5 Unofficial Actors and their Role in the

Policy Process
Avinash Samal

Political parties in 10th schedule

The policy studies scholars have divided the players in the policy process into two main
categories such as official and unofficial actors. Official actors are those involved in public policy
by virtue of their statutory or constitutional responsibilities and have the power to make and
enforce policies. This does not preclude the possibility of these people being influenced by
others, like political party bosses or other interest/pressure groups. The actors belonging to
legislature, executive (including bureaucracy), judiciary and regulatory agencies are clearly the
official actors.

Besides the official actors, there are many other groups and organizations which do
participate in the policy-making process. These actors are called unofficial because their
participation in the policy process is not a function of their duties under the Constitution or the
law. This is not to say that these actors have no rights or standing to participate in the process.
Rather, it means that their mode of participation in policy formulation is not specified in law. On
the other hand, it has evolved and grown as the nation has evolved and grown. So the unofficial
actors refer to those who play a role in the policy process without any explicit legal authority to
participate, aside from the usual rights of participation in a democracy. These groups include the
interest/pressure groups of various types, political parties, individual citizens, research
organizations and think tanks, and the mass media. They considerably influence policy
formulation without possessing legal authority to make binding policy decisions. While the
previous chapter focused on the role of official actors (legislature, executive and judiciary) in
policy formulation, the present chapter discusses in detail the role of unofficial actors in the
policy process.

Interest Groups

1
At the societal level, interest or pressure groups play a significant role in the policy-making in
many countries. While policy-making is a preserve of the government, and particularly of the
executive and bureaucracy, the realities of modern politics enable groups formed specifically to
promote the interests or positions of specialized social groups to play a significant role in the
policy process. One of the most important resources that differentiates such actors from others is
the specific knowledge they have at their disposal. The possession of specific information that
may be unavailable or less available to others constitutes a very important advantage for them.
The members of specialized groups often know a great deal about their area of concern. Since
policy-making is a highly information-intensive process, those with information may normally
expect to play an important role than the other. Politicians and bureaucrats often find the
information provided by interest groups indispensable for performing their tasks. Government
and opposition parties at times curry favour with such groups to secure the information required
for effective policy-making or for attacking their opponents. Bureaucrats similarly often need
these groups’ help in developing and implementing many policies (Baumgartner and Leech
1998).

The other resources possessed by interest or pressure groups are organizational and
political. The primary concern of a pressure group is to influence policy in a particular manner.
They may also supply the official lawmakers with much technical information for and against a
specific issue and possible consequences of a policy proposal. Special interest groups often make
financial contributions to the campaign chests of sympathetic political parties and politicians.
They also campaign for and deliver votes to sympathetic candidates who they think would
support their cause in the government. The main function of these groups is to express demands
and present alternatives for policy action. Often there are several groups with conflicting desires
on a particular policy issue, and policy makers are faced with the problem of having to choose
between conflicting demands.

However, interest groups’ political impacts on the formulation and implementation of

public policies vary considerably according to their access to differing levels of organizational
resources.

First, interest groups differ tremendously in terms of size of membership. All other things
being equal, larger groups can be expected to be taken more seriously by the government. Well-
organized and active groups naturally have more influence than groups whose potential
membership is poorly organized and inarticulate.

Second, their propensity to associate with other similar groups also works as a powerful
influential factor. Some groups often form a ‘peak association’ consisting of representatives from
other groups with similar interests. A coherent peak association may be expected to be more
influential than those interest groups operating individually.

Third, some groups are well funded which enables them to hire permanent specialized
staff and influence parties and candidates during elections.

Fourth, their influence and effectiveness also depends on other resources like
cohesiveness, leadership skills, social status and attitudes of the policy makers on specific policy
issues. The strength and legitimacy of groups also differs from country to country, depending
upon whether they are democratic or dictatorial, developed or developing.

