Time-inconsistent Preferences

and Consumer Self-Control

STEPHEN J. HOCH
GEORGE F. LOEWENSTEIN*

Why do consumers sometimes act against their own better judgment, engaging in
behavior that is often regretted after the fact and that would have been rejected
with adequate forethought? More generally, how do consumers attempt to maintain
self-control in the face of time-inconsistent preferences? This article addresses con-
sumer impatience by developing a decision-theoretic model based on reference
points. The model explains how and why consumers experience sudden increases
in desire for a product, increases that can result in the temporary overriding of long-
term preferences. Tactics that consumers use to control their own behavior are
also discussed. Consumer self-control is framed as a struggle between two psy-
chological forces, desire and willpower. Finally, two general classes of self-control
strategies are described: those that directly reduce desire, and those that overcome
desire through willpower.

The same person will vary in his mood, model. Consumers decide whether to make a purchase,
being at one time impatient, and greedy and which purchase to make, by weighing the costs
for present enjoyment; while at another and benefits of alternatives. The terminology used to
his mind dwells on the future, and he is describe these decisions-"trade-offs," "attributes,"
willing to postpone all enjoyments that can
conveniently be made to wait. Sometimes
"choices," "decision rules"-reveals a particular view
he is in a mood to care little for anything of behavior. Consumers are seen as dispassionate in-
else: sometimes he is like the children who formation processors, evaluating alternatives in a
pick the plums out of their pudding to eat boundedly rational fashion and effortlessly imple-
them at once, sometimes like those who menting decisions (Bettman 1979). Indeed, much
put them aside to be eaten last. [Marshall purchase behavior is probably well described by these
1890, p. 100] utilitarian terms. But, as suggested in the earlier ob-
Who among us has never been guilty of servations of Marshall and B6hm-Bawerk, a more
being unable to deny himself the momen- complete understanding of consumer behavior must
tary enjoyment of that luscious dessert or recognize that people are influenced both by long-term
the fragrant Havana that the doctor or-
dered us to forgo? And that in spite of
rational concerns and by more short-term emotional
knowing perfectly well that it is going to factors.
bring an aggravation of our ailment which Holbrook, O'Shaughnessy, and Bell (1990) write,
subsequent unbiased appraisal will rec- "Recent approaches to consumer research have tended
ognize as being far more unpleasant than to regard consumer behavior as a mode of reasoned
the renunciation of that trifling enjoy- action or as a repository of emotional reactions . . .
ment. [B6hm-Bawerk (1898) 1959, p. 269] [but] a one-sided focus on either aspect by itself-ac-

I n marketing, the dominant paradigm used to de-

scribe consumer behavior is the rational choice
tions or reactions-provides a distorted view of the
consumption experience." We agree. There is a clear
need to examine the interaction between rational and
*Stephen J. Hoch is professor of marketing and behavioral science hedonic motives-between what Albert Hirschman
and George F. Loewenstein is associate professor of behavioral sci- (1977) called the "interests" and the "passions" and
ence, both at the Center for Decision Research, Graduate School what Abelson (1963) labeled "cold" and "hot" cog-
of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 E. 58th St., Chicago, IL
60637. Both authors contributed equally to the writing of this paper.
nition. Although each perspective adequately describes
This work was supported in part by the Beatrice Companies, Inc., a wide range of consumer behaviors, neither alone can
Faculty Research Fund at the Graduate School of Business, Uni- provide a complete account. One reason that little
versity of Chicago, a National Science Foundation grant #SES- progress has been made in integrating the rational with
8910755 to S.l.H., and by grants from the Russell Sage Foundation the hedonic is an incompatibility in vocabulary. Typ-
and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to G.F.L.
ically, the rational side has been modeled formally
492
© 1991 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc.• Vol. 17. March 1991
All rights reserved. 0093-5301/91/1704-0004$02.00
CONSUMER SELF-CONTROL 493

while the hedonic side has been described more qual- We propose a model to explain consumer impatience
itatively. One way to tie the cognitive to the emotional and the circumstances under which it will occur. Spe-
is to place them in a framework with a common lan- cifically, the model addresses the question of how and
guage. why consumers experience "sudden, often powerful
We do not intend to provide a complete model of urge(s) to buy something immediately" (Rook 1987)
the interplay between cognition and emotion. Our in- that can involve temporary overriding of long-term
terests here are narrower and our efforts more modest. preferences. Next, we discuss tactics that consumers
We offer an economic-psychological model that seeks use to control their own behavior and to avoid time-
to integrate the rational and emotional forces influ- inconsistency. We organize our discussion around a
encing consumer self-control. Although consumers are two-factor model of behavior, where the battle for self-
often evenhanded in their balancing of present and control is conceptualized as a struggle between the two
future benefits and costs, certain situations can induce psychological forces of desire and willpower. We dis-
extreme impatience. At such times, buying assumes a tinguish two classes of self-control strategies: (a) those
more hedonic character (Hirschman and Holbrook that attempt to directly reduce desire, and (b) those
1982), one better characterized by sudden increases in that seek to overcome desire through a variety of will-
desire accompanied by inner conflict and attempts to power tactics.
control one's own behavior. Shifts in time perspective Before continuing, it is important to place this work
of this type have been labeled "myopic" or "time-in- in proper perspective. First, we assume that consumers
consistent" by economists (Strotz 1956) and "impul- do indeed have long-term preferences. We do not ad-
sive" by psychologists (Ainslie 1975). Self-control, as vocate (or require) the extreme position of some econ-
we define it, consists of efforts on the part of the con- omists, who argue that tastes are stable and essentially
sumer to avoid or resist behaving in such an inconsis- constant across all consumers. Rather we assume that
tent manner. consumers have long-terms goals that, in turn, guide
their preferences (Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 1960).
TIME-INCONSISTENCY Second, we assume that passionate behavior can be
A time-inconsistent choice is one that would not modeled. We retain the essential cost-benefit orien-
have been made if it had been contemplated from a tation of the utilitarian perspective, but modify it to
removed, dispassionate perspective; it represents a incorporate the emotional reactions excluded from
transient alteration in tastes, not a permanent reeval- most economic models. Finally, our approach is most
uation of an alternative due to receipt of new infor- relevant to contemporary Western consumers, where
mation (cf. Stigler and Becker 1977). Time-inconsis- possessions play an indirect role in defining individ-
tent behavior is of special interest to economists ually based identities, and less relevant to more tra-
because of its significance for macroeconomic policy ditional societies, where group identity is the guiding
(Kydland and Prescott 1977) and savings behavior force behind self-concept (Belk 1984).
(Thaler and Shefrin 1981). Psychologists have been
concerned mainly with the connection between im- A REFERENCE-POINT MODEL
pulsivity and dieting, addiction, and other self-regu- OF DESIRE
lation problems. The ability to delay gratification has
been studied extensively in developmental and clinical Why do people sometimes act inconsistently over
settings (Mischel 1974). time engaging in behavior that would have been re-
Time-inconsistency raises important questions jected if contemplated in advance and that may be
about consumer sovereignty (Strotz 1956). Are im- regretted after the fact? This question has puzzled gen-
patience-driven decisions as legitimate (normative) as erations of social scientists. One view, espoused by
the evenhanded preferences that are usually assumed Marshall (1890) in the opening quote, is that time-
to reign? Is there no arguing with tastes, as economists inconsistent behavior arises from unpredictable
often assert? The consensus of social scientists, and changes in moods and tastes (also see Bass 1974). In
apparently of consumers themselves, is that time-in- a modern rendition of this view, Winston (1980) pro-
consistent preferences are not as legitimate as their posed an economic model of impulsivity in which a
more farsighted counterparts. Consumers talk about decision maker randomly vacillates between two sets
being driven to buy something against their own better of preferences, one myopic and the other farsighted.
judgment, and, as a result, we commonly observe at- Winston describes a variety of strategies that people
tempts by consumers to control their own behavior, can employ to maximize expected utility in the face
to avoid or resist episodes of extreme impatience. of inconsistent preference fluctuations. This economic
Popular magazines aid consumers in control efforts by model of impulsivity has two shortcomings. First, it
offering elaborate instructions on how to fight the "urge places time-inconsistent preferences on an equal foot-
to splurge" and avoid "binge buying" (Time 1987). ing with temporally consistent preferences. But im-
This article begins with a discussion of consumer patience is not simply the random manifestation of an
time preference and the causes of time-inconsistency. alternate and equally valid preference ordering; rather,
494 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

