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An Overview of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 Fitness-For-Service

Assessment Standard with Applications to Case Studies

Conference Paper · December 2017

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An Overview of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1
Fitness-For-Service Assessment
Standard with Applications to Case
Studies
By
Mohammad M. Megahed
Professor of Solid Mechanics
Cairo University – Egypt

Keynote Lecture Presented at

Al-Azhar 14th International Conference on
Engineering, Architecture & Technology

12-14 December 2017

Cairo, Egypt
 Layout of This Presentation

Concepts
 What is FFS assessment
 Objectives, Advantages, History, Contents
 The THREE Levels of Assessment
 Concept of Remaining Strength Factor (RSF)
 Concept of Failure Assessment Diagram (FAD)

Case Studies
 Case #1: Fire Damage in a Drilling Platform
 Case #2: Wall Cracking in Regeneration
Columns
 Case #3: Corroded Cantilever Pipe
 Case #4: Pipes Suffering from Pitting
Resource Documents of FFS Standard

1320 Pages (2016 Issue) 374 Pages (2007 Issue)

 Objectives of FFS Assessment
 FFS assessment is a multi-disciplinary
approach to determine whether an equipment,
which is suffering from flaws or damage or
subjected to operating conditions higher than
design loads, is fit for continued service or
not.
 Final outcome of FFS assessment is a decision:
to run as is, repair, re-rate, alter, or retire the
equipment.
 FFS outcome may also include an estimate of
remaining life which is useful for planning
future inspection (in case of continued service)
and future budgeting (in case of equipment
retiring)
 ‫‪FFS Arabic Terminology‬‬

‫‪English‬‬ ‫‪Arabic‬‬
‫‪Fitness for Service‬‬ ‫تقييم لياقة المعدة لالستمرار فى الخدمة‬
‫‪Assessment-FFS‬‬ ‫من عدمه‬
‫‪To run as is‬‬ ‫استمرار المعدة فى الخدمة كما هى‬
‫‪To repair‬‬ ‫اجراء اصالحات على المعدة‬
‫‪To Re-Rate‬‬ ‫االستمرار فى الخدمة عند أحمال مخفضة‬
‫‪To Alter‬‬ ‫اجراء تغييرات فى التصميم‬
‫‪To Retire‬‬ ‫احالة المعدة الى االستيداع‬
Historical Background of FFS Assessment
 1990: Joint industry project was organized
by the Materials Properties Council (MPC) to
develop FFS guidelines for the refining
industry
 2000: Based on MPC final report, API issued
API-579 recommended practice (RP) for FFS
Assessment, which was welcomed by both
refinery and non-refinery industries
 2007: ASME joined forces with API and
issued API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 Standard
 2016: Latest edition of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1
Standard with a number of reorganizations,
Updates and addition ofr Part-14 on Fatigue
 Contents of API 579 - Code Parts
Part 1 - Introduction
Part 2 - FFS Engineering Evaluation Procedure
Part 3 - Brittle Fracture
Part 4 - General Metal Loss
Part 5 - Localized Metal Loss
Part 6 - Pitting Corrosion
Part 7 - Blisters, HIC, and SOHIC Damage
Part 8 - Weld Misalignment and Shell Distortions
Part 9 - Crack-Like Flaws
Part 10 - Equipment Operating in the Creep Range
Part 11 - Fire Damage
Part 12 - Dents, Gouges, and Dent-Gouge Combinations
Part 13 - Laminations
Part 14 - Fatigue
List of Annexes of FFS Standards (2007 Issue)

 Annex A - Thickness, MAWP, and Stress Equations for a

FFS Assessment
 Annex B1 - Stress Analysis Overview for a FFS Assessment
 Annex B2 - Recommendations for Linearization of Stress
Results for Stress Classification
 Annex B3 – Histogram Development and Cycle Counting for
Fatigue Analysis
 Annex C - Compendium of Stress Intensity Factor
Solutions
 Annex D - Compendium of Reference Stress Solutions
 Annex E - Residual Stresses in a FFS Evaluation
 Annex F - Material Properties for a FFS Assessment
 Annex G – Damage Mechanisms
 Annex H – Technical Basis and Validation
 Annex I - Glossary of Terms and Definitions
 Annex K – Crack Opening Areas
 Multidisciplinary Nature of FFS
Assessment

