CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS-ACADEMIC COMMITTEE

2023
Benina Cristianne Bautista
Head
Subject Area Heads
Christian Caesar M. Perez Niño Cortez
Political Law Commercial Law
Randolph Jay Bale Jesus N. Gutierrez
Labor Law Criminal Law
Eloisa Salitrero Ma. Kathrina Lou R. Perez
Civil Law Remedial Law
Leslie Faye Pago Cez Allora Laine Fajardo
Taxation Law Legal Ethics
Allysa Joy Dadulla
Layout Editor

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 Members of Academic Committee from Manila Campus
Gatuz, Denice Patricia H. Caronan, Richard N. (Commercial Law)
(Political/Taxation Law) Dapon-Napaton, Manuela Jinky
Mosquera, Rosie Jane S. (Political Law) (Commercial Law)
Reyes, Jerickson A. (Political Law) Jabonillo, Malou (Commercial Law)
Zantua, Ronn Mikkhael S. (Political Law) Villaluz, Rhiana Beatriz (Commercial Law)
Arteche, Nikka Pauline R. (Labor Law) Castano, Teri (Criminal Law)
Dimarucut, Jayson M. (Labor Law) Mariano, Arnold B. (Criminal Law)
Espelimbargo, Ben Jay B. (Labor Law) Bautista, Paula C. (Remedial Law)
De Leon, Cindy (Civil Law) Chi-Young, Ian Kenneth C. (Remedial Law)
Del Birut, Carmina (Civil Law) Devesfruto, Richard J. (Remedial Law)
Santiago, Lalaine (Civil Law) Pigao, Jackylyn Loriefel Z. (Remedial Law)
Bidlan, Redelyn L. (Taxation Law) Balang, Randy Alej (Legal Ethics)
Maloles, Rochelle M. (Taxation Law) Lopez-Shin, Joylyn (Legal Ethics)
Priela-Salazar, Cecilia (Taxation Law) Viguilla, Joycen Au Lina (Legal Ethics)
Adina, Paul Robert (Commercial Law)

Atty. Kayzer Aldrin Z. Saba Atty. Ismael L. Sarangaya, Jr. Atty. Randy S. Villaluz
Adviser Associate Dean-Manila Associate Dean-Dasmariñas
Justice (Ret.) Raoul V. Victorino
Dean

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 Members of Academic Committee from Dasmariñas Campus
Malou O. Jabonillo (Commercial Law)
Redelyn L. Bidlan (Taxation)
Nikka Pauline R. Arteche (Labor Law)
Richard N. Caronan (Commercial Law)
Rhiana Beatriz O. Villaluz (Commercial Law)
Maria France Imelda P. Carrion (Political Law)
Manuela Jinky D. Napaton (Commercial Law)
Cindy Lorreine D. De Leon (Civil law)
Carmina B. Del Birut (Civil Law)
Rochelle M. Maloles (Taxation)
Teresita D.Tibayan (Taxation)
Cecilia P. Salazar (Taxation)

Christine Ann S. Taborda (Documentation)

Atty. Kayzer Aldrin Z. Saba Atty. Ismael L. Sarangaya, Jr. Atty. Randy M. Villaluz
Adviser Associate Dean-Manila Associate Dean-Dasmariñas
Justice (Ret.) Raoul V. Victorino
Dean

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 LAW STUDENT GOVERNMENT
Manila Campus
ACADEMIC YEAR 2023-2024
Vanessa Rose Piñote
President
Jan Gabriel Villanueva
Vice President
Jiana Quitlong Ryan Velitario
Secretary Treasurer
Denice Patricia Gatuz
Public Relations Officer
Year-Level Representatives
First Year: Angelu Traya Third Year: Juan Miguel Villaseran
Second Year: Marge Alvarez Fourth Year: Randolph Jay Bale
Atty. Kayzer Aldrin Z. Saba
Adviser
Atty. Ismael L. Sarangaya, Jr.
Associate Dean
Ret. Justice Raoul V. Victorino
Dean

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 LAW STUDENT GOVERNMENT
Dasmariñas Campus
ACADEMIC YEAR 2023-2024

Christine Ann Taborda

President
Maria France Imelda Carrion
Vice President
Carmina Del Birut Nikka Pauline R. Arteche
Finance Officer Auditor
Manuela Jinky Napaton
Malou Jabonillo
Finance Officers

