PRIVATIZATION OF PSUs - A CRITICAL ANALYSIS w.r.t.

COMPETITION LAW

Submitted by-
AKANKSHA SINGH - 17040142037
MUHAMMED FASAL FARZIN- 17040142012

Submitted to-
Prof. Vishal Babasaheb

Alliance School of Law

Alliance University

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ABSTRACT

In theory, revamping the portfolio of public assets is required if efficiency gains, revenue
realization, and income distribution are to be realized. The problem is how it is done and where
the money is spent. When properly planned and executed, it allows for the transfer of a public
asset to private hands, a process that is inherently vulnerable to corruption, crony capitalism, and
misuse because a monopoly in the public sector becoming a monopoly in the private sector is not
a solution.
According to Arvind Panagariya, an economist, and former Vice-Chairman, NITI Aayog, the
experience of privatization of some infrastructure projects shows “sub-optimal forms of
competitive bidding; sometimes even the terms of agreement were drafted and negotiated after
the concessionaire was zeroed down on. Even the terms of prequalification were so designed that
credible bidders often stayed away.”1

INTRODUCTION

In India, a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) or a Public Sector Enterprise (PSE) or a Public
Sector Unit (PSU) is a government entity that is either a government owned enterprise, a
government owned corporation, a statutory corporation, a government owned company, or a
nationalized company (PSU). These establishments are owned completely or partially by the
Government of India and/or one of the multiple state or territorial governments. Central Public
Sector Undertakings (CPSUs) are wholly or partially owned by the Government of India,
whereas state-level PSUs (SLPUs, SLPSEs) are wholly or partially owned by state or territorial
governments.
In 1951, there were only 5 PSUs in India that were owned by the government. By March 2021,
the number of such government entities had risen to 365, with 7 new Defense PSUs joining the
ranks. As of March 31, 2019, these government entities had a total investment of approximately
16.41 lakh crore. As of 31 March 2019, their total paid-up capital has been 2.76 lakh crore.
CPSE earned approximately 25.43 lakh crore in revenue during the fiscal year 2018-19.

On the eve of independence, India was dealing with real socio economic issues such as low
income and unemployment, regional imbalances and a lack of skilled personnel, a weak
industrial base, a low level of investment, and infrastructure gaps, among many other things. As
a result, the public sector was developed as a tool for self-sufficiency growth. The country
implemented the planning, paving the way for the development of PSUs. After initially limiting
themselves to core and strategic industries, governments in the second phase began to nationalize
industries, take over sick private-sector units, and expand public-sector operations into new
fields such as consumer goods manufacturing, consulting, contracting, and transportation, among
others. The Industrial Policy Resolution 1948 explained the logic behind and importance of
continuous growth in production and equitable distribution. The policy envisaged active
engagement of the State i.e., state-owned PSUs in the development of industries.

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PSUs' role is to build significant capacities (capability to produce) in basic and capital goods. It
also aims to achieve self-sufficiency in core areas, facilitate import substitution, and reach
commanding heights in the economy, becoming a driver of industrial growth and a catalyst in
accelerating economic expansion. It also plays a part in:

● Adopting pro-labour technology to create employment opportunities

● Setting up industries in backward/tribal areas for their integration with the rest of the
economy and for better regional development.
● Provide for the development of the private sector.
● Set up self-contained townships covering residential, schools, hospitals, transport, etc.
● Public sector to have regulated prices by the government given their importance to
the economy and not creating an upward spiral in the prices of basic goods.

In summary, PSUs have delivered strong emphasis capacities in all core areas and achieved self-
sufficiency in all types of industrial goods required by the economy. India is reliant on other
countries for its industrial needs, largely owing to the Public Sector, which has provided gainful
employment in the country. PSUs have aided the evolution of the private sector and have made a
contribution to the levels of industrialization and industrial maturity acquired. Having said that,
PSUs are also critiqued. PSUs are now regarded as relics of past inefficiencies and white
elephants that must be sold in order to accomplish resource planning efficiencies.

The governance of the PSUs is a problem. The placement of career bureaucrats at the helm
curtails the efficient management of these PSUs. The appointments in higher management are
being politicized, resulting in a spoils system. There is an excess of job security in the public
sector, which breeds inefficiency and reduces production quality. The presence of obsolete plant
machinery and the inability to incorporate newer technologies is a major reason for PSU losses.
The losses cause PSUs to take out bank loans that they will be unable to repay, resulting in the
twin balance sheet situation. The management team's lack of vision results in lower capital
resource usage, higher input prices, and quality compromise.