Fitness of Service Assessment require

familiarity with the following fields:

 Stress Analysis
 Finite Element Analysis
 Metallurgy
 Materials Engineering
 Non-Destructive Examinations (NDE)
 Corrosion Science and Engineering
 Fracture Mechanics
 API 579 Assessment Levels
Most conservative
 Level 1 assessment:
 conservative screening criteria
 Minimum amount of inspection and information
 May be performed by an Inspector or Engineer
 If result not acceptable, can resort to levels 2 or 3
 Level 2 assessment:
 more detailed evaluation
 More detailed calculations needed
 Would be done by an experienced Engineer
 Produces more precise results
 If result not acceptable, can resort to level 3
 Level 3 assessment:
 The most detailed evaluation
 Detailed inspection and information required
 Usually based on numerical techniques such as FEA
 Produces most precise results. Most rigorous
 To be performed by experienced engineering specialist
 Matching between Degradation
Mechanisms and FFS Parts- 2007 Version
Concept of Remaining Strength Factor (RSF)
RSF = LDC /LUC
RSF = Remaining Strength Factor
LDC = Limit Load of the Damaged Component
LUC = Limit Load of the Un-Damaged Component

RSF is estimated by equations for Levels-1,2

RSF is computed by Non-linear FEA in Level-3

RSF is compared with an allowable value RSFa =0.9 say

If RSF<RSFa then the component can be operated at a
reduced pressure (Re-rated)
MAWPr/MAWP = RSF/RSFa
MAWP = Original maximum allowable pressure
MAWPr = Rerated pressure value
 Deformed Shapes at limit loads of corroded
pipe with FCA = 0.4 mm, 1 mm and 1.6 mm

Calculation of RSF for

corroded cantilever
pipes with increasing
corrosion levels (a)

Future
Operation FCA P-Limit
RSF
Months after (mm) (MPa)
last inspection (b)

0 0 37 100%
4 0.4 18 49%
10 1.0 15 41 %
16 1.6 12 32%
 Part-9 Failure Assessment Diagram- FAD

0.8
Toughness Ratio Kr

Unacceptable Region
Cut-off for steels
0.6 with yield plateau

Cut-off for ASTM A508

0.4 Cut-off for
Cr-Mn steels
Cut-off for
0.2 Acceptable Region stainless steels

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio L  P ref

 ys
r

14
Advantages of FFS Assessment

 Safe and reliable operation of aging

equipment
 Reduce downtime by eliminating
unnecessary repairs
 Extra time to plan shutdown and
replacement of equipment
 Improved yields, if rate of equipment
deterioration or life consumption can be
estimated
 Case-1
Fitness-For-Service
Assessment of A Drilling
Platform Structure and
Piping following Fire
Damage
 Introduction
 This investigation was called upon following a
major fire incident that took place on a Drilling
Platform 2004.
 The methodology used in the assessment of
fire damage (Part-11 of API-RP-579. This
recommended practice was the first issue of
FFS-579 (2000), see Fig.1
 In level-1, evidence is gathered and collected
to justify assigning a component to a certain
heat exposure zone. The fire damage was thus
categorized into six distinctive heat exposure
zones as illustrated in the platform computer
model shown in Fig. 2.
Fig.1. Consequences of Fire Damage
Fig.2. Identification of the 6 Heat Exposure Zones
Level-1 Assessment
 The Three Levels of Assessment of Fire Damage

THREE levels of assessment of increasing complexity:

Level-1: Gather data and documents to justify assigning

a component to a certain heat exposure zone

Level-2: Conducted for Components that did not pass

level-1 and need to be assessed for continued
service. Requires hardness measurement in order to
determine the remaining strength of the affected
Material

Level-3: More complex assessment conducted for

components that did not pass level 2. Reliance
is made on grain size measurement and
metallurgical in-sito investigations
 Specifications of Features of the 6 Fire Zones

