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Sammy Lasco Kavinga V The People Appeal No 51

This document discusses a case where a religious leader was sentenced to 105 years in prison for rape and other crimes. It analyzes whether this sentence is constitutional and humane under Zambian law. It examines principles from other cases and considers whether Zambian courts could do more to incorporate customary law into sentencing.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
61 views5 pages

Sammy Lasco Kavinga V The People Appeal No 51

This document discusses a case where a religious leader was sentenced to 105 years in prison for rape and other crimes. It analyzes whether this sentence is constitutional and humane under Zambian law. It examines principles from other cases and considers whether Zambian courts could do more to incorporate customary law into sentencing.

Uploaded by

finesschisanga
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Sammy 1Lasco 1Kavinga 1v 1The 1People 1Appeal 1No 151/2018 1(21 1August 12019)

Facts

The 1appellant 1served 1as 1a 1pastor 1or 1apostle 1at 1the 1Spirit 1of 1Christ 1Fellowship 1church

1 in 1Lusaka. 1He 1was 1convicted 1by 1the 1Subordinate 1Court 1on 1one 1count 1of 1rape, 1one

1 count 1of 1attempted 1rape 1and 1two 1counts 1of 1indecent 1assault 1involving 1three 1family

1 members. 1The 1crimes 1had 1a 1religious 1dimension 1as 1the 1appellant 1committed 1the

1 crimes 1on 1the 1pretext 1of 1removing 1bad 1omen 1from 1the 1victims. 1Upon 1conviction, 1the

1 magistrate 1referred 1his 1case 1to 1the 1High 1Court 1for 1sentencing. 1The 1High 1Court

1 sentenced 1him 1to 1prison 1terms 1ranging 1from 1three 1years 1to 125 1years 1with 1hard 1labour,

1 to 1run 1concurrently. 1Unhappy 1with 1the 1outcome, 1the 1appellant 1appealed 1against 1his

1 conviction 1only 1to 1the 1Court 1of 1Appeal.

How 1the 1courts 1have 1used 1Jurisprudence 1to 1come 1up 1with 1the 1said 1logical

1 judgement;

The 1Court 1of 1Appeal 1considered 1the 1sentence 1inadequate 1and 1shocking. 1This 1was

1 because 1the 1appellant 1was 1a 1religious 1leader 1who 1betrayed 1the 1trust 1reposed 1in 1him

1 by 1the 1victims. 1Because 1of 1this, 1the 1Court 1of 1Appeal 1decided 1there 1was 1need 1for 1a

1 stiffer 1punishment. 1It 1decided 1to 1interfere 1with 1the 1decision 1of 1the 1High 1Court 1and

1 instead 1sentenced 1the 1appellant 1to 145 1years’ 1imprisonment 1with 1hard 1labour 1on 1count

1 1, 140 1years 1with 1hard 1labour 1on 1count 12, 120 1years 1with 1hard 1labour 1on 1counts 13 1and 14

1 each. 1The 1court 1further 1ordered 1that 1these 1sentences 1should 1run 1consecutively 1(one

1 after 1the 1other) 1on 1account 1that 1they 1were 1separate 1offences. 1The 1Court 1effectively

1 sentenced 1him 1to 1105 1years’ 1imprisonment 1with 1hard 1labour

1
various 1Jurisprudential 1issues 1that 1the 1case 1presents

First, 1the 1105-year 1prison 1term 1is 1a 1violation 1of 1article 115 1of 1the 1Zambian 1constitution,

1 which 1states 1that 1‘a 1person 1shall 1not 1be 1subject 1to 1torture, 1or 1to 1inhuman 1or 1degrading

1 punishment 1or 1other 1like 1treatment.’ 1The 1right 1is 1couched 1in 1absolute 1terms 1and 1does

1 not 1permit 1any 1exceptions. 1In 1sentencing 1the 1appellant 1to 1105 1years, 1in 1a 1country 1with

1 life 1expectancy 1hovering 1around 150 1years, 1that 1would 1have 1required 1the 1appellant 1to

