2/1/24, 11:21 AM G.R. No.

L-8995

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8995 November 6, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHUA LUI, defendant-appellant.

Beaumont and Tenney, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila convicting Chua Lui and Koh
Kieng Sien of the illegal possession of opium and sentencing the said Chua Lui to five years' imprisonment and to
pay one-fourth of the costs and Koh Kieng Sien to six months' imprisonment and to pay one-fourth of the costs. The
two other defendants who were jointly charged with Chua Lui and Koh Kieng Sien were acquitted. Koh Kieng Sien
did not appeal.

In the early part of March, 1913, Chua Lui, a resident of a city of Manila, became one of the parties to a written lease
in which he secured the possession, use and occupation of a house in Caloocan, a short distance beyond the city
limits of the city of Manila, for a period of five years. Soon after the execution of the lease Chua Lui, Chua Tong and
Chua Bee Cho moved into the house and occupied the same. Two or three weeks later George W. Marshall, acting
chief of secret service of Manila, in company with three other American officers and one Filipino officer, went to the
house. At the approach of the officers Koh Kieng Sien jumped from the rear window of the house and ran across the
fields. The officers gave chase, overtook, and arrested the fleeing Chinaman. They testified that the fugitive had with
him a piece of bamboo containing an opium pipe and a can of opium and that when he saw himself hard pressed he
threw them away, evidently hoping of dispose of the incriminating evidence in such a way as to deceive the officers.
Having captured Koh Kieng Sien, the officers then arrested Chua Tong, and Chua Bee Cho and preferred against
them the following charge:

The undersigned accuses Chua Lui, alias Chua Lui Sane, alias Luis Sane, Chua Tong, Chua Bee Cho, and
Koh Kieng Sien of a violation of section 31 of Act No. 1761 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by
section 3 of Act No. 1910 of the Philippine Legislature, committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of March, 1913, in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, Philippine
Islands, within 2 ½ miles from the limits of the city of Manila, P. I., and within the jurisdiction of this court, the
said accused, conspiring among themselves and helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have in their possession and under their control and knowingly in their premises about 75
grams of opium. Contrary to law.

It is admitted that after a very close and thorough search of the house and premises no opium was found or
anything which led to the suspicion that there had been opium on the premises at any time except that found in the
possession of Koh Kieng Sien. It is also conceded, as a necessary result, that unless the fact that the accused Koh
Kieng Sien had the opium in his possession is sufficient to convict the other occupants of the house of the crime
charged the prosecution must fail.

It is the undisputed evidence in the case, except by mere inference, that Koh Kieng Sien, the only person who was
found in the possession of opium, was a casual visitor at the house, having been there but a few hours when the
policemen arrived; that he was then under sentence following a conviction of a violation of the Opium Law; that the
reason of his presence at the house at that time was to borrow money of the accused Chua Lui to pay the fine
imposed upon him by such sentence. lawph!1.net

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All of the accused, except Koh Kieng Sien, denied that they had possession of opium or that there was opium in the
house, and they denied all knowledge of the fact that Koh Kieng Sien had opium in his possession at the time.

There is some claim on the part of the prosecution that Koh Kieng Sien was engaged in smoking opium just prior to
the arrival of the police officials, and that the other accused, being then in the house, must have known that fact. It is
asserted that there was an odor of opium fumes in the house when it was entered by the police and that the pipe
found in the possession of Koh Kieng Sien was still warm. There is not entire agreement among the police officials
relative to these facts. Some claimed to have noticed the odor, others did not; some claimed to have observed the
warmth of the pipe, others did not. We doubt very much if there is evidence sufficient to establish clearly that Koh
Kieng Sien was engaged in smoking opium when the officers arrived. There are facts and circumstances, in addition
to the absolute denial of the accused, which go to show that such an allegation is not altogether well founded. It
seems that the same officers who made the arrests, or part of them, had visited and searched the house the night
before; that on the following morning the inmates thereof, in company with the teniente of the barrio, went to a
justice of the peace for the purpose of making a complaint against the officers for the unlawful entry of their
premises; that the justice of the peace requiring more evidence, the accused, in company with the teniente at the
barrio, returned to the house, arriving there but a few minutes before the appearance of the police which resulted in
their arrest. There was present, therefore, at the house at the time it is claimed that Koh Kieng Sien was engaged in
smoking opium, the teniente of the barrio, who was an officer of the law and whose business it was to prevent the
commission of crime. He testified that there was no opium being smoked there at that time. It should be noticed also
that Koh Kieng Sien was at the house but temporarily; that he was there on a business matter; that in all probability
he brought the contraband articles with him and he certainly took them away with him when he attempted to escape;
that there was no lamp found in the house in such condition or in such a place that it could have been used by Koh
Kieng Sien. Moreover it should be noted that the house having been searched or at least visited, the night before, by
the police, the accused were fully aware that they were under surveillance, and if they were engaged in the
commission of crime, they had every reason to believe that they were liable to be apprehended at any moment. But
even if it be true that Koh Kieng Sien was smoking opium, it has not been shown that any of the other accused were
aware of it. Certainly the teniente of the barrio knew nothing of it, and the accused and he were talking together at
the time.

