Evidence LA3007 Module Guide

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Amber Marks & Beverley Brown
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Evidence

Beverley Brown
Amber Marks
This module guide was prepared for the University of London by:

u Beverley Brown, PhD (retired) formerly: Professor, Law School, University of East
London (1996–99); Senior Lecturer, Law Faculty, University of Edinburgh (1985–96)

u Amber Marks, LLB, Barrister, Gray’s Inn, Lecturer in Criminal Law and Evidence,
Queen Mary, University of London.

This is one of a series of module guides published by the University. We regret that
owing to pressure of work the authors are unable to enter into any correspondence
relating to, or arising from, the guide.

University of London
Publications Office
Stewart House
32 Russell Square
London WC1B 5DN
United Kingdom

london.ac.uk

Published by: University of London

© University of London 2019. Reprinted with minor revisions in 2020, 2021 and 2022

The University of London asserts copyright over all material in this module guide
except where otherwise indicated. All rights reserved. No part of this work may
be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without permission in writing from
the publisher. We make every effort to respect copyright. If you think we have
inadvertently used your copyright material, please let us know.
Evidence page i

Contents
Module descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

1 Introduction to the study of evidence law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 Studying the law of evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 A suggested approach to study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 The examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 Basic concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Key concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Theoretical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Procedural context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3 Burden and standard of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 Criminal trials before the Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and defence burdens in criminal trials . . . . . 29
3.3 Directions to the jury and effects of misdirection in criminal trials . . . . . . 34
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

4 Confessions and improperly obtained evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1 Confessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Section 78(1) of PACE 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3 Entrapment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

5 The right to silence and adverse inferences under the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1 Section 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Sections 36 and 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.3 Section 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Critical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

6 Hazardous witness testimony and judicial warnings to the jury . . . . . 61

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.1 Makanjuola warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2 Directions about a defendant’s lies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3 Eyewitness identification testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.4 Pre-trial identification procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
page ii University of London

7 Evidence of a complainant’s extraneous sexual behaviour in trials of

sexual offences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.1 Legislative background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.2 Sections 41–43 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 . . . . . 78
7.3 R v A (No 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.4 The application of YJCEA 1999 since R v A (No 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.5 Eye on relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.6 Critical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

8 Character evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.1 Good and bad character in civil proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.2 Evidence of a defendant’s good character in criminal trials . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.3 Evidence of bad character in criminal trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.4 Bad character of non-defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.5 Critical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

9 The rule against hearsay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
9.1 Basic overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.2 Hearsay in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the preserved
common law exception for res gestae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
9.3 Supplementary safeguard provisions of note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
9.4 The impact of Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention
on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
9.5 Eye on relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
9.6 Critical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

10 Expert evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
10.1 The Law Commission’s reform proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
10.2 Admissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3 Eye on relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
10.4 Sufficiency for case to answer, presentation and evaluation,
and judicial directions to the jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.5 Critical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Feedback to activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

About feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Chapter 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Chapter 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Evidence page iii

Module descriptor
GENERAL INFORMATION

Module title
Evidence

Module code
LA3007

Module level
6

Enquiries
The Undergraduate Laws Programme courses are run in collaboration with the
University of London. Enquiries may be made via the Student Advice Centre at:
https://sid.london.ac.uk/

Credit
30

Courses on which this module is offered

LLB, EMFSS

Module prerequisite
None

Notional study time

300 hours

MODULE PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

Evidence is offered as an optional module to students studying on the Standard Entry
and Graduate Entry LLB courses. It is also offered as an Individual Module. Students
taking Evidence as an Individual Module are advised that prior knowledge of Criminal
law is desirable. Credits from an Individual Module will not count towards the
requirements of the LLB.

Evidence rules govern what evidence may be presented and contested in the
courtroom, as well as the inferences that may properly be drawn from it and any
guidance that must given in relation to such inferences and the role of the lawyers,
jury and judge in an adversarial system. Highly relevant to actual day-to-day legal
practice, this module will appeal particularly to students intending to become
courtroom lawyers.

MODULE AIM
The aim of this module is to equip students with some of the skills necessary for in-
depth legal analysis and good advocacy. The rationale and principles underpinning the
rules of evidence will be explored, taking account of their context, value and purpose.

LEARNING OUTCOMES: KNOWLEDGE

Students completing this module are expected to have knowledge and understanding of
the main concepts and principles of Evidence law. In particular they should be able to:

1. Demonstrate a critical awareness of the relationship between the theoretical

context of the law of evidence (its policy aims and objectives) and the common
law and legislative provisions in the law of evidence;
page iv University of London
2. Explain and distinguish between legal and evidential burdens of proof; the role
of policy in the allocation of burdens; the difficulties in determining whether a
statute has impliedly placed a burden of proof on a defendant and the role of
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in this determination;

3. Construct an argument for or against the relevance of a particular piece of

evidence and be able to construct an argument for or against the admissibility of a
range of types of evidence;

4. Explain and critically evaluate judicial warnings to the jury.

LEARNING OUTCOMES: SKILLS

Students completing this module should be able to demonstrate the ability to:

5. Analyse and interpret complex legal concepts and their application to factual
scenarios;

6. Articulate well-argued potential solutions to a range of complex evidential topics

(such as the challenges posed by expert scientific evidence);

7. Reflect on learning, identifying areas for improvement;

8. Evaluate legal issues (such as the right to silence or the admissibility of sexual
history evidence or bad character evidence) in a social context taking account of
their policy and doctrinal importance.

BENCHMARK FOR LEARNING OUTCOMES

Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) benchmark statement for Law 2019.

MODULE SYLLABUS
a. Basic concepts of relevance, admissibility and weight and theoretical and procedural
context. Nature and classification of various types of evidence. Objectives of
evidence law and determination of probative value.

b. Burden of proof. Legal and evidential burdens. Allocation of the legal burden in
criminal and civil trials. The standard of proof in criminal and civil proceedings.
Critical evaluation.

c. Confessions and improperly obtained evidence. Using and excluding confessions.

Using and excluding improperly obtained evidence. Entrapment. Critical
evaluation.

d. The right to silence and adverse inferences under the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act 1994. Critical evaluation.

e. Hazardous witness testimony and judicial warnings. Makanjuola warnings. Directions

about a defendant’s lies. Eyewitness identification. Dangers and pre-trial
identification procedures. Directions to the jury and withdrawal of the case/
evidence. Critical evaluation.

f. Evidence of a complainant’s extraneous sexual behaviour in trials of sexual offences.

Legislative background. Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Sections
41–43 and its interpretation in the case law. Critical evaluation.

g. Character evidence. Good and bad character evidence and the admissibility
gateways for bad character evidence concerning defendants and non-defendants.
Critical evaluation.

h. The rule against hearsay. The definition of hearsay. The rule (its definition, scope
and rationale). Exceptions to the rule. The impact of Article 6(3)(d) of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Critical evaluation.

i. Expert evidence. Admissibility. Evaluation of the law (including judicial directions)

and practice. Dangers and reforms to ameliorate associated risks. Critical
evaluation.
Evidence page v

LEARNING AND TEACHING

Module guide
Module guides are the students’ primary learning resource. The module guide covers
the entire syllabus and provides the student with the grounding to complete the
module successfully. It sets out the learning outcomes that must be achieved as well
as providing advice on how to study the module. The module guide is supplemented
each year with the pre-exam update, made available on the VLE.

The Laws virtual learning environment (VLE)

The Laws VLE provides one centralised location where the following resources are
provided:

u a module page with news and updates;

u a complete version of the module guides;

u pre-exam updates;

u past examination papers and reports;

u discussion forums where students can debate and interact with other students;

u quizzes – multiple‑choice questions with feedback are available for some modules
allowing students to test their knowledge and understanding of the key topics.

The Online Library

The Online Library provides access to:

u the professional legal databases LexisLibrary and Westlaw;

u cases and up-to-date statutes;

u key academic law journals;

u law reports;

u links to important websites.

Core texts
Students should refer to the following core texts and specific reading references are
provided for this text in each chapter of the module guide:
¢ Choo, A. Evidence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021) sixth edition
[ISBN 9780198864172].

¢ Durston, G. Evidence: text and materials. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
second edition [ISBN 9780199583607].

ASSESSMENT
Learning is supported through tasks in the module guide, which include self-
assessment activities with feedback. There are additional online activities in the form
of multiple‑choice questions.

Summative assessment is through a three-hour and 15 minute unseen examination.

Students are required to answer four questions out of eight from a choice of essay and
problem questions.

Please be aware that the format and mode of assessment may need to change in
light of extraordinary events beyond our control, for example, an outbreak such as
the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. In the event of any change, students will be
informed of any new assessment arrangements via the VLE.
page vi University of London

Permitted materials
Students are permitted to bring into the examination room the following specified
document:

¢ Hart core statutes on evidence 2022–23 (Bloomsbury).

1 Introduction to the study of evidence law

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1.1 Studying the law of evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.2 A suggested approach to study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1.3 The examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

page 2 University of London

Introduction
This module guide is designed to help you to study evidence in English law. Each
chapter will highlight the most important aspects of the topic and give guidance as to
the core texts as well as the Essential and Further readings. Within each chapter you
will find exercises (activities) designed to test your understanding of the topic and
self-assessment questions to monitor your understanding and progress. There are
also sample examination questions with advice on possible approaches (not model
answers) to the questions.

The key to the successful study of evidence is understanding, not rote-learning.

Evidence law can be found in a mixture of common law and statutory sources,
including codes of practice made under statutory powers. You must be able to adopt a
critical approach to these sources, and be able to apply them to factual situations.

Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter (which does not contain any readings) you should be able
to:
u approach the study of evidence in a systematic way
u understand what the various elements of this module guide are designed to do
u uunderstand what is involved in a ‘critical approach’
u begin your study of evidence with confidence.
Evidence 1 Introduction to the study of evidence law page 3

1.1 Studying the law of evidence

Welcome to the law of evidence and congratulations on a wise choice of module. The
law of evidence is of huge importance to legal practice; it is taught on all vocational
courses. If you do go on to study law at a vocational level you will find it very helpful
to have already studied the law in this area in greater depth than the time constraints
of vocational courses permit, and you will be better equipped to become an effective
advocate as a result.

The law of evidence regulates the admission of evidence, the use that may be made
of the evidence during the trial and the judicial directions that should be given to the
jury after all the evidence has been received and before they begin their decision-
making process. The law of evidence also establishes fundamental features of the trial
process concerning which party should bring evidence on which facts in issue and the
relevant standard of proof required.

The law of evidence draws on a wide range of disciplines to enhance the legal system’s
ability to achieve accurate decision-making. This makes it both interesting and
challenging to study. Many of its rules are informed by discoveries in science, such
as the peculiarities of human perception and memory (see Chapters 6 and 10). The
law of evidence has sought to incorporate lessons learned in the fields of psychology,
logic and philosophy, and its developments are informed by these, as well as by public
policy considerations and legal principle.

The bulk of the law of evidence that you will study relates to the conduct of criminal trials
in the Crown Court. This is because the law is most highly developed in this context. In
civil trials, the vast majority of which are tried by a judge alone, the law of evidence has
been considerably relaxed by the removal of many of the restrictions on admissibility
that apply in criminal jury trials. In magistrates’ courts, generally because of the absence
of a jury, the rules of evidence are different, to some extent, in practice. In many tribunals
and in arbitrations the rules of evidence have little or no application at all.

Evidence law is a mixture of principles, rules, guidelines and discretions.

1.2 A suggested approach to study

See also the Programme handbook and Studying law.

You should start with this module guide. Start at the beginning and work through the
chapters sequentially, studying the core texts and Essential reading and doing the
activities as directed. It may be tempting to start with, say, hearsay, or identification
evidence, but this is not a good idea. The guide builds on the basic foundations
without which particular topics later in the course cannot be understood. Chapter
2 deals with some complex issues and you may find some of the material difficult to
understand at first. You will find the rest of the module much easier if you take the
time to get to grips with the preliminary foundational material. Although you are
unlikely to find a question in an examination paper that is based on the material in
Chapter 2 alone, all of the examination questions will be much better answered if you
have fully understood the material in it.

1.2.1 Core texts and Essential reading

This guide will provide you with references to the two primary textbooks.

Core texts
¢ Choo, A. Evidence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021) sixth edition
[ISBN 9780198864172].

¢ Durston, G. Evidence: text and materials. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
second edition [ISBN 9780199583607].
page 4 University of London
Extracts from the following additional textbooks on evidence are available on the VLE.
If you particularly like the style of any of these books, you might consider purchasing a
copy.

Additional textbooks
¢ Allen, C., C. Taylor and J. Nairns Practical guide to evidence. (London: Routledge,
2015) fifth edition [ISBN 9781138781719] (available in VLeBooks via the Online
Library).

¢ Emson, R. Evidence. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) fifth edition

[ISBN 9780230272682] (available in VLeBooks via the Online Library).

¢ Dennis, I.H. The law of evidence. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2020) seventh edition
[ISBN 9780414075597] (available in VLeBooks via the Online Library).

¢ Munday, R. Evidence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022) 11th edition

[ISBN 9780192895660].

¢ Roberts, P. and A. Zuckerman Criminal evidence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2010) second edition [ISBN 9780199231645].

Statute book
You should also obtain a statute book. Under the Regulations you are allowed to take
one authorised statute book into the examination room.

Information about the statute books and other materials that you are permitted to use
in the examination is printed in the current Regulations, which you should refer to.

Please note that you are allowed to underline or highlight text in these documents –
but you are not allowed to write notes etc. on them if you wish to bring them into the
examination room.

Statute books are regularly updated: try to obtain the latest copy.

Legal journals
In additional to the essential texts, you should consult a range of legal journals to keep
yourself up to date with academic writing on the subject.

Read the law reports in:

u Criminal Law Review

u Criminal Appeal Reports.

The Criminal Law Review has helpful commentaries on new cases. Useful short articles
on evidence can sometimes be found in New Law Journal. Case notes and longer
articles sometimes appear in: Law Quarterly Review, Cambridge Law Journal and Modern
Law Review. The International Journal of Evidence and Proof is, as its title indicates, a
journal devoted exclusively to evidence.

Please note that as long as you read the core texts and Essential reading you are then
free to read around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource. You will
need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by thinking about
how these principles apply in the real world. To help you read extensively, you have the
virtual learning environment (VLE), Online Library and other legal resources.

1.2.2 How to proceed

u For general advice on studying law courses and managing your study time, see
the Programme handbook.
This guide takes you through the entire subject of evidence in a logical and systematic
way, with each chapter covering a particular topic or group of topics. It is centred on
the core texts. References in the text to ‘Choo’ or ‘Durston’ are references to these
textbooks.
Evidence 1 Introduction to the study of evidence law page 5
Much of your study time should be taken up reading the textbooks, though you will
also need to study numerous case reports and statutes.

Working through a chapter of the module guide

1. Begin each chapter of the module guide by reading the Introduction.

2. Next you will see a heading ‘Core texts’. This tells you what parts of the textbooks
are required reading for the topic you are studying. This is followed by the Essential
readings. ‘Essential’ means that you must read this material. This is where you
will find the information that you will need to pass your examination. Do not skip
these readings. You should read the readings at the point that they are referred
to in the subsequent text.

