Julie Orr - Scotland, Darien and The Atlantic World, 1698-1700 (2022, Edinburgh University Press)
Julie Orr - Scotland, Darien and The Atlantic World, 1698-1700 (2022, Edinburgh University Press)
Julie Orr
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
The right of Julie Orr to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance
with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and Related Rights
Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
1 Introduction 1
Ambition and Anxiety 4
The Cautionary Tale 6
European Distraction, American Disquiet 8
An Atlantic World of Evidence 10
At the time of the events studied here, Spain had adopted the use of the
Gregorian calendar. Scotland and England continued to utilise the Julian
calendar, which resulted in dates ten days prior to those of the Spaniards.
Dates contained in the following chapters are those cited by the individual
document or author relevant to the event being discussed and have not
been altered.
Introduction
exception was the 1698 arrival of the Scots and their intent to establish a
permanent presence on the Isthmus. Cruxent had located their settlement
of Fort Saint Andrew, easy to delineate due to its defensive canal excavated
in coral rock and the presence of bricks, unique among sites he had exam-
ined across the area. Meticulously documented were the scattered ceram-
ics, dated to the latter seventeenth century and identified as having been
produced in the Lower Rhine for export to England and her colonies.2
Through his cataloguing of the anomalous infrastructure and dispersed
fragments of the Company of Scotland settlement, the archaeologist pro-
vides a metaphor for the singular impacts of the Darien expeditions and
their dispersed yet durable remnants on three continents. His accom-
panying reference to the allure of the strategic strip of land bridging
the Atlantic and Pacific, enhanced by minimal Spanish development and
proven opportunities for native support, addresses the high value of the
property not only for the Scots, but also for the substantial cast of oppos-
ing interests determined to witness New Caledonia’s failure.
Although the enterprise had a profound influence on diminished
Scottish sovereignty and consolidation of parliamentary authority in
Westminster resulting from the Treaty of Union of 1707, that justifi-
ably well-examined aspect of the Company of Scotland should not be
allowed to eclipse recognition of its implications and influence across a
far broader geography. From New York and Jamaica, from Rome to Lima
and across Spain, reactions were deliberate and dramatic. Testimony of
Councillor and Captain Robert Pincarton before the judges of the Casa
de la Contratación, payment of a donativo by churches across Mexico,
conflicts between Jewish and English merchants in Jamaica, and confron-
tation with Danes on Crab Island all attest to the intensity and breadth
of reverberations asserting themselves as the Company of Scotland imple-
mented its dream of a flourishing trading enterprise. Economic implica-
tions were manifested not only in mercantile interest piqued across the
Caribbean and up the coast of British North America, but also in Lisbon,
where Spanish impoundment in Cartagena of slave ships belonging to
Portugal’s Cacheu Company and its English subcontractors resulted in
lost revenues and frayed relations.3
Within the chaotic opportunism that characterised the Atlantic World
at the close of the seventeenth century, the actions of the Company of
Scotland provided enticing opportunities for alliance, redemption, intel-
ligence-gathering and self-promotion. Juxtaposed against arbitration in
Europe of the Partition Treaties and the anticipated death of Spain’s King
Carlos II, the Scots’ offence to Madrid allowed Louis XIV ideal circum-
stances to proffer armed naval assistance and information, ingratiating
France to the identical governor of Cartagena who had been so soundly
humiliated three years prior during French raids on his city. The English
also showed little hesitation in seeking advantage, deploying Admiral Ben-
bow to the Caribbean with offers of support to Spanish governors along
the coast. Convenient acquisition of intelligence from his squadron’s calls
along the Spanish Main not only provided updates to London on the activ-
ities of the Scots, but would also enhance the Royal Navy’s knowledge of
ports and defences during the forthcoming War of the Spanish Succession.
Surviving their months within the colony, men such as the deserter Robert
Allen and the eventual governor of Annapolis Royal Samuel Vetch would
strive to seek personal advancement, marketing their individual experi-
ences and acquired knowledge for position and financial reward.
Nor was the highest level of European diplomacy exempted from
involvement in the short but turbulent history of New Caledonia. While
the Spanish ambassador in London met with his Scottish spy and relayed
the latest developments to Madrid, King William III was forced to initi-
ate a campaign to assure Spain of his non-involvement and astonishing
lack of awareness of his Scottish kingdom’s initiatives. With no time to
spare, the British monarch would finally heed the caution of his advisers,
assigning the Hague’s trusted envoy to Madrid to seek from the Spanish
king a stay on the ordered execution of four Darien survivors convicted
of piracy by the court of the Casa de la Contratación.
There were no less significant impacts for Spanish America. The
threat imposed by the intent to create a permanent foreign enclave
between the vital centres of Portobello and Cartagena, with its potential
to interrupt the critical transport of Spanish wealth from the Pacific to
the Atlantic, activated the intricate colonial complex of administrative
and military resources that would effectively expel the Scots, even with-
out the support of the armada mounted and dispatched from Cadiz. The
native Cuna, in whose territories events unfolded and armed conflict
was waged, would witness among the most immediate effects. Having
cultivated relationships with a succession of European arrivals over the
previous two centuries, their equally established history of discord with
the Spanish, coupled with alarm over the Scots’ attempt at permanent
foreign occupation, provided a brutal reminder not just to Panama and
Cartagena, but also to Lima and Madrid, of the absolute requirement to
impose control over the highly coveted but porous Isthmus.
Inevitably, investigation into the broader implications of the Darien
expeditions also reveals new and sometimes contradictory detail regard-
ing individual participants, events that unfolded, and the way history has
recorded them. From interrogations of deserters and prisoners to definitive
identification of Walter Herries as a spy dealing directly with the Spanish
Ambassador to testimony of the four men and one boy incarcerated in
besides its being one of the most healthful, rich, and fruitful Countries
upon Earth, hath the advantage of being a narrow ISTHMUS, seated
in the heighth of the World, between two vast Oceans, which renders it
more convenient than any other for being the common Store-house of the
insearchable and immense Treasures of the Spacious South Seas, the door
of Commerce to China and Japan, and, the Emporium and Staple for the
Trade of both Indies.4
The Council represents to your majesty that with great regret and pain it
hears not only confirmation that Scotch have obtained a foothold in Darien
. . . that which previously was menace only is today fact, and shortly these
dominions will begin to experience violence, robbery, usurpation of prov-
inces, in course of which the Catholic religion will perish, which is what will
most deeply grieve your majesty’s Catholic Heart. And although the nations
will combat each other in those quarters, which may serve us as diversion
yet, in the long run, all falls upon us, since their object is to seize those rich,
far-extended kingdoms, whose treasure fertilizes, maintains, conserves these
dominions, and although these nations be divided among themselves, ours
must decline, for its commerce will fall off, and we will find ourselves lacking
the substance which supports the body of this monarchy.5
Clearly, neither the Company of Scotland nor the Council of the Indies
regarded the former’s campaign to establish a trading entrepôt in Darien
as an inconsequential colonial initiative symptomatic of the essentially
unrestrained and pervasive illicit trading of the last decade of the sev-
enteenth century. Both major protagonists acknowledged menace and
opportunity, dosed with critical native alliances, defence of religious
faith and major economic stakes. The perceived field of competition was
not limited to a small peninsula of land extending into the Caribbean Sea
demarcated by an excavation of coral rock, but instead extended across
the Isthmus to the South Sea, down that coast to Peru, and across the
Pacific to China and Japan.
The Scotland of the 1690s suffered crop failure and starvation, rising
tariffs imposed on vital linen exports to England, resulting social unrest,
and, following the 1697 termination of the Nine Years War, an influx of
newly unemployed veterans of King William’s Scottish troops.6 Seeking
to emerge from the troubled social and economic landscape, events upon
which the following chapters are based, had their formal beginning in
1695 with sanction by the sovereign Scottish Parliament of the newly
created Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies. Notably,
required approval of King William, absent in the Low Countries, was
instead provided by his high commissioner in Scotland, an action which
later would be utilised by the monarch to defend ignorance of his
Scottish kingdom’s intent to intrude on Spanish territory.
Originally designed to be guided by a combined contingent of Scot-
tish and English directors, the Company quickly succumbed to rival-
ries between London- and Scotland-based factions. As Scottish historian
George Insh writes in his history of the Company, intentions of English
interests focused on distinctly commercial success and conflicted with
broader Scottish desires to facilitate their nation’s long-desired but elusive
participation in colonial development and emerging global commerce.7
The chasm that developed between the competing sides provoked the
Company’s evolution into a distinctly Scottish joint-stock effort, based
in Edinburgh and funded solely by Scottish subscribers. Along with the
patriotic fuelling of economic support came the opportunity for the Scot-
tish projecter and former Bank of England director William Paterson
to finally witness the realisation of his long-held personal dream of a
Darien-based trading entrepôt.8
Preparations for the implementation of the enterprise, facing a myriad
of financial and political obstacles, continued in earnest during 1696 and
1697, with Company representatives being dispatched to Amsterdam and
Hamburg to oversee the acquisition of appropriate vessels while trade
goods and provisions to establish a colony were consolidated in Scotland.
Markedly absent was serious study and debate regarding Spain’s history
on the Isthmus and the reaction that could legitimately be expected from
an initiative by any foreign entity to establish a permanent presence in
the strategic heart of her American colonial holdings. As presented in
Chapter 5, Company of Scotland personnel would vehemently stand by
their claims that they had sailed from Leith in July 1698 under sealed
orders, ignorant of their final destination and unaware of the fatal affront
they were about to impose on Spain and her empire.
Cuna, the Scots literally constructed the strongest possible reminder to the
Spanish of the vulnerability and attraction of the Darien region to outside
invaders. Not only did the area have to cope with the responding influx
of Spanish and associated forces and the trauma of actual combat, Scot-
tish promises to defend their local allies against Spanish colonial author-
ity were abruptly negated by the March 1700 capitulation, causing both
immediate reprisals upon the native population and efforts to formulate
longer term strategies to prevent future such occurrences.
Figure 1.1 New Caledonia’s Spanish America, 1700. Illustration by Sydney Freeland.
Compounding matters for all concerned was the specific site chosen
for New Caledonia, positioned between the principal Pacific adminis-
trative and ecclesiastical centre of Panama, with its Atlantic access at
Portobello, and the major Caribbean port and slave-trading centre of
Cartagena. The two cities, each under ultimate authority of the dis-
tant viceroy of Peru in Lima, fell within different provincial jurisdic-
tions, or audiencias, both of which had established histories of over
140 years and had suffered devastating foreign raids well within living
memory. Of vital consequence to the Scots, and reflecting the promi-
nence of both urban centres in the maintenance of the entire Spanish
Empire, Panama was administered by a presidente-gobernador y capi-
tán general and Cartagena by a gobernador also designated as maestro
de campo general, both men thus entrusted with consolidated military
and civic authority.
Nor would American attention elicited by the Scottish enterprise be
confined to Spanish-claimed territories. An international cast extending
down the northern Atlantic seaboard and across the Caribbean, some
authorised by monarchs and others operating outside any treaty or legal
sanction, keenly watched, assessed and often participated in the Darien
initiative, simultaneously wary and enticed by the entry of a new partici-
pant into a high-stakes world of commercial risk.
the Company of Scotland would have been to fully consider the lands
to which they sailed and the peoples upon whom they were about to
impose their own tumultuous dream.
NOTES
These poor men who were design’d for Souldiers or Planters, finding
themselves mistaken in their golden Hopes, and no appearance of any
thing but felling huge Trees, and very shrimp allowance of Victuals (and
those very bad) soon wearied of the Enterprize; and before they were a
full month upon the place, several deserted, some by Land towards the
Spaniard and others lurk’d in the Woods till they had an opportunity to
transport themselves by water to Jamaica.1
through New Caledonia would extend across the Caribbean into larger
entanglements of the Atlantic World.
In addition to scattered personal accounts and official reports, the
extensive and methodical catalogue of Spanish interrogations of desert-
ers gives voice to sectors of the population who were either illiterate
and thus unable to provide their own record or who felt inclined to
maintain some semblance of anonymity. The records also provide a
lens through which the effectiveness and intricacies of Spain’s extensive
intelligence network, vital to planning and execution of efforts to eradi-
cate the Scottish presence, may be examined. Both administrative and
military officials efficiently mobilised the support of translators, scribes
and legal professionals to capitalise on the knowledge and vulnerability
of their unanticipated guests. The resulting cast, from illiterate Irish sol-
diers serving in the Spanish military to the capitán general y presidente
of Panama, the critical and often first-hand information they acquired,
and its distribution throughout the vast structure of empire, all illustrate
how Spain sought to protect her interests amid the chaotic and threaten-
ing conditions as the era of Habsburg rule reached its conclusion. This
synergistic relationship between those who voluntarily departed New
Caledonia and those who received them comprises a new perspective on
the enterprise’s dramatic failure.
sent from the fledgling colony. A comparison with the expedition’s official
journal, prepared by Hugh Rose, reveals that he merely edited and revised
the log of the commodore, at the same time eliminating any reference to
either Pearson’s desertion or any of the others that had occurred.3 The
omissions helped assure news of unmitigated success, prompting celebra-
tions in Edinburgh and enabling the Court of Directors to continue prep-
aration for successive expeditions unmarred by the realities of conditions
challenging the settlers and administration of the colony.
Desertions had, in fact, plagued New Caledonia within weeks of the
fleet’s November 1698 arrival. On the thirtieth of that month ten plant-
ers fled, along with a supply of arms stolen from the Unicorn. A council
meeting convened that same afternoon dispatched a search party by boat
which successfully located and returned the men, who were put in irons
and provided with only bread and water. The morning of 16 December
witnessed yet another group of seven planters desert. Despite both land
and sea searches, and requests of assistance to local indigenous leaders,
there is no indication of the group’s return.4
Transport for at least part of this group may have been facilitated
through a unique bounty programme designed by Governor Beeston of
Jamaica to alleviate his island’s chronic labour shortage. In a report from
Secretary of State Vernon relaying the governor’s initiative, King William
Another early fugitive from the colony was Robert Allen, whose abili-
ties and accumulated experience enabled him to survive the dual roles
of deserter and prisoner and eventually thrive through his uniquely
acquired knowledge of Spanish America. In 1708 Allen authored and
submitted a memorial to the British secretary of state Charles Spencer
documenting an impressive résumé. Although Allen does not identify
himself as a deserter, he incriminates himself by conceding that he left
the Scottish colony of Darien in December 1698 for Jamaica. From the
island, he roamed widely throughout Spanish America working for mer-
chants on trading voyages until 1701, when he found himself back in
Darien exploring for logwood. As the lone survivor of a native attack,
he lived for approximately eighteen months with a decidedly friendlier
indigenous community until he received news of nine English sloops in
the vicinity. Joining that combined force of 600 commissioned by the
governor of Jamaica, and confirming his value to the project through
the recruitment of sixty native allies, Allen and his comrades completed
a successful raid on the town and mines of Cana. A second, smaller,
attack on Antioquia proved far more hazardous. Finding their numbers
reduced from 210 to 150, short on supplies and surrounded by hostile
the 1707 Treaty of Union with Scotland and as secretary of state for the
Northern Department. Having opened secret negotiations with Spain to
end the war, he possessed a particular interest in trade and would eventu-
ally acquire a position as a governor of the South Sea Company.
Markedly absent in the original pamphlet and its two later editions
is any reference to Darien, the Company of Scotland, or prior employ-
ment within Spain’s colonial administration. What Allen does provide
is a substantive primer on the workings of Spanish America, utilising,
not surprisingly, the Audiencia of Quito as an example. The interests of
his readers are specifically addressed by a discussion of means by which
‘other European Nations, and in particular England, have always receiv’d
some considerable Share of the Profits therof’. Following discussion of
trade routes, including the transport of money being remitted to Spain
and access to various mines of silver, gold and emeralds, the lucrative
illegal trade between the Spanish colonies and Jamaica encompassing the
occupation of New Caledonia is summarised:
But that which most of all favour’d this Jamaica-Trade, was the galleons
not coming from Old Spain, as had been usual for Nine or Ten Years
together, viz. from the taking of Carthegena by Monsieur Ponti, Anno
Domino 1697, until the Year 1706, for the Spaniards, during that interval
of time, receiving few or no Supplies from Old-Spain, and at the same
time many of them coming down with their Money and other commodi-
ties, under pretence of waiting for the arrival of the Galleons, they took
their opportunities, supply’d themselves privately from our Vessels, and
by such Means the Merchants and Factors at Jamaica, drove a very con-
siderable Clandestine Trade . . . the largest and most beneficial part of
that Trade was carri’d on within the aforesaid Limits, on the Coast of
Porto-Belo and Carthagena, those Places being the Ports from whence
all the Kingdoms of Peru, Chili and New-Granada were supply’d, and
whereof our Merchants had then a very considerable Share, to the very
great advantage of their Mother Kingdom.