While the exact impact of interest group campaign expenditures on government policy is
contentious, there is no doubt that differences in financial resources matter and that in democratic

2
political systems the information and power resources of interest groups make them key members
of policy subsystems. While this does not guarantee that their interests will be accommodated,
they are unlikely to be entirely ignored except in rare circumstances when executive makes a
high-level and deliberate decision to go ahead with a policy despite opposition from concerned
groups.

Interest groups are found to be more numerous in the USA, UK and India than they are in
the Soviet Union or China. Given the plural character of USA or Indian society, it is not
surprising that pressure groups are many and varied in number, interests, size, organization and
style of operation. In fact, the number of interest groups has rapidly expanded since the 1960s.
Today, while many groups are local and deal with local issues, many interest groups and popular
movements cannot be confined to small states or communities. Rapid socio-economic and
technological changes, coupled with transportation and communications capabilities unimagined
in the past, has made it possible for large many groups to mobilize quickly on a regional or
national scale. With freedom of association and speech guaranteed by the Constitution, neither
US nor India place any legal burden in the path of those who wish to mobilize and form an
interest group. Grassroots organizations form nearly daily to pursue myriad goals, such as halting
the construction of multipurpose dams across rivers to banning the screening of some of the
movies in the theatre halls. While mobilization and group development are not greatly
constrained in our political system, the mere existence of a group does not necessary suggest that
it will have any voice in policy making. While some groups, particularly those representing
concentrated economic and business interests, have considerably more power, other groups
simply do not have it. Groups that represent powerful or privileged interests are partly responsible
for Americans’ suspicion of interest groups or, as they are often called, ‘special interest groups’.
In fact, some groups call themselves ‘public interest groups’ to signal that they view their mission
as a counterweight to these ‘special’ interests.

Types of Interests Groups

There are many ways to categorize interest groups. One can distinguish between an institutional
interest group, whose members belong to a particular institution, and a membership group, whose
members have chosen to join. If one happens to be a student at a university, he or she is a
member of an institutional interest group – university students union – because he or she shares
some interests with the fellow students, such as affordable tuition fee and quality education. If
one joins the NCC or a Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), he or she becomes part of a
membership group because he or has chosen to join the same deliberately.

One can also categorize interest groups as economic or private interest groups versus
public interest groups. While the difference between the two is sometimes rhetorical – almost
every group believes it is acting, directly or indirectly, in the broader public interest – there is also
a more technical way to distinguish between the two. Public interest groups, such as
environmental groups, Common Cause, and the like, seek to create broad benefits for the entire
society, not simply their members. Indeed, it is difficult to allow only public interest group
members to reap the benefits of, say, a cleaner environment without providing such benefits to
others. While public interest groups would like more people to join their causes, they also know
that non-members constitute a potential force of supporters, and, as mentioned earlier, when
many such people are mobilized, a social movement may result.

In economic terms, we can say that non-members of public interest groups are free riders
who benefit from the work of the group without contributing resources such as labour or money.
Economic groups, on the other hand, seek to overcome the free-rider problem by creating benefits
only for the members of their groups. For example, labour unions, particularly in ‘closed shop’

3
states where all workers must pay dues to the union, work to provide wage and benefit
agreements that benefit only the members of the union. By restricting benefits in this way, the
union seeks to promote cohesion and to encourage others to join the union. Industry groups, such
as FICCI, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Automobile Dealers
Association, are clearly economic groups. These tend to be small groups in terms of the actual
numbers of members, but are powerful because of what these groups are: collections of powerful
economic interests that often enjoy considerable local, regional, or national political support.
Finally, one can consider professional and trade associations to be economic associations. Groups
such as the Indian Medical Association and the Indian National Bar Association seek to promote
and protect the professional and economic interests of doctors and lawyers. While they provide
important benefits and services to their members, such as journals and continuing education, they
also seek to protect the economic interests of their members. They play an active role in the
education and licensing of doctors and lawyers, thereby seeking to keep the size of the profession
relatively fixed. When their interests are threatened, they lobby elected and appointed officials for
its redress.