Aside from these issues, the philosophy underlying PSUs has changed dramatically with the
redefinition of the state's role as a facilitator rather than a producer, but most of our PSUs remain
trapped in the vast no man's land between the state and the market. Apart from the
aforementioned issues that push India toward privatization, there are a variety of pull factors as
well. The private sector has come a long way and now has the will and capability to compete on
a global scale. It is no longer necessary for the government to look after non-profit industries.
Rather, it sees opportunities in areas such as railways as well as investments in Mass Rapid
Transit Systems.
There are substantial advantages to privatization that could be complementary to development
goals. Privatization enhances government revenue, which can then be spent on social welfare
programs. It generates finances for PSU restructuring and improvements. It helps restore

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professional management to mismanaged public-sector enterprises. It boosts a company's
profitability. Privatization attracts more investment, including direct foreign investment. It also
aids in the advancement of technology, skills, and operational efficiency. It reduces the national
debt, which is reaching unsustainable proportions. It also frees up resources such as large
amounts of government manpower that are currently locked up in managing PSUs, enabling
them to be redeployed in priority areas.

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. TT Ram Mohan, India's Privatization drive:https://theindianforum.in/article/india-s-

privatisation-drive.
The author talks about how privatization, if not done correctly, is likely to suffer the same
destiny. If privatization results in significant job losses, as it very certainly will in the short term,
there will be a tremendous political backlash. If the public believes that significant public assets
are being sold for pennies on the dollar to a few well-connected businesspeople, there will be
accusations of a scam. This country's politics are such that when the cry of "scam" is raised, the
institutions of government tend to paralyze. Not only will privatization be tough, but so will
disinvestment and any type of PSU reform. Be cautious what you wish for, for it may come true
for a short while, only to end in policy gridlock.
2. Mr. Richard Hemming and Mr. Ali M. Mansoor, Privatization and Efficiency Ch IV,
Privatization and Competition Policy, 5 Sep 1998, International Monetary Fund,
ISSN: 0251-6365 -
The authors discuss the clear impact of competition policy—and privatization—on the efficiency
of privatized companies with dominating positions in potentially contestable markets will be
determined by the effectiveness of the regulatory framework. Indeed, the success of the present
change in industrial policy emphasis toward private competition is heavily reliant on the
effectiveness of regulation. The design of appropriate regulatory regimes will not be discussed
here, but it should be noted that, despite its flaws, some consider public ownership to be a
relatively efficient way of regulating monopolies, particularly in the case of natural monopolies
and other markets that are unlikely to be contestable.
3. Mini Raman, India: The Government of India's Tryst With Privatization, 26th May
2020,LexOrbis,Mondaq,https://www.mondaq.com/india/government-contracts-
procurement-ppp/941298/the-government-of-india39s-tryst-with-privatisation.
According to the author it is argued that enabling privatization of PUSs is in the best interests of
the end customer because it increases competition in the industry, lowering the cost of goods and
services. According to a recent declaration by the GOI, all PSEs in non-strategic industries
would be privatized. Private sector engagement will be permitted in crucial sectors as well.
However, the author believes that before beginning a privatization process, the government must

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have clear and transparent regulations in place to deal with the myriad difficulties that occur as a
result of privatization, such as labor concerns, management structure, debt writing off, and so on.
Privatization of each PSU must be tackled individually and exhaustively; a blanket policy will
not suffice because PSUs differ substantially from one another.
4. Bavi Dharwadkar, Gerard George, Pamela Brandes, Privatization in Emerging
Economies: An Agency Theory Perspective, RESEARCH COLLECTION LEE KONG
CHIAN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, 7/2000,
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4632/ -
The author believes that before beginning a privatization process, the government must have
clear and transparent regulations in place to deal with the myriad difficulties that occur because
of privatization, such as labor concerns, management structure, debt writing off, and so on.
Privatization of each PSU must be tackled individually and exhaustively; a blanket policy will
not suffice because PSUs differ substantially from one another.

