Ester Paksuniemi

Principles of International Security, Spring 2023, Essay

The Security Dilemma Revisited (Glaser, 1997) - Response paper

As realism proposes, the state’s interest in its own security is greatly in focus. States are
assumed to act rationally, using their available power to secure their selfish interests. Despite
this, there tend to be a security dilemma between states. This paper will respond to how
Charles Glaser discusses the security dilemma, which he bases on Robert Jervis’s article
“Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, on whether and how the security dilemma
operates between rational states (Glaser, 1997). The meaning of the dilemma is that states
seek for increased security by trying to minimize the adversary’s security, which on the
contrary reduces the security in the state because of the adversary’s reactions to the threat. I
will argue to the extents to which I agree with Glaser’s opinion to develop Jervis’s arguments,
including response to some weaknesses I find in Glaser’s article.

Glaser (1997) examines how state security is reduced by trying to limit the competitors
security by three explanations, which are all further arguments from Jervis’s article. When
states are in competition, they are likely to defend themselves by their abilities to perform
military missions. Although, by doing so, the competitor might want to have the same
chances for defense, which reduces the state’s own security. If the defense in the competition
is not matched with one another, then the security will increase for one of the states. This
makes sense in my opinion, because if the state is already in a competition, it will try by all
its possibilities to secure itself. What is questionable is if a state would perform military
missions without being in competition or in face of a external threat. To examine that, Glaser
would have to develop his argument from a neutral point of view of states.

What I find meaningful, is how competitors are likely to value expansion if a state tries to
reduce the security of its competitor. This is basically what we can recognize in the world
today, with the Russian attacks in Ukraine. Other scholars would agree, for example
Mearsheimer (2014), in where defending countries outside of Russia by the expansion of
NATO or EU, would increase a threat-like reaction in Russia, and thereby they would act in
interest of further expansion. Ever since the invasion in Crimea 2014, Russia, or precisely
Putin has been interested in securing itself against other states’ cooperation by military action
and expansion. Today it has even gone further with the war in Ukraine. It seems like a
never-ending spiral, where the Russian attacks pushes NATO to expand and EU imposing
Ester Paksuniemi
Principles of International Security, Spring 2023, Essay

more sanctions against Russia. By this means, we can see how both sides in an international
competition value expansion once its security is threatened.

Glaser (1997) also discusses the reduce of prosperity in a state, when it puts money on
military capabilities, which also makes sense. He even questions this means himself in why
states cannot simply cooperate, even if they are assumed as rational actors. Glaser’s response
is the lack of trust between states, in which one state cannot trust the motives of another state
are purely security, and that no competition is wanted. He argues, states can be greedy and
not seek for mainly security, but for power and interest in offending the other state, and
thereby adding competition. By including state’s motives of greed as well as unit-level
knowledge of the competitor, Glaser advances the points of the security dilemma made in
Jervis’s article. Looking at the motives of greed of a state to go in competition, is indeed valid
in realist thinking. Glaser even mentions different realist perspectives such as contingent
realists, who argue that competition among states are simply not because of security motives.
Therefore, I would myself relate to this type of realism, although greediness is a very selfish
way to go into competition, but as seen in many dictatorships for example, it is a factor in the
real world.

A weakness I believe should be mentioned in Glaser’s article is the assumption that states act
like it is a must to go in to any competition or defense against an other state/adversary. It also
seems like the only way to offend and defend the state is by the state’s ability to perform
military missions. In realism, cooperation is indeed limited, but if it still exists somewhere,
why is it so hard to trust it could actually work? Then there would be no need to secure the
state by its military capabilites or no need for the security dilemma to even exist at all. The
state’s expenditures would be spent on building its welfare as well as helping and cooperating
with other states to build theirs. We would not have to see the expenditures as “waste of
money”. We could also disregard the fact that other state’s would be threatened and act in
reverse towards a powerful state. Instead, other less powerful states would base their trust on
the cooperation and actually develop their welfare slowly but steadily, and not put its energy
into trying to defend or expand itself. Although I would agree with the realist thinking of
state security or greedy motives and actions, I believe we should not neglect a slighty more
positive agenda where competition is unwanted.
Ester Paksuniemi
Principles of International Security, Spring 2023, Essay