Atty. Randy Villaluz

Associate Dean
Ret. Justice Raoul V. Victorino
Dean

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(1) TOPIC: Privilege Communication
Q: Assuming that the meeting between Pedro Tigas and Atty. Chloe in Jollibee Restaurant occurred
after the killing of Pepeng Taga, and in that meeting Pedro Tigas expressly admitted to Atty. Chloe, in
strict confidence as his lawyer, said that he had shot Pepeng Taga. Is Atty. Chloe ethically bound to
reveal the admission of Pedro Tigas to the police investigator what Pedro Tigas had stated to her at
the Jollibee Restaurant? Explain your answer.
A:
No, Atty. Chloe is not ethically bound to reveal the admission of Pedro Tigas to the police investigator
because doing so violates the lawyer-client privilege.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
In this case, the admission was made after the killing of Pepeng Taga and during a meeting between
Pedro Tigas and Atty. Chloe with a view of Atty. Chloe’s engagement as counsel.
Hence, the lawyer-client privilege attaches, and therefore, Atty. Chloe is not ethically bound to reveal
the admission of Pedro Tigas to the police investigator.

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(2) TOPIC: Conflicting interests
Q: St. Ivan's Hospital, Inc. (St. Ivan's) and Allied Construction Co. (Allied) separately retained the
legal services of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices. St. Ivan's engaged the services of Allied for the
construction of a new building but failed to pay the contract price after the completion of the works.
A complaint for a sum of money was filed by Atty. Budoy, a former associate of Tomas and Benedicto
law Offices, on behalf of Allied against St Ivan's. St. Ivan's lost the case and was held liable to Allied.
Thereafter, St Ivan's filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Budoy. It claimed that while Atty.
Budoy has established his own law office, an arrangement was made whereby Tomas and Benedicto
Law Offices assign cases for him to handle, and that it can be assumed that Tomas and Benedicto
Law Offices collaborate with Atty. Budoy in the cases referred to him, creating a conflict of interest.
Rule on the complaint with reasons.
A:
I will rule in favor of St. Ivan's and against Atty. Budoy because of conflict of interest.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
In this case, Atty. Budoy was in a position to know the information transmitted by St. Ivan's to the
firm as he is presently in collaboration with the Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices. Subsequently,
Atty. Budoy represents a new client, whose interests oppose a client engaged in the services of a firm
in which he is affiliated.
Hence, conflict of interest attaches and therefore, I will rule in favor of St. Ivan's and against Atty.
Budoy.

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(3) TOPIC: Contingent Fee
Q: Andrew engaged the services of Atty. Juju under a contingent fee agreement to help him file a
complaint for damages against his employer, Wilkon Shipping, Inc. Atty. Juju handled Andrew's case
for two (2) years before the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), filing
the necessary pleadings and attending several hearings. The complaint, however, was dismissed. To
improve his chances, Andrew replaced Atty. Juju with Atty. Jen, who eventually succeeded in getting
a favorable decision from the Court of Appeals, which became final when Andrew's claims were
satisfied by Wilkon, Atty. Juju filed a collection suit against him claiming that he (Atty. Juju) is
entitled to attorney's fees for the services he rendered for two (2) years. Will the collection suit
prosper? Explain.
A:
No, the collection suit will not prosper because the agreement for attorney's fees between Andrew and
Atty. Juju was a contingent fee agreement.
According to jurisprudence, a contingent fee agreement is one in which the lawyer will be paid a fee
only when he is successful in handling the case of the client.
In this case, the payment of the fee was agreed to be given after obtaining a favorable decision from
the Court of Appeals, which Atty. Jen, not Atty. Juju, successfully achieved.
Hence, it is clear that the agreement is based on contingency and thus, the collection suit will not
prosper.

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Alternative Answer:
Yes, the collection suit will prosper on the basis of Quantum Meruit.
According to jurisprudence, Quantum Meruit is applicable in cases where the parties fail to agree to a
price, when no contract comes into existence and when a contract is brought to a premature end by a
repudiatory breach.
In this case, there is no price agreed upon and there is no showing of a contract between Andre and
Atty. Juju despite the services rendered by Atty. Juju for and on behalf of Andrew.
Therefore, the collection suit will prosper based on Quantum Meruit.