 Categorization of fire damage into 6 distinctive zones of

fire exposure according to thermal effects on materials

 Zone-I: Ambient temperature during fire = No Exposure

 Zone-II: Ambient to 66o C = Smoke and water exposure
 Zone-III: 66oC – 204o C - Light heat exposure
 Zone-IV: 204oC – 427oC - Moderate heat exposure
 Zone-V : 427oC – 732oC - Heavy heat exposure
 Zone-VI: Greater than 732oC – Severe heat exposure
 Level-2 Assessment
 Level-2 Assessment require measurement of
surface hardness in order to estimate the
remaining strength of component material
following exposure to fire.
 Many pipelines in addition to specific parts of
the platform steel structure were assessed
according to level-2.
 The investigation involved measurement of
hardness and remaining pipe wall thickness at
thousands of locations on the fire affected
zones.
 Estimated remaining ultimate tensile strengths
(UTS) were thus estimated
 Hardness Survey on Fire-Affected Piping

Variation of BH Hardness .VS. Position of Test Header 6" and 8" HB (MIN.)
200 HB (MAX.)
180
160
Av. for Gr-B
140

120
Min. for Gr-B
HB

Along PIPE EF 6"

Along PIPE FG 6"

100
Along PIPE GH 6"

Along PIPE OP 6"

Along PIPE GH 6"

Along PIPE MN 6"

Along PIPE IJ 6"

Along PIPE NO 6"

Along PIPE AB 8"

Along PIPE JK 6"

Along PIPE TW 8"

80

Along PIPE ST 6"

Along PIPE MS 6"
Along PIPE LK 6"

60

40
20

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
Position
 Results of FFS Assessment
 Affected pipes that need to be replaced
were identified

 Pipes that need to be de-rated were further

investigated. Allowable stress for affected
piping Safd is estimated using hardness
measurement and appropriate piping
design codes.
Safd =Min [0.25 Sutsht (SaT/SaA), SaT )

 Procedures for repair of the steel structure

were proposed.
Pressure De-Rating of Heat Affected Piping
 Outcomes of FFS Assessment of Fire Damage

 FFS has identified fire-affected piping

 FFS provided piping de-rated capacities.
 Fire-affected zones of the platform structures
has been identified for possible repair actions.
 The root cause of the fire incident was
identified as an explosion in a riser due to local
thinning of riser wall thickness at the splash
zone.
 Case-2
Fitness-For-Service
Assessment of Two
Regeneration Columns
Suffering from Wall
Cracking
 Introduction
 A gas plant implements a sweetening process, in which
CO2 and small amounts of H2S are stripped-off the
produced gas through two Lean Benfield System Trains
# A, B. The process is conducted inside a vertical tower;
known as a “Regeneration Column”. Geometry of the
column: height = 28 m above the skirt, Di = 3 m, wall
thickness =16 mm
 The lower 18.6 m is fabricated from carbon steel (ASTM-
A516- Grade 70) with yield strength around 400 MPa,
while the upper 10 m is fabricated from stainless steel
316.
 A passivation technique of the inner wall was adopted
through circulating a Vanadium Pent-Oxide (V2O5)
through the lower section the regenerator column;
supposed to be effective for a normal duration of 5
years
Construction of the Regeneration Column
 Design Conditions and Loads
 Design Conditions
Design Pressure Pd = 4.1 barg,
Operating pressure Po = 1.6 barg,
Po reduced to = 0.4 barg.
Design temp. Td = 140 oC ,
Operating temp. To = 115 oC.
Column weight +Contents = 1350 kN
Maximum eccentricity of weight = 100 mm
Maximum wind speed = 31 m/sec
 Estimation of Stresses in the wall due to Operating Loads:
Hoop stress due to 0.4 barg = +4 MPa
Axial stress due to 0.4 barg = +2 MPa
Axial stress due to column weight = -9 MPa
Stress due to weight eccentricity = + 1.2 MPa
Highest hoop stress due to P = 4 MPa = 1% of Sy
Highest compressive stress due to all loads = -8 MPa = 2 %
of Sy
Problem History and Inspection Data
History
Year 1999: commissioning of the two columns: A, B
Year 2002: Uniform pitting observed at C.S./S.S. interface of
deepest pit =1.5 mm. Pits attributed to galvanic corrosion.
Year 2004: Leaks observed at small pinholes at weld locations in
the CS section, e.g. at shell girth welds, and piping connections.
Years 2004-2006: Increasing number of leaks + observed corrosion
in the vessel wall under the insulation
Damage was observed only in column A but not in column B
Most Important Inspection Results (April 2006)
Vessel Body: Branched long through-thickness crack at the girth
weld of Strakes 4 and 5.
Down-Comer: Non-penetrating internal circumferential cracks at the
welds connecting the down- comer piping to the vessel wall with
max. length of 220 mm.
N5 and N6 Nozzles: Non-penetrating internal circumferential cracks
at the HAZ of the welds connecting nozzles to vessel wall, lengths up
to 150-230 mm
Girth Weld Crack Defects

