iliij"!}JHt:t1t . i~*il&~ 2005 Vol. 2 pp.

87 - 122

The Rise and

Jian Zhao

The shi (±) class was split into military and civilian camps in the early Chunqiu (~~
f)( 770-476 B.C.). Society was then undergoing dramatic changes. The original highly
hereditary system of public service (0~) was disintegrating. Many warriors could not
find a career. They began to work for private houses (;v1.1 111), many of which had replaced
the old aristocratic houses to become the dominant forces in the former vassal states.
From these warriors came the earliest group of xia (1~), who provided services for their
nusters, such as fighting in battle or conducting an assassination. The xia warriors were
extremely active through the whole period of the Warring States (irtIGl~ 475-221 B.C.),
but under the brutal regime of Qin (* 221-207 B.C.) they were forced underground
and disappeared from the front stage of the political arena. The anti-Qin rebellion and
founding of the Western Han (Tt§?~l 202 B.C.-8) revitalized the xia and also changed the
nature of the classical xia. In this article, the development of the xia in the Western Han
dynasty is extensively introduced and carefully analyzed, with a focus on the xia's general
position in society and its relationship with both the central and local authorities. The
most famous Han xia figure, Guo Xie (!JIS1~¥), is singled out for examination, as he will
fully demonstrate the characteristics of the xia at the time.

The xia and the founding of the Han empire

The founding of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. was one of the most significant
historical events in Chinese history. It marked the end of a long period of chaotic wars
and social instability, and the beginning of two millennia of primarily unified and
centralized imperial regimes.

Under the repression of the First Emperor of Qin's reign (221-210 B.C.), the xia, who
had been extremely active in the arena of interstate conflict, seem to have been forced
underground. However, along with the loyalists of the defeated former feudal states,
they were waiting for their season to come again. This happened unexpectedly soon.
The Qin regime lasted only fifteen years before it was toppled by the joint uprising
of peasants and aristocrats of the former feudal states. The xia immediately joined the
growing tide against the Qin and actively involved themselves in the battles among
rival warlords.
88 Zhao

At the head of the uprising against the Qin stood the Xiang (J]) family. This family
had produced a long line of men with military careers in the former state of Chu (~).
Its last prominent member during the Warring States was Grand General Xiang Yan (J]
~ d. 224 B.C.), who was killed in the war between Qin and Chu. His son Xiang Liang
(J]W; d. 208 B.C.) was compelled by the Qin to move his family from his native place
after killing a person there. In his new location in Kuaiji (~fW in present day Zhejiang)
he retained many men and privately gave them military training. His commitment
to the welfare of the locality as a self-appointed organizer and benefactor earned him
support from both landowners and general populace.

Two months after Chen Sheng (1)~UWf d. 209 B.C.) launched his uprising, Xiang Liang
assassinated the chief of the prefecture and formed an army of eight thousand men
to join the rebel forces north of the Yangtze.' In taking upon himself matters of local
welfare, he was behaving somewhat like a xia. But he was different from the pre-Qin
xia and warriors in his brutality, trickery, ambition and manipulation. I believe that he
was driven more by his appetite for power than by his sense of justice. His aristocratic
family background and his life as a commoner made him a combination of the noble
and commoner xia, demonstrating a new aspect of the post-Qin xia, which will be
discussed in detail later in this article.

Unlike the other prominent members of the family, Xiang Liang's younger brother
Xiang Bo (JJHI~I d. 192 B.C.) is said to have been mild tempered. He was committed
more to loyalty in personal friendship. When the Xiang family had to leave its native
town, Xiang Bo fled to his friend Zhang Liang (5:&.& d. 189 B.C.) for refuge. Later
Zhang became an important advisor to Liu Bang (fU:fo~ r. 202-195 B.C.), the arch-rival
of the Xiang family. When Xiang Bo became aware that his nephew Xiang Yu (JJi~~
232-202 B.C.) intended to destroy Liu Bang's forces, he went to see his friend Zhang
Liang and asked Zhang to return with him. When Zhang told him that he was obliged
by his conscience to stay with Liu, Xiang Bo agreed to persuade his nephew to give
up the plan to attack Liu Bang. As on many later occasions, Xiang Bo successfully
protected Liu Bang and his family.2 He placed the code of brotherhood and personal
loyalty over the interests of his family, typical conduct of the xia of the pre-Qin era.

Xiang Liang's nephew Xiang Yu, commander of the rebel forces for almost five years,
is described by Sima Qian (\:I] ,~~) as heroic and vigorous. He learned swordsmanship
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 89

after failing to become a scholar as his family had expected. He was more ambitious
and egocentric than his uncle Xiang Liang. When he saw the First Emperor on an
inspection tour, he declared that the arrogant emperor could be replaced, causing his
3
uncle to cover his mouth for fear his words would be overheard. Although Xiang
Yu cannot simply be labeled a xia, he possessed some of the characteristics that were
associated with the xia, such as bravery, determination and personal integrity. Liang
Qichao (t{{:§Mf) in his Zhongguo zhi Wushidao (r=/=I 1!lzlEt-J:-~), or The Chinese "Wtzyof
the "Wtzrrior, listed three of his encounters to show the development of his image as a
heroic knight:

With his newly assembled motley army, he challenged the awe-inspiring Qin
by rushing to the rescue of the state of Zhao. Is that not chivalrous (~1%)?
Unable to endure any longer the people's suffering from wars, he challenged
Liu Bang to a duel. Is that not benevolent and heroic (1=~)? When besieged
at Gaixia (±tCF), he refused to escape to his home base across the Yangtze
for feeling too ashamed to see his elders. This is the countenance of a true
knight!4

Liang's account is somewhat romanticized. Xiang Yu's rescue of Zhao, I believe, was
more likely driven by his ambition to resume the leadership of the uprising following
the death of his uncle. The suggestion of a once-and-for-all duel between him and Liu
Bang was entirely unrealistic when his armies faced certain defeat. However, Xiang
Yu's refusal to retreat to his home district did show the true color of a hero, who was
convinced that ill fortune had doomed him, despite his military efforts and personal
bravery. Remaining calm and undaunted, he awaited his fate. In this respect, Xiang Yu
was close in temperament to the classical xia. Yet at the same time, Xiang Yu and those
like him introduced new elements, like political ambition and an overbearing manner,
into xia behavior and also increased the level of brutality and rebelliousness. As will be
seen later, the development of the Han xia was primarily in this less noble direction.

Zhang Er (sjfll=), a native of Wei (~~) and one of the leaders of the anti-Qin uprising,
was Prince Xinling's ({§~£tn retainer in his youth. He had to leave his home town,
probably because of violating the Qin law. He later became rich in his place of exile
by marrying a woman from a wealthy family. He then began to retain people from a
distance beyond even a thousand Li. Among his retainers were Chen Yu (~~), later an
90 Zhao

important leader in the uprising, and Liu Bang, then a commoner. After Qin annexed
the state of Wei, both Zhang and Chen were declared wanted by the Qin government.
All their property was confiscated and they went into hiding. Later they used assumed
s
names to make their living as gate-keepers until the revolt began.

Ji Bu (*:1IJ) , a general in Xiang Yu's army, became famous in Chu for he was depicted
as "acting recklessly and chivalrously" (1.?,A1f1iJt). There was a common saying: "A
hundred catties of pure gold are not as good as one of Ji Bu's promises." On the
battlefield Ji Bu several times pushed Liu Bang into a tight corner. Liu thus held a bitter
grudge against him for his humiliation. After Liu Bang defeated Xiang Yu's forces and
subjected all the remaining lords to his rule, he offered a reward of a thousand catties
of gold for the capture of Ji Bu. The emperor ordered that whoever dared protect him
would be killed along with his whole family. However, many people risked their lives
not only to hide Ji Bu but also to help him escape his misfortune. Among them were
the most famous xia of the time, Zhu Jia (**) and the chivalric general Xiahou Ying
6
(J[ 1*M). The latter successfully persuaded Liu Bang to pardon Ji Bu. The incidents
surrounding Ji Bu's rescue seem to demonstrate that the xia character and xia behavior
were broadly accepted both among the common people and officialdom.

The anti-Qin forces consisted in the main of four components: peasants like the
initiator of the uprising Chen Sheng, city vagrants and scoundrels like Han Xin (lji!1~ d.
196 B.C.), junior government officials like Liu Bang and former nobles like Xiang Yu
and Tian Heng (133 iPi).

The former nobles who participated in the anti-Qin uprising almost succeeded in
reviving the old order of independent states. The classic way of the xia of the previous
Warring States era was also partially preserved among the members of this group. Like
Xiang Yu, Tian Heng was one of the famed warriors from the nobility. As members
of the former royal family of Qi, Tian Heng and his brothers took advantage of the
uprising to seize back the power they had lost in the Qin unification of the country.
However, when caught between the forces of Xiang Yu and Liu Bang, they had to
take side with one of the rivals in order to survive. Tian was a strong opponent of the
Liu forces. After Liu became emperor, Tian fled to an island in east with 500 or so of
his followers, in fear of punishment. Worrying about their possible revolt later, the
emperor sent an envoy to pardon Tian for his offenses and summon him to the capital.
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 91

Regarding acknowledging Liu as his ruler as an unbearable shame, Tian committed

suicide on his way to the capital, and so did his 500 men? Like Xiang Yu, Tian Heng
was a classic noble warrior. He treated his people well and they were all willing to die
for him. His heroic death became a source of inspiration to the braves of later ages.
Liang Qichao ardently praised Tian and his five hundred followers and claimed that it
was their heroic deeds that brought the eight-hundred-year history of Qi to a glorious
. . 8
termmatIOn.