You will be provided with options for Further reading.

3. When you have finished the readings, look at the list of ‘Learning outcomes’ for the
chapter. Keep these in mind as you work through the rest of the chapter.

4. At the end of most sections you will find a Reminder of learning outcomes that are
relevant to them. Test yourself against these.

u If you feel that you have achieved the outcomes, then it is safe to proceed. If
you do not, you should go back over the work you have done until you do.

5. At the end of each chapter is a ‘Quick quiz’ consisting of multiple‑choice questions.

Attempt to answer these before you look at the answers on the VLE.

Activities and self-assessment

The activities are exercises that are designed to help you learn and understand
important issues. They do this by getting you to think about a question and devise a
response. Activities will not have simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers: often you will need to
write down a few sentences, so activities also give you useful practice in using legal
English. In most cases, feedback is provided at the end of the guide, but it is essential
to do the activities before you look at the feedback.

Do each activity to the best of your ability, then check the feedback. How well did you
do? If your answer to the activity was incorrect or incomplete, think carefully about
what went wrong. Do you need to re-read part of the textbook, or work through the
module guide chapter again?

Sample examination questions

Most chapters contain one or two sample examination questions. These are examples
of the kinds of questions that have been asked on the particular topic in previous
years.

You should answer the examination questions fully. This will give you practice in
presenting your knowledge and understanding of the topic in a thorough and
integrated way. Think about what each question is asking and how you could use your
knowledge to answer it. Ask yourself:

u What legal issues does this question relate to?

u What knowledge do I need to lay out and explain in order to answer it, in terms of
case law, statutes or codes of practice?

u What is the best way to organise this material in order to answer the question?
There is no one set way to answer questions but it is important to be systematic
and coherent.

u What material might be useful to help me evaluate this area of law or address the
issue asked? Is this a topic on which there are differing academic views? Might
there be material in other chapters (such as Chapter 2) that might help me to
evaluate the law? Note that evaluating an area of law is central to offering a ‘critical
approach’ – but ‘critical’ does not mean only a negative evaluation. Rather, it
means looking at the picture in the round, drawing on a range of considerations
and views.
page 6 University of London
Next read the Advice on answering the questions that follows. This will help you put
together an effective answer. Spend 15–30 minutes writing your answer.

By writing down your answers, you will develop the skill of expressing yourself clearly
and logically. It will also help you to approach the examination at the end of the year.
You need to put in as much practice as possible in carefully reading examination
questions to identify the issues you need to address in fully answering them.

Self-assessment questions (SAQs) are a little different. These are factual questions
designed to test your memory of the chapter you have just worked through. You may
find it useful to ask a friend, fellow student or family member to test you on these
questions. No feedback is given to SAQs because you can always find the answer
somewhere in the text of the module guide chapter.

Cases
Numerous cases are mentioned in the text. These cases are not chosen at random:
they are the important cases that have established, modified or clarified the law.

Further reading
When you have completed your study of a section or chapter of the guide and
textbook, check whether any Further reading is recommended.

1.2.3 Ten golden rules for studying evidence

1. Learn each topic as you study it and revise frequently. Evidence is not a subject
that you can ‘cram in’ at the last minute.

2. Read each chapter in your textbook at least twice. What is unclear at first reading
will often become clearer on a second or subsequent reading.

3. Read as many of the important cases as you can. Textbooks have to summarise cases
succinctly, and summarising can be an obstacle to understanding. You are more likely
to understand a decision in a particular case if you have read the case itself in full.

4. Read as much of the recommended Further reading as you can. This will be
important for essay questions in the examination.

5. Take full notes of what is said in any lectures and tutorials that you attend as
well as of everything that you read – chapters in textbooks, articles and cases. Keep
these notes in a loose-leaf file so that you can add new material to each section as
the need arises.

6. Read with a book of statutes at hand for reference. You are allowed to bring a
statute book into the examination hall, but you will not be able to use it effectively
unless you are already familiar with its contents. Statutes are not easy to read, and
so you will need to take your time with this, reading each section that your book or
article refers to several times to ensure that you have grasped all its details.

7. Condense your own full notes into a skeleton set of notes. Your skeleton notes
will be infinitely more valuable than someone else’s, and are essential to ensure
that you learn and revise properly. You will need an ordinary, bound notebook, with
separate sections for each topic that you learn. Ask at a law stationer’s for some
‘counsel’s notebooks’ if you can; they are more substantial than ordinary school
exercise books and come in ruled and unruled varieties.

When you have finished studying one topic in evidence, go through your full notes
and condense them into a pattern of rules set out under headings, sub-headings
and any further divisions that are convenient. Do this at first on rough paper so that
you can find the best way of setting things out and of summarising your full notes.
Then copy your final version onto the right-hand page of your notebook, making
sure that you add the names of the cases and statutory references that support
each rule. On the left-hand page summarise each case referred to on the right-
hand page in not more than three or four lines. When you have done that, put your
skeleton notes aside, take some more rough paper, and see if you can write out
Evidence 1 Introduction to the study of evidence law page 7
from memory what you have just written. Check it against the skeleton and, if need
be, repeat the exercise until you have the whole section clearly in your memory.

8. Practise answering the Sample examination questions. Begin by looking up as

much information as you need to answer the question. Make any notes you think
necessary, including a framework for an answer. Then put your notes aside and try
to write your answer in 35–40 minutes. Later, choose another question and try to
answer it in the same period of time, but without any preliminary reading. Make a
plan for your answer as part of the ‘unseen’ exercise within the 35–40 minute period.

9. Keep up to date. To some extent, every textbook is out of date as soon as it appears
in the bookshops because the law is constantly changing. The Pre-exam update will
highlight relevant changes in the law since the publication of this guide and you are
advised to bear in mind the date of publication of your Core texts to ensure you take
note of instances where the law has been updated or reformed since their publication.

10. Try to see the law in action. What you read in books often makes more sense if you
go to see criminal trials in the Crown Court. Pay particular attention to any legal
arguments that take place in the absence of the jury; very often they will be about
points of evidence.

1.2.4 Study time

You should set aside a specific amount of time each week to study this subject,
increasing the amount in the six weeks before the examination. Remember, though,
that individuals vary greatly in their needs; the time to stop studying is when you
know the topic thoroughly – and not until then. It is very important to plan your time
carefully. Do not forget to leave time every week and month for revision in addition to
the period before the examination. Revision must be a continuous process.

1.3 The examination

Important: the information and advice given in the following section are based on the
examination structure used at the time this guide was written. However, the University
can alter the format, style or requirements of an examination paper without notice.
This is especially relevant in the current context of online examinations, where
more precisely focused examination questions may be appropriate.

Because of this, we strongly advise you to check the rubric/instructions on the paper
you actually sit.

The examination contains a choice of essay and problem questions. Essay questions
require you to think carefully about the question asked and how to marshal your
knowledge in order to address it directly. Problem questions require you to apply your
knowledge of the law to the particular sets of facts specified in the question. To cope
with problem questions successfully, you must be able to see what issues arise on the
facts and advise on them accurately and succinctly, referring always to the sources
of law that you rely on for your conclusions. The law may well be uncertain. If so, you
must explain why, then choose what you believe to be the decision most likely to be
made by the court, giving reasons for your choice. Both types of question (essay and
problem) require you to show both knowledge of the law and a critical approach to
it. In essay questions, you will critically evaluate the law you describe, in problem
questions, you will make critical comments on the law you have applied. Generally,
more critical evaluation is required in essay questions than in problem questions.
In problem questions, you will seek to demonstrate your understanding of the law
mainly through your application of it to the facts but most problem questions do
invite you to make critical comments on the law applied.

Showing knowledge of different scholarly views and an appreciation of their

significance in respect of the issues is a key part of developing a critical perspective. To
take this further in forming a capacity for independent thought, during your studies
you must:
page 8 University of London

u think for yourself about the persuasiveness of the arguments put forward in what
you read

u ‘read around’ the topic

u discuss problems with your tutor or lecturer, if you are studying at an institution or
receiving tuition

u discuss problems with fellow students.

It follows that reading a single textbook, and some of the cases it refers to, is not
enough to satisfy the examiners. You must be aware of major proposals for reform of
the law, as well as arguments that have been advanced by writers who are critical of
the present state of the law. This means that you must read as widely as you can from
recommended articles.

Also, do look out for the type of problem question that deals only with the directions
the trial judge should give to the jury. These directions come after all evidence has
been heard by the jury and so admissibility issues are no longer relevant.

Remember to read the Examiner’s reports on previous years’ examinations. Avoid the
same errors and benefit from good practice examples.

Good luck!
2 Basic concepts

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2.1 Key concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.3 Theoretical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.4 Procedural context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
page 10 University of London

Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to familiarise you with:

1. Key concepts: This chapter will introduce you to the concepts of relevance, weight
and admissibility.

2. Terminology: You need to understand the most important legal terms early on in
order to get to grips with the subject. This chapter introduces you to these terms.

3. The theoretical context: Besides ‘learning the language’ of evidence, you need to
begin to develop a critical attitude towards the law so that you can write good
answers to questions in the examination. Good answers to essay questions will
evaluate as well describe the relevant law, noting which aspects of the law are
satisfactory and which are not and explaining the criteria used by the student in
making their evaluation. Problem questions will often invite you to make critical
comment on the law you have applied in the question. It is impossible to adopt the
a critical approach required to evaluate the law if you have no understanding of
the principles and objectives of the particular law and of the law of evidence more
generally. What and which principles and objectives to apply will often be a hotly
contested topic in itself and you should develop your awareness of these tensions
within the law of evidence.

This is an important section and you will need to return to it repeatedly

throughout the module in order to evaluate the new areas of law you are learning
about.

Familiarity with the principles, aims and objectives of the law of evidence is
particularly important on account of the trend in the development of the law
of evidence away from rules and prescription, and towards judicial discretion.
Discretionary powers should be exercised in accordance with a framework of
principles and you will need to familiarise yourself with them.

4. The procedural context: It can be difficult to understand the law of evidence

without some understanding of the context in which it is being applied. This
chapter seeks to familiarise you with the trial and appeal processes in the
adversarial system of England and Wales.

Core texts
u Choo, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’ and Chapter 3 ‘The course of evidence’.
u Durston, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction to the law of evidence’ and Chapter 2 ‘Judicial
discretion’.

Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
u explain what is meant by ‘relevance’, ‘weight’ and ‘admissibility’
u present arguments on the relevance and admissibility of a given item of evidence
u explain what is meant by the following major technical terms used in evidence
law: direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, collateral facts, documentary
evidence, testimony, facts in issue, real evidence and hearsay
u discuss the current objectives of evidence law and comment critically on them
u describe the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention
on Human Rights on evidence law
u explain the functions of cross-examination
u explain the functions of judge and jury in a Crown Court trial
u explain when the Court of Appeal has the power to quash a conviction.
Evidence 2 Basic concepts page 11

2.1 Key concepts

The basic framework for the admission of evidence is that all relevant evidence is
admissible except by virtue of an exclusionary rule or an exclusionary discretion.

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’, Section 2 ‘Relevance, admissibility, and weight’.

¢ Durston, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction to the law of evidence’, Section 7 ‘Three

key concepts: relevance, cogency, admissibility’ and Section 8 ‘Confusion in
terminology’; Chapter 2 ‘Judicial discretion’.

Essential reading
¢ Allen et al., Chapter 1 ‘Basic concepts’ (available on the VLE).

¢ Dennis, Chapter 3 ‘Relevance and admissibility’, Section B ‘Relevance’; and

Chapter 4 ‘Facts and fact finding’, Section E ‘Theories of fact finding’ (available on
the VLE).

¢ Appendix A of ‘The admissibility of expert evidence in criminal proceedings

in England and Wales: a new approach to the determination of evidentiary
reliability’, Law Commission Consultation Paper 190 (2009) (at www.lawcom.
gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/cp190_Expert_Evidence_Consultation.pdf).

¢ Cases: Wilson [2008] EWCA Crim 1754, commentary in (2009) Crim LR 193; Barry
George [2007] EWCA Crim 2722; Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228 (ignore arguments about
whether or not it is hearsay and focus on the relevance).

2.1.1 Relevance
The concept of relevance is not a straightforward one and we will explore it in some
depth. It is crucial to have a working definition of relevance. The best is that given by
Lord Simon in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, 756: ‘Evidence is relevant if it is logically
probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof.’ (Evidence is
‘probative’ of a proposition if it tends to show that proposition to be true; evidence is
‘disprobative’ if it tends to show that proposition to be false.) The concept of relevance
is fundamental to evidence law because:

u all relevant evidence is prima facie admissible

u the relevance of an item of evidence can determine what rules or principles of law
govern its admissibility. For example, the rule against hearsay excludes an out-of-
court statement only if it is adduced in order to establish the truth of what was
stated. If it is relevant for a different reason (e.g. to prove the maker of the out of
court statement speaks English), the rule does not apply. To evaluate the relevance
of a piece of evidence you need to identify what it could be probative of.
You need to be able to construct an argument for or against the relevance of a given
item of evidence. In constructing such arguments you need to realise how important it
is to use generalisations about what the world is like.

2.1.2 Weight
The weight or ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence will generally, though not
always, be determined in a criminal trial in the Crown Court by the jury. However,
sometimes judges do decide questions of weight; for example, on a submission of
‘no case to answer’ (see below), and in exercising the judicial discretion to exclude
prosecution evidence where its potential for causing unfair prejudice to a defendant
is greater than its probative value. Note also the problem of whether weight is an
element to be taken into account when determining relevance.
page 12 University of London

2.1.3 Admissibility and exclusion of evidence

Admissibility is clearly a matter of law – unlike relevance and weight, which are matters
of logic and common sense. But note that questions of admissibility may turn on the
relevance that a particular item of evidence has in the circumstances – as with the rule
against hearsay. It follows that before you can tackle the legal question of admissibility,
you will often have to clarify the logical or common sense question of relevance. Note
the position in civil trials under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), where the judge has a
wide discretion under CPR r.32.1(2) to exclude evidence that is relevant and admissible
so as to secure the ‘overriding objective’, as defined in CPR r.2.1(2). In criminal cases
the court has the discretion to exclude prosecution evidence on the ground that
its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In order to exercise these
discretions it is inevitable that the judge will have to consider questions of weight.

In Wilson [2008] EWCA Crim 1754 (case comment by Roberts, A. (2009) Crim LR
193) the Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of evidence, from a witness
responsible for monitoring crime, that no similar offences had been committed since
the defendant’s arrest. The defence argued that the evidence was ‘too nebulous and
prejudicial’ to be admitted. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s ruling that it did
have sufficient probative value to be admitted.

In HSBC Asia Holdings BV v Gillespie [2011] ICR 192 EAT, Underhill J (President) held that
employment tribunals have the power to exclude evidence which is ‘“logically” or
“theoretically” relevant but nevertheless too marginal, or otherwise unlikely to assist
the court, for its admission to be justified’ (at [13]).

Further reading
¢ Choo, A. ‘The notion of relevance and defence evidence’ (1993) CLR 114.

¢ Cases: Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44; Hollingham and Head [1858] 27 LJCP 241;
Blastland (1985) 81 Cr App R 266.

