REPORT 2023/2024

OVERVIEW

Reimagining
cooperation in
a polarized world
Copyright @ 2024
By the United Nations Development Programme
1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017 USA
REPORT 2023/2024

Reimagining cooperation in a polarized world

Breaking the gridlock
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a polarized world
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 H U M A N D E V E LO P M E N T
REPORT 2023/2024

OV E R V I E W

Breaking the gridlock

Reimagining cooperation in a polarized world
H UM A N D EVE LO P ME NT RE P O RT 2 02 3/ 2 02 4

Team

Director and lead author

Pedro Conceição

Research and statistics

Cecilia Calderón, Pratibha Gautam, Moumita Ghorai, Divya Goyal, Yu-Chieh
Hsu, Christina Lengfelder, Brian Lutz, Tasneem Mirza, Rehana Mohammed,
Josefin Pasanen, Fernanda Pavez Esbry, Antonio Reyes González,
Som Kumar Shrestha, Ajita Singh, Heriberto Tapia and Yanchun Zhang

Digital, data and knowledge management, communications, operations,

National Human Development Reports
Nasantuya Chuluun, Jon Hall, Seockhwan Bryce Hwang, Nicole Igloi,
Admir Jahic, Mohammad Kumail Jawadi, Fe Juarez Shanahan, Minji
Kwag, Ana Porras, Stanislav Sailing, Marium Soomro and Sajia Wais

iii
 HUM A N D E V ELO P M E NT RE P O RT 2 02 3/2 02 4

The 2023/2024 Human Development Report

Advisory Board

Co-chairs Tharman Shanmugaratnam Joseph E. Stiglitz

President of the Republic University Professor,
of Singapore Columbia University

Members Olu Ajakaiye Scott Barrett Kaushik Basu Laura Chincilla

Executive Chairman, Lenfest-Earth Institute Professor of International Former President of the
African Centre for Shared Professor of Natural Studies, Cornell University Republic of Costa Rica
Development Capacity Resource Economics,
Building, Nigeria Columbia University
Diane Coyle Oeindrila Dube Cai Fang Marc Fleurbaey
Bennett Professor of Public Philip K. Pearson Professor, Chief Expert of National Research Director, CNRS;
Policy and Co-Director of Harris School of Public Think Tank, Chinese Professor, Paris School
the Bennett Institute for Policy, University of Academy of Social of Economics; Associate
Public Policy, University of Chicago Sciences Professor, Ecole normale
Cambridge supérieure, Paris
Ravi Kanbur Judith Kelley Melissa Leach Harini Nagendra
Professor, Dean, Duke Sanford Director, Institute of Director, Research Centre,
Cornell University School of Public Policy, Development Studies and Professor and Lead,
Duke University Centre for Climate Change
and Sustainability, Azim
Premji University
Abebe Shimeles Belinda Reyers Ilona Szabo De Carvalho Krushil Watene
Honorary Professor, Professor, University Co-founder and president, Peter Kraus Associate
Department of Economics, of Pretoria; Affiliated Igarape Institute, Brazil Professor in Philosophy,
University of Cape Town, Researcher, Beijer Institute University of Auckland
South Africa and Senior of Ecological Economics,
Economic Advisor; Swedish Royal Academy of
Outgoing Director Sciences
of Research, African
Economic Research
Consortium

iv
Foreword

We live in a tightly knit world. Yet shared, interlinked disempowerment around the world. New analysis in the
global challenges, such as runaway climate change, Report using data from the World Values Survey shows
are outpacing our institutions’ capacities to respond that only half the global population feels in control of
to them. We face “a global gridlock,” exacerbated by their lives and that only one-­third of people believe that
growing polarization within our countries, which trans- their voice is heard in their political system.
lates into barriers to international cooperation. Looking ahead, there will only be more globally shared
Why, despite all our riches and technologies, are we opportunities and challenges. Besides the high economic
so stuck? Is it possible to mobilize action to address glob- interdependence, two main drivers of interdependence
ally shared challenges in a world that is intensively polar- are likely to shape our future in the decades to come. First,
ized? These questions motivate the 2023/2024 Human the dangerous planetary changes of the Anthropocene
Development Report. Firmly grounded in the advance- are deepening the global connections among societ-
ment made in its predecessors, the Report reminds us ies, economies and ecosystems: viruses, microplastics
that our shared aspirations for development need to go in our oceans and forest fires do not care much for
beyond wellbeing achievements to also enable people national borders. As the Report argues, we may choose
to feel more in control of their lives, less threatened and to de­globalize, but we cannot “deplanetize.” Second, an
more empowered to act on shared challenges. unfolding Digital Revolution has led to a dizzying increase
The human toll of this growing gridlock is huge. In in the sharing of data, ideas and culture across societies.
lives lost, in opportunities forgone, in feelings of de- To break the gridlock, the Report is an invitation to
spair. After 20 years of progress, and for the first time on reimagine cooperation by pursuing three ideas that it
record, inequalities in Human Development Index (HDI) encourages the world to fight for.
values­—­which measure a country’s health, education First, it is imperative to pursue common ground while
and standard of living­—­are growing between countries accepting that people will have the right to retain their
at the bottom and countries at the top of the index. Fol- diverse interests and priorities. Piercing a fog of false
lowing the 2020 and 2021 declines in the global HDI differences, or misperceptions, is one of the most effec-
value, the world had the opportunity to build forward tive ways of changing behaviour towards cooperation
better. Instead, this Human Development Report shows that addresses shared challenges.
that our global community is falling short. Deaths in Second, we must enable people to pursue their le-
battle and displacement from violent conflicts are in- gitimate and natural human security ambitions without
creasing, reaching the highest levels since World War II. protectionism. It has now been 30 years since the 1994
Leading up to a decade of increasingly higher tempera- Human Development Report introduced the notion of
tures, 2023 has been the hottest ever recorded. The human security. It focuses on what gives people agency
path of human development progress shifted down- to shape their lives free from fear, want and living
wards and is now below the pre-­2019 trend, threatening without dignity. From the energy transition to artificial
to entrench permanent losses in human development. intelligence, discussion of risks and challenges needs
Unless we change course. to be rebalanced with the consistent articulation of the
We can still redress inequalities in human develop- potential to live, for the first time ever, with a surplus
ment, but we must rapidly learn some lessons. To of energy and with artificial intelligence that augments
start, the Report argues that we need to capitalize on what people can do.
our global connections, choosing cooperation over Third, we need a 21st century architecture for inter­
conflict. The Report shows how the mismanagement national cooperation to deliver global public goods.
of cross-­ border interdependencies (the response to This includes the planetary public goods required to
the Covid-­19 pandemic, for example) is at the root of navigate the Anthropocene­ —f­
rom climate change
many contemporary challenges, ranging from debt mitigation to pandemic preparedness to biodiversity
distress in numerous low- and middle-­ income coun- preservation­—­as well as the digital public infrastructure
tries to threats to food security to a pervasive sense of and digital public goods that would enable the Digital

Foreword v
 Revolution to be harnessed to enable people to flourish extraordinary technologies and our greatest asset:
in more equitable ways. Global public goods are vital for human ingenuity and our cooperative capacities. Yet
our interdependent future as global citizens and require today, psychologists warn that many children report
rethinking international finance to complement devel- feeling anxious and that they feel they live in a world
opment assistance (supporting poor countries) and that does not care about their future. This Report is a
humanitarian assistance (saving lives in emergencies). rallying cry­—­we can and must do better than this. It
Indeed, we need to recognize the undeniable fact charts ways forward and invites to a conversation on
that we now have access to new financial mechanisms, reimagining cooperation.

Achim Steiner
Administrator
United Nations Development Programme

vi HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

 Acknowledgements

How to make sense of producing a Hu- framing and analysis in the report. But we We are especially thankful for our close
man Development Report at a time of would like to recognize in particular co-­ collaborations with our partners: the Inter-
war? Not only of wars between and within chair President Tharman Shanmugarat- national Science Council, including Peter
countries but also with our planet, with nam, who has graciously and generously Gluckman and Megha Sud; Lloyd’s Regis-
ourselves and with our future? These been co-­chair since 2019, and has agreed ter Foundation, including Suela Aksoy and
questions weighed heavily on our minds. to remain in this role even after assuming Ed Morrow; McKinsey Global Institute, in-
But over time they strengthen the resolve high office. We, and everyone interested cluding Anu Madgavkar; Peace Research
of the team, fuelled by the conviction that in human development and development Institute Oslo, including Siri Aas Rustad,
the recurring messages of successive more broadly, owe President Tharman a Andrew Arasmith, Kristine Helskog and
Human Development Reports are more huge debt of gratitude. Gudrun Østby; South-North Scholars,
relevant than ever. They bear repeating Complementing the advice from our including Nino Nadirashvili and Charlie
and reaffirming, because even though Advisory Board, the Report’s Statistical Zong; the Climate Impact Lab, including
they may have been said many times be- Advisory Panel provided guidance on Hannah Hess; Gallup, including Jon Clif-
fore, they seem to be pushed more and several methodological and data aspects ton and Andrew Rzepa; the Global Policy
more into the background. The primacy of the Report­—­particularly those related Laboratory, including Solomon Hsiang,
of people as the purpose and agents of to calculating the Report’s human devel- Jonathan Proctor and Luke Sherman;
development. The crucial importance of opment indices. We are grateful to all the the Human Development and Capability
enabling people to live free from want, panel members: Mario Biggieri, Camilo Association, including Ann Mitchell and
fear and indignity, still relevant 30 years Ceita, Ludgarde Coppens, Koen Decancq, Melanie Walker; the International Institute
after the introduction of the concept of Thomas Helgeson, Jason Hickel, Milo- for Applied Systems Analysis, including
human security in the 1994 Human Devel- rad Kovacevic, Steve Macfeelys, Silvia Luis Gomez Echeverri, Pratik Patil and Ele-
opment Report. Montoya, Shantanu Mukherjee, Ekaterina na Rovenskaya; the Oxford Poverty and
This, as other Human Development Poleshchuk, Michaela Saisana, Hany Human Development Initiative, including
Reports, is an examination of the barriers Torky, Mohd Uzir and Dany Wazen. Sabina Alkire, Maya Evans, Alexandra For-
that enable people to live their lives to Appreciation is also extended for all tacz and Usha Kanagaratnam; the World
their full potential and what to do about the data, written inputs and peer reviews Bank, including Indermit Gill and Luis
them. And here there is much that is of draft chapters to the Report, including Felipe López-Calva; the World Inequal-
new in the world today. Building on the those by Barbara Adams, Scott Barret, ity Lab, including Lucas Chancel; as well
2021/2022 Human Development Report, Cornelia Betsch, Robert Böhm, Wolfgang as research collaborations with Ingvild
which identified polarization as a bar- Buchholz, Leonardo Bursztyn, Fernando Almås, David Blanchflower, Alexander
rier to addressing shared challenges as Casal Bertoa, Patricia Clavin, Tiago De- Bryson, Erle Ellis, Nicholas Depsky, Paul
one of the novel layers of uncertainty vesa, Charles Efferson, Charlotte Fiedler, Hufe, Diren Kocakusak, Justin E. Lane,
confronting the world, this Report does Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Katha Freistein, Stephen Sepaniak and F. LeRon Shults.
a deep dive into the reasons why polar- Karla Daniela González, Kenneth Hartt- Several consultations with thematic
ization is increasing, how that creates gen, Nicole Hassoun, Luca Henkel, Jo- and regional experts and numerous infor-
gridlock in collective action and how to seph Henrich, Tadashi Hirai, Ingrid Home mal consultations with many individuals
reimagine cooperation to break the grid- Sjursen, Eduardo Ibarra-Olivio, Solava without a formal advisory role were held
lock. The Report was possible only be- Ibrahim, Otto Ilona, Julia Leininger, An- in the process of preparing this year’s
cause of the encouragement, generosity drea Marinucci, Ronald Mendoza, José Report. We are grateful for input in these
and contributions of so many, recognized Antonio Ocampo, Laura Pereira, Hannah consultations from Ima Abdul Rahim, Lina
only imperfectly and partially in these Pool, Marcela Rios Tobar, Todd Sandler, Abirafeh, Jeremy Adelman, Arun Agrawal,
acknowledgments. Emanuele Sapienza, Armin von Schiller, Aroe Ajani, Fonteh Akum, Henry Alinaitwe,
The members of the Advisory Board are Tobias Schillings, Phillip Sprengholz, Ingvild Almås, Tariq Al-­ Olaimy, Sherine
recognized next to the report team, given Andrew Thompson, Jurel Yap and Sarah Al-­Shawarby, Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, Elsie
their fundamental contributions to the White. Attafuah, Tan Sri Azman Hj Mokhtar, Joe

