INR 5315: Foreign Policy Analysis

Fall 2003, Thursday: 1:30-4:00pm

Bellamy Room 113

Professor Mark Souva

Office: Bellamy 555
Office Hours: MW, 4-5pm or by appointment
E-mail: [email protected]

Course Overview

How can we account for the foreign policies of states in the international system? Why do they
behave the way they do? This course examines some of the major themes of research on foreign
policy, paying particular attention to the United States. The course focuses on why decision-
makers choose a particular policy, rather than proposing prescriptions for design and
implementation. In general, any given choice is a function of systemic and domestic incentives
and constraints, and ideational preferences. The course will examine the primary sources of
incentives, constraints, and preferences on foreign policy decision-making in general and with
respect to specific questions such as the use of economic sanctions.

Course Goals

1. One goal of the course is to introduce you to some of the important theoretical and
substantive issues in the study of foreign policy, paying particular attention to the American case.
To meet this goal, we will read and discuss recent scholarly literature on a variety of foreign
policy topics.

2. Another goal of this course is to enhance students’ ability to think analytically. The
immediate, instrumental purpose for this goal is to provide insight on how to design one’s own
research papers. The primary means of addressing this goal will be through weekly seminar
discussion and feedback on students written work.

3. This course also aims to develop your writing skills. Most professions value excellent
writing skills, and individuals with these skills almost always quickly advance. To foster your
ability to clearly communicate your thoughts to someone else on paper, students will write
weekly reaction papers (see below). Each student will also write a research paper (see below).

Course Requirements

Reading: There are 4 books required for this course. They are available at the FSU bookstore
and Bill’s bookstore in town. They are also available online at places like Amazon.com.

• Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s
World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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 • Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.

• Regan, Patrick M. 2000. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in
Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

• Lake, David A. 1999. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

I have also assigned a number of journal articles for the course. They are detailed on the
syllabus. Nearly all of the journal articles are available online through JSTOR (see the FSU
Library web page for information). Articles not available online will be made available for
students to copy in advance. The heart of this course is the reading material. If you do not read
the material and study it BEFORE each class meeting, then you will not perform well in the
course and the seminar will not go well.

Attendance and Participation: This is a graduate course. To perform well, to meet the goals of
the course, you must attend each course meeting and participate in class discussion. Each class
meeting will be devoted to an analysis of the readings. The quality of your participation depends
on your having read and reflected upon the material for that week.

Beyond regular class attendance and active participation in class discussions, each student will
make three presentations to the rest of the class on the weekly topics. The presentations involve
leading the class discussion for that week. The presentations should analyze the readings. In
analyzing the readings, think about these questions:

What is the research question?

What is the thesis?
What is the logic of the argument?
What does this concept mean and why is it important? Be able to define key terms.
What are the implications of the argument?
Research Design
What is the unit of analysis?
Is the selection of cases appropriate for this argument? Is there a problem with selection bias?
Do the measurements match the concepts they are measuring?
Can you think of an alternative explanation for the author’s evidence?

The following general grading scale will be used for participation and presentations:

A to A-: The student made a very strong contribution to the course. Class discussion,
comments, and presentations reflected understanding and analysis of the material, and were
constructive. Constructive means that you do not simply identify a weakness or problem.
Rather, constructive comments identify a problem and offer a suggestion for how to address the
weakness or problem

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B+ to B-: The student contributed meaningfully to the course. Class participation and/or
presentations went beyond repeating the assigned material, perhaps identifying weaknesses in the
current literature, but did not make many constructive suggestions about how these weaknesses
might be overcome or how the literature might usefully be extended in the future.
C+ or lower: The student did not contribute meaningfully. Class participation and/or
presentations were limited to repeating the assigned material rather than making connections or
extensions.
F: The student was a net drain on the course, rarely if ever speaking in class, making
presentations filled with inaccuracies, and/or failing to make the number of required
presentations.

One-Page Papers: Every week you will submit a 1 page single-spaced paper (either 10 or 12
point font) that evaluates the readings assigned for that week. These one-page reaction papers
are due at the beginning of class. Late papers will be marked down one full letter grade for each
day they are late. If the paper is five minutes late, it will be marked down one letter grade. The
reaction papers are NOT meant to be summaries of the readings assigned for that week. You can
assume that I’ve read the material and that I don’t need a summary. Rather, what you should
strive for is to evaluate the material you have read, and draw comparisons and contrasts between
the readings. Every reaction paper must conclude with at least two research questions that are
suggested by, but not answered by, the readings. You should be able to describe each research
question with 2 to 4 sentences.