Through-Thickness
Branched crack ~80
mm long at shell
girth weld joining
strakes 4 and 5.
Scope: Use API-579 RP for FFS Assessment of
the most significant cracks in Column A

Cracks at toes of welds connecting

down-comer to shell
Crack

Cracks near welds of nozzles N5 , N6

Shell girth-weld
Methodology of Part-9 of API-579 RP for
Crack-Like Flaws: FAD
FAD combines the effects of stress field and stress
intensity factor into one assessment point
Level-3 Assessments
Assessment result for each cracking case is
shown on a simple plot known as the Failure
Assessment Diagram (FAD), which
characterizes the border of safe operation in a
2-D plot.

Since the observed cracking pattern was

growing with time, it was compulsory to
implement Level-3 assessment, which is the
most stringent assessment procedure.

Assessment results of the most severe cracks

in the column wall identified both the present
condition and the remaining life of the column
based on Level-3 assessment.
 FFS of Down-Comer Flaws Increasing
Crack Depth (a)

4 Case # a [mm] K iR MPa m K iR / K mat

5 1 6.4 91.81 0.69
2 8 119.77 0.90
3.5
Toughness Ratio Kr

3 9.6 150.23 1.14

4 12.8 203.975 1.55
4 5 16 497.21 3.77
1.5
3
Not-Acceptable
1
2 Crack

0.5 1
Acceptable
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio LPr  ref

 ys
36
 FFS of the Branched Through-Thickness Girth
Weld

FFS Treatment of Branched

Crack to determine the
Equivalent Crack Length as 67
mm

0.8
Toughness Ratio Kr

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio LPr  ref

 ys
Reboiler Vapour Return Nozzle N5 – Circumferential Crack
X58 with L= 150 mm is the most Serious

X58 =150 mm

X43 =120 mm
 FFS of Crack N58 with L =150 mm in Nozzle N5 for
increasing Values of Crack Depth

3
Case # a [mm] K iR MPa m K iR / K mat
1 8 96.6 0.733
2.5 2 11.2 114.8 0.871
Toughness Ratio Kr

3 12.8 128.3 0.973

4 16 299.7 2.274
4
2
3 Not-Acceptable
1
2

0.5 1
Acceptable
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio L  P ref

 ys
r
Conclusions and Recommendations
Stresses in the tower wall due to Operating loads are
very small. Residual stresses are present at the girth
welds due to absence of PWHT.

Presence of residual stresses + lack of effectiveness of

the passivation technique are the main causes of
observed cracking located primarily at or near welds in
the CS section of the tower(s).

FAD showed that most of the material toughness is

exhausted at the through-thickness branched crack.
Immediate Repair is highly recommended.