In both public interest and economic groups, people join because they gain some benefit.
The challenge for public interest groups is to make clear what those benefits are in order to attract
and keep members. As a rule, it is easier for economic groups to do so because their members
have their economic security at stake, and the benefits are then more tangible. Public interest
groups, on the other hand, must appeal to other motivations than economics. Most public interest
groups make an appeal to people’s desire to do good, augmenting it by material benefits like
discounted nature tours, glossy magazines, calendars, etc. These benefits seem trivial, but they
help to attract new members and promote group cohesion. Still, they are not as powerful as
economic inducements in promoting group unity.

Finally, it is important to note that some groups do not fit neatly into the public interest-
economic dichotomy. In particular, the United States contains many religious and ideological
groups that come together without being based on economics or a broader public interest mission.
Rather, their mission is to promote their religious, moral, and ideological values among their
members and, sometimes, in the broader society. These groups range from the mainstream
churches to the more ‘fundamentalist’ churches, and from the politically moderate to the
politically extreme on both ends of the ideological spectrum. Such groups can become important
players in the policy process, at least briefly, during times of social upheaval and crisis or when
issues of morality and values are paramount.

As pointed out by both neo-pluralist and corporatist theorists, the organization of

business and labour is often seen as the most significant factor in determining a state’s policy
capabilities. This is because of the vital role each plays in the production process, which is, in
every society, a fundamental activity that has effects far beyond the economy.

Business Associations
Among the various types of interest groups, business is generally the most powerful, with an
unmatched capacity to affect public policy. The increasing globalization of production and
financial activities, due to improvements in modem means of communication and transportation
and the gradual removal of controls on international economic transactions, has contributed
tremendously to the power of capital in recent decades. It is possible for investors and managers
to respond, if they so wish, to any unwanted government action by moving capital to another
location. Although this theoretical mobility is limited by a variety of factors – including the
availability of suitable investment opportunities in other countries – the potential loss of
employment and revenues is a threat with which the state must contend in making decisions.

4
Because of their potential to affect state revenues negatively, capitalists – both domestic as well
as foreign – have the ability to ‘punish’ the state for any action it might take of which they
disapprove (Hayes 1978).

The financial contributions that businesses make to political parties also afford them an
important resource for influencing policy-makers. Elections can sometimes turn on relatively
short-term issues and personalities, which necessitate large budgets to influence voters through
extensive media advertising campaigns. In such situations, political parties supported by
contributions from business are in a better position to run such campaigns and thus influence
voting behaviour. This can lead political parties and candidates running for office to
accommodate business interests more than they would for those of the other groups. Similarly,
the financial contributions that businesses often make to public policy research institutions and
individual researchers serve to further entrench their power. The organizations and individuals
receiving funds tend to be sympathetic towards business interests and can provide business with
the intellectual wherewithal often required to prevail in policy debates (McGann and Weaver
1999, Abelson 1999).

A strong business organization is able to adopt a bold position if necessary and convey it
to the government, without incurring serious opposition from its rank and file. It usually takes the
form of a peak association (a sort of federation of associations) with the authority to impose
sanctions and discipline among its members. Moreover, if the state is confident of the strength of
the business association, then it can delegate some business-related responsibilities to the
business association itself. Generally speaking, the US is regarded as having the weakest business
organizations in the industrialized world and Japan the strongest, with countries like Britain or
Canada falling closer to the US model. Other European countries, such as France, Spain,
Germany, Austria, and Sweden, fall closer to the Japanese model (Katzenstein 1977).

The strength or weakness of business and the varying patterns of government-industry

relations found in a country are usually shaped by a range of historical factors. Although the
example of Japan cited above is somewhat typical, business is often strongly organized if it has
been confronted with strong, persistent challenges from trade unions or socialist parties. The
stronger the unions, the stronger will be the business influence. Second, countries with strong
states often have strong business organizations because in order to pressure strong governments
business itself must be well organized. A strong state may also nurture a strong business
association in order to avoid the problems arising from too many groups making conflicting
demands on the same issue. The existence of strong business associations simplifies the
government’s job by aggregating their demands within the organization. Third, the organizational
strength of business is affected by the structure of the economy. In national economies
characterized by low industrial concentration or high levels of foreign ownership, it is difficult for
the disparate elements to organize and devise a common position. Fourth, political culture, too,
has an important bearing on the extent and nature of business involvement in politics. In countries
such as the US and Canada with cultures highly supportive of business, corporations have seen
few reasons to organize.