Research Paper: Each student will write a paper between 15 and 30 pages in length. Ph.D.
students will write an academic oriented research paper on a topic of their choosing, with
approval by the instructor. An academic research papers involves developing a theory, deriving
hypotheses from the theory, and testing the hypotheses. This paper provides you an opportunity
to contribute something original to the body of knowledge regarding foreign policy. Developing
the skill to produce independent research is essential for anyone considering an academic career.
Masters students will either write an academic oriented research paper or a policy
memorandum. The policy memorandum also requires research but it does not involve testing
hypotheses. The policy memorandum requires identifying an issue, making a reasoned argument
in favor of a specific policy action, and addressing counterarguments. I will provide grading
criteria for the policy memorandum in class.

Evaluation
Grades will be determined as follows:

Attendance and Participation: 30%

Reaction Papers: 35%
Research Paper/Policy Memo: 35%

Grading is based on a straight percentage scale. There is no grading curve. There is no extra
credit.

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Letter Percentage Letter Percentage Letter Percentage
Grade Score Grade Score Grade Score

A 93-100 B- 80-82 D+ 67-69

A- 90-92 C+ 77-79 D 63-66

B+ 87-89 C 73-76 D- 60-62

B 83-86 C- 70-72 F 59 or below

Americans with Disabilities Act

Students with disabilities needing academic accommodations must (1) register with and provide
documentation to the Student Disability Resource Center (SDRC), and (2) bring a letter to the
instructor from SDRC indicating that you need academic accommodations. This must be done
within the first week of class.

FSU's Academic Honor Code

"The academic honor system of The Florida State University is based on the premise that each
student has the responsibility: (1) To uphold the highest standards of academic integrity in the
student’s own work, (2) To refuse to tolerate violations of academic integrity in the University
community, and (3) To foster a high sense of integrity and social responsibility on the part of the
University community."

I expect students to bring possible violations of this honor code to the attention of the instructor
as soon as possible, so that the violations -- if any -- may be stopped quickly. Violations include
(but are not limited to) the use of unauthorized information on course assignments or
examinations, representing another’s work or any part thereof (published or unpublished) as
one’s own, assisting another student in obtaining unauthorized information for course
assignments or examinations, and attempting to commit such an offense. A more complete
listing of violations can be found in the FSU Student Handbook.

Violation of this honor code will be dealt with in an appropriate manner, consistent with FSU
guidelines. Academic penalties may include (but shall not be limited to) a lower or failing grade
on the assignment or examination in question, and a lower or failing grade for the course. The
University may also enforce further disciplinary penalties, such as a formal reprimand,
probation, or suspension or dismissal from the University.

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 Course Calendar

Week 1: What is Foreign Policy?

August 28

• Lake, David A. and Robert Powell. 1999. “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice

Approach.” In Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press: pp. 3-35.

• Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2003. “Foundations of International Politics.” In Principles

of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and Perceptions. Washington,
DC: Congressional Quarterly Press: pp. 1-21.

• Elman, Colin. 1996. Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security Studies 6
(1): 7-53.

• Waltz, Kenneth N. 1996. International Politics is Not Foreign Policy. Security Studies 6
(1): 54-57.

• Elman, Colin. 1996. Cause, Effect and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz.
Security Studies 6 (1): 58-61.

Week 2: Realism And The Importance Of Power

September 4

• Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s
World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Brooks, Stephen. 1997. Dueling Realisms. International Organization 51 (3): 445-478.

Recommended

• Waltz, Kenneth W. 2000. Structural Realism After the Cold War. International Security
25 (1): 5-41.

• Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation. International Security 24

(1): 42-63.

• Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. Is Anybody Still a Realist?

International Security 24 (2).

• Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W.
W. Norton.

• Zakaria, Fareed. 1992. Realism and Domestic Politics. International Security 17 (1): 177-
198.

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Week 3: Liberalism: The Importance of Domestic Groups, Institutions, and Culture
September 11

• Brawley, Mark R. 1993. Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and Their Challengers in
Peace and War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Chapter 1 only)

• Brawley, Mark R. 1995. Political Leadership and Liberal Economic Subsystems: The
Constraints of Structural Assumptions. Canadian Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 85-
103.