Surface cracks at the down-comer weld could become

serious if the crack depth exceeds 50 % of shell wall
thickness. Inspection by ToFD should be conducted to
verify crack growth. Similar conclusions are made for
cracks at nozzles N5 and N6
Actions taken after First FFS Assessment

 ToFD Inspection was conducted in May 2007;

almost one year after April 2006 inspection
campaign
 ToFD inspection showed that cracks are
propagating, and adjacent neighboring cracks are
combining together to form longer cracks.
 Further ToFD inspection on columns A,B showed
that cracks kept propagating at an alarming rate
with column A deteriorating faster than column B.
 A decision was thus made to replace the two
columns with new ones with improved design and
material of construction
 FFS Assessment has thus given the operator of the
columns enough lead time to re-design and
contract the new improved columns
 Case-3
Fitness-For-Service
Assessment of a Corroded
Cantilever Pipe
Based on an Article entitled:
“Assessment of corrosion damage acceptance criteria in
API579-ASME/1 code” M. S. Attia · M. M. Megahed · M.
Ammar Darwish · S. Sundram, published in “The
International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in
Design” 01/2014; DOI:10.1007/s10999-014-9278-6 ·
1.20 Impact Factor
Problem Statement and Objectives
 A 4” sch. 80 API 5L Grade B steel pipe is suffering
from severe corrosion, and FFS assessment is
required.
 Wall thickness measurement by UT in 2006 and
2008 showed that the annual corrosion rate is
around 1.2 mm
 Pipe nominal thickness is 8.6 mm and metal loss is
localized in a straight section at 6 O’clock. The
minimum wall thickness recorded is around 3 mm
 The pipe carries internal pressure in addition to
mechanical loads due to attached valves
 This type of piping arrangements is of type-B and
therefore FFS assessment of level-1 may not be
made if supplemental mechanical loads can be
ignored; which is not the case. Thus Levels 2 and 3
only are conducted here
 Schematic of the Corroded 4” Cantilever Pipe

Corroded
Region

Nominal wall thickness = 8.6 mm

Weight of Gate Valve = 92 Newton
Weight of Globe Valve = 2220 Newton
MAWP = Design Pressure = 9.3 MPa
Current operating Pressure = 1.6 MPa
Material Yield Strength = 241 MPa
Design Stress = 138 MPa
 UT Wall Thickness in the Corroded Region

Corrosion rate =1.2 mm/Y

From two consecutive
inspections
UT Grid size:
10 mm in axial direction
46 mm in circumferential
direction
Nominal Wall thickness
= 8.56 mm
Min. Wall thickness
At 180o = 3.0 mm
At 135o = 3.5 mm
At 225o = 4.8 mm
3D Wall Thickness Profile in Corroded Region
 Results of Level-1 Assessment
Summary of Level-1 Acceptability Criteria
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8
FCA (mm) from last inspection
4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Months of Future Operation
Acceptability of Average Measured Thickness
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-1:Tams-FCA > TminC
TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-2:Tamc-FCA >TminL
Acceptability of MAWP
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-3/1: MAWPr>P-design
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE
Condition-3/2:MAWPr>P-Current
Acceptability of Minimum Measured Thickness
TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-4: tmm –FCA <= Tlim

The pipe does not satisfy Level-1 acceptability criteria with respect
to measured thickness
The pipe should not be operated at the design pressure of 9.3 MPa
The pipe can be operated for future 24 months at the current
pressure of 1.6 MPa
Mechanical Loads acting on the 4” Pipe
 Results of Level-2 FFS Assessment
Summary of Level-2 Acceptability Criteria
0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8
FCA (mm) from last inspection
4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Months of Future Operation
Acceptability of Average Measured Thickness
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-1:Tams-FCA > TminC
TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-2:Tamc-FCA >TminL
Acceptability of MAWP
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-3/1: MAWPr>P-design
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-3/2:MAWPr>P-Current
Acceptability of Minimum Measured Thickness
TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Condition-4: tmm –FCA <= Tlim

 The pipe does not satisfy Level-2 acceptability criteria with

respect to measured thickness
 The pipe should not be operated at the design pressure of 9.3
MPa
 The pipe can be operated for future 16 months at the current
pressure of 1.6 MPa
Assessment of Remaining Life at Design and
Current Pressure Values using Level-2
 Corroded Pipe FE Model used in Level-3 FFS

