Rousseau’s Philosophy

Rousseau s theory of education emphasized the importance of expression to produce a well-

balanced, freethinking child. He believed that if children are allowed to develop naturally without
constraints imposed on them by society they will develop towards their fullest potential, both
educationally and morally.
He said that the chief aim of education was the attainment of fullest natural growth of the
individual, leading to balanced, harmonious, useful and natural life. (ii) The real aim of
education is to help the child to lead an enjoyable, useful and natural life. He says, “To live is
not merely to breathe.
Political Philosophy. Rousseau's contributions to political philosophy are scattered among
various works, most notable of which are the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, the
Discourse on Political Economy, The Social Contract, and Considerations on the Government of
Poland
Rousseau pleaded for what is known as Negative Education. ... With him the
entire education of the child was to come from the free development of his own nature, his own
powers, his own natural tendencies and inclinations. His will was not to be thwarted.

General will, in political theory, a collectively held will that aims at the common good or
common interest. ... In Du Contrat social (1762; The Social
Contract), Rousseau argued that freedom and authority are not contradictory, since
legitimate laws are founded on the general will of the citizens.

Education
Rousseau’s ideas about education are mainly expounded in Emile. In that work, he advances
the idea of “negative education”, which is a form of “child-centered” education. His essential
idea is that education should be carried out, so far as possible, in harmony with the
development of the child’s natural capacities by a process of apparently autonomous
discovery. This is in contrast to a model of education where the teacher is a figure of
authority who conveys knowledge and skills according to a pre-determined curriculum.
Rousseau depends here on his thesis of natural goodness, which he asserts at the beginning
of the book, and his educational scheme involves the protection and development of the
child’s natural goodness through various stages, along with the isolation of the child from the
domineering wills of others. Up to adolescence at least, the educational program comprises a
sequence of manipulations of the environment by the tutor. The child is not told what to do
or think but is led to draw its own conclusions as a result of its own explorations, the context
for which has been carefully arranged. The first stage of the program starts in infancy, where
Rousseau’s crucial concern is to avoid conveying the idea that human relations are
essentially ones of domination and subordination, an idea that can too easily by fostered in
the infant by the conjunction of its own dependence on parental care and its power to get
attention by crying. Though the young child must be protected from physical harm, Rousseau
is keen that it gets used to the exercise of its bodily powers and he therefore advises that the
child be left as free as possible rather than being confined or constrained. From the age of
about twelve or so, the program moves on to the acquisition of abstract skills and concepts.

The Idea of Christian Philosophy

Ryan Topping
Those concerned with the creation or sustenance of a Christian college or university are faced
with a problem. How can such an institution, which is devoted to the scholarly acquisition and
teaching of knowledge, claim to teach “public” knowledge if committed to certain
nonchallengeable religious commitments? The heart of this difficulty involves the proper
relationship between faith (theology) and reason (philosophy). 1
The medieval position is antagonistic to our own because it is an affirmation of the power of
natural reason to know metaphysical truth with certainty.
Many in today’s Christian church have inherited an erroneous understanding of this
relationship. That understanding—where faith is conceived primarily in terms of an activity of
the will—destroys the integrity of Christian belief. If the theological virtue of faith is divorced
from the faculty of natural reason, then the hope of a Christian practice of philosophy is
unfounded.
In this essay, I defend the possibility of a distinctively Christian practice of philosophy in
which faith and reason are united. The argument proceeds as follows. First, I present the
rational method introduced and developed by Greek philosophers, and the distinction between
philosophy and theology. Next, I consider some objections to a synthesis of faith and reason.
Third, I note some historical precedents to a medieval {200} Christian synthesis, beginning with
the early church. Finally, I argue for the coherence of the idea of a distinctively Christian
practice of philosophy, taking as my model the integration envisioned by the medieval
theologian St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275).
In becoming Christian, philosophy has discovered (among other things) its own true nature. Far
from losing that nature within the world of revelation, philosophy has purified and developed it
under the positive influence of faith. 1 7
When the medieval theologian applied his mind to problems of philosophy, he
understood himself to be engaged in a distinctive kind of philosophical activity to which the
designation Christian ought to be applied. Though it is not the only available conclusion, the
medieval solution to the problem of the relationship between faith and reason is particularly
valuable for two reasons First, on its own merits it represents the most original answer to the
question of how these two modes of knowledge relate. Christian theology produced its original
solution because at that time it was faced with the most comprehensive formulation of the
problem brought about by the introduction of many texts of Aristotle hitherto unknown. These
texts, for the first time in the Christian West, presented a comprehensive view of the universe
totally without recourse to revelation, and forced twelfth- and thirteenth-century theologians
to reformulate the role of reason in faith.
Second, in relation to our present understanding of how theology can and cannot interact
with the other sciences, the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas offers us a teaching fundamentally
different from our own. Because it is such a foreign view, Aquinas’s position is able to provide
us with an alternate standard by which we can judge our own conclusions.

