ReligiousBeliefs,Metaphysical

of Science
Beliefs,andHistoriography
By StephenJ. Wykstra*

T HE MISSION assignedto me in thisessay is to providea "philosophicalanal-

ysis" of the differencebetweenreligiousand metaphysicalbeliefs-of how
(or,ifthechipsso fall,whether)we shoulddrawthisdistinction. The taskis concep-
tual, but the underlyingmotivationis historiographical. By reflectingon how we
drawthisdistinction, myhope is to see how historyof science maybetterilluminate
thedistinctive role of religiousbeliefsin past science.
The essay has fourparts.PartI considerssome issues raisedby recenthistorians
of sciencewhichneed to be takenseriouslyifa philosophicalanalysisis to haveany
relevanceto workinghistorians.In particular,an analysismusthelp us to avoid a
whiggish"essentialism"thatimposesourown metacategories ("religion,""science,"
etc.) on thepast; it mustalso help us to avoid "metaphysicalizing" religiousbeliefs
(barbarichabitsdeservebarbaricnames!) and so to illuminatehow theconditioning
effectof religiousbeliefsmaydifferfromthatof metaphysicalbeliefs(whose role
has long been recognized).Turning,then,to thephilosophicaltask,partII suggests
thatin delineatingthese categories,we must fertilizea Wittgensteinian family-
resemblanceapproachwiththeepistemologist's betweenbeliefsqua 'be-
distinction
lieveds' (the contentof the beliefs) and beliefs qua 'believings' (the acts of be-
how thisapproachmight
lieving).PartIII thenuses some historicalcases to illustrate
affectour process of classifyinga beliefas metaphysical,as religious,or as scien-
tific.Finally,partIV suggestsone way in whichour vision of thenatureof science
needs to be broadenedif we are to accountfortheroles thatmetaphysicaland reli-
gious believingsplay withinthescientificprocess.

*CalvinCollege,Department HiemengaHall 340,3201 BurtonSt.,GrandRapids,

ofPhilosophy,
MI 49546
I thankThe Pew CharitableTrustandCalvinCollegeforsponsoring a CalvinCollegeSeminarin
ChristianScholarshipallowingme to workon aspectsoftheideaspresented here.I am indebtedto
manypeopleforhelpfulcomments: Rev. Dr. JohnPolkinghorne, mycolleaguesin thephilosophy
department at CalvinCollege,WilliamAlston,Ed Manier,Margaret Osler,severalanonymous ref-
erees,andJitsevanderMeerofthePascal Centre.Butaboveall I wantto thankRev.DavidFife,of
PigeonCoveChapel,PigeonCove,Mass.,forhiscontinued encouragement, fellowship,andsupport
duringoursabbaticalon Cape Anne.
This essaywas commissioned by JitsevanderMeer fortheSecondInternational Pascal Centre
Conference on ScienceinTheisticContexts heldat thePascal CentreforAdvancedStudiesinFaith
andScience,Redeemer College,Oncaster,Ontario, Canada,21-5 July1998.Theessaywasprecircu-
latedas a commonreference pointto allow participantsto clarifytheirownuse of theadjectives
I havenottriedto disguisethisorigi-
In revisingit forpublication,
"religious"and "metaphysical."
nal function.

reserved.
?) 2001 byThe Historyof ScienceSociety.All rights 0369-7827/01/1601-0001$2.00

Osiris,2001. 16:00-00 29

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30 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

I. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKDROP

TheHistorians Dilemma
For mosthistorians,"religiousbelief" and "metaphysicalbelief" are partof an un-
derstoodvocabulary.Yet,manyofus wouldbe hardpressedifasked to giveadequate
definitions of theseterms.But why,then,we mightask, use such categoriesat all?
One answerstemsfromour finitude.As the historianof science Erwin Hiebert
has noted,"One can ask countlessquestionsof an historicalnature,buttheycannot
all be asked at thesame time.Choices become inevitable,and thissuggestspriori-
ties.I1 Our categorieshelp us to demarcatea subjectmatterof interest.Moreover,in
seekingto make some partof the past intelligible,we seek to see one thingin its
relationshipsto otherthings.So we ask, "How, ifat all, did Boyle's religiousbeliefs
relateto his scientificstudyof gases?" Or, "Did Boyle's metaphysicalbeliefsplay a
role in his view of fermentation?" Such categoriesthusgive focusand shape to our
inquiries.And since our choices are groundedin our interests, and to make intelli-
gible is to make intelligibleto ourselves, it seems inevitablethat ourown categories
play some role here.As Hiebertconcludes, "Some whiggism is essential in making
thechoices. One cannotgetridof the 'here and now."'
But thecategorieswe use have themselvesevolvedhistorically. And herelies the
rub: whatif our categories,as historians in the here and now, rub againstthegrain
of thoseof thepersons in thepast whom we seek to understand? Physics and meta-
physics,forexample,are for us very farapart: in our universities, they are different
disciplineshoused in different divisions. But were they so far apart fora Boyle, or
a Newton,or an Euler? When Newton calls his book Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy, his use of the word "philosophy" alerts us to a potentialgulf
betweenhis disciplinarycategoriesand ours.This,however,raisesa thorny problem.
David Wilson puts it thus:

'Science'and 'religion'aremoderntermswith(several)modernmeanings. Theycan

thusall tooeasilybecomemisleading labelswhenappliedtopastthought. Thereis not
onlytheproblem ofwhether 'science',say,as oneintended,
one'sreaderswillinterpret
butalso theproblem ofdeceivingoneselfin applying (a word
"science"or "scientist"
notinvented untilthenineteenthcentury) likeCopernicus
to figures andGalileo.As-
sumingthattheyare scientistsdoingsciencemaymakeit too easyforus to see the
waysin whichtheyagreewithus and too difficult to recognizethewaystheydiffer
fromus.'

Religious beliefsobviouslychange; butWilson'spointis thatso too does the very

notionof whatit means fora beliefto be "religious."Whatcountsas "religious"is
itselfhistoricallyconditioned;thecategoryof "thereligious"has a historicalstory.
And so too, of course,do thecategoriesof "the scientific"and (Wilson mighthave
added) of "themetaphysical."So in usingour categories-of "scientific"or "meta-

' ErwinN. Hiebert,"The ProspectfromHere,"in ChemicalSciencesin theModernWorld,ed.

SeymourH. Mauskopf(Philadelphia: Univ.ofPennsylvaniaPress,1993),p. 368.
2 David Wilson,"On theImportanceofEliminating'Science' and 'Religion'fromtheHistoryof
Scienceand Religion:The Cases of OliverLodge,J.H. Jeans,andA. S. Eddington,"in Facets of
Faith and Science, ed. J. van der Meer, vol. 1: Historiographyand Modes of Interaction(Lanham,
Md.: PascalCentreforAdvancedStudiesinFaithandScience! Univ.PressofAmerica,1997),p. 27.

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 31

physical"or "religious"-to give focus to our studyof Boyle or Newtonor Euler,

are we notalreadyremakingthemin our image?
Wilson worriesthatwe are. As a remedy,he proposesthatwe avoid using such
termsaltogether. But ifwe setaside ourcategories,how will we as historianschoose
whatis of interestand seek to make it intelligible?Does not (again) "of interest"
mean of interestto us, and "intelligible"mean intelligibleto us? Wilson mayavoid
using the words "science" and "religion,"but if he is stillusing these conceptsto
pick thepeople and textsto study,thiswill just make his workingassumptionsless
visible,not get rid of them.The tensionbetweenWilson and Hieberton thispoint
suggeststhatif historianscannot live with such categories,neithercan theylive
withoutthem.I will call this"theHistorian'sDilemma."