SCOPE & OBJECTIVES

The scope of the paper would be to analyze the framework for anti-trust analysis of the
privatization of state-owned enterprises.
The objectives of this paper would be three-fold
a) To understand that monopolies being transferred from State to Private entities is not the
solution to the issue.
b) To understand how these profit-making private entities impact the right to fair trade of
small-scale players.
c) To understand the anti-competitive framework for the process of privatization.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

In a Public Sector Undertaking 51% or more of the paid-up capital is owned by the central
government or any state or territorial government and partly by one or more state
governments. When privatization happens, the

RESEARCH QUESTION-

1. Whether the fact that a monopoly/extreme dominance of an enterprise in the public

sector impact its position after the process of privatization.
2. Whether the process of privatization could be justified along the lines of DPSP?
3. Whether the process of privatization takes away the right of free trade of small
players in the respective domain.

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HYPOTHESIS

The privatization of PSU does not have to be anti-competitive prima facie; however, the outcome
usually results in the violation of Right to fair trade for small individuals.

CHAPTERIZATION
1. Introduction
2. Privatization of PSUs; an Overview
3. Anti-Competitive Facets of Privatization
4. Conclusion & Analysis

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 CHAPTER 2 - PRIVATIZATION OF PSUs

2.1. What is privatization?

Privatization is a measure in which the ownership and management of public sector industries
(industries under the government’s control) are moved to the private sector. Privatization of
certain government activities occurs in a variety of ways, but in general, the government
transfers control of specific facilities or business processes to a for-profit private enterprise. In
general, privatization assists governments in saving money and increasing efficiency.

2.2. Objectives of Privatization.

a) Improved efficiency: State-owned enterprises are mostly affected by political motives

rather than economic well-being. It reduces the efficiency and growth of public-sector
firms. Privatization reduces government influence while promoting economic growth.
Because private bodies do not have a political objective, they are more concerned with
promoting development and efficiency inside a corporation in order to generate more
cash.

b) Increased Competition: State-owned enterprises have a monopoly and are unaffected by

market competition. Privatization, along with market deregulation, allows the private
sector to participate more actively and stimulates competition. In turn, competition will
boost overall industrial and economic progress while protecting the market against
monopolistic sluggishness.

c) Promotes Market Dynamism: Privatization frees the economy from government

control. The market functions organically since there are no government laws
determining market evolution. Because of the absence of government intervention, the
market becomes more dynamic and adheres to fundamental economic fundamentals such
as demand and supply. Consumers respond more positively and produce more income in
a more dynamic and organically operated market.

d) Revenue from the Sale of a Company: The fundamental goal of privatization is to

generate one-time cash for the government. When confronted with a budgetary crisis,
some governments have already turned to privatization.

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2.3. Impacts of privatization.

a) No Welfare State: With the privatization of the economy, the notion of the welfare state
may be rejected. The private sector is unconcerned about society since its primary goal is
to maximize profits.
b) Less Social Development: Government or public sector organizations continue to
perform social work at the same time. Privatization will result in fewer funding for
society because private enterprises are not required to conduct social services.
c) Unemployment: Employees will be laid off as a result of privatization. Individuals who
have been doing work for years without much pressure find it difficult to adjust to new
settings and many end up resigning from their service because there is an emphasis on
performance in private sector enterprises, which indirectly results in work pressure and
meeting deadlines or targets..
d) Long Term Risk: Short-term gains pose a significant risk in private enterprises. There
are decisions to establish businesses that have short-term rewards but may not be good in
the long run.

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 CHAPTER III - PRIVATIZATION & DPSP

Ensuring public welfare, as ordained under the Constitution, in the age of privatization is one
such issue that did not get adequate attention. This is an important issue that needs to be
considered. The relevant question to begin with is this: Does ‘privatization’ and ‘public welfare’
go together?

The Constitutional conception of a welfare state is not limited only to provide certain basic
facilities, amenities or services like health, education, housing, sustenance etc. The concept of
welfare state envisaged under the Indian Constitution is a holistic one. It is evident from Article
38(1), one of the cardinal directive principles of state policy, which mandates that:

[T]he State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as
effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform
all the institutions of national life.

Whereas this is a very broad and a grand principle envisaged under the Constitution, various
other welfare functions the State is expected to discharge are specified under clause (2) of Article
38, 39A, 41,42,43,45, 46 & 47 of the Constitution of India. All these are directive principles of
state policies.