Labour Groups
Labour, too, occupies a powerful position among social groups, though not so powerful as
business. Unlike business, which enjoys considerable weight with policy-makers even at the
individual level of the firm, labour needs a collective organization, i.e. a trade union, to have its
voice heard in the policy subsystem. In addition to bargaining with employers on behalf of their
members’ wages and working conditions, which is their primary function, trade unions engage in
political activities to shape government policies affecting them (Taylor 1989). The origin of the

5
role of the trade unions in the public policy process is rooted in late nineteenth-century
democratization, which enabled workers, who form a majority in every industrialized society, to
have a say in the functioning of the government. Given the voting clout afforded to them in a
democracy, it was sometimes easier for them to pressure the government to meet their needs than
to bargain with their employers. The creation of labour or social democratic parties, which
eventually formed governments in many countries, further reinforced labour’s political power
(Qualter 1985).

The nature and effectiveness of trade unions’ participation in the policy process depend
on a variety of institutional and contextual factors. The structure of the state itself is an important
determinant of trade union participation in the policy process. A weak and fragmented state will
not be able to secure effective participation by unions because the latter would see little certainty
that the government would be able to keep its side in any bargain. Weak businesses can also
inhibit the emergence of a powerful trade union organization because the need for it is less
immediate.

However, the most important determinant of labour’s capacity to influence the policy
process and its outcomes is its own internal organization. The level of union membership affects
the extent to which states seek or even accept union participation in the policy process. The same
is true for the structure of bargaining units: decentralized collective bargaining promotes a
fragmented system of articulation of labour demands. Britain, Canada, and the United States, for
example, have decentralized bargaining structures, whereas in Australia, Austria, and the
Scandinavian countries bargaining takes place at the industry or even countrywide level (Esping-
Andersen and Korpi 1984, Hibbs 1987). A union movement fragmented along any or all of
possible regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or industrial versus craft, foreign versus domestic,
or import-competing versus export-oriented lines will also experience difficulties in influencing
the policy process. Fragmentation among labour ranks tends to promote local and sporadic
industrial strife and incoherent articulation of labour’s interest in the policy process (Lacroix
1986).

Finally, to realize its policy potential labour needs a central organization, such as the
Australian or British Trade Union Congress (TUC), All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC),
the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and the American Federation of Labour-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), even more than does business. Since collective action is the
only tool through which labour can influence the employers’ or the government’s behaviour, the
more united a front it is able to put up, the more successful it is likely to be. To be effective, the
trade union needs to enjoy comprehensive membership and have the organizational capacity to
deal with conflicts among its members and maintain unity. Trade Unions’ role in the policy
process tends to be the highest in corporatist political systems such as the ones in Scandinavian
countries, in Austria and the Netherlands, where the state encourages the formation and
maintenance of strong trade unions, and the lowest in pluralist political systems such as the
United States and Canada, where it does not.

Political Parties
Political parties are an intermediating actor existing on the margins or border between state and
societal actors. They have a significant impact on public policy, though in the modern era this
usually has been only indirectly. Though they are not directly represented in the policy
subsystem, the party to which they are affiliated may influence many of the actors in the
subsystem. Political parties tend to influence public policy indirectly, primarily through their role
in staffing the executive and, to a lesser degree, the legislature. Indeed, once in office, it is not

6
uncommon for party members in government to ignore their official party platform while
designing policies (Thomson 2001).