Acknowledgements vii
Bak-­Coleman, Anne Bardsley, Carl Berg- Nadia Chamberlain, Judith Kelley, An- Niloy Banerjee, Fiona Bayat-Renoux,
strom, Amar Bhattacharya, Debapriya irudh Krishna, Eddy Malesky and Kerilyn Julie Berg, Tessa Bertrand, Georgiana
Bhattacharya, Haroon Bhorat, Roberto Shewel; at the University of Chicago, with Braga’Orillard, Michele Candotti, Ales-
Bissio, Lia Brazil, Carlos Brown, Joanna Natalie Arsenault, Alison Baulos, Luis sandra Casazza, Angelique M. Crumbly,
Bryson, Vural Çakır, Miguel Centeno, Bettencourt, Christopher Blattman, Emily Mirko Ebelshaeuser, Maja Edfast, Ahunna
Tan Sri Dato Seri Jeffrey Cheah, Sysan Grant, Michael Greenstone, Gary Herri- Eziakonwa, Alfonso Fernández, Almudena
Clayton, Sarah Cliffe, Dawnelle Clyne, gel and Mathias Staisch; at Georgetown Fernández, Sara Ferrer, Arvinn Gadgil,
Flavio Comim, Alistair Cook, Vanesa University, with Dagomar Degroot; and at Raymond Gilpin, Carolina Given Sjölander,
D’Alessandre, Yves Daccord, Isabel de Yale University, with David Alzate, David George Gray Molina, Janil Greenaway,
Saint Malo, Dagomar Degroot, Faisal Engerman, Jessica Faieta, Ardina Hasan- Niamh Hanafin, Wenwen He, Caroline
Devji, Catherine D’Ignazio, Ishac Diwan, basri, Jim Levinsohn, Costas Meghir, Aish- Hopper-Box, Vanessa Howe-Jones,
Jamie Drummond, Jaco Eyelu, Nadim warya Ratan, Ernesto Zedillo and with Yale Ghida Ismail, Tomohiro Kawase, Julia
Farajalla, Hege Fisknes, Peter Frankopan, Greenberg World Fellow Emma Sky. We Kercher, Adithya Kumar, Raquel Lagunas,
Jemima Garcia-­ Godos, Nilanjan Ghosh, appreciate the collaboration of academics Bas Leurs, Sarah Lister, Fatmata Lovetta
Andrew Grotto, John Haldon, Corinne from the South-South Global Thinkers. Sesay, Zhaoxi Meng, Ulrika Modeér, Luca
Heckmann, Oli Henman, Luis Hernán Var- Further support was also extended by Monge Roggarello, Annet Mpabulungi
gas, Eria Hisali, Karla Hoff, Nadim Houry, others too numerous to mention here. Wakabi, Michelle Muschett, Marcos Athias
Saleemul Huq, Nigar Islamli, Andry Ivanov, Consultations are listed at https://hdr.undp​ Neto, Sjeila Ngatria, Shoko Noda, Mizuho
Jennifer Jacquet, Rasha Jarhum, Xu Jin, .org/towards-­hdr-2023. Contributions, sup- Okimoto-Kaewtathip, Robert Opp, Anna
Mitzi Jonelle Tan, Tehmina Kaoosji, Ibrahim port and assistance from many colleagues Ortubia, Thangavel Palanivel, Prachi Pali-
Kasirye, Lina Khatib, Julius Kiiza, Ruth Kita- across the UN family is gratefully acknowl- wal, Stefano Pettinato, Ricardo Pineda,
mirike, Martin Korte, Nagesh Kumar, Oliver edged. They include the Executive Office Sarah Poole, Corli Pretorius, Georgios
Lacey Hall, Michèle Lamont, Lyse Langlois, of the Secretary-General, through Michèle Profiliotis, Soha Rasheed, Luca Renda,
Julia Leininger, Sharachchandra Lele, Griffin; the UN Office of South-South Coop- Carolina Rivera Vázquez, Sara Maaria
Hod Lipson, Genevieve Lively, Hela Lotz-­ eration, including Dima Al-Khatib, Zanofer Saastamoinen, Philip Schellekens, Bahdja
Sisitka, Winnifred Louis, Fatmata Lovetta Ismalbebbe and Naveeda Nazir; the Unit- Sehli, Narue Shiki, Ashvinder Singh Pramjit
Sesay, Tan Sri Jamilah Mahmod, Andrés ed Nations SDG Action Campaign, includ- Singh, Ben Slay, Anca Stoica, Rania Tarazi,
Malamud, Beckie Malay, Yadvinder Malhi, ing Xavier Longan, Marina Ponti and Olcay David Tat Ui Tan, Claire van der Vaeren,
Kanchan K. Malik, Heghine Manasyan, Tetik; the United Nations Entity for Gender Federico Vaz, Francis Wasswa, Kanni
Emma Marris, Steve McCorriston, Tarik Equality and the Empowerment of Women, Wignaraja, Bronwyn Williams, Clarise
Megerisi, Emel Memis, Rana Mitter, Ro- including Ginette Azcona and Papa Seck; Wilson, Haoliang Xu, Shinobu Yamaguchi
man Mogilevskii, Petra Molnar, Samar the International Labour Organization, and Ivana Živković. We are also grateful
Muhareb, Khalid Mustafa Medani, Mwam- including Rafael Díaz de Medina, Youcef to all the UNDP Signals Scanners and the
butsya Ndebesa, Sjeila Ngatria, Dianah Ghellab, Roger Gomis, Steven Kapsos and UNDP Accelerator Labs that participated
Ngui Muchai, Ibrahim Okumu, Iliana Olivié, Sangeon Lee; the United Nations Popula- in consultations.
Margie Ong, Mavis Owusu-­Gyamfi, Foteini tion Division, including Patrick Gerland; the We were fortunate to have the support
Papagioti, Toril-­Iren Pedersen, Tawana United Nations Environment Programme, of operations consultants Judey Austin,
Petty, Seeta Prabhu, Cristelle Pratt, Satin including Dany Ghafari; the United Nations Beatrice Chinapen and Milagros Feliciano
Seri Sunita Rajakumar, Michael Robbins, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga- and talented interns and fact checkers:
Emma Ruttkamp-­ Bloem, Silvia Salvatici, nization Institute for Statistics, including Dopé Adjor, Natalia Aguilar Ruiz, Edwige
Marc Saner, Mahendhiran Sanggaran Olivier Labé, Alasdair McWilliam, Patrick Bayili, Parth Chawla, Seussler Daniel,
Nair, Carlos Scartascini, Mario Scharfbilli, Montjouides and Said Ould Ahmedou Modi Michael Elisa, Morgane Hamza, Sijie
Kareem Shaheen, Binyam Sisay Mendisu, Voffal; and the United Nations University Han, Yingyilong Hu, Jessica Karki, Alive
Scott Smith, Masashi Soga, Hema Sridar, World Institute for Development Econom- Lassman, Danielle Mallon, Luiza Naka-
Erika Stael von Holstein, Abida Suleri, ics Research, including Rahul Lahoti. All mura, Paricia Noguieira, Nazifa Rafa, Maria
Zeynep Tufekci, Gatoloaifaana Tilianamua United Nations Development Programme Nathalia Ramirez, Yu-­Ya Rong, Laura San-
Afamasaga, Lucas Tse, Tania Vásquez (UNDP) regional and central bureaus and zarello, Zahraa Shabana, Ching To Chung,
Luque, Harvey Whitehouse, Deborah Will- country offices are also acknowledged Diego Vallejo, Yuqing Wang, Xuan Yi and
ing, John Willshire, Jiajun Xu, Ong Keng with much gratitude. Moya Zhu.
Yong, Zhang Yujun, Anis Yuszal Yusoff and Colleagues in UNDP provided advice The Human Development Report Of-
Yingqin Zheng. and inputs and organized consultations. fice also extends its sincere gratitude
We are thankful for especially close We are grateful to Jairo Acuna Alfaro, to the Republic of Korea as well as the
dialogues at Duke University, with Tehmina Akhtar, Abdallah Al Dardari, Da- Governments of Japan and Portugal for
Stephanie Alt Lamm, Sarah Bermeo, rah Aljoudar, Elsie Attafuah, Julie Axelsen, their financial contributions. Their ongoing

viii HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

support is much appreciated and remains We would like to warmly invoke the unprecedented innovations such as
essential. memory of Inge Kaul, an early leader of the Human Climate Horizons Platform
We are grateful for the highly profes- the Human Development Report Office (https://horizons.hdr.undp.org/)­—­he has
sional work of our editors and layout artists and a pioneer on global public goods­—t­o always been generous in sharing his
at Communications Development Incor- which this Report returns­—­and a fiercely time (a precious commodity!) and wis-
porated—led by Bruce Ross-Larson with independent thinker and mentor. Inge is dom with the team. Our office is named
Joe Caponio, Meta de Coquereaumont, very much missed. the Human Development Report Office,
Mike Crumplar, Christopher Trott and It is hard to express how much we but, as he always reminds us, the goal is
Elaine Wilson. Bruce, especially, is so owe to UNDP Administrator Achim not to produce a report but to advance
much part of the process that he feels Steiner. In giving us the space and debates around human development
part of the team, as he has been for all freedom to explore and take risks, to try and to invite decisionmakers to engage
the Human Development Reports over new things­—­not only in Human Devel- with the analysis. As always, we strive to
the decades. opment Reports but beyond, including meet this aspiration.

Pedro Conceição
Director
Human Development Report Office

Acknowledgements ix
 Contents of the 2023/2024 Human Development Report

Foreword CHAP TER 6

Acknowledgements Breaking the gridlock to enhance collective action
Snapshot How does political polarization come about?
Overview Political polarization imperils cooperation
Enhancing international collective action­—n
­ ow

PART I Notes
Advancing human development in an interdependent world
References

C H A PTER 1
BOXES
Human development suffers when interdependence is mismanaged
O.1 Global public goods 101: What are summation, best-­shot and
Building forward weaker? An unequal and incomplete recovery in weakest-­link global public goods?
human development from the 2020–2021 dip
2.1 A smartphone’s global journey­—­a tale of cross-­border economic,
Mismanaging interdependence imposes costs on human development social and environmental impacts
Prospects for advancing agency and wellbeing will be shaped by 2.2 Human mobility in the face of climate change: The case of Viet Nam
the management of interdependence
S2.2.1 Relational and interdependent wellbeing
3.1 Digital public infrastructure and digital public goods
C H A PTER 2
3.2 What drives countries to contribute to global public goods?
Global interdependence persists—but is being reshaped
4.1 A standard selfish choice model of behaviour
The persistence of global ties­—­a hyperconnected world with
multiple global interdependences 4.2 A behavioural choice model of decisionmaking
Global interdependence is being reshaped and likely to persist 4.3 Social preferences can scale up
well into the future
4.4 “It’s not a lie if you believe it”—Beliefs, social norms and collective action
4.5 The promise and peril of nudges in changing behaviour
CHAPTER 3
4.6 Social context shapes what people do and how they see themselves
Providing global public goods to manage interdependence
4.7 Where are the politics?
What are global public goods?
5.1 Promoting more deliberative forms of citizen participation
What does it take to provide global public goods? They are not
created equal 5.2 Social dialogue in the world of work
Applying a global public goods lens to the response to Covid-19 6.1 Public reasoning and deliberation for human development

FI G URES
PART II S.1 A permanent shift in the Human Development Index (HDI) trajectory?
Reimagining cooperation by expanding agency and easing polarization
S.2 Recovery of Human Development Index (HDI) values since the
2020–2021 decline is projected to be highly unequal
C H A PTER 4
S.3 Inequality between very high Human Development Index (HDI)
Examining how to enhance collective action and low HDI countries is increasing, bucking long-­run declines
Start with a standard selfish choice model of behaviour S.4 Self-­reported stress rose in most countries, even before the
Covid-­19 pandemic
Apply insights from behavioural science, but handle with care
S.5 The democracy paradox? Unwavering support for democracy but
Recognize how culture shapes behaviour and institutions
increasing support for leaders who may undermine it
S.6 Reasons for hope: Improvements on the Human Development
C H A PTER 5
Index without increasing planetary pressures
Expanding agency for collective action
S.7 Agency gaps in collective action are higher than those in control
How agency gaps hinder collective action over one’s own life
Narrowing agency gaps to foster collective action O.1 War deaths and forced displacement are getting much worse
Institutions to bring collective action to scale­—­people-­centred, O.2 Climate change could result in an explosion of inequalities
co-­owned and future-­oriented

x HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

O.3 Economic interdependence is stabilizing at very high levels 4.1 Behavioural change and institutional reform influence each
other—jointly shaping and being shaped by social choice procedures
O.4 Profit shifting to tax havens has skyrocketed
4.2 Widespread efforts draw on behavioural insights to inform public policy
O.5 Lower confidence in national government tends to correlate with
lower confidence in the United Nations 4.3 Effects of several behavioural phenomena are stronger in more
educated and wealthier segments of the population
O.6 Freedom of expression goes hand-­in-hand with agency and has
been receding in recent years 4.4 There are widespread differences in fairness preferences around the world
O.7 The higher the perceived human insecurity, the lower the sense 4.5 The world is undergoing a major transition from accelerating to
of control over one’s own life decelerating population growth
O.8 The perception of agency (control over one’s own life) is shaped S4.2.1 The identification of 180 cognitive biases makes it hard to derive
by income insights about how to change behaviour to enhance collective action
O.9 Gender equality in politics is being constrained by biased social S4.4.1 Most people in African countries think that not paying taxes on
norms against women income is at least “wrong, but understandable” and are closer to
agreeing than to disagreeing that the tax authority always has the
1.1 The global Human Development Index (HDI) value is below its
right to make people pay taxes
pre-2019 trend
S4.4.2 Redistribution through taxation is not a salient election issue in
1.2 The recovery in Human Development Index (HDI) values is incomplete
most African countries, nor is it a strong priority of their citizens
1.3 The recovery in Human Development Index (HDI) values is
5.1 The democracy paradox? Unwavering support for democracy
projected to be highly unequal
along with increasing support for leaders who may undermine it
1.4 Low Human Development Index (HDI) countries have been left behind
5.2 Large and increasing shares of the population support leaders
1.5 Each developing region’s projected 2023 Human Development who may bypass democratic norms and practices, 1994–2022
Index value is below its pre-2019 trend
5.3 Economic shocks are associated with lower trust in institutions­—­
1.6 Unprecedented declines in learning outcomes, as measured by but the relationship is weaker for trust in the United Nations and in
PISA test scores one another
1.7 Civilian fatalities as a result of conflict are surging after years of declining 5.4 Agency gaps in collective action are higher than those in control
over one’s own life
1.8 People forced to flee their homes trending upwards towards
record levels 5.5 Reducing corruption increases confidence in government but so
does narrowing agency gaps
1.9 Planetary pressures are decoupled from their geographic and
temporal effects 5.6 Agency in control over one’s own life and trust
1.10 Climate change could result in an explosion of inequalities in 5.7 The perception of agency (control over one’s own life) is shaped
human development by income
1.11 Trends in reducing global hunger have reversed 5.8 The higher the income, the more likely people are to report being
interested in politics and voting
1.12 The Covid-­19 pandemic may have permanently shifted the
trajectory for poverty reduction 5.9 The higher the education level, the more likely people are to
report being interested in politics and voting
1.13 Freedom of expression­—­receding in recent years
5.10 The higher the perceived human insecurity, the lower the sense
2.1. Hyperglobalization is down, but interdependence remains
of control over one’s own life
unprecedentedly high
5.11 Perceived human insecurity is related to generalized trust,
2.2 Remittances to low- and middle-­income countries are
especially for higher Human Development Index (HDI) groups
approaching the level of foreign direct investment
5.12 Perceived human insecurity is related to confidence in state institutions
2.3 Support for anti-elite politics is on the rise
5.13 Biased gender social norms limit women’s political agency
2.4 Mismanaged interdependence leads to demand for populism
through welfare losses and beliefs 5.14 Gender inequalities in agency gaps in facing future disasters are pervasive
2.5 Even prior to 2020, worry and stress were rising in most countries S5.1.1 Proposed elements of social cohesion
2.6 Elites have been able to cash in on hyperglobalization, as profit 6.1 Support for national redistribution is correlated with support for
shifting to tax havens has skyrocketed global redistribution in Germany, but some people want extensive
national and very little global redistribution and vice-­versa
2.7 Discontent is costly: Lower GDP trajectories in countries with
populist episodes 6.2 More universalist beliefs are correlated with concerns both for the
global poor and for the global environment
2.8 Violent conflicts affected 15 percent of the global population in 2022
6.3 Universalist beliefs are associated with global redistribution and
2.9 Inequalities and the Anthropocene­—­higher Human Development
global environment in high-­income countries, but the cultural
Index countries put higher pressures on the planet
context matters
2.10 Pushing possibility frontiers­—­higher Human Development Index
6.4 Confidence in national institutions is correlated with confidence in
values at lower planetary pressures
multilateral institutions, key for international collective action
2.11 Decoupling of planetary pressures and the Human Development
6.5 Confidence in several institutions is highly correlated with
Index (HDI)
confidence in the national government
2.12 Digital technologies are driving shifts in global economic
6.6 The misperception of the share of immigrants in the population is
interdependence, with dramatic increases in modern service
high and widely shared across society
exports since 2000
S6.1.1 How group identification might increase polarization
3.1 Authorization for Covid-19 vaccines was unprecedently fast
S6.2.1 Half a billion people live in politically estranged situations, about
S3.1.1 About one-third of the world’s fishery stocks are overfished
five times more than in 2010

