Important Cases Pil
Important Cases Pil
1.
one each to be appointed by the Company and by the Government and the
2.
(3) The International Court of Justice can exercise jurisdiction if there is
voluntary submission to jurisdiction by either party. When an unilateral
reference of a dispute is made to the Court by one party, assent by conduct
can scarcely by inferred where the respondent State consistently denies that
the Court had jurisdiction.
3.
Apart from this principle regarding the base line, the case has other far –
reaching consequences :
(i) The International Court of Justice held, in this case, that the maritime
belt is not so much a limited artificial extension of a State’s territorial
domain, but is a contiguous area wherein, for economic security and
geographical reasons, the Coastal State is entitled to exercise exclusive
sovereign rights. According to this decision, a State might take even its
economic interest into consideration while defining the maritime belt.
(ii) Another contribution of this case is that, by implication, it defined the
seas or the open sea as all parts of the sea which are not –
(a) The territorial sea, or
(b) Internal waters.
(iii) Further, this case shows that the International Court of Justice is free
to develop international law, without being tied by the weight of practice
and authority. But the decision has been criticized by many of the failure
of the International Court of Justice to pay proper regard to the weight of
practice and judicial precedence.
(5) The Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co.
Ltd. (Second Phase), (1970)
In the case concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co.
Ltd. (Second Phase), an interesting question arose, as to whether the state is
entitled to espouse the claim of companies and its shareholders. In this case,
the Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. Ltd. Was incorporated in Canada,
and it was operating in Spain. But a considerable investment in the company
was made by shareholders in Belgium. Certain action taken by the
Government of Spain caused serious loss and damage to the Company. In the
eyes of law, the Company was of Canadian nationality, though the majority of
the shareholders affected were Belgian nationals. The Government of Belgium
espoused the cause of its citizens as shareholders.
4.
The International Court of Justice came to the following conclusions :
(a) Only the national State of a Company concerned was entitled to
exercise diplomatic proceedings for the purpose of seeking redress of the
wrong done to the Company.
(b) When a wrong is done to the Company, the wrongdoer is not liable to
the shareholders. Therefore, the Spanish State was not liable to the
Belgian shareholders.
(c) As Canada had not espoused the cause, Belgium had no locus standi to
espouse, before the Court of International Justice, the claims of Belgian
nationals who were shareholders in the Company.
(6) Chung Chi Cheung v. R. (1939)
Facts : Chung Chi Cheung, a cabin boy on board a Chinese arme
public ship, shot and killed its Captain, while the vessel was in the Hongkong
territorial waters. He also shot and wounded another officer of the ship. The
ship proceeded to Hongkong, and Chung Chi Cheung was charged with
murder “in the waters of their colony” and duly committed. Both he and the
murdered Captain were British nationals. The Chinese authorities instituted
extradition proceedings on the ground that the offence was committed in a
Chinese public ship. The extradition was refused. The accused was convicted
and sentenced to death. He went in appeal to the Privy Council.
On the particular facts of the case, it was held that the Hongkong Court
had jurisdiction.
Significance : (a) This case held that international law was to be treated
as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it was not inconsistent with
any rule enacted by statutes or finally declared by the Tribunals.
(b) The Privy Council rejected in this case the “Floating Island” Theory
of a public ship, and it held that the territorial court accords to the ship and its
crew immunity depending, not on an objective theory that the public ship is
part of a foreign territory, but on an implication of an exemption granted by
the local territorial law. The immunity conceded by local law is conditional,
and can, in turn, be waived by the State to which the public ship belongs.
5.
(c) But at the same time, it held that the public ship enjoys the jurisdictional
immunity, only so far as it is necessary to enable such public vessel to
function efficiently as an organ of the State and for the purposes of the State.
(7) Corfu Channel (Merits) Case (1949)
Facts : The Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between Albania and
Greece. The British warships passing through the same channel were seriously
damaged by mines in the Albania territorial waters. This damage, done on
22nd October 1946, not only caused damage to the warships, but also resulted
in the death of and injuries to several persons. In Novermber, 1946, the Units
of the British Navy, without the consent of the Government of Albania,
conducted mine sweeping operations in the channel. A dispute arose between
Great Britain and Albania. The matter was taken before the Security Council.
Then the dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice. The
premilinary question arising in the matter is discussed under Case No. 14,
below. Apart from this premilinary question, two questions were raised in this
case :
(1) Was Albania responsible under international law for the damage
caused and loss of human life by explosions in its territorial waters? If
so, was Albania liable to pay compensation to Great Britain?
(2) Had Great Britain violated the sovereignity of Albania, by carrying on
the mine sweeping operations in the territorial waters of Albania?
It was held that Albania was responsible for the damage caused as it was
negligent in not giving warning to ships. It was also negligent, in not trying to
find out and punish those who were responsible for laying the mines.
On the second question, the International Court of Justice held that, by
carrying on the mine sweeping operations in the territorial waters of Albania,
without its consent, the United Kingdom had violated the sovereignty of
Albania, and thereby was guilty of intervention not justifiable in international
law.
6.
Significance : The International Court of Justice stated in this case that :
(a) It was a “generally well – recognized principle that every State is under
an obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other States”.
(b) Warships are, in times of peace, entitled to a right of inoffensive
passage through such parts of the territorial sea as form an international
highway, and cannot be prohibited from exercising this right.
