WHO Benchmarks For Strengthening Health Emergency Capacities
WHO Benchmarks For Strengthening Health Emergency Capacities
for strengthening
health emergency
capacities
WHO benchmarks
for strengthening
health emergency
capacities
2
This publication is the update of the document published in 2019 under the following title -“WHO benchmarks
for International Health Regulations (IHR)capacities”.
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Contents
1. Legal instruments 25
Acknowledgements 8 2. Financing 39
Introduction 11
4. Antimicrobial resistance 58
Updating process of the benchmark tool 18 13. Linking public health and security authorities 205
tool
16. Risk communication, community engagement 234
& infodemic management
benchmarks
Acronyms
IM Incident management
IT Information technology
WASH FIT Water and sanitation for health facility improvement tool
Acknowledgements
The World Health Organization (WHO) would like to express its sincere gratitude to all those who contributed
to the development of the WHO Benchmarks for Strengthening Health Emergency Capacities. The WHO
Health Security Preparedness Department developed this tool to support States Parties, partners, academia
and WHO regional and country offices.
Thank you to our colleagues at WHO Headquarters who provided valuable input, review and expert
consultations: Mohamed Refaat Abdelfattah, Philip Abdelmalik, Onyema Ajuebor, Oluwatosin Akand, April
Baller, Benedetta Allegranzi, Farah Al-Shorbaji, Brett Archer, Anand Balachandran, Valentina Baltag, Sara
Barragan Montes, Helene Barroy, Uzma Bashir, Yolanda Bayugo, Isabel Bergeri, Silvia Bertagnolio, Eric Gerard
Bertherat, Supriya Bezbaruah, Kingsley Bieh, Lucy Boulanger, Nienke Bruinsma, James Campbell, Zhanat
Carr, Lisa Carter, Ofelia Cazaku, Denis Charles, Musse Chekol, Sean Cockerham, Sebastien Bruno Francois
Cognat, Giorgio Cometto, Frederik Anton Copper, Peter Cowley, Miranda Deeves, Stéphane De La Rocque
De Severac, Khassoum Diallo, Zlatina Dobreva, Jicui Dong, Erin Downey, Rachelle El Khoury, Sergey Eremin,
Siobhan Fitzpatrick, Melinda Frost, Lester Sam Geroy, Nina Gobat, Shoshanna Goldin, Fernando Gonzalez-
Martin, Brandon Gray, Michael Griffin, Christine Guillard, Fahmy Hanna, Sarah Hess, Vicky Houssiere, Kai-
Hsun Hsiao, Qudsia Huda, Verica Ivanoska, Nellie Kartoglu, Mika Kawano, Suzanne Kerba, Kazunobu Kojima,
Monika Kosinska, Ljubica Latinovic, Hannah Lewis, Jian Li, Glenn Lolong, Ramona Ludolph, Catherine
Makison Booth, Constance McDonough-Thaye, Yuki Minato, Andrew Mirelman, Ryoko Miyazaki-Krause, Paul
Molinaro, Madison Moon, Simone Moraes Raszl, Thomas Moran, Deusdedit Mubangizi, Arno Muller, Tapas
Nair, Tim Nguyen, Lesley Jayne Onyan, Ponnu Padiyara, Narayan Pal Shanthi, Sarah Paulin-Deschenaux,
Boris Pavlin, Devin Perkins, Emilie Peron, Carmen Pessoa da Silva, Camila Philbert Lajolo, Rogerio Paulo Pinto
De Sa Gaspar, Pravarscha Prakash, Ong-orn Prasarnphanich, Tina Purnat, Guillaume Queyras, Pryanka Relan,
Mauricio Reynaud, Kwang Rim, Clara Rodriguez Ribas, Paul Rogers, Diana Rojas Alvarez, Sohel Saikat, Flavio
Salio, Gina Samaan, Karl Schenkel, Lisa Scheuermann, Redda Seifeldin, Dubravka Selenic Minet, Rajesh
Shreedharan, Katja Siling, Hiiti Baran Sillo, Sudhvir Singh, Susan Sparkes, Romina Stelter, Lisa Stevens,
Sameera Suri, Ludy Prapancha Suryantoro, Rayoko Takahashi, Barnas Thamrin, Joao Toledo, Anthony
Twyman, Nosheen Usman, Nicole Valentine, Mark Van Ommeren, Liviu Vedrasco, Kai Von Harbou, Ninglan
Wang, Kathleen (Taylor) Warren, Niluka Wijekoon Kannangarage, Victoria Willet, Jun Xing, Yu Zang and Rica
Zinskey.
A special thank you to colleagues at WHO regional offices who provided valuable insight, review and expert
perspectives: Ali Abdullah, Jehan Al-Badri, Ali Ardalan, Gertrude Avortri, Tara Rose Aynsley, Celso Bambaren,
Deborah Barasa, Joyrine Biromumaiso, Philippe Borremans, Nilesh Buddha, Emma Callon, Alex Camacho,
Astrid Chojnacki, Jennifer Collins, Ana Paula Coutinho Rehse, Ibadat Dhillon, Senait Tekeste Fekadu, Mahgoub
Hamid, Peggy Hanna, Iman Heweidy, Genevieve Howse, Masaya Kato, Aminata Grace Kobie, Benjamin Kung,
Jan-Erik Larsen, Zhao Li, Allan Mpairwe, Miriam Nanzunia, Julienne Ngoundoung Anoko, Phuong Nam
Nguyen, Leonardo Palumbo, Ihor Perehinets, Jetri Regmi, Cristiana Salvi, Dalia Samhouri, Reuben Samuel,
Tanja Schmidt, Sandip Shinde, Aparna Singh Shah and Roland Wango. A special thank you to representatives
of WHO Member States who provided input: Jantsansengee Baigalmaa (Mongolia), Chuman Lal Das Kebrat
(Nepal), Muhammad Salman (Pakistan), Ratsamy Vongkhamsao (Lao People’s Democratic Republic).
A sincere thank you to our partners, including international organizations and academia for their time and the
particular inputs of: Mario Ignacio Alguerno (World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH)), Susan Amoaten
(United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA)), Hellen Amuguni (Tufts University), Cedric Aperce (Resolve
to Save Lives (RTSL)), Ombretta Baggio (International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)), Sulzhan Bali (World
Bank), Nicholas Brook (UKHSA), Sydney Morgan Brown (United States Centres for Disease Control (US-CDC)),
Gina Chen (UKHSA), Haydn Cole (UKHSA), Michael Coninx (US-CDC), Duncan Cox (UKHSA), Sheena De Silva
(The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)), Raquel Duarte-Davidson (UKHSA), Gwendolen Eamer
(IFRC), Rania Elessawi (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)), Sarah Emami
(RTSL), Tina Endericks (UKHSA), Annie-May Gibb (UKHSA), Rachel Goodermote (IFRC), Lydia Izon-Cooper
(UKHSA), Humberto Jaime (UNICEF), Mariam Kone (IFRC), Jennifer Lasley (WOAH), Christopher Lee (RTSL),
David Lowrance (The Global Fund), Rachel Amy MacLeod (IFRC), Silvia Magnoni (IFRC), Mike Mahar (US-
CDC), Amanda McClelland (RTSL), Maureen McKenna (IFRC), Virginia Murray (UKHSA), Rohini Pande (World
Bank), Julio Pinto (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), Monica Posada (IFRC), Maria
Consorcia Quizon (SafetyNet), Wbeimar Sanchez (IFRC), Maya Schaerer (IFRC), Muhammad Shafique (IFRC),
Jane Shallcross (UKHSA), Charles Turner (UKHSA), Madeline Tyre (Health Canada), Julie Wahl (RTSL) and
Peter Williams (CARPHA).
We would also like to extend gratitude to the members of the World Health Organization Strategic & Technical
Advisory Group on Infectious Hazards with Pandemic and Epidemic Potential as well as the members of the
World Health Organization Informal Technical Working Group for Health Security Preparedness Research,
Development and Innovation.
The tool was developed and finalized by the Evidence and Analytics for Health Security Unit, in particular
by Priyanga Ranasinghe, Rebecca Gribble, Luc Tsachoua Choupe, Marc Ho, Guna Nidhi Sharma, Lina Yu,
Barbara Burmen, Cynthia Bell, Luca Vernaccini, Lorcan Clarke, Robert Nguni, under the supervision of Nirmal
Kandel and the leadership of Stella Chungong, Scott Pendergast and Mike Ryan. The tool was edited by
Sanjana Ravi and administrative support was provided by Cecile Vella.
Introduction
What is the benchmark tool? emergency prevention, preparedness, response and
resilience2 (HEPR) capacities and the Preparedness
Benchmarking is a strategic process often used by
and Resilience for Emerging Threats (PRET)3
businesses and institutes to standardize performance
initiative. The benchmarks support implementation
in relation to the best practices of their sector. The
of IHR and HEPR capacities and are broad in nature
World Health Organization (WHO) and partners
to improve health security and integrate multisectoral
have developed a tool with a list of benchmarks and
actions at national and subnational levels, where
corresponding suggested actions that can be applied
appropriate. The benchmark actions are designed
to implement the International Health Regulations
to provide guidance for capacity development to
2005 (IHR) and strengthen health emergency
move up capacity levels as measured by the IHR
prevention, preparedness, response and resilience
MEF, including voluntary external evaluation such
capacities. The first edition of the benchmarks was
as the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool4 and the
published in 2019 to support countries in developing,
States Parties Self-assessment annual reporting
implementing and documenting progress of national
tool5 (SPAR). Other assessment tools including the
IHR or health security plans (e.g. national action
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway
plan for health security (NAPHS), national action
(from the World Organisation for Animal Health
plan for emerging infectious diseases, public health
(WOAH)), the Dynamic Preparedness Metric6 (DPM),
emergencies and health security1 and other country-
Universal Health and Preparedness Review (UHPR)
level plans for health emergencies). The tool has been
and readiness assessments can also measure
updated to incorporate lessons from COVID-19 and
improvements in capacity, with the ultimate goal to
other health emergencies, to align with the updated
sustain an optimal level of prevention, preparedness,
IHR monitoring & evaluation framework (IHR MEF)
response and resilience for health emergencies in
tools and the health systems for health security
the country.
framework, and to support strengthening health
1
World Health Organization. 2019. Documenting progress following the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and implementation of
the national plan for emerging infectious diseases (EID), public health emergencies (PHE) and health security in Loa People’s
Democratic Republic Mission Report: 04-08 February 2019. https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/health-security-
preparedness/ehs/lao-pdr-mission-report.pdf?sfvrsn=4c81f642_5&download=true
2
World Health Organization. 2023. Strengthening the global architecture for health emergency prevention, preparedness, response
and resilience https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--
preparedness--response-and-resilience
3
World Health Organization. Preparedness and resilience for emerging threats (PRET). https://www.who.int/initiatives/preparedness-
and-resilience-for-emerging-threats
4
World Health Organization. 2022. International Health Regulations (2005) Joint External Evaluation Tool third edition. https://www.
who.int/publications/i/item/9789240051980
5
World Health Organization. 2021. International Health Regulations (2005): State Party Self-assessment annual reporting tool, second
edition. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240040120
6
World Health Organization. 2023. Dynamic Preparedness Metric. https://extranet.who.int/sph/dpm
Purpose of the benchmark tool MEF, DPM, UHPR and other assessment tools. The
benchmarks can help countries delineate relevant
This document guides States Parties, partners,
steps to take to improve capacity in each technical
donors, international and national organizations,
area and document progress. The benchmarks are
and other stakeholders on suggested actions
organized around five levels of capacity, from no
to improve IHR and HEPR capacities for health
capacity to sustainable capacity, mirroring the IHR
emergencies. States Parties and other entities
MEF structure. The suggested actions at each level
working to reduce the risk of global health threats
provide guidance to build the capacity needed to
can use the benchmarks and suggested actions in
move up levels, starting at a country’s current level
their national planning and investment processes to
and working up to reach level five.
address gaps, including those identified by the IHR
HEPR
The HEPR framework encompasses proposals and ongoing efforts related to governance, financing
and systems based on the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and other emergencies and
more than 300 recommendations from various independent reviews. HEPR explores core capacities
across five interconnected health emergency subsystems referred to as the “five Cs” that sit at the
intersection of health security, primary health care and health promotion: collaborative surveillance,
community protection, safe and scalable care, access to medical countermeasures and emergency
coordination. The five interlinked systems encompass and complement all core capacities required
by the IHR (2005), and require a multi-sectoral, One Health and whole-of-government approach.
Benchmark
z States Parties to the IHR, to suggest
Denotes a standard or point of reference for
activities for IHR and HEPR implementation
the capacity. Setting benchmarks facilitates
and any other strategic plans relevant to
the development of plans to increase capacity
ensure prevention, preparedness, readiness
levels (limited, developed, demonstrated and
and resilience for health emergencies.
sustainable) and the adoption of best practices
z Health agencies, civil society and
with a target of reaching sustainable capacity
specialized organizations at local,
for each benchmark.
subnational, national, regional and global
levels, to identify priorities for strengthening
capacity and support the implementation Action
of strategic plans. Denotes a set of activities in each capacity
z Researchers and academics for level of the benchmark. These actions define
the development and conduction of the steps that may be taken to progress up
implementation and operational studies to levels for the given benchmark.
generate scientific evidence for innovative
solutions to address health emergency
capacity gaps and to promote training and Structure of the tool
education programs.
The tool covers all IHR capacities and all HEPR
z Development partners, non-governmental
capabilities/capacities. This includes the 15 IHR
organizations (NGOs) and other donors,
capacities covered in SPAR (2021), the 19 technical
who can use the benchmarks to guide
areas in the JEE (2022), and the HEPR five Cs. The
funding and technical support for country
actions provided in the tool reflect an amalgam
assistance and ensure alignment with
of attributes of both JEE, SPAR indicators and
evolving needs, and to provide objective
HEPR capacities, with technical areas arranged to
milestones to help guide and determine the
reflect the IHR MEF. The tool contains a total of 80
effectiveness of assistance.
benchmarks, 62 strengthening both IHR and HEPR
z All national sectors and stakeholders who
capacities with an additional 18 focusing on HEPR
are involved in activities to strengthen health
capacities beyond IHR.
emergency prevention, preparedness,
response and resilience.
z WHO country and regional offices, to be When to use the benchmark tool?
able to prioritize assistance.
The tool should be used during a country’s planning
z Other stakeholders with interest in national
process (such as national health plans, strategies
and global improvements in health security.
and policies (NHPSP), NAPHS, hazard-focused plans,
diseases specific plans, etc.) when a multisectoral
and multidisciplinary planning team is identifying
and prioritizing activities, when strengthening health
NAPHS/HEPR
Benchmarks complement the NAPHS or HEPR How to use the benchmark tool?
planning process by looking at the current
The benchmarks tool can be utilized through this
level of capacity (based on IHR MEF and other
document and through the Benchmarks online
assessments) within the country and providing
portal7. Both versions of the tool present the same
suggested actions to adapt according to
set of benchmarks and actions. The benchmarks tool
capacity level and country context. These can
facilitates State Party planning through the process
then be used to update or develop plans.
of:
NHPSPs
After performing a situational/gap analysis, Review current
the benchmarks provide suggested actions situational analysis for
STEP
01
which can be adapted to the country’s current priority actions within
capacities and expected targets. These can the selected technical
then be used to update or develop NHPSPs. area
PRET
The PRET initiative recognizes that the same
Review the benchmarks
systems, capacities, knowledge and tools
tool and determine which
can be leveraged and applied for groups of STEP
02
capacity level a country
pathogens based on their mode of transmission
would like to achieve
(e.g. respiratory, vectorborne, foodborne). The
benchmarks online portal provides key actions
for respiratory pathogens (which include
influenza viruses and coronaviruses), which
based on a country’s hazard, vulnerability and
Identify the actions that
capacity, can be used to update or develop a STEP the country needs to
hazard-focused plan.
7
World Health Organization. Strengthening health emergency capacities. https://ihrbenchmark.who.int/
Each benchmark presents actions across five levels, Please see the table below for an explanation of each
ranging from no capacity to sustainable capacity, benchmark level and example actions within each
as in line with the IHR MEF levels of evaluation. level of capacity.
CAPACITY LEVEL Suggested actions to achieve the capacity level and strengthen prepar-
edness
These suggested standardized actions define the steps which can be taken to
move from one capacity level to the next, depending on country context and
requirements
For example, actions listed in level 3 (developed capacity) are suggested actions
to help achieve level 3 (developed capacity).
01
The country has no core capacity related to the area. Such as no risk assessment,
plan, nor human or financial resources assigned to the area. Or capacities are in
NO CAPACITY development with activities conducted ad hoc.
02
Actions to achieve this level:
Core capacities at level 2 are in the development stage, with implementation
LIMITED started. While some elements of the capacity area may be in place, others are at
CAPACITY the commencement stage. Example actions across technical areas at this level
include:
z Conduct stakeholder mapping and form a national multisectoral committee/
working group to perform subsequent actions
z Conduct analysis, including a review of existing plans and policies relevant to
the area, to identify gaps and needs
z Map existing resources and required needs for implementation in the area
03
Actions to achieve this level:
Core capacities at level 3 are in place at the national level but are not sustainable.
DEVELOPED Example actions across technical areas at this level include:
CAPACITY
z Develop and implement procedures, processes and plans at national level to
support capacity implementation for the area
z Develop and conduct training of relevant staff at the national level
z Establish systems relevant to the area, such as standards, data and
information sharing, deployment mechanisms and networks
04
Actions to achieve this level:
Core capacities at level 4 are in place at the national and subnational level and
DEMONSTRATED are somewhat sustainable through being supported by funding and inclusion in
CAPACITY national plans. Example actions across technical areas at this level include:
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR or other M&E actions (if not already performed at
earlier levels)
z Expansion and adaptation of national-level plans, training actions and
systems to the subnational level
z Securing funding
05
Actions to achieve this level:
Core capacities at level 5 are fully functional and sustainable, reaching the highest
level of achievement of core capacity implementation. Example actions across
SUSTAINABLE
technical areas at this level include:
CAPACITY
z Regular, ongoing improvement of systems and functions based on updates
and integration of results from SimEx/AAR/IAR and other M&E actions
z Achieve long-term sustainability of systems and capacities, including full
funding
z Contributions to capacity development through peer-to-peer learning and
sharing of best practices at subnational, national and international levels
In this tool, actions are presented within each level with a multisectoral approach. Each level contains actions
for IHR implementation and health sector as well as actions which require engagement from other sectors.
This is visually represented in the example table below. The second row in each level lists actions that require
engagement from other sectors alongside additional actions. This listing does not prioritize actions, it serves
as a reference list to support a multisectoral approach.
01
The country has no core capacity related to the area. Such as no risk assessment,
plan, nor human or financial resources assigned to the area. Or capacities are in
NO CAPACITY development with activities conducted ad hoc.
02
IHR Implementation and Health Sector
z Action 1
LIMITED z Action 2
CAPACITY
z Action 3
However, for two benchmarks8 the two rows are Benchmarks online portal
reversed with the top row of each level containing
Countries are able to quickly develop draft national
actions for IHR implementation, animal health and
plans through the Benchmarks online portal9. These
agricultural sectors while the lower row contains
plans are based on the automated input of benchmark
actions which require engagement from human
actions according to available current JEE scores/
health and other sectors.
SPAR scores and the score in which the country
would like to aim to progress towards. The online tool
How to apply the benchmarks takes users through a step-by-step process, is fully
The benchmarks tool provides a list of suggested interactive, and countries can manually adapt the
actions which can then be used at the country-level target levels and actions as needed for the country
to inform the health emergency planning process. context.
This includes determining the activities required to
achieve each suggested action based on country The Benchmarks online portal contains a reference
context. All actions and activities are aimed at library to support application of the benchmarks.
meeting a priority recommendation from previous The library contains downloadable documents (best
assessments or to advance to a higher level in practices, guidelines, tools, training packages) which
capacity implementation, focusing on progressing provide guidance for implementing benchmark
to sustainable capacity (level 5) in the future. For actions by technical area. The library is a living portal
example, an action may be to develop guidelines that is continually being updated and which users
and standard operating procedures (SOPs) relevant can contact through the webpage directly to request
to the technical area; activities which contribute to certain guidance or to share additional references to
this may include forming a working group to develop be included.
such guidelines and SOPs, identifying a focal point
for drafting documents, finalizing the guidelines Building systems using the
and SOPs, developing and implementing training benchmarks
packages to increase awareness and facilitate roll
The collective and coordinated actions described in
out.
the benchmarks contribute to the country’s health
systems for health security. These benchmark actions
While benchmark actions are primarily used to
support the strengthening of health system capacity
support the planning process for IHR and HEPR
for health emergency prevention, preparedness,
implementation, they may additionally be used
response and resilience. These benchmark actions
to help develop priority recommendations during
serve five purposes in strengthening the system:
evaluations and reviews (such as a JEE) or to help
track incremental progress made from one capacity
z Allow for a definition of desirable attributes
level to the next.
– what actions are required for prevention,
8
Benchmark 4.5 in AMR (Optimize use of antimicrobial medicines in animal health and agriculture) and benchmark 5.3 in Zoonotic
diseases (Safe practices in animal breeding and animal product systems limit the risk of zoonotic diseases).
9
World Health Organization. Strengthening health emergency capacities. https://ihrbenchmark.who.int/
01 02 03 04
z August 2020 to z March 2022 to z March 2023 to z May 2023 to
February 2022 March 2023 May 2023 September 2023
z Wide online z Ongoing extensive z In person global z Development
consultation consultation consultation of additional
across all levels of across WHO and meeting to finalize benchmarks for
WHO and partners partners draft. HEPR technical
z Map and z Update draft to z Incorporate areas
incorporate align with updated suggestions from
lessons learned IHR MEF, HSforHS, the global meeting
from COVID-19 HEPR z Finalization of
z Further document with all
Incorporate relevant technical
recommendations focal points
from COVID19
and other
recent health
emergencies,
novel initiatives
and new
health security
frameworks
z Added new
benchmarks
and updated all
actions
Legal instruments 1.2 Gender equity and equality principles are applied throughout IHR
capacities
IHR coordination, 3.3 Strategic planning for IHR, preparedness or health security are in
national IHR focal point place and supported by functional advocacy mechanisms for IHR
functions and advocacy implementation
Zoonotic diseases 5.3 Safe practices in animal breeding and animal product systems
limit the risk of zoonotic diseases
Surveillance 10.2 Well functioning event verification and investigation systems are
in place
Human resources 11.4 Multisectoral workforce surge strategy for health emergencies is
well established and functional
Health emergency 12A.1 Effective risk profiling, readiness assessment and rapid risk
management assessment (RRA) processes are in place and strongly linked
to health emergency and disaster management plans and
structures
12A.6 Research, development and innovation (RD&I) capacity for
emergency management is in place
Health services 14.2 Mechanism for continuity of essential health services (EHS)
provision during a health emergency is well established
14.3 Mechanism is in place to ensure effective utilization of health
services before, during and after health emergencies at all levels
of health service delivery
Infection prevention 15.1 National and health facility level infection prevention and control
and control (IPC) programmes are in place
15.2 A functional healthcare acquired infection (HCAI) surveillance
system is in place for public health decision-making
15.3 Provide a safe environment in all healthcare facilities
Risk communication, 16B.1 Community engagement is integrated and prioritized within the
community management of health emergencies and unusual events
engagement and
infodemic management
Points of entry and 17.3 An effective multisectoral mechanism for risk-based approach to
border health international travel related measures is in place
Public health and social 20.1 Leadership and governance dedicated to public health and social
measures measures (PHSM) is in place in relevant sectors, at all levels and
between levels
Additional benchmarks
Health emergency 12B.1 All hazard health emergency and disaster risk management
management (EDRM) are mainstreamed across IHR capacities
12B.2 Safe and resilient hospitals and health facilities are in place to
rapidly respond to emergencies
Alignment with HEPR (additional benchmarks for health emergency capacities beyond IHR)
Community protection H2.1 Integrated vector control management systems are in place
H2.3 Social welfare and protection systems are expanded and health
emergency specific mechanisms are implemented
Emergency H5.1 Operational support and logistics platforms are established and
coordination functional for health emergencies
z Actions for foundational health system elements and other sector contributions were added for
each benchmark.
Continuous updating and from users around the world who want to share their
implementation experience. Following versions of
improvement of the tool
the benchmarks tool will be updated based on these
The development of the benchmarks tool follows a contributions, keeping up to date with the IHR MEF
process of continuous improvement. We will continue framework, ongoing lessons learned from health
to receive comments and suggestions on the tool emergencies, IHR and HEPR implementation.
technical areas
Benchmarks:
IMPACT:
Legal instruments are in place in all relevant sectors to support IHR implementation including core capacity development and maintenance.
GENDER:
All persons irrespective of their gender identity (men, women and gender diverse people), should have equal and equitable access to service delivery during
sustainable strategies and integrated through multisectoral action across all IHR capacities.
IMPACT:
Gender informs the design of health emergency preparedness, response and recovery legal instruments, frameworks and strategies, resulting in
equal and equitable access to health services, information and protection mechanisms for health security. Moreover, the integration of gender-
responsive approaches into health emergency preparedness, response and recovery will help achieve gender parity and gender equality in the
workplace, balance representation in leadership and decision-making roles (particularly increasing representation of women), and help ensure
decent working conditions for all.
z The country has not conducted legal mapping12 (identification, review, collection and documentation of relevant legal
12
Legal mapping helps to survey (and compare) the relevant legal instruments existing within a larger context in order to understand the country’s legal frameworks for the prevention,
preparedness, and response of public health emergencies. Such mapping provides a look at legal instruments across jurisdictions and/or review of legal instruments within a jurisdiction to
understand how public health risks are addressed. Legal mapping involves the review and documentation of the existence of legal authorities, what those authorities do or provide, and what
they do not provide. Legal mapping is an objective activity. The process does not intend to evaluate the effectiveness of legal instruments, nor analyze its gaps.
27
13
Legal instruments are measures enacted and implemented by national or subnational levels of government that are legally binding and enforceable. The types of legal instruments vary
depending on the country’s legal system (e.g. constitutions, laws, arrêtés, decrees, regulations, administrative requirements and applicable international agreements).
Advocacy
z Develop advocacy materials and packages to raise awareness on the process and resources needed to conduct a legal
mapping and legal analysis at the national and subnational levels, where applicable.
z Identify legislative/policy champion(s) who can advocate for the role and necessity of conducting legal mapping and legal
analysis at the national and subnational levels.
Mechanism for conducting and completing a legal analysis and developing and/or revising necessary legal
03 instruments in the health sector
DEVELOPED z Establish a unit or function within the health sector to serve as a liaison across relevant sectors, ensure legal mapping
CAPACITY documentation is kept up to date and to align activities across relevant sectors.
z Conduct legal analysis14 (legal mapping and legal assessment) and develop or revise the necessary legal instruments for
IHR implementation at the national and subnational levels.
z Complete a functional review using legal mapping results to identify, understand, assess and analyse gaps within the
country’s legal instruments for IHR implementation across the health sector at the national and subnational levels, where
applicable.
z Complete a multisectoral review of identified gaps for IHR implementation across the health sector and develop or revise
legal instruments in the health sector at the national and subnational levels, where applicable.
Advocacy
z Use and update strategies and materials (e.g. communication strategies with targeted messaging based on stakeholder) to
14
Legal analysis is a process consisting of legal mapping, legal assessment and legal surveillance.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
z Involve all national legislative and regulatory bodies, as well as law enforcement bodies (e.g. parliament, senate,
interministerial committees, police, national security agencies, etc.) in regular preparatory meetings about proposals for
revision of IHR related legal instruments.
z Involve relevant professional organizations (e.g. medical associations, law associations) and civil society organizations
(CSOs) in discussions around revising legal instruments.
Mechanisms for conducting and completing a legal analysis and developing and/or revising necessary legal
04 instruments in all sectors
DEMONSTRATED z Conduct a legal analysis across relevant sectors and government levels (to complement the health sector’s legal analysis)
CAPACITY to identify, understand, assess and analyse gaps within the country’s legal instruments for IHR implementation.
z Analyse any conflict of law in legal instruments for IHR implementation across relevant sectors.
z Convene a national multisectoral coordination working group for legal preparedness to align efforts to review identified
gaps in legal instruments for IHR implementation across sectors and develop or revise legal instruments at the national
and subnational levels, where applicable.
z Routinely organize and conduct simulation exercises, after action reviews, intra-action reviews (SimEx/AAR/IAR)
(as relevant) to monitor and evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of legal instruments relating to IHR
implementation.
z Develop or revise legal instruments as necessary based on identified gaps for IHR implementation across all sectors and
all levels of governance.
activities.
BENCHMARK 1.2: Gender equity and equality principles are applied throughout IHR capacities
OBJECTIVE: To integrate gender equity and equality within all IHR capacity areas to ensure gender-based health inequities and inequalities are not
exacerbated by health emergency prevention, preparedness, response or recovery interventions
z No analysis available on health-related gender inequities and inequalities in the context of health emergencies, to inform
z Integrate gender analysis into specific IHR capacity assessments in relevant sectors to identify and prioritize gender gaps,
02 and integrate indicators to measure effects of gender norms, roles and relations on an individual’s differential vulnerability
LIMITED to health emergencies, including treatment received, immediate and long-term effects, and differences between persons
CAPACITY with different gender identities.
z Compile key sources of information (e.g. academic-, scientific-, government-led or other) to identify key sociocultural,
economic and other factors influencing gender gaps in access to and use of health information, services, care and
treatment for essential health services in the country17.
z Promote collection, analysis, dissemination and use of data disaggregated by sex and age at minimum, and by pregnancy
emergencies and identify gender focal points in relevant sectors such as education, social welfare and employment.
17
Resource: Out-of-Pocket Expenditure: The Need for a Gender Analysis
z Conduct a stakeholder analysis to identify relevant actors that could support integration of gender-responsive actions
across IHR capacity areas, and identify linkages between programmes dedicated to the advancement of gender equity and
equality (including education, social and economic sectors) and the development of IHR core capacities.
z Develop training curricula to raise awareness and understanding of gender and human rights issues within health security.
z Assess whether decision making mechanisms for IHR core capacities incorporate equitable representation of diverse
stakeholders, including balanced gender representation.
z Establish a robust national communications strategy to promote gender-specific needs and considerations during health
emergencies.
z Conduct novel research jointly with relevant stakeholders (including government and nongovernment actors) to assess
03 gender-based health inequities and inequalities; how these may be exacerbated by potential health emergencies and how
DEVELOPED they negatively affect the country’s (and individuals’) capacity to prepare, respond and recover from health emergencies.
CAPACITY This could also include holding consultations with communities living in vulnerable situations to identify priority gender
needs and potential implementation mechanisms, to inform development of IHR sector-specific action plans18.
z Identify and prioritize gender gaps in both service delivery and service access based on gender analysis data collected
through IHR capacity assessments, compilation of key sources of information and novel research, to be addressed with
short-, medium- and long-term interventions.
z Systematically conduct gender analysis of health information systems data, on health seeking behaviour, service access,
04 service provision and other data related to health emergency response and recovery in relevant surveillance systems24.
DEMONSTRATED
23
Resource: Guide for analysis and monitoring of gender equity in health policies
24
Resources: Key Considerations for Integrating Gender Equality into Health Emergency and Disaster Response: COVID-19, Health and Service Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS), The
Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action, Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action – Reducing risk, promoting resilience and aiding recovery,
Minimum Initial Service Package (MISP) Resource.
z Promote discussions, public engagements and seminars on gender equity and equality in health emergencies as an
essential thematic area and disseminate findings of systematic data collection systems to ensure continuous engagement
and positioning of the relevance of gender equity and equality for IHR.
z Establish a functional multisectoral coordination mechanism of gender focal points and experts tasked with
periodically reviewing progress on the integration of gender into IHR capacity development, identifying gaps and issuing
recommendations to inform future planning.
z Appoint a gender advisor within health sector M&E teams responsible for monitoring data collected for gender-responsive
interventions and initiatives and reporting on IHR, including integration of gender equity and equality principles in health
emergencies as a pillar to assess in SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant).
z Identify and implement evidence-based, sector-specific interventions for the integration of gender-responsive approaches
for health security25.
z Integrate specific objectives related to gender inequities and inequalities in health into national health sector policies and
strategies, including in health emergency contexts, with budgeted activities and a monitoring framework that reflects
gender-responsive indicators.
z Integrate training modules focused on gender analysis in health and gender-responsive programming skills into national
health systems trainings.
z Include gender equity and equality with special reference to health emergency prevention, preparedness and response
as a major thematic area in multisectoral research symposia, orations, conferences and other academic and/or scientific
venues that focus on health systems.
z Incorporate gender analysis and interventions for gender equity and equality into curricula and research agendas for
undergraduate and postgraduate research in relevant subject streams (e.g. sociology, disaster management, public health,
epidemiology, etc.).
05 and mixed methods approaches) to understand and address gender inequality in health emergencies, including at
SUSTAINABLE subnational levels26.
CAPACITY z Identify and integrate M&E indicators to track progress towards gender-responsive health security within relevant
strategies, including through the establishment and maintenance of data platforms to identify gender gaps in health
service access and delivery during health emergencies.
z Document best practices and lessons learned related to addressing gender inequalities in health emergencies and
disseminate widely across IHR capacities, relevant sectors and external partners to encourage peer-to-peer learning and
knowledge-sharing across countries.
z Develop and sustain mechanisms to monitor, detect and address unequal gender distribution in key decision-making roles
across the health system.
z Outline specific objectives within the national IHR capacity development strategies that seek to increase the ratio of
reached populations in vulnerable situations – disaggregated by sex and age – during preparedness, response and
recovery interventions.
z Establish clear funding streams to support gender integration across IHR capacity areas and ensure that specialized
gender functions and specialists are in place and adequately resourced.
z Establish an accountability framework that is aligned with the national gender policy, against which staff, systems,
structures and activities are audited.
26
Resource: Pan American Health Organization. 2019. A framework for indicators for monitoring gender equality and health in the Americas.
35
Tools:
z International Health Regulations (2005). Third edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016
(https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241580496).
z Supporting national implementation of International Health Regulations [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
activities/supporting-national-implementation-of-international-health-regulations).
z World Health Organization Strategy (2022-2026) for the National Action Plan for Health Security. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://
www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240061545).
z Health systems strengthening glossary. Geneva: World Health Organization (https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/health-
systems-strengthening-glossary.pdf).
z Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2022 (https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-
manuals/terrestrial-code-online-access/?id=169&L=1&htmfile=chapitre_vet_legislation.htm).
z PVS Pathway [website]. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2023 (https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-offer/improving-veterinary-services/
pvs-pathway/#ui-id-2).
z International health regulations (2005): state party self-assessment annual reporting tool, 2nd ed. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://
www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240040120).
z Addressing sex and gender in epidemic-prone infectious diseases. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2007 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/43644).
z Pande RP, Mollard IMP, Lnu NKH. Gender in Preparedness and Response Toolkit (GENPAR). Washington DC: World Bank Group; 2022 (https://www.
genderandcovid-19.org/resources/gender-in-preparedness-and-response-toolkit-genpar/).
z Gender mainstreaming for health managers: a practical approach. Facilitator’s Guide. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2011 (https://www.who.int/
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
IMPACT:
Financial resources are available and agile public financial management systems are in place to enable IHR implementation, including core
capacity development and maintenance, as well as for the health emergency response.
z No specific budget line or budgetary allocation28 available to finance the implementation of IHR capacities, or financing is
z Identify and convene key stakeholders to review financing for implementation of IHR capacities from both domestic and/or
02 external sources.
LIMITED z Establish a national coordination mechanism (with drafted ToRs) to coordinate prioritized IHR related funds and
CAPACITY corresponding alignment of budget lines allocated to implementation of IHR in relevant sectors at the national level.
z Identify different types of budgetary resources available for implementation of IHR capacities (including for capital and
recurrent sources of expenditure) and provide recommendations to prioritize IHR implementation actions to match the
available funds.
z Collate and review cost estimates for the implementation of national action plans relevant to IHR capacities that align with
a costed operational national action plan for health security (NAPHS). If a costed operational NAPHS is not available, then
develop one with costing experts and focal points of each technical area, as needed.
03 to determine what activities are being funded, what are the sources of funding (domestic and/or external), and where are
DEVELOPED the funding gaps across sectors at the national level.
CAPACITY
27
Financing refers to funds and resources identified, allocated, distributed and executed with regard to activities and interventions. It does not consider costing or identifying how many
resources or funds are necessary for the implementation of activities or interventions.
40
28
A budget line exists, and a budget is allocated (the budget line is funded).
29
Accounts held by government bodies, but not included in the government budget.
z Analyse current domestic and external financing for IHR capacities and compare resources available to resource needs to
understand funding gaps and opportunities.
z Prioritize, as needed, activities in the national action plan (e.g. NAPHS) and/or operational plans based on estimated costs,
expected impacts and available resources and funding.
z Routinely update cost and impact evidence, as well as resource mapping evidence, to allow for reprioritization and
reallocation of IHR-related budgets.
z Develop and institute flexible mechanisms for funds disbursement to match evolving needs and allow reallocations as
needs change.
z Develop a methodology/framework for monitoring relevant multisectoral IHR related expenditures.
z Source sufficient30 budget at national and subnational levels for the implementation of all IHR capacities in relevant
04 ministries or sectors.