BeyondKoyre
It may,indeed,be theinterestwe have in questionsabout religionand metaphysics
thatmake our studyof theirhistoricalinteractionswithscience of such interestand
vitalityin twentieth-centuryhistoriographyof science. For about these thingswe
findconflictingvoices among-and, sometimes,within-ourselves. FrankManuel
in his importantReligionof Isaac Newton(1974), thuscontraststhe verydifferent
voices ofGeorgeSartonand Einstein,concerningNewton'stheologicalmanuscripts:

Newton's theological thatarenowhousedin Jerusalem

manuscripts wereonceshown
to AlbertEinstein.Despitethefactthatit was September 1940 and he was already
involvedhimself in an apocalyptic he tookthetroubleto composea letter
enterprise,
praisingthepapersfortheinsight theyafforded geistigeWerkstatt,
intoNewton's his
workshop'.
spiritual On theotherhand,GeorgeSarton,thatprodigious innovatorin
thehistory of science,expressedcool indifference. he
He declaredthatas a scientist
waspersonally nomoreconcerned withNewton'snon-mathematicalworksthana medi-
cal manwouldbe withtherabbinical booksofMaimonides.3

Though no one did morethanSartonto establishhistoryof science as a profes-

sional disciplinein thefirsthalfof thetwentieth
century, thenew postwargeneration
of historiansof science would findinspirationin a visioncloser to thatof Einstein.
For them,as Charles Gillispie recounts,it was AlexandreKoyre,not Sarton,who
provided"a revelationofwhatexcitingintellectualinterest theirnewlyfoundsubject
mighthold."4And whatwas theheartof thisrevelation?It was-as David Lindberg
putsit-"the convictionthatthereis a fundamental unityto all humanintellectual
effort-an intimatelinkagebetweenscience,philosophy,and theology." The devel-
opmentof science "was notan independentseriesof events,butwas intimately con-
nectedwith"theevolutionof idees transscientifiques-philosophical, metaphysical,

I FrankManuel,TheReligionofIsaac Newton(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press,1974),p. 27.

Manuel'scomment bringsoutclearlytheunderlying issue:"SuchpolarresponsestoNewton'stheo-
logicalwritings mayhavemorethanpassinghistorical fortheyraiseagainin naive,anec-
interest,
dotalformawesomequestionsthatbegantoemergein thehalcyonyearsofthescientific revolution:
Can therebe an autonomous realmofhumanknowledgethatlivesby itsownlaw?Is itpossibleto
encapsulate knownas sciencein themindofthescientist
activities andto keepthemfreeandinde-
pendent,unshackledby deep passionsand transcendent longings?"Manuelarguesthatalthough
Newtonsometimes professedallegianceto theidea ofkeepingnaturalphilosophy fromre-
distinct
vealedreligion, Newton'sactualpractice"is a farmorecomplexmatter."
I C. Gillispie,"Koyr6,"
Dictionary ofScientificBiography, vol.7, p. 485.

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32 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

and religious?"5Koyre's enormousinfluencethusbears witnessto Einstein'spro-

phetic sense thatin Newton'stheologicalmanuscriptswe may findthe "spiritual
workshop"of his science.
Perhaps,however,thatwitnessremainsincomplete.In her 1991 JanusFaces of
Genius,BettyJoTeeterDobbs givesa fascinatingglimpseofherownhistoriographi-
herfirstbook on Newton'searlyalchemi-
cal pilgrimageon thisissue.Afterfinishing
cal manuscripts,Dobbs planneda secondbook "focusedalmostexclusivelyon New-
ton and alchemy."Sixteenyearslater,Dobbs explains whythatbook took so long
and turnedout so differently:

My slow recognitionthatalchemicalstudiesheldreligioussignificance forNewton

himselfwasoneoftheturning pointsin mythinking thatled meon toquitea different
book.Sixteenyearsago I was imperfectlydetachedfrommodernist and
convictions
fromourgeneralculturalperceptionofNewtonas a founder ofmodernscience.Even
though notionthatNewton's
theheretical
I waswillingtoentertain alchemy wasworthy
of scholarly I was notwillingto entertain
examination, ofit.
a religiousinterpretation
arebothmoreacceptable
Religioussentiments andmoreperceptible inthispostmodern
erainwhichreligious profoundly
revolutions manypartsoftheglobe,whichmay
affect
perhapshelptoexplainwhyI perceiveIsaac Newtonso differently.6

How, we maywell ask, could thisbe? Dobbs learnedhercraft,afterall, whenNew-

tonscholarship(by RichardWestfall,J.E. McGuire,and others)was doingmuchto
illuminatetherelationof religiousand scientificbeliefs,verymuchalong thelines
laid downby Koyre.So how could a strongreligiousconnectioncome as a surprise
to her?
Partof theanswermaylie in Dobbs' phrasing.She speaks of postmodernity mak-
ing religious"sentiments"moreacceptable,and she concludesherepilogueby sug-
gestingthatforNewtonand othersin thepost-Reformation turmoilof earlymodern
Europe,studyofnaturesatisfied"a religioushunger"forknowledgeof God (empha-
sis added). "Religious hunger":this,I think,is nota phrasethatwould come easily
fromthe pen of Koyre,whose stresson the unityof trans-scientific guidingideas
may overlookthe differencesbetweenreligiousand metaphysicalbeliefs.Dobbs'
phrasing(and hersurprise)suggestthatwe need to reflecton whatmakes religious
belief religious,on how (in the famous words of Pascal) "the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob"difersfrom"theGod of thephilosophers."

II. METAPHYSICAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: A META-ANALYSIS

Beliefs
Metaphysical
Turningnow to thedistinctionitself,let us beginwiththeconceptof "metaphysical
beliefs."Since metaphysicalbeliefs are those havingto do withmetaphysics,we
mightbeginby askingwhat"metaphysics"means.
Here etymologyis notveryhelpful.The term"metaphysics"seems to have been

5 DavidC. Lindberg, oftheScientific

"Conceptions A Pre-
fromBacon to Butterfield:
Revolution
liminarySketch," in Reappraisals of the ScientificRevolution,ed. David Lindberg and Robert S.
(Cambridge:
Westman Univ.Press,1990).
Cambridge
6 Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemyin Newtons Thought
Univ.Press:1991),pp. 250-1.
Cambridge
(Cambridge:

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 33

firstusedinconnection withAristotle'sfamousworkofthattitle,butthetitleseems
notto comefromAristotle himself. Instead,on thestandard account,it was intro-
ducedbyeditorsinthefirst century B.C., whoplacedfourteen treatises
ofAristotle's
together hisworksonphysics,
after callingthem"TaMetataPhusika"("whatcomes
afterthewritings onnature"), where"after" refers simplytotheirphysicallocation.
Still,thequestionsaddressed-on issuesregarding substanceand being,change
andexplanation, unityandplurality, thenatureoftheeternalandunchanging, and
impossibility-did seemrelated;laterthinkers thuscametoidentify workon such
questions witha specificrationalenterprise called"metaphysics," wherethe"meta"
is takentomeanthatthequestionsgo beyond(or,arepriorto) "physics."8
Butto saythequestions"go beyondphysics"tellsus moreaboutwhattheques-
tionsarenotthanaboutwhattheyare.Whatpositivedefining make
characteristics
metaphysical questions"metaphysical"? Lookingat whatcurrent philosophers say
on this,perhapsthemoststriking thingis theirreticence to answerit.In the1995
BlackwellCompanion to Metaphysics, theentryon "metaphysics" begins,"There
is no clearand generally accepteddefinition of metaphysics, no agreement on its
tasks,scope,or divisions.In thesecircumstances itis bestsimplyto explainwhat
influentialphilosophers havetakenthesetobe."9Followinghisownadvice,theau-
thorgoes on to surveytheconceptions of metaphysics heldbyAristotle, Suarez,
Hume,Wolff, Meinong, Kant,Husserl,andIngarden. Aristotle, we learn,tookmeta-
physicstohaveas itsobjectall existing beings,"butonlyinrespectofwhatbelongs
to themas beings."Meinong,in contrast, thought metaphysics mustdeal withim-
likeroundsquares:though
possibilities thesecannotexistorhave"being,"theyare
nevertheless objects.(How else couldone sayof themthattheydo notexist?)So
forMeinongbutnotAristotle, roundsquaresfallunderthepurview ofmetaphysics.
A similarreticenceis foundin PeterVan Inwagen'srecenttextMetaphysics
(1993).Notingthatsomeonewhohasnotstudiedmetaphysics formallywillalmost
certainly "haveno inklingof whattheword'metaphysics' Van
means," Inwagen
says,"Itseemsobviousthatan introduction tometaphysics shouldbeginwithsome
sortofdefinition of metaphysics. Unfortunately, itis unlikely thata definitioncan
conveyanything of
useful.The nature metaphysics is best explainedby example.
Whenyouhavereadthisbook,youwillhavea tolerably goodidea of whatmeta-
physicsis."10VanInwagengoeson,however, toendorsethedefinition he wasgiven
as an undergraduate: is the
metaphysics study of ultimate Using
reality. "World"to
denoteeverything thatexists(including God, ifthere is a God), Van Inwagen identi-
fiesthreequestionsas central:

