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Junk Food Politics
 This page intentionally left blank

349-99188_Rothfels_ch01_3P.indd 6
Junk Food Politics
How Beverage and Fast Food Industries
Are Reshaping Emerging Economies

Eduardo J. Gómez

JOHNS HO P KIN S UN IV ER SIT Y P R ESS B A LTI M O R E

© 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press
All rights reserved. Published 2023
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Johns Hopkins University Press

2715 North Charles Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21218
www.press.jhu.edu

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Gómez, Eduardo J., 1973– author.

Title: Junk food politics : how beverage and fast food industries are reshaping
emerging economies / Eduardo J. Gómez.
Description: Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021047164 | ISBN 9781421444284 (hardcover) | ISBN
9781421444291 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Nutrition policy—Developing countries. | Public health—Economic
aspects—Developing countries. | Food industry and trade—Moral and ethical
aspects. | Junk food—Developing countries.
Classification: LCC TX360.5 .G66 2022 | DDC 363.809172/4—dc23/eng/20220327
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021047164

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Special discounts are available for bulk purchases of this book. For more information, please
contact Special Sales at [email protected].
To my dear father, Guillermo Leon Gómez,
who always listens, encourages, and supports
my big ideas and ambitions
 This page intentionally left blank

349-99188_Rothfels_ch01_3P.indd 6
 Contents

Preface ix

Introduction 1

1 Interest Group Theory, Institutions, and Public Health Policy 14

2 Fear and Opportunity 34

3 Mexico 41

4 Brazil 75

5 India 124

6 Indonesia 180

7 China 225

8 South Africa 270

Conclusion 310

References 325
Index 393
 This page intentionally left blank

349-99188_Rothfels_ch01_3P.indd 6
 Preface

I love London coffee shops—they welcome diverse groups of people,

are always lively, and often are the best place to mingle, read, and generate
big ideas. My idea for this book emerged in such a place. Sipping a dark
cafezinho one afternoon in west London, I chanced upon an online news
article discussing the power of food-based interest groups for influencing
university research in ways that made US health care officials overlook the
harmful health effects of sugar. I could not believe how influential these
interest groups were. At the same time, I began to realize that many of the
most innovative programs for preventing obesity and type 2 diabetes around
the world were not working as well as expected. After several years of pol-
icy innovations in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, cases of obesity and
type 2 diabetes were burgeoning; and even more worrisome, it was happen-
ing at an alarming rate among vulnerable populations, such as children and
the poor. Why? Could it be that a major external force, such as the political
and social prowess of major food industries, was hampering the design and
implementation of these policies? A flame was lit. A big idea emerged. And I
endeavored to find answers to this vexing question.
I soon realized that providing an answer to this question required an in-
depth comparative historical analysis of how major food and beverage in-
dustries came to wield great influence; how these industries were shaping
politics, policy, and society; and how or even if governments should work
with these industries in response. I wondered—in emerging middle-income
countries seeing a rapid increase in foreign direct investment and economic
growth—whether recent transitions to democracy and electoral institutions
could safeguard vulnerable populations from the industries’ policy influence
and their unhealthy products. Were politicians genuinely committed to pro-
tecting children and the poor from consuming these products too much and
preventing their associated ailments? Were presidential, congressional, and
bureaucratic institutions adapting by learning how to grapple with this new
public health challenge? In my mind, writing a book was the only fitting way
to address these concerns adequately.
x Preface

Books require a lot of work, commitment, and support. Writing one is a

marathon. I had the honor and privilege along the way of working with
amazing colleagues. I would like first to thank my editor at Johns Hopkins
University Press, Robin Coleman, as well as the Editorial Board at Hopkins
for providing me with the opportunity to have this book published. Robin
offered in-depth comments, support, and encouragement along the way.
Robert Brown, a production editor at Hopkins, did a brilliant job of working
with me on polishing the end product. I would also like to thank other col-
leagues and research assistants for their thoughts and suggestions at differ-
ent stages of research and writing: Ally Wolloch, Nino Dzotsenidze, James
McGuire, Joseph Harris, and Tara Kessaram.
Finally, my family and friends were there for me throughout the process.
My father, Guillermo L. Gómez, never failed to offer a listening ear and en-
couragement. When I wasn’t writing, my dear friends Patrick Crotty, Ash
Hoque, Fathima Wakeel, and Robert Hargrove, along with my family away
from home at the Roger Gracie Brazilian Jiu Jitsu Academy in west London,
were always available for respite and support. It was a long haul, but my
peeps helped push me across the finish line.
Junk Food Politics
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349-99188_Rothfels_ch01_3P.indd 6
 Introduction

In 2016, Dr. Margaret Chan, who was China’s first woman to serve as
director general of the World Health Organization (WHO), delivered a key-
note address to the National Academy of Medicine. She was a leader. She
was a visionary. And she had an important message. Speaking to a capti-
vated audience, Director Chan discussed the need to tackle the burgeoning
epidemic of obesity and type 2 diabetes. Toward the end of her presentation,
she argued that one of the primary reasons for the emergence of these epi-
demics was the lack of political will to tackle the interests and power of big
industry. Specifically, she commented: “When crafting preventive strategies,
government officials must recognize that the widespread occurrence of obe-
sity and diabetes throughout a population is not a failure of individual will-
power to resist fats and sweets or exercise more. It is a failure of political will
to take on the powerful food and soda industries. If governments understand
this duty, the fight against obesity and diabetes can be won. The interests of
the public must be prioritized over those of corporations” (Chan 2017).
In essence, this book seeks to address why many of our most thriving
emerging economies today have neglected to fulfill Dr. Chan’s call to duty of
taking on the interests and power of major junk food industries—defined
here as multinational and domestic soda and ultraprocessed food companies.
Achieving this requires policies that not only effectively inform consumers,
such as by ensuring the provision of accurate and reliable food labels, but
also effectively regulate the marketing and sale of their products, especially
toward vulnerable populations, such as children and the poor. Unfortunately,
for most countries in the developing world, governments have neglected to
earnestly pursue these marketing and sales regulatory policies, instead al-
2 Junk Food Politics

lowing junk food industries to thrive and prosper, but at the expense of the
deteriorating health of these vulnerable populations.
An intriguing puzzle emerges. Despite the absence of these much-needed
regulatory policies, several of the world’s biggest emerging economies, such
as Mexico, Brazil, India, China, Indonesia, and South Africa, have done a
commendable job of implementing a host of innovative obesity and type 2
diabetes prevention programs. Indeed, in these emerging economies, which
are the focus of this book, governments have unleashed a myriad of inno-
vative public awareness campaigns and funding for nutritional and exercise
programs, and, in some instances, have even introduced controversial soda
taxes. Mexico was a global leader in this last regard, being the first in the
world to adopt a national soda tax in 2013. What’s more, in 2010, Brazil was
recognized by the international community, along with the United King-
dom, for its policy innovations in tackling obesity (Gómez 2015). Neverthe-
less, these governments have repeatedly neglected to take on the power of
big industry by failing to enact effective regulatory policies circumscribing
industry’s ability to communicate, market, and sell their products, espe-
cially to vulnerable populations. These policy outcomes have emerged at a
time when the majority of childhood obesity cases are soaring in these high-
growth emerging markets, throughout the Americas, Asia, and Africa, and
where type 2 diabetes is now prevalent among adults and adolescents. In fact,
according to the WHO, “the vast majority of overweight or obese children
live in developing countries, where the rate of increase has been more than
30% higher than that of developed countries” (2020, 1; see figure).
Addressing this puzzling situation requires an in-depth comparative his-
torical analysis of the complex world of junk food politics. In this book, I
argue that there is a context of fear and opportunity—that is, junk food
industries continuously fear the prospect of losing revenue in the industri-
alized West and opportunities abound for investment in the emerging econ-
omies. With a rising middle-income class and increased consumer spending,
more than ever industries have had incentives to engage in several political,
institutional, and civil societal tactics facilitating their ability to stymie the
creation and implementation of regulatory policies. From engaging in inno-
vative policy partnerships with government to reshaping bureaucratic insti-
tutions and civil societal actors in their favor, these industries have garnered
the political legitimacy and influence needed to achieve this policy objective.
But industries are only partly to blame. Governments are equally respon-
 Introduction 3

16
Global
14 Africa
Americas
12
Southeast Asia
10 Europe
Percentage

Eastern Mediterranean
8 Western Pacific

0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Years
Prevalence of obesity among children and adolescents (ages 5–19). Source:
WHO, 2020. Global Health Observatory data repository. https://apps.who.int
/gho/data/view.main.BMIPLUS2REGv?lang=en

sible. Basically, junk food politics is a two-way street. While industries have
worked hard to influence government, political leaders have had a historic
track record of partnering with industry to achieve their alternative pol-
icy, and thus political, agendas. Powerful presidents in Mexico, Brazil, India,
China, Indonesia, and South Africa have viewed these industries as neces-
sary allies, helping these heads of state implement a host of economic and
social welfare programs—and in the process, contributing to their nation’s
developmental prospects. But more importantly for these leaders, they have
benefited politically, as partnering with industry has helped them to ful-
fill their economic and social welfare objectives, and thus achieve electoral
promises. In this context, industry’s political tactics have been indirectly
supported by presidential partnership and political ambition.
To better understand and explain the complex world of junk food poli-
tics, this book introduces an analytical framework named Industry Politics
and Complementary Institutions (IPCI). To my knowledge, this framework
is the first to unify several theoretical schools of thought in political science
and public health policy to guide our analysis and, more importantly, pro-
4 Junk Food Politics

vide a more thorough explanation of the junk food industry’s political and
policy influence in several emerging economies. As I explain in chapter 1,
this framework begins by focusing on the broader historical context of fear
and opportunity, where, more than ever, industry fears of dwindling global
profits, when combined with new investment opportunities in the emerging
economies, have generated incentives for junk food industries to influence
politics, society, and policy. In this historical context, IPCI emphasizes that
industries have engaged in several political processes, ranging from the for-
mation of health policy partnerships with government officials to industry
lobbying, the provision of largesse, and the strategic infiltration of bureau-
cratic institutions. At the same time, IPCI underscores industry’s efforts to
restructure society in its favor—that is, by establishing civil societal part-
nerships and providing social services while strategically using these partner-
ships to generate divisions in society and, ultimately, to undermine collective
opposition against industry. And finally, this framework introduces the im-
portant concept of complementary institutions. In other words, the historical
and contemporary incentives that presidents have to partner with and use
industry for political objectives. These partnerships ultimately serve to in-
directly supplement the political tactics and influence of junk food indus-
tries while emphasizing the fact that governments and their political leaders
are also to blame for industry’s ongoing policy influence over noncommuni-
cable diseases (NCDs).
When taken together, IPCI provides greater insight into why junk food
industries continue to have the political legitimacy and influence needed to
repeatedly undermine the introduction and effectiveness of NCD regulatory
policies. Nevertheless, this approach also helps to explain why several of our
biggest emerging economies have neglected to achieve Director Chan’s call
to duty of taking on the power and interests of big business. Sometimes it
seems that political leaders benefit more from seeing these industries thrive
and prosper, sadly, to the detriment of the health of our children and the
poor.