These provisions require the state, in particular, to take measures to minimize in inequalities in
income and endeavor to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities amongst
individuals as well as groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different
vocations

It is self-evident that the state cannot promote public welfare as prescribed by the Constitution
unless it has effective control over the market/economy. The state and control of economic
activity are required for the execution of welfare programmed provided by the Constitution. That
is why the framers of the Indian Constitution not only considered a mixed economy in which
both the public and private sectors could coexist, but also allowed the State to create monopolies
in favor of public sector undertakings as well as effectively control and regulate all economic
activities.

However, since 1991, when the New Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented, the state has
increasingly lost effective influence over the economy. The government implemented the NEP,
among other things, to comply with the 'conditionals' of global regulatory agencies such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Since the introduction of the NEP, successive
administrations in India have been persistent in their pursuit of liberalization, privatization, and
globalization (LPG). Disinvestment, denationalization, and deregulation have also become
hallmarks of NEP.

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When states embrace deregulation, disinvestment, and denationalization policies, they lose not
just their regulatory capabilities but, more significantly, their redistributionist potential. In the
following terms, David Schzeiderman summarized this feature when addressing global
investment standards1:

The emergence of a transnational regime for the protection and promotion of foreign investment
challenges directly the proposition that global capital has no tangible, institutional fabric. This
ruling regime cumulatively attempts to fashion a global tapestry of economic policy, property
rights, and constitutionalism that institutionalized the political project of neoliberalism. This
project advances the idea that the state should recede from the market, restrict its economic
functions, and limit its redistributionist capacity. The paradox is that at a time when institutions
of democracy are being reproduced globally, democracy is not to be trusted in economic
matters.

It should be stressed, however, that the NEP meant to encourage LPG is not inherently unlawful.
However, there appears to be a clash between the directorial principles, specifically the socialist
goal expressed within, and the NEP.

Given that policies promoting liberalization in general, such as privatization and disinvestment,
have been declared constitutional and are here to stay, it is necessary to consider how they
impact the Indian state's constitutional obligation to promote human rights – whether embodied
as directive principles or in the form of "converted fundamental rights."

For example, can the Indian government still build a just social order by minimizing/eliminating
disparities, ensuring that wealth or means of production are not concentrated, securing maternity
benefits in the private sector, or protecting the environment and wildlife? The same might be said
of the multitude of rights established by the judiciary by incorporating directive concepts into
fundamental rights. For example, it is unclear how the government intends to ensure that certain
aspects of globalization do not disproportionately impair, say, the right to a livelihood or the
right to housing.

While privatization policy is not inherently illegal, it may fail to meet the target values of the
cardinal directive principles envisioned in articles 38 (1) and (2), as well as 30 (a), (b), and (c) of
the Constitution.

We might conclude that in growing economies such as India, where infrastructure services have
historically been delivered by public utilities or government departments, a regulator is required
to foster competition and provide a fair playing field for new entrants. Furthermore, rather than
reacting to infractions of competition regulations, it is obliged to act proactively to restrict anti-

1 David Schzeiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s

Promise 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

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competitive behaviors. A sector regulator with a greater grasp of the industry is likely to be the
most qualified to create competition in that sector, which might fall under the supervision of the
Competition Commission of India and could also be withdrawn after competition is firmly
established in that area.

CHAPTER IV - ANTI COMPETITIVE FACETS OF PRIVATIZATION

4.1. Port Sector: An Upcoming Anti-Competitive Horizon

The Indian competition watchdog, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), concluded that
intervention is required in the port sector because "several factors such as insufficient hinterland
connectivity, associated transport costs, insufficient availability of infrastructure at the
competing port, and the quality of service offered by the alternative port restrict inter-port and
intra-port competition." (1) However, this solution was recommended in an examination of
commissioned research by The Energy Resource Institute (TERI) in 2008. There has been no
progress in bringing the port industry inside the relevant antitrust area through any official talks
or negotiations since then.

Generally, port functions come under multiple headings, with accountability falling on either the
Terminal operators or the Port authorities, depending on the nature of the activity undertaken.
There are several forms of antitrust concerns that may arise in the port sector; however, the
foundation of the same is based on the nature and operation of the ports. Thus, in common
terminology, there are three forms of port-related rivalry: inter-port, intra-port, and intra-terminal
competition. There are several economic drivers that fuel inter-port rivalry, including:

a) Port activities have a low utilization rate and a high fixed cost.
b) Internal transportation expenses are decreasing.
c) Containerization should be increased.