In modem societies, political parties generally perform the function of ‘interest

aggregation’, i.e. they seek to convert the particular demands of interest groups into general
policy alternatives. The way in which parties ‘aggregate’ interests is affected by the number of
parties. In predominantly biparty systems such as the United States and Great Britain, the desire
of the parties to gain widespread electoral support will force both parties to include in their policy
proposals popular demands and avoid alienating the most important social groups. In multiparty
systems, on the other hand, parties may do less aggregating and act as the representatives of fairly
narrow sets of interests as appears to be the case in France.

In India, there is a multiparty system, with half a dozen national parties and regional
parties of twice the number. Most of the national parties have manifestos, which only differ in
stress rather than in content since their common desire is to extend their electoral base as wide as
possible. The regional parties, however, are more sectarian in their approach since they desire
mainly to woo a particular regional segment of the population. In one-party systems like the
Soviet Union and China, they are the chief official framers of public policy. Generally, political
parties have a broader range of policy concerns than interest groups. Hence, they act more as
brokers than as advocates of particular interests in policy formation.

In parliamentary democracies, the political party that has a majority of votes in

parliament forms the government, which is the chief official policy maker. Needless to say, most
of the governments make policies according to the policy manifestos on which they have been
elected to office. In presidential systems like the United States, the fact that members of
Legislatures often vote in accordance with their party policy, the party that controls the Congress
exercises significant influence on policy matters.

The idea that political parties play a major role in the public policy process, of course,
stems from their undeniable influence on elections and electoral outcomes in democratic states.
While vote-seeking political parties and candidates attempt to offer packages of policies they
hope will appeal to voters, the electoral system is not structured to allow voters a choice on
specific policies. The representational system also limits the public’s ability to ensure that
electorally salient policy issues actually move onto official government agendas. The official
agenda of governments is, in fact, dominated by routine or institutionalized agenda-setting
opportunities rather than by partisan political activity (Kingdon 1984, Howlett 1997).

Even when parties do manage to raise an issue and see it move from the public to the
official agenda, they cannot control its evolution past that point. As Richard Rose (1980: 153)
puts it:

“A party can create a movement on a given issue, but it cannot ensure the direction it will
lead. Just as defenders of the status quo may find it difficult to defend their position without
adapting it, so too proponents of change face the need to modify their demands. Modifications are
necessary to secure the agreement of diverse interests within a party. They will also be important
in securing support, or at least grudging acceptance, by affected pressure groups. Finally, a
governing party will also need to make changes to meet the weaknesses spotted by civil service
advisors and parliamentary draftsmen responsible for turning a statement of intent into a bill to
present to Parliament.”

7
 While their direct influence may be muted, however, their indirect influence is not. The
role played by political parties in staffing political executives and legislatures, of course, allows
them considerable influence on the content of policy decisions taken by those individuals,
including those related to the staffing of the senior public service. However, this power should
not be overestimated. In modem governments, as we have seen, the degree of freedom enjoyed by
each decision-maker is circumscribed by a host of factors that limit the conduct of each office and
constrain the actions of each office-holder. These range from limitations imposed by the
country’s constitution to the specific mandate conferred on individual decision-makers by various
laws and regulations (Pal 1988, Axworthy 1988). Various rules set out not only the decisions that
can be made by government agencies or officials, but also the procedures they must follow in
doing so.

Political parties tend to have only an indirect effect on policy making through their role in
determining who actually staffs legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Their role in
agenda setting is very weak, as they play a stronger but still indirect role in policy formulation
and decision-making due to the strong role played in these two stages of the policy cycle by
members of the political executive. Their role in policy implementation is virtually nil, while they
can have a more direct effect on policy evaluation undertaken by legislators and legislative
committees (Minkenberg 2001).

The fact that the influence of parties on particular stages of the policy process may be
muted, or that any such influence may be waning, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
‘parties do not matter’. That is, as Richard Rose argued almost a quarter century ago in the case
of Britain:

“Parties do make a difference in the way [a country] is governed, but the differences are
not as expected. The differences in office between one party and another are less likely to arise
from contrasting intentions than from the exigencies of government. Much of a party’s record in
office will be stamped upon it from forces outside its control...parties are not the primary forces
shaping the destiny of …society; it is shaped by something stronger than parties. (Rose 1980:
141).