DEMONSTRATED z Routinely track IHR budget allocation, disbursement, spending and accounting embedded within routine expenditure
CAPACITY monitoring systems to assure funding is disbursed and spent effectively by relevant ministries at national and subnational
levels.
z Implement and review the use of available financing and its effectiveness in achieving IHR implementation benchmark
actions.
z Conduct a political (i.e. political cycle and budget process) and legal (i.e. legislative and administrative pathways)
landscape analysis and impact assessment to build the case for increased investment in the implementation of IHR
This refers to access to funds by relevant ministries or government bodies for the implementation of all IHR capacities. Sufficiency is measured, where possible, by comparing budget
allocation amounts to resource needs identified in national plans related to IHR and/or health security.
z Engage a national coordination group in annual operational planning for the implementation of IHR capacities, prepare
05 annual budget requests and advocate for funding levels for relevant ministries or sectors.
SUSTAINABLE z Document and disseminate information on the timely distribution and effective use of funds to strengthen health security
CAPACITY capacities at the national and subnational levels in relevant ministries or sectors.
z Develop open access platforms embedded within routine expenditure monitoring and accountability systems to assure
transparency and accountability of IHR related budgets.
z Engage relevant sectors regarding multisectoral program-based budgeting for IHR implementation.
01 z Funds are allocated and distributed in an ad hoc manner from different sources during health emergencies.
NO CAPACITY
z Define potential sources of and mechanisms to access general, earmarked or contingency funding to support timely
z Identify and convene key stakeholders to conduct a legal and regulatory review to understand the various legal
31
Defined by the country through a set of triggers that declare a situation as a public health emergency.
z Develop or revise mechanisms and structures to receive and rapidly disburse funds during health emergencies.
z Analyse current health system capacity for routine service continuity during a health emergency and devise a plan to
address financial constraints for routine service delivery during a health emergency.
z Review and make recommendations to ensure the functionality of emergency public financing mechanisms (PFM),
particularly the mobilization of funds when needed at the national and subnational levels for relevant sectors.
z Develop and share training packages to raise awareness and train relevant stakeholders on PFM to enable timely response
to health emergencies.
z Disseminate, build capacity and ensure awareness of exceptions to routine PFM rules for health emergency funding.
If external funding is being used for health emergencies, external funding accounting and procurement rules are well
understood.
z Demonstrate and document that sources of funding have been identified and could be mobilized in advance of a health
emergency.
z Develop mechanisms and guidelines to adapt routine provider payment mechanisms, such as diagnosis related groups,
outcomes-based payment, or capitated payments, in a health emergency.
z Demonstrate that relevant ministries and levels of government have capacity to access and utilize the PFM for early
detection, notification, response and recovery operations.
z Establish a link and/or MoU with other regional or global emergency contingency funds, through which a national authority
Tools:
z Delivering global health security through sustainable financing. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/
WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.38).
z Funding for emergencies [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/funding).
IMPACT:
A mechanism for multisectoral multidisciplinary coordination, communication and partnerships to detect, assess and respond to any public health
event or risk is in place. A National IHR Focal Point is accessible at all times to communicate with the WHO IHR Regional Contact Points and with
all relevant sectors and other stakeholders in the country. The National IHR Focal Points, the WOAH Delegate and WOAH-World Animal Health
Information System (WAHIS) National Focal Point (NFP) will have access to a toolkit of best practices, model procedures, reporting templates and
training materials to facilitate rapid (within 24 hours) notification of events that may constitute a potential public health emergency of international
concern (PHEIC) to WHO and listed diseases to WOAH, as well as be able to respond rapidly (within 24-48 hours) to communications from these
organizations. High-level support for implementation of IHR is present within the country.
and procedures.
BENCHMARK 3.1: The IHR national focal point (NFP) is fully functional
OBJECTIVE: To establish a fully functional IHR NFP
z IHR NFP does not exist, or consists of one individual, lacks legal authority, capacity and resources to effectively carry out
01 functions.
NO CAPACITY z ToRs describing the mandate, structure, roles and responsibilities of NFP are not in place or are under development.
z Designate or establish an office or centre to serve as the IHR NFP in line with Article 4 of the IHR.
02 z Develop ToRs outlining the roles and responsibilities of the IHR NFP in fulfilling relevant obligations of the IHR.
LIMITED z Maintain and regularly update a contact directory including all members of NFP and capacitate NFP to be available 24
CAPACITY hours a day, seven days a week (24/7) in line with Article 4 of the IHR and share with the World Health Organization (WHO)
and relevant partners.
z Develop and test SOPs for communicating and coordinating with WHO, including triggers and processes for notification,
verification and reporting in line with Annex 2 of the IHR.
z Develop and test SOPs for communication among relevant sectors, including thresholds for reporting, response,
coordination and communication mechanisms during health emergencies.
z Develop and implement an IHR NFP training package for NFP unit staff.
z Provide annual reporting to the World Health Assembly on IHR capacity development, in line with IHR obligations.
z Develop processes to complete and submit the States Parties Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) Tool in line with
Article 54 of the IHR.
03 requirements.
DEVELOPED z Establish IHR NFP and share ToRs describing the roles and responsibilities of the IHR NFR at all levels (i.e. senior and
CAPACITY technical) within the ministry where the IHR NFP is located.
z Implement SOPs on communication and coordination between NFPs and WHO including triggers and processes for
notification, verification and reporting based on relevant articles of the IHR, and review performance regularly.
z Implement SOPs for communicating between NFP and relevant sectors (e.g. those responsible for surveillance and
reporting, points of entry, public health services, clinics and hospitals and other government).
z Develop and test SOPs for communication and coordination between the NFP and nongovernmental agencies, including
media and civil society communication channels (e.g. website updates or newsletters), to apprise relevant sectors, media
and civil society on developments related to IHR implementation.
z Regularly test the processes of the IHR NFP for health emergency management, coordination, multisectoral collaboration
and communication through actual experience and/or scenarios for different types of health emergencies32.
z Regularly assess staffing and funding needs to maintain a functional IHR NFP and allocate sufficient funds for IHR NFP to
perform the basic functions required by the IHR for reporting and response to health emergencies.
z Conduct IHR NFP-led orientation events for relevant stakeholders and sectors.
z Raise and maintain awareness about the functions of the IHR NFP among senior leadership and technical levels across
32
Such as disease outbreaks, mass gatherings, intentional biological incidents, chemical events, radiological emergencies.
z Develop guidance on engaging additional resources called upon as regular or complementary human resources for health
to work on addressing the health emergency, including funding to support the efforts of unwaged volunteers.
z Dedicate sustained resources (i.e. financial, human and technical) that are accessible and available for IHR NFP activities.
05 z Facilitate continuous quality improvement of IHR NFP functionality by leading national multidisciplinary risk assessment
SUSTAINABLE processes in line with Annex 2 of the IHR.
CAPACITY z Regularly monitor cross-sectoral surveillance mechanisms and evaluate the response to health emergencies at national
and subnational levels.
z Identify, document and address key bottlenecks and gaps in IHR NFP functionalities based on M&E results.
z Document and share lessons learned and best practices related to IHR NFP.
z Facilitate and engage country in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Define the scope of a multisectoral coordination committee and conduct a stakeholder analysis to identify key entities that
03 ensuring that outcomes of these meetings are promoted among external and internal stakeholders across sectors at the
DEVELOPED national level.
CAPACITY z Sensitize stakeholders from national level ministries, agencies, departments and partners to the purpose, role and priorities
of the multisectoral coordination mechanism and committee.
z Mobilize the multisectoral coordination mechanism at national level by enacting formal MoUs or other formal and legal
documents with multisectoral stakeholders whose engagement in IHR implementation is necessary.
z Develop and test a system to assess how the multisectoral coordination mechanism is working to address zoonotic
diseases, food safety and other existing or new health events at the human-animal interface at national and subnational
levels.
z Host trainings for experts from relevant sectors on the IHR aimed at promoting multisectoral coordination in IHR
implementation.
z Conduct regular meetings of the multisectoral coordination mechanism to advance its mandate and trigger actions,
04 ensuring that outcomes of meetings are promoted among external and internal stakeholders across sectors at the national
DEMONSTRATED and subnational levels.
CAPACITY z Mobilize the multisectoral coordination mechanism at subnational level by enacting formal MoUs or other formal and legal
documents with intermediate multisectoral stakeholders whose engagement in IHR implementation is necessary.
05 z Routinely revise or update existing strategies, guidelines and SOPs for the multisectoral coordination mechanism based on
SUSTAINABLE lessons learned from M&E.
CAPACITY z Develop a system to assess how the multisectoral coordination mechanism is working to address radiation emergencies
among stakeholders from relevant sectors and safety authorities at national and subnational level.
z Document and share best practices for multisectoral coordination mechanism, and engage country in peer-to-peer
learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
Strategic planning
01 z There is no national action plan for IHR, preparedness or health security.
NO CAPACITY Advocacy for IHR implementation
z Planning and capacity development for IHR implementation is not supported by advocacy mechanisms or activities are
conducted on an ad hoc basis.
Strategic planning
02 z Identify gaps in health emergency preparedness and IHR implementation by synthesizing results from recent IHR
LIMITED monitoring and evaluation framework (MEF) approaches, assessments and implementation data from existing plans.
CAPACITY
z Convene technical area leads to prioritize actions based on synthesized results and recommendations and establish a
multisectoral working group to develop national action plan for IHR, preparedness or health security.
z Compile priority actions into a draft national action plan for implementation, cost the plan and map financial and technical
gaps as well as available resources to support implementation.
Advocacy for IHR implementation
z Conduct stakeholder analysis and mapping to identify actors (ranging from technical area implementers to high
Strategic planning
03 z Engage the multisectoral working group to finalize a national action plan for IHR, preparedness or health security, involving
DEVELOPED relevant sectors across the government.
CAPACITY
z Identify offices and individuals in the government who can promote and/or provide avenues for promotion of national action
plans (such as NAPHS) and IHR implementation.
z Engage high level decision-makers to obtain formal endorsement and adoption of the national action plans (such as
NAPHS).
z Disseminate national action plans (such as NAPHS) to all departments, ministries, agencies and partners responsible for
implementation.
z Confirm availability and accessibility of the national action plans (such as NAPHS) for stakeholders as well as any guidelines
and SOPs needed for IHR implementation.
Advocacy for IHR implementation
z Develop and disseminate advocacy messages and materials for raising awareness across government and at all levels on
the national action plans (such as NAPHS) and importance of IHR implementation to the country (e.g. by introducing IHR
implementation and health emergency preparedness as an economic case).
Strategic planning
04 z Develop a plan for routine monitoring and accountability for implementation of the national action plans (such as NAPHS).
DEMONSTRATED z Develop processes to incorporate SPAR, Joint External Evaluation (JEE), SimEx/AAR/IAR results (as relevant),
CAPACITY
recommendations and gaps national action plans (such as NAPHS).
z Define the processes for routine implementation tracking to ensure accountability among stakeholders and includes the key
elements of data-driven decision-making: collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of data.
z Organize regular SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) as part of the IHR MEF programme for assessing the potential functionality of
and activate political will for health emergency preparedness and IHR implementation.
z Conduct training on advocacy for IHR implementation and health emergency preparedness for key stakeholders in relevant
sectors at the subnational level. Develop a budget for sustained operation of multisectoral coordination mechanism and
advocate for its full adoption. .
Strategic planning
05 z Review implementation progress for the national and subnational (if applicable) action plans on a quarterly basis to identify
SUSTAINABLE key implementation successes, gaps and recommendations for addressing gaps.
CAPACITY
z Regularly (i.e. quarterly) update all relevant stakeholders, ranging from implementers to high level decision-makers, on key
implementation progress, barriers and recommendations for improvement.
z Facilitate annual reviews of national action plans (such as NAPHS) to ensure that it is updated, costed and resourced each
year, based on implementation data and recommendations drawn from other capacity assessments.
z Develop policies to support the development and implementation of national action plans for IHR implementation,
preparedness and/or health security.
z Document and share best practices, challenges and lessons learned related to national action plans (such as NAPHS)
development, implementation and advocacy across relevant sectors and with other countries through bilateral and
international engagements, including capacity-building programmes.
Advocacy for IHR implementation
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Tools:
z National IHR focal points [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/teams/ihr/national-focal-points)
Includes links to National IHR Focal Point Guide
z WHO guidance for the use of Annex 2 of the International Health Regulations (2005). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2010 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/who-guidance-for-the-use-of-annex-2-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)).
z IHR-PVS National Bridging Workshops [database]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-pvs-bridging-workshop).
z Bridging capacities between animal and human health sectors [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/activities/
bridging-human-and-animal-health-sectors)
z Members [website]. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2023 (https://www.woah.org/en/who-we-are/members/).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
The JEE tool reviews the country’s self-assessed response to the annual global monitoring survey on AMR (Tracking AMR Country Self-assessment Survey
(TrACSS)).
z Regulating and promoting the appropriate use of antimicrobials in human medicine, animal health, agriculture, food production and other
fields as appropriate; and
z Supporting initiatives to foster the development and appropriate use of new antimicrobial agents, vaccines and diagnostic tools.
z No national action plan for AMR and no formal multisectoral governance or coordination mechanism on AMR.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Establish a national AMR focal point to serve as a coordinating office for AMR within the health ministry or other relevant
02 ministry.
LIMITED z Identify key stakeholders and AMR leads across relevant ministries and sectors to establish a national multisectoral AMR
CAPACITY coordination committee.
z Initiate joint development of a national multisectoral AMR action plan (AMR NAP) based on situational analysis, to identify
major risks for occurrence and transmission and include a review of relevant existing regulations and policies.
z Identify programmes and priority activities to be included in the AMR NAP, aligned with the AMR Global Action Plan and for
development or scale up.
z Involve AMR experts in the development of national health policies, strategies and plans (NHPSPs) to strengthen health
system capacities to manage and integrate AMR activities.
z Advocate for political commitment to call for and support active participation of all relevant ministries in the national
multisectoral AMR coordination committee.
03 activities and regular meetings (at least four per year) to review AMR NAP implementation.
DEVELOPED z Complete the development of the multisectoral AMR NAP with prioritized activities to address AMR in line with the AMR
CAPACITY Global Action Plan33.
z Submit the AMR NAP for official endorsement through relevant governance mechanisms (e.g. office of the head of state,
cabinets, and health and agriculture ministries).
z Enhance internal health sector coordination between stakeholders for AMR, universal health coverage (UHC), primary
health care (PHC) and health emergencies.
z Train staff from relevant ministries and sectors on leadership skills for effective multisectoral collaboration and
coordination needed to develop, implement and monitor joint plans and activities..
04 z Identify priority actions (based on risk and feasibility) from the AMR NAP, develop a costed implementation plan with
DEMONSTRATED engagement of responsible agencies with established timelines, and begin implementation of actions.
33
WHO Global action plan on antimicrobial resistance.
z Train staff in relevant sectors to support implementation of the AMR NAP.
z Incorporate prioritized AMR activities into national plans and budgets of relevant programmes and agencies, and allocate
05 adequate funding.
SUSTAINABLE z Regularly evaluate implementation of AMR NAP through M&E, involving relevant sectors and the multisectoral AMR
CAPACITY coordination committee, to jointly update plans and submit data on progress to regional and global levels accordingly.
z Dedicate senior level leadership for the AMR multisector coordination committee and empower it to hold partnering
sectors accountable for the delivery of clearly specified actions and targets.
z Embed specific AMR relevant interventions in national strategies and associated budgets for health systems strengthening
(e.g. PHC and UHC), as well as national pandemic preparedness plans, response strategies and budgets.
z Document and disseminate lessons learned from efforts for effective multisectoral coordination on AMR and the AMR NAP
implementation, including addressing inequities associated with gender, disability and social inclusion.
z Develop capacity to monitor and address social and economic inequities with regards to AMR interventions in relevant
sectors.
z No or limited capacity for generating, collating and reporting data (e.g. antibiotic susceptibility testing (AST) and
z Designate a national coordinating centre to oversee the development and functioning of the national AMR surveillance
02 system with epidemiological, information technology (IT) and data management capacities, with a designated a focal
LIMITED point for the WHO Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) and other international AMR
CAPACITY surveillance networks the country collaborates with.
z Define national AMR surveillance objectives in accordance with AMR national action plan objectives and cost planned
activities.
z Complete an assessment of existing laboratory capacities for identifying and performing AST for common bacteria, fungal
pathogens and Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
z Designate a national reference laboratory to support AMR surveillance based on an assessment of existing microbiology
laboratory capacities in the country.
z Designate, based on the assessment of microbiology lab capacities, laboratories to support the national AMR surveillance
and secure laboratory reagents to detect and report on at least some priority AMR pathogens.
z Develop and initiate training programmes for diagnostic stewardship, data collection and reporting on AMR at national and
z Identify all laboratories that can contribute to an integrated AMR surveillance system using a One Health approach,
including food monitoring, animal health, environmental and other sectors.
z Designate national focal points for the International Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ (FAO)
Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (InFARM) covering AMR surveillance domains in food and agriculture.
z Designate national reference laboratories for AMR surveillance based on assessments of existing microbiology capacity.
z Establish an external quality assessment programme for the national reference laboratory and ensure that it can conduct
04 reporting to ministries of health and agriculture, and a mechanism to analyse data and report back to facilities and WHO.
DEMONSTRATED z Establish an external quality assessment programme for all laboratories generating data for AMR surveillance, to evaluate
CAPACITY and provide feedback on capacities to identify and perform AST for targeted pathogens.
z Expand AMR testing and surveillance to include other clinical sites and/or other components of the country’s health
64
05 z Disseminate reports indicating the proportion of AMR pathogens among specimens or isolates, results from participation
SUSTAINABLE in international external quality assessment rounds of the national reference laboratory, and incidence of infections caused
CAPACITY by AMR pathogens at sentinel sites (community- and hospital-acquired).
z Use surveillance data to implement policy changes, develop new legislation or update existing legislation, improving
facilities and adapting prevention and control strategies.
z Revise and update AMR surveillance strategies, guidelines, operational plans and SOPs based on lessons learned (from
M&E) and ensure follow up of the implementation of M&E recommendations.
z Regularly share AMR surveillance data across sectors, analyse relevant AMR data for policy-making and contribute to
z Designate international (e.g. FAO/WHO/WOAH) reference laboratories to support relevant sectors conducting regional and
global AMR surveillance based on assessments of technical capacities and global collaboration.
BENCHMARK 4.3: Effective mechanisms are in place to prevent multidrug resistant organisms (MDRO)
OBJECTIVE: To strengthen mechanisms for preventing MDRO
z Priority MDRO pathogens (phenotypes and genotypes) have not been identified by national authorities, and MDRO
z Perform a situational analysis and document current efforts on MDRO prevention in the country.
02 z Map key stakeholders for MDRO prevention with a One Health approach and involvement from the AMR coordination
LIMITED committee and IPC programme.
CAPACITY z Mandate the IPC programme to develop an action plan and lead activities to prevent MDRO in close collaboration and
consultation with the AMR coordination committee, the AMR national reference laboratory and other relevant stakeholders.
z Integrate MDRO prevention into the country’s overall IPC strategy and programme, ensuring alignment with WHO minimum
requirements for IPC with involvement of all relevant stakeholders, and design measures to prevent MDRO in both health
facilities and community settings.
z Identify, in consultation with the AMR coordination committee, priority AMR types that are associated with common
infections and create a list of priority MDRO.
z Develop training materials on MDRO prevention including the roles and responsibilities of clinicians, laboratory technicians
and other relevant professionals, and integrate into existing IPC and AMR training packages.
z Develop surveillance and laboratory capacities to identify groups at risk for MDRO.
03 z Improve awareness of priority MDRO at all health facilities (including both public and private sector facilities and
DEVELOPED laboratories) and in community settings, and provide training on MDRO prevention for relevant officials at national level.
CAPACITY z Implement a strategy and action plan to prevent MDRO at national level (embedded in the overall IPC strategy) and
develop, endorse and disseminate a standard protocol for containing MDRO outbreaks..
66
z Collaborate with AMR and IPC programmes to apply available evidence to guide MDRO prevention activities and
understand effective prevention methods that extend beyond the AMR domain.
z Improve health facility capacities to characterize AMR pathogens causing human infections, systematically report to the
national level and identify reference laboratories to provide confirmatory testing for exceptional phenotypes.
z Implement national strategy and action plan on MDRO prevention at all levels.
04 z Conduct training on MDRO prevention for all relevant health workers at all levels.
DEMONSTRATED z Design a mechanism for timely detection, reporting, risk assessment and monitoring of novel, re-emerging and priority
CAPACITY MDRO in the country, and strengthen capacities for the national focal point to track and provide support for MDRO
incidents.
z Establish and use indicators and monitoring systems to regularly assess implementation of the MDRO prevention strategy,
action plan and MDRO risk assessment activities at national and facility levels.
z Conduct MDRO related research studies to generate local evidence to inform strategies, protocols and action.
z Improve IPC strategy implementation in both public and private health facilities to prevent and control MDRO infections in
alignment with WHO core components for effective IPC programmes.
z Implement systematic monitoring and reporting of AMR infections by the national body responsible, including a framework
for early reporting of any unusual antimicrobial susceptibility profile to WHO’s Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use
Surveillance System - Emerging Antimicrobial Resistance Reporting (GLASS-EAR) framework.
z Conduct regular M&E for detection, timely notification of priority and novel MDRO within facilities and at the national level.
z No or weak policy and regulations on appropriate use, availability and quality of antimicrobials for human health.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Establish and endorse, by the national AMR coordination committee, a national working group (with ToRs) of experts from
02 relevant authorities and designate a national focal point for surveillance and optimal use of antimicrobials.
LIMITED z Assess the national medicines strategy including regulatory framework, selection on the essential medicines list, supply
CAPACITY chain management, stewardship, rational use plans and strategies, and activities focusing on antimicrobial medicines.
z Assess existing mechanisms for monitoring antimicrobial consumption34 (AMC), define objectives according to aims and
targets of the AMR NAP, and identify relevant actors and sources of data.
z Develop methods to collect relevant AMC data including piloting of methods.
z Develop a draft national antimicrobial stewardship (AMS) plan or strategy and national legislation that regulates use,
access and quality of antimicrobials.
z Identify AMS training and educational needs of health workforce, both in preservice and in-service education and training.
34
Antimicrobial consumption: The term consumption refers to estimates that are derived from aggregated data sources (mainly import and domestic manufacturing, sales or reimbursement
data) and serves as proxy for actual use of antibiotics.
z Establish a national AMC surveillance system to monitor and report national AMC data based on the Access, Watch,
35
69
Antimicrobial use: Data on antibiotic use refers to estimates derived from individual patient level data, and may be accompanied by information on patient characteristics and indication of
treatment.
z Monitor and regularly report on AMC disaggregated by health sector and level when possible.
05 curriculum standards for healthcare professionals, accreditation standards for health facilities and national health policies,
SUSTAINABLE strategies and plans.
CAPACITY z Maintain the national regulatory framework for appropriate use of affordable, quality assured antimicrobials, including
monitoring of prescription only sales of key antibiotics.
z Evaluate routine surveillance for AMC with annual data collection at national and facility levels.
z Perform regular surveys on AMU in hospitals and ad hoc surveys on AMU in primary healthcare/community facilities, and
report results to all relevant stakeholders.
z Monitor and report if national targets for AMC are met and adjust interventions accordingly.
z Conduct monitoring, documentation and reporting on antibiotic quality (e.g. substandard and falsified medicines).
z Capture data on illegal AMC (e.g. street markets, trafficking, internet sales).
z Participate in international initiatives to support capacity-building for optimizing AMU globally and share country
experiences in the human health sector relevant international forums and platforms.
z No or weak policy and regulations on responsible and prudent use, availability and quality of antimicrobials in the animal
z Involve public and private stakeholders from animal health and/or agriculture sector in activities of the dedicated national
z Develop and disseminate information, education and communications materials to key stakeholders on AMR and misuse
04 or abuse of antimicrobials across the animal health sector and/or agriculture sectors.
DEMONSTRATED z Develop and enforce a full national regulatory framework for responsible and prudent use of affordable, quality assured
CAPACITY antimicrobials in animals and agriculture.
z Recommend and implement the phasing out the use of antimicrobials for animal growth promotion.
z Monitor the sale and use of substandard and/or falsified antimicrobials, and develop corresponding enforcement
mechanisms.
05 z Document and disseminate the results and lessons learned from efforts to minimize AMR events in relevant sectors (e.g.
SUSTAINABLE livestock, agriculture, food safety, etc.)
CAPACITY z Develop and promote best practices for reducing AMU in the animal and plant farming and agriculture sectors.
z Conduct monitoring, documentation and reporting on antibiotic quality (e.g. substandard and falsified medicines).
73
z Conduct and collaborate operational research on the impact of responsible and prudent AMU in relevant sectors (i.e.
animal health, human health, food security, agriculture and the environment).
Tools:
z The Pursuit of Responsible Use of Medicines: Sharing and Learning from Country Experiences. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2012 (https://apps.
who.int/iris/handle/10665/75828).
z Guidelines for the prevention and control of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, Acinetobacter baumannii and Pseudomonas aeruginosa in
health care facilities. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259462).
z Implementation manual to prevent and control the spread of carbapenem-resistant organisms at the national and health care facility level. Geneva:
World Health Organization; 2019 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-UHC-SDS-2019-6).
z Handle antibiotics with care in surgery [infographic]. Geneva: World Health Organization (https://www.who.int/images/default-source/ihs/ipc/
infographic_ssi_tb.jpg?sfvrsn=7eee0a5_5).
z The role of infection prevention and control in preventing antibiotics resistance in health care [infographic]. World Health Organization (https://cdn.who.
int/media/docs/default-source/documents/infection-prevention-control09320f4b-309f-4999-8e23-23541eeb60a6.pdf?sfvrsn=1ea132d5_1).
z Antimicrobial Resistance: A manual for developing national action plans. Version 1. Geneva: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
z Guidelines on Core Components of Infection Prevention and Control Programmes at the National and Acute Health Care Facility Level. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2016 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241549929).
z Interim Practical Manual: supporting national implementation of the WHO Guidelines on Core Competencies of Infection Prevention and Control
Programmes. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-HIS-SDS-2017-8).
z WHO implementation handbook for national action plans on antimicrobial resistance: guidance for the human health sector. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240041981).
z Global Database for Tracking Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Country Self- Assessment Survey (TrACSS) [database]. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, UN Environment Programme, World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health (www.
amrcountryprogress.org).
z Monitoring and evaluation of the global action plan on antimicrobial resistance. Framework and recommended indicators. Geneva: Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Organisation of Animal Health and World Health Organization; 2019 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/monitoring-and-evaluation-of-the-global-action-plan-on-antimicrobial-resistance).
z World Organisation for Animal Health. ANIMUSE Global Database on antimicrobial agents intended for use in animals [website]. Paris: World
Organisation for Animal Health; 2023 (https://amu.woah.org/amu-system-portal).
z OIE Standards, Guidelines and Resolutions on Antimicrobial Resistance and the use of antimicrobial agents. Paris: World Organisation for Animal
Health; 2020 (https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/book-amr-ang-fnl-lr.pdf).
z OIE List of Antimicrobial Agents of Veterinary Importance. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2021 (https://www.woah.org/app/
uploads/2021/06/a-oie-list-antimicrobials-june2021.pdf).
z Global action plan on antimicrobial resistance. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241509763).
z U.S. National action plan for combating antibiotic-resistant bacteria [website]. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 2021 (https://www.
cdc.gov/drugresistance/us-activities/national-action-plan.html#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20National%20Action%20Plan,the%20health%20of%20all%20
Americans).
int/publications/i/item/9789241550130).
z Integrated surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in foodborne bacteria: application of a one health approach: guidance from the WHO Advisory
Group on Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/255747).
z Critically important antimicrobials for human medicine: 6th revision 2018. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/9789241515528).
z GLASS Emerging antimicrobial resistance reporting framework (GLASS-EAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/9789241514590).
z GLASS guidance for national reference laboratories. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/
item/9789240010581).
z Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS) Molecular methods for antimicrobial resistance (AMR) diagnostics to enhance the
global antimicrobial resistance surveillance system. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-WSI-
AMR-2019.1).
z Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
initiatives/glass).
z The International FAO Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring (InFARM) System (under development) [website]. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations; 2023 (https://www.fao.org/antimicrobial-resistance/resources/database/infarm/en/).
z Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
IMPACT:
Functional animal, environment and public health systems work individually and collaboratively through documented mechanisms and operational
frameworks using a multisectoral One Health approach, and based on international standards, guidance and best practices to limit the risk of spill
over and minimize transmission of endemic, emerging or re-emerging zoonotic diseases to human populations.
z No jointly agreed upon list of priority diseases to conduct coordinated multisectoral surveillance efforts.
01 z No organized coordinated surveillance system in place to connect animal and public health systems.
NO CAPACITY
z Identify key stakeholders and focal points from animal health (domestic animals and wildlife), human health, environmental
02 health and other key sectors, and formalize a coordination mechanism (e.g. a multisectoral national surveillance team).
LIMITED z Review and assess surveillance capacities for zoonotic diseases, as well as existing coordination or data sharing
CAPACITY mechanisms between relevant sectors.
z Conduct an IHR-PVS national bridging workshop to improve collaboration between the human and animal health sectors
for zoonotic disease surveillance.
z Conduct a joint process to define and prioritize zoonotic diseases of greatest national public health concern One Health
approach involving all relevant stakeholders and develop operational plans and training packages for the management of
priority diseases.
z Involve zoonotic disease experts in the development of NHPSPs to define the country’s vision, policy and strategies to
strengthen zoonotic disease management before, during and after health emergencies.
z Identify relevant medicines and medical products for preventing and treating priority zoonotic diseases that have a
potential to cause an outbreak, and develop novel and innovative solutions.
z Identify a focal point or unit in animal health, veterinary services, wildlife and environmental sectors to collaborate with
health ministry for joint action. .
z Perform a WOAH PVS evaluation (or other relevant tool of the PVS pathway), or review PVS evaluation findings and
implementation status if one was conducted in the past two to three years.
z Develop a list of priority animal diseases (zoonotic and non-zoonotic animal diseases) in the animal health sector.
z Establish basic disease surveillance mechanisms for priority animal diseases and early warning mechanisms in the
veterinary sector, and disseminate outputs to relevant health authorities.
z Develop and implement an operational plan to guide prevention and detection of priority zoonotic diseases of greatest
03 national public health concern, and allocate associated resources at the national level.
DEVELOPED z Establish mechanisms and procedures to exchange surveillance information on zoonotic diseases among relevant sectors
CAPACITY (and other decision-makers, as needed), ideally through interoperable electronic systems and/or platforms.
z Train responsible staff at the national level on surveillance and management of priority zoonotic diseases.
z Conduct a joint risk assessment to identify high risk areas to develop risk-based surveillance where/when appropriate,
and to inform risk management and communication for an effective coordinated preparedness and response to zoonotic
diseases.
z Develop laboratory capacities within relevant sectors (human, animals incl. wildlife) to enable zoonotic disease detection
and diagnosis.
z Develop and include modules on zoonotic disease management using a One Health approach in midlevel training
programmes and public health education.
z Incorporate a module on zoonotic diseases and interactions at the human-animal-environment interface to undergraduate
and postgraduate courses in relevant educational curricula, including for medical administrators.
z Identify and map high risk settings for zoonotic diseases with the potential to cause an epidemic.
z Implement operational plans for preventing and detecting priority zoonotic diseases of greatest national public health
z Revise and update the strategies, guidelines, operational plan and SOPs for coordinated surveillance of zoonotic diseases/
z No coordination between the animal health, public health and environment sectors is organized for zoonotic diseases.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Designate a focal point (with ToRs) from relevant sectors (animal (domestic animals and wildlife), human and
z Develop a multisectoral One Health operational plan with provision of resources in relevant sectors for coordinated
z Review and update the operational plan or mechanism based on the results of M&E and ensure follow up in
05 implementation of recommendations.
SUSTAINABLE z Document and disseminate the results and lessons learned from efforts to minimize zoonotic disease transmission from
CAPACITY animals to humans.
z Share country experiences in zoonotic disease response and management and engage the country in peer-to-peer
learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
z No systematic efforts to improve good sanitary practices in the breeding of terrestrial and aquatic animals and in the
z Identify key stakeholders involved in the various value chains associated with a potential risk of zoonotic disease
02 transmission through animal breeding, trade and/or production of animal products in relevant sectors.
LIMITED z Establish a technical working group mandated to assess and map potential zoonotic disease transmission risks along
CAPACITY various value chains, with representatives from relevant sectors, including animal health and production, wildlife, human
health, agriculture, legislation, food and drug authority, police, animal welfare, etc.
z Develop and implement management plans to reduce the risk of zoonotic diseases associated with animal breeding and
Participation and contribution from human health and other sectors in actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
86
z Establish continuous and functional processes to identify risks of zoonotic disease transmission associated with animal
Participation and contribution from human health and other sectors in actions:
1, 2, 3, 4
z Sustained collaboration and linkages across relevant sectors for promoting and implementing safe animal production
Participation and contribution from human health and other sectors in actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
87
Tools:
z Strengthening the IHR through a One Health approach. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/activities/strengthening-global-
health-security-at-the-human-animal-interface/strengthening-the-IHR-through-a-one-health-approach).
z World Health Organization & World Organisation for Animal Health. Handbook for the assessment of capacities at the human–animal interface, 2nd
edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254552).
z Operational framework for good governance at the human-animal interface. World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health; 2014
(https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-oie-operational-framework-for-good-governance-at-the-human-animal-interface).
z Berthe FCJ, Bouley T, Karesh WB, Legall IC, Machalaba CC, Plante CA, et al. One Health: Operational framework for strengthening human, animal,
and environmental public health systems at their interface. Washington DC: World Bank Group; 2018 (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/961101524657708673/One-health-operational-framework-for-strengthening-human-animal-and-environmental-public-health-systems-at-their-
interface).
z Joint Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-World Health Organisation for Animal Health-World Health Organization. Global
early warning system for health threats and emerging risks at the human–animal–ecosystems interface (GLEWS) [website]. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, World Organisation for Animal Health and World Health Organization (http://www.glews.net/).
z Strengthening global health security and the human-animal interface. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/activities/
strengthening-global-health-security-at-the-human-animal-interface).
z The control of neglected zoonotic diseases: from advocacy to action: report of the fourth international meeting held at WHO Headquarters, Geneva,
Switzerland, 19-20 November 2014. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2024 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/183458).
z WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia, WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and
World Organisation for Animal Health. Zoonotic diseases: a guide to establishing collaboration between animal and human health sectors at the
z PVS Pathway [website]. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2023 (https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-offer/improving-veterinary-services/
pvs-pathway).
z One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization (OHZDP) [website]. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 2022 (https://www.cdc.gov/
onehealth/what-we-do/zoonotic-disease-prioritization/index.html).
88
z Taking a Multisectoral, One Health Approach: A Tripartite Guide to Addressing Zoonotic Diseases in Countries. Geneva: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, World Health Organisation for Animal Health, and World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/325620).
z Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway. Paris: World Health Organisation for Animal Health; 2023 (https://rr-europe.woah.org/en/our-
missions/veterinary-services/pvs-pathway/).
z IHR-PVS National Bridging Workshops [database]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023
(https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-pvs-bridging-workshop).
z Strengthening Veterinary Diagnostic Capacities: the FAO Laboratory Mapping Tool. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations;
2016 (https://www.fao.org/documents/card/es/c/e13cf0b7-c8f4-4ff7-b340-439f40c677ec/).
z FAO Assessment Tool for Laboratories and AMR Surveillance Systems (FAO-ATLASS) [website]. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations; 2020 (https://www.fao.org/antimicrobial-resistance/resources/tools/fao-atlass/en/).
z Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2022 (https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-
manuals/terrestrial-code-online-access/?id=169&L=1&htmfile=chapitre_vet_legislation.htm).
z Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Health Organisation for Animal Health & World Health Organization Tripartite Joint Risk
Assessment Operational Tool (JRA OT). Geneva: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Organisation for Animal Health and
World Health Organization; 2020 (https://www.who.int/initiatives/tripartite-zoonosis-guide/joint-risk-assessment-operational-tool).
z Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
IMPACT:
Timely detection and effective response to mitigate food safety emergencies, in collaboration with relevant sectors responsible for food safety.
z No or very limited surveillance system in place for foodborne disease or for food contamination (chemical and
01 microbiological) monitoring.
NO CAPACITY
z Review foodborne disease surveillance and food contamination monitoring capacity to assess gaps and needs, and
02 examine diseases and syndromes already under surveillance in the country that may indicate foodborne diseases.
LIMITED z Develop guidelines and SOPs for the detection of foodborne events through indicator-/event-based disease surveillance37.
