THE PHILOSOPHY

OF

CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT AN OBJECT

A Discussion of the Nature of

Transcendental Consciousness

by

Franklin Merrell-Wolff
 PREFACE

While the present work presupposes acquaintance

with my earlier volume Pathways Through to Space , yet it

may be read independently . The earlier contribution is a

record of transformation in consciousness written down

during the actual process itself and, thus, while it

supplies a peculiarly intimate view, yet loses thereby

something of the objective valuation which only distance

can contribute . In the present volume a recapitulation

of the record, written after the fact, forms the material

of the second chapter . The perspective in this case is

naturally more complete . As a result, the interpretative

thought, which follows as the implication of the transforma-

tion, possesses a more explicit logical unity . The earlier

writing was, of necessity, more in the form of a stream

of ideas, composed as they welled up into the foreground

of consciousness, rather than a systematic development .

The writing was true to the thought of the day or the

moment and synoptic in form in so far as it was related

to the development of conceptions . Many problems were

left incompletely handled, and this was done knowingly,

with the intention subsequently to develop the thought

more fully . The present book was planned to fill the

gaps left in the earlier work .

-i-
 However, despite my intention to write a logically

organized system, I found, somewhat to my embarrassment,

the thought persisted in growing in directions I had not

foreseen . Formal systematic organization broke down again

and again as the flow burst over the dams of preconceived

structure . As a result, the present work is only somewhat

more systematic than the Pathways . but falls short of the

requirements of a completed system . Clearly the time is

not yet ripe for the rounding out of all parts . Some

problems have received a clearer elucidation, but in the

process others have arisen that remain unfinished .

He who knows the Awakening becomes something of a

poet, no matter how little he was a poet before . No longer

may thought remain purely formal . The poet pioneers, while

the intellect systematizes . The one opens the Door, while

the other organizes command . The functions are comple-

mentary . But in this combination there are difficulties

as well as advantages . The thought that seeks the rounded

system, which shall stand guarded on all sides, ever finds

new Doors opening in unexpected places and, then, reorgani-

zation becomes necessary . The vistas appearing through

each new Opening are far too valuable to be ignored and,

besides, Truth cannot be honestly denied . So the system

is never closed . I beg the critic to indulge this flaw,

if flaw it is,

-ii-
 In the present volume I have found it even logic-

ally impossible to disregard the personal factor . By

preference I would have written as Spinoza wrote, but in

this day we are no longer free to disregard the epistemo-

logical problem . No longer can we take conceptions at

their face value as carriers of Knowledge . Since the work

of Kant we must ever question the authority of all con-

ceptions . Always it is asked , what do the conceptions

mean? And , in general , they mean a somewhat which is not

itself a conception . How, then , is the acquaintance with

this somewhat , itself , attained ? When the reference is to

ordinary experience , the problem is simple enough and may

often be assumed , but the Way of Consciousness which be-

comes available through the transformation is far from

the beaten track , so it cannot be taken implicitly, if one

would do the reader justice . For that reason a review of

the process of transformation is introduced to provide the

ground on which the more systematic discussion rests .

Today it is not necessary to prove that there are

states of mystical consciousness possessing positive in-

dividual and social value . Too many writers of proven

intellectual and scientific competency have given serious

attention to the subject and demonstrated not only the

actuality of mystical states of consciousness but have

found the results for feeling and character development

excellent , at least in many instances . I can list the

-iii-
names of men like William James , John Dewey, Bertrand

Russell , James H. Leuba , and Alexis Carrel, to say nothing

of the great German Idealists , who have either written

directly from the awakened mystical sense or, at least,

know full well its actuality . But with the exception of

William James and the German Idealists; there is a gen-

eral tendency among such students to claim that no true

knowledge of reality of the "thing -in-itself " can come

from the mystical experience . As a result , the primary

problem of the present work is the demonstration, as far

as may be , of the actuality of noetic value springing

from mystical or gnostic roots . I was forced , therefore,

to give serious attention to philosophical and psychologi-

cal criticism and develop my thesis with an eye to the

pitfalls indicated by such criticism . Much of this

criticism is distinctly challenging and may not be lightly

brushed aside . To him who has the poet ' s insight or the

intuitive feeling of the unfettered religious nature,

much of the critical part of the discussion will appear

unnecessary and many modes of formulation unduly devious

and recondite . To such I would say : " Be patient, and

remember I am not writing only for those who believe

easily . Know you not that there are men of intellectual

power and honesty in this world who view you patronizingly

as little , well -meaning but credulous : children ? I would-

command for you respectful attention even though there

may be much honest disagreement ."

 PART I

THE GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE

Chapter I
The Idea and Its Reference

#l . The office of great philosophy is to be a Way

of realization, and not solely a monitor of doing . This

the ancients knew well, but in these later more sordid

days this truth is all but forgotten . The serious citizen

of the present-day world may well blush when he thinks of

what must be the judgment of the future historian who,

when he writes of our age, notes how superb genius and

skill served mainly the mundane needs and convenience of

a "plantigrade, featherless, biped mammal of the genus

homo" in its adaptations to environment, or else studied

how very intricate and technical devices might be adapted

to the destruction of that same mammal in the most un-

pleasant way conceivable . Indeed, when knowledge serves

such ends ignorance is preferable . But though it is ill

enough when technical knowledge finds no more worthy ob-

jective, far worse and darker is it when the royal Queen

of Knowledge is dragged down to the status of handmaiden

of earthly science . Admittedly, by its very form and

method earthly science can find its ultimate justification
only in doing , but it is the true office of philosophy to

serve a more worthy and ultimate end . For the eternal

function of the Divine Sophia is to supply the knowing

which serves being first of all and doing only in so far

as action is instrumental to that being .

The present sad estate of much philosophy is

largely the result of a critical acumen which has run

far ahead of the unfoldment of balancing insight . Far be

it from me to question the valid functions of the critical

spirit , for I would be among the last who would care to

abide in a fool's castle of illusion , but criticism by

itself leads only to the dead-end of universal skepticism .

To be sure , this skepticism may be variously disguised,

as revealed in statements such as " all knowledge is only

probable knowledge ", or "knowledge is only warranted

assertibility which is tested by how far it serves adapta-

tion of an organism to its environment ", or it may lead

to the out-right denial that there is any such thing as

Reality or Truth . But in any case certainty is lost with

even the hope that certainty may ever be found . There

are men of strange taste who seem to like the resultant

gambler's world of complete uncertainty wherein nothing

may be trusted and only illusions are left to feed the

yearning for belief . But for all those of deeper religious

need the death of hope for certainty is the ultimate tragedy

of absolute pessimism--not the relative pessimism of a

Buddha, a Christ , or a Schopenhauer , who each saw the

hopeless darkness of this dark world as well as a Door

leading to the undying Light, but rather a pessimism so

deep that there is no hope for Light anywhere . Somewhere

there must be certainty if the end of life is to be more

than eternal despair . And to find this certainty something

other than criticism is required .

As the stream of experience passes by us we find

no beginning and no end . With our science we slash arbi-

trary cuts across that stream and find innumerable re-

lations intertwining indeterminate parts that we can define

and organize into systems with considerable skill . But

as to the ultimate nature of the parts in relation we know .

nothing at all . From whence the stream and whither? That

is the question which centuries and millenia of knowledge

grounded only in the empirically given has never been able

to answer . Hopeless is the estate of man if the source of

all he knows is experience and nothing more .

But is there , mayhap , a source of knowledge other

than experience and its ( supposedly ) one-parented child,

the concept ? The great among the ancients have affirmed

that there is, and so have others throughout our racial

history . I, too, affirm that there is this third organ

of knowledge and that it may be realized by him who strives

in the right direction . And I, also, confirm those ancients

who say that through this other organ the resolution of

the ultimate questions may be found and a knowledge real-

ized that is not sterile, though its form may be most un-

expected . But do the barricades of modern criticism leave

room for the forgotten Door? I believe that they do once

the structure of criticism is carefully analyzed and that

which is sound is separated from that which is unsound .

For philosophic criticism is no authoritarian absolute

competent to close the door to testimony from the fount

of immediacy.

#2 . Kant's Critique 1 seems to have established this

important proposition : The pure reason by itself can

establish judgments of possibility only and can predicate

existence of that possibility solely as a possibility .

In order to predicate actuality of an existence something

more is required . In general, the predication of actual

existence becomes possible by means of the empiric material

given through the senses . The combination of the princi-

ples of pure reason and the material given through the

senses makes possible the unity of experience whereby raw

immediacy can be incorporated in a totality organized

under law . This establishes a basis for confidence in

the theoretic determinations of science as such, with all

that follows from that . But there are demands within

human consciousness that remain unsatisfied by this

integration . Kant was aware of this fact and tried to

resolve the problem in his Critique of Practical Reason,

but he failed to achieve any adequate ground for assur-

ance . Thus we stand today in a position where for thought

there is no certain but only probable knowledge .

In the present philosophic outline I do not chal-

lenge the essential validity of the above conclusion, drawn

from the Critique of Pure Reason . I accept the principle

that Pure thought can give only judgments of possible ex-

istence . But I go further than Kant in maintaining that

in the total organization of consciousness there are phases

which are neither conceptual nor empiric--the latter term

being understood as consciousness -value dependent upon the

senses . I draw attention to such a phase which, while not

commonly active among men, has yet been reported by a few

individuals throughout the span of known history, and

maintain that I have myself realized at least some measure

of the operation of this phase . This phase has been known

in the West under a number of designations, such as "Cosmic

Consciousness", "Mystical Insight", "Specialism", " Trans-

humanism", etc . In the Orient it has been given a more

systematic treatment and designation . Thus, it is recog-

nizable under the terms "Samadhi", "Dhyana", and "Prajna" .

The character of this phase of consciousness , as it has

been represented in existent discussions and as revealed

in my own contact with it, is of the nature of immediate

awareness of an existential content or value . This im-

mediacy is of a far superior order as compared to that

given through the senses , for the latter is dependent upon

the instrumentality of sensuous organs and functions . As

compared to experience through the senses this rarer phase

of consciousness gives a transcendent value immediately and

renders possible the predication of its existence in a

judgment without violating the fundamental principles laid

down by Kant .

