Aldueso- admin law

Aratuc vs. COMELEC

88 SCRA 251

FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of
the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the
KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.”
“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.
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Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

G.R no. 96266

Facts: Caltex, Shell and Petron applied for a provisional increase on wholesale posted prices of
petroleum products, which the Energy Regulatory Board granted. The petitioners posits that the
Order of the Board was made without proper notice and hearing and constitutes as an act of
taxation (due to the increase in the price), ad valorem taxes on oil which Republic Act No. 6965
had abolished.

Issue: Whether the Board committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order

Ruling: The Court finds no merit in the petitions. The Court stated that the petitioners
overlooked the provisions that grants the Board the Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. The
petitioners base their argument on Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 172 but the Court
reiterated that Section 3 (e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it
may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that,
however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a
hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented
from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority – which is of course, the better
procedure – however, it can not be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

US vs Dorr
2 Phil 332

Administration as an Organization Distinguished from Government

FACTS: The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense
of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon
section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as follows:

"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which
tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government,
or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of
the court."
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The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6,
1902, under the caption of" A few hard facts."

The article in question is described in the complaint as “a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which
tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to instigate others to cabal
and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests and incite rebellious conspiracies,
and which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the
safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands.”

ISSUE: Whether the article in question attacks the governmental system

RULING: No. The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292
by the expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general
and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the
aggregate of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being,
administered? Either sense would doubtless be admissible.

We understand, in modern political science, by the term "government", that institution or

aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of
action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon
the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing
them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration"
again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the
aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the
chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 89l.) But the writer adds
that the terms "government and ’’administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that
"government" is often used for ’’administration.’’

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States,
and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body
and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by
which the authority of the United States is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by
a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into
disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals,
and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency
being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.
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Poindexter vs Greenhow
114 US 270 (1885)

Facts: The plaintiff owed to the state of Virginia, for taxes on property owned by him in said city
for the year 1882, $12.45, which said taxes were due and leviable for, under the laws of
Virginia. The defendant was the treasurer of the city of Richmond, and as such charged by law
with the duty of collecting taxes due to the state of Virginia by all residents of said city; the
defendant made upon the plaintiff demand for the payment of the taxes due by him to the state
as aforesaid; the plaintiff, when demand was so made for payment of his taxes, tendered to the
defendant in payment thereof 45 cents in lawful money of the United States, and coupons
issued by the state of Virginia; the said coupons and money so tendered by the plaintiff
amounted together to exactly the sum so due the state by the plaintiff for taxes; that the
defendant refused to receive the said coupons and money so tendered in payment of the
plaintiff’s taxes; that the defendant, after said tender was made, as he deemed himself required
to do by the acts of assembly of Virginia, entered the plaintiff’s place of business in said city,
and levied upon, and took possession of the desk, the property of the plaintiff now sued for, for
the purpose of selling the same to pay the taxes due from him; and that the said desk is of the
value of $30, and still remains in possession of the defendant for the purpose aforesaid, he
having refused to return the same to the plaintiff on demand.

Issue: Whether or not it was valid for a US tax official to refuse coupons as tax payments
despite being allowed by the United States Constitution

Ruling: The defendant relied on the act of January 26, 1882, requiring him to collect
taxes in gold, silver, United States treasury notes, national bank currency, and nothing else, and
thus forbidding his receipt of coupons in lieu of money. That, it is true, is a legislative act of the
government of Virginia, but it is not a law of the state of Virginia. The state has passed no such
law, for it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has not done. The
constitution of the United States, and its own contract, both irrepealable by any act on its part,
are the law of Virginia; and that law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons
tendered in payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter taken, to be
without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped of his official character,
and confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff’s right, for which he must personally answer,
he is without defense.
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Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.

GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of
a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of pre-
qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened
on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm
of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,
petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming
that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to
accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December,
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited
from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by
PD No. 1818, which provides: “Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order… in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project… of the government… to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project…”
Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a
state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the
prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like
the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it
would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.

HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
GOCC’s. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institution—refers to
any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that
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ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent

that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the
anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly
issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
denied.