CAPACITY z Establish indicator-based disease surveillance for notifiable syndromes and diseases such as diarrhoea (i.e. develop a
database to store data, alert thresholds, regular analysis of notifiable diseases, cause analysis of undetectable outbreaks,
documentation and protocol/SOPs).
z Establish event-based disease surveillance (i.e. identify national focal point, specify if the event being reported is suspected
as foodborne, train health workers to recognize and report foodborne events).
z Adapt the rapid risk assessment (RRA) process to accommodate foodborne diseases and conduct at the national level38.
z Identify a mechanism or multisector team with relevant agencies to coordinate the development and implementation of
foodborne disease surveillance, food contamination monitoring system(s), data sharing and staff that can contribute to
RRAs.
z Identify high risk settings such as farms, industries, points of entry, markets, mass gathering events, etc. that require
z Continue to implement actions (as suggested above) for both indicator- and event-based disease surveillance systems at
39
An event is defined as a manifestation of disease or an occurrence that creates a potential for disease.
40
Refer to stage 2 strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne diseases in Strengthening indicator-based surveillance https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/hand
le/10665/259472/9789241513258-eng.pdf.
z Develop an integrated food chain surveillance system that allows integration of information from foodborne diseases and
z Analyse the integrated food chain surveillance system for food regulators conducting risk analysis in accordance with
05 diseases, food contamination, food fraud and non-compliance issues, and participate in international initiatives to
SUSTAINABLE strengthen capacities globally.
CAPACITY z Identify gaps in knowledge and conduct relevant research studies to supplement surveillance and monitoring data.
z Apply whole genome sequencing techniques to foodborne disease surveillance and food monitoring.
z No mechanism for the response and management of food safety emergencies has been established or is in place, or is
01 very limited.
NO CAPACITY
z Review the legal framework for the response and management of food safety emergencies at the national and subnational
02 levels.
LIMITED z Identify and map key government agencies and cross-sector partners for roles and responsibilities in response and
CAPACITY management of food safety emergencies and contribution to RRAs.
z Develop a response plan, SOPs and guidelines for national food safety emergencies.
z Develop capacity to gather epidemiological and laboratory evidence during a response (i.e. train outbreak response teams
to conduct investigation, collect information to identify source of outbreak, conduct event database analysis, develop a list
of priority foodborne hazards and identify testing laboratories).
z Identify relevant medicines and medical products for preventing and treating priority foodborne diseases and food
contamination events that could potentially cause an outbreak.
z Regularly share data on food safety emergency management with national health authorities and include in the national
health database.
z Involve foodborne diseases experts in developing NHPSPs to define the country’s vision, policy directions and strategies
INFOSAN:
z Designate an INFOSAN emergency point of contact in the government agency responsible for the response and
management of food safety emergencies and establish a communication system with the IHR NFP during food safety
emergencies. The parties are encouraged to refer to the IHR/INFOSAN communication template44.
44
Template for INFOSAN/IHR communication. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240012288
95
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
z Identify and map high risk settings for food safety emergencies.
z Develop and share advocacy materials (by relevant sectors) to engage experts and raise community awareness about
mechanisms to respond to priority zoonotic diseases, foodborne diseases and food contamination events.
z Update the response plan, SOPs and guidance to include findings from analytical epidemiological studies conducted during
z Report regularly to the national public health authorities all relevant information and updates on the management of
04 foodborne incidents and emergencies in the country (and outside the country).
DEMONSTRATED z Collect and collate routine health data, and regularly analyse data on management of foodborne diseases across the
CAPACITY country.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR (as relevant) for foodborne events to test the capacity of surveillance and monitoring systems and
include relevant sectors (animal health, environment, food business operators, etc).
INFOSAN:
z Establish a mechanism for regular information sharing between the INFOSAN emergency contact point, the INFOSAN
Secretariat, the IHR NFP, INFOSAN focal points and relevant sectors during a food safety emergency on the national and
international level.
z Test information sharing mechanisms at the international and global regional levels by performing SimEx/AAR (as relevant)
on a regular basis.
z Participate, all relevant parties (i.e. INFOSAN emergency contact point, INFOSAN focal points and the IHR NFP), in national
participation and commitment of the community, food chain actors from public and private sectors (including the informal
economy), and strategic and technical partners in the response and management of food safety emergencies at the
national and subnational levels.
z Document and disseminate lessons and best practices for timeliness, information exchange, public health risk messaging,
05 efficiency and effectiveness of response, collaboration and communication for food safety events.
SUSTAINABLE z Review and update management and response plans and relevant legislation based on findings from SimEx/AAR (as
CAPACITY relevant).
z Continuously monitor medicines and medical products for preventing and treating priority foodborne diseases to track
adverse reactions, side effects and benefits over time.
z Share country experience in response and management of food safety emergencies and participate in international
initiatives to strengthen capacities globally.
INFOSAN:
z Conduct an audit on membership and update the designation of INFOSAN emergency contact points and focal points as
needed.
Tools:
z Food Control System Assessment Tool: Introductory booklet. Geneva: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Health
Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240028371).
z Food safety [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/health-topics/food-safety#tab=tab_1).
z Using indicator- and event-based surveillance to detect foodborne events. Stage One Booklet: Strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne
diseases. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/strengthening-surveillance-of-and-response-to-
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
99
07
Immunization
Immunization is key to the prevention and control of epidemic-prone vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs). A national vaccine delivery system should be in
place, with nationwide reach, effective distribution, easy access for marginalized populations, adequate cold chain and ongoing quality control, to respond to
existing and new disease threats.
IMPACT:
Effective protection through achievement and maintenance of immunization against measles and other epidemic-prone VPDs. Measles
immunization is identified as a proxy indicator for overall immunization against VPDs as measles is a continuing cause of substantial avoidable
morbidity and mortality. Identification and implementation of targeted immunization activities to protect populations at risk of other epidemic-
prone VPDs of national importance (e.g. cholera, Japanese encephalitis, meningococcal disease, typhoid, yellow fever and COVID-19, etc.).
Diseases that are transferable from animals to humans, such as anthrax and rabies, are also included.
z Less than 50% of the country’s 12 month old population has received measles-containing-vaccine first-dose (MCV1), as
z Assess and map existing coverage data to identify high risk areas and populations to target control of selected VPDs.
02 z Conduct stakeholder mapping and form a multistakeholder national advisory committee which will guide country policies
LIMITED and strategies for optimum vaccine coverage based on country risk profile for measles and other VPDs.
CAPACITY z Develop an immunization strategy with a comprehensive multiyear operational plan outlining and describing actions and
activities for increasing vaccine coverage at national and subnational levels.
z Evaluate immunization surveillance data, registries, data and reporting systems to identify areas for strengthening of
immunization data management.
z Develop and disseminate guidance and tools to increase routine immunization services, with a focus on MCV1 coverage
and conduct activities to achieve 50–69% MCV1 coverage in the country’s 12 month old population.
z Develop plans to perform catch-up campaigns or supplemental immunization activities, based on epidemiologic and
coverage data.
z Develop a standardized system of monitoring and reporting adverse events following immunization (AEFI).
z Use mapping and assessment data to plan targeted routine and supplemental immunization activities in high risk areas
03 and populations.
DEVELOPED z Finalize, approve and operationalize the national immunization plan with activities to achieve 70–89% MCV1 coverage in
CAPACITY the country’s 12 month old population and introduce immunization into targeted populations.
101
z Develop guidelines, SOPs, training materials and toolkits on pre- and post-service guidance for immunization, safety, waste
management and reporting and train health workers.
z Create and disseminate messaging tools to improve knowledge-based capacities (i.e. communication and education) of
health workers conducting community mobilization.
z Operationalize a national vaccine registry and standardized system of monitoring and reporting AEFI at all health facilities
and train health workers on these.
z Develop specific plans to ensure continuity of routine immunization activity, prevent interruption of services during health
emergencies and catch-up vaccination plans when interruptions have occurred.
z Conduct activities to achieve 90% MCV1 coverage in the country’s 12 month old population, implementing specific
04 strategies focused on reaching vulnerable and marginalized populations at the national and subnational levels to reduce
DEMONSTRATED inequities with the target of progressing to 95% national coverage in 2030.
CAPACITY z Develop and implement quality assurance standards and M&E mechanisms for immunization including data quality
reviews, and ensure sufficient health workers are appropriately trained.
z Promote immunizations and sensitize communities through routine messaging through traditional and social media and
engaging CSOs and religious leaders.
z Evaluate and validate the AEFI reporting system.
z Integrate the national vaccine registry with national health information systems, as appropriate.
05 z Conduct activities to ensure 95% of the country’s 12 month old population have received at least one dose of MCV.
SUSTAINABLE z Conduct formal surveys of underserved areas to ensure that coverage among vulnerable and marginalized populations is
CAPACITY >90%.
z Use results from SimEx/IAR/AAR (as relevant) to update and improve the national immunization strategy.
z Share country experiences in the management of vaccination campaigns for priority VPDs and engagement with
marginalized and vulnerable groups, and engage the country in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational,
national and international levels.
z Develop programmes or incentives to encourage and support routine vaccination while respecting the autonomy of
beneficiaries.
z Develop educational programmes to promote the importance of vaccination and combat misinformation and
disinformation about vaccines.
z Develop innovative tools to support information and education campaigns on immunization including development of
new platforms, social media tools, and mobile and internet-based technologies based on lessons learned from previous
z No plan is in place for nationwide vaccine delivery, nor have plans been drafted to provide vaccines throughout the country
01 to target populations or inadequate vaccine procurement and forecasting has led to regular stockouts at the central or
NO CAPACITY district levels.
z Draft or review existing plans, policies and procedures for vaccine delivery and use results to guide vaccine procurement
z Conduct a detailed assessment of existing cold chain equipment, including functioning, and identify bottlenecks to
03 maintaining needed cold chain infrastructure at the district, state and provincial levels and use assessment data to
DEVELOPED operationalize a plan to service and procure cold chain infrastructure as needed.
CAPACITY z Operationalize national guidelines for vaccine delivery to target populations and develop and disseminate protocols, SOPs,
trainings, technical guidelines and toolkits for storage, transportation and deployment of vaccines to health workers and
104
staff.
z Establish a cold chain for vaccine delivery to at least 40–59% of districts or 40–59% of the target population in the country.
z Establish guidance to prevent interruption of routine vaccination during health emergencies (with clear designation of
funding sources, minimum staff and cold chain capacity to ensure continuity of immunization services), specifying
procedures for procurement, efficient customs clearance, storage and transportation of vaccines.
z Form a strategic national vaccine stockpile based on the list of essential vaccines identified for the country, with security
and quality requirements met for sufficient vaccine access and delivery to target populations.
z Regularly invite national vaccine manufacturers to the national working group for coordination of vaccine access and
delivery, to facilitate dialogue and negotiation and to ensure affordability of vaccines before, during and after emergencies
to avoid speculation.
z Work with relevant partners to secure resources and investments in immunization.
z Procure and service cold chain equipment in areas identified by the detailed assessment to ensure vaccine delivery to at
z Secure sustainable funding for vaccine delivery systems, including for procurement and routine repair of cold chain
z No contingency plans or mechanisms for mass vaccination response to outbreaks of VPD are in place.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Include in the ToRs of a national advisory committee on immunization planning for mass vaccination for epidemics of
02 VPDs (including vaccines for novel pathogens) and a decision framework for use of mass vaccination.
LIMITED z Develop and include contingency plans for mass vaccination deployment for at least one priority VPD outbreak (e.g.
CAPACITY Ebola virus disease, measles, yellow fever, cholera, meningococcus, polio, etc.) – including the use of new vaccines – in
the national immunization plan. The strategy should include storage, cold chain and distribution capacities, required
consumables, potential target populations and engagement of relevant sectors for implementation.
z Conduct a situational analysis on fast-track approval and procurement process for new vaccines/pharmaceuticals – from
both new and existing suppliers – and identify regulatory and importation mechanisms for new and experimental vaccines
during epidemics of novel pathogens.
z Establish a technical working group endorsed by advisory committee on immunization to work as a knowledge hub to
get updates on research, development and global stock details related to vaccines for novel pathogens and report to the
advisory committee to support planning for mass vaccination campaigns as needed.
z Designate staff to lead planning and implementation of mass vaccination campaigns for VPD outbreaks.
z Include quality assessment and emergency approval for the use of new and experimental vaccines in epidemics of VPD
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) for mass vaccination campaigns during epidemics of VPD in collaboration with
relevant sectors, to identify functionality, bottlenecks, best practices and assess performance of RCCE activities. Revise
z Sustain supply of vaccines for mass vaccination campaigns and test vaccine surge capacities, storage capacities and
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419).
IMPACT:
A comprehensive, sustainable and legally embedded national oversight programme for biosafety and biosecurity which includes the safe and
secure use, storage, disposal and containment of biological agents of high consequence in all laboratory and holding facilities across human
health, animal health and agricultural sectors. Strengthened, sustainable biological risk management best practices are in place in relevant
sectors and safe and compliant transport of infectious substances occurs according to national and international regulations.
47
Laboratory biosafety describes the containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins or their accidental
release (refer to WHO’s Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th edition).
48
Laboratory biosecurity describes the protection, control and accountability for valuable biological materials within laboratories, as well as information related to these materials and dual-use
research, to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release.
49
Refer to The Australia Group’s list of human and animal pathogens and toxins for export control.
50
Minimal/best practices, as referred in WHO’s Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th edition.
112
51
Refer to Responsible life sciences research for global health security: a guidance document.
BENCHMARK 8.1: Whole-of-government biosafety and biosecurity system is in place for relevant sectors including human, animal (domestic animals
and wildlife) and agricultural facilities
OBJECTIVE: To develop and implement a biosafety and biosecurity system for relevant sectors including human, animal (domestic animals and
wildlife) and agricultural facilities to minimize the risk of accidental or intentional infection of laboratory staff or release of biological agents of high
consequence
z Elements of a comprehensive national biosafety and biosecurity system, such as policy instruments and proper financing,
z Establish a multisectoral technical advisory board to advise and guide decision-makers in relation to risk- and evidence-
02 based recommendations for mitigating and managing biosafety and biosecurity threats and incidents that may arise.
LIMITED z Review and develop or revise national legislation and regulations for biosafety and biosecurity in the human health, animal
CAPACITY health and agricultural sectors.
z Identify and document human and animal health facilities that store and maintain biological agents of high consequence
and toxins and health professionals responsible for them.
z Identify all departments, facilities and settings that handle or may handle biological agents of high consequence and toxins
in relevant sectors (e.g. food safety, agriculture, points of entry, internal security, fire services, defence, customs, postal
services, waste management, agriculture, etc.).
z Establish a mechanism for laboratory licensing in relevant sectors and ensure that biosafety and biosecurity requirements
are included in general licensing requirements.
z Conduct a biosafety and biosecurity assessment of animal health laboratories to identify critical needs.
z Develop a national biosafety and biosecurity regulatory framework, including guidelines and recordkeeping obligations for
04 z Develop site-specific biosafety and biosecurity supporting documents that include incident and emergency response
DEMONSTRATED plans (e.g. in case of explosion, fire, flood, worker exposure, accident or illness, major spillage, waste management, etc.) for
CAPACITY laboratories at national and subnational levels.
z Develop SOPs for identifying and addressing high consequence research, such as dual-use aspects of research, and
include a responsible code of conduct for scientists and other staff.
z Develop and implement an incident reporting system that includes identifying incidents, reporting according to regulations,
and addressing action items that improve safety and security. Share reports with the relevant sectors.
z Establish external monitoring and oversight of biosafety and biosecurity programmes and activities.
z Develop guidelines and procedures for the management of suspicious packages (for example, Anthrax letters) in
collaboration with relevant sectors (e.g. police, defence, postal services, customs, etc.) at national and subnational levels.
z Develop a national strategic stock of medicines (including antibiotics, antitoxins, serums and vaccines) for prevention or
emergency treatment related to biosafety or biosecurity threats and incidents.
z Conduct SimEx to test procedures for the management of biosafety and biosecurity threats and incidents and confirm
functionality.
z Develop (in collaboration with occupational health services and other relevant parties) protocols for emergency care of
workers and victims of biosafety- and biosecurity-related incidents, procedures for emergency medical evacuation to
specialized health facilities, and decontamination protocols.
z No biosafety and biosecurity training programme or plans are in place in any sector.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Assess biosafety and biosecurity training needs and gaps in relevant sectors.
02 z Conduct an engagement meeting to develop biosafety and biosecurity training programmes that align academic curricula
LIMITED with international best practices.
CAPACITY z Develop training programmes for both trainers and trainees as required.
z Emphasize risk- and evidence-based approaches to biosafety and biosecurity and include risk assessment in training
programmes and curricula.
z Identify and create a directory of laboratory staff that have basic training, at least, in biosafety and biosecurity working in
laboratories and related fields.
z Identify laboratory staff by category that require training in biosafety and biosecurity, determine the level of training
required and conduct required training regularly.
03 procedures, risk assessment and procedures to comply with biosafety and biosecurity rules and regulations and align with
DEVELOPED international best practices.
CAPACITY z Train and oversee facilities that are housing or working with biological agents of high consequence and toxins to comply
with biosafety and biosecurity rules and regulations.
z Begin developing sustained academic curricula, continuing education and training programmes for biosafety and
biosecurity that align with international best practices.
z Develop and/or adapt biosafety and biosecurity training module for specialized and continuing education of healthcare
professionals.
z Implement training programmes and oversight to assess compliance with biosafety and biosecurity rules and regulations,
05 z Include biosafety and biosecurity training courses in university curricula of pre-training education in human and animal
SUSTAINABLE health programmes.
CAPACITY z Implement periodic training programmes on emergency response procedures.
z Participate in international initiatives to support capacity-building and staff training at the global level.
Tools:
z Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240011311).
z WHO guidance on implementing regulatory requirements for biosafety and biosecurity in biomedical laboratories: a stepwise approach. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/332244).
z Guide to participating in the confidence-building measures of the biological weapons convention. Revised edition 2015. Geneva: United Nations Office
for Disarmament Affairs; 2015 (https://disarmament.unoda.org/publications/more/cbm-guide).
z Responsible life sciences research for global health security: a guidance document. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2010 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/70507).
z List of human and animal pathogens and toxins for export control [website]. The Australia Group; 2022 (https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/
theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/human_animal_pathogens.html).
z Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
IMPACT:
Effective use of a nationwide laboratory system, including relevant sectors, capable of timely, safely and accurately detecting and characterizing
pathogens causing epidemic-prone disease, including both known and unknown threats, from all parts of the country. Expanded deployment,
utilization and sustainable use of modern, safe, secure, affordable and appropriate diagnostics tests or devices is established.
z No system in place for transporting specimens from peripheral/rural/district levels to national laboratories, or only ad hoc
01 transportation is available.
NO CAPACITY
z Map existing laboratory capacity for priority diseases and establish referral networks for priority pathogens.
z Expand service agreements with courier services (public or private) for transporting most priority pathogens from
03 subnational to national level (or from all subnational levels to reference laboratories).
DEVELOPED z Train health workers on sample collection, secured packing and storage before transportation for suspected cases of
CAPACITY priority diseases.
z Train staff from courier companies and health facilities on appropriate management of specimens from suspected cases
of priority diseases.
z Establish formal agreements with neighbouring and partner countries if they are responsible for testing referred
specimens.
z Provide prepositioned outbreak investigation kits (i.e. sample collection and transportation kits) at subnational levels and
facilities as applicable.
z Develop a system for data collection, analysis and M&E for specimen referral and transport system, including turnaround
time and specimen integrity.
04 z Provide prepositioned outbreak investigation kits (i.e. sample collection and transportation kits) at all levels and facilities.
DEMONSTRATED z Conduct regular reviews of specimen transportation systems to confirm that specimens are being transported promptly
CAPACITY and in a manner that maintains safety and specimen quality.
z Establish a system to collect and test specimens from hard-to-reach areas.
z Organize and support training programmes on M&E of specimen referral and transport system, for all relevant stakeholders
(e.g. courier companies, customs, animal health and environment officers, etc.).
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant), with relevant sectors, to assess the functionality of specimen referral systems in
health facilities (including public and private) at all levels.
z Conduct training exercises to develop a pool of shippers that is trained on infectious substances and is always available,
01
NO CAPACITY
z Establish an independent unit or laboratory working group at the national level to oversee laboratory services and develop
etc.).
z Develop and publish national guidance on registration procedures for in vitro diagnostic devices and other relevant devices.
03 z Establish a national quality assessment programme for peripheral laboratories testing for diseases with epidemic potential.
DEVELOPED z Implement a system of inspecting and licensing laboratories, including using local adaptations of international standards
CAPACITY and norms and obtaining required funding and human resources, including training/retraining of laboratory staff in the
inspection of laboratories according to minimum standards.
z Implement minimum standards for certification or licensing using international standards adapted to the local setting,
develop a system for regulation of laboratories, and allocate sufficient funding and human resources for implementation.
z Train and/or retrain health workers on laboratory quality principles and procedures.
z Update undergraduate and postgraduate curricula of relevant fields (e.g. medicine, laboratory technicians and other
relevant health workers) to include laboratory quality standards in relevant modules.
z Implement a mandatory licensing programme for national and subnational public health laboratories (including
04 laboratories in the private sector) and issue licenses in conformity with national quality standards.
DEMONSTRATED z Obtain WHO accreditation for selected laboratories for disease specific testing (e.g. polio, HIV genotyping, measles, etc.).
CAPACITY
z Accredit all national reference laboratories in line with international standards (e.g. ISO 15189 for health laboratories).
05 z Update existing laboratory strategies, guidelines and procedures for laboratory quality based on lessons learned from M&E
SUSTAINABLE activities.
CAPACITY z Implement a national external quality assurance programme including microbiology, virology, serology, parasitology, etc. in
relevant sector laboratories (public and private).
z Organize corrective actions based on the results of external quality assessments and recommendations from reviews and
supervisions.
z Improve the national plan for quality management system compliance at all levels in public and private laboratories
through continuous quality improvement, based on analysis of country experiences.
z Allocate sustainable funding for laboratory quality assurance programmes.
z Share experiences in laboratory quality management system and engage the country in peer-to-peer learning programmes
at the subnational, national and international levels.
z Country has not taken a risk-based approach to determine testing modalities for priority diseases.
01 z Testing for priority diseases relies only on point of care testing (POCT) and/or other simple testing modalities such as
NO CAPACITY microscopy.
z Review or develop a list of priority diseases for the country and update (compile) supporting evidence to perform a national
z Review or update or develop national laboratory policies to reflect strategies and procedures developed for testing priority
03 diseases.
DEVELOPED z Train and equip laboratories from relevant sectors involved in laboratory detection of the country’s endemic and priority
CAPACITY diseases, based on the national testing algorithms and national laboratory administrative and technical structures.
ongoing support to national reference laboratories to ensure the implementation of capacity-building plans.
z Implement national proficiency and quality assurance processes for all tests conducted for the country’s endemic and
priority diseases.
z Develop capacity for in-country production and procurement processes for acquiring necessary media and reagents to
perform laboratory tests for priority diseases.
z Provide funding to implement capacity-building plans for national reference laboratories performing testing for priority
diseases as well as ongoing monitoring and assessment visits to assure implementation.
z Establish mechanisms and protocols for timely and appropriate sharing of information generated by laboratory testing in
relevant sectors, especially linking laboratory data with surveillance and risk assessment.
z Identify essential tests that the country is currently unable to perform, and prioritize developing that capacity within one
year (with domestic or donor funding).
z Conduct SimEx or AAR (as relevant) to test the functionality of laboratory testing capacities for detecting priority diseases
at the national level.
z No evidence of use of rapid and accurate point-of-care, farm-based diagnostics and/or laboratory-based diagnostics, and
z Develop a national laboratory policy or regulation that formalizes a tiered diagnostic structure and enables collaboration,
02 information sharing and specimen referral between different tiers of the system, relevant sectors and private laboratories.
LIMITED z Assess national diagnostic capacity and use findings to develop a national plan for strengthening national diagnostic
CAPACITY capacity, taking into account available resources within the national health system administration at all levels.
z Develop a tiered laboratory network structure to test and monitor the country’s priority diseases, ensuring efficient linkages
between tiers along the national referral system.
z Identify existing point of care and rapid diagnostic tests that are available in-country for the detection of priority diseases.
z Assess the feasibility for procurement, validation and use of new point of care and rapid diagnostic tests for priority
diseases that are not currently available in-country.
z Develop national guidance on the initial evaluation and field validation/quality assurance requirements for all new point of
care tests, rapid diagnostic tests and/or in vitro diagnostics introduced for priority diseases.
z Develop a legal basis for strengthening collaboration between public and private sector laboratories and partner agencies
at both national and subnational levels.
03 and specimen referral systems, ideally within the framework of a national laboratory policy for each priority disease.
DEVELOPED z Develop in-service training plans for all staff that align with national tiered testing approaches and include task-based
CAPACITY training, refresher training, and mentoring in relevant technical and administrative areas.
z Allocate resources (human and material) to conduct appropriate diagnostic testing at the subnational level in line with the
SOPs for tiered testing or national laboratory policy.
z Develop a real-time laboratory information management system (LIMS) that can be deployed across the tiered network
and interoperable with other health information management systems.
z Collect data from diagnostic networks across the country, share with relevant national authorities including epidemiology
departments, and collate with all other health data for regular analysis and planning.
z Conduct SimEx and AAR (as relevant) to monitor and evaluate functionality of the national diagnostic network in routine
systems and during health emergencies.
z Monitor the implementation of point of care and rapid diagnostic tests using national guidance for field validation and
quality assurance processes.
z Secure sustainable financing for all tiers of the national laboratory system to support ongoing testing and sequencing of all
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419).
To address the challenges highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic and other past and current emergencies, the collaborative surveillance concept has
been introduced as a core building block of the WHO Framework for Strengthening Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Resilience (HEPR), which proposes key objectives and capabilities for strengthening public health intelligence for improved decision-making. Collaborative
surveillance is defined as “the systematic strengthening of capacity and collaboration among diverse stakeholders, both within and beyond the health sector,
with the ultimate goal of enhancing public health intelligence and improving evidence for decision making”54. This concept promotes the strengthening of
routine surveillance capacities (including public health and laboratory surveillance) and health systems monitoring, and collaboration between and beyond
these systems to collectively support diverse surveillance objectives and decision-maker needs on a routine ongoing basis and toward health emergency
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
Benchmark actions listed below are limited to areas related defined by the current JEE indicators (3rd edition):
Wherever possible, countries should consider the full range of collaborative surveillance objectives, capacities, and subcapabilities in addition to those
outlined here, as well as other related benchmarks, during the prioritization of actions.
54
Defining collaborative surveillance: a core concept for strengthening the global architecture for health emergency preparedness, response, and resilience (HEPR).
137
IMPACT:
Coordinated surveillance systems that collectively address the full range of objectives for monitoring, detecting and responding to prioritized
hazards and risks55. Strengthened public health intelligence for improved decision making through routine collaboration across key dimensions56.
sharing data, information and intelligence; sharing workforce capacities; applying common/interoperable data platforms and standards to link data sources; conducting joint assessments,
investigations and interventions; and strategic alignment of priorities and plans.
BENCHMARK 10.1: Early warning surveillance systems are well established and functional
OBJECTIVE: To establish a well functional early warning surveillance system
z National public health surveillance strategies, capacities and coordination mechanisms do not exist.
01
NO CAPACITY
Develop a national public health surveillance strategy, capacities and coordination mechanism based on IHR
requirements and priority hazards:
02
LIMITED z Develop a national public health surveillance strategy, capacities and coordination mechanism based on IHR requirements
CAPACITY and priority risks.
z Identify priority events, diseases and conditions under surveillance based on an all hazards approach.
z Designate a national public health authority to coordinate surveillance (dedicated unit or department) with surveillance
focal persons at subnational and local levels.
z Finalize operational plans and processes, including training and guidance.
z Disseminate guidelines and SOPs for health and public health workers (e.g. clinicians, laboratorians, surveillance officers)
to support detection and assessment of prioritized risks.
z Map surveillance stakeholders to improve coordination, avoid duplication of efforts, and identify resources for management
and control of priority diseases and risks, including human resources, equipment, digital tools and infrastructure.
Reinforce, implement and enhance public health surveillance strategies, capacities, and coordination and
collaboration mechanisms at the national level:
03
DEVELOPED z Map cross-sectoral surveillance stakeholders and identify focal points for better data/information/intelligence exchange,
CAPACITY coordination and collaboration.
z Conduct multisectoral assessments58 of public health risks at the national level and match surveillance capacities to
prioritized hazards.
z Train health and public health workers (e.g. clinicians, laboratorians, surveillance officers) on SOPs for detecting and
Improve existing IBS and EBS systems and establish enhanced surveillance approaches:
z Expand core IBS and EBS systems, extending coverage to all relevant public and private health services, and other relevant
healthcare providers.
140
58
For example, using the WHO Strategic toolkit for assessing risks (STAR), or equivalent.
z Establish immediate and weekly reporting mechanisms and feedback loops for reporting units, investigate and assess the
reported cases or events with outbreak potential for public health response, link to laboratory results and share information
with relevant sectors.
z Conduct regular AAR/IAR of major events.
z Establish and test complementary59 or more appropriate surveillance approaches to fill identified gaps for prioritized risks.
z Digitize surveillance processes where appropriate, giving prioritization to points of data collection.
Reinforce, implement and enhance public health surveillance strategies, capacities, and coordination and
collaboration mechanisms at national and subnational levels:
DEMONSTRATED
04 z Critically evaluate performance of the constellation of surveillance systems and capacities, including effectiveness and
CAPACITY efficiency in respective systems for achieving early warning objectives and driving timely decision-making against locally
prioritized risks. Document and disseminate findings and apply recommendations to update and strengthen overall
efficiency of strategies, systems and tools.
z Establish decentralized coordination and technical capacities at subnational levels to enable more timely decision-making
58
This may include for example, community-based IBS, health service capacity and usage monitoring, centralized media and social media-based EBS, targeted surveillance among specific
vulnerable populations (e.g. aged care facilities, IDP communities), syndromic surveillance in specific health service units (e.g. emergency departments), intelligence sharing among One
141
Health partners (e.g. animal health monitoring), and environmental surveillance (e.g. wastewater monitoring).
z Establish community engagement and support communities to establish self-coordinated capacities and systems for
community-centred detection, notification and response through integrated approaches between communities, civil
societies, primary care and local government.
Well functioning core and enhanced surveillance through integration of systems and capacities, incorporation of
diverse insights and systems that can flexibly respond to diverse emergencies:
z Integrate or collaborate with surveillance activities where appropriate through consolidation of systems, and by:
Applying common/interoperable data platforms and standards
Routine exchange of data, information, intelligence and capacities between stakeholders
Conducting joint assessments, investigations and interventions
Strategic alignment of priorities and plans.
z Extend the use of digital tools across surveillance systems and levels to automate routine data management and reporting
processes, and enable greater linkage and interoperability between systems.
z Incorporate contemporary and multidisciplinary insights on hazards, vulnerabilities and risks60 (e.g. multidimensional
poverty index) to better interpret surveillance findings and complement early warning and response activities.
z Review limitations of routine surveillance capacity to surge during emergencies, adjust where possible and preselect
contingency tools to fill anticipated gaps.
z Conduct data collection and both routine and ad hoc reporting at health facilities at a high level of quality.
z Conduct joint operational research for the development and testing of surveillance best practices, tools and technologies,
and innovative approaches, and translate findings into system improvements.
Sustain and streamline core and enhanced surveillance through integration of systems and capacities,
incorporation of diverse insights and systems that can flexibly respond to diverse emergencies:
z Establish and reinforce decentralized surveillance coordination and technical capacities at primary public health levels to
enable local use of data for local decision-making and response.
z Routinely apply surveillance findings together with information on hazards, vulnerabilities and risks for predicting and pre-
emptively responding to emerging risks (even before the first cases).
z Contribute to local, regional and global surveillance capacity through regional/international networks, support other
countries to strengthen their surveillance system and participate in international initiatives to strengthen capacities
globally.
z Establish a mechanism to ensure continuous improvement in data quality at health facilities by monitoring, evaluating and
adapting data collection and reporting of routine and ad hoc events.
z Advance joint operational research for the development and testing of surveillance best practices, tools and technologies,
and innovative approaches, and translate findings into system improvements.
z Method, process or mechanisms for verifying and investigating detected events does not exist.
01
NO CAPACITY
assessment and characteristics); and response (triggering public health actions, case finding, and ongoing enhanced surveillance to inform response activities). Key components are further
detailed in the WHO Early warning alert and response (EWAR) in emergencies: an operational guide.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
z Review opportunities for multisectoral collaboration for the detection, verification and assessment of potential public
health events.
z Develop and participate in cross-sectoral collaborations with health sector to exchange data, information and intelligence
between One Health partners and conduct joint verification of signals, investigations and risk assessments of events
related to zoonoses.
undertaking enhanced surveillance and information management during an emergency (e.g. case investigation and line listing, contact tracing, maintaining situational reporting/briefings,
etc.), establishing multidisciplinary capacities for special epidemiological/laboratory/clinical studies, etc.
Reinforce EWAR core functions and collaborations at national and subnational levels, implement/strengthen
complementary activities at primary public health levels, and routinely test systems to respond to emergencies:
05
SUSTAINABLE z Establish a mechanism to maintain that core functions and cross-sectoral collaboration are operating seamlessly at
CAPACITY national and subnational levels. Identify limitations in EWAR systems and fill gaps where possible.
z Conduct necessary training and activate complementary EWAR capacities, systems and SOPs at primary health level;
ensuring functions are interconnected with local decision-making and response authorities to affect timely local action.
z Document and share best practices nationally and internationally for peer-to-peer learning.
z Systematic analyses of disease surveillance data for action not conducted or extended delays exist precluding timely
01 action.
NO CAPACITY
Develop routine analysis and reporting capacities for prioritized hazards under surveillance at national level:
02 z Review national capacities to undertake analyses of surveillance data.
LIMITED z Develop a training package for data management data collation, analysis, trend analysis and developing reports or weekly
CAPACITY
surveillance bulletins.
z Develop and disseminate guidelines and procedures to assess risks.
z Produce ad hoc analysis reports of outbreaks or other public health events based on needs or emerging events and
disseminate from the national level.
z Establish reporting standards and identify pathways for informing decision-making and response authorities of
surveillance findings, as well as broader dissemination.
z Map cross-sectoral surveillance stakeholders and identify focal points for coordination, collaboration and the exchange of
relevant data, information and intelligence.
Implement routine analysis and reporting for prioritized hazards under surveillance at national level:
03 z Conduct training on data analysis and report development at national and subnational levels.
DEVELOPED z Conduct annual or monthly analysis of surveillance data for continuous monitoring of events of potential concern for
CAPACITY
public health and health security, including routine trend analyses and data quality assessment at national level.
z Establish standards and training to integrate data and information sources from multisectoral partners.
148
z Establish feedback loops for sharing analytic results, from national to subnational levels at a minimum and across sectors.
z Develop standards and training for quality data collection for routine and ad hoc reporting of unusual or unexpected events
at healthcare facility level.
Reinforce routine analysis and reporting for prioritized hazards under surveillance at national level, implement
complementary capacity at subnational levels and strengthen collaboration across sectors at all levels:
04
DEMONSTRATED z Develop or reinforce standards, content and format for epidemiological bulletins for national and subnational levels
CAPACITY and weekly epidemiological reports on priority diseases and ad hoc events, including analysis and risk assessment
disseminated at all levels.
z Develop or reinforce standards and training to analyse data from multiple information sources across sectors available at
all levels.
z Establish or reinforce capacity to routinely triangulate data from multiple health information and surveillance systems,
including from relevant sectors.
z Establish or reinforce existing real time analytical information sharing, including data visualizations and dashboards.
z Develop and implement a mechanism for M&E of timely data analysis and reporting for prioritized hazards under
surveillance at national and subnational levels.
Tools:
z Defining Collaborative Surveillance: A core concept of the framework for strengthening the global architecture for health emergency preparedness,
response, and resilience (HEPR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/367927).
z Early warning, alert and response (EWAR) in emergencies: an operational guide. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/9789240063587).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
The workforce includes, but is not limited to, public health specialists and related occupations (e.g. biomedical technicians, biostatisticians epidemiologists,
laboratory scientists and technicians, etc.), the clinical professions (e.g. midwives, nurses, pharmacists, physicians, etc.) and others (e.g. social scientists,
communications personnel, occupational health personnel, information technology (IT) specialists, etc.). There is a corresponding and overlapping workforce
in the animal and environmental sectors (e.g. animal health professionals, environmental health personnel, veterinarians and para-veterinarians, etc.) that are
essential for health security measures. The workforce also includes personnel from a wide group of other allied occupations beyond the health sector who
contribute to addressing the determinants of health, such as personnel engaged in water and sanitation, food supply chains and road safety.