Understanding Junk Food Politics

Applying my analytical framework to the cases of Mexico, Brazil,
India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa helps to provide a thorough expla-
nation of the junk food industry’s political interference in NCD regulatory
policy.
 Introduction 5

In Mexico, the presence and influence of these industries emerged shortly

after the introduction of free market reforms—for instance, free trade and
deregulation. This context allowed industries, such as Coca-Cola, to obtain
an early foothold in the market, becoming important economic and politi-
cal entities. As the public health challenges of obesity and type 2 diabetes
emerged, however, the government was slow to respond. After several years
of scientific warnings from Mexico’s National Institute of Public Health, the
government implemented national prevention programs focusing on NCD
awareness and improved nutrition. While regulatory policies targeting the
marketing and sale of junk food products were eventually introduced, they
were poorly enforced and mostly ignored.
For the most part, these outcomes were the product of the junk food
industry’s apparent legitimacy and policy influence, facilitated through sev-
eral political and social tactics. These tactics included working closely with
Department of Health officials to create health and educational programs in
schools, lobbying, and engaging in largesse (mainly via electoral campaign
contributions) while infiltrating national bureaucratic advisory committees
in order to safeguard industry’s ideas and policy interests. These industries
also engaged in several partnerships with academic researchers and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), but to the detriment of civil society’s
ability to mobilize and hold industries accountable for their actions. Despite
these challenges, activists continue to draw attention to the need to address
Mexico’s childhood obesity and diabetes problem. Though initially strug-
gling to gain government recognition and influence, in recent years, activ-
ists and NGOs have highlighted the junk food industry’s harmful effects and
drawn greater attention to the need for more aggressive regulatory action.
Nevertheless, industry’s political tactics and influence were also indi-
rectly supported by Mexico’s powerful presidents, such as Vicente Fox (PAN,
2000–2006), Felipe Calderón (PAN, 2006–2012), and Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI,
2012–2018). These leaders partnered with soda and ultraprocessed food
companies in order to achieve their alternative economic and social welfare
agendas, such as implementing popular anti-hunger campaigns. This kind
of strong presidential support, what IPCI refers to as an example of com-
plementary institutions, further emboldened industry’s political legitimacy
and, unfortunately, its ongoing policy influence.
Mexico’s neighbor to the south, Brazil, faced similar challenges. There,
major junk food industries emerged following the transition to democracy
6 Junk Food Politics

and free market reforms, a process facilitating and encouraging investment

in the soda, snack food, and fast food sectors. Despite an increase in obesity
and type 2 diabetes cases among Brazil’s most vulnerable populations, the
government was slow to respond. And when it did eventually respond, the
Ministry of Health’s (MoH) focus was first on providing innovative preven-
tion programs, with an emphasis on information and awareness. While reg-
ulations restricting the marketing and sale of products were eventually in-
troduced, they were either limited, ignored, or blocked by industry interests.
And to this day, the government has not implemented—or even attempted
to introduce—a tax on sodas and junk foods.
Similar to what we saw in Mexico, these outcomes were the product of
several industries’ efforts to engage in health policy partnerships with the
MoH, lobbying and largesse (via campaign donations), while strategically
infiltrating national regulatory agencies, such as Anvisa, Brazil’s national reg-
ulatory agency for food, pharmaceutical, tobacco, and other health care ser-
vices. Nevertheless, major industries, such as PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, and Nestlé,
also provided several corporate social responsibility activities, ranging from
the provision of community employment programs to supporting gay rights
campaigns. Helpful in building social allies, these industry efforts neverthe-
less contributed to divisions in society between those that supported indus-
try and those that did not, in turn hampering nutrition activists’ ability
to mobilize in opposition. Despite these challenges, the activist community
continues to strive to address industry’s harmful effects in society, and es-
pecially among children and the poor.
And yet, the onus of responsibility cannot solely be placed on junk food
industries. The government has also been responsible for industry’s ongo-
ing policy influence. Indeed, Brazil’s presidents, such as Luiz Inácio “Lula” da
Silva (PT, 2002–2010), appear to have benefited from establishing a strong
partnership with industry leaders, strategically using them to achieve pop-
ular anti-poverty measures. Lula even went so far as to create federal institu-
tions that would sustain this partnership with industry. Strong presidential
backing, or what I refer to as complementary institutions, indirectly con-
tributed to these industries’ political legitimacy and policy influence.
India, Brazil’s counterpart in South Asia, is also experiencing similar
challenges. Although junk food industries initially struggled to enter India’s
market due to the presence of a nationalist socialist government, free mar-
ket reforms beginning in the 1990s generated new incentives and opportu-
 Introduction 7

nities for several industries (mainly foreign) to capture and develop the
market. India’s government faced the dual burden of malnutrition, how-
ever, where ongoing undernutrition was soon accompanied by a high level
of obesity and type 2 diabetes cases, surging in recent years among children
and the poor. In this complex nutritional context, the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare (MHFW) was considerably delayed in providing several NCD
prevention programs. While parliament eventually succeeded in adopting a
“sin tax” on sodas and junk foods in 2017, ineffective regulations emerged in
the area of food labeling; the marketing of these products has instead relied
on ineffective industry self-regulation, sans government involvement, while
to this day, not a single piece of legislation exists regulating junk food sales,
especially toward children.
Industry politics has once again interfered, contributing to these policy
outcomes. These outcomes were influenced by industry’s efforts to partner
with government on several innovative NCD prevention programs, aggres-
sive lobbying, as well as industry’s infiltration of federal regulatory agen-
cies. At the same time, several companies, such as PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, and
Nestlé, have invested in local communities by providing health and other
social welfare services. While broadening their support base, these efforts
have nevertheless divided society and its ability to mobilize against industry’s
political activities and policy influence. While new and emerging, nutrition-
ist activists in India are nevertheless making excellent progress in drawing
attention to these industry tactics, raising greater awareness about the need
to improve children and the poor’s nutrition and overall health while pres-
suring the government to adopt more aggressive regulatory policies.
However, once again, industry politics is only partly to blame. In India,
the government has also done its part in contributing to industry’s ongoing
policy influence. Indeed, as seen in Mexico and Brazil, India’s political lead-
ers, such as Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2014–present) of the Bharatiya
Janata Party, have relied on junk food industries as vital partners in achiev-
ing Modi’s objective of increasing foreign direct investment, economic growth,
and prosperity for all. By working with industry to achieve these alternative
economic objectives, though, Modi has indirectly bolstered the political le-
gitimacy and influence of these industries, while helping him maintain pop-
ular support. Here, once again, complementary institutions have only served
to benefit industry, ultimately at the expense of improving the health of
children and the poor.
8 Junk Food Politics

Indonesia, India’s neighbor to the south, also saw the gradual emergence
of a thriving junk food industry, kindled by the expeditious transition to
free market reforms and decentralization. Similar to India, the double bur-
den of malnutrition contributed to delays in the MoH’s policy response.
While MoH prevention programs eventually emerged, efforts to introduce
a soda tax were nevertheless short-lived. Few, if any, regulatory efforts were
made in the areas of food labeling, marketing, and sales. And this has oc-
curred amid the burgeoning growth of obesity and type 2 diabetes cases
among the islands’ most vulnerable populations.
But why did this occur? Industries and their supportive interest groups
were successful mainly due to their aggressive lobbying efforts while inces-
santly pressuring legislators to refrain from adopting a soda tax. Although
close policy partnerships were never pursued with government, several junk
food industries engaged in a wide range of corporate social responsibility
initiatives in order to establish social legitimacy and influence. Neverthe-
less, these activities contributed to growing divisions in society, where in-
dustry partnerships with nutrition scientists and NGOs reduced the num-
ber of allies that activists could work with to mobilize and confront industry’s
ongoing policy influence. In this challenging context, and despite the fact
that civil society’s presence in the area of nutrition has only recently emerged,
activists are doing a commendable job of raising awareness about obesity
and type 2 diabetes, and the double burden of malnutrition, while calling for
more aggressive industry regulations.
At the same time, however, Indonesia’s presidents have also indirectly
contributed to the junk food industry’s success. Recent presidents, such as
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, commonly referred to by his initials (SBY; 2004–
2014) and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo (2014–present), have established close part-
nerships with several major industries in order to help accelerate economic
development, provide food security, and reduce poverty. But unfortunately,
these complementary institutions once again appear to have indirectly con-
tributed to industry’s ongoing political and NCD policy influence.
By far Asia’s largest economy, China has also seen the consequences of
complex junk food politics. After several years of political isolation from the
West and a closed-off economy, major multinational industries emerged to
capture the market, instigate development, and establish a strong foothold
in the economy. Amid an escalating increase in childhood obesity and type
2 diabetes cases, the MoH was slow to respond, and when it did, it empha-
 Introduction 9

sized a host of NCD prevention and awareness campaigns. In addition to

highlighting sound nutrition, most of these prevention programs were fo-
cused on the importance of daily physical exercise, especially for children.
Despite these impressive campaigns, a soda tax was never introduced. Worse
still, no effort has been made to create effective food labels, while no legis-
lation exists regulating the marketing and sale of these foods to children.
This, in turn, has incentivized industries to aggressively market their prod-
ucts to children and the poor.
But why has this occurred? Once again, industries have been highly adept
at influencing prevention and regulatory policy in their favor. As we saw in
other countries, one key strategy has been these industries’ policy partner-
ships with government, such as helping improve nutrition and exercise in
schools. At the same time, industries have engaged in several lobbying tac-
tics, though mainly through informal meetings with policy makers. Perhaps
industries’ most effective strategy has been its strategic infiltration of the
China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and industry’s abil-
ity to inculcate its policy ideas by establishing strong linkages with policy
makers within the China CDC (Greenhalgh 2019a). This tactic has allowed
major companies like Coca-Cola to work through supportive NGOs, such
as the International Life Sciences Institute, to establish the importance of
physical exercise for preventing childhood obesity within the China CDC
(Greenhalgh 2019a). What’s more, industries have engaged in a wide variety
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, in turn aiding industries
in their ability to increase their community support and social legitimacy.
The dearth of NGOs that are working on advocating for improved nutrition
among ­China’s most vulnerable communities means that these CSR activi-
ties have not contributed to divisions within society. And unfortunately,
while civic awareness and interests in improving China’s obesity and type 2
diabetes situation has increased, for a variety of political reasons, ranging
from government suspicion of activist activities (especially those linked to
foreign NGOs) and a reluctance to incorporate civil society’s views, NGOs
still have not had the space and opportunity needed to successfully hold
industries accountable while pressuring government for NCD regulatory
policies.
Once again, further complicating matters is the central government’s ef-
forts to partner with industry to help achieve the government’s goal of ad-
vancing economic development and eradicating poverty. In fact, central and
10 Junk Food Politics

provincial governments have worked closely with major companies such as

PepsiCo and Coca-Cola on eradicating poverty, especially in rural areas—a
historic central government priority. All the while, political leaders, since
the days of Deng Xiaoping (1978–1992) to the current president, Xi Jinping
(2012–present), have viewed these industries, and the private sector in gen-
eral, as vital to helping develop China’s economic and social prosperity. In
the end, it appears that these complementary institutions have helped to
increase industry’s broader political acceptability and policy influence.
Finally, South Africa, the African continent’s largest economy, has also
struggled with the two-way road of junk food politics. After several years of
geopolitical and economic isolation due to Apartheid rule, eventually major
soda and ultraprocessed food industries entered South Africa’s market with
gusto, flourishing and providing new opportunities, backed by the new dem-
ocratic president, Nelson Mandela, in 1994. The burgeoning growth and con-
sumption of these junk food products has nevertheless contributed to an
ongoing increase in obesity and type 2 diabetes, afflicting not only children
(who now lead the African region in overall obesity cases) but also the urban
and rural poor. In a context of ongoing malnourishment, poverty, and HIV/
AIDS, the Department of Health was slow to respond; when it did, it empha-
sized the introduction of public health prevention campaigns, such as im-
proved nutrition, balanced diets, and exercise. While a soda tax was even-
tually introduced, it took several years to be passed by parliament, while
the tax was substantially reduced. Even further disheartening has been the
inadequacy of food labels, and the absence of any regulation for advertising
and selling these products to children. Instead, the government has encour-
aged industry self-regulation through company pledges not to market prod-
ucts to children, especially near schools, but this, too, has been repeatedly
ignored by these companies.
But why did these outcomes emerge? Once again, industry politics mat-
tered. And this entailed a host of political tactics. For instance, several in-
dustries engaged in health policy partnerships with government officials,
such as working with government to provide physical education programs
in schools. At the same time, these industries and their interest group rep-
resentatives, such as the Beverage Association of South Africa, aggressively
lobbied the government to successfully delay and water down the 2018 soda
tax. But several companies, such as Nestlé and Coca-Cola, also engaged in a
host of CSR initiatives, ranging from the provision of health care to job train-
 Introduction 11