of theWorld,andwhatsortsof things
1.Whatarethemostgeneralfeatures
does itcontain?

I The standard accounthas comeundercriticismby Hans Reinerand others:see GaryHatfield,

"Metaphysics andtheNew Science,'inLindbergandWestman, ReappraisalsoftheScientific Revo-
lution(cit.n. 5), p. 97 andn. 7.
8 Thoughhe seemsnotto haveusedtheterm "metaphysics" forthem,Aristotle did see manyof
thesequestionsas belonging whichhe called"first
to a commonenterprise, philosophy." See Martha
Nussbaum,'Aristotle," inA CompaniontoMetaphysics,ed. Jaegwon KimandErnestSosa (Oxford:
Blackwell,1995),pp. 24-5.
9 "Metaphysics," in KimandSosa, CompaniontoMetaphysics (cit.n. 8), p. 310.
` PeterVan Inwagen,Metaphysics (Boulder:Westview,1993), p. 1; subsequentquotationson
pp. 4-5.

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34 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

in 1?
identified
2. Whydoes a Worldexist,a Worldwiththefeatures

3. Whatis ourplacein theWorld?How do we humansfitintoit?

VanInwagenthensketches twoopposingmetaphysical answerstothesequestions.

The first picturethattheWorldconsistsof God and all thathe has
is thetheistic
made;thatGod is self-existent and therestis dependent;and thathumanbeings
werecreatedbyGod to loveand serveHimforever. The secondis thenaturalistic
picturethattheWorldconsistsofmatter in motion;thatmatterhas alwaysexisted,
so thatthereis no "why"toitsexistence;andthathumanbeingsarecomplexcon-
figurationsofmatter,"serving no morepurposethana puddleofspiltmilk."
Whatis striking hereis thaton Van Inwagen'saccount,answersto thecentral
questionsof metaphysics includethingsthatare also clearlymatters of religious
belief-thathumanbeingswere"createdto loveGod and servehimforever," for
example.Fromthisone mighteasilygatherthatin theircentralideas,metaphysics
andreligionarenotdistinct at all: we arebackto Koyre's"fundamental unity."

ReligiousBeliefs
Butletus nowpickup thedistinction fromtheotherend.Sincea religious beliefis
one withsomesuitably intimate to religion,
relation we mustaskhow"religion" is
tobe defined.
The philosopher WilliamAlstonhas critically surveyed a dozenor so proposals
thatattempt toidentifytheessentialdefining thatmakesomething
characteristics a
Comparing
religion.11 theproposalswitha rangeofcasesthatwe wouldpreanalyti-
callycountas religions,Alstonarguesthatnoneof thedefinitions fitall thecases:
on somedefinitions, Buddhismfailsto countas a religion;on others,Quakerism
failstocount-and so on.Therootproblem, Alstonurges,is thinking we caniden-
tifysomesingleaspectofreligionas itsdefining essence,thewaywe can identify
"three-sidedness"as thedefiningoressentialfeature Insteadofseeking
of"triangle."
anessentialist we shouldsee theconcept"religion"
definition, as covering a spanof
casesrelatedinthe"family-resemblance" analysisfavored byLudwigWittgenstein.
Whatholdsthecasestogether is an overlappingwebof"religion-making character-
istics,"each ofwhichhelpstendto makesomething countas a "religion," without
beingnecessary orsufficientforso counting. Alstonlistsninesuchcharacteristics:

1. Beliefin supernatural
beings

andsacredobjects
betweenprofane
2. A distinction

3. Ritualactsfocusedon sacredobjects

bythegods
4. A moralcodebelievedtobe sanctioned

religiousfeelings(awe,senseofmystery,
5. Characteristic adoration)

inEncyclopedia
" WilliamAlston,"Religion," ed. Paul Edwards(New York:Mac-
ofPhilosophy,
millan,1967).

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 35

6. Prayerand otherformsof communicationwithgods

7. A worldview,or generalpictureof the worldas a whole, and theplace of

theindividualtherein.This picturecontainssome specificationof an overall
purpose or point of the world,its purpose,and an indicationof how the
individualfitsintoit.

8. A moreor less totalorganizationof one's lifebased on theworldview

9. A social groupboundtogetherby theabove

Alstondoes notproposethislist as exhaustiveand warnsagainsttryingto use it

to make "religion"a precise concept.There are paradigmcases to whichthe term
clearly applies, but thereare also cases which resemblethese paradigmcases in
some respectsbutnotothers.Ritualcan thusbe sharplydeemphasizedin some reli-
gions (Quakerism);beliefin thesupernatural can dropawayin others(Unitarianism,
some formsof Buddhism); moralitycan have no close connectionwiththe belief
systemin others(culticsystemsin some primitive societies).We tendto countsome-
thingas a religionwhenenoughof theaspectsare presenttogether;butthereis not,
Alstonargues,a sharpline separatingreligionfromnonreligion.Insteadthereis a
continuum, rangingfromparadigmcases (Christianity, Islam), to less and less obvi-
ous cases (HinayanaBuddhism,communism,humanism)sharingfewerand fewer
featureswiththe paradigmcases. Seeking a precise essentialistdefinition, Alston
argues,restson a mistakenassumptionabout how language works.
Alston'sWittgensteinian approach,itseems to me, is historian-friendly and can be
extendedto categorieslike"metaphysical"and "scientific." It allows us to illuminate
temporalshiftsin the list of "religion-making characteristics"(or "metaphysics-
makingcharacteristics," etc.) and in how these are weighted,and so to articulate
differencesbetweenour categoriesand thoseof the agentswe study.It thusallows
us to use and clarifycategoriessuch as "religiousbelief" withoutbuyinginto an
essentialismthatwould keep us frombeing genuinelyhistorical.
Alston'slistagain,however,throwsintoreliefthequestionofhow we areto distin-
guishreligiousfrommetaphysicalbeliefs.His seventhfeaturespecifies,as a feature
tendingto make somethinga religion,thatit provide"a worldview,or generalpic-
tureof theworldas a whole,and theplace of theindividualtherein."This is notably
similarto Van Inwagen'sproposal thatmetaphysicsdeals withquestionsabout the
mostgeneralfeaturesof theWorld,whya Worldexists,and whatour place in it is.
So again we mustask how or whether we can distinguishreligiousand meta-
physicalbeliefs.