Liu Bang, the founder of the Han Dynasty, was quite a different kind of person. His
immediate origins were part city rogue and part junior government official. Unlike his
arch-rival, Xiang Yu, who was from a prominent warrior family, Liu Bang came from
an obscure peasant family. According to his biography in the Shi Ji (5I:~c), he had no
intention to becoming a farmer like his father and elder brothers. He became a junior
official but was not really devoted to his work. Instead he indulged himself in wine and
women and led an idle life. However, he was also generous and his easy temperament
made him attractive to many people. Once he was sent on a mission to escort a batch
of labor-draftees to Lishan (Ii Ill) for hard labor. Many fled on the way. It seemed to
him that very few would be left when they reached their destination and no doubt he
would be punished for his failure to bring them all there. Liu Bang decided to let the
remaining criminals go and to hide himself A small number of the men were willing to
follow him. He thus became the leader of a gang of outlaws even before the uprising.
Once the uprising occurred, Liu Bang's former colleagues found him, and together
9
they built a force oflocal people to join the tidal wave against Qin.

In his behavior, Liu Bang reflected his lower social origins, while Xiang Yu exemplified
more the style of the landowning aristocracy. But they seem to have had one thing in
common: their ambition. Sa Mengwu (~i~iEt) wrote that in the course of China's
history there were two kinds of people who had the ambition and capacity to contend
for the throne. One consisted of members of influential noble families, that is haozu
(~jj*), the other consisted of rogues. His explanation was: "Influential noble families
could take advantage of their privileged position to obtain power; while scoundrels
and rogues had no scruples and would gamble everything."ID Most contenders for the
throne came from the former group. Those in the latter group usually had their chance
in a widespread, chaotic peasant uprising. Liu Bang's success was the most famous
example of this second type.
92 Zhao

It is noteworthy that many of Liu Bang's military associates came from a similar
background. Ban Gu (fJllIll) in his preface to Han Shu U~:;:), or Han History, listed
a few of them: "Han Xin (~f~) was a man who struggled along on the verge of
starvation, Ying Bu (~J$) a criminal with his face tattooed, Peng Yue (Sf3~) a bandit,
and Wu Rui (-Yl:PG) a man of low social status. They all rode on the tide of the time and
became nobles." 11 Almost all of Liu Bang's prominent aides except Zhang Liang (5~1~)
came from humble origins.

Zhang Liang, Liu Bang's senior adviser, was born to a noble family in the state of Han
(~IT~). For five generations, members of his family had served as chief ministers. When
the state of Han was annexed by Qin, Zhang Liang was still a young man who had
not yet started his career. He sold off all his family's property to hire an assassin to kill
the First Emperor of Qin. He put his plan into operation when the emperor was on
an eastward inspection tour. However, the assassin attacked the wrong carriage. Zhang
Liang escaped, changed his name and hid in a place called Xiapi cr1iI~). His biography
in the Shi Ji has the following note: "During the years he stayed at Xiapi, he conducted
himself as a xia. When Xiang Bo killed a man, he hid himself in Zhang Liang's place."
When the uprising started, Zhang quickly organized hundreds of young men to
. jJ
respon d to It. -

Among the important assistants of Liu Bang, Chen Ping ([{JIPf), Wang Ling (.£
I~), Luan Bu (~1fi), Chen Xi (IIJR5ffff) and Fan Kuai (~U@") all possessed the xia
temperament. The young Chen Ping was so poor that his house even lacked a door,
but in front of it wealthy and influential people often left their carriages when they
visited Chen. 1.3 Wang Ling offended Liu Bang in defending his friend Yong Chi (~fiID).
This almost cost him his noble title. 14 Luan Bu's loyalty to his former lord Zang Tu O~
*) almost cost him his own life. 15 Chen Xi admired Prince Xinling and like him kept
a huge number of retainers. He once passed by Handan (~'rs,~) on his way home and
took with him over one thousand carriages of retainers, who filled up all the official
16
guest houses in the town. Fan Kuai was the most heroic of Liu Bang's warrior. At
the critical moment in the Hongmen Banquet U:rr~I'i~*), it was Fan Kuai who bravely
17
rushed to the rescue of Liu Bang. Together these men brought the xia temperament
and life style into early Han officialdom.

The Han Dynasty was founded as a result of prolonged military struggle. After two
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 93

decades of quiescence under the severe Qin dictatorship, the xia across the land
returned to the center of the stage, which they had occupied in the Warring States
period. But in comparison to their Warring States predecessors, the xia and xia-like
figures who founded the Han Dynasty were different in several ways.

Most important are the following: 1.) They were not as closely allied with the shi C::I:)
class, and came largely from the lower levels of society. Consequently, the culture and
education usually present in a Chunqiu xia were diminished or simply non-existent.
Xiang Yu, Liu Bang, Han Xin and Lu Huan are all said to have had some "scholar
training" (~t!f) when they were young, but they did not pursue this. Liu Bang's
training was enough for him to pass the selection test to become a junior official (~tt~
~), but he was notorious for his anti-scholar attitudes. 2.) The shi class had changed.
In the past it had been composed largely of warriors, but now it consisted mainly of
intellectuals. Most of the Han xia came from other social classes. The shi were no
longer the major s~urce of xia. By the founding of the Han, the xia were on their
way to be more of a lifestyle and spiritual inclination than a concrete social entity. 3.)
Most of the xia involved in founding the Han were ambitious. The unification by Qin
remodeled Chinese society and uprooted the old feudal system. Officials appointed by
the government replaced the hereditary nobles; prefectures and counties replaced the
feudal states. When the suppressed xia were suddenly freed from the Qin tyranny in
the country-wide rebellion, they found themselves cast into the political arena without
allegiance to any individual persons or groups. The uprising created the unprecedented
opportunity for them to become generals and even lords in their own right. In this
regard Sima Qian made an interesting observation at the end of Ji Bu's biography:

The Grand Historian remarks: with a spirit like that of Xiang Yu, Ji Bu made
a name for daring in Chu. From time to time he commanded armies and
several times seized the enemy pennants. He deserves to be called a brave
man. Yet he suffered punishment and disgrace and became a slave and' did
not commit suicide. Why did he stoop to this? Because he chose to rely upon
his abilities. Therefore he suffered disgrace without shame, for there were
things he hoped to accomplish and he was not yet satisfied. Thus in the end
he became a renowned general of Han. Truly the wise man regards death as
a grave thing. When slaves and scullery maids and such mean people in their
despair commit suicide it is not because they are brave; it is because they
94 Zhao

know that their plans and hopes will never again have a chance of coming
true!18

In general, switching loyalty to the enemy of one's former lord was unacceptable for
classic warriors and xia as well. This does not mean that there were not cases where a
warrior or a xia in the pre-Qin period might shift his loyalty. But when he found a lord
who appreciated his ability and service, he would rarely change his loyalty, regardless
of what fonunes befell his lord. Yu Rang (f~~jl), the famous Chunqiu xia, shifted his
loyalty twice before he found a lord who appreciated his ability and recognized him
as a guoshi (~Ij:), or a state knight. His first two lords had paid little attention to his
existence. He thus felt no obligation to take revenge for them and actually shifted his
loyalty to their killer, his third lord, Zhibo (~1B). When Zhibo was later killed, Yu
Rang took great pains to plan revenge on the murderer. When his plan failed, Yu Rang
took his own life. Despite Yu Rang's steadfast loyalty to his dead lord, no historical
record mentioned his contribution as a guoshi when Zhibo was in power. He never
tried to stop Zhibo' s suicidal policy of making enemies everywhere. His sole virtue was
his uncompromising loyalty.

In the early Han, loyalty was still regarded as an important ingredient of the
xia personality, but self-fulfillment was gaining more weight, as was the further
development of a warlike character. In Ji Bu's case, the transfer of loyalty caused
apparently no embarrassment to either Ji Bu or the historian, because Ji Bu's full
expression of his abilities outweighed his commitment to personal loyalty. Ji Bu's
change of loyalty and Tian Heng's choice of death to preserve his integrity demonstrate
the common pursuit of individual goals from two seemingly opposite ends. While Ji
Bu endured all kinds of humiliation in order to survive, Tian Heng maintained that
the only way to defend his dignity was to die. Both indicate the awakening of xia
individualism. As we will see in the following sections, this was to add a new element
to the original simplicity of the xia personality.

Xia influences on early Han official behavior

As the previous section has shown, many xia and xia-tempered figures were involved
in the anti-Qin uprising and the founding of the Han Dynasty. They became generals,
ministers and even lords in the new regime. The 5hi Ji describes the situation in the
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 95

early Han as follows: "There were sporadic outbreaks of wars. Even after all within
the four seas were pacified, education was still not an urgent matter of the moment.
During the reigns of the Emperor Hui (!-:m r 195-187 B.C.) and Empress Lu Us
Fa r. 188-179 B.C.), nobles and ministers were all vigorous veterans with meritorious
military service." 19 The Qin Dynasty had adopted Legalism as its official ideology and
banned almost all the other philosophical schools. From the collapse of Qin to the
establishment of Confucianism as the official ideology of Han Dynasty under the reign
of Emperor Wu Ullitm r. 141-87 B.C.), there was toleration of different opinions
and lifestyles. For many of the former rebels and military veterans who now made up
officialdom and who were searching for a new identity, the chivalric and uninhibited
lifestyle of "the four princes" (1ZY0~) in the Warring States held out a fascination.
Furthermore, since most of these nobles came from the lower strata of society, they
bore a natural affinity for youxia (iht1>JO ethics, as revealed in the spirit of brotherhood
and the demands of revenge. Thus a mixture of noble xia and commoner youxia
characterized early Han officialdom.