it is a momentary and involuntary departure from the FIGURE 1

'consumer's dominant preferences. Even while behav- ADAPTATION AND THE VALUE OF CONSUMPTION
ing impulsively, consumers often view their own de-
cision making as distorted (Rook 1987.). Second, the Satisfaction
random-preference model fails to shed light on the ba-
sic question of when and why myopic preferences come
into play. - - - no adaptation
An alternative and better-known explanation ofim- ---adaptation
patience (Ainslie 1975; Strotz 1956) is based on the
economic concept of discounting. According to this
view, people are disproportionately attracted to im-
mediately available rewards. When two rewards (e.g.,
the pleasure of a cigarette and the pleasure of good
health) are both substantially delayed, the individual
is able to make a rational trade-off between them.
However, when one reward (the cigarette, in this ex- t
purchase
ample) is imminent, it exerts a disproportionate at-
traction. The discounting perspective is accurate as
far as it goes, but it leaves basic questions unanswered.
Why are certain types of goods (e.g., dessert) associated
with impulsivity and not others (e.g., gasoline)? Dis-
counting also fails to explain why other factors, such
as physical proximity, are commonly associated with
time-inconsistency.
Although recognizing the importance of time (as
well as other dimensions of proximity), our model of
impatience differs from the economic discounting
perspective. We believe that time-inconsistent pref-
erences are due to sudden increases in desire brought Tversky's (1979) prospect theory and more recently
on by a shift in the consumer's reference point. Ref- applied to consumer choice (Thaler 1980, 1985) and
erence-point shifts can be precipitated by any number intertemporal choice (Loewenstein 1988). The value
of factors (e.g., physical proximity in a store), causing function represents the consumer's satisfaction level
the consumer to partially adapt to the notion of owning exclusive of any costs (the y-axis) as a function of a
or consuming the product. After a reference point discrete outcome level (purchase or nonpurchase) rel-
shifts, consumers not only attach positive utility to the ative to some reference point. The reference point is
object itself (what one might call a standing or existing located where the value function intersects the x-axis.
desire before the reference-point shift), but they also The value function is assumed to be steeper for neg-
attach negative utility to failure to consume the object. ative departures (losses) than for positive departures
Failure to purchase implies more than the forgone (gains) from the reference point (Bell 1982, 1985;
pleasure from consumption; the individual actually Fishburn 1977; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
feels deprived. This deprivation is a psychological state Consider a good that would yield a value of D 1 if it
of need analogous to physiological states of need were purchased. The no-adaptation value function,
(which can range from hunger and thirst to addiction). represented by the lighter line that goes through the
origin, is drawn such that the purchase of the good
Reference Points and Deprivation yields D 1 , and nonpurchase yields zero. This no-ad-
The concept of a reference point, or adaptation level, aptation function depicts the case of a consumer who
has a long history in psychology. Reference points play would derive satisfaction from owning an object (based
a central role in research on perception (Helson 1964), on long-term needs) but who has not adapted to the
satisfaction with achievement (Lewin et al. 1944), dis- notion of possessing it. With no adaptation, the steeply
tributive justice (Walster, Berscheid, and Walster sloped negative region of the value function is not rel-
1973), saving behavior (Duesenberry 1949), and life evant.
satisfaction (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman The value function's usefulness lies in showing what
1978). The reference point reflects the fact that people happens when the consumer partially adapts to pos-
are less concerned with absolute attainments than with session of the good. The partial adaptation case is de-
attainments relative to some psychologically relevant picted by the bold-line value function. As compared
comparison point. with the no-adaptation situation, the zero point of the
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a reference-point value function has moved to the right, signifying that
shift using a framework introduced in Kahneman and the consumer is now in an intermediate state between
CONSUMER SELF-CONTROL 495