Activity 2.1
Read Dennis, Chapter 4, Section E ‘Theories of fact finding’, p.128 and the top of p.129
(available on the VLE). Without reading the remainder of p.129, try to identify the
assumptions and generalisations relied upon to make the inferential steps in A and B.

Self-assessment questions
1. What was the definition of relevance given by Lord Simon in DPP v Kilbourne?

2. Define:

a. relevance

b. weight

c. admissibility.

3. How well is relevance defined in English law?

4. How can the admission of irrelevant or minimally relevant evidence thwart the
aims of evidence law?

5. What is the difference between an exclusionary rule and an exclusionary

discretion?

2.2 Terminology

Core texts
u Choo, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’, Sections 1 ‘Facts in issue and collateral facts’ to
5 ‘The allocation of responsibility’.
u Durston, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction to the law of evidence’, Sections 13 ‘Evidential
categories/terminology’ and 14 ‘The “best evidence” rule’.
Evidence 2 Basic concepts page 13
You should thoroughly acquaint yourself with definitions of the following terms:

u direct evidence

u circumstantial evidence

u collateral facts

u documentary evidence

u testimony

u facts in issue

u real evidence

u hearsay.

You will not be able to understand evidence law without a confident understanding of
these terms.

Self-assessment question
u Define and give an example of each of the terms listed above.

Reminder of learning outcomes

By this stage you should be able to explain what is meant by the following major
technical terms used in evidence law:
u direct evidence, circumstantial evidence; collateral facts, documentary evidence,
testimony, facts in issue, real evidence and hearsay;
u explain what is meant by ‘relevance’, ‘weight’ and ‘admissibility’
u present arguments on the relevance and admissibility of a given item of evidence.

2.3 Theoretical context

This topic will be helpful to you when you get to the critical evaluation sections in
forthcoming chapters and you are encouraged to refer back to it regularly. Theories
about the current objectives of the law of evidence can depend on explicitly rights-
based arguments, on explicitly consequentialist arguments, or on arguments relying
on the legitimacy of the verdict.

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’, pp.1–2 and Sections 7 ‘Free(r) proof’ to 14
‘Organization of the book’.

¢ Durston, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction to the law of evidence’, Sections 9 ‘The history

of exclusionary rules and their reform’, 10 ‘The rationale behind evidential rules’
and 11 ‘The impact of ECHR/HRA 1998’.

Essential reading
¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, extract from Chapter 1 ‘Principles of criminal evidence’,
Section 1.3 ‘Five foundational principles of criminal evidence’ (available on the
VLE).

¢ Dennis, extract from Chapter 2 ‘The aims of the law of evidence’ (available on the
VLE).

Further reading
¢ Damaška, M.R. Evidence law adrift. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997)
[ISBN 9780300069372].

Accurate fact-finding (what Jeremy Bentham called the ‘rectitude of decision-making’)

is a core aim of any trial, criminal or civil. Some writers have argued that the whole of
the law of evidence may be derived from this one central value – or that it should be
the sole value. However, it is widely agreed that many other values are in play, such
page 14 University of London
as fairness and upholding the moral integrity of the criminal justice system. Often
it is debatable whether a particular objective is about ensuring the reliability of the
evidence (accurate fact-finding) or about the protection of broader principles. For
example, is evidence that has been unlawfully obtained by the police excluded on
grounds of principle or on account of the risk that the evidence may be unreliable?

Appreciating that there are such different – and sometimes conflicting – objectives
informing the law of evidence lays the foundation for considering the admissibility of
evidence. Why are certain types of evidence not permitted? What are the underlying
principles and rationales for exclusionary rules? Is it purely because such evidence is
likely to be unreliable – that is, is truth the overriding value? Not infrequentl, you will
find that case law reflects such competing values, making it difficult to identify a single
underlying pattern of reasoning. Being able to identify such underlying conflicts is the
mark of a critical reflective perspective and will serve you well in the examination.

You need to distinguish three basic lines of argument:

u rights-based arguments

u consequentialist arguments

u arguments based on the moral legitimacy of the verdict.

Activity 2.2
Suppose that, in the case of Adolphus Griggs, DC Goodall had entered Griggs’s room
unlawfully. He found Griggs there and said: ‘You’ve got a coat and a knife. Give
them to me.’ At first Griggs denied having any such articles. Thereupon, DC Goodall
broke Griggs’s arm and said: ‘I’ll break the other one if you don’t give them to me.’
Fearing a second assault, Griggs handed over a blood-stained coat and knife. The
prosecution wishes to produce these as evidence against Griggs.
a. Write down a consequentialist argument in favour of admissibility.

b. Write down a consequentialist argument against admissibility.

c. Write down a rights-based argument against admissibility.

d. Write down an argument against admissibility based on the legitimacy of the

verdict.

2.3.1 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights
Act 1998

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’, Section 13 ‘The implications of the Human Rights
Act 1998’.

¢ Durston, Chapter 1 ‘Introduction to the law of evidence’, Section 11 ‘The impact

of ECHR/HRA 1998’.

You should be able to explain in outline the effect of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) in relation to the law of evidence, noting especially Article
6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 8 (right to privacy). A fundamental point is that
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) adopts a flexible approach to the
interpretation of the Convention, despite the apparently absolute character of some
of the articles.

You need to be especially aware of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA
1998) (which came into force in October 2000). You should already be familiar with the
provisions of HRA 1998 but, by way of reminder, under HRA 1998, the court’s (judges’)
interpretive task can be broken down into three main stages:

1. Is the legislation, as conventionally interpreted in terms of its ordinary/

natural meaning, compatible with the ECHR (‘taking into account’ Strasbourg
jurisprudence as per s.2)?
If yes, that is the end of the question. If not:
Evidence 2 Basic concepts page 15
2. The court’s interpretive duty under s.3 is engaged, to see if it is possible to reach a
Convention-compliant interpretation of the statute. You should already be familiar
with the techniques of ‘reading in’, ‘reading out’ and ‘reading down’ in order to
achieve compatibility. If a Convention-compliant reading cannot be achieved:

3. The last recourse is s.4, a declaration of incompatibility.

You may need to return to this interpretive schema in later chapters (for example, in
Chapters 3 and 6).

Self-assessment questions
1. Why does English law assume that the worst possible outcome of the criminal
justice process is the conviction of the innocent?

2. Why is it a challenge to achieve ‘equality of arms’ in criminal proceedings? How

does the criminal law of evidence seek to achieve ‘equality of arms’?

3. What role can the law of evidence play in demonstrating the integrity of the
criminal process? How might a political regime forfeit the moral authority to call
suspected offenders to account and punish the guilty?

4. Why does public confidence in the administration also hinge on its ability to
convict the guilty?

5. According to Roberts and Zuckerman, what are the five foundational principles
of criminal evidence? Explain them and provide illustrations of the law’s
attempts to satisfy these principles.

2.4 Procedural context

The bulk of the law of evidence that you will study relates to the conduct of criminal
trials in the Crown Court. This is because the law is most highly developed in this
context. The vast majority of civil trials are tried by a judge alone and the law of
evidence has been considerably relaxed by the removal of many of the restrictions on
admissibility that apply in criminal jury trials. In magistrates’ courts, generally because
of the absence of a jury, in practice the rules of evidence are different to some extent.
You will not be asked questions in the examination that are specifically directed to
trials in magistrates’ courts.

2.4.1 The course of testimony

Core text
u Choo, Chapter 3 ‘The course of evidence’
In civil trials the claimant will present their case first, followed by the defence. In
criminal trials the prosecution will present their case first, followed by the defence.
Each party’s evidence is usually given in three stages. During examination-in-chief a
witness for one party is called and examined by that party’s counsel. The witness will
then be cross-examined by counsel for the opposing party. In a criminal trial where
there is more than one defendant, a defendant who gives evidence can be cross-
examined by counsel for co-defendants as well as by counsel for the prosecution.

Lastly, counsel who have examined the witness in chief examination can re-examine
that witness in order to clear up any misunderstandings or ambiguities that may have
arisen as a result of cross-examination. This is a very simple picture of the course of
testimony and there can be variations: for example, in civil trials a witness’s pre-trial
written statement can stand as evidence-in-chief.

u Examination-in-chief

This is the first stage of the examination of a witness at trial, and is conducted on
behalf of the party who has called that witness. In civil trials a witness’s pre-trial
written statement can stand as evidence-in-chief: see CPR r.32.5(2).
page 16 University of London
Witnesses are normally favourable to the cause of the parties who call them,
and so are likely to agree readily to any suggestion made to them by the parties’
advocates. Because of this, the rule was developed that questions suggesting
the answer that is desired (‘leading questions’) cannot be asked during
examination-in-chief.

u Cross-examination

The objectives of cross-examination are to complete or challenge the story told

by the witness during examination-in-chief or put an alternative version of events
to the witness. It follows that the scope of cross-examination is not confined to
those matters covered by evidence-in-chief, but extends to all relevant matters.
Leading questions are permitted in cross-examination, as are questions designed
to discredit the character of the witness being cross-examined or otherwise cast
doubt on their credibility or reliability.

There are some rules that restrict the scope of cross-examination. We will look
at restrictions on cross-examination of a complainant’s sexual history in trials
of sexual offences and at restrictions on cross-examination of a witness’s bad
character in later chapters. The only restriction of which you should be aware
at this preliminary stage is the collateral-finality rule. This provides that, where
a witness is cross-examined on a matter relevant solely to their credibility, the
witness’s answers have to be taken as final, and evidence may not be called by the
cross-examining party to rebut the witness’s answers. The reason for this is that
the trial should remain focused on the principal issues at stake and should not
be side-tracked into the pursuit of questions entirely collateral to the litigation
(sometimes referred to as ‘satellite litigation’). The reason behind this is that the
jury may become confused or overwhelmed by the pursuit of such side issues.
There are several exceptions to this rule, but the only one you need be aware of at
this stage is s.4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865, which applies where a witness
denies making a previous inconsistent statement.

u Re-examination

The object of re-examination is to clarify matters that were referred to in cross-

examination. It is important to remember that re-examination is confined to those
matters only, and may not be used to raise for the first time matters that should
have been dealt with during examination-in-chief.

2.4.1.1 The role of the judge

Essential reading
¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, extract from Chapter 2 ‘The procedural framework of
adversarial jury trial’ (available on the VLE).

2.4.1.2 Trial rulings governing the admissibility of evidence

Essential reading
¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, extract from Chapter 2 ‘The procedural framework of
adversarial jury trial’, Section (a) ‘Trial rulings governing the admissibility of
evidence’ (available on the VLE).

2.4.1.3 Submission of no case to answer

Core text
¢ Choo, Chapter 2 ‘Burden and standard of proof’, Section 2.1 ‘Burden of proof’.

Essential reading
¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, extract from Chapter 2 ‘The procedural framework
of adversarial jury trial’, Section 2.5(c) ‘Submissions of “no case to answer”’
(available on the VLE).
Evidence 2 Basic concepts page 17
¢ Cases: AB v CPS [2017] EWHC 2963; Sardar [2016] EWCA Crim 1616; Galbraith [1981]1
WLR 1039.

Understanding submissions of no case to answer will be particularly helpful to you

in grasping the procedure judges should follow in relation to some of the types of
evidence we will look at in subsequent chapters, for example, eyewitness testimony
and hearsay.

You should familiarise yourself with the different elements of the Galbraith test.
The application of the Galbraith test to cases based on circumstantial evidence was
considered in Sardar [2016] EWCA Crim 1616, where Sir Brian Leveson P cited (inter alia)
this passage from King CJ’s judgment in Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of
1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 as one that correctly reflects English law:

If there is direct evidence which is capable of proving the charge, there is a case to answer
no matter how weak or tenuous [the judge] might consider such evidence to be. If the
case depends upon circumstantial evidence, and that evidence, if accepted, is capable
of producing in a reasonable mind a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
thus is capable of causing a reasonable mind to exclude any competing hypotheses as
unreasonable, there is a case to answer. There is no case to answer only if the evidence
is not capable in law of supporting a conviction. In a circumstantial case, that implies
that even if all the evidence for the prosecution was accepted and all inferences most
favourable to the prosecution which are reasonably open were drawn, a reasonable mind
could not reach a conclusion of guilty beyond reasonable doubt, or to put it another way,
could not exclude all hypotheses consistent with innocence, as not reasonably open on
the evidence.

2.4.1.4 Judge’s summing up and directions to the jury

Essential reading
¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, extract from Chapter 2 ‘The procedural framework of
adversarial jury trial’, Section (d) ‘Judicial comment and summing up’ (available
on the VLE).

The chapters in this module guide discuss the relevant jury directions on the
different areas of evidence. The Crown Court Compendium (2021) Part 1: ‘Jury and trial
management and summing up’ (previously known as the Judicial Studies Board Crown
Court Bench Book) is a user guide for the judiciary. Please note that judges are not
intended to follow the specimen directions in a mechanical fashion.

2.4.2 Appellate review

Essential reading
¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, extract from Chapter 2 ‘The procedural framework of
adversarial jury trial’, Section (e) ‘Appellate review’ (available on the VLE).

The bulk of the cases you read will be decisions by the Court of Appeal. Errors of
law, including misdirections to the jury and mistaken rulings on admissibility, are
an element in the Court’s decision as to the safety of the verdict in criminal cases,
although an error as such will not necessarily be decisive, especially if the prosecution
case is overwhelming. From this perspective the test is whether, absent that error,
the jury would have reached the same conclusion. On the other hand, especially with
the growing influence of Article 6 of the ECHR, it is now more likely that the Court of
Appeal will find a conviction unsafe even where there is no doubt about guilt but the
trial process has been vitiated by serious unfairness or a significant legal misdirection.
However, the trend towards expanding the discretion of the trial judge, noted
above, adds to reluctance on the part of the Court of Appeal to overturn a verdict (as
discussed by Roberts and Zuckerman).

Irrespective of the success or failure of an appeal against conviction, Court of Appeal

rulings are a crucial source of clarification of law.
page 18 University of London

Self-assessment questions
1. What are the purposes of cross-examination?

2. What is a voir dire?

3. What is a submission of no case to answer?

4. What is the role of the trial judge in summing up to the jury in a criminal trial?

5. When will the Court of Appeal quash a conviction?

Reminder of learning outcomes

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should
be able to:
u explain what is meant by ‘relevance’, ‘weight’ and ‘admissibility’
u present arguments on the relevance and admissibility of a given item of evidence
u explain what is meant by the following major technical terms used in evidence
law: direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, collateral facts, documentary
evidence, testimony, facts in issue, real evidence and hearsay
u discuss the current objectives of evidence law and comment critically on them
u describe the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention
on Human Rights on evidence law
u explain the functions of cross-examination
u explain the functions of judge and jury in a Crown Court trial
u explain when the Court of Appeal has the power to quash a conviction.

Quick quiz

Question 1
Which case is the authority on how the judge should approach a submission of no case
to answer in a criminal trial?

a. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039.

b. Humphreys [1945] 3 WLR 203.

c. Peewall [1902] 1 WLR 737.

Question 2
In a defendant’s trial for murder, which of the following is an example of circumstantial
evidence?

a. An eyewitness account of the defendant stabbing the victim in the heart.

b. An eyewitness account of the defendant leaving the house of the victim shortly
after the victim’s time of death.