An epistemological critique of this transcendental

phase of consciousness is possible only by one in whom it

is operative . This is true for .the reason that the episte-

mologist , unlike the psychologist , can work only upon the

material he actually has within his own consciousness .

His is the inside view, while the psychologist, so long as

he is only a psychologist , is restricted to the material

that can be observed externally . Thus, the epistemologist

is concerned with an analysis of the base of judgments of

significance and value , while the method of the psycholo-

gist confines him to the field of judgments concerning

empirically existent fact . As a consequence , the findings

of the psychologist are irrelevant with respect to the more

interior field of value and meaning . Failure to keep this

fact in mind has produced a considerable confusion and

heartache that were quite unnecessary .

The problem before us at this point is largely

outside the reach of the psychologist , as it is concerned

with value and meaning and not with observable existences,

save only in very incidental degree . Very likely, the

operation of the transcendental phase of consciousness,

which is predicated here, may have co-ordinate effects

which can be observed by the psychologist , and perhaps

even the physiologist . But whatever may be thus observed

has no bearing upon the standing of the inner and directly

realized value and meaning . Apparently , deviation from

psychological and physiological norm may be, and indeed

has been , noted . Often this deviation from norm has been

interpreted as an adverse criticism of the directly

realized meaningful content . This procedure is both un-

scientific and unphilosophical , for it involves the blind

assumption that the virtue of being superior attaches to

the norm as such . By applying this same method consistent-

ly within , say, the setting of the life and consciousness

of the Australian bushmen, we would be forced to an adverse

judgment relative to all the higher human culture in all

forms . As many of our psychologists and physiologists

do not actually maintain this consistent position, we are

forced to the conclusion that they permit personal pre-

judice the determinant part in their valuations .

In current discussions it has been frequently

noted that some concepts refer to sensuously given ex-

istences directly while others do not . These existences

have been called "referents" . This leads to the formula-

tion: Some concepts have referents while others do not .

Generally the former concepts are given the superior

validity and the latter only such validity as they may

acquire by leading to concepts that do have referents .

Indeed, there are some writers who deny that there is any

such thing as a concept, and admit only words . In any

case , the concepts, or words, without referents, are viewed

as mere abstractions . Now, while it may be valid to regard

concepts as important only in so far as they lead to refer-

ents, it is an arbitrary assumption to maintain that the

referent must always be an empirically given fact . The

referent may be a content given by the transcendent phase of

consciousness immediately . In this case, the abstract con-

cept may have as genuine reference-value as the more concrete

ideas . It is only through the mystical awakening that this

question can be answered positively . It is part of the thesis

of the present work that abstract concepts, or at any rate

some abstract concepts, do in fact mean a content that can

be realized immediately . Thus the most abstract phase of

thought can lead to meaning at least as directly as con-

crete ideas . But this meaning is not a sensuously given

content .

A fundamental implication is that some conceptual

systems may be regarded as symbols of transcendental mean-

ing . Perhaps we may regard this symbolical form of refer-

ence as characteristic of all concepts with respect to

all referents, whether empiric or transcendental . Some

of the more mature branches of modern science seem to be

arriving at such an interpretation of their own theoretical

constructions . Thus, in current physics the constructions

are often spoken of as models which mean a reality or

referent which in its own nature is not thinkable . The

model, then, is not a mere photographic reproduction but

a thinkable and logical pattern which corresponds to the

observed relationships in the referent . Such a pattern

is a symbol, though perhaps not in the special sense in

which Dr . C . G . Jung uses this term . At any rate, in this

case it is a symbol of relationships . In the transcend-

ental sense the symbol would represent substantialities .

We have here, then, the essential difference between the

intellect as used in science and as employed in connection

with metaphysics . In the one case it supplies a symbol

for relationships, in the other a symbol of substantial

realities .
 The primary value of the intellect is that it

gives command . By means of science nature is manipulated

and controlled in an ever widening degree . This fact is

too well known to need elaboration . The same principle

applies to transcendent realities . Through the power of

thought this Domain, too, becomes one which can be navi-

gated . Immature mystics are not navigators, and there-

fore realize the transcendent as a Sea in which their

boats of consciousness either drift or are propelled by

powers which they, individually, do not control . In such

cases , if the boats are controlled, other unseen intelli-

gence does the work . Many mystics give this controlling

power the blanket name of "God" . The real and genuine

reference here is to a Power beyond the individual and

self-conscious personal self that is realized as operative

but not understood in its character . On the other hand,

the mystic who has control may drop the term "God", with

its usual connotations, from his vocabulary . However, he

knows that the term does refer to something quite real

though very imperfectly understood by the larger number

of mystics . This control depends upon the development of

understanding and thought having quite a different order

of reference from that which applies to experience through

the senses .
#3 . The empirically given manifold of fact that con-

stitutes the raw material of physical science is not

itself the same as science , nor does it become so simply

by being collected, recorded, and classified . To raise

this body of fact to the status of science it must all be

incorporated within an interpretative theory which satis-

fies certain conditions . Two of these conditions are

fundamental and ineluctable . First, the interpretative

theory must be a logical and self-consistent whole from

which deductive inferences can be drawn . This is an ab-

solute necessity of science as such . Second, the theory

must in addition be so selected and formulated that the

sequential train of inferences therefrom shall at some

stage suggest an empirically possible experiment or obser-

vation which can confirm or fail to confirm the inference .

This condition is not a necessity of science in the onto-

logical sense , but is an essential part of empiric science .

This condition peculiarly marks the radical departure of

modern science as contrasted to the science of the schol-

astics and of Aristotle . It is a principle of the highest

pragmatic importance and is the prime key to the western

and modern type of control of nature . Now, any organiza-

tion of a collection of observed facts that satisfies

these two conditions is-science in the current sense of

the word .
 But while the above two principles are the only

two necessary conditions for defining a body of knowledge

as scientific, in the current sense , yet in practice

scientists demand more . There is a third condition which

serves convenience and even prejudice rather than logic .

This is the requirement that the interpretative theory

shall be congruent with already established or accepted

scientific points of view, unless it is well proven that

this third condition cannot be satisfied without violating

the first or second . The long resistance to the accept-

ance of the Einstein dynamics was due to the fact that the

relativity theory violated the third condition, though

conforming to the first two . Only with reluctance could

the body of scientists be induced to abandon the classical

mechanics of Newton . For many years the latter was lovingly

patched with the baling wire of ad hoc hypotheses, and

the body of scientists--very much like a conservative farmer

attached to a tumble-down wagon, ancient team, and dis-

integrating harness , held together and kept going by every

device of ingenuity, and hating the modern truck that has

been offered him as a present--refused to have anything

to do with the new theory , even though it satisfied the

first condition with exceptional beauty . But, ultimately,

because the relativity theory met the test of the second

condition and the Newtonian view had indubitably lost its

logical coherence in the domain of electrodynamics, due

to heavy patching, the former was, perforce, accepted .

This bit out of the history of science simply illustrates

the fact that the third condition is merely arbitrary in

the logical sense . However, it must be acknowledged that

this condition does have a degree of practical and psycho-

logical justification . It is part and parcel of the

conservative spirit which someone has given a rather aphor-

istic formulation in the following terms : "So long as it

is not necessary to change it is necessary not to change ."

Change that is too rapid for adjustment and assimilation

is not without its danger .

The danger of change is a danger to the all too

human nature of the scientist and not a danger to science

itself . The third condition exists for the protection of

the scientist because he is a human being, and is quite

irrelevant so far as science as such is concerned . I have

talked to scientifically oriented minds and developed

conceptions implying or explicitly affirming the reality

of the transcendent, to which they took no logical excep-

tion, but they then drew the protecting robes of the third

condition about themselves and withdrew to what they

imagined was the safety of their enclosure . It is not wise

to treat scared children too roughly, and, in so far as the

third condition is used as a protective temenos for the

fallible human nature of the scientist, it should be

respected . But this third condition is no real part of

science as science and may not be properly invoked to

discredit the truth of any interpretative construction .

Today in the vast domain of the bio-psychological

sciences --which include the whole of man in so far as he

is an object for science--and in much of philosophy, the

predominant orientation is to Darwin . Darwinism has a

two-fold meaning of which the lesser aspect is innocent

and creditable enough, but the larger aspect of which is

a sinister force--perhaps the most sinister--that seri-

ously threatens the ultimate good of the human soul .

In the narrower sense , Darwin gave us a major

scientific contribution . Through the facts observed by

Darwin the notion of organic evolution is drawn into the

focus of consciousness with a well-nigh ineluctable

force . So far the contribution of Darwin is positive and,

I believe, permanent . But in the larger sense Darwinism

involves a good deal more than this . The evolutionary

process is interpreted as a blind and mechanical force

operating in the primordial roots of life and responsible

for every development including man, even the most cultured .

The facts may, and I believe do, require some conception

of evolution for their interpretation . But there are other

conceptions of the nature of evolution, differing radically

from Darwin' s idea, that do interpret the facts, or may

be adapted to such interpretation . Evolution may be con-

ceived as the technique of an intelligent process, and it

may be conceived comprehensively as the complement of an

involutionary process . Evolution thus conceived is not

part of Darwinism in the invidious sense .

The first two conditions of scientific method do

not impose the blind and mechanical view of evolution as

a scientifically necessary interpretation . The orienta-

tion on the part of scientists to this radically anti-

transcendental view is merely in conformity with the arti-

ficial third condition . Yet it must be confessed that the

mechanistic interpretation does have certain advantages .

To those who hate mystery it seems as though here we have

a key for understanding life, in all its elaborations, that

is directly and objectively understandable . Thus the

senses and the intellect are all that is necessary for the

conquest of life . There is much of illusion in this . For

when the biologist falls back on the chemist to explain

his vital phenomena , the chemist gives him cold comfort

when he says that he does not find chemical phenomena

adequate to meet the requirements of the biologist ; and

then when the biologist turns to the most basic physical

science of all, i .e ., physics, he finds that since 1896 phys-

ics has laid the foundation for mysticism with a vengeance,

and the materialistic biologist is left without fundamental

support for his interpretative view .