owning and not owning the product. Failing to make expectations about the future or the consumption level
the purchase is no longer affectively neutral, but in- of a referent individual or group (Austin 1977; Gurr
stead results in deprivation (the distance between the 1970; Walster et al. 1973). Falling below one's refer-
origin and where the bold value function intersects the ence point or adaptation level, whether biological or
y-axis). Now, overall desire for the product is repre- psychological, can lead to feelings of deprivation and
sented by the distance D 2 (i.e., the utility resulting from provides the motivation to improve one's relative po-
consumption coupled with the relief ensuing from not sition.
feeling deprived).
In both the no-adaptation and adaptation cases, we Dynamic Effects of Reference-Point Shifts. Al-
define desire (D 1 and D 2 ) as the difference between though the reference-point shift depicted in Figure 1
owning and not owning the object. The graphic de- provides a mechanism for the motive force behind
piction of desire (D) in Figure 1 can be written in time-inconsistency, it is a static conception. Most de-
equation form, cisions made in the present have hedonic consequences
that extend over time. If desire is not transient, the
D == ex(P - r) + (J(r - 0), (1)
loss depicted on the value function will understate the
where a is the slope of the value function in the positive deprivation anticipated or experienced by the con-
region, {J is its slope in the negative region, and r is the sumer while consumption is delayed. The deprivation
consumer's level of adaptation between purchase (P) induced by a reference-point shift is not instantaneous,
and nonpurchase (0). The value P is normalized so but may linger. Thus, the relevant loss must take into
that aP is equal to the consumer's no-adaptation level account the length of time during which the 90nsumer
of desire for the good D 1 • feels deprived. Figure 2a depicts the choice between
As long as {J > ex, an increase in r will raise D. Desire an inferior, immediate object and a superior, delayed
represents the consumer's level of motivation to pos- object under conditions of partial adaptation. The
sess the object; in the no-adaptation case, it is based smaller rectangle in Figure 2 represents the utility de-
solely on a standing preference for the item. Because rived from consuming a smaller immediate reward;
the consumer views the purchase as hypothetical, fail- the larger rectangle depicts the utility derived from a
ure to purchase does not result in deprivation (the larger delayed reward. The area marked "deprivation
consumer possesses nothing and, so, loses nothing). from waiting" represents the negative utility experi-
The consumer will buy the product whenever desire enced while waiting for the larger delayed reward. The
exceeds the costs (both economic and psychic) of pur- delayed reward could be a concrete object (e.g., a car)
chase. Deprivation, induced by partial adaptation, in- or something more abstract (e.g., long-term health
tensifies desire and the motivation to purchase because benefits). As Figure 2a shows, the more deprived one
D 2 > D 1 • The consumer who partially adapts has al- feels while waiting, the greater is the incentive to con-
ready had a taste and may dread the pain of having to sume quickly so as to terminate the stream of negative
forgo further tastes. Similarly, the bait-and-switch vic- utility.
tim, who anticipates making a purchase but finds the In certain cases, the consumer may be aware that
item out of stock, will feel deprived and may feel com- desire for an object is transient and may opt for the
pelled to purchase a substitute item to mitigate the delayed option, knowing that the deprivation will be
immediate frustration. short-lived. This situation is depicted in Figure 2b; with
Divergent social science research points to the pow- time, deprivation from waiting decreases. Often de-
erful incentive value of negative departures from a ref- privation decreases with time because the consumer
erence level. Research on animal learning has distin- moves on to other activities. Reduced attention to the
guished three types of incentives: reward, punishment, object of desire can result in a leftward shift of the
and frustrative nonreward. Frustrative nonreward oc- reference point back toward the nonpurchase zero
curs "when we fail to reinforce a response that has point in Figure 1. An example of decreasing depriva-
previously been reinforced" (Skinner 1950, p. 203). tion over time can arise in eating behavior. Some peo-
There is evidence that frustrative nonreward has ple have learned that, even if they remain ravenous
greater incentive value than either reward or punish- after a big meal, they should delay the decision to order
ment (Amsel 1958; Wagner 1959). For example, the dessert. The reason is that changes in osmotic pressure
powerful motivating effect of intermittent reinforce- in the stomach and blood sugar that accompany eating,
ment can be explained in terms of the frustration and reduce feelings of hunger, do not occur immedi-
brought on by nonreinforced trials (Amsel 1962). Re- ately (Guyton 1971). Within 20 minutes, however, the
search on social unrest also provides evidence for the pain of abstinence usually fades. In other cases, desire
significance of negative departures from reference lev- may intensify over time, a situation illustrated in Fig-
els. Most theories assume that discontent results from ure 2e. Again, physical appetites provide a context for
a negative discrepancy between current position and understanding such phenomena; feelings of hunger
some reference value, whether the reference value is and thirst typically intensify if left unsatisfied. This
496 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

FIGURE 2 ity. For example, consumers asked to discuss recent

CHOICE BETWEEN IMMEDIATE AND DELAYED CONSUMPTION impulse purchases (Rook and Hoch 1985) repeatedly
commented on the difficulty of deferring consumption.
(8) -Constant deprivation
"It gnaws at me until I buy it." "The feeling starts
Satisfaction when I see something . . . it comes on very quickly
and is a persistent nagging." The deprivation experi-
enced by the consumer is, thus, analogous to a mild
addiction. Addiction is a complex phenomenon with
multiple stages, progressions, and influences (Marlatt
et al. 1988). But some research suggests that the ad-
Delayed dict's powerful urge to consume is not so much a search
consumption for pleasure (addictive substances lose hedonic potency
Immediate II with prolonged use) as a flight from pain, the pain of
consumption not consuming (Silverstein 1976; Solomon and Corbit
o 1974).
Deprivation while waiting
Time ..
In sum, we believe that time-inconsistent prefer-
ences are induced by reference-point shifts in which
consumers adapt to possession of not-yet-purchased
items. When reference points shift, the consumer's de-
sire for the nonpurchased object increases. More im-
(b) Transient deprivation portantly, the consumer desires to purchase or con-
Satisfaction
sume the object as quickly as possible so as to terminate
the stream of deprivation. In the next section, we dis-
cuss environmental factors that can lead to reference-
point shifts and promote impulsivity.

Proximity-induced Impatience
Delayed In general, reference-point shifts are induced by a
consumption
process of accommodation or adaptation. People ex-
posed to a persistent sensory stimulus (e.g., a noise or
smell) adapt to that stimulus to the point at which
O-b-------J""::'"""'=-:-_~---_:::::;::::IO+__-----'---
they are no longer aware of it; they are sensitive only
Time ... to deviations from the adapted-to-stimulus level. Re-
garding consumer behavior, reference-point shifts are
caused by the consumer's adapting to possession of a
good that has not been purchased. There are many
mechanisms that can cause such adaptation (a right-
(c) Intensifying deprivation ward shift of the reference point in Fig. 1). All of the
Satisfaction mechanisms involve increasing the consumer's prox-
imity to the good along some dimension.
Physical Proximity. Perhaps the most potent in-
ducer of reference-point shifts is physical proximity.
The effect of physical proximity on impulsivity has
been well documented in experiments on delay of
Delayed gratification by Mischel (1974). In a typical experi-
consumption ment, children are placed in a room and taught that
Immediate they can quickly summon the experimenter by ringing
consumption a bell. They are then given a choice between an im-
mediate inferior reward (e.g., a single marshmallow)
or a delayed superior reward (two marshmallows). If
the child is able to wait for the experimenter to return
without ringing the bell, s/he obtains the superior item.
may be one reason why physical appetites are such Impulsivity is measured by how long the subject waits
potent instigators of impulsivity; they just do not go before ringing the bell. In an early experiment, Mischel
away. and Grusec (1967) examined the effect of the visible
The pain associated with not buying is a recurring presence of the reward on willingness to wait; when
theme in consumers' accounts of their own impulsiv- either the immediate or delayed reward was in view,
CONSUMER SELF-CONTROL 497