Contents of the 2023/2024 H uman D evelopment R eport xi

 SPOTL I G H TS TABL ES
2.1 The human toll of mismanaging interdependence: Insights from 3.1 Recommendations for how to improve the provision of different
national and international history Patricia Clavin types of global public goods
2.2 Managing global interdependence to advance human development S3.2.1 Summary of global public good assessments: Five cases
3.1 The global commons of ocean fisheries Scott Barrett S4.4.1 Types of norms and examples
3.2 Assessing the net benefits from global public goods and their 6.1 Confidence in national and international institutions is higher
distribution Ronald U. Mendoza and Jurel Yap among people who trust others
3.3 How inequity in access to Covid-19 vaccines unfolded: An account
using a global public goods lens
4.1 A technology-centred approach to climate change negotiations ​ STATISTICAL AN N EX
Scott Barrett
Readers guide
4.2 Using insights from behavioural science: Watch out!
4.3 Cultural evolution and development policy Joseph Henrich
HUMAN DEVELOP MENT COMP OSI TE I NDI CES 
4.4 The role of trust and norms in tax compliance in Africa ​
1 Human Development Index and its components
Odd‑Helge Fjeldstad and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen
2 Human Development Index trends, 1990–2022
5.1 Strengthening social cohesion to mitigate human insecurity: Promise
and peril Julia Leininger, Armin von Schiller and Charlotte Fiedler 3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
5.2 Solidarity and creative resolve Nicole Hassoun 4 Gender Development Index
5.3 The role of multilateral development banks in the provision of global 5 Gender Inequality Index
public goods José Antonio Ocampo and Karla Daniela González
6 Multidimensional Poverty Index: developing countries
6.1 Identity, polarization and their societal and political consequences ​
7 Planetary pressures-adjusted Human Development Index
Robert Böhm, Philipp Sprengholz, Luca Henkel and Cornelia Betsch
6.2 International collective action in a time of geopolitical upheaval
Developing regions
6.3 Geopolitics and the early history of the United Nations: Friend or foe? ​
Andrew Thompson Statistical references
6.4 (Mis)perceiving others Leonardo Bursztyn

xii HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Breaking the gridlock
A snapshot of the 2023/2024
Human Development Report
 Breaking the gridlock
A snapshot of the 2023/2024 Human Development Report

2 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

We can do better than this. Better than runaway cli- Human Development Reports. Yet we need not sit on
mate change and pandemics. Better than a spate of our hands simply because great power competition is
unconstitutional transfers of power amid a rising, heating up while countries underrepresented in glob-
globalizing tide of populism. Better than cascading al governance seek a greater say in matters of global
human rights violations and unconscionable massa- import. Recall that global cooperation on smallpox
cres of people in their homes and civic venues, in hos- eradication and protection of the ozone layer, among
pitals, schools and shelters. other important issues such as nuclear nonprolifera-
We must do better than a world always on the brink, tion, happened over the course of the Cold War.
a socioecological house of cards. We owe it to our- Slivers of hope have emerged even now. The
selves, to each other, to our children and their children. Ukraine grain deal, before its suspension in 2023,
We have so much going for us. averted widespread food insecurity, which would
We know what the global challenges are and who have hurt poorer countries and poorer people most.
will be most affected by them. And we know there The production of Covid-­19 vaccines, which saved
will surely be more that we cannot anticipate today. millions of lives, relies on global supply chains, al-
We know which choices offer better opportunities though, tragically, many more lives could have been
for peace, shared prosperity and sustainability, better saved if vaccine coverage had been more equitable.2
ways to navigate interacting layers of uncertainty and Countries continue to cooperate on genomic se-
interlinked planetary surprises.1 quencing of variants, even as shameful inequities in
We enjoy unprecedented wealth, knowhow and vaccine access persist.3 At the 28th Conference of the
technology­—­unimaginable to our ancestors­—­that with Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
more equitable distribution and use could power bold Change, the world established a new loss and dam-
and necessary choices for peace and for sustainable, in- age fund to benefit more than 3 billion people, with
clusive human development on which peace depends. pledges totalling over $600 million.4 Global clean
So why does pursuing the ambitions of the 2030 energy investment, and the jobs and opportunities
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris that come with it, reached an all-­time high of $1.8 tril-
Agreement feel like a half-­hearted slog through lion in 2023 (equivalent to the size of the economy of
quicksand? the Republic of Korea), almost twice the amount in
Why in many places does restoring peace, even 2020.5
pauses or ceasefires as hopeful preludes to peace, feel However challenging they are, geopolitics are sim-
so elusive? ply not an excuse to stay stuck in gridlock. There are
Why are we immobilized on digital governance paths through. Reimagining and fully providing glob-
while artificial intelligence races ahead in a data al public goods in ways that meet national develop-
goldrush? ment needs at the same time is one of them.
In short, why are we so stuck? And how do we The 2021–2022 Human Development Report ar-
get unstuck without resorting myopically to vio- gued that a new uncertainty complex is unsettling lives
lence or isolationism? These questions motivate the the world over and dragging on human development.
2023/2024 Human Development Report. The global Human Development Index (HDI) value
Sharp questions belie their complexity; issues with fell for the first time ever­—in both 2020 and 2021.
power disparities at their core often defy easy expla- The global HDI value has since rebounded to a
nation. Magic bullets entice but mislead­—­siren songs projected record high in 2023 (figure S.1). All compo-
peddled by sloganeering that exploits group-­based nents of the global HDI are projected to exceed their
grievances. Slick solutions and simple recipes poison pre-­2019 values.6
our willingness to do the hard work of overcoming Despite being projected to reach a new high, the
polarization. global HDI value would still be below trend. And
Geopolitical quagmires abound, driven by shift- the global figure masks disturbing divergence across
ing power dynamics among states and by national countries: every Organisation for Economic Co-­
gazes yanked inward by inequalities, insecurity and operation and Development country is projected
polarization, all recurring themes in this and recent to have recovered, but only about half of the Least

Snapshot — Breaking the gridlock 3

Figure S.1 A permanent shift in the Human Development Index (HDI) trajectory?

Global HDI value

0.800
d
tren
2019
Pre-
0.750 al
Actu

0.700

2015 2017 2019 2021 2023

(projected)
0.650

0.600
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
(projected)

Note: The global HDI value for 2023 is a projection. The pre-2019 trend is based on the evolution of the global HDI value in the previous 20 years.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from Barro and Lee (2018), IMF (2023d), UNDESA (2022, 2023), UNESCO Institute for
Statistics (2023), United Nations Statistics Division (2023) and World Bank (2023).

Developed Countries are projected to have done so

Figure S.2 Recovery of Human Development Index (HDI) (figure S.2). After 20 years of steady progress, ine-
values since the 2020–2021 decline is projected to be quality between countries at the upper and lower
highly unequal ends of the HDI has reversed course, ticking up each
year since 2020 (figure S.3).
If the global HDI value continues to evolve below
Country recovery by 2023 from
the HDI setback in 2020 or 2021 the pre-­2019 trend, as it has since 2020, losses will be
permanent. Based on the 1999–2019 trend, the glob-
al HDI value was on track to cross the threshold defin-
ing very high human development (a value of 0.800)
51% by 2030—coinciding with the deadline to meet the
did not
recover Sustainable Development Goals. Now, the world is
100% off track. Indeed, every region’s projected 2023 HDI
recovered value falls below its pre-2019 trend. Whatever its
future trajectory, the global HDI value will capture­
49%
recovered —­incompletely, if at all­—­many other important ele-
ments, such as the debilitating effects of chronic illness
or the spikes in mental health disorders or in violence
Least Developed Organisation for Economic against women, all restricting people’s possibilities for
Countries Co-operation and
Development their lives. For rich and poor countries alike some loss-
es will never be recovered. Whatever the charts and
Note: Least Developed Countries have low levels of income and face vulner- indicators may say about people today, the Covid-­19
abilities that make them “the poorest and weakest segment” of the interna-
tional community (https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-least-developed​
pandemic took some 15 million lives.7 We cannot get
-countries). Recovery means that countries that suffered a decline in HDI value them back. Nor the time siphoned off in so many ways­
in 2020 or 2021 are projected to reach or surpass their pre-decline HDI value
by 2023. —­in isolation, in caregiving, in not attending school.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from The HDI is an important, if crude, yardstick for
Barro and Lee (2018), IMF (2023d), UNDESA (2022, 2023), UNESCO Institute
for Statistics (2023), United Nations Statistics Division (2023) and World Bank human development. Just a few years ago wellbeing
(2023). had never been higher, poverty never lower. Yet people

4 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Figure S.3 Inequality between very high Human Development Index (HDI) and low HDI countries is increasing, bucking
long-­run declines

Difference in HDI value between

very high and low HDI countries
0.44 0.39

0.42 0.38
2017 2020 2023
(projected)

0.40

0.38
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023
(projected)

Note: The difference in HDI values for 2023 is based on projections.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from Barro and Lee (2018), IMF (2023), UNDESA (2022, 2023), UNESCO Institute for
Statistics (2023), United Nations Statistics Division (2023) and World Bank (2023).

around the world were reporting high levels of sad- institutions built on a bedrock of generalized trust.
ness, stress and worry (figure S.4).8 Those self-­reported Over the past 10 years both very high and high HDI
measures have since risen for nearly 3 billion people.9 countries have improved their HDI values without
And while 9 in 10 people show unwavering support increasing planetary pressures, a shift from previous
for the ideal of democracy, there has been an increase trends of the two increasing together, so there are rea-
in those supporting leaders who may undermine it: sons to hope that this might be possible (figure S.6).
today, for the first time ever, more than half the global Or it can be channelled, as it seems now, into vi-
population supports such leaders (­figure S.5).10 cious cycles of demonizing blame games that breed,
The uncertainty complex has cast a very long shad- at best, suspicion and distrust and, at worst, preju-
ow on human development writ large, with recent dice, discrimination and violence.
years marking perhaps an unfortunate and avoidable Troublingly, populism has exploded, blowing past
fork in its path rather than a short-­lived setback. last century’s peaks, which roughly corresponded to
What gives? periods of mismanaged globalization.11 That is hap-
Progress feels harder to grasp, especially when pening alongside, and in many cases exploiting, wick-
planetary pressures are brought into view; our ed forms of polarization, such as the winnowing and
standard development measures are clearly miss- hardening of narrow identities, a sort of coercion or
ing some things. One of those things may be the unfreedom enabled, if not outright celebrated, by an
disempowerment of people­— ­gaps in human agency­ ongoing fetishization of so-­called rational self-­interest.
—­which is taking combined hits from new configu- People’s ability to determine for themselves what it
rations of global complexity and interdependence, means to live a good life, including defining and reas-
uncertainty, insecurity and polarization. sessing their responsibilities to other people and to the
People are looking for answers and a way forward. planet, has been crowded out in many ways. Metastat-
This can be channelled helpfully via shared am- ic hands-­off dogma hides the raiding of the economic
bition that brings everyone along (not necessarily and ecological cookie jar. Dog-­eat-dog and beggar-­
on everything) in areas of cooperation that are not thy-neighbour mindsets harken back to mercantilist
zero-sum, enabled by cooperative narratives and eras. And policies and institutions­—­including those

Snapshot — Breaking the gridlock 5

Figure S.4 Self-­reported stress rose in most countries, even before the Covid-­19 pandemic

Change in the percentage of people reporting experiencing stress,

2011–2019 (percentage points)
Increase
Low HDI Medium HDI High HDI Very high HDI
60 group group group group

24 out of 30 25 out of 32 24 out of 40 39 out of 59

40
countries countries countries countries

20

–20

–40

–60

–80

Decrease

 DI is Human Development Index.

H
Note: Values refer to the change in the percentage of people who reported experiencing stress “during a lot of the day yesterday.”
Source: Human Development Report Office, based on Gallup (2023).

that have mismanaged globalized market dynamics­—­ cooperation, complementing development assis-
default to “me” before “we.” tance focused on poorer countries and humanitarian
We are at an unfortunate crossroad. Polarization assistance focused on emergencies. These tracks are
and distrust are on a collision course with an ailing not silos. Distinctively, a global public goods archi-
planet. Insecurity and inequalities have a lot to do tecture would aim for transfers from rich countries
with it. So does a constellation of disempowering to poorer ones that advance goals for every country
narratives that engender defensive fatalism and cat- to benefit. Every country has a chance to have a say,
astrophic inertia­— ­all circumscribed and, in some as well as an opportunity to contribute. As such, this
sense fuelled by, dizzying political polarization. third track is intrinsically multilateral.
What can we do to help turn things around? Quite Global public goods will require additional financ-
a lot. ing as a complement, rather than substitute for or
competitor, to traditional development assistance.
The financing can come in many forms. For exam-
Build a 21st century architecture for global public goods ple, when some portion of an investment in a poorer
country generates global benefits, the corresponding
First, we should build out a 21st century architecture financing (or technology transfer) should tend to be
to deliver the global public goods that we all depend concessional, so that alignment is achieved between
on. It would function as a third track to international who benefits (the rest of the world) and who pays (the

6 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

 Figure S.5 The- democracy paradox? Unwavering support for democracy but increasing support for leaders who
may undermine it

Percent of population that thinks positively

about leaders who may undermine democracy

60

Majority of population thinks

positively about democracy
but also about leaders who may undermine it

2017–2022

50

2010–2014

2005–2009

40
1994–1998

1999–2004

Majority of population thinks

positively about democracy
and leaders who do not undermine it

30
40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Percent of population that thinks positively about having a democratic system

Note: Data are population-­weighted averages for a panel of countries representing 76 percent of the global population. Percent of population on the verti-
cal axis refers to people who responded that having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is “very good” or “fairly
good.” Percent of population on the horizontal axis refers to people who responded that having a democratic political system is “very good” or “fairly good.”
Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from multiple waves of the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022).

rest of the world). The flipside is the case of hazards will correcting misperceptions about other people’s
or shocks that are not of a single country’s making. preferences and motivations. All too often people
Automatic triggers can be embedded in bonds or make biased assumptions about other people, in-
loan agreements, especially state-­contingent debt in- cluding people on the other side of political divides.
struments, to help poorer countries cope with crises Often, people agree with one another more than
that they had little part in generating, as with climate they think. For example, while 69 percent of peo-
change. This would create more predictable condi- ple around the world report being willing to sacrifice
tions in navigating an uncertain world that could mo- some of their income to contribute to climate change
bilize and attract private finance to those countries. mitigation, only 43 percent perceive others believ-
ing the same (a 26 percentage point misperception
gap).12 The result is a false social reality of pluralistic
Dial down temperatures and push back polarization ignorance where incorrect beliefs about others ham-
strings cooperation that, if recognized and corrected,
Second, we need to dial down the temperature and could help build collective action on climate.
push back on polarization, which poisons practically Not all polarization can be reduced to mispercep-
everything it touches and impedes international co- tion, however big a role it plays. That makes it impor-
operation. Providing global public goods will help. So tant to create spaces of deliberation to bridge divides.