 The idea that in the purely naturalistic sense

there is a tendency in living organism to rise in the

scale is by no means a scientifically established fact .

To be sure, we do find a vast difference of level in the

hierarchy of living creatures, reaching from the mineral

or near the mineral to the Buddhas, but it is not a-

scientifically established fact that this difference of

elevation is not due to periodic or continuous impinge-

ment of energy from transcendental roots . If the cause

of rise in the scale is transcendental, then it is not

2 Apart from this consideration--which for
naturalistic .

the moment I shall treat as only speculative --there is

strong positive evidence that in the purely naturalistic

sense all function in nature tends toward degradation .

The physicists tell us that in all of their observation

from the laboratory up to astro-physics they find no ex-

ception to the second law of thermo-dynamics . In simple

terms , this law says that all energy tends to flow down

hill, that is, from centers of high concentration to

regions of low concentration, as from the stars to the

depths of space . And further , energy is available for

work only while it is on this flow , and is lost in the

final stage of dissemination . All of this simply leads

to the view that the purely naturalistic tendency is

toward degradation .
 Are we not justified in viewing life as some

kind of energy ? Would not such a view be a peculiarly

consistent application of the third condition? Because

it constitutes an extension of an already accepted scien-

tific viewpoint . But if natural life is to be viewed as

an energy , is there not then a strong presumption that

this energy does not constitute an exception to the gen-

eral law which seems to be universally confirmed by the

observation of the physicist? If the answer to these

three questions is affirmative, it follows that we must

view natural life, taken in isolation from any transcend-

ental impingement of energy, as tending toward degradation .

The consequences of such an altered viewpoint are far-

reaching . For instance, the ethnologist would no longer

find justification for viewing the culture of so-called

primitive man as the interpretatively significant root-

source of higher culture, since this primitive culture

would actually be degraded culture and thus not a root but

the near end-term of a process of degradation. We would

no longer be justified in viewing something like the voodoo

as the primitive form of religious consciousness, or the

seed from which ultimately flowered the higher religious

consciousness , but we would see in this form of religious

practice the degraded state of religion--that which re-

ligion becomes in the hands of a race moving toward ex-

tinction . As another instance we would find that the

reductive3 interpretation in analytic psychology would lose

all really significant value .

Later in this volume I shall have occasion to de-

velop more fully the line of argument sketched above in

its relation to much current psychological interpretation

of mystical states of consciousness . For it appears that

most of the disparagement found in such interpretations

develops from the prejudicial attitude growing out of a

predeliction for the invidious extension of Darwinism .

For the present I am concerned only with the development

of a general orienting pre-view in relation to the general

reference of ideas .

#4 . The following chapter is introduced to establish

a ground of knowledge upon which the body of subsequent

interpretation is largely based . This mainly descriptive-

narrative statement is to be understood as having the same

methodological significance that attaches to the labor-

atory record in the development of scientific theoretical

interpretation . But in this case the immediately given

material is not of the objective sort studied in scientific

laboratories ; it is that which is found by a predominantly

conscious penetration of the subjective pole of conscious-

ness . In this case that which corresponds to the raw

Is
material of scientific theory,-aae•the qualities or states

found by piercing into the "I" rather than by observing

the "not-I" . A referential ground for interpretation of

this sort is far from being a commonplace in the sense

that all the objective material of scientific theory may

be called commonplace, since the latter is, in principle,

available to any so-called five- sense consciousness . Very

few human beings have conscious familiarity with the zone

in question, but there are a few who do, and they under-

stand each other when they meet . This latter fact is of

the very highest significance for it reveals that the sub-

jective realm is not something absolutely unique in an

individual and having nothing in common with anyone else .

Unquestionably there are detailed features of the subject-

ive zone which are unique as one individual is contrasted

with another individual and as one type of individual is

set off by another type . But these variants grow less and

less with the depth of penetration, while there is a

progressive growth in congruency of insight which in the

end tends to become absolute . At the very center stands

Enlightenment, which is fundamentally the same for all men .

I must leave this statement in dogmatic form since it can

neither be proved nor disproved in objective terms .

The initial and most superficial stage of the sub-

jective penetration is, admittedly, intensely personal,

for no man can start at any point save that of himself, a

concrete individual living at some particular point in time

and space . An early danger of the Way is that of becoming

entrapped in this purely personal subjectivity for an

indefinite period of time . But he who is caught at this

point has scarcely taken the first step on the ladder .

The real penetration lies beyond the personal self .

Reaching beyond the personal stage the " I" rapidly grows

in impersonality until it acquires the value of a Universal

Principle . Thus the inner ground is a common ground just

as truly as is the objective content of consciousness com-

mon to all men . As empiric scientists , in general , under-

stand each other's way of thinking, so those who know some

measure of the impersonal "I" understand each other's

peculiar language , at least in its primary reference . To

be sure , there are variants here, just as there are differ-

ences of scientific specialty , which restrict the complete-

ness of mutual understanding . In general , a specialist in

sub-atomic physics would not talk the specific language

of a specialist in biology , yet with respect to the general

determinants of empirical science as such there is mutuality

of understanding . The analogue of this is definitely to be

found among the mystics . And this fact is a real cause for

confusion on the part of a non -mystical investigator of

mystical states of consciousness . There are agreements

and differentiations not hard for him who has Vision to

understand , but which are hopelessly confusing to the un-

initiated .
 In the record given in the next chapter, part of

the material is doubtless unique with respect to the in-

dividual . In this respect there are several divergences

from other records that can be found in literature . But

very soon the content acquires a progressively universal

character . Proof of this can be found, likewise, by

reference to the appropriate literature . It is this more

universally identical content that constitutes the main

ground of reference of the later interpretation . Indeed,

there is here a common ground for all men, but generally

it is lost in the Unconscious , yet waiting , ever ready to

be revealed when the Light of Consciousness turns upon

Itself toward Its Source .

Footnotes to Chapter I

1 The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, the most

important work in the whole of Western philosophical
literature .

2"Naturalism " here is taken to mean that sensuously

observed Nature is all that there is of Reality.

31n analytic psychology the standpoint which views the

reference of complexes welling up from the unconscious
as being due to causal factors which lie in the conscious
field of the past is called " reductive " . This stands in
contrast to the "constructive " standpoint which views
such complexes as symbolically meaning , or also meaning,
an end to be developed in the future . See "Definitions",
Chapter XI in Jung ' s Psychological Types .
 Chapter II

A Mystical Unfoldment

It was during the period when I was a student

in the Graduate School of Philosophy of Harvard Uni-

versity in 1912-13 that, finally, I became convinced of

the probable existence of a transcendent mode of con-

sciousness which could not be comprehended within the

limits of our ordinary forms of knowledge . Several

factors converged in the forming of this conviction .

For one thing, a considerable portion of western philo-

sophy from the Greeks to the present day seemed to imply

some sort of insight into Reality that was not reducible

to observation or derivable from immediate experience by

logical deduction, however acute the course of reasoning

might be . At the same time, the profound assurance of

truth I had realized in my studies in pure mathematics

did not seem to be explained satisfactorily by any of

those philosophical interpretations which aim to show

that mathematics is derived from the facts of the ex-

ternal world by mere abstraction . Throughout all dis-

cussion the feeling persisted that at the root of mathe-

matics there lay a mystery, reaching far deeper than any-

thing attained through the senses . In addition, for a

period of some three years I had had a degree of contact

with the Buddhist, Vedantist, and Theosophical phases

of oriental thought, and in all these the evidence of

some sort of transcendental consciousness was peculiarly

decisive . On the other hand, as a factor which acted

in a sort of negative sense , the various philosophies

which repudiated the actuality of any transcendental or

mystical reality seemed to have the effect of barrenness

which left them far from satisfactory . Meanwhile, acting

beneath the surface of my consciousness, there was a more

or less inarticulate faith which insisted that the truly

valid interpretation of reality must be such as would

satisfy through and through, and thus not be barren . Yet

the dialectical and polemical processes of the various

western schools of thought were inadequate for supplying

the completely satisfactory solution which, while afford-

ing the appropriate recognition of the needs of experience

and of reason, at the same time satisfied the hunger for

assurance and depth . However, the evidence from history

seemed to make it clear that at least some few among

mankind had achieved this assurance which was both reason-

able and full . So it seemed to me to be highly probable

that there must be a mode of consciousness or knowledge

not yet comprehended by epistemology and psychology as

developed in the Nest .

At that time I had no clear idea of what this

knowledge might be, or of the methods by which one might

hope to attain it . I had had some brief contact with

the oriental manuals on transformation and realized that

they seemed to point to a kind of consciousness, which,

while not generally realized by mankind, yet was poten

tially within the range of human attainment . At first

I attempted to interpret the material contained within

these manuals in the conceptual forms of western thought,

but always in these efforts I finally met failure . I

soon found enough to know that there was something con-

cealed within the manuals, because I noted certain subtle

affective changes they induced within me, and there was

aroused also a sense of something near that yet defeated

the efforts of my understanding to comprehend . So I be-

gan to feel sure of a hidden somewhat to which these

manuals were related, if for no other reason than that

their first effect was to leave me disturbed and restless .

The desire for peace of mind sometimes counseled me to

turn away from them, but then the realization that the

subsequent position would be arbitrary and artificial,

and therefore a repudiation of an honest search for

reality, whatever that might be, always forced me to

return to those disturbing manuals .

It soon became clear, if this search in a new

direction was to be successful, I had to reach beyond

anything contained within the academic circles of the
West . The manuals demanded a life-practice or attitude

which involved the whole man, and thus the requirements

were incompatible with the attitude of a tentative trying

while part of the man stood back enclosed in a sort of

reserve . Again and again I found the statement that,

if a man would attain the transcendent realization, he

must renounce all, and not merely part, of what he per-

sonally is . I did not find this an easy step to consum-

mate . For years I resisted it, offering part of myself,

yet holding back a certain reserve . During all this time

I realized only imperfect and unsatisfactory results, and

often regretted the experiment . But it was not long be-

fore I found that I had gone too far to turn back . I had

realized enough to render forever barren the old pastures,

and yet not enough to know either peace or satisfaction .

