RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos

g the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
vs. they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION and also for its presumed validity. 2
IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
CRUZ, J.: court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here.
particularly with respect to age;
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different
matter.
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation; constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following: involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity,
be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
eighty. unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question
the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
of due process.
play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to
the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade
the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
by the body. 10
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
"iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
changing times and circumstances may require. destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing,
to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances,
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process
previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they
the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and
may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to
present danger.
leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus,
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12 in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason
of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except
power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the
by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and
womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless.
their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The
It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has
solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages,
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema
stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to
the benefit of the greater number.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them. slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered
meat.
his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction
was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The
which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the
and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because
effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows: conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ... returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of
the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted,
however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject
of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
preventing their improvident depletion. safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
FACTS:
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity
The case challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order 626-A which amends EO 626 and states
and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
that:
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall
legislative powers.
be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
On January 13, 1984, petitioner Restituto Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
unconstitutional.
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated and also for its presumed validity.
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial
member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere court, and now Ynot comes before the SC through a petition for review on certiorari.
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself Ynot’s petition assails that the questioned EO is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. Petitioner
annul. claims that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,
this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure
ISSUE:
would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without
WON EO 626-A constitutional.
the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without
RULING:
protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
NO. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED. process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of
the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case at bar, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as the Court held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not
by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

To sum up, then, the SC finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.