Snapshot — Breaking the gridlock 7

 Figure S.6 Reasons for hope: Improvements on the Human Development Index without increasing planetary pressures

Index of Planetary Pressures value

0.180
Very high HDI
countries
0.160 1990

0.140 2022
The HDI value of high HDI countries is approaching
the HDI value of very high HDI countries in
0.120 1990 but with lower planetary pressures

0.100 2022

0.080 High HDI

The 2022 HDI value of low HDI countries is countries
similar to the HDI value of medium HDI countries
0.060 in 2003 but with lower planetary pressures

The 2022 HDI value of medium HDI countries

0.040 1990 is similar to the HDI value of high HDI countries
Medium HDI in 2002 but with lower planetary pressures
Low HDI
countries
0.020 countries 1990 2022
1990 2022
0.000
0.350 0.450 0.550 0.650 0.750 0.850 0.950

Human Development Index (HDI) value

Note: The Index of Planetary Pressures is constructed using the per capita levels of carbon dioxide emissions (production) and material footprint in
each country (it is 1 minus the adjustment factor for planetary pressures presented in table 7 in the Statistical Annex of the full Report).
Source: Human Development Report Office. See specific sources in tables 2 and 7 in the Statistical Annex of the full Report.

Citizen assemblies can function in this way, but they worldwide reporting that they have no or limited con-
are not the only means. Practical schemes to facili- trol over their lives and more than two-­thirds perceiv-
tate more deliberative processing of information can ing that they have little influence in the decisions of
help counter the growing danger of people becoming their government (figure S.7).
trapped in beliefs that have no basis in fact.13 In con- To help narrow agency gaps, institutions need
texts of intergroup conflict, presenting information to become more people-­centred, co-­owned and
in a frame that does not provoke anger can be depo- future-­oriented.
larizing.14 Interventions that rely on qualitative and People-­centred is about placing ultimate objectives
narrative-­based approaches, such as storytelling and in terms of human development and human security,
vignettes, are particularly effective.15 recognizing the interdependence of people and the
The key words are deliberate and deliberative. Po- planet.
larization is more likely to self-­destruct badly than to Co-­owned is about the fair distribution of the power
self-­correct helpfully. Steady positive pressure that en- to set collective goals, the responsibilities to pursue
courages empathy, builds interpersonal trust and em- them and the resulting outcomes. It stresses the for-
phasizes overlapping, shared identities is the way to go. mation of social norms that cultivate the value of col-
lective achievements and cooperative behaviour.17
Future-oriented is about focusing on what we can
Narrow agency gaps shape and create if we work together, enriching the
space for deliberation and agreement.18 In the face of
Third, we need to narrow agency gaps­—­fuelled in challenges, a future-­oriented perspective opens pos-
part by the divergence between what people believe sibilities for hope and creative resolve.
is possible or probable and what is objectively possi- Tailoring these principles to different contexts will
ble.16 Agency gaps are also apparent in half of people put us on the road to productive dialogue and action,

8 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Figure S.7 Agency gaps in collective action are higher than those in control over one’s own life

Control over own life

5 in 10 or about half the world’s people report not being in control of their own lives

Voice in political system

7 in 10 or 68 percent of people report that they have little influence

in the decisions of their government

Note: Agency is the ability of people to act as agents who can do effective things based on their commitments (Sen 2013). It is proxied by two indica-
tors: the share of the population that reported feeling in control over their lives (measured on a scale of 1–10, where 1–3 indicates an acute agency
gap, 4–7 indicates a moderate agency gap and 8–10 indicates no agency gap) and the share of the population that reported feeling that their voice is
heard in the political system (those who responded “A great deal” or “A lot”). Data are computed using microdata and equal weights across countries.
Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022).

which must be flexible and iterative amid so much They will help us better manage evolving global
uncertainty, for lessons to inform course corrections. interdependence.
They will help us break through the tyranny of single They will help us cooperatively and peacefully
adversarial narratives and single exclusive identities. break through the global gridlock.

Snapshot — Breaking the gridlock 9

 OV E R V I E W

Managing
interdependence in
a polarized world
 OV E RV IE W

Managing interdependence in a polarized world

12 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

 Mismanaged global Violent conflicts and their consequences for people
interdependence hurts people are the tip of the iceberg. Gridlock means that systemic
risks arising from global interdependence are misman-
The human toll of mismanaged interdependence is aged or simply unaddressed, that people are walloped
huge­—­in lives lost or uprooted, in opportunities for- by surprises not capitalizing on them. In extreme cases
gone, in feelings of despair. Aggression, conflict and surprises spiral into full blown crises, ricocheting and
violence are extreme realities when complex webs of amplifying in unexpected ways in an unequal, tightly
interdependence fester, especially against backdrops knit world. The extreme is becoming the norm.
of prolonged power imbalances. A long series of disease outbreaks preceded the
From wars in Gaza and Ukraine to Sudan, Yemen Covid-­19 pandemic, which caught the world flatfoot-
and elsewhere, to gang violence and civil insecuri- ed and struggling for a modicum of global coherence
ty, peace and stability are under strain or breaking over the course of the emergency. Some 15 million
down at alarming rates. Large-­scale conflicts involv- people (perhaps more) died worldwide,3 and the glob-
ing major powers are escalating. War fatalities have al Human Development Index value tanked.
jumped (figure O.1). Sadly, we live in a violent new In addition to huge, unjust divides in access to effec-
era characterized by the highest level of state-­based tive vaccines, a missing ingredient was trust­—­in our
armed conflicts since 1945 and a growing share of governments and in each other.4 According to one esti-
one-­sided conflicts where unarmed civil populations mate, if all countries had attained the levels of interper-
are being attacked.1 sonal trust seen in the top quarter of countries, global
Violence and peace can both be contagious. Major infections might have been reduced by 40 percent,
political events such as coups, revolutions and dem- saving millions of lives.5 In polarizing societies around
ocratic transitions have a habit of spilling across bor- the world, vaccine status identification became another
ders. Conflicts often change the perception of war, factional marker separating one camp from the other.6
making it more acceptable and increasing the likeli- The Covid-­19 vaccine story exemplifies the pos-
hood of violent outbreaks elsewhere. sibilities of global cooperation, as well as the grave
In 2022 the number of forcibly ­displaced people in injustices that can result when it breaks down. The
the world reached 108 million, the highest level since development of mRNA vaccines relied heavily on
World War II (figure O.1) and more than two and a cross-­border, cross-­regional partnerships for sourcing
half times the level in 2010.2 components,7 for clinical development and trials8 and

Figure O.1 War deaths and forced displacement are getting much worse

Fatalities in Displaced people, total

state-based conflicts (millions)

250,000 120

100
200,000

80
150,000
60
100,000
40

50,000
20

0 0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2023; UNHCR 2023.

Overview — Managing interdependence in a polarized world 13

 for manufacturing. But the Covid-­19 vaccine story of existence are in the process of collapse.” 12 Disap-
follows pernicious patterns of inequality in access to pearing biodiversity, landscapes and ways of life can
technologies generally, including lifesaving ones.9 be paralysing, skewing major life decisions such as in-
The pattern is all too familiar­—­and must be broken vesting in school or having a child.13 Effectively, this
for its own sake. And because technological trajecto- is a restriction on human development­—­in freedoms
ries, from artificial intelligence to synthetic biology, and possibilities in life­— ­owing to both the reality of
are so steep, so fast and so powerful, the deep cleav- human-­induced planetary pressures and how that
ages between haves and have-­nots could worsen. reality is mediated by technical reports, the popular
Perhaps the greatest casualty of global gridlock, cli- press and political leaders. Narratives of shared fu-
mate change is already exacerbating those cleavages. tures rooted in denialism, fatalism or fearmongering
Last year was the hottest in more than 140 years.10 leave little space for agency and imagination.
The average belies considerable regional differences Political systems mediate, for good or ill (or both),
that the United Nations Development Programme’s the impacts of crises on people, and the systems
(UNDP) Human Climate Horizons11 platform projects themselves are often shaken by crises, including
will worsen under business-­as-usual climate scenar- those from mismanaged global interdependence.
ios (figure O.2), with climate change resulting in an The destabilizing effects of shocks, alongside the per-
explosion of inequalities. ceived inability of institutions to protect people from
The consequences of climate change are already them, can stir populism.14
shaking communities and societies, exacting so- Owing to a shock or other cause, populist turns
cial, emotional and mental tolls. Among the various often upset democratic norms and practices and tend
stressors of climate change is a crippling eco-­anxiety, to be very costly economically.15 In parallel, recent lit-
a “generalized sense that the ecological foundations erature suggests that the economic losses of certain

Figure O.2 Climate change could result in an explosion of inequalities

Change in deaths per 100,000 people

120 Arab States

100
South Asia
80 Sub-Saharan Africa

60

40

20
East Asia and the Pacific
Latin America and the Caribbean
0
Europe and Central Asia
–20

–40

–60 Developed

–80
2020–2039 2040–2059 2080–2099
(Next decades) (Mid-century) (End of century)

Note: Very high emissions scenario.

Source: Human Development Report Office based on Carleton and others (2022) and Human Climate Horizons (https://horizons.hdr.undp.org/).

14 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

 kinds of shocks are never fully recovered, that trajec- fog­—­alongside uncertainty, insecurity, inequalities
tories on growth or poverty reduction permanently and polarization­— ­complicates hopeful paths forward.
downshift following crises.16 When crises and other By some measures global interconnectivity is at re-
shocks precede populist turns, and in some cases pre- cord levels, even as the pace of economic integration
cipitate them, these populist turns can function as cri- stabilizes (figure 0.3).17 Trade in intermediate goods
sis refractors and compounders rather than buffers now slightly exceeds trade in final goods.18 Altogeth-
and mitigators, twisting and propagating shockwaves er, goods today travel twice as far as they did 60 years
in an interdependent world. ago, and cross more borders, before final consump-
tion.19 The production of smartphones, for example,
Global interdependence is evolving looks nothing like last century’s assembly line. Vari-
ous inputs, from mined cobalt on up to batteries and
The Covid-­19 pandemic, climate change, and the camera modules, crisscross the globe, sometimes re-
global surge in populism and conflicts all point to a tracing their steps and too often leaving avoidable so-
hard truth: ignoring or otherwise mismanaging glob- cial and environmental scars along the way.
al interdependence hurts people. Rolling them back Global financial interdependence remains high,
in any time frame of relevance, whether for the cli- even if the pace of integration stalled somewhat fol-
mate or national security or whatever other reason, is lowing the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 20 Low- and
equally foolhardy. middle-­income countries’ debt servicing costs bal-
Neither business as usual nor fantasies of deglo- looned over the past two years, following a torrent of
balization will do. Instead, we must embrace the interest rate hikes unleashed by central banks to com-
complexity of global interdependence and better bat inflation.21
manage its old and new forms in ways that protect Cross-­border flows of information break records
and expand people’s possibilities, even as geopolitical every year. Digital services exports now account for

Figure O.3 Economic interdependence is stabilizing at very high levels

Sum of global exports and imports

as a share of global GDP (%)
70

60

50

40

30

20

10
Globalization post–Bretton Woods Hyperglobalization A new era?

0
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022

Source: Human Development Report Office based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database; recreated from Aiyar and others (2023).

Overview — Managing interdependence in a polarized world 15

 more than half of global trade in commercial servic- Advocates for deglobalization or any of its lexiconic
es.22 Almost the entire global population is now with- kin­—­reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring­—­may
in the range of a mobile broadband network, and have their reasons, but those have little to do with
5.4 billion people were internet users in 2023, though practicably addressing new evolving and, in some
inequities remain stark.23 cases, inescapable forms of global and planetary in-
The number of people living outside their country terdependence. Whatever dent might be made in in-
of birth has tripled since 1970, from 84 million to al- ternational trade and capital flows would not come
most 280 million in 2020­— ­or nearly 3.6 percent of close to offsetting plane tickets, smartphones, carbon
the global population.24 International migration is an dioxide and other means of transboundary hyper-
exercise of people’s agency, expanding their choices connection. For reasons of water and food security,
and human potential.25 It creates social, cultural and among others, some countries face major constraints
economic ties between host and sending countries26 on their ability to restrict trade and would suffer if
and drives cross-border financial flows.27 others chose to do so. No country or region is close
We should expect familiar forms of interdepend- to self-­sufficient, as all rely on imports from other re-
ence to persist well into the future. Regulation that gions for 25 percent or more of essential goods and
helps manage them better will be crucial, unless the services.33 The climate remains largely indifferent to
objective is to privatize rewards and socialize risks.28 national borders, and its worsening impacts will con-
After all, we sometimes build roads with speed tinue to also ignore them. The same applies to cur-
bumps. Yet, interdependence in the 21st century is rent and future pandemics.
much more than bean counting based largely on 20th In other words if we deglobalize­— ­even if partially­
century metrics­—­that is, how many goods or people —­we cannot deplanetize, not in the Anthropocene.
or bits are moving across borders. The qualities of the We must view 21st century global public goods, from
interconnections matter, too. Our interdependence is pandemic preparedness and peace to climate and
increasingly planetary and instantaneous. digital governance, as opportunities to grasp rath-
Many interdependences among economies, people er than challenges to avoid. The answer to misman-
and planet are emerging and deepening as the Digi- aged interdependence is not shying away from them
tal Revolution powers ahead and we go deeper into
the Anthropocene­—­the age of humans. Expanding Figure O.4 Profit shifting to tax havens has skyrocketed
global trade has helped generate enormous wealth,
especially for some, and lift millions out of poverty.29 Global corporate tax revenue loss due to profit shifting to
Regrettably, it has also paralleled the dismantling of tax havens (% of global corporate tax revenue collected)
social, economic and ecological guardrails that would
10
otherwise protect and promote human development.
Markets have become more concentrated, encourag-
ing rent seeking. Almost 40 percent of global trade in 8

goods is concentrated in three or fewer countries­—­

even for goods where more suppliers exist.30 6
Antiglobalization sentiment has grown louder in
overall partisan discourse.31 Populists’ anti-­elite ire
4
has global dimensions. Fuelling that frustration is
a sense that the forces of globalization have bene-
fited some at the top and left everyone else behind. 2
Multinational companies may have shifted as much
as $1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2022.32 Glob-
0
al losses in corporate tax revenue have skyrocketed
1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

since the mid-­1990s as a result of profit shifting (fig-

ure O.4). Caught up in the antiglobalization mael-
strom, international cooperation is being politicized. Source: Alstadsæter and others 2023.