The Public (Individual Citizens)

Since democratic governments are representative governments, it is often said that citizens arc
therefore indirectly represented in the policy-making process. In an abstract sense, this is true.
But concretely, this aphorism means very little. Surprising as it may appear, the ‘public’ plays a
rather small direct role in the public policy process. Citizen participation in policy-making, even
in democratic countries, is very negligible. Many people do not exercise their franchise or engage
in party politics. Neither they join pressure groups nor do they display any active interest in
public affairs. This is not to say that its role is inconsequential, as it provides the backdrop of
norms, attitudes, and values against which the policy process is displayed. However, in most
liberal democratic states, policy decisions are taken by representative institutions that empower
specialized actors to determine the scope and content of public policies, rather than the public per
se determining policy.

One important role played by members of the public in democratic polities, of course, is
voting. On the one hand, in democratic states voting is the most basic means of participating in
the political and, by implication, policy process. It not only affords citizens the opportunity to
express their choice of government, but also empowers them to pressure political parties and
candidates seeking their votes to offer them attractive policy packages. On the other hand, the
voters’ policy capacity usually cannot be actualized, at least not directly, for various reasons. In

8
modern democracies policies are made by representatives of voters who, once elected, are not
required to heed the preferences of their constituents in their day-to-day functioning. Moreover,
as was discussed above, most legislators participate very little in the policy process, which tends
to be dominated by experts in specific sectoral areas rather than by legislative generalists. More
significantly, candidates and political parties often do not run in elections on the basis of their
policy platforms. Even when they do, voters usually do not vote on the basis of proposed policies
alone. However, despite such political attitudes of a great majority of citizens, some still
participate directly in decision-making. In some of the American states (like California) and
some countries (like Switzerland) citizens can and still vote directly on a legislation or on
constitutional amendments which are submitted to the voters for approval.

Elections are the major instruments in democratic countries to gauge public opinion or
popular wishes. The most conspicuous difference between authoritarianism and democratic
regimes is that democracies choose their top policy makers in genuine elections. Voting in
genuine elections may be an important method of citizen influence on policy; not so much
because it actually permits citizens to choose their officials and to some degree instructs these
officials on policy, but because the existence of genuine elections puts a stamp of approval on
citizen participation. Indirectly, therefore, elections enforce on proximate policy makers a rule
that citizens’ wishes count in policy making.

However, it is a truism that no government, howsoever dictatorial, can afford to go

against the desires, wishes, customs or traditions of the people. Even dictators undertake many
popular measures to keep down unrest or discontent against the regime. One-party systems like
the Soviet Union also seem concerned to meet many citizen wants even as they exclude citizens
from more direct participation in policy formation.

Research Organizations and Public Policy Think Tanks

Another significant set of unofficial actors in the policy process is composed of the researchers
working at universities, research institutes, and think-tanks on particular policy issues. University
researchers often have theoretical and philosophical interests in public problems that may not lead
to research results that can be translated directly into usable knowledge for policy purposes. To
the extent that they do conduct research for the purpose of participating in policy debates, they
often function in a manner similar to their counterparts in think tanks. Indeed, in many instances,
academics undertaking directly relevant policy research are sponsored by think-tanks (Ricci
1993).

In fact, the development of more complex government problems and the need for greater
analytic capacity than that possessed by the governments have led to the growth of independent
research organizations, or what are often called ‘think tanks’. A think-tank can be defined as an
independent organization engaged in multidisciplinary research intended to influence public
policy (James 1993). Such organizations maintain an interest in a broad range of policy problems
and employ, either full-time or on a contract basis, experts on various issue areas in order to
develop a comprehensive perspective on the issues facing governments. Their research tends to
be directed at proposing practical solutions to public problems or, in the case of some think-tanks,
finding evidence to support the ideological or interest-driven positions they advocate. This sets
them apart somewhat from academic researchers at universities, whose interests are more
specialized and who do not necessarily seek practical solutions to policy problems.