The pursuit of health security, universal health coverage and health-related development goals requires investment in national health system capacity, with a
focus on primary health care and public health. National and subnational system capacity is dependent on an integrated, multisectoral and multidisciplinary
workforce that can deliver all essential public health functions (EPHFs), including emergency preparedness and response. It is critical that countries develop
multisectoral workforce strategies that are informed by mapping and measuring the occupations that contribute to EPHF delivery, as well as regular health
01
NO CAPACITY
z Identify a national coordination working group (with ToRs) including all relevant stakeholders and sectors who can
03 z Conduct advocacy to relevant stakeholders, including ministries of health, finance, planning and administration/civil
DEVELOPED service, to implement the strategy.
CAPACITY z Develop minimum standards for human health staffing levels, using methods such as the Workload Indicators of Staffing
Need.
154
z Establish a national case for investment in human resources for health as a vital component of the Sustainable
Development Goals, universal health coverage, health security and universal access to healthcare.
z Develop a framework to promote the social, legal and economic protection and rights of health and care workers in health
emergencies including their occupational safety.
z Create appropriate job classifications and descriptions for health workers at all levels of relevant ministries, with clear
career progression.
z Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the multisectoral workforce strategy (including financing and operations) to
05 z Incorporate appropriate incentive packages and strategies to attract, train and retain competent personnel to meet national
SUSTAINABLE and subnational needs within the multisectoral workforce strategy.
CAPACITY z Allocate funding for regular and fair payment of the health workforce at the national and subnational levels.
z Establish national health workforce registries of competent and practicing personnel and collect key performance
indicators.
Based on M&E results, latest scientific evidence and aligned with current policy guidance from WHO, including details on the workforce sustainability, staffing and incentive models, personnel
recruitment, development/training and retention mechanisms, planning and monitoring of human resources, and implementation of a career progression ladder.
BENCHMARK 11.2: Human resources are available to effectively implement IHR
OBJECTIVE: To develop a health workforce that is available and competent to prevent, detect, assess, notify, report and respond to health emergencies
of domestic and international concern and health service provision (such as epidemic preparedness and control) at all levels of the health system to
effectively implement IHR.
z The country has negligible human resources capacity in relevant sectors required to prevent, detect, assess, notify, report
z Identify a responsible unit and advisory committee for the development of human resource capacity to meet IHR capacity
02 needs.
LIMITED z Conduct engagement meetings with relevant sectors to expand the multisectoral health workforce strategy to include IHR
CAPACITY capacity needs.
z Identify the needs, as well as current availability and distribution, of human resources for health capacities, including the
workforce for IHR implementation.
z Actively engage international organisations (IOs)/NGOs/civil society organized associate health worker groups (such as
community first aid responders and Red Cross/Crescent volunteers).
z Establish or strengthen national rapid response teams, ensuring they are multidisciplinary and multilevel.
z Use the data obtained from mapping and measurement of occupations to identify gaps in the national workforce capacity,
04 conduct evidence-based planning and policy making and create projections for future needs.
DEMONSTRATED z Mobilize resources to ensure each local level has the needed capacity for epidemiology, case management, laboratory
158
z Conduct annual data collection on the workforce which contributes to the delivery of EPHFs and progressively incorporate
05 this reporting into the national health information systems and national health workforce accounts.
SUSTAINABLE z Use this data to update and inform the national multisectoral workforce strategy annually (Benchmark 11.1).
CAPACITY z Conduct periodic health labour market analyses to understand key policy questions and devise strategies to address
labour market gaps.
z Review national preparedness and response plans as well as legal and regulatory frameworks and establish protocols,
SOPs, technical guidelines and toolkits to send and receive multidisciplinary health personnel during health emergencies.
z Review, evaluate and update policies or procedures for sustainable appropriate human resources in all relevant sectors
according to IHR provisions.
z Establish a sustainable mechanism to ensure the availability of health and care workers to cover IHR needs in routine
z No formal multisectoral competency-based training programme(s) is (are) in place or efforts are ad hoc.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Map the required workforce training needs for the different EPHFs and occupational groups aligning with the multisectoral
z Establish competency-based standards for the workforce in each relevant sector to guide training.
03 z Operationalize competency-based education programmes that address identified training needs, including content on
DEVELOPED surveillance, outbreak preparedness and response.
CAPACITY z Develop and implement in-service competency-based training on surveillance, outbreak preparedness and response for
specific occupational groups at the national level, at minimum.
z Conduct at least one level of a field epidemiology training programme (FETP) (basic, intermediate or advanced) or
comparable applied epidemiology training programme.
z Organize trainings for managers and leaders to improve management and leadership skills in the workplace.
z Define rules and incentives to facilitate and ensure the participation of all health workers in relevant in-service training
programmes.
04 system and RCCE for specific occupations at the national and subnational levels.
DEMONSTRATED z Develop measures to assess and monitor the implementation of in-service training programmes that are aligned with the
CAPACITY country’s training strategy.
z Conduct at least two levels of FETP (basic, intermediate and/or advanced) or comparable applied epidemiology training
programme(s) in the country, or in another country through an existing agreement.
z Explore and implement measures to organize and finance advanced trainings and continued education programmes in
public health, including epidemiology, laboratory, animal and environmental health.
z Build mechanisms that ensure strict adherence to nationally or internationally recognized standards for competency-
z Document and share experiences on competency-based trainings, programmes and education for the workforce.
BENCHMARK 11.4: Multisectoral workforce surge strategy for health emergencies is well established and functional
OBJECTIVE: To develop and implement a valid (recognized by law or official government protocols) an up-to-date (no older than 5 years) workforce
surge strategy for health emergencies
z The country does not have a national multisectoral workforce surge strategic plan for health emergencies, or is still under
01 development.
NO CAPACITY
z Initiate development of a multisectoral workforce surge strategic plan by the national coordination working group for
02 multisectoral workforce strategy to staff, roster, prepare and train the workforce at the national level.
LIMITED z Conduct a situational analysis on existing policies/plans and methods for multisectoral workforce surge during health
CAPACITY emergencies and identify gaps.
z Identify relevant agreements and/or MOUs needed between different health programmes to ensure a cohesive
multisectoral surge strategy for large scale activation.
z Conduct a gap analysis of surge capacity and training needs required in health and relevant sectors for health
emergencies.
z Initiate plans to disseminate the multisectoral workforce surge strategic plan for health emergencies to all relevant staff
and stakeholders.
03 z Develop or update policy for surge staffing for health emergency response for staff welfare, overtime and insurance
DEVELOPED measures.
CAPACITY z Develop training packages to orient and build the capacity of the multisectoral surge workforce.
z Develop and maintain a network of trained multisectoral surge teams at national level.
z Document and implement the procedures for predeployment, deployment and postdeployment of the multisectoral surge
workforce at national level.
z Develop ToRs for all relevant units and departments based on the multisectoral workforce surge strategic plan at all levels.
z Develop and implement rosters for surge workforce in the health sector at national level.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to review the functionality of the multisectoral surge workforce strategic plan.
z Implement a multisectoral surge workforce strategic plan for health emergencies at all levels.
04 z Implement training packages and conduct training in advance of health emergencies for the multisectoral surge workforce
DEMONSTRATED at all levels.
z Review and update the multisectoral surge workforce strategic plan at all levels, including incorporating the results from
05 M&E.
SUSTAINABLE z Evaluate and update training packages and rosters of multisectoral surge workforce.
CAPACITY z Document best practices and lessons learned from the implementation of the multisectoral workforce surge strategic plan.
Tools:
z WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2010 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/wha68.32).
z Workload Indicators of Staffing Need. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2010 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241500197).
z Executive Board 128.R9. Health workforce strengthening. In: One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Executive Board Session, Agenda Item 4.5. Geneva: World
z National health workforce accounts: a handbook. Second edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (Forthcoming).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419).
166
12
Health emergency management
This capacity focuses on management of health emergencies for enabling countries to be prepared and operationally ready for response to any health event,
including emergencies, as per the all-hazard requirement of IHR. Ensuring risk-based plans for emergency preparedness, readiness and response, robust
emergency management structures and mobilization of resources during an emergency is critical for a timely response to health emergencies.
IMPACT:
Multisectoral actors at national, subnational and local health response levels are well coordinated and have a common understanding of the
priority risks and are ready to implement timely, effective and efficient emergency response operations for outbreaks and other emergencies.
Countries have the necessary legal and regulatory processes to allow for rapid national or cross-border deployment and receipt of public health,
medical personnel and logistics and supplies during emergencies.
z National all hazards risk profile not available based on a multihazard risk assessment or has not been updated in the past
01 five years and there is no formal mechanism for the readiness assessment for potential health emergencies.
NO CAPACITY
Risk profiling
02 z Designate a national authority to coordinate the development of a multihazard risk profile (dedicated unit/department).
LIMITED z Conduct contextual analysis to ensure that relevant factors (cultural, societal, economic, etc.) are taken into consideration
CAPACITY
during the risk profiling development process.
z Assess existing policies, legislation and legal basis, ethical rules, norms and standards to conduct risk assessments in
nonemergency and emergency periods.
z Develop a national risk profile, using a standardized approach with relevant focal points across health and relevant sectors.
z Share available/updated risk profile with multisectoral stakeholders to inform IHR-related planning and actions including
readiness and RRAs.
Readiness assessment
z Designate a national authority to coordinate a readiness assessment and identify priority anticipatory actions for high
64
168
Risk profiling
03 z Form/reconvene a risk assessment implementation team to organize, prepare and conduct risk profiling exercises at the
DEVELOPED national level on a regular basis (i.e. every two years).
CAPACITY
z Train multisectoral risk assessment facilitators to conduct risk profiling exercises, including refresher sessions at the
national level, and maintain a risk assessment facilitator roster.
z Define data consolidation process to make use of multiple sources of information/analysis from different sectors, inclusive
of all hazards (i.e. natural, human-induced and environmental hazards) to inform the risk profile and anticipatory actions
for priority risks.
z Develop or update the national risk profile and share updated risk profile and prioritized risks regularly with relevant
multisectoral stakeholders to inform preparedness and readiness actions.
Readiness assessment
z Integrate the risk profile and prioritized readiness anticipatory actions into relevant national emergency management
mechanism(s), plans, strategies and frameworks.
Rapid risk assessment
z Conduct RRAs systematically after the detection of an event with provision of updates to the assessment over time.
z Follow a systematic and stepwise methodology for the RRA process with SOPs after the detection of threats or events that
can lead to health emergencies. This includes assessment of hazard, exposure, context and level of impact of the negative
consequences of the event and their respective likelihood.
z Share RRA output with relevant stakeholders and partners.
z Use the output of the RRA to support the decision-making process.
z Train a multidisciplinary team that includes health, animal and environment sectors to conduct RRA.
z Engage relevant departments of the health ministry and other relevant governmental ministries and agencies in the
development of the initial RRAs and ongoing updates.
Risk profiling
exercises.
z Allocate funding to develop and maintain risk profiles at the national and subnational levels.
Readiness assessment
z Designate an authority to coordinate readiness assessments and the development of operational contingency plan(s) at
the subnational level(s).
z Develop/review/update and test hazard specific national and subnational operational contingency plans or equivalent for
high priority and imminent risks based on readiness assessment(s) and prioritized readiness anticipatory actions.
z Establish rapid deployment mechanisms for the release of available contingency resources (human, financial, technical) for
prioritized readiness anticipatory actions on a no regrets basis.
z Apply hazard specific preparedness and readiness tools based on the risk profile and prioritized risks at the national and
subnational levels to inform actions.
RRA
z Establish or designate a RRA division in the health ministry to coordinate the management of risk assessment in all
programme divisions and provide appropriate resources for supporting risk assessment activities (staff, funds, material,
regular trainings).
z Use information from the most recent strategic risk assessment performed at national and/or subnational levels for RRA
to contextualize acute events.
z Conduct SimEx for RRA to identify gaps/best practices and update plan and risk assessment mechanisms accordingly.
z Include RRA trainings in the curricula of postgraduate studies in public heath, health administration, emergency medicine,
disaster management and other relevant fields.
RRA
z Establish cooperation agreements between partners, community representatives and the RRA division to ensure whole-of-
society, multisectoral/multidisciplinary risk assessments are conducted at national and subnational levels.
171
Risk profiling
05 z Update risk profiles at the national and subnational levels on an annual basis (or as required based on emerging threats).
SUSTAINABLE z Incorporate research and risk modelling from academic institutions, scientific data and modelling into the national and
CAPACITY
subnational risk profile through a well defined process with a special focus on emerging threats.
Readiness assessment
z Apply hazard specific readiness tools based on high priority and imminent risks to assess and scale up readiness of the
health sector to respond to health emergencies.
z Regularly update health emergency strategy, contingency plans, legislation, risk informed capacity-building plans and other
relevant documents based on risk profiles and readiness assessments at the national and subnational levels.
z Establish or designate national and subnational mechanisms or processes to review the application of the risk profile
as related to national and subnational policies, contingency and capacity planning, readiness assessments and risk
management are fit for purpose on an annual basis (or as required based on emerging threats).
z Share country experiences, lessons learned and innovations on risk profiling and application of readiness tools within a
community of practice.
RRA
z Use conclusions and recommendations from RRAs to develop/update contingency or response plans during health
emergencies as well as to prioritise public health programmes and capacity-building planning.
z Develop and update RRA methods tailored to the country context and based on M&E results.
z Document country experiences in risk assessment (strategic and RRA), share best practices and engage the country in
peer-to-peer learning programmes at subnational, national level and international levels.
from relevant sectors, based on updated information and changes to the risk situation.
BENCHMARK 12A.2: Public health emergency operations centre (PHEOC) capacities, procedures and plans are in place
OBJECTIVE: Develop PHEOC capacities to enable countries to respond in a timely manner to all hazard emergencies and disasters
z A PHEOC has not been identified at the national level and no PHEOC handbook is in place.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct high level advocacy on the importance of creating functional PHEOCs with heads of state, ministries and
02 agencies.
LIMITED z Conduct a baseline assessment of emergency operations capacities and gaps including infrastructure (facility,
CAPACITY communication technology equipment, internet, software, office supplies and power), information systems, workforce,
legislation, policies and plans.
z Form a steering committee or other management structure to oversee the implementation and strengthening of PHEOC
and a policy group to provide strategic direction and allocation of resources.
z Incorporate the concept of operations for the entire emergency response system, including PHEOC, within the national
emergency response plan.
z Develop a PHEOC implementation plan, including resource mobilization plan, to meet the minimum requirements of a
functioning PHEOC.
z Complete a comprehensive mapping of existing legal mandates on health emergency management systems and PHEOCs.
z Draft a legal framework for the PHEOC to coordinate emergency operations and advocate for its enactment in the presence
03 z Implement and validate health emergency preparedness and response plans, PHEOC handbook and SOPs in routine and
DEVELOPED emergency operations.
CAPACITY z Assign permanent staff for core PHEOC functions (operations and management in preparedness, response and recovery
phases).
z Identify staff to conduct core incident management system (IMS) functions within the national PHEOC.
z Develop standardized forms, templates and other tools for data/information management, task management, reporting,
briefing and record keeping.
z Determine data and information requirements (essential elements and critical requirements) to inform decision-making
and identify critical sources of information such as epidemic intelligence, laboratory system, risk assessments and
resources etc.
z Develop and implement MoUs and SOPs to establish communication, coordination, information management and sharing
of mechanisms between relevant stakeholders.
z Establish a PHEOC information system and an interoperability platform, linking the health information system, to capture
and manage required information and exchange information between the various existing information systems and
stakeholders.
z Review and update the national incident management system/response coordination structure.
04 z Align emergency operations centres (EOCs) existing in relevant sectors with the PHEOC and the national EOC for all
DEMONSTRATED hazards to ensure interoperability and harmonization of actions and interventions during health emergencies.
CAPACITY z Monitor, evaluate and improve the PHEOC facility, communication technology infrastructure, information management and
sharing platforms, emergency policies, plans, PHEOC handbook and procedures.
z Identify/develop alternative/additional PHEOCs at the national level and establish PHEOCs at the subnational level (based
on the risks and geographical need) with associated PHEOC handbooks.
z Mobilize and allocate sufficient and sustainable funds to build, equip, maintain and operate PHEOCs at the national
(including alternative PHEOCs) and subnational levels.
z Develop and implement a tracking of decision-making procedures for the activation of a PHEOC.
z Activate the national PHEOC within 120 minutes of receiving an early warning or information of an emergency requiring
PHEOC activation.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant).
z Develop and implement a training programme for PHEOC staff (routine and surge staff) on IMS function, roles and PHEOC
operations at subnational levels and allocate dedicated resources.
01 z An IMS integrated with a national PHEOC or equivalent structure is not available or under development.
NO CAPACITY
z Establish a national health emergency coordination focal point that maintains regular contact with experts from human,
02 animal (domestic animals and wildlife) and environmental health as well as other relevant sectors.
LIMITED z Identify and develop linkages with key potential informants and response partners for health emergency operations that
CAPACITY can provide 24/7 coverage in all major health systems.
z Establish capacity for the availability of IHR NFP and other responsible parties to receive information about potential health
threats and to report a public health emergency of international concern as outlined in the IHR.
z Develop a plan and SOPs for an IMS which is integrated with the national PHEOC or equivalent structure, including
thresholds and levels of activation for the emergency response coordination mechanism, and develop SOPs for the
coordination of key health sector actors (such as surveillance, health facilities, emergency medical teams, mental health
departments) and other relevant sectors.
z Involve health emergency coordination focal points in the development of NHPSPs to define the country’s vision, policy
directions and strategies for ensuring coordination mechanisms for emergency response.
z Establish an IMS for managing emergency response at the national level, including participation of relevant sectors, and
These include entities, such as points of contact, EOCs or response committees to coordinate health sector actors and resources in response to emergencies, and to coordinate health sector
response with other sectors. Coordination mechanisms may apply IMSs to fulfil the coordination function.
z Identify the roles and responsibilities of multisectoral stakeholders actively involved in the IMS and emergency response.
z Establish and maintain a roster of emergency operations staff with defined roles and functions.
z Develop a training plan linked to other relevant trainings for emergency operations staff, including IMS, and implement at
the national level, at a minimum.
z Develop advocacy material and training packages on coordination of emergency response for communities and all relevant
stakeholders.
z Develop a strategy, standards of conduct, training and advocacy material to prevent and address misconduct during
response operations including sexual exploitation and abuse of vulnerable population, staff harassment, etc.
z Establish a health sector emergency response coordination mechanism with participation from health and relevant
04 sectors, linked to the national IMS and PHEOC or equivalent structure, with capacity to support the management of
DEMONSTRATED emergency responses at the subnational level.
CAPACITY z Train subnational level and local health sector staff on the emergency response coordination mechanism.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) with a focus on IMS, including coordination between national and subnational levels.
z Disseminate advocacy materials and training packages to raise awareness of communities and train or retrain relevant
stakeholders on their role(s) and responsibilities during an emergency response.
z Make safety and security training mandatory for all staff before being deployed in emergency response operations.
z Develop an anonymous and secured platform for reporting misconduct during response operations including sexual
exploitation and abuse of vulnerable population, staff harassment, etc. Make training and awareness raising campaigns to
05 equivalent structure, at national and subnational levels, with international coordination mechanisms through the focal
SUSTAINABLE points.
CAPACITY z Allocate sustainable funding for IMS activities at all levels.
z Evaluate, document and disseminate information on activations and, if done, include exercises to promote continuous
improvement in communication and coordination.
z Review and adjust plans, SOPs, advocacy material and training packages for IMS and coordination of the emergency
response based on lessons learned from SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant).
z Keep record and track data of security and safety incidents as well as all allegations of misconduct, conduct investigation
and take subsequent actions accordingly across all relevant sectors.
z Share experiences of coordination mechanisms for emergency response and engage the country in peer-to-peer learning
programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
z No national plan for health personnel deployment or team (sending and receiving) has been drafted, or is under
01 development.
NO CAPACITY z No plan for establishing national rapid response team (RRT)/emergency management team (EMT) has been drafted and
no coordination mechanisms for RRTs/EMTs or health personnel deployment have been described.
z Review national preparedness and response plans and legal and regulatory frameworks for preparing, sending,
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
z Develop and implement the technical procedures and legal provisions required to adopt and execute the national plan on
z Review the implementation plan of sending and receiving health personnel in at least one event response, or conduct a
66
https://extranet.who.int/emt/
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
z Development of sector-specific external evaluation mechanisms for multisectoral teams and capacities.
z Update plans, SOPs, protocols and trainings based on findings from SimEx/AAR/IAR and identify improvements to regular
05 health system operations resulting from personnel and team deployment during emergencies.
SUSTAINABLE z Identify and partner with regional and international partners (such as GOARN or the EMT Network via the WHO EMT
CAPACITY Secretariat) for mobilizing health personnel.
z Share experiences in the management of health personnel during health emergencies with subnational, national and
international partners.
z Maintain sustainable sources of funding for maintaining national EMT coordination and deployment mechanisms.
z Achieve certification as international RRTs/EMTs from WHO to support national health personnel deployment in health
emergencies.
z Routinely test and evaluate capacity for emergency deployment of health personnel (sending and receiving), including EMT
coordination cells and/or case management pillar operations within the national PHEOC, and the provision of continuing
education programmes to ensure deployment staff readiness.
z Play a mentoring role for other interested countries for RRT/EMT deployment whilst maintaining ethical standards
including for the international hiring of health workers and participate in a twinning arrangement to support at least one
country in their development of a national EMT.
z Support research programmes in service delivery and other areas related to the management and deployment of health
personnel during health emergencies.
z Emergency logistics and supply chain management system/mechanisms is under development and/or not able to provide
z Review national preparedness and response plans, legal and regulatory frameworks, and baseline capacity for procuring,
02 stockpiling and deploying medical countermeasures, including sector roles and responsibilities, involving all key
LIMITED stakeholders.
CAPACITY z Review national laws and regulations for the registration, procurement and use of medical devices, vaccines, drugs,
biologicals and medical supplies from national and/or international sources during health emergencies.
z Form a national expert group, bringing together all relevant experts, to advise decision-makers on how to strengthen
capacity for management of medical countermeasures during a health emergency.
z Draft a national plan to mobilize, receive, stockpile and deploy medical countermeasures, including SOPs for receiving
donations of medical countermeasures.
z Develop a legal framework and regulation to facilitate shipping and customs clearance of medical countermeasures during
a health emergency.
z Complete feasibility assessment for establishing a medical countermeasures procurement stockpile, including secure and
functional facilities at all levels.
67
Emergency logistics and supply chain system and mechanism include the capacity to purchase, store and deliver essentials products and materials necessary for a response (emergency
kits, protective equipment, diagnostics, medical consumables, therapeutics, drugs and biomedical equipment) wherever they may be required in adequate quantity and in a timely manner.
183
It also gathers and organizes the material, capacities and processes allowing for a rapid deployment and implementation of the response including emergency medical infrastructures,
transportations, emergency offices and telecommunications.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
z Identify countermeasures required for use across relevant sectors (PPE for animal culling, for example).
z Adopt and implement the national plan to mobilize, receive, stockpile and deploy medical countermeasures, including
03 mapping resources within the country and with all relevant partners.
DEVELOPED z Develop standardized protocols and plans for storage, deployment, logistical and administrative support at all levels.
CAPACITY z Establish regulatory pathways for the use of medical countermeasures including appropriate authorizations, clearances,
ethical norms and permissions during investigations and responses.
z Create deployment protocols, SOPs, technical guidelines and toolkits including communication materials, trainings and
educational information to inform staff, the community and stakeholders.
z Develop a procedure for accelerated market authorization for novel and innovative drugs and medical products during
health emergencies.
z Develop a training plan for rapid logistics needs assessments, planning, management and distribution of stockpiles for
health emergencies and train early responders in the appropriate use and management of medical countermeasures.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to test the implementation plan.
z Implement measures for the management and distribution of stockpiles at the national level and develop tools for regular
monitoring of quantity and quality control of the strategic stockpile of essential medical countermeasures at the national
and subnational levels.
04 one response or conduct a SimEx if no response has occurred in the past year.
DEMONSTRATED z Develop and implement a strategy to ensure safe and secure access to medical countermeasures for the most vulnerable
CAPACITY groups, including forcibly displaced people, low income people, people living in unsafe areas, etc.
z Develop SOPs and train a sufficient number of health workers for rational prescription and utilization of medical
countermeasures to provide an appropriate response to health emergencies.
z Conduct regular monitoring and quality control missions of strategic stockpile of essential medical countermeasures at the
national and subnational levels.
z Implement rapid needs assessments, planning, management and distribution of stockpiles for health emergencies at
national and subnational levels.
z Complete trainings to support the management and distribution of stockpiles for health emergencies.
z Test the management of the strategic stockpile regularly and update plans and strengthen capacities accordingly.
05 z Develop and routinely apply criteria to document progress of sending and receiving medical countermeasures during a
SUSTAINABLE response.
CAPACITY z Routinely test and evaluate capacity of for emergency deployment of medical countermeasures and update plans
accordingly.
z Develop a system for automatic replenishment of strategic stockpiles of essential medical countermeasures for health
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
BENCHMARK 12A.6 Research, development68 and innovation69 (RD&I) capacity for emergency management is in place
OBJECTIVE: To develop and implement a RD&I mechanism to generate evidence-based solutions for emergency preparedness and response through
research and development and dissemination of findings
z Research and development activities (operational and implementation), including approvals of research, are conducted on
01 an ad hoc basis.
NO CAPACITY
z Establish a national multisectoral committee (with ToRs) with relevant stakeholders and sectors to contribute to the
02 development, updating and implementation of a national RD&I agenda for health emergencies based on the country risk
LIMITED profile and to coordinate dissemination of evidence70.
CAPACITY z Develop a national strategy, action plan or framework to guide RD&I for emergency preparedness and response including
dissemination and advocacy strategy.
z Map existing national entities (public and private) which provide funding for research and development.
z Develop a national regulatory review process71 for conducting RD&I in country.
z Assess capacities (including local networks of stakeholders in relevant sectors) to conduct RD&I activities before, during
and after health emergencies both at the national and subnational levels.
z Map existing scientific evidence dissemination platforms.
protection of the rights and welfare of the human subjects (Institute of Medicine (US) Roundtable on Research and Development of Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, Davis JR, Nolan VP,
Woodcock J, et al., editors. Assuring Data Quality and Validity in Clinical Trials for Regulatory Decision-Making: Workshop Report. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 1999. FDA
Regulatory Review. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK224583/.
z Implement a national RD&I strategy, action plan or framework which includes mechanisms and procedures for conducting
03 RD&I.
DEVELOPED z Secure sufficient funding, including from external sources if limited resources available from domestic funds, to support
CAPACITY RD&I activities.
z Implement the national regulatory review process for conducting RD&I in country.
z Identify institutions, within and outside of the country, that support RD&I activities.
z Create in-country networks of stakeholders from relevant sectors who can contribute to RD&I activities before, during and
after health emergencies.
z Develop or adapt RD&I orientation packages to train relevant staff on mechanisms and procedures to conduct research
before, during and after health emergencies, based on a training needs assessment.
z Train relevant staff across sectors and organizations at the national level on mechanisms and procedures for efficient
RD&I based on country context.
z Develop a platform or network for sharing and exchanging scientific information with relevant sectors during health
emergencies at local, subnational, national and international levels72.
04 health emergencies across all programme divisions with appropriate resources (staff, funds, material, facilities, etc.)
DEMONSTRATED and cooperation agreements with partners, donors and other countries to support multisectoral/multidisciplinary RD&I
CAPACITY activities in the country.
z Develop a mechanism to support the fast tracking and expansion of research capacities during health emergencies and
increase the frequency of activity during public health emergencies of international concern/novel emergencies to gather
the latest evidence and communicate with decision-makers.
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72
To disseminate findings from RD&I widely among experts, decision-makers and communities and take into account potential sensitivity of innovation in local context (including social, cultural
and political contexts).
z Increase collaboration and engagement between the research community and policy-makers, practitioners and
stakeholders.
z Share documented research activities, evidence and outcomes with decision-makers to support policy, practice and
guideline improvement.
z Expand training of relevant staff across sectors to subnational level and incorporate RD&I into undergraduate and
postgraduate studies in relevant programmes.
z Evaluate RD&I mechanisms, procedures and utilization of findings in health emergencies within AARs/IARs, as relevant.
z Collect and record adverse events from all phases of RD&I from all sectors to evaluate and address incidents and preserve
transparency and trust in RD&I initiatives.
z Identify and promote opportunities for international cooperation on RD&I related to health emergencies.
z Maintain sustainable funding for RD&I from both domestic and international sources.
05 z Review RD&I strategy and activities based on recent health emergency risk assessments/RD&I evaluations and update
SUSTAINABLE accordingly.
CAPACITY z Establish and maintain prearrangements and MoUs to facilitate public-private partnership for multisectoral/
multidisciplinary RD&I during health emergencies.
z Review and update training packages and advocacy materials based on assessment and evaluation results.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Tools:
z Partners platform for health in emergencies [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://partnersplatform.who.int/en/).
z Emergency medical teams initiative [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://extranet.who.int/emt/).
z Health innovation for impact. Digital health [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/teams/digital-health-and-
innovation/health-innovation-for-impact).
z Institute of Medicine (US) Roundtable on Research and Development of Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices. Washington DC: Davis JR, Nolan VP,
Woodcock J, and Estabrook RW; 1999 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK224577/).
z Strategic toolkit for assessing risks: a comprehensive toolkit for all-hazards health emergency risk assessment. Geneva: World Health Organization;
2021 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240036086).
z Words into Action guidelines: National disaster risk assessment. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction; 2017 (https://www.undrr.
org/publication/words-action-guidelines-national-disaster-risk-assessment).
z Rapid risk assessment of acute public health events. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2012 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/70810).
z WHO Human Health Risk Assessment Toolkit: Chemical Hazards, second edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/9789240035720).
z Joint Risk Assessment Operational Tool. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Health Organization and World Organisation for
Animal Health; 2020 (https://www.who.int/initiatives/tripartite-zoonosis-guide/joint-risk-assessment-operational-tool).
z Kandel N, Chungong S, and the WHO Technical Working Group of the Dynamic Preparedness Metric and Health Security Preparedness Department.
Dynamic preparedness metric: a paradigm shift to measure and act on preparedness. The Lancet Global Health. 2022; 10(5), e615–e616. doi: 10.1016/
S2214-109X(22)00097-3.
z Framework for a Public Health Emergency Operations Centre. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2015 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
Provides information on how to prepare for field activity, to activate international support, to coordinate response in the field, to evaluate and follow up
outbreaks of international importance.
z Classification and Minimum Standards for Emergency Medical Teams. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/341857).
Describes the capacities and capabilities of EMTs, as well as their guiding principles and standards.
z The regulation and management of international emergency medical teams. Geneva: World Health Organization and International Federation of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies; 2017 (https://disasterlaw.ifrc.org/media/1328).
Provides an overview of the issues in regulating and managing international emergency medical teams in a selection of large and small-scale sudden
onset disasters.
z COVID-19: Operational guidance for maintaining essential health services during an outbreak. Interim guidance, 25 March 2020. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/331561).
z An R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/an-r-d-
blueprint-for-action-to-prevent-epidemics---update-2017).
z Establishing a global coordination mechanism of R&D to prevent and respond to epidemics – toward implementation of the GCM. Meeting Report from
28 March 2017, London, UK at the Welcome Trust for the R&D Blueprint. London: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/blue-print/gcm/blue-print-gcm2017-meetingsummary.pdf?sfvrsn=3f78ce1c_2).
z Seven principles for strengthening research capacity in low- and middle-income countries: simple ideas in a complex world. ESSENCE Good Practice
Document Series. Geneva: TDR/ World Health Organization; 2014 (https://tdr.who.int/publications/m/item/2014-06-19-seven-principles-for-
strengthening-research-capacity-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-simple-ideas-in-a-complex-world).
z Planning, monitoring and evaluation Framework for research capacity strengthening. Revision 2016. ESSENCE Good Practice Document Series. Geneva:
TDR/ World Health Organization; 2016 (https://tdr.who.int/docs/librariesprovider10/essence/essence-frwk-2016-web-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=7282f353_6).
z WHO guidance on research methods for health emergency and disaster risk management. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps.who.
int/iris/handle/10665/345591).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public health
emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
191
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
Health emergency management additional benchmarks
BENCHMARK 12B.1: All hazard health emergency and disaster risk management (EDRM) are mainstreamed across IHR capacities
OBJECTIVE: To ensure all hazard health emergency and disaster risk management across the IHR capacities.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct mapping of all areas requiring integration of all hazard health EDRM into IHR capacities at national and subnational
02 level.
LIMITED z Establish a working group with key health and relevant other sector stakeholders for the review and development of a
CAPACITY mechanism73 to mainstream all hazard health EDRM for IHR capacities.
z Designate a focal point/unit for all hazard health EDRM at the national level.
z Assess human resources capacities for all hazard health EDRM.
z Develop advocacy mechanisms to for all hazard health EDRM.
73
Policies, strategies, guidelines, SOPs as needed.
192
74
Use multisectoral capacity assessment tools, such as the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) partnership diagnostic tools and other health emergency and disaster risk
management assessment tools to identify capacity gaps for health EDRM.
z Establish all hazard health EDRM coordination and planning mechanisms to mainstream health EDRM in health sectors.
03 z Conduct advocacy campaigns to introduce all hazard health EDRM at the national and subnational levels.
DEVELOPED z Integrate all hazard health EDRM into relevant health policies, strategies and plans at national level aligned with IHR and
CAPACITY international frameworks75,76.
z Develop, establish and test a coordination mechanism for the national health response to disasters, especially natural,
technological and societal.
z Map domestic and international financing sources for all hazard health EDRM and allocate financial resources to address
gaps and support capacity development for all hazard health ERDM.
z Develop and disseminate training packages on all hazard health EDRM at the national level.
z Integrate all hazard health EDRM considerations into all relevant health policies, strategies and plans at subnational level,
75
Including Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, 2015), Paris Agreement (2016), WHO Health EDRM Framework (2019).
76
To address the risks and needs of women and other groups identified as most at risk of being left behind as a result of disaster and climate change.
193
77
Including consideration for different levels of vulnerability, across prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, including capacities for cross-border or multinational action,
taking into account the possible cascading effects of a disaster and critical interdependencies among sectors and stakeholders.
z Scale up all hazard health EDRM in non-government sectors, including private sector.
z Document the economic impacts of disasters on health and socioeconomic systems.
z Evaluate the integration of all hazard health EDRM into IHR capacities and update the mechanisms as needed78.
05 z Secure anticipatory finance mechanisms that are designed to address all hazard health EDRM for IHR capacities.
SUSTAINABLE z Conduct all hazard health EDRM research and development at the national and subnational levels.
CAPACITY
z Evaluate the coordination mechanism for the health response to disasters, especially natural, technological and societal at
the subnational level.
z Engage the country in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
z Include considerations for all hazard health EDRM in undergraduate and postgraduate curricula for health professionals in
universities and other learning programmes.
78
To address the risks and need of women and other groups identified as most at risk of being left behind as a result of disaster and climate change.
BENCHMARK 12B.2: Safe and resilient hospitals and health facilities are in place to rapidly respond to emergencies79
OBJECTIVE: To assess, develop and establish safe and resilient hospital and health facility capabilities as part of the Hospital Safety Programme80 (HSP)
before, during and after emergencies
z No strategies or plans in place for HSP capabilities for safe and resilient hospitals and health facilities.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Map HSP capabilities81 in policies, norms and legislation at national and subnational levels and identify gaps.
02 z Develop standards for hospital accreditation for safety, resilience and preparedness that correspond to the mapping of HSP
LIMITED capabilities.
CAPACITY z Identify a focal point for hospital preparedness and mass casualty management at the national level for coordination and
service delivery.
z Develop minimum standards of hospital workforce, including capacity-building of medical teams for rapid response as part
of HSP resources management.
z Assess the current level of resources for workforce/rapid response medical teams, equipment and supplies as part of HSP
resources management.
z Conduct a hospital safety and risk management assessment for health facilities.
z Establish and train a hospital incident management (IM) team and function, identify a hospital IM leader and determine
relevant SOPs.
79
Hospitals and health facilities share interdependencies with multiple IHR benchmarks, e.g. Human Resources, National Laboratory Systems, Infection Prevention and Control, Surveillance
Systems and Medical Counter Measures, Health Services Provision that collaboratively support maintaining continuity of Essential Health Services (EHS) and have interdependencies that
extend into Community Engagement via whole-of-society partners and their engagement.
80
The Hospital Safety Index is a tool that helps to assess the probability that a hospital or health facility will continue to function in emergency situations, based on structural, non-structural and
functional factors, and provides a snapshot of areas that need to be addressed to ensure that the services remain accessible and functioning at maximum capacity during and immediately
195
following the impact of a disaster. Hospital safety index: guide for evaluators, second edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2015
81
Policies, legislation, laws and regulations, guidelines, SOPs and functionality for hospital resiliency, mass casualty management and incorporation of green technologies.
z Establish minimum standards that are reflected in policy, norms and legislation for HSP hospital design and construction at
03 the national level (e.g. mass casualty management and referral pathways).