16 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

 by retreating within porous borders; it is to embrace from the bottom by our imagination and collective
and manage them better, learning and improving will and from the top by the way power is structured
as we go. Rather than be unwound or reversed, glo- and wielded. They are thus social choices, not just in
balization can and should be done differently, in how we imagine them but whether we decide to im-
ways that do not destroy the planet, that do not over- agine them at all.
concentrate supply chains and that do not generate Understanding that vaccine development and, say,
cost-­of-living crises that fuel debt crises in low- and blowing up an asteroid hurtling towards Earth can be
middle-­income countries. Global interdependence is framed as global public goods­—­and, what is more,
tenacious, deepening and evolving. A shift in mind- a specific kind of global public good known as best-­
sets, policies and institutions is essential to manage shot (box O.1)­—­means we do not need to start from
them better and to get unstuck. scratch when we respond. Time means lives. It means
we can think across sectors and silos and get better
Providing global public goods will help prepared. It means we can draw from our Covid-­19
pandemic experience, for example, when an asteroid
A global public goods lens can add much. When fully or a deadly new pathogen or a bout of global financial
provided, global public goods go a long way to better instability does come. They will come. But we do not
manage deeply rooted and evolving global interde- have to chase yesterday’s crisis.
pendence, to safeguard and promote human develop-
ment and to encourage virtuous cycles of cooperation
and trust building. They help us work with complex-
“A global public goods lens helps us disentangle
complex issues, many of which are complex
ity rather than ignore it. They challenge corrosive precisely because their different aspects call
zero-­sum thinking that pits groups against one anoth- for different ways of organizing ourselves
er. They spark our imagination to frame and reframe
shared problems into win-­win opportunities. And A global public goods lens helps us disentangle
they invigorate our sense of duty to one another and complex issues, many of which are complex precisely
to our single, shared planet. All without wishing away because their different aspects call for different ways
divergent interests or even disagreements. of organizing ourselves. Much of our response, and
What is a global public good?34 In a nutshell, a its shortcomings, to the Covid-­19 pandemic can be
global public good is anything­—­an object, an action understood through a global public goods lens, with
or inaction, an idea–that, when provided, everyone insights on how to structure incentives to foster coop-
around the world can enjoy. Climate change miti- eration and how to design supportive financing.
gation is a global public good. So is the work of 13th Recognizing that global public goods can be en-
century poet Rumi. And so is freedom of the seas. A joyed by everyone is one thing; the distribution of
special subcategory of global public goods is plan- their benefits is another. Because countries have dif-
etary public goods, which correspond to planetary ferent interests and resources, the value of each glob-
interdependence and respond to spillover impacts be- al public good to each country will be shaped by those
tween countries that cannot be managed or mitigated factors. Some of the challenges with providing global
at their borders. Another may be that of digital public public goods are driven by this asymmetry in benefits.
infrastructure and what have been called digital pub- A global public goods lens can also offer insights
lic goods, associated with the Digital Revolution. about reframing challenges. For instance, climate
While global public goods can serve as a rally- change mitigation (a summation global public good)
ing cry for redress against injustices or inefficien- could be advanced by accelerating the technolo-
cies, they are not merely things that are desirable. gies and innovations for renewable and clean en-
In fact, global public goods are less “goods” or con- ergy sources (including moonshots such as nuclear
crete things per se and more a choice about how we fusion)­—­which reframes the challenge as providing
humans can enjoy them together. They can be seen best-­shot global public goods. Imagine massive car-
also as a mindset­—­an aspiration—and can mobilize bon sequestration plants, powered by nuclear fusion,
cooperation in many forms. As such they are limited in the Arctic tundra or across the Sahara. Framing

Overview — Managing interdependence in a polarized world 17

 Box O.1 Global public goods 101: What are summation, best-­shot and weakest-­link global public goods?

Three kinds of global public goods stand out: summation, best-­shot, and weakest-­link. Climate change mitigation is
a typical example of a summation global public good, where the overall level of mitigation depends on the sum of
contributions from each individual agent, or country. Institutions must aggregate contributions big and small, work
to resolve free riding and navigate game-­theoretic problems, such as those posed in the classic prisoner’s dilemma
(where cooperating producers a better outcome than acting separately in one’s self-­interest).
Now imagine a cataclysmic, but destructible, asteroid hurtling towards Earth. What would be the best course of
action? The probability of destroying the asteroid depends on whichever country or other agent develops the most
accurate asteroid-­busting technology­—­in other words, a best-­shot global public good. The benefit to everyone on
the planet is determined by the agent (in this example, a country or pool of countries) that invests the most resources
effectively. Much technology production, such as the race to sequence the human genome, as well as knowledge in
the public domain, can generally be considered best-­shot global public goods.
Stubborn pockets of endemic polio illustrate the third kind of global public good: weakest-­link. While two of the
three wild polio viruses have been eradicated (type 2 in 2015 and type 3 in 2019),1 polio eradication efforts have not
succeeded yet­—­and have missed several target dates­—­because the third strain of the virus (wild polio type 1) persists
in only a few small areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and vaccine-­derived type 2 also continues to circulate.2
Disease eradication, as with smallpox, is a global public good. Yet, as with polio, the entire world remains at risk
if the pathogen circulates anywhere. The global benefit is then tied to the circumstances of the weakest agent. The
implications for focusing pooled resources are clear. Disease surveillance is also generally considered a weakest-­link
global public good.3

Notes
1. https://www.who.int/news-­room/feature-­stories/detail/two-­out-of-­three-wild-­poliovirus-strains-­eradicated. 2. Barrett 2011; Cohen 2023.
3. Post–Covid-­19 pandemic assessments established that countries with more generic public health capacities were better able to control
the disease, highlighting the importance of not only an emergency response but also the buildup of capacities for surveillance and public
health where they are lacking (Neill and others 2023).

climate change as a technological opportunity to be doing things, exactly what is needed to navigate in un-
solved could have a crowding-­in effect, generating certain times. Marrying that creativity with the right
its own positive momentum, instead of the foot drag- incentives and institutional architectures, whose gen-
ging of voluntary carbon emissions reductions. eral features we can already anticipate, will go a long
As important as human choice is for establishing, way to get things moving and build out a 21st century
framing and providing global public goods, it is not the global architecture to provide global public goods.
whole story. Technology plays an important role, too.
The advent of broadcast radio and television opened Wicked forms of polarization
access to information carried through the airwaves are getting in the way
to anyone with a receiving device. Cable television­—­
and later streaming services­— ­created opportunities to Easier said than done. What is getting in the way?
fence off programming, excluding nonpayers and lead- For starters, us.
ing to the proliferation of subscription services, which Group-­based polarization is widespread and in-
could be classified economically and epithetically as creasing around the world.35 It is affecting national
excludable. The demise of public telephones after mo- and international politics that will shape how shared
bile phones burst onto the scene offers a similar story: global challenges will be addressed in the decades
the technology created opportunities for exclusion that to come.36 Because polarization often translates into
policy choices permitted, if not outright encouraged. intolerance and an aversion to compromise and ne-
As with technology itself, global public goods often gotiation, it can lead to political gridlock and dys-
are not given but created. By us! By our imagination function. It does so in part by eroding trust across
and social choices. Therein lies a good measure of communities, impeding efforts to address major soci-
their power. They require and therefore activate our etal issues, such as health crises, violent conflict and
imagination for a different world, a different way of climate change. Since many of these issues engender

18 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

opposing beliefs and intense political competition, Figure O.5 Lower confidence in national government tends
polarization poses a major societal obstacle to ad- to correlate with lower confidence in the United Nations
dressing shared problems.37
Polarization is not the same as difference or dis-
Confidence in
agreement, even vigorous disagreement. Diversity
the United Nations
in preferences and perspectives enriches collective
decisionmaking and action.38 Indeed, political institu- 1
tions have been designed to harness rivalry to serve the
public interest. For instance, the arguments invoked by 0.8
James Madison in designing the US Constitution did
not assume away competing interests but rather de-
0.6
signed institutions that leveraged those differences to
be both adaptable and to serve the public interest.39
But polarization presents new challenges that are 0.4

fraying those institutions.40 All differences in view

are collapsed into questions of a narrow or single 0.2
identity. The Brexit referendum gave rise to new so-
cial identities­—­Leaver and Remainer­—­which formed 0
the basis of heightened group-­based polarization be-
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
tween those two groups.41 In the United States and
elsewhere, Covid-­19 vaccine status identification be- Confidence in national government
came a factional marker separating one camp from
the other.42 Note: Confidence in institutions (the national government and the United Na­
tions) implies reporting “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence (other op­
Polarization at the national level has global con- tions: “not very much” or “none at all”).
sequences; it is a drag on international cooperation, Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from wave 7
(2017–2022) of the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022).
including for the provision of global public goods.
Between 1970 and 2019 there were 84 referendums
concerning international cooperation (such as mem- human behaviour (and that of countries) are limited
bership in international organizations), with an in- to self-­interest and where cooperation is relegated to
crease in more recent decades.43 There have been reciprocity­—­that is, repeat games of the prisoner’s di-
campaigns for withdrawing from international insti- lemma. Providing global public goods will languish at
tutions.44 The European Union, the World Trade Or- either extreme. People and their countries have other,
ganization and international justice institutions have often more dominant motivations that are shaped by
been described as facing legitimacy challenges.45 social preferences and norms, many of which are cul-
For one, highly polarized societies that seesaw be- turally contingent. For cooperation crowding-­in is just
tween political extremes make international partners as possible as crowding-­out­—­if not more so­—­not on
less reliable. There is also a trust problem. Polariza- everything, but on challenges that are not zero-­sum.
tion signifies an erosion in trust, and lower trust­— ­or Doing so will require additional financing for glob-
confidence, more broadly­—­in national institutions al public goods as a complement to, rather than a
tends to correlate with lower confidence in interna- substitute for or competitor to, traditional develop-
tional organizations such as the United Nations (fig- ment assistance. The costs of inaction in not provid-
ure O.5). And polarization tends to feed on zero-­sum ing global public goods pale in comparison with the
thinking and breed cynicism about compromise and benefits.46 Mindsets and narratives matter here, too.
tolerance, all antithetical to global public goods. Many motives for support to global cooperation, in-
Providing global public goods does not require a cluding global redistribution, go beyond self-­interest
kumbaya moment among nations (divine interven- and have to do with people’s views on fairness and
tion for harmony). But nor does it live on the other end equity and whether their sense of duty stops at their
of the spectrum, where prevailing assumptions about country’s border or expands around the world. When

Overview — Managing interdependence in a polarized world 19

 provided, global public goods are a win-­win, the op- Populism has become an unhelpful pressure valve.
posite of zero-­sum. If we want to provide them, giv- The result is that institutions are failing to deliver. No
ing more salience to the nature of these challenges wonder that while the vast majority of people support
and setting up institutions to facilitate their provision democracy as an ideal, more than half now support
will be crucial. leaders that may undermine it in practice.
Mismanaged global interdependence, particular- Agency is a cornerstone of human development.
ly when culminating in shocks and crises, stokes po- Albeit difficult to measure directly, agency in pursuit
larization in many ways. One, by making people feel of collective action49 may be eroding (figure O.6),
insecure, and two, when sloganeering transforms at least for a sizeable portion of people around the
insecurity into fear and is exploited for political and world.50 For many there is a sinking feeling­— ­evident
personal gain. That is why providing global public in widespread increases in self-­reported measures of
goods is so important. By helping us manage global stress, worry and despair­—­that options for exercising
interdependence, they will dampen a major driver of choice in their lives, based on what they have reason
polarization around the world. to value, is shrinking. From among a diminishing set
of options, they are less sure­—­more insecure­—­that a

“By helping us manage global interdependence,

global public goods will dampen a major
choice they want to make can be realized.
These are threats to the human psyche­—­to our
driver of polarization around the world sense of self and autonomy, to our sense of securely
belonging and commitment to shared intentional-
Polarization can also be eased directly. One way ity,51 to our ability to decide what we value and how
to do this is by correcting misperceptions about oth- we can and do act on those values­— ­of no less impor-
ers’ beliefs, misperceptions that are widespread. For tance than the threats posed by a super typhoon, a
instance, the prevalence of pro-­climate beliefs in the disease outbreak or violence. Conventional metrics
United States is twice what people think it is.47 The re- such as GDP or even the Human Development Index
sult is a false social reality that hampers collective ac- are missing something important that is being voiced
tion on climate change. loudly on the streets, at the ballot box and in the in-
Another way to cool things down is by creating crease in support for leaders that may undermine de-
spaces of deliberation to bridge divides. Citizen as- mocracy. Agency may be a way of understanding the
semblies are one way to do this. Avenues for struc- gaps and, alongside concepts of insecurity, is an area
tured, repeat personal interaction like these matter ripe for innovative measurement. Indeed, across all
a lot. It is far easier to objectify, dismiss and malign regions human security and agency gaps go hand-­in-
behind the impersonal safety of a flamethrowing so- hand (figure O.7).
cial media post or to hurl vitriol through a television Now add inequality. There is a steep decline in the
camera than it is when sharing a meal with someone, share of people reporting having very low control
even with political foes. This may be why storytelling over their lives along the income distribution for the
and vignettes have been shown as effective ways to bottom 50 percent of the income distribution (fig-
ease polarization.48 They make “othering” harder. ure O.8). That is, agency increases as income grows
for the bottom 50 percent of the distribution. At the
We need to narrow gaps in agency very bottom lack of agency is particularly heightened
(agency gaps are three times greater among people in
Our institutions are struggling to keep up with evolv- the lowest income decile than in decile 6 and above).
ing, deepening forms of global interdependence and Moreover, the share of people reporting having very
provide global public goods. Polarization is a big part high control over their lives is low and relatively equal
of the problem. So are narrow and self-­fulfilling as- for the bottom 50 percent of the population but rises
sumptions about human behaviour that limit it to self-­ with income for deciles 6 and above. Thus, income
interest, assumptions that have long held sway over inequalities, which often intersect and are associated
institutions at all levels. Space for social preferences, with other inequalities in human development, shape
norms, duties and culture have been squeezed out. agency.

20 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Figure O.6 Freedom of expression goes hand-­in-hand with agency and has been receding in recent years

Freedom of Expression Index value

0.70

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.30

0.20
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Note: Data are population-­weighted global averages.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the Varieties of Democracy project and the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators database.

Figure O.7 The higher the perceived human insecurity, the lower the sense of control over one’s own life

Percent of people in each insecurity category

facing acute agency gap
14

Arab States
12

10
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and the Pacific
Developed countries
8 South Asia
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and
the Caribbean
6

2
Low Medium/High Very high
Perceived human insecurity
Note: Perceived human insecurity is measured as “low,” “medium and high” and “very high,” using microdata and equal weights across countries, and
is based on the index described in annex 1.2 of UNDP (2022d). Acute agency gap measures the share of the population reporting feeling no or very
little control over their lives (options 1–3 on a 1–10 scale).
Source: Human Development Report Office based on the latest available data from wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values
Survey (Inglehart and others 2022).

Overview — Managing interdependence in a polarized world 21

 Figure O.8 The perception of agency (control over one’s own life) is shaped by income

No agency gap
(in control over own life, percent of people in each income decile) Acute agency gap
80 18

12

60

40 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income decile (within countries)

Note: Computed using microdata and equal weights across countries.

Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022).