CONCLUSION
We are ready now to say it: Faith, as the medieval theologians understood it, is the
obedient exercise of reason that is confronted with the claims of revelation. Christian
philosophy is a way of reasoning in which Christian faith and the human intellect combine in a
common investigation into truth and a knowledge of the good of the whole. {207} The
testimony of the history of medieval theology is that philosophy, like every other branch of
human activity, can only find its true nature when it is brought into the service of God who
revealed himself in Christ the king.
This notion of Christian philosophy, articulated by certain medieval theologians, is a view
fundamentally different from our own. Happily for us, as with every discovery of a true
alternative, it provides the possibility of further self-knowledge. And in this case the arguments
for the medieval integration of faith and philosophy hold out to us the potential for gaining
insight into the reasons why we in the present age, and with it the contemporary church, find
this problem so riddled with confusion.
My hope is that this alternative will be recognized for what it is. The medieval position is
antagonistic to our own because it is an affirmation of the power of natural reason to know
metaphysical truth with certainty. On this basis rests the whole of Thomas Aquinas’s theological
framework. It is, of course, fair to ask whether or not the medievals were right in holding such a
position. But before we can dismiss the conclusions of our elders, we must first learn the
reasons for their convictions.

Confuanicism

Conclusion
The classical texts of
Analects and Xueji have shed
light on the principles and
practices of
education for early
Confucianism. An aim of
education, as intended by
Confucius and
explicated in Analects and
Xueji, is for learners to
apprehend and expand dao
through ren-
centred li. A Confucian
curriculum is essentially
holistic, comprehensive and
integrated. A
holistic curriculum emphasises
the students’ cognitive,
affective and behavioural
domains.
Learners are called to
internalise and apply the
contents learnt through self-
cultivation and
social interaction. The
curriculum is also broad-based
where students learn the six
arts of
rituals, music, archery,
charioteering, calligraphy, and
mathematics. Furthermore, the
curriculum is designed in such a
way that the students learn
systematically and
progressively
by constantly building upon,
synthesising and putting into
practice what they have learnt.
Teaching and learning are
learner-focused where the
teacher responds
empathetically to the
individual needs of students.
The ‘enlightening approach’ is
recommended where the teacher
encourages independent
thinking and guides students
using the questioning
technique and
peer learning. Confucian
education also fosters critical
and creative thinking, as
modelled by
Confucius himself who
challenges the rulers and
social norms of his time and
aspires to
tranform his society through a
return to and continual
(re)creation of dao. An open
tradition
ensures that Confucian
education is not essentialised,
static and fossilised. Instead,
it is
diverse, fluid and evolving,
offering an educational
paradigm that is all-rounded,
ethical,
universal and ultimately
enduring.
Tan, C. (2017). Confucianism and education. In Noblit, G. (Ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Education (pp. 1-18). New York: Oxford University Press.