ing, in turn helping build social support and legitimacy. As we saw in several
other countries, however, these activities have contributed to the emergence
of a divided society, where industry’s relationship with NGOs and academics
has generated conflict and a lack of collaboration with other activists seek-
ing to raise attention about NCDs and to hold these industries accountable.
While the activist community in the area of nutrition is new, it is troubled
by a lack of adequate resources and attention. Nevertheless, activist efforts
continue and are gradually building greater attention and awareness to the
need to improve the health of children and the poor.
But industry alone cannot be blamed for South Africa’s ongoing efforts
to introduce more effective NCD regulations and improve the health of its
most vulnerable populations. Once again, the government is also to blame.
Indeed, since the Nelson Mandela administration (1994–1999) to current-­
day president Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC political party (2018–present),
presidents have strengthened their partnership with junk food industries in
order to achieve these politicians’ priorities to improve the economy, pro-
vide jobs, tackle poverty, and ensure food security. In essence, these comple-
mentary institutions have once again served to indirectly support the junk
food industry and its unrelenting efforts to influence policy and politics.
Thus, in sum, the countries of Mexico, Brazil, India, China, Indonesia,
and South Africa have revealed that the political power and influence of junk
food industries is strong, enduring, and obstructing the creation of NCD reg-
ulatory policies. Unfortunately, and as we will see in the following pages, it
seems that most governments in these emerging economies still have not
paid heed to former WHO director Margaret Chan’s initial warnings and rec-
ommendations to take on the power and interests of big business. Regard-
less of how innovative these governments have been at introducing NCD
policies, even those focused on childhood obesity and type 2 diabetes, for
the most part, they are still far from willing to undercut the power and in-
fluence of industries through more aggressive regulatory policies. Junk food
politics has interfered, and most importantly of all, it has interfered in ways
that continue to impair the health and well-being of children and the poor
in these thriving developing nations.

Methodological Approach
I adopted a qualitative methodological approach to comparative his-
torical research in preparation for writing this book. The empirical evidence
12 Junk Food Politics

used for the country case study chapters were obtained from several quali-
tative sources, such as books, peer-reviewed journal articles, policy reports,
and credible newspaper sources. In-depth interviews with several activists,
academic researchers, and NGO experts were also conducted for many of the
country case study chapters. This interview data was used to provide fur-
ther empirical evidence of the causal and factual claims made throughout
this book. Interviews were conducted via Skype and Zoom communications
in 2019, 2020, and 2021.
With respect to case study selection, I selected and compared the coun-
tries of Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa for several
reasons. First, these nations are arguably the largest emerging economies in
their respective regions with high levels of obesity and type 2 diabetes, par-
ticularly among children and the poor. Second, I sought to obtain global re-
gional representation—that is, selecting countries from Latin America, Asia,
and Africa. Third, these case studies were selected due to the rich availability
of published literature on these countries and on the issues of concern in
this book. Finally, these cases were selected in order to illustrate the poten-
tial utility of IPCI, rather than striving to use these case studies to test and
establish a generalizable theory through a deductive approach to causal in-
ference (Imenda 2014). Instead, and as I explain in chapter 2, this analytical
framework was inductive in its approach. That is, IPCI’s concepts were de-
veloped based on existing concepts and theories in political science and pub-
lic health policy as well as new theoretical concepts that I established, with
the goal of better organizing and explaining complex causal events within
countries rather than predicting them and establishing generalizable theo-
retical claims, which is a key distinction between analytical and theoretical
frameworks (Stanley 2012).
But what was the purpose of my comparative analysis? The countries
of Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa are different in
many ways, seemingly incomparable. So why compare them? The goal was
to illustrate and explain their unique politics, institutions, policies, and so-
cial movements and their distinctive experiences in dealing with junk food
industries rather than treating them as similar generalizable cases, reflect-
ing similar patterns of causality and outcomes over time. I therefore adopted
Skocpol and Somer’s (1980) notion of contrasts of contexts in comparative
historical analysis for the purpose of highlighting unique causal mechanisms
and outcomes between complex sets of cases (see also Collier 1993).
 Introduction 13

A Road Map
This book is broken up into several chapters. In the next chapter, I
conduct a literature review and introduce readers to IPCI. Chapter 2, titled
“Fear and Opportunity,” then provides an explanation for why junk food
industries are seeking to eagerly invest in emerging markets, setting the
broader historical context for these industries’ political and policy strategies
in these countries. Chapter 3 closely examines the case of Mexico, followed
by Brazil in chapter 4, India in chapter 5, Indonesia in chapter 6, China in
chapter 7, and South Africa in chapter 8. The conclusion summarizes the key
findings from these chapters, as well as the theoretical and empirical lessons
learned, while providing recommendations for policy makers.
 1
Interest Group Theory, Institutions, and Public

Health Policy

The study of interest groups and public policy has a long tradition in
the field of political science. This is particularly the case when it comes to
studying health care policy in the United States. Indeed, one of the very first
books to focus on interest group theory in American health care politics—
and the field of political science in general—was Oliver Garceau’s (1941)
seminal discussion of the rise and policy influence of the American Medical
Association. Over time, a phalanx of scholarly articles and books began to
emerge exploring the various contexts under which interest groups success-
fully manipulate public health policy in the United States and Western Eu-
rope (Eckstein 1960; Marmor and Thomas 1972; Morone 1992; Navarro 1995;
Oliver and Dowell 1994). By the 1990s, the field of comparative politics also
began to see discussions of interest groups and their interaction with polit-
ical institutions and health care in other Western European democracies
(Immergut 1992).
Interest group theory has traditionally focused on the United States and
Western European democracies. Little is known about how this theoretical
approach informs the transformation of public health policy in developing
nations. With this new scholarly topic only emerging in the past two decades,
political scientists examining public health policy in developing nations have
instead focused on other types of political and institutional issues as factors
influencing health policy reform. Focuses include the impact of democratic
consolidation on children’s health (McGuire 2010); the importance of state
capacity, government commitment, and leadership to eradicate HIV/AIDS
and other diseases (Gauri and Khaleghian 2002; Johnson 2004); the formal
 Interest Group Theory 15

design and impact of political institutional arrangements, such as federal-

ism, decentralization, and intergovernmental relations (Rich and Gómez
2012); and even ethnic divisions and HIV/AIDS policy contestation (Lieber-
man 2009). Nevertheless, in the area of public health policy, it seems that
political scientists have paid little attention to the role of professional inter-
est groups in developing nations, their interaction with political institutions
and civil society, and their ability to manipulate policy in their favor. This
book strives to fill this lacuna in the literature.
To do so, we first need to understand the major schools of thought with
respect to interest group theory and their political activities in the health
policy–making process, as well as the recent public health policy literature
addressing these issues. In what follows, I lay out the main arguments in the
existing literature, along with their strengths and weaknesses, with the ul-
timate objective of proposing an alternative analytical framework based on
the literature’s theoretical and contextual limitations. Called Industry Poli-
tics and Complementary Institutions, or IPCI for short, the proposed ana-
lytical framework applies and builds on the existing literature in political
science and public health policy to provide a more comprehensive picture
and explanation of the complex interest group and institutional contexts
facilitating junk food industries’ ongoing ability to influence noncommuni-
cable disease policy in the emerging economies.

Interest Group Theory and Policy Reform

In the field of political science, the study of interest group lobbying
and political strategies for manipulating public policy has a long-standing
tradition. Inspired mainly by the works of American politics scholars, sev-
eral theoretical and methodological approaches have emerged to explain how
private sector interest groups manipulate congressional voting and policy
agenda-setting processes (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Historically much
of this literature has focused on two areas: that is, what Gais and Walker
(1991) once referred to as “insider” versus “outsider” interest group political
tactics; because of this, I focus on the literature addressing these particular
legislative and bureaucratic tactics that interest groups take as well as their
counterarguments.
Insider lobbying strategies have traditionally focused on the various tac-
tics that interest groups use within government to manipulate policy agenda-­
16 Junk Food Politics

setting processes. More specifically, this literature focuses on the efforts

made by industry lobbyists to directly meet with presidents, congressional
politicians, and/or senior bureaucrats to persuade them into taking a partic-
ular stance on a proposed piece of legislation. This art of persuasion, if you
will, occurs when lobbyists meet with these government officials to provide
information, such as scientific evidence supporting industry’s policy inter-
ests, with the goal of changing these politicians’ views through the dissem-
ination of information and evidence (Berry 1977; McSpadden and Culhane
1999; Milbrath 1963). When the policy issue receives little media attention,
thus dropping in its overall public and political saliency, and is more tech-
nical in nature, Culpepper (2011) claims that these lobbying activities often
take place behind closed doors, dubbed “quiet politics.” McGrath (2007) also
discusses how these industries often employ strategies commonly used by
marketing firms to alter their language and organizational titles to make
them more appealing and persuasive to politicians. Finally, an ongoing, well-­
known strategy is the simple act of direct bribery and corruption. In this
context, lobbyists’ tactics have included using campaign contributions to en-
sure that their policy interests are maintained and that legislators vote in
their favor, revealing a context where legislators and lobbyists act as agents
engaged in a mutual beneficial exchange (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Klüver
and Zeidler 2019; Morton and Cameron 1992).
Though not explicitly applying political science interest group theory to
their research, recent health policy scholars have unearthed similar kinds of
industrial insider tactics. For several years, scholars have addressed the cor-
porate political activity literature (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Lawton, McGuire,
and Rajwani 2012; Savell et al. 2014). In general, this literature focuses on
the ways in which a variety of industries strive to influence policy through
a myriad of political and social tactics. In recent years, Hillman and Hitt
(1999) built on the existing CPA literature to put forth a more comprehen-
sive approach explaining the various political tactics used by industry to
influence policy. These tactics referred to what the authors described as
information (i.e., industries engaging in various lobbying activities—as de-
scribed earlier—as well as sponsoring supportive scientific research). Next,
industries engage in what Hillman and Hitt (1999) refer to as constituency
building (i.e., industries partnering with voters or local communities who, in
turn, pressure policy makers in support of an industry’s policy views), thus
emitting “bottom-up” pressures. Hillman and Hitt (1999) also describe fi-
 Interest Group Theory 17

nancial incentives, which may take the form of industry-direct contributions

to politicians and political parties: for example, providing speaking hono-
rariums and paid travel expenses to influence votes and achieve industry’s
policy preferences. Savell and colleagues (2014) later developed a taxonomy
of six strategies used by the tobacco industry to influence congressional
votes on public health policy while also introducing us to the various narra-
tives used by these industries to shape policy discussions and agenda setting.
This was achieved by emphasizing the unintended economic consequence of
policy reform, legal and regulatory redundancy, and the existence of insuffi-
cient credible evidence.
Savell and colleagues’ (2014) six CPA strategies are as follows:

1. Information: that is, building upon Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) discussion
about lobbying while adding to this industry’s effort to fund support-
ive scientific research, thus reformulating evidence and estab­lishing
policy partnerships with government, such as participating in gov-
ernment policy working groups and technical and advisory groups, as
well as working with and providing advice to policy makers. Lima and
Galea (2018) subsequently also referred to these kinds of information
lobbying tactics, such as industry’s usage of scientific information and
expertise (though at times being biased / having incomplete infor-
mation) when discussing the food industry’s tactics, influence, and
power.
2. Financial incentives are used by lobbyists to engage in the aforemen-
tioned insider tactics of policy influence via direct and indirect finan-
cial incentives to legislators (even the offering of employment).
3. Constituency-building: that is, building upon Hillman and Hitt’s (1999)
discussion of industry partnering with other sectors and communities
in support of industry’s policies, thus connoting broad support for
industry’s policy positions (see also discussions by Miller and Harkins
[2010] and Moodie and colleagues [2013] of the food industry on these
related issues) while extending this to include partnerships with other
industries supporting their policy position.
4. Legal: that is, using the law either as a preemptive strategy or a threat
(of legal action).
5. Policy substitution: that is, advocating for industry self-regulation in the
area of marketing and sales.
18 Junk Food Politics

6. Constituency fragmentation/destabilization encompasses strategies to dis-

credit and prevent the emergence and influence of potential opponents
in society.

