LESSON 4 :THE CONFLICT OF VALUES

Before proceeding further, we wish to observe that this conflict of values

does not necessarily mean the character of contradictions since these
oppositions between values need not be primary conflicts existing in the ideal
realm. Nicolai Hartman indicates that the situation is a constituent element in the
conflict, that means to say, that even where value and value do not antagonize
each other, the concrete situations bring it about, that only one can be fulfilled
and the other must be violated. We can indicate as an example the situation
where a politician places personal love or love for his family above law; he gives
preference to love and violate justice, although in themselves justice and love do
not exclude each other.
In general, it is in practice where value conflicts exist. However, if the conflicts
are genuine antinomies, the opposition is between the values themselves. In this
case it is in the realm of values where the antinomies exist, not in the situation. In
this case the antinomies are per se insoluble.

MODAL CONFLICTS OF VALUES

An example of modal opposition is the antinomy of necessity and freedom.
A kind of necessity inheres in the mode of existence peculiar to what ought to be.
It is necessity which is “absolute”, that is, bound to nothing outside of itself. This
absolute necessity does not only pertain to value as such but is itself a value;
nay, it gives to the Ideal Being that elevation above the relative and lends to
values their characteristic universality as regards validity. However, this absolute
necessity has its counterpart in the value of freedom: the freedom which the
values, even in their absolute necessity, allow to that being who in his sense of
value participates in them.

RELATIONAL CONFLICT OF VALUES

Concerning relational oppositions, we can cite as an example the
antinomy of the carrier of value. A value is attached to every carrier of possible
values. However, the carrier is itself cleft in two in all ethically fulfilled actuality
since the intended value has not the same carrier as the value of the intention.
But at the same time, the object to which the intended value adheres and the
subject to which the value of the intention is related, are of one and the same
intention and are both in the same way carriers. The antinomy lies in the fact that
the subject and object coincide as carriers.
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATTIVE CONFLICT OF VALUES
We can give many examples of qualitative and quantitative oppositions
but we deem it necessary to limit ourselves to citing only some of them. One of
them is that of universality and singularity. It is commonly admitted that values
are generally universal. This widespread notion is correct if by it we mean only a
subjective validity, that is, the value of anything must appeal to every person
capable of perceiving it. But this notion includes something objective; it also
means the validity of any value for every potential carrier of value, and in this
sense, there are values which are singular or have individuality. This contrast
between universality and singularity is qualitative; the significance inheres in the
content. The value lies in the identity of the distinctive mark. This contrast is
connected to that between all and the individual.

POLARITY AND CONFLICT VALUES

Polarity is a condition where two people or groups of people impose their

views or hierarchy of values upon each other. These views or hierarchy of values
are seen as priority lists. This imposition upon each other of a particular list of
value-priorities results in a conflict of values. When people have a consensus in
most areas of life with regards to values, the phenomena of conflict and polarity
are less frequent.
Brian P. Hall cites three levels at which imposition of values, conflicts and
polarity operate:
1. When a person imposes false sets of priorities on himself;
2. When people impose false sets of priorities on others;
3. When people impose all sorts of priorities on others.

CONFLICT AND VALUES RANKING

A person can take a number of value stances on an almost unlimited

number of issues in his life. For example, depending upon the depth and extent
of priority which we place upon our own worth and the worth of others, we have
different stances on such interpersonal values as intimacy, authority, freedom,
control, sexuality and love. As we investigate how we react to any of these
values, we will in turn be coming to grips with our other values and priorities. The
encounter with one value always involves relating it with the others.

GUILT AS A PROBLE, OF VALUE RANKING

Guilt is basically a problem of value ranking and as such social in its
dimension. Sometimes a person chooses and acts upon a value ranking he is
happy with at the time, only to find out later that he has made a wrong choice. At
this point, guilt comes in when he discovers that the other alternative he should
have chosen is more beneficial to himself and to others.

CRISIS IN VALUES
 Values have always created abrasive relationships between generations.
We can examine in the biblical and philosophical pagan literature the anxieties of
those times regarding the crisis in values among the youth. Anxiety among the
older generation was brought about by their struggle for continuity.

THE MODES OF PARTICIPATION ON VALUE

In describing the fundamental modes or ways by which one partakes of
values, we shall discuss the three modes given by Dietrich Von Hildebrand:

1. Objective Endowment with Value - The first fundamental form of partaking in

the world of values is the objective endowment with value which, from the
objective point of view, is the most intimate and holds priority in place. Certainly it
is not a conscious experienced contact. Nevertheless a very intimate conscious
contact with the world of values in the value perception and free value response
is presupposed. This mode of participation is experienced from outside.

2. Conscious Union with a Value-Bearing Good

The second mode of participation on value is the conscious union with
value-bearing good. Subjectively speaking, this is the most intimate and ranks
almost as high as the first mode. This participation or union is fully experienced
and shows itself fully to our consciousness. This union can be with personal or
impersonal goods. It presupposes value perception and value response. It has
the character of a full development of what is already present and initiated in the
value perception and an increase of the contact already existing in value
perception and value response.

3. Authorship of Value-Endowed Goods

The third form of participation on value is the authorship of value-endowed
goods, that is, “to bring into existence a good which is endowed with values,
whether it is an action through which such a good is created or preserved or the
initiation of a worthy spiritual movement, an association or a work of art. It is the
bringing into existence of any good which is a reality apart from the act of the
person who created it.

Reference: Andres, Tomas D., Understanding Values