While think-tanks are generally more partisan than their purely academic counterparts,
they too maintain an image of intellectual autonomy from the government or any political party in
order to be taken seriously by policy-makers. Some of the prominent think-tanks in the United

9
States are the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, the
Urban Institute, and the RAND. Similar organizations in Canada include the C.D. Howe Institute,
the Fraser Institute, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and the Institute for Research on
Public Policy. Major think-tanks in Britain include the Policy Studies Institute and the National
Institute for Economic and Social Research. In India too, there are a few policy think tanks like
Centre for Policy Research, Observer Research Foundation, etc. which have come up in recent
years. Literally hundreds of such institutes are active in the Western, developed, and developing
countries, some with broad policy mandates, and others that are more limited in their purview
such as the Canadian Environmental Law Association (Lindquist, 1993; Abelson, 1996). Many
think tanks are associated with a particular ideological position. While Brookings and Urban
Institute are center-left, the American Enterprise Institute is somewhat more to the right, and Cato
is libertarian. Others, like RAND, are more closely associated with their methodological style.
RAND uses very sophisticated techniques in its analyses of a range of public issues.

Think-tanks target their research and recommendations to those politicians who may be
expected to be favourably disposed to the ideas being espoused. They also seek originality in
their ideas and, unlike the researchers working in universities or the government, spend a great
deal of effort publicizing their findings. The need for a quick response to policy issues and
problems has forced many think-tanks to develop new ‘product lines’. Short reports, journal
articles, and policy briefs that can be quickly read and digested have replaced book-length studies
as the primary output of many think-tanks. In addition, a premium has been placed on writing
articles and pieces for newspapers and making appearances on radio and television programmes.
This new brand of research and analysis is dependent on ‘the public policy food chain’, which
includes a range of knowledge and policy-oriented institutions. Over the last few decades, much
of the work of think-tanks has been devoted to promoting economic efficiency, since this has
been an important preoccupation of the governments in the industrialized world.

Mass Media
Last but not the least, media constitutes one of the important intermediating actors active in the
policy-making process. While some regard the role of the mass media in the policy process as
pivotal (Herman and Chomsky 1988, Parenti 1986), others describe it as marginal (Kingdon
1984). There is no denying that the mass media are crucial links between the state and society, a
position that allows for significant influence on the preferences of government and society in
regard to the identification of public problems and their solutions. Yet, at the same time, like
political parties, their direct role in the various stages of the policy process is often sporadic and
most often quite marginal.

The role of the media in the policy process originates in the fact that in reporting
problems they function both as passive reporters and as active analysts, as well as advocates of
particular policy solutions. That is, news programmes do not just report on a problem but often go
to great lengths in locating a problem not otherwise obvious, defining its nature and scope and
suggesting or implying the availability of potential solutions. The media’s role in agenda-setting
is thus particularly significant. Media portrayal of public problems and proposed solutions often
conditions how they are understood by the public and many members of government, thereby
shutting out some alternatives and making the choice of others more likely. However, the mass
media has the tendency to be a one-sided source for setting the policy agenda, as it has an
inclination toward the sensational news and also a tendency to exaggerate some aspects of an
issue, while playing down others.

This is particularly significant considering that news reporting is not an objective mirror
of reality, undistorted by bias or inaccuracy. Reporters and editors are newsmakers, in the sense

10
that they define what is worthy of reporting and the aspects of a situation that should be
highlighted. Thus, policy issues that can be translated into an interesting story tend to be viewed
by the public as more important than those that do not lend themselves so easily to narrative
structures and first-person accounts and sound bites. This partially explains why, for example,
crime stories receive so much prominence in television news and, as a corollary the public puts
pressure on governments to appear to act tough on crime.