Political scientists have also underscored the outsider tactics used by

industry lobbyists to sway agenda-setting processes. One strategy has been
lobbyists’ efforts to engage in what Keller (2018) refers to as noisy politics,
or publicly sharing information about the proposed legislation through the
usage of the media and other public venues with the goal of increasing the
overall political saliency of the issue. In this process, the author emphasizes
the importance for industry lobbyists to carefully frame policy issues in ways
that the general public can easily understand. By raising public awareness
and the saliency of a policy issue, lobbyists exert external pressure and may
incentivize politicians to refrain from pursuing costly legislation. Alterna-
tively, Berry (1977) highlights how industries can use the media to publicly
discredit existing policies, embarrass legislators, and, in the process, moti-
vate the latter to support industry’s views. West and colleagues (1996) have
also underscored that interest groups often use media ads not only to cri-
tique proposed health care policy proposals but also to generate negative
perceptions about the proposed legislation in society. This reveals the lat-
ter’s distaste for policy proposals, ultimately motivating legislators not to
pursue the legislation.
Recent work in the CPA research illustrates the utility of participating
in what political scientists refer to as outsider tactics. As the work of Miller
and Harkins (2010) demonstrates, alcohol and food industries, for example,
have expanded their lobbying efforts to include strategic communication
strategies through their management of social media, civil society (NGOs),
and academics (the science). For example, these industries often work with
online magazines to convey their message about particular policies, publicly
discrediting critics and skewing scientific evidence while financing NGOs or
consulting firms (often working within government), even going so far as
to create NGOs, in essence capturing society in order to convey industry’s
views and have influence over decision makers (Miller and Harkins 2010).
Finally, in addition to these insider and outsider tactics, it is important
to emphasize that interest groups have also strategically used their work
with local communities to further augment their reputation, legitimacy, and,
by extension, policy influence. While political scientists have focused on the
 Interest Group Theory 19

electoral legislative arena, sociologists and policy scholars have mainly ad-
dressed this issue through the literature on corporate social responsibility.
Often surfacing in response to civil societal protests and demands on indus-
tries to act ethically and responsibly, CSR activities emerge when industries
voluntarily engage in a host of social and community activities. This is done
to enhance their reputation as industries conscious of societal needs, dis-
playing that they are ethically and morally responsible, with the objective of
increasing their social and, by extension, political reputation and influence.
In the area of food and NCD policy, Moodie and colleagues (2013) have em-
phasized how industries often provide campaigns focused on preventing vi-
olence against women in order to reduce criticism of industry. Similarly, in
the United Kingdom, Hastings (2012) has underscored the alcohol industry’s
efforts to empower women through midwife training programs, while work-
ing with NGOs to improve school education and other social services that
will improve the alcohol industry’s reputation as entities that are part of the
solution to the alcohol problem. Alternatively, work by Fooks and Gilmore
(2013) has highlighted the ways that major tobacco industries, such as the
British American Tobacco corporation, have used philanthropy to increase
access to politicians and bolster industry’s reputation in providing impor-
tant and trustworthy policy information. In particular, they reference how
philanthropic efforts can increase the company’s reputation and trust among
legislators, in turn facilitating their ability to influence policy.
Yet another CSR tactic employed by industry has been voluntary self-­
regulation. As the work of Vogel (2008) discusses, typically, in response to
social protests and demands, industries will voluntarily pledge to engage in
activities that display their dedication to acting in an ethical and responsi-
ble manner. Moreover, Vogel (2008) maintains that industries often pursue
these self-regulations as a strategy with the goal of incentivizing the govern-
ment not to pursue additional policy regulations. As Vogel (2008) further
points out, these self-regulations are soft laws, different from hard laws, in
that they do not entail any enforcement mechanisms—an ongoing problem
as we will soon see in the emerging economies. In the area of NCD policy,
this tactic has been increasingly popular among major food industries. They
do so mainly by engaging in public pledges or agreements with government
to restrict the sale and marketing of their products toward children, or by
improving the nutritional content of their foods (Sacks et al. 2013). The goal
has not only been to increase the industry’s political and social reputation
20 Junk Food Politics

but, rather, and following Vogel (2008, 2010), to convince government offi-
cials that no further costly regulations on industry are required.
While I certainly break bread with these scholars in emphasizing the
importance of these interest group tactics, such as the political science and
CPA literature’s emphasis on insider tactics, several limitations still remain.
First, in the area of junk food politics, more than ever, industries are re-
luctant to engage in outsider policy tactics. Junk food industries and their
supportive interest groups often fear the negative political, social, and pos-
sible financial ramifications of publicly obstructing the creation of NCD pol-
icies, such as obesity prevention, especially those geared toward children. In-
stead, they prefer to be seen as solutions to the problem by openly working
with government and civil society and engaging in supportive CSR activities
to overcome the harmful health effects of their products (Hastings 2012).
Second, this literature does not address the broader social consequences of
interest group tactics, especially with respect to civil society’s ability to ef-
fectively mobilize in response to industry’s obstruction of regulatory policy.
Third, this literature pays essentially no attention to how interest groups
strategically use institutions, such as federal bureaucratic agencies, to en-
sure that their policy ideas are firmly in place to safeguard their interests.
And finally, this literature does not address how industry’s CSR activities
supplement national insider political tactics to further increase industry’s
political legitimacy and policy influence; in accordance with Bernhagen and
Patsiurko (2015) and Walker and Rea (2014), this research needs to explore
how, when, and to what extent CSR supplements insider and outsider indus-
try tactics.
However, some studies suggest that relying exclusively on interest group
tactics is not enough. Sometimes interest groups engage in a variety of in-
sider or outsider tactics but do not achieve their policy objectives (De Bruycker
and Beyers 2019). On the other hand, industry’s desired objectives may emerge
in the absence of these interest group tactics, often due to policy makers’
personal views, support, and unforeseen events, or what De Bruycker and
Beyers (2019) refer to as “exogenous factors or even lucky coincidence” (59).
De Bruycker and Beyers (2019) go on to explain that there is therefore no
guarantee that lobbying tactics are sufficient for explaining policy influence.
Alternatively, other interest group scholars have emphasized the importance
of contextual conditions, rather than industry tactics, such as organizational
 Interest Group Theory 21

or political contexts, that facilitate the emergence of effective insider and

outsider tactics.
Indeed, other political scientists emphasize the organizational power
and resources of interest groups, which, in turn, determine whether they
can—and are willing to—engage in insider or outsider tactics in the first
place. In this camp, Gais and Walker (1991) were among the first to claim
that the lobbying industry’s policy success rests on the cohesiveness and
adaptability of its organizational structure; this includes the ability to over-
come internal conflicts of interest, as well as having the financial resources
needed to engage in the preferred lobbying activities. Moreover, the authors
also highlighted the importance of possessing technical knowledge on par-
ticular sectors to improve their credibility and persuasiveness. As Hojnacki
and colleagues (2012) explain, the amount of resources interest groups have
shapes their legislative tactics: civic groups with access to fewer financial re-
sources, when compared to business-based interest groups, had to be more
careful and selective in where and how they were spending their money
during advocacy campaigns, while considering the visibility of their efforts.
In this context, moreover, findings by Figueiredo and Richter (2014) confirm
that smaller lobbying firms are less likely than larger firms to engage in lob-
bying activities because they have fewer resources. Berry (1977) and, later,
De Bruycker (2014) added the importance of these industries’ ability to have
strong internal communications structures and thus make decisions more
quickly. However, what also mattered for Gais and Walker (1991) was where
these financial and technical resources came from. That is, if these resources
were acquired from NGOs or activists, industries were more likely to en-
gage in the aforementioned outsider tactics of working with these groups
to raise public awareness and confront lawmakers. Alternatively, when these
resources were acquired from big businesses, lobbyists were more likely to
engage in insider tactics. Binderkrantz and colleagues (2015) have neverthe-
less claimed that the reason some lobbyists are more successful than others
has to do with their cumulative access to several political arenas—that is, the
same interest groups having the same access to several arenas, over time,
which, in turn, is shaped by a group’s vast resources; this leads to a sense of
“privileged pluralism” (p. 109).
However, research by Grossman (2012) finds that interest group organi-
zational resource capacity was not a key factor in explaining their ability to
22 Junk Food Politics

influence policy. Through an innovative historical policy analysis of 268 pol-

icy decisions in the United States from 1945 to 2004, across 14 policy sectors,
Grossman (2012) found that advocacy-based organizations with compara-
tively fewer resources (e.g., when compared to businesses and unions) were
the most influential with respect to policy change. These advocacy associa-
tions were more influential because of their strong reputation for represent-
ing particular constituencies. Similar to Grossman (2012), Lorenz (2019) also
discovered that the large size of interest groups, their homogenous status,
and massive campaign contributions does not necessarily guarantee their
ability to influence policy agenda-setting processes. Instead, what is more
important is the diversity of interests present within lobbying coalitions,
the information that they provide to congressional committees, and the lat-
ter’s willingness to see these diverse interests as viable policies and interests
to pursue them, which, in turn, is shaped by a committee’s perception of bills
supported by a party majority or divided government.
Finally, rather than focus on interest group tactics and their organiza-
tional capacity, political scientists have focused on the nature of political
institutions and their ability to determine if and to what extent these groups
can access politicians and bureaucrats, which legislative tactics they can take,
and if they will be successful. Here, the work of Ishio (1999), for example,
claims that industry’s ability to participate in insider or outsider tactics is
shaped first and foremost by the design of political and bureaucratic institu-
tions. For example, the United States’ complex checks and balances system,
especially with respect to limited bureaucratic autonomy, which provides
lobbyists with several potential avenues of influence, as well as its direct
election of political candidates can encourage a combination of insider and
outsider tactics. By contrast, Japan’s more consensual decision-making struc-
ture, greater autonomy in bureaucratic decision making, along with a polit-
ical party system that is more cohesive in nature has encouraged the usage
of insider tactics. Alternatively, Heitshusen (2000) emphasizes how the US
congress’ decision in the 1970s to increase the decentralization of policy
deliberations by introducing several subcommittees in the US House of Rep-
resentatives has gradually forced interest groups to alter their insider lobby-
ing tactics. As seen in the House on issues such as labor policy, this is espe-
cially the case when new committees introduce legislative representatives
with alternative ideological and policy views on labor policy, thus requiring
more convincing information from interest groups, such as the provision of
 Interest Group Theory 23

technical information. Conversely, when interest groups encounter legisla-

tive committees with more support, as seen with policy issues focused on
the environment, representative interest groups need only provide less costly
political information.
While this book certainly agrees with the importance of institutional de-
signs, which includes access to politicians, bureaucratic committees, and the
federal courts, and how this, in turn, influences interest group insider tac-
tics, this literature is limited in several areas. First, following Gómez (2019),
it does not underscore how interest groups’ access to institutions, over a
long period of time, amplifies their policy influence. Moreover, it does not
address how interest groups strategically infiltrate institutions, such as the
bureaucracy, with their policy ideas and interests, ultimately ensuring that
their policy interests are sustained. Additionally, this literature does not ad-
dress what I describe as the importance of complementary institutions—that
is, important agenda-setting institutions, such as the office of the presi-
dency, that can also serve to complement and reinforce interest group po-
litical tactics, legitimacy, and influence within government. While political
scientists have acknowledged the importance of political context, such as
legislative activity in being positively associated with interest group density
and response (see Klüver and Ziedler 2019, though they also find a positive
relationship between interest group density and legislative activity over
time), supportive presidential contexts can also serve to indirectly complement,
rather than compete with, interest group interests, tactics, and strategies—
as I discuss in more detail shortly.