Men sold their new shirts to the Indians for 20 or 24 plantains a piece,
which would not serve a Man above three or four days, and our council
were oblig’d to give strict Orders that no Man should sell his Cloaths,
else I verily believe our Men had been naked in two months after our
Landing.
Nor did Herries shy away from more inflammatory controversies involv-
ing the Company, writing of deliberate efforts to lure men from English
and French Caribbean settlements to Darien and of the intent to initiate
lucrative contraband trade with communities along the Spanish Main.15
The surgeon’s accusations did not go uncontested. A campaign against
him by the Company and its proponents culminated in a January 1701
warrant for his arrest, accompanied by a reward of 6,000 pounds Scots
and indemnification for anyone harming the fugitive in the course of
his capture. The blasphemous statements his writings were accused of
containing resulted in a further order that the pamphlets themselves be
burned by the Edinburgh hangman.16
Herries’s campaign against the Company was not, however, confined
to production of damnifying pamphlets or legal action to recoup wages.
Evidence in British documents reveals both his complicity with English
interests and his motivation for doing so. As early as June 1699 there
emerged an unusual request for a pardon allowing his return to the
Royal Navy. The following day the Admiralty Board considered the case,
identified as originating with Secretary of State Vernon, but hesitated
over its potential to undermine navy discipline. Unable to resolve their
concerns, they included a request to the king for guidance. A response
was forthcoming the following month through the secretary, resulting in
the passage of an exceptional resolution pardoning the surgeon and halt-
ing all punitive action regarding his dispute with his former commander
Captain Graydon.17
In return, the surgeon provided intelligence and attempted to influence
opinion through a variety of means ranging from letters and pamphlets to
active intervention with Company of Scotland personnel. Results of his
efforts were submitted to the secretary of state, who in turn informed King
William of relevant details. By June 1699 Secretary Vernon was reporting
of initiatives on Jamaica to promote Scottish interests, information he had
received from correspondence acquired by Herries.18 In January 1700 the
surgeon related his direct intervention to mitigate censorship of reports
returned during the month of January with Mr Hamilton, who had gone
to Edinburgh to report to the Company regarding the positive state of the
colony. Herries elaborated that he knew the calamities that could occur
from the enterprise for the king of Britain. He offered to divulge all the
secrets he knew, showing the ambassador a letter from Secretary Vernon
verifying his role and identity. He also had come prepared with a small
map of the Isthmus and demonstrated his authenticity by naming the ves-
sels and captains of the Scottish fleet and the Council of New Caledonia
as well as recounting stipulations of original Company patents.
The surgeon continued, confirming his familiarity with principal
operatives in Edinburgh and relating that he had discussed the situation
with Vernon, who had ordered him to interact with Scots instrumental
in Darien affairs, especially the Duke of Hamilton and one Johnson, and
to deliver resulting intelligence to him personally. It was for the good of
both England and Spain that the Scottish endeavour should not succeed,
Herries added, acknowledging problems created for English merchants
involved in the transportation of slaves and for Spain’s efforts to defend
her American territories. Following six hours of conversation the men
concluded the session, Herries saying he would require the secretary of
state’s permission before providing more information. He would return
under cover of darkness, the need for secrecy being vital to protect him-
self from the Scots.
The subsequent visit did occur in the middle of the night, the ambas-
sador being informed that permission had been granted by Vernon. The
spy reported the disgust felt by his own king at action undertaken in
Darien, particularly the deceitful way in which it had been perpetrated
by the Parliament of Scotland and its potential to rupture the relationship
between the two crowns. The reports Herries would make, he assured
the ambassador, would not be frivolous and would help secure the peace
between the reigns and in the Indies.
Verification that communication did continue is provided in a subse-
quent report sent to the Spanish king from the ambassador’s residence in
July 1699, relating further visits with the Scottish spy.21 The value, detail
and frequency of forthcoming intelligence, although not specifically attrib-
uted to Herries, is exemplified in another dispatch to Spain from Canales:
The latest letters from Edinboro in Scotland assert that on the 19th of that
month there cleared for Darien a convoy consisting of five vessels . . . which
sent 300 gentlemen, young volunteers, and 1200 men and some women, to
settle the country, 400 seamen, in addition to the ordinary crews of these
vessels, with all sorts of subsistence, munitions, war material, and other
things necessary to offensive warfare and expansion into the region which
they say they have taken under their protection. Further, that another con-
voy is making ready to clear before Christmas for, although they say they
do not need further immediate relief, the wish to make themselves entirely
safe against all enemies.22
While debate and intelligence echoed across the Atlantic, events con-
tinued to unfold at disparate points in the Americas. In April 1699 the
problem of desertion finally forced itself into official Company cor-
respondence. From New Caledonia the councillors were compelled
to send home a representative with dispatches to enlighten Company
directors on dramatic events with which they had to contend. A ‘most
villainous and treacherous design, that was lately carrying on, for
[S]ince our arrival in this Port Severall as well Saylors as Planters have
run away and deserted the Company’s service, and ships to which they
belonged, by which and the great mortality which was among us, the
ships are so disabled that scarce remains of what was in both so many as
will be able to carry home one . . .27
The nine men that Borland and the viceroy wrote of had headed to
Portobello, where they arrived safely and were brought forward for
interrogation on 29 December 1699. Juan Bauptista, Nicholas Grillo,
Simon Modesto and Juan Coda were the four individuals questioned,
and exhibited the multinational composition of the expeditions. Two of
the men were English, one Italian and one Greek. All are included on the
pay list of the Rising Sun: ‘John Baptista’ listed as a yeoman, ‘Nicholo
Greilo’, ‘Simon Amodesto’ and ‘John Codd’ as sailors. They related to
their inquisitors their departure from Scotland three months earlier in the
fleet of four ships, further describing the firepower of each vessel and the
state of land defences currently being rehabilitated. Total manpower of
soldiers and sailors had originally been 1,150 men, reduced by deaths
to 1,000. They had understood they were coming to an established and
functioning colony, but had found only two small vessels, one English
and one Scottish, upon their arrival. They related what they had heard
of ships from the original expedition, that one had returned to Scotland
and another was in Jamaica. Their intelligence regarding enthusiasm in
New Caledonia for a possible raid against Santa Marta no doubt raised
some alarm but was likely countered by the accompanying revelation of
a tentative plan to send the sick and one or two ships of men to Jamaica
in order to conserve dwindling food supplies. Queried as to why they
had chosen to escape, the men reported that they had been deceived and
had no desire to take up arms against Spain as they shared the Catholic
faith. As with other intelligence gathered from deserters and prisoners,
the declarations were copied and sent to a network of officials across
Spanish America, as well as to Madrid.31
Similar information was acquired from the additional pair of Scots
who chose to desert, utilising a very different avenue of escape. Their
interrogations were conducted by the president of Panama on 15 January
1700, and illustrate the standardisation, formality, organisation and thor-
oughness of the process. A team was mobilised to witness and document
the procedure, accompanied by an Irish soldier serving in Spain’s Wind-
ward or Barlovento fleet, who was summoned to act as translator. The
first deponent was named as Juan Jadin, who gave his age as twenty-
five and his birthplace as Monte, Scotland. He related he had come with
the first expedition of five vessels and served on board Caledonia under
the command of Captain Thomas Drummond. Their purpose had been
to establish themselves in Darien and conduct trade with the Spanish.
Jadin gave a detailed review of the design and structure of fortifications
constructed by the first arrivals, as well as the placement and size of can-
non and supplies of guns, grenades and ammunition. For sustenance, he
related, they had flour, meat and fish from Jamaica until the king’s pro-
hibition eliminated that trade. Because of the lack of provisions, high
mortality and illness, they had left for New England, where they received
notice of additional ships having left Scotland for New Caledonia. With
a crew of seventeen and a hold full of supplies, they re-embarked for the
colony, arriving after a month and a half. Two days later the squadron
of four ships arrived carrying 1,270 new colonists, including twelve cap-
tains, infantry and eight women. Questioned as to the cause and means
of his escape, Jadin simply said hunger had been his motive. Emphasising
the dire lack of provisions, he described his daily allocation of two small
biscuits and a little fish. He and his companion had not known how to
negotiate the jungle terrain so they had bartered linen for local Cuna to
guide them to the Spanish. They had been delivered to the maestro de
campo Luis Carrisoli, who had relayed them forward to Panama.
The second deponent, named as thirty-four year old Guillermo Estra-
fan, had also originally sailed on Caledonia. Although he couldn’t pro-
vide the total number on the first expedition, he could clearly quantify
its military composition of twelve companies of forty-five men each. He
knew that for certain, he related, because he was a soldier in one. As
his companion had done, he detailed original fortifications and arms and
reiterated the intent to establish trade. Combined with high rates of death
and disease, he related the fear that there would eventually be insuffi-
cient survivors to man the ships. In response to why they had returned to
Darien, he corroborated Jadin’s information and added that a new vessel
had been acquired in New England. The squadron that now lay at New
Caledonia included ships of sixty and thirty cannon and two merchant
vessels. The artillery had not yet been mounted, there was extensive dam-
age to prior construction and there was much work but little food. He
verified they had departed voluntarily, hunger being the motive, and that
linen had been traded for guide services across the Isthmus to Real de
Santa Maria, from where they had sailed to Panama.32
The pair who had successfully negotiated a crossing of the Isthmus did
mention the recent prior desertion of nine men in one of the Company’s
boats, but did not refer to, and may not have known about, a more
serious but unsuccessful plot by some of their companions. Alexander
Campbell had been executed on 20 December 1699 following exposure
of his role in a plan to seize council members and sail away with two
Company ships.33 The current Council of New Caledonia showed no
Now the enemy, either because they were afraid, or bored by the coun-
try, or wearied of their work, or vexed at the ill-treatment they received,
were passing over to our side . . . Others hid from their men until they
had the opportunity to come to us, and said that they would all come
if they had not been frightened by their superiors who told them that
the Spaniards would give them no quarter. Senor Pimienta received them
with great kindness, and sent them on board the ships with orders that
they be treated well.36
For it hath been our directors error first and last to send and entrust with
their ships and concerns too many men who have no principle either of
conscience or honour . . . too many knaves, too many fools, too many
Lairds and lairds bairns that think it below them to work and finding
themselves disappointed of their big Phantastick hopes of getting goupens
of gold for the uptaking and never thinking of the necessities working and
sweating for it. Felling trees, cutting down many groves, digging in the
bowels of the earth, which now they find they must be put to with thrift
and hunger. This makes many rue their voyage and long to be at home
again . . .39
NOTES
Among the three accounts of the afternoon’s events and the aftermath
are depositions from Captain Pincarton and pilot James Graham, pre-
pared for their employer upon their return to Scotland following their
transportation to, trial and conviction of piracy in Seville. Editor John H.
Burton, in a footnote to published versions of the accounts, notes both
appear to be in Pincarton’s handwriting and the contents’ style and sub-
stance are remarkably uniform, an opinion verified by review of the origi-
nal documents.3 Pincarton writes that collision with a rock, so severe that
baling and pumping were ineffective, required the run on to the shore.
The subsequent arrival of the governor and his officers resulted in a canoe
being dispatched for the imperilled men, who were duly ordered ashore.
The initial plea for assistance to retrieve goods from the Dolphin received
a positive response, but a brief consultation among the Spanish precipi-
tated a rapid change of attitude; the crew were suddenly put under strong
guard, marched to town and imprisoned. Pincarton, suffering a broken
rib, found himself in irons and solitary confinement. Following his sub-
sequent interrogation he was taken to the upper prison, where he was
held for three months. Pleading for food and clothing, he was instructed
to petition for liquidation of some of the cargo in order to provide for
himself and his men. By that time some of the crew had died and he
himself was ‘in a starving condition’. His forthcoming request approved,
allocations were made for daily meals and cloth retrieved from the stores
provided clothing for both himself and Captain Malloch. Pincarton wit-
nessed the cargo and fittings of the Company’s ship being carried away
and would recognise some of her guns remounted on his later transport
to Havana. While the two officers were kept in a ‘house of office for the
guards’, where they cleaned a place to sleep every night, the remainder of
the crew was sent out daily to clean streets and work on the massive city
walls, during which time they begged passers-by for charity. Upon receiv-
ing word that New Caledonia had been deserted, Pincarton petitioned the
new governor for the group’s release, but was denied with the explanation
that he would instead be sent to Spain.
Graham’s almost identical account does add that he was searched for
papers and had his money confiscated. He also witnessed his personal
effects, including books, instruments and clothes, carried away, being
allowed to retain only ‘one cap, one wescoat, one pair of drawers, one
shift, one pair of shoes’.
Neither man elaborates on their interrogations in Cartagena, which
constitute the second version of events. Initiated the morning following
the beaching of the Dolphin, the Spaniards, having mobilised an effi-
cient and experienced team, including an Irishman to serve as translator,
them belonging to the English king. Pincarton was also asked about what
he knew of Benbow’s activities, to which he responded that he knew of
him, but was unaware of his whereabouts and that he had not been at
New Caledonia. He further explained that a Company messenger had been
sent back to Scotland via Jamaica with pleas for supplies. The trade goods
on the Dolphin such as shoes, slippers, wool and linen were to be traded
for sugar and tobacco in Barbados, which were then to be transported to
Scotland. With the exception of one Italian and one man from Holland,
the thirty-man crew was from Scotland. Help had not been solicited from
Jamaica and there had been no communication with that island’s gover-
nor. Questioned regarding the indigenous population, Pincarton related
they had established friendly relations and been assured by the native cap-
tains that their lands were not part of the Spanish king’s domain. Although
the Cuna had requested arms to fight Spaniards, the Scots had refused on
the premise that they wished to maintain peace with all parties. Pincarton
assured his interrogators that the Company of Scotland had no intention of
expanding into other parts of the region. To the detriment of his colleague,
he also identified his fellow prisoner as Captain John Malloch.6
Next to be interrogated was the Spanish-speaking Italian, Juan
Bautista Acame. He declared himself to be a seaman who had originally
sailed from Holland to Scotland on the Unicorn under Captain Pin-
carton. The mariner gave accounts of deserters, mortality, inadequate
supplies and defensive measures, noting the latter were hampered by
lack of appropriate construction materials. There had been searches for
gold, but they had none in their possession. The French lieutenant that
accompanied the Dolphin had been at the colony for about a month
and a half and was attempting to return home after his ship had been
lost. The sailor gave his age as twenty-seven, but did not know how to
sign his declaration.7
With the assistance of a translator, the content of the paper pro-
vided by the French lieutenant was then introduced into the record.
The author, who gave his name as Durinan, recounted his service under
Captain Duvivier Thomas. At the behest of the king of France, they had
been hunting pirates to assist security of Spanish dominions until they
had lost their ship in Caledonia Bay. Identifying himself as an official
of the marine guard of Rochefort, he provided a detailed description
of what he had learned of the housing, defence and governance of the
Scottish colony, as well as the presence there of a Dutch vessel. He
reiterated that resident Cuna had assured the Scots they had never been
conquered by the Spanish and that they had given the colonists permis-
sion to create a settlement.8
A seaman from Holland, for whom yet another translator was uti-
lised, received particular attention. He identified himself as Esteban de
Berga from Breda and of the reformed Calvinist faith. During his first
session he denied having been at New Caledonia, with the result that he
was manacled and placed in solitary confinement. After substitution of
a German resident of Cartagena to serve as translator he was brought
back before the inquisitors and was able to clarify that his city was under
Swedish jurisdiction. After confessing to having sailed with the original
fleet on the Unicorn, he transmitted what he knew of ships, men and
arms at the colony.9
As interrogations continued into the week, twenty-three-year-old
pilot James Graham was questioned, declaring they had been sailing to
Barbados to trade for rum, sugar and tobacco to carry to Scotland. In
response to an inquiry regarding the mission of the Dutch ship at New
Caledonia, he replied it needed to be watered and careened. He elabo-
rated that his role as pilot limited his knowledge of land activities to
acquiring water and wood.10 Thomas Bachah, a twenty-seven-year-old
Scottish seaman, related he had not known their destination when he
left Scotland, but was concerned solely with his salary for service on the
Unicorn. He also admitted that Captain Pincarton had given the order
as they ran aground that they should all deny having come from New
Caledonia and maintain they were from Jamaica bound for Barbados.11
Twenty-nine-year-old surgeon Andrew Livingston, who would escape his
imprisonment and eventually return to New Caledonia via Jamaica, was
asked for information similar to that demanded of his shipmates, but
emphasised he could not be precise about current details as they had
sailed fifteen days prior.12
The second interrogation of Captain ‘Diego Tamayson/Jamison’
resulted in the admission of his true identity as John Malloch and that
he had sailed from New Caledonia. After giving intelligence regarding
the defensive capacity of the colony, he verified Pincarton’s order to pres-
ent themselves as bound for Barbados and further confirmed the latter’s
elevated position within the colony.13
The consolidated information acquired from the ten documented
interrogations was extraordinary for its quality, quantity and timeliness.