Liu Bang's dislike of scholars is well known. There were only a few prominent scholars
in his camp. The first to join was Li Yiji (JmI)jtJ~~). When he went to see Liu wearing
his scholar's robe and hat, Liu said he was busy with matters of great importance and
had no time to meet scholars. It was only after Li angrily claimed he was actually a
drunkard that he met Liu Bang and became his advisor.20 The second example was
Shusun Tong (,f~f*:im), an "erudite" (t~J:) in the Qin court. He became Liu Bang's
advisor and pleased his new lord by changing his scholar's robe to a shorter gown.
He never recommended his scholar peers to Liu Bang. Those he recommended were
exclusively former bandits and xia, because he thought Liu Bang needed zhuangshi (;I±
21
±), or heroic warriors and knights, to assist him in his bid for the throne. Even after
Liu Bang put the crown on his head, he still sought zhuangshi to defend his newly
founded regime. Once after he had drunk much wine in his native town, the emperor
sang a song of his own making, while playing the zhu (fFL), a local instrument: "The
great wind rose to blow away the clouds. With my glory covering the whole country I
return home. Now how to find brave warriors to guard the territory of the country?"n
It is natural that in the early days of the Han Dynasty the noble class was still highly
militant in spirit and attracted to heroic deeds. Even in the presence of the emperor,
the nobles, most of whom were formerly zhuangshi, would drink wine and dispute
with one another as to the ranking of their military exploits. When they became high
96 Zhao

spirited under the influence of alcohol, they brandished their swords and struck the
pillars of the palace, while a din filled the whole court. 23

These scenes evoke recollections of the Warring States. Many historians noticed the
similarity between the two periods. The author of the Hou Han Shu (1ki~H~f), or
History ofthe Later Han, Fan Ye GQ]I~ 398-445), described the time as follows:

After the founder of Han rose with his sword, warriors grew vigorously in
number. [In the early Han] the law was lenient and the rites were simple.
Inheriting the boldness of the four princes, the people harbored disobedient
thoughts in their mind. They despised death and valued their personal
integrity. They would requite any favor they received and avenge any insult
they suffered. Orders from private houses were enforced and authority was
24
usurped by commoners. Xia conduct had become the custom.

Fan Ye's observation refers to the activities of the xia in both upper and lower society.
During the Qin regime xia activity was limited mainly to the lower ranks of society.
After the victory of the rebels and the founding of the Han Dynasty, xia behavior
spread into upper ranks of society as the former warriors and youxia became ministers
and nobles. The penetration of higher society by the xia during the Han Dynasty, in
particular the early Han, can been seen in three areas.

First, xia behavior was common to many nobles, ministers and ranking officials. Zhang
Er, who I introduced in the previous section as a xia and a prominent military leader
in the rebel forces, was appointed Lord of Zhao (j11[E) by Liu Bang. When he died two
years later in 198 B.C., his son Zhang Ao (5~1:&), who married Liu Bang's daughter
Princess Luyuan (f~7c0.:t), succeeded him as Lord of Zhao. In 196 B.C. Liu Bang
stayed with him during an inspection tour. Zhang waited upon the emperor day and
night like a son. The emperor treated him rudely by often scolding him in the presence
of his subordinates, some of whom, such as Guan Gao (ffiti%) , the premier of Zhao,
and Zhao Wu (jt1r!:F) , were infuriated. They went to the lord and told him that they
would kill the emperor. Without their lord's support, Guan and Zhao later plotted to
assassinate the emperor when he came through their state during his Dongyuan (Jlt!:J[)
inspection tour. The emperor avoided assassination only because he changed his tour
schedule. The conspiracy was found and the lord was arrested. When a dozen of the
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 97

lord's ministers were hurrying to cut their own throats, Guan Gao decided to testifY
that the lord was innocent. When he was brought before the inquisitors he told them,
"I and my group alone are responsible. The lord knew nothing about it!" The prison
officials, hoping to force a confession, gave him several thousand lashes and pierced
him with needles until there was no spot on his body left to pierce, but he would say
nothing more. When the Minister of Justice told the emperor of the interrogation of
Guan Gao, the emperor was impressed by his bravery. He then sent a friend of Guan's,
Xiegong UtIt0), to find out whether the lord was personally involved in the scheme.
Guan convinced him that the lord was truly innocent. The Lord of Zhao was thus
released.

The emperor greatly admired Guan Gao for standing by his word so
faithfully and sent Xiegong to inform him that Zhang Ao had already been
released and that Guan Gao was pardoned as well. "Has my lord really been set
free?" asked Guan Gao joyfully. "He has," replied Xiegong. "And because the
emperor admires you," he added, "He has pardoned you as well. "The reason
I did not choose death before, but suffered every torture that my body could
endure, was so I could bear witness that Lord Zhang was not disloyal. Now
that the lord has been released, my duty is fulfilled and I may die without
regret. As a subject I have incurred the name of a would-be usurper and
assassin. With what face could I appear again before the emperor? Though
he might spare my life, would I not feel shame in my heart?25

For Guan Gao and his comrades, the dignity of their lord was as inviolable as their own.
Dignity was most sacred to a man of xia temperament. Once it was violated, he would
either avenge himself on the offender or, if forced by circumstance, commit suicide. In
the above case, revenge against the emperor was the intent. When the plotters' scheme
failed, Guan Gao took upon himself the task of proving the innocence of his lord,
while the others committed suicide. Guan gained wide fame for his conduct in the
incident. The emperor was himself moved by Guan's bravery and loyalty. He pardoned
Guan, the chief plotter, and promoted those who defied his order by accompanying
their unfortunate lord to trial to be state premiers and prefectural governors.

Yuan Ang (:R~) was a highly important and influential official in the early Han period.
His father was a former rebel (&tM~) in the rebellion against the Qin. Yuan Ang was
98 Zhao

said to be a man of unyielding integrity and principle. When he worked as a junior

advisory official in the court of Emperor Wen u~t)(* r. 179-157 B.C.), he directed
criticism at the emperor's favorite brother, the emperor's chosen concubine, the prime
minister, and even the emperor himself. At the same time, he made many friends
among local community leaders (5~~£:&~) and fellow officials during his official
career. Among them, a few were prominent xia. Ji Xin (*{,), Ji Bu's younger brother,
enjoyed equal fame with his brother for his bravery and xia character. Ji Xin once killed
26
an enemy and fled for shelter to Yuan Ang, who was then premier of WU. Another
leading xia of the time, Ju Meng (~IJ~), was also Yuan's close friend. One of Yuan's
friends warned him that Ju was merely a gambler and wondered why Yuan should keep
a friend like him. Sima Qian recorded Yuan's answer as follows:

Ju Meng is a gambler, but when his mother died the carriages of over 1,000 guests
appeared to attend her funeral. So he must be something more than an ordinary
man. Moreover, everyone sooner or later finds himself in serious trouble. But if
one morning you were to go with your troubles and knock on Ju Meng's gate,
he would not put you off with excuses about responsibility to his parents, or try
to avoid the issue because of the danger to himself. The only men you can really
27
count on in the world are Ji Xin and Ju Meng.

Yuan touched the essence of xia behavior in his remark. Giving help to people in
distress without thought of personal gain or loss formed the kernel of xia behavior.
Yuan was famed for his outspokenness. When one of his important proposals was not
adopted by Emperor Jing (i~Jf:3il-: r. 157-141 B.C.), he asked for leave on account of
his poor health. Although Emperor Jing's envoys continued to consult him on policy
matters, Yuan immersed himself in lower society, attending cockfights and dog-racing
with his friends and followers. Because he opposed the appointment as crown prince of
the emperor's favorite brother, Lord Xiao of Liang CY{~~3:.), the latter sent an assassin
to kill him. The assassin was so impressed by Yuan's popular renown as a worthy man
that, instead of killing Yuan, he told him of his secret mission. However, in the end
Yuan did not escape assassination because Lord Xiao sent someone else to perform the
28
task.

The second point of note with regard to the new role of the xia is the return to the
practice in the early Han of retaining 5hi (±), both scholars and xia were included
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 99

as shi. They served in both official and military capacities. In the early Han, nobility
and officialdom both realized that by retaining 5hi they could increase their power and
influence. The practice of retaining shi also demonstrated their personal wealth and
magnanimity. Ban Gu in his preface to Biographies of Ybuxia (i1j~f)Hi) summarized the
situation in the following statement:

When Han was newly founded, the law was lenient. [The habitual practice
of retaining personal followers represented by the four princes in the Warring
States] was not rectified. For this reason, Chen Xi, premier of Dai (1-t), could
be followed by a thousand carriages, while the lords ofWu (~) and Huainan
OffT¥]) could all engage retainers up to thousands. The imperial kinsmen and
ministers like Dou Yin (.~) and Tian Fen (EE1~) competed in the capital
with each other (seeking retainers]' while the commoner youxia like Ju Meng
and Guo Xie (~~j9r(:) ran wild in the alleys and lanes. Their influence was
exercised in the regions and their strength was greater than that of lords and
marquises. Their fame and prestige were highly regarded and they became
29
the envy of the populace.

The Lord of Wu (~3:') was Liu Bang's nephew. He ruled Wu's three prefectures and
fifty-three cities for over forty years. During that time, he welcomed refugees and
fugitives from all over the country and used them to work the copper mines and salt
pans in his state. With his wealth he attracted "Heroes of the world" CKT~;1:) to
his court. When other prefectures and states requested extradition of their escaped
criminals, he ordered his officials to refuse all demands. This was regarded at the time
as conduct typical of the noble xia. When the central government attempted to reduce
the territory and powers of the vassal states, he allied himself with six other states and
30
raised an abortive rebellion against the Han.