(c) The decisive criterion of a strait as a highway was its geographical
situation, as connecting two parts of the open sea and the fact of its use
for international navigation, and not whether there was considerable
volume of traffic passing through it.
(8) The Corfu Channel (Preliminary Objection) Case (1948)
It was held that the Security Council could not subject a Member
State to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, by
calling upon the parties to adjust their differences by judicial settlement, if
either of the parties to the dispute had not accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court either under a treaty or under a convention or by a
declaration under Article 36 of the Statute.
(9) The Cristina (Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Cristina
S.S.)(1938)
Facts : During the Spanish Civil War (1936 – 1939), General Franco’s
Army captured from the Republican Government, the Port of Bilbao. The
Cristina was a ship registered at Bilbao. The Republican Government issued a
decree a week later, requisitioning all ships registered at Bilbao. When the
Cristina arrived in a British Port, she was taken charge of by the Spanish
Consul. The original owners of the vessels raised an action by a writ in rem
and claimed possession of the vessel as sole owners. The Spanish Government
entered a conditional appearance and contended that the action be dismissed
as it impleaded a foreign sovereign State.
The House of Lords held, in Appeal, that the contention of the Spanish
Government was good, and that a sovereign State could not be impleaded,
unless it consented. It was also held that as the Spanish Government took
7.
possession of Cristina under a requisition order, the vessel was brought within
the description of public property of the State. Therefore, it was immune from
the jurisdiction of the English Courts.
Significance : The House of Lords observed in this case that, as a
condition of obtaining immunity, the foreign Government needs only to
produce evidence showing that “its claim is not merely illusory, nor founded
on a title manifestly defective”.
Another problem discussed in this case was whether the State – owned
commercial ships should enjoy immunity. Lord Maugham observed that as
diplomatic representations made to foreign States would render a very
uncertain remedy, the foreign State – owned commercial ships should not
enjoy the immunity. However, it may be noted that the majority held that
immunity would extend to State – owned commercial ships also.
(10) Duff Development Company v. Kelentan Government (1924)
Facts : In 1912, the Government of Kelantan entered into an
agreement with the Duff Development Co. Ltd. and granted it certain rights of
mining, etc. An arbitration clause was added in the agreement. In 1921, a
dispute was referred to arbitration, and an award was made in favour of the
Duff Development Company. An attempt was made to enforce the award
against the Government of Kelantan. The Court of Appeal held, reversing the
judgment of the lower Court, that as the Government of Kelantan was
Sovereign Government, the English Court could not exercise jurisdiction. This
decision was confirmed by the House of Lords. The contention of the plaintiff
company was that Kelantan was not an independent State, as it was in the
position of a Protectorate of Great Britain. The House of Lords held that,
although not completely independent, a protected State may enjoy sufficient
measure of sovereignity to claim jurisdictional immunities in the territory of
another State.
Significance : This case is also illustrative of the practice of the
English Courts that regarding the nature of a Foreign State, the British Courts
seek the opinion of the executive and accept such opinion as the best evidence
of the status of the concerned foreign State.
8.
This case also lays down that a submission to arbitration proceeding, or even a
subsequent application to set aside these proceedings, does not amount to
waiver or immunity or to a submission to the jurisdiction of the British Courts.
(11) Eastern Greenland Case (1933) (B. U. Apr. 83, 84 & Nov. 82. 83)
Facts: The dispute in this case arose between Denmark and Norway
regarding Denmark’s claim of sovereignity over the whole of Greenland. The
foreign ministers of these two Governments had discussed the matter, and the
foreign minister for Norway had assured that the plans of the Danish
Government respecting Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland
would meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway. This assurance was
regarding Norway’s attitude at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
The question to be decided by the International Court of Justice was
whether the declaration made by the foreign minister for Norway did not
constitute an engagement, obliging Norway to refrain from occupying any
part of the territory of Greenland. It was held that an oral declaration in the
nature of a promise made by the minister for foreign affairs of one country on
behalf of the country to the minister of foreign affairs of another, and in a
matter within its competence and authority, may be as binding as a formal
written treaty. International Law does not as yet require established forms of
treaties.
Significance : The Court also laid down, in this case, that occupation,
to be effective, requires, on the part of the appropriating State, two elements:
(i) An intention or will to act as sovereign, and
(ii) The adequate exercise or display of sovereignty.
(12) The Franconia Case (R.v.Keyn)(1876)
Facts: The Franconia, a German Steamer, collieded with Strathclyde,
a British steam vessel, on the sea, at a distance of about two miles form Dover
pear – head. Keyn, the Officer – in – Command of the Franconia, it was
alleged, was negligent. On account of the collision, a person in Strathclyde
died. Keyn was indicted for manslaughter and convicted by the lower Court.
A question of law was reserved by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court
of the Appeal had to decide whether the English Courts could exercise
9.
jurisdiction over an offence committed within a distance of three miles from
the English shore. It was held, by a majority, that the English Court had
jurisdiction over such offence.
Significance: (a) It was held in this case that International Law was not
part of English law, unless adopted by legislation.
(b) This case also is interesting for the views of Lord Coleridge regarding the
nature of International Law. His Lordship observed, “Strictly speaking,
International Law is an exact expression and it is apt to mislead if its
inexactness is not kept in mind. Law implies a law giver, a tribunal capable of
enforcing it and coercing its transgressors. But there is no common law giver
to a Sovereign State and no tribunal has the power to bind them by decrees or
coerce them if they transgress.”