We must not, however, exaggerate the mass media’s role in the policy process. Other
policy actors have resources enabling them to counteract media influence, and policy-makers are
for the most part intelligent and resourceful individuals who understand their own interests and
have their own ideas about appropriate or feasible policy options. As a rule, they are not easily
swayed by media portrayals of issues and preferred policy solutions or by the mere fact of media
attention. Indeed, they often use the media to their own advantage. It is not uncommon for public
officials and successful interest groups to provide selective information to the media to bolster
their case. Indeed, very often the media are led by state opinion rather than vice versa (Howlett
1997).

Conclusion
To conclude, it can be said that while the official actors like the minister(s) and bureaucrats by
virtue of their central position in the policy subsystem and access to abundant organizational
resources critically affect and influence the policy process, their societal counterparts like interest
groups (business and labour), political parties, research organizations/think tanks and the media
often play a significant role in many policy areas. All these actors have their own objectives,
which they seek to achieve through subsystem membership and participation in the policy
process. But what objectives they pursue, how they do so, and the extent to which they succeed in
their efforts depend to a large extent on the institutional context in which they operate. At the
domestic level, the structure of political institutions affects the autonomy and capacity of the
executive and bureaucracy, a situation paralleled at the international level by the structure of
international regimes and the role played by state resources within them. These structures have a
decisive effect on actors’ interest and behaviour, and on the outcomes of the policy process.

11
References

Abelson, Donald E. (1996). American Think Tanks and Their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy.
London: Macmillan.
Abelson, Donald E. (1999). “Public Visibility and Policy Relevance: Assessing the Impact and
Influence of Canadian Policy Institutes”, Canadian Public Administration, 42 (2): 240-
70.
Axworthy, Thomas S. (1988). “Of Secretaries to Princes”, Canadian Public Administration, 31
(2): 247-64.
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Beth L. Leech (1998). Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in
Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta and Walter Korpi (1984). “Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-War
Capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany”, in J. H. Goldthorpe, ed. Order and
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hayes, Michael T. (1978). “The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory
and an Alternative Typology”, Journal of Politics, 40 (1): 134-61.
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1988). Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy
of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books.
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (1978). “On the Political Economy of Long-run Trends in Strike Activity”,
British Journal of Political Science, 8 (2): 153-75.
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (1987). The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Howlett, Michael (1997). “Issue-Attention and Punctuated Equilibria Models Reconsidered: An
Empirical Examination of the Dynamics of Agenda-Setting in Canada”, Canadian
Journal of Political Science, 30 (1): 3-29.
James, Simon (1993). “The Idea Brokers: The Impact of Think Tanks on British Government”,
Public Administration, 71: 491-506.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (1977). “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign
Economic Policy”, International Organization, 31 (4): 879-920.
Kingdon, John W. (1984). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Little Brown.
Lacroix, L. (1986). “Strike Activity in Canada”, in W.C. Riddell, ed. Canadian Labour Relations.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Lindquist, Evert A. (1993). “Think Tanks or Clubs? Assessing the Influence and Roles of
Canadian Policy Institutes”, Canadian Public Administration, 36 (4): 547-79.
McGann, James and R. Kent Weaver, eds. (1999). Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for
Ideas and Action. New Brunswick., NJ: Transaction.
Minkenberg, Michael (2001). “The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy
Effects”, West European Politics, 24 (4): 1-21.
Pal, Leslie A. (1988). “Hands at the Helm? Leadership and Public Policy”, in Pal and David
Taras, eds. Prime Ministers and Premiers: Political Leadership and Public Policy in
Canada. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 16-26.
Perenti, Michael (1986). Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media. New York: St
Martin’s Press.
Qualter, Terence H. (1985). Opinion Control in the Democracies. London: Macmillan.
Ricci, David (1993). The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the
Rise of Think Tanks. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rose, Richard (1980). Do Parties Make a Difference? London: Macmillan.
Taylor, Andrew J. (1989). Trade Unions and Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.

12
Thomson, Robert (2001). “The Programme to Policy Linkage: The Fulfillment of Election
Pledges on Socio-Economic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986-1998”, European Journal of
Political Research, 40: 171-97.

13