The New Politics of Junk Food Industries

and Policy Manipulation
In explaining the rise and political influence of junk food industries
in the emerging economies, this book comports with several aspects of the
aforementioned political science (insider) interest group research, public
health CPA, and social responsibility literature, while nevertheless address-
ing their theoretical and contextual shortcomings. More specifically, the
analytical approach taken in this book applies and builds on the importance
of interest group insider, CPA, and social responsibility tactics, as well as the
importance of institutional design and industry manipulation of bureaucratic
institutions, while also revealing an alternative complementary role that
presidential institutions play in supplementing these industry activities.
24 Junk Food Politics

My focus on the emerging economies introduces yet another limitation

with the existing political science, CPA, and social responsibility literature.
The first centers on the fact that this literature to date has focused mainly
on consolidated democracies within the United States and Western Europe
(Hojnacki et al. 2012). With the exception of recent studies addressing this
topic in developing nations (Carriedo et al. 2021; Ojeda et al. 2020; Tang­
charoensathien et al. 2019), to my knowledge essentially no research has
been conducted on an in-depth comparative historical analysis of the junk
food industry’s political and policy tactics across several emerging econo-
mies, as well as their relationship with the bureaucracy, political leaders, and
civil society. However, because of this, we do not know to what extent these
efforts are present and help to explain NCD policy obstructions in the devel-
oping world. Furthermore, without an in-depth comparative historical anal-
ysis, we cannot discover and explain the alternative political and social tactics
that these interest groups engage in, their broader policy and social conse-
quences, and the vital role of political context—particularly at the domestic
and international level—due to the developing world’s increased global in-
tegration and the ongoing influence of international policy ideas and power.
This book argues that in this alternative domestic and international
context, major junk food industries and their representatives have pursued
several types of political and social tactics, becoming increasingly entrepre-
neurial and successful in their efforts to obstruct any and all NCD policies
challenging their ability to conduct business. But why is this the case? Why
have industries in these countries been more creative and aggressive in pur-
suing alternative approaches to NCD policy obstruction?
We must first understand the broader historical context generating these
types of activities in the first place. In essence, it’s all about fear and oppor-
tunity. Due to an increasingly health-conscious market in the West, indus-
tries fear a continued decrease in sales and profitability. As chapter 2 ex-
plains, in recent years, junk food industries have seen a precipitous decline
in sales within their traditional Western markets, such as the United States
and Europe. Though delayed when compared to these nations, the interna-
tional wave of public awareness and interest in good nutrition and health is
finding its way to emerging markets. This trend concerns these industries
and makes them all the more eager to find creative political and social strat-
egies to safeguard their NCD policy interests.
 Interest Group Theory 25

At the same time, opportunity matters. These industries are taking ad-
vantage of a gradual rise in income among the middle class and poor in
emerging markets, which is often the result of popular anti-poverty pro-
grams providing disposable cash to these members of the population. Fur-
thermore, these industries are taking advantage of the excessive concen-
tration of political power, at the highest levels of government, which often
facilitates their ability to have an impact on the policy-making discussions
of the political elite. As Gómez and Menedez (2021) have argued, in the
realm of public health policy in Latin America, a very small concentration of
political and bureaucratic elites often make the most critical policy decisions
on their own, without adequately consulting civil society. These industries
know this and have taken strategic advantage of this context. Indeed, unlike
democracies in the advanced industrialized world, where, due to a longer his-
tory of democracy, vibrant political parties reflect strong social movements,
it seems that big businesses in nascent democracies often face fewer coun-
tervailing political forces and credible threats to policy interests. Junk food
industries in the emerging economies therefore appear to have considerably
more power and influence than in mainly Western-based pluralist democra-
cies where they may at times be forced to choose between policy adaptation
and defeat due to staunch political party opposition (Paster 2018).

Establishing a New Analytical Framework: Industry Politics

and Complementary Institutions
In order to provide a more comprehensive explanation of junk food
industries’ political and policy influence in the emerging economies, this
book introduces an analytical framework titled Industry Politics and Com-
plementary Institutions. IPCI builds on the theoretical and empirical lim-
itations of the aforementioned political science and public health policy lit-
erature. The goal of IPCI is to better explain the NCD policy agenda-­setting
and implementation processes in these economies—that is, why and how
NCD prevention and regulatory policies become a national priority, and why
existing legislation may not be enforced. IPCI is used to explain the reasons
why, for example, presidents and legislative institutions do not pursue spe-
cific NCD policies, such as soda taxes or marketing/sales regulations, or why
they do not enforce these policies by means of monitoring and imposing
penalties for noncompliance.
26 Junk Food Politics

Broader Independent Intervening Causal Dependent

Historical Variables Variable Mechanism Variable
Context
Fear Political Action Industry Ineffectiveness
& • Policy partnerships Legitimacy & &
Opportunity • Lobbying Policy Absence of
Complementary
and largesse Influence NCD Regulatory
Institutions
• Institutional Policy
infiltration

Restructuring Society
• Corporate social
responsibility
• Partnering with society
• Dividing society

Industry politics and complementary institutions

IPCI combines an analysis of historical contextual backdrop and the

causal mechanisms linking industry political activity and the role of insti-
tutions in policy outcomes (see figure). As previously mentioned, it begins
with the broader historical context of fear and opportunity as explanations
for why industries pursue the emerging economies and become political
entities in the first place. Next, IPCI focuses on the specific processes that
industries, as well as governments, engage in. In the area of industry called
political action, IPCI applies the political science and health policy literature
on insider lobbying and CPA (Culpepper 2011; Gais and Walker 1991; Hill-
man and Hitt 1999; Savell et al. 2014), the institutional infiltration and con-
version literature (Falleti 2009; Goldfrank 2011; Klein and Lee 2019), and,
in the area of restructuring society, industry strategies for shaping civil so-
cietal views and interests as well as their ramifications for civic mobilization
(Gómez 2019a; Moodie et al. 2013; Walker and Rea, 2014). At the same time,
however, IPCI maintains that domestic institutions also matter—that is,
these industry tactics are greatly facilitated by the complementary role of
presidents who are supportive of industry and seeking to work closely with
industries to achieve alternative economic and social welfare policies and
political objectives. As the figure illustrates, this process reflects the pres-
ence of complementary institutions as intervening variables both comple-
menting and reinforcing the tactics of political action and restructuring so-
ciety, in turn contributing to industry’s legitimacy and policy influence and
ultimately the ineffectiveness and absence of NCD regulatory policies.
 Interest Group Theory 27

Political Action
In the emerging economies today, interest groups representing junk
food industries, as well as industries themselves, have employed a host of
creative insider and CPA strategies to achieve their primary objective: they
work to not only limit the creation of public health prevention programs
discouraging the consumption of their products, such as a soda tax, but,
perhaps more importantly, to prevent any and all legislation proposing to
regulate the marketing and sale of their products.
The first political tactic that industries use is nothing new: they often
seek to partner with politicians and government officials, often through
government workshops/committees, to create innovative public health pro-
grams tackling NCDs (Miller and Harkins 2010; Savell et al. 2014). Industries
may also work closely with government officials to improve the overall qual-
ity of ingredients in foods and food labeling. Moreover, these industries may
also enter into formal agreements with governments to restrict the adver-
tising of their products to children—also known as self-regulation (Vogel
2010). Through these crafty political tactics, as well as through CSR activi-
ties, industries want to ensure that they are viewed within government as
the solution to the problem of industrial epidemics (Hastings 2012). Impor-
tantly, IPCI also builds on Vogel’s (2010) position that these tactics are mainly
used to avoid the creation of any further regulations harming industry’s
interests (on this note, see also Bernhagen and Patsiurko 2015). By partner-
ing with government on NCD prevention programs and food reformulation
initiatives, this generates trust and support from government officials to-
ward industry, viewing them as genuine allies in the plight against obesity
and type 2 diabetes among children, adolescents, and the poor, believing
that industry is doing its part in helping the government stem the rising
tide of NCDs. Consequently, politicians often have no interest and incentive
to pursue alternative regulations that may jeopardize their relationship with
industry.
And yet, industry’s goal is not altogether altruistic in striving to safe-
guard these vulnerable populations from NCDs. Instead, industries’ politi-
cal activities are often used to establish enduring government allies, such as
with politicians, who can be trusted to never cross the line in support of
legislation restricting the marketing and sale of industry products.
As we will see in several countries discussed in this book, companies such
28 Junk Food Politics

as Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nestlé, and Unilever have been very proactive in seek-
ing out government officials and local schools to work with and create pro-
grams focused on increased physical fitness and exercise while at the same
time working with governments to adopt limited policy regulations, such as
improving nutritional content and information about their foods (e.g., food
labeling). To achieve these endeavors, industries and the interest groups or
NGOs they work with are often proactive in organizing one-on-one meetings
with health officials while involving themselves with national and local gov-
ernment committees, often co-organized with industry leaders (on China,
see Greenhalgh 2019a).
In addition, IPCI applies the rich literature on interest group lobbying
and largesse to influence public health policy (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Lima
and Galea 2018; Morton and Cameron 1992; Savell et al. 2014). Building on
this literature, IPCI reinforces the fact that these political strategies are also
occurring in the emerging economies in response to proposed NCD preven-
tion and regulatory policies. Indeed, industries in several countries discussed
in this book have engaged in numerous lobbying tactics to obstruct the cre-
ation of these policies.
As IPCI emphasizes, yet another tactic that junk food industries engage
in is the process of institutional infiltration. This process occurs when indus-
tries or their representatives (e.g., NGOs) strive to occupy bureaucratic in-
stitutions in order to ensure that their interests are represented, incessantly
pressuring policy makers (in a sense, assuming an internal bureaucratic
lobbying process), while establishing their policy ideas and interests within
existing federal bureaucratic agencies to ensure that their views are safe-
guarded and maintained over time. Here, IPCI builds on the work of several
scholars recognizing how external actors, for example, civil society, can pur-
posefully infiltrate institutions in order to achieve their objectives (Falleti
2009; Goldfrank 2011; Klein and Lee 2019).
For example, through their analytical framework, Politics of Infiltration,
Klein and Lee (2019) highlight the proactive efforts of civil societal actors
to infiltrate institutions, what they refer to as the politics of forward infil-
tration and occupation. In an instance of institutional occupation, after on-
going bargaining with state actors, social movements gradually obtain a pres-
ence within state institutions to ensure that society’s interests and agendas
are established, thus reforming preexisting institutions to society’s liking.
 Interest Group Theory 29

Ultimately, these reformulated institutions leave little choice for incumbent

state actors but to adopt the institutional infiltrator’s (civil society’s) refor-
mulated institutions. Similarly, Falleti (2009) claims that, after state intru-
sion into society, social movements may then infiltrate institutions with
their interests and health policy ideas in order to build sustainable coalitions
of support for these movements’ ideas within bureaucratic institutions. Dis-
cussing the case of Brazil, Falleti (2009) asserts that social health move-
ments, such as the prodemocratic Sanitarista social movement, dedicated
to establishing universal health care as a human right during the transition
to democracy, gradually established their own presence within federal agen-
cies (as well as municipal governments and international health agencies),
introducing and sustaining their particular policies, maintaining a strong
network of societal and state government support, and redirecting health
policy reforms established by the military to achieve new health care objec-
tives. These objectives included achieving universal health care as a right and
provided by the state in a decentralized, participatory manner through the
new democratic constitution of 1988.
As IPCI explains, junk food industries may take a similar approach by
infiltrating federal health care agencies through allied NGOs in society. As
the seminal contribution of Greenhalgh (2019a) explains in the case of China,
NGOs such as the International Life Sciences Institute often clandestinely
infiltrate public health agencies, implant their ideas and policy prescriptions,
and in the process transform NCD policies in industry’s favor.