Question 3
What does s.78(1) of PACE 1984 provide?

a. It provides the court with a discretion to exclude evidence where its admission
would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court
ought not to admit it.

b. It places a duty on the court to exclude evidence where its admission would have
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not
to admit it.

c. It provides the court with a discretion to exclude prosecution evidence in the

interests of ensuring the fairness of the trial.
Evidence 2 Basic concepts page 19

Sample examination question

‘The concept of “relevance” is an imprecise one. In criminal trials this enables it
to be used as a cloak to obscure a court’s reasons for refusing to admit evidence.’
Discuss.
page 20 University of London

Advice on answering the question

This is a very difficult question and would not appear in the examination as we would not
have an examination question on the topic of relevance in isolation. We include it here to
demonstrate the depth of analysis possible into the concept of relevance so that you can
keep this in mind when exploring the topic of relevance in the context of later chapters.

The first step is to state what the test of relevance is supposed to be (you could use
the quote from DPP v Kilbourne) and the extent to which it governs the admissibility of
evidence (all relevant evidence is admissible unless subject to an exclusionary rule or
discretion).

Next you will want to discuss its operation in practice. You could describe how logical
relevance is established with reference to an argument based on an acceptable
generalisation about the way things are in the world. Give an example (it could be a case
such as Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44 – or a made up one) to demonstrate you know
what logical relevance means.

You will want to develop your discussion in such a way that you address the question. In
what way is the concept imprecise? Can you think of any examples in which the courts’
basis for refusing to admit evidence is obscure? What do you think is to blame for the
obscurity?

You might discuss the different concepts of relevance that courts often appear to draw
on in practice (perhaps the Wigmorean concept of legal relevance). Blastland is an
obvious example where the court’s basis for refusing to admit the evidence is obscure.
On what other grounds was the case criticised?

Your conclusion should be the result of your discussion. You might consider that the
obscurity of the courts’ reasoning would be clarified if they abandoned the concept of
logical relevance and adopted instead the test of legal relevance (you would need to
address the fact that the Wigmorean approach has itself been criticised for obscuring
the basis on which a decision on admissibility is reached). You might consider that
it is not imprecision in the concept of relevance that is to blame for the obscurity
of the court’s reasons for refusing to admit evidence, but the absence of any clearly
articulated discretion to exclude defence evidence. You might think that the criminal
courts should adopt a rule similar to that provided in civil trials (CPR r.22.1). This
permits the tribunal of law to exclude any logically relevant evidence, as a matter
of case management, to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with cases
justly (you would need to address the different objectives of civil and criminal trials
and any implications this might have for the adoption of such a rule).

The important thing is to demonstrate that you understand the law and are capable of
considering the issues.
3 Burden and standard of proof

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3.1 Criminal trials before the Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and defence burdens in criminal trials . . . . 29

3.3 Directions to the jury and effects of misdirection in criminal trials . . . . 34

Quick quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
page 22 University of London

Introduction
The rules and principles of evidence on burdens and standards of proof provide an
overarching structure of civil and criminal trials by determining:

1. Which party has the burden of bringing evidence on which facts in issue?

2. Where a party bears a burden, what test is applied to determine whether

sufficiently weighty evidence has been adduced to discharge the burden? There is
an important distinction between the legal burden – where a specific standard of
proof is required – and a merely evidential burden.

3. Which body (judge or jury) decides – and at what stage in the trial – whether the
relevant test has been satisfied?

In criminal proceedings the presumption of innocence is intimately connected with

the allocation of the legal burden of proof to the prosecution to prove all the essential
elements of their case beyond reasonable doubt, as famously stated by Lord Sankey
in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. However, Woolmington also noted exceptions
to this principle, where the defendant bears a legal burden. Such tensions with the
presumption of innocence in criminal offences were explored in earlier case law in
the context of implied statutory exceptions. Since the passing of the Human Rights
Act 1998 (HRA 1998) renewed and restructured judicial attention to reverse burdens in
relation to Article 6 (Right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).

You should also note that the presumption of innocence has a wider scope than
burden of proof issues. Chapter 5 examines the right to silence and the privilege
against self-incrimination in light of ss.34–37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act 1994, which permit inferences of guilt from a defendant’s silence.

Eye on relevance: This topic cannot be properly understood without paying attention
to relevance. Where a party bears a burden, it is always in respect to specific facts in
issue that are relevant to making their case. (See Chapter 2 on ‘facts in issue’.)

With respect to criminal trials, this chapter is organised in terms of before and after
the HRA 1998. This is slightly different from the arrangements of the core texts and
necessitates some skipping around but specific guidance on the readings is given here.

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 2 ‘Burden and standard of proof’.

¢ Durston, Chapter 3 ‘The burden and standard of proof’.

Essential reading
¢ Cases: Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; Edwards [1975] QB 27; Hunt [1987] AC
352; Nimmo v Alexander Cowan and Sons Ltd [1967] 3 All ER 187; Salabiaku v France
(1988) 13 EHRR 379; DPP ex p Kebilene [2000] 1 Cr App R 275; Lambert [2001] 3 All
ER 577; Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28; Sheldrake v DPP; A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002)
[2004] UKHL 43.

Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
u state the Woolmington principle and exceptions
u explain the nature of the legal burden of proof and distinguish between legal
and evidential burdens
u understand the different standards of proof
u identify when a defendant in a criminal trial bears an evidential burden
u explain the difference between express and implied statutory exceptions
u explain the difficulties in determining whether a statute has impliedly placed a
burden of proof on defendants prosecuted under its provisions
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 23

u explain the role of extrinsic policy in the allocation of legal burdens in criminal
trials
u have developed a view on the extent to which Woolmington has been
undermined by subsequent statute and case law, if at all
u explain the effect of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) on placing a burden of proof on defendants in criminal trials
u analyse how the courts have interpreted reverse burdens under the HRA 1998
u offer and explain your views on whether a burden of proof should ever be placed
on defendants in criminal trials
u have a basic knowledge of jury directions and the effects of misdirection on
burden and standard of proof
u critically evaluate the law in this area
u apply the law in a problem scenario.

3.1 Criminal trials before the Human Rights Act 1998

3.1.1 General overview: The presumption of innocence and the burden of

proof
As famously stated by Lord Sankey in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 as the ‘golden
thread’ running throughout English criminal law, ‘it is the duty of the prosecution
to prove the prisoner’s guilt’. The presumption of innocence correlates with the
allocation of the burden of proof to the prosecution in three respects.

1. a. The legal burden lies on the prosecution to prove all the essential elements
of their case. This means that they must prove the relevant facts in issue as
determined by the definition of the offence.

b. The legal burden means that all the facts in issue for the prosecution case must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt (the criminal standard of proof).

c. Whether the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof

beyond reasonable doubt on all the relevant facts in issue is determined by the
jury in deciding the verdict.

The fact that the prosecution must prove its case to a very high standard of proof
(beyond reasonable doubt) is an inherent part of the presumption of innocence.

Correspondingly, it is not for the defence to prove the innocence of the defendant. The
basic position is that the defence could do nothing, or merely seek to create doubt
through cross-examining prosecution witnesses, and still achieve a not guilty verdict.

2. The presumption of innocence is also operative at an earlier moment in a criminal

trial. If, at the close of the prosecution’s presentation of their evidence, the court
finds that the prosecution has failed to provide sufficient evidence to make out a
prima facie case against the defendant, the judge will direct the jury at that point to
find a verdict of not guilty. (See Chapter 2 on ‘No case to answer’.)

3. Finally, if the defence goes beyond the basic position and offers a specific defence
for which they bear an evidential burden and provides sufficient evidence in
respect of that defence, the prosecution then bears the legal burden of disproving
(‘negativing’) that defence beyond reasonable doubt.

However, Woolmington also noted that there were exceptions to the golden thread by
which a legal burden was placed on the defence either at common law (insanity) or by
statute.

Activity 3.1
Why should the prosecution bear the overall burden of proof in criminal trials?
Note: P. Roberts ‘Taking the burden of proof seriously’ (1995) Crim LR 783 (‘Three
good reasons for putting the prosecution to proof’ (pp.785–88) (available in
page 24 University of London
Westlaw via the Online Library) is a useful source. It is extracted in Durston,
pp.99–100.

3.1.2 The nature of the legal burden of proof and the evidential burden

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 2 ‘Burden and standard of proof’, Section 1.1 ‘The legal burden
and the evidential burden’ but only up to the first paragraph of Section 1.2.1.2
‘Express statutory exceptions’.

¢ Durston, Chapter 3 ‘The burden and standard of proof’, Sections 1 ‘Introduction’

to 5 ‘Evidential burdens’.

Essential reading
¢ Cases: Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547 (self-defence); Gill [1963]
2 All ER 688 (duress); Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 (sane
automatism); Lesley [1996] 1 Cr App R 39 (alibi).

Legal burden of proof: The legal burden of proof (also called the ‘persuasive’ or
‘probative’ burden) is the obligation that rests on a party in relation to a particular fact
in issue that must be ‘discharged’ (or ‘satisfied’) to a specified standard of proof if that
party is to win (i.e. convince the jury) on the issue in question. On matters where the
prosecution in a criminal trial bears the legal burden, the standard of proof is ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’.

Where the defence bears a legal burden in a criminal trial – a ‘reverse burden’ – the
standard of proof is the civil standard: the balance of probabilities (Carr-Briant
[1943] KB 603). The only common law instance is the defence of insanity as stated in
Woolmington (McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200). See Section 3.1.3 for statutory
reverse burdens.

Why is a reverse burden called a ‘reverse’ burden? Reverse burdens are highly
controversial because they go against the presumption of innocence. They reverse
the roles of prosecution and defence where normally only the prosecution has to
prove facts in issue to a standard of proof but here, if offering certain defences, it is
the defence whose evidence on the relevant facts has to be proved (albeit to the civil
standard only). Consequently, a greater risk of failure is transferred to the defence.

These concerns can be exacerbated depending on the sort of fact at issue. Are there
some matters that inherently belong to the prosecution to prove, i.e. concerning
the actus reus or, especially, mens rea? Belief that there are gives rise to an additional
meaning of ‘reverse burdens’ – that they transfer the responsibility for proving certain
types of essential facts, as Lord Hope puts it, away from the prosecution to prove and
onto the defence to disprove:

A ‘persuasive’ burden of proof requires the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities,

a fact which is essential to the determination of his guilt or innocence. It reverses the
burden of proof by removing it from the prosecution and transferring it to the accused.

(Lord Hope in Kebilene at 378, emphasis added)

Lord Hope is here expressing a widely shared ‘gut level’ sensibility, common to many
members of the judiciary as well as some legal academics and practitioners that
a reverse burden means that the defence is being required to do what ‘properly’
belongs to the prosecutor. From this perspective, it should never be for the defence to
have to prove that they did not fulfil some aspect of either the actus reus or the mens
rea of an offence. This is the ‘classic model’ of proof of criminal liability. Hence the
special concern where an offence, as defined in statute (see Section 3.1.3 on statutory
exceptions), has few or no mens rea specifications (as in strict liability offences) and, in
the same statute, a defence is specified where the defendant may escape liability by
proving, for example, their lack of relevant knowledge? The objection here – and the
idea of a reverse burden as a ‘transfer’ – rests on this underlying classic model or ideal
of what ‘real’ criminal law should be like. Parallel matters arise in respect of so-called
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 25
‘regulatory offences’ but do they involve the same core values of criminal justice? (See
further discussion at Section 3.2.3.)

In reading judicial debates on common law and statutory reverse burdens both
before and after the coming of HRA 1998, you will frequently encounter the ‘classic’
perspective. While Lord Hope is speaking in the context of the HRA 1998, Glanville
Williams expresses the same approach in respect of implied reverse burdens long
before that. You may well share it yourself and it will help your understanding if you
consider that now. In Section 3.2.3 we return to these issues of perspective in terms of
the debate between ‘substantivists’ like Lord Hope and ‘proceduralists’ (notably Paul
Roberts).

Evidential burden: This is the burden of adducing sufficient evidence to satisfy the
judge that there is an issue to put before the jury.

All that is required to satisfy an evidential burden is for the party to adduce ‘some’
evidence, enough to make it a ‘live issue’ at the trial. For that reason, the evidential
burden is sometimes called the burden of ‘production’. The important point to grasp
is that it is not a burden of proof because there is no standard of proof required. For
example, for self-defence, it would be sufficient if the defendant testified to facts
indicating this; even cross-examination of a prosecution witness could be sufficient.
Failure to satisfy the evidential burden at the close of the defence case would result
in the judge withholding that defence from the jury. The evidential burden is thus
sometimes called the burden of ‘passing the judge’.

You should familiarise yourself with the defences for which the defence bears an
evidential burden. Many of these are common law defences but note that the
common law partial defence of provocation has been replaced by statute: the s.54(5)
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 loss of control defence expressly places an
evidential burden on the defence. These can be distinguished from reverse burdens
not only because of the lesser burden but also because (this is contestable) no
‘transfer’ is involved. Self-defence, for example, involves introducing a separate set of
facts. For this reason, these defences are sometimes called affirmative defences.

The only common law exception where the defence bears a legal burden is insanity,
as stated in Woolmington (McNaghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200). Formally, a defence
of insanity is a rebuttal of the presumption of mental capacity that otherwise holds
for all criminal trials. It is also consistent with the statutory reverse legal burden in
respect to diminished responsibility (s.2(2) of the Homicide Act 1957). Whether the
insanity exception is justifiable has been a matter of debate but is not an issue pursued
here. (Of possible interest: H v United Kingdom, Application No 15023/89, in which
the complaint was that the burden on the accused in criminal proceedings to prove
insanity on the balance of probabilities was contrary to the presumption of innocence
and in violation of Article 6(2).)

3.1.3 Express and implied statutory exceptions/‘reverse burdens’

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 2 ‘Burden and standard of proof’, Section 1.2.1.3 ‘Implied statutory
exceptions’, up to p.38.

¢ Durston, Chapter 3 ‘The burden and standard of proof’, Section 2 ‘Legal burdens
in criminal matters’, subsections ‘Express statutory exceptions’, ‘Implied
statutory exceptions, ‘The scope of implied burdens’, ‘Criticism of reverse onus
provisions’.

Essential reading
¢ Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh report, evidence (general) (1973)
para. 140, pp.88–90 (available on the VLE).

¢ Cases: Edwards [1975] QB 27; Hunt [1987] AC 352; Nimmo v Alexander Cowan and
Sons Ltd [1967] 3 All ER 187.

¢ Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

page 26 University of London
Note on terminology: (i) the expression ‘statutory exception’ means exception to
the normal rule that the prosecution bears the legal burden, and (ii) ‘reverse burden’
always means reverse legal burden. Also, ‘onus’ is a synonym for ‘burden’.

Express reverse burdens: ‘Express’ means that the statute makes it clear that the
defence bears the legal burden in respect to a statutory defence by using terms such
as ‘it shall be for the defence to prove’ or ‘show’ or ‘…the burden whereof shall be on
the accused’. For example, s.139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to
be in possession of an article with a blade or point in a public place but s.4 provides
that ‘it shall be a defence [...] to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority
for having the article with him in a public place’ and s.5 further specifies ‘it shall be
a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he
had the article with him – (a) for use at work; (b) for religious reasons; or (c) as part
of any national costume’ (emphasis added). (In L v DPP [2002] 2 All ER 854, the reverse
burdens in this statute were found compatible with Article 6(2) of the ECHR.)