(13) The Case of the Freezone’s of Upper Savoy and Gex (1932)
Facts: The matter in dispute, in this case, was whether France had
succeeded to Sardinia in the matter of an obligation to respect a territorial
arrangement between Sardinia and Switzerland. It was held that treaties which
create obligations pertaining to, or for the benefit of, the territory, will pass in
succession.
Significance: (a) The Permanent Court of International Justice pointed
out in this case that the operation of the right of a third State, which is not a
party to the treaty, is not likely to be presumed; much depends on the
circumstances of each case. But, if the parties intended to confer rights on a
State which was not a party, this intention may be decisive.
(b) In this case, the Permanent Court of International Justice adopted
the subjective theory of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.
(14) The Case of the Extradition to Haya De La Torre (1951) (Asylum
case)
Facts: Haya De La Torre, a political leader of Peru, had been accused of
have instigated a military rebellion in Peru. He sought refuge in the
Columbian Embassy, which was granted by the Columbian Ambassador. The
Government of Peru refused to issue a safe conduct for the departure of Haya
10.
De La Torre. The Government of Columbia moved the International Court of
Justice.
The International Court of Justice held that the asylum granted to the
accused by the Columbian Embassy was irregular, as there was no urgency
though if there was urgency, the accused would be entitled to such asylum.
(15) I’m Alone Case (1929) (B.U. Apr. 83)
Facts: The ship “I’m Alone” was a British Schooner of Canadian
Registry. The ship was engaged in the smuggling of alcohol into the United
States. This ship was sunk in 1929 by United States Coast Guard Vessel, at a
point on the high seas more than 200 miles from the United States course. The
Canadian Government claimed damages. The matter was referred to an
arbitration. The award was in favour of Canada.
The argument of the United States was that the ship was in fact
owned by the American nationals, though de jure, the ship was of Canadian
nationality. It was also urged that the damages awarded would ultimately go
to the pockets of American citizens. But these contentions on behalf of the
United States of America, were of no avail. The Canadian Government was
entitled to claim, as injury was caused to a ship of its nationality.
The other significance of the case is that the Arbitral tribunal
awarded two separate heads of damages, the other being in respect of injury to
the claimant State.
It may be noted here that such an award made in the I’m Alone
case is consistent with the views expressed by the International Court of
Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injury suffered in the
Service of the United Nations (1949).
(16) Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
Labour Organization upon complaints made against the UNESCO
(1956)
The facts of the case are as follows:
Certain employees of the UNESCO were appointed with UNESCO on a fixed
term. Subsequently, the appointments were renewed. Such renewed
appointments were due to expire on 31st December, 1954. These employees
were asked from the representative of their national state for UNESCO to
11.
furnish certain information, to answer a questionnaire and to appear before the
Loyalty Board of their State Embassy in Paris. All these were executive
orders. The concerned employees informed the Director General of UNESCO
of their decision not to appear before the Board and of the reason of
conscience which caused them to take such decision. Consequently, the
Director General issued an Administrative Memorandum on the subject of non
– renewal of appointments expiring at the end of 1954, while the appointment
of others were renewed, to which the concerned employees complained to the
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization. The
Tribunal declared its competence to entertain the complaint and gave a
decision on the merits of the complaint.
The Executive Board of the UNESCO sought an advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the competence of the Tribunal and the
validity of its judgment. Under Article 11 of the Statute of the Tribunal,
Advisory opinion of the International Court could be sought complaining
against the judgment of the Tribunal by the following:
(1) A Member State;
(2) The Secretary – General; or
(3) The person in respect of whom a judgment was made (including any
person who has succeeded to that person’s right on his death), and the
statute further provided that the challenge may be made on the
following grounds:
(1) that the Tribunal has “exceeded its jurisdiction or competence”;
(2) that the Tribunal had “failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it”;
(3) that it has “erred on a question of law relating to the provisions” of the
U.N. Charter; or
(4) that it has committed “a fundamental error in procedure which has
occasioned a failure of justice”.
The Executive Board raised the following issues, and the Court answered
them accordingly:
12.
(1) Was the Administrative Tribunal competent under Article 11 of the
Statute to hear the complaints against UNESCO?
Ans. – The Court, after examining the problem in detail, gave a positive
answer.
(2) The competence of the Administrative Tribunal to determine the
power of the Director General to renew fixed term appointment was
also challenged.
Ans. – The I.C.J. did not think it necessary to answer this question, as it
accepted the judgment of the Tribunal.
(17) Liandovery Castle (1923-24)
During the First World War, a German killed a defenceless person in
a life – boat, and when he was accused, he pleaded the order of the superiors
as a defence. His plea was rejected on the ground that such an order was
“universally known to be against the law”. It was also held that such order
might be an extenuating circumstance, but it does not absolve a person from
the crime committed by him.
(18) The Lotus Case (1927)
Facts: The French mail steamer, the Lotus, collided on the high seas
with a Turkish ship. It was alleged that the collision was due to the gross
negligence of the Officer of the Watch on board the Lotus. The result was that
the Turkish ship sank, and eight Turkish nationals on board died. The collision
took place on the high seas. Subsequently, the crew members of the Lotus
were taken to Constantinople. The Turkish authorities instituted proceedings
against the Officer of the Watch, basing their claim to jurisdiction on the
ground that the act of negligence on board the Lotus has produced effects on
the Turkish ship, and according to the objective territorial principle, the
Turkish ship, and according to the objective territorial principle, the Turkish
authorities were justified in exercising the jurisdiction. France protested
against this exercise of jurisdiction by the Turkish authorities. The dispute was
referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. By a majority
decision, the Permanent Court held that the action of the Turkish authorities
was not inconsistent with international law.