Restructuring Society
At the same time, IPCI emphasizes that industries are equally as
committed to restructuring civil society in their favor. To this end, several
strategies are pursued. First, applying and building on the aforementioned
CPA strategy of constituency building (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Savell et al.
2014), industries work hard to create supportive allies within academia. In-
dustries often seek out influential academics from prestigious universities
that will conduct research and provide evidence supporting industry’s pol-
icy views on nutrition, NCDs, and the effectiveness of existing policies, such
as soda taxes. However, the process industries use to approach academics is
often clandestine and indirect, such as funneling money through seemingly
independent private foundations and philanthropies, who, in turn, provide
30 Junk Food Politics

funding to academic researchers. Ultimately, the objective is to not only ob-

tain scientific evidence supporting industry claims but also to alter the dis-
course surrounding the root causes of NCDs.
The second strategy that industries pursue is to establish strong, mu-
tually reinforcing alliances with ideologically sympathetic NGOs and poor
communities. With respect to NGOs, industries often seek to support advo-
cates who provide research and public campaign messages highlighting the
importance of individual liberty in food consumption, as well as the impor-
tance of physical exercise and overall happiness as an essential ingredient
for prosperous living. These NGOs also work with local communities—such
as schools and families—on behalf of these industries; in so doing, these
NGOs act as hired middlemen shaping community views through a variety
of tactics. These efforts resemble and build on Walker and Rea’s (2014) dis-
cussion of corporations mobilizing society by hiring NGOs or think tanks
in support of industry’s views, as well as hiring consulting firms to engage
grassroots lobbying campaigns that help to marshal supportive public opin-
ion about particular policy issues.
With respect to poor communities, junk food industries may reduce
public criticism and build a strong support base by providing critical social
services, activities that build on the aforementioned CSR literature (Moodie
et al. 2013). An increasingly common strategy has been the provision of
community jobs. In return for helping sell and market food products, poor
families receive a monthly income and a sense of empowerment and inde-
pendence. At the same time, industries build a strong social support base
by financing and organizing popular community events. For example, by
sponsoring local sports clubs, as well as providing T-shirts and equipment
in communities that cannot afford them, industries generate social support,
acceptability, and legitimacy for their products.
Thus, to further ensure that their various political and institutional tac-
tics work and help to guarantee their legislative policy influence, junk food
industries supplement these efforts with additional tactics geared toward
civil society. De Bruycker and Beyers (2019) claim that legislative tactics, on
their own, are often insufficient for ensuring that interest groups achieve
their desired policy objectives. De Bruycker and Beyers (2019) further main-
tain that interest groups’ creation of “heterogenous coalitions—which rely
on a diverse and representative constituency—can exert a more credible
and encompassing signal of societal support when compared to coalitions
 Interest Group Theory 31

consisting of a narrower set of organized interests (e.g., only environmental

NGOs or only business interests)” (60). While the interest group social tac-
tics described in this book do not fall in line with traditional outsider tactics
(as mentioned earlier), the aforementioned IPCI tactics in society can help
to further augment junk food industries’ legitimacy and influence within
government, in turn supplementing and further reinforcing their insider tac-
tics. This view aligns with others claiming that business civic mobilization
tactics can often complement and industry’s lobbying activities within gov-
ernment (Bern­hagen and Patsiurko 2015; Walker and Rea 2014).
Nevertheless, while industry strategies to restructure and mobilize civil
societal support may often be successful, the scholarly literature to date
has overlooked the broader social consequences of these efforts. As Gómez
(2019a) maintains, a key area that the literature has failed to address is how
these strategies contribute to increased division and conflict between those
nutrition activists who defend the public’s health and those academic re-
searchers or NGOs working with industry, in turn hampering civil society’s
ability to create a unified voice and to engender an effective social move-
ment in response to industry’s activities. IPCI applies and illustrates the
efficacy of Gomez’s (2019a) claim that, by industries supporting those aca-
demic researchers or NGOs upholding industry’s policy message, pitting
these NGOs against activists who do not share these views and do not have
nearly the same amount of resources, industries essentially divide society
and hamper civic mobilization by generating conflicts of interests and dis-
agreements between these actors. In the end, this reduces the number of
potential allies in society that activists can potentially work with and that
can mobilize with them to hold industries accountable for their actions.

Complementary Institutions
Nevertheless, industries’ various political and social strategies are
insufficient for explaining why they continue to have so much influence over
NCD policy in the emerging economies. As IPCI explains, governments are
also partly to blame. More specifically, I argue that a government’s comple-
mentary institutions can serve to further increase junk food industries’ po-
litical legitimacy and policy influence. Building on recent scholars’ arguments
that a politician’s personal connections and rational electoral interests to
support industry bolsters the latter’s policy-making influence (Gómez 2019a),
according to IPCI, complementary institutions are comprised of three com-
32 Junk Food Politics

ponents. First, these institutions emerge when a president’s preexisting re-

lationship and experiences with industries, either by way of previous work-
ing relationships or investments in them, cultivate a sense of loyalty and
support from presidents for these industries’ ongoing development and pros-
perity. In this context, industries are viewed with a favorable eye that then
facilitates their ability to gain access to policy makers and have influence
within government (Gómez 2019a).
The second component of these complementary institutions arises when
presidents strategically partner with and use these industries to achieve al-
ternative policy and, thus, political objectives, such as broader social welfare
(e.g., anti-poverty) and economic policy goals (e.g., foreign direct invest-
ment and economic growth). Third, complementary institutions arise when
presidents engage in institution-building processes in order to ensure that
industries can sustain these partnerships and achieve these politicians’ al-
ternative social welfare and economic policy objectives. In the process, this
institution-building exercise helps to secure a president’s popularity and
support in society and within government. For example, institution build-
ing may take the form of creating federal agencies or formal offices designed
specifically to deepen these presidential policy partnerships with industry—
as we’ll see in the case of Brazil.
When these components are taken together, complementary institutions
serve to further supplement and enhance junk food industries’ political and
social strategies. Guided by presidents’ historical ties and broader political
and policy objectives, complementary institutions generate incentives for
the government to reach out to and use industries, which comports nicely
with industries’ aforementioned strategies to work with government and
civil society. Seen in this light, government and industries’ interests dove-
tail to engender a context that facilitates industry’s NCD policy-making
influence.

Conclusion
When taken together, the IPCI analytical framework applies the po-
litical science and public health policy literature to provide a more in-depth
explanation for why and how junk food industries are having ongoing NCD
regulatory policy influence in the emerging economies. More than ever, in
these countries, industries are succeeding in avoiding costly policy regula-
tions, such as marketing, labeling, sales, and, in some instances, soda tax
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 CHAPTER XX.
STUDIES INTERRUPTED.