There are many other examples of express statutory exceptions/reverse burdens,

for example: s.13 of the Bribery Act 2010; s.1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953
(possession of an offensive weapon in a public place); s. 54(5) of the Coroners and
Justice Act 2009 (loss of control) and s.2(2) of the Homicide Act 1957 (diminished
responsibility); s.31(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

The justifications for imposing such legal burdens are that there is held to be a strong
public interest in controlling such behaviour and yet it is not difficult for the defendant
to prove the defence.

Implied reverse burdens: With implied statutory exceptions/reverse burdens, the

statute does not make the allocation of the legal burden explicit. The court must
therefore determine whether Parliament intended to impose a legal burden on the
defence. For summary trials, s.101 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (formerly s.81
of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952) is an aid to statutory interpretation: ‘Where the
defendant to an information or complaint relies for his defence on any exception,
exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification...the burden of proving the exception,
exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification shall be on him’ (emphases added). In
Edwards [1975] QB 27 it was held that there is a closely similar rule at common law and
Hunt [1987] AC 352 held that this rule applied to trials on indictment. In order to escape
liability, the defendant must prove on the balance of probabilities that they fall within
the exemption, etc. An example of an exemption, etc. in an express reverse burden
is s.139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 defence in ss.4 and 5 of having ‘good reason or
lawful authority’ to be carrying a bladed article in a public place, for example, as part
of a national costume (see above).

In Edwards, the defendant had been convicted of selling alcohol without a licence. The
statute was silent as to the allocation of the burden for proving whether the defendant
had or had not a licence, once selling alcohol was shown by the prosecution. On
appeal, Edwards argued that the burden lay on the prosecutor but the court saw ‘with
a licence’ as in effect lawful authority for an otherwise prohibited activity (selling
alcohol), followed the claimed rule of interpretation and ruled that the defendant
bore the burden. At the same time, Lawton J also acknowledged that this was ‘an
exception to the fundamental rule of the criminal law that the prosecution had to
prove every element of the offence charged’ (at 27).

The justification was that this anomaly arises only in relation to a limited class of
offences. Put more widely than in Edwards, such low-level ‘regulatory offences’
concern activities that generically pose a danger to the public at large if they are not
conducted under certain conditions, often managed literally through licensing (selling
alcohol, driving a car) or some other required authorisation. The implication is that
Woolmington’s ‘golden thread’ is reserved for ‘real’ crimes.

An important background case, approved in Hunt, is the Scottish case of Nimmo v

Alexander Cowan and Sons Ltd [1967] 2 All ER. This case is also broadly regulatory in
character in that it concerned health and safety requirements (it was a civil action
but the section also created a summary criminal offence, so, in Lord Griffiths’ view,
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 27
the same question would have arisen in a prosecution). An employee of a factory
was unloading railway wagons filled with bales of pulp for which he was required to
stand on some bales. The bales were insecure and when one tipped, the employee
fell, hitting his head and fracturing his skull. He claimed that the factory employer was
in breach of their statutory duty under s.29(10) of the Factories Act 1961 to keep the
workplace safe:

There shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be provided and maintained safe means of
access to every place at which any person has at any time to work and every such place shall,
so far as is reasonably practicable, be made and kept safe for any person working there.

However, there was a qualification to the duty: ‘so far as reasonably practicable’.
Did the burden rest on the claimant (the employee) to show that it was reasonably
practicable to keep the workplace safe or the defendant (the employer) to prove that
it was not? The wording of the statute was of no help; as Lord Griffiths comments on
it in Hunt, ‘what might be regarded as a matter of defence appears in a clause creating
the offence’. As with Edwards, the ‘logic’ of reverse burdens seems very different from
the common law examples, such as self-defence, where it appears there is a clear
difference between offence and defence.

You should familiarise yourself with the basic facts of Hunt. As before, the issue of
which party has to prove (or disprove) the exception is bound up with the question
of whether that is part of the definition of the offence or a separate defence. Lord
Griffiths’ famous speech points outside such doctrinal questions to other, extrinsic
policy considerations (‘practical matters’) to be taken into account by the court
in order to decide Parliament’s intentions. His words continue to have weight in
contemporary cases decided with reference to the HRA 1998:

... if the linguistic construction of the statute did not clearly indicate on whom the burden
should lie the court should look to other considerations to determine the intention
of Parliament, such as [1] the mischief at which the Act was aimed and [2] practical
considerations affecting the burden of proof and, in particular, the ease or difficulty that
the respective parties would encounter in discharging the burden. I regard this last
consideration as one of great importance, for surely Parliament can never lightly
be taken to have intended to impose an onerous duty on a defendant to prove
his innocence in a criminal case, and a court should be very slow to draw any such
inference from the language of a statute. When all the cases are analysed, those in which
the courts have held that the burden lies on the defendant are cases in which the burden
can be easily discharged.

([at 374] (emphasis added))

Edwards and especially Hunt (despite its favourable outcome for the defendant)
produced significant legal academic outrage at the time. In ‘The logic of exceptions’
(1988) Glanville Williams wrote: ‘Every so often the Appeal Committee of the House
of Lords produces a decision that sets back the rational development of the criminal
law for several years or decades...Now, in Hunt, they have done it again’ (p.261). He
makes two particularly powerful arguments. First, that Hunt effectively generalised
the possibility of judges finding implied exceptions far beyond the narrow straits
of Edwards. Second, that Lord Griffiths (inspired by Nimmo) justifies the derogation
from Woolmington solely on the basic of extrinsic policy: the relative ease of proof for
prosecutor or defendant.

In 1973 the Law Revision Committee had argued in its 11th report on evidence (general)
that Parliament should legislate that (almost) all defences, common law and statutory,
express or implied, should be reduced to imposing evidential burdens only. It is
worth reading the few paragraphs available on the VLE for a sense of their arguments.
Parliament was unmoved.

Blake and Ashworth’s famous 1996 study found 540 offences triable on indictment
(in the Crown Court) with reverse legal burdens or presumptions favouring the
prosecution.

Since October 2000, statutes with express and implied reverse burdens, as well as
common law reverse burdens, are subject to the new interpretive regime under the
page 28 University of London
HRA 1998. Judges now have the power to ‘read down’ reverse burdens to evidential
burdens under s.3 of the HRA 1998. Would the 1998 Act ‘encourage a reconsideration
of a trend which has, for over a decade, been exposed to powerful criticism’ (Lord
Clyde in Lambert at [155])? Yet many of the concerns and considerations in these
earlier judicial skirmishes with implied exceptions foreshadow post-HRA 1998 judicial
wrangling over express as well as implied exceptions. Please spend some time
reflecting on the following questions.

Activity 3.2
These questions do not have right or wrong answers. Rather, they are designed
to promote preliminary reflection on the issues initially raised by implied reverse
burdens that return under the HRA 1998 cases discussed in the next part of this
chapter.
a. Rape is sexual intercourse without consent. Therefore – like selling alcohol
without a licence – should there be a legal burden on the defendant to prove
consent? If not, why not?

b. Should the same rules apply to indictable and summary offences even though
the penalties and sentencing powers are so different?

c. In your opinion, which party should bear the legal burden of proof in Nimmo v
Alexander Cowan and for what reasons? Would it make a difference if, instead of
the employee (a poorly paid manual worker) bringing a civil action, it was the
public prosecutor bringing a criminal action?

d. Do you agree or disagree with the arguments put forward by the 1973 the Law
Revision Committee 11th report on evidence (general) as to why all defence
burdens should be evidential only.

No feedback provided.

Further reading
¢ Blake, M. and A. Ashworth ‘The presumption of innocence in English criminal
law’ (1996) Crim LR 306.

¢ Williams, G. ‘The logic of exceptions’ (1988) 47(2) CLJ 261.

Learning outcomes
By this stage you should be able to:
u state the Woolmington principle and exceptions
u explain the nature of the legal burden of proof and distinguish between legal
and evidential burdens
u understand the different standards of proof
u identify when a defendant in a criminal trial bears an evidential burden
u understand the difference between express and implied statutory exceptions
u explain the difficulties in determining whether a statute has impliedly placed a
burden of proof on defendants prosecuted under its provisions
u explain the role of extrinsic policy in the allocation of legal burdens in criminal
trials
u have developed views on the extent, if at all, to which Woolmington has been
undermined by subsequent statute and case law.
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 29

3.2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and defence burdens in

criminal trials

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 2 ‘Burden and standard of proof’, Sections 1.2.1.2 ‘The effect of the
Human Rights Act 1998’, and 1.2.1.3 ‘Implied statutory exceptions’ starting from
p.39.

¢ Durston, Chapter 3 ‘The burden and standard of proof’, Section 3 ‘Reverse

burdens of proof and human rights’.

Essential reading
¢ Dennis, I. ‘Reverse onuses and the presumption of innocence: in search of
principle’ (2005) Crim LR 901.

¢ Cases: Salabiaku v France [1988] 13 EHRR 379; DPP ex p Kebilene [2000] 1 Cr App R
275; Lambert [2001] 3 All ER 577; Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28; Sheldrake v DPP; A-G’s
Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43.

Further reading
¢ Hamer, D. ‘The presumption of innocence and reverse burdens: a balancing act’
(2007) 66(1) CLJ 142.

¢ Roberts, P. ‘The presumption of innocence brought home? Kebilene

deconstructed’ (2002) 118 LQR 41.

¢ Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh report, evidence (general) (1973)

para.140, pp.88–90 (available on the VLE).

¢ Glover, R. ‘Regulatory offences and reverse burdens: the licensing approach’

(2007) 71 J Crim L 259.

Article 6 of the ECHR (Right to a fair trial) identifies the presumption of innocence
as a key component of a fair trial: ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’ (Article 6(2)). These new
powers and interpretive obligations under the HRA 1998 saw the appeal courts engage
with the implications of Article 6 in ways that were not previously required of or
available to them. Before the HRA 1998, express reverse burdens were ‘automatic’,
meaning that the courts had no power to challenge what Parliament explicitly laid
down. Implied reverse burdens have also been tested in the courts for Convention
compliance.

3.2.1 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6

It is accepted that it is never a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR for the defendant to
bear an evidential burden only. In Bianco [2001] EWCA Crim 2516, the Court of Appeal
affirmed that a defence evidential burden is compatible with Article 6 as it does not
interfere as greatly with the presumption of innocence as placing a legal burden on
the defendant. This was unanimously accepted by all members of the House of Lords
in Sheldrake v DPP; A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43.

If the court decides that a legal burden placed on the defendant by a provision of
domestic law (common law or statute) is incompatible with Article 6, the court can
‘read down’ that provision under s.3 of the HRA 1998. No reverse burden case has ever
resulted in a s.4 declaration of incompatibility.

(It will be helpful if you revisit Chapter 2 for a reminder of the stages of judicial
interpretation under the HRA 1998.)

The crucial first question, therefore, is whether it is necessarily contrary to Article

6 for the defence to bear a legal burden. Looking to European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 provided a broad
answer. Salabiaku concerned a provision of the French customs code that enabled a
page 30 University of London
presumption of liability for smuggling to be drawn if a person was found in possession
of prohibited goods (in what was virtually a strict liability offence).The Court stated
that the rights comprised in Article 6(2) are not absolute. As Lord Bingham put it later
in Sheldrake: ‘The overriding concern is that a trial should be fair [Article 6(1)], and the
presumption of innocence [Article 6(2)] is a fundamental right directed to that end’
(see Chapter 9 on hearsay for a parallel argument in respect to the relation between
Article 6(3)(d) and Article 6(1)). However, Salabiaku did set out limitations on when
a presumption favourable to the prosecution could be compatible with Article 6.
By extension, Salabiaku is taken to mean that reverse burdens are not necessarily
incompatible with Article 6 as long as the same limitations are observed. Salabiaku
is often criticised for vagueness and contrasted with more robust decisions by the
ECtHR in respect to the related right to silence (see Chapter 5). Indeed, the ECtHR finds
strict liability offences compatible with Article 6. On the other hand, how far should
the ECtHR involve itself in what would be, in effect, the substantive criminal law of
individual national courts – their right to define criminal offences as they choose – or
their adjudicative independence in matters of evidence (margin of appreciation)?

Activity 3.3
What conditions did the European Court of Human Rights stipulate in Salabiaku for
determining whether presumptions favourable to the prosecution comply with
Article 6(2)?
In determining whether it is compatible with Article 6 for legislation (or common law)
to impose a legal burden on defendants, the courts frequently invoke ‘proportionality’.
‘Proportionality’ is a term of art in human rights jurisprudence more generally and
so you should already be familiar with this concept. It entails posing two questions:
first, is the domestic law in question in pursuit of a legitimate aim? It would be quite
extraordinary if the court found against this, given Parliamentary supremacy and the
division of powers. Second, is the provision under consideration proportionate to
achieving that aim? In Janosevic v Sweden (2004) 38 EHRR 473 the ECtHR produced a
clear formulation:

Contracting States are required to strike a balance between the importance of what is
at stake and the rights of the defence; in other words, the means employed [including
reverse burdens] have to be reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aim to be
achieved.

3.2.2 Reading the key cases

The approach in the rest of this section is essentially a guided reading of five key
express reverse burden cases. The articles by Dennis and Hamer will help you to get
the most out of the case law. It is important to realise that the judges in these cases are
not deciding the allocation of legal burdens (i.e. which party bears a burden).

When is it proportionate for a burden borne by a defendant to be a legal burden?

‘Balance’ is an analogue term for proportionality and also echoes Salabiaku’s
‘reasonable limits’. The speech of Lord Hope in DPP ex p Kebilene [2000] 1 Cr App R 275
remains an important point of reference on balancing the potentially competing
interests of ‘the community’ in controlling crime, especially certain types of crime, and
the due process rights of the defendant.

Activity 3.4
a. In Kebilene, what three questions did Lord Hope suggest broke down the broad
issue of balance into its essential components?

b. How did they guide him in forming a view on the Article 6(2) compatibility of a
reverse onus in this case?

Have the courts succeeded in translating such general ideas into working criteria of
compatibility, and how are such criteria to be weighed against each other? Legislative
aims are largely consequentialist (see Chapter 2) and focused on crime control, law
enforcement and potentially easing the task of the prosecution. Against this are rights-
based arguments favouring the defendant.
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 31
Lambert initially seemed to offer an answer. Lambert (along with A (No 2) (2001) – see
Chapter 7) was one of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court when the HRA 1998
was coming into force. Both cases are sometimes seen in retrospect as examples of
adventurous judicial activism possibly straining the boundary between the judiciary
and Parliament, especially in respect to the original intention of the legislation in
question.

Activity 3.5
a. In Lambert, what did the prosecution have to prove in order to succeed?

b. What is the defence available in s.28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971?

c. How, according to Lord Steyn, is this in conflict with the presumption of

innocence?

d. Why, according to Lord Steyn, is there an objective justification for some

interference with the burden of proof in prosecutions under s.5 of the Misuse of
Drugs Act 1971?

e. How did the court ultimately resolve the issue under s.3 of the HRA 1998?

f. What were Lord Hutton’s dissenting arguments?

Johnstone, by contrast, seemed to take the courts in a different direction. While the
offence in question was clearly a regulatory one, it carried a high penalty. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court held that a reverse legal burden was justified in respect to a
statutory defence concerning the defendant’s knowledge.

