ABRC PRE-WEEK REVIEW MATERIALS 2021

JUSTICE LEONEN DECISIONS

LABOR LAW

Illegal dismissal
Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. V Celso E. Fuentes, G.R. No. 169303,
February 11, 2015
Facts: Celso E. Fuentes (Fuentes) was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime. A group
of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took five (5) M-16 rifles, three (3) carbine rifles, and
one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, all with live ammunition and magazines. Agency-issued
uniforms and personal items were also taken. These armed persons inflicted violence upon
Fuentes and the other security guards present at Post 33. On the same day of the incident,
Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the PNP.
After its initial investigation, the Philippine National Police found reason to believe that Fuentes
conspired and acted in consort with the NPA. Hence, the PNP filed a Complaint for robbery
committed by a band against Fuentes, a certain Mario Cabatlao, and others.
Immediately upon the filing of the Complaint, Fuentes was detained at the Mangagoy Police Sub-
Station, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Sur issued the Resolution dismissing the
Complaint against Fuentes. It found during preliminary investigation that there was no probable
cause to warrant the filing of an Information against Fuentes.
Fuentes was dismissed by Protective on the ground of abandonment and for justifiable reasons.
Thus, he filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue: Was Fuentes illegally dismissed?
Ruling:
The absence of respondent does not constitute abandonment.
Petitioner justifies its actions against respondent by maintaining that respondent never reported
to his supervising officer after the July 20, 2000 raid at Post 33. Thus, this alleged prolonged
absence from work constituted abandonment. Petitioner asserts that since respondent failed to
report for work after the raid, there was no "actual" dismissal of respondent.
Abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is based on Article 282(b) of the Labor Code:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any
of the following causes:
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties[.]
Abandonment constitutes a just cause for dismissal because "[t]he law in protecting the rights of
the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." The employer
cannot be compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in fulfilling his duties to the employer,
particularly the fundamental task of reporting to work.
In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court discussed the concept of
abandonment:
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors
should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second
as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has [sic] no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue
the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer.
Thus, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of abandonment. First,
petitioner must provide evidence that respondent failed to report to work for an unjustifiable
reason. Second, petitioner must prove respondent's overt acts showing a clear intention to sever
his ties with petitioner as his employer.
There is no abandonment in this case.
The first element of abandonment is the failure of the employee to report to work without a valid
and justifiable reason. Petitioner asserts that respondent failed to report for work immediately
after his release from prison. He also failed to abide by company procedure and report to his
immediate superior. According to petitioner, respondent's actions constitute a failure to report to
work without a valid and justifiable reason.
The National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found that respondent's failure
to return to work was justified because of his detention and its adverse effects. The Court of
Appeals found that petitioner did not refute the allegation that respondent, while in the custody
of the police, suffered physical violence in the hands of its employees. Thus, the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the report submitted by Inspector Escartin, which stated that respondent was
"so traumatized that he actually asked to remain in the custody of the police because he feared
for his life." The Court of Appeals further found that respondent experienced intense fear,
manifested by the fact that he left the custody of the police only when his mother accompanied
him."
Thus, the intervening period when respondent failed to report for work, from respondent's prison
release to the time he actually reported for work, was justified. Since there was a justifiable
reason for respondent's absence, the first element of abandonment was not established.
The second element is the existence of overt acts which show that the employee has no intention
to return to work. Petitioner alleges that since respondent "vanished" and failed to report
immediately to work, he clearly intended to sever ties with petitioner.
However, respondent reported for work after August 15, 2001, when the criminal Complaint
against him was dropped. Further, petitioner refused to allow respondent to resume his
employment because petitioner believed that respondent was a member of the New People's
Army and had already hired a replacement.
Respondent's act of reporting for work after being cleared of the charges against him showed
that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer. He attempted to return to work after the
dismissal of the Complaint so that petitioner would not have any justifiable reason to deny his
request to resume his employment.
Thus, respondent's actions showed that he intended to resume working for petitioner. The second
element of abandonment was not proven, as well.
xxx
Moreover, respondent Javier's acquittal for rape makes it more compelling to view the illegality
of his dismissal. The trial court dismissed the case for "insufficiency of evidence," and such ruling
is tantamount to an acquittal of the crime charged, and proof that respondent Javier's arrest and
detention were without factual and legal basis in the first place.
In deciding that there was no abandonment, this court applied its ruling in Magtoto v. National
Labor Relations Commission. In Magtoto, Alejandro Jonas Magtoto was arrested by virtue of the
Arrest, Search and Seizure Order dated September 1, 1980. Magtoto was charged with violating
Article 136 (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion) and Article 138 (Inciting to Rebellion
or Insurrection) of the Revised Penal Code. On April 10, 1981, seven months after his arrest,
Magtoto was released after the City Fiscal dismissed the case due to lack of evidence. On the
same day, Magtoto informed his employer of his intention to resume working, but the employer
rejected his request to return to work. According to his employer, Magtoto's prolonged absence
justified his dismissal from work.
Rules of Procedure
Far East Bank and Trust Company v Lilia S. Chua, G.R. No. 187491, July 08, 2015
Facts: Chua was employed as a bank executive by Far East Bank, rising through the latter's ranks
and holding the position of Assistant Vice President from October 1, 1997 until the termination of
her employment. Chua's employment was terminated as Far East Bank found Chua to have
engaged in multiple kiting transactions, which are fraudulent transactions "involving the drawing
out of money from a bank account that does not have sufficient funds in order]no cover a check."
Assailing Far East Bank's basis for terminating her employment, Chua filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City of the
National Labor Relations Commission. Despite an extension having been given to Far East Bank,
it failed to timely file its Position Paper. On April 25, 2000, Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B.
Cueto III rendered a Decision finding Chua to have been illegally dismissed.
On the same date, Far East Bank filed a Motion to admit its Position Paper. They then directly
filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission.
Issue: Whether Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto Ill's April 25, 2000 Decision attained
finality in light of petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co.'s direct filing of its appeal before the
National Labor Relations Commission, rather than before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII,
Cotabato City.
Ruling: Article 218 of the Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations Commission the
authority to adopt procedural rules:
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
 1. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases
before it and its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code.
It is consistent with this power that the National Labor Relations Commission adopted the rules
that are at the core of the present controversy. Rule VI, Section 3 of the 1999 Rules of Procedure
of the National Labor Relations Commission that were in effect when petitioner appealed from
Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto's Decision provides for the requisites that must be satisfied in order
that an appeal from a decision of a Labor Arbiter may be perfected:
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. — (a) The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof
of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided
in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall
state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or
award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not
stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
(b) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office or in the
POEA where the appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of
appeal, not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of
the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of the appeal to file his answer or
reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to file the same.
(c) Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in accordance
with these rules, the Commission may limit itself to reviewing and deciding specific issues
that were elevated on appeal.
Rule VI, Section 4 of the same rules stipulates where appeals must be filed:
Section 4. Where Filed. — The appeal in five (5) legibly typewritten copies shall be filed
with the respective Regional Arbitration Branch, the Regional Office, or the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration where the case was heard and decided.
This venue for filing appeals is unequivocal. The Court of Appeals was thus correct in stating that
it "is clear and unambiguous that the memorandum on appeal must be filed with the Regional
Arbitration Branch which rendered the decision sought to be appealed."
It is not disputed that this rule was violated by petitioner. In the present Petition, petitioner
categorically admitted that it "filed its memorandum of appeal directly with the [National Labor
Relations Commission.]"
Thus, there is basis for positing, as respondent and the Court of Appeals did, that "no appeal
before [the National Labor Relations Commission] could have been perfected.” The logical
consequence of this position, assuming it is correct, is that Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto's April
25, 2000 Decision "has attained finality.”
This conclusion, however, fails to consider that the error committed by petitioner pertains to the
place for filing appeals and not the requisites for perfecting an appeal which Rule VI, Section 3
enumerates. The place where appeals must be filed is governed by a distinct provision (i.e.,
Section 4) and is thus a matter that is different from the requisites for perfecting appeals. Per
Section 3, only the following are necessary in order that petitioner may perfect its appeal:
1. Filing within the applicable reglementary period as provided by Section 1;
2. That the appeal was under oath;
3. That the appeal fee must have been paid;
4. That the appeal bond must have been posted;
5. A memorandum of appeal which states: a. the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support of the appeal; b. the relief sought; and c. a statement of the date when the
assailed decision was received; and
6. Proof of service of the appeal on the adverse party.
Likewise, this conclusion presupposes that procedural rules in labor cases must be adhered to
with uncompromising exactitude. This is misguided. The same rules which respondent and the
Court of Appeals rely on allow for the liberal application of procedural rules. In Rule VII, Section
10, it states:
Section 10. Technical rules not binding. — The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law procedure, all in the interest of due process.
In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may be represented by legal counsel but
it shall be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding commissioner or Commissioner to exercise
complete control of the proceedings at all stages.
The need for liberality in this case is underscored by how the National Labor Relations Commission
acquiesced to the filing of an appeal directly before it. As pointed out by petitioner, not only did
the National Labor Relations Commission admit its Memorandum of Appeal, it also "required
petitioner to pay the appeal fee and to post the required bond." As the agency statutorily vested
with jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal, petitioner could very easily have mistaken that the filing
of its Memorandum of Appeal was rightly made before the National Labor Relations Commission.
If at all, the provision that filing of a Memorandum of Appeal must be made before the Regional
Arbitration Branch is merely a delegation of a function more appropriately pertaining to the
appellate body itself.
In any case, the National Labor Relations Commission could have very easily advised petitioner if
there was anything irregular with its direct filing of a Memorandum of Appeal. Its silence on this
matter would have induced in petitioner no other reasonable conclusion than that direct filing
before the National Labor Relations Commission was in keeping with the procedural requirements
for filing appeals.
V
Not only did the National Labor Relations Commission acquiesce to the direct filing of an appeal
before it, so did respondent. The matter of the propriety of the National Labor Relations
Commission's assumption of jurisdiction was never raised by respondent before the Commission.
Even after petitioner's appeal had been initially decided against her and she filed her Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent totally overlooked this matter. As was evident from the recital of
grounds invoked in her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent's contentions centered merely on
the National Labor Relations Commission's supposedly erroneous reliance on petitioner's Position
Paper.
The Court of Appeals thus failed to account for the crucial fact that the issue of jurisdiction was
invoked by respondent only upon her elevation to it of the case. It failed to recognize that
respondent had all the opportunity to raise this issue before the very tribunal whom she claims
to have had no competence to rule on the appeal, but that it was only after the same tribunal
ruled against her twice — first, in its initial Resolution and second, in denying her reconsideration
— that she saw it fit to assail its jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals failed to see through
respondent's own failure to seasonably act and failed to realize that she was guilty of estoppel by
laches, taking "an unreasonable . . . length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier.”
Respondent cannot now profit from her own inaction. She actively participated in the proceedings
and vigorously argued her case before the National Labor Relations Commission without the
slightest indication that she found anything objectionable to the conduct of those proceedings. It
is thus but appropriate to consider her as acceding to and bound by how the National Labor
Relations Commission was to resolve and, ultimately did resolve, petitioner's appeal. Its findings
that the requisites of substantive and procedural due process were satisfied in terminating
respondent's employment now stand undisturbed.
Dismissal for just cause
G.R. No. 198066, June 07, 2017, YOLANDO T. BRAVO v. URIOS COLLEGE (NOW
FATHER SATURNINO URIOS UNIVERSITY) AND/OR FR. JOHN CHRISTIAN U. YOUNG
Facts:
Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In addition to his duties as
a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller.
Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-academic
employees for school year 2001-2002."
The proposed ranking system for school year 2001—2002 was presented to Bravo for comments.
Bravo recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a middle
management position [because it was] . . . informally merged with . . . the position of [V]ice-
[P]resident for [F]inance." In addition, the Comptroller and the Vice-President for Finance
performed similar functions, which included follow up of payroll preparation, verification of daily
cash vouchers, and certification of checks issued by the school. Moreover, they were responsible
for the control of checkbooks issuance to the Cashier, preparation of departmental budget
guidelines, supervision of reports and payments to various government agencies, and analysis
and interpretation of financial statements. Bravo further suggested that since he assumed the
duties of Comptroller and Vice-President for Finance, his salary scale should be upgraded.
The committee allegedly agreed with Bravo and accepted his recommendations. Bravo was then
directed to arrange a salary adjustment schedule for the new ranking system.
Later, Bravo obtained his employee ranking slip which showed his evaluation score and the
change of his rank "from office head to middle manager-level IV." The change, however, was
merely superimposed. The employee ranking slip bore the signatures of the Human Resources
Department Head, the Vice-President for Administration, and the President of Urios College.
Meanwhile, Urios College decided to undertake a structural reorganization.20 During this period,
Bravo occupied the Comptroller position in a "hold-over" capacity until May 31, 2003. He was
reappointed to the same position, which expired on May 31, 2004. Bravo was then designated as
a full-time teacher in the college department for school year 2004-2005.
On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to explain in writing why
his services should not be terminated for his alleged acts of serious misconduct.
Bravo was found guilty of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum of
P179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. He received a copy of the
investigation committee's decision on July 15, 2005.
On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services for serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of the termination letter, Bravo
immediately filed before Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez (Executive Labor Arbiter
Pelaez) a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages,
and attorney's fees.
Issues: First, whether petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause;
Second, whether petitioner was deprived of procedural due process; and
Finally, whether petitioner is entitled to the payment of separation pay, backwages, and attorney's
fees.
Ruling: Petitioner's dismissal from employment was valid.
Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for
the following just causes:
Article 297. [282] Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes:
(a)Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work;
(b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d)Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e)Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
To warrant termination of employment under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the misconduct
must be serious or "of such grave and aggravated character." Trivial and unimportant acts are
not contemplated under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code.
Recently, this Court has emphasized that the rank-and-file employee's act must have been
"performed with wrongful intent" to warrant dismissal based on serious misconduct. Dismissal is
deemed too harsh a penalty to be imposed on employees who are not induced by any perverse
or wrongful motive despite having committed some form of misconduct.
Hence, in Moreno v. San Sebastian College-Recoletos, this Court deemed the penalty of dismissal
as disproportionate to the committed offense because the employee was neither induced by nor
motivated by a perverse or wrongful intent in violating the school's policy on external teaching
engagements.
Thus, to warrant the dismissal from service of a rank-and-file employee under Article 297(a) of
the Labor Code, the misconduct (1) must be serious, (2) should "relate to the performance of the
employee's duties," (3) should render the employee "unfit to continue working for the employer,"
and (4) should "have been performed with wrongful intent."
Set against these parameters, this Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on loss
of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His position of
responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent.
The entire payroll account depended on the accuracy of the classifications made by the
Comptroller. It was reasonable for the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations
especially with respect to his own compensation. The preparation of the payroll is a sensitive
matter requiring attention to detail. Not only does the payroll involve the company's finances, it
also affects the welfare of all other employees who rely on their monthly salaries.
Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear
breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In addition, there was no reason for the
Comptroller's Office to undertake the preparation of its own summary table because this was a
function that exclusively pertained to the Human Resources Department. Petitioner offered no
explanation about the Comptroller's Office's deviation from company procedure and the
discrepancies in the computation of other employees' salaries. Petitioner's position made him
accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's established
procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held liable by respondent on the basis of
command responsibility.
In termination based on just causes, the employer must comply with procedural due process by
furnishing the employee a written notice containing the specific grounds or causes for dismissal.
The notice must also direct the employee to submit his or her written explanation within a
reasonable period from the receipt of the notice. Afterwards, the employer must give the
employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself or herself. A hearing, however, is
not a condition sine qua non. A formal hearing only becomes mandatory in termination cases
when so required under company rules or when the employee requests for it.
Previously, a formal hearing was considered as an indispensable component of procedural due
process in dismissal cases. However, in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co., this
Court clarified:
The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277 (b) [now, Article 292(b)] cannot be
whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the
employee. The "ample opportunity to be heard" standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a
formal hearing. To confine the employee's right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that
right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense.
Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The "very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation
Finally, the employer must serve a notice informing the employee of his or her dismissal from
employment.
In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process in
terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause memo
stating the specific grounds for dismissal. The show cause memo also required petitioner to
answer the charges by submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner
that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a thorough investigation.
Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate occasions. The findings of the investigation
committee were then sent to petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination
containing respondent's final decision.
Ordinarily, employees play no part in selecting the members of the investigating committee. That
petitioner was not given the chance to comment on the selection of the members of the
investigating committee does not mean that he was deprived of due process. In addition, there
is no evidence indicating that the investigating committee was biased against petitioner. Hence,
there is no merit in petitioner's claim that he was deprived of due process.
Under Article 294 of the Labor Code, the reliefs of an illegally dismissed employee are
reinstatement and full backwages. "Backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that
was lost by reason of [the employee's] dismissal" from employment. It is "computed from the
time that [the employee's] compensation was withheld . . . [until] his [or her] actual
reinstatement." However, when reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay is awarded.
Considering that there was a just cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there is no
basis to award him separation pay and backwages. There are also no factual and legal bases to
award attorney's fees to petitioner.
2nd motion for reconsideration
Angelito L. Cristobal v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. and Lucio Tan, G.R. No. 201622,
October 04, 2017
Facts: Angelito Cristobal (Cristobal) was a pilot for Philippine Airlines (PAL.) PAL reassured
Cristobal that he could continue to accrue seniority and that the he could opt to retire during his
unpaid leave. Yet when Cristobal signified his retirement, PAL advised him that he was deemed
to have lost his employment status on June 9, 1998. Thus, on May 12, 1999 Cristobal filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission.
Issue: Whether the June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Angelito L.
Cristobal assailing the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision was a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration?
Ruling: Petition Granted, the CA Decision is reversed and set aside, the CA is ordered to reinstate
the petition for certiorari for further proceedings.
Rule VII, Section 15 of the National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure provides:
Motion for reconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of the Commission shall not be
entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under
oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with
proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the
adverse party; and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be
entertained.
The National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from questioning
a decision, resolution, or order, twice. In other words, this rule prohibits the same party from
assailing the same judgment. However, a decision substantially reversing a determination in a
prior decision is a discrete decision from the earlier one. Thus, in Poliand Industrial Ltd. v. National
Development Co., the Court held:
Ordinarily, no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same
party shall be entertained. Essentially, however, the instant motion is not a second motion for
reconsideration since the viable relief it seeks calls for the review, not of the Decision dated
August 22, 2005, but the November 23, 2005 Resolution which delved for the first time on the
issue of the reckoning date of the computation of interest
The Court ruled similarly in Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, where the Labor Arbiter dismissed
a labor complaint but awarded the employee separation pay, compensatory benefit, Christmas
bonus, and moral and exemplary damages. This was appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission by both parties. The National Labor Relations Commission rendered a Decision
affirming the Labor Arbiter Decision but modifying it by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the employee had been illegally dismissed
and, considering the cessation of the employer's operations, awarded the employee separation
pay, backwages, compensatory benefit, Christmas bonus, unpaid salary, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees. Then, the employer bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, while the employee filed a Motion tor Clarification
and/or Partial Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals then issued an Amended Decision,
modifying the amount awarded as separation pay, backwages, and unpaid salary. Afterwards,
the employee filed another Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, and the Court of Appeals
again corrected the amounts awarded as separation pay, backwages, and unpaid salary. In its
petition assailing the Court of Appeals Resolution, the employer bank claimed that the Court of
Appeals erred in granting the employee's second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited
pleading. The Court held:
The Amended Decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision, for
which a new motion for reconsideration may be filed again.
Anent the issue of Lazaro's "second" motion for reconsideration, the Court disagreed with the
bank's contention that it is disallowed by the Rules of Court. Upon thorough examination of
the procedural history of this case, the "second" motion does not partake the nature
of a prohibited pleading because the Amended Decision is an entirely new decision
which supersedes the original, for which a new motion for reconsideration may be
filed again.
In Barba v. Liceo De Cagayan University, where the Court of Appeals denied a motion for
reconsideration from an amended decision on the ground that it was a prohibited second motion
for reconsideration, this Court held that the prohibition against a second motion for
reconsideration contemplates the same party assailing the same judgment:
Prefatorily, we first discuss the procedural matter raised by respondent that the present petition
is filed out of time. Respondent claims that petitioner's motion for reconsideration from the
Amended Decision is a second motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.
Respondent's assertion, however, is misplaced for it should be noted that the CA's Amended
Decision totally reversed and set aside its previous ruling. Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. This contemplates a situation where a
second motion for reconsideration is filed by the same party assailing the same judgment or final
resolution. Here, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed after the appellate court
rendered an Amended Decision totally reversing and setting aside its previous ruling. Hence,
petitioner is not precluded from filing another motion for reconsideration from the Amended
Decision which held that the labor tribunals lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for
constructive dismissal. The period to file an appeal should be reckoned not from the denial of her
motion for reconsideration of the original decision, but from the date of petitioner's receipt of the
notice of denial of her motion for reconsideration from the Amended Decision. And as petitioner
received notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration from the Amended Decision on
September 23, 2010 and filed her petition on November 8, 2010, or within the extension period
granted by the Court to file the petition, her petition was filed on time.
Here, the National Labor Relations Commission May 31, 2011 Decision substantially
modified its September 30, 2010 Decision. Thus, petitioner was not precluded from
seeking reconsideration of the new decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, and it was clearly an error for the Court of Appeals to find that
petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed out of time on that ground.
As for the purported failure to attach the records necessary to resolve the petition, in Wack Wack
Golf & Country Club v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held:
In Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court recognized the authority of the general
manager to sue on behalf of the corporation and to sign the requisite verification and certification
of non-¬forum shopping. The general manager is also one person who is in the best position to
know the state of affairs of the corporation. It was also error for the CA not to admit the requisite
proof of authority when in the Novelty case, the Court ruled that the subsequent submission of
the requisite documents constituted substantial compliance with procedural rules. There is ample
jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call
for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice. While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. It was, therefore, reversible error for the CA to have dismissed the
petition for certiorari before it The ordinary recourse for us to take is to remand the case to the
CA for proper disposition on the merits; however, considering that the records are now before
us, we deem it necessary to resolve the instant case in order to ensure harmony in the rulings
and expediency.
Thus, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the
petition outright, considering the circumstances of this case.
Petitioner raised in issue whether or not the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan is part of the
retirement benefits that should be computed in comparing the retirement benefits accorded to
him under the Labor Code as against what he is entitled to under PAL policy. However, the matter
of retirement benefits is not addressed in respondent's memorandum. It would better serve the
interest of substantial justice to remand this case to the Court of Appeals to allow the parties to
fully discuss this issue.
Constructive dismissal
G.R. No. 200170, June 03, 2019 ,MARILYN R. YANGSON v. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY BRO. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, FSC
Facts: Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are
not station-specific may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service.
Marilyn R. Yangson was Principal III at the Surigao Norte National High School. On April 30, 2008,
Yangson was personally served a Memorandum dated April 14, 2008 issued by then Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent Officer-in-Charge Fidela Rosas. In the Memorandum, Yangson
was reassigned from Surigao National to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School.
Yangson refused to accept the Memorandum without first consulting her counsel.
Two (2) days prior to the effectivity of her reassignment on May 5, 2008, Yangson filed before
the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Damages against Rosas and Dulcesima Corvera, who was supposed to replace Yangson as the
new principal of Surigao National.
The Regional Trial Court denied Yangson's prayer for preliminary injunction. It held that Yangson
did not have a vested right over her position at Surigao National because her appointment as
Principal III was not station-specific.12 It also found that the Temporary Restraining Order was
sufficient to vindicate her rights even if the Memorandum was not served properly.
Thus, Yangson appealed before the Department of Education CARAGA Regional Office, which
denied the appeal.
Regional Director Arteche also ruled that Yangson was not constructively dismissed because her
reassignment was done in good faith. Further, it held that Rosas had the discretion to reassign
principals and teachers under DECS Order No. 7, series of 1999, which directed the reassignment
of teachers and principals every five years.
Yangson elevated her case to the Department of Education Central Office, but her appeal was
denied in the August 13, 2008 Resolution.
In its June 15, 2010 Resolution, the Civil Service Commission reversed both Resolutions of the
Department of Education Central Office and ruled in favor of Yangson. It found that her
reassignment did not comply with the requirements of Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers.
The Civil Service Commission affirmed that Yangson could be assigned anywhere in the school
division.32 However, it noted that while the movement would be in the same region, Yangson
would be placed in a different division. It found that Surigao National is under the Division of
Surigao City, while Toledo Memorial is under the Division of Surigao del Norte. Thus, it ruled that
Yangson's consent was necessary.
In its July 28, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the rulings of the Civil Service
Commission.
The Court of Appeals maintained that while reassignments are different from transfers, both are
covered by Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. However, though it was
applicable, the Court of Appeals found that the provision was not violated.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the reassignment was valid without Yangson's consent, and
the notice served to her sufficiently complied with the requirement under the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers. It agreed with the Civil Service Commission that Yangson had not been
demoted as there was no reduction in Yangson's rank, status, or salary.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Marilyn R. Yangson's reassignment was valid.
Ruling:
This Court affirms the finding that petitioner's appointment was not station-specific.
Petitioner suggests that her appointment is station-specific because her appointment papers state
that she would replace Racaza, who, before his retirement, had been assigned at Surigao
National. This contention is untenable.
An appointment is station-specific if the employee's appointment paper specifically indicates on
its face the particular office or station the position is located. Moreover, the station should already
be specified in the position title, even if the place of assignment is not indicated on the face of
the appointment.
Moreover, Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers does not apply
here. The provision states:
SECTION 6. Consent for Transfer — Transportation Expenses. — Except for cause and as herein
otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to
another.
Where the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another,
such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the
teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the teacher believes
there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools
or the Director of Vocational Education, as the case may be. Pending his appeal and the decision
thereon, his transfer shall be held in abeyance: Provided, however, That no transfers whatever
shall be made three months before any local or national election.
Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the
Government if his transfer is finally approved.
The text of the law is clear and unequivocal: Section 6 applies to transfers, not reassignments.
Petitioner's movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial was a reassignment, not a
transfer.
The legal concept of transfer differs from reassignment. Most notably, a transfer involves the
issuance of another appointment, while a reassignment does not.
Moreover, petitioner's reassignment did not violate her right to security of tenure.
In Brillantes v. Guevarra, another principal contested her assignment to a school, alleging that
she was being removed without cause and her consent. This Court found her contentions
unmeritorious.
Arguing that an appointment as principal in the Bureau of Public Schools and assignment to a
particular school are inseparable, plaintiff maintains that her unconsented transfer to another
school by virtue of an administrative directive amounts to a removal — prohibited by the
Constitution and the Civil Service Act — which cannot be done unless for causes specified by law.
Plaintiffs confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her
refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable.
She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School
by appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads, thus: "You are hereby
appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of
Education" without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as
Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station. She may be assigned to any
station as exigency of public service requires, even without her consent. She thus has no right of
choice.
The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specific station.
Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of
this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain—even as public
service dictates that a transfer be made—in a particular station.
Here, it has been established that petitioner's appointment is not station-specific. While she is
entitled to her right to security of tenure, she cannot assert her right to stay at Surigao National.
Her appointment papers are not specific to the school, which means she may be assigned to any
station as may be necessary for public exigency. Because she holds no vested right to remain as
Principal III of Surigao National, her security of tenure was not violated.
Clearly, petitioner's reassignment was for the exigency of service.
Prior to the issuance of the Memorandum, in a March 31, 2008 letter, Rosas recommended the
reshuffling and/or reassignment of secondary administrators and teachers to the Regional
Director of the Department of Education CARAGA. The Regional Director did not object.
While petitioner was absent on the day of the meeting, she does not deny that the meeting took
place. Neither can she assert that she was insufficiently notified of her reassignment, since she
had refused the Memorandum precisely entailing her reassignment to be served upon her.
Section 26(7) of the Administrative Code allows any government department or agency that is
embraced in the civil service prerogative to reassign employees.
Similarly, here, we cannot conclude as a matter of established fact that petitioner was reassigned
by whim, fancy, or spite, as she would like this Court to believe. It is presumed that reassignments
are "regular and made in the interest of public service." The party questioning its regularity or
asserting bad faith carries the burden to prove his or her allegations.
Petitioner's reassignment cannot be considered a demotion or constructive dismissal.
A demotion means that an employee is moved or appointed from a higher position to a lower
position with decreased duties and responsibilities, or with lesser status, rank, or salary.
Constructive dismissal occurs whether or not there is diminution in rank, status, or salary if the
employee's environment has rendered it impossible for him or her to stay in his or her work. It
may be due to the agency head's unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations, hardship
because geographic location, financial dislocation, or performance of other duties and
responsibilities inconsistent with those attached to the position.
A reassignment may be deemed a constructive dismissal if the employee is moved to a position
with a more servile or menial job as compared to his previous position. It may occur if the
employee was reassigned to an office not in the existing organizational structure, or if he or she
is not given a definite set of duties and responsibilities. It may be deemed constructive dismissal
if the motivation for the reassignment was to harass or oppress the employee on the pretext of
promoting public interest. This may be inferred from reassignments done twice within a year, or
during a change of administration of elective and appointive officials.
Finally, petitioner argues that assuming she was only reassigned, her reassignment should not
be for an indefinite period and should not last longer than a year.
Again, petitioner's argument fails.
When an employee's appointment is station-specific, his or her reassignment may not exceed a
maximum period of one (1) year. This is not the case for appointments that are not station-
specific. In such instances, the reassignment may be indefinite and exceed one (1) year—as in
petitioner's case.
Abandonment

Demex Rattancraft, Inc. and Narciso T. Dela Merced vs. Rosalio A. Leron, G.R. No.
204288, November 08, 2017

Facts: Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc. (Demex), a domestic corporation
engaged in manufacturing handcrafted rattan products for local sale and export.

Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis and his services were contracted through job orders. He
worked from Monday to Saturday. However, there were times when he was required to work on
Sundays. Leron received his wages at the end of every week but he never received standard
benefits such as 13th month pay, service incentive leave, rest day pay, holiday pay, and overtime
pay.

Sometime in June 2006, Leron was dismissed by Demex's foreman. Leron did not report for work.
The next day, he filed a complaint against Demex for illegal dismissal.

Demex construed Leron's failure to report to work as an absence without leave. Demex sent
Leron notices requiring him to return to work. Despite having received these two (2) notices,
Leron did not resume his post. Leron received a third notice from Demex informing him of its
decision to terminate his services on the ground of abandonment.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Rosalio A. Leron was validly dismissed from employment by
petitioners Demex Rattancraft, Inc. and Narciso T. Dela Merced on the ground of abandonment
of work.

Ruling: The determination of whether or not an employee is guilty of abandonment is a factual

matter. It involves a review on the probative value of the evidence presented by each party and
the correctness of the lower courts' assessments. The Court of Appeals' finding that respondent
did not abandon his work would generally be binding upon the parties and this Court. However,
an exception should be made in this case considering that there is a variance in the findings of
the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission.

Article 297 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the dismissal of an employee:

Article 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment

for any of the following causes:
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
e. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Although abandonment of work is not expressly enumerated as a just cause under Article 297 of
the Labor Code, jurisprudence has recognized it as a form of or akin to neglect of duty.

Abandonment of work has been construed as "a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's
employment without any intention of returning back." To justify the dismissal of an employee on
this ground, two (2) elements must concur, namely: "(a) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship."

Mere failure to report to work is insufficient to support a charge of abandonment. The employer
must adduce clear evidence of the employee's "deliberate, unjustified refusal . . . to resume his
[or her] employment," which is manifested through the employee's overt acts.

Valid termination requires the employer to send an initial notice to the employee, stating the
specific grounds or causes for dismissal and directing the submission of a written explanation
answering the charges. After considering the employee's answer, the employer must give another
notice informing the employee of the employer's findings and reason for termination. These are
the operative acts that terminate an employer-employee relationship. In Kams International, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court explained:

Furthermore, it must be stressed that abandonment of work does not per se sever
the employer- employee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, which
is in turn a just cause for termination of employment. The operative act that will
ultimately put an end to this relationship is the dismissal of the employee after
complying with the procedure prescribed by law.

The employer has the burden of proving that an employee's dismissal from service was for a just
or authorized cause. Having failed to clearly establish that respondent abandoned his work, this
Court denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals' finding that respondent was illegally
dismissed from employment.
Recovery of liability
G.R. No. 206178, August 09, 2017, PEDRO C. PEREA VS. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT
PHILIPPINES, INC., AUGUSTEA ATLANTICA SRL/ITALY, AND CAPTAIN ANTONIO S.
NOMBRADO
Facts:
On October 28, 2009, Perea entered into a Contract of Employment[4] with Elburg
Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. On May 15, 2010, Perea had difficulty breathing while repairing
a pipe. The following day, he had chest pains with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that
same afternoon and was advised to take medication and to rest for three (3) consecutive days.
However, he did not feel any better even after resting and taking medications; thus, he asked to
be repatriated.
A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was holding
exploded. He hit his left shoulder and twisted his fingers in trying to avoid the explosion. He took
a pain reliever to ease the pain but three (3) days later, he found that two (2) of his fingers had
grown numb.
On May 27, 2010, Perea was sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued
chest pains. He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid exertion,
and avoid using his right arm. The following day, he was transferred to SEMA Hospital where he
was declared to be suffering from "[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome (mainly due to swelling and
bleeding), soft, tissue injury of the right elbow." The treatment proposed was to put his right arm
in a sling and to rest for recovery for 10 days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines.
On June 3, 2010, after conducting laboratory examinations and other medical procedures on
Perea, company-designated physicians Dr. Karen Hao-Quan and Dr. Robert D. Lim gave an initial
impression, "To Consider Cubital Tunnel Syndrome, Right; Hypertension; Rule Out Ischemic Heart
Disease" and recommended that a Dipyridamole Thallium Scan be conducted.
On July 31, 2010, in a letter to Elburg, Dr. Hao-Quan stated that the cause of hypertension was
not work-related and opined that Perea's estimated length of treatment would be approximately
three (3) to four (4) months.
On September 28, 2010, Perea filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay,
permanent disability benefits, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
On October 21, 2010, Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual), an internist,
cardiologist, and echocardiographer, who diagnosed him with "Uncontrolled Hypertension [and]
Coronary Artery Disease." Dr. Pascual found Perea to be medically unfit to work as a seafarer.
Portions of Dr. Pascual's medical certificate read:
On November 5, 2010, after a series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that
Perea was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation.
Issues: First, whether the issue of the concealed pre-existing condition was rightly ruled upon
by the National Labor Relations Commission when it was not raised by any of the parties;
Second, whether petitioner is entitled to disability benefits;
Third, whether petitioner is entitled to the balance of his disability allowance; and
Finally, whether petitioner is entitled to his claims of damages and attorney's fees.
Ruling: Petition is DENIED. Rule VI, Section 4(d) of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
National Labor Relations Commission, categorically states that in deciding an appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission shall limit itself to the specific issues elevated on appeal:
Petitioner was correct to assail the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling on the
concealment of a pre-existing fracture or dislocated elbow because it appears that it was never
raised by the parties before the Labor Arbiter or even the National Labor Relations Commission.
In fact, aside from petitioner questioning this ruling, the alleged concealment of a pre-existing
injury was also not raised as an issue before this Court. The National Labor Relations Commission
clearly erred in considering a matter that was never raised for resolution on appeal.
However, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the dismissal of his claim was not brought about by
his concealment of a pre-existing condition. Rather, his complaint was rightly dismissed by the
Court of Appeals because of his failure to substantially corroborate his claim that he was unfit to
work as a seafarer, thus:
We deem the [National Labor Relations Commission]'s finding of concealment to be merely an
adjunct, if not a superfluity, to. its main ground for the dismissal of the appeal, i.e., the lack of
any medical/laboratory examination to support Dr, Pascual's declaration that petitioner is "unfit
to work as a seaman" due to ""uncontrollable hypertension" and "coronary artery disease". Thus,
even if the [National Labor Relations Commission] had not made any reference to the preexisting
fracture[,] the outcome of its decision would have remained the same: petitioner's appeal would
still have been dismissed
This Court sees no reason to distrust Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim's assessment of Perea's condition
considering that they were able to monitor Perea's condition over a prolonged period. As the
Court of Appeals discussed:
As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who conducted an
extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who saw petitioner on only one (1)
occasion and did not even order that medical tests be done to support his declaration that
petitioner is unfit to work as [a] seaman, the company-designated physicians' findings that
petitioner has been cleared for work should prevail.
This finds support in Philman Marine v. Cabanban, which also gave more credence to the findings
of the company-designated physician over those of the private physician:
In several cases, we held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual
medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the
seafarer's illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer's disability. In. Coastal Safeway Marine
Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, the Court significantly brushed aside the probative weight of the
medical certifications of the private physicians, which were based merely on vague diagnosis and
general impressions. Similarly in Ruben D. Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., et al., the
Court accorded greater weight to the assessments of the company-designated physician and the
consulting medical specialist which resulted from an extensive examination, monitoring and
treatment of the seafarer's condition, in contrast with the recommendation of the private
physician which was "based only on a single medical report . . . [outlining] the alleged findings
and medical history . . . obtained after . . . [one examination]."
Petitioner's claim for sickness allowance under the Collective Bargaining Agreement is likewise
denied.
Petitioner prays for the award of moral, exemplary, and compensatory damages, allegedly due
to respondents' gross negligence with respect to the proper medical attention he needed while
on board the vessel. Petitioner fails to persuade.
The POEA Contract, which is deemed read and incorporated into petitioner's employment
contract, governs his claims for disability benefits. These guidelines were amended in recent
years, but the 2000 version of the POEA Contract applies since petitioner was hired in 2009.
In his petition, Perea exhaustively enumerated the progress and medical reports issued by the
company-designated physicians, belying his own allegations of respondents' negligence or delay
in providing him with the necessary medical care both onboard the vessel and upon his
repatriation.
Considering respondents' compliance with the POEA Contract, including the payment of his wages
and sickness allowance, this Court sees no reason to grant petitioner's prayer for damages and
attorney's fees.
Illegal Termination

Renante B. Remoticado v. Typical Construction Trading Corp. and Rommel M. Alignay,

G.R. No. 206529, April 23, 2018
Facts: Remoticado’s services were engaged by Typical Construction as a helper/laborer in its
construction projects, the most recent being identified as the Jedic Project at First Industrial Park
in Batangas. As stated by Typical Construction’s Field Human Resources Officer and Remoticado’s
co- workers, Remoticado was absent for 14 days from December 6 to December 20, 2010. He
showed up on the latter date and informed Nielo (Human Resources Officer) that he was
resigning. When prodded by Nielo for his reason, Remoticado noted that they were “personal
reasons considering that he got sick.” Nielo advised Remoticado to return the following day as he
still has to report Remoticado’s resignation to Typical Construction’s main office, and as his final
pay had yet to be computed.
Remoticado returned the following day and was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He protested
saying that he was entitled to “separation pay computed at least 2 months for his services for 2
years. In response, Nielo explained that Remoticado could not be entitled to separation pay
considering that he voluntarily resigned. He added that if Remoticado was not satisfied with
P5,082.53, he was free to continue working for Typical Construction. Remoticado, however, was
resolute and proceeded to sign and affix his thumb marks on a Kasulatan ng Pagbawi ng
Karapatan at Kawalan ng Paghahabol, a waiver and quitclaim.
Remoticado filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Typical Construction and its owner and
operator, Rommel M. Alignay. He claimed that he was told to stop reporting for work due to a
“debt at the canteen” and was prevented from entering Typical Construction’s premises.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Renante B. Remoticado voluntarily resigned or his employment
was illegally terminated in the manner, on the date, and for the reason he averred in his
complaint.
Ruling: It is true that in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to prove that
termination of employment was for a just cause. Logic dictates, however, that the complaining
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of termination by the employer. If
there is no proof of termination by the employer, there is no point in even considering the cause
for it. There can be no illegal termination when there was no termination:
Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal,
the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal
from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality
or illegality thereof.
Petitioner here insists on his version of events, that is, that on December 23, 2010,
he was told to stop reporting for work on account of his supposed indebtedness at
the canteen. This bare insistence, however, is all that petitioner has. He failed to
present convincing evidence. Even his basic narrative is bereft of supporting details
that could be taken as badges of veracity. As the Court of Appeals underscored,
"Petitioner only made a general statement that he was illegally dismissed . . . He
did not state how he was terminated [or] mentioned who prevented him from
reporting for work."
In contrast with petitioner's bare allegation are undisputed facts and pieces of evidence adduced
by respondents, which cast serious doubt on the veracity of petitioner's recollection of events.
It is not disputed that the establishment identified as Bax Canteen, to which petitioner owed
P2,115.00, is not owned by, or otherwise connected with any of the respondents, or with any of
Typical Construction's owners, directors, or officers. There was also no showing that any of the
two (2) respondents, or anyone connected with Typical Construction, was prejudiced or even just
inconvenienced by petitioner's indebtedness. It appears that Bax Canteen was merely in the
proximity of the site of Typical Construction's Jedic Project. Petitioner failed to show why Typical
Construction would go out of its way to concern itself with the affairs of another company. What
stands, therefore, is the sheer improbability that Typical Construction would take petitioner's
indebtedness as an infraction, let alone as a ground for terminating his employment.
The waiver and quitclaim bearing petitioner's signature and thumbmarks was dated December
21, 2010, predating petitioner's alleged illegal termination by two (2) days. If indeed petitioner
was told to stop reporting for work on December 23, 2010, it does not make sense for Typical
Construction to have petitioner execute a waiver and quitclaim two (2) full days ahead of the
termination of his employment. It would have been a ludicrous move for an employer that is
purportedly out to outwit someone into unemployment.
The waiver and quitclaim could very well have been antedated. But it is not for this Court to
sustain a mere conjecture. It was for petitioner to allege and prove any possibility of antedating.
He did not do so. In any case, even if this Court were to indulge a speculation, there does not
appear to be any cogent reason for antedating. To the contrary, antedating the waiver and
quitclaim was an unnecessary complication considering that any simulation of resignation would
have already been served by petitioner's mere affixing of his signature. Antedating would just
have been an inexplicably asinine move on the part of respondents.
What is most crucial is that petitioner has never disavowed the waiver and quitclaim. It does not
appear also that petitioner has accounted for why this document exists, such as by alleging that
he was coerced into executing it.
Jurisprudence frowns upon waivers and quitclaims forced upon employees. Waivers and
quitclaims are, however, not invalid in themselves. When shown to be freely executed, they validly
discharge an employer from liability to an employee. "A legitimate waiver representing a voluntary
settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties." In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation v. Ativo:
It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees
who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers
seeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. In
certain cases, however, the Court has given effect to quitclaims executed by
employees if the employer is able to prove the following requisites, to wit: (1) the
employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on
the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
Our pronouncement in Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission on this
matter cannot be more explicit:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof
that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or
the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.
Petitioner's barren tale of his employer's order for him to stop reporting for work is hardly the
requisite "clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person."
Indeed, courts and tribunals should not be so gullible as to lend validity to every waiver and
quitclaim confronting them. However, neither should they be so foolhardy as to believe a
complaining employee's narrative at the mere sight or mention of a waiver or quitclaim.
Petitioner here would have this Court rule in his favor when he does absolutely nothing more
than entreat the doctrine on an employer's burden to prove just cases for terminating
employment. It is as though this invocation was a magic spell that would win the day for him
regardless of whether or not he is able to discharge his primordial burden of proving the
occurrence of termination. This Court cannot fall for this. The task of adjudication demands more
than convenient conclusions obtained through handy invocations. Rather, it requires a meticulous
appraisal of evidence and legal bases.
Petitioner is utterly wanting, both in evidence and legal bases. This Court cannot be so witless as
to rule in his favor. With an utter dearth of proof in petitioner's favor, the consistent findings of
the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Labor Arbiter must be
sustained.