For some years I rested in this position of indecision,

without achieving much visible progress . Yet meanwhile,

as time rolled on, progressive exhaustion of the world-

desire developed , while concomitantly there grew a greater

willingness to abandon all that had been reserved and so

complete the experiment .

As the years passed , I began to form a better idea

of the goal and of the reasons underlying the requirements

of the manuals . All this helped to arouse a greater will

to effort , and so I began to experiment more deliberately

with the various transformation-techniques that came

before my attention . All, or nearly all, of these were

of oriental origin, and in most cases I found them disap-

pointing in their effectiveness . But, finally, I realized

that there are several techniques and that these are de-

signed to meet the needs of quite various temperaments

and psychical organizations . In time it became clear

that there are important temperamental and psychical

differences as between orientals and occidentals, and

that this fact implied modification of methods . So I

began seeking for the invariable elements in the dif-

ferent techniques with a view to finding just what was

essential . Ultimately I found one oriental Sage with

whose thought and temperament I felt a high .degree of

sympathetic rapport . This Sage was the Vedantic philo-

sopher known as Shankara . I found .myself in striking

agreement with the more fundamental phases of his thought

and quite willing to apply the highly intellectual tech-

nique which he had charted . It was in this Sage's writ-

ings that I finally found the means which were effective

in producing the transformation which I sought .

In the meantime I had met various individuals and

groups who offered and rendered assistance in the direc-

tion I was seeking to go, and from all of them I must

acknowledge having received positive values which had a

progressively clarifying effect upon the understanding .

But none of them offered methods which proved decisively

effective with me . Nearly all of these placed their

predominant stress upon feeling-transformation and failed

to satisfy the intellectual demands which, with me, always

remained strong . Of all such Teachers whom I met, either

through their living presence or their written word,

Shankara, alone, adequately satisfied the intellectual

side of my nature . So, while I owe much to many whom

I have known in one way or another, it yet remained for

Shankara to offer the hint which proved to be decisive .

However, even Shankara did not supply all the

specifications for the method which became finally ef-

fective . Also, I had to discover adaptations which would

satisfy the needs of an academically trained occidental

nature . None of these adaptations violated any of the

fundamentals of Shankara's teaching . But what I added

as a sort of creative discovery was peculiarly decisive

in its effect . At the present time, I am convinced that

some such original discovery is vitally important in

effecting a self-induced transformation .

In the period just preceding the hour when success

finally crowned a search which covered nearly a quarter

of a century, certain features characteristic of the

-27-
transcendent consciousness had become theoretically clear .

I had attained an intellectual grasp of the vitally im-

portant fact that transcendent consciousness differs

from our ordinary consciousness in the primary respect

that it is a state of consciousness wherein the disjunc-

tion between the subject .e-R- consciousness and the object

of consciousness is destroyed . It is a state wherein

self-identity and the field of consciousness are blended

in one indissoluble whole . This supplied the prime charac-

teristic by which all our common consciousness could be

differentiated from the transcendent . The former is all

of the type which may be called subject-object or relative

consciousness .

The second fact of primary importance, that I

now understood, was that the common denominator, as it

were, of both kinds of consciousness lay in the subject

or self . This fact is identical, in a significant degree,

with the fundamental discovery of Descartes, i .e ., that

when everything is submitted to critical examination it

still remains impossible to doubt one's own being, how-

ever little one may be able to understand the nature of

that being . I also discovered the essential timelessness

of the subject or self, and that in its purity, unmixed

with any objective element, it can never truly be an

object of consciousness . I readily realized that if

pure subjectivity, or the bare power to be aware, was a

permanent or unchanging element and therefore must, as a

consequence, stand outside of time and be unaffected by

any history, then it must be, of necessity, immortal .

I saw that this kind of immortality is wholly impersonal

and does not, by itself, imply the unlimited persistence

of the quality of individuality which c'istinguishes one

man from another . But the finding of one immortal element

affords a definite anchorage and security, grounded in

certainty of an order far superior to that of any kind

of faith . When I had reached this point in the unfold-

ment of my understanding I really had achieved the posi-

tive value of decisive importance which, some years later,

was to prove the effective entering wedge for opening the

Way to the transcendent level of consciousness .

While, in addition to the principles or facts

just discussed, there are a number of other statements

relative to the transcendent that can be found in litera-

ture, yet, in my judgment, the recognition of these is

all that is absolutely essential to prepare the under-

standing for the Transcendental Awakening . These princi-

ples or facts are clearly of noetic value, and they can

be appreciated quite apart from any affective transforma-

tion that may be associated with the arousing of trans-

cendental apperception . In fact, it may be entirely

possible that a sufficiently concentrated meditation

upon the inner significance of these principles might

prove an efficient means for effecting the transforma-

tion without the aid of any other subsidiary factor .

However, they were not the sole factors that were opera-

tive in my experience, though they occupied the position

of first importance .

Concurrently with the attainment of the prelimi-

nary noetic adjustment certain important transformations

were developing in the affective and conative side of

my nature . Early in my studies I found that the manuals

emphasized the necessity of killing out desire . This

proved to be a difficult step to understand and far from

easy to accomplish . Desire and sentient life are in-

separable, and so it seemed as though this demand implied

the equivalent of self-extinction . It was only after

some time that I discovered that the real meaning con-

sisted in a changing of the polarization of desire .

Ordinarily, desire moves towards objects and objective

achievements, in some sense . It is necessary that this

desire should be given another polarization so that, in-

stead of objects and achievements in the world-field being

sought, an eternal and all-encompassing consciousness

should be desired . This interpretation clarified the

meaning of the demand and rendered it intellectually

acceptable, but did not at once effect the required re-
polarization. To accomplish this the wearing power of

time proved to be necessary . As the years passed the

outward polarization of the desire did grow weaker3 and

some months just prior to the hour when the radical transi-

tion in consciousness was consummated, it actually had

become transformed into a distaste for practically every-

thing belonging to the world-field . It seemed that all

in the world-field was drained dry of every significant

value . Though there still remained vast quantities of

objective secular information of which I was ignorant

and could have acquired, and there were many experiences

which I had never sampled, yet I realized that, as such,

they were void of depth and had no more value than David

Hume' s game of backgammon . If there had not been a com-

pensating polarization of desire in another direction,

it seems highly probable that at this stage my state of

consciousness would have had a very pessimistic and de-

pressed coloring, but as there was at the same time a

strong growth of the desire for transcendent conscious-

ness , the result was that the psychical energy did have

an outlet . However, there was a critical point at which

the shifting polarization had attained something like a

neutral balance1 . At this point there was no decisive

wish to go either way and the whole field of interest

took on a very colorless quality . As I look back upon

the whole experience I would say that this stage was the
only one which involved real danger . I found it necessary

to supplement the neutral state of desire by a forcibly

willed resolution, and thus proceed in the chosen direc-

tion regardless of the absence of inclination 2 . However,

once past the critical point, the inward polarization of

desire developed rapidly, and presently spontaneous in-

clination rendered the forcibly willed resolution unneces-

sary .

In addition to the barrier of desire directed

toward external objects, the manuals specify a very im-

portant and closely related barrier to attainment . This

is egoism . The strong feeling for, and attachment to,

egoistic differentiation is an insurmountable barrier to

a kind of consciousness which, instead of being discrete

and ego-bound, is continuous, free, and impersonal . So a

certain critical degree of dissolution or solution of the

egoistic crystallization must be effected if the trans-

formation of consciousness is to be successful . I did not

find it difficult to appreciate the logic of this require-

ment, but again, as in the case of outwardly polarized

desire, the difficult part was the actual dissolution of

the egoistic feeling . The ordinary technique is the prac-

tice of practical altruism until personal self-consideration

sinks well into the background . But this is not the only

means which effects this result . A desire for the trans-

cendent Self and a love of universals also tend toward the
required melting of the egoistic feeling . In this part
of the discipline I found that my already established love:

of mathematics and philosophy was an aid of radical im-

portance that, supplemented by more tangible practices,

finally produced the requisite degree of melting .

In my experience , the preliminary noetic adjust-

ment required much less time and effort than the requisite

affective and conative re-orientation . With the latter

the wearing- down process of time proved to be necessary .

Unquestionably , if the feelings and will could . have been

made to respond more readily to the leadership of under-

standing , then the transformation of the consciousness

would have been achieved in much less time . But, as human

nature is constituted , it appears this phase of the labor

does require much patience and the assistance of the matur-

ing which time brings in its natural course .

Preceding the hour . of the radical transition in

consciousness there had been two premonitory recognitions

of substantial adjustment value . The first occurred about

fourteen years before, and the second only about nine months

prior to, the culminating stage . The first of these il-

lustrates the important difference between the theoreti-

cal appreciation of a fact or principle and a kind of

adjustment to, or realization of, that which I have called

'recognition ' . For some years I had been familiar with

the Indian concept of Atman and understood that it meant

a spiritual ' Self', conceived as being the irreducible

center of consciousness on which all knowledge or con-

sciousness in the relative sense depended . I had found

no empiric or logical difficulty with this concept and

had accepted it as valid . I understood quite well, as

an immediate implication , that since I am the Self, there-

fore , the judgment " I am Atman " is practically a tautology .

I did not see how any idea could have greater philosophical

clarity . But on one occasion , when a friend was outlining

a method of systematic discrimination between the Self

and the not-Self , finally culminating in the judgment

"I am Atman", I recognized in this a profound truth carry-

ing the very highest significance . With this there came

a sense of new insight and of j oy . It made a difference

in me which the theoretical acceptance and appreciation

of the judgment had failed to do .

In analyzing the difference between the recog-

nition and the theoretical acceptance without recognition,

it seems that in the latter instance there is a quality

which might be called mediative distance , while in the

case of recognition there is the closeness of immediacy .