subjects were less willing to delay. It appears that plac- ferred the more temporally proximate toy (75 percent),
ing the object in view leads to a reference-point shift whether faced with a one-week (82 percent) or three-
that increases deprivation and makes waiting more dif- minute (68 percent) delay in receiving the other toy.
ficult. Loewenstein (1990) examined the effects of temporal
A variety of marketing practices may induce a ref- proximity by manipulating the interval that high
erence-point shift by increasing physical and sensory school sophomores anticipated waiting before receiv-
proximity. Much advertising shows the product in use, ing a reward object. Subjects either expected an early
increasing proximity by vividly simulating the expe- (e.g., four weeks) or a late delivery (e.g., eight weeks)
rience (MacInnis and Price 1987; Wells 1987). Distilled of a $7 gift certificate from a local record store. After
spirits ads opt for simple "bottle, glass, and ice" de- a two-week delay, subjects were given a choice between
pictions to help consumers visualize the experience. $7 at the early date or $8.50 if they delayed until the
Marketers also use atmospherics (Kotler 1973-1974; late date. Subjects expecting an early delivery were less
Nord and Peter 1980) to provide the senses with a hint likely to wait than those expecting a later delivery (42
of the real experience. For example, Mrs. Field's percent vs. 64 percent). Apparently, subjects adapted
Cookies has successfully overcome high rents by to their anticipated delivery dates, and those subjects
pumping chocolate-chip cookie odor into the heavily- who felt temporally closer to the reward were more
trafficked corridors of American shopping malls. impatient than those who felt temporally farther away.
Sometimes marketers actually give the consumer a Some marketing efforts may increase impatience by
taste through sampling. Scratch-and-sniff perfume selling imminent opportunity, reminding the con-
samples are accompanied by product order forms. sumer that the product is "yours for the asking" or
Publishers who send books and magazines into the "only a phone call away." Pizza-delivery services that
home with the explicit assurance that they can be re- give a substantial discount if the pizza is not delivered
turned if they are not wanted may also shift the con- within 30 minutes not only are guaranteeing a warm,
sumer's reference point (Thaler 1980), as may sellers nonsoggy product, but are also playing on the time
of Oriental rugs who encourage customers to borrow element in a domain where impatience tends to be
rugs to "see how they look in your home." Clearly particularly severe. The discount raises the credibility
there are often unanticipated transaction costs asso- of the claim and offsets any anticipated impatience
ciated with product return; however, it is also the case once the pizza is ordered, since late delivery confers
that parting with a book that has graced one's coffee significant economic savings. Many direct-response
table, or a rug that has enhanced the atmosphere of advertisements are accompanied by a toll-free hot line
one's living room, is more difficult than turning away allowing immediate ordering. Direct-mail catalog
from the same book or rug displayed with countless companies not only feature toll-free numbers with 24-
others in the retail outlet (Knetsch, Thaler, and hour order-taking operators, they also provide the
Kahneman 1987). option of next-day express delivery for an extra fee.
Television-based marketers of carpeting offer next-day,
Temporal Proximity. Earlier theoretical accounts in-home viewing of samples and 2-3-day delivery
of impulsivity (Ainslie 1975; Strotz 1956) focused on thereafter.
only one dimension of proximity, proximity in time.
In the animal-learning literature, it is well known that Social Comparison. A third factor that appears
the more immediate a reward, the greater is its rein- capable of inducing a reference-point shift is social
forcing value (Chung and Herrnstein 1967). Hence, comparison. People faced with an adverse social com-
the immediate availability of a reward will tend to in- parison want what their more fortunate peers already
crease the desire for it. Research on time preference possess, and they do not want to wait. For example,
suggests that increasing temporal proximity not only sociological research (Easterlin 1974; Merton 1968;
increases desirability, but also increases impatience. Stouffer et al. 1949) suggests that people of all income
Willingness to delay gratification in exchange for levels tend to compare themselves with others who are
greater rewards decreases as consumption objects be- slightly better off than they are. Festinger (1954) argued
come imminent (Ainslie and Haendel1983; Benzion, that people prefer to compare themselves to "superior"
Rapoport, and YagiI1987). The increase in impatience· others, for both informational and status reasons (cf.
is due in part to nonexponential discounting (Ainslie Brickman and Bulman 1977). A reference.:.point shift
1975), but it is also exacerbated by a temporally in- induced by social comparison increases proximity and
duced reference-point shift (Loewenstein 1988). may reduce willingness to delay consumption. Related
In four experiments with five- to seven-year-old research on coaction effects has found that people
children, Irwin, Armitt, and Simon (1943) examined consume more food in the presence of others who are
preference for immediate- and delayed-choice objects. also consuming (Zajonc 1968). Terkel (1970) provides
Children were shown two toys, one to be received im- anecdotal evidence that, during the Great Depression,
mediately and one later; preferences for the two toys there was an upswing in gambling on horses and num-
were measured. The children overwhelmingly pre- bers; in this example, the relevant reference point may
498 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

have been previous income levels (i.e., an example of The ability to maintain self-control and successfully
intraindividual social comparison and its effect on im- implement long-run decisions depends on the relative
pulsivity). strength of the opposing forces of desire and willpower.
Loewenstein (1990) experimentally demonstrated The consumer's conflict is portrayed in Figure 3. The
the effect of social comparison on impulsivity. Fifth- consumer can rest at any place on the diagram. The
graders who won a moderate prize ($4) in a competi- x- and y-coordinates represent current levels of desire
tion against opponents who won a larger prize ($8) and willpower. In Figure 3a, the consumer begins with
displayed greater impatience than subjects who won a standing level of desire for a product, D 1 • To illus-
the same moderate prize but whose opponents won a trate, imagine a consumer who has previously decided
smaller prize ($2). Losers were willing to give up more on a long-term course of action, weight control, and
than winners to get the reward immediately (43¢ vs. vows not to eat desserts. At D 1 , willpower is greater
12¢). Losers also required a larger premium than win- than desire, so the consumer does not want to pur-
ners for enduring a further delay (53¢ vs. 23¢). Iflosers chase. If, however, the consumer were to come into
use their lucky peers as a consumption standard and direct contact with a previously rejected alternative
partially adapt to what they might have gotten if they (e.g., by being confronted by the dessert cart after a
had won, then the reference-point model of desire pre- lavish meal), the increased proximity might boost de-
dicts greater feelings of deprivation and impatience sire and move the consumer rightward to D 2 • With a
for losers than for winners. large enough increase in desire, the consumer can cross
Advertising based on modeling and identification over the "buy line" to the point where desire now
with prototypical product users (Peter and Olson 1987) dominates willpower. At this point, there is a need for
may induce reference-point shifts through social com- self-control. A time-inconsistent purchase will result
parison. An example is VALS-inspired advertising unless the consumer can quickly move back above the
(e.g., American Express) that targets emulators, who dashed diagonal.
model much of their behavior after the more materially Figure 3b shows that there are several ways that the
successful achievers (Holman 1984). Although iden- consumer can respond. First, s/he may buy, and pos-
tification with a product user undoubtedly increases sibly consume, the product immediately in an attempt
desire by increasing the slope of the value function on to sate the desire; in such cases the consumer never
the gain side, our analysis suggests that identification moves from D 2 • Purchases of this kind may occur with
may also encourage buying through a rightward shift the minimum conscious deliberation characteristic of
of the consumer's reference point. Of course, the automatic or mindless behavior (Langer, Blank, and
strength of the reference-point shift will depend on the Chanowitz 1978; Langer and Imber 1980; Weinberg
level of identification with the product user (Krebs and Gottwold 1982), or the pure reaction with little
1975). or no cognition (Holbrook et al. 1990). Alternatively,
consumers may experience an "interrupt" (Bettman
SELF-CONTROL: THE CONFLICT 1979; Simon 1967) that alerts them to the need for
cognitive deliberation. Interrupts can assume many
BETWEEN DESIRE AND WILLPOWER forms. Consumers may recognize that they are in a
Consumers are not passive victims of their own situation in which they previously made purchases that
fluctuating preferences. Those who have experienced were regretted (e.g., in a fancy clothing store right after
time-inconsistency and its consequences (e.g., the re- payday). The act of paying for the item may also act
gret associated with closets full of unworn clothes or as an interrupt. Even desire itself may serve as an in-
embarrassing product returns) are likely to develop terrupt; too sudden an increase in desire may lead
self-control strategies for imposing consistency on their consumers to be suspicious of their motives.
own behavior. In this article, we frame the self-control The desire-willpower framework illustrated in Fig-
problem as a psychological conflict between desire (the ure 3b makes it clear that there are two distinct forms
initiating hedonic force previously discussed) and that self-control attempts can take: desire-based and
willpower (strategies used to overcome desire). willpower-based. First, consumers may attempt to di-
Two-factor models of behavior have been an integral rectly reduce desire (a direct movement to the left) by
part of many accounts of self-control (Freud 1911; physically or psychologically reducing proximity to the
James 1890; McIntosh 1969; Winston 1980). In psy.- product. Alternatively, consumers may attempt to
choanalytic theory, the conflict is represented as an overpower desire (an upward movement) by relying
oscillation between primary process thinking (the id on a variety of willpower strategies. Willpower at-
or pleasure principle), which is impulse-driven, largely tempts will be successful to the extent that consumers
irrational, and seeks immediate gratification at any and cannot offer persuasive rationalizations (a downward
all costs, and secondary process thinking (the ego or movement) that might legitimate a time-inconsistent
reality principle), which is patient, logical, and has the preference.
will to postpone gratification in the service of future Before moving on, it is important to note that con-
long-run gains or goals (Hilgard 1962). sumer self-control, however, need not be as reactive
CONSUMER SELF-CONTROL 499