Retirement Benefits
United Doctors Medical Center vs. Cesario Bernadas, represented by Leonila Bernadas
G.R. No. 209468, December 13, 2017
Facts: Cesario worked as an orderly in United Doctors Medical Center’s (UDMC) housekeeping
department, and was later promoted as utility man. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between UDMC and its rank-and-file employees provided the latter an optional retirement
benefits, in addition to insurance paid by UDMC. Inclusive of the premium paid by UDMC was to
cover for family members of the employee.
Cesario died from a freak accident while working in a doctor’s residence, he was 53 years old.
Leonila, representing her deceased husband Ceasrio, filed a complaint for payment of retirement
benefits, damages and attorney’s fees with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Noting that she and her son claimed, and received insurance proceeds under the CBA.
Issue:
1. Whether Cesario Bernadas is entitled to receive his optional retirement benefits despite his
untimely death;
2. Whether Leonila Bernadas as her husband's representative, may claim his optional retirement
benefits
Ruling: Petition denied, the CA decision Affirmed. UDMC is ordered to pay respondent Cesario
Bernadas, through his beneficiary Leonila Bernadas, optional retirement benefits in the amount
of P98,252.55 as provided by the Labor Code.
I
Jurisprudence characterizes retirement as "the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain
age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former."
At the outset, retirement benefits must be differentiated from insurance proceeds. One is in the
concept of an indemnity while the other is conditioned on age and length of service. "A 'contract
of insurance' is an agreement whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another
against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event.” On the other
hand, retirement plans,while initially humanitarian in nature, now concomitantly serve to secure
loyalty and efficiency on the part of employees, and to increase continuity of service and decrease
the labor turnover, by giving to the employees some assurance of security as they approach and
reach the age at which earning ability and earnings are materially impaired or at an end.
Thus, the grant of insurance proceeds will not necessarily bar the grant of retirement benefits.
These are two (2) separate and distinct benefits that an employer may provide to its employees.
II
Within this jurisdiction, there are three (3) types of retirement plans available to employees.
The first is compulsory and contributory. This type of plan is embodied in Republic Act No. 8282
for those in the private sector and Republic Act No. 8291 for those in the government. These laws
require a mandatory contribution from the employer as well as the employee, which shall become
a pension fund for the employee upon retirement. Considering that the mandatory employee
contribution is deducted from the employee's monthly income, "retirement packages are usually
crafted as 'forced savings' on the part of the employee."
Under this type of retirement plan, the pension is not considered as mere gratuity but actually
forms part of the employee's compensation. An employee acquires a vested right to the benefits
that have become due upon reaching the compulsory age of retirement. Thus, the beneficiaries
of the retired employee are entitled to the pension even after the retired employee's death.
The second and third types of retirement plans are voluntary. They may not even require the
employee to contribute to a pension fund. The second type of retirement plan is by agreement
between the employer and the employee, usually embodied in the CBA between them. "The third
type is one that is voluntarily given by the employer, expressly as in an announced company
policy or impliedly as in a failure to contest the employee's claim for retirement benefits."
The rules regarding the second and third types of retirement plans are provided for in Article 302
[287] of the Labor Code, as amended, which read:
Article 302. [287] Retirement. - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he
may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective
bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees
in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not
beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
However, these types of retirement plans are not meant to be a replacement to the compulsory
retirement scheme under social security laws but must be understood as a retirement plan in
addition to that provided by law. Llora Motors, Inc. v. Drilon, explained:
Article 287 of the Labor Code also recognizes that employers and employees may, by a collective
bargaining or other agreement, set up [a] retirement plan in addition to that established by the
Social Security law, but prescribes at the same time that such consensual additional retirement
plan cannot be substituted for or reduce the retirement benefits available under the compulsory
scheme established by the Social Security law. Such is the thrust of the second paragraph of
Article 287 which directs that the employee shall be entitled to receive retirement benefits earned
"under existing laws and any collective bargaining or other agreement."
Unlike the fixed retirement ages in social security laws, Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code allows
employers and employees to mutually establish an early retirement age option. The rationale for
optional retirement is explained in Pantranco North Express v. National Labor Relations
Commission:
In almost all countries today, early retirement, i.e., before age 60, is considered a reward for
services rendered since it enables an employee to reap the fruits of his labor - particularly
retirement benefits, whether lump-sum or otherwise at an earlier age, when said employee, in
presumably better physical and mental condition, can enjoy them better and longer. As a matter
of fact, one of the advantages of early retirement is that the corresponding retirement benefits,
usually consisting of a substantial cash windfall, can early on be put to productive and profitable
uses by way of income-generating investments, thereby affording a more significant measure of
financial security and independence for the retiree who, up till then, had to contend with life's
vicissitudes within the parameters of his fortnightly or weekly wages. Thus we are now seeing
many CBAs with such early retirement provisions.
Optional retirement may even be done at the option of the employer for as long as the option
was mutually agreed upon by the employer and the employee. Thus:
Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free,
and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally
permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually
instituted early retirement plan. In other words, only the implementation and execution of the
option may be unilateral, but not the adoption and institution of the retirement plan containing
such option. For the option to be valid, the retirement plan containing it must be voluntarily
assented to by the employees or .at least by a majority of them through a bargaining
representative.
III
The issue in this case concerns the second type of retirement plan, or that which was provided
under the employer and employees' CBA. To wit, the CBA between the parties provides:
ARTICLE XI
RETIREMENT AND SEVERANCE PAY
SECTION 1. RETIREMENT AND SEVERANCE PAY. The CENTER shall grant each employee
retirement and severance pay in accordance with law. It shall also continue its present policy on
optional retirement.
The terms and conditions of a CBA "constitute the law between the parties." However, this CBA
does not provide for the terms and conditions of the "present policy on optional retirement."
Leonila merely alleged before the Labor Arbiter that petitioner "grants an employee a retirement
or separation equivalent to eleven (11) days per year of service after serving for at least twenty
(20) years," which was not disputed by petitioner. Therefore, doubt arises as to what petitioner's
optional retirement package actually entails.
It is settled that doubts must be resolved in favor of labor. Moreover, "retirement laws should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all
doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its
humanitarian purposes."
Optional, by its ordinary usage, is the opposite of compulsory. It requires the exercise of an
option. For this reason, petitioner insists that respondent Cesario would not have been entitled
to his optional retirement benefits as he failed to exercise the option before his untimely death.
However, retirement encompasses even the concept of death. This Court has considered death
as a form of disability retirement as "there is no more permanent or total physical disability than
death." Compulsory retirement and death both involve events beyond the employee's control.
Petitioner admits that respondent Cesario was already qualified to receive his retirement benefits,
having been employed by petitioner for 23 years. While the choice to retire before the compulsory
age of retirement was within respondent Cesario's control, his death foreclosed the possibility of
him making that choice.
Petitioner's optional retirement plan is premised on length of service, not upon reaching a certain
age. It rewards loyalty and continued service by granting an employee an earlier age to claim his
or her retirement benefits even if the employee has not reached his or her twilight years. It would
be the height of inequity to withhold respondent Cesario's retirement benefits despite being
qualified to receive it, simply because he died before he could apply for it. In any case, the CBA
does not mandate that an application must first be filed by the employee before the right to the
optional retirement benefits may vest. Thus, this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
retiree.
Retirement benefits are the property interests of the retiree and his or her beneficiaries.66 The
CBA does not prohibit the employee's beneficiaries from claiming retirement benefits if the retiree
dies before the proceeds could be released. Even compulsory retirement plans provide
mechanisms for a retiree's beneficiaries to claim any pension due to the retiree.67 Thus, Leonila,
being the surviving spouse of respondent Cesario,68 is entitled to claim the optional retirement
benefits on his behalf.
G.R. No. 215568, August 3, 2015, RICHARD N. RIVERA, Petitioner vs. GENESIS
TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. AND RIZA A. MOISES
Facts:
Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. beginning June 2002 as a
bus conductor, assigned to the CubaoBaler, Aurora route. As part of the requisites for his
employment, he was required to post a cash bond of ₱6,000.00. Riza A. Moises is Genesis'
President and General Manager.
In his Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Rivera acknowledged that he was dismissed by
Genesis on account of a discrepancy in the amount he declared on bus ticket receipts. He
responded that it was an honest mistake, which he was unable to correct "because the bus
encountered mechanical problems."
The discrepancy between the reported and remitted amount as against the correct amount was
detailed in the "Irregularity Report" prepared by Genesis' Inspector, Amel Villaseran.
On July 20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his
case was set on July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were terminated
through a written notice dated July 30, 2010. Contending that this termination was arbitrary and
not based on just causes for terminating employment, he filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal.
For their defense, Genesis and Riza A. Moises claimed that Rivera's misdeclaration of the amount
in the bus ticket receipts and failure to remit the correct amount clearly violated Genesis' policies
and amounted to serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of trust; thereby justifying his
dismissal.
Issue: Whether Richard N. Rivera's employment was terminated for just cause by Genesis
Transport, Inc.
Ruling: Our laws on labor, foremost of which is the Labor Code, are pieces of social legislation.
They have been adopted pursuant to the constitutional recognition of "labor as a primary social
economic force" and to the constitutional mandates for the state to "protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare" and for Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, [and] reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities."
They are means for effecting social justice, i.e., the "humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in the rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated."
Conformably, liberal construction of Labor Code provisions in favor of workers is stipulated by
Article 4 of the Labor Code:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor
of labor.
This case revolves around an alleged discrepancy between the amounts indicated on a single
ticket. For the paltry sum of P196.00 that petitioner failed to remit in his sole documented instance
of apparent misconduct, petitioner's employment was terminated. He was deprived of his means
of subsistence.
Misconduct and breach of trust are just causes for terminating employment only when attended
by such gravity as would leave the employer no other viable recourse but to cut off an employee's
livelihood.
The Labor Code recognizes serious misconduct, willful breach of trust or loss of confidence, and
other analogous causes as just causes for termination of employment:
Article 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following just causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Serious misconduct as a just cause for termination was discussed in Yabut v. Manila Electric Co.:
Misconduct is defined as the "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error in judgment." For serious misconduct to justify dismissal, the following requisites must be
present: (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties;
and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.
Thus, it is not enough for an employee to be found to have engaged in improper or wrongful
conduct. To justify termination of employment, misconduct must be so severe as to make it
evident that no other penalty but the termination of the employee's livelihood is viable.
There are several ways to manifest the severity that suffices to qualify petitioner's alleged
misconduct or breach of trust as so grave that terminating his employment is warranted. It may
be through the nature of the act itself: spanning an entire spectrum between, on one end, an
overlooked error, made entirely in good faith; and, on another end, outright larceny. It may be
through the sheer amount mishandled. It may be through frequency of acts. It may be through
other attendant circumstances, such as attempts to destroy or conceal records and other
evidence, or evidence of a motive to undermine the business of an employer.
We fail to appreciate any of these in this case.
The records are bereft of evidence showing a pattern of discrepancies chargeable against
petitioner. Seen in the context of his many years of service to his employer and in the absence
of clear proof showing otherwise, the presumption should be that he has performed his functions
faithfully and regularly. It can be assumed that he has issued the correct tickets and given
accurate amounts of change to the hundreds or even thousands of passengers that he
encountered throughout his tenure. It is more reasonable to assume that—except for a single
error costing a loss of only ₱196.00—the company would have earned the correct expected
margins per passenger, per trip, and per bus that it allowed to travel.
Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by petitioner can hardly
be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has acted in a
manner that runs afoul of his employer's trust. More so, petitioner cannot be taken to have
engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his employer. Terminating
his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust.
To infer from a single error that petitioner committed serious misconduct or besmirched his
employer's trust is grave abuse of discretion. It is an inference that is arbitrary and capricious. It
is contrary to the high regard for labor and social justice enshrined in our Constitution and our
labor laws.

Illegal dismissal

Macario S. Padilla vs. Airborne Security Service, Inc. and/or Catalina Solis, G.R. No.
210080, November 22, 2017

Facts: On September 1, 1986, Padilla was hired by respondent Airborne Security Service, Inc.
(Airborne) as a security guard. Padilla allegedly rendered continuous service until June 15, 2009,
when he was relieved from his post and was advised to wait for his re-assignment order.

On July 27, 2009, he allegedly received a letter from Airborne directing him to report for
assignment and deployment. He called Airborne's office but was told that he had no assignment
yet. On September 9, 2009, he received another letter from Airborne asking him to report to its
office. On September 22, 2009, he personally reported to the office to inquire on the status of his
deployment. He was told that Airborne was having a hard time finding an assignment for him
since he was already over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was advised by Airborne's personnel
to resign, but he refused. In December 2009, when he reported to the office to collect his 13th
month pay, he was again persuaded to hand in his resignation letter.

Still not having been deployed or re-assigned, on February 23, 2010, Padilla filed his Complaint
for illegal dismissal, impleading Airborne and its president, respondent Catalina Solis.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Padilla’s Complaint. The National Labor Relations Commission
affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the rulings of the
National Labor Relations Commission and of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment with respondent,
having been placed on floating status apparently on the basis of his age.

