of the
proposed building did not conform to the requirements of section 107 of the
Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 124, which
provides: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially approved."
It is the contention of the appellees herein that... this provision is unconstitutional and
in violation of the fundamental rights of the property owners of the city of Manila as
guaranteed by the established laws of these Islands and by the Constitution of the
United States, in that it constitutes an invasion of their property... rights without due
process of law.
the only... questions which need be considered, are whether its provisions are or are
not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its purposes, and whether they
are or are not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Ruling:
The lower court found in favor of appellees and declared the ordinance null and void,
at least to the extent of the above-cited provision.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the city of Manila to make all
reasonable regulations looking to the preservation .and security of the general health
of the community, and the protection of life and property from loss or destruction by
fire.
It is very clear that the ordinance, if it be held to be reasonable, prescribes a rule in
the interest of the public of the city of Manila generally, as distinguished from the
interests of individuals or of a particular class.
The purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and
secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of
fire and disease.
The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings within the city...
limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or
alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion reasonably necessary to
secure the end in view.
There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the
ordinance under discussion.
It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of
Manila generally, and was not conceived in favor of any class or of particular...
individuals.
Principles:
"Its business is to regulate and protect the security of social order, the life and health
of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in thickly populated communities, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property."
In the absence of any constitutional prohibition a legislature may lawfully prevent all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society though the prohibition
invades the right of liberty or property of an individual."
We are of opinion that the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the
public good, and that it should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the
people is the highest law"
(salus populi suprema est lex)
Taxicab Operators v. Board of Transportation
Facts:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular... traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being
an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,
convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
should be adopted
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the
latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the
cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments;
Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in
implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and
operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972
and later shall be accepted for... registration and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as
taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later
shall be accepted for registration and... allowed for operation; and every year
thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn
from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their
respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for
subsequent turnover... to the Land Transportation Commission.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the National Capitol
Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year
1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of
model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of... earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the
time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent
Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition.
Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading
entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the
Case for Resolution.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case,
but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following
queries were posed for consideration by this Court:
Issues:
"A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'
constitutional rights to:
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
Ruling:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed
by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or
other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be
affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of
inquiry.
petitioners contend that they were not called upon to submit their position papers,
nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the
questioned BOT Circular.
It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or... require the submission of
position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected,
this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither
violative of procedural due process.
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary
and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual
physical condition... should be taken into consideration at the time of registration.
As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to
constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door
to the adoption of multiple standards,... possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected
uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard.
With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement
of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners allege that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection
of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed
solely towards the taxi industry.
To repeat the pertinent portion:
Its implementation outside Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been... determined by the
Board.
The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations... to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.
It may also regulate property rights.
it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically... or
similarly situated.
What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded
the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac

Facts:
on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena... against
the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the
warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and... tranquility of the
neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a
committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter.
The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and
the... surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the
warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives
and properties of the people within the... neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac...
declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within
the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code... petitioner instituted the present
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed
in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without
maintaining the necessary distance... of 200 meters from said block of houses to
avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due
process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not
having been passed in accordance with law.
the court a quo ruled as follows:
"1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued
by the municipality of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be
destroyed or removed from its present location;
2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police
power by the Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void
as claimed by the petitioner;
3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse...
constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and may be abated
4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said
warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored therein
which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13... the petitioner
is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs
against petitioner".
Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors
 1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac,
Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the
Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional;
Issues:
whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.
Ruling:
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in
the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local
self-government and as such... are endowed with police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.[3] Its
authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code
"The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles
of a substantive... nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with... public policy, and (6) must
not be unreasonable.[5] Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not
been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government.
No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade
but merely a prohibition... from storing inflammable products in the warehouse
because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the
vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what
has been conceived by the municipal government.
Velasco v. Villegas

In the 1980s, the City of Manila passed an ordinance prohibiting barbershops from
offering massage services if the massage services shall be done in an
adjacent/separate room. Tomas Velasco and other barbershop operators questioned
the constitutionality of the ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power by a local
government unit?

HELD: Yes. Firstly, the remedy (declaratory relief) availed of by Velasco et al. was
improper.

Secondly, the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. In enacting the measure,
the City of Manila was (1) seeking to regulate barbershops and (2) to forestall
possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers. The ordinance is in keeping with the General Welfare
Clause.

Local governments are in a better position to assess what is best for their
constituents. This is the significance of the general welfare clause which delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality.
Lozano v. Martinez

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the
law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus
appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-
imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of
money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty
or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason,
checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken,
the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may
become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade
circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
“lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides,
we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely
free from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check,
but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime
as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee
by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
DECS v. San Diego

Facts: Private respondent San Diego thrice flunked the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT). Upon application again, herein petitioner rejected the application due
to MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 which contains the rule: “A student shall be
allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures,
a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.” Private
respondent went to the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to
the test. Respondent Judge granted the petition, and held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.
Issue: Whether there was improper exercise of police power
Held: No.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.
The court found no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the
case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the
applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed
with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less
valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat
that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,
and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those
not qualified to be doctors.
The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13,
1989, is reversed.
Del Rosario v. Bengzon
Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March
1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7,
Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated
28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and
penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act
and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf
of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit
requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics
Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto
as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for
declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for
prohibition instead.
Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or
words of similar import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it
implements the constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right
to health of the people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost” (Section 15, Art. II and Section
11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of “no
substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation
to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose
between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to
write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is
allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with “no substitution,” the patient’s option to
buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be
curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the
population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally
healthy minority
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
Facts:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao
sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,
Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who
have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission
test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year
1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on
26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al.
accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set
aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such
regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the
“Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of
physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine
in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed
certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in
their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of
RA 238, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provision is
Article 14, Section 1 which states “The State shall protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all.

The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
“accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who
qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the
mind of the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police
power is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote important interest and needs -- in other words, the public order
-- of the general community. An important component of that public order is health
and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to
take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for
admission to medical schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Telebap v. COMELEC