The Lord of Wu was not alone in this regard. Retaining 5hi was a commo"n practice
among the lords of the vassal states, especially those with inordinate political ambitions.
There was an institutional reason for this. In the early Han, imperial kinsmen were
normally appointed as lords of the vassal states, the size and location of the state
being determined according to their position in the royal house. But their power
was limited because administration, law enforcement and military operations were
administered by officials such as the xiang (t-§) , neishi (i*J 51:) and zhongwei (I=j::l ~t),
100 Zhao

who were directly appointed by the central government. Only with the consent of
these imperial appointees could a lord execute his orders. Emperor Jing's son, Lord
Jing of Zhongshan ('::j::l[lJ~f=EE), once reflected upon the normal life of a vassal lord. He
criticized his brother, the Lord of Zhao (JmI), for taking the duties of his officials into
his own hands, declaring that a lord should instead devote himself daily to recreational
activities. 3' However, there were many lords like the Lord of Zhao. His senior relation,
the Lord of Wu, was able to turn the central government's appointees into mere
figureheads. What was a problem for the vassal lords was mobilizing the state army.
Even if they brought the commanders over to their side, the local armed forces were
not strong enough to resist armed intervention by the central government. So the lords
retained and recruited warriors, youxia, migrants and even criminals at large to form
their personal forces, which they used either to further their influence or protect their
own interests.

Lord Xiao of Liang (~~4I) is an example of the first case. As Emperor Jing's brother,
he was determined to be the successor. He retained a huge number of haojie (~~),
or vigorous men, from all over the country. The treasury and wealth he amassed were
greater than that of the central government. Several hundred thousand weapons were
privately manufactured in his state so that he could arm a future military.32 The Lord
of Hengshan (f~J UJ :E) illustrates the second case. He also built a secret armed force, but
for a different purpose. He could not get along with his brother, the neighboring Lord
of Huainan. Upon hearing that his brother was preparing for an uprising against the
central government, he reacted "with determination to recruit retainers of his own" out
of fear that he would become the first target of his ambitious brother. 33

The retention of shi by non-royal family nobles was also politically motivated, although
they were less ambitious since by practice they had no potential to become lord or
emperor. For them, shi consolidated their position and extended their influence. As
mentioned in Ban Gu's statement above, Dou Ying and Tian Fen were two prominent
ministers in the court of Emperor Wu and both committed themselves to retain large
numbers of shi. The number of shi they retained was indicative of their political rise and
fall. Dou was Empress Xiao Wen's cousin. Sima Qian in Dou's biography specifically
pointed out that he "liked to keep retainers" (%J[~). After he led the imperial forces
to defeat the rebel army of seven vassal states, he was given the title of Marquis Weiqi
(IDllJ~;1*). Many shi rushed to pledge allegiance to him. But his prestige was waning
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 101

and he was challenged by Marquis Wuan (:liX1(W~), Tian Fen, Empress Jing's brother.
They competed with each other to win more shi and other followers to broaden their
influence. The more shrewd Tian won out over Dou and became prime minister. A
large number of shi and nobles across the country attached themselves to him, among
them many of Dou's former retainers and followers.,=>4

The third point in regard to the role of the xia in the early Han is that besides retaining
shi to form their private forces, the nobles and ministers took pride in associating with
renowned xia. Wei Qing (i~JW), Emperor Wu's chief commander of his armies, had a
friendship with Guo Xie (~15Wt-), the most well known youxia of the time according to
Sima Qian. When the emperor began to contain the youxia and other regional powerful
groups by moving them to places under the government's direct supervision, Guo's
name was one of those on the list. General Wei talked to the emperor on Guo's behalf,
claiming his friend should not be included. The general's plea made the emperor more
determined to remove Guo, because he did not wish to see a commoner have such
great influence. One Shi]i scholar observed that only twice in his life had General Wei
35
interceded with the emperor on behalf of a friend.

Making friends with prominent youxia was not rare among high profile generals in the
early Han. Emperor Jing's general commander Zhou Yafu (J8JTIlI::k) acted the same way.
When the Lord of Wu and six other vassal lords began their rebellion against the Han
central government, Zhou was appointed taiwei U(Jff,~·), Defense Minister, to lead the
army to put down the rebellion. When the army reached Luoyang, he met the renowned
youxia Ju Meng and they became friends. General Zhou later made this comment:
"Since Wu and Chu started their rebellion without support from Ju Meng, I know they
will not succeed!" Sima Qian's comment on this incident reads: "When the country
was put in a turmoil, the significance of obtaining Ju Meng for the Grand General
was like winning a victory over an enemy state. ,,36 Sima Qian may have overstated the
significance ofZhou's befriending Ju, but this episode indicates that at certain times the
youxia played important roles in the power struggles within the ruling class.

The xia and their local influence

When the xia first emerged on the Chunqiu stage, they reflected largely the moral
and behavioral features of the warrior class of that time. The xia and their variant,
102 Zhao

youxia, consciously acted upon principles that can be summarized as altruism, courage,
personal loyalty, integrity, sense of honor and generosity. The period of the Warring
States witnessed the rise of the noble xia. After the founding of the Han, many former
rebels became nobles of the new regime. They brought their xia temperament and
behavior into the court and officialdom. At the same time, xia influence was also
reaching down into the local levels of society. Local families of landowners joined the
xia to form a combined force that to some extent shared power with local authorities
in regional affairs. A new variant of xia appeared in the early Han. It was called haoxia
(fd~), or powerful xia. Its worst form was haoqiang (~BiU), which may be translated as
"local bully".

The bullying inclination of the xia can be found earlier in the Warring States. The Lie
Zi (90-i-) has a following story: Yu (J!l~) was a wealthy man of Liang (~), the capital
city of Wei (~). One day he was entertaining friends at his residence which overlooked
a big street. His guests were drinking, playing games and listening to music. A group
of xia came along the street and passed by the building. One guest burst into laughter
when he won his game. Meanwhile, by coincidence, a bird flying by dropped a dead
rat onto the head of one of the xia group members. The group thought the dead rat
was purposely thrown by Yu and vowed to take revenge. They set a date to come back
with their comrades. They later attacked and killed the whole Yu family.37 The story
shows the ease and willingness with which xia would take offense, sometimes on false
grounds as in the above story, and their brutality in settling such matters. Even Prince
Mengchang once led his xia retainers to massacre hundreds of people out of personal
spite, because the victims had expressed their disappointment upon seeing the prince's
short and slight stature.

As shown in the previous section, in the early Han the nobles, especially the young
princes, were attracted to the lifestyle of xia models like the four princes of the Warring
States. However, most of these young princes lacked the qualities which the four princes
frequently displayed. They were said to be pampered and high-handed. The Lord of
Wuts bitter relationship with the imperial house was initiated by the death of his son
and heir. He once sent his son to the court of Emperor Wen. The young Wu prince
was an arrogant and bellicose man. When he played chess with the crown prince, the
future Emperor jing, the prince ofWu actep belligerently and showed no respect to his
host. The equally overbearing crown prince knocked the prince down and killed him
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 103

with the chessboard in a rage. The tragic incident made the Lord ofWu resolve to take
. 38
vengeance against the court.

I found that arrogance and imperiousness were almost the defining mode of the young
princes during the early Han period. Liu Qian (~UJ!), the crown prince of Huainan,
was a notorious ruler in his vassal state. He monopolized state power, detaining his
subjects arbitrarily and seizing their land and property. He was also a skilled swordsman,
thinking himself the best in the world. When he heard Lei Pi (§t:J:JJ[), an official of the
state, was also adept in swordcraft, he summoned him to practice together. Lei yielded
several times but finally hit the prince by mistake. Lei knew the prince was angry
with him and asked to join the national army on the border. The prince blocked his
39
departure in order to punish him. Some princes even rode roughshod over their own
people to fulfill their unusual desires. A further example is the Lord of Jidong U*,JilQ3=:),
son of Lord Xiao of Liang. He was so fascinated with the lives of bandits that he led his
domestic servants and other juvenile desperadoes to loot and kill his own subjects at
40
night. Over a hundred people fell prey to his sport.

However, a local haoqiang more often would conduct himself in subtler ways. Cuan Pu
OI3C) is an example. His father, an army officer, was killed in a battle with the rebel
troops of the Lord ofWu. Cuan Pu is said to have led a squad of soldiers to gallop off
to the encampment of the Wu army. He killed many enemy soldiers and returned alone
with a number of serious wounds on his body. His bravery earned him the reputation
of a hero. He was stubborn and outspoken in character, despising any kind of flattery.
He paid little respect to those powerful and influential royal relatives who were socially
his superiors, and often picked quarrels to insult them. To those who were socially
inferior, he always showed great respect and treated them as his equals. Sima Qian
in his biography depicted Cuan as a man who "liked to conduct himself as a xia and
was absolutely true to his word." Nevertheless, his friends were primarily haoxia and
haoqiang. With his huge amount of wealth, he could keep dozens of retainers daily in
his residence. His kinsmen and retainers tyrannized the local people, securing lands
and property from them by force and trickery. The Cuan family is said to have become
an evil force in the region, giving rise to the folk saying: "When the waters of the Ying
run clear, the Cuan family is at ease; but when the waters run muddy, the entire Cuan
family will be beheaded. ,,41
104 Zhao

Although there were haoqiang like Guan Fu who used their political power and
influence to exploit and tyrannize the people within their areas, the majority of
haoqiang came from the lower levels of society. Their influence extended widely. Ban
Gu, who was critical of the expansion of xia influence, once estimated that: "They
could be found everywhere across the prefectures and states. ,,42 Even in the capital city
Chang' an, "at the height of haoxia influence, they could be found in every alley and
lane. ,,43 Sima Qian defined their spheres of influence in the four suburbs of the capital
in his time: "There are the Yao family (tL3Ef\:) in the north, the Du clan (~t-t±) in the
west, Qiu Jing (fjL~) in the south and Zhao Tuoyu (!E111m~~) in the east. ,,44 In Kuli
Liezhuan (f~j!f~?fiJfi), or Biographies of Stern Officials, he also mentioned the Xian clan
(I~L~) in Jinan UJiHt~), which consisted of over three hundred families. This clan was so
45
powerful that the local authority was unable to control it.