The governor of Cartagena, with minimal effort and expense, had been
able to capitalise on his enemy’s misfortune to compile both a complete
and current assessment of the situation at the colony and beyond, and
readily disperse it to his superiors and compatriots.
An impressive amount of the same detail, supplemented with additional
information, was also exposed through the pen of a source in England.
That author, the censured Walter Herries, would have undoubtedly appre-
ciated the vindication of his own work that Spanish documents provide. In
his 1701 pamphlet An Enquiry into the Caledonian Project, with a Defence
of England’s Procedure (in Point of Equity) in Relation Thereunto, in a
Friendly Letter from London, to a Member of the Scots African and Indian
Company in Edinburgh, to Guard against Passion, the surgeon–spy pro-
vides a third version of events in Cartagena. Based on claimed London
conversations with Pincarton, Malloch and the surgeon Livingston shortly
after their return and only three months prior to publication, Herries writes
that the actual mission of the Dolphin was to trade along the Spanish Main
in the vicinity of Riohacha and Santa Marta. The ship was then to seek
Barbados or other English or French possessions where, under the pretence
of needing water and wood, they were to conduct Company business and
distribute the printed declarations intended to recruit additional settlers.
Discovering heavy leakage in the ship, they instead turned back towards
the colony. As they passed offshore of Cartagena they noticed another
vessel, headed in her direction attempting to communicate, and collided
with an unseen rock. Their sole option for survival a run ashore, the entire
crew, recognising the danger they faced should they be revealed as Scots
from New Caledonia, agreed to present themselves as Englishmen from
Jamaica heading towards Barbados. Acknowledging that the Spanish well
knew the identity of their councillors and captains, Malloch and Pincarton
were to use the pseudonyms of ‘James Jamison’ and ‘John Robertson’,
respectively. Incriminating documents were thrown overboard, while Pin-
carton’s clerk John Neilson (‘either designedly or negligently’) kept a packet
of letters to Edinburgh in his pocket. A Frenchman on board, after swear-
ing to not betray the origin of the crew, was allowed to accompany the
men ashore. As the English flag was flown from the Dolphin the immediate
reception was welcoming, but ‘upon suspicion (or some discovery of the
French lieutenant)’, Captains Pincarton and Malloch were each placed in
solitary confinement. Interrogations began the following day, with Malloch
maintaining his identity as ‘James Jamison’, even when faced with contrary
evidence. The recovered documents, besides proclaiming the men’s actual
origin, included their intention to trade in Spanish-held dominions along
the coast. Refusing to concede his contrived name or origin, Malloch was
taken away and ‘loaded with iron’. Pincarton was then sent for and initially
declared himself as ‘John Robertson’. Warned about the condition of his
soul and informed about the letter submitted by their French passenger, he
confessed his true identity and answered thoroughly questions regarding
the circumstances at New Caledonia. He was then well treated, as opposed
to Malloch, who was ‘used like a dog’. Upon completion of his questioning
Pincarton sent for Livingston, directing him to notify the remainder of the
men that the Spanish knew their identities and they need not maintain any
pretence of being Englishmen. Based on full recognition of who the men
were, their attempted false identities and colours, and the intent to blatently
violate the Treaty of 1670 by trading directly with subjects of Spain, both
the ship and her cargo were confiscated.14
The striking corroboration, including the identification of pseudonyms,
between original Spanish reports and Herries’s publication substantiates
both versions of events, particularly when it is considered that the mate-
rial was produced within a relatively short time frame on two continents,
in two different languages, by two men who had never met. Herries also
would have been well acquainted with the Scots involved, having served
with them on the voyage to Darien and having abandoned the colony only
weeks prior to the ill-fated departure of the Dolphin.
The entire saga of this first group of prisoners not only verifies the cred-
ibility of Herries as a source and the inclusion of non-Scottish participants,
but, of greater importance, it acknowledges the goal of the Company of
Scotland to establish illicit trade along the Spanish Main. Such a pretence
underscores the complications the entire enterprise created for Scotland’s
king, the competition it presented to English, Portuguese, French and
Dutch interests, and its flagrant violation of Spain’s territorial claims and
international treaties. Exemplifying the level of concern in London are
reports reaching King William by June 1699, originating with Admiral
Benbow and relayed through the secretary of state, providing notification
of the capture of the Dolphin.15
to obtain prisoners and intelligence. The Cuna captain Pedro had prom-
ised that his men could obtain ten or twenty ‘English’, but, after being
informed the Spanish did not have in their possession sufficient gold to
pay for the services, negotiations broke down. The following morning,
expecting to speak again with Pedro, the Spaniards were instead sur-
prised by the force from New Caledonia. De la Rada found himself cut
off from escape by the Cuna, immediately making the determination that
approaching the Scots presented a more attractive option.17
An attempt was made to capitalise on de la Rada’s capture by prepar-
ing a letter for Canillas, assuring him of the Scots’ peaceful intentions
and extending an offer to initiate diplomatic relations. The message was
first relayed to the governor of Santa Maria, notifying him that they had
the Spaniard in their custody and would continue to treat him ‘with all
kindness and civility until we have advice from you how to dispose of
him’. Maestro de campo Luis Carrisoli produced the initial reply, both
courteous and curt, writing that he had forwarded the Scots’ correspon-
dence and would wait for direction from his superior prior to mak-
ing any judgement. As for de la Rada’s future, he responded, ‘I thank
you for the offer, and leave it to your selves to dispose of him as you
shall please’.18
As witnessed by his eventual deposition administered in Santa Maria
by the same maestro de campo, de la Rada was well able to fend for
himself. Three months following the Tubacanti skirmish he approached
Carrisoli’s home in the company of two Scotsmen and was recognised
as one of the men who had participated in the surprised patrol. When
he did not return it had been said he had gone into the Scottish camp.
He had indeed been in New Caledonia and now returned with a valu-
able first-hand account of the colony and the gullibility of his Scottish
captors. The thirty-eight-year-old described himself as a trader from
Barbacoas who had accompanied the patrol. Witnessing his comrade
wounded by an arrow, suffering from the flux, and finding himself cut
off by Cuna fighters from whom he knew he would receive no quarter,
he opted to turn himself over to the Scots. Near their settlement he had
met two Frenchmen salvaging the wreck of their ship, who eventually
took him to the Scottish vice-admiral, who in turn had released him on
4 May. He had been provided with a gun, two pistols and a supply of
linen for his return journey, as well as his current two-man escort. The
pair was intended to accompany him only part way, but de la Rada,
‘through deceit and flattery’, had delivered them to Carrisoli. The for-
mer prisoner explained his release had been contrived through his recog-
nition of the Scots’ desire to trade with the Spanish, their ample supply
The Master of the Vesell tells me that he met three Canoes . . . that
came from Callidonia and had three Spaniards on them who had been
Prisonors with the Scotch and Freed by them when they saild and also
that those Canoes were laden with Iron Crows Shot and other Iron
Tools the Scotch left behinde them which seems to Indicate that they
went away in haste.22
The great anxiety occasioned them during the seven full months that this
fleet remained in their vicinity, making war upon them both by sea and
also by land, and by its having come to this port to assemble greater
force, of which they were informed. This fear, added to certain lack of
subsistence they suffered and sicknesses which came upon them, moved
them to the aforesaid resolution.24
with that town, but it was only a journey of a day and a half from their
settlement and the Scots knew it was adjacent to the gold mine called
Cana. Trade with the Cuna was minor, basically food materials. There
had been no discussion of crossing to Panama, as they had been occu-
pied establishing their settlement, at which no one remained. A French
ship, apparently spying on their activities, had been sent by Admiral Du
Casse. Evidence of its intent had been acquired from a letter contained in
a bottle discovered on a vessel taken along the coast. In that document
Du Casse, governor of Petit-Goave, offered to assist the governor of
Portobello in dislodging the Scots.
Returning to events at the colony, Spencer explained that a failure of
promised relief ships from Scotland had created serious confusion and
was only understood when news of King William’s proclamation order
was received. At that point ‘they resolved to abandon their scheme to
settle, because they could not maintain it’. The four ships that had sailed
away had become separated, and Spencer’s vessel had entered Matanzas
Bay not understanding where it was. As Spencer had been speaking to
the Spanish guard ashore, his shipmates, remaining in the launch, had
become frightened by the sight of Spanish guns and the sound of shoot-
ing as they rowed away from shore.
Spencer also provided information regarding the Scots’ reaction to
the imprisonment of Captain Pincarton and the taking of the Dolphin
in Cartagena. After the return of the men had been refused, the decision
had been made to attempt to capture ‘persons of esteem’ to negotiate an
exchange.
The interrogation then led into a discussion of authority for their set-
tlement, which Spencer claimed had come from the king of Britain. He
recalled the stipulation to settle in lands unoccupied by any European
monarch and that permission of any native population was to be secured.
The indigenous people were to be exempt from taxation for a period of
twenty-one years.
Questioning then turned to ships that had visited New Caledonia,
providing the Spaniards with a localised census not only of vessels in the
immediate vicinity, but also those communicating and potentially col-
laborating with the colony. Spencer responded that he had seen five Eng-
lish ships and several French vessels. One of the latter had come to trade
along the coast, and this was the one that was wrecked as it was leaving
the bay. It was from that ship that some gold and considerable amounts
of silver had been salvaged. Commodore Pennycook had a portion of the
treasure in his possession, prompting discord with the French captain.
Eventually an agreement was reached, giving the Scots one eighth of the
gold and silver saved, but the argument did not end and arms were even-
tually raised over the allocation.
Gold had also been obtained from the native cacique Diego as com-
pensation for the hospitality of the Scots and ‘in recognition of a per-
petual league and alliance’. Having an estimated value of 300 pounds
sterling, it had been presented following an incident involving a launch
belonging to the colony being retained by Diego’s people. Some addi-
tional gold had also been acquired from nose and ear jewellery worn by
Cuna men and women.
Goods originally brought to New Caledonia were intended for trade
with both the English and Spanish, and included many types of linen. In
one of the few references to slavery in the Darien record, Spencer said
there were also wrought iron implements, arms of all kinds, and vari-
ous tin, iron and copper plates, as well as cups and goblets designed for
barter with kings along the Guinea coast in return for Africans. Some of
these original stores were still on board the Unicorn, which, according
to what he had heard his captain say, was headed to New England to
secure provisions. The ship was leaking badly and they estimated they
had only a month’s worth of supplies. Spencer had heard no word about
returning to Darien.
As the interrogation wore on, the governor returned to the subject of
fortifications at New Caledonia. He was told there had been no engineer
at the colony. A captain who had served in Flanders was in charge of
construction and the intent was to expand the fort when reinforcements
arrived from Scotland. At the present time it was more of a battery than
a regular castle.
Tension appeared to intensify between captor and prisoner as the
governor indicated scepticism regarding some of Spencer’s responses,
particularly his explanation as to the presence of the Scots at Matanzas.
Mention was made of the content of documents seized at Cartagena,
which had previously been provided to Havana. Spencer found himself
remanded in jail and ordered to be ‘pressed’ regarding the circumstances
of Darien’s abandonment and his arrival in Cuba. Overtly threatened
with torture, the translator repeated that the survivors, approximately
500 individuals, had departed in their four remaining ships, leaving
behind four or five Frenchmen. Recounting again events at Matanzas, he
pled ‘and this is the truth and God fail him if it is not, and may his soul
burn endlessly in hell if he is lying’. He was taken to a torture chamber
where he was stripped, placed on ‘the horse’, and again commanded to
tell the truth.27 At that point the governor, ‘seeing how heavily this illness
bore upon him’, suspended the proceedings.
Some of the Indian chiefs who had been most friendly to the colony, were
taken from the side of the Scottish ships and made prisoners. The minis-
ters, pitying the poor natives, drew up a petition in their favour and sent
it to the Spanish.29
The request being denied, we are reliant on Walter Herries for the pun-
ishment imposed. Unlike the trials, interrogations, dispersal and release
of other prisoners, and indicative of policies aimed at preventing further
alliances with foreigners and assuring control over the Cuna, native pris-
oners who had fought alongside the Scots at Tubacanti were, the surgeon
wrote, ‘impaild alive’.30
NOTES
1. Burton, The Darien Papers, p. 183. Douglas Watt addresses the significance
of the lost cargo, estimating it at 18 per cent of trading assets. Watt, The
Price, p. 154.
2. The governor’s report, including interrogations and translations of seized
documents, is in AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 193v–265r.
3. Burton, The Darien Papers, pp.102–4. The originals are at NLS, Adv. MS
83.7.5, f. 160 initiating Pincarton’s and f. 158 Graham’s.
4. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 255r–6v.
5. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 199v–208r. Benbow, the subject of the next chapter,
had sailed from Cartagena only days prior to the Dolphin’s sudden arrival.
6. Ibid., ff. 208r–15v.
7. Ibid., ff. 216r–18v. A ‘Joan Baptista triconia’ is listed as originally sailing on
the Unicorn. Adv. MS 83.7.4, f. 93v.
8. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 220v–5v. The lieutenant had been aboard the Mau-
repas, which had broken apart on rocks attempting to leave New Caledonia,
eliciting a rescue by the Scots.
9. Ibid., ff. 226r–7r and 236v–7v. ‘Stephen Deberg’ is included as a sailor on
the Unicorn’s pay list. NLS, Adv. MS 83.7.4, f. 94v.
10. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 227r–9r. Graham had originally sailed as first mate on
the Dolphin. NLS, Adv. MS 83.7.4, f. 100r.
11. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 229v–31v.
12. Ibid., ff. 232r–3v. and Burton, The Darien Papers, p. 298. The surgeon’s
escape was not unique. The 1705 investigations, or residencias, of the
administrations of Governors Rios and Pimienta cited lax prison security,
resulting in numerous escapes. AGI, Escribania de Cámara 1192.
13. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 233v–5r.
14. Herries, An Enquiry, pp. 44–7. Regarding the high quality of transatlantic
intelligence even prior to initial landfall in Darien, the journal of first expedi-
tion participant, Dr Wallace, contains a November 1698 entry noting that
the Scots’ identities were well known in Madeira and St Thomas and that
the Spanish in Portobello possessed listings of the names of their councillors
and ships’ captains. Insh, Papers, pp. 76–7.
15. BL, ADD MS40774, f. 41v.
16. Burton, The Darien Papers, pp. 84–6.
flowed neither from a regard to the interests of England, nor to the Treaties
with Spain, but from a Care of the Dutch, who from Curacao drove a coast-
ing trade, among the Spanish plantations, with great advantage; which, they
said, the Scotch colony, of once well settled, would draw wholly from them.5
Directly impacted was yet another monarchy and its international array
of slave-trading partners. At the time the Scots chose to proceed with their
effort for commercial advancement, the asiento, providing a monopoly
over delivery of slaves to Spain’s American dominions, was held by Portu-
gal’s Cacheu Company. The Portuguese had initially established themselves
in 1693 by providing 4,000 slaves under a subcontract with a Spanish
company.6 Three years later they had secured the asiento for themselves
for a period of six years and eight months, committing to deliver 30,000
Africans of acceptable quality and age, and counting Portugal’s King
Pedro among investors realising considerable profits.7 Stipulating delivery
of slaves to Cartagena, Havana and other designated ports, the lucrative
contract recognised the need for an optimum number of transport vessels,
allowing subcontracts with English ships from London and Jamaica and
Dutch ships from the Low Countries and Curacao.8
As extensive as the financial rewards of the slave trade were, associ-
ated benefits were readily available for added exploitation. Beyond the
sanctioned commerce in human flesh lay a well-developed network of
accompanying contraband trade and proven profits, facilitated by the fact
that slaves did not have to be registered or taxed by Spain’s Casa de la
Contratación. The convenient presence on board of both free labour and
contraband goods provided resources for enterprising merchants, coordi-
nating with Spanish accomplices, to create bundles carried by slaves to an
established isolated location prior to a ship’s formal entry into port. The
jettisoned contraband would then be guarded until eventual movement
into secure storage under cover of night.9 The advantageous condition of
legal entry into Spanish ports, coupled with a functioning parallel system
of illegal trade, created a dedicated cast of profiteers wary of new com-
petitors and fiercely protective of their substantial revenues.