FIGURE 3

DESIRE-WILLPOWER MODEL OF SELF-CONTROL

(8) Time-inconsistent preference induced by proximity (b) Strategies for maintaining self-control

Willpower Willpower BUy. Line

Cost an:,I,~~~~"/
Avoidance
••------,..::~~P. Proximity &
distraction ,D2
0, D2
,
I
t
Rati onal izati on

Desire Desire

as suggested in the desire-induced, interrupt view. Although standard models of decision making take
There are other reasons people might want to regulate tastes as fixed and invariant, there has been some work
their immediate consumption behavior. In his discus- on the self-manipulation of preferences. Most relevant
sion of modern hedonism, Campbell (1987) offers a to our reference point model is the literature on as-
much more proactive conception of self-control. For piration level. Although aspiration level sometimes is
Campbell, much pleasure is sought via emotional considered as exogenously specified, much of the lit-
stimulation (imagination, window shopping) to create erature has recognized that individuals have some
a necessary level of novelty. Drawing on earlier work ability to control their own aspirations. Downward
by Scitovsky (1976), Campbell offers a conception of manipulations of aspirations may serve to reduce the
self-control that could be labeled "pleasure manage- frustration arising from failure to meet goals (Festinger
ment." Consumers engaged in pleasure management 1942). Likewise, people may inflate their aspirations
recognize (at least implicitly) that there is a trade-off to increase their motivation level (Frank 1941). In our
between comfort and pleasure. Scitovsky defined framework, people manipulate their reference points
comfort as residing at an optimal state of arousal. He to maintain consistency in their own behavior. Like a
argued that comfort in itself is not pleasurable; pleasure surge protector on a computer, the goal of such efforts
is generated during the process of getting to the com- is to neutralize transient shifts in desire that are caused
fortable state (either increasing or decreasing arousal by sudden increases in proximity. This section outlines
to the optimal level). Pleasure management involves three self-control tactics (avoidance, postponement
self-imposed periods of deprivation to increase future and distraction, and substitution) that reduce desire
pleasure. It demands consumer foresight, requiring a by undoing reference-point shifts. Each tactic implies
consumer worldly enough to appreciate George Ber- a leftward movement in Figure 3.
nard Shaw's observation that "There are two tragedies
in life. One is not to get your heart's desire. The other Avoidance. Clearly, the best way for consumers to
is to gain it." Everyone engages in pleasure manage- avoid time-inconsistent behavior is to eschew situa-
ment to some degree. Not eating between meals so as tions in which they are likely to experience increases
to better enjoy dinner, and taking a 10-kilometer run in desire for previously rejected alternatives. Avoid-
so as to experience the pleasure of stopping, are ex- ance precludes physical or sensory proximity and, thus,
amples of deferring short-term gains for the promise prevents a proximity-induced shift in a reference stan-
of long-term pleasure. Pleasure management is a fas- dard. The importance of avoidance is well-known to
cinating form of self-control that deserves more study. those who have given up alcohol or drugs (although
there is some controversial clinical evidence that al-
coholics and addicts may be able to consume in mod-
Desire Reduction 'eration; Polich, Armor, and Braiker 1981). Recogniz-
One way in which consumers can maintain self- ing that their resolve could lapse under the wrong
control is by manipulating their own reference points. circumstances, recovering alcoholics and addicts often
500 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