United Residents of Dominican Hills vs Commission on the Settlement of Land problems

353 SCRA 782

FACTS: The property is a 10.36 hectare property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills. It was
mortgaged to the UCPB which foreclosed the mortgage, acquired the same as highest bidder,
and was donated to the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB. The deed of donation stipulated
that the property would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human
settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements

However, the Ministry of Human Settlements was abolished when President Corazon Aquino
issued EO No. 85. All the agencies as well as all the assets, programs and projects of the
Ministry were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS)

PMS received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC.
(UNITED) to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. PMS Secretary referred the
application to the HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC). A MOA was
signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED where PMS would sell the property to
HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. Eventually, HIGC sold the property to
UNITED

Sometime in 1993, private respondents, DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS

ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION), entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED
and constructed houses. Petitioner secured a demolition order.

Private respondents filed an action for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 3316-R but their
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction was later denied. While Civil Case No. 3316-R was
pending, private respondents filed Civil Case No. 3382-R represented by the Land Reform
Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES). They prayed for the damages, injunction and
annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC which was
dismissed by the trial court.

Another demolition order was subsequently implemented. To forestall the re-implementation of

the demolition order, private respondents filed petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for
a temporary restraining order in the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) against petitioner HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as
the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. Public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo.
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Petitioner then filed the instant petition

ISSUE: Is COSLAP empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer
for a temporary restraining order and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing?

RULING: No. The COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy

Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 states that:

…The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have
the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding
upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same

The COSLAP may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are already pending in the regular
courts. Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the
COSLAP as having the "force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or
decision." The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative character of
the COSLAP's determination, amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or
decisions "shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction
over the same."

The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions:

"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they
are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Accordingly, the
executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies,
upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Anak Mindanao Party list vs The Executive Sec

Facts: Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and
379, both issued in 2004, in a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive
relief. They contend that the two presidential issuances are unconstitutional. AMIN contends
that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed,
merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.

Issue: WON placing the PCUP under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency is
unconstitutional.
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Ruling: No. The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive
departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. It justifies an executive action to carry
out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President
does not remove said body from the President’s control and supervision with respect to its
performance of administrative functions. In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached
agency, the President effectively tempered the exercise of presidential authority and
considerably recognized that degree of independence.
A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In the present case, AMIN
glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by executive fiat would hamper the exercise of
citizen’s rights and privileges. AMIN has not shown that by placing the NCIP as an attached
agency of the DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction and
adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving rights of
indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay alleged,
that the reorganization was made in bad faith.

Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

207 SCRA 689

FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre
supervisor in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21,
1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and
Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were
preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district
attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit.
On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager
also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was
also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was
redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it
to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two
days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.

ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.

HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.
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With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was
created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.
Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the
DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control
and administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program
coordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency
from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an
agency under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law
impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to
subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89.
The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
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Eugenio vs CSC

Definition of Administrative Relationships

Attachment

FACTS: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993,
she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 93-4359
which resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure.
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for
Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of
the Office for Career Executive Service. The above resolution became an impediment to the
appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished
CESB, an office created by law, through the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359

RULING: Yes. The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was
created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which adopted the
Integrated Plan.

It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function.

Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is
primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted
by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are
suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to
create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-
officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
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has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission's power to reorganize
is limited to offices under its control. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is
expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a
broad and positive outlook." The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by
its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain
"policy and program coordination."

RATIO: Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.

---
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Luzon Development Bank vs Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees

Facts:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the
following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on
December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received
ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its
Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May
23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position
Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

Issue:

Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial
entities

Held:

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of
Appeals shall exercise:

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within
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the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact
that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the
exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise
be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to
provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities
not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or
another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act
No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which
the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial
Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which
the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within
one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order
confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified
or corrected.

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional
trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision,
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY VS CA

FACTS:

P.D. 272 was issued creating Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA"). National Government embarked
on a program which is the construction of NSC which is an integrated steel mill in Iligan City.
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from sale or
settlement tract of public land and reserving that land for the use and occupancy of NSC. Since
certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by
private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"). LOI No. 1277 also directed
that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of
sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of
eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings. The negotiations
failed thus, Petitioner commenced eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in RTC. While
the trial was ongoing, the statutory existence of ISA expired. The trial court dismissed the case
which was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court that “only natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law may be parties in civil case.”

ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to exercise the power of eminent domain.
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HELD: In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an
agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority
under P.D. No. 272. In addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the
Philippines shall have such other specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or
imposed on him by law. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has
substantially reproduced the foregoing provision in the following terms:

"Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National Government,
and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute
expropriation proceedings in the proper court." (Italics supplied) In the present case, the
President, exercising the power duly delegated under both the1917 and 1987

Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was necessary and
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the
Republic and accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed with the suit.
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Ursal vs. CTA

101 Phil. 209

FACTS: Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu in the exercise of his powers assessed for
taxation certain real properties of Consuelo Noel and Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu, and
that upon protest of the taxpayers, the Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the
assessments. It also shows he took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his
valuation; but said Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides, the
assessor had no personality to bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125, which reads as follows:

SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an
appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or
ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu have the personality to resort to
the Court of Tax Appeals on his valuation on the taxes of Consuelo and Jesusa Samson.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner has
no personality to bring before the CTA. Supreme Court stressed out that “The rulings of the
Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu 1
that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty
taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but
the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals
was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.”
Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals did not grant it blanket authority to
decide any and all tax disputes. Defining such special court's jurisdiction, the Act necessarily
limited its authority to those matters enumerated therein.
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Sea-Land Service Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

357 SCRA 441

FACTS: Sea-Land Service Incorporated (SEA-LAND), an American international shipping

company licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the
Philippines entered into a contract with the United States Government to transport military
household goods and effects of U. S. military personnel assigned to the Subic Naval Base.
From the aforesaid contract, SEA-LAND derived an income for the taxable year 1984 amounting
to P58,006,207.54. During the taxable year in question, SEA-LAND filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) the corresponding corporate Income Tax Return (ITR) and paid the
income tax due thereon of 1.5% as required in Section 25 (a) (2) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) in relation to Article 9 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, amounting to
P870,093.12. “Claiming that it paid the aforementioned income tax by mistake, a written claim
for refund was filed with the BIR on 15 April 1987. However, before the said claim for refund
could be acted upon by public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner-
appellant filed a petition for review with the CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 4149, to judicially
pursue its claim for refund and to stop the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the
then Section 243 of the NIRC. “On 21 February 1995, CTA rendered its decision denying SEA-
LAND’s claim for refund of the income tax it paid in 1984.” On March 30, 1995, petitioner
appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals. After due
proceedings, on October 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abused of discretion.

HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court sees no reason to
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals. The Supreme “Court will not set aside lightly the conclusion reached by the Court of
Tax Appeals which, by the very nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to the
consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject,
unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.”

Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err or gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition
for review
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Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals
477 SCRA 49

FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company herein referred to as the petitioner is a domestic
banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. In the
early part of 1992, the Cavite Development Bank [CDB], also a domestic banking corporation,
was merged with Petitioner with the latter as its surviving entity [under] the merger. Petitioner
being the surviving entity, [it] acquired all [the] assets of CDB During the period from 1990 to
1991, CDB sold some acquired assets in the course of which it allegedly withheld the creditable
tax from the sales proceeds which amounted to P755,715.00. In said years, CDB filed income
tax returns which reflected that CDB incurred negative taxable income or losses for both years.
Since there was no tax against which to credit or offset the taxes withheld by CDB, the result
was that CDB, according to petitioner, had excess creditable withholding tax. Thus, petitioner,
being the surviving entity of the merger, filed this Petition for Review after its administrative
claim for refund was not acted upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals are not
based on Facts and the Law.

HELD: The petition is denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Court
stressed out that “The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise
on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court,
especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final
arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a
party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on
a misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which
if considered would justify a different conclusion”
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Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp.

474 SCRA 258

FACTS: Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the “Corporation”) is a duly

organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act, which
owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium
(the “Condominium”), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the
various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its
Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses,
capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in
the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. Proceeding from the
premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the
Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government
Code, “business” is defined as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of
livelihood or with a view to profit.” It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium
corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the
Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels
of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under
its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it
did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The
protest was rejected by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit
owners was effected primarily “to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with
the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium
occupants and to command better marketable prices for those occupants” who would in the
future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the “chances of getting higher
prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that
condominiums with poor managed common areas,” the corporation activity “is a profit venture
making”. The CA reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay
business taxes to the City of Makati.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium
corporations.

HELD: No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the
Makati Revenue Code (“Revenue Code”), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072.
The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue
Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses
which are covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the
Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is
the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax
on petitioner.
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Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals

101 Phil. 490

FACTS: Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case
No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6
under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his
care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a
committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty
of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be
considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at
the discretion of the appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted
the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?

HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative

remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on
considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give
the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
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