Material model = Elastic Perfectly-plastic

Material Yield Strength = 207 MPa
Limit load analysis is composed from 2 steps:
- Apply all mechanical loads and keep them in action
- Apply monotonically increasing pressure and observe
stresses and strains
- Limit pressure is reached when the pressure stabilizes while
strains keep increasing
3D Wall Thickness Profile in Corroded Region
 Deformed Shapes at limit loads of corroded
pipe with FCA = 0.4 mm, 1 mm and 1.6 mm

Calculation of RSF for

corroded cantilever
pipes with increasing
corrosion levels (a)

Months of
FCA P-Limit
Future RSF (b)
(mm) (MPa)
Operation
0 0 37 100%
4 0.4 18 49%
10 1.0 15 41 %
16 1.6 12 32%
 1st Yield and Limit Pressures for corroded pipes after 4,10,16
months from date of last inspection compared to new pipe

Months of
Operation after P-Limit
FCA (mm) RSF
date of last (MPa)
inspection
0 0 37 100%
4 0.4 18 49%
10 1.0 15 41 %
16 1.6 12 32%

240 240
FCA=0.4mm
Effective Stress [MPa]

Effective Stress [MPa]

200 Uncorroded 200
Py=13.5 MPa

160 160
FCA=0.4mm
120 120 FCA=1mm
FCA=1.6mm
80
PL=37 MPa
PL=18 MPa

80

40 40
0 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Internal Pressure [MPa] Internal Pressure [MPa]

Limit Pressures for the Corroded Pipe for Various
FCA values: (a) 0.4 mm, (b) 1 mm, (c) 1.6 mm
Variation of Effective Strain with Pressure for Corroded Pipes
for Various FCA values: (a) 0.4 mm, (b) 1 mm, (c) 1.6 mm
 Conclusions and Recommendations
 The corroded pipe failed both Level-1 and
Level-2 FFS assessments for safe operation at
the design pressure of 9.3 MPa, but could be
operated at the current reduced pressure of
1.6 MPa for about 24 months
 Ignoring Level-2 thickness acceptability
criteria, a Remaining life of about 18 months is
estimated for operation at a reduced pressure
of 1.6 MPa
 Level-3 assessment shows safe operation at Pd
for up to 4 months only. Operation at a
reduced pressure 1.6 MPa can be tolerated for
about 16 months.
 Case-4

Fitness-For-Service
Assessment for Pipes
Suffering from Pitting
Damage with Increasing
Severity
 Introduction
 Pitting is an extremely localized corrosion in the form of
holes of metal loss in the metal.
 Usually corrosion exists in the form of pitting colonies.
Pits can be simplified as circular defects of metal loss.
 Each pit can be described by two geometrical factors; pit
diameter and pit depth.
 Part-6 of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 presents assessment
procedures to determine remaining pressure carrying
capacities of pipes suffering from random pitting of
increasing severity.
 Three cases of random colonies of increasing pitting
severity are considered here for investigation by non-
linear FEA based on simplifying pits by shell elements
with reduced thickness.
 FEA predictions are compared with level-1 and level-2
assessment of part-6 of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1.
Different cross sectional shapes of pits
 The 8 Standard Templates of Pitting Grades
 Part-6 of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 contains 8 templates of
pitting charts representing 8 grades of increasing pitting
severity. Colonies corresponding to higher grades of
pitting simulate propagation with time of lower grades
and hence contain more pits within the same area.
Selection of pitting colonies
 Each pitting grade has an area of 150 mm x
150 mm. Only a region of an area of 57 mm x
57 mm was selected at the lower left corner of
each template, to satisfy the code requirement
of including at least 10 pits for the
assessment.
 Colonies of grades 1, 2 and 3 contain 12, 36
and 53 pits respectively of a widespread
scattered pitting. Higher grades are evolution
of lower grades with time. This evolution is
presented by defining pits of each grade by a
different color.
 Pipe wall thickness is 8 mm and with outer
diameter of 458.8 mm. The pipe material is
API-5L X80.
Evolution of pitting Grades with Time
Assessment of pitting colonies using part 6 of
API579-1/ASME-FFS-1

 Assessment procedures of part-6 are based on

determining the remaining strength factor
(RSF) for components suffering from pitting
corrosion.
 The code consists of three levels of
assessment; with levels 1 and 2 being of
analytical nature and level-3 assessment
relying on non-linear FEA of the pitted pipe.
 Level 1 assessment utilizes the 8 standard
pitting templates to carry out a preliminary
assessment.
 Level 2 assessment provides detailed
assessment which considers all parameters
defining the colony.
 Level 1 Assessment
 Level 1 assessment is a preliminary analysis
utilizing standard pitting grades charts.
Further, the remaining strength factor RSF is
determined by the maximum pit depth within
the pitting colony.