avoid bars and parties where alcohol or drugs are peanuts or potato chips. The purpose of this tactic is
served. Rook and Hoch (1985) found that consumers to provide sufficient immediate satisfaction to endu~e
employed a variety of distancing strategies based on the deprivation associated with waiting, perhaps Sl-
avoidance, such as: "You've got to walk away-as soon m ultaneously distracting oneself from the original de-
as I feel an impulse, I immediately leave the area," sired object. Low-calorie foods (e.g., light and nonal-
and "I steer clear of record stores when I can't afford coholic beverages and high-fiber breads that fill you
it." Schifter and Ajzen (1985) found that women were up but not out) are positioned as wholesome s~bstitu.tes
more successful in losing weight when they had de- for the real thing. Specialty shops and gallenes sellIng
veloped a fairly detailed plan of action to deal with expensive antiques or artwork also offer relatively in-
the unanticipated difficulties of dieting. expensive baubles and gewgaws that can be purchased
to sate desires for more imposing objects.
Postponement and Distraction. Postponement
The effecti veness of substitution is uncertain. Sev-
means putting off a choice until some future date, an
eral findings from the delay-of-gratification paradigm
effective strategy against transient desires (Fig. 2b).
suggest that it can backfire (Yates and ~isc~el 1979).
Many consumers devise postponement rules, such as:
Although substitution may momentanly dIstract the
"Never buy a car on the first visit to the dealership,"
consumer from the more desirable object, the delayed
or "Always consult my spouse before making a major
object may come back into focus. Impatience may in-
purchase." After a consumer leaves the showroom or
tensify when the small reward is no longer available.
department store, his or her desires, \vhich had seemed
Moreover a "lesser evil" substitute may not always be
firmly entrenched, often reced~. Ro.ok (19.87) fou:nd
an improvement over the focal object of desire, as wit-
that the most difficult moments In an ImpulsIve-buyIng
nessed by people who continue to smoke in order to
situation occur immediately after the impulse to con-
avoid weight gain (Klesges et al. 1989).
sume is first felt. Consumers believed that the intense
desire would subside by itself if they could only resist
it for a little while. Recognizing that impulsivity lnay Willpower
be cultivated by high-pressure sales tactics, numerous
The second factor influencing self-control is will-
states have three- to seven-day cooling-off periods
power. Willpower refers to the diverse tactics that peo-
during which a consumer can reconsider and nullify
ple use to overcome, rather than to reduce, their own
a purchase. Postponement, however, does not work
impatience. The idea of overcoming desires is inimical
for all people. Nisbett and Kanouse (1968) found that,
to the rational choice perspective, which assumes that
although there was a positive relation between un-
people try to satisfy, rather than to overcome, desires.
planned impulse buying and number of hours of food
The use of willpower tactics implies the existence of
deprivation for normal-weight individuals, there was
multiple, quasi-independent centers of motivation
no relation for obese consumers. In fact, obese con-
within individuals (or multiple selves [Elster 1977]).
sumers purchased even more when th~y had just eat~n,
In literature and the fine arts, self-conflict is often
suggesting the possibility of an eatIng-begets-eatIng
portrayed as the soul caught between the. devil's im-
mechanism.
precations and an angel's moral exhortatIons. Intra-
Distraction has proved to be one of the most suc-
personal conflict is a recurring theme in consumers'
cessful means of postponing. Whereas attention to the
self-reports of impulse purchases (Rook 1987; Rook
delayed-goal object increases the pain associated with
and Hoch 1985). To capture the introspective expe-
waiting, distraction reduces the fr~strati?n and ar~usal
rience of intrapersonal conflict, theoretical frameworks
that accompanies the typical waitIng perIod, effectIvely
of interpersonal conflict have been used to model the
reducing the magnitude of the shaded areas in Figure
struggle between multiple selves. Game theory, the
2. Work by Mischel and his colleagues has demon-
problem of collective action, and principal agent the-
strated that self-distraction is an effective way for chil-
ory have all been translated into intrapersonal terms.
dren to maintain self-imposed delays of desired goal
Schelling (1978) and, more recently, Ainslie (1985)
objects (other than avoidance). In t~o sets of experi-
view intrapersonal conflict as a repeated two-person
ments, subje'cts were instructed to dIstract themselves
game, an "intimate contest for self-com~and"
while waiting (Mischel and Ebbesen 1970) or to cog-
(Schelling 1984) between two selves, one m.yoplc and
nitively transform the immediate rewards (e.g., by
the other farsighted. For example, there IS the self
thinking of the marshmallows as little whi~e clou:ds;
(dominant right after smoking a cigarette) who wants
Mischel Ebbesen, and Zeiss 1972). Both dIstractIon
to quit smoking and the self who wants "just one
and cog~itive transformation increased willingness to
more." There is the self who wants to rise early (and
wait.
sets the alarm clock accordingly) and the self who re-
Substitution. Substitution involves offering oneself jects the previous night's resolve in favo~ of sleeping
a small but immediate reward for successfully resisting in. Willpower, in this context, can be VIewed as the
a larger impulse. For instance, as a snack, a diet:r ~ay efforts of the farsighted self to constrain the behavior
substitute a piece of celery for the much more satIsfyIng of the myopic self. Elster (1-977) views intertemporal
CONSUMER SELF-CONTROL 501

choice as a problem of collective action between a se- Precommitment. Precommitment involves any
quence of temporally situated selves. In the same way device through which consumers impose constraints
that social equilibrium can unwind as the result of in- on, or alter incentives for, future behavior. A classic
dividual defections, impulsive acts by earlier situated example of precommitment was Ulysses' instructions
selves (e.g., smoking a cigarette) can lead to an ever- to his crew to bind him to the mast so that he could
expanding series of defections. Thaler and Shefrin hear the Sirens without jumping overboard to his
(1981) apply a theoretical framework adopted from death; his crew stuffed wax in their ears so that they
principal agent theory in economics to understand in- could safely sail the boat (Elster 1977). Wiring one's
trapersonal conflict. In their model, an atemporal, far- jaw shut as a means of losing weight and taking the
sighted planner (the principal) attempts to regulate the drug Antabuse to discourage future drinking are mod-
behavior oftemporally situated, shortsighted doers (the ern examples of precommitment through self-binding,
agents). as are the less extreme cases of placing the alarm clock
Sjoberg (1980; Sjoberg and Johnson 1978) views across the room (Schelling 1978) and leaving one's
willpower as a form of high-quality deliberation re- credit cards and checkbook at home when going shop-
quiring cognitive effort. "To have a strong will means ping. "Side bets" (Becker 1960) are also often included
being able to stick to an initial well-balanced decision in the precommitment category. Side bets are contracts
under various forms of pressure" (Sjoberg and Johnson that commit consumers to a course of action in which
1978, p. 150). Volitional breakdowns occur under the future rewards are irrevocably tied to the ability to
influence of strong moods or desires, when "some en- avoid more immediate satisfactions.
ergy which otherwise would have been available for Precommitment is usually assumed to operate by
the cognitive system is lost. . . . The withdrawal of brute force. The individual either eliminates the option
energy first affects more sophisticated cognitive mech- of consuming or imposes such extreme penalties on
anisms leaving the more primitive ones. This may leave impulsive behavior that the costs outstrip the benefits.
the door open for a corrupt, twisted, and shortsighted However, if credible, precommitment may also have
reasoning which generates excuses for changing the an impact through its effect on desire and impatience.
initial decision" (p. 151). Sjoberg and Johnson tested Knowing that one will not have the option to consume
their theoretical perspective by repeatedly interviewing in the future can reduce desire. For example, addicts
smokers who attempted to quit. As predicted, reversion suffer less withdrawal pain when detoxifying in an es-
to smoking generally occurred at times of extreme tablishment that has a reputation for incorruptibility
stress; subjects who resumed smoking identified cog- (Schelling 1984).
nitive distortions of reality that occurred prior to re- Precommitment has received much attention, es-
sumption of smoking. pecially in recent economic analyses of self-control
In what follows, we classify all of the interpersonal (Elster 1977; Strotz 1956; Thaler and Shefrin 1981).
strategies that people can apply intrapersonally under It remains an obvious enigma for the standard time
the category of "willpower." People can attempt to discounting view. Despite the abundance of literature
regulate their own behavior (by erecting constraints on the subject, the prevalence of precommitment in
or altering incentives) in the same way that they at- aiding day-to-day consumer self-control is unclear.
tempt to regulate others' behavior. Just as individuals Precommitment strategies are often difficult or costly
may attempt to use reason and argument to persuade to initiate and are of limited effectiveness. Consumers
another person to adopt their perspective, they may are adept at constructing easily revocable side bets,
apply analogous persuasion tactics to themselves. inventing rationales for why a current purchase is a
Willpower tactics differ from desire-reduction tactics valid exception to the rule. Even individual retirement
in an important way. Willpower is a force that opposes accounts, pensions, and trusts have provisions for early
desire. Pure willpower implies an upward move in the withdrawal.
desire-willpower model in Figure 3. Exercise of will- Economic Cost Assessment. When consumers are
power need not change the level of desire experienced asked what types of self-control devices they use to
by the individual, although it can decrease, or inad- resist impulsive buying, conscious consideration of the
vertently increase, the intensity of a desire in certain purchase's economic costs is often the first tactic men-
cases. tioned (Rook and Hoch 1985). Self-control based on
Willpower-based strategies include all attempts by cost-benefit considerations is not always easy. While
consumers to enumerate and make salient the costs of desire is proximate and vivid, economic consequences
satisfying time-inconsistent preferences. There are usually are remote and difficult to define (Hirschman
economic costs, based on an assessment of the ability 1977). Ten dollars spent now results in a minute de-
to pay, and psychic costs, such as guilt and regret. We crease in savings, or an insignificant increase in debt,
also discuss consumer rationalizations that might un- and is quickly lost in the complex flow of income and
dermine the effectiveness of particular willpower purchases (Johnson, Kotlikoff, and Samuelson 1987).
strategies. There is little relation between an isolated expenditure
502 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