Sima Qian further divided the haoqiang into two major groups and described their
characteristics. First were those who "form cliques among the powerful clans, and use
their wealth to enslave the poor. They tyrannically and cruelly oppress the helpless and
weak to fulfill their desires and seek their pleasure. ,,46

The Xian clan, the four families in the suburbs of Chang' an, and most of the haoqiang
in the prefectures and states, would fall into this group. They no longer wandered from
place to place as did the youxia in the Warring States but established themselves locally
as major players. They formed alliances with other influential local families to curb the
influence of the authorities and to maintain their local interests. Their xia style of life
helped consolidate their cliques and attract more followers. Basically, they controlled
the neighborhood through their wealth and influence without openly challenging
and breaking the law. In many cases, these influential families colluded with corrupt
officials to pursue their joint interests.

The second group consisted primarily of unruly youths. Sima Qian described them as
follows:

When the youths of the lanes and alleys attack passers-by or murder them
and hide their bodies, threaten others and commit evil deeds, dig up graves
and coin counterfeit money, form gangs to bully others, lend each other
a hand in avenging wrongs, and think up secret ways to blackmail people
 The I{ise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 105

or drive them from the neighborhood, paying no heed to the laws and
prohibitions, but rushing headlong to the place of execution, it is in fact all
because of the lure of money.47

These were ruthless young thugs, who ganged together to commit crimes against
society. While most of them came from poor families and ended up as criminals and
outlaws, a few succeeded in climbing into upper society, like two of Emperor Wu's
important law enforcement ministers, Yi Zong (~~1fE) and Wang Wenshu CEilill.~T).48

Guo Xie: the sophisticated Han xia

The above two groups of haoxia, had close connections with each other. The thuggish
behavior of the latter often served the interests of the former, while the former would
often protect the latter when cornered by the authorities. Many haoxia in the first group
originated from the latter group when they were young. The life of Guo Xie, the most
prominent haoxia in Sima Qian's time, shows how these two groups were interlinked
and how they developed their influence. Guo was one of the figures Sima Qian openly
admired. The historian tried to distinguish his beloved commoner xia model from the
notorious local bullies, who were regarded by most of the historian's contemporaries as
the mainstream xia. Sima Qian was successful to some extent in making a distinction
in his description of Guo Xie, but in so doing he revealed quite a few characteristics of
the haoxia.

Guo's detailed biography provides one of the most complete portraits of a haoxia. For
purpose of analysis, the entire biography, based on Burton Watson's translation, is
presented here with my comments interspersed.

Guo Xie, whose polite name was Wengbo (~1Ij), was a native of Zhi (q!~=~).
He was a grandson on his mother's side of the famous physiognomist Xu
Fu (Bf~), who was skilled at reading people's faces. Guo Xie's father was
executed in the time of Emperor Wen because of his activities as a xia. Guo
Xie was short in stature and very quick-tempered; he did not drink wine.
In his youth he was sullen, vindictive, and quick to anger when crossed in
his will, and this led him to kill a great many people. In addition, he would
take it upon himself to avenge the wrongs of his friends and conceal men
who were fleeing from the law. He was constantly engaged in some kind of
106 Zhao

evil, robbing or assaulting people, while it would be impossible to say how

many times he was guilty of counterfeiting money or looting graves. He
met with extraordinary luck, however, and no matter what difficulties he
found himself in, he always managed to escape or was pardoned by a general
amnesty. When he grew older, he had a change of heart and became much
more upright in his conduct, rewarding hatred with virtue, giving generously
and expecting little in return. In spite of this, he took more and more delight
in daring and chivalrous actions. Whenever he saved someone's life, he
would never boast of his achievements. At heart he was still as ill-tempered
as ever, however, and his meanness would often flare forth in a sudden angry
look. The young men of the time emulated his actions and would often take
it upon themselves to avenge his wrongs without telling him.

The above description displays two new features of the Han youxia. The first one is
that xia behavior was passed on from father to son. Guo came from a youxia family
and followed his father's footsteps to become a xia. Even his father's execution by the
authorities did not intimidate him into giving up his xia style of life. The second is that
he was an outlaw, who committed various kinds of crimes against the authorities and
society, before becoming a renowned youxia.

The son of Guo Xie's elder sister, relying upon [Guo] Xie's power and
position, was once drinking with a man and tried to make him drink up all
the wine. Though the man protested that it was more than he could do, Xie's
nephew threatened him and forced him to drain the cup. In anger the luan
drew his sword, stabbed and killed the nephew, and ran away. Xie's sister
was furious. "POI' all my brother's so-called sense of duty," she exclaimed,
"He allows his own nephew to be murdered and will not even go after the
culprid" Then she threw her son's corpse into the street and refused to bury
it, hoping to shame Xie into action. Guo Xie sent men to discover where the
murderer was hiding and the latter, fearful of the consequences, returned of
his own accord and reported to Xie exactly what had happened. "You were
quite right to kill my nephew," said Xie. "He was at fauld" Then he let the
murderer go and, laying the blame for the incident entirely on his nephew,
took the corpse away and buried it. When men heard of this, they all
admired Xie's righteousness and flocked about him in increasing numbers.
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 107

The crude and overbearing actions of Guo's nephew were typical of Han haoqiang
descendants. Guo's reaction to the incident showed that the xia side of his character
predominated over the haoqiang side of cruel-heartedness. This is where Guo Xie
was different from the ordinary Han haoqiang and why he was admired by his fellow
men and the historian as well. Forbearance and vindictiveness created a tension in his
character. Sima Qian called this yinzei (I)~~), and he used the term twice in the first
paragraph of Guo's biography to indicate that this tension was fundamental to his
character.

Whenever Guo Xie came or went, people were careful to get out of his way.
Once, however, there was a man who, instead of moving aside, merely sat
sprawled by the road and stared at Xie. Xie sent someone to ask the man's
name. Xie's retainers wanted to kill the man on the spot, but Xie told them,
"If I am not respected in the village where I live, it must be that my virtue is
insufficient to command respect. What fault has this man committed?" Then
he sent secret instructions to the military officials of the district, saying,
"This man is very important to me. Whenever his turn comes for military
service, see that he is let of£1" As a result, the man was let off from military
service every time his turn came, and the officials made no attempt to look
for him. The man was baffled by this and asked the reason, whereupon he
discovered that Xie had instructed that he be excused. The man then went
to Xie and, baring his arms, humbly apologized for his former disrespect..
When the young men of the district heard of this, they admired Xie's
conduct even more.

In Han China, streets would be evacuated for passage of ranking officials and imperial
tours. Guo's fellow townsmen gave way to Guo whenever he was about, and it was
regarded as unusual when someone failed to do so. He exercised his influence not only
over the common people in his neighborhood, from whom he would neither expect
nor tolerate any challenge, but also over the local officials, with whom he would collude
to arrange things in his favor. Connection with government officials of different levels
was a major source of Han haoqiang power. Guo Xie's influence was not limited to his
neighborhood, it reached to other areas as the following passage shows:

In Luoyang there were two families which were carrying on a feud and,
108 Zhao

although ten or more of the worthy and eminent residents of the city had
tried to act as mediators between them, they refused to accept a settlement.
Someone asked Guo Xie to help in the matter and he went at night to
visit the hostile families, who finally gave in and agreed to listen to Xie's
arguments. Then he told them, "I have heard that the gentlemen of Luoyang
have attempted to act as mediators, but that you have refused to listen to
any of them. Now, fortunately, you have consented to pay attention to me.
However, I would certainly not want it to appear that I came here from
another district and tried to steal anthority from the virtuous men of your
own city!" He therefore went away the same night so that people would not
know of his visit, telling the feuding families, "Pay no attention to my advice
for a while and wait until I have gone. Then let the eminent men of Luoyang
act as your mediators and do as they say!"

Guo's sophistication is shown in how he mediated between the feuding families. He

demonstrated his ability to unite the different haoxia and haoqiang groups to pursue
their common interests in the locality. This was rarely seen among the pre-Qin xia, who
acted more out of straightforward impulsiveness. The Han xia, especially the haoxia
type, preferred using their influence and diplomacy to resorting to force.

Guo Xie was very respectful in his behaviour and would never venture to ride
in a carriage when entering the office of his district. He would often journey
to neighbouring provinces or states in answer to some request for aid. In
such cases, if he thought he could accomplish what had been asked of him,
he would undertake to do so, but if he thought the request was impossible,
he would go to pains to explain the reasons to the satisfaction of the other
party, and only then would he consent to accept food and wine. As a result,
people regarded him with great awe and respect and vied with each other in
offering him their services. Every night ten or more carriages would arrive at
his gate bearing young men of the town or members of the eminent families
of neighbouring districts who had come begging to be allowed to take some
of Xie's guests and retainers into their own homes.

His relation with the local authorities was one in which each used the other for their
own ends. This coexistence with the authorities was crucial to him, as well as to the
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 109

Han haoxia in general, in order to maintain their influence over the common people.
Since only rich people and officials could ride in carriages at the time, Guo entered the
district office always on foot to show his modesty. Like Guo, the Han haoxia sought
to share power and influence with the authorities. They accom.plished it usually by
ensuring they did not alienate the latter. This was another characteristic of the Han
haoxia. While the authorities may have needed the haoxia's cooperation in the local
area to carry out duties such as collecting taxes and conscripting labor, the haoxia
needed the authorities' backing, more often their tacit permission, to legitimize their
activities.