There is something non-logical that is added , but, while

non-logical, it is not anti -logical . Part of the effect

was an increased clarity in the apperception of the logi-

cal implications which followed . Spontaneously and with

intellectual ease I began thinking consequences which

were practically identical with a number of fundamental

statements in the Bhagavad-gita . But now these thoughts

were my thoughts in a close and intimate sense , whereas

prior to that time they were simply ideas which I had

touched through my reading, often not feeling very sympa-

thetic with them . Within a considerable range of con-

sciousness I now felt assurance, whereas previously I had

merely believed or accepted because of theoretical con-

siderations . Ideas which formerly had had the effect of

constraint upon me now had a definitely joyous and freedom-

giving value . And it was only a momentary flash of insight

that had made all this difference! The effect persisted

and has never been lost at any time since, though the fresh-

ness of the insight gradually waned and became a 'matter of

course' in the background of my thinking and valuation .

Much that had been previously obscure in a certain class

of oriental thinking I now found myself understanding with

a greatly increased clarity3 .

In connection with the foregoing recognition, it

seems clear to me that the prior theoretical acceptance

had prepared the soil of the mind, as it were, for the

subsequent realization . While there is something addi-

tional in the recognition as compared to the theoretical

acceptance, that 'something' is not in the nature of con-

cepts nor of an added experience in any perceptive sense .

It rather belongs to some other dimension of conscious-

ness , not contained in either concepts or percepts, but

which has a radical effect upon value . It may lead a

train of thought to new discovery, but is not itself re=-

vealed in a subsequent analysis of that train of thought .

The formal relationships of the final expression of the

thought may be quite clear and understandable to the

trained intellect of a man who is without insight and

they may stand up quite well under criticism . Yet the

insight renders possible much that is beyond the power

of the trained intellect which lacks the insight . It

can lead the way in radical cognitive discovery and con-

tribute a form to the time-bound world that will have its

effects, large or small, in the stream of time . But he

who is blind to this dimension of consciousness that I

have called "Value" will see only a form , a mere con-

figuration on the surface . Yet another who is awake to

Value will, at the same time, recognize depth in the con-

figuration . Also, one who is not awakened may, by dwell-

ing upon the configuration through a method that has long

been known as meditation, find the value-dimension aroused

to recognition in his consciousness . And it is just this

something additional, this somewhat that is over and

above the concept, with all its traceable ramifications,

which makes all the difference in the world!

The second premonitory recognition had a markedly

different background, since it expressed itself in a judg-

ment for which I had not been prepared by prior theoreti-

cal acceptance . I had been meditating upon the concept

of 'Nirvana' when, suddenly, it dawned upon me that I,

in the inmost sense , am identical with Nirvana . My pre-

vious ideas upon this subject had involved a confusion

which, while logical analysis should have dispelled it,

none the less persisted . Despite statements to the con-

trary, with which I was familiar, I had been thinking of

Nirvana as a kind of other world standing in disparate

relation to this world of relative consciousness . Of

course, I should have realized the hidden error in this

view, as such an interpretation involved placing Nirvana

in the relative manifold . But probably through intel-

lectual laziness I failed to carry my thought through on

this point . The result was that the recognition effected

for me a new cognitive discovery as well as a deepening

and illumining effect in the dimension of value . I readily

saw the reason why so little had been said, and indeed

why so little could be said , concerning Nirvana beyond

the assertion of its reality . The inner core of the 'I',

like Nirvana , is not an objective existence but is , rather,

the 'thread ' upon which the objective material of con-

sciousness is strung . Relative consciousness deals with

the objective material but never finds the ' thread' as an

object . Yet it is that 'thread ' which renders all else

possible . In fact , it is the most immediate and ever-

present reality of all . Nirvana , like the 'I ', cannot

be located anywhere , as in a distinct place , for it is

at once everywhere and nowhere, both in space and time .

Upon this ' thread', space and time are strung just as
truly as all perceptual experience and all thought con-

sciousness and any other mode of relative consciousness

there may be .
This second recognition had implications which

actually were to become clear to me at the deepest stage

of realization some ten months later . Presumptively, a

sufficiently acute thought would have developed the con-

sequences beforehand , but I failed to do this . At any

rate , I now see that this second recognition contained

the seed of insight which renders clear the Buddhist doc-

trine of anatman4 , which in turn constitutes an important

part of the central core of that philosophy , as well as

one of its most obscure doctrines . But I shall return

to this point at a later time when the ground for its

discussion has been better prepared .

 For the last two or three years prior to the cul-

minating transition in consciousness I was aware of a de-

crease in my intellectual capacity . The meaning of philo-

sophic and mathematical literature that formerly had been

within the range of my working consciousness became obscure .

The effort to understand much which I had formerly under-

stood reasonably well simply produced drowsiness . At the

time this caused me considerable concern, and I wondered

whether it might be a sign of premature intellectual aging .

However, it proved to be a passing phase , for shortly prior

to the culminating point the intellectual alertness re-

turned, and after that point it became more acute than

it ever had been . The recognition, among other effects,

proved to have the value of an intellectual rejuvenation .

I mention this development since it seems to have some

significance . When observed retrospectively it would

seem that there had been a withdrawal of the personal

energy from the intellectual field into some level that

was not consciously traceable . As yet, I have not found

any records of an analagous experience on the part of

others when approaching the mystical crisis . I am noting

this development for such value as it may ultimately prove

to haves .
During the last few weeks just preceding the

transformation there grew within me a strong expectation

and a kind of inner excitement . I felt within me an in-

definable assurance that, at last, the culminating success

of a long search was within reach . I felt that I was near

the discovery of the means whereby I could surmount the

apparently unscalable walls which seemed to lie all about .

I had been studying and meditating upon the philosophic

writings of Shankara more seriously than at any prior time

and sensed that in them was to be found the vital key . At

the same time I had a strong desire for a period of soli-

tude . Presently the opportunity came to satisfy this de-

sire , and, taking a volume of Shankara ' s translated works

with me, I spent several days in a wild and lonely place6 .

The study and thought of this period proved to be decisively

effective . As a result of this effort an idea of cardinal

importance was evolved in my mind . In this case, as in

that of the first premonitory recognition , the value of

the idea did not inhere in its being something new to

thought as such . It exists in literature , and I had come

across it in my reading , but at the time in question it

came with the force of a new discovery in a matrix of as-

surance and with an affective quality which I can hardly

express in any other way than to say it was " Light" . While

the moment of this discovery was not that of the culminat-

ing recognition , yet I have reason to believe that it was

the critical or turning-point which rendered the final

recognition accessible . It altered the base of thought

I

and valuation in a profound way and in a direction con-

firmed by the subsequent realization . Because of the

important part this idea played , a brief elucidation of

it seems necessary .

It is a common and apparently quite natural habit

with us to regard the material given through the senses

as being something actual . Our science and philosophy

may fail to give an adequate interpretation of this material,

but still we generally feel sure that it is something . So

the larger portion of the human search for Reality is in

the field of the things given to our consciousness through

the senses . But in my reflecting upon the idea that this

universe of things is derived from and dependent upon a

primordial plenum, it suddenly struck me that in the midst

of the bare and original fullness there could be nothing

to arouse discrete or concrete consciousness . It is a

familiar fact of psychology that a long - continued or un-

changing state or quality tends to become unconscious .

Thus , in a state of health an individual is only slightly

conscious of his body in its organic functioning . But let

there be some form of injury or sickness , and at once the

individual is conscious of his organism as he was not before .

Likewise , when a long- continued period of bodily pain has

ceased , there is then a concrete consciousness of well-

being such as did not exist before the pain . In such a
case , simply to be free of the pain has the value of an

active joy, though the same bodily state did not have

that value formerly . Through pain the joy-consciousness

of health was aroused to recognition . Now, applying this

principle in an ontological sense , it follows that the

Consciousness of the original Fullness can only be aroused

by first passing through the experience of 'absence' or

'emptiness', in some degree . Thus the active, concrete,

and perceptual consciousness is to be viewed as an arousal

of specific awareness through a partial blanking-out of

the full and perfectly balanced consciousness of the

Primordial State . As a result, the world of things,

apparently given through the senses , is actually a domain

of relative emptiness . We become concretely aware only

when contacting voids . There is nothing in this to in-

validate the positive findings of natural science . Science

studies the direct or indirect determinations of the senses

and finds those relationships binding the various parts

which render possible the formulation of laws . The ques-

tion as to whether the terms or facts of science have a

substantial base and, if so, what its nature is, is a

metaphysical question quite beyond the range of the

methodology of natural science . Scientific philosophy

reveals a real critical acumen in dropping the notion of

'substance' as being relevant to our kind of science . It

says--I think correctly--that science is concerned with

terms in various relations , and nothing else . When it

goes further than that and says specifically or in effect

that scientific knowledge is the only kind of real know-

ledge possible to man, or possible at all , it trips on

the very error it charges against certain other philo-

sophies , i .e ., that of " definition by initial predication" .

Now, if it is relative emptiness that arouses to

activity concrete consciousness , then it follows that actual

substantiality is inversely proportional to sensibility

or ponderability . There is most substance where the senses

find least , and vice versa . Thus the terms -in-relation of

the sensible world are to be viewed as relative emptiness

contained in an unseen and substantial matrix . From this

there follows , at once , a very important consequence .

The discrete manifoldness and apparent pluralism of sensibly

given things are quite compatible with a continuous and

unitary substantial matrix . The monistic tendency of

interpretations based upon mystical insight at once be-

comes clear , and here is afforded a reconciliation of the

one and the many? .

It is not my purpose at the present time to enter

upon an adequate philosophical defense of this interpreta-

tion, but simply to present the idea which was of decisive

psychological importance with me in removing a barrier to
mystical realization . At least, the validity of this

idea was , and still remains , clear to me as an individual .

The idea I had just recognized made possible an

effective conceptual re-orientation . The totality of

being had become divided into two phases . The higher

phase I called the ' substantial ' or 'transcendental' .

This was super- sensible and monistic , and served as the

base in which the lower phase inhered . The latter phase

thus became , by contrast, the sensible and phenomenal

world, existing only through a complete dependence upon

the super-sensible and substantial . Within the latter

existed endless multiplicity and divisibility .