13.
Significance : (a) This case is also an authority on the ‘floating island’ theory
of a ship. The International Court of Justice considered the effect of the
negligence on the Turkish ship to be an effect on an operation of Turkish
authority, and therefore, the objective territorial principle was acceptable.
(b) It was also pointed out in this case that no presumption of
immunity arises from the fact that the person against whom the proceedings
are taken is a foreigner,
(c) However, one of the judges in this case pointed out that an
article of the Turkish Penal Code, whereby jurisdiction was asserted over
foreigners committing offences abroad “ to the prejudice” of a Turkish
subject, was contrary to international law. According to him, the passive
nationality principle of jurisdiction was not to be generally accepted. The
same view is also supported in the Cutting case.
(d) It may be noted that the objective territorial principle of
jurisdiction as laid down in the Lotus case was not generally acceptable to
mariners, and it has been disapproved by the Conference at Brussels in 1962,
which adopted the Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to
Penal jurisdiction in matters of collision and other incidents of navigation.
(e) It may also be noted that the International Law Commission has
disapproved of the rule laid down in the Lotus case.
(f) This case is also significant in that the Permanent Court of
International Justice had recourse to juristic opinion for ascertaining the
existence or non – existence of a customary rule.
(g) This is also significant in view of the fact that the Court refused
to deduce a customary rule where State judicial decisions on the point were
divided.
It must be noted, however, that the principle laid down in the Lotus Case has
not been approved by the International Law Commi-ssion. The Brussels
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Penal Jurisdiction
in Matters of Collision and other Incidents of Navigation, now provides for
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State in penal or disciplinary proceedings
out of collision cases, subject to penal and disciplinary jurisdiction being
conceded to a non – flag State over an accused person of its nationality.
14.
(19) Lather v. Sagor
Facts : In June 1918, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic
passed a decree nationalizing mechanical saw mills and wood working
establishments belonging to private and limited Companies, and took over the
plaintiffs’ mill and certain manufacturing goods belonging to them in Russia.
The representative of the Russian Commercial Delegation in
London made a contract with the defendants in August 1920, for the sale and
delivery of a quantity of timber, including some of them seized from the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that these goods were their
property, an injunction restraining the defendants from selling, and damages
for conversion and detention. The defendants argued that the decree of June
1918 was the Act of a sovereign Government and was valid to deprive the
plaintiffs of the title and convey it to the defendants. In the Court of First
Instance, the following letters from the Foreign Office were admitted:
(1) To the Solicitor of the Russian Commercial representative, that he was
regarded as a foreign representative for certain purposes and should
be exempt from the process of the Court.
(2) To the defendants’ Solicitors, recognizing the claim of the Delegation
to represent in this country a State Government of Russia.
(3) To the plaintiffs’ Solicitors, pointing out that the representative
received privileged treatment for certain limited purposes, but his
Majesty’s Government had never officially recognized the Soviet
Government in any way.
The Court of First Instance gave judgment for the plaintiff, on the basis that
the Russian Government had not been recognized. In the Appellate Court, the
defendants produced further letters from the Foreign Office – one of which
stated that His Majesty’s Government recognized the Soviet Government as
the de facto Government of Russia. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.
Significance: (1) Recognition is retroactive to such duty as the
recognizing government might accept.
(2) For the present purpose, there is no difference between a
Government recognized de jure and one recognized de facto.
15.
(3) The Court of England will recognize and give effect to the Acts of
a de facto Government in relation to persons and property in the Government
territory, and will disregard and treat as annulled the Acts of a de jure
Government.
(20) Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [(1894) Q.B. 149]
Facts: The Sultan of Johore, whilst staying in Great Britain,
introduced himself by the assumed name of “Alburt Baker”. He did not reveal
that he was a foreign sovereign. He promised to marry the plaintiff. He did not
carry out his promise and the plaintiff sued him for breach of promise of
marriage. It was contented on his behalf that the Court had no jurisdiction, as
he was a sovereign, independent ruler and he had not submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Court. It was contended, on behalf of the plaintiff that since
the Sultan lived as private citizen under a false name, it would amount to
waiver of immunity, and therefore, the English Courts would exercise
jurisdiction over him. The Court of Appeal, as well as the Court of First
Instance, held that jurisdiction could be exercised over the Sultan of the State
of Johore, as living in cognito did not amount to voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the English Court.
The significance of this case is that the immunity given to a
foreign sovereign prevents a Court from exercising jurisdiction, unless such
foreign sovereign waives his immunity and voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the Court at the date of institution of proceedings. His conduct
or agreement, implied or express, to submit himself to the law of a Country
does not amount to submission.
(21) The Island of Palmas Arbitration (Asked at B.U. Apr. 84)
Facts : The Palmas Island is situated half – way between the Phillipine
Islands and the former Netherland East Indies. In 1906, there was a dispute
between the U.S.A and the Netherlands regarding sovereignty over this Island.
The contention of the American Government was that the Island was ceded to
the U.S. by the treaty of 1808 by Spain. The Dutch Government maintained
that the Island was a part of its territory, and that Spain, from whom the U.S.A
claimed to have acquired sovereignty over the Island, never had any right over
the same. The dispute was referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It
16.
was held that, though Spain was responsible for the discovery of the Island, it
was not in effective control of the Island. On the other hand, the Netherland’s
East India Company was in possession of the Island and exercised sovereignty
over the same since 1677.