When the order went out for powerful and wealthy families in the provinces
to be moved to Maoling (ar~), Guo's Xie's family was exempted, since his
wealth did not come up to the specified amount. He was so well known,
however, that the officials were afraid they would get into trouble if they
did not order him to move. General Wei Qing spoke to the emperor on his
behalf, explaining that Guo Xie's wealth was not sufficient to require him to
move. But the emperor replied, "If this commoner has enough influence to
get you to speak for him, general, he cannot be so very poor!" So in the end
Guo Xie's family was ordered to move, and the people who came to see him
off presented him with over 10,000,000 cash as a farewell gift. The man who
was responsible for originally recommending Guo Xie for transportation to
Maoling was a district official named Yang, the son of Yang Jizhu of Zhi.
In retaliation for this, the son of Guo Xie's elder brother cut off the head of
Yang, and as a result the Yang and the Guo families became bitter enemies.

It is not surprising that Guo had friends like the grand general Wei Qing, since
befriending xia and youxia was not rare among the generals in the Western Han period.
The chief commander of the army, Zhou Yafu, had willingly made himself a friend of
the renowned youxia Ju Meng. The astonishing fact is that Guo's family dared to kill
the law enforcement official whom they regarded as the mastermind of their forced
migration, without causing the local authorities to look into the incident. If the family
of the official had not lodged a complaint directly with the throne, it seems that Guo
would have escaped scot-free. The local authority's avoidance of the matter shows how
great Guo's influence was in the district.
110 Zhao

After Guo Xie entered the Pass, the worthy and eminent men within the
Pass, both those who had known him before and those who had not, soon
learned of his reputation and vied with each other in making friends with
him. Some time after this, Yang Jizhu, the father of the official who had
recommended that Xie be moved to Maoling, was murdered. The Yang
family sent a letter of protest to the throne, but someone murdered the
bearer of the letter outside the gate of the imperial palace. When the emperor
learned of this, he sent out the legal officials to arrest Guo Xie. Xie fled and,
leaving his mother and the other members of his family at Xiayang (~~~),
escaped to Linjin ([4~T=f). Ji Shaogong (*iY%), who had charge of the pass
at Linjin, had never known Guo Xie. Therefore, when Xie assumed a false
name and asked to be allowed to go through the pass, Ji Shaogong gave him
permission. From there Xie turned and entered the region ofTaiyuan (::tNl).
Whenever Xie stopped anywhere in his flight, he would make his destination
known to his host, so that as a result the law officials were able to trail him
without difficulty. When his trail led to Ji Shaogong, however, ]i Shaogong
committed suicide to keep from having to give any information. After some
time, Guo Xie was captured, and a thorough investigation made of all his
crimes. It was found, however, that all the murders he had committed had
taken place before the last amnesty.

Ji Shaogong was an official in charge of issuing exit permits to those who had legal
documents to leave through the Pass. Although he and Guo Xie were completely
unknown to each other, Ji killed himself when he learned that the person he let go
was Guo Xie. In Sima Qian's opinion, he did this to eliminate any dues as to Guo's
movement. Sima Qian and his contemporary historians did not leave any further
information about Ji Shaogong. But he was obviously an official with xia spirit.
Sacrificing oneself to rescue a friend or comrade was central to the xia code. ]i knew
what would happen to him under Emperor Wu's severe penal code if it were found
that he let Guo go through the Pass. In addition, possibly as a xia himself, Ji may have
felt indebted to Guo for telling him where he was going, because this had given him
the opportunity of informing the searchers of Guo's whereabouts. Ji also may have felt
offended by Guo's leaving him a way out. He therefore took his own life to show that
he was a true xia and would never betray the xia code, even though Guo tempted him
to do so by telling him his next destination.
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty III

There was a certain Confucian scholar from Zhi who was sitting with the
imperial envoys at Guo Xie's investigation. When one of Xie's retainers
praised Xie, the Confucian scholar remarked, "Guo Xie does nothing but
commit crimes and break the law! How can anyone call him a worthy man?"
The retainer happened to overhear his words and later killed the Confucian
scholar and cut out his tongue. The law officials tried to lay the blame on
Xie, though as a matter of fact he did not know who had committed the
murder. The murderer disappeared, and in the end no one ever found out
who he was. The officials finally submitted a report to the throne declaring
that Xie was innocent of the charges brought against him, but the imperial
secretary Gongsun Hong objected, saying, "Xie, although a commoner, has
taken the authority of the government into his own hands in his activities
as a xia, killing anyone who gave him so much as a cross look. Though he
did not know the man who murdered the Confucian scholar, his guilt is
greater than if he had done the crime himself. He should be condemned as
a treasonable and unprincipled crimina!!" In the end Guo Xie and all the
49
members of his family were executed.

The Confucian scholar was merely stating the obvious in refuting the claim that
Guo was a virtuous man. His refutation had little influence on the imperial envoys
investigating Guo's case. Nevertheless, he was not spared by the Guo's followers. This
was too much for a regime which sought to expand its authority. Gongsun Hong's
rationale for executing Guo well expressed the mentality of the regime: It could not
coexist with a force which rose from the grass-roots level of society and stole from it a
part of its authority in ruling the land. The Han authorities had every reason to think
the xia, and their variant forms haoxia and haoqiang, were the kind of challenge they
must respond to ruthlessly.

Suppression of the xia in the Han Dynasty

Sima Qian depicted the social situation in the early Han in the following remark: "At
that time, the net of the law was slack and the people were rich. It was possible for men
to use their wealth to exploit others and to accumulate huge fortunes. Some, such as
the great landowners and powerful families, were able to do anything they pleased in
50
the countryside." Sima Qian here was primarily referring to the haoxia and haoqiang
groups, who had banded together with the influential local families, and gangs of
112 Zhao

unruly youths. These non-official forces challenged the power of the government in the
locality. Their suppression became inevitable.

The large-scale suppression of these local forces was initiated under the reign of
Emperor Jing (i~;t1i'f 151-141 B.C.). The previous half century witnessed the Han
empire moving from recovery to prosperity. Economic development paved the way for
political expansion of the central government. Emperor Jing was a strong-willed and
harsh ruler. Right after he ascended the throne, he launched a campaign to reduce the
power and territory of his vassal lords. This caused the rebellion led by the Lords of
Wu and Chu. The emperor suppressed the rebellion, finally eliminating the threat to
the center from the recalcitrant vassal states headed by members of the royal house.
After removing the main obstacle to his political goals, the emperor turned to make the
youxia and haoqiang his second target of attack.

The method usually taken by Emperor Jing to suppress these forces was to send
what were known as stern (or "cruel") officials (kuli ~~~) into the areas where xia or
haoqiang influence constituted a threat to his government. Zhi Du (~5tl)) was the first

such official entrusted by Emperor Jing. The Biographies of Stern Officials in the Shi Ji
record that:

The Xian clan of Ji'nan, consisting of over 300 households, was notorious
for its power and lawlessness, and none of the 2,000 local officials could
do anything to control it. Emperor Jing thereupon appointed Zhi Du as
governor of Ji'nan. As soon as he reached the province, he executed the worst
offenders among the Xian clan, along with the members of their families,
51
and the rest were all overwhelmed with fear.

The emperor also appointed other stern officials such as Ning Cheng (~nX:) and
Zhouyang You (Jj!fJ I)~ EI=I) to the regions to wipe out xia or haoqiang forces. However, the
suppression of local haoqiang influence achieved only superficial and temporary results.
Sima Qian put it ironically in the Biographies of the Youxia:

At the time the Xian clan ofJi'nan and the Zhou Yong (mJJI) family of Chen
(I~) were both noted for their great power and influence. When Emperor
Jing heard of this, he sent an envoy to execute all the members. After this,
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 113

Han Wupi (!j!YM~~~$) of Liang (W2), Xue Xiong (f:i*£) ofYangdi (I~}~~), Han
Ru (~~H~) of Shan (pj{) and various members of the Bai clan (~'lf B) of Dai (1-t),
. 51
came to prommence.

In fact, many noble families, local government officials and haoqiang were bound by
common economic and political interests, although they were often in conflict in local
power struggles. The members of the first two groups not only protected the interests
of the haoqiang when they were in conflict together with the central government, but
also involved themselves in haoqiang activities. With the help of the two ruling groups,
haoqiang used every avenue of influence to strike back at individual officials who were
sent by the central government to diminish or eliminate their influence. Almost all the
so-called kuli listed in Sima Qian's biographies who established their fame through
suppressing local haoqiang (and sometimes even in-laws of the royal house) were
eventually executed by imperial order. Zhi Du's harsh interrogation of the Prince of
Linjiang (~%iI3~), who had been deposed as crown prince to Emperor ling, forced the
young man to kill himself. The prince's powerful grandmother, Empress Dowager Dou,
resented this bitterly and eventually found an excuse to put Zhi Du to death. With
Zhi Du's death, those powerful families and haoqiang (*1-~ ~~), who once suffered
53
from his terror, resumed their old vices. The emperor's campaign against the haoqiang
relied chiefly upon a handful of stern and ruthless officials. However, by the time of his
death the emperor had not succeeded in curbing the influence of the haoqiang.