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(4) TOPIC: Negligence
Q: Mrs. Conchita Conchu engaged the services of Atty. Carlo Colorado to act as private prosecutor to
handle a criminal case against persons suspected of slaying her husband. Atty. Colorado performed
his duties, he interviewed witnesses to build up his case and religiously attended hearings. However,
he failed to attend one hearing (allegedly because he did not receive a notice) in which the court, over
Mrs. Conchu’s objections, granted bail to all the accused. Mrs. Conchu belligerently confronted Atty.
Colorado about his absence. Stung by Mrs. Conchu’s words, Atty. Colorado filed with the court a
“Motion to Withdraw as Counsel”. The motion did not bear the consent of Mrs. Conchu, as in fact,
Mrs. Conchu refused to sign her conformity to Atty. Colorado’s withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearing in
the criminal case continued, but Atty. Colorado no longer appeared at the hearings nor did he
contact Mrs. Conchu. Mrs. Conchu then filed a complaint seeking disciplinary sanctions against
Atty. Colorado. Atty. Colorado cited “loss of confidence” and “serious differences” with the client as
his reasons for withdrawing his services unilaterally.
Can Atty. Colorado be sanctioned for his actions?
A:
Yes, Atty. Colorado can be sanctioned for his actions because he abandoned his service to Mrs.
Conchu without a reasonable cause.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In this case, Atty. Colorado took the liberty and put utmost defiance in appearing at the hearings as
the counsel of Mrs. Conchu without explanation or contact to his client.

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Hence, Atty. Colorado’s abandonment of service is without reasonable cause and thus, Atty. Colorado
can be sanctioned for his actions.

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(5) TOPIC: Code of Judicial Conduct
Q: Judge Celso Camarin posted in the bulletin board of his sala for two weeks, an advertisement
which says: “Wanted attractive waitresses, personable waiters and cooks who may be interested in
applying for employment in my family’s restaurant business. Interested applicants may submit
applications to Branch XXX, RTC of Camarines Sur.” The screening of some applicants was also
conducted in the Judge’s office. What provisions, if any, of the Code of Judicial Conduct did Judge
Camarin violate?
A:
In the case of Dionisio vs. Escano, a case ruled by the Supreme Court involving similar facts, the
High Tribunal found the erring judge to have violated the following rules of the Code of Judicial
Ethics and New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
1. Canon 11, Rule 2.00 and Canon 4, Section 1
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
In this case, Judge Celso Camarin exhibited impropriety by conducting his personal
activities in his sala which may give the public eye a sense of mistrust as to how the Court is
used primarily for businesses unrelated to the dispensation of justice.
2. Canon 5, Rule 5.02 and Canon 4, Section 7
A judge should refrain from acts pertaining to financial and business dealings that
may affect the court’s impartiality and interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities.
In this case, the screening of applicants being conducted in the Judge’s office hinders
his proper performance of judicial activities because it does not align with his official duties
in the judiciary.
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3. Canon 5, Rule 5.03
A judge should not serve as an office, director, advisor, or employee of any business
except as director, or non-legal consultant of a family business.
In this case, the advertisement of his family business in the bulletin board of his sala
and the screening of applicants in his office encompasses acts not directly related to the role
of a director or non-legal consultant of a family business which is in violation of the said
provision.
4. Canon 4, Section 8
A judge should not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance his private
or personal interest that may give an impression of providing special favors and privileges to
others.
In this case, Judge Celso Camarin is advancing his private interests through his family
business by conducting affairs related to it in his own office that is meant solely for legal
and judicial purposes only.

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(6) TOPIC: Conduct of Judges
Q: Cacai, a law student, filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge Casimiro Conde, her
professor in law school, based on the following allegations:
· In a school convocation where Judge Conde was the guest speaker, Judge Conde
openly disagreed and criticized a recently decided Supreme Court decision and even
stressed that the decision of the Supreme Court in that case was a serious violation of
the Constitution.
· In his class discussions, Judge Conde named Cacai’s mother, an MTC judge, as one
of the judges involved in a marriage scam. At that time, the case against her mother
was still pending. Judge Conde also included in his class discussion Cacai’s brother
whom he referred to as a “court-noted drug addict.”
Cacai asserted that the acts of Judge Conde were open displays of insensitivity, impropriety, and lack
of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive conduct. She also alleged that Judge Conde acted
with absolute disrespect for the Court and violated the “subjudice rule” when he discussed the
marriage scam involving her mother because, at that time, the case was still pending.
In his defense, Judge Conde argued that the case he discussed in the school convocation was already
of public knowledge and had been published after it had become final. He also said it was part of his
academic freedom to openly discuss and criticize a decision of the Court since it was already decided
with finality, was patently erroneous, and clearly a violation of the Constitution. With respect to
discussions in class about Cacai’s mother, he said that the marriage scam where her mother was
charged scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when the Office of the Court
Administrator held a press conference on the matter and, that as a citizen, he could comment
thereon in the exercise of his rights to freedom of speech and expression. He also asserted that his
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discussions in both fora could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because they were
not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
Rule on each of the charges raised by Cacai, and the corresponding defenses raised by Judge Conde.
A:
1. As to Academic Freedom:
The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges, like any other citizens, are
entitled to freedom of expressions, belief, association, and assembly, but in exercising such
right, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality of the judiciary.
In this case, Judge Conde should not have criticized in public the Supreme Court
decision as a serious violation of the Constitution.
2. As to open displays of insensitivity, impropriety, and lack of delicadeza:
Judge Conde is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge in using intemperate language
and unnecessary comments tending to project Cacai’s mother as a corrupt and ignorant
judge and her brother as a drug addict (in his class discussion).
While the Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes the right of judges to freedom of
expression, this freedom should be exercised in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself and judiciary as a whole.