Despite inevitable friction with the asiento and its associated illegal
activities, officials in both Spain and her colonies recognised the vital
communication its traffic sustained. The slave trade’s liberal movements
across the Atlantic and within the Caribbean, assignment of factors in
major ports, use of international crews, and transportation of colonial
officials and religious personnel created an invaluable stream of intel-
ligence. From Jamaica it had been the Cacheu Company’s representative
who had written to Spain in February 1699, providing notice of the
arrival of four Scottish vessels.10 In another case, don Juan de Castro
y Gallego, returning to Madrid from royal service in Chile, had sailed
from Havana to Lisbon on a Company vessel and produced testimony
regarding not only what he had experienced in his own position, but
also information about the Scots and English that he had acquired from
other passengers.11
In March 1698, months prior to departure from Leith of the first Company
of Scotland expedition, then Rear Admiral John Benbow, his career ascend-
ing following success against the French and convoy escort service, found
The brevity and lack of clarity of the directive did not go unnoticed, an
anticipated scenario relayed to the king. Secretary of State Vernon reported
the Lord Justices ‘can’t tell what to make of Benbow’s Expedition’ while
expressing his greater personal concern that ‘when they become to be
known among the Scotch as that can’t now long be defer’d I am rather
apprehensive’.14
Sailing away from the speculation, the fleet departed from Portsmouth
on 29 November, making initial landfall in Barbados, where Benbow
was informed by infuriated officials of Spanish injustices. Ignoring stipu-
lations of the asiento contract strictly forbidding interference with move-
ments of slave-trading vessels, the governor of Cartagena had seized two
English ships, declaring his purpose to be requiring the vessels for the
upcoming campaign to oust the Scots from Darien.15
Contemporary tensions, the impact of the seizures, relief of merchants
involved in the slave trade at the arrival of the admiral’s fleet, and the
ensuing complications were relayed to London by Josiah Heathcote, the
Royal African Company’s factor in Jamaica. In a March 1699 report
he complained further of offences committed by the Spaniards, adding
that Benbow was sailing to confront officials along the Spanish Main,
accompanied by several merchants. Heathcote emphasised losses to his
king caused by ‘Roguery of the officials Real’, specifying the ‘impudence’
of payments to ‘the Master out 22 or 23 and Sold Each Negroe before
their faces for 200’.
The factor also informed the Board of Trade of another worrisome
impact of the current circumstances, the flight of the meagre Jamaican
labour force to the Scots, exacerbated by the presence of Benbow’s fleet.
Despite the king’s command and the failure to gain the required support
of the governor, the factor claimed that the admiral had been impress-
ing men, frightening ‘away all our seamen and Ordinary people to the
Scotch or any Place Else where they think they can be Easie’.16
The impressments had understandably also alarmed Governor Beeston,
who quickly mounted his own campaign to counter the admiral’s activities
and tactics. Late in January, he reported to Secretary of State Vernon, two
of Benbow’s ships had arrived and reported that their commander had
parted from them at Nevis. He had apparently sailed in the company of
a slave-trading vessel to the coast of the Spanish Main without explain-
ing his intentions to the remainder of his fleet, which he had directed to
Jamaica.17 News of the ultimate destination particularly piqued Beeston as
he was currently engaged in delicate diplomatic correspondence with the
president of Panama, the admiral of the Barlovento Fleet and the governor
of Portobello, seeking to assure them of King William’s total lack of com-
plicity or support for the Company of Scotland.18
The governor’s concern was not misplaced. Logs of the master and
lieutenant of Benbow’s flagship Gloucester chart the progress of a mis-
sion steadily increasing in diplomatic complexity. As Beeston dispatched
his complaints to London, the admiral was in the midst of a strained dia-
logue with the governor of Cartagena, don Diego de los Rios y Quesada.
Benbow had anchored outside his city in late January, pleading the need
for water. The governor had initially refused the visitors access into port,
instead relaying to them the requested water by two Portuguese boats.
In response, Benbow implemented a campaign of diplomacy and threat
to obtain the release of the detained English merchant ships, with the
eventual result that all the vessels were cleared to depart on 3 February.19
A distinctly different interpretation of interactions between Cartage-
na’s governor and the visiting naval command, complicated by simul-
taneous French proposals, is covered in the former’s report to Carlos II
and dramatically expands the reasons for the English presence. Rios first
recounted the heavy demands upon his position, providing a self-appraisal
that he was handling his responsibilities admirably. In the midst of trying
to organise action against the Scots and control contraband trade, the
governor had received an offer of assistance against the Scots from French
captain Jean Rache. Within days of vetting the validity of that offer, and
sending Rache in the company of the Barlovento fleet to gain Darien
intelligence, two additional arrivals had caught the governor by surprise.
The pair of vessels had immediately posted English colours and sent in a
launch with a letter from one Admiral Benbow. The visitor reported con-
cern over the site and intent of the Scottish settlement, declaring that his
total fleet was ‘ready for any eventuality should the Scotch commit any
evil’. They were also hunting for pirates, Benbow elaborated, which were
reported to be operating off the coast of Hispaniola. He was so concerned
about getting accurate information, he declared, that he had come alone
so as not to alarm local jurisdictions. He requested water, explaining that
it had been fifty days since their departure from England and there had
been no previous opportunity to replenish their supply. They would, he
assured the governor, be departing for Jamaica once the task was com-
pleted. The captain assigned to relay communications ashore volunteered
that their squadron was under direction from King William to ‘gather
up the Scotch’, adding that additional ships of the fleet were standing at
Nevis and off the coast near Santo Domingo.
Rios was particularly wary that the English visitors were seeking intel-
ligence on how much the Spanish knew of Scottish initiatives, and that
they might actually comprise the relief fleet he had heard was expected
from Scotland. Exercising prudence, he dispatched a contingent of offi-
cials to meet with the admiral on his flagship and provide a first-hand
evaluation of the situation. The embassy was received cordially and given
surprising news:
The Englishman stated that it was by command of his king to inform him-
self of the governor concerning the place and position where the Scotch had
landed and were founding a settlement, in order to advise his majesty and
later to return to execute them all for having come without the authoriza-
tion of their king, who was in Flanders when they left, and who, as soon
as he learned of it, sent this admiral after them with the purpose stated, to
which end he had in Jamaica as many as ten ships, and a supply of bombs.
have to force his way in. A compromise was finally negotiated with an
offer from Rios to send men to obtain the empty barrels and return them
to the English replenished. An acceptable arrangement was also forged
to allow the small asiento vessel accompanying the admiral into port to
unload its cargo of slaves and obtain its own water supply.
There remained the issue of the detained slave transports. The gov-
ernor had been pressured for their release as early as 15 January by the
local representative of the Portuguese concession, who requested that
his company’s ships be allowed to clear for Lisbon, along with the pair
of English ships for their home port. It was claimed the vessels had been
held for a month, causing substantial delay and expense, without for-
mulation of any firm plans for operations against the Scots. Settlement
was eventually reached with the governor acknowledging the stipulation
of the Slave Trade Concession prohibiting detention of its vessels, gra-
ciously expressing his desire to avoid financial losses for all concerned.
In spite of consistently finding himself in receipt of assurances that the
‘sole object of their coming was to remove the Scotch, who, they said,
had come hither without order of their king’, Governor Rios was no
doubt relieved to witness the English depart on 12 February. The parade
of surprising offers to assist in eliminating the colony at Darien, however,
continued the following day as word came of an additional proposal
from the French Governor and Admiral Du Casse of Petit-Goave, offer-
ing ‘munitions, firearms, and all the assistance possible’ to expel ‘this evil
people from these parts’.20
No doubt gratified by his initial success, Benbow sailed for Jamaica,
from where he filed a report to London dated 3 March 1699. The doc-
ument, forwarded by Secretary of State Vernon to the king, informed
his superiors he had found the Spaniards in Cartagena very disposed
towards the French and very ‘jealous of us on the Scotch account’. He
included the latest intelligence on New Caledonia, including the dramatic
news that the Dolphin and her crew were being held in Cartagena and
an initial armed skirmish had occurred between the Spanish and Scots
in Darien. He was sailing the following day for Portobello, he wrote, to
gain a better account of the situation and to demand additional English-
owned trade goods, men and ships seized by the Barlovento fleet. Vernon
included his own assessment, noting to his king:
The Spaniards are very little sensible of the declarations that you did not
approve of the Scotch, since they make no end of the seizing of our ships.
Benbow is taking a course that will either make them very civil or very
angry.21
As William pressed his case to assure the Spanish monarch of his lack of
complicity in the Scottish effort, increasing expressions of concern from
English and Portuguese slave-trading interests demanded a response.
Following Benbow’s report from Jamaica, Secretary of State Vernon
wrote to Ambassador Stanhope in Madrid, informing him of additional
English ships detained in Portobello. He related that merchants involved
with the asiento had paid him a visit ‘to complain that some of their
ships there and the Negros [were] taken away from them without paying
for them’. Included in his letter was a deposition taken during March
1699 illustrating the tactics and consequences behind the complaints.
John Chapman and John Noale had been chief mate and gunner, respec-
tively, of the Good Will, sailing with a prescribed cargo of slaves from
Guinea. They had arrived in Cartagena on 27 September and delivered
their human merchandise to the Portuguese as stipulated. Preparing to
depart for England, they were consistently denied permission to clear and
their rudder was ordered unhung by the admiral of the Barlovento fleet,
incapacitating their ship. This was followed by a visit from the governor,
who ‘took away all small arms, locked up the great cabin, powder room
and hatches and ordered the Captain and two doctors on shore . . . at
their own expense’. After two days the men had been allowed to return
to the ship, discovering that powder, provisions, iron bars and two sets
of sails had been seized. The explanation given by the Spaniards was that
the Spanish and French were to ‘join against the English, then that the
reason was because the Scotch had landed on Golden Island’. They were
to be held prisoner, the men were informed, until word was received
from Spain regarding their future. An escape attempt to Jamaica, fully
supported by their captain, had succeeded in an English vessel sailing
under the Dutch flag. The secretary added a footnote to Stanhope, direct-
ing him to ‘make people there (Madrid) sensible’.22
Stanhope was not caught by surprise. He had previously initiated a
campaign to assure the Spanish court of his monarch’s innocence and
frustration, writing to Vernon to assure him that England’s position
would be conveyed to all relevant authorities. The effectiveness of his
efforts was transmitted two weeks later, when the ambassador reported:
PORTOBELLO
Cartagena to demand the Dolphin and her crew. The Spanish governor,
however, had refused. The Scots, ‘after giving the Admiral an account’,
sailed for New Caledonia.26
Within a week of the dialogue Benbow’s fleet anchored off Portobello,
where they received a less than enthusiastic reception from the governor.
Master Thompson of the Gloucester recorded that an introduction had
been relayed into port, eliciting dissatisfaction at their close proximity
and warning that the Barlovento fleet was present in the harbour. The
governor had good reason for caution. Unknown to the English, Admiral
don Andrés de Pez was absent, conferring in Panama on plans to eradi-
cate the Scots and had left his fleet manned ‘with only seamen, ship’s
boys, and some officers, in small number’.27
Subsequent developments at Portobello are provided by both English
and Spanish reports to their respective authorities and reflect the ten-
sion created by the Scottish presence in the region. In his communication
to the Lords of the Admiralty, Benbow expressed his frustration at the
continuing belief that England’s interests were inseparable from those of
Scotland:
I used all the arguments I could to persuade them to the contrary but to
little progress being denied the privilege of their ports to water, all the
country in an alarm, letters passed almost every day wherein I insisted
to have the goods, men and vessels that belonged to my prince and sub-
jects, which at last they did consent that if I would go from befor their
port my demands should be sent after me, for my lying there was very
nervous to them.28
such strength and cost should come upon a matter of so small importance
since the expense of the Admirall’s Fleet must in 15 days amount to more
than he asked for’.30
Missing from official correspondence concerning Portobello, but
noted in the logs of two of the English ships, was a brief reappearance
of the Scots. On 9 April two sails were spotted which were subsequently
identified as being from New Caledonia. They had appeared at night
and departed the following morning, but not before the captain of the
Germoon had occasion to log ‘Rear Admiral with Scotch vessels’.31
The stalemate between Benbow and Portobello’s governor continued
until the arrival of the Maidstone on 20 April. With her came urgent
news in the form of the proclamations prohibiting any assistance to the
Scots by citizens of English dominions. Copies were rapidly transmitted
to shore and produced a marked change of attitude. Benbow abruptly
found himself treated ‘very civilly’, adding that a French ship had sailed
into port, offering its services against New Caledonia. As Benbow noti-
fied his Spanish hosts that he was preparing to sail, he wrote that they
now seemed hesitant to let him go ‘for fear the Scotch should invade
them’. Citing pressing orders of his own but acknowledging the request
for defensive support, the admiral ordered Captain Pickard to take com-
mand of the Soldado, Falmouth and Lynn and remain behind, while ‘the
Maidstone I sent to cruise the Gulph of Darien for ten days then to return
to Jamaica’.
The orders prepared for Captain Pickard specifically addressed inter-
action with the Scots and clear intent to provide assistance against New
Caledonia should it be requested by the Spanish. Dated 28 April 1699
they instructed the reduced fleet to maintain communication with the
Spanish,
unless it be their request that you stay to protect them from the Scotch, if
so then you are to remain there, taking care you use no violence against
the Scotch, without they are the first aggressors, and send one of the ships
to Jamaica to advise of the matter . . . if the Spaniards . . . nor think well
of ye proposal in assisting them, you are to depart that place.32
News that the Scotch had settled in these dominions under patents issued
by the British King was the reason of his arrest, it being plain that had no
such news arrived he would by now be in his own country, a free man. It
is equally clear that my course is justified, for if vassals of the British king,
having no right to do so, proceed as though possessed of absolute author-
ity to intrude upon and settle his majesty’s territory, thereby occasioning
expense to his royal treasury, how much greater justification have I to
hold his British majesty’s vassals’ property . . .
names. Benbow’s pay lists do reflect recruits and impressments, not only
in Jamaica, but also during stops in Cartagena and Portobello. The sole
indication of Darien survivors transferring to the English fleet involves
William and David Strachan, who came aboard the Maidstone at Port
Royal, Jamaica, on 12 February 1700. William was likely the deserter
‘Guillermo Estrafan’ who had been interrogated by the president of
Panama the previous month. He had identified himself as having served
on the Caledonia, but neither he nor the like-named David are listed on
that vessel’s rolls. It is, however, possible that they were not originally
seamen but landmen and had endured the pragmatic and challenging
naval training their circumstances demanded.38
Some of the survivors who arrived with the St Andrew did, however,
openly replenish British military ranks. William Hutchinson had arrived
in New Caledonia with a relief expedition to find the colony abandoned
and witnessed the burning of the Olive Branch and her vital store of pro-
visions.39 Evaluating the remaining food supply and realising the short-
fall, his group had sailed for Jamaica. They discovered the St Andrew
there, expecting it to go to sea within two weeks. The infirmity and mor-
tality among her crew, however, made it obvious to Hutchinson that
the ship would have to remain in port until the Company made alter-
native arrangements. Hutchinson had himself been severely ill but was
now recovered and had been approached by a Colonel Knight regard-
ing potential service commanding forces at Port Royal. His first priority
would remain the Company of Scotland, Hutchinson wrote to the direc-
tors in Edinburgh, assuring them he had accepted the position only after
consultations with fellow surviving officers present in Port Royal.40
The news of Benbow’s mission to the Caribbean, and the potential threat
it posed for New Caledonia, had not failed to reach Scotland. As relief ships
were being dispatched there was speculation about the admiral’s orders and
whereabouts. George Hume, who had invested 500 pounds in the venture
the initial day of subscriptions, wrote in his diary of the uncertainty:
We hope that if Jameson and Stark continued their course and were not
interrupted (as some say they are by Bambo) we have 9 months provisions
aboard and knowing there were recruits soon to follow would continue
in their places . . . there is talk as if Bambo should all ready have taken
possession.41
with the allowance of the General, came and traded with our people, buy-
ing several of their commodities, which our men were very willing to sell
to them: and by this means some of our people came to be provided with
money to bear their charges, when they arrived at another port, which
proved a favorable providence to many of them.48
As the remaining seaworthy Scottish ships struggled out of the bay, the
varied factions that had sought their removal returned to other assorted
missions, equipped with an expanded understanding of allies and adver-
saries. Upon his return to Cartagena, Pimienta faced an onslaught of
new accusations from the Cacheu Company regarding interference with
the asiento. Whatever her precise location during the final days of New
Caledonia, the Germoon was in Jamaica on the first day of April. Cap-
tain Boye filed his report to the Admiralty, notifying them he was fitted
with a full complement of men and six weeks’ provisions. He requested
a continuance ‘in these parts, being well acquainted with ye Countrey
& my men all Seasoned to it’. They would return to the Spanish Main,
logging their presence in the vicinity of Portobello and the nearby San
Blas Islands through June.49 From his vantage point in Jamaica, Gov-
ernor Beeston addressed his own appreciation, not only pertaining to
resolution of the Scottish problem, but also regarding the absence of
challenges to his authority: ‘Now the ships of war are gone all in quiet
and amity.’50
On the opposite side of the Atlantic obvious expressions of relief fol-
lowed both the first abandonment and final capitulation. In response to the
failure of the initial Scottish expedition, Ambassador Methuen reported
from Lisbon of ‘very joyful’ receipt of the news at court, based on the
‘great hindrance the settlement was to . . . furnishing the West Indies with
negroes by our means’.51 To the English secretary of embassy in Paris,
Alexander Stanhope wrote from Madrid to say the Spanish court was
‘extremely pleased with the advice of the Scots’ removal from Darien’.