Emperor Jing's successor, Emperor Wu U:lff:tw r 141-87 B.C.), continued his

father's undertakings in this respect. He readjusted his father's anti-haoqiang policy
and coordinated it with other measures. First, Emperor Wu promoted many stern
officials to key posts of law enforcement at both the central and local levels. Ning
Cheng and Zhouyang You, the two most notorious stern officials from Emperor
Jing's reign, were promoted by Emperor Wu. Zhouyang was described at the time of
Emperor Wu's enthronement by his contemporary Sima Qian as "the mo'st cruel and
tyrannical official." He would twist the law to have people he favored set free even if
they were serious criminals and he would bend the law to any lengths to destroy those
he hated. His record of killing haoqiang in his tenure of various local offices drew the
attention of the emperor. 54 Because of the emperor's encouragement and advocacy of
harsh governance, his officials became cruel and often bloodthirsty. Sima Qian stated
that "the officials for the most part were men of the same type as Ning Cheng and
114 Zhao

Zh ouyang \TIOU. ,,55

Zhang Tang (*i~) was the most repressive of Emperor Wu's official. He undertook the
investigation and trial of many important cases such as those of the Lord of Huainan
and the Lord of Jiangdu. On every occasion he was able to "uproot all the adherents"
U*1i!:5t~) and "go deep to the bottom of the case" (1=Yf;H~*). He was thus highly
regarded by the emperor, who appointed him deputy prime minister and kept him
in that post for seven years. Zhang masterminded many specific measures against
law-breakers, such as those who failed to report their holdings accurately under the
Declaration of Property Decree (E~-%). Eliminating local haoqiang forces was the
56
rationale behind these measures.

Emperor Wu also deliberately put officials who had formerly been xia or haoqiang
themselves in charge of suppressing the haoqiang. Yi Zong and Wang Wenshu,
mentioned in the previous section, were examples of this. The first action Yi took
after assuming office in Henei OiiJ pq) district as duwei (~~~t: chief commander for
local security and law enforcement) was to execute the whole family of the local
haoqiang Xiang (fl~). Later the emperor appointed him governor of Dingxiang (JE~)
Prefecture, where haoqiang forces were rampant. Soon after he arrived in his office, he
sent troops to surround the prison and seized over two hundred men accused of major
and minor crimes, along with another two hundred or so of their friends and relatives
who had slipped into the jail to visit the prisoners. He accused the latter group of
plotting to free those prisoners who deserved to die, and ordered all of them executed
along with the two hundred prisoners. After this massacre, the remaining haoqiang in
the area were all obedient to his rule. 57

Wang Wenshu, the most feared legal official of Emperor Wu, also began his life
as a youthful xia. He carried the ruthlessness and cruelty of his past into his later
career as a law enforcement official. His biography contains terrible stories of his
cold-bloodedness. He had many people arrested. Over 1,000 families were implicated.
Most of them were executed during the first winter after he was appointed to his office.
He was very disappointed when the winter was over:

When the beginning of spring came Wang stamped his foot and sighed, "Ah!
If only I could make the winter last one more month I could finish my work
 The Rise and Fall of the xia in the Western Han Dynasty 115

to satisfaction!" Such was his fondness for slaughter and demonstrations of

power and his lack of love for others. When the emperor heard of this he
concluded that Wang was a man of ability and transferred him to the post of
58
zhongwei (1=j=l1~:I"), the military commander of the capita1.

Wang's biography continues to tell us that during his tenure he took in many equally
ruthless officials as his aides in suppressing the local haoqiang. They put many haoqiang
and their families into prison. Most of them ended up either being executed or dying
in prison, with few leaving the prison alive. Under the personal encouragement of
Emperor Wu, those leading regional officials who were desirous of impressing the
emperor with their harshness all followed Wang's policy of" ruling with terror" (tUR~1.?,
i§).59 It is said that when Sima Qian concluded the Biographies of Stern OfficiaLs in the
later years of the emperor's reign, there were around seventy thousand people detained
by the central law enforcement ministry alone and over one hundred thousand by
its subordinate departments. Among them were many from throughout the country
believed to be haoqiang. Although the forces of the local haoqiang were heavily hit by
the repression, many managed to survive and eventually regained their lost ground.

Emperor Wu took a further measure to control the local haoqiang forces. The emperor
was under the strong influence of necromancers and alchemists. One year after
he ascended the throne, he began to construct his mausoleum in Maoling, to the
northwest of the capital. He encouraged people to migrate to the place by awarding
them money and free land. Ten years later, his newly appointed policy advisor Zhufu
Yan (:=EXill ?-127 B.C.) submitted a memorial to the throne suggesting:

Now that Your Majesty's mausoleum has been established at Maoling in the
suburbs, it would be advisable to gather together the wealthy and powerful
families and the troublemakers among the people from all over the empire
and resettle them at Maoling. In this way you will increase the population of
the capital area and at the same time prevent the spread of evil and vicious
ways in the provinces. This is called preventing danger without resorting to
. hments. 60
punls

The emperor adopted this proposal and issued an edict ordering haoqiang and other
influential families whose property value exceeded three million jin to move to Maoling
116 Zhao

under the direct surveillance of the central government. G1 The significance of this
measure was more political than economic. Many haoqiang families were pulled out of
their power bases and most of them became less influential, or even lost all influence
in their new place of abode. Large-scale forced migration of powerful families was
frequently implemented, and the biographic annals of Emperor Wu contain a specific
G2
account of one such in his later years. Haoqiang families were not only forced to
move to within arm's reach of the emperor; some were also moved to the northwest
frontier. In the fifth year ofYuanshou (:J[J~: 118 B.C.), the emperor ordered that "the
treacherous be moved from across the country to the borders in company with officials
and commoners."G3 Many youxia were believed among them. Li Ling (*I~$t) once
reported to the emperor that "those I command at the border were all brave warriors,
excellent soldiers and swordsmen from Jingchu Of'ij~). They are able to catch tigers and
· any target. "G4
hIt

As the result of Emperor Wu's various measures of suppression, the regional influence
of the xia and haoqiang was reduced in the later years of his reign. However, it was still
far from being eliminated. Sima Qian made the point clearly that after the execution
G5
of Guo Xie the xia were still numerous across the land. Under the reign of Emperor
Xuan (?g~1K1(i r. 74-49), the grandson of Emperor Wu, the influence of haoqiang once
again began to pose a threat to the local government in many areas. The Han Shu has
the following account:

In Zhuo Prefecture (i%~:il~ in Hebei), there were two big families, the
Western Gao (f§i%.t\) and Eastern Gao (JRi%.t\). All officials from the
prefecture level avoided them out of fear, never daring to offend them. Those
officials would say: "We would rather disappoint the governor than the great
haoqiang families." The retainers of the two Gao families unscrupulously
committed robberies and thievery and would flee to the Gao fortresses
whenever discovered. No official dared to chase them. It had been the
situation for quite a long time. Nobody dared walk on the street without
. weapons at t1le rea dy. GG
carryl11g

This situation further worsened under the reign of Emperor Cheng (ii)1X;1if r. 33-7
B.C.). The influence of haoxia and haoqiang even infiltrated into the capital Chang'an,
under the very eyes of the central government, as related in the Han Shu:
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 117

Between Yongshi (7i(~f::l 16-13 B.C.) and Yuanyan (nJJ1 12-9 B.C.),
Emperor Cheng was weary of holding court. The influence of imperial
relatives prevailed. The Hongyang (~II~) and Changzhong (:L~1$) brothers
made friends with frivolous xia and sheltered desperadoes. In Beidi (~t
1m) a haoqiang named Hao Shang (if5 itli) and his followers killed the chief
of Yiqu (~~) with his wife and children, six people in all, out of revenge.
Yet, Hao could still come and go in Chang'an. The office of deputy prime
minister sent its officials to chase the culprits. An imperial order was also
issued to arrest Hao. It took a long time to bring him to justice. The number
of villains was gradually growing in Chang' an. The youths from the alleys
ganged up in groups to kill officials. They were hired to take revenge. They
cast pellets [to decide what to do]. The red pellet went to cut down a military
officer, the black one to cut down a civic official, and the white one to
arrange the funeral of a fellow gangster. As dusk came to the city, they turned
out in a cloud of dust to rob people. The dead and injured were left lying on
67
the street. Alarms were sounded all the time.

Faced with this rampant development of haoxia influence and activity, the government
of Emperor Cheng seemed unable to do more than appoint strong officials. However,
the government was now much weaker and had little confidence of crushing the haoxia
and haoqiang forces. It was capable now of securing order only in the capital and the
neighboring areas. When Wang Zun (3:.$) was appointed mayor of the capital city (~
~bjl), he immediately arrested and executed a group of haoxia in the city: Yu Zhang (~

~), Zhang Hui (~Im), Zhao Jundu (Jl:j1JEPli~) and Jia Ziguang Cl~T:Yt), who "as famous
haoxia in Chang' an were all engaged in taking revenge and retaining assassins. ,,68 Years
later, an even harsher official Yin Shang (jl:l) was appointed to the post. The difficult
situation he confronted is described in the continuation of the above account in the
Han Shu:

Yin Shang was selected to be the mayor of Chang'an (~~bj=l') from the top of
the recommendation list and allowed to do whatever he would see fit. Upon
arriving at his office, he built up prisons, which were several-zhang-deep
pits surrounded by a wall with a huge stone covering on top. He named
them huxue (JjE1\), or the tiger's den. Then he instructed his aides and
various levels of officials to list all those frivolous youths and evil juveniles,
118 Zhao

unregistered merchants, and those wearing bright suits of armor and carrying
weapons. Several hundred were listed. Yin Shang assembled all officials in
Chang'an one morning with hundreds of carriages, sending them to take
all the people on the list into custody. He accused them all of collaborating
with the rebels. He read the list and released one from every group of ten.
The remaining people were put into the huxue, one hundred for each. All
the huxue were covered by huge stones. When the stones were removed days
later, all of them were found dead with their bodies lying on top of each
other. The bodies were all buried near a monastery at Hengdong ('liiJR). The
names of the dead were left at their burying place. A hundred days later, the
families of the dead were allowed to take back the bodies. They were wailing
while the passers-by all lamented. A ballad spread in the city of Chang'an:
"Where to find the place where they have died? It will be in the grounds for
the youth of Hengdong. If you behave yourself recklessly when you are alive,
where else will your body be found when you are dead?,,69

Yin's suppression was so cruel that the event became an often-used allusion in later
youthful xia literature. Those released by Yin were either the leading haoxia, or the
children of former officials or rich families. They escaped punishment. The pardoned
haoxia leaders were later recruited to pursue and capture their fellow haoxia, rebels
70
and other outlaws. During the later years of the Western Han, the common strategy
adopted by the regime in suppressing haoxia and haoqiang was to split the local
haoqiang forces and to use one group to combat another. In Ban Gu's Biographies ofthe
Youxia, the three most famous haoxia of the time, Lou Hu (1~MIi), Chen Zun (I~~)
and Yuan She (JJJ{rW) were all appointed to local offices.