There remained now merely the clearing up of the

residual barriers to the complete identification of the

self with the super-sensible and substantial world, ac-

companied by the thorough divorcement of the self-identity

with the phenomenal world . But a few days were required

for the completion of this effort . Meanwhile , I had re-

turned from physical solitude to the active concerns of

social life, although I remained in a state of considerable

mental detachment and continued brooding . Finally, on the

7th of August, 1936, after having completed the reading

of Shankara ' s discussion of "Liberation", as given in the

System of the Vedanta by Paul Deussen , I entered upon a

course of meditative reflection upon the material just

read8 . While engaged in this course of reflection, it

suddenly dawned upon me that a common error in medita-

tion--and one which I had been making right along--lay

in the seeking of a subtle object or experience . Now,

an object or an experience , no matter how subtle , remains

a phenomenal time-space existence and therefore is other

than the super-sensible substantiality . Thus the con-

sciousness to be sought is the state of pure subjectivity

without an object . This consideration rendered clear to

me the emphasis , repeatedly stated by the manuals, upon

the closing-out of the modifications of the mind . But I

had never found it possible completely to silence thought .

So it occurred to me that success might be attained simply

by a discriminative isolation of the subjective pole of

consciousness , with the focus of consciousness placed

upon this aspect , but otherwise leaving the mental pro-

cesses free to continue in their spontaneous function-

ing--they, however, remaining in the periphery of the

attentive consciousness . Further, I realized that pure

subjective consciousness without an object must appear

to the relative consciousness to have objects . Hence

Recognition did not , of itself , imply a new experiential

content in consciousness9 . I saw that genuine Recognition

is simply a realization of Nothing , but a Nothing that is

absolutely substantial and identical with the SELF . This

was the final turn of the Key which opened the Door .

I I found myself at once identical with the Voidness,

Darkness, and Silence, but realized them as utter,

though ineffable, Fullness, in .the sense of Substan-

tiality, Light, in the sense of Illumination, and Sound,

in the sense of pure formless Meaning and Value . The

deepening of consciousness that followed at once is

simply inconceivable and quite beyond the possibility

of adequate representation . To suggest the Value of

this transcendental state of consciousness requires

concepts of the most intensive possible connotation

and the modes of expression that indicate the most

superlative value art can devise Yet the result of

the best effort seems a sorry sort of thing when com-

pared with the immediate Actuality . All language, as

such, is defeated when used as an instrument of portrayal

of the transcendent .

There are a number of implications and conse-

quences following from such an insight that do fall with-

in the range of formulation, and in this a man who has

the appropriate skill can certainly do more than one

who has little knowledge of the art of expression . But

the immediate noetic and affective values of the insight,

while they may be directly realized, cannot be conveyed

by any formulation or representation whatsoever .

 A definite line of demarcation must be drawn

between the transcendental state of consciousness it-

self and the precipitated effects within the relative

consciousness . The former is not an experience, but a

Recognition or an Awakening on a timeless level of con-

sciousness . The latter is an effect precipitated into

the time -world and therefore has experiential and rela-

tive value . At the final moment , I was prepared not to

have the personal , time-bound man share in any of the

values that might inhere in the insight . But, very

quickly, values began to descend into the outer conscious-

ness and have continued to do so, more or less periodi-

cally , to the present day . These precipitated values

have much that is of definite noetic content and decided

affective value , well within the range of expression .

The listing and delineation of the elements that

were precipitated into the relative consciousness from

the first stage of insight is the next step' .

1 . The first discernible effect in conscious-

ness was something which I may call a shift in the base

of consciousness . From the relative point of view, the

final step may be likened to a leap into Nothing . At

once, that Nothing was resolved into utter Fullness,

which in turn gave the relative world a dreamlike quality

of unreality . I felt and knew myself to have arrived,

at last, at the Real . I was not dissipated in a sort

of spatial emptiness, but on the contrary was spread

out in a Fullness beyond measure . The roots of my con-

sciousness , which prior to this moment had been (seem-

ingly) more or less deeply implanted in the field of

relative consciousness, now were forcibly removed and

instantaneously transplanted into a supernal region .

This sense of being thus transplanted has continued to

the present day, and it seems to be a much more normal

state of emplacement than ever the old rooting had been .

2 . Closely related to the foregoing is a trans-

formation in the meaning of the 'Self' , or 'I' . Previously,

pure subjectivity had seemed to me to be like a zero or

vanishing point, a somewhat which had position in con-

sciousness but no body . So long as that which man calls

his 'self' had body it stood within the range of analytic

observation . Stripping off the sheaths of this body until

none is left is the function of the discriminative tech-

nique in meditation . At the end there remains that which

is never an object and yet is the foundation upon which

all relative consciousness is strung like beads upon a

string . As a symbol to represent this ultimate and ir-

reducible subject to all consciousness , the 'I' element,

I know nothing better than zero or an evanescent point .

The critical stage in the transformation is the realiza-

tion of the 'I' as zero . But, at once, that 'I' spreads

out into an unlimited 'thickness' . It is as though the

'I' became the whole of space . The Self is no longer

a pole or focal point, but it sweeps outward, every-

where , in a sort of unpolarized consciousness , which is

at once self-identity and the objective content of con-

sciousness . It is an unequivocal transcendence of the

subject-object relationship . Herein lies the rationale

of the inevitable ineffability of mystical insight . All

language is grounded in the subject - object relationship,

and so, at best , can only misrepresent transcendent con-

sciousness when an effort is made to express its imme-

diately given value .

3 . There is a sense of enormous depth penetration

with two phases barely distinguishable during this first

stage of insight . The first phase is highly noetic but

super-conceptual. I had awareness of a kind of thought

of such an enormous degree of abstraction and universality

that it was barely discernible as being of noetic charac-

ter . If we were to regard our most abstract concepts as

being of the nature of tangible bodies, containing a hid-

den but substantial meaning , then this transcendent thought

would be of the nature of the meaning without the con-

ceptual embodiment . It is the compacted essence of

thought, the 'sentences ' of which would require entire life-

times for their elaboration in objective form and yet re-

main unexhausted at the conclusion of such effort . In my

relative consciousness I knew that I was thinking such

massive thoughts , and I felt the infiltration of value

from them . In a curious way I knew that I KNEW in cos-

mical proportions . However , no brain substance could be

so refined as to be capable of attunement to the grand

cosmical tread of those Thoughts .

But still beyond the thoughts of cosmic propor-

tions and illimitable abstraction there were further deeps

transcending the furthest reaches of noetic and affective

value . Yet, in this, the self-identity remained unbroken

in a dimly sensed series of deeps reaching on to ever

greater profundities of what, in one sense , was an im-

penetrable Darkness , and yet I knew It was the very

essence of Light itself.

4 . I knew myself to be beyond space , time , and

causality . As the substantial , spatial, and transcendent

'I', I knew that I sustained the whole phenomenal universe,

and that time , space and law are simply the Self -imposed

forms whereby I am enabled to apprehend in the relative

sensel3. I, thus, am not dependent upon the space-time

manifold , but, on the contrary, that manifold is dependent

upon the Self with which I am identical .

5 . Closely associated with the foregoing reali-

zation there is a feeling of complete freedom . I had

broken out of the bondage to the space-time manifold and
the law-form governing in this manifold . This is largely

an affective value, but one which, to me, is of the very

highest importance . The quest for me was less a search

for bliss than an effort to satisfy a deep yearning for

Freedom .

6 . There is the sense of freedom from guilt .

That feeling, . which is variously called sense of sin,

guilt, or karmic bondage, dropped completely away from

me . The bindings of a discrete individuality no longer

existed . The accounts were closed and the books balanced

in one grand gesture . This came at once as an immediate

affective value, but I realized readily the underlying

rationale . As the individual and personal self, I was

bound within the space-time field and necessarily in-

curred the rebound of all actions there, but, as the

transcendent Self, I comprehended that field in its

entirety, instead of being comprehended by it . So it

might be said that all action and its rebounding were

contained within ME, but left the Self, with which I am

identical, unaffected in its totality 14 *

7 . I both felt and knew that, at last, I had

found the solution of the ' wrongness ' , the sensing of

which constitutes the underlying driving force of all

religion and much philosophical effort . Beneath the

surface of life, in the world-field, there is a feeling

of loneliness which is not dissipated by objective

achievement or human companionship , however great the

range and penetration of sympathetic adjustment . Reli-

gious and other literature afford abundant testimony

that this feeling of solitude is very widely, if not

universally , experienced . I am disposed to regard it

as the driving motif of the religious quest . In common

with others , I felt this solitude and realized that the

sense of incompleteness which it engenders forces the

individual to accept one or the other of two alternatives .

He may accept the solitude and despair of ever attaining

a resolution of it , in which case he accepts fundamental

pessimism as part and parcel of the very core of his life .

But the feeling of incompleteness may drive him on to a

hopeful quest for that which will effect its resolution .

The more common mystical resolution is a sense of Union

with God, wherein a companionship with a transcendent

otherness is attained . My own recognition had more the

value of a sort of fusion in identity, wherein the self

and the otherness entered into an indistinguishable blend .

Before the final moment of the transformation I was aware

of an otherness , in some sense , which I sought , but after

the culminating moment that otherness vanished in identity .

Consequently , I have no real need of the term ' God' in

my vocabulary . I find it useful , at times , to employ

this term in a literary sense , because it suggests certain

values I wish to convey . But its significance is psycho-

logical rather than metaphysical .

Through the Recognition, I attained a state where-

in I could be at rest and contented in the most profound

sense . For me, individually, it was not necessary to

seek further, to achieve further, nor to express further

in orddr to know full enjoyment . However, there was a

blot on the contentment that grew out of the realization

of the pain of the many millions who live in this world,

and also out of the knowledge that a private solution of

a problem is only a part of the great problem of the

philosopher, which is the attainment of a general solution

which shall be of the widest possible universality and

availability . But all this is not a defect in the adequacy

of the transformed state of consciousness itself .

8. There is a decided increase in the realization

of the affective qualities of calmness and serenity . In

the immediate presence of the transcendent state the dis-

turbing factors produced by the circumstances and forces

of the world-field lose their effective potency . They

are simply dissolved away as something irrelevant, or as

something which acts so far below one as to leave him in

his real being untouched . When in the mystical state,

there is no need of trying to be calm and serene, but

rather these qualities envelop the individual without his

putting forth any specific effort . Subsequently, when

I have been out of the immediate presence of the state,

it has been easier for me to remain calm and serene than

formerly , though the more I am out of the state the

greater is the effort required to retain these affective

qualities .