Privatization carries along itself some inherent risks2.

2 De Monie ( 1994 pp. 3-4)

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 a. It increases the risk of neglect of statutory public service obligations as private sector
would be interested only in profit generating activities
b. There is a threat of public monopoly getting converted into private one due to lack of or
little competition, to the detriment of port users.
c. Poor coordination between public port authority and private operator leading to reduced
efficiency.
d. The risk of favourable treatment being offered to business interest of private operator
resulting in discriminatory treatment of clientele in a common user facility.

The monopolistic nature of ports, whether public or private, arises from the fact that it is a
capital-intensive business in which the investment cannot be put to other use. Monopolistic
behavior in the private sector may occur when a port cannot support more than one operator
owing to insufficient cargo volume, or when one operator is comparably too large, or when an
operator has many terminals serving the same hinterland (Theory of natural monopoly).

Assumptions have been made that the privatization of ports would result in the conversion of a
public monopoly into a private one. In fact, if such a circumstance arises, it may undermine one
of the basic foundations of PSP, which is to bring competition and hence profit from the
resulting boost in productivity. It is normal for a private operator to seek to maximize his profits
by erecting barriers to entry for possible rivals. This propensity may also stem from a real desire
to recoup large investments with appropriate earnings.

Antitrust loopholes may be distinguished from difficult features that may exacerbate antitrust
concerns in the port industry, since the former are prevalent in the sector, while the latter may
cause antitrust issues in the near future. The taxation worry is that the sector regulator may
experience difficulties as a result of port privatization in several nations. Concerning the difficult
elements (condition regions), it can be classified into the following main categories:

a) Risk of operating in International waters

b) Pricing strategies for capturing markets
c) Customs Authorities role

To name a few anti trust loopholes-

a) Vessel Sharing Agreements

b) Vertical agreement
c) Pricing inputs and Loyalty contracts
d) Disguised concession agreements
e) Preferential agreements and transportation services

CCI has already investigated the existing state of affairs regarding competition challenges in the
port business and discovered that the port sector is mostly governed by state authorities, marine
boards, and TAMP, but they have no explicit mission to foster competition in the ports sector.

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TAMP was established as an independent tariff regulator with the goal of moving toward
competitive pricing and providing a fair playing field to all companies, at least in terms of
pricing. However, it has failed to do so, leading us to the conclusion that a single sector regulator
is required to address the aforementioned anti-competitive and antitrust concerns widespread in
India.3

Ideally, at least according to the commission, it should be left to competition authorities to

develop and preserve competition across the economy. However, most countries, including
India, only have ex-post powers to enforce and sustain competition, i.e. after a breach of a
competition rule. Furthermore, the competition authority's competition promotion is limited to
advocacy 4. This becomes problematic since managing a complete industry would be a big
responsibility for the commission, which now lacks the manpower to do so.

As a result, the necessity for regulation may develop in two primary areas: technical and
economic. The technical regulation, which may encompass navigational safety, VTS,
environmental protection, performance requirements, employee safety, health and welfare,
property safety, and internal security, may be handled by the public port authority. It is economic
regulation that is up for dispute and deserves careful consideration. The goal of economic
regulation is to guarantee that private operators' tariffs are not monopolistic and that no
cartelisation among private operators occurs, resulting in tariff manipulation. Market forces
moderate pricing in a highly competitive context, however this does not present in all areas
where PSP is being implemented.

Thus, unless there is adequate interport and intraport rivalry, or even competition between
different means of transportation, a regulatory mechanism to act as a deterrent to monopolistic
behavior may be required. This may necessitate a broad legislative framework to prevent
monopolistic or anti-competitive behaviors in the general economy, as well as a particular one
for the port sector. There are several methods advocated for preventing monopolistic behavior by
private operators, including tariff control by an impartial authority. The market force is now
unquestionably the best regulator. As a result, any such regulatory system should only be
temporary until the market matures, and such control should not destroy the commercialism that
comes with PSP.

One of the current goals of Indian policy is to transform large ports into landlords while also
implementing progressive corporatisation. The landlord model of port management assumes that
the landlord is just the owner of land/infrastructure and a regulator, not an operator, with
commercial tasks delegated to private/public sector operators. Corporatisation is a reform that
aims to provide public ports operational and commercial autonomy free of bureaucratic
supervision by transforming them into a corporate entity under standard corporate law.