The Believed-BelievingDistinction

To make progresshere,I suggestwe drawon a further distinction.Epistemologists

regularlystressthatthe term"belief" is ambiguous:it can referto a propositional

discussions
12 Tworecent of"essentialism" Alston'sphilo-
ofscience,complementing
byhistorians
sophicalanalysis,arefoundinMargaret ScienceandReligionorNatural
Osler,"MixingMetaphors:
Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe,'" Hist. Sci. 35 (1997):91-113, and JohnBrooke
and GeoffreyCantor,ReconstructingNature: The Engagementof Science and Religion (Edinburgh:
Clark, 1998). pp. 274-7.

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36 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

content(to whatis believed),or to an act (or state)of believingthiscontent.If Dick

and Janebothbelieve thatSpot is a dog, we say thattheyhave thesame belief:what
is believed by each of them(regardingSpot's doghood) is identical.On the other
hand, thereis also a clear sense in which theydo not have the same belief: their
beliefsmayoccurat different times,fordifferent reasons,or witha different degree
of confidence.Here,of course,we are attendingnotjust to whatis believedby each
of them,butto theirrespective"acts" (or "states")'Iof believing.Philosophersoften
avoid ambiguityhere by replacing"belief" witheither"believed" or "believing"
(used as nouns,sometimessprucedup witha qua or two): Dick and Janehave "dif-
ferentbelievings" (or different "beliefs qua believings"),but theyhave the same
"believed" (or "beliefqua believed"). Keeping close trackof thedistinction is espe-
cially importantwhen discussingthe conditionsunderwhich a belief is justified
(or rational),because questionsof "justifiedness"are person-specific and situation-
specific,requiringus to look closely at relevantfeaturesof thebelieving(by a spe-
cificpersonin a specificcontext),notjust at thebelieved.14
Because it helps us to make our questionsaboutbeliefsbothperson-specific and
situation-specific,the believed-believing distinctionseems to me a historian-
friendly one. And in thepresentcontext,it allows us to ask whetherreligiousbeliefs
mightdifferfrommetaphysicalbeliefsnotjust in the contentof the believed,but
also in thecharacter, thehow and thewhy,of thebelieving.Alston'slistof religion-
makingcharacteristics now gains relevance,because even itemson thelist thatdo
not specifytypesof propositionalcontentmaybe relevant,by qualifyingwhyand
how some beliefis held.Whethersomeone'sbeliefin God as a "FirstCause" counts
as a religiousbelieving,forexample,maydepend on whetherit functionsas a ve-
hicle of feelingsof awe, mystery, or adoration(Alston'sfifth characteristic),or as a
means of organizingone's life (his eighthcharacteristic), and so on. And since the
same belief(qua "believed") mightfunctionin different waysfordifferent people,
it mightbe a matterof religiousbelievingforone person,of metaphysicalbelieving
foranother,and of scientificbelievingforyetanother.

III. APPLICATIONS

Characteristics
Metaphysics-Making
Whatfeatures,then,mighttendto make beliefscountas "metaphysical"(or as "sci-
entific")ratherthanas "religious"?To see how thismightgo, let us now consider
some textsexpressingbeliefs.In the firstcase, the authoris well known,but as an
exerciselet us feignignoranceaboutthis,so as to betterclarifywhatconsiderations
mightbe relevantto theclassificationprocess.Here is thepassage:

itseemsprobableto me,thatGod in thebeginning

All thesethingsbeingconsidered,
formed matterinsolid,massy,
hard,impenetrable, ofsuchsizesand
moveableparticles,

standard
optionpointstoa further
13 The act-state between"believing"as an occurrent
distinction
event(in whicha personmoreorless consciously'entertains' someproposition), andbelievingas a
latentdisposition (and acton) someproposition
to affirm wereitto be consciously See
formulated.
H. H. Price,Belief(London:Allen& Unwin,1969).Forsimplicity I includebothundertheterm"act"
14 To distinguishbetweentheact andcontentof a beliefdoes notmeanthatthetwoaspectsof a
beliefhavenobearingoneachother:clearly, itis oftenthecontentofa beliefthatallowsthebelieving
tofunction in thewayitdoes.

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 37

figures, andin suchproportion

andwithsuchotherproperties, to space,as mostcon-
ducedto theendforwhichhe formed them;and thattheseprimitive being
particles
solids,areincomparably thananyporousbodiescompounded
harder ofthem;evenso
powerbeingabletodivide
veryhard,as neverto wearorbreakin pieces;no ordinary
whatGodhimself madeonein thefirstCreation.'5

So heretheauthorhas set fortha numberof propositionswhich,he says,"all things

considered,seem probable."Let us suppose thatthe authortakes themas probable
enoughso thattheycountas amongthingshe or she believesto be true.What sort
of beliefsare they:scientific,religious,or metaphysical?
Suppose we focus on the firstproposition.Matter,the authorsays, is made of
particlesthatare "so veryhard,as neverto wear or break in pieces." Note, in the
firstplace, thatattendingsolelyto contentof thebeliefdoes notgetus veryfarhere.
On one hand,theauthoris assertingthatmatteris made up of "atoms."Claims about
atoms,someone mightsay,are partof science,so thebeliefshouldbe classifiedas
"scientific"(whichis notto say thatit is heregood science). On theotherhand,the
passage also, at threepoints,bringsin referenceto God: claims aboutGod, someone
thusmightretort, are religious,so thebeliefexpressedis a religiousbelief.The clash
mightbe adjudicatedby distinguishing differentsubpropositions, but thisdoes not
promiseto be veryilluminating.
But suppose we look notjust at whatis believed,but also at whatmotivatesand
sustainsthispersonin his orherbelieving.This questionmightbe pursuedat various
levels.A reasonablestartis to attendto thereasonsthattheauthorgives,on thepre-
sumption(a defeasibleone,tobe sure)thatstatedreasonsoftenplaya genuinecausal
roleinpeople believingas theydo. We maysee suchreasonsas theauthorcontinues,

Whiletheparticlescontinueentire,theymaycomposeBodies of one and thesame

NatureandTexture inallAges:butshouldtheywearaway,orbreakinpieces,theNature
ofThingsdepending on them,wouldbe changed.WaterandEarth,composedof old
wornParticlesandFragments wouldnotbe ofthesameNatureandTexture
ofParticles,
now,withWater andEarthcomposedofentire intheBeginning.
Particles Andtherefore,
thatNaturemaybe lasting,theChangesofcorporealthingsaretobe placedonlyinthe
variousSeparationsand newAssociationsandMotionsof thesepermanent Particles;
compound butwherethese
Bodiesbeingapttobreak,notinthemidstofsolidParticles,
andonlytouchin a fewpoints.
arelaidtogether,
Particles

Here, then,theauthorarguesthattheclaim in question(thatmatteris made of 'un-

chippable' atoms)helps us to make sense of the"lasting"characterof matter,illus-
tratedby waterbeing of the same texturenow as it was in thebeginning.The aim
is to makesense of a verygeneralfeatureof matter one requiringno special obser-
vationsor experiments. Furthermore,water"in thebeginning"is notsomethingthe
authorclaims to have actuallyobserved;indeed,thephrasing(thatnature"maybe
lasting")may expressnot so muchan observablefactas a sense of whatis appro-
priatefora createduniverse perhapsreflecting particles'beingendowedwithsuch
properties"as mostconducedto theEnd forwhich[God] formedthem."'6
15
theexercise,I postponegivingtheauthorand sourceto thelastfootnote
To facilitate of the
subsection entitled"Science-making Characteristics."
16 I poweris able to
am notincluding, as partoftheauthor'sreason,his claimthat"no ordinary
dividewhatGod himself madeone inthefirst As I see it,thisdoes nottellus muchabout
Creation."
whatcausestheauthorto thinkmatter has thepropertyofindivisibility;instead,itgivesan account
ofhow,onceonehas attributed thisindivisibility
tobasicparticles,
indivisibility is tobe theistically

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38 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

Suppose, now,thattheauthor'sbeliefis, at least in part,generatedor sustainedby

thisaim of makingsense of stabilityat thisgenerallevel. Will thisaffectwhether
or metaphysical,or religious?For mostof us, it
we classifythebeliefas scientific,
probablywill, for seekingto make sense of permanenceand change at this very
of theenterprise
generallevel has longbeen characteristic of metaphysics. Attention
to thehow and whyof theauthor'sbelievingthusmightincline us to classifyit as a
metaphysicalbelief.