9 . The significance and value of information

is radically changed . Formerly , I acquired information

very largely as part of the search for the Real . In the

transcendent state I felt myself to be grounded in the

Real, in a sense of the utmost intimacy ; and since then

I have continued to feel this grounding , though involving

sometimes less and sometimes more the sense of immediate

Presence . At the present time, knowledge, in the sense

of information , has value chiefly as an instrument of

expression or a means to render manifest that which is

already known to me in the most significant sense . This

making manifest is valuable, not alone for the reaching

of other individuals but likewise for the enriching of

my own personal consciousness . The abstract and super-

conceptual knowing attains a formal and experiential

clarification through giving it concrete embodiment in

thought . Nevertheless , in all this, knowledge-as-

information serves only a secondary role , quite inferior

to the vital importance it formerly had . It seems as

though, in an unseen and-dark sense , I already know all

that is to be known . If I so choose , I can give .a por-

tion of this knowledge manifested form so that it is re-

vealed to the consciousness of others, as well as to my

own personal consciousness . But there is no inner neces-

sity , at least not one of which I am conscious, which

drives me on to express and make manifest . I feel quite

free to choose such course as I please .

10 . The most marked affective quality precipitated

within the relative consciousness is that of felicity .

Joy is realized as a very definite experience . It is of

a quality more intense and satisfying than that afforded

by any of the experiences or achievements that I have

known within the world-field . It is not easy to describe

this state of felicity . It is in no sense orgiastic or

violent in its nature ; on the contrary it is quite subtle,

though highly potent . All world -pleasures are coarse and

repellent by contrast . All enjoyment--using this term in

the Indian sense --whether of a pleasurable or painful type,

I found to be more or less distasteful by contrast . In

particular , it is just as completely different from the

pleasures experienced through vice as it is possible to

imagine . The latter are foiled by a sense of guilt, and

this guilt persists long after the pleasure -quality of

the vicious experience has passed . The higher felicity

seems almost , if not quite , identical with virtue itself .

I find myself disposed to agree with Spinoza and say that

real felicity is not simply the reward of virtue, but is

virtue . One feels that there is nothing more right, or

more righteous , for that matter , than to be so harmonized

in one ' s consciousness ' as to feel the Joy at all times .

It is a dynamic sort of Joy which seems to dissolve such

pain as may be in the vicinity of the one who realizes it .

This Joy enriches rather than impoverishes others .

I doubt that anyone could possibly appreciate the

tremendous value of this felicity without directly ex-

periencing it . I felt, and feel, that no cost could be

too high as the price of its attainment , and I find that

this testimony is repeated over and over again in mystical

literature . It seems as though but a brief experience of

this Joy would be worth any effort and any amount of suf-

fering which could be packed into a lifetime that might

prove necessary for its realization . I understand now

why so much of mystical expression is in the form of

rhapsody . It requires an active restraint to avoid the

over-use of superlatives , especially as one realizes that

all superlatives , as they are understood in the ordinary

range of experience , are, in fact , understatements . The

flowery expressions of the Persian and Indian mystics are

not at all over-statements . But this mode of expression

is subject to the weakness that it suggests to the non-

mystical reader a loss of critical perspective upon the

part of the mystical writer . It is even quite possible

to be abandoned in the Joy , and so a real meaning does

attach to the idea of "God intoxication " . On the whole,

it seems probable that the most extreme experience of

this Joy is realized by those in whom the affective side

of their nature is most developed . If the cognitive in-

terest is of comparable or of superior development, it

seems likely that we would find more of the restraint

that was evident in men like Spinoza and Buddha .

The Joy seems to be a dynamic force . If one is

justified in saying there is such a thing as experiencing

force , in the ordinary sense of ' experience ', then it

certainly is true that one experiences a force either

associated with , or identical with, the Joy derived from

the transcendental level . In my experience , the nearest

analogy is that afforded by a feeling of force I have

sometimes experienced in the vicinity of a powerful elec-

tric generator. There is something about it that suggests

a 'flowing through', though it is impossible to determine

any direction of flow , in terms of our ordinary spatial

relationships . It induces a sense of physiological, as

well as emotional and intellectual , well-being . The sheer

joy in life of a healthy youth , who is untroubled by

problems , faintly suggests a phase of this sense of well-

being . It gives a glow to life and casts a sort of sheath

over the environment that tends towards an effect of beauty

which at times is very strong . I have demonstrated to

my satisfaction that this joyous force , or whatever else

it may be called , is capable of being induced , in some

measure , in those who may be in the vicinity . I find

there are some who will report feeling the joyous quality,

even though the state I might be experiencing was not an-

nounced or otherwise noted . It is not inconceivable that

in this 'force' we are dealing with something which may be

within the range of detection by some subtle instrument .

Clearly there are detectable physiological effects . Nervous

tensions are reduced and the desire for ordinary physical

food decreases . In fact , one does have a curious sense

of feeling nourished . On the other hand , there are some

after -effects which suggest that one's organism has been

subjected to the action of an energetic field of too in-

tense or high an order for the nervous organism to endure

easily . For my part , during the past eight months I have

experienced frequent alternations between being in this

' force-field ' and being more or less completely out of it .

The latter I have come to regard as a sort of deflated

state . Particularly in the early days and after periods

when the 'force ' and joy qualities had been especially
intense, I found that in the subsequent . deflated states

there was a subtle sense of fatigue throughout the whole

body . Return of the joyous state would at once induce

the feeling of well-being . However, I soon realized

that a due regard for the capacities of the physical

organism rendered necessary a discriminating restraint

when inducing the joyous 'force-field' . I found that

this 'force' was subject to the will in its personal

manifestation and could be held within the limits of

intensity to which the organism could adapt itself .

In the process of time it does seem that my organism is

undergoing a progressive adjustment to the higher energy

level .
There are times when this 'force' seems to be of

the nature of a flame with which I am identical . In

general, this flame is not accompanied with a sense of

heat, but under certain conditions it is . Thus, if,

while in the 'force-field', I permit myself to feel

disturbing affections, I begin to feel heat in the

organism . The effect is of such a nature as to suggest

that the affective disturbance has a value analagous to

resistance in an electric circuit . It is well known

that an electric conductor of sufficiently high resist-

ance will produce heat, and so the analogy is readily

suggested . Further, the 'force-field' does seem, at

times, to produce a feeling of heat in others who are in

the vicinity . These are objective effects, apparently

well within the range of objective determination . Yet,

the inciting cause is a state of consciousness which I

find to be subject, in considerable degree, to conscious

control through the intervention of purely mental control

with no manual aids . Does this not confirm the suggestion

of William James that there is such a thing as a penetra-

tion of energy into the objective field of consciousness

from other zones of consciousness that are ordinarily in

disparate relationship?
Though the symbols of the electro-magnetic field

and of fire go far in indicating the quality of this

subtle and joy-giving 'force', they fall short of full

adequacy . The 'force', at the same time, seems to be

of fluidic character . There is something in it like

breath and like water . At this point it is necessary

in some measure to turn away from the mental habits of

the modern chemist and physiologist and try to feel a

meaning closer to that given by the ancients . It is

important that the 'water' should not be thought of as

simply H20, and the breath as merely a pulmonary rhythm

involving the inhalation and exhalation of air . In the

present sense , the essence of the water and air lies in

their being life-giving and life-sustaining fluids . The
chemical and physical properties of these fluids are mere

external incidents . In a sense that still remains a

mystery to science, these fluids are vitally necessary

to life . The joy-giving 'force' is Life, but it is life

in some general and universal sense of which life-as-

living-organism is a temporary modification . Thus, to

be consciously identical with this 'force' is to be con-

sciously identical with Life as a principle . It gives

a feeling of being-alive, beside which the ordinary feel-

ing of life is no more than a mere shadow . And just as

the shadow-life is obviously mortal, the higher life is

as clearly deathless . It may be said that time is the

child of Life in the transcendent sense , while life-as-

living-organism is the creature of time . Right in this

distinction lies one resolution of the whole problem of

immortality . So long as the problem is stated in terms

of life-as-living- organism , immortality remains incon-

ceivable . In fact, in this sense, all life is no more

than a 'birthing'-dying flux with no real continuity or

duration at all . But the higher Life is identical with

duration itself . Hence , he who has consciously realized

himself as identical with the .higher Life has at the same

time become consciously identical with duration . Thus,

death-as-termination becomes unthinkable, but, equally,

birth is no beginning .
 11 . There is also associated with the deep feel-

ing of Joy a quality of Benevolence . It seems as though

the usual self-interest, which tends to be highly developed

in the midst of the struggles of objective life, spontan-

eously undergoes a weakening in force . It is not so much

a feeling of active altruism as a being grounded in a kind

of consciousness in which the conflict between self-interest

and altruism is dissolved . It is more a feeling of in-

terest in good being achieved than simply that I, as an

individual, should realize the good . Before the attain-

ment of the Recognition I felt a distinct desire for the

attainment of good as something which I, individually,

might realize, but once I became identified in conscious-

ness with the transcendent state, the individually self-

centered motivation began to weaken . It is as though

there is a spreading out of interest so that attainment

on the part of any self is my concern as truly as my own

individual attainment had been . There is not the usual

sense of self -sacrifice in this, but, rather, a growing

impersonality of outlook . In such a state of conscious-

ness one could readily accept a course of action that

would involve personal hardship, if only it would serve

the purpose of bringing the realization more generally

within the range of attainment . It is not a motivation

in which the thought of heroism, nobility, or reward plays

any part . It simply seems to be the appropriate and

sensible course to follow if circumstances indicate that

it is necessary . All this is a spontaneous affective

state born out of the very nature of the consciousness

itself , without thought of an ethical imperative . I

the more deflated states of consciousness , I find the

force of the feeling considerably weakened and then it

becomes necessary to translate it into the form of a

moral imperative to set up a resistance to the old ego-

istic'habits . But on the higher level the moral impera-

tive is replaced by a spontaneous tendency which, when

viewed from the relative standpoint , would be called

benevolent .
The underlying rationale of this induced atti-

tude seems clear to me . When the II' is realized as a

sort of universal or 'spatial ' Self , synthesizing all

selves, the distinction between the 'me' and the 'thou'

simply becomes irrelevant . Thus the good of one self

is part and parcel with the good of all selves . Con-

sequently , altruism and self - interest come to mean es-

sentially the same thingl7

12 . Associated with the transcendent Life-force

there is a very curious kind of cognition . It is not

the more familiar analytic kind of intellection . To me

this development has proved to be of especial interest,

for by temperament and training my mental action, hereto-

fore , has been predominantly analytic . Now analysis

achieves its results through a laborious and painful

dissection of given raw material from experience and a

reintegration by means of invented concepts applied hypo-

thetically . This gives only external relations and defi-

nitely involves ' distance ' between the concept and the

object it denotes . But there is another kind of intel-

lection in which the concept is born spontaneously and

has a curious identity with its object . The Life-force

either brings to birth in the mind the concepts without

conscious intellectual labor or moves in para4el~ism with

such birth . Subsequently , when these concepts are viewed

analytically and critically, I find them almost invariably

peculiarly correct . In fact , they generally suggest cor-

relations that are remarkably clarifying and have enabled

me to check my insight with the recognition of others .