Ruling: The Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals gravely erred
in ruling that petitioner was not constructively dismissed and in concluding that he went on
absence without leave and abandoned his work.
II
The practice of placing security guards on "floating status" or "temporary off-detail" is a valid
exercise of management prerogative. Jurisprudence has settled that the period of temporary off-
detail must not exceed six (6) months. Beyond this, a security guard's floating status shall be
tantamount to constructive dismissal. In Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency:
Temporary displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally,
allowed in a situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their
service contract with the agency and no post is available for the relieved security
guard. Such situation does not normally result in a constructive
dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6) months,
the employee may be considered to have been constructively dismissed. No less than
the Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure, thus,
employees can only be dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they have
been afforded the due process of law.
Therefore, a security guard's-employer must give a new assignment to the employee within six
(6) months. This assignment must be to a specific or particular client. "A general return-to-work
order does not suffice.":
A holistic analysis of the Court's disposition in JLFP Investigation reveals that: [1] an employer
must assign the security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his last deployment,
otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be
assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-to- work order does not suffice.
III
To prove that petitioner was offered a new assignment, respondents presented a series of letters
requiring petitioner to report to respondent Airborne's head office. These letters merely required
petitioner to report to work and to explain why he had failed to report to the office. These letters
did not identify any specific client to which petitioner was to be reassigned. The letters were, at
best, nothing more than general return-to-work orders.
Jurisprudence is consistent in its disapproval of general return-to-work orders as a justification
for failure to timely render assignments to security guards.
In Ibon v. Genghis Khan Security Services, petitioner Ravengar Ibon (Ibon) filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal after he was placed on floating status for more than six (6) months by his
employer, respondent Genghis Khan Security Services (Genghis Khan). In its defense, Genghis
Khan claimed that Ibon abandoned his work after he failed to report for work despite its letters
requiring him to do so. Ruling in favor of Ibon, this Court noted that:
Respondent could not rely on its letter requiring petitioner to report back to work to refute a
finding of constructive dismissal. The letters, dated November 5, 2010 and February 3, 2011,
which were supposedly sent to petitioner merely re-quested him to report back to work and to
explain why he failed to report to the office after inquiring about his posting status.
Similarly, in Soliman Security Services, Inc. v. Sarmiento, respondent security guards claimed that
they were illegally dismissed after they were placed on floating status for more than six (6)
months. Their employer, petitioner Soliman Security Services, Inc. (Soliman), presented notices
requiring them to go back to work. However, this Court found that the notices did not absolve
Soliman of liability:
The crux of the controversy lies in the consequences of the lapse of a significant
period of time without respondents having been reassigned. Petitioner agency faults
the respondents for their repeated failure to comply with the directives to report to
the office for their new assignments. To support its argument, petitioner agency
submitted in evidence notices addressed to respondents, which read:
You are directed to report to the undersigned to clarify your intentions
as you have not been reporting to seek a new assignment after your
relief from Interphil.
To this date, we have not received any update from you neither did
you update your government requirements. . .
We are giving you up to May 10, 2007 to comply or we will be forced
to drop you from our roster and terminate your services for
abandonment of work and insubordination.
Consider this our final warning.
As for respondents, they maintain that the offers of new assignments were mere
empty promises. Respondents claim that they have been reporting to the office for
new assignments only to be repeatedly turned down and ignored by petitioner's
office personnel.
....
Instead of taking the opportunity to clarify during the hearing that respondents were
not dismissed but merely placed on floating status and instead of specifying details
about the available new assignments, the agency merely gave out empty promises.
No mention was made regarding specific details of these pending new assignments.
If respondent guards indeed had new assignments awaiting them, as what the
agency has been insinuating since the day respondents were relieved from their
posts, the agency should have identified these assignments during the hearing
instead of asking respondents to report back to the office. The agency's statement
in the notices - that respondents have not clarified their intentions because they
have not reported to seek new assignments since they were relieved from their
posts - is specious at best.
IV
As a further defense, respondents add that it was petitioner who abandoned his work.
For an employee to be considered to have abandoned his work, two (2) requisites must concur.
First, the employee must have failed to report for work or have been absent without a valid or
justifiable reason. Second, the employee must have had a "clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship." This Court has emphasized that "the second element is the more
determinative factor." This second element, too, must be "manifested by some overt acts."
Petitioner's conduct belies any intent to abandon his work. To the contrary, it demonstrates how
he took every effort to retain his employment.1âwphi1 Right after he received the first letter
dated July 27, 2009, he called Airborne's head office, only to be told that he had no assignment
yet.
Petitioner emphasized that he also personally reported to Airborne's Operations Director, Mr.
Dagang, to inquire about his re-assignment. However, Mr. Dagang told him that ''they were
having difficulty finding him a deployment because he was already old." Petitioner added that
sometime in December 2009, when he personally reported to the head office to get this 13th
month pay, he was persuaded to resign.
Considering petitioner's 24 years of uninterrupted service, it is highly improbable that he would
abandon his work so easily. There is no logical explanation why petitioner would abandon his
work. Being a security guard has been his source of income for 24 long years.
In Tatel v, JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Vicente Tatel (Tatel), a security guard, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal after being placed on floating status for more than six (6) months.
In finding that Tatel did not abandon his work, this Court gave consideration to Tatel's prolonged
service or continuous employment:
The charge of abandonment in this case is belied by the high improbability of Tatel intentionally
abandoning his work, taking into consideration his length of service and, concomitantly, his
security of tenure with JLFP. As the NLRC had opined, no rational explanation exists as to why
an employee who had worked for his employer for more than ten (10) years would just abandon
his work and forego whatever benefits he may be entitled to as a consequence thereof. As such,
respondents failed to si1fficicntly establish a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of Tatel
to resume his employment, which therefore leads to the logical conclusion that the latter had no
such intention to abandon his work.
Equally belying petitioner's intent to abandon his work is his immediate filing of a Complaint for
illegal dismissal on February 23, 2010. This was only eight (8) months after he was placed on
floating status. As similarly noted in Tatel v. JLFP Investigation Security Agency:
An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot, as a general
rule, be said to have abandoned his work, and the filing of the complaint is proof
enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of
abandonment.
Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, this Court is unable to conclude that
petitioner abandoned his work. Rather, this Court finds that he was placed on floating status for
more than six (6) months. Thus, he was constructively dismissed.
As a consequence of the finding of illegal dismissal, petitioner would ordinarily be entitled to
reinstatement, pursuant to Article 294 of the Labor Code:
Article 294. Security of Tenure. - ... An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits
or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
It is unreasonable to deny employees their means of earning a living exclusively on the basis of
age when there is no other indication that they are incapable of performing their functions. It is
true that certain tasks require able-bodied individuals. Age, per se, is not a reliable indication of
physical stamina1 or mental rigor. What is crucial in determining capacity for continuing
employment is an assessment of an employee's state of health, not his or her biological age,
Outside of limitations founded on scientific and established wisdom such as the age of minority,
proscriptions against child labor, or a standard retirement age, it is unjust to discriminate against
workers who are within an age range that is typical of physical productivity.
Ordinarily, it is not for this Court to foreclose an employee's chances of regaining employment
through reinstatement. It is not for this Court to rule out reinstatement on its own. To do so
would amount to a tacit approval of the abusive, discriminatory conduct displayed by employers
such as Airborne. It would be a capitulation to and virtual acceptance of the employer's assertion
that employees of a certain age can no longer engage in productive labor. However, considering
that petitioner himself specifically prayed for an award of separation pay and has also been
specific in asking that he no longer be reinstated, this Court awards him separation pay, in lieu
of reinstatement.
VI
Respondent Solis may not be held personally liable for the illegal / termination of petitioner's
employment.
As this Court explained in Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio:
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. Thus, as a rule, corporate directors and officers are not liable for the
illegal termination of a corporation's employees. It is only when they acted in bad
faith or with malice that they become solidarily liable with the corporation.
In Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng Ever Electrical, this
court clarified that "[b]ad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity i:uid conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a
known duty through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."
Other than Solis' designation as Airborne's president, this Court finds no indication that she acted
out of bad faith or with malice specifically aimed at petitioner as, regards the termination of his
employment. Thus, this Court finds that she did not incur any personal liability.

Authorized cause for dismissal

MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE

TELEPHONE COMPANY INCORPORATED (PLDT), G.R. No. 190389, April 19, 2017

Facts:

Manggawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), representing the employees of PLDT, filed two
notices of strike and charged PLDT of unfair labor practices for PLDT’s alleged transfer of several
employees of its Provisioning Support division from Bicutan to Taguig, abolition of a division,
farming out of jobs to casuals and contractual, unreasonable refusal to provide MKP its
comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/ reorganization and closure of
exchanges, continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary," "project," and "casual" employees for
regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union membership
and in the denial of the right to self-organization to the concerned employees, alleged
restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services and its closure of traffic
operations at various regional operator services.

MKP then went on strike. PLDT declared only 323 employees as redundant as it was able to
redeploy 180 of the 503 affected employees to other positions. The Secretary of Labor certified
the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration. All striking workers were directed to return to work
within twenty-four (24) hours except those who were terminated due to redundancy. MKP
challenged the SOLE’s order insofar as it created a distinction among the striking workers in the
return-to-work order. Meanwhile the NLRC dismissed the charges of ULP against PLDT and ruled
that PLDT’s redundancy program was valid and did not constitute ULP.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the redundancy program of PLDT is valid

2. Whether the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was rendered
moot when the National Labor Relations Commission upheld the validity of the redundancy
program

Ruling:

1. Redundancy is one of the authorized causes for the termination of employment provided
for in Article 298 of the Labor Code, as amended:

Article 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. - The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent
to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year.

Wiltshire File Co. Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission has explained that redundancy
exists when "the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the
actual requirements of the enterprise." While a declaration of redundancy is ultimately a
management decision in exercising its business judgment, and the employer is not obligated to
keep in its payroll more employees than are needed for its day to-day operations, management
must not violate the law nor declare redundancy without sufficient basis.
Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission listed down the elements for
the valid implementation of a redundancy program:

For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must

comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the
employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior
to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to
at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and
accordingly abolished. (Citations omitted)

To establish good faith, the company must provide substantial proof that the services of
the employees are in excess of what is required of the company, and that fair and reasonable
criteria were used to determine the redundant positions.

PLDT Company claims that the pattern of decline with operator-assisted calls has been
consistent through the years. The National Labor Relations Commission has found
that PLDT was able to discharge its burden of proving that its redundancy
measures had substantial basis. The Court of Appeals echoed the findings of the NLRC
regarding the validity of PLDT's redundancy measures.

As such, the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it regarded the
technological advancements resulting in less work for the redundated employees as justifying
PLDT's declaration of redundancy. This Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of
the Court of Appeals and of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's declaration of redundancy was

backed by substantial evidence showing a consistent decline for operator-
assisted calls for both local and international calls because of cheaper
alternatives like direct dialing services, and the growth of wireless
communication. Thus, the National Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of PLDT's redundancy program. Redundancy
is ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of such
business judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals or
even this Court, as long as the law was followed and malicious or arbitrary action
was not shown.

Nonetheless, there is a need to review the redundancy package awarded to the employees
terminated due to redundancy. For either redundancy or retrenchment, the law requires
that the employer give separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay of the
affected employee, or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. The employer must also serve a written notice on both the employees and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the effective
date of termination due to redundancy or retrenchment. While we agree that PLDT
Company complied with the notice requirement, the same cannot be said as regards the
separation pay received by some of the affected workers.
When an employer declares redundancy, Article 298 of the Labor Code requires that the employer
provides a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay of the affected employee, or
at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, PLDT
claims that the terminated workers received a generous separation package of about 2.75 months'
worth of salary for every year of service. But it seems that the retirement benefits of the
terminated workers were added to the separation pay due them, hence the large payout. This
should not be the case.

Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission differentiated between separation pay and
retirement benefits:

Separation pay is required in the cases enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor
Code, which include retrenchment, and is computed at at least one month salary or at the
rate of one-half month salary for every month of service, whichever is higher. We have held
that it is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during
the period that he is looking for another employment.

Retirement benefits, where not mandated by law, may be granted by agreement of the
employees and their employer or as a voluntary act on the part of the employer. Retirement
benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening
the burden of worrying for his financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty
and service to the employer.

Separation pay brought about by redundancy is a statutory right, and it is irrelevant that
the retirement benefits together with the separation pay given to the terminated workers resulted
in a total amount that appeared to be more than what is required by the law. The facts show that
instead of the legally required one (1) month salary for every year of service rendered, the
terminated workers who were with Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company for more than
15 years received a separation pay of only 75% of their basic pay for every year of service,
despite the clear wording of the law. The workers, who were terminated from employment as a
result of redundancy, are entitled to the separation pay due them under the law.

2. In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Secretary of Labor, pending

resolution of the legality of the strike, the Secretary of Labor and Employment directed
the employer to accept all the striking workers except the Union Officers, shop stewards,
and those with pending criminal charges. This Court struck down the Secretary of Labor
and Employment's order for being issued with grave abuse of discretion, and directed the
employer to accept all the striking workers without qualifications.

The ruling in Telefunken cannot be applied to the case at bar.

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc. v. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa

Pilipinas, which was promulgated on July 14, 2005, this Court struck down the return-to-work
order dated January 2, 2003, issued by Secretary Sto. Tomas for being tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. We ruled that the return-to-work order should have included all striking
workers and should not have excluded the workers affected by the redundancy
program. However, barely three (3) months after Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc.
's promulgation, the National Labor Relations Commission in its October 28, 2005
Resolution upheld the validity of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company's redundancy
program. This resolution also dismissed the charges of unfair labor practice, and illegal dismissal
against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.

When petitioner filed its Motion for Execution on January 17, 2006 pursuant to
this Court's ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc., there was no longer
any existing basis for the return-to-work order. This was because the Secretary of
Labor and Employment's return-to-work order had been superseded by the National
Labor Relations Commission's Resolution. Hence, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment did not err in dismissing the motion for execution on the ground of
mootness.

Reinstatement and Backwages

Petitioner cites Garcia v. Philippine Airlines to support its claim that the affected and
striking workers are entitled to reinstatement and backwages from January 2, 2003, when
Secretary Sto. Tomas directed the striking workers to return to work, up to April 29, 2006, when
the National Labor Relations Commission's Resolution upholding Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company's redundancy program became final and executory.

Petitioner is mistaken. Garcia upholds the prevailing doctrine that even if a Labor Arbiter's
order of reinstatement is reversed on appeal, the employer is obligated "to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court."

There is no order of reinstatement from a Labor Arbiter in the case at bar, instead, what
is at issue is the return-to-work order from the Secretary of Labor and Employment. An order of
reinstatement is different from a return-to-work order.

The award of reinstatement, including backwages, is awarded by a Labor Arbiter to an

illegally dismissed employee pursuant to Article 294 of the Labor Code:

Article 294. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
(Emphasis supplied)

If actual reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee becomes entitled

to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

On the other hand, a return-to-work order is issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment when he or she assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry that is
considered indispensable to the national interest. Article 278(g) of the Labor Code provides that
the assumption and certification of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall automatically
enjoin the intended or impending strike. When a strike has already taken place at the time the
Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute, all striking
employees shall immediately return to work. Moreover, the employer shall immediately resume
operations, and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike.

Return-to-work and reinstatement orders are both immediately executory; however, a

return-to-work order is interlocutory in nature, and is merely meant to maintain status quo while
the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum. In contrast, an order of reinstatement
is a judgment on the merits handed down by the Labor Arbiter pursuant to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction provided for under Article 224(a) of the Labor Code. Clearly, Garcia is not
applicable in the case at bar, and there is no basis to reinstate the employees who were
terminated as a result of redundancy.

Illegal dismissal

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA v. MA. JOPETTE M.

REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND
LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
Facts:
SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Rebesencio et, al. were recruited and hired by SUDIA as Temporary Flight Attendants with the
accreditation and approval of POEA.
Consequently, on separate occasions, the Respondents asked for Maternity Leave when
they got pregnant. Initially, Saudia had given its approval put later on informed Rebesenico that
its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves.
In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. They were told that if
they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed
the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements.
Rebesncio et, al. then filed a case against SAUDIA for illegal termination with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC ruled in favor of the SAUDIA asserts that
stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi
Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the forum non convenience can be a ground for dismissal in this case.
2. Whether or not SAUDIA is correct in claiming that the NLRC should refrain from exercising
jurisdiction because of Forum Non-Convenience.
Ruling:
1. NO. On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non
conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded
as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual matter, it is imperative

 that it proceed from a factually established basis. It would be improper to dismiss an
action pursuant to forum non conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or
hypothetical multiplicity of fora. Thus, a defendant must also plead and show that a prior
suit has, in fact, been brought in another jurisdiction.

The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered by duplicitous litigation,
the embarrassment of intruding into the affairs of another sovereign, and the squandering
of judicial efforts in resolving a dispute already lodged and better resolved elsewhere.

It is more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant not only
allege supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must
also show that such danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has
commenced in another jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise
jurisdiction.

2. In Puyat v. Zabarte, 352 SCRA 738 (2001), this court recognized the following situations
as among those that may warrant a court’s desistance from exercising jurisdiction:
(1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either
because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the
material witnesses have their residence there;
(2) The belief that the nonresident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as
forum shopping, merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or
harass the defendant;
(3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to nonresidents or aliens
when the docket may already be overcrowded;
(4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought
to be maintained; and
(5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.

In this case, the circumstances of the parties and their relation do not approximate the
circumstances enumerated in Puyat, which this court recognized as possibly justifying the
desistance of Philippine tribunals from exercising jurisdiction.
First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more conveniently tried elsewhere.
As established earlier, Saudia is doing business in the Philippines. For their part, all four (4)
respondents are Filipino citizens maintaining residence in the Philippines and, apart from their
previous employment with Saudia, have no other connection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
It would even be to respondents’ inconvenience if this case were to be tried elsewhere.
Second, the records are bereft of any indication that respondents filed their Complaint in an
effort to engage in forum shopping or to vex and inconvenience Saudia.
Third, there is no indication of “unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to nonresidents
or aliens.” That Saudia has managed to bring the present controversy all the way to this court
proves this.
 Fourth, it cannot be said that the local judicial machinery is inadequate for effectuating the
right sought to be maintained. Summons was properly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over
its person was validly acquired.
Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law. Philippine law properly governs the
present dispute.
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is the laws of Saudi Arabia which
should apply, it does not follow that Philippine tribunals should refrain from exercising
jurisdiction.

Retrenchment

LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE OF MANILA, SR. IMELDA A. MORA, OSA, ALBERT D.

MANALILI, AND ALICIA MANABAT vs. VIRGINIA PASCUA, M.D, G.R. No. 214744,
March 14, 2018

Facts:

On January 10, 2000, Pascua's services as school physician were engaged by La

Consolacion. She started working part-time before serving full-time from 2008. On September
29, 2011, Pascua was handed an Inter-Office Memo from Manalili, La Consolacion's Human
Resources Division Director, inviting her to a meeting concerning her "working condition." In that
meeting, Pascua was handed a letter terminating her employment due to the current financial
situation of La Consolacion College Manila caused by the decrease in enrollment in the institution.
As per LCCM, said retrenchment was made to prevent serious business losses.

Pascua was not satisfied, so she wrote a letter to Sr. Mora, pointing out that the part-time
school physician, Dr. Venus Dimagmaliw (Dr. Dimagmaliw), should have been considered for
dismissal first. She also noted that rather than dismissing her outright, La Consolacion could have
asked her to revert to part-time status instead.

In the meantime, Pascua underwent La Consolacion's clearance procedures and

completed them on November 3, 2011. However,she made a handwritten note on her Exit
Clearance, stating that she was reserving the right "to question the validity/legality of [her]
termination . . . before any agency/court with appropriate jurisdiction over the case." Following
this, Pascua proceeded to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against La Consolacion, Sr. Mora,
Manalili, and Manabat.

Sr. Mora replied that Pascua was retrenched since the purpose of the downsizing was to
reduce payroll costs, the employees with the highest rates of pay would be the first to be
retrenched, if their services could be dispensed with.

Issue: Whether or not the reason cited for her retrenchment—that she had the highest rate of
pay—justified her dismissal.

Ruling:
 The Labor Code recognizes retrenchment as an authorized cause for terminating
employment. It is an option validly available to an employer to address "losses in the operation
of the enterprise, lack of work, or considerable reduction on the volume of business":

Retrenchment is normally resorted to by management during periods of business reverses

and economic difficulties occasioned by such events as recession, industrial depression,
or seasonal fluctuations. It is an act of the employer of reducing the work force because
of losses in the operation of the enterprise, lack of work, or considerable reduction on the
volume of business. Retrenchment is, in many ways, a measure of last resort when other
less drastic means have been tried and found to be inadequate. (Citations omitted)

While a legitimate business option, retrenchment may only be exercised in compliance

with substantive and procedural requisites.

As to the substantive requisites, an employer must first show "that the retrenchment is
reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not
merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer." Second, an employer must
also show "that [it] exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the
advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of
tenure." Third, an employer must demonstrate "that [it] used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as
status (i.e., whether they are temporary, casual, regular or managerial employees), efficiency,
seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.

Procedurally, employers must serve a "written notice both to the employees and to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of
retrenchment." Likewise, they must pay "the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to
one month pay or at least 1/2 month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

Jurisprudence requires that the necessity of retrenchment to stave off genuine and
significant business losses or reverses be demonstrated by an employer's independently audited
financial statements. Documents that have not been the subject of an independent audit may
very well be self-serving. Moreover, it is not enough that it presents its audited financial statement
for the year that retrenchment was undertaken for even as it may be incurring losses for that
year, its overall financial status may already be improving. Thus, it must "also show that its losses
increased through a period of time and that the condition of the company is not likely to improve
in the near future."

The records indicate that La Consolacion suffered serious business reverses or an aberrant
drop in its revenue and income, thus, compelling it to retrench employees. In its Petition, it
explained the backdrop of a "sharp spike in enrollment of students in its College of Nursing" in
2008, only for "[t]he nursing bubble [to] burst." As acknowledged by Labor Arbiter Roque, this
financial backdrop demonstrates the starkly difficult financial situation besetting La Consolacion.
This also shows that La Consolacion proceeded with a modicum of good faith and not with a
stratagem specifically intended to undermine certain employees' security of tenure.
 La Consolacion's failure was non-compliance with the third substantive requisite
of using fair and reasonable criteria that considered the status and seniority of the
retrenched employee.

As early as 1987, this Court in Asia World Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople considered
seniority, along with efficiency rating and less-preferred status, as a crucial facet of a fair
and reasonable criterion for effecting retrenchment.Emcor, Inc. v. Sienes was categorical,
a "[r]etrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account rendered the retrenchment
invalid.

In Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. v. National Labor Union, this Court quoted with
approval the following discussion by the National Labor Relations Commission:

x x x Things being equal, retaining a newly hired employee and dismissing one who had
occupied the position for years, even if the scheme should result in savings for the
employer, since he would be paying the newcomer a relatively smaller wage, is simply
unconscionable and violative of the senior employee's tenurial rights. x x x According to
the Court, the following legal procedure should be observed for a retrenchment to be
valid: (a) one-month prior notice to the employee as prescribed by Article 282 of the Labor
Code; and b) use of a fair and reasonable criteria in carrying out the retrenchment
program, such as 1) less preferred status (as in the case of temporary employees) 2)
efficiency rating, 3) seniority, and 4) proof of claimed financial losses.

There is no dispute here about respondent's seniority and preferred status. Petitioners
acknowledge that she had been employed by La Consolacion since January 2000, initially as a
part-time physician then serving full-time beginning 2008. It is also not disputed that while
respondent was a full-time physician, La Consolacion had another physician, Dr. Dimagmaliw,
who served part-time. Precisely, respondent's preeminence is a necessary implication of the very
criteria used by La Consolacion in retrenching her, i.e., that she was the highest paid employee
in health services division. La Consolacion's disregard of respondent's seniority and
preferred status relative to a part-time employee indicates its resort to an unfair and
unreasonable criterion for retrenchment.

Indeed, it may have made mathematical sense to dismiss the highest paid employee first.
However, appraising the propriety of retrenchment is not merely a matter of enabling an employer
to augment financial prospects. It is as much a matter of giving employees their just due.
Employees who have earned their keep by demonstrating exemplary performance and securing
roles in their respective organizations cannot be summarily disregarded by nakedly pecuniary
considerations. The Labor Code's permissiveness towards retrenchments aims to strike a balance
between legitimate management prerogatives and the demands of social justice. Concern for the
employer cannot mean a disregard for employees who have shown not only their capacity, but
even loyalty. La Consolacion's pressing financial condition may invite commiseration, but its
flawed standard for retrenchment constrains this Court to maintain that respondent was illegally
dismissed.

Besides, La Consolacion could have also modified respondent's status from full-time to
part-time. When retrenchment becomes necessary, the employer may, in the exercise of its
business judgment, implement cost-saving measures, but at the same time, should respect labor
rights.

While the impropriety of the termination of respondent's employment is settled, it is

equally manifest that she "was not a victim of arbitrary and high handed action." In prior cases,
this Court mitigated an employer's liability for backwages "where good faith is evident." In Pepsi-
Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon:
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation
pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. In certain cases, however, the
Court has ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages considering the
fact that (1) the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (2) the
employer was in good faith in terminating the employee.

La Consolacion's prohibitive financial condition and demonstrated, though imperfect,

attempt at devising a reasonable mechanism for retrenching employees impel this Court to temper
its liability for backwages. Accordingly, this Court upholds Labor Arbiter Roque's order for
respondent to be reinstated, but modifies the amount of backwages. Respondent is deemed to
be employed on a part-time basis from the effective date of her wrongful termination and is
entitled to backwages corresponding to such status and period.

Retrenchment
PAL vs. Dawal, G.R. No. 173921, February 24, 2016
Facts: On September 200, PAL severed the employment of Petitioner, Lorna Concepcion and
Bonificaio Sinobago. They were regular rank-and-file employees of PAL and were bonafide
members of the Philippine Airlines Employee’s Associaction (PALEA) until their dismissal.
When PAL was privatized in 1993, the new owners acquired PAL’s alleged aging fleet and overly
mannered workforce. PAL sought to expand its business through a five-year re-fleeting program.
It began in 1993. In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis devalued the peso against the dollar. PAL
claimed that this has strained its financial resources—counting its losses to P750 Million in
December 1997 alone.
In addition, the Airline Pilots Association of the PH (ALPAP) staged a three-week strike on June
5, 1998. PAL claims that this caused the further deterioration of the company’s financial condition.
PAL implemented a massive retrenchment program on June 15, 1998. PAL filed for corporate
rehabilitation before the SEC. After a year, PAL COO and President, Avelino Zapanta allegedly
wrote to PALEA, informing the latter of the new management’s plan to sell the maintenance and
Engineering department.
On June, 1999, the SEC approved PAL’s Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan. The Plan
stated that PAL’s noncore activities… have the potential to be sold off.”
On Feb 2000, PALEA had a general election for its new officers headed by PAL President Jose T.
Penas. The newly proclaimed officers included Dawal as Secretary. However, the result of the
election was contested. On March 2000, the new union leadership informed PAL by the election
result and requested a courtesy call visit. However, PAL refused to meet with them in light of the
pending election protests.
Meanwhile, Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc (Lufthansa) expressed its desire to purchase PAL’s
Maintenance and Engineering Divisions. The SEC approved the sale to Lufthansa. Under Article
XXIV, Sec 4, 1995-2000 PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Memorandum of
Agreement dated 1996, “in case PAL deems it necessary to reorganize its corporate structure for
the viability of its operations by forming joint and spin-offs, PAL shall only do so after proper
consultation with PALEA within 45 days before implementation of said organization.”
No consultation meeting was held within 45 days prior to September 2000. When PAL turned
down the courtesy call visit of the newly-elected PALEO Officers, the latter refused to commence
the consultation meeting “until PAL anagement respects” their alleged election.
To make up for this, PAL issued primers to “address questions regarding the spin-off” The primers
stated that the spin-off aimed to reduce PAL’s costs, improve its performance and efficiency, and
prepare its creditors, among others. PAL also allegedly conducted ugnayan sessions with its
employees to inform them of the spin-off. According to Dawal et. al, PAL announced the spin-off
informally and belatedly, reaching them sometime in April 2000. PALEA members signed and
executed Resolution 01-1, Series of 2000, rejecting the spin-off.
Under the spin-off program, those from the Maintenance and Engineering Department, and those
from Logistics and purchasing,, Financial Services and Information Services Departments doing
purely maintenance and engineering-related tasks would be absorbed by Lufthansa.
After signing a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim, Dawal Concepcion and Sinobago and other
affected employees were given generous separation packages less their outstanding obligations
or accountabilities. Dawal received P590, 511.90. Concepcion received P588,575.75 and Sinobago
received P411,539.98. PAL also offered work for the employees who were not absorbed by
Lufthansa.
After the spin-off, PAL created a new Engineering department, called the Technical Services
Department, allegedly in compliance with aviation regulations requiring airline companies to
maintain an engineering department.
In a letter dated September 2000, the (protested) new PALEA President Jose T. Penas III
submitted a lost of economic and non-economic proposals for the renewal of the 1995 Collective
Bagaining Agreement, which would expire on September 30, 2000. PALEA and Dawal, et al filed
before the LA a complaint dated January 31, 2001 for ULP and illegal dismissal. Their labor suit
was consolidated with a similar complaint filed against PAL.
Issue: Whether or not the termination of the employment of Dawal, et al was due to
an unauthorized cause, and could be justified as redundancy or retrenchment?

Ruling: No. Retrenchment is the employer’s cutting down of personnel to reduce the costs of
business operations and avert business losses.