Characteristics
Science-Making
I now wantto turnto the author'sbeliefson a morespecificquestion,the question
ofhow suchabsolutelyhardatomsbehaveon collidingwitheach other.Here is what
he says:

Bodieswhichareeitherabsolutely willnot
hard,or so softas to be voidofelasticity,
reboundfromone another. makesthemonlystop.If twoequal [abso-
Impenetrability
lutelyhard]bodiesmeetdirectlyinvacuo,theywillbytheLawsofMotionstopwhere
theymeet,andlose all theirMotion,andremainatrest.'

What sortof believingis this?Again, lookingjust at the contentof thebelief-

about how bodies move undercertainsortsof collisions-might inclineus to clas-
sifythebelief as "scientific."But if we attendto the characterand groundsof the
believing,thisbecomes less clear.The issue is how absolutelyhardbodies ("atoms"
withno movableor deformableparts)behave in collisions.Directexperimentsare
irrelevant here,because all bodies we can observedo deformin collisions:even the
hardeststeel balls owe theirreboundingpower to elastic deformation. What moti-
vatestheauthoris, instead,thedifficulty of conceivingofhow bodies could rebound
when such deformation is impossible as it mustbe for"absolutelyhard"bodies.
Whatgives rise to theauthor'sbelievingis thusa conceptualproblem.
Sometimesthe characterof a problembecomes clearerwhen one looks at rival
ways of addressingthe problem.In the presentcase, one alternativewas to reject
the idea of "perfecthardness"altogether to hold that"absolute hardness"is not
even a possible propertyof a physicalbody.If absolute hardnesswere a possible
property, thenwhen two such bodies collide head-onwitheach other,at least one
would need to change velocityinstantaneously frommotionin one directionto ei-
therrestor motionin anotherdirection:it would haveto go from,say,10 metersper
second to -10 metersper second,withoutpassingthroughanyintermediate veloci-
ties. But this,manythought,is inconceivable.Here is a representativepassage:

ThepartisansofAtomshaveattributed hardness. .. totheirelementarycorpuscles,an

idea whichappearsto be thetruth whenone considersthingsonlysuperficially, but
whichis soonperceived to containan obviouscontradiction,upondeeperprobing. In
sucha principle
effect, of hardness couldnotexist;it is a chimerarepugnant to that
generallawwhichnature observesconstantly I speakofthisimmu-
inall itsoperations;

"explained." ofa theistic

Ofcourse,theavailability explanation confi-
mayitselfsustaintheauthor's
dencein itsplausibility.
1" Authorandsourcegivenin thelastnoteofthepresent subsection.

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 39

tableandperpetual oftheuniverse
sincethecreation
orderestablished in termsofthe
LAWOF CONTINUITY,byvirtueofwhichall thattakesplacedoes so byinfinitely
smalldegrees.It seemsthatgood sensedictatesthatno changecan occurbyjumps;
natura non operator per saltum;nothingpasses fromone extremeto theotherwithout
passingthrough all thedegreesinbetween.
Ifnature couldpassfromoneextreme forexamplefrom. . . movement
toanother, in
onedirection tomovement without
direction
ina contrary passingthroughall theinsen-
siblemovements whichlead fromone to theother, it wouldbe necessaryforthefirst
statetobe destroyed withouta newstatebeingdetermined byNature;indeedforwhat
reasoncouldshechooseone statein preference to another withoutourbeingable to
ask why?Since,havingno necessary liaisonbetweenthetwostates(no passagefrom
motiontorest,fromrestto motion), no reasonwoulddetermine theproduction ofone
thingrather thananother.
Let us concludethenthathardness takenin thepopularsense,is absolutely impos-
sibleandcannotsubsistwiththelawofcontinuity."8

This authorgoes on to urge thatwe mustconceive of "perfecthardness"as a

species of perfectelasticityratherthanof absolutehardness.Considera ball being
inflatedwithcompressedair. As the internalpressureincreases,the ball becomes
moreand morehard;yetat thesame time,it becomes moreelastic,able to rebound
betterthroughgreaterefficiency in deformingand restoringshape on collision. By
replacingthenotionof absolutehardnesswiththisconceptof elastichardness,one
bringsthe laws of collision into conformity withtheprinciple,which"good sense
dictates,"thatno physical change "can occur by jumps," but must instead pass
throughall intermediate values. So again,themotivatingproblemseems to have the
characterof a conceptualproblem.
Does seeing thisbear upon how we categorizethebelief?I thinkit does. Many
readerstoday,encountering considerationslike these,wouldbe inclinedto see them
as ratheralien to the scientificenterprise.Certainly,few college physicscourses
mentionthemas thesortofthingthatplaya rolein scientific theorizing.Lord Kelvin
used to readhis classes a passage by Hegel on Newtonian forces and say,"If,gentle-
men, these be his physics,thinkwhat his metaphysics must be!"19 Many readers
today,I suspect,wouldrespondsimilarlyto thesepassages, showing that theyregard
a belief'sbeing motivatedby conceptualproblemsas a "metaphysics-making char-
acteristic."
But it is now timeto let the cat out of the bag (or to cease feigningignorance
aboutwhatwe haveknownall along): thepassages withwhichI began are notfrom
Hegel but fromtwo of the mosteminentfiguresin thehistoryof physics.The de-
fenderof atomswithabsolutehardnessis Isaac Newton,writingin Book III of the
Opticks; and the defenderof the opposing conceptionof elastic hardnessis Jean
Bernoulli.20 The debate falls squarelyin thehistoryof theoreticalphysics.So here
we beginto see a way thatconceptionsof science and metaphysicscommonlyheld
todaymaydivergefromthoseof thepersonswe are studying.

18 Forsource,see thelastfootnote subsection.

ofthepresent
BaronKelvinofLargs
The Lifeof WilliamThomson,
'9 Kelvin,quotedin SilvanusP. Thompson,
2 vols.(Macmillan,1910),vol.2, p. 1124.
20 "Thethreepassagesdefending unbreakable atomsarefromIsaac Newton,Opticks, 4thed. (New
York:Dover,1958),onp. 400,andp. 398,respectively. Opera
Therivalpassageis byJeanBernoulli,
(Lausanneand Geneva,1742),vol. 3, pp. 9-10, as givenbyWilsonL. Scott,TheConflict between
Atomism Theory,
and Conservation 1644 to 1850 (New York:Elsevier,1970),p. 23.

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40 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

Characteristics
Religion-Making
theact-content
In deploying I havebeenfocusing
distinction, mostly onthedistinc-
tionbetweenmetaphysical I nowwanttoreturn
believings.
andscientific toreligious
AgainI shalltakea cue fromNewton,thistimefromthefinalsentences
believing.
oftheOpticks.Afternotingthathe has,in Book III, given"hints"to be improved
byfurtherexperimentsandobservations,Newtoncontinues,

Andif naturalphilosophyin all itsparts,bypursuing thismethod, shallat lengthbe

theboundsofmoralphilosophy
perfected, Forso faras we can
willalso be enlarged.
knowby naturalphilosophy whatis thefirst Cause,whatPowerhe has overus, and
whatBenefitswereceivefromhim,so farourDutytowards him,as wellas thattowards
willappearto us bytheLightofNature.Andno doubt,iftheWorship
one another, of
falseGodshadnotblindedtheheathen, theirmoralPhilosophy wouldhavegonefarther
thanto thefourCardinalVirtues; andinsteadofteaching theTransmigration ofSouls,
and to worshiptheSun and Moon,and dead Heroes,theywouldhavetaughtus to
worship ourtrueAuthorandBenefactor, as theirAncestors didundertheGovernment
ofNoahandhisSonsbeforetheycorrupted themselves.