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(7) TOPIC: Practice of Law
Q: Atty. Cornelio Carbon, 36 years of age, had always dreamed of becoming a judge, and eventually,
a justice, but his legal career took a different turn. Upon graduation, he joined a government-owned
financial institution where he worked in the Loans and Claims Division. He also taught Negotiable
Instruments Law in a nearby law school at night. He has been active in his IBP Chapter and other
law organizations. However, in his 12 years of practice, he has never done trial or litigation work.
(a) Is Atty. Carbon engaged in the “practice of law”?
(b) Is Atty. Carbon qualified to become a Regional Trial Court Judge?
A:
(a) Yes, he is engaged in the practice of law because Atty. Carbon applies law, legal procedure and
knowledge in his professions.
In the case of Cayetano v. Monsod, practice of law has been defined as “any activity in or out of
court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience”.
Here, Atty. Carbon’s work requires analyzing loans and claims in a government-owned financial
institution, and he teaches Negotiable Instruments Law at night in a law school.
Hence, Atty. Carbon applies law, legal procedure and knowledge in his professions and thus, he
is engaged in the practice of law.

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 (b) Yes, Atty. Carbon is qualified to become a RTC Judge pursuant to the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as he has satisfied the requirement of being engaged in the practice of law for a period
of at least ten years.

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(8) TOPIC: Impartiality of Judges
Q: Justice B of the Court of Appeals (CA) was a former Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge. A case
which he heard as a trial judge was raffled off to him. The appellant sought his disqualification from
the case but he refused on the ground that he was not the judge who decided the case as he was
already promoted to the appellate court before he could decide the case. Was the refusal of Justice B
to recuse from the case proper? Explain your answer.
A:
No, Justice B's refusal to recuse is not proper because he already had personal knowledge of the case
despite his promotion to the appellate court before he could decide on the case.
Under Canon 2, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, the conduct of a judge must be above
reproach and perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In this case, a case which Justice B heard as a trial judge was raffled off to him as the appellate
judge wherein, he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings.
Hence, Justice B already had personal knowledge of the case he previously handled as a trial judge,
and therefore, Justice B's refusal to recuse is not proper.

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(9) TOPIC: Rules of Notarial Practice
Q: Under the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, what may be used to satisfy the requirement of
"competent evidence of identity"?
(A) Passport, Senior Citizen card, HMO card.
(B) Police clearance, credit card, Professional Regulatory Commission ID.
(C) Voter’s ID, NBI clearance, Driver’s license. (A)
(D) Ombudsman’s clearance, private office ID, PhilHealth card.
(E) All of the above.

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(10) TOPIC: Inhibition
Q: Atty. Tristan filed a motion to disqualify Judge Robert from hearing a civil case on the ground that
the latter was the classmate and fraternity brother of Atty. Mark, Atty. Tristan's opposing counsel.
Judge Robert denied the motion on the ground that under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
he is not required to inhibit in all cases where his classmates and fraternity brothers are
participating lawyers in cases before him.
Is Judge Robert correct in denying the motion?
A:
Yes, Judge Robert is correct in denying the motion for inhibition on the ground that he was the
classmate of Atty. Tristan’s adverse counsel, because the same is not a mandatory ground for
inhibition.
Under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, being a classmate and fraternity brother does not,
by itself, establish a mandatory ground for inhibition.
In this case, the ground relates to Judge Robert being a classmate and fraternity brother of Atty.
Mark.
Hence, the same is not a mandatory ground for inhibition and thus, Judge Robert is correct in
denying the motion for inhibition on the ground that he was the classmate of Atty. Tristan’s adverse
counsel.

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