DRAFT Summary Issues related to the aim of education, curriculum, teaching and learning are
perennial concerns in Confucianism. Within the Confucian canon, two texts, Analects (Lunyu) and
Xueji (Record of Learning) are particularly instructive in illuminating the principles and practices of
education for early Confucianism. Accordingly, the aim of education is to inculcate ren (humanity)
through li (normative behaviours) so that learners could realise and broaden dao (Way). To achieve
this aim, the curriculum should be holistic, broad-based and integrated where students constantly
practise what they have learnt through self-cultivation and social interaction. Supporting the
curriculum is learner-focused education where the teacher is sensitive to the individual needs of
students. The ‘enlightening approach’ is recommended where the teacher encourages and guides
students using the questioning technique and peer learning. The impact of Confucian education is
evident in the creation and flourishing of ‘Confucian pedagogic cultures’ in East Asia. However, a
key question confronting a Confucian conception of education is whether such a paradigm is able
to nurture critical and creative thinkers who are empowered to critique prevailing worldviews and
effect social changes. A textual analysis of the Xueji and Analects reveals that critical and creative
thinking are valued and indispensable in Confucian education. Confucius himself chastises the
rulers of his time, modifies certain social practices, and ingeniously re-defines terms that were in
wide circulation such as li and junzi by adding novel elements to them. Confucian education should
be viewed as an open tradition that learns from all sources and evolves with changing times. Such a
tradition fulfills the educational vision to appropriate and extend dao, thereby continuing the
educational project started by Confucius.

Conclusion

The classical texts of Analects and Xueji have shed light on the principles and practices of
education for early Confucianism. An aim of education, as intended by Confucius and explicated
in Analects and Xueji, is for learners to apprehend and expand dao through ren-centred li. A
Confucian curriculum is essentially holistic, comprehensive and integrated. A holistic curriculum
emphasises the students’ cognitive, affective and behavioural domains. Learners are called to
internalise and apply the contents learnt through self-cultivation and social interaction. The
curriculum is also broad-based where students learn the six arts of rituals, music, archery,
charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics. Furthermore, the curriculum is designed in such a way
that the students learn systematically and progressively by constantly building upon, synthesising and
putting into practice what they have learnt. Teaching and learning are learner-focused where the
teacher responds empathetically to the individual needs of students. The ‘enlightening approach’ is
recommended where the teacher encourages independent thinking and guides students using the
questioning technique and peer learning. Confucian education also fosters critical and creative
thinking, as modelled by Confucius himself who challenges the rulers and social norms of his time
and aspires to tranform his society through a return to and continual (re)creation of dao. An open
tradition ensures that Confucian education is not essentialised, static and fossilised. Instead, it is
diverse, fluid and evolving, offering an educational paradigm that is all-rounded, ethical, universal
and ultimately enduring.

Paulo Freire’s Philosophy of Education and Our Ontological Incompleteness

August 30, 2016 by James Anderson 1 Comment

Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, perhaps best known for his work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and for
popularizing the practice of “critical pedagogy,” also wrote passionately and profoundly about what it
means to be human. In fact, both Freire’s critique of oppression and his ideas about education were
informed by how he posed the problem of being human.Problematizing humanity as a “project,”[1]
Freire explored the dialectical interdependency of subject and object, conscious human action and the
world. He framed the problem thus:There would be no human action if there were no objective reality,
no world to be the ‘not I’ of the person and to challenge them; just as there would be no human action if
humankind were not a ‘project,’ if he or she were not able to transcend himself or herself, if one were
not able to perceive reality and understand it in order to transform it.[2]

Working within and beyond the Marxist tradition, Freire’s “philosophy of praxis,” to borrow the phrase
popularized before Freire’s time by the Italian Marxian thinker Antonio Gramsci,[3] the Brazilian
philosopher of education distinguished human life and history from other nonhuman life.

Throughout history, we men and women become special animals indeed, then. We invent the
opportunity of setting ourselves free to the extent that we become able to perceive as unconcluded,
limited, conditioned, historical beings. Especially, we invent the opportunity of setting ourselves free by
perceiving, as well, that the sheer perception of inconclusion, limitation, opportunity, is not enough. To
the perception must be joined the political struggle for the transformation of the world. The liberation
of individuals acquires profound meaning only when the transformation of society is achieved. The
dream becomes a need, a necessity.[4]

It is not only that we are historical beings capable of reflecting upon our own historicity. As creative
beings, we humans “tri-dimensionalize time” into past, present and future, creating a history of
“epochal units,”[5] yet it is our thinking and action to transform the world mediating us that humanizes
us and that world we co-create. Humans, “as beings of praxis,”[6] are endowed with the capacity for
interrelated theory and action, mutually reinforcing action and reflection. “Only human beings,” Freire
added, “are praxis—the praxis which, as the reflection and action which truly transform reality, is the
source of knowledge and creation.”[7] As humans reflect upon and “produce social reality (which in the
‘inversion of praxis’ turns back upon them and conditions them), then transforming that reality is an
historical task, a task for humanity.”[8]

That “historical task,” however, reveals humanity’s “problematic nature,” as Freire put it.[9] While we
“humanize” the world by transforming it, that process does not always signify our own
“humanization.”[10] Indeed, as humans change the world our actions can lead to our deleterious
“dehumanization,”[11] a widening of the gap between our potential and our actual. The necessity of
choice—between either dehumanization, an oppressive denial of our (or others’) individual faculties and
collective capacities, the harmful distancing of what is and what could or ought to be, or humanization,
the actualization of potentials—signifies an element of human freedom.