Significance:(a) In his Award, Max Huber, the Arbitrator, described
sovereignty in these terms – “Sovereignty, in the relation between States,
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a
State.”
(b) It was also held in this case that if a State were to occupy a
territory, there must be display of effective control and authority either by the
claiming sovereignty or by a State from which the State claiming sovereignty
can prove that the title has been derived.
(c) It is claimed by some writers that the award in the Island of
Palmas case is an authority to support the doctrine of acquisitive prescription
in International Law.
(22) Paquete Habana (1900)
Facts: The Paquete Habana, a fishing boat, and another fishing boat,
Lola, flying the Spanish flag, and belonging to Spanish subjects, were
captured by a United States warship engaged in the blockade of the North
coast on Cuba. They were brought before the Court for condemnation. The
question that was to be decided was whether, under customary International
Law, fishing boats were exempt form capture. The Supreme Court of the
U.S.A reversing the order of the lower Court, held that they were free from
capture.
Significance: (a) This case is illustrative of the attitude of the
American Courts towards International Law. During the course of the
judgment, Gray. J. made the following remarks:
“International Law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the Courts of Justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”
17.
(b) This case is also illustrative of the judicial method in the application of
custom. The Supreme Court, after a detailed investigation of State laws and
practice, treaties, writings of publicists evidencing usage and decisions of
courts, found that they uniformly proved the existence of a valid customary
rule giving immunity to small fishing vessels from belligerent action in times
of war.
(c) This case is also illustrative of the function of State judicial decisions in
clarifying an international nature of custom and law.
In this case, Gray, J. also pointed out that the juristic works have the value of
being, on many occasions, the evidence of International law. He observed:
“Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculation of
their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is”.
(23) Parlement Belge (1679)
Facts: The Parlement Belge was a Belgian mail vessel belonging to the
King of Belgium. In addition to mail duties, it was also used for trading
purposes. The vessel collided against a British ship in the Dover Habour.
Proceedings against the Parliament Belge were started to recover damages. It
was held by the Court of Appeal that the British Courts had no jurisdiction
over the Parliament Belge, as it was the property of the King of Belgium.
Significance: This case supports the doctrine of the immunity of State –
owned trading vessels. [A reference may be made to the Cristina case, where
this doctrine was approved by the British Courts.]
(24) Preah Vihear Case (1962)
In the case, concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Merits) (Cambodia –
Thailand) I.C.J Reports (1962) 9, the disputed area was the region of a certain
Temple sanctuary (Preah Vihear), and there was a conflict between the
frontier according to a Treaty of 1904, whereby it was to follow a watershed
line, and the frontier according to boundary maps completed in 1907 and
communicated in 1908 to the Siamese (now Thai) Government. As the
Siamese Government, and later the Thai Government, had, by their conduct,
apparently accepted the map frontier line, the Court held that the map line
18.
should be preferred, and that the Temple area was under the Sovereignty of
Cambodia.
19.
(3) Such a claim could also be in respect of the damage caused to the
victims or to persons entitled through such persons.
(4) Such claim in respect of damage caused to the victim or to persons
entitled through him may be claimed, whether the responsible State is a
Member State or not.
(5) These claims, being based upon a breach of obligations due to the
United Nations, there will not be a conflict between the action of the
United Nations and such rights as the individual national State may
possess. The claims can be reconciled as there is no conflict. The claims
of the individual national State and the United Nations Organization are
based on different grounds. However, there may be need for
reconciliating these claims on the basis of agreements to be made
between the organizations and individual States, either generally or in
each case.
(26) The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812)
Facts: The Schooner Exchange, which was at Philadelphia, was an
armed ship under the control of France. McFaddon and another alleged that
they were the sole owners of the Schooner Exchange which sailed from
Baltimore for a port in Spain on October 27, 1809, that the vessel was seized
under the decrees and orders of Napoleon, and it was disposed of, though no
sentence of condemnation had been passed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction.
The contention of the American Government was that, as there was
peace between the United States and Napoleon, the public vessels of France
could freely enter the ports of the United States and depart there from. Even
though the ship had been captured, it had become vested in His Majesty
Napolean according to the laws of France, and therefore, the American Courts
could not exercise jurisdiction over such a ship. Marshall C.J. of the Supreme
Court of the U.S.A held, “The national ships of war entering the port of a
friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by
the consent of that Power from its jurisdiction.”
Significance: (a) In this case the immunity of public vessels was based on
20.
“an implied licence” to enter a port, the licence containing an exemption from
jurisdiction of the State which granted the rights of hospitality.
(b) It was also held in this case that a State which admits to its territory
armed forces of a friendly foreign Power, impliedly undertakes not to exercise
any jurisdiction over the force which would be inconsistent with its continuing
to exist as an efficient force. In brief, it was held that no jurisdiction could be
exercised over members of the visiting force in such a way as to impair the
integrity and efficiency of the force.