DEVELOPED z Implement recommendations of the hospital risk assessment into policies, strategies and plans at the national level.
CAPACITY z Develop and implement hospital safety plans as part of national HSP coordination of service delivery.
z Develop, test and establish hospital coordination systems82 at the national level.
z Develop a mechanism to coordinate with nongovernment sectors including private hospitals and facilities.
z Establish and implement minimum construction standards for safe and secure hospitals, including the protection of
resources (workforce, equipment and supplies), at the national level across relevant sectors83.
z Develop a training package to implement the HSP and disseminate at the national level.
z Develop and test a flexible hospital IM structure84 to engage across hospital departments.
z Establish minimum standards for HSP policy, norms and legislation of hospital design and construction at the subnational
84
With clear lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities, and has the capacity to communicate with patients and the public in accordance with hospital policy.
85
Coordination systems includes stockpiles of supplies of local, national and international health assistance, workforce and resource sharing.
z Evaluate HSP at the national and subnational levels and update programmes based on findings.
05 z Regularly conduct refresher trainings to implement the HSP at all levels including nongovernment sectors.
SUSTAINABLE z Document and share best practices and lessons learned from HSP in health emergencies and engage the country in peer-
CAPACITY to-peer learning at the subnational, national and international levels.
z Sustain contingency and operational funding to maintain safe and resilient hospitals and health facilities.
z Develop an all hazards hospital and mass casualty research and development strategy, and conduct research activities.
z No formal resource mapping or planning for effective utilization of emergency resources is in place.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Identify stakeholders across sectors to be involved in the identification, mapping and utilization of resources for emergency
03 z Identify needs and gaps (financial, technical and in-kind) in relevant sectors based on the mapping of resources.
DEVELOPED z Develop national level inventories based on resource mapping for emergency preparedness and response.
CAPACITY
z Identify and engage relevant ministries and/or partners who can support relevant sector needs and gaps based on the
mapping of resources.
z Refer to the country public health risk profile and identify public health resources at national and subnational levels.
z Identify sector-specific country risk profiles for mapping, planning and prioritization of resources for prevention, mitigation
05 emergencies on a regular basis (at least every 3 years) based on the risk profile.
SUSTAINABLE z Adjust deployment of resources to areas most at need at national and subnational levels, based on updated resource
CAPACITY mapping.
z Secure funding to conduct rapid resource needs assessments during emergency situations.
z Engage the country in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels to support
capacity-building for mapping and utilization of emergency resources.
z Multisectoral and multihazard health emergency preparedness and response measures are not planned or implemented
z Map key ministries and multisectoral stakeholders involved in multihazard health emergency preparedness and response
02 including human, animal (domestic and wildlife) and environmental health sectors, meteorology, border control, food and
LIMITED drug agency, military, private agricultural sector, emergency services, interior, defence, transport, media and finance.
CAPACITY z Conduct capacity assessments of each stakeholder to support emergency preparedness for priority risks at the national
level, as appropriate, and clearly define the roles and responsibilities for each sector.
z Form a multisectoral technical advisory group, with clear leadership and governance, gathering experts from relevant
sectors to develop a multisectoral multihazard emergency response plan at the national level.
z Review current health sector multihazard emergency response plans and other response plans for specific hazards.
z Develop or update the national health sector multihazard emergency response plan, including a performance monitoring
framework with indicators, criteria and timelines.
z Involve emergency preparedness experts in the development of NHPSPs to define the country’s vision, policy directions and
strategies for ensuring strengthening of health system capacity for emergency preparedness.
z Institutionalize (through MoUs, SOPs, ToRs) the multisectoral coordination for health emergency preparedness and
03 response and any necessary legal instruments and guidelines for implementation of measures.
DEVELOPED z Implement emergency preparedness measures at the national level by human health, animal health and other relevant
CAPACITY sectors, including for points of entry and mass gathering events, and assess the need for additional measures, including
201
policies, procedures, SOPs and financial mechanisms, required to strengthen emergency preparedness.
z Develop, review, implement and assess the multisectoral multihazard emergency response plan at the national level,
including conducting a national level SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to test and adjust the plan based on outcomes.
z Develop advocacy and training strategies for strengthening emergency preparedness measures and the multisectoral
multihazard emergency response plan at the national level.
z Disseminate advocacy materials and conduct trainings to raise awareness within the community and media and train
relevant multisectoral experts on the multisectoral multihazard emergency preparedness and response plan at the national
level.
z Secure capacity required for emergency preparedness measures for specific hazards or risk scenarios, including
contingency planning, additional training and equipment.
z Develop mechanisms and SOPs to implement domestic and international surge capacity as part of the multisectoral
multihazard emergency response plan.
z Implement and monitor emergency preparedness measures at national and subnational levels by human health, animal
04 health and relevant sectors, including at points of entry and mass gathering events.
DEMONSTRATED z Conduct capacity-building and awareness raising programmes for specific community groups (e.g. three wheeler drivers/
CAPACITY cab drivers who can support transport of casualties, community leaders, youth groups, media, religious leaders etc.) and
communities to ensure participatory approach in preparedness and response to emergencies.
z Develop, update and implement multisectoral multihazard subnational and local emergency response plans.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) at national and subnational levels to test the multisectoral multihazard emergency
z Regularly conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to test multisectoral multihazard emergency response plans at national
05 and subnational levels involving relevant sectors. Implement measures to build capacities based on outcomes and
SUSTAINABLE recommendations and adjust plans based on lessons learned.
CAPACITY z Conduct international SimEx to test multisectoral multihazard emergency response plans for multiple country events.
Adjust plans and strengthen emergency preparedness based on outcomes and recommendations.
z Assign dedicated human resources and sustain regular budget funding to support the coordination and implementation of
emergency preparedness measures by human health, animal health and relevant sectors.
z Develop a mechanism to ensure that dedicated resources, including manpower and funding, are in place for testing and
implementation of multisectoral multihazard emergency response plans, contingency plans and SOPs at national and
subnational levels including an emergency financing mechanism for emergency response.
z Engage the country in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels, including
initiatives to support capacity-building for multisectoral multihazard emergency preparedness in compliance with the IHR at
the global level.
z Strategic toolkit for assessing risks: a comprehensive toolkit for all-hazards health emergency risk assessment. Geneva: World Health Organization;
2021.(https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/348763).
z Words into Action Guidelines. National Disaster Risk Assessment. Governance Systems, Methodologies, and Use of Results. Geneva: United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction; 2017 (https://www.unisdr.org/files/52828_nationaldisasterriskassessmentpart1.pdf).
z Rapid Risk Assessment of Acute Public Health Events. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2012 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/70810).
z WHO Human Health Risk Assessment Toolkit: Chemical Hazards, second edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/9789240035720).
z Joint Risk Assessment Operational Tool. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Health Organization and World Organisation for
Animal Health; 2020 (https://www.who.int/initiatives/tripartite-zoonosis-guide/joint-risk-assessment-operational-tool).
z Kandel N, Chungong S, and the WHO Technical Working Group of the Dynamic Preparedness Metric and Health Security Preparedness Department.
Dynamic preparedness metric: a paradigm shift to measure and act on preparedness. The Lancet Global Health. 2022; 10(5), e615–e616. doi: 10.1016/
S2214-109X(22)00097-3.
z Hospital safety index: guide for evaluators, 2nd edition. Geneva: World Health Organization & Pan American Health Organization; 2015 (https://apps.who.
int/iris/handle/10665/258966).
z Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) tool [website]. CARDI; 2021 (https://www.cadri.net/cadritool/home).
Supports countries to develop integrated strategies to address climate and disaster risk.
z Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. 2015-2030. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction; 2015 (https://www.undrr.org/
publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public health
emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
204
handle/10665/333419)
13
Linking public health and security authorities
The country conducts a rapid, multisectoral response for any event of suspected or confirmed deliberate origin, including the capacity to link public health
and law enforcement, and to provide timely international assistance.
IMPACT:
Development and implementation of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or other similar framework outlining roles, responsibilities and best
practices for sharing relevant information among appropriate human and animal health, law enforcement and defence personnel, and validation
of the MoU through periodic exercises and simulations. Countries have systems to conduct and support joint epidemiological and criminal
investigations to identify and respond to suspected biological, chemical or radiological incidents of suspected deliberate origin in collaboration
with States Parties’ Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), FAO, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL), WOAH, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the United Nations Secretary-General’s
Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, WHO and other relevant regional and international organizations
as appropriate.
z No legislation, relationships, protocols, MoUs or other agreements exist between public health, animal health, radiological
z Identify sectors responsible for response to potential IHR related hazards (biological, chemical and radiation).
02 z Identify points of contact to assist with the implementation of prevention, detection and response activities at government
LIMITED agencies across multiple sectors (such as public health, animal health, security authorities, agriculture, chemical, radiation).
CAPACITY z Determine the roles and responsibilities for responding to various threats and other incidents of concern through a review of
national response plans, policies and procedures, or other means such as an engagement meeting.
z Assess risk of significant biological (and chemical or radiological) incidents of concern to the country.
z Develop triggers for sharing information on biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and
radiological) with relevant multisectoral agencies.
z Establish an informal or formal communications process to share information, based on identified triggers, related to
biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological) among relevant multisectoral agencies
(such as public health, animal health and security authorities).
04 z Conduct at least one health emergency response, or SimEx, per year that includes appropriate information sharing between
DEMONSTRATED public health and security authorities using the formal protocol or MoU.
CAPACITY z Document findings of the response or SimEx, highlight the gaps and best practices, and adjust protocols as appropriate.
z Conduct and document joint training of public health, animal health and security authorities to orient, exercise and
institutionalize the knowledge of MoUs and other agreements related to all hazards.
207
05 animal health and security authorities to exercise and institutionalize knowledge of MoUs and other agreements related to
SUSTAINABLE all hazards.
CAPACITY z Expand joint risk assessment, exchange of information, reporting and implementation activities to all levels.
z Conduct an evaluation to determine whether information about events of joint concern is shared in a timely and effective
manner at all levels as outlined in formal MoUs or other agreements/protocols, that the response is appropriate and
effective, and that corrective action is taken based on evaluation.
z Review and update the SOPs, protocols, MoUs, trainings, etc. for collaboration between public health and security
authorities based on lessons learned from M&E and follow up from the implementation of recommendations.
z Involve the country in international initiatives for linking public health and security authorities to share lessons learned and
best practices during suspected or confirmed biological, chemical or radiological events at the global level.
Tools:
z Multisectoral preparedness coordination framework: best practices, case studies and key elements of advancing multisectoral coordination for health
emergency preparedness and health security. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240006232).
z National civil-military collaboration framework for strengthen health emergency preparedness. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps.
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
IMPACT:
Resilient health systems that are capable of delivering emergency related clinical care, and optimal utilization of health services while ensuring
continuity of health systems functions including delivery of essential health services in emergencies.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Develop a list of priority diseases and IHR relevant hazards based on the country risk profile at national and subnational
02 levels.
LIMITED z Establish a scientific advisory board involving senior health experts, including academia, to lead the development of
CAPACITY standardized case management guidelines87 for priority diseases and IHR relevant hazards.
z Develop standardized case management guidelines for priority diseases and IHR relevant hazards.
z Develop triggers for sharing and recording information on diseases, conditions and public health emergencies of
international concern with relevant multisectoral agencies.
z Develop dissemination plans (including training packages) for case management guidelines for all levels targeting all
relevant health workers.
z Map health system resources available to manage cases of priority diseases and simultaneously maintain routine essential
health services, including a primary health care approach.
z Develop a package of health services required for effective, safe, high quality case management in priority health
emergencies and adapt to be relevant at all levels of care.
86
e.g. epidemic prone diseases, trauma, chemical events, radiation emergencies, etc.
87
To identify novel approaches for case management of IHR hazards/case management guidelines for new diseases and advise the development/update of case management guidelines in the
211
country.
z Disseminate case management guidelines at the national level and to points of entry, and test implementation.
03 z Develop and disseminate SOPs for the management and transport of potentially infectious patients, including patient
DEVELOPED referral, transportation mechanisms and referral centres based on priority risks at the national level.
CAPACITY z Review and adapt the legal framework for quality, safe and secure implementation of case management procedures for
relevant IHR hazards at the national and subnational levels.
z Train relevant health workers at the national level, including managers and decision-makers, on case management
guidelines (as applicable to the target audience) and update preservice training curricula for health professionals to include
current guidelines on case management of priority diseases.
z Prioritize investment in prehospital care facilitates/patient transport mechanisms.
z Conduct multidisciplinary SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) at the national level including review of the effectiveness and
efficiency of case management guidelines.
z Develop and maintain an up-to-date roster of health workers trained in case management of priority risks/diseases, based
on national and subnational risk profiles.
z Disseminate case management guidelines and SOPs for the management and transport of potentially infectious patients at
1, 2, 3, 4
z Establish a mechanism to allow for the continuous presence of trained staff and resources for case management, patient
z EHS package is not defined and there are no plans or guidelines for continuity of EHS during emergencies.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Define or update the EHS package for the country based on population health needs, with consideration to the continuity of
z Incorporate the continued delivery of EHS during a health emergency into the ToRs of relevant sectors.
z Establish and test a well functioning, safe, effective, quality and equitable EHS delivery, including access to primary care,
04 data flow and reporting mechanisms from both public and private sector with an allocated budget for decision-making and
DEMONSTRATED continuity of EHS.
CAPACITY z Implement mechanism/system to monitor continuity of EHS before, during and after emergencies.
z Monitor health services data, considering the risk for disruptions during emergency response operations, in coordination
with other emergency related data including readiness and response.
88
Which can be maintained at the same place, relocated, performed remotely or temporarily suspended during an emergency and develop mutual aid arrangements between health facilities
215
within the same catchment area to facilitate service continuity in emergency contexts.
z Use data on service delivery continuity to inform decision-making on EHS and optimum emergency response care during
emergencies.
z Routinely monitor the availability of health service continuity plans at subnational and health facility levels.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) at national and subnational levels to test the functionality of EHS continuation plans/
guidelines during emergencies.
z Allocate contingency funds that are accessible at subnational and health facility levels for addressing challenges related to
continuing EHS during emergencies.
z Develop and finalize prearrangements and MoUs to facilitate EHS continuity during emergency responses, such as
relocation of offices, additional transport and accommodation, internet connectivity solutions during an emergency and
provision for rapid recruitment of staff at the national and subnational levels during an emergency, including private and
nongovernment sectors.
z Update and test plans regularly based on the recommendations from SimEx/AAR/IAR and all relevant M&E processes.
05 z Identify and conduct health system research on the continuation of EHS during emergencies.
SUSTAINABLE z Share the best practices of EHS during emergencies among subnational, national and international forums.
z Update other sector’s roles in maintaining EHS during emergencies as part of sector-specific protocols, plans, policies,
training etc.
BENCHMARK 14.3: Mechanism is in place to ensure effective utilization of health services before, during and after health emergencies at all levels of
health service delivery
OBJECTIVE: To ensure effective utilization of health services before, during and after emergencies at all levels of health service delivery
01
NO CAPACITY
z Map existing health services facilities required to deliver safe, effective, quality and equitable health services before, during
z Map existing health service facilities required to deliver safe, effective, quality and equitable health services before, during
89
Focused on the roles and responsibilities of health facilities before, during and after emergencies.
90
SOPs focusing on managing different types of health emergencies (like epidemics, disasters (floods, earthquakes), others)
z Disseminate and implement standards for effective health service utilization for health services, both in government and
nongovernment sectors including private sector, before, during and after emergencies at the national level.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to review/test the SOPs and standards of effective health service utilization at the
national level.
z Develop a mechanism and capacity to conduct health service utilization data analysis and interpretation91 before, during
and after emergencies.
z Allocate resources to implement plans to strengthen selected health facilities to provide safe, effective, quality and equitable
05 z Conduct reviews of events (SimEx/AAR/IAR, as relevant) regularly on health service utilization at all levels.
SUSTAINABLE z Share or use the results of reviews and analysis of health services utilization to inform the updating or development of
CAPACITY national health sector strategic plan.
z Share experiences (best practices/lessons learned) and peer-to-peer learning on health service utilization before, during
and after emergencies at regional/national and global forums.
Tools:
z Emergency Response Framework (ERF), second edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/
item/9789241512299).
z Maintaining essential health services: operational guidance for the COVID-19 context: interim guidance, 1 June 2020. Geneva: World Health Organization;
2020 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-essential_health_services-2020.2).
z Maintaining essential health services during emergencies [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/teams/primary-
health-care/health-systems-resilience/essential-services-during-emergencies).
z Strategic toolkit for assessing risks: a comprehensive toolkit for all-hazards health emergency risk assessment. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021
(https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240036086).
z Health service continuity planning for public health emergencies: a handbook for health facilities. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://www.
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419).
IMPACT:
Prevent HCAIs and emergence and spread of AMR.
z An active national IPC programme or operational plan according to WHO minimum requirements is not available or is under
01 development.
NO CAPACITY
z Appoint a full time, dedicated and trained IPC focal point at the national level with defined ToRs.
02 z Establish a national IPC working group/committee involving all relevant stakeholders for IPC in health and relevant sectors,
LIMITED with ToRs, including developing a legal framework for the implementation of IPC programmes at the national, subnational
CAPACITY and facility levels.
z Identify an IPC focal person in health facilities to interact with the national IPC working group/committee.
z Develop/adapt national IPC guidelines92 and SOPs according to the WHO minimum requirements for IPC programmes93.
z Develop IPC components for the national health emergency preparedness, readiness and response operational plan94.
z Use the WHO national IPC assessment tool for minimum requirements (IPCAT-MR) to identify and document gaps in the
current IPC programme95.
z Develop evidence-based strategic documents (policies, laws, strategies, etc.) to reinforce responsibility and commitment of
the health sector in IPC management at national, subnational and facility levels.
z Develop and advocate for a secure dedicated budget for IPC implementation based on plans, informed by local context
budget cycles, local political/legal landscape analyses and impact assessments, utilizing local civil society organizations.
95
IPCAT-MR will identify precise areas/core components requiring action. Also consider the key elements of other WHO frameworks and toolkits for infection prevention and control in outbreak
preparedness, readiness and response at the national level and the healthcare facility level and identify elements requiring action.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
2, 4, 5, 7, 8
z Identify other sector focal points for services related to IPC in hospitals and community health facilities (such as
environment, education, etc.).
03 z Design an operational plan, informed by assessment results, following the five step implementation cycle outlined in the
DEVELOPED WHO Interim practical manual at national level96 including input from WASH, RCCE and relevant sectors.
CAPACITY z Identify and allocate adequate financial resources for the implementation of the operational plan97.
z Appoint IPC committees and trained, dedicated IPC focal points98 in selected healthcare facilities99 with defined ToRs.
z Develop a national IPC curricula for new employee orientation, in-service training and national training programme for
health workers based on national standards and guidelines. Include IPC modules in specific preservice health-oriented
degrees (such as nursing, medicine, etc.).
z Monitor IPC and WASH implementation in selected healthcare facilities100.
z Develop a national system for M&E of IPC programmes in health facilities for regular monitoring and periodic evaluation
of IPC indicators including implementation of standard precautions (such as hand hygiene, WASH and other related IPC
practices).
z Develop and share the IPC and WASH operational plans with national, subnational and local IPC committees and
incorporate their feedback/guidance.
The following tools can be used to support IPC and WASH monitoring in selected facilities: infection prevention and control assessment framework (IPCAF), hand hygiene self-assessment
framework (HHSAF), hand hygiene compliance observational tools and/or the complimentary WASH framework improvement tool (WASH FIT) tool.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
3, 5, 6, 7, 8
z Develop necessary infrastructure and supplies to enable implementation of IPC norms, standards and practices in special
settings such as points of entry, industrial plants, waste management companies, sewage systems, schools and other
community settings, etc.
z Include the importance of IPC/WASH including hand hygiene techniques, cough etiquette and other IPC measures to be
adhered to by citizens and school children/students in all school curricula as appropriate to age.
z Involvement from NGOs and other donor agencies to provide support in developing infrastructure and technical expertise
for IPC, particularly at the health facility level, and for the development of a M&E framework for health professionals.
z Use IPC assessment tools at national level (IPCAT2) to identify areas still requiring action and update the operational plan101.
04 z Mandate and support IPC improvement at all health facilities, recommending the use of the IPC assessment framework
DEMONSTRATED (IPCAF) and the WASH FIT tool.
CAPACITY z Include specific interventions related to IPC for AMR prevention, tailored to the local epidemiological situation, in
operational/action plans.
z Conduct IPC and WASH trainings for health workers at the commencement of employment, at regular intervals throughout
employment and at specific trainings for health workers and IPC focal points at all levels and all health facilities.
z Evaluate the status of IPC outbreak preparedness and readiness by organizing SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to test the
functionality of IPC capacities for responding to health emergencies.
z Monitor IPC implementation in all health facilities to evaluate IPC outcomes, with a target of 75% achieving WHO IPC
minimum requirements.
z Adjust and increase budgetary allocations, using financial audit and disbursement data, from dedicated budget for IPC
101
Update and implement operational plans, informed by regular assessment results and following the five-step implementation cycle outlined in the WHO Interim practical manual supporting
national implementation of the WHO Guidelines on core components of infection prevention and control programmes. Ensure all recommended IPC priority core components are progressively
224
achieved at the national and facility level according to WHO minimum requirements/action checklists for the priority core components identified. Supplement IPCAF with more detailed analysis
and planning on water, sanitation, cleaning and healthcare waste with WASH FIT.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
2, 4, 5, 7, 8
z Conduct training on WASH and IPC measures in relevant sectors.
z Prioritize and allocate space in the media sector to develop public awareness on roles and responsibilities in IPC in
healthcare facilities.
z Develop standards for IPC measures in all relevant settings (outside of health facilities) such as points of entry, industrial
plants, schools, community settings, etc.
z Routinely monitor health facility environments for functioning WASH infrastructures and services in relevant.
05 z Conduct annual IPC and WASH FIT assessments at healthcare facilities as part of their review cycle to address long term
SUSTAINABLE sustainability.
CAPACITY z Conduct continuous monitoring of progress in fulfilling the IPC core components (such as assessments repeated annually
or more often), tracking changes and scores to develop a long term improvement plan.
z Analyse and regularly report national IPC and WASH data and support discussion on actions to incorporate lessons learned
in a long term improvement plan.
z Revise and update IPC and WASH guidance materials such as strategies, plans, SOPs and training materials, based on
lessons learned and ongoing assessment results.
z Evaluate the status of health workers’ protection against occupational infections and update as required (plans, SOPs,
trainings, etc.).
z Share country experiences in IPC and WASH and participate in international initiatives to strengthen capacities globally.
etc. based on normal and special health events in the country or globally.
BENCHMARK 15.2: A functioning health care acquired infection (HCAI) surveillance system is in place for public health decision-making
OBJECTIVE: To develop and maintain a functioning and effective system for HCAI surveillance (for ongoing surveillance of endemic HCAIs, including
AMR pathogens, and for early detection of pathogens prone to infectious disease outbreaks) at national and health facility levels
z National HCAI surveillance system or national strategic plan for HCAIs surveillance, including endemic HCAIs, antimicrobial
01 resistant pathogens and pathogens prone to infectious disease outbreaks, is not available or is under development.
NO CAPACITY
z Review the availability and functional status of HCAI surveillance in the country.
02 z Identify the development of a HCAI surveillance system as a priority in national working group/committee for IPC.
LIMITED z Set up a national multidisciplinary technical advisory group for HCAI surveillance, establish a surveillance coordinating
CAPACITY centre for HCAI and designate a national reference laboratory.
z Design a HCAI surveillance system and designate as a priority action in health sector plans and budgets.
z Identify focal points at the national level for HCAI surveillance with linkages to communicable disease, AMR surveillance
and WASH monitoring.
z Develop a national HCAI surveillance plan that includes standardized definitions and targeted organisms (including
AMR pathogens), appropriate methods for surveillance and linkages with existing communicable or integrated disease
surveillance systems.
z Identify and document minimum resources required to establish HCAI surveillance at the national level and selected
tertiary facilities.
03 surveillance (including endemic HCAIs, AMR pathogens and pathogens prone to infectious disease outbreaks) in selected
DEVELOPED tertiary and secondary health facilities in a stepwise manner.
CAPACITY z Develop laboratory capacity and provide resources to identify and report HCAI through a national surveillance system with
linkages to communicable disease surveillance systems.
z Include HCAI training into trainings for IPC focal points and relevant health workers within health facilities and conduct
trainings regularly.
z Identify and allocate trained staff (or provide training to staff) to develop, implement and maintain HCAI surveillance
programme at select health facilities102.
z Coordinate with national and subnational surveillance networks that include syndromic and microbiologic surveillance for
diseases with outbreak potential.
z Use data for benchmarking purposes (for example, establishing baselines for comparison).
z Provide timely feedback reports to relevant stakeholders on the national situation of HCAI and special events, including
recommendations.
z Establish a national HCAI surveillance system (including endemic HCAIs, AMR pathogens and pathogens prone to
infectious disease outbreaks, through integrated or separate systems) in all secondary and tertiary health facilities.
102
Selected facilities might include referral, regional and/or large tertiary teaching hospitals.
z Conduct nationwide training in all facilities on HCAI surveillance for IPC focal points and other health workers responsible
at the facility level at regular intervals.
z Identify and support healthcare facilities that are unable to adhere to the HCAI surveillance programme.
z Develop and implement linkages between hospital systems and national microbiology and other laboratory capacities to
ensure surveillance, early detection and laboratory surge capacity for the rapid identification of diseases with outbreak
potential.
z Establish national networks for HCAI surveillance, also in connection to international networks (such as the European HCAI
z National standards and resources for an environment enabling IPC (such as WASH, screening, triage, isolation areas and
01 sterilization services in healthcare facilities), including appropriate infrastructure, materials and equipment are not available
NO CAPACITY or are under development.
z Standards for reduction of workload and overcrowding for optimization of staffing levels in healthcare facilities are not
available or under development.
z Review international guidelines103 and the current national status of healthcare facilities in relation to water, sanitation,
02 hygiene, cleaning, waste and energy services and document gaps or areas for improvement104.
LIMITED z Identify and document gaps in WHO core components for IPC programmes number seven and eight and develop national
CAPACITY plan for a safe built environment (core component 8) and overcrowding and optimization of staff levels (core component
7)105.
z Define standards for IPC and WASH both in hospital and community (primary) health care settings106.
z Develop training materials based on national guidelines and standards for the development of a safe built environment,
including when to start and stop isolation of patients, donning and doffing PPE and engineering and environmental
controls.
z Develop norms and standards in developing the safe built environment of healthcare facilities in relation to IPC, with special
reference to crowd control measures, triage facilities, isolation rooms, ventilation, sewerage facilities, waste management, etc.
respectively) alongside WHO/UNICEF/WASH Fit tools. These plans should also clearly identify roles and responsibilities of key staff and/or community members.
106
These standards should be based on the WHO Minimum requirements for infection prevention and control programmes and WHO standards on drinking water, sanitation, and healthcare waste.
Develop and disseminate SOPs to implement these standards, including checklists.
z Implement the WHO IPCAF component eight minimum requirements for a safe built environment107.
03 z Mandate and support IPC improvement at all healthcare facilities, based on assessment results using the IPCAF and
DEVELOPED complimentary WASH FIT tools or national equivalents and use standard checklists to monitor the safety of the hospital
CAPACITY environment at regular intervals and take corrective measures.
z Update national building standards, standards for safe water, sanitation, hygiene, waste and clean energy services for
healthcare facilities to enable compliance with IPC measures.
z Identify, document and practice minimum requirements for staffing, workload and bed occupancy standards to ensure IPC
at healthcare facilities.
z Establish hand hygiene facilities to adhere to hand hygiene requirements in both hospitals and community healthcare
facilities.
z Organize procurement and make available a sufficient quantity of PPE, hygiene and disinfection products and other IPC
108
Work to reduce unnecessary and overuse of PPE (e.g. hand hygiene rather than gloves when not indicated) and reduce environmental impact of waste.
z Clearly outline requirements for PPE and supplies (including cleaning supplies and equipment, alcohol based hand rub,
soap, etc.), and establish contingency plans in the event of supply shortages.
z Update health facility level plans regularly based on lessons learned and gap analysis/evaluations to identify priority areas
Tools:
z Guidelines on Core Components of Infection Prevention and Control Programmes at the National and Acute Health Care Facility Level. Geneva: World
item/9789241516945).
z Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
initiatives/glass).
z Diagnostic stewardship: a guide to implementation in antimicrobial resistance surveillance sites. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016 (https://
www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-DGO-AMR-2016.3).
z Infection prevention and control assessment framework at the facility level. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018 (https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/WHO-HIS-SDS-2018.9).
z Instructions for the national infection prevention and control assessment tool 2 (IPCAT2). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017. (https://apps.who.
int/iris/handle/10665/330078).
z Assessment tool of the minimum requirements for infection prevention and control programmes at the national level. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/assessment-tool-of-the-minimum-requirements-for-infection-prevention-and-control-
programmes-at-the-national-level).
z Hand Hygiene Self-Assessment Framework. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2010 (https://www.who.int/teams/integrated-health-services/
infection-prevention-control/hand-hygiene/monitoring-tools).
z Global action plan on antimicrobial resistance. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241509763).
z National systems to support drinking-water, sanitation and hygiene: global status report 2019. UN-Water global analysis and assessment of sanitation
and drinking-water (GLASS) 2019 report. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://www.unwater.org/publications/un-water-glaas-2019-
national-systems-support-drinking-water-sanitation-and-hygiene).
z Compendium of WHO and other UN guidance on health and environment [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
tools/compendium-on-health-and-environment).
z Framework and toolkit for infection prevention and control in outbreak preparedness, readiness and response at the national level. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032729).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
Risk communication
Risk communication is the real-time exchange of information, advice and opinions between experts or officials and people who face health threats. Risk
communication enables people to make informed decisions to mitigate the effects of a threat and take protective and preventive measures. Timely and
effective dialogue between concerned authorities, stakeholders and the population at risk is multisectoral, leverages existing functions, includes proactive
dissemination of information, social listening, and adapts approaches based on community feedback. Risk communication approaches and strategies
consider the social, religious, cultural, political and economic context in which threats occur, with dissemination through appropriate and trusted channels
(e.g. media, social media, mass awareness campaigns, health promotion platforms, social mobilization, stakeholders and trusted community leaders) to
IMPACT:
Effective risk communication guides people to better understand risks they face and make informed decisions about how to mitigate effects
of risks and how to take protective and preventive measures. Messages and interventions are shaped by social and contextual realities, and
234
authorities and experts listen to and address people’s concerns and needs so advice is relevant, tailored and timely.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION:
(1) Formal multisectoral risk communication plans, arrangements and systems are in place. (2) Coordination mechanisms for internal and
partner communication, data exchange and shaping of the information environment exist and are functional. (3) Risk communication materials
are culturally appropriate and acceptable to target populations, regularly updated and disseminated rapidly through appropriate channels. (4)
Communication mechanisms have been established with at-risk populations at the community level.
Community engagement
Health security can only be achieved when health systems work with resilient communities. Resilient communities have the capacity to report all available
essential information to the appropriate level of healthcare response, rapidly implement preliminary control measures, coordinate with health systems and
co-create solutions as the emergency evolves.
Community engagement develops relationships and structures for stakeholders to work together to promote well-being, achieve positive health outcomes
and empower communities to lead, plan and implement initiatives. Community engagement builds resilient communities by implementing relevant policies,
enabling legislation, providing resources, providing quality services, mobilizing expertise and maximizing community capacities with long-term commitment
and investment. Sustained community engagement with the health system co-develops solutions and adapts and localizes health emergency programmes
by working collaboratively with groups of people affiliated by geographic proximity, identity, ways of communication, shared interest or similar situations, or
health conditions. National emergency preparedness, readiness and response structures should be designed with community-centred approaches integrated
within national coordination mechanisms. Community engagement includes additional benchmarks 16B.2 and 16B.3.
IMPACT:
Infodemic management
Infodemic management monitors the information environment that communities live in to understand how it shapes their perceptions and health behaviours.
Health workers and health systems can also be impacted by infodemic harms, such as loss of public trust, stigmatization or violence against health workers
and by patients delaying care-seeking or taking non-approved treatments. Infodemic harms can be addressed and resilience can built in communities
and health systems against health misinformation by rapidly addressing precursors and components such as questions, concerns, information voids, and
circulating narratives.
In today’s increasingly connected world, health information is shared rapidly and amplified through digital channels while also influencing offline conversations,
traditional media news cycles or less-digitally connected communities. In this evolving information environment, individuals can access many sources of
health information beyond public authorities. Health misinformation narratives can often take advantage of the dynamics and design of the information
environment, such as algorithms and content moderation policies of internet platforms and varying levels of digital, media and health literacy among readers.
Infodemic management strategies are relevant to all levels of society, including health systems, to help reduce impacts of health emergencies at individual,
community, health system and societal levels by using a deep understanding of the underlying reasons how and why narratives gain traction and become
part of broader social conversations. Infodemic management includes additional benchmark 16C.1.
and structures that can strengthen resilience of the health system, health workers or communities to health misinformation. During an outbreak,
rapid infodemic insights inform faster response to the questions, concerns and needs people express in different communities of focus. Insights
support the promotion of health information equity and tailoring of emergency response strategies, health policy, health guidance, treatments,
diagnostics, vaccines, public health and social measures (PHSM), engagement, communication and service delivery.
z Mechanisms for RCCE functions and resources including behavioural and cultural insights, are under development or
z Develop and test systems109 for the implementation of RCCE, including mechanisms for community and multisectoral
02 engagement and infodemic management.
LIMITED z Identify dedicated RCCE focal points and appoint spokespersons110 at national and subnational levels.
CAPACITY z Establish coordination mechanisms111 with relevant sectors including ministries, partners and other stakeholders at national
and subnational levels.
z Develop a national multihazard emergency RCCE plan and policy112 based on IHR requirements and priority risks, for at least
three priority risks.
z Develop a budget and forecast human and financial resource needs for activating RCCE plans during a health emergency.
z Develop113 RCCE training packages.
z Develop and test mechanisms to support data to drive RCCE action114.
Such as SOPs for routine analyses of target audiences based on online and offline social listening, MoUs with providers of technology for message development, surveys or rapid qualitative
studies for identification of local perceptions and concerns.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
z Identify data sources within relevant sectors and develop partnerships with public health sector to collect and share data
and evidence to strengthen RCCE policy and practice.
z Apply systems for the implementation of RCCE, including mechanisms for community and multisectoral engagement and
03 infodemic management.
DEVELOPED z Expand networks and reinforce communication channels between RCCE focal points, including within the health ministry
CAPACITY and relevant sectors for health emergencies and across different functions of an emergency response115.
z Implement mechanism for data to drive RCCE action at the national level.
z Develop and test SOPs, guidelines, agreements and/or MoUs for effective coordination of RCCE and infodemic
management among relevant key stakeholders at national and subnational levels.
z Review116, test117 and update national multihazard emergency RCCE plans and policies based on IHR requirements for all
priority risks.
z Organize and conduct trainings for staff at national and subnational levels to raise awareness about the importance of risk
communication, review and adapt trainings based on capacity-building needs118.
z Build a network with specific communities such as education, faith based, arts/culture, employers, etc., to coordinate RCCE
and infodemic management activities, adapt messages and guidance.
z Establish M&E systems to evaluate the implementation of risk communication and infodemic management activities
during health emergencies, including rapid approaches that enable intervention adaptation to improve outcomes.
115
Including surveillance, laboratory, patient care, infection prevention and control, logistics, human resources, planning, budgeting and finance.
116
Review national multihazard plans to include all priority risks and to align relevant existing policies, legislation and legal frameworks.
117
Test and improve capacities, resources and activation mechanisms for operational readiness through tabletop exercises or SimEx for different priority threats.
239
118
Including capacity-building on effective communication, behaviour change communication, communication for behavioural impact, social marketing techniques, drafting media communiques,
developing information, education and communication materials, and social listening.
z Allocate dedicated resources for an effective RCCE system, including skilled personnel, volunteers and financial resources
04 to form dedicated teams with a budget for implementing activities at the national and subnational levels.
DEMONSTRATED z Create a repository of tools, products, templates and mechanisms for the rapid development of new products as needed.
CAPACITY z Expand networks and mechanisms for systematic exchange between the RCCE function and other essential functions of
an emergency response119, health system120 and outside the health system121.
z Implement mechanisms for data to drive RCCE action at the subnational level, using evidence of best practices in routine
collection of data and analyses to inform practice.
z Expand M&E systems to evaluate the implementation of risk communication and infodemic management activities
during health emergencies, including rapid approaches that enable intervention adaptation to improve outcomes at the
subnational level.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to test plans including SOPs, guidelines, agreements and/or MOUs for effective
RCCE coordination among relevant key stakeholders and identify and address gaps in capacity, coordination and resources
at national and subnational levels.
z Update training needs based on outcomes of M&E activities that identify capacity gaps.
z Engage communities such as employers/unions, faith based, arts/culture, hospitality/tourism, transport, universities,
entertainment, etc. in RCCE activities.