A few days after this conversation a considerable number of troops

traversed the country. The Germans were manœuvring on both
sides of the Loire, and were threatening Tours. A general officer was
quartered at M. de Gandelau’s who was acquainted with Eugène.
The latter was impatient at the inactivity to which he had been
condemned since the war had begun to take so fatal a turn.
In the evening he had a long conversation with this officer, and
next morning announced to M. de Gandelau that he was intending to
set out with the corps which was traversing the country; observing
that officers of the Engineers were wanting, and that he could at
need fulfil their functions; that his friend, the general, very much
approved his determination; and that in circumstances of such
gravity he thought it his duty not to hesitate to go, as he might
possibly be of some service. M. de Gandelau did not attempt to keep
him; he understood too well the sentiments by which his guest was
influenced.
“What shall we do with Paul?” said he to Eugène.
“I believe you have Vitruvius in the original in your library?”
“Yes.”
“Well, if you will let me have it for an hour before I go, I shall be
able to explain to Paul how he should set to work with this treatise:
that will prevent him from forgetting his Latin, and further him in the
studies we have commenced.”
“An excellent idea.”
“You will require Paul to give you, twice a week, the translation of a
chapter, with explanatory drawings: that will keep his hand in and
occupy his mind. I do not suppose his translation will supersede
even Perrault’s; but that does not matter, he will not be losing his
time absolutely. As soon as I can return you shall see me again.”
 Paul was disconsolate at his cousin’s departure, and at not being
able to accompany him; he would have greatly liked to follow up his
studies in the art of building by a course of military engineering in the
field, but this would have embarrassed his cousin, and Madame de
Gandelau would scarcely have survived her anxiety. Paul was
furnished with the edition of Vitruvius, and the work to which he was
to devote himself was explained to him.
Two hours after, Eugène, provided with a small portmanteau, was
on his way with his friend, the general; whose corps was en route for
Chateauroux. Promises to write as often as possible had been given
on both sides.
We can easily imagine the gloomy aspect which M. de Gandelau’s
house assumed after this hasty departure. At the very beginning of
the war he had equipped and despatched all his able-bodied
dependants. There remained only two or three old men-servants,
and some female domestics whose husbands or children were for
the most part in the army. Monsieur and Madame de Gandelau
ceased to use the drawing-room, in which beds had been placed for
the wounded in case any should come. The family used to assemble
in Madame de Gandelau’s room, and took their meals in a small
apartment that usually served for a pantry.
Paul, when his cousin was gone, went to pay a visit to the works.
They were deserted; snow covered the heap of walling stones, the
cut stones, and the scattered timbers. The walls, which had reached
a certain height, protected by straw and surmounted by a crest of
snow—their surfaces showing brown in contrast with the white veil
that mantled them—and some pieces of wood black with damp, gave
to these incipient constructions the aspect of the débris of a
conflagration.
Although at Paul’s age young people are not very accessible to
sombre thoughts, the poor boy could not restrain his tears in
presence of this scene of desolation. He recalled in thought this spot
so animated a month before with its bands of active workmen. All
were gone, and the soul of this habitation, which he had begun to
associate with all the joys of family life, had just quitted him.
 In spite of the cold he seated himself on a stone, his head in his
hands, overwhelmed with gloomy thoughts. This was the first deep
grief, the first severe disappointment, he had experienced: it seemed
to him that all was over, and that there was no more hope nor
happiness possible for him in this world.
A hand laid upon his shoulder made him start; he raised his head
—his father was behind him. Paul threw himself into his arms at
once, sobbing.
“Come, Paul, my boy, calm yourself,” said M. de Gandelau to him.
“We are living in a time of trials; who knows what are reserved for
us? For us, indeed, they have scarcely begun. Think how much
suffering there is in France now! What are our anxieties and griefs
compared with the anguish suffered by others! Reserve your tears;
perhaps you will have only too frequent occasion for them. We need
not be in a hurry to despond. I observed you going in this direction,
and followed you, anticipating your melancholy feelings. But, after
all, what is there to grieve over? Nothing, or only a trifle. Set to work
again courageously, alone, since our friend has been obliged to quit
us to fulfil a sacred duty. He will return; you have learned to love and
esteem him more: prove to him that you are worthy of the affection
he has exhibited to you by showing him some thoroughly good work
when he comes back.
“Certainly he would be touched by your grief, of which his absence
is to a great extent the cause; be assured that he would be still more
touched to see that you had scrupulously followed his last
instructions, and that his presence is not the only inducement to
make you like work.”
Father and son regained the house. The counsels of M. de
Gandelau, and the pains he took to give Paul a glimpse of brighter
days, had by degrees restored to him, if not gaiety, at least
tranquillity of mind and the desire to do his best. M. de Gandelau
most dreaded for his son a feeling of despondency—that vague and
sterile sadness on which youth sometimes loves to feed, and which
enervates the most gifted minds.
 He therefore entered Paul’s room, and taking up Vitruvius, which
had been left on the table, began to look through it. M. de Gandelau
was a good scholar, though he never made a parade of his
acquirements. They were a possession he reserved for himself.
Familiar with the classics, he could read the text of Vitruvius, if not
explain it architecturally in all its parts. “Stay,” said he to Paul, “here
is a chapter which must be interesting, and which may teach you
many things; it is Chapter VIII.: De generibus structuræ et earum
qualitatibus, modis ac locis. How would you translate this title?”
“Of the kinds of constructions, and their qualities, according to
customs and localities,” replied Paul.
“Yes, that is the translation. But on looking through this chapter, I
see that masonry only is considered; the author, in making use of the
word structura, seems to me to have wished only to treat of
constructions of brick or stone. It would be better, doubtless, to
render the passage thus: Of the different kinds of masonry, and the
properties of this structure according to local usages and
circumstances.
“Well, set to work to translate this eighth chapter. I see that the
author has described the kinds of masonry whose use he
recommends on such or such occasions. You will therefore have to
illustrate your translation by sketches. Come! take courage, and
imagine your cousin at hand ready to rectify your mistakes.”
Paul therefore set himself to work, endeavouring to embody in
sketches each of Vitruvius’s descriptions. This gave him no little
trouble, of course; many words were new to him, and the dictionary
helped him only very imperfectly when it was necessary to know
their exact sense. Nevertheless, by degrees the work acquired a
charm for him. To further his comprehension of the author he tried to
recall to mind buildings he had seen; he remembered some
instructions given by Eugène; and put on paper, to the best of his
ability, opposite the translation, sketches tolerably drawn, if they
were not the true expression of the descriptions in the original.
Thus, during the end of the month of December and the
commencement of January, he succeeded in translating a dozen
chapters which his father selected for him, giving illustrations of the
text. This gave him a great desire to become acquainted with the
buildings existing in his author’s times, and he examined attentively
a set of engravings by Piranesi descriptive of ancient Rome, and
which his father possessed. M. de Gandelau had advised Paul to
write down the questions which his reading suggested to him, so as
to submit them to Eugène on his return. Thus the days passed
rapidly away: and although sadness and anxiety darkened every
hour, yet, as M. de Gandelau was incessantly occupied in relieving
the misery around him and organizing the struggle against the
invaders, while Paul was working with energy and seeing his results
accumulating, and Madame de Gandelau had organized a workroom
in which the women of the village were engaged in providing linen for
our unfortunate and destitute soldiers, when the evening arrived, the
members of the family could still assemble with that feeling of secret
joy which duty accomplished procures. Towards the close of January
the inmates of the château learned from the newspapers that an
armistice had been signed. Though this news announced the end of
the struggle, it presaged the commencement of the severest
humiliations. It produced, therefore, a sad, rather than consolatory
impression.
A few days afterwards Eugène returned to the château. It need not
be said that he was welcomed with open arms, and that Paul
especially manifested his joy. They talked of resuming the works.
The last letters of Madame Marie announced that she would be
home again towards the end of the following winter. These letters,
filled as they were with expressions of the anxiety—the anguish—felt
by the writer in her absence from France, said nothing of the future
house. If then it could be finished, the surprise would be complete.
While Eugène was enjoying the rest he so much needed, he looked
through and revised Paul’s translation, and corrected his sketches. A
fair copy was made of the whole; and the first days of March drew
on, when it was decided to recommence the works.
 CHAPTER XXI.
BUILDING RECOMMENCED—THE TIMBER WORK.

Towards the middle of March, the weather being fine, the works were
resumed, and instructions for executing the floors and roofs had to
be given to the carpenter, that no time might be lost. Paul was
beginning to understand his cousin’s sketches more readily, and to
be able to make himself useful. Besides, he had acquired the
excellent habit of asking for explanations when he had reason to
suppose on a first view that he could not faithfully interpret a rough
sketch; and Eugène was not sparing of explanation and
commentaries. His patience was inexhaustible. Nevertheless, every
time Paul was embarrassed and was unable to solve a difficult
question, before putting him in the way to do so, Eugène used to let
him try for a reasonable time.
“Reflect,” he would say to him, “and you will be sure to find some
solution. If it is not the right one, I will help you; but you must get
some result for yourself. It is impossible to have a clear
understanding of a solution given by a person who understands the
matter, until we have thoroughly considered it, and made some
efforts to solve the given problem ourselves. This is a necessary
preliminary exercise, and one which puts the mind in a right state for
comprehending. Draw a general section of the main building through
the billiard-room and your brother-in-law’s study: I mean a transverse
section which will indicate the walls, the floors, the fireplaces, and
roofs. You have nearly all the necessary elements. Endeavour to
arrange the whole in proper order, that you may make all the parts of
the building clear to yourself. I do not wish to see this section till you
have finished it. Not till then shall I correct it; and that correction will
be of advantage to you.”
Making use, therefore, of the details already drawn, Paul drew the
transverse section, not without difficulty; but the roof-timbers were
singularly conceived,—their composition appeared to him difficult
and complicated. He did not know how to close the wide opening
between the billiard-room and the drawing-room. The dormer-
windows of the roof embarrassed him considerably. Besides, he had
much difficulty in realizing the junction of all these parts. In spite of
all his efforts he could not succeed in representing clearly their
relative positions. He was not satisfied, and frankly told his cousin
so.
“I am very glad,” replied the latter, “that you are not satisfied. It
would be a bad sign if you were, for it would prove that you had not
made any great effort. Your walls are fairly in their right place
according to the section we have taken. But the timbers, the dormer-
windows!—this could not hold together, and is wanting in simplicity.
Why so many pieces of wood?... Have you assured yourself of their
utility? We have walls; let us make use of them. Why not make use
of the wall which separates the billiard-room from the study to bear
the roofing timbers in part?—especially as this wall receives chimney
flues, which must surely be carried up through the roof. You did not
remember the chimneys; that is thoughtlessness, for you see them
marked in the plans of the ground floor and of the first and second
floors.”
“I certainly thought of them,” replied Paul; “but I did not know how
to carry them up through the roof.”
“And so you did not draw them; that is certainly a way of avoiding
the difficulty; but yet you know they must go up through the roof.
That I cannot approve of; putting aside a question is not solving it.
Come, let us revise all this together.”
 Fig. 46.—Transverse Section of the House.

The section was soon corrected (Fig. 46), and Eugène did not fail
to furnish it in detail, according to the uses of the apartments through
which the section was drawn; which pleased Paul greatly, as he
could thus realize the billiard-room completed, with its opening into
the drawing-room, his brother-in-law’s study, with its doors; then
above, his bedroom, dressing-room, and the two attic rooms. This
drawing appeared to him charming; he could fancy himself already
entering the apartments and enjoying his sister’s surprise on
examining these interiors. He was wanting to show all these pretty
things to Madame de Gandelau directly, but Eugène persuaded him
to have a little patience.
“All this,” he said, “is a mere trifle indeed—nothing but fancy; we
shall have to furnish the details of the woodwork and internal
arrangements, and when we come to study them we shall find much
to revise. Leave off looking at these interiors for a few minutes, and
let us examine the timber-work of the roof. Let us draw it in plan.”
(Fig. 47).

Fig. 47.
“The walls a b are the gables which are to support the purlins. We
have at c d two cross-walls, which also form gables, and will also
receive the purlins. But the spaces e c are too wide for purlins from e
to c. They measure 22 feet between; now the purlins must not have
a bearing of more than 13 feet if we would avoid their bending.
Intermediate principals are therefore necessary at g h, against the
sides of the middle dormers i. The purlins from a to g will not then
exceed 13 feet in length, and we shall be able to strengthen them by
means of struts from the end gables. From k to l there will be valley-
rafters at the penetration of the roofs. Let us first consider the
principals g h (Fig. 48).
 Fig. 48.
“The height between the floors of the story in the roof should be 10
feet. We will put two main supports a, fixed into foot-pieces
connected by a tie-rod, which will pass under the floor; upon these
supports a tie-beam b; then to secure the tie-beam to these
supports, clip-braces c. On the ends of this tie-beam will rest the
purlins d. The blades e will fasten into this tie-beam and into the
king-post f. Beneath the second purlins h, it will be necessary to put
clips g, forming a collar-beam. The ridge-pole i will be carried by the
king-post, with diagonal struts. The other ends of the purlins will rest
in the gables. Thus we shall be enabled to fix the rafters which will
receive the battens and the slates. These timbers (tie-beams, collar-
beams, and blades) may pass through the longitudinal wall k,
containing the chimney flues, and in turn the roof-timbers will stay
the wall, while the wall supports and stiffens the roof. As to the
middle of the building, having the two walls c d, it will suffice to rest
the ridge-pole l across, and relieve its bearing with two struts m,
tenoned into the ends of a beam n, which will prevent their
spreading. At the level of the latter we will place the beams a b (see
Fig. 47), which will receive the ridge-poles o of the cross-roofs.
These beams will also be relieved by struts r. On the ridge-poles o
will come the meeting of the valley-rafters s (shown in elevation at
s). Thus the raftering will be everywhere well supported; and,
relatively to the surface of the building, we shall use but a small
quantity of timber, since we take every possible advantage of the
support afforded us by the interior walls. The gables will enable us to
avoid the necessity of hip-roofs, which are difficult to contrive and
require a good deal of timber. There remains the roof of the
staircase. In order that you may understand how to construct it, I am
going to draw it for you in perspective. This roof is supported by
walls which rise above the cornice of the building, but it penetrates
the main roof at x (see Fig. 47). If you examine the drawing (Fig. 39),
you will observe that the walls of the staircase leave an angle without
any vertical support over the entrance-hall. It will be necessary then
to provide a bearing for the hip of the roof which comes over that
space. To effect this, we will place on the two wall ends a small
principal which shall receive the foot of the hip-rafter v, denoted in
Fig. 47. This arrangement is apparent in the perspective drawing
(Fig. 49), which gives the square tower of the principal stairs with its
roof-framing. We will raise the oblong newel a of this stairs up to the
level of the cornice. Upon the walls we will lay the wall-plates b; then
from the three angles to the newel, the foot-pieces c. On the ends,
halved together, of these foot-pieces we will erect the two king-posts
p, and the three hip-rafters e. The feet of the two king-posts will be
connected by the clips f. As to the back hip-rafter g, it will fix into the
front of the king-post of the little principal, as I show you at g´; and in
order to hinder the principal from being thrust out by this hip-rafter,
clips h will connect the head of the king-post of the little principal with
the king-post d of the roof. On the angles of the hip-rafters at i, it will
be necessary to fix some blocks to carry the ends k of the purlins,
which will support the bearing of the rafters.
 Fig. 49.