Among other, the following are the 4 criteria that the employer must meet:
Firstly, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If
the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial
and inconsequential in character, the bonafide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be
seriously in question.
 Secondly, the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such
imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other
words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse
with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off.
Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, thirdly, be reasonably
necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken
other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs other
than labor costs.
Lastly, but certainly not the least important, alleged losses if already realized, and the
expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing
evidence. The reason for requiring this quantum of proof is readily apparent: any less exacting
standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination of services of
employees.
Here, there is no showing that PAL “resorted to less drastic and less permanent cost-cutting
measures” prior to the so-called retrenchment. In 1998, PAL already retrenched about 5,000
employees. Two years later, it again turned to cutting off its employees’ livelihood. PAL has not
shown proof that retrenchment was indeed the remedy of last resort, and that it sought for
retrenchment only after it had pursued all viable options to no avail.
Likewise, PAL has failed to explain how the rehiring of the affected employees in the spin-off
could possibly alleviate PAL’s financial difficulty. For there to be a valid retrenchment, the
employer must exercise its management prerogative “in good faith for the advancement of its
interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees; right to security of tenure. That PAL gave
separation pay way beyond what the law requires is not challenged by the parties is of no
moment. This shed doubts on PAL’s alleged “dire financial condition”. PAL’s job offer is
unmistakably for lower positions, “with substantially diminished salaries and benefits” and
conditioned on their being considered as new employees. Thus, instead of providing utmost
security and reward to PAL’s enduring and loyal employees, PAL’s acts effectively circumvented
their security of tenure and seniority rights.
Unfair labor practice
Sonedco Workers Free Labor Union, et.al. vs. Universal Robina Corporation, et.al.,
G.R. No. 220383, October 05, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent PACIWU-TUCP, the exclusive bargaining representative of URC rank-and-file
employees, entered into CBA effective January 01, 2002 to December 31, 2006. Days after the
2002 CBA was signed, a certification election was conducted and the petitioners won as the SEBA.
PACIWU-TUCP questioned the results before DOLE, and Mediation Arbiter Romulo Sumaling
certified SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of URC-SONEDCO.
PACIWU-TICP elevated the same issue to the CA and SC, which resolved that the
certification election was valid. SWOFLU was then declared the exclusive bargaining agent of
URC-SONEDCO's rank-and-file employees.
 URC-SONEDCO consistently refused to negotiate a new CBA with SONEDCO Workers Free
Labor Union, despite several demands from SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, allegedly due
to the 2002 CBA, which it signed with PACIWU-TUCP.
The CBA then expired with no new CBA being signed, and since no CBA was in effect,
URC-SONEDCO informed the rank-and-file employees that they would be granted certain benefits.
URC-SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of these benefits to sign a
2007 and 2008 waiver, which stated that “in the event that a subsequent CBA is negotiated
between Management and Union, the new CBA shall only be effective January 01, 2008”.
A certification election was conducted. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won again
and proceeded to negotiate a new CBA which became effective January 01, 2009 to December
31, 2013. The SWOLFU refused to sign the 1007 waiver.
SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and
2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued
that the requirement of a waiver before the release of the wage increase violated their right to
self-organization, collective bargaining and concerted action.
The Labor Artbiter found that URC-SONEDCO did not commit unfair labor pratice. On
appeal, NLRC and CA sustained the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent committed unfair labor practice; (YES)
2. Whether petitioners, who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers, are entitled to the
wage increase and other economic benefits as a continuing employee benefit
notwithstanding the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement; and (YES)
3. Whether respondent is liable for damages (YES)

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
Respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals ruled that respondent
did not commit unfair labor practice since the requirement of a waiver for 2007 and 2008 did not
interfere with the employees 5 exercise of their right to self-organization. However, the Court of
Appeals failed to take into account that unfair labor practice not only involves acts that violate
the right to self-organization but also covers several acts enumerated in Article 259 of the
Labor Code, thus:
ARTICLE 259. [248] Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. — It shall be unlawful for an employer
to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor
organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing
in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized
collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are
already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other
fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members
accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided, That the individual
authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code 204 shall not apply to the
non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having
given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney's fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of
corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified
unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
Under this provision, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice when it fails in its duty to
bargain in good faith.
Although it Is well-settled that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as the National
Labor Relations Commission are accorded great respect, this rule does admit exceptions. One of
these exceptions is when, as in this case, the Court of Appeals errs in appreciating the facts. In
Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.:
While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals, if
supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts, this general rule admits of exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable
and demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the
factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, these
findings may be examined by the courts.
In ruling that respondent did not commit unfair labor practice, the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the totality of respondent's acts, which
showed that it violated its duty to bargain collectively. This constitutes unfair labor practice under
Article 259(g) of the Labor Code.
 Article 263 of the Labor Code defines the duty to bargain collectively:
ARTICLE 263. [252] Meaning of Duty to Bargain Collectively. — The duty to bargain
collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect
to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and
executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such
duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Respondent repeatedly refused to meet and bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union,
the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees. In its Position Paper before the
National Labor Relations Commission, respondent cited the different instances when petitioners
sent it letters trying to set meetings to discuss a new collective bargaining agreement. Respondent
admitted that it refused to meet with petitioners in light of the 2002 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, which it signed with PACIWU-TUCP, the previous bargaining representative. It
claimed that the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement remained in full force and effect without
change until December 31, 2006, despite PACIWU-TUCP losing the May 17, 2002 certification
election to SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union.
Respondent's argument has no merit. Respondent's reliance on the 2002 Collective Bargaining
Agreement as basis for not negotiating with petitioners is unjustified. The Collective Bargaining
Agreement that respondent invoked had been entered into when a Petition for Certification
Election was already filed.
In Associated Trade Unions v. Trajano, this Court ruled on the temporary nature of this type of
collective bargaining agreement:
The Court will not rule on the merits and/or defects of the new CBA and shall only consider
the fact that it was entered into at a time when the petition for certification election had
already been filed by TUP AS and was then pending resolution. The said CBA cannot be
deemed permanent, precluding the commencement of negotiations by another union with
the management. In the meantime however, so as not to deprive the workers of the
benefits of the said agreement, it shall be recognized and given effect on a temporary
basis, subject to the results of the certification election. The agreement may be continued
in force if ATU is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers or
may be rejected and replaced in the event that TUP AS emerges as the winner.
Respondent claimed that it refused to bargain with petitioners because the issue of representation
was still pending before the courts. It claimed that when the 2002 Collective Bargaining
Agreement expired on December 31, 2006, it had no bargaining agent to deal with as SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union had filed before the Department of Labor and Employment a Petition
for Certification Election on December 6, 2006, which resulted in the absence of a duly elected
bargaining representative. Respondent claimed it was only on September 25, 2008 that SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union was certified by the Department of Labor and Employment as the
exclusive bargaining agent of respondent's rank-and-file employees.
This argument fails to persuade.
The Department of Labor and Employment, in its Order dated May 4, 2007 granting SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union's second Petition for Certification Election, illustrated why respondent's
argument is untenable:
Let it be noted that based on the results of the certification election conducted in the
establishment on 17 May 2002, Mediator-Arbiter Sumalinog, declared and certified
SWOFLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
SONEDCO. The office of the Secretary affirmed SWOFLU's certification in OS-A-6-63-01,
and the decision became final and executory on 15 April 2003. As such, the suspension of
the running of the one (1) year period referred in Section 3(a) Rule VIII was automatically
lifted on 15 April 2003. Hence, the one (1) year bar cannot be used to deny the subject
petition. Furthermore, despite PACIWU-TUCP's act of questioning the Office of the
Secretary's affirmation before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari, no
restraining order was issued to stay the implementation of the decision.
In other words, as far as this Office is concerned, SWOFLU is the incumbent sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SONEDCO. As such, there
was actually no necessity for SWOFLU to file the subject petition, as its representation
status remains to be effective unless challenged by other legitimate labor organizations
during the freedom period of the CBA that was entered into by PACIWU-TUCP and
employer SONEDCO.
Incidentally, the Office of the Secretary declared in OS-A-6-63-01 that SWOFLU had the
option to adopt the interim CBA or negotiate with SONEDCO a new CBA. Whether SWOFLU
was able to actually administer the said CBA, or whether it attempted to negotiate with
the employer for a new CBA but was rejected, the issues are already moot and academic
by reason of the expiration of the effectivity of the agreement.
Respondent's duty to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the incumbent
bargaining agent is clear. The last paragraph of Article 268 of the Labor Code states:
ARTICLE 268 [256]. Representation issue in organized establishments. — In organized
establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-
day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported
by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast
their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified
as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which
provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid
votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the
two highest number of votes: Provided, that the total number of votes for all contending
unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification
election is filed.
 When petitioners held a conference on May 26, 2003, respondent refused to attend.
Because respondent failed to appear in the conference, petitioners wrote their demands
in a letter sometime in July 2003. The letter included, among others, a wage increase of
P50.00/day from September 2003 to 2006. Instead of explaining its non-attendance to
the conference or making a counter-offer, respondent replied on August 15, 2003
acknowledging the receipt and contents of the July 2003 letter but invoking the 2002
Collective Bargaining Agreement as an excuse not to answer petitioners' demands to
negotiate. This is contrary to Article 261 of the Labor Code, which requires the other
party to reply within 10 days from receipt of the written demand:
ARTICLE 261. [250] Procedure in Collective Bargaining. — The following
procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make
a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice
This was not respondent's only violation of Article 261. Respondent likewise failed to reply
to the collective bargaining agreement proposal sent by petitioners on August 21, 2007.
The September 22, 2007 letter, sent with the agreement proposal, also went unheeded.
Respondent's reliance on the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement is contrary to
jurisprudence. In Associated Labor Unions v. Trajano, this Court explicitly held that the
winning union had the option to either continue the existing collective bargaining
agreement or negotiate a new one:
The new CBA negotiated by petitioners whether or not submitted to the MOLE in
accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code cannot be deemed permanent,
precluding commencement of negotiations by another union with management,
considering that it was entered into at a time when the petition for certification
election had already been filed by respondent union. . . . Meantime, this interim
agreement must be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis so as not to
deprive the workers of the favorable terms of the agreement. . . .
If, as a result of the certification election, respondent union or a union other than
petitioner union which executed the interim agreement is certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of respondent company,
then, such union may adopt the interim collective bargaining agreement or
negotiate with management for a new collective bargaining agreement.
As petitioners asked for a P50.00 wage increase, as opposed to the P12.00 wage increase they
had been receiving under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners were justified in
demanding a renegotiation. Respondent was remiss in its duty when it repeatedly refused
negotiations with petitioners.
Respondent's refusal is even more unfounded considering that the Labor Secretary's Resolution,
which upheld the result of the May 17, 2002 certification election and declared SONEDCO Workers
Free Labor Union as the exclusive bargaining agent, became final and executory as early as April
15, 2003. Even though there had been a pending petition for certiorari questioning the election
results, no temporary restraining order was issued to preclude respondent from bargaining with
SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, the declared incumbent union.
Even if we consider respondent's refusal to bargain as merely a mistake made in good faith, its
subsequent acts show an attempt to restrict petitioners' negotiating power.
First, the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was done on May 6, 2002, only days before the
May 17, 2002 certification election. When respondent and PACIWU-TUCP entered into the 2002
Collective Bargaining Agreement, they had been aware that a certification election was going to
be conducted in a few days. In pushing through with negotiations instead of waiting for the
outcome of the election, respondent risked needing to renegotiate with a new union if PACIWU-
TUCP loses. It cannot, thus, invoke the hastily concluded 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement
as an excuse not to bargain with petitioners. If respondent had truly intended to bargain in good
faith, it could have easily waited a few more days to know the result of the certification election.
Second, when the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired in December 2006, the Labor
Secretary's Resolution declaring SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the bargaining agent of
respondent's rank-and-file employees was already final and executory. Respondent's initial basis
for refusal to bargain had expired, and since no temporary restraining order was issued, nothing
was legally preventing respondent from negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement with
petitioners. That it chose to refuse negotiations and instead entered into an agreement with its
employees to essentially waive negotiations for 2007 and 2008 betrays its intention of limiting
petitioners' bargaining power.
The 2007 waiver provided, in part:
In the event that a subsequent CBA is negotiated between Management and Union, the new CBA
shall only be effective January 1, 2008. The 2008 waiver provided, in part:
Sa panahon na kung saan may CBA na maisasara sa pagitan ng Management at Unyon, ito ay
magiging epektibo lamang Simula January l, 2009
The wording of the waivers shows a clear attempt to limit petitioners' bargaining power by making
them waive the negotiations for 2007 and 2008. In stipulating that the collective bargaining
agreement that would be entered into would only be effective the year following the 2008 waiver,
respondent limited when the collective bargaining agreement could be deemed effective. Tn other
words, respondent asked petitioners to forego any benefits they might have received under a
collective bargaining agreement in exchange for the company-granted benefits.
Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals regarded the incentives
as a magnanimous move because it gave the employees a P16.00 wage increase, P4.00 more
than the P12.00 increase under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement. However,
respondent's claim of benevolence falls short: the wage increase proposed by petitioners in 2007
was P50.00. If a collective bargaining agreement had been concluded in 2007, employees who
signed the waivers would have lost the chance to receive P34.00 wage increase for that year.
Lastly, when the 2007 waiver was circulated, respondent already had a copy of petitioners'
agreement proposal. Respondent was aware that petitioners asked for a P50.00 wage increase.
More importantly, the last bar preventing respondent from recognizing SONEDCO Workers Free
Labor Union as the bargaining agent has been resolved by the time it issued the waivers. The
Petition for Certiorari relative to the May 17, 2002 certification election was denied with finality
by this Court on July 11, 2007. There was no reason to doubt that SONEDCO Workers Free Labor
Union was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative. If respondent did indeed act in good
faith, it would have undergone agreement negotiations with petitioners. However, respondent
incessantly refused to meet with petitioners to discuss the agreement proposal even after
petitioners sent their September 22, 2007 letter. Instead of negotiating the proposed P50.00
wage increase, respondent granted a P16.00 wage increase on the condition that if a collective
bargaining agreement was to be signed, it would only be effective the succeeding year. In effect,
respondent hindered petitioners' bargaining power when it made them waive the bargaining
efforts for 2007 and 2008.
SECOND ISSUE:
The National Labor Relations Commission did not err in granting the benefits for 2007 and 2008
to the employees who did not sign the waiver.
After SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was again declared as the exclusive bargaining
representative in the August 20, 2008 certification election, the 2009 Collective Bargaining
Agreement was created to cover 2009 to 2013. Since the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement
did not include the years 2007 and 2008, the alleged purpose of the waivers, which was to prevent
double compensation, was already served. It would be unfair for the employees to still not receive
the benefits for 2007 and 2008 simply because they refused to sign a waiver that was already
moot.
However, there is no need for the continuation of the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 since the
2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement contains wage increase provisions for 2009 to 2013. As
explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing v. National Labor Relations
Commission, if a proposal is not printed in the collective bargaining agreement, it cannot be
demanded:
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties — the collective bargaining
representative and the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the
expressed policy to give protection to labor, hi the same vein, CBA provisions should be
"construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a
practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which
it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the dictum
that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest. It goes
without saying, however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so
interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not
find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever
to its implementation.
If petitioners wanted the wage increase for 2007 and 2008 to be carried on, the proper recourse
would have been to demand that this be included in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
THIRD ISSUE:
Respondent is liable to pay moral and exemplary damages. In Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission:
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the
promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. As the conscience of the
government, it is the Courts sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights.
 For this reason, we find it proper in this case to impose moral and exemplary damages on
private respondent.