So here,Newtonrefers witha certain

topropositions theyspecify"whatis
content:
thefirstCause,""whatPowerhehasoverus,""whatBenefits we receivefromhim,"
and"ourDutytowards him"-especiallyourdutytoworship himas "ourtrueAu-
thorandBenefactor." Wemayhope,Newtonsays,thatperfecting philosophy
natural
willallowthetruth ofsuchpropositions tobecomeevident "bytheLightofNature."
Butimplicit forNewtonthinks
inthisis a contrast; canalso be knownin
theirtruth
another way-the waytheywereknownby"NoahandhisSons."
Thereis, I think,a naturalsuggestion lurking in thispassage.Typically, people
cometoapprehend whattheytaketobe divinereality bywhatseemslikea kindof
perception,
spiritual a perception deepening inthecourseofa lifelivedinrelation-
We may,ofcourse,disagreeaboutwhether
shipto thatreality. suchreligious"per-
ception"is evergenuine:ifwe areFreudians, we willregardit insteadas an illu-
sion-a "projection" ratherthangenuineor veridicalperception. Still,we must
grantthatmanyreligious beliefsseem,tothosewhohavethem,tohavea character
thatis morelikeperception thanlikeinference. The personofreligiousfaithtypi-
callyhas a strong"sense"thatthereis a divinereality, a realityperceived through
variouspersons,events, ortexts.Moreover,thisdivinereality is sensedas havinga
claimuponus,rather
radicalexistential thanas a matter ofspeculationorhypothesis
thatonemaychoosetoadoptornotadopt(depending onone'sinterests)."Youshall
lovetheLordyourGod,andHimaloneshallyouworship.:
I wouldsuggestthattheseare "religion-making" featuresand are partof what
distinguishesreligiousbelieffrommetaphysical belief.A beliefis notreligious
merelybecauseit is aboutGod: metaphysical beliefsmayalso be aboutGod. But
metaphysicalbeliefsaboutGod are generatedor sustainedby an inferential
activity
we call "metaphysics"),
(theactivity seekingto articulate andrefine ourcategories
forthinkingabout"ultimate
reality" so as tosolvevariousexplanatory orconceptual
problems.Religiousbeliefs,incontrast,typically gettheirprimary sustenancefrom
withinthereligiousandspiritual a
life, life which provides thecontext foraccessto
God whichis perception-like,and thus is availablenotjust to themetaphysically

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 41

mindedAugustine,butalso to his devoutmotherMonica, who mayhave littleinter-

est in solvingmetaphysicalproblems.21
In sayingthis,I do notmeanto denythatreligiousbeliefsare ontological,making
claims about whatexists,about whatis ultimatelyreal. I am using "metaphysical"
to marka particularsortof ontologicalbeliefs-ones generatedand sustainedby a
reflectiveenterpriseseekingto solve problemsof a certainsort.My pointis that
religiousbeliefs are typicallynot generatedin this way: instead,theyare a more
spontaneousresponseto an experientialsense of divinereality, of thisreality'sclaim
upon one, and of the feltneed to be rightlyrelatedto thisdivine realityand trans-
formed by it.22
One last pair of cases will help to illustratethis point. The firstcomes from
D. S. Cardwell'sbiography(1989) of JamesPrescottJoule(1818-1889). Cardwell
writesthatJoule,despitea habitof sleepingthroughsermons,was a sincereChris-
tian.But, says Cardwell,"thereis no evidence of a religiousmotivationforhis re-
searches.The occasional referencesto theAlmightyto be foundin his papers and
veryoccasionallyin his correspondenceare notmorethanconventionalexpressions,
shorthandfor the principleof the uniformity of nature,and thereforeacceptable
in Britain."23
Cardwell'sassessmentis thatJoule'sreferencesto God are metaphysicalin char-
acter.However,eventhecorrespondence citedbyCardwellshowsthatJoule's"refer-
ences to theAlmighty"go well beyondthis.In the summerof 1854, Jouleand his
wifeAmelia saw thedeathof theirinfantson. It was theseason of cholera,and soon
afterlosing theirchild to theterribledisease, Amelia herselfwas stricken.She had
repeatedbut illusoryremissions,and afterthreemonthsof "alternatinghope and
despair,"she too died of theillness.In a letterdated20 August1854, Joulewroteto
William Thomson (laterLord Kelvin) as one whom he knew would "sympathize
withme in the occasion of the terribleblow whichhas fallenupon me." As noted
by Cardwell,Joule'sletterrecountshis wife'sillnessand deathand continues,

I havethuslostmydearestearthly friend,andno one can fullycomprehend thegreat-

nessoftheloss whohas nothadtheopportunity I havehadduring ourunionof seven
years,ofestimatingherhighmoralworthandintellectual How theloss of
refinement.
sucha parentcan be replacedto mydearchildren I cannottell.I musttrustin the
Almighty to careforthemandto directme in theirupbringing....Andit is a great
thatdeathhad no terrors[jreposingas shedidon themerits
to reflect
satisfaction of
herSaviouras hertitletoherheavenlyinheritance.24

And on New Year's Day of thesame year,Joulewroteto Thomsonand his wife,

wishMrs.Thomsonandyourself
I mosthonestly a happynewyearandpraythatGod
not
of 1854is fullofbitterness
maycrownitwithgoodnesstous all.Theremembrance
21 Of course,a believing maybe sustainedbothby a devoutspiritual lifeand by a sensethatit
helpsto solveinteresting metaphysical problems. byreligion-making
Classifying andmetaphysical-
makingcharacteristics allowsus to see thecategoriesas notmutuallyexclusive.
22 A beliefmayalso arisejustbyinduction intoa community,withlittlefunctionalappropriationby
theindividual. We mightregardsuchbeliefsas nominally metaphysical or scientific),
(or religious,
depending on whatsustainsthemin therelevant community.
23 D. S. Cardwell, JamesJoule:A Biography (Manchester,U.K.: Manchester Univ.Press,1989),
p. 271.
24 See ibid.,pp. 161ff.,fortheaccountofJoule'sloss.

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42 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

onlytomebuttounusualnumbers whohavebeendeprived bythedeathofthedearest

andmostimportant members oftheirfamilies.God grantthattheseseveretrialsmay
goodofthesurvivors.
totheeverlasting
be sanctified

Cardwellmaybe correctthatEnglishconventionsdictatedrestraint in expressing

religiousfaith.If so, the deathof Joule'swife liftedthoserestraints, forthesepas-
sages show us a deeplyreligiousheart.It is notto theprincipleof theuniformity of
naturethatJouleis trusting fordirectionin raisinghis children.It is notto a principle
of uniformity thatJoule sees his wife as looking forreassurancein her death,in
reposingon themeritsofherSavior.It is nottheprincipleoftheuniformity of nature
thatJouleprayswill sanctifythetrialsof thesurvivorsto theireverlastinggood. To
the contrary,Joule'swords here radiatea deep convictionin the atoningworkof
Christand in a sustainingand redeemingGod in whomall thingsworktogetherfor
good to thosewho love Him.
To discernwhetherJoule'sbeliefsabout God are metaphysicalor religious,it is
essentialthatwe attendto thecontextsthatilluminatethecharacterof thebelieving,
notjust thecontentof thebelieved.In thepresentcase, we can see Joule'sbeliefin
God as havingits primaryhome in thecontextof strugglewithpracticalexistential
problems,experiencingwhathe takesto be thepresenceof God in thesestruggles,
and findingorientationto a God who has a fundamentalclaim on his life. These
features-havingto do, again,withthehow and whyof thebelieving,notjust with
thecontentofthebelief-are clearlyreligion-making features.It seemsto me essen-
tialforhistoriansto sensitizethemselvesto theexperiential, existential,and practical
functionsof religiousbelief if theyare to approachtheirsubjectmatterwithdis-
cernment.25

ofReligiousBelief
Appropriation
Once we have attendedto thesefeaturesthatmake a religiousbelief religious,we
can go on to explore with more discernmentcases in which a particularthinker
pressessuchbeliefsintotheserviceof addressingproblemsin metaphysicsor phys-
consideran unpublishedessay in whichNewtonpro-
ics. As a possible illustration,
poses an accountof the"impenetrability" of materialbodies. Newtonwrites,