(27) South – West Africa Cases
South-West Africa was administered by South Africa under a mandate
agreement with the League of Nations. Supervision of the carrying out of the
mandate was vested in the Council of the League, to which annual reports had
to be submitted by South Africa, in accordance with Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League and Article 6 of the mandate. In the resolution of 18th
April, 1946, the Assembly of the League had recognized that, “on the
termination of the League’s existence, its functions with respect to the
mandated territories will come to an end”; it had noted that U.N. Charter
embodied “principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the
Covenant”; and it had also taken note of the expressed intentions of the
Members of the League now administering territories under the Mandate, to
continue to administer them for the well – being and development of the
peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the
respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been made between the
United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers.”
But there was no express transfer of functions to the United Nations.
South Africa was the only administering power which refused to enter into a
trusteeship agreement with the United Nations to supersede its mandate.
Disputes had arisen with regard to South Africa’s obligations under the
mandate, and those controversies were the subject – matter of a number of
advisory opinions by the International Court. In the first case (Status of South
– West Africa, I.C.J. Reports, (1950), 128), the Court was asked three
questions:
(1) About the continued existence of the mandate;
21.
(2) About the applicability of Chapter 12 of the Charter dealing with
supervision of trusteeship agreements to mandate; and
(3) About the competence of South Africa acting alone to modify the
status of South – West Africa.
The Court had no difficulty in answering the first and third questions. It had
been obvious to all concerned that the mandates continued to exist, even after
the dissolution of the League. It was envisaged that they should be replaced by
trusteeship agreements, but there was no obligation upon a mandatory state to
enter into such an agreement. On the other hand, the fact that the mandatory
state continued to be bound by the mandate implied that it could not
unilaterally alter the status of the mandated territory.
In its advisory opinion of 1962 (South – West Africa cases, I.C.J., Reports,
(1962), 154), the International Court of Justice reaffirmed that a Mandate
constituted a new international institution, the primary over – riding purpose
of which is to promote the well – being and development of the people of the
territory under the Mandate. It also affirmed that a mandate was a treaty
between the League and the Mandatory State.
In the South – West Africa cases, Second Phase (1966), the International
Court of Justice dealing with the League of Nations, ruled that an individual
member State had, with reference to a mandate, no separate self – contained
right to assert before the Court, over and above the League’s collective
institutional activity.
This opinion appears to be consistent with the opinion expressed in the
Reparation case regarding the international personality of international
organizations. Therefore, the Court held that individual member States of the
League had no legal claim or standing, by themselves, to enforce the terms of
a mandate, this being a matter for organic or institutional action.
Consequently, the Court held that the plaintiffs, Liberia and Ethiopia, had no
legal right or interest in the matter of apartheid in South – West Africa.
22.
ADVISORY OPINION OF THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATE
OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA, IN NAMIBIA
(SOUTH – WEST AFRICA) (I.C.J. REPORTS (1971), 16):
In its opinion, the Court upheld and reaffirmed its views expressed in its
advisory opinion of 1950. The Court ruled, in addition, that the failure of
South Africa to comply with its obligation to submit to the supervision of the
United Nations Organs made its continued presence in South – West Africa
illegal. The Court also reaffirmed the obligation of non – recognition on the
part of the member States in pursuance of the directives of the Security
Council. The Court was of the opinion that “Member States, in compliance
with the duty of non – recognition imposed by paragraphs 2 and 5 of the
covenant, are under an obligation to abstain from sending diplomatic or
special missions to South Africa, including in their jurisdiction the Territory
of Namibia, to abstain from sending consular agents to Namibia, and to
withdraw any such agents already there”.
(28) Stoeck v. Public Trustee (1921)
Facts: Stoeck was born in Prussia in 1872. In 1895, he went to
Belgium to live there. In 1896, he was deprived of his Prussian nationality.
After that, he did not apply for any nationality, and consequently obtained
none. In 1896, he went over to England and made that country his permanent
home. However, he did not apply for British nationality. During the First
World War, he was interned and deported to Holland. From there he shifted to
Germany. He had certain shares in a limited company of England and the
Public Trustee proposed to attach his property on the ground that he was an
enemy. Stoeck contended that his property could not be attached, as he was
not a German national.
On the basis of the evidence before him, Lord Russell came to the
conclusion that Stoeck had lost his German nationality. Therefore, he was a
Stateless person.
23.
Significance: (a) Russell J. observed in this case – “The question to what
State a person belongs must ultimately be decided by the municipal law of the
State of which he claims to belong or to which it is alleged that he belongs.”
(b) It was also held in this case that a person who seeks to establish loss of
nationality of a particular State must prove that nationality has been lost
for all purposes and with all incidence, and any possibility that a right of
protection or a chance of resumption of nationality still exists will
prevent the onus being discharged. It was also observed, in this case, the
state – lessness is a condition recognized by both municipal law and by
International Law.
24.
CASE LAWS
25.
5. Principles of forum Progration once consent is given by the parties
authorizing International Court of Justice it could proceed the case, even
after subsequent refusal by the party e.g. Corfu Channel Case.
8. Revision of a judgment.
The ship which arrived in London was still under detention by Spanish
insurgent leader General Franco, the Spanish Government issued a writ in rem
to get possession of the ship. The Franco insurgents styled as ‘Nationalist
Government of Spain’ contended that the Court could not implead a foreign
Sovereign State when it was not willing to submit to the jurisdiction to the
Court.
26.
His Majesty’s Court held that the nationalist Government was recognized
as a Government which exercised de facto administrative control over the
larger portion of Spain and hence it was a foreign Sovereign State and
therefore it could not be impleaded as a party. As a result, the detention of the
ship by the Nationalist Government of Spain under Franco was held valid.