Polarization, insecurity, inequality and reductive political agency. Women serve as heads of state or
narratives all exact human tolls that can be under- heads of government in only about 10 percent of
stood through agency, which threads these strands countries, a statistic that has changed little over re-
together as a common denominator and a lodestar cent decades.52
for action. The UNDP’s 2023 Gender Social Norms Index,
Agency gaps are not just about formal institutions. which treats biases as deviations from global shared
Norms, which interact dynamically with institutions, standards of gender equality, shows that gender
matter a lot too. At the beginning of the 20th century, equality is being constrained by biased social norms
women in most countries were officially prohibited against women (figure O.9).53 Almost half of people
from participating in various societal roles, rang- believe that men make better political leaders than
ing from owning property and attending universities women.54 And biased norms might be so entrenched
to engaging in politics. Women’s agency gaps were that we judge the women who occupy high political
stark and widespread. Throughout the 20th century offices more harshly. These biases permeate voting
extensive reforms worldwide recognized the equal booths, interview panels, board meetings and more­—­
legal, social, economic and political rights of women all limiting women’s agency.
and men. Although women in many countries still To help narrow agency gaps, institutions need to
face legal restrictions affecting their agency, the pro- be people-­centred, co-­owned and future-­oriented.
gress in institutional reforms has been remarkable. What do these principles mean for existing multilat-
Agency gaps encoded in formal laws have tended to eral institutions?
disappear. The legal right to vote in elections­—­a fun- One proxy for people-­centred is human develop-
damental form of political agency­—­serves as a visible ment, which multilateral institutions recognize, at best,
example of this evolution. in a limited or partial way. Economic performance still
However, the effective agency of women remains dominates the agenda. That’s why Beyond GDP, em-
restricted in many areas. A notable example is wom- phasized by UN Secretary-­General António Guterres,
en’s access to top political office­—­the pinnacle of is so important.55 Gaps in co-­ownership are manifested

22 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Figure O.9 Gender equality in politics is being constrained by biased social norms against women

Share of parliamentary seats

occupied by women (%)
60

50

40

30

20

10

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Biases in gender social norms (% of population who agree or strongly agree

with the statement “Men make better political leaders than women do”)

Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey (for biases in social norms) and data
from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (for the share of parliamentary seats occupied by women in 2021). See also UNDP (2023a).

in the continuation of governance arrangements are well enforced.59 Enforcement is largely a policy
through written and unwritten rules that reflect a leg- choice and hinges on international coordination.
acy of the distribution of power in the post–World War Future-­oriented means accounting for the way in-
II world. This extends from the international financial terdependence is being reshaped in the Anthropocene
institutions to the United Nations, with several pro- and as a result of the Digital Revolution and finding
posals tabled over the years to redress the current lack ways to more systematically, efficiently and equitably
of representativeness of governance arrangements.56 providing global public goods.
Co-­ownership implies a fair distribution of the
burden of government action, avoiding inequalities Towards an agency-centred
resulting from tax avoidance and evasion. Over the vision of development
past decade there has been considerable progress in
controlling tax evasion, mainly through increased in- What is development and how is it best pursued? A
formation and transparency around the world.57 The central question in the postwar era whose answer has
UN General Assembly has started the process for a changed over time in response to emerging realities.
Framework Convention on International Tax Co- Today, the dynamic interactions between the planetary
operation, to facilitate policy coordination on these pressures of the Anthropocene on the one hand and
issues.58 Global minimum tax rates, such as the min- growing inequalities and insecurity on the other are to-
imum effective corporate income tax, do not have gether a gauntlet thrown to all development narratives.
to be very large to raise substantial amounts if they Even to human development.

Overview — Managing interdependence in a polarized world 23

 The first Human Development Report in 1990 20th century welfare state. Freedom blossoms into
proudly proclaimed that “people are the real wealth fuller meanings, going beyond the necessary and
of a nation.” People still are; they always will be. important “froms”­—­freedom from fear, from want,
What is the point of development if not for people? from deprivation­—­to the aspirational and important
Yet, how we talk about and measure people has to go “ofs”­—­freedom of self, thought and action, including
beyond wellbeing achievements, as measured by the helpful collective action.
Human Development Index and other conventional
indicators, to include agency­—­the unique, limitless
capacity for people to form and reform goals, com-
“States of all political stripes and incomes have
the opportunity and obligation to shape agency-
mitments and values; to make reasoned choices that centred policies and institutions, anchored in
may or may not advance their own wellbeing; and, human development and guided by human rights
ultimately, to lead lives with purpose, which may be
greater than their individual selves. States of all political stripes and incomes have the
Agency has largely been left off development agen- opportunity and obligation to shape agency-centred
das in any explicit sense. And it shows. Agency gaps policies and institutions, anchored in human devel-
coincide with worrying trends on democratic norms opment and guided by human rights, the protection
and p­ ractices, polarization and declines in general- of the planet and institutions that liberate us from
ized trust and confidence in governments and inter- dysfunctional stasis, that better respond to and em-
national institutions. International cooperation itself power people and that free us all from rigid and di-
is becoming more politicized. Our institutions are visive zero-­sum narratives about ourselves and each
struggling with an agency gap. other. When people feel freer to inhabit multiple,
In his landmark Development as Freedom, Amartya overlapping identities, when reasoned, issue-­based
Sen recasts development as the pursuit of “great- dialogue prevails over emotionally charged rhetoric
er freedom [that] enhances the ability of people to that exploits group-­based grievances, when people
help themselves and also to influence the world […] meet people instead of tweeting at them, then people
The concern here relates to what we may call […] the are more able and likely to pursue their own goals, as
‘agency aspect.’”60 well as compromise and cooperate on shared objec-
The 2023/2024 Human Development Report tives that make their own goals more achievable.
starts to mould what could be called an emancipatory This is the virtuous cycle that an agency-centred vi-
vision for development that shines Sen’s notion of de- sion for development, whose building blocks are out-
velopment as freedom on the grand challenge of our lined in this Report, aspires to. Global gridlock begins
time: people and planet in joint crisis. This take on de- to give way to cooperation, including for global public
velopment centres the expansion of agency at the in- goods, even when diverse preferences persist­—­and
tersection of human development, human rights and we should expect them to persist. Indeed, differences
sustainability. Its goal is the expansion of freedoms in in what people value is a motivating observation be-
their many forms, including freedom from the tyran- hind human development and, as argued in previous
nies of single exclusive identities, of zero-­sum beliefs Human Development Reports, diversity in its many
and of oversimplified models of behaviour that re- forms is essential to navigating novel and interacting
duce people to number-­crunching narcissists. layers of uncertainty.
Institutions of the 21st century would narrow agen- We can do better. We have a lot going for us. Let’s
cy gaps and enlarge, rather than replace, those of the get moving.

24 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Notes

SN AP SH OT OVERVIEW 29 See Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), Bartley

Johns and others (2015); Frankel and Romer
1 See UNDP (2020, 2022a). 1 Persson and Bennich 2023.
(2017) and IMF (2001). See Birdsall and oth-
2 Watson and others 2022. 2 IRC 2023; UNHCR 2023b, 2023c. ers (1993) for reflections on the East Asian
miracle. Trade also had differential impacts
3 See the United Nations Development Pro- 3 Msemburi and others 2023; Wang and others
across population groups (Engel and others
gramme’s Global Dashboard for Vaccine Equity 2022;
2021).
at https://data.undp.org/insights/vaccine​-­equity.
4 Bollyky and others 2022; Lenton, Boulton and
30 White and others 2023.
4 Vaidyanathan 2024. These pledges still fall Scheffer 2022.
short of the annual loss and damages associ- 31 Walter 2021.
5 Bollyky and others 2022.
ated with climate change, which have been
32 Alstadsæter and others 2023.
estimated to be as high as $400 billion a year. 6 Henkel and others 2023.
33 Minerals, energy, key crops, electronics, phar-
5 https://about.bnef.com/blog/global-­c lean​ 7 Kumar and others 2022.
maceuticals, basic metals, chemicals, financial
-energy-­investment-jumps-­17-hits-­1-8-­trillion​
8 Druedahl, Minssen and Price 2021. services, professional services intellectual
-in-­2023-according-­to-bloombergnef-­report/
property (Seong and others 2022).
(accessed 31 January 2024). 9 Gleeson and others 2023.
34 Contributions to conceptualizing global public
6 HDI data up to 2022 are from table 1 in the 10 NASA 2023.
goods gaining force at the turn of the 20th cen-
Statistical Annex of the full Report. Values for
11 UNDP’s Human Climate Horizons is an tury (Kanbur, Sandler and Morrison 1999; Kaul,
2023 are projections using the same data
interactive visualization platform (https:// Grunberg and Stern 1999; Sandler 1997). A first
sources used for that table.
horizons.hdr.undp.org/) consisting of a dy- wave of policy interest in global public goods
7 Msemburi and others 2023. namic digital public resource that projects is reflected in Kaul and Conceição (2006),
up to the end of the 21st century impacts of Kaul and others (2003) and Zedillo and others
8 See UNDP (2022a).
climate change on people and its implications (2006). For a recent review of the increasing
9 Some 3 billion people report feeling worried for human development. importance of global public goods in today’s
today, an increase of 687 million people over world, see Buchholz and Sandler (2021).
12 Albrecht 2012, p. 250. See also Clayton and
the past decade; 2 billion people report sad-
Karazsia (2020), Stanley and others (2021) 35 Boese and others 2022; Card and others
ness, 540 million people more than a decade
and Wullenkord and others (2021). 2022; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012; McCoy
ago; and 2.9 billion people experience stress,
and Somer 2019; Wagner 2021.
an increase of 596 million people over the 13 Hickman and others 2021.
past decade (Human Development Report 36 Levin, Milner and Perrings 2021.
14 Funke, Schularick and Trebesch 2016; Guiso
Office calculations based on data from Gallup
and others 2019; Gyöngyösi and Verner 37 See Van Bavel and others (forthcoming) for
2023). Daly and Macchia (2023) document
2022; Mian, Sufi and Trebbi 2014. the costs of polarizing a pandemic.
an increase in the prevalence of feelings of
emotional distress between 2009 and 2021. 15 Funke, Schularick and Trebesch 2023. 38 Schimmelpfennig and others 2022.
10 See Kurlantzick (2022), Nichols (2021) and 16 Cerra, Fatás and Saxena 2023. 39 As argued in Bednar (2021).
UNDP (2023b).
17 Aiyar and others 2023. 40 Bednar 2021.
11 Funke, Schularick and Trebesch 2023.
18 Aiyar and others 2023; Xing, Gentile and Dol- 41 Hobolt, Leeper and Tilley 2021.
12 Andre and others 2024. lar 2021.
42 Henkel and others 2023.
13 Fernbach and Van Boven 2022. 19 Ganapati and Wong 2023.
43 De Vries, Hobolt and Walter 2021.
14 Gur, Ayal and Halperin 2021. 20 Chen, Mrkaic and Nabar 2019; Lane and
44 Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019.
Milesi-­Ferretti 2018.
15 Graeber, Roth and Zimmerman 2023; Vogt
45 Deitelhoff 2020; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015;
and others 2016. 21 Holland and Pazarbasioglu 2024.
Nye Jr 2001; Schneider 2018.
16 Demeritt and Hoff 2023. Expanding agency is 22 WTO 2023.
46 See Conceição and Mendoza (2006) and
about enhancing the ability of people to be
23 As of 2023, based on data from the Interna- chapter 3 in the full Report.
agents of change. Policies have not stressed
tional Telecommunication Union (https://www​
enough the central role of agency as a key 47 Sparkman, Geiger and Weber 2022.
.itu.int/en/ITU-­D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default​
pillar of human development. Narrowing
.aspx, accessed 16 November 2023). 48 Graeber, Roth and Zimmerman 2023.
agency gaps allows people to participate in
public reasoning and decisionmaking through 24 IOM 2022. 49 The notion of agency linked with collective
institutions they have confidence in. outcomes has been referred to as “collective
25 UNDP 2009.
agency.” See, for instance, Ibrahim (2006),
17 On the importance of co-ownership for politi-
26 Koczan and others 2021. Leßmann (2022), Pelenc, Bazile and Ceruti
cal institutions, see Allen (2023).
(2015) and Rauschmayer and others (2018).
27 Engler and others 2020.
18 On the mobilization of the future as a political
50 See also Prados de la Escosura (2022).
idea, see White (2023). 28 Stiglitz 1998.

Notes 25
51 O’Madagain and Tomasello 2022; Tomasello 56 For instance, the Stiglitz Commission for the for Tax Purposes. In 2022 information on
2022. Reform of the International Financial and almost EUR 12 trillion in assets was automati-
Monetary System (convened in 2008, in the cally exchanged. See OECD (2024).
52 UNDP 2023a.
middle of the 2007–2008 global financial
58 United Nations Secretary-General 2023.
53 UNDP 2023a. crisis) suggested establishing a Global Eco-
nomic Coordination Council as an option 59 Alstadsæter and others 2023.
54 UNDP 2023a.
(Stiglitz Commission 2009).
60 Sen 1999, p. 18.
55 UN 2023.
57 Through the 171 members of the Global Forum
on Transparency and Exchange of Information