1 live 1at 1least 1two 1lives 1to 1satisfy 1the 1penalty. 1

This 1effectively 1meant 1that 1he 1was 1given 1a 1life 1sentence. 1His 1whole 1natural 1life 1would

1 expire 1in 1prison. 1A 1prison 1sentence 1that 1forecloses 1the 1possibility 1of 1reform 1and

1 reintegration 1into 1the 1community 1is 1manifestly 1inhuman 1and 1degrading. 1An 1interesting

1 illustrative 1case 1is 1that 1of 1Vinter 1and 1Others 1v 1The 1United 1Kingdom 1(Applications 1Nos

1 66069/09, 1130/10 1and 13896/10) 11(9 1July 12013) 1determined 1by 1the 1European 1Court 1of

1 Human 1Rights. 1The 1case 1was 1brought 1by 1three 1applicants 1against 1the 1UK 1challenging

1 their 1mandatory 1life 1sentences 1for 1the 1offenses 1of 1murder. 1The 1Challenge 1was

1 premised 1on 1article 13 1of 1the 1Convention 1for 1the 1Protection 1of 1Human 1Rights 1and

1 Fundamental 1Freedoms 119502 1(on 1which 1the 1Zambian 1Bill 1of 1Rights 1is 1based),

1 couched 1as 1follows: 1‘No 1one 1shall 1be 1subjected 1to 1torture 1or 1to 1inhuman 1or 1degrading

1 treatment 1or 1punishment.’ 1As 1can 1be 1seen, 1Article 13 1is 1framed 1similarly 1to 1article 115 1of

1 the 1Zambian 1constitution. 1In 1determining 1the 1legality 1of 1the 1life 1sentences, 1the 1Court

1 distinguished 1between 1three 1types 1of 1life 1sentences, 1as 1follows: 1

1
Vinter 1and 1Others 1v 1The 1United 1Kingdom 1(Applications 1Nos 166069/09, 1130/10 1and 13896/10)
1
2
article 13 1of 1the 1Convention 1for 1the 1Protection 1of 1Human 1Rights 1and 1Fundamental 1Freedoms 11950
1

2
(i) 1a 1life 1sentence 1with 1eligibility 1for 1release 1after 1a 1minimum 1period 1had 1been 1served; 1

(ii) 1a 1discretionary 1sentence 1of 1life 1imprisonment 1without 1the 1possibility 1of 1parole 1(that

1 is, 1a 1sentence 1which 1is 1provided 1for 1in 1law, 1but 1which 1requires 1a 1judicial 1decision

1 before 1it 1can 1be 1imposed); 1and 1

(iii) 1a 1mandatory 1sentence 1of 1life 1imprisonment 1without 1the 1possibility 1of 1parole 1(that 1is,

1 a 1sentence 1which 1is 1set 1down 1in 1law 1for 1a 1particular 1offence 1and 1which 1leaves 1a 1judge

1 no 1discretion 1as 1to 1whether 1to 1impose 1it 1or 1not). 1The 1Court 1considered 1the 1first 1type 1of

1 life 1sentence 1acceptable 1as 1it 1is 1reducible, 1but 1not 1the 1other 1two. 1

The 1Court 1held 1that 1by 1imposing 1irreducible 1mandatory 1life 1sentences 1on 1the 1three

1 applicants, 1the 1UK 1was 1in 1violation 1of 1article 13. 1This 1is 1notwithstanding 1the 1possibility

1 of 1Executive 1clemency 1as 1that 1is 1capricious 1and 1not 1predictable 1nor 1is 1it 1based 1on 1the

1 prisoner’s 1capacity 1for 1reform.