He acknowledged offers of French assistance, adding, ‘I assure you it was
very lustily promised, and would have certainly have been accepted, if
the news has staid a little longer.’ He reiterated the French position in a
second communication, emphasising to his secretary of state the fortunate
timing of the news, for the king of Spain had been anticipated to ‘declare
that very day his acceptance or refusal to accept French help to rout the
Scots . . . France to furnish 40 Men of War and 1200 land men’.52 As a
most uncomfortable series of events came to a close, King William III
could experience some sense of relief over conflicts caused by his northern
subjects, about whom he wrote to the Pensionary Heinsius prior to hear-
ing of the capitulation:
The Caribbean would experience only a brief respite before the long-
anticipated death of the king of Spain in November 1700 and ensuing
struggles over his succession. Survivors from New Caledonia would
face continued perils as they struggled towards any source of secu-
rity, whether it be labour in Jamaica, a new life in North American
colonies, or even transport to Spain following shipwreck. Admiral
Benbow, now well versed in managing a fleet in the West Indies, had
NOTES
Portobel to demand prisoners, and was intending to come hither also, which
was very supporting to us’. Burton, The Darien Papers, p. 250.
27. NA, ADM52/39, entry for 23 March 1699 and Hart, The Disaster, App.
XIX, p. 296.
28. NMM-Caird, PLA/23, f. 9r.
29. NA, ADM51/341, captain’s log of the Falmouth.
30. HL, MSBL10, Copy of the Governor of Porto Bello’s Letter to Me. Received
June the First 1699.
31. NA, ADM51/389, captain’s log of the Germoon and ADM52/39, master’s
log of the Gloucester. The latter records the shallop and sloop departed ‘ply-
ing to windward’.
32. NMM-Caird, PLA/23, ff. 9r–v. and 79r.
33. MHS-Hart, Darien Item 18, English translation of letter from Andrés de Pez
to Carlos II, 10 June 1699.
34. AGI, Panamá 109, testimony taken by the general of Portobello, 15 May 1699.
35. NA, ADM51/341/Part III, captain’s log of the Falmouth, entries for 17 and
19–20 May 1699 and ADM51/3892, captain’s log of the Lynn, entry for 29
May 1699.
36. NA, CO137/4, f. 382r.
37. Burton, The Darien Papers, pp. 150–1.
38. Company of Scotland pay lists for marine personnel are in NLS, Adv. MS
83.7.4, starting with f. 88r. Those for Benbow’s fleet are: NA, ADM33/204
for Germoon, ADM33/206 for Lynn and Maidstone and ADM33/207 for
Gloucester. Muster books for Saudados Prize are in ADM36/3378.
39. Although the fire’s accepted cause was a reckless seaman, a witness stated
the loss of the vessel and critical stores was ‘through wicked negligence . . .
while (Captain) Jameson and his Mate were cutting one anothers throats for
a whore’. HL, MSBL9, Copy of Mr Sheil’s Letter, 25 December 1699.
40. UGSp, MS1685, letter from Port Royal, 24 October 1699.
41. NRS, GD1/649/2, typed transcript of Diary of George Home of Kimmerghame,
Vol. 2. 1697–1699, entry for 13 Oct 1699 and Burton, The Darien Papers,
p. 374.
42. NA, ADM1/5261, ff. 223r–6r.
43. NA, CO137/5, f. 8.
44. NA, ADM51/3892, log of the Lynn, 14 September – 22 October 1699.
45. Burton, The Darien Papers, pp. 311, 337.
46. NA, ADM1/1435. Allan to Admiralty Office, date illegible but referring to
a 16 February communication.
47. Borland, The History, p. 59.
48. Ibid., p. 68. Borland’s account contrasts with the Gazeta extraordinaria.
Likely included to indicate compliance with policies regarding contraband
trade, the document maintains that ‘He (Pimienta) ordered that none of his
men should purchase any cloth or any jewelry from the enemy, under pen-
alty’. MHS-Hart, Gazeta-English, p. 13.
49. NA, ADM1/1462 and ADM51/389, captain’s log of the Germoon, entries
for 26 and 29 June 1700.
50. NA, CO137/5, f. 51, Beeston to Board of Trade, 20 April 1700.
51. KLHC-Stanhope, U1590, 29/5, Methuen to Stanhope, November 1699.
52. Stanhope, Spain, p. 151 and KLHC-Stanhope, U1590, 022/5, Stanhope to
Jersey, October 1699.
53. Grimblot, Letters, p. 415.
Figure 5.1 Fuerza Vieja Sector of Havana, 1691. Note the king’s prison (7),
adjacent to the governor’s palace at the bottom of the map. Source: Spain.
Ministry of Culture. General Archives of Indies, AGI, MP Santo_Domingo 96.
subsequent trial. The prisoners, held aboard the San Ignacio some dis-
tance from the communicating vessels, reported they could identify the
ship’s English construction, but had no knowledge of the content of or
motivation for the dialogue. John Malloch did state he recognised the
ship from the river in London and that it appeared to be that of Captain
David Breholt.8
Evidence indicates that Malloch’s identification was correct, and
Breholt’s actual mission, had it been revealed, would have elicited a
strong reaction from the Spanish fleet. The Carlisle had recently been
active across the Caribbean, documented in Montserrat in August
prior to joining a chase after a pirate off St Thomas. Admiral Benbow
acknowledged the vessel’s primary mission in a log entry, noting he
had sailed with her from Jamaica ‘in order to countenance Captain
Brahoult who was going also on a wreck which was cast away two
years since off the Havana with great treasure’.9 Although no docu-
mentation defines the relationship with the prisoners, Breholt’s bold
approach indicates he knew Pincarton and the other men through their
mercantile careers and/or he had heard of their plight while in Jamaica.
It is likely pertinent that Pincarton himself had experience of recover-
ing Spanish treasure, having served as boatswain for Sir William Phips
during his enriching 1686–7 expedition to the Caribbean.10
Apparently without additional unusual events, the homecoming fleet
sailed into Cadiz in mid-December, the five New Caledonia veterans
once again placed in irons.11 Officials of the Casa did not immediately
acknowledge their arrival, however, apparently distracted by the activi-
ties of General Zavala. The commanding officer aroused suspicion and
was subjected to his own imprisonment when he failed to complete
entry documents or allow the requisite inspection. Compounding
matters were multiple accounts of French and English launches fer-
rying unidentified cargo from the San Ignacio on a moonless night.
Zavala responded with disdain, declaring his rank and status elevated
him above the Casa’s jurisdiction and adding that the launches were
benignly bringing foreign officers wishing to express congratulations
on his successful sail, an action for which he was compelled to provide
appropriate hospitality.12
Despite diverted Spanish officials, the prisoners soon came to the
attention of the port’s English consul, Martin Westcombe, who took
up their cause with the Marquis of Narros, president of the Casa de la
Contratación, pleading that the men had not been ‘found in the exercise
of any thing that was prohibited, but were only sailing to the parts of the
dominion of the King of Great Brittain with marchandizes of their own
manufacture’. The consul cited the prisoners’ service on the San Ignacio,
informing the marquis of their ‘being the most forward on all occasions
of danger that offer’d in the whole course of the voyage’. The initial
diplomatic effort elicited only an oral reply, relaying that no resolution
would be forthcoming without the king’s order.13 Nevertheless, involve-
ment of Westcombe and his deputy, a Scot named James Chalmers, insti-
tuted continuing efforts to mitigate the prisoners’ conditions and seek
their release. Resulting benefits included receipt of fifty pounds from the
Company for the men’s subsistence, along with documents intended to
convince the Spanish court of their innocence.14
The seemingly positive steps failed, however, to halt the pre-
scribed examination by the Casa’s judicial arm in Seville. At the end
of March the men, still accompanied by young David Wilson, were
again put in irons and loaded into a small open boat for the trip up
the Guadalquivir River, where the case against them awaited and
their arrival in custody of boat owner Diego Gomes was documented
in the log of the Casa’s prison.15 The long reach of Spanish justice
had retrieved the Scottish dream of a Darien-based trading empire
and presented it before the formidable, highly experienced tribunal
of the Casa de la Contratación.
The trial took place throughout April and May, exacerbated by the
receipt of news of the second expedition’s arrival at New Caledonia.16
The proceedings would be punctuated by short recesses: translation ser-
vices were secured from Benjamin Pitis, a Catholic Englishman living
in the city, and Joseph Moreno, appointed as legal guardian for eleven-
year-old David Wilson and twenty-three-year-old James Graham due to
their minority ages, was given time to prepare the defence of his clients.17
Once the initial examination of Benjamin Spencer was completed, pre-
siding judge Manuel de la Chica ordered that the prisoners be restricted
to separate quarters and prevented from communication with each other
and outsiders. Each detainee was brought twice before the tribunal and
outside witnesses were also solicited, notably Captain don Bartolome
Antonio Garrote, aboard whose advice boat the prisoners had been
transported from Cartagena to Havana.18
The fundamental importance of the trial record, however, rests in the
lines of questioning undertaken during the dual examinations. These sub-
jects of interrogation, here identified as 1. Intent to Invade Dominions
of his Catholic Majesty; 2. A Question of Trade; and 3. Indicting the
The trio of judges confronting the five defendants was incredulous, par-
ticularly since Spain had learned as early as 1697 from its resident in
Hamburg that two ships departing for Scotland were intended for an
expedition to Darien, that the men before them could not have known
their destination or grasped its critical geographical position within their
king’s American dominions. Why, they questioned Spencer, would any-
one sail without knowing their destination? What would happen in the
case of separation due to storms or accident? The interrogators could
not comprehend how the translator, in light of his testimony that he had
previously worked in customs enforcement in London, could not have
been aware of where the expedition was intending to sail.19
When it came to the professional seamen, the disbelief was just as
acute. In response to Pincarton’s account of sailing under a series of closed
orders to be opened only upon reaching specific destinations, de la Chica
and his colleagues refused to accept that a captain claiming over sixteen
years of experience and serving on the Council of New Caledonia could
not have been privy to where the fleet was headed. Reiterating ignorance
of any objective within dominions of the Spanish king, Malloch claimed
that, prior to departure, some said they were going to Africa and oth-
ers that they would sail to the Amazon, which appeared to be within
Portuguese territory.20
Asked specifically about their understanding of the prohibition
against sailing to Spanish territories without express permission, the men
claimed a lack of awareness of the law until they had become prisoners
in Cartagena and learned otherwise from Spaniards. Pincarton related
efforts to investigate settlements along the coast near New Caledonia
Bay, but those explorations discovered solely natives and a few French-
men, none of whom identified the area as under Spanish control. Pincar-
ton, Malloch and Graham all testified their sole interest in the expedition
was their salaries, the former emphasising his responsibilities to wife and
family. Malloch admitted he had recognised from maps the proximity of
retained a presence in the colony longer than his fellow prisoners, could
speak first-hand to the intent and conditions of the initial abandonment.
They had been seeking refuge in Boston, he related, to resupply and return
to Scotland. The decision to abandon the site had resulted from their scant
supplies and absence of any word of the relief convoy anticipated from
Scotland. They had simply lost hope, particularly after hearing of King
William’s order prohibiting them any form of assistance. New Caledonia’s
structures, including 130 of wood and cane, two or three others built to
sell rum, beer and other commodities, and the fort had been abandoned as
they were in response to word of forces mobilising against the colony and
the inability to defend themselves, fully one half of the population suffering
from illness.25
Despite continual and prolonged imprisonment, the detainees
reported receipt of information regarding the whereabouts of some
of the expedition’s original ships. While in Cadiz they had been told
by fellow prisoners from England that the St Andrew was in Jamaica,
the Caledonia in Scotland and the Unicorn in New England. Pincarton
added he had heard it had been published in newspapers that a second
group had actually returned to Darien.26
2. A Question of Trade
heard such projects were under consideration. The pilot also related he
hadn’t witnessed any commerce during his brief months at Darien other
than limited barter of shirts and old coats to the native population in
return for bananas and other produce. The men did admit that a Dutch
ship had entered their bay seeking refuge from the Barlovento fleet, one
or two vessels had come from Jamaica to fish for turtle, a French ship was
obtaining wood and water, and yet another arrival from New England
had brought supplies of wheat and salted fish.28 Clearly, New Caledonia
was attracting an array of international interest.
Testimony given by Captain Garrote presented a contrasting por-
trait. The Seville resident informed the tribunal he had received orders
from the governor of Cartagena to transport four prisoners to Havana
and forward a request to the governor there that his passengers remain
confined pending transport to Spain. He recounted it had been public
knowledge that the Scots were frustrated by their failure to instigate
trade with coastal areas near Santa Maria and Panama. Furthermore,
Garrote had heard from other Dolphin crew members while in Cart-
agena that Pincarton occupied a high position within the Company
and had expended up to 80,000 pesos for preparation of a squadron
intended to pursue trade with Tierra Firme and Peru from New Cale-
donia. Towards that end the Scots were to dispatch small ships to the
Darien River and penetrate markets in the inland cities of Popayan
and Antioquia. The incriminating account was corroborated by Cap-
tain Philipe del Real, who had served with Garrote. The mariner, who
resided across the river in Triana, verified his acquaintance with the
defendants. Not specifying his source, he said he had learned during
the transit from Cartagena to Havana that establishment of the Darien
fort was to facilitate trade with New Granada, Tierra Firme and Peru,
but that the Scots had been motivated to abandon the site due to its
harmful climate.29
As the defendants were brought forth for their second round of ques-
tioning, they were probed both on the damning information acquired
from Spanish naval personnel and further on the pursuit of contraband
trade. The latter was substantiated, the judges noted, by appropriateness
for the Spanish West Indies of trade goods the Dolphin was transport-
ing. Although the tribunal was primarily investigating the commercial
goals of the Scots, their auxiliary evaluation regarding suitability of the
cargo is in marked contrast to the general criticism and even ridicule
assigned to the product inventory throughout Darien historiography.
Given the cumulative concern shown by the Casa, which for two cen-
turies had administered Spanish America’s governance and commerce,
Accusations of illegal trade had not been admitted to by any of the pris-
oners, but the Casa was well versed on the larger organisation behind
It could have been no surprise given the content and tone of court pro-
ceedings when, at the end of June, the sentence from the Casa de la
Contratación confirmed all negative predictions. For their crime of hav-
ing gone from Scotland ‘With a Squadron consisting of Five Ships of
Warr, bringing with Them divers Goods into America, and a Colony
therein called Darien, and building there Houses and Forts, and doing
other things contained in The Libell’ the men were found guilty. Pincar-
ton, Malloch, Graham and Spencer were condemned to death, David
Wilson excepted and liberated on account of his age, but prohibited from
returning to Spain’s dominions in the Americas. Time and manner of the
four executions were to be determined. All goods belonging to the men,
as well as the Dolphin and her cargo, were to be confiscated. The sen-
tence was to be immediately dispatched to Governor Pimienta in order
that proceeds from the sale of the ship and freight could be forwarded to
Spain as expeditiously as possible.