“At l you see the gable which has to join the roof of the staircase;
and do not forget that stone filletings m must be built into the walls
against which roofs abut, forming a weather-moulding above these
roofs, to hinder the rain-water from getting in between the slating and
the wall. Filletings are most commonly made with mortar or cement,
on the roofing itself; but as that is subject to movement, these
filletings break away and have to be constantly renewed. Built into
the masonry above the slope of the roofing, they cover the junction
of the slate or tile with the walls, and, being independent of the roof,
they cannot suffer from any giving in the timbers.
“You will draw the roofs to a scale of a quarter of an inch to a foot;
I will correct your drawings, and we will give them to the carpenter, in
order that he may prepare his timbers as soon as possible. We will
figure the scantlings of these timbers. Thus, the blades on the
principal rafters should be 8 inches × 7 inches, the collar-clips 3½
inches × 7 inches, the king-posts 7 inches × 7 inches, the tie-beam
the same, the main supports 8 inches × 8 inches, the rafters 3
inches × 4 inches, the purlins 8 inches × 8 inches, without sap or
flaws.”
“What do you mean by flaws?”
“Depressions; deficiencies of material apparent at the corners
when timbers are squared which are rather crooked, and which
thereby leave sap visible on these corners and even a hollow place,
such as I mark here at a (Fig. 50). You will be careful not to allow
flaws in timbers which the carpenter may employ for the roofs and
joists.

Fig. 50.
 Fig. 51.
“In considering our floors, I see that for the billiard-room, the
dining-room, and the drawing-room, we shall do well to have in each
of these apartments two beams to take the joists, on account of the
width of bearing, and the partitions which come over these floors.
You remember that we deferred this question, and that in the detail
(Fig. 42), and in the section (Fig. 46), we have supposed the
existence of these beams. The joists in these three rooms, instead of
bearing from one side wall to the other, will bear from the gable walls
on to the beams. But these beams, though cut from the best oak,
invariably deflect sooner or later; which, to say the least, looks very
bad. We will therefore make them each in two pieces, sawn through
in the manner I showed you for lintels, and between the two pieces
we will interpose a thin plate of iron. That will enable us to treat the
beams like the wall bearers, and fit the joists into their sides, instead
of laying them on the top, and consequently avoid a too great
projection below the ceiling. Thus (Fig. 51), having two pieces of
timber a, 12 inches × 6 inches, we will put between them a plate of
iron ⅛th of an inch thick. We will bolt the whole together at regular
intervals as marked at d, and, in the notches c, we will fix the ends
of the joists e. A few iron straps will be nailed across to connect
these ends one to another, and we shall obtain in this manner
perfectly rigid floors. The beams will be supported in their bearings
by corbels, and will not go more than six inches into the wall. This
then is another detail to be got ready for the carpenter. Mind and see
that the ends of the beams within the wall have a coat of red lead,
and are enclosed in a box of sheet zinc, No. 14, to prevent the
moisture of the wall from penetrating the grain of the wood. Well! that
is something done: draw it all out neatly. To-morrow, when I have
looked over your drawings, we will send for Jean Godard, and we
will go and select the wood in your father’s timber-yard.”
Next day Paul presented his drawings. Many corrections were,
indeed, necessary, still on the whole his cousin congratulated him on
the result. Paul was taking pains, and was endeavouring to
understand everything thoroughly; and though he could not always
find the simplest and most natural solutions, he showed at least that
he had reflected before putting anything on paper.
Jean Godard having been summoned, the drawings were
presented to him. Some explanations were given him, after which
Eugène asked him if he had any observations to make. Jean Godard
was scratching his head, but said nothing.
“Is there anything in all this that you do not clearly understand, or
that seems faulty?” said Eugène to him.
“No, sir; but yet these are floors that are out of the common way; it
will be difficult—we are not accustomed—and you see—it isn’t what
we generally do in carpentry.”
“Which means that you must be paid more than for floors made in
your way.”
“Yes, to be sure—you understand—there is labour to be
considered—all these timbers here must be sawn—planed,
perhaps.”
“Consider well, Jean. The joists must be sawn on two faces only—
the two faces that are seen; but all joists are sawn out. If we asked
you to supply the wood, you might say that you would not find joists
of this kind; but in this case you have to select from our wood. If you
use small timber it will be enough to saw two faces thus (Fig. 52):
you may, if you like, leave the faces a roughly squared and only
cleared of sap. If you cut your joists out of large timber (Fig. 53) you
will only have to run the saw-cuts as I have sketched here at b. But I
prefer to use small timber, because it does not crook in drying, as
timber which is quartered is sure to do; and I think we shall have
enough of the former to prevent us from being obliged to employ this
last method. We shall have, then, to pay you only for the sawing of
the two faces, as for the joists you usually employ. As for the beams,
they will be also sawn on two faces only, for if we cut them from a
single trunk we shall put the two sawn faces outside (Fig. 54), and
the plate of iron being interposed at d we shall put below a moulded
board c, to cover the joining, and the flaws, should there be any.
With regard to the triangular notchings to be made at e, they are less
difficult to fashion than mortises, and as the joists bear in full they
have no tenons. It is the same with the bearers which, along the
walls, receive the ends of the joists, and take the place of cornices.
—Well, what do you say about it?”

Fig. 52. Fig. 53. Fig. 54.

“Why—still it isn’t flooring such as we see everywhere.”

“What does that matter, if it gives you no more trouble to make?
We shall take account of the time you spend, as we furnish the
wood; consequently you are secured against loss. Make a careful
estimate, and if you like we will make a bargain. We will pay you by
the cubic foot as for ordinary flooring, or take account of the time
employed in working and pay you for that time. Make your choice!”
Jean Godard twirled his cap about some time, looked at the
drawings in every possible way, scratched his right ear again, then
his left, and after a good half-hour declared that he consented to be
paid for floors of this kind at the same rate as for ordinary floors
according to measurement.
“And you are right,” said Eugène; “for if you manage your work
well, if there is no bungling, you will gain more by this bargain than if
we paid you according to time, because there is less work in flooring
of this kind for the same quantity of material than in those you are
accustomed to make, especially in this neighbourhood.”
Jean Godard, however, asked for an additional consideration for
the bearers that were to be substituted for the rough fixing in the
walls.
“Granted,” said Eugène; “we save plaster cornices, and it is right
that we should make you an allowance on that account.”
It was therefore resolved that they should make a separate
payment for the labour on the bearers, that is, for their notches and
chamfers.
Next day four pit-saws were at work, cutting up the timber that had
been stored. The scene of labour had resumed all its activity. In the
masonry department a design for a dormer-window remained to be
furnished, but which was soon supplied (Fig. 55), and besides this
the direction of the chimney flues.
Eugène on giving Paul the particulars of the dormer-windows,
section a and exterior elevation b, drew his attention to their
construction. Raised on a gutter-wall 20 inches thick, they were to
consist of two jambs of three courses each. On the first two courses
would be left a string-course c, designed to cover the slate of the
roofing and to form a filleting. These two jambs would carry the lintel
and two stones forming corbels. Two pieces on this lintel would
receive the gable knees, and would form the jambs of the higher
opening designed to ventilate the attics. The gable would consist of
two courses surmounted by a finial. The section indicated how the
slopes of the coping would form a filleting on the small roofs of these
dormer-windows behind, and a drip in front, to hinder the rain-water
from running down the faces of the stone-work.
Fig. 55.
 CHAPTER XXII.
THE CHIMNEYS.

“Why do chimneys smoke?” asked Paul of his cousin.

“You mean rather to ask me,” replied the latter, “why some
chimneys smoke. Many causes contribute to make chimneys smoke,
while there is only one condition which must be observed if they are
not to smoke. We must therefore do our utmost to fulfil that
condition, viz. a flue proportioned to the fireplace, and the supply of a
quantity of air to the latter proportioned to the combustion. If the flue
is too narrow for the amount of smoke given off by the combustion,
this smoke does not rise easily enough, its advance in ascending is
checked by friction, and the discharge being insufficient for the
production, the smoke comes out into the room. We can stimulate
the combustion, and consequently the ascent of the smoke by a
current of external air directed towards the wood or coal. When the
fire is well lighted it warms the column of air that fills the chimney,
and the warmer this column is the lighter the air is, and the more it
tends to rise.
“That is why in some ill-built chimneys a certain time is required
before the smoke will take its proper course—that is to say, the
column of air must be warmed. And until it is so, the smoke passes
not into the flue, but into the room; then we open a window to supply
the fire with air, which brightens it up so as to warm the flue and
allow the smoke to take its proper course. For the same reason all
new chimneys smoke. Flues carried up in masonry are damp and
cold, and the air they contain is heavy; it takes some time to warm
and lighten it.
“Instead of opening a window to stimulate the fire (which is a
rather primitive method), we supply each grate with an air draught—
that is, we give it a channel which conducts the external air to the
combustible as soon as the least heat is developed, that, e.g. of a
piece of paper lighted. Immediately this exterior air is called in to fill
the vacuum produced by the commencement of combustion, and it
stimulates the fire by bringing it oxygen. The livelier the fire the more
rapid is the draught; and the more rapidly the air comes in, the more
brightly does the wood or coal burn. The air-channel is to a grate
what a pair of bellows are to a forge fire. But the air-channel, as well
as the flue, must bear a due proportion to the fireplace. If the flue is
too narrow, the smoke is obstructed, and comes out into the room; if
it is too wide, it is not uniformly heated, and the external currents of
air—the winds—exert a pressure at its upper extremity which
neutralizes the effect of the draught, and the smoke is beaten down.
If the air-channel is too small for the extent of the grate, it does not
bring the quantity of air necessary for combustion; the fire
languishes, it heats the flue imperfectly, and the lukewarm smoke
does not ascend rapidly enough. If the air-channel is too large, or
brings in too considerable a volume of air, the oxygen of which is not
completely taken up, then a part of the cold air enters the flue and
does not stimulate the draught; or, if there are changes in the
temperature, the air-channel attracts the air from the chimney
instead of bringing in air from the outside. The process is reversed,
and the chimney smokes dreadfully.”
It was in the evening, after dinner, and when the family were
seated around the hearth, that Eugène was propounding this theory.
“That appears to me simple enough,” said Madame de Gandelau;
“but then why does the chimney in my room, which I have had
altered several times, smoke on certain days?”
“Because your room, Madame, is situated in the new wing of the
house, the roof of which is lower than that of the older part. They
could not carry the flue high enough to rise above the ridges of the
roof of the old building, for that isolated chimney would not have
resisted the squalls. When the wind comes on your side it finds the
obstacle presented by the loftier building, and rebounds: an eddy is
formed, and whirling about on itself it becomes engulfed in your
chimney-flue, or at least obstructs for a time the passage of the
smoke. In such a case the flues should bifurcate; as the pressure of
the wind is never exerted equally in both orifices, the air rushing into
one makes the smoke issue violently through the other. I know of no
other plan: I have already proposed it to you; but you have thought,