In the case of United States vs. De los Reyes (20 Phil. Rep., 467), it appeared that a few days prior to the 5th of
November, 1910, one Gabriela Esguerra, who lived in San Miguel de Mayumo, being a friend of De los Reyes and
his wife, came to visit them at their home in the city of Manila. While Gabriela was still there, certain revenue officials
went to the house to search for opium. While some of the officers were in the house prosecuting the search therein,
others were on the outside watching to see that no one left the house. During the progress of the search in the front
part of the house one of the officers outside saw the accused Gabriela throw a package from the window of the
kitchen into the grass. Upon recovering the package it was found to contain a considerable quantity of morphine.
Upon these facts together with his refusal to permit the officers to enter the house, the trial court convicted De los
Reyes of the crime of illegal possession of opium. Upon an appeal to this court, the judgment was reversed upon
the ground that the mere fact that a temporary visitor at the house of De los Reyes had in her possession a quantity
of morphine and that fearing discovery she threw it from the window of his kitchen was not sufficient to charge him
with knowledge of the fact that the opium was on his premises.

In the case of United States vs. Tan Tayco (12 Phil. Rep., 739), the court said at page 743:

Possession has been defined to be the detention or enjoyment of a thing which a manholds or exercises by
himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name. (Bouviers' Law Dictionary, Rawles' Revision, Vol.
II.) Clearly it involves' a state of mind on the part of the possessor whereby he intends to exercise, and as a
consequence of which, he does exercise a right of possession, whether that right be legal or otherwise; and
while the intention and the will to possess may be, and usually are, inferred from the fact that the thing in
question is under the apparent power and control of the alleged possessor, nevertheless, the existence of the
animus possidendi is subject to contradiction, and may be rebutted by evidence which tends to prove that the
person under whose power and control the thing in question appears to be does not in fact exercise such
power of control and does not intend to do so. In order to complete a possession two things are required, that
there be an occupancy, apprehension or taking; that the taking be with an intent to possess (animus
possidendi). . . .

The statements of the witness Abila . . . furnish a full, satisfactory and sufficient explanation of the presence of
the utensils for smoking opium in his house at the time of their seizure, which is entirely consistent with the
allegations of the defendant that those utensils were not at the time in their possession; and, therefore,
entirely consistent with the innocence of the defendants charged with a violation of the provisions of the
Opium Act.

There is no evidence in the record showing or tending to show that the house occupied by the accused was an
"opium joint" or that it had been built or constructed for the purpose, or that it had been changed and modified by the
appellant Chua Lui so as to make it an "opium den," or that it had any of the qualities, whatever they may be, of
such a resort, or that he intended to use it for any illicit purpose. There is no evidence in the record showing or

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tending to show that Chua Lui was acquainted with any gang of opium smugglers or persons connected with such
gang, or that he was himself connected therewith or with such persons, or that he had ever been convicted of any
violation of the Opium Law. Even though all these things were true, it does not necessarily follow that he is guilty of
the crime charged. Persons may not be convicted on general principles, but only on evidence which establishes the
precise charge lodged against them.

We are satisfied from the whole case that the guilt of the appellant has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted. The sureties on his bond will be exonorated.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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