26 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

Human development indices
Human
Development Planetary pressures–
Index (HDI) Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) Gender Development Index Gender Inequality Index Multidimensional Poverty Index adjusted HDI
Intensity of Difference
Overall Headcount deprivation from HDI
Value Value loss (%) Value Group Value Rank Value (%) (%) Value value (%)
HDI rank 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2022 2022
Very high human development
1 Switzerland 0.967 0.891 7.9 0.971 2 0.018 3 .. .. .. 0.826 14.6
2 Norway 0.966 0.903 6.5 0.986 1 0.012 2 .. .. .. 0.808 16.4
3 Iceland 0.959 0.910 5.1 0.975 1 0.039 9 .. .. .. 0.806 16.0
4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.956 0.840 12.1 0.972 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
5 Denmark 0.952 0.898 5.7 0.981 1 0.009 1 .. .. .. 0.839 11.9
5 Sweden 0.952 0.878 7.8 0.983 1 0.023 4 .. .. .. 0.839 11.9
7 Germany 0.950 0.881 7.3 0.966 2 0.071 19 .. .. .. 0.833 12.3
7 Ireland 0.950 0.886 6.7 0.991 1 0.072 20 .. .. .. 0.814 14.3
9 Singapore 0.949 0.825 13.1 0.991 1 0.036 8 .. .. .. 0.745 21.5
10 Australia 0.946 0.860 9.1 0.978 1 0.063 17 .. .. .. 0.763 19.3
10 Netherlands 0.946 0.885 6.4 0.960 2 0.025 5 .. .. .. 0.796 15.9
12 Belgium 0.942 0.878 6.8 0.975 1 0.044 11 .. .. .. 0.803 14.8
12 Finland 0.942 0.886 5.9 0.989 1 0.032 6 .. .. .. 0.787 16.5
12 Liechtenstein 0.942 .. .. 0.949 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
15 United Kingdom 0.940 0.865 8.0 0.976 1 0.094 28 .. .. .. 0.846 10.0
16 New Zealand 0.939 0.856 8.8 0.970 2 0.082 23 .. .. .. 0.814 13.3
17 United Arab Emirates 0.937 0.859 8.3 0.986 1 0.035 7 .. .. .. 0.688 26.6
18 Canada 0.935 0.864 7.6 0.988 1 0.069 18 .. .. .. 0.726 22.4
19 Korea (Republic of) 0.929 0.841 9.5 0.948 3 0.062 16 .. .. .. 0.775 16.6
20 Luxembourg 0.927 0.839 9.5 0.993 1 0.043 10 .. .. .. 0.685 26.1
20 United States 0.927 0.823 11.2 1.005 1 0.180 44 .. .. .. 0.740 20.2
22 Austria 0.926 0.859 7.2 0.972 2 0.048 12 .. .. .. 0.789 14.8
22 Slovenia 0.926 0.882 4.8 0.999 1 0.049 13 .. .. .. 0.832 10.2
24 Japan 0.920 0.844 8.3 0.968 2 0.078 22 .. .. .. 0.809 12.1
25 Israel 0.915 0.808 11.7 0.991 1 0.092 26 .. .. .. 0.780 14.8
25 Malta 0.915 0.837 8.5 0.980 1 0.117 35 .. .. .. 0.806 11.9
27 Spain 0.911 0.796 12.6 0.988 1 0.059 15 .. .. .. 0.839 7.9
28 France 0.910 0.820 9.9 0.986 1 0.084 24 .. .. .. 0.823 9.6
29 Cyprus 0.907 0.827 8.8 0.977 1 0.253 62 .. .. .. 0.803 11.5
30 Italy 0.906 0.802 11.5 0.969 2 0.057 14 .. .. .. 0.825 8.9
31 Estonia 0.899 0.835 7.1 1.022 1 0.093 27 .. .. .. 0.766 14.8
32 Czechia 0.895 0.848 5.3 0.988 1 0.113 32 .. .. .. 0.782 12.6
33 Greece 0.893 0.801 10.3 0.969 2 0.120 37 .. .. .. 0.809 9.4
34 Bahrain 0.888 .. .. 0.937 3 0.181 45 .. .. .. 0.673 24.2
35 Andorra 0.884 0.810 8.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
36 Poland 0.881 0.797 9.5 1.009 1 0.105 31 .. .. .. 0.780 11.5
37 Latvia 0.879 0.802 8.8 1.022 1 0.142 39 .. .. .. 0.782 11.0
37 Lithuania 0.879 0.795 9.6 1.028 2 0.098 30 .. .. .. 0.748 14.9
39 Croatia 0.878 0.817 6.9 0.993 1 0.087 25 .. .. .. 0.807 8.1
40 Qatar 0.875 .. .. 1.027 2 0.212 54 .. .. .. 0.450 48.6
40 Saudi Arabia 0.875 .. .. 0.928 3 0.229 55 .. .. .. 0.690 21.1
42 Portugal 0.874 0.774 11.4 0.998 1 0.076 21 .. .. .. 0.807 7.7
43 San Marino 0.867 .. .. 0.966 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
44 Chile 0.860 0.704 18.1 0.973 2 0.190 49 .. .. .. 0.786 8.6
45 Slovakia 0.855 0.808 5.5 1.002 1 0.184 46 .. .. .. 0.776 9.2
45 Türkiye 0.855 0.717 16.1 0.941 3 0.259 63 .. .. .. 0.783 8.4
47 Hungary 0.851 0.800 6.0 0.989 1 0.230 56 .. .. .. 0.769 9.6
48 Argentina 0.849 0.747 12.0 0.995 1 0.292 71 0.001 0.4 34.0 0.782 7.9
49 Kuwait 0.847 .. .. 1.014 1 0.199 51 .. .. .. 0.580 31.5
50 Montenegro 0.844 0.756 10.4 0.978 1 0.114 33 0.005 1.2 39.6 .. ..
51 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.838 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
52 Uruguay 0.830 0.720 13.3 1.020 1 0.240 60 .. .. .. 0.784 5.5
53 Romania 0.827 0.739 10.6 0.981 1 0.230 56 .. .. .. 0.759 8.2
54 Antigua and Barbuda 0.826 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
55 Brunei Darussalam 0.823 0.727 11.7 0.983 1 0.279 68 .. .. .. 0.576 30.0
56 Russian Federation 0.821 0.747 9.0 1.021 1 0.178 43 .. .. .. 0.725 11.7
57 Bahamas 0.820 0.663 19.1 1.007 1 0.333 79 .. .. .. 0.744 9.3
57 Panama 0.820 0.647 21.1 1.017 1 0.392 95 .. .. .. 0.773 5.7
59 Oman 0.819 0.721 12.0 0.937 3 0.267 66 .. .. .. 0.593 27.6
60 Georgia 0.814 0.728 10.6 1.005 1 0.283 69 0.001 0.3 36.6 0.767 5.8

Continued →

Human development indices 27

 Human
Development Planetary pressures–
Index (HDI) Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) Gender Development Index Gender Inequality Index Multidimensional Poverty Index adjusted HDI
Intensity of Difference
Overall Headcount deprivation from HDI
Value Value loss (%) Value Group Value Rank Value (%) (%) Value value (%)
HDI rank 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2022 2022
60 Trinidad and Tobago 0.814 .. .. 0.992 1 0.264 64 0.002 0.6 38.0 .. ..
62 Barbados 0.809 0.617 23.7 1.030 2 0.289 70 0.009 2.5 34.2 .. ..
63 Malaysia 0.807 0.692 14.3 0.973 2 0.202 52 .. .. .. 0.704 12.8
64 Costa Rica 0.806 0.656 18.6 0.995 1 0.232 58 0.002 0.5 37.1 0.763 5.3
65 Serbia 0.805 0.740 8.1 0.986 1 0.119 36 0.000 0.1 38.1 0.732 9.1
66 Thailand 0.803 0.681 15.2 1.011 1 0.310 74 0.002 0.6 36.7 0.750 6.6
67 Kazakhstan 0.802 0.734 8.5 0.998 1 0.177 42 0.002 0.5 35.6 0.688 14.2
67 Seychelles 0.802 0.715 10.8 1.064 3 .. .. 0.003 0.9 34.2 .. ..
69 Belarus 0.801 0.750 6.4 1.003 1 0.096 29 .. .. .. .. ..
High human development
70 Bulgaria 0.799 0.703 12.0 0.995 1 0.206 53 .. .. .. 0.720 9.9
71 Palau 0.797 0.633 20.6 1.007 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
72 Mauritius 0.796 0.625 21.5 0.976 1 0.369 87 .. .. .. .. ..
73 Grenada 0.793 .. .. 0.976 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
74 Albania 0.789 0.687 12.9 0.977 1 0.116 34 0.003 0.7 39.1 0.747 5.3
75 China 0.788 0.662 16.0 0.962 2 0.186 47 0.016 3.9 41.4 0.679 13.8
76 Armenia 0.786 0.721 8.3 1.026 2 0.198 50 0.001 0.2 36.2 0.752 4.3
77 Mexico 0.781 0.641 17.9 0.979 1 0.352 84 0.016 4.1 40.5 0.734 6.0
78 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.780 0.584 25.1 0.880 5 0.484 121 .. .. .. 0.715 8.3
78 Sri Lanka 0.780 0.630 19.2 0.947 3 0.376 90 0.011 2.9 38.3 0.762 2.3
80 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.779 0.667 14.4 0.952 2 0.148 40 0.008 2.2 37.9 0.710 8.9
81 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.772 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
82 Dominican Republic 0.766 0.627 18.1 1.029 2 0.433 107 0.009 2.3 38.8 0.732 4.4
83 Ecuador 0.765 0.630 17.6 0.990 1 0.371 89 0.008 2.1 38.0 0.733 4.2
83 North Macedonia 0.765 0.679 11.2 0.950 2 0.134 38 0.001 0.4 38.2 0.715 6.5
85 Cuba 0.764 .. .. 0.973 2 0.300 73 0.003 0.7 38.1 0.740 3.1
86 Moldova (Republic of) 0.763 0.698 8.5 1.033 2 0.156 41 0.004 0.9 37.4 0.731 4.2
87 Maldives 0.762 0.597 21.7 0.976 1 0.328 76 0.003 0.8 34.4 .. ..
87 Peru 0.762 0.607 20.3 0.952 2 0.360 85 0.026 6.6 38.9 0.733 3.8
89 Azerbaijan 0.760 0.707 7.0 0.961 2 0.329 77 .. .. .. 0.719 5.4
89 Brazil 0.760 0.577 24.1 1.000 1 0.391 94 0.016 3.8 42.5 0.702 7.6
91 Colombia 0.758 0.568 25.1 0.998 1 0.392 95 0.020 4.8 40.6 0.725 4.4
92 Libya 0.746 .. .. 0.988 1 0.266 65 0.007 2.0 37.1 0.661 11.4
93 Algeria 0.745 0.588 21.1 0.881 5 0.460 114 0.005 1.4 39.2 0.702 5.8
94 Turkmenistan 0.744 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.001 0.2 34.0 0.662 11.0
95 Guyana 0.742 .. .. 0.992 1 0.416 104 0.007 1.8 39.3 .. ..
96 Mongolia 0.741 0.645 13.0 1.032 2 0.297 72 0.028 7.3 38.8 0.619 16.5
97 Dominica 0.740 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
98 Tonga 0.739 0.654 11.5 0.996 1 0.462 115 0.003 0.9 38.1 .. ..
99 Jordan 0.736 0.615 16.4 0.863 5 0.449 111 0.002 0.4 35.4 0.706 4.1
100 Ukraine 0.734 0.676 7.9 1.021 1 0.188 48 0.001 0.2 34.4 0.685 6.7
101 Tunisia 0.732 0.574 21.6 0.928 3 0.237 59 0.003 0.8 36.5 0.701 4.2
102 Marshall Islands 0.731 0.620 15.2 0.945 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
102 Paraguay 0.731 0.582 20.4 0.994 1 0.429 106 0.019 4.5 41.9 0.684 6.4
104 Fiji 0.729 0.632 13.3 0.940 3 0.332 78 0.006 1.5 38.1 .. ..
105 Egypt 0.728 0.561 22.9 0.884 5 0.389 93 0.020 5.2 37.6 0.695 4.5
106 Uzbekistan 0.727 .. .. 0.924 4 0.242 61 0.006 1.7 35.3 0.696 4.3
107 Viet Nam 0.726 0.607 16.4 1.007 1 0.378 91 0.008 1.9 40.3 0.681 6.2
108 Saint Lucia 0.725 0.539 25.7 1.013 1 0.347 82 0.007 1.9 37.5 .. ..
109 Lebanon 0.723 .. .. 0.928 3 0.365 86 .. .. .. 0.680 5.9
110 South Africa 0.717 0.462 35.6 0.985 1 0.401 99 0.025 6.3 39.8 0.667 7.0
111 Palestine, State of 0.716 0.587 18.0 0.880 5 .. .. 0.002 0.6 35.0 0.695 2.9
112 Indonesia 0.713 0.588 17.5 0.940 3 0.439 109 0.014 3.6 38.7 0.685 3.9
113 Philippines 0.710 0.590 16.9 0.966 2 0.388 92 0.024 5.8 41.8 0.687 3.2
114 Botswana 0.708 0.488 31.1 0.998 1 0.483 120 0.073 17.2 42.2 0.677 4.4
115 Jamaica 0.706 0.584 17.3 1.016 1 0.350 83 0.011 2.8 38.9 0.676 4.2
116 Samoa 0.702 0.602 14.2 0.968 2 0.406 101 0.025 6.3 39.1 .. ..
117 Kyrgyzstan 0.701 0.634 9.6 0.975 1 0.345 81 0.001 0.4 36.3 0.683 2.6
118 Belize 0.700 .. .. 0.982 1 0.454 113 0.017 4.3 39.8 0.668 4.6
Medium human development
119 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.699 0.600 14.2 1.002 1 0.521 134 .. .. .. 0.664 5.0
120 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.698 0.560 19.8 0.965 2 0.418 105 0.038 9.1 41.7 0.662 5.2
120 Morocco 0.698 0.508 27.2 0.851 5 0.440 110 0.027 6.4 42.0 0.672 3.7
122 Nauru 0.696 .. .. 1.037 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
123 Gabon 0.693 0.526 24.1 0.982 1 0.524 136 0.070 15.6 44.7 0.667 3.8
124 Suriname 0.690 .. .. 0.987 1 0.405 100 0.011 2.9 39.4 .. ..
125 Bhutan 0.681 0.465 31.7 0.970 2 0.334 80 .. .. .. 0.615 9.7
126 Tajikistan 0.679 0.585 13.8 0.919 4 0.269 67 0.029 7.4 39.0 0.664 2.2