For example, strengthening infrastructure for routine, rapid evidence generation and evidence synthesis to inform practice, drive intervention development and identify factors that influence
transferability to other and similar contexts.
z Sustain domestic budget line and appropriate budget for RCCE national and subnational level activities throughout the
z Mechanisms for public communication are under development or implemented on an ad hoc basis by non-specialist
z Establish an advisory committee including representatives from health and other relevant sectors and develop a mechanism
02 to coordinate communication among subnational, national and international stakeholders123.
LIMITED z Set up mechanisms for risk communication messages, products and intervention development including process and
CAPACITY engagement of trained teams linked with relevant technical focal points124.
z Identify mechanisms for social listening and community feedback and collate with existing materials for RCCE to drive
action125.
z Map mainstream national and local media (all types) and social media platforms and develop networks.
z Develop a media engagement strategy, involving stakeholders from the media sector including social media.
z Test the mechanism to coordinate communication among stakeholders and apply it during emergencies at the national
123
Including the health ministry and internal stakeholders, hospitals partners, civil society groups (including female oriented organizations), private sector, nongovernmental organizations,
religious and traditional leaders, etc.
124
Identify and engage with a trained team for message development, message clearance in collaboration with relevant focal points, message testing, creative content development, artwork and
dissemination in health emergencies and unusual events. Identify a mechanism to coordinate messages with other response areas (such as surveillance, laboratory, patient care, infection
prevention and control, logistics, human resources, planning, budgeting, and finance).
242
125
Such as online and offline social listening, surveys or rapid qualitative studies for identification of local perceptions and concerns.
z Establish and test feedback mechanisms for risk communication such as a hotline or call centre126,127 to activate within 24
hours of an emergency at the national level.
z Develop and disseminate risk communication products in different formats and relevant local languages based on
information from RCCE to drive action at the national level.
z Test and apply different modes of communication to reach different groups of audiences using different communication
channels128.
z Implement media engagement strategy and build partnerships with media networks129 at the national level.
z Conduct training for appointed spokespersons on risk communication on a regular basis.
z Implement the coordination mechanism among stakeholders during a health emergency at the national and subnational
04 levels.
DEMONSTRATED z Establish and test feedback mechanisms for risk communication such as a hotline or call centre to activate within 24
CAPACITY hours of an emergency at the subnational level.
z Review and identify gaps and vulnerabilities in established networks of trusted community leaders and champions130 at the
subnational level.
z Develop and disseminate risk communication products in different formats and relevant local languages based on
information from RCCE to drive action131 at the subnational level.
z Implement media engagement strategies and build partnerships with media networks at the subnational level.
131
Including those based on systematic online and offline daily media monitoring and compiling and analyzing feedback and reports to spokespersons and other relevant authorities before, during
and after emergencies.
z Identify and involve journalists representing all media stations and key focal points from relevant media outlets and engage
regularly132 in ways that build mutual understanding, trust and credibility.
z Develop mechanisms to monitor risk communication messages developed and shared by key stakeholders at national and
subnational levels.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) for risk communication to identify the level of implementation of risk
communications plans, identify gaps and best practices.
z Evaluate the coordination mechanism for risk communication and sustain engagement with stakeholders including media.
05 z Update media engagement strategies, feedback mechanisms and usage of hotlines or call centres based on results from
SUSTAINABLE M&E activities.
CAPACITY z Update risk communication plans based on results of SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) on a regular basis.
z Sustain data driven mechanisms for risk communication product and intervention development133.
z Document and disseminate best practices and lessons learned.
132
e.g. in-person briefings, targeted press releases, press conferences, media seminars, etc.
133
Routinely use data collected through online and offline social listening systems or formative research to drive risk communication messages testing and other product development. Proactively
244
advance mechanisms for evidence and data driven approaches to inform RCCE action. For example, evidence syntheses to inform strategy and to influence the transferability of best practices
to other settings.
Tools:
z WHO guidance on Risk Communication [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/risk-communications/
guidance).
z Communicating Risk in Public Health Emergencies: a WHO guideline for emergency risk communication (ERC) policy and practice. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2018 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241550208).
z Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/risk-
communications).
z The Collective Service. For a Community-led Response [website]. British Red Cross Collective Service; 2022 (https://www.rcce-collective.net/).
z World Health Organization strategy for engaging religious leaders, faith-based organization and faith communities in health emergencies. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/347871).
z Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public health
emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
z Mechanisms for community engagement in health emergencies, including policies, plans, guidelines, programmes and/or
z Identify unit/focal point within the health emergency management office or health ministry equivalent, with ToRs to
02 coordinate efforts for community engagement in health emergencies with relevant units/departments, programmes and
LIMITED sectors and for social mobilization, health promotion or community engagement for emergency response.
CAPACITY z Form a multisectoral and multiagency national working group/steering committee to streamline and prioritize community
engagement efforts for health emergencies across relevant sectors.
z Review available policies, legislation, plans, guidelines and frameworks relevant to health emergencies across relevant sectors
to identify the level of inclusion of community engagement, and to identify and document gaps.
z Conduct contextual analysis considering cultural, political, social, economic and geographic factors to develop/update
community engagement strategy/guidelines/SOPs for health emergencies.
134
246
z Develop, test and disseminate national protocol for community mobilization for health emergencies136 along with an
03 identified mechanism for dedicated community engagement teams to reach out to affected or at risk populations during
DEVELOPED emergencies.
CAPACITY z Identify focal points and define the roles of subnational and local governments and primary health care staff to ensure
community engagement in health emergencies, including for community level detection, early warning, logistics
management, etc.
z Map key stakeholders such as community leaders, faith based organizations and civil society to contribute to the
development and implementation of health emergency preparedness and response plans.
z Conduct participatory community risk assessment, context analysis, hazard mapping, health profiling, vulnerability
mapping, capacity assessment, context analysis and readiness planning in priority communities through inclusive
approaches with involvement of NGOs, CSOs and CBOs and networks.
z Develop and test a mechanism for communities to be actively involved in emergency response and codesign of emergency
response initiatives.
z Establish formal/informal, ongoing feedback mechanisms before, during and after emergencies between at risk or affected
populations and response authorities with special reference to vulnerable and marginalized groups137.
z Integrate community engagement in the M&E framework for health emergencies and outbreak response at all levels
(including SimEx/AAR/IAR, as relevant).
136
Preparedness, prevention and response to outbreaks and other hazards or emergencies (such as involvement in early warning and detection, immediate notification and containment, contact
247
tracing, specimen collection and referral), and translate messages into major country languages.
137
Such as linkages with hotlines, social behaviour research, direct communication platforms, etc.
Participation and contribution of other sectors to actions:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
z Integrate community engagement mechanisms into existing national DRR and emergency response frameworks.
z Implement national protocol for community mobilization for health emergencies at all levels.
z Update existing plans, guidelines and SOPs for community engagement based on lessons learned and best practices from
138
248
Initiatives include local or district plans e.g. readiness, contingency, response and business continuity plans. Codesign and implementation shall include stakeholders such as community
leaders, faith based organizations and civil society, which are mapped and systematically engaged throughout the process.
Tools:
z Minimum Quality Standards and Indicators in Community Engagement. Amman: UNICEF Middle East and North Africa; 2020 (https://www.unicef.org/
mena/reports/community-engagement-standards).
z Community engagement: a health promotion guide for universal health coverage in the hands of the people. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020
(https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/334379).
z World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations & United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Communication for
behavioural impact (COMBI): a toolkit for behavioural and social communication in outbreak response. Luxembourg: World Health Organization; 2012
(https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/75170?ua=1).
z Social + Behavioural Change [website]. New York, United States of America: UNICEF; 2023 (https://www.sbcguidance.org/).
z Clinical and Translational Science Awards Foundations for Accelerated Discovery and Efficient Translation. Principles of Community Engagement
(Second Edition) Progress Report 2009-2011. United States of America: National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Health and Human Services
and USA Government; 2011 (https://ncats.nih.gov/ctsa_2011/ch5_v2.html).
z Engagement of crisis-affected people in humanitarian action. Background Paper. Addis Ababa: ALNAP; 2014 (https://reliefweb.int/report/world/
engagement-crisis-affected-people-humanitarian-action-background-paper).
z WHO Community Engagement Framework for Quality, People-centred and resilient health services. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017
(https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259280).
z WHO Faith Network [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/groups/who-faith-network).
z World Health Organization strategy for engaging religious leaders, faith-based organization and faith communities in health emergencies. Geneva:
World Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/347871).
Areas of focus: Fostering and building partnerships, inclusion, capacity, and resilience.
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
z Community engagement efforts are not systematically linked to the emergency response.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Identify and map major CSOs, NGOs, community networks and other sector stakeholders139 working in health emergency
02 related areas at national and subnational levels.
LIMITED z Codevelop, with communities, frameworks, guidance and tools for community engagement, social mobilization and health
CAPACITY promotion teams to connect with affected or at risk populations during health emergencies.
z Identify priority communities for preparedness, readiness and response capacity-building based on national risk assessment,
readiness assessment, programme reviews and other information.
z Map the capacities of community partners and networks existing at the subnational and local levels in health and other
139
One Health, DRR, WASH, zoonotic diseases, food safety and security, such as farmer associations, agricultural organizations, food vendors, transportation, livelihood, etc.
z Co develop, with communities, and disseminate local guidelines, SOPs, tools and templates for community mapping,
assessments, planning (such as contingency plans), case detection, early warning and response coordination in health
emergencies.
z Train community stakeholders, along with CSOs, CBOs and NGOs in case detection, early warning and response
coordination for health emergencies.
z Plan and conduct pilot activities for local level health emergency SimEx (including drills and other exercises), with
participation from community stakeholders and actors.
z Develop, test and implement local models and pilot projects on community knowledge management including
identification of health priorities, resource mapping, community-based surveillance and local response coordination and
governance using community engagement approaches.
z Conduct nationwide participatory community risk assessment, vulnerability mapping, capacity assessment, context
140
Including village representatives, CSOs, CBOs, religious groups and other community networks.
z Involve local/community institutions (including schools, workplaces, private entities, NGOs, etc.) in health sector
emergency planning and preparedness activities.
z Establish a multisectoral body for health emergencies (preparedness and response) at the local level including non-
traditionally involved community stakeholders and networks such as employers/unions, faith based community, etc.
z Identify and register individuals in situations of vulnerability, such as patients needing long term care, children without
vaccination, elderly and persons with disabilities.
z Evaluate/review community management of health emergencies, including the participation of community stakeholders.
05 z Allocate resources at subnational and/or local level for risk assessment, community health emergency planning, SimEx/
SUSTAINABLE IAR/AAR (as relevant) with participation from community stakeholders.
CAPACITY z Develop reports and case studies on effective management of health emergencies from a community perspective at the
subnational/local level.
z Share country experiences in community health emergency management and participatory public health and engage in
peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational level (between regions) and/or international level.
z Implement dynamic data and evidence generation by communities to inform research and support programmes for health
emergency management, outbreak preparedness and response, DRR, risk assessment and programme implementation.
z Disseminate, promote and support evidence-based interventions among stakeholders in developing and implementing
community engagement programmes in health emergency management.
z Capacity-building mechanisms for engaging and empowering communities for health emergency preparedness and
z Identify key national experts to develop minimum standards, capacity development frameworks/plans for community health
02 workforce capacity-building for community engagement in health emergencies.
LIMITED z Map existing national community engagement capacity-building programmes and tools in DRR and other relevant sectors141.
CAPACITY z Establish a national network of experts/practitioners who can support community engagement for health emergency
management.
z Develop and test minimum standards, capacity development frameworks/plans for community health workforce as well as
competencies for the health workforce at all levels on community engagement for health emergencies142.
z Establish a platform for disseminating learning opportunities for national focal point(s) for community engagement and
social mobilization in health emergencies and outbreak response and develop trainings and knowledge products on topics
such as community level health emergency management, engagement with populations in situations of vulnerability143 and
community engagement skills144.
141
Such as education, transportation, security and tourism, through a One Health approach.
142
Considering current needs, types of workforce, community capacities, workforce competencies and ToRs, current knowledge and skills level.
143
Such as refugees, internally displaced populations, ethnic minorities, etc. (or integrate as part of existing capacity-building).
254
144
Such as community dialogue and participation, interpersonal communication, coordination skills and processes, collaborative teams, social and behavioural change, health literacy, etc.
z Disseminate minimum standards, capacity development frameworks/plans for community health workforce as well as
03 competencies for the health workforce on community engagement for health emergencies.
DEVELOPED z Develop and disseminate training packages on minimum standards, capacity development frameworks/plans for
CAPACITY community health workforce and competencies on community engagement in health emergencies at the national level.
z Implement mechanism to support community engagement in health emergency design, programming, advocacy,
emergency response planning, M&E, research, training activities and implementation.
z Develop and test capacity-building packages on community engagement for health emergency preparedness and
response for multidisciplinary actors in health including private sector, health professionals in workplaces and schools,
traditional healers, burial attendants, etc.
z Develop and test SOPs for surge capacity for the rapid deployment of officers and staff trained in community engagement
during health emergencies.
z Review the functionality of national network of experts/practitioners who can support on community engagement for
05 emergency management before, during and after emergencies based on M&E results and update training packages as
SUSTAINABLE needed.
CAPACITY z Review and update mechanisms to provide insurance, indemnification and compensation to staff and volunteers injured or
sickened during community engagement work.
z Review and update capacity-building programmes, including the learning platform to disseminate training and knowledge
for community engagement.
z Document and disseminate best practices and lessons learned of community engagement before, during and after
emergencies.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Establish an infodemic management unit/team, with ToRs, in the health ministry and/or the national institute of public health.
02 z Conduct multisectoral landscape analysis to identify stakeholders and potential partners as well as opportunities and
LIMITED weaknesses in health information seeking and use.
CAPACITY z Identify and connect with stakeholders and teams who have relevant job profiles and functions related to infodemic
management145.
z Develop and test a national multihazard multisectoral infodemic management strategy146 and plan.
z Develop a basic editorial style for published heath information products147 and start health authority webpages148 and social
media channels.
z Produce social listening and infodemic insight reports to inform specific routine health programme activities that require
infodemic management support149 on an as needed basis.
z Integrate infodemic management capacities and strategies in the national multihazard risk communication and community
engagement plan and health emergency incident management system SOPs.
145
Such as health promotion, health communication, social media engagement, health information systems, digital health, risk communication, behavioural insights and community engagement.
146
Content moderation strategy for all official social media channels to determine when to rebut, prebunk or debunk health misinformation.
147
Example: permalinks, dating each piece of content or health guidance, using terms that have been pretested and are well understood by the target population.
148
257
Including a maintained and up-to-date webpage where most common questions and misinformation are addressed to provide factcheckers and media with reliable links.
149
Such as support of health promotion or supplementary immunization activity campaigns.
z Implement the national multihazard multisectoral infodemic management strategy and plan at the national level.
03 z Develop SOPs for analysis, access to data sources to conduct rapid infodemic insights analysis and to respond to ad hoc
DEVELOPED requests from the IMS.
CAPACITY z Identify networks and staff for surge support capacity during outbreaks, who are trained in infodemic management tools
and practices, at the national level.
z Establish and test a mechanism for rapid content development to support infodemic response using infodemic insights150.
z Develop, test and implement multisectoral infodemic monitoring and evaluation tools151 at the national level.
z Develop and disseminate training packages and tools to support health workers to effectively address questions from their
patients and media and for the management of misinformation at the national level.
z Implement the basic editorial style for published heath information products and update health authority webpages and
social media channels regularly at the national level.
z Establish a coordination mechanism for infodemic management including health information publishers152 at the national
level.
z Implement the national multihazard multisectoral infodemic management strategy and plan at the subnational level.
152
Such as expert groups, health regulatory authorities, medical associations, libraries, health reference web sites and other publishers for credible and accurate health information, and
unstructured digital communities and networks whose values support health information promotion (such as world of work, community influencers, etc.).
z Develop and disseminate training packages and tools to support health workers to effectively address questions from their
patients and media and for the management of misinformation at the subnational level.
z Identify, develop and deploy infodemic management interventions153.
z Develop SOPs, tools and partnerships to detect, address and mitigate disinformation and cyberattacks154 and delineate
multisectoral responsibility for response.
z Conduct a review (SimEx/AAR/IAR, as relevant) on infodemic management before, during and after emergencies at
national and subnational levels.
z Develop infodemic management capacities in CSOs, academic institutions and other partners engaged in health
emergency preparedness, health promotion and health service delivery.
z Update infodemic management strategies, plans, SOPs and trainings based on lessons learned and best practices from
153
These interventions include those that promote resilience to health misinformation, reduce circulation of health misinformation, promote spread of accurate credible health information, and
address policy and structural barriers for effective infodemic management.
154
To detect, report and address deceptive marketing practices and consumer rights violations in areas of health information dissemination.
155
Advanced analytics include language agnostic or across multiple languages, type of digital content beyond text based analysis, can produce infodemic insights on a more rapid basis and in
259
real time and updates on information environment landscape analysis every 6 months.
156
Including for detection of unintended consequences and for ensuring ethical social listening and infodemic management.
z Document and disseminate best practices and lessons learned on infodemic management.
Tools:
z Infodemic [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic#tab=tab_1).
z WHO launches pilot of AI-powered public-access social listening tool [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/news-
room/feature-stories/detail/who-launches-pilot-of-ai-powered-public-access-social-listening-tool#:~:text=The%20EARS%20platform%20is%20
powered,scale%2C%20in%20real%2Dtime).
z 3rd WHO training on infodemic management. 16 Nov - 9 Dec 2021, cosponsored by US CDC, UNICEF and RCCE collective service [website]. Geneva:
World Health Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/teams/risk-communication/infodemic-management/3rd-who-training-on-infodemic-
management).
z How to build an infodemic insights report in six steps. Geneva: World Health Organization and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF); 2023
(https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/370317).
z Infodemic management 101 OpenWho [website online course). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://openwho.org/courses/infodemic-
management-101).
z Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
260
17
Points of entry and border health
States Parties must designate international airports and ports (and, where justified for public health reasons, a State Party may designate ground crossings) at
which it must implement and maintain core public health capacities required to prevent, detect and manage a variety of public health risks using a multisectoral
approach (IHR Annex 1B). The management of health threats and events at points of entry (PoE) requires effective communication and collaboration among
many sectors, including health, foreign affairs, customs, interior affairs, security, transport, tourism and migration, among others. In addition, States Parties
must also have effective multisectoral capacities at the national level to decide upon the adequate use of travel-related measures during a health emergency.
IMPACT:
Timely detection of and effective response to any potential hazards that occur at or may be spread via PoE.
z Country has not undertaken a strategic risk assessment to designate individual PoEs.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct strategic risk and capacity assessments to inform and prioritize selection of key PoEs for IHR designation.
02 z Designate PoEs according to IHR requirements and identify competent authorities at designated PoE.
LIMITED z Identify key relevant stakeholders for establishing and maintaining core capacities at each designated PoE in a multisectoral
CAPACITY manner.
z Develop a plan to establish and maintain all the routine capacities prescribed in the IHR Annex 1B.
z Establish some capacities at some designated PoEs such as the development and implementation of SOPs and training
packages for routine capacities, the provision of adequate resources including space, equipment and premises for the
management of public health events, and resources for the inspection of conveyances and the control of vectors and
reservoirs in and near PoEs as per the requirements in IHR Annex 1B.
03 place and functioning in at least some designated PoEs, for all hazards, including biological.
DEVELOPED z Conduct regular trainings to ensure that all relevant staff at some designated PoEs are knowledgeable about the SOPs for
CAPACITY the establishment and maintenance of core capacities for all hazards, and that these are functional, as per IHR Annex 1B.
z Integrate surveillance activities in at least some designated PoEs within the national surveillance system for all hazards,
including biological.
262
z Conduct regular M&E exercises, such as SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant), to assess the functionality and sustainability of core
capacities at some designated PoEs.
z Allocate adequate resources to maintain routine capacities for all hazard prevention, detection and response at all
04 designated PoEs.
DEMONSTRATED z Implement the plan to have all routine capacities prescribed in IHR Annex 1B in place and functioning in all designated
CAPACITY PoEs and for all hazards.
z Develop and implement SOPs for the establishment and maintenance of functional core capacities as per Annex 1B and
train and assign staff at all designated PoEs to respond to routine public health events for all hazards.
z Integrate all designated PoEs into the national surveillance systems for all hazards with the involvement of relevant
sectors.
z Formalize agreements with neighbouring countries for rapid and secured sharing of data and information on health risks
and emergency events at and around PoEs, in particular at ground crossings in high risk areas and where communities
adjacent to borders are deeply integrated.
z Public health emergency contingency plans for each designated point of entry to respond to health emergencies are not in
z Identify designated PoEs that do not have a multisectoral health emergency contingency plan in place, or where a plan is
02 under development, and identify and convene all relevant stakeholders that need to be involved in the development of the
LIMITED multisectoral health emergency contingency plan at each designated PoE.
CAPACITY z Review and map the relevant laws, guidance and SOPs related to the response to a health emergency caused by a biological
hazard in at least some designated PoEs including in relation to sensitive issues such as: information sharing, management
of personal data, implementation of measures such as quarantine or closure of borders, etc.
z Conduct a public health risk assessment at/around some designated PoEs, including both sides of the border in the case of
ground crossings, to identify priority biological hazards as well as vulnerable populations that may be at higher risk.
z Develop a multisectoral health emergency contingency plan for events caused by biological hazards, including SOPs and
guidance following risk assessment, in at least some designated PoEs according to IHR Annex 1.
z Identify surge capacity to respond to a potential cross-border emergency public health threat at/around PoEs and document
the means to mobilize such surge capacity in the PoE multisectoral health emergency contingency plan and/or SOPs.
z Train border health staff on the multisectoral health emergency contingency plan and related guidance and SOPs for
responding to events due to biological hazards in some designated PoEs, and develop a regular training programme to
z Develop a multisectoral health emergency contingency plan for biological hazards in all designated PoEs with guidance
03 and SOPs for responding to public health events caused by biological hazards.
DEVELOPED z Integrate all designated PoEs, and some non-designated PoEs, into the national surveillance system to ensure the timely
CAPACITY sharing of information to inform the public health response.
z Integrate all designated PoEs into the national emergency preparedness and response plan with the involvement of
relevant sectors and services.
z Allocate resources including funds to all designated PoEs for implementation of the plan during public health events
caused by biological hazards.
z Demonstrate capacity to apply health measures related to travellers at PoEs and PoE environment for early detection,
assessment and containment of public health risks, isolation and safe transfer of sick travellers to appropriate medical
facilities at all designated PoEs.
z Organize regular trainings on and demonstrate knowledge of the required health related documents and the correct use of
information for detecting, reporting, assessing and providing first control measures to public health events, according to
type and kind of conveyances.
04 in all designated PoEs and integrate into national emergency response plans.
DEMONSTRATED z Train staff of all designated PoEs on guidance and SOPs for responding to events due to any type of hazard, including care
CAPACITY of affected animals and referral mechanism in collaboration with the animal sector.
z Allocate resources including funds to all designated PoEs for implementation of the plan during any type of hazard event,
including care of affected animals and referral mechanism to veterinary services.
z Demonstrate capacity to apply all recommended health measures to travellers, animals and cargo, conveyances including
to disinfect, de-rat, disinsect, decontaminate or otherwise treat baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal
parcels.
z Establish isolation units to isolate and quarantine suspected human or animal cases of communicable diseases and
establish a strategic stockpile157 of essential medical countermeasures based on the health emergency risk assessment
conducted at all designated PoEs.
z Constitute a roster of trained staff ready to be deployed as surge at PoEs to support rapid implementation of emergency
activities in line with national and international recommendations.
z Establish a PHEOC at major designated PoEs with material and functional equipment, updated SOPs and staff trained.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) at regular intervals to test and review response capacities of all designated PoEs
and document results.
157
The stockpile will be made of relevant medical devices, vaccines, drugs, biologicals, personal protective equipment and other medical supplies for early response to public health emergencies.
z Demonstrate action to address recommendations for improvement based on the results of SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant).
05 z Update the PoE multisectoral health emergency contingency plan and related mechanisms, guidance and SOPs based on
SUSTAINABLE findings from evaluations and tests.
CAPACITY z Share best practices for continuous improvement with all relevant stakeholders.
z Communicate public health risks and related mitigation measures to multisectoral partners operating at PoEs, including
conveyance and PoE facility operators.
z Support research programmes to generate evidence on capacities required to manage health emergencies at PoEs.
z Share experiences from capacity development for the management of health emergencies at PoEs and engage the country
in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
z Draft, review and/or test joint strategies and procedures with neighbouring countries for the management of cross border
or international health emergencies at designated PoEs.
z National multisectoral mechanism to conduct risk-based approaches for strategic planning for international travel-
01 related measures, including prevention, detection/investigation, response and recovery is not available, is ad hoc or
NO CAPACITY underdevelopment.
z Identify and map key stakeholders for the development and implementation of international travel-related measures including
02 prevention, detection/ investigation, response and recovery in relevant sectors (health, transportation, migration, customs,
LIMITED tourism, etc.) taking into consideration the entire traveller pathway from departure to transit and destination.
CAPACITY z Develop a national multisectoral strategy and advisory committee with ToRs (with identified roles and responsibilities) to
streamline public health risk assessments, the implementation of recommended international travel-related risk mitigation
measures (e.g. screening, contact tracing, quarantine, testing, immunization requirements, etc.), and risk communication.
z Review existing mechanisms for conducting risk assessments to inform travel related measures and related policy and legal
documentation in the country.
z Identify gaps and methods to streamline the risk assessment and communication processes for international travel related
threats which may require the use of travel-related measures.
z Develop a training package for multisectoral staff to operationalize international travel related measures at PoEs, national and
subnational levels.
z Develop a RCCE strategy to explain the rationale underpinning international travel related measures, create feedback loop
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
z Develop or update legislation (relevant to screening, quarantine, testing, contact tracing, etc.) to enable the implementation
04 international travel related measures and maintain a database including contact details.
DEMONSTRATED z Conduct trainings on SOPs/guidelines for relevant multisectoral staff at all levels including the subnational level.
CAPACITY z Establish quick communication channels with relevant multisectoral stakeholders at all levels including subnational level.
z Implement risk-based strategies/SOPs/guidelines on national multisectoral process for international travel related
measures at the subnational level while continuing functioning at the national level.
z Implement appropriate RCCE practices to share information on the public health risk and mitigation measures, including
international travel-related measures, with all relevant stakeholders including the general public.
z Develop an M&E system to monitor the process and assess effectiveness and impact of the international travel measures
implemented, including any potential unintended consequences.
z Conduct regular risk assessments to update and adjust international travel-related measures, applying new information on
their effectiveness and impact as it becomes available.
z Conduct SimEx regularly on different components of international travel related measures (such as entry/exist screening,
contact tracing, quarantine) at different levels with involvement of multisectoral staff.
05 screening, communication, testing, transport for referral hospitals, etc. using risk-based scenarios with multisectoral
SUSTAINABLE stakeholders.
CAPACITY z Conduct regular monitoring of the functionality and evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of risk-based international
travel related measures within country.
z Update SOPs/guidelines based on results of SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant), addressing identified gaps.
271
z Continue implementation of national multisectoral processes and mechanisms to determine the adoption of international
travel related measures at all levels and that they are exercised (as appropriate), reviewed, evaluated and updated on a
regular basis, in response to an event or emergency.
z Provide regular updates from risk assessment teams with an all hazard approach to timely initiate relevant international
travel related measures commensurate with risk level, with multisectoral involvement.
z Maintain good collaboration with regional and global networks/agencies for early warning and travel health.
z Identify best practices and share among multisectoral teams at all levels and with international platforms for peer learning.
Tools:
z International Health Regulations (2005): assessment tool for core capacity requirements at designated airports, ports and ground crossings. Geneva:
World Health Organization; 2009 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/70839).
This document was developed to support States Parties in assessing existing capacities and capacity needs at points of entry when deciding which
airports, ports and ground crossings to designate under Article 20.1 and Annex 1B. It includes an Excel spreadsheet file model for IHR core capacities
assessment at ports, airports and ground crossings.
z Coordinated public health surveillance between points of entry and national health surveillance systems: advising principles. 1st edition. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2014 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/144805).
This document provides steps for implementing/strengthening communication mechanisms and defines criteria for deciding what and how events
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
IMPACT:
Timely detection of and effective response to potential chemical risks and/or events in collaboration with other sectors responsible for chemical
safety, industries, transportation and safe waste disposal.
01 z National policies, plans or legislation for chemical event surveillance, alert and response do not exist.
NO CAPACITY
z Assess existing policies, legislation, plans and capacities for chemical event surveillance, alert and response in relevant
02 sectors and existing laboratory capacities for the analysis of human and environmental samples to inform the assessment
LIMITED and manage investigation of chemical events and poisonings.
CAPACITY z Establish a multisectoral steering committee consisting of key stakeholders from relevant sectors with identified roles,
responsibilities and ToRs to enable agreed risk profiling, prioritization, planning and implementation.
z Develop strategies, guidelines/manuals and SOPs for surveillance, alert and response to chemical events and emergencies
including for laboratories and develop training packages on these guidelines and SOPs.
z Conduct risk profiling to identify hazard sources (including sites, transport and issues at point of use), likelihood and severity,
based on populations at risk and potential nature of an incident.
z Identify and describe priority chemical events to inform planning. This process can include conducting an inventory of
potentially hazardous chemical sites and manufacturing facilities and a review of past chemical events.
z Assess capacities for chemical event surveillance, alert and response, including health sector workforce, identification and
availability of medical countermeasures and antidotes for high risk chemical hazards and overall health system response
risks and establish focal points for coordination and collaboration for chemical event surveillance, alert and response.
z Conduct a multiagency situational analysis/review to understand data availability, data sources, pathway of data flow and
receptors towards the development of the surveillance system for chemicals.
z Develop all the necessary policies and legislation for chemical event surveillance, alert and response.
03 z Develop event response plans at all levels with the involvement of relevant stakeholders and ensure the following:
DEVELOPED Map and review all hazardous sites and facilities
CAPACITY
Define roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies for response during events
Prepare protocols for the investigation and verification of chemical events and poisoning, including through laboratory
testing
Assess training needs and develop a training plan
Conduct training of personnel at relevant agencies and facilities
Implement SOPs for coordination and collaboration during chemical events.
z Establish a surveillance system based on the strategy, guidelines, SOPs for surveillance, alert and response to chemical
events.
z Put in place agreements with designated quality assured laboratories (national or in other countries) for timely analysis of
biological and environmental samples with suspected chemical exposure.
z Establish a system for a national poisons centre to receive information on the composition of hazardous products
(detergents, paints, adhesives, etc.) imported and sold in the country.
z Develop capacities for diagnosis and treatment of chemical poisonings and establish a poison information service, as a
part of the national poisons centre, that operates at least during office hours. Procure and ensure access to a stockpile of
medical countermeasures and antidotes required for high risk chemical hazards.
z Collect technical factsheets on chemical hazards based on the list of priority chemical events in the country and develop or
adapt them according to the risk profile and country context. Distribute the list to all relevant stakeholders.
z Document and use M&E findings to assess, review and strengthen surveillance, alert and response including coordination
158
Examples include the WHO global and regional toxicology networks and other regional networks, such as in the European Union, professional toxicology associations.
159
278
The poisons centre should be sufficiently staffed and resourced to provide a robust and reliable 24/7 service. The poisons centre should be well used by the population it serves (check number
of calls per day). Refer to Guidelines for establishing a poison centre (WHO, 2021)
z Sustain a mechanism to ensure response capacity160 at national and subnational levels.
z Support research programmes to generate evidence on surveillance, alert and response to chemical events or
emergencies.
z Share country experience in surveillance, alert and response to chemical events or emergencies and engage the country in
peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
Tools:
z Chemicals road map: workbook. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/273136).
z IOMF tool box for decision making in chemicals management. OECD (https://www.iomctoolbox.org/).
z WHO Manual for the Public Health Management of Chemical Incidents. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2009 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/
item/9789241598149).
z International Health Regulations (2005) and chemical events. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2015 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/249532).
z Guidelines for establishing a poison centre. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/338657).
z Manual for investigating suspected outbreaks of illnesses of possible chemical etiology: guidance for investigation and control. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2021 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240021754).
z Initial clinical management of patients exposed to chemical weapons: interim guidance document. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014 (https://
160
This includes setting minimum requirements for: local emergency planning and response activities (i.e. arrangements for scaling up capabilities of local emergency response, national support
279
mechanisms and infrastructure and alerting mechanisms); inspection of hazardous sites and assessment of emergency plans; and operators to comply and liaison with local governments.
see also: WHO manual: The public health management of chemical incidents. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2009.
z International Chemical Safety Cards (ICSCs) [database]. Geneva: International Labour Organization; 2018 (https://www.ilo.org/dyn/icsc/showcard.
listCards3).
z International Programme on Chemical Safety and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (IPCS). IPCS risk assessment
terminology. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2004 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/42908).
z Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
IMPACT:
Timely detection and effective response to potential radiological and nuclear emergencies with cross-sectoral coordination.
z No mechanism (such as policies, plans, coordination and communication) is in place for the detection, assessment and
z Conduct a comprehensive assessment of potential radiological risks in the country, identify potential radiation emergency
02 scenarios and map high risk areas, most vulnerable regions and sites.
LIMITED z Review and identify gaps in legislation, policies and plans for the detection, assessment and response to radiation
CAPACITY emergencies.
z Identify key technical experts from relevant sectors to develop technical guidelines or SOPs for the management of radiation
emergencies (including risk assessment, reporting, event confirmation, notification and investigation).
z Develop policies, strategies, costed plans and SOPs for the detection, assessment and response to radiation emergencies,
including provisions for coordination and communication between relevant national authorities clearly indicating roles and
responsibilities (including those for the health authorities and IHR national focal points).
z Disseminate policies, plans and legislation for radiological event surveillance, alert and response to relevant stakeholders.
z Develop capacity to monitor radiation exposure in the environment, food and drinking water.
z Identify medical countermeasures required for radiation emergencies depending on the national risk profile, and develop a
z Develop, evaluate and/or update technical guidelines or SOPs for the management of radiation emergencies (including risk
04 mitigate contamination as necessary and/or provide reassurance that people are not contaminated at levels which require
DEMONSTRATED mitigation.
CAPACITY z Develop and conduct emergency response drills, SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) on radiation emergencies and update the
response plan, mechanisms and guidelines accordingly.
z Respond to any radiological threats with joint risk assessment, investigation and implementation of the response plan.
z Share information with relevant stakeholders regularly on the risk and threats that are potential for emergencies.
z Regularly monitor (quantity and quality) of the national stockpile of medical nuclear and radiation emergency
countermeasures.
z Expand health facilities with capacity to manage patients of radiation emergencies.
z Provide arrangements for evacuation and relocation plans for high risk regions, premises and facilities.by national
competent authority.
05 z Conduct regular training of staff of health facilities to manage patients in the event of a radiation emergency.
SUSTAINABLE z Regularly review and adapt response plan, mechanisms and guidelines based on findings from emergency response drills
CAPACITY and SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant).
z Sustain a mechanism to establish the response capacity at national and subnational levels.
z Support research programmes to generate evidence for detecting and responding to radiological and nuclear emergencies
z National stockpiles for radiological and nuclear emergencies: policy advice. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
285
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
20
Public health and social measures
Public health and social measures (PHSM) are nonpharmaceutical interventions implemented by individuals, communities, governments and institutions to
reduce the risk and scale of epidemic- and pandemic-prone infectious disease transmission. They range from surveillance, contact tracing, mask wearing
and physical distancing to social measures, such as restricting mass gatherings and modifying school and business openings and closures. PHSM play
an immediate and critical role throughout the different stages of health emergencies and contribute to decreasing the burden on health systems so that
essential health services can continue and effective vaccines and therapeutics can be developed and deployed with their effects maximized to protect the
health of communities. If PHSM are not implemented with a focus on equity and consideration of risks and benefits, they can have unintended negative
consequences on the health and well-being of individuals, societies and economies, such as by increasing loneliness, food insecurity, the risk of domestic
violence and reducing household income and productivity.
IMPACT:
PHSM are systematically integrated into health emergency management plans, policies, financing, governance and leadership in all relevant
sectors at national, subnational and community levels across the health emergency actions, with consideration for interventions that are evidence-
driven, context-specific and sensitive to trade-offs between benefits and unintended negative consequences for individuals and communities.
z No systematic, dedicated mechanism to guide implementation and adjustment of PHSM for emergency management.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Review current legislation and legal frameworks relevant to supporting and enabling PHSM implementation and identify any
02 gaps.