 Check if RSF ≥ RSFa , where RSFa is the

allowable RSF is taken as 0.9. If the condition
is verified, then the pipe passes level 1
assessment and is safe for operating at the
calculated MAWP. If not, then the pipe is safe
for operating at a reduced pressure MAWPr
calculated according to
Determination of RSF using pitting
grades templates

The shown tables are

extracted from part 6
of API579-1/ASME-
FFS-1 2016 edition
provides RSF values
corresponding to five
levels of pit depths as
represented by the
ratio of remaining wall
thickness at the
deepest pit (Rwt ) for
use in level 1
assessment.
Results of Level 1 assessment

RSF MAWP (MPa)

Colony Gr-1 0.95 7.3
Colony Gr-2 0.91 7.3
Colony Gr-3 0.83 6.7
 Level 2 Assessment
 Level 2 assessment provides detailed analysis
which accounts for mutual interaction between
neighboring pits
 Pitting couples are defined based on the
nearest neighbor for each pit. Orientation of
each pitting couple with respect to pipe
longitudinal direction becomes important.
 For each couple, the spacing between the two
pits and the orientation of the line linking them
with respect to the pipe longitudinal direction
should be defined.
 Diameters and depths of the two pits forming a
couple are used in the assessment.
Determination of pitting couples
Results of Level 2 assessment

RSF MAWP (MPa)

Colony Gr-1 0.94 7.3
Colony Gr-2 0.85 6.9
Colony Gr-3 0.83 6.7
 Level 3 assessment (Nonlinear FEA)
 Level 3 assessment is based on nonlinear FEA. Shell
element is used to simulate the pipe wall. Pits are
modeled as circular defects with reduced thickness
equal to the remaining wall thickness of the pit.
 To estimate limit pressure for a pitted pipe, the “Twice
Elastic Slope (TES)” methodology was used. TES method
relies on constructing a line with a slope equal to twice
the elastic slope.
FE modelling for pitted pipe
Von-Mises Stress Distributions from FEA
Distributions of Radial deformation from FEA
Limit Pressures for Pitted Pipes by TES method

Colony Colony Colony

Perfect Pipe
Gr-1 Gr-2 Gr- 3
Limit Pressure PL (MPa) 22.43 21.5 20.1 19.9
RSF - 0.96 0.90 0.89
Comparison between the results obtained
using FEA and part 6 of API-579/ASME-FFS-1

RSF
Colony Colony Colony
Gr-1 Gr-2 Gr-3
Level 1 0.95 0.91 0.83
Level 2 0.94 0.85 0.83
Level 3 (FEA) 0.96 0.90 0.89
Conclusions and Recommendations
 Level 1 assessment provides inaccurate
estimation for RSF due to its sole dependence
on the deepest pit depth and templates of
pitting grades.
 Level 2 assessment provides RSF values less
than that of Level-1 estimates due to its
consideration of the interaction between
neighboring pits
 Level-3 estimates of RSF provided RSF
estimates slightly higher than that of level 2
assessment. Level 3 provided detailed
indications on where burst will occur and how
neighboring pits interact.
 Research on Pitting still continuing…………
 Acknowledgements
Acknowledgement is expressed here for
my friends, colleagues and students at
Cairo University (CU) who contributed
to the results reported in this
presentation:

1- Dr. Saad El-Raghy (CU)

2- Dr. Hesham Sobhi Sayed (CU)
3- Dr. Mohammad Salah Attia (GE-Research)
4- Eng. Ahmad El-Taweel (CU)

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