Freedom, for Freire, must also be struggled for and achieved. Of all the “uncompleted beings, man is the
only one to treat not only his actions but his very self as the object of his reflection,”[12] and it is
through that objectification that humans are able to grasp the “dialectical relationship between the
determination of limits and their own freedom.”[13] Conscious of being conscious, people, through
dialogue, can pose the “limit-situations”[14] that alienate and disempower them as problems to be
overcome through concerted, conscious action in a reality recognized as really a process always
undergoing transformation.

The process of overcoming, of realizing freedom, is inseparable from education. The human, “a
consciously inconclusive being,”[15] is immersed in a perpetual pedagogical process. “Consciousness of
one’s inconclusiveness,” Freire averred, “makes that being educable.”[16] A critical education is a
“problem-posing” pedagogy.[17] It contrasts with the “banking concept of education,” which posits
students as only objects (not also subjects), receptacles or deposit boxes into which nuggets of
knowledge can be inserted.[18] The banking model assumes a problematic “dichotomy between human
beings and the world,” supposing a person merely exists in the world, not with that world and with
others whom he or she co-creates said world with.[19]

“Whereas banking education anesthetizes and inhibits creative power,” Freire observed, “problem-
posing education involves a constant unveiling of reality.”[20] Critical pedagogy does not simply take the
world as given datum nor students as just containers of knowledge for storing fixed facts. It instead
involves examination of the genesis of existing facts, an exploration of how what is came to be and an
unpacking of the contradictions within what prevails at present. Problem-posing pedagogy promotes
people’s “power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find
themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in
transformation.”[21] Contra the banking method, which engenders a “fatalistic perception” of the
existing circumstances taken as immutable or natural, this critical pedagogy presents that same present
as an objective problem subject to subjective cognition and transformative action informed by that
cognition, clarifying the “situation as an historical reality susceptible to transformation,”[22] propelling
further collectively self-organized inquiry and control over the co-constructed social universe.

Through cultivated conscientização, the process of increasingly critical consciousness and “the
deepening of the attitude characteristic of all emergence,” agency is enabled: “Humankind emerge from
their submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality as it is unveiled.”[23]

Unveiling of exploitative relationships that empower some people at the expense of others, entails
assailing such situations as interfering “with the individual’s ontological and historical vocation to be
more fully human.”[24]

Through conscientização human beings become conscious of their own ontological incompleteness and
of the historically structured “limit-situations” presently precluding their continued humanization. To be
sure, fuller humanization is in no way guaranteed. “Hope,” however, as Freire understood is an
ontological need.

Paulo Freire’s Philosophy of Education

and Our Ontological Incompleteness
August 30, 2016 by James Anderson 1 Comment

Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, perhaps best known for his work, Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, and for popularizing the practice of “critical pedagogy,” also wrote
passionately and profoundly about what it means to be human.

In fact, both Freire’s critique of oppression and his ideas about education were informed
by how he posed the problem of being human.

Problematizing humanity as a “project,”[1] Freire explored the dialectical interdependency

of subject and object, conscious human action and the world. He framed the problem
thus:
There would be no human action if there were no objective reality, no world to be the
‘not I’ of the person and to challenge them; just as there would be no human action if
humankind were not a ‘project,’ if he or she were not able to transcend himself or
herself, if one were not able to perceive reality and understand it in order to transform it.
[2]

Working within and beyond the Marxist tradition, Freire’s “philosophy of praxis,” to
borrow the phrase popularized before Freire’s time by the Italian Marxian thinker
Antonio Gramsci,[3] the Brazilian philosopher of education distinguished human life and
history from other nonhuman life.