today and the ability to make a specific purchase in the development of frustration (deprivation) tolerance.
the future; this may be especially true in households Hence, he viewed ideation about delayed rewards as,
where the spender is not the bill payer. Studies of self- in effect, a substitution tactic where the intermediate
help groups for compulsive shoppers (e.g., Spender- rewards are psychic rather than material.
Menders; see O'Guinn and Faber 1989) have found Time binding and other types of internal reinforcers
that, when making purchases, profligate spenders have been the subject of much study, particularly in
sometimes relied on a "just-charge-it" logic; appar- developmental research on delay of gratification (see
ently, they were are able to successfully divorce the Mischel [1974] for a summary). When waiting for a
pleasures of purchase from the economic realities of goal object is involuntary (i.e., an externally imposed
payment. delay that cannot be overcome), time binding has been
Consumers may make numerous rationalizations demonstrated to be an effective strategy to reduce
(some provided by salespeople who have read personal frustration (Miller and Karniol 1976). However, when
selling manuals) that sabotage their attempts at ra- the situation involves a self-imposed delay of gratifi-
tional cost assessment; most notable are feelings of cation (arguably the most common situation in con-
entitlement. Entitlement represents the quintessential sumer behavior), experimental research overwhelm-
Yuppie theme-"you work hard, so you deserve to ingly demonstrates that time binding does not work
play hard." As the theme was expressed on a recent well. Mischel et al. (1972) found that instructing sub-
bus-stop advertisement for women's designer clothes, jects to think about delayed rewards while waiting for
"Being it all is hard work; having it all makes up for them made subjects less willing to delay gratification.
it." Splurging is acceptable because a penance has been An increasing unwillingness to delay gratification is
paid in advance or will be in the near future. The especially likely when delayed-reward objects are sim-
VALS-inspired achiever ads rely on the entitlement ilar to immediate-reward objects (e.g., both are con-
theme, as exemplified by a print ad showing two ex- summatory objects; Mischel and Baker 1975).
hausted racquetball players as backdrop to the copy: What accounts for the limited effectiveness of time
"He works as hard as he plays. And he drinks Johnnie binding (as opposed to pleasure management, which
Walker." A recurrent theme in consumers' discussions does seem to be effective)? One reason may be that
of why they engage in recreational shopping and im- virtually all delay-of-gratification research has used
pulse buying is that it relieves feelings of depression child subjects, a population with limited, if any, plea-
(Bellenger and Korgaonkar 1980). Entitlement offers sure-management intuition or skills. Another possi-
the consumer the argument that "you do not deserve bility is that, even though focusing on the delayed ob-
to feel miserable; buy it and cheer yourself up." En- ject makes the benefits associated with waiting more
titlement sometimes is supplemented with a "greed- salient, it may also inadvertently increase proximity,
is-good" rationale. During the Gilded Age (1860- which, in turn, activates desire and increases impa-
1900), some social commentators argued that con- tience. Thinking about how good dessert will taste to
spicuous consumption offered positive benefits by en- avoid overeating appetizers may actually increase cur-
couraging self-help behavior in the middle class, a class rent hunger pangs, thereby increasing the likelihood
that was fueled by the social emulation motive (Mason of time-inconsistent consumption (Ruderman 1986).
1981 ). However, time binding may be more effective in prac-
Entitlement may provide an even more potent ra- tice than is indicated by empirical research. Time
tionalization for purchase when it is coupled with so- binding has been studied in situations in which subjects
cial comparison, which, as mentioned earlier, can cre- have had to react to a desirable stimulus. It may be
ate impatience by increasing proximity to the product. that time binding does not work as well as a reactive
The basic argument here is that, not only do you de- self-control strategy in responding to sudden increases
serve to be compensated for your good deeds or hard- in desire, even though it does work as a proactive form
ships, but, in addition, since "everybody else is doing of pleasure management.
it," you ought to jump on the bandwagon as well. This
Bundling of Costs. Another tactic for increasing
attitude would result in a shift toward the bottom right-
the salience of purchase costs is to bundle a series of
hand corner of Figure 3b. Since the movement is per-
otherwise isolated actions (Ainslie 1975). Through
pendicular to the buy line, such rationalizations may
bundling, impulsive transgressions become inseparable
dramatically increase impatience and the propensity
(as in a formal budget); the influence of the transgres-
for time-inconsistent behavior.
sions is felt in other areas, such as the postponement
Time Binding. In addition to thinking about the of more important and needed purchases. The old ad-
negative consequences of consuming, consumers may age "calories add up" is an explicit form of bundling.
also focus on the positive benefits of delay, a tactic Rather than myopically view the eating of an ice-cream
known as "time binding" (Jones and Gerard 1967). cone as an isolated act, a dieter may attempt to reframe
Freud ( 1911) believed that the ability to cathect images it as the first in an endless string of self-control vio-
of desired but delayed gratifications was necessary for lations. By bundling eating of the current cone with
CONSUMER SELF-CONTROL 503