LIMITED z Assess and identify gaps in capacities of health and nonhealth sectors to implement, adjust and monitor PHSM to address
CAPACITY priority hazards for health emergencies.
z Involve multilevel161, multisectoral stakeholders in defining national strategies for PHSM and systematically integrating PHSM
in national and subnational emergency management plans/policies.
z Form a national working group with stakeholders from relevant sectors to develop common standards and strategic work
plans for health emergency preparedness and response.
z Link continuous risk assessments of epidemiological changes, health system capacity and contextual factors to PHSM policy
design, to inform the introduction, adjustment and phasing out of PHSM at national and subnational levels.
z Develop a mechanism to systematically include the evaluation of PHSM in health emergency AARs/IARs.
161
I.e. from the national government to the community level
z Establish a dedicated PHSM team in the health ministry to coordinate and manage PHSM strategic and operational
03 activities, including PHSM policy monitoring and advice, coordination, leadership and research.
DEVELOPED z Form an interdisciplinary, multilevel expert advisory group at the national level to maximize the use of best available
CAPACITY evidence on PHSM and employ precautionary principles when robust context specific data and research are limited to
enable and strengthen evidence-informed decision-making for PHSM.
z Initiate multilevel, multisectoral tracking of PHSM policy, implementation and adherence at the beginning of a health
emergency and maintain tracking to inform adjustment and phasing out of PHSM as required.
z Regularly assess the benefits versus unintended negative consequences of PHSM during health emergencies and
implement relevant social protection policies to reduce negative consequences across health, social and economic factors.
z Train and provide ongoing development opportunities for policy-makers and practitioners in health and nonhealth sectors
to introduce, implement, adjust and phase out context specific, equitable and balanced PHSM policies.
z Systematically integrate PHSM indicators into existing M&E efforts for health emergency management and health systems
core capacities.
z Conduct AARs/IARs for PHSM policy, implementation, adjustment and adherence including experts from relevant sectors,
communities and professional associations.
z Secure staff, funds, materials and facilities to mainstream and strengthen PHSM in health emergency management
while identifying resources and developing mechanisms to swiftly raise and allocate funds for rapid expansion of country
capacity for PHSM during health emergencies.
z Review and adjust existing legislation, regulations, mechanisms and mandates of all relevant sectors based on M&E
outcomes for effective implementation of PHSM.
Tools:
z Non-pharmaceutical public health measures for mitigating the risk and impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2019 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/non-pharmaceutical-public-health-measuresfor-mitigating-the-risk-and-impact-of-
epidemic-and-pandemic-influenza).
z Considerations for implementing and adjusting public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19. Interim guidance – 30 March 2023.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-2019-ncov-adjusting-ph-measures-2023.1).
z Measuring the effectiveness and impact of public health and social measures [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.
int/activities/measuring-the-effectiveness-and-impact-of-public-health-and-social-measures).
z Report of the WHO global technical consultation on public health and social measures during health emergencies: online meeting, 31 August to 2
September 2021. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/352096).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
290
21
Additional benchmarks for health emergency capacities beyond IHR
The 62 benchmarks above focus on strengthening health emergency capacities for IHR and HEPR, the following 18 additional benchmarks focus on HEPR
capacities beyond IHR. Please see Annex 2 for mapping of all benchmarks against IHR MEF (JEE and SPAR) and HEPR.
Collaborative surveillance
Health service capacity, access and usage monitoring
Collaborative surveillance objectives include establishing comprehensive surveillance mechanisms that encompass various health-related factors to detect
and monitor diseases, threats and vulnerabilities. By implementing such systems, countries can enhance their ability to identify and respond to emerging
health risks in a timely and effective manner. Health service monitoring is an integral component to achieve this, working in conjunction with public health
surveillance to enhance emergency preparedness and response. Enhancing these systems may provide a dynamic assessment of health system resilience,
enabling effective emergency planning and response efforts by informing the optimization of healthcare services and interventions, and contributing to
response monitoring activities.
Health service monitoring complements public health surveillance for emergency preparedness and response by providing a dynamic picture of the resilience
of health systems, this includes: regular monitoring and reporting of key metrics on health service capacities, access and usage to provide a dynamic picture
of contemporary and projected system resilience; and health service monitoring capacities interconnected with response mechanisms, with the necessary
z There are no existing mechanisms for systematic routine monitoring of key metrics for health service availability, capacity,
z Assess existing monitoring systems for health service capacity, access and usage to identify gaps, strengths and areas for
02 improvement.
LIMITED z Form steering and technical working committees (with ToR) to develop a national health service capacity, access and usage
CAPACITY monitoring framework, including the context of emergencies.
z Define the key metrics of health service capacity, access and usage to be incorporated into the national monitoring framework
and identify existing and new data sources for monitoring the key metrics.
z Assign a nodal agency/entity responsible for coordination and communication in relation to development and implementation
of the monitoring framework.
z Conduct stakeholder analysis within and beyond health sectors for monitoring of health service capacity, access and usage.
z Explore pathways for community engagement to incorporate local level readiness and capacities into the national monitoring
framework.
z Develop a national health service capacity, access and usage monitoring framework that illustrates strategies, approaches,
03 tools and resources to systematically monitor the defined key metrics for health service availability, capacity, access and
DEVELOPED usage.
CAPACITY z Identify, adapt and implement internationally recommended standards and tools to ensure consistent and accurate data
293
collection.
z Establish mechanisms to connect routine health information systems, including health service monitoring, with the public
health surveillance system to facilitate data integration and sharing.
z Develop a data governance and sharing policy along with a data quality and structure assurance mechanism to facilitate
data sharing and quality.
z Develop capacity-building trainings, services and rescources for the collection, analysis and interpretation of data for
relevant health personnel.
z Design a mechanism to facilitate interconnectedness between health service monitoring capacities and health emergency
response mechanisms, to support a coordinated and agile health emergency response.
z Foster collaboration and information sharing among health and other relevant sectors to enhance coordination and data
exchange for health service monitoring.
z Develop and implement community engagement strategies to actively involve local communities in health service capacity,
access and usage monitoring.
z Implement the national health service capacity, access and usage monitoring framework in a phased manner across all
further enhance the timeliness, accuracy and flexibility of health service monitoring to respond to diverse emergencies with
minimal impact on routine data collection.
z Enhance community collaboration to optimize information collection on vulnerability, risk mapping, demand and access to
health services.
z Increase collaborative partnerships with nonhealth sectors to facilitate efficient monitoring of health service availability,
capacity, access and usage during health emergencies.
z Regularly review and update the national health service capacity, access and usage monitoring framework to adapt to
Tools:
z Defining collaborative surveillance: a core concept for strengthening the global architecture for health emergency preparedness, response, and
resilience (HEPR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240074064).
z SCORE for Health Data Technical Package. World Health Organization. (https://www.who.int/data/data-collection-tools/score)
z Sharing and reuse of health-related data for research purposes: WHO policy and implementation guidance. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022
(https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240044968).
295
z Social innovation in health monitoring and evaluation framework. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://fctc.who.int/publications/i/item/
social-innovation-in-health-monitoring-and-evaluation-framework).
z Analyzing and using routine data to monitor the effects of COVID-19 on essential health services, A Practical guide for national and subnational
decision-makers, interim guidance, Geneva: World Health Organization: 2021 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-2019-nCoV-essential-
health-services-monitoring-2021-1)
z Primary health care measurement framework and indicators: monitoring health systems through a primary health care lens. Geneva: World
Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); 2022. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO (https://www.who.int/publications/i/
item/9789240044210)
z Harmonized Health Facility Assessment (HHFA). World Health Organization. (https://www.who.int/data/data-collection-tools/harmonized-health-
facility-assessment/introduction)
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
IMPACT:
Timely public health decision-making is informed by genomic surveillance for pathogens with pandemic and epidemic potential.
z Genomic surveillance systems are not in place, genomic sequencing is conducted ad hoc, or the country does not have
01 access to networks or regional laboratories with genomic sequencing capacities to support national pandemic/epidemic
NO CAPACITY surveillance systems or disease control programmes163.
z Identify a national multisectoral committee (with ToR) with relevant stakeholders to contribute to the strengthening of
02 genomic surveillance and coordinate effective collaboration between stakeholders such as national public health institutes
LIMITED and relevant partners.
CAPACITY z Map existing or potential genomic surveillance capacity within the country, including an alignment with existing laboratory
capacity assessments to assess potential capability for performing genomic sequencing (facilities, personnel, equipment,
logistics, etc.).
z Map existing pathways to access a network or regional laboratory for genomic sequencing and analytical capacities, and use
regional or international laboratories to conduct sequencing for pandemic/epidemic surveillance systems or disease control
programmes.
z Use genomic surveillance reports/assessments generated by WHO or international reference laboratory networks to inform
local public health decisions.
z Develop a national genomic surveillance strategy or action plan for pathogens with pandemic and epidemic potential164,
including identifying the key pandemic/epidemic genomic surveillance use cases relevant to country context.
163
Pandemic/epidemic surveillance systems or disease control programme use cases include, but are not limited to, SARS-CoV-2, influenza, arbovirus, cholera, viral haemorrhagic fevers, polio,
measles and rubella.
298
164
Considerations for developing a national genomic surveillance strategy or action plan for pathogens with pandemic and epidemic potential. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023. Licence:
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO
z Implement the national genomic surveillance strategy or action plan for pathogens with pandemic/epidemic potential,
03 including the development or implementation of guidelines, procedures and tools to support effective implementation.
DEVELOPED z Increase access to efficient sampling, collection, sequencing, analysis, interpretation and surge capacities, through access
CAPACITY to networks and regional laboratories, and continue to regularly use regional or international laboratories to conduct
sequencing for pandemic/epidemic surveillance systems or disease control programmes until capacities are developed
within the country.
z Identify relevant (WHO) global standards on data sharing for genomic surveillance and establish mechanisms to align
current agreements, data sharing platforms and privacy protection as relevant.
z Continue to use genomic surveillance reports/assessments generated by WHO or international reference laboratory
networks to inform local public health decisions.
z Conduct advocacy to relevant stakeholders, including multisectoral ministries, agencies and funding agencies to support
implementation of national strategy or action plan.
z Establish collaborations with international reference laboratories, research networks or training/knowledge exchange
platforms to support the use of genomic surveillance as part of pandemic/epidemic surveillance system or disease control
programmes.
z Regularly revise the national genomic surveillance strategy or action plan to reflect current threats and adapt to potential
04 future threats, and relevant related guidelines, procedures and tools are assessed regularly and updated accordingly.
DEMONSTRATED z Increase in-country sequencing infrastructure165 and human workforce for sequencing or access to regional or
CAPACITY international laboratories as part of pandemic/epidemic surveillance systems or disease control programmes.
z Generate and use genetic sequencing data to inform risk assessments and public health decisions both locally and
regionally/globally.
165
Including sufficient, stable and secure data management systems.
z Advance collaborations with international reference laboratories, research networks and training/knowledge exchange
platforms to support use of genomic surveillance as part of pandemic/epidemic disease control programmes and
participate in relevant training programmes.
z Establish national financing for at least one genomic surveillance pandemic/epidemic use case.
z Participate in genomic surveillance global/regional norms, standards and system setting activities.
z Review and update the national genomic surveillance strategy or action plan based on M&E outcomes.
05 z Establish a network of national and subnational laboratories that provide specimens or genomic data in a timely manner to
SUSTAINABLE inform national genomic surveillance objectives for priority pandemic/epidemic pathogen use cases.
CAPACITY z Routinely test the quality and timeliness of the national genomic surveillance system through SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant)
to confirm the system’s readiness for a novel pathogen response.
z Routinely participate in quality assessment programmes for genomic sequencing, and implement a national quality
assessment programme if appropriate.
z Routinely apply data access principles, agreements and standards for responsible use of genetic sequence data.
z Generate and use genetic sequencing data to inform risk assessments and public health decisions both locally and
regionally/globally.
z Secure national financing for all priority pandemic/epidemics genomic surveillance use cases.
z Use national expertise in genomic surveillance to drive, inform and guide global norms, standards and systems.
Tools:
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
IMPACT:
Event detection, risk assessment and public health decision-making is supported by collaborative surveillance systems which provide standardized,
shared data that is analyzed and accessible, through a One Health approach.
z Integrated, interoperable and standardized data systems including data sharing platforms are not available, used on an ad
01 hoc basis or provide inconsistent integration across a few surveillance data systems.
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct stakeholder mapping and establish a multisectoral committee for coordination of an integrated, interoperable,
02 standardized data system and data sharing platform.
LIMITED z Review existing legal frameworks across relevant sectors to assess compatibility to develop integrated, interoperable,
CAPACITY standardized data systems and data sharing.
z Conduct analysis of existing data and surveillance systems (e.g. disease specific, veterinary and environmental surveillance)
and existing data sharing mechanisms and identify opportunities and challenges for integration, interoperability and
standardization.
z Develop a national strategic plan for integration, interoperability and data standardization across data systems, including data
sharing platforms and visual interpretation.
z Identify a mechanism to develop data sharing platforms and dashboard frameworks to support data sharing and analysis.
z Establish a communication channel with designated contact persons from relevant sectors and participating agencies/
entities for effective communication and coordination.
z Disseminate to all relevant sectors, and implement the national strategic plan for integration, interoperability and data
03 standardization across data systems, including data sharing platforms and visual interpretation.
DEVELOPED z Develop guidelines and SOPs for data system integration, interoperability and standardization as well as data sharing
CAPACITY mechanisms to support implementation of the national strategic plan at the national level.
303
z Develop data sharing platforms and dashboard frameworks to support data sharing and analysis.
z Develop tools for visual interpretation of integrated data on data sharing platforms and dashboards, including data
analyses, and ensure compatibility with existing surveillance data collection. Develop accompanying advocacy and user
guides to facilitate roll out and encourage use of visual interpretations.
z Increase the number of existing surveillance data systems that share data in a standardized manner and contribute to joint
analysis and visual interpretations.
z Adapt legal frameworks across relevant sectors, as required, to support integrated, interoperable, standardized data
systems and data sharing.
z Develop training materials and disseminate to relevant stakeholders in health and other relevant sectors for management,
use and interpretation of integrated data sharing system outputs.
z Secure ongoing budget allocation for implementation of the national strategic plan, based on costing.
04 z Adapt guidelines and SOPs for data system integration, interoperability and standardization as well as data sharing
DEMONSTRATED mechanisms to support implementation of the national strategic plan at the subnational level.
CAPACITY z Increase the number of surveillance data systems that share data in a standardized manner and contribute to joint analysis
and visual interpretations, including at the subnational level.
z Conduct SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant) to evaluate data sharing, systematic integration, system intraoperability and use of
visual interpretations in a real or simulated event.
z Provide available technical, institutional and human resources for the maintenance and quality assurance of integrated
data sharing systems.
z Review, update and adapt the national strategic plan for integration, interoperability and data standardization across data
05 systems, including data sharing platforms and visual interpretation based on results from M&E activities.
z No national networks exist to support surveillance information sharing and collaboration, or collaboration is conducted in
z Conduct a comprehensive assessment of existing stakeholders, sectors, organizations and partners involved in health
02 surveillance (including non-traditional partners) to identify potential network participants.
LIMITED z Establish a multisectoral committee (with ToR), with representatives from relevant sectors, organizations and partners
CAPACITY involved in surveillance in the country to guide the development and maintenance of national information sharing and
networks.
z Perform an assessment of existing national networks within the country, including networks of small size or with intersectoral
collaboration, to determine current networks and opportunities for growth.
z Establish ToRs for national networks including mission, membership, meetings, secretariat, responsibilities, reporting and
organization.
z Review current country contribution to regional and global surveillance networks.
z Promote awareness and engagement among stakeholders of the benefits of networks, emphasizing the importance of
sharing information and resources to enhance collaborative surveillance.
03 support collaboration within and between sectors relevant to surveillance. Ensure alignment with any existing national
DEVELOPED strategic plans for integration, interoperability and data standardization, including data sharing platforms and visual
CAPACITY interpretation.
z Networks to establish SOPs for data sharing amongst network members, with consideration to existing data systems and
sharing platforms.
305
z Networks to establish mechanisms to share capacities across sectors, organizations and health system levels within the
country to increase overall capacity and integrate learning.
z Develop mechanisms and opportunities to contribute to regional and global platforms’ strategic agendas and knowledge
exchange.
z Implement protocols and SOPs developed by networks across all relevant sectors, organizations and partners to facilitate
z Demonstrate that information sharing across relevant network stakeholders, resources and knowledge generated from
05 networks was used to support health emergency management response, planning or preparedness activities.
SUSTAINABLE z Secure regular and sustainable in-country funding for ongoing collaborative surveillance networks across relevant sectors.
CAPACITY z Continuously improve and refine networks’ ToRs to ensure adaptability and responsiveness to emerging needs and threats,
technological advancements, and evolving best practices in information sharing.
z Document and share best practices in developing in-country networks and engage country in peer-to-peer learning
programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
z Actively increase engagement in regional and global platforms and engage the country in international activities to support
Tools:
z “Crafting the mosaic”: a framework for resilient surveillance for respiratory viruses of epidemic and pandemic potential. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240070288).
z Cross-border collaboration on emerging infectious diseases. World Health Organization. Regional Office for South-East Asia; 2007. (https://iris.who.int/
306
handle/10665/204925)
z Sharing and reuse of health-related data for research purposes: WHO policy and implementation guidance, Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023.
Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240044968)
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
z Risk assessment and mapping of vulnerable areas: Assessment of risk during preparedness and readiness is essential to identify vulnerable areas that
should be prioritized for prevention and control efforts.
z Harnessing local knowledge and data: The active use of local insights and data to inform the planning, designing and scaling of vector control tools and
interventions. By incorporating context specific information, interventions can be tailored to meet the unique needs and challenges of the community.
z Mobilizing and supporting communities: Recognizing the essential role of community involvement in developing and implementing local vector control
interventions through a One Health approach. By empowering communities and fostering active participation, interventions can leverage community
knowledge, resources and networks for more effective and sustainable outcomes.
z Continuous review, lessons learned, and monitoring and evaluation: Ongoing assessment and learning is important in vector control interventions. By
systematically reviewing interventions, capturing lessons learned, and monitoring and evaluating their impact, interventions can be refined and adapted
over time to enhance local effectiveness and efficiency.
IMPACT:
Contextually informed, community driven vector control interventions lead to a significant reduction in vector-borne disease outbreaks.
z Integrated community driven vector control management systems are not in place, or efforts are ad hoc.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Establish a multisectoral coordination committee (with ToR), with representatives from One Health, other relevant sectors and
02 the community, to facilitate planning, design, development of vector control management systems with local knowledge and
LIMITED data, and community implementation of interventions.
CAPACITY z Assess existing vector control efforts and data management systems for the degree of integration of community level
knowledge and data into plans, policies and interventions alongside mapping key stakeholders and community engagement.
z Conduct a risk assessment and vulnerability mapping for vector-borne diseases, if not already available.
z Establish mechanisms for community engagement and communication, including channels for local knowledge and data to
be integrated into vector control management systems, to facilitate risk communication, and to mobilize communities toward
joint assessment and identification of contextualized interventions.
z Develop a national strategy for community engagement and mobilization in vector control.
z Develop and implement integrated community driven vector control strategies and plans that can be tailored to meet the
needs and challenges of a community, and which provide a channel for local knowledge and data integration.
z Expand implementation of integrated community driven vector control interventions as per guiding strategies and plans,
05 activities to ensure local involvement in implementation and effective collection and use of local knowledge and data.
SUSTAINABLE Customize vector control strategies and plans by adapting to the specific needs and circumstances of local context.
CAPACITY z Sustain community engagement and participation in vector control activities through ongoing communication, education
and involvement in planning, design and development of vector control management systems and implementation of
interventions.
z Conduct research, development and innovation to support improvement in integrated vector control tools, strategies and
technologies, and participate in relevant international forums.
z Secure sustainable financing mechanisms through domestic budgets and by exploring innovative financing options.
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
z Needs assessment, planning and designing: By planning and designing WASH interventions in collaboration with communities, interventions can be
designed to meet specific needs and preferences. A collaborative approach considers the results of risk and needs assessments and adapts established
guidelines, best practices and available tools to the local context.
z Implementation: Implementation of safe community WASH services includes the provision of safe drinking water, toilets, hygiene facilities and hygiene
promotion training. The process should prioritize safe management of WASH facilities in communities and community health facilities before, during
and after health emergencies.
IMPACT:
Community driven WASH interventions foster sustainability and resilience, and result in improved health outcomes and enhanced overall well-
being through WASH-related diseases being significantly reduced.
z Community driven effective WASH interventions are not in place or efforts are ad hoc.
01
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct a situational analysis to understand the community’s water, sanitation and hygiene needs, considering existing
02 infrastructure, resources, local practices, vulnerable areas and water sources.
LIMITED z Engage key stakeholders, such as community members, local authorities and CSOs, to identify priorities and challenges
CAPACITY related to WASH interventions.
z Collaborate with local stakeholders, including government agencies, NGOs, international organizations and community
leaders, to establish partnerships and leverage resources to support WASH interventions.
z Set up a coordination mechanism, with defined roles and responsibilities, to ensure active community participation in the
development and implementation of WASH interventions.
z Develop national policies for community WASH, including governance mechanisms, financing and monitoring, as well as
Provide technical assistance and guidance to communities for planning and designing WASH interventions
Facilitate community engagement activities to gather input and ensure active involvement in decision-making
processes and implementation
Build capacity of local institutions and CBOs to take a lead role in needs assessment, planning and implementing
WASH interventions
Support communities to develop local guidelines and protocols for WASH interventions based on best practices and
current evidence.
z Secure funding and resources necessary for the implementation of community WASH interventions.
04 z Build community capacity in monitoring, feedback and evaluation techniques to assess the effectiveness of WASH
DEMONSTRATED services.
CAPACITY z Co-design and establish comprehensive monitoring and evaluation systems to track the progress and impact of
community WASH interventions.
z Continuously improve and adapt WASH interventions based on feedback and evaluation results, emerging knowledge and
best practices.
z Develop hygiene promotion and awareness campaigns and conduct train the trainers programs for community members
to expand campaign reach.
z Provide training on community driven WASH to relevant multisectoral staff and key stakeholders in IPC and WASH-FIT
assessment of community facilities.
z Foster collaboration and knowledge sharing among communities to learn from each other’s experiences and successes in
WASH interventions.
z Conduct review meetings at national and subnational level convening multisectoral key stakeholders to assess
implementation progress of community driven WASH, and to identify and document best practices and lessons learned.
05 maintenance.
SUSTAINABLE z Secure local funding mechanisms and partnerships to ensure the financial sustainability of community WASH services.
CAPACITY z Co-develop and implement innovative approaches for sustainable management of WASH facilities, such as rainwater
harvesting and decentralized wastewater treatment.
314
z Strengthen community networks and alliances to advocate for WASH policies and secure ongoing support from
government authorities and other stakeholders.
z Integrate M&E of community WASH services as part of overall service delivery and primary health care.
z Document and share country experiences in community-driven WASH and engage the country in peer-to-peer learning
programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017. (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
Food security is a right of all people, and it is vital in protecting communities in the context of health emergency preparedness, response and resilience.
Enhancing the resilience of food production and distribution systems before, during and after health emergencies needs to prioritized to further support
community resilience and well-being.
IMPACT:
Social welfare and protection systems expanded to support the well-being and resilience of communities before, during and after emergencies.
Food production, procurement and distribution systems are functional before, during and after health emergencies to ensure resilience of food
security systems and community well-being.
z Social welfare and protection systems are not expanded for health emergencies or efforts before, during or after health
z Assess existing social welfare and protection policies within the country to identify level of integration of health emergencies
02 within the existing system(s).
LIMITED z Assess the status of infrastructure logistical networks and organizational frameworks necessary for the seamless provision
CAPACITY of social welfare and protection during health emergencies.
z Conduct regular risk and vulnerability assessments, alongside assessments of the potential socioeconomic and health
impacts from health emergencies, for vulnerable and at risk populations to identify social protection policies for scale up and
expansion during health emergencies.
z Establish a steering committee with relevant stakeholders to scale up and expand existing social welfare and protection
policies, plans and procedures for health emergencies.
z Expand, or update as needed, social protection policies, plans and procedures that address the specific needs of vulnerable
z Scale up social welfare and protection systems for health emergencies at all levels.
04 z Establish linkage between social welfare and protection systems and emergency response systems, ensuring seamless
DEMONSTRATED coordination and integration to address the needs of vulnerable and at risk populations due to health emergencies.
CAPACITY z Establish and maintain resilient infrastructure to support the scale up of social protection policies and the delivery of goods
and services before, during and after health emergencies at all levels.
z Strengthen coordination and collaboration among community leaders, CSOs and other stakeholders involved in social
welfare and protection initiatives.
z Develop strategic partnerships and collaborations with international organizations and donors for financial and technical
support, as needed.
z Establish M&E mechanisms to assess the scale up and implementation of social protection and welfare systems during
health emergencies.
z Regularly monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of scaling up social welfare and protection policies and procedures for
05 health emergencies and update relevant policies and procedures based on results.
SUSTAINABLE z Sustain the integration of health emergencies into social welfare and protection policies through policy reforms and
CAPACITY legislative measures.
z Secure sustainable financing for social welfare and protection systems through establishing a strategic communication
z Food production, procurement and distribution systems that are resilient to health emergencies are not in place or efforts
01 are ad hoc.
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct a situational analysis of existing food production, procurement and distribution systems including contingency plans
02 for strategic stockpiling to identify gaps and vulnerabilities during health emergencies.
LIMITED z Conduct an assessment of existing infrastructure, technological and logistical networks related to local food production to
CAPACITY identify potential gaps.
z Review relevant best practices and lessons learned from previous health emergencies related to food production,
procurement and distribution systems to identify effective strategies and insights for enhancing resilience.
z Explore partnership opportunities with local, national and international suppliers and producers to establish a diverse food
supply chain that is reliable during health emergencies.
z Designate a national entity or steering committee (with ToR) to be responsible for communication and coordination of the
development and implementation of policies, plans and procedures related to food production, procurement and distribution
systems before, during and after health emergencies.
z Develop policies, plans and procedures for the production, procurement and distribution of food, nutrition and raw
z Train relevant stakeholders on procurement and distribution systems to be implemented during health emergencies,
including efficient resource allocation and timely delivery.
z Enhance the capability of local producers and suppliers to be able to meet increased demand for food, nutrition and raw
materials during health emergencies.
z Institutionalize and operationalize the national entity or steering committee for communication, coordination and
implementation of food production, procurement and distribution systems during health emergencies.
z Implement policies, plans and procedures for the production, procurement and distribution of food, nutrition and raw
04 materials and strategic stockpiling during health emergencies at national and subnational levels.
DEMONSTRATED z Test the effectiveness of the contingency plan for stockpiling through conducting SimEx/AAR/IAR (as relevant).
CAPACITY z Increase the use of technology and innovation to enhance efficiency and sustainability of food production systems and
infrastructure relevant to health emergencies.
z Conduct in-country research through collaboration with relevant research institutions to identify emerging trends and
challenges and innovative food production, procurement and distribution strategies for health emergencies.
z Secure adequate funding by engaging in strategic communication with domestic and international organizations and
donors.
z Establish mechanisms for M&E of the food supply chain to assess the reliable delivery of essential food resources during
health emergencies.
z Conduct regular M&E of the established systems for producing, procuring and distributing food, nutrition and raw materials
05 before, during and after emergencies. Identify areas for improvement and implement necessary adjustments to policies,
SUSTAINABLE plans and procedures, using a data driven approach to support evidence-based decision making.
CAPACITY z Maintain and continuously improve infrastructure, technological and logistical networks for local food production, ensuring
long-term sustainability and adaptability to changing needs and challenges due to health emergencies.
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
z Legislation and social systems/services and labour standards: The reinforcement or expansion of legislation for labour, social protection and education
along with standards and service coverage aiming to ensure the continuity of basic social and education services and protections during health
emergencies helps to mitigate the adverse effects of health emergencies and create a more secure and resilient workforce. This includes: social
protection benefits (social assistance, insurance and specific labour and other regulatory mechanisms, such as a moratorium on evictions); care (e.g.
pre-school), education and learning (e.g. when educational institutions are closed due to an emergency); encourage employment guarantee in the case
of long periods of closures or absences owing to illness; reduce precarious and unsafe work arrangements; ensure labour participation in decision-
making; facilitate flexible work options; and foster accountability among governments, businesses, and other organizations.
z Creation, management and allocation of funds and systems: The provision, creation, management and allocation of funds for emergencies as well as
how different systems have the capability to perform their usual functions or expand their functions and coverage during emergencies. Social systems
that are functioning below 100 percent coverage may need additional finances to expand their reach, in particular to disadvantaged populations. The
service and benefits offered may need to be more comprehensive during an emergency or as a result of emergencies. For example, schools that do
not have digital platforms may need to be provided with funds to increase access to digital learning. Funding is essential to provide support to affected
communities and those at the highest risk of being severely impacted by health emergencies.
z Physical and digital infrastructure: The development of physical and digital infrastructure plays a vital role in ensuring education and business continuity
and protecting livelihoods. By providing support and resources, communities can adapt and sustain their economic and daily living activities, as well as
social connections, in the face of disruptions caused by health emergencies. Robust physical and digital infrastructure facilitates smooth functioning of
It is crucial to promote and safeguard universal, inclusive and equitable quality education and learning opportunities for children and all individuals, regardless
of their age or circumstances. This includes: continuity of the development and implementation of relevant curriculum and evaluation tools to ensure
uninterrupted delivery of quality education to children, adolescents and adults; establishment of policies and services that provide school-based or school-
linked social support including food security, child protection, psychological support and other health services for children, and ensure continuity during
emergencies; and digital technologies and infrastructure should aim to support – and not replace – schools, offering inclusive and equitable face-to-face
322
learning as compatible with the emergency supported by a seamless transition between quality hybrid or distance learning modalities.
IMPACT:
The protection of livelihoods and business continuity systems play a significant role in addressing the health, economic and social impacts of
health emergencies. All children, adolescents and adults have access to inclusive and effective learning opportunities before, during and after
emergencies.
z The protection of livelihoods, business continuity and continuity of education and learning systems is not in place, or
z Establish a dedicated task force to review current legislation regarding social protection/welfare and education systems for
02 the protection of livelihoods, business continuity and continuity of education and learning.
LIMITED z Collaborate with social protection services, community leaders and CSOs to assess existing legislation and social protection
CAPACITY coverage related to livelihoods for various population groups (e.g. formal sector, informal economy, professions, workers in
the care economy) and the continuity of business operations.
z Collaborate with educational institutions and relevant stakeholders to assess existing education systems’ resilience to health
emergencies, including remote, hybrid and in-person learning systems during health emergencies and capacity for equitable
and seamless transition between modalities.
z Collaborate with educational institutions and stakeholders to assess the resilience of school-linked and school-based
social protection and healthcare services (e.g. child protection, school meals, psychosocial support, immunization and other
healthcare services) including capability for continuity when schools are closed.
z Conduct a vulnerability assessment to identify priority groups and develop targeted support systems based on the level of
03 to effectively protect livelihoods and ensure the seamless continuity of business operations and education activities during
DEVELOPED health emergencies including targeted support systems for identified priority groups.
CAPACITY z Establish a dedicated fund management system with transparent processes for efficient allocation of resources to support
vulnerable populations during emergencies.
z Develop and implement educational policies and programs including remote, hybrid and in-person learning modalities to
ensure inclusive, uninterrupted and effective learning opportunities for all individuals during health emergencies.
z Develop guidelines and resources for educators and learners to facilitate remote learning and adapt educational practices
to emergency situations.
z Develop and implement policies for alternative modalities to deliver school meals and other school-linked and school-
based social protection when schools are closed due to emergencies.
z Develop guidelines and resources for health professionals that deliver school-based or school-linked healthcare services
to facilitate telehealth consultations and other modalities to ensure the continuity of services when schools are closed or
partially closed due to emergencies.
z Develop and implement necessary reforms in legislation and social systems to ensure formal employment, safe
workplaces and facilitation of flexible work arrangements.
z Invest in the development of physical and digital infrastructure to enhance business continuity, livelihood protection and
continuity of education and learning.
z Establish a coordination mechanism among relevant stakeholders to exchange best practices and share resources for
supporting livelihoods, business continuity, and continuity of education services during health emergencies.
z Enhance compliance with legislation, social systems and services, including for social protection and education, and labour
z Regularly review and update guidelines, policy and legal frameworks based on M&E results for the protection of livelihood,
Tools:
z Building back resilient: how can education systems prevent, prepare for and respond to health emergencies and pandemics? United National
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419).
Proactive measures to tackle these impacts prioritize reducing risks, promoting overall mental health and well-being, fostering resilience and developing
effective coping strategies. Safeguarding community health and mental health and psychosocial well-being during emergencies requires a comprehensive
approach that includes risk reduction and management, preparedness, readiness, response and building back better after crises. Designing systems for
scaling up community health services and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) as a part of health emergency preparedness, and developing
and maintaining infrastructure for community health services and MHPSS need to be prioritized to mitigate indirect health and mental health impacts due to
emergencies. Designing preparedness systems for scaling up health services and MHPSS includes developing strategies, systems and minimum services
that ensure timely access to mental health and psychosocial support167, enabling communities to effectively address the indirect health and mental health
impacts that arise before, during and after health emergencies. By implementing these mechanisms, decision-makers and stakeholders can establish a
resilient approach to emergency preparedness and risk management that prioritizes the community health, mental health and well-being of individuals.
Developing and maintaining infrastructure for community health services and MHPSS includes the development and maintenance of physical and digital
infrastructure before emergencies occur, specifically for providing community health services and MHPSS.
IMPACT:
166
Charlson F, van Ommeren M, Flaxman A, Cornett J, Whiteford H, Saxena S. New WHO prevalence estimates of mental disorders in conflict settings: a systematic review and meta-analysis.
Lancet. 2019;394(10194):240-248. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30934-1.
167
The following resource provides a globally agreed package of minimum services to be provided during humanitarian emergencies: Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services Package.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee; 2022. (https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-reference-group-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support-emergency-settings/iasc-minimum-
328
service-package-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support)
MONITORING AND EVALUATION:
(1) A strategy for scaling of community health services and MHPSS, as a key part of health emergency preparedness, is developed and
implemented. (2) Physical and dynamic digital infrastructure and human resources are developed, strengthened and maintained to support the
delivery of community health services and MHPSS.
z Strategic scaling of community health services and MHPSS is not in place during health emergency preparedness or
z Conduct a situational analysis of community health services and MHPSS for addressing indirect health and mental health
02 impacts of health emergencies.
LIMITED z Conduct a comprehensive needs and risk assessment to identify specific community health service and MHPSS gaps and
CAPACITY requirements within the community before, during and after emergencies.
z Conduct a review of multisectoral collaboration, including community engagement, for community health services and
MHPSS before, during and after emergencies to identify opportunities for further collaboration.
z Establish a mechanism for communication and joint development of plans, guidelines and protocols for strategically
scaling up community health services and MHPSS between healthcare providers, mental health professionals, community
organizations and emergency response agencies.
z Develop relevant plans, guidelines and protocols for the strategic scaling of community health services and MHPSS168
before, during and after health emergencies, based on existing guidance and incorporating strategies for communication
168
330
Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services Package. Inter-Agency Standing Committee; 2022. (https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-reference-group-mental-health-and-
psychosocial-support-emergency-settings/iasc-minimum-service-package-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support)
z Develop and implement strategies for community outreach and awareness campaigns to promote mental health,
resilience, stress management, positive coping and self-care practices before, during and after emergencies.
z Train health providers and mental health professionals, and educate community leaders, on existing guidance for provision
of basic psychosocial support during emergencies.
z Develop and implement capacity-building and training programs for local community members to offer peer support, basic
psychosocial support and psychological first aid, and promote mental health in emergency situations.
z Scale up existing services to provide community health services and MHPSS, ensuring equitable access to care for all
05 health emergencies and update plans, protocols and guidelines based results and evolving community needs.
SUSTAINABLE z Integrate the scaling efforts for health services and MHPSS into standard practice.
CAPACITY z Allocate sustainable funding to secure human, logistical and technological resources to build sustainable capacity for the
continuity of community health services and MHPSS before, during and after emergencies.
331
z Enhance the digital infrastructure by implementing advanced telemedicine systems and digital platforms that leverage
cutting edge technologies such as machine learning and data analytics to provide comprehensive and integrated health
services and MHPSS remotely.
z Document and share best practices for scaling health services and MHPSS before, during and after emergencies and
engage the country in peer-to-peer learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
Tools:
z Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services Package. Inter-Agency Standing Committee; 2022. (https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-
reference-group-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support-emergency-settings/iasc-minimum-service-package-mental-health-and-psychosocial-
support)
z Charlson F, van Ommeren M, Flaxman A, Cornett J, Whiteford H, Saxena S. New WHO prevalence estimates of mental disorders in conflict settings: a
systematic review and meta-analysis. Lancet. 2019;394(10194):240-248. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30934-1.