Throughout history, we men and women become special animals indeed, then. We
invent the opportunity of setting ourselves free to the extent that we become able to
perceive as unconcluded, limited, conditioned, historical beings. Especially, we invent
the opportunity of setting ourselves free by perceiving, as well, that the sheer perception
of inconclusion, limitation, opportunity, is not enough. To the perception must be joined
the political struggle for the transformation of the world. The liberation of individuals
acquires profound meaning only when the transformation of society is achieved. The
dream becomes a need, a necessity.[4]

It is not only that we are historical beings capable of reflecting upon our own historicity.
As creative beings, we humans “tri-dimensionalize time” into past, present and future,
creating a history of “epochal units,”[5] yet it is our thinking and action to transform the
world mediating us that humanizes us and that world we co-create. Humans, “as beings
of praxis,”[6] are endowed with the capacity for interrelated theory and action, mutually
reinforcing action and reflection. “Only human beings,” Freire added, “are praxis—the
praxis which, as the reflection and action which truly transform reality, is the source of
knowledge and creation.”[7] As humans reflect upon and “produce social reality (which in
the ‘inversion of praxis’ turns back upon them and conditions them), then transforming
that reality is an historical task, a task for humanity.”[8]

That “historical task,” however, reveals humanity’s “problematic nature,” as Freire put it.
[9]
While we “humanize” the world by transforming it, that process does not always signify
our own “humanization.”[10] Indeed, as humans change the world our actions can lead to
our deleterious “dehumanization,”[11] a widening of the gap between our potential and our
actual. The necessity of choice—between either dehumanization, an oppressive denial
of our (or others’) individual faculties and collective capacities, the harmful distancing of
what is and what could or ought to be, or humanization, the actualization of potentials—
signifies an element of human freedom.

Freedom, for Freire, must also be struggled for and achieved. Of all the “uncompleted
beings, man is the only one to treat not only his actions but his very self as the object of
his reflection,”[12] and it is through that objectification that humans are able to grasp the
“dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and their own
freedom.”[13] Conscious of being conscious, people, through dialogue, can pose the
“limit-situations”[14] that alienate and disempower them as problems to be overcome
through concerted, conscious action in a reality recognized as really a process always
undergoing transformation.

The process of overcoming, of realizing freedom, is inseparable from education. The

human, “a consciously inconclusive being,”[15] is immersed in a perpetual pedagogical
process. “Consciousness of one’s inconclusiveness,” Freire averred, “makes that being
educable.”[16] A critical education is a “problem-posing” pedagogy.[17] It contrasts with the
“banking concept of education,” which posits students as only objects (not also
subjects), receptacles or deposit boxes into which nuggets of knowledge can be
inserted.[18] The banking model assumes a problematic “dichotomy between human
beings and the world,” supposing a person merely exists in the world, not with that world
and with others whom he or she co-creates said world with.[19]

“Whereas banking education anesthetizes and inhibits creative power,” Freire observed,
“problem-posing education involves a constant unveiling of reality.”[20] Critical pedagogy
does not simply take the world as given datum nor students as just containers of
knowledge for storing fixed facts. It instead involves examination of the genesis of
existing facts, an exploration of how what is came to be and an unpacking of the
contradictions within what prevails at present. Problem-posing pedagogy promotes
people’s “power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in
which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a
reality in process, in transformation.”[21] Contra the banking method, which engenders a
“fatalistic perception” of the existing circumstances taken as immutable or natural, this
critical pedagogy presents that same present as an objective problem subject to
subjective cognition and transformative action informed by that cognition, clarifying the
“situation as an historical reality susceptible to transformation,”[22] propelling further
collectively self-organized inquiry and control over the co-constructed social universe.

Through cultivated conscientização, the process of increasingly critical consciousness

and “the deepening of the attitude characteristic of all emergence,” agency is enabled:
“Humankind emerge from their submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality
as it is unveiled.”[23]

Unveiling of exploitative relationships that empower some people at the expense of

others, entails assailing such situations as interfering “with the individual’s ontological
and historical vocation to be more fully human.”[24]

Through conscientização human beings become conscious of their own ontological

incompleteness and of the historically structured “limit-situations” presently precluding
their continued humanization. To be sure, fuller humanization is in no way guaranteed.
“Hope,” however, as FreIre understood as ontological need.