Continued →

28 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

 Human
Development Planetary pressures–
Index (HDI) Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) Gender Development Index Gender Inequality Index Multidimensional Poverty Index adjusted HDI
Intensity of Difference
Overall Headcount deprivation from HDI
Value Value loss (%) Value Group Value Rank Value (%) (%) Value value (%)
HDI rank 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2022 2022
127 El Salvador 0.674 0.548 18.7 0.972 2 0.369 87 0.032 7.9 41.3 0.649 3.7
128 Iraq 0.673 0.519 22.9 0.786 5 0.562 143 0.033 8.6 37.9 0.643 4.5
129 Bangladesh 0.670 0.470 29.9 0.914 4 0.498 127 0.104 24.6 42.2 0.656 2.1
130 Nicaragua 0.669 0.507 24.2 0.949 3 0.397 97 0.074 16.5 45.3 0.642 4.0
131 Cabo Verde 0.661 0.471 28.7 0.981 1 0.325 75 .. .. .. .. ..
132 Tuvalu 0.653 0.545 16.5 0.975 1 .. .. 0.008 2.1 38.2 .. ..
133 Equatorial Guinea 0.650 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.624 4.0
134 India 0.644 0.444 31.1 0.852 5 0.437 108 0.069 16.4 42.0 0.625 3.0
135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 0.634 .. .. 0.950 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
136 Guatemala 0.629 0.453 28.0 0.931 3 0.474 117 0.134 28.9 46.2 0.604 4.0
137 Kiribati 0.628 0.528 15.9 0.849 5 .. .. 0.080 19.8 40.5 .. ..
138 Honduras 0.624 0.480 23.1 0.974 2 0.413 102 0.051 12.0 42.7 0.606 2.9
139 Lao People's Democratic Republic 0.620 0.466 24.8 0.919 4 0.467 116 0.108 23.1 47.0 0.580 6.5
140 Vanuatu 0.614 .. .. 0.936 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
141 Sao Tome and Principe 0.613 0.459 25.1 .. .. .. .. 0.048 11.7 40.9 .. ..
142 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 0.610 0.372 39.0 0.987 1 0.491 124 0.081 19.2 42.3 .. ..
142 Namibia 0.610 0.399 34.6 1.006 1 0.450 112 0.185 40.9 45.2 0.584 4.3
144 Myanmar 0.608 0.475 21.9 0.941 3 0.479 119 0.176 38.3 45.9 0.596 2.0
145 Ghana 0.602 0.378 37.2 0.933 3 0.512 130 0.111 24.6 45.1 0.586 2.7
146 Kenya 0.601 0.438 27.1 0.948 3 0.533 139 0.171 37.5 45.6 0.590 1.8
146 Nepal 0.601 0.424 29.5 0.885 5 0.495 126 0.074 17.5 42.5 0.581 3.3
148 Cambodia 0.600 0.438 27.0 0.926 3 0.486 122 0.070 16.6 42.3 0.572 4.7
149 Congo 0.593 0.385 35.1 0.909 4 0.572 144 0.112 24.3 46.0 0.580 2.2
150 Angola 0.591 0.344 41.8 0.905 4 0.520 133 0.282 51.1 55.3 0.581 1.7
151 Cameroon 0.587 0.362 38.3 0.900 4 0.555 142 0.232 43.6 53.2 0.577 1.7
152 Comoros 0.586 0.334 43.0 0.914 4 .. .. 0.181 37.3 48.5 .. ..
153 Zambia 0.569 0.344 39.5 0.930 3 0.526 137 0.232 47.9 48.4 0.561 1.4
154 Papua New Guinea 0.568 0.407 28.3 0.927 3 0.604 151 0.263 56.6 46.5 0.558 1.8
155 Timor-Leste 0.566 0.407 28.1 0.904 4 0.415 103 0.222 48.3 45.9 .. ..
156 Solomon Islands 0.562 .. .. 0.959 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
157 Syrian Arab Republic 0.557 .. .. 0.805 5 0.487 123 .. .. .. .. ..
158 Haiti 0.552 0.335 39.3 0.929 3 0.621 158 0.200 41.3 48.4 0.546 1.1
159 Uganda 0.550 0.377 31.5 0.899 5 0.527 138 0.281 57.2 49.2 0.543 1.3
159 Zimbabwe 0.550 0.370 32.7 0.936 3 0.519 132 0.110 25.8 42.6 0.541 1.6
Low human development
161 Nigeria 0.548 0.369 32.7 0.886 5 0.677 165 0.175 33.0 52.9 0.539 1.6
161 Rwanda 0.548 0.377 31.2 0.921 4 0.400 98 0.231 48.8 47.3 0.541 1.3
163 Togo 0.547 0.345 36.9 0.848 5 0.578 147 0.180 37.6 47.8 0.541 1.1
164 Mauritania 0.540 0.351 35.0 0.874 5 0.603 150 0.327 58.4 56.0 0.520 3.7
164 Pakistan 0.540 0.360 33.3 0.834 5 0.522 135 0.198 38.3 51.7 0.528 2.2
166 Côte d'Ivoire 0.534 0.318 40.4 0.861 5 0.612 156 0.236 46.1 51.2 .. ..
167 Tanzania (United Republic of) 0.532 0.372 30.1 0.940 3 0.513 131 0.284 57.1 49.8 0.525 1.3
168 Lesotho 0.521 0.332 36.3 0.999 1 0.552 141 0.084 19.6 43.0 .. ..
169 Senegal 0.517 0.334 35.4 0.925 3 0.505 129 0.263 50.8 51.7 0.503 2.7
170 Sudan 0.516 0.331 35.9 0.868 5 0.548 140 0.279 52.3 53.4 0.506 1.9
171 Djibouti 0.515 0.341 33.8 0.844 5 .. .. .. .. .. 0.493 4.3
172 Malawi 0.508 0.359 29.3 0.926 3 0.579 148 0.231 49.9 46.3 0.501 1.4
173 Benin 0.504 0.309 38.7 0.848 5 0.649 160 0.368 66.8 55.0 0.494 2.0
174 Gambia 0.495 0.311 37.2 0.940 3 0.585 149 0.198 41.7 47.5 0.489 1.2
175 Eritrea 0.493 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.487 1.2
176 Ethiopia 0.492 0.324 34.1 0.922 4 0.494 125 0.367 68.7 53.3 0.485 1.4
177 Liberia 0.487 0.310 36.3 0.860 5 0.656 161 0.259 52.3 49.6 0.482 1.0
177 Madagascar 0.487 0.328 32.6 0.945 3 0.574 145 0.386 68.4 56.4 0.483 0.8
179 Guinea-Bissau 0.483 0.310 35.8 0.862 5 0.631 159 0.341 64.4 52.9 .. ..
180 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 0.481 0.315 34.5 0.891 5 0.605 152 0.331 64.5 51.3 0.477 0.8
181 Guinea 0.471 0.285 39.5 0.818 5 0.609 154 0.373 66.2 56.4 0.462 1.9
182 Afghanistan 0.462 0.300 35.1 0.622 5 0.665 162 0.272 55.9 48.6 0.459 0.6
183 Mozambique 0.461 0.270 41.4 0.929 3 0.477 118 0.372 61.9 60.0 0.456 1.1
184 Sierra Leone 0.458 0.277 39.5 0.885 5 0.613 157 0.293 59.2 49.5 0.452 1.3
185 Burkina Faso 0.438 0.261 40.4 0.881 5 0.577 146 .. .. .. 0.433 1.1
186 Yemen 0.424 0.285 32.8 0.456 5 0.820 166 0.245 48.5 50.6 0.420 0.9
187 Burundi 0.420 0.273 35.0 0.926 3 0.499 128 0.409 75.1 54.4 0.417 0.7
188 Mali 0.410 0.277 32.4 0.830 5 0.607 153 0.376 68.3 55.0 0.404 1.5
189 Chad 0.394 0.238 39.6 0.776 5 0.671 163 0.517 84.2 61.4 0.382 3.0
189 Niger 0.394 0.262 33.5 0.826 5 0.609 154 0.601 91.0 66.1 0.389 1.3
191 Central African Republic 0.387 0.237 38.8 .. .. .. .. 0.461 80.4 57.4 0.383 1.0
192 South Sudan 0.381 0.222 41.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.376 1.3
193 Somalia 0.380 .. .. 0.769 5 0.674 164 .. .. .. 0.376 1.1

Continued →

Human development indices 29

 Human
Development Planetary pressures–
Index (HDI) Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) Gender Development Index Gender Inequality Index Multidimensional Poverty Index adjusted HDI
Intensity of Difference
Overall Headcount deprivation from HDI
Value Value loss (%) Value Group Value Rank Value (%) (%) Value value (%)
HDI rank 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2011–2022 2022 2022
Other countries or territories
.. Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Human development groups
Very high human development 0.902 0.807 10.5 0.988 — 0.150 — 0.002 0.5 35.9 0.779 13.6
High human development 0.764 0.628 17.8 0.962 — 0.339 — 0.016 3.8 40.7 0.691 9.6
Medium human development 0.640 0.447 30.2 0.870 — 0.476 — 0.091 20.5 44.1 0.622 2.8
Low human development 0.517 0.341 34.0 0.868 — 0.579 — 0.274 51.6 53.2 0.509 1.5
Developing countries 0.694 0.524 24.5 0.929 — 0.485 — 0.088 18.2 48.5 0.652 6.1
Regions
Arab States 0.704 0.534 24.1 0.877 — 0.523 — 0.074 15.1 48.9 0.658 6.5
East Asia and the Pacific 0.766 0.640 16.4 0.962 — 0.340 — 0.022 5.1 42.4 0.683 10.8
Europe and Central Asia 0.802 0.708 11.7 0.963 — 0.224 — 0.004 1.2 37.1 0.743 7.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.763 0.605 20.7 0.991 — 0.386 — 0.024 5.6 43.1 0.716 6.2
South Asia 0.641 0.443 30.9 0.855 — 0.478 — 0.091 20.5 44.6 0.622 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.549 0.363 33.9 0.915 — 0.565 — 0.262 49.5 52.9 0.539 1.8
Least developed countries 0.542 0.363 33.0 0.890 — 0.556 — 0.268 51.7 52.0 0.533 1.7
Small island developing states
Organisation for Economic Co‑operation
and Development 0.906 0.803 11.4 0.984 — 0.194 — 0.017 4.2 40.5 0.787 13.1
World 0.739 0.576 22.1 0.951 — 0.462 — 0.088 18.2 48.5 0.685 7.3

Gender Inequality Index: A composite measure reflecting

Definitions inequality in achievement between women and men in three Main data sources
dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the la-
Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measur- Columns 1 and 4:: HDRO calculations based on data from
bour market. See Technical note 4 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites​
ing average achievement in three basic dimensions of human Barro and Lee (2018), IMF (2023), UNDESA (2022, 2023),
/default/files/hdr2023_technical_notes.pdf for details on how
development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a de- UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2023), United Nations Statis-
the Gender Inequality Index is calculated.
cent standard of living. See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp​ tics Division (2023) and World Bank (2023).
.org/sites/default/files/hdr2023_technical_notes.pdf for details Multidimensional Poverty Index: Proportion of the population
Column 2: Calculated as the geometric mean of the values
on how the HDI is calculated. that is multidimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the
in the inequality-adjusted life expectancy index, inequality-
deprivations. Not all indicators were available for all countries,
Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI): HDI value adjusted for in- adjusted education index and inequality-adjusted income index
so caution should be used in cross-country comparisons. When
equalities in the three basic dimensions of human develop- using the methodology in Technical note 2 (available at http://
an indicator is missing, weights of available indicators are
ment. See Technical note 2 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default​ hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2023_technical_​notes.pdf).
adjusted to total 100 percent. See Technical note 5 at http://
/files/hdr2023_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the IHDI
hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2023_technical_​notes.pdf Column 3: Calculated based on data in columns 1 and 2.
is calculated.
for details on how the Multidimensional Poverty Index is calculated.
Column 5: Calculated based on data in column 4.
Overall loss: Percentage difference between the IHDI value
Multidimensional poverty headcount: Population with a
and the HDI value, calculated only for countries for which an Column 6: HDRO calculations based on data from Barro and
deprivation score of at least 33.3 percent. It is expressed as
IHDI value is calculated. Lee (2018), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, ILO
a share of the population in the survey year, the number of
(2023), IPU (2023), OECD (2023), UNDESA (2022), UNESCO
Gender Development Index: Ratio of female to male HDI val- multidimensionally poor people in the survey year and the
Institute for Statistics (2023), United Nations Children’s Fund
ues. See Technical note 3 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default​ projected number of multidimensionally poor people in 2021.
(UNICEF) Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and WHO, UNICEF,
/files/hdr2023_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gen-
Intensity of deprivation of multidimensional poverty: Av- UNFPA, World Bank Group and UNDESA/Population Division
der Development Index is calculated.
erage deprivation score experienced by people in multi- (2023).
Gender Development Index groups: Countries are divided in- dimensional poverty.
Column 7: Calculated based on data in column 6.
to five groups by absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI
Planetary pressures–adjusted HDI (PHDI): HDI value ad-
values. Group 1 comprises countries with high equality in HDI Columns 8–10: HDRO and OPHI calculations based on data
justed by the level of carbon dioxide emissions and material
achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of on household deprivations in health, education, and standard
footprint per capita to account for the excessive human pres-
less than 2.5 percent), group 2 comprises countries with medi- of living from various years of ICF Macro Demographic and
sure on the planet. It should be seen as an incentive for trans-
um to high equality in HDI achievements between women and Health Surveys and UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.
formation. See Technical note 6 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites​
men (absolute deviation of 2.5–5 percent), group 3 comprises
/default/files/hdr2023_technical_notes.pdf for details on how Column 11: HDRO calculations based on data from Barro and
countries with medium equality in HDI achievements between
the PHDI is calculated. Lee (2018), IMF (2023), UNDESA (2022, 2023), United Nations
women and men (absolute deviation of 5–7.5 percent), group
Environment Programme (2023), UNESCO Institute for Statis-
4 comprises countries with medium to low equality in HDI Difference from HDI value: Percentage difference between
tics (2023), United Nations Statistics Division (2023) and World
achievements between women and men (absolute deviation the PHDI value and the HDI value.
Bank (2023).
of 7.5–10 percent) and group 5 comprises countries with low
equality in HDI achievements between women and men (ab- Column 12: Calculated based on data in columns 1 and 11.
solute deviation from gender parity of more than 10 percent).

30 HUMA N DEVELOP MENT R EP ORT 2023/2024

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R eferences 33
KEY TO H U M A N D E V E LO P M E N T I N D E X R A N KS , 202 2

Afghanistan 182 Dominican Republic 82 Liberia 177 Saint Lucia 108

Albania 74 Ecuador 83 Libya 92 Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 81
Algeria 93 Egypt 105 Liechtenstein 12
Samoa 116
Andorra 35 El Salvador 127 Lithuania 37
San Marino 43
Angola 150 Equatorial Guinea 133 Luxembourg 20
Sao Tome and Principe 141
Antigua and Barbuda 54 Eritrea 175 Madagascar 177
Saudi Arabia 40
Argentina 48 Estonia 31 Malawi 172
Senegal 169
Armenia 76 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 142 Malaysia 63
Serbia 65
Australia 10 Ethiopia 176 Maldives 87
Seychelles 67
Austria 22 Fiji 104 Mali 188
Sierra Leone 184
Azerbaijan 89 Finland 12 Malta 25
Singapore 9
Bahamas 57 France 28 Marshall Islands 102
Slovakia 45
Bahrain 34 Gabon 123 Mauritania 164
Slovenia 22
Bangladesh 129 Gambia 174 Mauritius 72
Solomon Islands 156
Barbados 62 Georgia 60 Mexico 77
Somalia 193
Belarus 69 Germany 7 Micronesia
(Federated States of) 135 South Africa 110
Belgium 12 Ghana 145
Moldova (Republic of) 86 South Sudan 192
Belize 118 Greece 33
Monaco Spain 27
Benin 173 Grenada 73
Mongolia 96 Sri Lanka 78
Bhutan 125 Guatemala 136
Montenegro 50 Sudan 170
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 120 Guinea 181
Morocco 120 Suriname 124
Bosnia and Herzegovina 80 Guinea-Bissau 179
Mozambique 183 Sweden 5
Botswana 114 Guyana 95
Myanmar 144 Switzerland 1
Brazil 89 Haiti 158
Namibia 142 Syrian Arab Republic 157
Brunei Darussalam 55 Honduras 138
Nauru 122 Tajikistan 126
Bulgaria 70 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 4
Nepal 146 Tanzania (United Republic of) 167
Burkina Faso 185 Hungary 47
Netherlands 10 Thailand 66
Burundi 187 Iceland 3
New Zealand 16 Timor-Leste 155
Cabo Verde 131 India 134
Nicaragua 130 Togo 163
Cambodia 148 Indonesia 112
Niger 189 Tonga 98
Cameroon 151 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 78
Nigeria 161 Trinidad and Tobago 60
Canada 18 Iraq 128
North Macedonia 83 Tunisia 101
Central African Republic 191 Ireland 7
Norway 2 Türkiye 45
Chad 189 Israel 25
Oman 59 Turkmenistan 94
Chile 44 Italy 30
Pakistan 164 Tuvalu 132
China 75 Jamaica 115
Palau 71 Uganda 159
Colombia 91 Japan 24
Palestine, State of 111 Ukraine 100
Comoros 152 Jordan 99
Panama 57 United Arab Emirates 17
Congo 149 Kazakhstan 67
Papua New Guinea 154 United Kingdom 15
Congo Kenya 146
(Democratic Republic of the) 180 Paraguay 102 United States 20
Kiribati 137
Costa Rica 64 Peru 87 Uruguay 52
Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of)
Côte d’Ivoire 166 Philippines 113 Uzbekistan 106
Korea (Republic of) 19
Croatia 39 Poland 36 Vanuatu 140
Kuwait 49
Cuba 85 Portugal 42 Venezuela
Kyrgyzstan 117
(Bolivarian Republic of) 119
Cyprus 29 Qatar 40
Lao People’s
Viet Nam 107
Czechia 32 Democratic Republic 139 Romania 53
Yemen 186
Denmark 5 Latvia 37 Russian Federation 56
Zambia 153
Djibouti 171 Lebanon 109 Rwanda 161
Zimbabwe 159
Dominica 97 Lesotho 168 Saint Kitts and Nevis 51
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