The judgement also addressed the broader scope of culpabil-
ity, holding the Duke of Hamilton, Lord Panmure, the Marquis of
Tweeddale and others guilty of the formation and administration of
the Company. Included were those who provided financial backing, as
well as participants and officers of the expeditions. The findings of the
court were to be transmitted to the appropriate official at the English
embassy, to be forwarded to the British king for his ‘exemplary pun-
ishments upon the Said Delinquents’. The Casa further directed that
accounts be compiled of all expenses incurred by Spain ‘on occasion
of this Embarcation, as well in fitting out a Squadron to go to Darien,
and the golden Coast to retake it’ in order to pursue compensation.
Governor Pimienta, who as yet unknown to the Casa had secured the
capitulation of the second expedition, was to be issued a reprimand
for not proceeding with punishment of the men while they remained
in Cartagena.39
The situation in Seville had been closely monitored from Edinburgh,
sustained by correspondence initiated in Cadiz and continuing during
the trial. The prisoners wrote of their fear of the outcome from their
Casa cells in April, stating ‘Our declarations are taken, and their deter-
minations is by some dubious, by most thought it will be hard, and we
fear the event’.40 The defendants’ families had mounted their own cam-
paign, with Henry Graham of Brackness, Glasgow merchant Robert
Malloch and Mrs Pincarton preparing a ‘Humble Petition’ to the king’s
High Commissioner and Parliament on behalf of the men. They claimed
their family members had been detained ‘for no other reason, but for
their being found imploy’d in the Service of the said company and their
Colony’ and implored the recipients to take up the issue with the king on
the basis that such support would promote others to join future Com-
pany endeavours.41
Indications of the eventuality and scope of the sentence precipitated a
new intensity of concern, the Court of Directors submitting fifty pounds
to assist the prisoners and forwarding requested documents, simultane-
ously beginning to address their own legal vulnerabilities through an
appeal that ‘by any means an Extract of the Process against them be
required and obtained if possible to be transmitted hither’. Plagued by
a chronic inability to attract a quorum despite charged circumstances,
the directors finally considered the Casa’s formal sentence on 20 August
1700. Among their decisions was that the now-convicted Marquis of
Tweeddale lead an embassy to the secretary of state for Scotland, Lord
We doubt not that your Majesty has heard what has recently happened
to our Scottish subjects, how by agreement with your Majesty’s governor
of Carthagena they left the country of Darien, how a short time before
one of their ships sailing thence for other parts of America was cast
ashore in the neighbourhood of Carthagena and was wrecked, and how
those on board, when they repaired to the above-mentioned city to seek
help, were seized and thrown into prison, were afterwards transported
to Spain and were there condemned to death, and have now appealed to
your Majesty’s supreme court at Cadiz for redress. Such is your Majesty’s
renowned and known clemency to all men that we most heartily com-
mend to it those our subjects who have been thus condemned for their
designs and attempts against your sovereignty, and have already endured
such grievous suffering. We believe that, when the condition of these men
is known and considered, your Majesty will not hold them unworthy of
that clemency. Therefore we have given instructions to our minister, M.
Schonenberg, to explain fully to your Majesty their circumstances, and
the weighty reasons why their release and restoration to liberty may be
hoped for. We persuade ourselves that there will be easy access for his
advocacy, and that as all our subjects are now withdrawn from those
countries, nothing more remains of that unpleasant enterprise than that
those unhappy prisoners may enjoy your Royal clemency and compas-
sion. Such an act so worthy of your Majesty’s noble and magnanimous
disposition we well look upon as a singular proof of your Majesty’s good-
will towards us, and we will make suitable return as often as opportunity
may arise.
for all other damages, and their persons to be seized’. Notice of this ‘droll
passage’ was submitted to Lord Seafield on 1 August, along with a message
that the alarming letter had been seen in possession of one of the Company
directors. Later in the same month Seafield arrived in Edinburgh and could
assess the situation for himself, after which he wrote to Carstares giving his
estimation of various factions in the Scottish Parliament:
What connects and unites the opposing party is that resolve concerning
Caledonia; and the argument they use is, that, if the right of Caledonia be
not declared, the directors themselves are not safe from being prosecute;
for they have got information that the King of Spain will apply to the
King, that it may be so.
He could not understand for what end we required it; and that, in regard it
might give jealousy and raise ill blood, he would not appear in it, without
a special order from the King his master, or from the English Secretary of
State.50
NOTES
17. AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 50r–1r and 110r–13v. The age of
majority was twenty-five. Wilson testified his father, the Dolphin’s boat-
swain, had died in a Cartagena hospital and he had no mother or anyone to
look after him in his own country. Ibid., ff. 134r–8r, 263r.
18. Ibid., ff. 49r and 150r–8v.
19. AGI, Panamá 159, f. 658r and AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 32v
and 172r–v.
20. AGI, Contratación 5726A, ff. 53r-–7v, 218v.
21. Ibid., ff. 57r–61r, 207r and 222r–v.
22. Ibid., ff. 193r–5r.
23. Ibid., ff. 17v–18r.
24. Ibid., ff. 181r–2v. For the Articles of Agreement pertaining to the reprisals,
see Appendix II.
25. Ibid., ff. 25v, 42v–7r.
26. Ibid., ff. 48r, 80r.
27. Grahn, The Political Economy, pp. 20, 23.
28. AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 71v–7v, 81r–v, 98r, and 124r–9r.
‘Baruada’ may refer to the island of Barbuda, today part of the country of
Antigua and Barbuda, or Barbados, the latter cited in numerous English
language documents.
29. Ibid., ff. 152v–4v and 159r–61r. 80,000 pesos was the sum paid in 1702
to acquire the position of treasurer of the mint for the Viceroyalty of Peru.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 271.
30. For an example of the assessment of trade goods see Fry, The Scottish
Empire, p. 29. Watt presents a broader appraisal in The Price of Scotland
by noting the persistent notion of inappropriate cargo, countering with data
verifying the small percentage of total goods ridiculed products comprised
(pp.122–3).
31. AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 172r–80r.
32. Ibid., ff. 188v–91v, 204v–9v.
33. Ibid., ff. 226v–8r and 248v.
34. Ibid., ff. 80r–1r, 132v and 34v–5r.
35. Ibid., ff. 203v–4r. The documents had been submitted to the governor in
March 1699 as part of the unsuccessful embassy to recover the men and
goods of the Dolphin. NLS, Adv. MS 83.7.4, ff. 157–8.
36. AGI, Contratación 5726A, Ramo 2, ff. 210r–13r.
37. Ibid., ff. 228v–31r and 249r–55v.
38. Ibid., ff. 257r–66v.
39. NA, SP94/212, Translation of the Sentence against the Scotsmen Taken at
Carthagena.
40. Grant, Seafield Correspondence, p. 288.
41. NRS, PA7/17/1/23.
42. RBS, D/1/2, 9 July, 16 July and 20 August 1700. The prisoners’ account was
established through R. Anderson, a San Lucar merchant. NLS, MS70, f. 210.
43. NLS, RY.II.b8, f. 36 and McCormick, State-Papers, p. 554.
On the 14th of July of the current year 1700 common joy came even
before dawn, the public rejoicing in the city of Lima being aroused by
the merry peal of the bells. This was commenced at the Cathedral at
half past one in the morning, and was followed by other churches and
chapels, and by religious institutions. The joyful sound was so unseason-
able and so untimely that it led people to believe that without doubt
it portended good news to the city and to the country on the day of St
Bonaventure, news that might dispel the fear that reigned in their minds
lest there should be a repetition within the same year of the earthquake
that last year, on the same day and with a slight difference in the time of
day, had violently laid the city in ruins. Soon the news spread of the suc-
cess that the army of His Majesty had in the dislodgement of the Scotch.1
A HISTORY OF OFFENCES
The Scots had unwisely inserted their own expectations into a volatile
landscape characterised not only by a history of raiding, but also cur-
rently experiencing, as discussed in earlier chapters, a thriving and highly
competitive contraband trade penetrating the coasts of the mainland. Ini-
tiation of the settlement at New Caledonia not only added a new, untried
cast member to the international high-stakes game of illegal commerce,
but it also directly impacted local populations. It was the permanent resi-
dents who faced immediate threats and disruption to themselves, their
families and their financial resources. Royal officials throughout Spanish
America were also well aware that their own appointments and thus
their careers could be assigned, revoked, tested or extended depending on
Benbow had departed on 12 February 1699 and the letter from Petit-
Goave had arrived on the 13th, but both events were eclipsed on the
15th with the even more dramatic occurrence of the grounding of the
Dolphin and subsequent arrest, incarceration and interrogation of her
crew. With concrete intelligence acquired from the prisoners, Rios was
able to inform his fellow officials and his king of actual conditions at
New Caledonia, concurrently emphasising the ambiguities and proxim-
ity of foreign interests in the entire affair and the requirement to avoid
delay. He would, he assured his correspondents, ‘take part with all my
strength’.11
Isolated by distance and topography from the numerous Councils of
War, debates over tactics and financial disagreements was the Count of
la Monclova, viceroy of Peru. New Caledonia fell within his expansive
jurisdiction, creating an administrative challenge defined by the logistical
problems of coordinating a military response. Having previously served as
viceroy in Mexico City and possessing a notable military career, Monclova
well comprehended both the threat and impediments involved in any cam-
paign to dislodge foreign invaders from the Isthmus. Initially questioning
the validity of intelligence indicating the Scottish intrusion, reasoning that
King William would not risk war with Spain and conditions in Darien
were not conducive to settlement, the count continued to enthusiastically
await his replacement from Spain and imminent retirement. Instead, he
soon comprehended not only the accuracy of the intelligence, but that
orders from Madrid would extend his tenure in Peru by three years in
response to the threat created by the Scots.
From his opposite side of the continent, across the formidable obstruc-
tion of the Andes, Monclova attempted to respond to the responsibilities
of his position, pleas for assistance, the changing scope of the crisis as the
Scots first abandoned their colony and then returned, and the mandate
from his king that he personally travel to Panama to take command. Fol-
lowing initial word of the Scots’ presence via a December 1698 notice
from President Canillas, the viceroy had responded with supplies and
the annual allocation of 300,000 pesos, dispatched by warship up the
Pacific coast the following month. Also provided was a contingent of
500 soldiers from Lima to augment existing military personnel in the
impacted region.
Although events would eventually negate the need for either his pres-
ence or the assistance he requested from the viceroy in Mexico City,
Monclova attempted to educate Madrid on the challenges created by its
decisions. He wrote that mandated transportation of artillery from Lima
to Cartagena, initiated after the French raid and increased in urgency with
the arrival of the Scots, was plagued by the conditions of the Isthmus,
making it impractical for both ground and sea transport. Land opera-
tions could be successfully undertaken only three months of the year due
to intense rainfall. The immense distances involved, besides presenting
a serious deterrant to effective coordination of any military response,
were incomprehensible to anyone who had not actually experienced
them. Illustrating his claims with the lag of communication plaguing the
New Caledonia operation, he recorded that he had received notice on 9
March that the Scots had returned to Darien to reoccupy their original
site. The very next day, he would eventually be informed on 21 July,
General don Juan Pimienta and his vessels out of Cartagena, united with
those of Admiral don Francisco Salmon out of Portobello, were present
off New Caledonia assuring expulsion of the enemy. Despite the dif-
ficulties faced, the viceroy wrote to his king, Pimienta’s forces had pre-
vented nothing short of the loss of America and assured the security of
the Catholic faith.12
Your majesty will observe that the governors, and particularly this
Frenchman with all his offers and all his compliments, are only seeking
a way, be it under the pretext of driving away Scotsmen from Darien
(though hard) or of cleaning these seas, to get into our ports loaded to the
brim with merchandise.15
That night the city celebrated with fireworks and illuminations, the Viceroy
Palace, the balconies of the archbishop’s house, the galleries of the Town
Hall, and Main Square being all decorated with long candles of white
wax. His Excellency ordered that solemn high mass be sung the follow-
ing day at the Presidio of Callao, and this was done with many artillery
salvoes. Said fortress celebrated for three days with bullfights in a ring with
parapets. . .
And in order that the due and just happiness resulting from such
good news might not be marred by the unpleasant regret for the severe
punishment and sad death of three unfortunates who already were in
the death house ready to be hung next day, His Excellency, who until
then had been inexorable to the insistent pleas of those who appealed
to his clemency for their pardon, in commemoration and honor of the
happy event saved their lives, commuting the sentence of death to per-
petual exile in the Presidio of Valdivia, that they might serve the King
in the fortress.
1699 consulta to Carlos II, the Council of the Indies had expressed severe
regret over confirmation of the Scottish foothold in Darien. Citing the
consequences of allowing foreign intrusion to go unchecked, the Coun-
cil signified its most dire concern that ‘the Catholic religion will perish,
which is what will most deeply grieve your majesty’s Catholic heart’.29
The absolute necessity to protect Catholicism from the heresy of the
Scots is reflected in the words of the Gazeta and the religious nature of
events conducted in response to the capitulation, yet the Church did not
restrict its activities against such a fundamental affront to conducting
masses or enforcing royal edicts to evangelise resistant native popula-
tions. As previously noted, the Bishop of Santa Marta submitted instru-
mental intelligence to the governor of Cartagena regarding initial arrival
of the Scots. Although incorrect in its reporting of the presence in St
Thomas of 3,000 men and 500 women, all Scots fully supported by their
king, the correspondence did confirm their entry into the region and their
intent to establish themselves near Golden Island.30 The new Bishop of
Panama, Lima native Juan de Argüelles, had immediately ascertained
that evangelisation of troublesome indigenous groups within his bishop-
ric was being seriously hampered by unrest relating to the establishment
of New Caledonia. Having only arrived on the Isthmus in 1699 he nev-
ertheless took it upon himself to submit a detailed account to the king
following the colony’s elimination.31
Nor was the expansive scope of the Church’s role in protecting the
faith limited by provision of intelligence or analysis of events. A lasting
and significantly more concrete affirmation of the degree of concern was
witnessed by financial responsibilities assigned to churches and associ-
ated facilities across Spanish America. Although generally exempted
from forms of taxation required of secular sources, there was no equiva-
lent prohibition against imposition of a donativo, utilised with frequency
during the reign of Carlos II as a funding mechanism to satisfy military
needs during periods of armed conflict.32 Once necessary papal permis-
sion was granted to the king, ecclesiastical institutions would find them-
selves funding improvements to defensive fortifications across Spain’s
West Indian dominions. Pope Innocent XII had, in 1693, set a precedent
by creating a subsidy to be paid from incomes of churches, convents and
hospitals in the Spanish Indies for a period of three years. The fund’s
declared purpose was the repression of piracy and, although initially
unimplemented, its form and function were revitalised in response to
the papacy’s recognition of the threat presented by the Company of
Scotland. Not only did the Church actively intervene with a warning to
Carlos II ‘although the Scotch have abandoned the country of Darien,
your majesty should now be more than ever alert’, but in July 1699 the
Pope issued a revision and reconfirmation of the earlier dispensation of
one million ducados. The new brief was explicit in its targeted enemy
and was followed by a set of instructions from the king, signifying the
resources were to be used in preparing for war against the heretic Scots
attempting to populate Darien and others who might attempt to occupy
or commit hostilities against Spain’s American dominions. Accompany-
ing the royal orders in the thirty-four packets prepared for the designated
recipients were copies of the brief itself, translated from the original Latin
and printed for distribution.33
The necessary mandates to implement collection of the subsidy, to be
comprised of 10 per cent of annual income until the eventual sum of one
million ducados was reached, were prepared in Madrid in duplicate and
triplicate for the recipient prelates. In addition to the documents’ sub-
mission to archbishops and bishops for further dispersal, they were also
distributed to officials of the Inquisition in the Americas. The geographi-
cal extent of the order was vast, ranging from Puebla and Michoacan in
New Spain to Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras, Santo Domingo,
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Venezuela and Lima. Florida was also to be included,
although the isolated regions of the Philippines and Marianas were spe-
cifically exempted. The resulting revenue-producing campaign would
last over two decades and its records, including a summary dated 1721,
would state clearly and repeatedly that it had been motivated by the
attempt of the Scots to establish New Caledonia.34
Although duty was acknowledged, the financial imposition was
not necessarily enthusiastically embraced across the intricate network
of ecclesiastical institutions. In a letter to the king, the Archbishop
of Lima assured his sovereign of compliance but also described the
intense hardships already caused by diminishing sources of revenue.