eating of future cones, the consumer may view the costs authorities available, higher authority can take the
of the cone not as 250 calories, but as an extra 250 form of talking to oneself or related forms of self-re-
calories a day for the foreseeable future, with obesity inforcement (Mischel et al. 1972). Relying on higher
as the inevitable outcome. To aid consumers in bun- authority, however, can be a risky strategy. When
dling, public-service television ads show piled-up car- transgressions occur, as is likely to happen occasion-
tons of cigarettes with the yearly cost of smoking puls- ally, instead of continuing to struggle for self-control,
ing on center-screen. Similarly, the Environmental individuals may view themselves as lost causes and
Protection Agency requires automobile and consumer abandon all further restraint. Research on dieting
appliance manufacturers to display a sticker stating (Loewe 1982) has found that binging behavior is often
average yearly fuel costs. Apparently having these ex- precipitated by reference to an "already-blown-it"
penses expressed as a lump sum makes them more real logic.
and consequential to consumers' future well-being. Regret and Guilt. In addition to the material costs
It should be noted that actions can be unbundled as associated with time-inconsistent purchases, there are
well as bundled. Instead of bundling impulsive acts, also psychic costs (O'Guinn and Faber 1989). Research
consumers can just as easily treat such episodes as iso- on decision making under uncertainty (e.g., Allais's
lated events, rationalizing their behavior with logic paradox) has found that people avoid actions that they
such as "just one won't hurt" or "a little is not that anticipate regretting (Bell 1982). Consumers may also
bad for you." Marketers, also, may reframe the eco- anticipate future guilt and shame. Impulsive purchase
nomic cost of a purchase into smaller, more palatable behavior may conflict with basic morals and values,
units. "Pennies a day" represents one example of such signaling hedonism, materialism, or selfishness (Belk
reframing through unbundling. Credit-card brochures 1982, 1985). Consumers may worry about the con-
that state the cost of maintaining a debit balance as spicuousness (Mason 1981) or fear the embarrassment
the minimum monthly payment, rather than as the that may accompany seemingly frivolous purchases.
interest cost, similarly focus attention on the small size The embarrassment need not be public, as witnessed
of payments; these brochures divert attention from the by consumers' feelings of immaturity when looking
more distant problem of how long the payments will into a closet filled with infrequently worn shoes and
last. Consumers may also attempt to redefine purchases clothing.
so that they appear time-consistent. Sales promotions A recent automobile ad, recognizing that guilt can
can provide a basis for rationalization by raising the reduce the probability of purchase, offered explicit
specter that it would be shortsighted not to make the countervailing arguments. It read, "To anyone who
purchase. A food firm's recent direct-mail offer shows thinks a Mercedes-Benz S-Class is self-indulgent, a
a large full-color picture of a fancy dessert with the brief lesson in self-preservation." A detailed pictorial
headline, "Would you throwaway a FREE Dobosh and verbal enumeration of the product's safety features
Torte worth $11.95?" The offer increases desire by followed. The ad ended with the tag line, "the only
shifting the consumer's reference point (i.e., not or- luxury sedan that can offer the luxury of being rated
dering results in a loss) and also provides a means for 'the safest car in America' two years running." Finally,
rationalizing other catalog purchases. Realtors are in many cases, recognition of future psychic costs may
well-versed in highlighting the unique characteristics diminish desire in the short run. For example, antic-
of a house and warning that if one does not make an ipated regrets about not practicing safe sex may directly
offer "it may get snapped up." decrease one's current desire. Willpower-inducing guilt
Higher Authority. Consumers may also invoke accompanied by desire-reducing fear may be one of
higher-order principles, or religious doctrine, in their the most effective self-control devices since it moves
efforts to resist impulsivity. Appealing to higher au- the consumer away from the buy line (perpendicular
thority is similar to cost bundling in that the costs as- toward the upper left-hand corner of Figure 3) as rap-
idly as possible.
sociated with succumbing to a momentary desire are
treated as global in nature. Violations that could be
considered as nothing more than a single lapse are re- CONCLUSIONS
cast as significant transgressions against one's beliefs In this article we have attempted to explain how
and values. Negative consequences cannot be local- consumers maintain self-control in the face of time-
ized. The basis of self-control in the higher-authority inconsistent preferences. We have conceptualized
situation involves strict adherence to rules and regu- consumer self-control as a struggle between the two
lations. Any momentary violation, no matter how psychological forces of desire and willpower.
small in isolation, represents a serious breach. Our desire-willpower model borrows heavily from
Higher authorities take a number of forms, both in- previous two-factor theories of self-control. However,
ternal and external. The consumer may pray for the model is also unique in several regards. First, using
strength, rely on peer groups, or treat the tempting of a decision-theoretic analysis of reference points, it
self-control as a challenge. When there are no external provides an explicit mechanism for sudden increases
504 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

in desire. Specifically, it shows how a nonproblematic tinguish between the different motives for unplanned
standing desire can turn into one that fosters time- purchasing, Stern (1962) developed four conceptually
inconsistent behavior. Second, whereas previous two- distinct categories of impulse buying: reminder, sug-
factor models have tended to lump all self-control at- gestion, planned, and pure. It is clear that not all im-
tempts into one broad category, we are able to draw pulse buying represents time-inconsistent behavior,
clear distinctions between desire-based, willpower- but time-inconsistency and consumer self-control are
based, and combination strategies. In particular, the closely linked to "truly impulsive buying, the novelty
model recognizes that self-control is influenced not or escape purchases which break the normal buying
only by environmental factors that influence proximity pattern" (Stern 1962). Our approach is compatible
and desire but also by the ability of consumers to ex- with the narrower focus of Rook (1987, p. 191), who
ecute their own desire- and willpower-based strategies. defined impulse buying as occurring "when a con-
The desire-willpower framework offers testable pre- sumer experiences a sudden, often powerful and per-
dictions concerning time-inconsistency and self-con- sistent urge to buy something immediately. The im-
trol, many of which are supported by the existing lit- pulse to buy is hedonically complex and may stimulate
erature. Additional tests of the model could involve emotional conflict. Also, impulse buying is prone to
increasing desire by using proximity to induce refer- occur with diminished regard for its consequences."
ence-point shifts, and then examining the effects of We feel that the best way to make progress in under-
the different desire- and willpower-based strategies standing impulse buying is to be specific about the be-
on subjects' ability to delay consumption. Self-control havior in question. Our framework may help in this
strategies could be provided through explicit instruc- regard.
tion. It would also be interesting to investigate the ef- Our economic-psychological model of consumer
fects of different forms of rationalization on self-con- self-control stands at the intersection of two broad
trol; however, this type of research is not easy to do. currents in consumer behavior research. One perspec-
Almost all of the work in the delay-of-gratification tive views decision making as rational and dispassion-
paradigm (Mischel 1974) has used very young subjects ate; the other views it as visceral and emotional. Thus,
who have not been well socialized to the need for self- the desire-willpower framework provides an ideal ar-
control. On the other hand, most adult consumers al- ena for examining the interaction between rational and
ready have well-developed repertoires of self-control hedonic motives. These two types of psychological
tactics, especially when they are placed in situations processes are normally compartmentalized into sep-
in which they know that they are being evaluated. arate literatures. Although each perspective adequately
Therefore, adults may not require experimenter in- describes a wide range of consumer behaviors, neither
structions to maintain self-control. alone can provide an adequate account of the entire
It would also be interesting to examine how self- decision-making process. Emotional factors are re-
control evolves over a family life cycle in which dis- flected in the reference-point model of deprivation and
posable-income levels and family expenditures are desire. Cognitive factors are reflected in the delibera-
typically negatively correlated. Because of multiple tion and self-control strategies that consumers utilize.
decision makers, the study of self-control would in- A change in either desire or willpower can cause the
volve both intra- and interpersonal conflict. Savings consumer to shift over the buy line, resulting in a pur-
behavior is another important research application. chase. Moreover, we have cited numerous cases in
Saving is the mirror image of consumption. Although which emotions influence cognitive factors (e.g., desire
it has received plenty of attention from economists, motivating a rationalization of the negative conse-
savings behavior has been neglected by consumer re- quences of a purchase) and vice versa (e.g., cost anal-
searchers (cf. Katona 1975). For reasons that are not ysis reducing a desire). Although conceptually distinct,
understood by economists, the United States currently the psychological factors of desire and willpower are
has one of the lowest savings rates among industrial- by no means independent of one another.
ized countries. Since consumer self-control underlies
the national savings rate (Shefrin and Thaler 1988), a [Received September 1989. Revised July 1990.]
better understanding of consumer self-control at the
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