From Emperor Jing to the usurper Wang Mang (.±#f r. 5-23), suppression of local
xia forces was the consistent policy of the Han regime. Along with the xia, haoxia and
haoqiang, numerous innocent people died at the hands of stern and repressive officials.
Bao Xuan Uuffill) , an official in the court of Emperor Ai (il-R1ff r. 6-1 B.C.), once
pointed out in a memorial to the throne that there were "seven major causes of death"
(1=::JE): first was death caused by torture by the stern officials, second by excessive
71
punishments, and third by the framing of innocent people. The first three causes
were all related to the suppression policy of the government. Atrocities committed by
the government were the main cause of unnatural death at the time, according to Bao.
 The Rise and Fall of the x£a in the Western Han Dynasty 119

However, the sustained nature of this suppression also shows that the local haoxia forces
stubbornly resisted over the long term any attempt by the government to strip them
of their economic and political interests. Both Sima Qian and Ban Gu noticed that
even under such harsh measures, as one group of xia fell, others rose, as if they were
unconquerable. The Western Han was the one time in history in which local xia forces
constituted a real threat to the regime, which is why they drew such extraordinary
attention from the authorities as well as the official historians.

After the Western Han, while the xia continued to exist, especially in the lower social
levels, no further biographies of xia were written by official historians. Many reasons
explain this silence. Among them three stand out. One was the suppressive government
policy towards the xia and other non-governmental forces in the succeeding Eastern
Han. The second was the increasing dominance of Confucianism in the ideological
system, which stifled political dissent among the literati. The third was that the xia
themselves underwent great changes during the period and they became far removed
from their classical model in the pre-Qin eras. The xia were gradually disappearing
from the mainstream political scene in real world, but meanwhile the idealization and
mythologization of the xia began.

Notes
1 Ma Chiying (1987), v.l, <JJVJ~*~r.>, that was in September of 208 B.C., pp264-6.
2 ibid., pp.275-7 and p.289. At the famous Hongmen Banquet O.n&~~~), Xiang Bo shielded
Liu Bang from the intended attack of Xiang Zhuang (JJi5i£) with his own body. On another
occasion, when the furious Xiang Yu ordered the captured father of Liu Bang to be killed,
Xiang Bo prevented it.
3 ibid., pp.264-S.
4 Liang, Qichao (1971), p.52.
Ma Chiying (1987), v.S, <5:&~~p~9iJ1~>, pp.2593-4.
G ibid., <*{!l~;(fJ9iJ1~>, pp.2738-9. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasry J, p.250.
7 ibid., <[f1ht9iJ1~>, pp.2663-5. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasty J, pp.201-2.
8 Liang, Qichao (1971), p.53. It was approximately eight hundred years from the founding
of Qi in the early Zhou to the suicide ofTian Heng.
9 Ma Chiying (I 987), v.l, <~1:l1*~r.>, pp.298-30S.
10 Sa, Mengwu. Shuihu yu Zhongguo shehui (7J(mtlij·I:I~ OOH~) (Changsha: Yueiu shushe,
1987), p.3.
120 Zhao

II Qian J-Jan shu C~ln~1!f), djW.l~T >, p.393.

12 1'b'dV. 4, < ;:'JJ,{~'~ij-~'
1 ., II~i:k L!:'. :;;a'<.>, pp.
2083 -.
5
13 ibid., <!It!tn5;J:13iit*>, pp.21 0 1-2.
14 ibid., p.2l12. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasty J, p.124-5.
15 ibid., v.5, <**j~;tIJ?1lj{i>, pp.2742-3. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasty J,
pp.251-2.
16 ibid., dei1§}~;Uf:\?1iJl~>, pp.2655-7.
17 ibid., <~Jr~~IJ*-il?1ljl~>, pp.2666-9 and <*;t1J~:;{fi?11j1~>, p.2739.
18 ibid., <*;tIJ~;tfl?1ljli>, p.2744. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasty J, p.253.
19 ibid., v.G, <1f1Fi~q'9Ijfi>, p.3144.
20 1'b'd
1 ., V. 5,<Jll!J).L ':1:::.5''11]:\>, pp. 2717 - 8.
l'Wl~ll::');l':;Iilu'-

21 ibid., <WU{9!d~t,*jill?11J1~>, p.273l.

22 ibid., v.l, <~t:ll2jqr.>, p.343.
23 ibid., v.5, <WiJfijXri~f~Jm9Ij{i>,p.2732.
24 Wang, Xiangian. Hou Han shu (1;£?9Hlll:~W(:), v.G7, <R:fJm91J1~>, p.782.
25 Ma Chiying (1987), v.5, dl~JI='I*M~9Ij{i>, pp.2G04-7. See also Watson's translation, Han
Dynasty J, pp.142-4.
26 ibid., <*1rj~1lJ9Ijl~>, pp.274l-2.
27 ibid., <~:l?ii:~ltL{j?1IHi>, p.2753. See also Watson's translation, Han Dynasty J, p.46l.
28 Ma Chiying (1987), v.5, <~f.~Hl~j*9IJf~>, pp.2745-54.
2') Qian Han shu (~n:9~~:), p.343.
30 Ma Chiying (1987), v.G, <~·3::' ~~l?1IJf~>, pp.2838-40.
31 1'b'd :;J-'=="',_lj"C>?
Li <JJ./J~
1 ., v.~, _~>, p. 2149 .
32 ibid., <~4~Etl±*>, pp.2131-3.
33 ibid., v.G, <i1j~T-¥j~f UJ ?1lJ1i> , p.3117.
34 ibid., <?1}UtlEttd~9Ijl~>, pp.285G-Gl.
35 ibid., <iljJ.1~9Ij{i>, p.3229.
36 ibid., p.3225.
37 Lie zi zhu (?1IJ-=fyt), <ID11~:>, 9G-7.
38 Ma Chiying (1987), v.G, <~3::.UJ:l?1IJf~>, p.2839.
39 ibid., <111~T-*J1f1~rI.Li?1iJl~>, p.310G.
40 ibid., v.4, <~q:3::'·lJt*>, p.2138.
41 ibid., v.G, <:s\&J~lE~$:9IJ1i>, pp.28G3-4.
42 Qian Han shu (Mi~i!r), v.92, <?ljJ:1~l~>, p.343.
 The Rise and Fall of the xl:a in the We..stern Han Dynasty 121

4.J ibid.
44 Ma Chiying (1987), v.6, <VH-1~§IHi>, p.3231.
45 ibid., <~Jli~§'Jli>, p.31G2.
46 ibid., dh-riiJt§IJli>, p.3223.
47 ibid., <1~Y!1!§ljii>, pp.3327 -8. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasty II, pp.446-7.
48 ibid., <~1:i~§ljii>, p.3178 and pp.3183-G.
49 ibid., <i1t19t§IJli>, pp.3226-30. See also Watson's translation in Han Dynasty II, pp.413-7.
50 ibid., v.3, <:'>:Iz:q~tf>, p.1449. See also Watson's translation in I-fan Dynasty II, p.63.
51 ibid., v.6, <§Jli~§ljli>, p.3162. See also Han Dynasty II, p.381.
52 ibid., <i1t1iJt§lJii>, p.3226. See also Han Dynasty II, p.413.
53 ibid., v.G, <~Jli~§U1i>, p.31G3.
54 ibid., p.3164. See also Han Dynasty II, p.384.
55 ibid., p.31G5. See also Han Dynasty II, p.384.
56 ibid., pp.3169-72.
57 ibid., pp.3178-9. See also Han Dynasty II, p.295-G.
58 ibid., p3181-2. See also Han Dynasty II, pp.398-9.
59 ibid., p.318G and p.3190.
60 ibid., <lFi~r19c:i::X§ljii>, p.2976. See also Han Dynasty II, p.204.
61 Qian Han shu (Mtr?~~fJ), v.G, <li:'tff,~:c>, p.19.
'b'd p. 22 .
62 1 1 .,

63 ibid., p.20.
64 Qian Han shu (8trilff), <$Jtif9tli>, p.230.
65 Shijijinzhu (9:~c:4-yt), v.G, <ih-r1~§U1i>, p.3231.
66 Qian Han shu (Mtr?~~tf), v.90, <IDi~i~ii>, p.340.
67 ibid., pp.340-1.
68 ibid., p.343.
69 ibid., p.341.
70 ibid., p.341.
71 'b'd
1 1 ., V. 72 ,< {tibr.!=>i-
.."illEL ].\>, p. 2 86 .

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