Voctor Raul Haya Dela Torre was a military rebellion of Peru. He was
granted asylum in the Columbian foreign embassy in Peru.
The court observed that asylum to Haya Dela Torre had not been
properly granted as three months had passed after the suppression of the
military rebellion and hence the urgent situation contemplated by the Havana
Convention as a condition for granting asylum did not exist.
However, the Court held that Haya Dela Torre was a political offender
and so even though asylum had been irregularly granted, Colombia was not
bound to surrender Haya Dela Torre to Peru.
27.
facto government had complete control over Abyssinia and hence would
prevail over the Emperor’s government as he was merely a theoretical head.
In more than thirty years since their resettlement, the Chakmas and Hajongs
have built villages, developed the land granted to them, and established strong
ties in the region. They have also become integrated into the social fabric of
the State of Arunachal Pradesh. They have voted in State elections and paid
State taxes on their lands.
Many of these Chakmas and Hajongs, who now number about 65,000
persons, were born in India and know no other home.
It is against this background that their claims for Indian citizenship are to be
considered.
28.
As per Section 5(1)(a) of the amended Indian Citizenship Act of 1986,
“persons of Indian origin who are ordinarily resident in India and have been
resident for five years immediately before making an application for
registration shall be eligible to be registered as citizens of India”.
Also, Sec. 3(1)(a) states that every person born in India, on or after the 26 th
day of January, 1950, but before the commencement of the Citizenship
Amendment Act, 1986, shall be a citizen of India by birth.
So, as per law, the Chakmas and Hajongs are of Indian origin as they have
been residing in Arunachal Pradesh for more than thirty years.
There were allegations of human rights abuses and violations suffered by the
Chakmas and Hajongs at the hands of the State Government of Arunachal
Pradesh and All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union.
Under the Assam Accord, codified at Section 6 – A of the Citizenship Act, the
Chakmas were found to be non citizens as they were not ordinarily resident in
Assam, but rather in Arunachal Pradesh.
29.
However, the Supreme Court affirmed their rights of Chakmas to apply for
citizenship under Section 5(1) a and ordered the State Government to take
steps to facilitate their registration.
Despite the Supreme Court order, the State Government continues to defy the
Supreme Court, the Central Government, and the rule of law and the Chakmas
and Hajongs continue to be denied the citizenship rights and constitutional
protections that they justly deserve.
8. Christina Case:
During Spanish civil war, general Franco’s army captured the port of
Bilbao. This ship Cristina was registered at the port of Bilbao and when the
ship reached a British port, the Spanish consul took charge of the ship on
behalf of the legitimate Spanish republican Government.
The original owner claimed possession of the ship and filed a suit in Great
Britain. The Spanish government raised the plea of immunity from the
jurisdiction of local English Courts and as such the local Courts could not
entertain such cases.
30.
9. Corfu Channel Case (1949):
The Corfu channel is situated between Albania and Greece. The British
warship were seriously damaged by the submerged mines in the territorial
waters of Albania. Several persons were injured and some died. The British
navy without the permission of the Albanian government cleaned the
explosive mines in the channel. The dispute between Great Britain and
Albania was referred to international court of justice for adjudication.
The important questions that came for adjudication are
The Mexican State contended that even if there was denial of justice by
31.
applicability of Mexican criminal procedure code was defective and did not
facilitate real justice. The offence was committed in Texas and Mexican Court
had no jurisdiction. The Mexican state contended that even if there was denial
of justice by applicabilityof Mexican Criminal Procedure Code. Mr cutting
had to exhaust the local remedies available in Mexico state. The International
Court of Justice held that the Mexican Court had no jurisdiction and therefore
ordered for the release of Mr. cutting. In deciding the case, it laid down the
following rules.
Norway declared her independents and sovereignty over the eastern part
of Greenland. However, Denmark also claimed her sovereignty over the said
area. Several allied powers afterwards declared that the whole of Greenland
was part of Denmark only.
32.
The Permanent Court of International Justice decided that Eastern
Greenland was under the sovereignty of Denmark, because the intention and
will to act as Sovereign and instances of actual exercise of display of such
authority was found with Denmark only.
In this case, the Permanent Court of International Justice laid down the
following two principles:
13. Emperor Haile Selassie Vs. Cable and Wireless Ltd., (1938):
Jacob factor who was alleged to have received money fraudulently left
33.
England and was residing in the state of Illinois, U.S.A. By the laws of
Illinois, the offence charged was not an offence in Illinois. It was held by the
Supreme Court that this did not prevent extradition as it was punishable
according to the Criminal Law in general of the U.S.A and the rule of Double
Criminality was satisfied.
The Permanent Court of International Justice held that all treaties which
obligation relating to or for the benefit of the territories will pass on
succession. The contention of France that there was fundamental changes in
the circumstances and therefore the treaty obligation could not be fulfilled was
not accepted. Doing so, the Permanent Court of International Justice applied
the subjective theory of rebus sic standibus.
Voctor Raul Haya Dela Torre was a military rebellion of Peru. He was
granted asylum in the Columbian foreign embassy in Peru.
34.
According to the Pan – American Havana convention on Asylum
(1928), subject to certain conditions, asylum could be granted in a foreign
embassy to a political offender who was a national of the territorial State and
on this basis, the Columbian embassy in Peru gave asylum to the Peru
political leader Haya Dela Torre. Peru could not prove that Haya dela Torre
was a common criminal.