The 1point 1is 1that 1an 1irreducible 1life 1sentence 1leaves 1the 1person 1with 1no 1hope 1for 1the

1 future 1and 1nothing 1significant 1to 1live 1for 1apart 1from 1sustaining 1his/biological 1life. 1The

1 rationale 1for 1this 1was 1perhaps 1best 1explained 1by 1Chief 1Justice 1Mahomed 1of 1the

1 Namibian 1Supreme 1Court 1in 1the 1case 1of 1Lukas 1Tcoeib 1v 1The 1State 1SA/4/93 1(1996):3

The 1second 1point 1is 1that 1the 1sentence 1of 1105 1years, 1considering 1that 1it 1effectively

1 means 1the 1appellant 1would 1spend 1the 1rest 1of 1his 1natural 1life 1in 1prison, 1is 1a 1violation 1of

1 human 1dignity. 1Article 18 1of 1the 1Constitution 1lists 1‘human 1dignity’4 1among 1the 1national

1 values. 1Article 19 1of 1the 1constitution 1is 1categorical 1that 1the 1national 1values 1are 1binding

1 and 1shall 1be 1considered 1in 1interpreting 1the 1constitution, 1enactment 1and 1interpretation

3
Lukas 1Tcoeib 1v 1The 1State 1SA/4/93 1(1996):
1

3
1 of 1legislation, 1and 1development 1and 1implementation 1of 1state 1policy.5 1Human 1dignity 1is

1 an 1elusive 1concept 1not 1susceptible 1of 1an 1easy 1definition. 1But 1what 1is 1clear 1is 1that 1the

1 doctrine 1of 1human 1dignity 1asserts 1that 1‘every 1human 1being 1counts; 1that 1every 1human

1 being 1has 1infinite 1value, 1regardless 1of 1his 1or 1her 1personal 1circumstances 1or 1actions.’6

1 Human 1dignity 1thrives 1in 1personal 1freedom. 1When 1freedom 1is 1taken 1away, 1dignity 1is

1 threatened. 1It 1is 1in 1freedom 1that 1the 1human 1being 1can 1thrive 1and 1fulfil 1their 1potential. 1

Third, 1the 1constitution 1empowers 1the 1Courts 1with 1power 1to 1Africanise 1or 1Zambianise

1 the 1law 1of 1sentencing 1but 1the 1opportunities, 1as 1in 1this 1case, 1are 1never 1seized. 1Article

1 7 1(d) 1of 1the 1Constitution 1recognizes 1customary 1law 1as 1a 1source 1of 1law 1while 1article

1 118(2)(a) 1empowers 1the 1courts 1to 1promote 1alternative 1forms 1of 1dispute 1resolution,

1 including 1usage 1of 1traditional 1dispute 1resolution 1mechanisms. 1Yet 1the 1Courts, 1in

1 sentencing, 1seem 1oblivious 1to 1these 1provisions. 1No 1effort 1is 1made 1to 1apply 1any

1 traditional 1thought 1patterns 1in 1the 1sentencing 1process. 1It 1appears 1that 1the 1judiciary 1in

1 general 1is 1still 1trapped 1in 1William 1Church’s 1criticism 1of 1the 1ambivalence 1created 1in 1the

1 early 1Zambian 1lawyers 1trained 1in 1English 1law:

1 Because 1the 1legal 1training 1was 1relatively 1remote 1from 1the 1practical 1circumstances

1 faced 1daily 1in 1Zambia, 1the 1substantive 1legal 1consciousness 1the 1training 1was 1designed

1 to 1promote 1tended 1to 1become 1fixed 1as 1of 1the 1point 1of 1formal 1training, 1unable 1to 1grow

1 easily 1in 1the 1Zambian 1surroundings 1of 1the 1new 1lawyer. 1When 1legal 1understanding

1 thus 1becomes 1fixed 1and 1unchanging, 1two 1things 1happen.

BIBIOGRAPHY 1

CASES

4
Vinter 1and 1Others 1v 1The 1United 1Kingdom 1(Applications 1Nos 166069/09, 1130/10 1and

1 3896/10)

Lukas 1Tcoeib 1v 1The 1State 1SA/4/93 1(1996):

Authorities

Article 13 1of 1the 1Convention 1for 1the 1Protection 1of 1Human 1Rights 1and 1Fundamental

1 Freedoms 11950

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