God,bythesole actofthinking andwilling,can preventa bodyfrompenetrating any

spacedefined bycertainlimits.Ifhe shouldexercisethispower,andcausesomespace
to be imperviousto bodiesandthusto stopandreflect lightandall impingingbodies,
it seemsimpossible thatwe shouldnotconsiderthisspaceto be trulybodyfromthe
evidenceofoursenses. . ., foritwillassumeall thepropertiesofa corporeal
particle,
exceptthatitwillbe motionless.
If we mayimaginefurther thattheimpenetrabilityis notalwaysmaintained in the
samepartofspace,butcanbe transferred hitherandthither accordingtocertain
laws,
... therewillbe no propertyofbodywhichthisdoesnotpossess.

25
I do not,however,wanttodenythatinferentialnormsmayalso playan important roleinarriving
atandsustaining oftheworld.See StephenWykstra,
a religiousconstrual and
"Reasons,Rationality,
Realism:The AxiologicalRootsof Rationality in Scienceand Religion,"in ChristianTheismand
theProblemsofPhilosophy, ed. MichaelD. Beaty(NotreDame, Ind.:Univ.of NotreDame Press,
1990),pp. 118-61,and idem,"Towarda SensibleEvidentialism: On theNotionof 'NeedingEvi-
dence,"'in Philosophy ofReligion:SelectedReadings,ed. WilliamRowe andWilliamWainwright
(New York:Harcourt, Brace,Jovanovich, 1989),pp. 426-37.

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 43

The usefulness of theidea of bodythatI havedescribedis brought outbythefact

thatit clearlyinvolvesthechieftruths of metaphysics and thoroughly and
confirms
explainsthem.For we cannotpostulate bodiesof thiskindwithout at thesametime
supposing thatGodexists.Ifwe saythatextension is body,do we notmanifestly offer
a pathto atheism,becausewe canhavean ideaofit [body]without anyrelationshipto
God.Indeed,however muchwe castaboutwe findalmostno otherreasonforatheism
thanthisnotionof bodieshaving,as it were,a complete, absolute,and independent
realityin themselves,suchas almostall ofus,through negligence, areaccustomed to
haveinourmindsfromchildhood (unlessI ammistaken), that
so thatitis onlyverbally
we call bodiescreatedanddependent.26

Here Newtonconstruestheimpenetrability of matteras a manifestationof God's

activity-God's freezing,as it were,of successiveregionsof space, so as to create
whatappearsphenomenallyas an enduringmovingobjectwhichexertsforceswhen
in contactwithothermatter. The proposalis thusaboutGod-but whatsortofbelief
does itexpress:a religiousbeliefor a metaphysicalbelief?Attendingto thecharacter
of thebelievingwould tendto qualifyit as a metaphysicalbelief,forit is generated
by a highlyinferential endeavorto formulateand refineour categoriesforunder-
standingtheultimatenatureof reality.Of course,Newtonwas profoundlyand de-
voutlyreligious:his beliefin God has, in othercontexts,a deeplyreligiousground-
ing. So here we have a case in which a thinkeruses his religiousbelief to inform
and help workout a theisticmetaphysicalconceptionof matter.27

IV. TOWARD AN INTEGRATIONIST VIEW OF SCIENCE

Over the past fourdecades, Newton scholarshiphas increasinglyilluminatedhow

such theisticmetaphysicalcommitments playeda key role in boththedevelopment
and receptionof Newton'sideas.28Historianof scienceErnanMcMullin,in hisNew-
tonon Matterand Activity(1978), thuswrites,9

Therecanbe no denying theimportance andothersliketheminthe

oftheseprinciples
thoughtofNewtonandthosewhofollowedhim.Shouldwe allowthepositivist claim
thatsciencewouldhavebeenbetter offwithoutthisexcessmetaphysics,andthatthe
historyof sciencehas witnessed itsgradualandcontinuing Can we con-
elimination?
cedeHertz'sdistinctionbetweena neutral mathematicalformalism, whichis the"real"
science,and itstheoreticalinterpretation in a physicalmodelservingonlyas an aid
toimagination?
The storyofNewtonoughtto be enough,ofitself, to showtheinadequacy ofthese
no longerso fashionableviews.Itis easyto"freeze"a theory focuson its
atan instant,
"hard"component (usuallyin eithermathematical oroperational andtreatthe
terms),
remainder crutch
as a dispensable fortheimagination. Butthisomitstheroleplayedby
suchphysicalnotionsas attraction ... intheconstructionofthetheory.
Newtontriedinvaintorestrict readersofthePrincipiatoformal But
considerations.
theshapeofwhatwas to comecannotbe foundin thatformalism....It madeall the

26
I. Newton,"On Gravitation andtheEquilibrium ofFluids,"in Unpublished ScientificPapersof
Isaac Newton,ed.A. R. Hall andM. B. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press,1962),pp. 142-4.
27
Beliefsthatarisein a religiouscontextmaybe developed,articulated, andrefined witha view
to makingthemmoreintellectually andlogicallycogent;thisis partofthedistinction betweenreli-
giousbeliefsandtheological beliefs.See also Osler,"MixingMetaphors" (cit.n. 12),p. 92.
28 Foran interestingandrelevant treatment,see JohnHenry,"OccultQualitiesandtheExperimen-
talPhilosophy: ActivePrinciples in Pre-Newtonian MatterTheory," Hist.Sci. 24 (1986):335-81.
29Ernan McMullin,NewtononMatterandActivity (NotreDame,Ind.:Univ.ofNotreDame Press,
1978),pp. 125-6.

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44 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

differenceintheworldtohisheirswhether forexample,was
ornotactionata distance,
to be regardedas an acceptableexplanation. was
The entirecourseoftheirtheorizing
quitelikelytobe affectedbythisoption.... Newtonhimself couldnothavedeveloped
histheorieswithout metaphysicalprinciplesofsomesort.