The extreme poverty of the region, he explained, had been exacer-
bated by a series of earthquakes over the previous decade, destroying
homes and reducing the fertility of the soil, simultaneously reducing
the Church’s income by over a third while increasing demands for
assistance.35 That the continuing challenges cited by the archbishop
impacted actual collection of the donativo can be assumed from resub-
missions of the order issued in November 1713 to all the prelates of
Peru and their viceroy.36 Regardless of problems inherent in the admin-
istration and success of the programme, its existence and repetitive
reminder of the Company of Scotland invasion served as a continu-
ing warning to both the population and its Church of the incessant,
sinister danger of foreign heretics.
NOTES
19. An English translation of the journal is in Hart, The Disaster, App. XXXI,
pp. 353–93. A copy of the original Spanish version is in AGI, Panamá 164.
20. Hart, The Disaster, App. XXXII, pp. 394–5. Don Juan Pimienta to the
Conde de Canillas, 12 April 1700.
21. AGI, Santa Fé 435, Don Juan Pimienta to Carlos II, 1 July 1700.
22. Castillo Mathieu, Los Gobernadores, p. 81.
23. AGI, Santa Fé 435, testimony dated 5 October 1700.
24. AGI, Panamá 181, ff. 691r–735v, from a collection of documents submitted
by Pimienta on 27 October 1700.
25. RBS Archives, D/1/2 and NA, SP94/75, Copia del Despacho de Dn Manuel
de Aperiguy, 14 de Marzo de 1701.
26. Moreyra y Paz-Soldán and Céspedes del Castillo, Virreinato peruano,
tomo III, p. xxvii and AGI, Panamá 182, report of Navarette’s accountant,
f. 230r.
27. MHS-Hart, Gazeta-English, pp. 2–4 and Moreyra y Paz-Soldán and Céspedes
del Castillo, Virreinato peruano, tomo III, p. vii.
28. MHS-Hart, Gazeta-English, pp. 6–14.
29. MHS-Hart, Darien Item 13.
30. AGI, Panamá 215, ff. 5v–6r.
31. Rojas y Arrieta, History of the Bishops, pp. 87–90.
32. Storrs, The Resilience, pp. 129–34.
33. MHS-Hart, Darien Item 70, Storrs, ‘Disaster’, pp. 22–3, and AGI, Panamá
162, ff. 277–99r.
34. AGI, Panamá 166, ff. 805r–929v.
35. AGI, Lima 520, Archbishop of Lima to Felipe V, 20 November 1701.
36. AGI, Panamá 166, f. 908r.
recorded his wonder at the novel vegetation and fruits he saw as he explored
the port.2 Upon the governor’s receipt of word that other of the Scots’ fleet
had landed on Crab Island, however, events quickly evolved in a less ami-
able direction. Submitting a sharply worded written response to Pincarton’s
introduction, Lorentz stressed that the king of Denmark and Norway had
claimed the territory since 1682 and any effort undertaken by the Scots to
take possession would be protested against in a strong manner. To reinforce
the warning, Captain Claus Hansen was dispatched to the island the same
day with instructions to secure the territory and defend it with whatever
action was required.
In his eventual report, Hansen records anchoring at the designated
location referred to as Settlement and sighting two vessels offshore. As
instructed, the Danish flag was planted on a rise and left under guard
while the pair of foreign ships was observed sailing out of sight. That
afternoon one vessel reappeared and shot several signals, causing their
larger fleet to consolidate. The strangers then raised their own flag and
sailed to the Danes, sending across a rowing boat to determine the iden-
tity of those ashore and the nature of their business. In turn, they were
instructed to approach the Danish command established on the beach, a
directive that appeared to make the visitors hesitate and return to their
own ship. The following morning the requested land meeting was con-
ducted, Hansen demanding the reason for the strangers’ presence on
Crab Island and the Scots replying that they required water and asking
where it could be found. Being told that fresh supplies were only avail-
able on the island’s west end, the visitors again returned to their vessels.
Later in the day the Scots returned to shore, this time accompanied by
armed personnel. Hansen reapproached the group and again enquired
why they were present on his king’s land. Captain Robert Jolly replied
that Crab Island did not appear to be worth any trouble or expense, but
assumed that its former occupation by the English gave him as much
right to it as anyone. The Scots proceeded to ask Hansen if he had a com-
mission, to which he responded in the affirmative, adding that he was
not going to show them anything. Again the Scots returned to their ships
and continued the search for water while maintaining their distance from
the Danes.
The following afternoon the two ships (repeatedly referred to by the
Danes as ‘English’) that had been at St Thomas arrived and joined their
countrymen, an event soon followed by intelligence reaching Hansen
that three or four tents had been erected while watering was being under-
taken. The next day the Danish captain and three soldiers walked over-
land to question the purpose of the camp and again assert the king of
Denmark and Norway’s sovereignty. The Scots replied that they would
have to discuss the matter with their commodore, who was on board his
ship. Asserting their authority, the Danes dispatched three men by canoe
to make the same protest directly to the designated Scot, who responded
that they held no claim on Crab Island and were acting appropriately
upon arrival in unoccupied territory by maintaining an armed guard as
they secured water. He reiterated that they would be able to take the
land if they wanted it, but it was not worth taking. Furthermore, they
intended to sail that evening or the following morning, pointedly refus-
ing to discuss their destination. Upon witnessing the promised departure
of the entire ‘English’ fleet prior to daylight, Hansen ordered his own
forces to return to St Thomas.3
Scottish accounts of the days at Crab Island fail to acknowledge
actual friction with the Danes, even reporting the host’s express wish that
the visitors remain in order to provide a buffer against Spanish settle-
ments in adjacent Puerto Rico. One comment included in a journal main-
tained by an anonymous Scot, however, supplies additional motivation
for Governor Lorentz’s active assertions of his king’s territorial claims.
Guaranteed to alarm any colonial administrator was the approach and
proposal by twenty-five St Thomas families to Captain Pincarton, offer-
ing to accompany the Scots to Darien should transportation be available
to accommodate them.4
TRADING PURSUITS
Pilkington and Sands were not the only enterprising Jamaican merchants
to be warned of pursuing commercial partnerships with the Company of
Scotland. Jewish and English merchants had sought to coexist since the
British acquisition of the island in 1655, the former continuing to ben-
efit from a long history of trade in the region, family connections with
Christian converts across Spanish America and proficiency in speaking
Spanish. Although permitted to openly practise their religion, the Jews of
Jamaica were restricted from holding public office and voting, and were
subject to special taxation, estimated at up to three times the normal
level in 1700.10
Inevitably, the opportunity presented by the arrival of the Scots in
the region had been quickly evaluated and plans formulated to capi-
talise on the advantages of a new trading link, a step by the Jewish
mercantile community that quickly provoked reaction from compet-
ing English companies. As recorded in the Journals of the Assembly
of Jamaica on 14 March 1699, an inflammatory paper attributed to
Jacob Mears and John Sadler was read before the body, resulting in an
order to take the authors into custody due to the ‘great grievance and
prejeudice to the island, and contempt of his majestys government’ the
content was perceived to present. Messengers were dispatched to Port
Royal to seize the books and papers of the accused, their boats to be
held in port and Mears to be confined to close custody without pen,
ink or paper.
The suspect document, entitled A Scheme for the Improvement and
Good Management of a Trade for the Scots Colony at Caledonia in
America, comprised a strategic business plan for profitable trade with
the Company of Scotland. It had been signed by Mears and Sadler in
Port Royal on 23 January 1699 and listed seven pertinent points, each
indicating familiarity with current realities of general commerce and the
slave trade across the Atlantic and within the Caribbean:
1. Jamaica had the most to offer the colony, including the supply of
provisions and Africans.
2. Jamaica was the most advantageous site for communicating with
Europe.
3. The Company of Scotland should assign a factor to reside in Jamaica,
securing from the king assurances that the appointed individual
would not be susceptible to interference by the governor.
Competition for and speculation about New Caledonia trade was soon
muted by the issuing of proclamations forbidding commerce or assis-
tance to the colony and the final capitulation to Pimienta’s forces. Gover-
nor Beeston, in spite of Secretary of State Vernon’s insinuations of a lack
of zeal in thwarting the designs of the Company of Scotland, was first to
issue a ban in the king’s name, on 8 April 1699. Shortly afterwards came
equivalent orders from Barbados, Virginia, New York, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts Bay, East New Jersey, Connecticut, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, New Providence and Maryland.14 In addition to their tar-
geted impact on New Caledonia, the proclamations provided a deterrent
against any consideration of trade with the Scots while inadvertently
mapping the geographical extent of interest in the venture. A significant
percentage of the far-flung locations would receive numbers of survivors,
adding an unforeseen, unsolicited and sometimes unwelcome contingent
of distressed newcomers to various colonial communities.
Due to its location and commercial activity, Jamaica found itself inex-
tricably tied to the fortunes of New Caledonia. Besides its piqued economic
interests, the island also served as a communications entrepôt between
Edinburgh and those coming and going from Darien. Capitalising on the
If the Queen will not spare English troopes, send us Ten Thousand Scotch,
this Warm Climate will Meliorate them, and make them of a more Socia-
ble Religion, the Queen need be at no great Expence, only furnish them
with arms and Transports, and Some Oatmeal, we will join them with
what men can be spared here. If We take Martinique the Queen gains a
fine Island, the Scotch shall have the Land, and we will have the Plunder.
The Queen ventures little, and may gain the Sugar Trade , This will be
a better Project than their beloved Darien . . . I promise they shall never
trouble the Queen’s affairs more, If they do not take Martinique I will get
them Disposed of; And I think that will be some Service.26
Further to the north events in Darien had been followed with high inter-
est, not solely of a commercial nature. Judge Samuel Sewall of Boston
had been particularly intrigued by potential religious influence the Com-
pany of Scotland might impose. Writing in his diary that the intentions
of the Scots were much discussed in his city, Sewall offered his private
assessment that Spanish America was the Antichrist and the Company
of Scotland the Sixth Angel. Reflecting maintenance of correspondence
between his city and the Isthmus, he wrote to the surviving ministers
in New Caledonia, providing support and expressing concern over the
potential for Pimienta to overcome them before they were fully settled.
The judge also recorded receipt of a letter of appreciation from William
Paterson for two books that had been sent to the colony. Further indicat-
ing the web of interrelationships that linked New Caledonia with other
portions of the Americas was Sewall’s friendship with local merchant
John Borland, brother to Reverend Borland discussed above, and future
business associate of Samuel Vetch, whose story is recounted later in this
chapter.27
Also reaching New York and New England, but following an entirely
different course encompassing both sides of the Atlantic, was Samuel
Vetch. Having been educated at Utrecht and rising to the rank of captain
during service against the French in the Netherlands he would become a
citizen of the empire, personifying the often entangled motivations that
had propelled his native country towards Darien. Exhibiting the prag-
matic realities of colonial survival, he would initially struggle into New
York with the Drummonds following the first expedition and assist in
the successful manipulation of the port’s politics and resources to out-
fit and commandeer a sloop for return to New Caledonia. Vetch, how-
ever, would opt against accompanying Drummond back to the Isthmus.
Claiming the need to oversee Company of Scotland assets left in New
York, he would choose the far more attractive pursuit of marriage into
the family of prominent local Scot Robert Livingston and participation
in trading ventures which adroitly manoeuvred between legality and
opportunity. Building on the established network of Scottish trading
interests, he became an associate of the previously introduced John Bor-
land of Boston and began decades of individual ambition and unfulfilled
speculation. Following an unsuccessful request for commission as cap-
tain of one of the Crown’s companies stationed in New York, a 1705
prisoner exchange requiring a voyage to Canada presented convenient
cover for the more commercial motives of the Borland–Vetch collabora-
tion. Having raised suspicions, the vessel and captain were seized upon
their return, Vetch pleading from prison that stormy weather had forced
him into Acadian ports and compelled him to trade in order to assure
welfare of his ship and crew.
NOTES
Darien Consequences
By the time of the Scots’ arrival, local Cuna had established their own his-
tory of simultaneously defending their sovereignty and accommodating
the presence of foreigners. Although Rodrigo Bastides first sailed along
Darien in 1501 and Columbus, hardly creating goodwill with native
groups, forayed upon its coast during his fourth voyage a year later, it
was the establishment of Santa Maria la Antigua del Darien in 1511 that
initiated protracted interaction between Spanish and indigenous groups.