Activity 3.6
a. What were the terms of the statutory defence relied on in Johnstone?

b. For what ‘compelling reasons’ did Lord Nicholls find that a legal burden on the
defendant was appropriate?

c. Do you find it a problem that, as Lord Nicolls remarks, the offences created by
s.92 have rightly been described as offences of ‘near absolute [strict] liability’?
The prosecution is not required to prove intent to infringe a registered trade
mark. Or is this reasonable, given the nature of the crime, difficulties of proof
for the prosecutor and the ‘assumption of risk’ that persons engaging in such
commercial activities willingly take on for gain?

(Here we are not considering the Court of Appeal case A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004)
which found fundamental conflicts between Lambert and Johnstone and ruled that the
courts should follow the latter.)

Finally, in the conjoined appeals in Sheldrake and A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004]
UKHL 43, the Court decided that a reverse burden was justified in one but not the other.

Activity 3.7
What were the key differences between Sheldrake and A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002)
that led to different decisions in the two cases on the compatibility of a reverse
burden with Article 6?
No feedback provided.
In seeking to draw these key cases together, it is useful to use Ian Dennis’s analysis of
the range of factors that have been employed. Some of these go back to Lord Griffiths
in Hunt [1987] AC 352 and debates about Edwards [1975] QB 27.

Activity 3.8
a. What six factors does Dennis identify as playing a part in judicial decisions on
Article 6 compatibility?

b. What is meant by ‘judicial deference’? What stances on judicial deference are

found in Kebilene and Johnstone by contrast to Sheldrake? What was Lord Woolf’s
stance in Lambert?
page 32 University of London
c. What is the difference between offences classified as mala in se and mala
prohibita? What is meant by the ‘gravamen’ of an offence? Do judges always
equate the gravamen of an offence with its definition? See especially Lord Clyde
in Lambert.

d. Why would it potentially be helpful to distinguish between elements of

the offence and defences but what problems are there in identifying these
differences? Consider: Lord Hope in Lambert, referring to Edwards; Lord Rodger
in Sheldrake. Also consider Lord Steyn in Lambert and the Court of Appeal in
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) suggesting that discovering the ‘gravamen’ of the
offence may blur the distinction. Is it better to concentrate on the nature of the
moral blameworthiness?

e. Why are maximum penalties significant – is there a conflict between taking

penalties as indicative of the seriousness of the offence (harm to the state and
the community) and the consequences of conviction for the defendant? See
Lord Steyn in Lambert, Sheldrake and A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002). But contrast
Johnstone.

f. How is ease of proof different from ‘peculiar knowledge’? To what extent do

problems of proof for the prosecution justify transferring the burden of proof
to the defendant? Is it true that the easier it is for the accused to discharge the
burden, the more likely it is that the reverse burden will be held to be justified?
Note the references to ‘peculiar knowledge’ by Lord Hope in Kebilene, Lord Clyde
in Lambert and Lord Nicholls in Johnstone.

g. What does Dennis mean by saying that for Strasbourg the presumption of
innocence is essentially a procedural principle? Have the English courts also
regarded the presumption of innocence as purely procedural in decision making
under the HRA 1998?

h. What is Dennis’s overall conclusion on the coherence and predictability of this

area of law?

No feedback provided.

3.2.3 Critical evaluation of reverse burdens

Essential reading
¢ Munday, ‘Criminal offences properly so-called and regulatory legislation’ pp.94
and 95 and ‘Statutes that impose strict liability’ pp.101 and 102 (available on the
VLE).

¢ Glover, R. ‘Regulatory offences and reverse burdens: the licensing approach’

(2007) 71 J Crim L 259 (available through the Online Library).

¢ Roberts and Zuckerman, ‘6.6 Woolmington’s legacy and the presumption of

innocence’ (available on the VLE).

¢ Cases: Wholesale Travel Group Inc [1991] 3 SCR 154.

Dennis’s analysis suggests a messy state of affairs in which it is difficult to see much
pattern or predictability. However, some writers suggest that this is because there are
different models in conflict: (1) regulatory governance – future oriented and highly
consequentialist, and (2) a classic criminal law and rights model (see Section 3.1.2).
Cory J’s analysis in the Canadian case of Wholesale Travel Group Inc [1991] 3 SCR 154
identifies the contrast:

The objective of regulatory legislation is to protect the public (such as employees,

common consumers and motorists, to name but a few) from the potentially adverse
effects of otherwise lawful activity. Regulatory legislation involves a shift of emphasis
from the protection of individual interests and the deterrence and punishment of acts
involving moral fault to the protection of public and social interests. While criminal
offences are usually designed to condemn and punish past, inherently wrongful conduct,
regulatory measures are generally directed to the prevention of future harm through the
enforcement of minimum standards of conduct and care.
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 33
[...] those who choose to participate in regulated activities have…placed themselves in
a responsible relationship to the public generally and must accept the consequences of
that responsibility…those who engage in regulated activity should...be deemed to have
accepted certain terms and conditions applicable to those who act within the regulated
sphere.

Regulatory offences are thus mere mala prohibita as opposed to ‘true crimes’.
Various writers have tried to explain why reverse burdens are more acceptable from
a regulatory perspective. Glover takes the case of Johnstone and the principle of
‘voluntary acceptance of risk’ as core. Munday notes Lord Clyde’s speech in Lambert.
Other relevant cases are Davies v Health and Safety Executive [2002] EWCA Crim 2949 and
Chargot Ltd [2008] UKHL 73. Also highly relevant is the implied reverse burden case of
Grundy & Co Excavations Ltd v Halton Division Magistrates Court [2003] EWHC 272 where
it was held that it was proportionate, necessary and compatible with Article 6(2) for
the defendant to bear the burden of showing they had the appropriate licence to fell
trees. While not regulatory in the strict sense, legislation designed to prevent crime
(such as terrorism legislation) bears some similarities, although here reverse burdens
have frequently been seen as incompatible with Article 6(2).

By contrast, the classic model is focused on offences already committed, not potential
crimes of the future. This perspective is highly conditioned by the issue of what can
justify the punishment of those convicted of crimes. Proof of blameworthiness and
fault (and hence mens rea) by the prosecution is seen as critical. Equally, where a
‘prohibited act’ does not seem wrong in itself (although it may make sense to penalise
it to prevent future crimes), this makes it difficult to identify the ‘gravamen’ of the
offence. Very many of the judgments that you have read in connection with this
chapter reflect this classical perspective (and it may well also be your own underlying
sensibility). So, would it be a solution to separate out regulatory from other criminal
offences?

One of the key signs of the presence of this perspective is reference to the prosecutor
normally having to prove all the ‘essential elements’ of the offence. But often this
is not the same as the way the offence is formally defined. So, when judges or
legal writers invoke these ‘essential elements’ (mens rea and an actus reus), they
are adopting a normative, or ‘substantively based’ position (meaning an implicit
philosophy of criminal law) in order to evaluate the law of evidence. A key example
involving the ‘transfer’ of proof obligations is .s 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act as
adjudicated in Lambert (2001).

This ‘classic’ approach is often labelled ‘substantivist’ by contrast to ‘proceduralists’

(notably Roberts) who say that all the presumption of innocence means is that
the elements of the crime – however it happens to be defined – be proved by the
prosecution: ‘The presumption of innocence is a presumption that one is not guilty
of whatever may be the elements of a criminal offence’ (Lord Phillips in G [2006] 1
WLR 2052 at [36]). Arguably, this is also the stance of the ECtHR in respect to Article 6,
reinforced by the court’s reluctance to involve itself in substantive issues of criminal
law in different jurisdictions.

Hamer (see Further reading) provides a good account of what this debate is all
about (see also the extract from Roberts and Zuckerman). A more recent article by
Allen offers a more radical challenge, even rejecting the terms ‘substantivist’ and
‘proceduralist’ as too narrow and contrasting instead a ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ understanding
of the presumption of innocence.

These wider perspectives may be difficult to grasp in more than outline form but they
suggest some underlying conflicts patterning the seeming randomness of judicial
decision-making on reverse burdens.

Further reading
¢ Roberts, P. ‘The presumption of innocence brought home? Kebilene
deconstructed’ (2002) 118 LQR 41.

¢ Hamer, D. ‘The presumption of innocence and reverse burdens: a balancing act’

(2007) 66(1) CLJ 142.
page 34 University of London
¢ Allen, J. ‘Rethinking the relationship between reverse burdens and the
presumption of innocence’ (2021) 25(2) IJEP 115.

Reminder of learning outcomes

By this stage you should be able to:
u explain the effect of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) on placing a burden of proof on defendants in criminal trials
u analyse how the courts have interpreted reverse burdens under the HRA 1998
u offer and explain your views on when, if ever, a burden of proof should be placed
on defendants in criminal trials.

3.3 Directions to the jury and effects of misdirection in criminal

trials

Core texts
¢ Choo, Chapter 2 ‘Burden and standard of proof’, Section 2.1.1.4 ‘Effect of
misdirection’.

¢ Durston, Chapter 3 ‘The burden and standard of proof’, Section 6 ‘The standard
of proof in criminal and civil matters’ up to but excluding ‘Standard of proof in
civil cases’.

Essential reading
¢ Crown Court Compendium (2021) Part 1: Section 5 ‘Burden and Standard of Proof’.

At the close of the trial, the judge is required to direct the jury both as to how the
allocation of the burden of proof relates to the primary facts in issue and the relevant
standard of proof required. A misdirection (or failure to give a direction) on burden
and standard of proof is highly likely to lead to the quashing of a conviction on appeal.

As to the form of words used to convey the standard of proof, the expression ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’, and especially judges’ remarks in response to jurors’ requests for
clarification, have led to significant appeals. (Durston provides a brief summary in ‘The
prosecution standard of proof’.) To remedy this, following Lord Goddard in Summers
(1952) 36 Cr App R 14, the words ‘satisfied so that you feel sure’ or ‘more simply’ ‘sure
of guilt’ are preferred today. However, problems arose in Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 2563
where the judge tried to distinguish being sure from being certain (see also Stephens
[2002] EWCA Crim 1529). Today the emphasis is away from requiring judges to follow
formulas slavishly. It is enough if they convey the correct message to the jury through
the substance of the direction as a whole.

Where the defendant has the burden of proving an issue, the standard may be
conveyed by the phrase ‘more probable than not’ and possibly adding ‘the defendant
does not have to go so far as to make the jury sure this was the case’.

See Choo for discussion of misdirections in: Zarrabi (1984) The Times, 23 February 1985;
Moon [1969] 1 WLR 1705; O’Brien [2004] EWCA Crim 2900. Note in Moon and O’Brien the
need to direct the jury on the prosecutor’s burden to rebut any defence put to the jury
that carries an evidential burden only. For a striking example of an incorrect direction,
which clearly shows how the wrong message may be conveyed through the direction
overall, see Bentley (2001) 1 Cr App R 21 at [49].

Further reading
¢ Cases: Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; Bentley (2001) 1 Cr App R 21.

Reminder of learning outcomes

Having completed this chapter, and the Essential reading and activities, you should
be able to:
u state the Woolmington principle and exceptions
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 35
u explain the nature of the legal burden of proof and distinguish between legal
and evidential burdens
u understand the different standards of proof
u identify when a defendant in a criminal trial bears an evidential burden
u understand the difference between express and implied statutory exceptions
u explain the difficulties in determining whether a statute has impliedly placed a
burden of proof on defendants prosecuted under its provisions
u explain the role of extrinsic policy in the allocation of legal burdens in criminal
trials
u have developed a view on the extent, if at all, to which Woolmington has been
undermined by subsequent statute and case law
u explain the effect of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) on placing a burden of proof on defendants in criminal trials
u analyse how the courts have interpreted reverse burdens under the HRA 1998
u offer and explain your views on whether a burden of proof should ever be placed
on defendants in criminal trials
u have a basic knowledge of jury directions and the effects of misdirection on
burden and standard of proof
u critically evaluate the law in this area
u apply the law in a problem scenario.
page 36 University of London

Quick quiz

Question 1
On which two grounds did the House of Lords decide that the prosecution bore the
burden of proof in relation to the issue of the percentage of morphine in Hunt [1987]
AC 352?

a. The practical difficulties in discharging it and the severity of the offence.

b. The statutory wording of the provision and the ‘golden thread’.

c. The danger society faced from the menace of illegal drugs and the ambiguity of
statutory provision.

Question 2
In which House of Lords’ decision was it first established that a statutory provision
that expressly placed the burden of proof on a defendant in a criminal trial could be
interpreted in light of the HRA 1998 to place only an evidential burden on the defendant?

a. Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545.

b. Edwards [1975] QB 27.

c. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462.

Question 3
In Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28 the House of Lords decided which of the following?

a. The prosecution bore the legal burden on account of the severity of the sentence.

b. The defence bore the legal burden on account of the fact that those who trade in
brand products are aware of the need to be on guard and the practical difficulties
for the prosecution in tracing the suppliers of counterfeit goods.

c. The defence bore the legal burden on account of the public interest in combating
drug trafficking and the practical difficulties of proving a defendant’s state of mind.

Question 4
In relation to the decision of the House of Lords in Sheldrake v DPP; A-G’s Reference (No 4
of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43, which of the following statements is correct?

a. The House of Lords decided that the legal burden of proof placed on the defendant
by s.5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 should stand, and not be read down as an
evidential burden but that the legal burden of proof placed on the defendant by
s.11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 should be read down as an evidential burden only.

b. The House of Lords decided that the legal burdens placed on the defendant
by s.5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and s.11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 were
proportionate.

c. The House of Lords decided that neither s.5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 nor
s.11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 placed an express burden on the defendant.

Question 5
Which of the following statements is correct?

a. Legal burdens on the defendant in a criminal case are controversial because it

is unfair for the defendant to have to prove their innocence beyond reasonable
doubt.

b. In civil cases the claimant must prove the issues that they assert to be the case
beyond reasonable doubt.

c. Where the defendant in a criminal trial bears the legal burden of proof, the
standard of proof is ‘on the balance of probabilities’.
Evidence 3 Burden and standard of proof page 37

Sample examination question

‘It remains difficult to predict whether or not the courts will hold that a reverse
burden of proof is compatible with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on
Human Rights.’ Discuss.

Advice on answering the question

You need to demonstrate that you understand what a reverse burden of proof is and
that you know what Article 6(2) of the ECHR provides. You should do this at the outset.
You might also mention Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 in your introduction.

In your first paragraph you could discuss the decision in Lambert. You could note the
number and name of House of Lords’ decisions on this issue before discussing them in
detail in subsequent paragraphs.

In the main body of the essay you need to demonstrate understanding that a broad
proportionality test applies to all reverse burdens of proof and the different factors
typically taken into account. You can highlight the difficulty of prediction by noting
the inconsistencies between the decisions, as observed by Ian Dennis in his article.
The best answers will not just parrot Dennis’s argument but will demonstrate your
detailed understanding of case law and the issues at stake. Ideally your opinion would
be informed by the arguments you come across in the Further reading.