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
Additionally, timely access to crucial medical products and efficient regulatory responses during emergencies support access to countermeasures and support
rapid responses to health emergencies, including: the use of the global benchmarking tool for the evaluation of national regulatory authority capabilities;
implementation of institutional development plans; agile product regulatory requirements and procedures during emergencies; coordination mechanisms
between regulators, and between regulators and researchers during emergencies; accelerated countermeasures review and approval through increased
regulatory reliance, harmonization and convergence; and participation in expedited emergency use listing and performance qualification processes by WHO
to rapidly evaluate and approve critical products for emergencies, as relevant.
IMPACT:
z Standardized platforms for equitable and scalable clinical trials are not in place, or efforts for outbreak research are
01 conducted ad hoc.
NO CAPACITY
z Assess national research capacity, including outbreak research capacity, use of platform trials, clinical practice training,
02 essential trial infrastructure, standardized design, clinical trial mapping and patient recruitment practices.
LIMITED z Identify a focal agency for effective coordination and communication of clinical trial activities for outbreak research; to collate
CAPACITY research outcomes, such as standardized designs for specific pathogens; and track planned, completed and ongoing clinical
trials and latest evidence base relevant to candidate medical countermeasures for priority diseases.
z Identify potential, or additional, clinical research sites and establish hospital networks for conducting clinical trials.
z Organize advocacy sessions to raise awareness among policy-makers and other relevant authorities, health providers and
community members regarding the importance of clinical trials to generate knowledge for the development of medical
countermeasures against priority diseases.
z Develop a national strategic plan for clinical trials and outbreak research to strengthen national research capacities and
03 support the development of platform trials, essential trial infrastructure, pathogen/outbreak-standardized trial designs and
DEVELOPED patient recruitment.
z Regularly update mapping of clinical trials and the latest evidence base for candidate countermeasures for priority
z Contribute to the development and dissemination of global standards and guidelines for standardized trial designs and
05 core protocols.
SUSTAINABLE z Sustain community engagement and participatory approaches in research to ensure transparency, quality, equity and
CAPACITY diverse participation in clinical trials and acceptance of research outcomes.
169
336
Good Participatory Practice: Guidelines for biomedical HIV prevention trials, second edition. Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; 2011. (https://avac.org/resource/report/
good-participatory-practice-guidelines-for-biomedical-hiv-prevention-trials-second-edition/)
BENCHMARK H4.2: Regulatory and legal frameworks are developed and functional for timely trials, product review and approval
OBJECTIVE: To develop and implement regulatory and legal frameworks for efficient regulatory response during health emergencies and timely access to
crucial medical products
z No regulatory and legal frameworks are available for clinical trials, product review and approval during health emergencies,
z Assess current regulatory and legal frameworks within the country for timely trials, product review and approval during health
02 emergencies. Include current capacities of the regulatory environment, such as regulatory requirements and procedures,
LIMITED coordination between regulators and researchers and accelerated countermeasures review and approval.
CAPACITY z Obtain technical assistance from global regulatory entities to develop an institutional development plan based on assessment
of capacities.
z Establish coordination mechanisms between regulators and researchers within the national context during health
emergencies.
z Explore opportunities for efficient regulatory response during health emergencies, including pathways for agile product
regulatory requirements and accelerated countermeasures review and approval.
z Participate in WHO evaluation of regulatory systems, as mandated by WHA Resolution 67.20, through the WHO Global
170
WHO Global Benchmarking Tool (GBT) for evaluation of national regulatory systems. World Health Organization. (https://www.who.int/tools/global-benchmarking-tools)
z Implement regulatory and legal frameworks for timely trials, product review and approval during health emergencies which
04 provide timely access to crucial medical products through an efficient regulatory response.
DEMONSTRATED z Continue participation in the WHO global benchmarking assessment of national regulatory systems, to monitor and
CAPACITY evaluate progress in efficiency and quality prior to issuing marketing authorizations and to conduct post-marketing
pharmacovigilance.
z Increase regulatory reliance, harmonization and convergence to facilitate accelerated medical countermeasures review and
approval during health emergencies.
z Monitor and evaluate coordination mechanisms between regulators and researchers and adapt as needed to support
effective collaboration and exchange of information for improved regulatory response during health emergencies.
z Refine and update agile product regulatory requirements and procedures based on lessons learned from previous health
emergencies and updated risk assessments for the country.
z Establish a comprehensive and sustainable framework for continued evaluation and improvement of national regulatory
05 authority capabilities, utilizing the WHO global benchmarking tool as a regular assessment mechanism.
SUSTAINABLE z Strengthen the country’s institutional development plan to ensure long-term sustainability and adaptability, considering
CAPACITY emerging regulatory challenges and evolving global regulatory landscapes, and contribute to global technical assistance
processes.
z Contribute to shaping global regulatory policies and frameworks, actively participating in international discussions and
initiatives to enhance regulatory response and advocating for timely access to critical medical products during health
emergencies.
z Participate in WHO emergency use listing171 and performance qualification processes, as relevant, to support the expediting
of vaccines, therapeutics and in vitro diagnostics during health emergencies.
Regulation and prequalification: Emergency use list. World Health Organization. (https://www.who.int/teams/regulation-prequalification/eul#:~:text=The%20WHO%20Emergency%20Use%20
Listing,by%20a%20public%20health%20emergency.)
Tools:
z Good Participatory Practice: Guidelines for biomedical HIV prevention trials, second edition. Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS;
2011. (https://avac.org/resource/report/good-participatory-practice-guidelines-for-biomedical-hiv-prevention-trials-second-edition/)
z Guzman J, O’Connell E, Kikule K, et al. The WHO Global Benchmarking Tool: a game changer for strengthening national regulatory capacity. BMJ Global
Health. 2020;5:e003181. doi:10.1136/ bmjgh-2020-003181.
z WHO Global Benchmarking Tool (GBT) for evaluation of national regulatory systems. World Health Organization. (https://www.who.int/tools/global-
benchmarking-tools)
z Regulation and prequalification: Emergency use list. World Health Organization. (https://www.who.int/teams/regulation-prequalification/
eul#:~:text=The%20WHO%20Emergency%20Use%20Listing,by%20a%20public%20health%20emergency.)
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
Furthermore, distributed manufacturing that is facilitated by pre-negotiated agreements plays a pivotal role in ensuring the production and equitable
distribution of adequate supply of high priority and quality assured medical countermeasures. This process mainly relies on: setting up manufacturing
platforms with technology transfer support; agreements for access and benefits sharing priority pathogens; transfer of intellectual property rights through
licensing agreements and patent waivers; funding manufacturing facility setup and ongoing operations through at-risk capital financing mechanisms; and
national policies for prenegotiated technology transfer, access and benefit sharing, licensing, and financing agreements.
Similarly, an ever-ready capability for rapid mobilization is a critical component of manufacturing to increase capabilities, enhance preparedness and optimize
the production of medical countermeasures during emergencies, this includes: dual purpose manufacturing through the integration of emergency capacity
into the production of nonemergency products; technical assistance for dual purpose production lines; stable access to production inputs, such as raw
materials and utilities; and procurement prioritization from local and regional manufacturers to create demand side incentives.
IMPACT:
The rapid mobilization of medical countermeasure products is effectively implemented during health emergencies to meet country and regional
needs.
z Adaptable manufacturing platforms, supported by prenegotiated agreements, are not in place or manufacturing efforts for
z Establish a multisectoral coordination committee (with ToR) to guide communication and coordination of relevant entities for
02 medical countermeasure manufacturing activities.
LIMITED z Assess the current medical countermeasure manufacturing landscape in the country, including threat and vulnerability
CAPACITY mapping, demand forecasting, capability and capacity, and include a regional production needs analysis.
z Conduct a situational analysis reviewing the policy environment, input materials, production workforce, financing and
technical support for the manufacturing of medical countermeasures within the country.
z Engage relevant key stakeholders, including legislative or policy-makers, to develop a national manufacturing plan based on
national needs.
z Initiate discussions for access to sharing agreements for priority pathogens, as relevant the specific needs and vulnerabilities
of the country.
z Expand implementation of the national manufacturing plan and national policies to support prenegotiated agreements.
04 z Expand access and benefit sharing agreements for a wider range of priority pathogens.
DEMONSTRATED z Secure funding for manufacturing facility set up and ongoing operations through more comprehensive at-risk capital
CAPACITY financing mechanisms.
z Facilitate the transfer of intellectual property rights through licensing agreements and patent waivers to manufacturers.
z Increase manufacturing platforms and technology transfer to support in-country or regional production of medical
countermeasures.
z Conduct M&E of the national manufacturing plan and implementation of national policies, such as through SimEx/AAR/IAR
(as relevant).
z Regularly review and update the national manufacturing plan and national policies based on M&E findings and the current
z An integrated dual purpose manufacturing system to support ever-ready capabilities is not in place or efforts to rapidly
z Conduct a comprehensive assessment of existing production lines to identify viable opportunities to integrate emergency
02 capacity into the production of nonemergency products to create dual purpose manufacturing.
LIMITED z Assess available technical assistance for operating dual purpose production lines.
CAPACITY z Identify local and regional manufacturers with the capacity to produce medical countermeasures, assessing their readiness
for emergency procurement prioritization.
z Assess the current availability and reliability of production inputs, such as raw materials and utilities, identifying potential
vulnerabilities and areas for improvement to support medical countermeasure production and dual purpose manufacturing.
z Review mechanisms in the country to prioritize procurement of medical countermeasures from local and regional
manufacturers during health emergencies to create demand side incentives.
z Develop a dual purpose manufacturing plan and supporting procedures/guidelines for the modification of production lines
to accommodate dual purpose manufacturing, considering regulatory requirements and industry best practices.
z Establish M&E mechanisms to assess the performance of dual purpose manufacturing systems.
z Implement the procurement prioritization strategy by actively engaging and contracting with selected local and regional
04 manufacturers.
DEMONSTRATED z Implement supply chain management practices for proactive monitoring of production inputs, optimizing inventory
CAPACITY management, and conduct regular assessments to ensure uninterrupted access to essential resources including raw
material and utilities.
z Conduct regular testing and SimEx (as relevant) to validate the readiness and responsiveness of dual purpose
manufacturing for health emergencies.
05 z Integrate dual purpose manufacturing for preparedness as an integral part of the overall national manufacturing strategy,
SUSTAINABLE ensuring sustainability and long-term viability of the approach.
CAPACITY z Sustain and enhance the procurement prioritization strategy including strengthening domestic manufacturing
collaboration and capabilities.
z Sustain collaboration and knowledge sharing with industry peers and relevant stakeholders to exchange best practices and
promote continued innovations in dual purpose manufacturing.
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
344
Regulatory framework for manufacturing platforms
The implementation of a strengthened regulatory framework to oversee the set-up and scale-up of manufacturing platforms for medical countermeasures
is essential to effective health emergency preparedness and response. Recognizing the importance of efficient, reliable, and timely production while adhering
to good regulatory practices and upholding stringent regulatory standards, includes capacities in the areas of robust regulatory systems, global and regional
technical support, adaptable manufacturing regulatory requirements, emergency coordination mechanisms, accelerated access to medical countermeasures
and expedited evaluation and approval process.
IMPACT:
Local and regional manufacture of medical countermeasures enables equitable access to life-saving interventions before, during and after health
emergencies.
These systems provide oversight of licensing and compliance with good practice including good manufacturing practices, good storage and distribution practices, good clinical practices and
good pharmacovigilance practices, ensuring adherence to high-quality standards.
BENCHMARK H4.5: National regulatory frameworks for manufacturing platforms are developed and implemented for health emergencies
OBJECTIVE: To establish robust national regulatory frameworks that effectively oversee the set-up and scale-up of manufacturing platforms for medical
countermeasure products during health emergencies
z National regulatory framework that effectively oversee the set-up and scale-up of manufacturing platforms for medical
01 countermeasure products during health emergencies is not in place or efforts are ad hoc.
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct a situational analysis of the existing regulatory framework for manufacturing platforms of medical countermeasures
02 for health emergencies, including: regulatory systems and oversight of licensing of good practice; level of adaptability in
LIMITED regulatory requirements during emergencies; coordination between regulators and manufacturers; level of technical support
CAPACITY received from regional and global entities; and ability for accelerated production during health emergencies.
z Conduct stakeholder analysis to identify key actors and their roles in the regulatory process and manufacturing for medical
countermeasures.
z Establish effective communication and coordination mechanisms among stakeholders to streamline regulatory operations
before, during and after health emergencies.
z Obtain technical guidance from global and regional entities to support national regulatory system strengthening.
z Explore opportunities for the accelerated production of medical countermeasures and how regulatory reliance, harmonization
and convergence can be increased during health emergencies.
z Develop comprehensive regulatory framework and strategies/guidelines to set-up and scale-up manufacturing platforms
04 up and scale-up manufacturing platforms for medical countermeasure products during health emergencies.
DEMONSTRATED z Assess the use of WHO emergency use authorization (EUA), emergency use listing (EUL) and licensing, as relevant to the
CAPACITY country.
z Conduct regular M&E of the regulatory system for manufacturing platforms, including adaptability of requirements during
health emergencies.
z Demonstrate coordination mechanism between regulators and manufactures for manufacture and access to medical
countermeasures during health emergencies.
z Establish regulatory oversight of licensing of Good Manufacturing Practice compliance.
05 z Secure long-term funding to sustain and support the regulatory oversight activities for medical countermeasure
SUSTAINABLE manufacturing platforms before, during and after health emergencies.
CAPACITY z Contribute to global regulatory technical support and offer guidance to other countries on national regulatory system
strengthening.
z Engage in knowledge sharing and collaboration with other regions to enhance regulatory practices and standards.
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
347
handle/10665/333419)
Coordinated demand aggregation for medical countermeasures
Coordinated demand aggregation is crucial in the efforts of building an agile and effective health emergency supply chain, and is essential for decision-
makers to anticipate and meet demand of medical countermeasures for emergency preparedness and response. This includes performing risk-based
demand analysis, demand forecasting, aggregating demand forecasts across countries and regions, and formulating robust methodologies for demand
forecasting.
IMPACT:
Decision-makers are able to effectively anticipate and meet demand for medical countermeasures during health emergencies.
z Coordinated demand aggregation systems that meet the needs for medication countermeasures during health
z Conduct a situational analysis to identify gaps and challenges in existing demand analysis and forecasting capabilities for
02 medical countermeasures during health emergencies.
LIMITED z Conduct a stakeholder analysis to identify key actors involved in the demand aggregation process, and establish effective
CAPACITY communication and coordination mechanisms.
z Develop a mechanism to perform risk-based demand analysis, including rapid risk-assessment of needs at the onset and
during a health emergency.
z Conduct a risk-based demand analysis, including rapid risk-assessment of needs at the onset and during a health
03 emergency.
DEVELOPED z Develop and implement tools and methodologies to conduct rapid assessments using data-driven approaches to facilitate
CAPACITY accurate and timely demand forecasts for medical countermeasures during health emergencies.
z Establish data integrity and privacy policies to support data-driven approaches to demand forecasting and aggregation,
including vulnerable populations.
z Develop and integrate advanced tools and methodologies, such as statistical modelling and scenario analysis, to facilitate
04 accurate and timely demand forecasts for medical countermeasures during health emergencies.
DEMONSTRATED z Develop and implement a M&E framework to assess mechanisms to effectively determine demand aggregation and
349
05 z Secure long-term funding and resource allocation to sustain demand aggregation and forecasting practices.
SUSTAINABLE z Document and share country experiences in demand aggregation and forecasting and engage the country in peer-to-peer
CAPACITY learning programmes at the subnational, national and international levels.
z Conduct research and analysis to identify new tools and methods to further enhance the accuracy and effectiveness of
risk-based demand analysis and demand forecasting.
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
IMPACT:
Fair, equitable and efficient distribution of medical countermeasures during health emergencies.
z Needs-based allocation frameworks for distribution of medical countermeasures are not in place or efforts are ad hoc
z Conduct a situational analysis of resource allocation frameworks or mechanisms and principles for equitable access to
02 medical countermeasures before, during and after emergencies.
LIMITED z Review collective agreements and international instruments that support equitable access to appropriate countermeasures.
CAPACITY z Conduct a stakeholder analysis and mapping to identify key actors involved in the allocation process, and provide guidance to
relevant stakeholders.
z Develop and implement needs-based allocation frameworks and principles to optimize equitable, effective and responsive
z Expand implementation of the needs-based allocation frameworks and principles to all levels to optimize medical
05 z Sustain needs-based allocation frameworks and principles within subnational and national emergency response systems,
SUSTAINABLE ensuring integration into policies, legislation and SOPs.
CAPACITY z Secure sustainable funding to optimize needs-based allocation frameworks and systems at all levels for health
emergencies.
z Advocate for fair global allocation processes by actively contributing to the development of international standards,
guidelines and frameworks, ensuring that allocation decisions are driven by public health goals and ethical considerations.
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022 (https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/10-proposals-to-build-a-safer-world-together---strengthening-
the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-preparedness--response-andresilience--white-paper-for-consultation--june-2022).
z Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/strengthening-the-global-architecture-for-health-emergency-prevention--preparedness--response-and-resilience).
z WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public
health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
353
Emergency coordination
Operational support and logistics platforms
Robust operational support and logistics systems enable the transformation of strategies into practical actions. The achievement of tangible outcomes can
be attained through:
z Staff safety and security: Ensuring the protection of both personnel and affected communities involved in emergency response efforts. Staff safety
and security mainly includes suitable accommodation and provisions, equipment for safety and communications, adequate working environment,
and provision of safe transport. Safety and security also safeguards against threats such as sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment, with a strong
emphasis on upholding the welfare of all individuals engaged in the emergency coordination and response process.
z Operational logistics: Medical and supply logistics involve the establishment and maintenance of vital infrastructure and processes that are indispensable
for effective coordination during emergencies.
z Operational support and management: A range of essential functions necessary for streamlined emergency coordination such as financial administration,
efficient allocation and utilization of resources, and effective management of human resources within the context of emergency response operations.
IMPACT:
Emergency coordination strategies are informed and supported by well established operational support and logistics platforms.
z Operational support and logistics platforms are not in place or are functional on an ad hoc basis during health
01 emergencies.
NO CAPACITY
z Conduct a situational analysis of existing capabilities for emergency coordination, including staff safety and security,
02 operational logistics and operational support and management, to identify strengths and gaps.
LIMITED z Conduct a review, as appropriate, to gather insights from previous health emergencies regarding staff safety and security,
CAPACITY operational logistics, and operational support and management aspects.
z Perform a stakeholder analysis to identify key actors involved in providing operational support and logistic platforms for
health emergencies.
z Designate a focal point or entity responsible to oversee and coordinate operational support and logistics required before,
during and after health emergencies.
z Develop a safety and security framework and protocols to ensure the protection of staff and communities they serve
04 z Implement the integrated operational support and logistics plan for effective coordination, resource management and
DEMONSTRATED response during health emergencies at national and subnational levels.
CAPACITY z Establish effective linkages between medical logistic and supply departments and PHEOCs to strengthen operational
logistic capacities and implement technology solutions.
z Enhance operational support and management by implementing relevant financial forecasting and risk management
systems, innovative resource allocation approaches and continuous capacity-building programs for relevant multisectoral
staff.
z Regularly monitor and evaluate and refine operational systems and processes based on performance metrics and
feedback.
z Sustain strategic stockpiles of essential resources and supplies, leverage advanced technology solutions and establish
Tools:
z 10 proposals to build a safer world together – Strengthening the Global Architecture for Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience.
z Guidance for after action review (AAR). Geneva: World Health Organization; 2019 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/311537).
z Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://apps.who.int/iris/
handle/10665/333419)
357
Annex 1: Glossary
Note: These terms and definitions have been provided for use within the context of this tool and may differ
from those used in other documents.
After action review. An AAR provides an opportunity to review the functional capacity of public health and
emergency response systems and to identify practical areas for continued improvement (Guidance for after
action review (AAR). Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2019 (WHO/WHE/CPI/2019.4). Licence:
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.)
Biological agents of high consequence. These are biological agents and toxins that have the potential to
pose a severe threat to both human and animal health. While some select agents are normally found in the
environment and don’t cause human disease, many of them – if manipulated or released in large quantities
– can cause serious health threats. The informal Australia Group provides a List of human and animal
pathogens and toxins for export control (http://www.australiagroup.net/en/human_animal_pathogens.html)
Biosafety. Laboratory biosafety describes the containment principles, technologies and practices that are
implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. (World
Health Organization. (2020). Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th ed. World Health Organization. https://iris.
who.int/handle/10665/337956. License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO)
Biosecurity. Laboratory biosecurity describes the protection, control and accountability for valuable biological
materials within laboratories as well as information related to these materials and dual-use research, in
order to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release. (World Health
Organization. (2022). Joint external evaluation tool: International Health Regulations (2005), 3rd ed. World
Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/357087. License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO)
Case. A person who has the particular disease, health disorder or condition that meets the case definitions
for surveillance and outbreak investigation purposes. The definition of a case for surveillance and outbreak
investigation purpose is not necessarily the same as an ordinary clinical definition. (adapted from Porta M,
editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York:
Oxford University Press; 2014).
Case definition. A set of diagnostic criteria that must be fulfilled for an individual to be regarded as a case of
a particular disease for surveillance and outbreak investigation purposes. Case definitions can be based on
clinical criteria, laboratory criteria or a combination of the two with the elements of time, place and person. (In
the IHR, case definitions are published on the WHO website1 for the four diseases for which all cases must
be notified by States Parties to WHO, regardless of circumstances, under the IHR as provided in Annex 2.)
Chemical event. A manifestation of a disease or an occurrence of an event which creates a potential for a
disease as a result of exposure to or contamination by a chemical agent.
Communicable disease. A disease whose causal agent can be transmitted from successive hosts to healthy
subjects, from one individual to another. An illness due to a specific infectious agent or its toxic products
that arises through transmission of such agent or products from an infected person, animal, or reservoir to
a susceptible host, either directly or indirectly through an intermediate plant or animal host, vector, or the
inanimate environment. All infections and infestations are communicable (transmissible) diseases. (adapted
from Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association,
Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014).
Competent authority. An authority responsible for the implementation and application of health measures
under the IHR.
Contamination. The presence of an infectious or toxic agent or matter on the body surface of a human or
animal, in or on a product prepared for consumption or on other inanimate objects, including conveyances
that may constitute a public health risk.
Decontamination. A procedure whereby health measures are taken to eliminate an infectious or toxic agent
or matter on the body surface of a human or animal, in or on a product prepared for consumption, or on other
inanimate objects, including conveyances that may constitute a public health risk.
Designated laboratories. These are laboratories designated to perform specific laboratory services by
national, WHO or other authorities because of their proven capacities and capabilities, such as for AMR
testing.
Designated points of entry. These refer to a port, airport and potentially a ground crossing that is designated
by a State Party to strengthen, develop and maintain the capacities as per main IHR articles 19, 20 and 21,
and as described in Annex 1 of the IHR: the capacities at all times concerning access to medical services
for prompt assessment and care of ill travellers, a safe environment for travellers (e.g. water, food, waste),
personnel for inspection and vector control functions; and the capacities to respond specifically to events
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.
Disease. An illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present
significant harm to humans.
Disinsection. The procedure whereby health measures are taken to control or kill insect vectors of human
diseases present in baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels.
Early warning alert and response. The organized mechanism to rapidly detect and respond to signals that
might indicate potential acute public health events (Early Warning Alert and Response in Emergencies: an
operational guide. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO).
Early Warning System. In disease surveillance, a specific procedure to detect as early as possible any departure
from usual or normally observed frequency of phenomena. (Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology,
sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014)
Epidemic. The occurrence in a community or region of cases of an illness, specific health-related behaviours,
or other health-related events clearly in excess of normal expectancy. The community or region and the
period in which the cases occur are specified precisely. The number of cases indicating the presence of an
epidemic varies according to the agent, size and type of population exposed, previous experience or lack of
exposure to the disease, and time and place of occurrence (adapted from Porta M, editor. A dictionary of
epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press;
2014).
Event-based surveillance. The organized collection, monitoring, assessment and interpretation of mainly
unstructured ad hoc information regarding potential public health events or risks which may represent an
acute risk to human health. (Early Warning Alert and Response in Emergencies: an operational guide. Geneva:
World Health Organization; 2022. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO).
z FETP Basic Level Training is for local health staff and consists of limited classroom hours interspersed
throughout as a three-to-five month on-the-job field assignment to build capacity in conducting timely
outbreak detection, public health response and public health surveillance.
z FETP Intermediate Level Training is for district/region/state-level epidemiologists, and consists of
limited classroom hours interspersed throughout as a six-to-nine month on-the-job mentored field
assignment to build capacity in conducting outbreak investigations, planned epidemiologic studies, and
public health surveillance analyses and evaluations.
z FETP Advanced Level Training is for advanced epidemiologists and consists of limited classroom hours
interspersed throughout the 24 months of mentored field assignments to build capacity in outbreak
investigations, planned epidemiologic studies, public health surveillance analyses and evaluations,
scientific communication, and evidence-based decision making for development of effective public
health programming with a national focus. Animal health professionals can be engaged in these FETP
trainings.
Gender. refers to socially constructed characteristics of women and men – such as norms, roles
and relations of and between groups of women and men. (World Health Organization. (2011). Gender
mainstreaming for health managers: a practical approach. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/
iris/handle/10665/44516)
Gender action plan. Refers to a planning document that includes: (i) Activity(ies) that will be undertaken to
address identified and assessed gender gap(s) (ii) Indicators to assess progress in closing each gender gap;
(iii) Data and measures required to track shifts in each indicator; (iv) Training and (human and institutional)
capacity requirements and how these will be met; (v) An estimated line-item budget; (vi) A timeline.
Gender gaps. refers to differences between men, women and people of diverse gender identities in terms
of their levels of participation, access, rights, remuneration or benefits. These gaps may arise because of
biological, socioeconomic or sociocultural reasons. Gender high priority gaps refers to sex and gender gaps
that are assessed to (i) inhibit implementation effectiveness, (ii) potentially affect a large proportion of the
population of the disadvantaged sex (women and girls, or men and boys) and (iii) act as a constraint to
effective and full preparedness and response that the whole population can access. Based on the gender
analysis conducted, each country will determine which elements of gender inequalities are high priority, with
consideration given to the differences across countries in sociocultural contexts and gender norms
Gender systematic assessment. refers to evidence-based identification of a gender gap to understand the
causes of that gender gap (sometimes referred to as gender analysis), without knowing the causes of a
gender inequality it is not possible to develop an action plan to address it. Assessments can be done using
secondary analysis of available data and research where possible, as well as with novel research.
Ground crossing. A point of land entry into a State Party, including those utilized by road vehicles and trains.
Hazard. The inherent capability of an agent or situation to have an adverse effect; a factor or exposure that
may adversely affect health (similar concept to risk factor).
Health worker. Any employee in a healthcare facility who has close contact with patients, patient-care areas
or patient-care items; also referred to as “health care worker, health worker, or health and care worker”.
Public health and social measures (PHSMs). Are a key strategies to reduce the transmission of pathogens
with epidemic or pandemic potential. PHSMs include non-pharmaceutical interventions that can be taken
by individuals, institutions, communities, local and national governments and international bodies to slow or
stop the spread of an infectious disease. (https://www.who.int/activities/measuring-the-effectiveness-and-
impact-of-public-health-and-social-measures)
Incidence. The number of instances of illness commencing, or of persons falling ill, during a given period in a
specified population (Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological
Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014).
Indicator-based surveillance. The systematic collection, monitoring, analysis and interpretation of structured
health-related data (indicators), produced by health facilities or other defined sources.
Reporting is based on standardized case definitions of selected priority diseases or conditions. (Early Warning
Alert and Response in Emergencies: an operational guide. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2022. Licence:
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO).
Infection. The entry and development or multiplication of an infectious agent in an organism, including the
body of humans and animals that may constitute a public health risk. Infection is non synonymous with
infectious disease; the result may be inapparent of manifest. (adapted from Porta M, editor. A dictionary of
epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press;
2014).
Infectious agent. A microscopic element that is capable or causing a disease in a susceptible host. (Porta M,
editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York:
Oxford University Press; 2014).
Infectious disease. A disease due to an infectious agent. While some infectious diseases are contagious, others
are noncontagious (i.e. require a vector for transmission). All infectious and infestations are communicable
diseases (See also Communicable diseases) (adapted from Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology,
sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014).
International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR). This is a legally-binding instrument of international law which
has its origin in the International Sanitary Conventions of 1851, concluded in response to increasing concern
about the links between international trade and spread of diseases (cross-border health risks).
Intra-action review. a country-led, facilitated discussion that allows national and subnational stakeholders of
the COVID-19 response to (i) reflect on actions being undertaken to prepare for and respond to the COVID-19
outbreak at the country level in order to identify current best practices, gaps and lessons learned, and (ii)
propose corrective actions to improve and strengthen the continued response to COVID-19. Additionally, IAR
findings and recommendations may contribute to improving the management of concurrent emergencies
and to long-term health security. (Guidance for conducting a country COVID-19 intra-action review (IAR).
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (WHO/2019-nCoV/Country_IAR//2020.1). Licence: CC BY-NC-SA
3.0 IGO.)
Isolation. Separation, for the period of communicability, of infected persons or animals from others under
such conditions as to prevent or limit the transmission of the infectious agent from those infected to those
who are susceptible or who may spread the agent to others. (Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology,
sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014).
Legislation. The range of legal, administrative or other governmental instruments that may be available for
States Parties to implement the IHR. This includes legally binding instruments, such as state constitutions,
laws, acts, decrees, orders, regulations and ordinances; legally non-binding instruments, such as guidelines,
standards, operating rules, administrative procedures or rules; and other types of instruments, such as
protocols, resolutions and inter-sectoral or inter-ministerial agreements. This encompasses legislation in
all sectors, such as health, agriculture, transportation, environment, ports and airports, and at all applicable
governmental levels (national, intermediate, local and other).
Multisectoral. A holistic approach involving the efforts of multiple organizations, institutes and agencies. It
encourages interdisciplinary participation, collaboration and coordination of people of concern and resources
from these key organizations for promoting health security, to achieve a specific goal.
National IHR Focal Point. The national centre designated by each State Party, which shall be accessible at all
times for communications with WHO IHR contact points under the IHR.
Notifiable disease. A disease that, by statutory/legal requirements, must be reported to a public health or
other competent authority in the pertinent jurisdiction when the diagnosis is made (adapted from Porta M,
editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York:
Oxford University Press; 2014).
Notification. The processes by which cases or outbreaks are brought to the knowledge of the health
authorities. In the context of the IHR, notification is the official communication of a disease/health event to
WHO by the health administration of the Member State affected by the disease/health event.
One Health. Defined by WHO as an approach to designing and implementing programmes, policies,
legislation and research in which multiple sectors communicate and work together to achieve better public
health outcomes, In the context of the WHO IHR monitoring and evaluation framework, taking a One Health
approach means including, from all relevant sectors, national information, expertise, perspectives and
experience necessary to conduct assessments, evaluations and reporting for the implementation of the IHR.
Other governmental instruments. Agreements, protocols and resolutions of any government authority or
body.
Outbreak. An epidemic limited to localized increase in the incidence of a disease, such as in a village, town
or closed institution (adapted from Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International
Epidemiological Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014).
Point of entry. A passage for international entry or exit of travellers, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances,
goods and postal parcels, and the agencies and areas providing services to them upon entry or exit.
Port. A seaport or a port on an inland body of water where ships on an international voyage arrive or depart.
Public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). An extraordinary event (as provided in the IHR)
that: (i) constitutes a public health risk to other states through the international spread of disease; and (ii)
potentially requires a coordinated international response.
Public health risk. The likelihood of an event that may adversely affect the health of human populations, with
an emphasis on whether it may spread internationally or present a serious and direct danger.
Rapid response team. A group of trained individuals that is ready to respond quickly to an event. The
composition and terms of reference are determined by the concerned country.
Readiness. It is the ability to quickly and appropriately respond when required to any emergencies.
Relevant/other sectors. Private and public sectors: such as all levels of the healthcare system (national,
subnational and community/primary public health); NGOs; ministries of agriculture (zoonosis, veterinary
laboratory), transport (transport policy, civil aviation, ports and maritime transport), trade and/or industry
(food safety and quality control), foreign trade (consumer protection, control of compulsory standard
enforcement), communication, defence, treasury or finance (customs), environment, interior, health, tourism;
the home office; media; and regulatory bodies.
Risk communication. For public health emergencies includes the range of communication capacities required
through the preparedness, response and recovery phases of a serious public health event to encourage
informed decision making, positive behaviour change and the maintenance of trust.
Subnational level. Refers to all administrative levels under the national level, including regional, provincial or
state, and can also include municipality level.
Surveillance. The systematic ongoing collection, collation and analysis of data for public health purposes
and the timely dissemination of public health information for assessment and public health response, as
necessary.
Syndrome. A complex of signs and symptoms that tend to occur together, often characterizing a disease, in
which the symptoms and/or signs coexist more frequently than would be expected by chance independently
(adapted from Porta M, editor. A dictionary of epidemiology, sixth edition. International Epidemiological
Association, Inc. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014).
Trained staff. Individuals that have educational credentials and/or received specific instruction that is
applicable to a task or situation.
Vector. An insect or other invertebrate that transmits an infectious agent or parasite from one animal
(including humans) or plant to another.
Verification. The provision of information by a State Party to WHO confirming the status of an event within
the territory or territories of that State Party.
WHO IHR contact point. The unit within WHO that is accessible at all times for communications with the
National IHR Focal Point.
Zoonotic diseases (or zoonoses). Any infection or infectious disease that is naturally transmissible from
vertebrate animals to humans.
Zoonotic event. A manifestation of a disease in animals that creates a potential for a disease in humans as
a result of human exposure to the animal source.
R3.3. Continuity of essential C8.3 Continuity of essential health services 14.2 Mechanism for continuity of essential health services (EHS)
health services (EHS) (EHS) during a health emergency is well established
R4. Infection Prevention and C9. Infection prevention and control 15. Infection Prevention and Control
Control
R4.1. IPC programmes C9.1. Infection prevention and control 15.1 National and health facility level infection prevention and
programmes control (IPC) programmes are in place
R4.2. HCAI surveillance C9.2 Health care-associated infections (HCAI) 15.2 A functioning health care acquired infection (HCAI)
surveillance surveillance system is in place for public health decision-making
R4.3. Safe environment in health C9.3 Safe environment in health facilities 15.3 Provide a safe environment in all healthcare facilities
facilities
R5. Risk communication and C10. Risk communication and community 16. Risk Communication, Community Engagement & Infodemic
Community Engagement engagement (RCCE) Management
Risk Communication
R5.1. RCCE system for C10.1. RCCE system for emergencies 16A.1 Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE)
emergencies systems with mechanisms for functions and resources are in place
and integrated within broader health emergency programmes
R5.2. Risk communication C10.2. Risk communication 16A.2 Mechanisms to deliver quality, timely, impactful risk
communication are operational
Community Engagement
R5.3. Community engagement C10.3. Community engagement 16B.1 Community engagement is integrated and prioritized within
the management of health emergencies and unusual events
Risk Communication, Community Engagement & Infodemic
Management Additional Benchmarks
Community Engagement
C.4.3.4 Equitable and transparent needs- H4.7 Equitable and transparent needs-based allocation frameworks are
Mapping is based on HEPR L1-L3 as of 23.05.2023, based on Strengthening health emergency prevention, preparedness, response and resilience. Geneva:
capacities
Financing Financing placed as a separate technical
area aligning with JEE 3rd ed. and SPAR
2nd ed.
Benchmark 1.2: Financing is available for 2 Benchmark 2.1: Financing is available and 3 Content updated
the implementation of IHR capacities disbursed for the implementation of IHR
capacities
Benchmark 1.3: Financing available 3 Benchmark 2.2: Financing available for 4 Content updated
for timely response to public health timely response to health emergencies
emergencies
IHR COORDINATION, COMMUNICATION IHR Coordination, National IHR Focal
AND ADVOCACY AND REPORTING Point Functions and Advocacy
Benchmark 2.1: The IHR NFP is fully 4 Benchmark 3.1: The IHR national focal 5 Content updated
functional point (NFP) is fully functional
Benchmark 2.2: Multisectoral IHR 5 Benchmark 3.2: Multisectoral IHR 6 Content updated
coordination mechanism effectively coordination mechanism effectively
supports the implementation of supports the implementation of prevention,
prevention, detection and response detection and response activities
activities
Benchmark 3.3: Strategic planning for IHR, 7 New benchmark added aligning with JEE
preparedness or health security are in place 3rd ed and SPAR 2nd ed.
and supported by functional advocacy
mechanisms for IHR implementation
Annex 4: Declaration
of Interests from WHO
Experts at the global
consultative meeting,
March 13-15 2023
All external experts submitted to WHO a declaration of interest disclosing potential conflicts of interest that
might affect, or might reasonably be perceived to affect, their objectivity and independence in relation to the
subject matter of the meeting. WHO reviewed each of those and had concluded that none could give rise to a
potential or reasonably perceived conflict of interest related to the subjects discussed at the meeting.