The best example of a corporatised port is PSA Corp., which functions as a service or

3 TERI 2008, Competition issues in regulated industries: Case of the Indian Transport Sector New Delhi: The
Energy and Resources Institute. 149 pp. [Project Report No. 2007CP21]
4 Supra 3 pp. 69

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comprehensive port and not as landlord and regulator. Another example of port corporation is the
Melbourne Port Corporation (MPC) acting as a landlord for the biggest container port of
Australia, but here MPC is not a corporate entity under the normal company law but a statutory
body created to oversee the landlord function by a separate act namely Port Services Act, 1995
(Section 11 defines MPC as a public authority not representing the crown) of the Victoria
province. Thus the objective of converting major ports into corporations, where PSP is being
pursued vigorously and are suitable for early conversion into landlords, appears to be somewhat
misplaced. For instance, in case of JNPT, where a container terminal is already being operated
by the private operator and a liquid cargo berth has been awarded to consortium of oil
companies, other terminals, namely second container terminal and the bulk terminal being
operated by the Trust could easily be hived off to the private sector. Therefore, what would be
needed after hiving off operational activities would be a landlord authority, which need not be a
corporation. The benefits of corporatisation stem from the fact that there is operational and
financial flexibility to undertake commercial activities and when no commercial activity is left to
be done, corporatisation would not serve much purpose.5

To conclude it could be safe to say privatization necessitates a clear demarcation and delineation
of the roles and duties of the public and private sectors, as well as the laws controlling the
contact between public and private authority. This is required to allow private capital to properly
analyze the risks and advantages of investing and to increase their level of comfort.

5 https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=all_dissertations

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 CHAPTER V- CONCLUSION & SUGGESTIONS

The paper started with an in depth description of what privatization means along with its merits
and impacts. Today, India is poised for unprecedented economic growth. However, its trade
potential and growth plans are hampered by inadequate port and transportation infrastructure.
Several expert studies have recommended private involvement and professional management in
Indian port operations. The attempt to create a privately owned and operated container terminal
at Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Nhava Sheva, has finally come to a financial close after many false
starts in some Indian major ports, and the port itself is being corporatized.

However, there are several aspects of the Indian port privatization model that need to be fine-
tuned before it is suitable for replication by others. These include long-term policy issues as well
as tactical issues like power and water supply to the private terminal operator.

Suggestions

a) The legal framework for regulating the port sector (technical and economic) after
privatization must be finalized and implemented. The Government of India should clearly
define the post-privatisation relationship between the public and private sectors, and
necessary legislation/statutory rules covering technical and economic regulations should
be drafted, which would apply to landlord port structures, as major ports are poised to be.

b) The Indian port sector still seems to be far from operating in a healthy competitive
environment and thus the need for economic regulations governing tariff and the
conditions of service appears desirable. The tariff setting mechanism should contain some
flexibility to allow the operators to price the service strategically charging the premium
for quality. Banding the tariff in a range rather than capping the tariff, thereby offering
flexibility to operators may achieve this.

c) The necessary organizational structure must be finalized and implemented. While

strategic planning should remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Shipping, a two-tier
public authority structure is recommended for sector regulation, with one at the national

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level establishing regulatory regimes and the other at the local level enforcing those
regulatory regimes and performing the landlord function. To avoid duplication, a single
local authority could be established for multiple contiguous ports.

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Bibliography

Statutes
 The Competition Act,2002
 The Constitution of India

Articles

 An Analysis on the Sectoral Dynamics in the Privatisation of Ports in India: The Way Ahead,
Mr. Swarnendu Chatterjee and Ms. Aakaansha Arya, March,2013, Issue 1, Vol 1, pp. 75-94
 Indian Port Policy Imperatives Post Privatisation, Sudhesh Kumar Shahi, September 2002,
Issue 1, Vol 1, pp. 24-48.
 Privatisation and Public Welfare: Constitutional Imperatives, Dr P Puneeth, KLE Law
Journal, April 2010, Vol 1, Issue 1, pp. 90-99.
 Social Welfare and Constitutional Responsibilities of Government: An Analysis of the
Current Scenario, Avneesh Kumar, Issue 3, Vol 1, pp. 32-56.

Websites

 https://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/january/03/Social-Welfare.
 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privatization.asp
 https://www.jstor.org/stable/40042927?seq=2
 www.manupatra.in

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