To their advantage the Cuna then inhabited lands on the periphery of this
initial interface with Spain. From their vantage point they would have
had the opportunity to witness and assess initial favourable relations with
Governor Vasco Núñez de Balboa, his beheading by fellow Spaniard and
successor Pedrarias de Avila, and the decimation through disease and slav-
ery of the contemporary resident indigenous group, the Cuevas. By 1519,
when the Spanish removed themselves and their livestock to anticipated
improved conditions in Panama, lessons had been learned. The Cuna
expanded into the newly vacated region, firmly anti-Spanish and predis-
posed to alliances, assistance and commerce with other foreign interests,
particularly those seeking a share of the wealth of the Americas at the
expense of Spain. The disaffection created by Pedrarias would be acknowl-
edged centuries later when military engineer Antonio Arevalo, reporting
in 1761 on the jurisdiction he had been ordered to bring under control,
would reference the durability of the region’s violent history.2
Despite abandonment of their initial settlement, Spanish officials fully
comprehended the necessity of asserting authority over the Isthmus and
struggled to contain the dual hazards of foreign penetration and domes-
tic strife. The actuality was that colonial policies had failed to check
either vulnerability. Efforts to evangelise and resettle the native popula-
tion into Spanish-style nuclear villages were met with tenacious and vio-
lent opposition. Two attempts by the Capuchin order, departing from
Cadiz in 1647 and 1681, to establish Cuna missions resulted in com-
plete failure.3 Restrictions intended to control Cuna access to weapons
and tools served only to perpetuate continued welcome of Dutch, British
and French smugglers offering the desired goods. A coordinated effort
between jurisdictions, indicative of later action against the Scots, resulted
in the appointment from Panama and Cartagena of Julian Carrisoli, a
Spaniard reared by Cuna, as Protector of the Indians. It had brought some
measure of relief when, in 1645, a Dutch force landed on the northern
coast of Darien and promised accommodation of Cuna customs in return
for support of a settlement. Carrisoli used his diplomatic and language
skills, reinforced by ties of kinship, to persuade vacillating Cuna to refuse
the proposition. Despite the success, and the deep impression it made on
Spanish officials, there was to be no reign of uniform or persistent peace
in the region. A plea to Madrid for military assistance from Panama in
1651 indicated only the latest insurrection, attributing it to the natural
character of the indigenous population and discounting any malevolent
treatment by Spaniards.4
The continuing lure of Darien’s gold mines, coupled with treasure
shipped from Peru for transport across the Isthmus and on to Spain, pro-
vided unrelenting enticement for foreign intrusions, a point reinforced
by a series of piratical raids conducted between 1680 and 1695. Among
those succumbing to the aggregate of adventure and potential fortune
was Lionel Wafer, a surgeon whose experience living with the Cuna for
several months while recuperating from wounds would gain him fame
and financial reward. Wafer’s subsequent return to London and successful
efforts to publish his story came to the attention of the Company of Scot-
land and would provide significant impetus for the designation of Darien
as the chosen destination. Wafer would ultimately be brought to Scotland
to consult with the ‘Secret Committee’ regarding assets of the Isthmus and
be escorted out of Edinburgh by fellow surgeon Walter Herries.5
Whatever decisions Wafer’s short duration in Darien may have facili-
tated, he would have been challenged to fully relay the kaleidoscope of
entangled and shifting alliances, chaotic at best, that greeted the Company
of Scotland fleet into what would become Caledonia Bay. Although Luis
Carrisoli, now serving in his father’s role, had measures of military success
with his Cuna defensive forces, other groups of Cuna had simultaneously
established vital roles for themselves as guides and informants for the cast
of plundering and trading foreigners. The sociopolitical landscape was
profoundly fragmented and subject to rapid and unanticipated change,
conditions relayed to Company councillors within days of their arrival and
hinting at the fact they had entered a world as complex as any they had left
behind. Captain Andreas was one of the first Cuna to approach the Scots,
enquiring if they were friends of the Spanish, explaining he understood
they intended to cross to the South Sea, and relating his friendships with
English privateers. Four days later arrived a group of visitors including the
previously mentioned Frenchman and two individuals from Martinique,
one of whom spoke Cuna fluently. They clarified to the Scots that the story
of a supreme leader over the Cuna was untrue and proceded to describe
the intricate network of diverse contemporary leaders, their territories and
variety of political affiliations. Captain Diego, with an estimated 3,000
men under his control, was regarded as the most powerful and had spent
the last year at odds with the Spanish over gold mines within his juris-
diction. Most recently, the strife had resulted in the murders of twenty
Spaniards and three priests. Captain Paussigo’s lands lay between those of
Diego and Andreas, the latter allied with his brother and residing closest
to the Scottish settlement. The two siblings had traditionally maintained a
more amicable relationship with the Spanish, even allowing some of them
to reside in the area and keep officials in Panama abreast of events. All had
changed within the previous two months, however, when Captain Ambro-
sio, quasi-leader of yet another adjacent territory, had convinced them to
join him in the killing of ten Spaniards on nearby Golden Island.6
What the Scots’ informant could not have known was the transatlan-
tic reverberations of the recent crimes, nor the region’s impending inter-
face with the aftermath. The president of Panama, just prior to receiving
word of the Scots’ appearance in Caledonia Bay, had dispatched word
to Madrid regarding the latest Cuna atrocity, including his higher tally
of victims as three Franciscan priests and thirty-two Spaniards. Walter
Herries would later provide additional details, relating that following
the murders and associated robbery of the chapel’s furniture, Diego’s son
brought vestments and a chalice to New Caledonia and presented them
to Captain Fraser. Ambrosio, also involved in the killings, had expressed
his opinion that he would receive no pardon.7
The various captains also possessed a range of personal résumés reflect-
ing impressive experience and acquisition of skills that allowed them to
promote their interests both within their own territories and on foreign
soil, circumstances that would deeply influence their individual actions
during the periods of Scottish residence. Ambrosio’s son-in-law Pedro
was a fluent Spanish speaker, having learned the language in Panama
while detained there as a slave. His language skills also included French,
which he had acquired while living in Petit-Goave. French support also
characterised Captain Corbete, who had assisted a group of French pri-
vateers and been offered compensation from Governor Du Casse. Sailing
to meet with the governor, Corbete had been captured by the English
and taken to Jamaica, where he and two companions had been sold into
slavery. Du Casse, learning of the incident, had successfully demanded
release of the three, allowing Corbete not only to travel twice to the
French stronghold at Petit-Goave, but also to Cartagena. Neighbouring
Corbete’s lands was Captain Nicola, who had been brought up among
the Spanish and was not only a fluent speaker, but also able to read and
write. He had remained a Spanish ally until only twelve months earlier,
when he had relinquished a treasured French firearm, acquired from a
buccaneer, to a Spaniard for repair. The weapon had captured the atten-
tion of and been retained by the governor of Portobello, resulting in
Nicola’s transition to those firmly opposed to the Spanish.8
The Scots were also quickly made aware not only of differences,
but also of discord, among Cuna communities. Ambrosio warned that
Andreas was not to be trusted and was functioning as a spy. Questioned
about the accusation, the latter captain related a critical account that was
to be echoed following final departure of the Scots. Andreas explained
that sixteen or seventeen years previously his people had assisted the
French and English in raids on both sides of the Isthmus, receiving in
return promises for continued protection from Spanish reprisals. Two
years later, once the raids had reaped sufficient treasure, the foreigners
departed and the Cuna were subjected to Spanish retribution, forcing
them to seek sanctuary in the mountains for several years. Beyond verbal
accusations levelled between the Cuna leaders, the underlying hostili-
ties soon exhibited more concrete manifestations. Despite attempts by
the Scots to negotiate between the two men, an alcohol-fuelled physical
altercation erupted between them on board one of the Scottish vessels
and Andreas was discovered dead the following morning, victim of a
suspicious fall through an open hatch.9
The situation was further complicated by other, non-indigenous con-
stituencies. The presence of Frenchmen had been, of course, quickly made
obvious to the Scots. These ex-buccaneers had integrated themselves into
Isthmian society, rearing half-Cuna families and considering themselves
citizens of Darien, not of the French king. They welcomed the Scots as
another intruding group who would not only provide trading opportuni-
ties, but would also deflect unwanted Spanish attention. A non-resident
French contingent was also active and willing to provide its own unique
narrative of regional sociopolitics. Captain Thomas of the Maurepas,
which would sink attempting to sail out of Caledonia Bay on Christmas
Day 1698, related to Commodore Pennycook that about eight months
prior there had been a slave revolt in Portobello. The original 700 rebels
had rapidly increased to 1,500, aided by arms and ammunition from
English, French and Dutch traders. The force had been too powerful for
the governor, who offered a guarantee of freedom in return for peace.10
Although the specific Portobello insurrection cannot be verified, the
account is indicative of a series of local slave uprisings. Acquisition of slave
labour had created the inevitable attendant problem of slave escapees, or
maroons (cimarrones), which could involve up to 300 of every 1,000 indi-
viduals. Their sheer numbers, coupled with a jungle environment provid-
ing unique conditions of shelter and security, resulted in the creation by
1570 of at least three maroon settlements or palenques on the Isthmus. The
largest of these, Ronconcholon, was said to include 1,700 fighting men
and sustained not only persistent tension across the area but also an ample
COSTLY REHEARSAL
We daily expected their coming into our harbour to attack our Fort and
ships . . . all hands, sea-men and Land-men, were put to work, to fortify
the place as well as they could: They also made several Fire-ships of their
smaller vessels, putting themselves in as good a posture of defence as they
could. But the Spaniards did not come in with their ships, for they knew
this harbour well enough, which is easy for great ships to come into, but
difficult and dangerous to get out again; the wind this season of the year,
generally blowing right into it. So they went another way to work, less
dangerous to themselves, and more disadvantageous to us, which was, To
hem us in both by sea and land.
While the naval blockade secured the mouth of the bay, Pimienta landed
men near Careto, merging his own forces with those arrived overland
‘from Panama and Santa Maria, accompanied with numbers of Indians,
Negroes and Molattoes, who were expert in knowing the woods, and
cutting passages through the thorny thickets of the woods in their way’.26
Fully exploiting the restrictions of New Caledonia’s wind-locked har-
bour, the governor strategically directed the landing of men on either side
of the bay’s mouth. As he pushed the Scots toward capitulation, Pimienta
would remind his adversaries of their predicament, writing to them of
his regret should he be required to order his own naval fleet into the
port, for then he would have to rush their defences and would find him-
self stranded, conditions which would prevent any opportunity of giving
quarter. The governor would return to the same issue as negotiations
faltered, reminding the Scots of their vulnerability by lamenting that his
own vessels would face difficulty in leaving the anchorage for up to two
months should he be forced to enter.27
13/09/18 3:20 PM
146 scotland, darien and the atlantic world
natives from their base near the Cana gold mines. The Pacific groups,
constituting their own incursion into Cuna territory, were assigned to
protect rear positions as the Spaniards advanced, Pimienta later com-
plaining that they did little more than consume rations.28
As the Spanish, reinforced by diverse regional and foreign partici-
pants, and the Scots, successively reduced to operating from within
their fortifications and isolated from their water supply, played out their
conflict, the changing political conditions and growing discomfort fac-
ing the Cuna did not go unrecognised by either principal party. With
the Spanish stranglehold intensifying around New Caledonia and an
estimated 2,000 men engaged in the immediate area, Borland noted
the impact of the loss of support previously provided by ‘our Indian
friends’, who now had to ‘shift for themselves, for fear of the Span-
iards’. He also commented on a pragmatic fact of Darien existence, that
some had approached and given intelligence to the Spaniards, offer-
ing his assessment ‘for they commonly join with the strongest side, and
little trust is to be put in most of them’.29 The Spanish perspective was
roughly equivalent, Pimienta directing natives be cordially welcomed,
but maintained under a watchful eye
the Indians who may come aboard these ships they will detain, or, if they
desire to join me, they will send to my port. They will treat these Indians
well and in such manner that they shall not resent their detention, seeking
pretexts to keep them aboard; especially if they come aboard with their
bands they will send them to me with the first vessel going to Carreto,
assuring these Indians always of our friendship.30
13/09/18 3:20 PM
150 scotland, darien and the atlantic world
NO RESTORATION OF PEACE
DARIEN EPILOGUE
The persons calling themselves British subjects, who have dispersed them-
selves into Caledonia Darien . . . have had no encouragement from this
government. On the contrary, every effort in my power shall be exerted
to recall such as are there.49
NOTES
The said Company pursuant to the Powers and Immunities granted unto
them by His Majesty of Great Britain, our Sovereign Lord, with Advice
and Consent of His Parliament of Scotland, having granted and con-
ceded unto us and our Successors in the Government for all times here-
after, full Power to equip, set out, freight, and navigate our own or hired
Ships, in warlike or other manner, from any Ports or Places in amity, or
not in hostility with His Majesty; to any Lands, Islands, Countries, or
Places in Asia, Africa, or America; and there to plant Colonies, build
Cities, Towns or Forts, in or upon the places not inhabited; or in or upon
any other place, by consent of the Natives or Inhabitants thereof, and
not possest by any European Soveraign, Potentate, Prince, or State; and
to provide and furnish the aforesaid Places, Cities, Towns, or Forts, with
Magazines, Ordinance, Arms, Weapons, Ammunition and Stores of War;
and by force of Arms to defend the same Trade, Navigation, Colonies,
Cities, Towns, Forts, Plantations, and other Effects whatsoever; and
likewise to make Reprizals, and to seek and take reparation of damage
done by Sea or by Land; and to make and conclude Treaties of Peace
and Commerce with Soveraign Princes, Estates, Rulers, Governours or
Proprietors of the aforesaid Lands, Islands, Countries, or places in Asia,
Africa or America.
And reserving to themselves five per Cent, or one twentieth part of
the Lands, Mines, Minerals, Stones of value, precious Woods, and Fish-
ings, have further conceded and granted unto us, the free and absolute
Right and Property in and to all Such Lands, Islands, Colonies, Towns,
WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWES.
First, The said Ephraim Pilkingtoun shall have and receive for the hyre of
his Shalloop twelve full shares.
2d, The said Ephraim Pilkingtoun shall have and receive for himselfe two
shares and a halfe.
3d, The Doctor shall have one hundred pieces of eight for his chest of
Medicins, and one share in comon.
4th, The said Council reserves to themselves one tenth part of all the
loading of any prize taken at sea – the wounded and disabled men
being first provided for, and the like share of all booty taken upon
land.
6. All the remaining part of the profit of the voyage to be equaly divided
amongst the men belonging to the vessels, share and part alike.
7. That the said Ephraim Pilkingtoun have his choice of first, second, or
third prize taken in the voyage in the lieu of his, not exceeding three in
number.
In virtue wherof, both parties have herto set their hands at Fort St
Andrew the Elevinth day of March One thousand six hundred nynty nyn
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
England
Bodleian Library (Oxford)
MSS Rawlinson, A290 and A312
Jamaica
National Library of Jamaica (Kingston)
J28L434 Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica (Vol. 1)
MS60 Legislative Council Minutes (Vol. 12)
MS1049 Notes on the Illicit Trade Carried on by Sloops from Jamaica
with the Spanish in the Gulf of Mexico
Scotland
Collection of Blair Castle (Perthshire)
NRAS 234, Box 45, Bundle 1
Spain
Archivo General de Indias (Seville)
Casa de la Contratación, Legajos 4887, 4987, 5726A
Audiencia de Lima, Legajos 91, 407, 520
Audiencia de Mexico, Legajo 61
Audiencia de Panamá, Legajos 105, 109, 110, 113, 159, 160, 161, 163,
164, 165, 166, 167, 175, 177, 181, 182, 215, 243, 255, 306, 307
Audiencia de Santa Fé, Legajos 48, 79, 435
Audiencia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 375
Contaduría, Legajo 1780A
Escribania de Cámara, Legajos 477A, 622A–C, 1048B, 1108B, 1179A,
1192
Indiferente General, Legajos 316, 2015
Mapas y Planos, Panamá, Legajos 119, 119BIS, 120, 149, 255
United States
Huntington Library (San Marino, California)
Huntington Manuscripts, West Indies: MS32282, MS32283
Papers of John Egerton, 3rd Earl of Bridgewater, 1594–1700: MS9714
Papers of William Blathwayt, 1657–1770: MSBL6, MSBL7, MSBL8,
MSBL9, MSBL10
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134, 136, 138, 140, 150 prisoners
Panmure, Lord see Maule, James, earl Casa de la Contratación trial, 2, 4,
of Panmure 76–88
Papacy see Innocent XII; Vatican death sentences, 3, 88–92
Papers Relating to the Ships and diplomatic efforts on behalf of,
Voyages of the Company of 80–1, 89–92
Scotland (Insh), 11 exchanged at capitulation, 147
Paredes, Antonio de, 108, 110, 111 execution of, 53, 147
Parke, Daniel, 126 indigenous prisoners, 52–3, 147
Partition Treaties, 2, 8 interrogation of, 38–43, 48–53,
Paterson, William, 6, 37, 48, 83, 105
116–17, 118, 119, 120, 126, 129 released in Lima during capitulation
Paussigo (Cuna Captain), 136 celebrations, 110–11
Pearson, Michael, 17–18 taken by the colonists, 1, 43–8
Pedro (Cuna Captain), 44, 136, 139, taken by the Spanish, 19–20, 37–43,
140, 142 48–53, 76–92, 105, 107, 147
Pedro II of Portugal, 57 torture of, 51–2
Pennycook, Robert, 17, 46, 50, 68, transported to Spain, 78–81, 107
116, 137 see also desertion; survivors
Pensacola, 101–2 Providence, 47
Peredo, Diego de, 106, 108 provisions
Perez, Ruben, 151 from the Cuna, 46, 50, 85
Petit-Goave, 50, 61, 104–5, 136 inadequacy of, 7, 23, 28, 30, 31, 32,
Philadelphia, 154 47, 69, 84, 151
Philip, Duke of Anjou, 8 from Jamaica, 45, 46, 118–20, 122
Phips, Sir William, 80 Puebla, 113
Pickard, Captain, 65, 68, 70 Puerto Rico, 113, 118
Pilkington, Ephraim, 119–20, 160–1
Pimienta, Juan, 31–2, 68, 71, 78, 88–9, Quito, 20, 21, 110, 111
92, 106–10, 111, 143–51
Pincarton, Mrs, 89 Rache, Jean, 59, 104
Pincarton, Robert, 1, 2, 37–43, 50, 52, raids, 3, 99–100, 101, 135, 137, 152
78–94, 107, 116–17, 118, 119 Rancho Viejo, 101, 144
pirates, 40, 60, 80, 101, 126, 127, 135, Real, Philipe del, 85
138, 151, 153 relief ships, 30, 39–40, 46, 69, 70, 124
Pitis, Benjamin, 81 reprisals
Popayan, 85, 86 by the Scots for the taking of the
Port Morant, 124 Dolphin, 36, 50, 78, 83, 120
Port Royal, 68, 69, 121, 124 by the Spanish against the Cuna, 8,
Portobello, 10, 29, 45–6, 62–8, 70, 52–3, 137, 139, 147
100, 102–4, 137, 139–42, 150 Rhode Island, 123
Portugal, 2, 21, 56–7, 61–3 Rio de Caucas, 103
Prebble, John, 12 Riohacha, 42, 84
Vernon, James, 18–19, 23–5, 47, 55–6, dispatches Benbow to the Caribbean,
58, 59, 61–3, 90, 123 55, 58
Vetch, Samuel, 3, 126, 128–30 intercedes on behalf of convicted
Virginia, 123 Darien survivors, 3, 91–2
negotiation of Partition Treaties, 8
Wafer, Lionel, 135 notified of capture of the Dolphin, 43
Wager, Charles, 20 prohibition of support for New
Walburger, Jacob, 153 Caledonia, 7, 27, 30, 50, 56, 63,
War of the Spanish Succession, 3, 20, 65, 84, 87–8, 90, 123, 128
126, 130, 152 Wilmot, Peter, 119
Wassén, Henry, 151 Wilson, David, 78–81, 88, 92, 107
Watt, Douglas, 14, 26 Wilson, John, 17
Waugh, Alan, 109 wool, 40, 84, 86
Westcombe, Martin, 80–1, 90, 91, Worcester, 7
92, 93 wrecks
William III of England French shipwreck near New
approval for Company of Scotland Caledonia, 39, 44, 46, 50
not obtained from, 6 salvage of treasure from, 19, 66,
asserts non-involvement in Company 80, 119
of Scotland activities, 3, 6, 59, survivors shipwrecked off Cuba, 109
62–3, 64, 67
dismisses secretaries in Scotland, Zavala, Martin de Aranguren, 49,
55–6 78–80, 101–2