Metaphysicalconsiderationsand debates of thiskindhave recurredtoo oftenin

the workof greatscientiststo be viewed as externalto the scientificprocess.Yet
our conceptionsof science oftenfail to finda place forthem-except, perhaps,by
relegatingthemto a "contextof discovery," wheretheyhave no moreto do withthe
how and whyof scientificbelievingthantheswirlingsnakesin Kekule's dreamhad
to do withhis insightintothestructure of benzene.Since scientistslike Newtonand
Jouleand Kelvin did see themas havingcognitiveimportforscience,our concep-
tionsof science are hereseriouslyat odds withthehistoricalrecord.
Whatadjustmentmightbringourconceptionof sciencemorein line withhistory?
My own suggestionis thatour conceptionof science mustgive a moreprominent
in the cognitivegoals of science.30Our usual
place to the quest forintelligibility
conceptionstressesthegoal of findingtheoriesthatmake theworldpredictable.But
predictabilitycan be achieved by derivingobservableregularitiesfromprinciples
statinganyfunctionalrelationshipbetweentheoreticalparameters.Historically, sci-
entistshave soughtto exhibitobservableregularitiesas instancesof principlesem-
bodyingspecial functionalrelationships-those embodyingcentral-force laws, or
conservationprinciples,or parityprinciples,or thoseexplainingchange of proper-
ties throughrearrangements of enduringsubstances,forexample. Such principles
thatwe bringto theworld,and theirarticulation
embodyideals of intelligibility and
refinement is what gives metaphysicalissues an internaland vital role withinthe
processof scientifictheorizingitself.
McMullin also argues that metaphysicalconsiderations,appearances notwith-
standing,play a continuingrole in scientifictheorizing.He writes,

The experience has servedto eliminate

of severalcenturies thatonceinflu-
principles
encedthecourseof scienceandto giveothersthesanctionof success.One mightbe
tempted to thinkthatregulativeprinciplesof a broadlymetaphysical kindno longer
playa rolein thenaturalsciences.Yetevena moment aboutthecurrent
of reflection
debatesin elementary-particle
theory,in quantum-fieldtheory,in cosmology,oughtto
warnthatthisis farfromthecase.True,theprinciples at issuemightnotbe as overtly
metaphysical as theyoftenwereinNewton's time,butthedistinction is oneofdegree,
notkind.3

" Thisis nota newsuggestion, ofcourse.A fewantecedents areLeonardK. Nash,TheNatureof

theNaturalSciences(Boston:Little,Brown,1963); G. E. D. Buchdahl,"Historyof Scienceand
ofChoice,"inMinnesotaStudiesinthePhilosophy
Criteria ofScience,vol.5: Historicaland Philo-
sophicalPerspectivesof Science,ed. RogerH. Steuwer(Minneapolis:Univ.of MinnesotaPress,
1970),pp. 204-29; LarryLaudan,Scienceand Values(BerkeleyandLos Angeles:Univ.ofCalifor-
nia Press,1984); and PeterRaillton,"Explanationand Metaphysical Controversy,"in Minnesota
Studiesin thePhilosophy of Science,vol. 13: Scientific
Explanation,ed. PhilipKitcherandWesley
C. Salmon(Minneapolis:Univ.ofMinnesotaPress,1989),pp. 220-52.
3' McMullin,Newton(cit.n. 29),p. 127.In quantum mechanics, consider-
theroleofintelligibility
ationshas againcometotheforethrough Bell'stheorem. See theessaysinJamesCushingandErnan
McMullin, Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory:Reflectionson Bell s Theorem(Notre
"WhathasCopenha-
Dame,Ind.:Univ.ofNotreDame Press,1989).I haveexploredthisinWykstra,
andMermin's
gento do withZurich?QuantumMechanics,Intelligibility, Metaphys-
Experimental
ics" (forthcoming).

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 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS, AND SCIENCE 45

This same adjustmentmay,perhaps,illuminatehow religiousbeliefsoftenenter

thescientificprocess.It is oftensuggestedthattheisticbeliefwas relevantto modern
science primarily throughits insistencethatGod's Creationof theworldwas an act
of utterdivinefreedom;thisvoluntansttheology,it is claimed,led theiststo think
that,in assessingtheories,"fitting theobservedfacts"is theonlythingthatcounts.
And no doubtwe can findearlymodernscientistswho do professsuch a positivist
methodologyand see a voluntarist theologyas sanctioningit.But even voluntarism
allows a richervision of science than this: even if God's creativeactivityis not
dictatedby his rationality, God is stillfreeto make us witha deep thirstto make
the worldaroundus intelligible,and to make theworldsuch thatit providessome
satisfactionof thisthirst.The theisticvision thuspermitsa scientistto see science
as a processof testingand refining our ideals of intelligibility
(via a searchforcon-
servationlaws, forsymmetry, forextremumprinciples,and so forth),ratherthanas
one which,positivistfashion,rejectssuch guidingideals as irrelevant fromtheout-
set. And this,ratherthanthe voluntarist-positivist connection,is a more common
patternby whichscientistshave allowed theirreligiousbeliefs(about whatlies be-
hind the physicaluniverse)to fruitfully guide theirexplanatoryideals (about the
typesof physicalinteractions we mightreasonablyhope to findwithinit).32
McMullin'sworklies largelywithinthe"historyand philosophyof science" histo-
riographicaltraditions:whilepostpositivist in recognizingtherolesplayedby meta-
physical and religiousbeliefs withinscientifictheorizing,this traditionwas still
strongly"internalist" in seeing scientifictheoriesas unfoldingfromthe goals and
problemsituationof science as a cognitiveenterprise.In recentdecades, thisap-
proachhas been labeled "intellectualist" bythosewho wantto replaceitwitha more
sociological, "contextualist"approach.The new contextualists, usually dismissive
of theinternalist-externalistdistinction,seek to linkscientifictheorizingmoreinti-
matelyto thesocial, economic,and politicalcontextsofthehistoricalagents.Never-
theless,theyoftensee themselvesas buildingupon the findingsof intellectualist
historianslike McMullin,preciselybecause religiousand metaphysicalbeliefspro-
vide a linkto interestsin theselargercontexts.Historianof science StevenShapin,
discussinghow we shouldtreat"therelationsbetweenmetaphysicsand religionon
theone hand,and an individual'sscientificthought,on theother,"thuswrites,

[E]venifthe'theories'ofpost-Koyr6an intellectualism thereis no reason

arerejected,
whatever todismissitsempirical
forcontextualists Indeed,demonstrated
findings. con-
nectionsbetweenonesetofideasandanother arethenecessary forhisto-
starting-points
rianswhowouldputanadditional setofcontextual questionstothematerials.
Contextu-
alistsneednotacceptthemodelofthecultural actorwhichintellectualists
employ, but
theymustbuildupontheintellectualists'empiricalfindings.33

How to extendtheolder"intellectualist"approachso as properlyto incorporatethe

concernsof thenew "contextualists" largetopicwhichI do notproposeto enter
is a

"Shouldworldviews
accountin StephenWykstra,
32 I havegivena fuller shapescience?Toward
AccountofScientific
an Integrationist inFacetsofFaithand Science,4 vols.,ed. J.M.
Theorizing,"
van der Meer, vol. 2: The Role of Beliefs in Mathematicsand the Natural Sciences: An Augustinian
Perspective (Lanham,Md.: Pascal CentreforAdvancedStudiesin Faithand Science/Univ.Press
ofAmerica,1997),pp. 124-71.
33 StevenShapin,"SocialUses ofScience,"inThe FermentofKnowledge: Studiesin theHistoriog-
raphyofEighteenth-Century Science,ed. G. S. Rousseauand RoyPorter(CambridgeUniv.Press:
1980),pp. 110-11.

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46 STEPHEN J.WYKSTRA

here.34But perhapsthereis an underlyingimperativeupon whichbothintellectu-

can agree.To take historyof science seriouslyis to let the
alists and contextualists
historicalfigureswe studysurpriseus withtheirunexpectedconnections.As we see
how the enterprisewe now call "science" has descended fromso manyof these
unexpectedconnections,our own initialpigeonholes(includingour categoriesof
the "metaphysical,"and the "religious")begin to interpenetrate
the "scientific," in
new ways. And the historian'sart lies in lettingthe subject matterenrichand re-
arrangeour categories.The accountI have givenis intendedto help thisprocess.

4 On this,I aminclinedtoagreewithShapin'scontention distinction

thattheinternalist-externalist
hasbeenprematurely dismissedandstillneedstobe properlyconsideredandassessed.Forhisinter-
estingandextensively documentedanalysis,see StevenShapin,"DisciplineandBounding:TheHis-
toryand Sociologyof Scienceas Seen ThroughtheEyes of theExternalism-Internalism Debate,"
Hist.Sci. 30 (1992): 333-69.

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