The court observed that asylum to Haya Dela Torre had not been
properly granted as three months had passed after the suppression of the
military rebellion and hence the urgent situation contemplated by the Havana
Convention as a condition for granting asylum did not exist.
However, the Court held that Haya Dela Torre was a political offender
and so even though asylum had been irregularly granted, Colombia was not
bound to surrender Haya Dela Torre to Peru.
The Arbitral tribunal held that the Canadian Government was entitled to
claim compensation from U.S.A. for the loss of the ship, as the same was
registered with them.
In King’s Case, the Court held that the existence of International law
35.
was out of expendiency and this was asserted by the following phrase –
‘Nothing was unjust which was expedient’.
The French ship ‘Lotus’ collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas.
The Turkish ship sank and some of the Turkish nationals died. The collision
was due to the gross negligence of the watch officer of Lotus Ship.
36.
and instituted proceedings against the watch officer for gross negligence. It
also claimed jurisdiction on Lotus Ship based on the ‘objective territorial
principle’. The French Government protested against this.
It also held that the damage to Turkish ship by negligence of French ship
officials is deemed as damage to the Turkish State, based on the ‘floating
island theory’. However the above principle was not accepted in later
decisions of International Court of justice.
In the meantime, U.K. recognized U.S.S.R. and so the higher Court held
that the goods be given to U.S.S.R. on the principle of retrospective effect of
recognition.
37.
24. Morrocco Case (1962):
However, the main defect of this school is that it lacks the parameter to
distinguish the moral and immoral nature of State Practice. Further, it has no
proof to show the binding character of International law.
38.
Justice claiming its right of protection of its citizen (by naturalization) Mr.
Nottebohm and his properties in ‘Guatemala’. The World Court held that
‘Leichtenstien’ was not entitled to claim compensation from ‘Guatemala’. In
deciding the case, it laid down the following rule:
However, Netherlands replied that the Island was never under the control
and occupation of Spain and so it had no authority to transfer it to America.
When the matter was referred to arbitration Court, it decided in favour of
Netherlands.
The arbitration Court held that for acquiring sovereignty over a particular
territory, effective occupation is a must. There should be occupation and
control and contacts with the local inhabitants. Here the term ‘occupation’
means both exercise of sovereignty and exhibition of actual authority.
The Arbitrator held that Palmas Islands though was discovered by Spain
there was no proof that the Spaniards occupied it and established contacts and
administration in the Island.
39.
28. Paquette Habana Case (1900):
In Paquette Habana Case (1900), the Court held that the unarmed coastal
fishing vessels were exempted from seizure by customary practice.
30. Re Castioni:
Castioni was revolutionist. He killed the Mayor of Swiss city and ran
away to England. The Swiss Government asked for extradition. The
government of England refused extradition on the ground that the offence was
a political crime.
31. Re Meunier:
40.
32. Re Mubarak Ali Ahmed:
of India and charged with forgery and fraud. He was committed for trial. He
jumped away and ran to Pakistan. When he later came to England, he was
arrested. The Court held that the arrest was valid, as the case was criminal in
nature and not political.
41.
Portugal took the matter to International Court of Justice. The Indian
Government contended that suspension became necessary due to special
circumstances that had arisen after its independence.
The International Court of Justice held:
1. The Portugal had no right to send its armed forces through the way
which fell within Indian Territory and such act would amount to
violation of India’s sovereignty.
2. That India did not intentionally violate the treaty of 1779 but had acted
under special circumstances.
a. The treaty of 1779 was a valid treaty and Portugal had the right of
passage through Indian Territory till the date of suspension of the treaty.
It was by Arbitral Tribunal that the successor great Britain was not
liable for the tort committed by the predecessor South African Boer Republic.
The Court held that it was the duty of Germany to give passage to S.S.
Wimbledon in accordance with Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles. It also
42.
held that damages should be paid to the British vessel by Germany for
withholding the passage.
37. Savarkar’s Case
Savarkar was a British Indian subject. He was charged for high treason
by Indian government. He was arrested in England and transported to India in
a British vessel.
The Court held that French Government could not make any claim, as
there was no law authorizing a country to illegally apprehend a suspected
criminal.
The Supreme Court of India held ‘extradition with foreign States is,
except in exceptional cases, governed by treaties or arrangemens made’.
43.
40. Teen Bigha Case:
The U.S. Supreme Court held that an international treaty is a law of the
land under the ‘supremacy clause’ of the U.S.Constitution.
44.
44. Union of India Vs. Sukumar Sen Gupta:
In 1899, the officers of South African republic seized the gold from
mines. As it was found that the gold mining operation was legal, as per the
South African Law, the seized gold must be either returned or equivalent
money be given to the mine authorities.
In the meanwhile, in the war that broke out between Britain and South
African Republic, in which Britain became victorious, the obligations of the
South African Republic automatically went to the British Government. Since
the British Government refused to return the gold, the mine authorities
claimed through the Court.
The Court held that the conquering State was not liable to fulfill the
private contractual obligations of the conquered State. The Court further
observed that waging war was an Act of State which was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and in the absence of express
understanding, the conquering State had no obligations to fulfill the
obligations of the conquered State.
45.
46. Wimbledon Case (1923):
the Peace Treaty of Versailles would prevail over the customary International
law relating to neutrality and therefore Germany was bound to keep the ‘Kilet
Canal’ open for navigation all times by all nations.
However such treaties must be lawful and comply with the peremptory
norms of International law.
46.