Appeal

Republic of the Philippines vs NLRC and Nacusip, et. al., Inc. G.R. No. 174747, March
09, 2016

Facts: NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter is the exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and-file
employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation. Bicolandia incurred heavy losses and
obtained loans from Philippine Sugar Corporation and Philippine National Bank. PNB ceded its
rights and interests over Bicolandia’s loans to the government through Asset Privatization Trust.
In 1988, Bicolandia in conformity of Asset Privatization Trust, entered into a Supervision and
Financing Agreement with Philippine Sugar Corporation for the latter to operate and manage the
mill. Subsequently, due to Bicolandia’s failure to pay its loan Asset Privatization Trust filed a
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Bicolandia.
In 1992, Asset Privatization Trust decided to sell the assets and properties of Bicolandia. They
issued a Notice of Termination to Bicolandia’s employees, advising them that their services would
be terminated within 30 days. NASUCIP Chapter received the Notice under protest.
NACUSIP Chapter filed a Complaint charging Asset Privatization Trust, et. al with unfair labor
practice, union busting, and claims for labor standard benefits. Labor Arbiter dismissed the case
for lack of merit. Asset Privatization Trust then filed a Notice of Partial Appeal, together with a
Memorandum of Partial Appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission but it was denied
for failure to perfect the appeal within the statutory period of appeal
Aggrieved, Privatization and Management Office filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari arguing that its appeal should have been decided on the merits in the interest of
substantial justice. CA denied the petition since the respondents failed to show that it falls under
the exemption for strict compliance with procedural rules.
Issues: (1) Whether procedural rules may be liberally applied in labor law?
(2) Whether private respondents' claim for labor standard benefits had already
prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code?

Ruling:

Before proceeding to the substantive issues of the case, petitioner's procedural misstep before
the National Labor Relations Commission must first be addressed.

It is settled that appeal is not a right but a mere statutory privilege. It may only be exercised
within the manner provided by law. In labor cases, the perfection of an appeal is governed by the
Labor Code. Article 223 provides:

Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
Petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on January 26, 2000. It had 10 days, or
until February 7, 2000, to file its appeal. However, it filed its Memorandum of Appeal only on
February 8, 2000. Petitioner did not explain the reason for its delay.

Petitioner's disregard of procedural rules resulted in the denial of its appeal before the National
Labor Relations Commission and its subsequent Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
In its Petition for Review before this Court, petitioner still did not explain its delay in filing the
Memorandum of Appeal. It merely insisted that its case should have been resolved on the merits.

Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. In labor cases,
however, procedural rules are not to be applied "in a very rigid and technical sense" if its strict
application will frustrate, rather than promote, substantial justice.

Liberality favors the laborer. However, this case is also brought against a government entity. If
the government entity is found liable, its liability will necessarily entail the dispensation of public
funds. Thus, its basis for liability must be subjected to strict scrutiny.

(2) An employer-employee relationship, it voluntarily obliged itself to pay Bicolandia Sugar

Development Corporation's terminated employees separation benefits in the event of the
Corporation's privatization.

In Barayoga, the aggrieved union members were those who were not recalled back to work by
Philippine Sugar Corporation during the start of the season in May 1991. The union members in
this case were those who were recalled back to work in May 1991 but were eventually served
with a Notice of Termination on September 1, 1992.

The timeline of events in this case mirror that of Barayoga. In Barayoga, Asset Privatization
Trust's Board of Trustees issued the Resolution dated September 23, 1992 authorizing the
payment of separation pay and other benefits to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's
employees in the event of its privatization.

In the present case, petitioner-unions members who were not recalled to work by Philsucor in
May 1991 seek to hold APT liable for their monetary claims and allegedly illegal
dismissal. Significantly, prior to the actual sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI on October 30,
1992, the APT board of trustees had approved a Resolution on September 23, 1992. The
Resolution authorized the payment of separation benefits to the employees of the corporation in
the event of its privatization. Not included in the Resolution, though, were petitioner-unions
members who had not been recalled to work in May 1991.
This Resolution was not made part of the records of this case. However, it is not disputed that
the union members here were Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's employees at the time
the Corporation was sold to Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill. The Labor Arbiter also found that:

With respect to complainants['] claim for labor standard benefits, records show that they were
paid separation pay including 13th month pay for the year 1992 as well as conversion of their
accrued vacation and sick leave (pp. 698 to 763, rollo) except that some complainants refused to
collect their checks representing said benefits whereas the payments due complainants Domulot,
de Luna, Falcon, Aguilar, Gomez, Ramos, Arao, de Jesus, Abonite, Bomanlag, and Parro were
released by APT to this Arbitration Branch (p. 764), rollo) in compliance with the Alias Writ of
Execution issued by then Executive Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose.
Under Section 27 of Proclamation No. 50, the employer-employee relationship is severed upon
the sale or disposition of assets of a company undergoing privatization. This, however, is without
prejudice to "benefits incident to their employment or attaching to termination under applicable
employment contracts, collective bargaining agreements, and applicable legislation":

SECTION 27. AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS.

Upon the sale or other disposition of the ownership and/or controlling interest of the
government in a corporation held by the Trust, or all or substantially all of the assets
of such corporation, the employer-employee relations between the government and
the officers and other personnel of such corporations shall terminate by operation of
law. None of such officers or employees shall retain any vested right to future
employment in the privatized or disposed corporation, and the new owners or
controlling interest holders thereof shall have full and absolute discretion to retain or
dismiss said officers and employees and to hire the replacement or replacements of
any one or all of them as the pleasure and confidence of such owners or controlling
interest holders may dictate.
Nothing in this section, however, be construed to deprive said officers and employees of their
vested entitlements in accrued or due compensation and other benefits incident to their
employment or attaching to termination under applicable employment contracts, collective
bargaining agreements, and applicable legislation.
When petitioner's Board of Trustees issued the Resolution dated September 23, 1992, it
acknowledged its contractual obligation to be liable for benefits arising from an employer-
employee relationship even though, as a mere conservator of assets, it was not supposed to be
liable. Under Article III, Section 12(6) of Proclamation No. 50,63 Asset Privatization Trust had the
power to release claims or settle liabilities, as in this case. When it issued its Resolution dated
September 23, 1992, petitioner voluntarily bound itself to be liable for separation benefits to
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's terminated employees.

Private respondents' claim to their separation benefits has not yet prescribed under Article 291 of
the Labor Code. Article 291 provides:
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer- employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from
the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred
In Arriola v. National Labor Relations Commission, the court have distinguished a money claim
arising from an employer-employee relationship and a money claim as reparation for illegal acts
done by an employer in violation of the Labor Code. The prescriptive period for the former is
three (3) years under Article 291 of the Labor Code while the prescriptive period of the latter is
four (4) years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Court also reiterated that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 290 of the Labor Code refers to "illegal acts penalized under the
Labor Code, including committing any of the prohibited activities during strikes and lockouts,
unfair labor practices, and illegal recruitment activities." Article 290 provides:

Art. 290. Offenses. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be filed within one (1) year from
accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
Private respondents filed their Complaint for unfair labor practices, union busting, and labor
standard benefits on April 24, 1996, or three (3) years, seven (7) months and 24 days after their
termination on September 30, 1992. Their Complaint essentially alleged that their termination
was illegal because it was made prior to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's sale to Bicol
Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill. They also alleged
that the sale was illegal since it was made for the purpose of removing NACUSIP/BISUDECO
Chapter as the sugar mill's Union.

Under the prescriptive periods stated in the Labor Code and Arriola, private respondents' cause
of action and any subsequent money claim for illegal termination has not yet prescribed. Their
Complaint dated April 24, 1996 before the Labor Arbiter was filed within the prescriptive period.

The claim for separation pay, 13th month pay, and accrued vacation and sick leaves are incidental
to employer-employee relations. Under Article 291 of the Labor Code, these claims prescribe
within three (3) years from the accrual of the cause of action:

Art. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from
the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be barred forever.
This Court has stated that "in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a
determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers'
right to the benefits being claimed was committed." In Barayoga, the September 23, 1992
Resolution "authorized the payment of separation benefits to the employees of the corporation
in the event of its privatization." The payment of these benefits, however, to private respondents
was mandated by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision dated January 14, 2000. It was only then that
private respondents' right to these benefits was determined. Since the case was appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, the prescriptive period to claim these benefits began to run
only after the Commission's Decision had become final and executory. The refusal to pay these
benefits after the Commission's Decision had become final and executory would be "the act
constituting a violation of the worker's right to the benefits being claimed."

Under Rule VII, Section 14 of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission,81 decisions of the Commission become final and executory 10 days after the receipt
of the notice of decision, order, or resolution. The three-year prescriptive period, therefore, begins
from private respondents' receipt of the National Labor Relations Commission Resolution dated
June 21, 2002 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Since the Complaint, which included the claim for labor benefits, was filed on April 24, 1996,
private respondents' claims did not prescribe.

NLRC Rules; Motion for reconsideration

LEJANDRO CEPRADO, JR., RONILO SEBIAL, NICANOR OLIVAR, ALVIN VILLEGAS, and
EDGAR MANATO vs. NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC./ROMEO T.
NOLASCO, G.R. No. 175198, September 23, 2015
Facts: On November 16, 2000, the DOLE conducted a regular inspection of Uniden's Cabuyao
plant pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
In the Notice of Inspection Results, it was found that there were various violations of labor law
standards against security personnel stationed at Uniden. Finding that Nationwide Security and
Uniden failed to rectify the alleged violations Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr. declared
the labor inspector's findings "final and conclusive" in the Order dated April 19, 2001. Then,
Nationwide Security filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Regional Director Martinez heard
Nationwide Security's Motion for Reconsideration.
In the meantime, five (5) of the security personnel (Ceprado, et al) filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission Regional Arbitration a Complaint for illegal dismissal. They alleged that
Nationwide Security terminated their employment when they "persisted in seeking enforcement
of the awards under the April 19, 2001 order.”
With no motion for reconsideration having been filed by Nationwide or Uniden, the Order dated
March 12, 2003, was deemed final and executory on April 28, 2003. Accordingly, the Regional
Office issued a Writ of Execution to implement the Order dated March 12, 2003.
A Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Execution was filed by Nationwide Security. Still, in the
Order dated March 23, 2004, Secretary Sto. Tomas denied the Motion to Quash and Recall Writ
of Execution, ruling that there was no denial of due process.
Nationwide Security filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Nationwide Security
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted Nationwide Security's Petition for Certiorari upon finding that
Nationwide Security filed its Motion for Reconsideration before Regional Director Martinez without
furnishing Ceprado, et al. a copy of the Motion.
Ceprado, et al. filed before the SC their Petition for Review on Certiorari. They alleged that
respondent Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. failed to file an appeal within the
reglementary period.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration was properly filed.
Ruling: Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the running of
the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Upon lapse of the reglementary period, the judgment
sought to be reconsidered becomes immutable.
Rule II, Section 19 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional
Offices allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of the Regional
Office. In this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Regional Director Martinez's
April 19, 2001 Order.
Respondent failed to furnish petitioners a copy of its Motion for Reconsideration. This is contrary
to Rule II, Section 12 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional
Offices, which requires parties to comply with due process requirements.
The Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in labor standards cases, requires a written notice
of every motion for reconsideration to be served on the adverse party as compliance with the
requirement of due process. Motions for reconsideration not served on the other party
are pro forma and are "mere scrap[s] of paper" not to be acted upon by the court. Motions for
reconsideration not served on the other party do not toll the running of the reglementary period
for filing an appeal, and the judgment sought to be reconsidered becomes final and executory
upon lapse of the reglementary period.
As respondent failed to furnish petitioners a copy of its Motion for Reconsideration of the April
19, 2001 Order, Regional Director Martinez had no jurisdiction to act on the Motion for
Reconsideration. Therefore, the Resolution dated May 8, 2002 granting the Motion for
Reconsideration is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration did not toll the running of the seven-day
reglementary period under Rule II, Section 19 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards
Cases in the Regional Offices. Thus, the April 19, 2001 Order became final and executory after
seven (7) days from the filing of the Motion, i.e., on May 16, 2001.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly set aside all the orders subsequent to the April 19,
2001 Order, specifically: the Regional Director's Resolution dated May 8, 2002 granting
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration; the Department of Labor and Employment's Order dated
March 12, 2003 granting petitioners' appeal; the Order dated March 23, 2004 denying the Motion
to Quash and Recall Writ of Execution; and the Order dated July 19, 2004 denying respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case to the Regional Director for further
proceedings on the Motion for Reconsideration. The proper course of action is to issue a writ of
execution to implement the April 19, 2001 Order.
Further, SC noted that similar to respondent, petitioners violated the requirements of due process.
They never denied that they failed to furnish respondent a copy of their Letter-Appeal to the
Secretary of Labor. Worse, their appeal did not strictly comply with the rules on appeal as provided
in the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices.
Appeal is a purely statutory privilege that "may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law." If an appellate court or tribunal takes cognizance of an appeal that
does not comply with the rules, the appellate court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction. The
decision on the appeal is null and void.
Rule IV, Section 3 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices
requires that "[t]he appeal [to the Secretary of Labor] ... be filed in five (5) legibly typewritten
copies with the Regional Office which issued the Order." Section 4 adds that the appeal "shall be
accompanied by a Memorandum of Appeal which shall state the date appellant received the Order
and the grounds relied upon and arguments in support thereof."
These provisions use "shall," indicating that these rules are mandatory and compulsory. To perfect
an appeal, it is the appellant's duty to submit a memorandum of appeal.
Throughout the proceedings in this case, petitioners never disputed that they merely filed a letter
before Secretary Sto. Tomas to set aside Regional Director Martinez's Resolution dated May 8,
2002. They did not avail themselves of the proper appeal pleading—a memorandum of appeal
filed before the Department of Labor and Employment.
Secretary Sto. Tomas, thus, acted without jurisdiction in treating petitioners' Letter dated May
27, 2002 as an appeal. Although the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the
Regional Offices provide that the rules "shall be liberally construed," still, courts and tribunals are
"limited by the legislative will and intent, as expressed in the law itself." In this case, the law
consists of rules issued under the quasi-legislative power delegated by the legislative branch to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Secretary of Labor should have strictly followed the
rules on appeal under the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional
Offices.
In any case, the April 19, 2001 Order is already final and executory and may no longer be
disturbed. It has become "immutable and unalterable." The April 19, 2001 Order "may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."

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