• Brawley, Mark R. 1993. Regime Types, Markets, and War: The Importance of Pervasive
Rents in Foreign Policy. Comparative Political Studies 26 (2): 178-197.

• John S. Duffield. 1999. Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds
Neorealism. International Organization 53 (4): 764ff.

Recommended

• Brawley, Mark R. 1993. Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and Their Challengers in
Peace and War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ISBN: 0801428084

• Brawley, Mark. 1999. Afterglow or Adjustment? Domestic Institutions and Responses to

Overstretch. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

• Kissinger, Henry A. 1977. Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy. In American Foreign
Policy, 3rd Edition. New York: W. W. Norton.

• Levy, Jack S. 1988. Domestic Politics and War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18
(4): 653-673.

Week 4: Bargaining: Credibility and Capability

September 18

• Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.

• Reiter, Dan. 2003. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics 1
(1): 27-44.

Recommended

• Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.

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 • Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49
(3): 379-414.

• Garztke, Erik. 1999. War is in the error term. International Organization 52 (3): 567-587.

• Gartzke, Erik and Quan Li and Charles Boehmer. 2001. “Investing in the Peace:
Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization 55
(2): 391-438.

• O'Neill, Barry. 2001. Honor, Symbols, and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.

• O’Neill, Barry. 2001. Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory. International

Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 617-640.

Week 5: Domestic Politics I: Institutions (Congress vs. the President)

September 25

• Prins, Brandon C. and Bryan W. Marshall. 2001. Congressional Support of the

President: A Comparison of Foreign, Defense, and Domestic Policy Decision-Making
During and After the Cold War. Presidential Studies Quarterly 31(4): 660-679.

• Cronin, Patrick and Benjamin O. Fordham. 1999. "Timeless Principles or Today's

Fashion? Testing the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in
the Senate." Journal of Politics 61 (4): 967-98.

• Meernik, James. 1993. “Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on

Foreign and Defense Policy.” Journal of Politics, 55(3): 569-587.

• Wittkopf, Eugene R. and James M. McCormick. 1998. “Congress, the President, and the
End of the Cold War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(4): 440-466.

• McCormick, James M. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 1990. Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and

Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988. Journal of
Politics 52 (4): 1077-1100.

• McCormick, James M. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 1992. At the Water’s Edge: The Effects
of Party, Ideology, and Issues on Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, 1947-1988.
American Politics Quarterly 20: 26-53.

Background Primer

• Thurber, James. 2002. "An Introduction to Presidential-Congressional Rivalry." In

Rivals for power: presidential-congressional relations. James A. Thurber, editor.
Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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Week 6: Domestic Politics II: Public Opinion
October 2

• Baum, Matthew. 2002. The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag

Phenomenon. International Studies Quarterly 46 (2): 263-298.

• Holsti, Ole. 1992. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges of the Almond-
Lippmann Consensus. International Studies Quarterly 36 (4): 439-466.

• Holsti, Ole and James Rosenau. 1990. The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among
American Leaders. Journal of Politics 52 (1): 94-125.

• Jentleson, Bruce W. and Rebecca L. Britton. 1998. Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War
American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 42(4): 395-417.

• Jentleson, Bruce. 1992. The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion
on the Use of Military Force. International Studies Quarterly 36 (1): 49-74.

• Bjereld, Ulf and Ann-Marie Ekengren. 1999. Foreign Policy Dimensions: A Comparison
Between the United States and Sweden. International Studies Quarterly 43 (3): 503-518.

• Aldrich, John, John Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. 1989. Foreign Affairs and Issue
Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ‘Waltz Before a Blind Audience’? American Political
Science Review 83: 123-141.

Recommended

• Holsti, Ole R. 1996. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor, MI:
The University of Michigan Press.

• Holsti, Ole. 2002. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Analysis: Where We Were, Are,
and Should Strive to Be. In Millennial Reflections on International Studies. Frank P.
Harvey and Michael Brecher, editors. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

• Baum, Matthew. 2002. Sex, Lies and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the
Inattentive Public. American Political Science Review 96 (March): 91-109

• Foyle, Douglas C. 1997. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating
Variable. International Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 141-170.