Additional examination question

‘In order to merit its reputation as a fundamental constitutional guarantee,
the presumption of innocence must be reasonably extensive and not too easily
defeated.’ Do you agree with this statement by Roberts and Zuckerman? In the
context of legal burdens of proof, has English law succeeded in ensuring that the
presumption of innocence is ‘not too easily defeated’?
No feedback provided.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Dagboek eener
reize ter walvisch- en robbenvangst, in de jaren
1777 en 1778 door Hidde Dirks Kat
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
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under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
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you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Dagboek eener reize ter walvisch- en robbenvangst, in de jaren

1777 en 1778 door Hidde Dirks Kat

Author: Hidde Dirks Kat

Release date: May 17, 2022 [eBook #68111]

Language: Dutch

Original publication: Netherlands: DE WED. A. LOOSJES Pz, 1818

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DAGBOEK

EENER REIZE TER WALVISCH- EN ROBBENVANGST, IN DE
JAREN 1777 EN 1778 DOOR HIDDE DIRKS KAT ***
 Dagboek
eener
reize
ter
walvisch- en
robbenvangst,

gedaan in de jaren 1777 en 1778

door
den kommandeur

Hidde Dirks Kat

met eene kaart van Groenland

Wat zeeman, die de kiel naar ’t barre Noorden stuurde,
Bestond er ooit op aard’, die zooveel ramps verduurde
Als KAT, die fiere KAT, die ’s lijdens beker heeft
Tot aan den boôm geleêgd, en toch, God dank! nog
leeft?
Voorberigt.
Dagboek gehouden door den kommandeur Hidde Dirks Kat.
Vervolg mijner reize. 1778.
Naberigt.
 Voorberigt.
De uitgever van dit Dagboek vond het na de lezing zoo belangrijk,
dat hij den Heer Kommandeur HIDDE DIRKS KAT, thans een
zeventigjarig grijsaard, die den avondstond zijns merkwaardigen
levens op het eiland Ameland slijt, verlof vroeg, om het door den
druk gemeen te mogen maken. Zijn Ed. vond daarin geene
zwarigheid; vooral, daar ik zijn Ed. te kennen had gegeven, dat
zoowel de meer bejaarden als het opkomend geslacht er welligt nut
uit zouden kunnen trekken; te meer wanneer men zich ook
verledigen wilde, om, ten dienste der scholen dit verhaal zoo te
wijzigen, dat het een Leesboek voor de jeugd vormde. Tot dat einde
zou het, mijns inziens, ook eene zeer doelmatige strekking hebben.
Als waarachtig verhaal verdient het niet alleen, om de hoogst
merkwaardige en zeldzame ontmoetingen, welke daarin voorkomen,
de aandacht van leergierige ouden en jongen, maar heeft het, na de
lezing, de eigenaardige kracht, dat het niet, gelijk zoovele andere uit
het onuitputtelijk rijk der hersenschimmen in het rijk der
wezenlijkheid overgevoerde en de op nieuwigheden van allerlei aard
azende menigte verrukkende droomen, in rook en damp verdwijnt,
maar als geschiedverhaal van daadzaken voortduurt en lessen en
wenken bevat, die zoo lang van waarde zullen zijn, als de
Zeevarende Natiën, en met name ons Vaderland, het van haar
belang zullen rekenen, om bronnen, waaruit weleer zoo aanzienlijke
rijkdommen opwelden, niet te doen opdroogen, maar zich, op het
voetspoor van onvermoeid werkzame en stoutmoedige voorgangers,
geene geringe schatting te doen betalen van de gedrogtelijke
bewoners des IJs-oceaans. Geschiedverhalen van dezen stempel
hebben bovendien voor den mensch, hij zij oud of jong (want op dit
punt heerscht er bij ouden en jongen groote overeenkomst) iets
bijzonder aantrekkelijks. Het avontuurlijke, weet men, valt in veler
smaak. Zij zullen daarom dit stuk bij voorkeur willen lezen—en
tevens dingen leeren, die in het rijk der wezenlijkheid t’huis
behooren, waarvan sommige misschien, te avond of morgen, partij
zullen kunnen trekken. Op onze eilanden en aan onze zeekusten, ja
rondom op den vaderlandschen bodem ontbreekt het niet aan
jongelingen, die het warme hoekje van den haard wel gaarne eens
met de frische lucht aan de kusten van Groenland, Straat Davids en
Spitsbergen willen verwisselen, als er maar geld bij te verdienen valt.
—’t Is waar, dit Dagboek behelst meer eene aaneenschakeling van
ongelukken en daarmede gepaard gaande zeer zeldzame
Lotgevallen dan wel een kort overzigt van hetgeen tot de Walvisch-
en Robben-vangst behoort. Wanneer men dit hier meende te
ontmoeten, zoude men zich te leur gesteld vinden. Maar er komen
zaken in voor, die de Jeugd tot dit weleer zoo gewigtig vak van
nationale nijverheid opleiden, er worden ontmoetingen, gevaren,
redmiddelen en uitkomsten in beschreven, die hem, die deze
wateren eens wil bevaren, grootelijks te stade kunnen komen; er
heerscht, om mij zoo eens uittedrukken, een ouderwetsche geest
van mannelijke kloekmoedigheid, onvermurwde standvastigheid,
ongeverniste Godsvrucht en geheel opregt en eenvoudig vertrouwen
op God en zijnen alvermogenden bijstand in, die der jeugd en ook
elken leeftijd nimmer zigtbaar genoeg voor oogen gesteld of te diep
in het hart geprent kunnen worden, vermits deze loopbaan zich door
ontelbare moeijelijkheden en gevaren henen kronkelt, die alleen de
man, wiens borst met het driedubbel erts van ware Godsdienstigheid
beslagen is, onverschrokken onder de oogen kan zien.—Het ware
misschien niet ondienstig der jeugd een Leesboek in handen te
geven, waarin zij zich, op eene doelmatige wijze, tot deze
belangrijke taak zou kunnen voorbereiden. Zoo de uitgever daartoe
eenen genoegzaam bemoedigenden wenk ontving, zou hij zich
daartoe (spaart God hem in het leven) gaarne in zijne snipperuren
willen verledigen (hoe weinig dit vak van wetenschap ook tot den
omtrek zijner eigenlijke Letteroefeningen behoort), aangezien hij zijn
vaderland te lief heeft, om niet met de grootste bereidvaardigheid,
ten minste eenen enkelen steen aan het gebouw van deszelfs
herlevenden welstand in dit vak van industrie te leggen. Om het
oorspronkelijke niet te verminken, is er hier en daar slechts een
weinigje aan den stijl gevijld en de spelling naar de thans gewettigde
gewijzigd. Gemakkelijk had de uitgever het in eenen dramatischen
vorm kunnen gieten; doch dit had niet dan ten koste der eenvoudige
waarheid kunnen geschieden, welke het blanketsel der kunst niet
behoeft, maar in een eenvoudig gewaad, zoo als de brave
Kommandeur dezelve heeft ingekleed, altoos het meest behaagt.
Dat ouden en jongen hier iets nuttigs mogen vinden, is de
hartelijke wensch van den Schoolopziener van het 3de District in
Vriesland, die zich met de uitgave belastte.

