FELICITY CONDITIONS

Austin’s conception of felicity and felicity conditions

(happiness) and infelicity (unhappiness). Illocutionary acts serve as

‘doings’ or ‘actions’ and they do so beyond the scope of the physical act of moving one’s speech

apparatus. The notion of felicity amounts to how successfully these actions are carried out. Speech

acts that are successful in this regard are called felicitous, and those that are not are called

infelicitous (Austin 2018, p. 16). Infelicities are “things that can be and go wrong” (Austin 2018,

p. 14) in illocutionary acts. Much of How to Do Things With Words is dedicated to naming,

determining, classifying, describing and providing examples of infelicities. To understand how a

certain speech situation is able to be effective, one also needs to delineate unsatisfactory cases.

The investigation into ‘what can go wrong’ in speech acts lead Austin to investigate under which

conditions felicity is made possible. In order for felicity to obtain in illocutionary acts, certain

linguistic and extra-linguistic conditions need to be met, and Austin called them ‘felicity

conditions’ (Austin 2018).

Felicity conditions are defined by Austin as conditions that “have to be satisfied if the utterance is

to be happy” (Austin 2018, p. 45). He believed that, without satisfying these conditions, a speech

act cannot be redeemed. The fulfillment of these conditions should serve as a criterium for

determining whether or not a specific speech act (illocutionary act) constitutes a fruitful

contribution to the speech situation.

For Austin, illocutionary acts are grounded in convention, and to carry them out successfully,

making them ‘felicitous’, they need to abide by felicity conditions (Austin 2018, p. 14). Austin

viewed felicity conditions as realization of specific social conventions (Harris, Fogal and Moss

2018, p. 2). The notion of convention in the scope of a speech theory seems to imply that these

conditions are ‘outside’ of the speaker.

Generally speaking, context seems to be of an insurmountable importance when dealing with

speech acts. Context of the utterance is determined by the circumstances in which the speech act
occurs. Therefore, circumstances play a central role in whether or not a speech act will be

felicitous. Circumstances of the act are not contained in the utterance itself, and constitute

extralinguistic factors. Illocutionary acts are, at least from the perspective of pragmatics, acts that

depend upon the circumstances of the speech situation. Austin (2018, p. 52) concludes that, in

order to come forward with a competent speech act theory, one needs to consider “the total

situation” and “the total speech act”. Furthermore, when referring to felicity conditions, Austin

treats them as if they were unspoken, implicit rules that are dependent upon conventions. In turn,

circumstances that create the context of illocutionary acts should align with these conventions.

He proceeds to address the importance of suitability of circumstances in bringing about success in

illocution: “Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words

are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that

either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether

‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words.” (Austin 2018, p. 8).

Therefore, in order to deem an illocutionary act as felicitous, one needs to take into account not

only what is said (the words uttered by the speaker), but also the behavior of others and the

circumstances in which they occur. In short, elements of the communicative situation as a whole

need to be taken into account to determine if an act is felicitous, and if not, what the reasons are

for it being infelicitous.

Similar to the view that Austin held on felicity conditions, Searle states that his method is to

determine “what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the act of promising to have been

successfully and non-defectively performed in the utterance of a given sentence” (Searle 1969, p.

54). Searle’s theory also states that what he calls a ‘defective illocutionary act’ is quite similar to

Austin’s ‘infelicitous illocutionary act’ (Searle 1969, p. 54). It is thus evident that, though Searle’s

and Austin’s theories were quite different in many respects, Austin’s notion of felicity conditions

provided an incentive for the development of further types of conditions in other speech act theories.
For performatives to actually "perform," both speaker and audience must accept certain assumptions
about the speech act. These assumptions are called felicity conditions and are often divided into three
categories: essential conditions, sincerity conditions, and preparatory conditions.

 Essential condition--This means that you say what you say, that both speaker and hearer take
the utterance to be performative. EX: If you say "I promise to do my homework" to a teacher,
both of you think of that statement as taking the form of a promise. If you quote yourself to a
friend as saying "I told my teacher 'I promise to do my homework,'" the quote--though identical
in its locutionary properties (see below)--fails to promise because it has become part of a
representative act reporting on the promise.

 Sincerity condition--This means that you mean what you say, that both speaker and hearer take
the utterance to be intentional, to accurately represent the wish of the speaker and the hearer's
understanding that the utterance expresses that wish. The common expression "in good faith"
illustrates the basic premise of the sincerity condition. EX: If you say "I promise to do my
homework" to a teacher, both of you think of that statement as being a promise, as a verbal
contract suggesting that you want to do the homework and possess the requisite capacities to
complete it.

 Preparatory conditions--This means that you can do what you say, that both speaker and hearer
agree that it is situationally appropriate to for you to perform the speech act. Don't confuse
"can do" with "able to do." Ability is part of sincerity. In this case, "can do" means "allowed to
do," to be socially sanctioned to perform the act. EX: If you say "I promise to do my homework"
to a teacher, you are actually a student in the teacher's class and the homework has been
assigned. If these conditions were not met, you'd have no homework and, thus, no need to
promise to do it.