• Aguilar, Edwin Eloy, Benjamin O. Fordham, G. Patrick Lynch. 1997. The Foreign Policy
Beliefs of Political Campaign Contributors. International Studies Quarterly 1997. 41 (2):
355-366.

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 • Hurwitz, Jon and Mark Peffley. 1987. How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A
Hierarchical Model. American Political Science Review 81 (4): 1099-1120.

• Hurwitz, Jon, Mark Peffley, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1993. Foreign Policy Belief
Systems in Comparative Perspective: The United States and Costa Rica. International
Studies Quarterly 37: 245-270.

• Page, Benjamin and Jason Barabas. 2000. Foreign Policy Gaps Between Citizens and
Leaders. International Studies Quarterly 44 (3): 339-364.

• Chittick, William O., Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis. 1995. A Three-Dimensional
Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs. International Studies Quarterly 39: 313-331.

• Hinckley, Ronald H. 1992. Peoples, Polls, and Policymakers: American public opinion
and national security. New York: Lexington.

Week 7: Domestic Politics III: Institutional and Societal Influences

October 9

• Hiscox, Michael. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from
Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. American Political Science Review 96 (3):
593-608.

• Trubowitz, Peter. 1992. Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The Political
Geography of Consensus and Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 36 (2): 173-
190.

• Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade."

American Political Science Review. 81 (4): 1121-1137.

• Milner, Helen. 1988. "Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade." World Politics. 40
(3): 350-376.

• Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2001. "Institutions and International Cooperation: A
Duration Analysis of the Effects of Sanctions." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (1): 61-
79.

Recommended

• Milner, Helen. 1999. The Political Economy of International Trade. Annual Review of
Political Science 2: 91-114.

• Hiscox, Michael. 2002. International trade and political conflict : commerce, coalitions,
and mobility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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 • Midford, Paul. 1994. International trade and domestic politics: improving on Rogowski’s
model of political alignments. International Organization 47 (4): 535-564.

• Brawley, Mark R. 1997. Factoral or Sectoral Conflict? Partially Mobile Factors and the
Politics of Trade in Imperial Germany. International Studies Quarterly 41 (4): 633-653.

Week 8: Sanctions
October 16

• Cooper Drury, Alfred. 1998. Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.” Journal of

Peace Research 35: 497-509.

• Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff. 1997. On the Determinants
of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis. American Journal of
Political Science 41: 608-618.

• Galtung, Johan. 1967. On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With

Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. World Politics XIX: 378-416.

• Kirshner, Johnathan. 1997. The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions. Security

Studies 6: 32-64.

• Lindsay, James. 1986. Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination.

International Studies Quarterly 30: 153-173.

• Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie Schwebach. 1997. Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of
Economic Sanctions in International Crises. International Studies Quarterly 41: 27-50.

• Pape, Robert A. 1997. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security
22: 90-136.

• Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2003. The Economic Peace Between Democracies:
Economic Sanctions and Democratic Institutions. Journal of Peace Research 40 (6):
641-660.

Recommended

• Chan, Steve and A. Cooper Drury, editors. 2000. Sanctions As Economic Statecraft. New
York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.

• Nooruddin, Irfan. 2002. Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy.

International Interactions 28: 57-74.

• Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie Schwebach. 1995. Economic Sanctions as an Instrument

of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics. International Interactions 21: 247-
263.

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 • Elliott, Kimberly Ann and Gary Clyde Hufbauer. 1998. Ineffectiveness of Economic
Sanctions: Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990s. American
Economic Review 89: 403-8.

• Hufbauer, Gary and Barbara Oegg. 2000. Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative. Law
and Policy in International Business. 32: 11-21.

Week 9: Intervention and Use of Force I

October 23

• Regan, Patrick M. 2000. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in
Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Week 10: Intervention and Use of Force II

October 30

• Meernik, James. 1994. Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military
Force. International Studies Quarterly 38: 121-138.

• Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998. The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A
Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994. International Studies
Quarterly 42 (3): 567-590.

• Benjamin Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and

U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42,
No. 4: 418-439.

• Fordham, Benjamin and C. C. Sarver. 2001. Militarized Interstate Disputes and United
States Uses of Force. International Studies Quarterly 45 (3): 455-466.