M. M.

1817.
 Dagboek
gehouden
door den kommandeur
Hidde Dirks Kat.
In den jare 1777, den 5 Maart, zeilde ik met de Brik de Jufvrouw
Klara, bestemd ter Walvisch- en Robbenvangst, en bemand met 38
koppen, van de stad Hamburg naar Groenland, voor rekening van
den Heer Boekhouder DAVID HENDRIK REWOEL, te Hamburg.
Op den 7den ligtte ik het anker op de Elve, liep in zee, en zeilde
met eenen gunstigen wind en goed weêr tot den 13den, op welk
tijdstip wij, na in goeden staat de Noordzee te zijn doorgezeild, met
eenen gunstigen wind Hitland voorbijstevenden, vervolgens de reize
voortzetten en op den 5 April (No 1.) voor het Westijs van Groenland
op 71 graden 30 minuten Noorder Breedte aankwamen, bij welk ijs
wij ons tot den 30sten ophielden, vangende op hetzelve 30 vaten
robbespek.
Den 1sten Mei geene robben meer kunnende vangen, zetten wij
met verscheidene schepen de reize om de Noord door het ijs voort,
koers houdende op Spitsbergen, en kwamen den 13 Mei (No 2.) op
75 gr. 30 min. N.B. tegen het Zuidijs; op den 17den (No 3.) raakten wij
met verscheidene schepen door hetzelve heen op 78 gr. 30 min.
N.B., en, van daar om de West zeilende, kwamen wij op den 26sten
aan de Westijsvelden; hier werden door verscheidene schepen
eenige Walvisschen gevangen. Vervolgens geraakten wij van den
koers af, dreven op goed geluk heen en maakten nu en dan de
schepen aan de ijsvelden of schotsen vast.—Op den 1 Julij (No 4.)
bevonden wij ons op 72 gr. 30 min. N.B. In dien tusschentijd vingen
wij eenen Walvisch van 30 vaten spek. Nu eens dreven wij met 27
schepen in getal in het ijs, dan bevonden wij ons weêr tusschen het
ijs op vrij water. Sommige schepen vingen toen nog eenige
Walvisschen. Tot den 4den dreven wij onophoudelijk sterk om de
Zuid-west, uit hoofde van den stroom en den harden wind uit het
Noord-oosten. Tot hiertoe zagen wij geen land, drijvende bestendig
met het ijs om de Zuid-west tot den 12den. Toen geraakten wij met 27
schepen sterk in het ijs bezet, en hadden 3 a 4 dagen zwaren storm
uit het Noord-oosten en geen gezigt wegens den dikken mist tot den
16den (No 5.).—Toen opende zich de lucht en kregen wij de kust van
Gale-Hamkes, op eenen afstand van 10 a 12 mijlen, ten Noord-
westen, in het gezigt. Wij zagen toen nog 27 schepen rondom ons en
dreven sterk om de Zuid-west. Het weêr bedaarde. Van 16 Julij tot 1
Augustus geraakten eenige schepen uit ons gezigt. In dien
tusschentijd vingen wij nog eenen kleinen Walvisch in gemeenschap
met Kommandeur HANS PIETERS. Voorts dreven wij zonder ophouden
door den sterken stroom en wind uit het Noord-oosten om de Zuid-
west tot den 6 Augustus (No 6.). Toen geraakten eenige schepen uit
ons gezigt, van welke eenige met een gedeelte van het volk vergaan
zijn. Wij bleven met 5 schepen in het ijs ingesloten, liggende aan een
klein ijsveld vast gemaakt, te weten Kommandeur HANS PIETERS,
PIETER ANDERSEN, HANS CHRISTIAAN JASPERS, ALBERT JANS en HIDDE
DIRKS KAT, alle vijf met Hamburger schepen. Dit was op 68 gr. 30 min.
N.B. Hier zagen wij het land niet meer, maar niets dan ijsbergen,
welke, met de toppen in de wolken, het land bedekken. Men kan
dezelve wel 16 a 18 mijlen ver zien. Even zoo vond ik naderhand het
land op 62 gr. 30 min. N.B. in de Straat Davis benoorden Kaap
Vaarwel. Van den 6den tot den 16den dreven wij door den sterken
Noord-oosten wind en den stroom met het ijs om de Zuid-west. Tot
den 18den werkte het ijs geweldig door malkander, hetwelk te midden
van den storm afgrijsselijk was te aanschouwen. In dien
schrikbarenden toestand werden de schepen van Kommandeur
PIETER A NDERSEN en ALBERT JANS door het ijs verbrijzeld. De
manschap redde zich op het ijs, wordende een gedeelte van den
leeftogt door dezelve geborgen. Wij verdeelden de manschap met
den leeftogt op de drie overgeblevene schepen, welke nabij de
verongelukte in het ijs beklemd lagen, op ieder van welke zich nu 78
zielen bevonden. Dit gebeurde op 67 gr. N.B. Nadat wij van de 5, 2
schepen verloren hadden, dreef het Walvisch-spek en de Traan om
ons heen, op welker reuk de Beeren in menigte af kwamen, waarvan
wij eenige dood schoten, die door het volk van de twee bij ons zijnde
schepen, wegens gebrek aan leeftogt, werden ingezouten. De
zoodanige, die er dadelijk van aten, vonden dit vleesch niet
onsmakelijk, maar na verloop van twee dagen, ging hun het vel in
den mond en van de tong als mede op andere plaatsen van het
ligchaam en van handen en voeten af. Volgens het oordeel van
Koopman ANDREAS OELZEN had men het, vóór het inzouten, ter deeg
moeten laten uitvriezen, alsdan zoude het een onschadelijk voedsel
zijn geworden. De Beeren veroorloofden ons niet, om gedurende den
nacht van het een tot het ander schip te gaan en verlieten ons niet,
vóór dat wij van het omdrijvende spek verwijderd waren. Voorts
dreven wij met onze drie in het ijs bezette schepen gedurig om de
West tot den 24 Augustus (No 8.). Toen konden wij uit den top van
den mast het eiland IJsland zien en tevens de vrije zee, hetwelk ons
hoop gaf, dat wij met onze schepen dit eiland zouden kunnen
bereiken, in gevalle het ijs van elkander mogt trekken. Op dit tijdstip,
waarin de hoop klein begon te worden, kwam ik zeer dikwijls bij
mijnen vriend, den Kommandeur HANS PIETERS, een man van 67
jaren, die aan eene scorbutieke ziekte krank te bedde lag, om met
denzelven over de mogelijkheid, om het eiland IJsland te bereiken, te
raadplegen. Deze had insgelijks weinig hoop, gevoelende tevens zijn
sterfuur naderen. Bij vollen verstande beklaagde hij ons, daar wij in
de kracht des levens in zulk eenen naren toestand verkeerden;
“Doch,” zeide hij, “God is magtig! Hij zal nog wel eenigen onzer in het
leven sparen, om deze gewigtige gebeurtenis aan de
nakomelingschap medetedeelen. Hetgeen ons te beurt valt, is niet
zonder wijze bedoeling der Voorzienigheid. Welligt kan het nog van
dienst zijn voor menschen, die naderhand in soortgelijke
omstandigheden komen te verkeeren.” Hij moedigde mij overigens
sterk aan, om, bijaldien onze drie schepen vergingen, vooral goeden
moed en raad te houden, de scheepssloepen, zooveel mogelijk, in
goeden stand te brengen en van leeftogt te voorzien.
 Ik legde mijne scheepskaart op het bedde van den kranken HANS
PIETERS, en raadpleegde met hem in zijne jongste oogenblikken.
“Kommandeur KAT,” zeide hij, “houd goeden moed en gedenk aan
mijne gezegden! Poog, is het mogelijk, daar wij IJsland reeds
voorbijdrijven, bij den hoek van Straat Davis, Statenhoek genaamd,
te landen.” Hierop stierf hij welgemoed op den 3 September. Niet lang
daarna werd zijn schip verbrijzeld.—Van 24 tot 30 Augustus (No 9.)
werden wij zeer sterk door stroom en wind om de Zuid-west
gedreven, zijnde bestendig ingesloten door het ijs met eene zware
deining of hooggaande zeeën, zoo dat wij ieder oogenblik vreesden
met man en muis te zullen vergaan, dat God tot hiertoe nog
verhoedde.
Van 30 Augustus tot 6 September (No. 10.) stevenden wij tusschen
het eiland IJsland en het vaste land van Nieuw-Groenland door, op
eenen afstand van 14 mijlen van den wal, van rondom met ijs bezet.
De drie schepen waren bij elkander. Het woei een orkaan uit het
Noord-oosten. Van rondom was de werking van het ijs onbeschrijfelijk
wreed en schrikbarende. Wij zagen elk oogenblik den dood te
gemoet. Dit viel voor op 66 gr. N.B. Wij zagen toen noch
Walvisschen, noch Robben (of Zeehonden), noch gevogelte meer. Dit
duurde van den 6den tot den 8sten September op gelijke
schrikbarende wijze voort. Toen bedaarde het weêr, en wij dreven
sterk langs de kust (of de ijsbergen) heen in eene Zuid-westelijke
rigting op eenen afstand van 14 mijlen, terwijl wij het land in het
gezigt hadden. De wind woei bestendig uit het Noord-oosten tot den
24 September (No 11.).—Toen konden wij van het dek de opene zee
aanschouwen, hetgeen ons hoop gaf, om uit het ijs te komen. Onze
schepen waren tot heden in eenen tamelijk goeden toestand en van
leeftogt voorzien; doch vermits stroom en wind dezelfde streek
hielden, opende het ijs zich niet, zoo dat onze schepen bestendig
door het ijs ingesloten en nu en dan in hetzelve beklemd waren. Dit
duurde tot den 29 September (No 12.) wanneer zich een geweldige
storm uit het Noord-oosten verhief. Wij bevonden ons toen eene mijl
ver van de opene zee. Onze 3 schepen bleven gedurende denzelven
zoo goed als onbeschadigd. Maar op den 30sten September (No 13.),
toen de wind allengs begon aftenemen, werden onze 3 schepen door
de geweldige werking der hooggaande zeeën (deining) tusschen het
ijs ingedrongen, en door deszelfs ontzettende stooten in één
oogenblik verbrijzeld. De masten buitelden op het ijs. Elk zocht op de
best mogelijke wijze lijfsberging op de woedende schotsen. Na het
vergaan van onze schepen, hadden wij het geluk van een gedeelte
van onzen leeftogt bij ons op het ijs te bergen. Ook redde ik zeven
sloepen. Hier stonden wij in dezen angstvollen toestand onder den
blooten kouden hemel, zonder schuilplaats, 21 mijlen ver van land op
het ijs, in zee, op 64 gr. N.B. Het land was uit ons gezigt. Wij
bevonden ons naar gissing 80 mijlen ten Westen van het eiland
IJsland. Ik en Kommandeur HANS PIETERS bevonden ons met onze
schepen, toen dezelve vergingen, digt bij elkander en Kommandeur
H.C. JASPERS was twee mijlen verder landwaarts van ons. In dit
tijdstip werd diens schip ook verbrijzeld, nemende hij de vlugt naar
het schip van Kommandeur KLAAS J. KASTERKOM, hetwelk, schoon
buiten ons gezigt, door hem gezien kon worden. Twee sloepen met
12 man bleven bij het verongelukte schip van H.C. JASPERS, welke
daar verongelukten. Kommandeur KASTERKOM bevond zich op zijn
schip met 286 man, toen het bij Statenhoek verging. Van dit getal zijn
slechts eenige te regt gekomen, alle de overige vergaan.
Nu bevonden wij ons, van ieder schip 78 man, op het ijs. Ik H.D.
KAT redde zeven sloepen en eenigen leeftogt. De een zag den ander
met droefheid aan, in zware gepeinzen verdiept, hoe en waar wij, in
dezen treurigen toestand, waarin wij den dood voor oogen zagen,
onze levensdagen zouden eindigen. Wij hadden geene zeilen, om
eene tent op het ijs opteslaan, waaronder wij ons een weinig zouden
hebben kunnen verschuilen.
Op den 1 October was er van onze verbrijzelde schepen niets
meer te zien of te vinden. Wij stonden hopeloos op het geweldig
stootend ijs, in vreeze, om ieder oogenblik door hetzelve vermorzeld
te worden. Het land was buiten ons gezigt. Wij waren nabij de opene
zee en werden Zuid-westwaarts aan voortgeslingerd op de schotsen.
Dit duurde tot den 3den October (No 14.) wanneer wij ons nog met 78
zielen op eene ijsschots van ongeveer 200 vierkante voeten in de
opene zee bevonden. Rondom ons heen was de zee eene vierde mijl
ver vol ijsgruis. Dit was ons behoud, vermits wij door middel van
hetzelve niet, bij het slingeren van onze ijsschots door de
hooggaande zeeën, van dezelve afgespoeld werden. Ondertusschen
ging zulks met groot gevaar vergezeld, zoo dat wij alle oogenblikken
vreesden om te zullen komen.
Tegen den morgen hoorden wij door het scheepsvolk van
Kommandeur PIETER ANDERSEN, bestaande in 78 man, die zich op
eene tweede digt bij ons drijvende ijsschots bevonden (No 3.) Gode
een gezang toezingen. Maar, toen de dageraad aanbrak, waren zij
van de ijsschots vergaan, uitgezonderd Kommandeur PIETER
ANDERSEN met eenige manschappen, die zich gered hadden. Om
middernacht was onze ijsschots midden doorgebroken ten gevolge
van de geweldige deining, waardoor wij 4 van onze sloepen verloren,
benevens onze meeste victualie (No 2.); van mijne 78 man (No 1.)
verloor ik op dit tijdstip niemand. Dit viel na gissing voor 40 mijlen ten
Oosten van Statenhoek. Gedurende den nacht waren wij door den
stroom het land sterk genaderd.
In den ochtend van den 4 October (No 15.) bevonden wij ons op
dezelfde ijsschots, die nu op de helft van 200 tot 100 voeten in het
vierkant verkleind was, op eenen afstand van 10 mijlen dwars van het
land af. Het weêr was nu goed. Ook hadden wij geene deining of
verheffing van zee, zijnde aan alle kanten ingesloten door drijfijs, dat,
naar ons bedunken, aan het land vast lag. Nu besloten wij onze drie
sloepen te verlaten en, zoo mogelijk, te voet op het land aantegaan,
weshalve wij onzen overgeschoten leeftogt onder malkander
verdeelden, bestaande eeniglijk in brood, waarvan ieder man omtrent
vijf scheepsbeschuiten met een weinigje boter ontving.
Bij nader inzien begrepen ik en Kommandeur ALBERT JANS, om
onze drie sloepen op onze kleiner ijsschots, waarop God ons, tot op
heden, zoo wonderbaar bewaard had, voor als nog, niet te verlaten.
Hiertoe besloten nog 49 andere, terwijl de overige 27 man een zeer
aandoenlijk afscheid van ons namen en over ijs naar land gingen. Of
deze aan land zijn gekomen, is mij onbekend.
In dezen nacht veroorzaakte eene hooggaande zee met weinig
wind, zulk eene zware deining in het ijs, dat de schotsen om ons
heen de een tegen de ander opstegen, zoo dat wij ieder oogenblik
den dood te gemoet zagen. Doch God was ons genadig. Het speet
ons toen zeer, dat wij met de 27 man niet naar land waren gegaan.
Deze nacht vertoonde aan ons oog akelige gedaanten. De zee
woedde aan de buitenzijde tegen het ijs. De baren verhieven zich als
torens in de lucht, makende in den langen donkeren nacht eene
verschrikkelijke vertooning, terwijl het zoute water vurige stralen
uitschoot. Onze kleine ijsschots van 100 voeten in het vierkant was
als met eene borstwering van kleine ijsschotsen omgeven. Deze
schoven zoodanig op elkander, dat wij ons naauwelijks konden
bergen. Doch wij bleven dezen nacht met onze 3 sloepen nog
onbeschadigd.
In den ochtendstond van den 5 October (No 16.) bedaarde het
weêr, en de zee werd hand over hand kalmer. Nu maakten wij onze
drie sloepen gereed, om er gebruik van te kunnen maken, als de
gelegenheid ons voorkwam, en besloten, om zoo lang op onze kleine
ijsschots van 100 voeten vierkant, (waarop God ons tot hiertoe zoo
wonderbaar bewaard had) te blijven, tot dat wij genoodzaakt zouden
zijn, om dezelve te verlaten. Het kwam ons voor, als of die schots
voor ons bestemd was.—Ons voedsel was zeer gering. Van onze 5
scheepsbeschuiten hadden wij niet veel meer overig. Den dorst
leschten wij met aan een stuk uitgevroren ijs te zuigen. Des
namiddags legde ik mij, bij mooi weêr, in eene der sloepen neder, om
een weinig te rusten. Ik was naauwelijks een weinig ingesluimerd,
toen het volk, (hetwelk in hoopen van 17 man, voor ieder der drie
sloepen één, verdeeld was) met groote verbaasdheid in de sloepen
viel, en mij, met een luidruchtig geschreeuw, bekend maakte, dat de
zee over onze ijsschots heen liep, waardoor dezelve dreigde te
zinken. Hierop opende zich boven verwachting het ijs, zoo dat wij ons
zeer schielijk op de vrije zee bevonden. Wij zetten toen onze zeiltjes
bij (No 16.) met eenen gunstigen Noord-oosten wind en stevenden op
Statenhoek aan. Wij hadden een kompas, konden het land zien en
zeilden des nachts langs het wit blinkend ijs.
Onze schipbreuk (No 13.) was zeer verschrikkelijk, vergezeld van
de smartelijkste gevolgen tot den 5 dezer, maar onze ijsbreuk (No
14.) en het verlies van de schots was niet minder schrikbarende. Wij
zeilden bij het ijs langs tot den 6 October (No 17.). Des middags
bevonden wij ons, naar gissing, 6 mijlen beoosten Statenhoek. Hier
dreven wij met het ijs zeer verre in zee op; (No 17.) zoo dat mijn volk
uit onkunde en vrees weigerde, om langer langs het ijs zeewaarts in
te zeilen, hetwelk nogtans noodzakelijk was, vermits dit ijs aan
Statenhoek vast lag en ons om de punt heen leidde. Wij zouden
alzoo doende met onze sloepen land hebben bekomen, schoon men
zich bij deze onderneming het gevaar van wind en zee moest
getroosten. Nu was men genoodzaakt, om, zooveel mogelijk, door
het ijs te werken, ten einde het land te bereiken. Hiermede vorderden
wij niet meer dan eene halve mijl, wanneer wij genooddrongen
werden het werk te staken en de sloepen op het ijs te halen. Hier
vond ik eenen ijsberg (zie No 17.) welke, naar gissing, 60 a 70 voeten
hoog was. Dezen beklom ik met eenige van mijne manschappen en
toonde hun de dwaasheid hunner keuze, hebbende mijnen raad niet
willen volgen, om met onze sloepen rondom de ver in zee
uitstekende ijspunt heen te zeilen, wanneer wij op Statenhoek,
waarschijnlijker wijze, hadden kunnen landen. Dit was nu te laat. Wij
hielden ons voorts bij onze drie sloepen op het ijs, gekweld door
grooten honger en koude en afgesold door vermoeidheid, doordien
wij geene rust hoegenaamd genoten.
Op den 7 October (No. 18.) kwamen wij des morgens bij goed
weêr, tot het verbazend en ijsselijk besluit, om onze drie sloepen te
verlaten, om te zien, of wij te voet over ijs het land zouden kunnen
bereiken, aangezien wij aan alle zijden door het ijs ingesloten waren,
en onze leeftogt slechts bestond in 3 scheepsbeschuiten voor ieder
hoofd. Vóór dat wij dit echter ondernamen, braken wij eerst het hout
uit de sloepen, maakten daarvan een vuur aan op het ijs,
verwarmden onze ingewanden met wat heet theewater en nam elk
onzer een’ beet van zijne drie beschuiten. Sterke drank ontbrak ons
ten eenenmale. Na deze verkwikking namen wij een zeer
aandoenelijk afscheid van twee onzer lotgenooten, welken wij Gods
groote genade toewenschten. Wij moesten hen, door dien zij niet
gaan konden, bij de sloepen laten. (No 17.) Vervolgens gingen wij,
ten getale van 49 man, op het land aan. De laatste groete aan deze
twee achterblijvende mannen viel ons zeer smartelijk. Wij hadden 2
haken, 1 theeketel en 1 biermok, tot ons gerijf, bij ons.
Van 7, 8, 9 tot den 10 October (No 19.) liepen wij, afgemat door
honger en koude, van het eene stuk ijs op het ander, om land te
winnen. Het ijs ging door de zeewelling of deining onophoudelijk met
geweld open en toe. Sommige onzer, pogende van de eene op de
andere schots te komen, geraakten, door de gladheid van het ijs,
tusschen de schotsen, in het water, verdronken en werden tusschen
het ijs verpletterd. Ik zelf geraakte tweemaal van het ijs af, doch werd
telkens weêr opgehaald en gered door de twee haken, vóór dat het
ijs zich weêr toesloot, en moest zoo met mijne natte kleederen al den
volgenden tijd gaan, hetwelk mij ongemeen verzwakte. Ik had toen
nog twee scheepsbeschuiten. Men beseffe eens, welke kracht de
goede God ons in deze omstandigheden verleende! Ziende de
zwarigheden, die wij nog moesten te boven komen, was het schier
niet om uit te houden.—Dagelijks overviel ons de vrees voor wild
gedierte, en onder het voortwandelen opende zich van tijd tot tijd
eene groote ijsspleet voor onze voeten, waarin velen onzer hun graf
vonden, vermits het ijs zich dadelijk, bij het terugkeeren van het
water, toesloot. Des avonds bevonden wij, dat wij nog twee mijlen
van het land verwijderd waren. Doch daar het ijs niet aan het land
vast lag, moesten wij hopende wachten, of het zich aan het land mogt
aansluiten. Terwijl wij dezen nacht met een diep neerslagtig hart
doorbragten, lag de een en zat de ander op het ijs, terwijl een derde
stond. Ik zat in het midden van twee ter regter en linker zijde naast
mij liggende mannen, welke des morgens dood gevroren waren.
In den morgenstond van 11 Oct. (No 20.) bevond ik, dat
Kommandeur ALBERT JANS met eenige manschappen, gedurende den
nacht, door de uitwerking van het draai-ijs van mij was verwijderd
geraakt. Ik zag dezelve hier niet weder. Dezen morgen dreef ons
eene lange strook ijs voor den mond eener rivier voorbij. Deze stiet
tegen onze ijsschots. Wij stapten er dadelijk op over, met
uitzondering van één’ man, die niet verder voort kon. Wij moesten
hem met hartverscheurende smart verlaten. Deze lange strook ijs
bragt ons aan land. Wij hadden aan beide zijden van dezelve de
opene zee, en kwamen des na den middags bij Statenhoek aan.
Deze hoek ligt op 59 graden 30 minuten N. Breedte. Wij vonden in de
valleijen eenige groente en boompjes, waaraan blaauwe bessen
groeiden. Wij plukten die bij menigte en aten ze met veel smaak.
Onze blijdschap, dat wij aan land waren gekomen zonder vooruitzigt,
waar wij belanden zouden, was onbeschrijfelijk groot. Hier bevonden
wij nog 18 in getale te zijn. Waar de overige gebleven zijn, behalve de
voorgemelde 27 man, die naar land waren gegaan, is ons ten deele
onbekend. Deze nacht viel ons lang en bang, door het vallen van
menigvuldige sneeuw en eenen harden kouden wind, alsmede door