• Prins, Brandon. 2001. Domestic Politics and Interstate Disputes: Examining U.S. MID
Involvement and Reciprocation, 1870-1992. International Interactions 26 (4): 411-438.

• Gowa, Joanne. 1998. Politics at the Water’s Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force
Abroad. International Organization 52 (2): 307-324.

Recommended

• Blechman, Barry M. and Stephen S. Kaplan. 1978. Force Without War: U.S. Armed
Force as a Political Instrument. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.

• Ostrom and Job. 1986. The President and the Political Use of Force. American Political
Science Review 80 (2): 541-566.

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 • Mitchell and Moore. 2002. Presidential Uses of Force During the Cold War:
Aggregation, Truncation, and Temporal Dynamics. American Journal of Political
Science.

Week 11: Substitutability

November 6

• Baldwin, David A. 1999. The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice. International
Security 24(3): 80-107.

• Clark, David H. 2001. Trading Butter for Guns: Domestic Imperatives for Foreign Policy
Substitution. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (5): 636-660.

• Regan, Patrick M. 2000. Substituting Policies During U.S. Interventions in Internal

Conflicts: A Little of This, A Little of That. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(1): 90-106.

• Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer. 1997. A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy: An
Application to Dispute Initiation and Reciprocation. International Interactions 22(3):
225-244.

• Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer. 2000. A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability:
Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s). Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (1): 11-32.

• Baldwin, David A. 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy. Annual Review of
Political Science 3: 167-182.

Week 12: Decision Making Theories

November 13

• Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis."
The American Political Science Review 63 (3): 689-718.

• Bendor, Jonathan and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. "Rethinking Allison’s

Models." The American Political Science Review 86 (2): 301-322.

• Mintz, Alex. 1993. The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory

of Decision Making. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (4): 595-618.

• Mintz, Alex and Nehemia Geva. 1997. The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign
Policy Decisionmaking. In Geva, Nehemia and Alex Mintz, editors. Decision-
Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate. Boulder, CO :
Lynne Rienner Publishers, pps. 81-103.

Recommended

Page 12 of 15
 • Krasner, Stephen. 1972. Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland).
Foreign Policy. Summer: 459-472.

• Alex Mintz; Nehemia Geva; Steven B. Redd; Amy Carnes. 1997. The Effect of
Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis
Using the Decision Board Platform. American Political Science Review 91 (3):
553-566.

• Hagan, Joe D. 2001. "Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs.
Historical Reality in IR Theory." International Studies Review 3(2): 5-47.

• Rosati, Jerel. 2000. The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World
Politics. International Studies Review 2 (3): 45-75.

Week 13: Multilateralism versus Unilateralism in U.S. Foreign Policy

November 20

• Lake, David A. 1999. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Ikenberry, G. John. 2003. Is American Multilateralism in Decline? Perspectives on

Politics 1 (3): 533-545.

Related Topic: Offense-Defense Balance:

• Heginbotham, Eric. 2002. The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military
Organization, Domestic Politics, and Grand Strategy. International Security 27 (2): 86-
125.

• Glaser, Charles L. and Chaim Kaufmann. 1998. What is the Offense-Defense Balance
and Can We Measure It? International Security 22 (4): 44-82.

• Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30 (2):
167-214.

• Quester, George H. 1977. Offense and Defense in the International System. New York:
John Wiley and Sons.

• Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. International
Security 22 (4): 5-43.

• Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 1995. Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics. Security Studies 4
(4): 660-691.

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 • Lieber, Keir A. 2000. Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance
and International Security. International Security 25 (1): 71-104.

• Biddle, Stephen. 1998. The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare.
Security Studies 8 (1): 1-74.

Week 14: Domestic Political Institutions and Foreign Policy Incentives

• Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Simth.
1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science
Review 93: 791-807.

• Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2003. The Economic Peace Between Democracies:
Economic Sanctions and Democratic Institutions. Journal of Peace Research 40 (6):
641-660.

Recommended

• Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Simth.
2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Week 15: Terrorism
December 4

• Mousseau, Michael. 2003. Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror. International
Security 27 (3): 5-29.

• Kydd, Andrew and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. Sabotaging the peace: the politics of
extremist violence. International Organization 56 (2): 263-296.

• Pape, Robert. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political
Science Review 97 (3): 343-362.

Recommended

• Dialogue IO articles, April 2002.

http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=4&tid=36

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