Undoubtedly, this cognitive process is a phase of

what has been called 'intuition' by many . For my part,

however , I do not find this term wholly satisfactory, be-

cause 'intuition' has been given a number of meanings

which are not applicable to this kind of cognition .

Accordingly , I have invented a term which seems much

more satisfactory . I call it ' Knowledge throu Identity ' .

As it is immediate knowledge , it is intuitive in the broad

sense , but as it is highly noetic it is to be distinguished

from other forms of immediate awareness that are largely,

if not wholly , non-cognitive . There are intuitive types

of awareness that are quite alogical and, therefore, such

that they do not lead to logical development from out their

own nature . In contrast , Knowledge through Identity is

potentially capable of expansive development of the type

characteristic of pure mathematics . Knowledge through

Identity may give the fundamental propositions or 'inde-

finables ' from which systems can grow at once by pure de-

ductive process . Knowledge through Identity is not to be

regarded as an analytic extraction from experience, but

rather as a Knowledge which is original and co -extensive

with a Recognizable , but non-experiential , Reality. It

is capable of rendering experience intelligible, but is

not itself dependent upon experience .

A realization of Knowledge through Identity does

not seem to be an invariable , or even usual , consequence

of mystical unfoldment . My studies of the record have

led me to the tentative conclusion that it occurs in the

case of certain types of mystical unfoldment , of which

Spinoza, Plotinus, and Shankara afford instances . In

such cases the cognitive interest and capacity is peculiar-

ly notable . But the larger class of cases in which the

mystical sense is well developed seems to be of quite a

different type . The well known Persian mystics, presump-

tively the larger number of the Indian mystics , most of

the Christian mystics , and naturalistic mystics such as

Whitman , seem quite clearly to fall into some other class-

ification or classifications . With all of these the af-

fective consciousness is dominant and the cognitive in-

terest and capacity may be --though not necessarily--but

poorly developed . With them, expression is almost wholly

in terms of art or way of life, rather than in terms of

philosophical systems . Apparently, the noetic quality of

their mystical consciousness is quite subordinate to the

affective, and, in some cases , even to the sensuous , values .

13 . Atypical features . There are certain respects

in which the precipitated effects from the transcendent

consciousness , as experienced by me, differ from typical

mystical experience . I have not known the so-called auto-

matisms , a class of psychical manifestations which are so

commonly reported . My psychical organization does not

seem to be of the type requisite for this kind of ex-

perience . I have never heard words coming as though ut-

tered on another level of b eing and having the seeming of

objective sound . Even the thought has not seemed to come

from a source extraneous to myself . I have thought more

deeply and more trenchantly than has hitherto been possible

for me as personal man, but the sense of intimate union

with the thought has been greater than was ever true of

the former personal thinking . Never has my thought been

less mediumistic . Formerly, my personal thought has

often been a reflection of a thought originated by some-

one else and not fully made my own before I used it .

There is a certain kind of mediumship in this, although

in this sense practically everybody is a medium part of

the time and many all the time . The thought which I have

found born in the Recognition is non-mediumistic in the

strictest sense , since it is MY thought but more than my

personal thought .
There never has been at any time a writing through

my hand in an automatic sense . What I have written has

been my own conscious thought, with full consciousness

of the problems of word selection and grammatical con-

struction . The effective words and the correct construc-

tions I find myself able to produce much more easily than

formerly, but there is a conscious selective effort re-

quired at all times .18

When in the field of the 'Life-force' the action

of the understanding is both more profound and more

trenchant than when in the 'deflated' state, but the

difference is one of degree and not of two radically

separated and discontinuous states of consciousness of

such a nature that the inferior consciousness is quite

incapable of understanding what is written under the

guidance of the higher . The inferior phase of conscious-

ness , when operating by itself, does not understand as

easily nor does it have as wide a grasp of the bearings

of the thought . But, in some degree, the inferior phase

readily becomes more or less infused with the superior

by the simple application of effort to understand . The

effect is analagous to the superposition of two rays of

light, with both of which I am identical, the resultant

being an intensified consciousness which is at the same

time relative and transcendent, in some way that is not

wholly clear to introspective analysis .

These states of Recognition have never been asso-

ciated with the so-called photisms . They most certainly

had Light-value, and I frequently have occasion to use

the word ' Light ' to express an important quality of the

higher consciousness , but this is 'Light' as an illumi-

nating force in consciousness and not a sensible light

apparently seen as with the eyes . There have been a

very few of these so-called photisms when in a kind of

dreaming state when half asleep, but these have not

occurred at times close to the periods of the deeper

Recognitions .
Never have I had experience of the type commonly

called psychical clairvoyance . It is possible that the

strength of my intellectual interest operates as a bar-

rier to this kind of experience . I admit having an

interest in such experience and would consider it a

valuable object of study if it came my way, But I

would not tolerate such a capacity for experience if

the price exacted was a growth of confusion in under-

standing . On the whole, psychical clairvoyance seems

to be quite frequently associated with mystical unfold-

ment, perhaps more the rule than the exception . There

even seems to be some tendency to confuse this clair-

voyance with genuine mystical value . However, the two

are by no means identical, nor are they necessarily

associated .

I have found that there is a very important

difference between psychical experience and noetic

Recognition . The transcendent Consciousness is highly

noetic, but on its own level is quite impersonal . In

order that a correlation may be established between

the personal consciousness and the transcendental state

there must be an active and conscious intermediating

agent . The evidence is that this intermediating agent

may be, and apparently generally is, an irrational psyche

of which the individual is more or less conscious . But

the intermediation may be intellectual with little or no

conscious correlation with the irrational psyche . It

seems practically certain that the precipitated effects

within the personal consciousness by the two routes

should not be congruent in form .

14 . If ecstasy is to be regarded as a state

of consciousness always involving a condition of trance,

then that state of consciousness which I have realized

and called "transcendental Recognition" is not one of

ecstasy. However, there is considerable reason for be-

lieving that ecstasy, or Samadhi--the Indian equivalent--

s!" not necessarily associated with trance 19 It becomes

very largely a question of the basis of classification .

If the externally discernible marks or symptoms of a

state are to be regarded as determinate , then ecstasy,

as ordinarily conceived , is a trance or trance-life

condition . But if the inner consciousness -value is to

be the ground of classification, then there is excellent

evidence that Ecstasy or Samadhi may be realized without

trance!' The latter basis of classification seems to me

to be of far more significance , for the external symptoms

of trance mark widely different inner states of conscious-

ness , such as those of hysteria, mediumship, and hypnosis,

as well as Ecstasy in the higher sense .

By subsequent comparison it appears that the

noetic and consciousness values which I have realized

have a very great deal in common with those reported by

Plotinus as characteristic of the state of Ecstasy . I

find a marked congruency between my present outlook and

that given in the teachings of Buddha and in the writings

of Shankara . But neither of these men regarded the state

of trance as necessary for the realization of the states

they called Dhyana or Samadhi, although Buddha seemed to

have no objection in principle to the use of trance as a

means of attaining the higher state of consciousness . It

seems rather clear that the state of the personal organism

is a matter of only secondary importance , while other

factors are primarily determinant .

For my own part , never in my life have I lost

objective consciousness , save in normal sleep . At the

time of the Recognition on August 7, I was at all times

aware of my physical environment and could move the body

freely at will . Further , I did not attempt to stop the

activity of the mind , but simply very largely ignored the

stream of thought . There was , however, a ' fading down'

of the objective consciousness , analagous to that of a

dimming of a lamp without complete extinguishment . The

result was that I was in a sort of compound state wherein

I was both here and 'There ', with the objective conscious-

ness less acute than normal . It is very probable that

the concentrated inward state would have been fuller and

more acute had the objective stream of consciousness been

stopped entirely as in a trance , but with regard to this

I cannot speak from personal experience

* * *
 The literature on the subject of mystical states

very clearly reveals their transciency . Often the state

is only momentary and, it is said , rarely exceeds two

hours in duration . Of course , the only phase of such

states that affords a basis for time -measurement is that

part which overlaps the objective consciousness . The in-

most content of the state does not lend itself to time-

measurement at all . Its value , therefore , is not a func-

tion of time . But if we take the perspective of the

personal consciousness , it is possible to isolate a

period during which the recognition was more or less

full, and this can be measured . In my own experience

I am unable to give definite data with respect to this

feature . For the first ten days following the awakening

I was far too greatly occupied with the contemplation of

the values unfolding in my consciousness to think of the

question of time -measurement , and, in addition, at that

time I had not been familiar with psychological studies

of the subject and so knew nothing about duration norms .

As I look at the whole period retrospectively , I do not

see how a very definite time measurement could have been

made . There was a sharply defined moment at which the

state was initiated, but there was no moment at which I

could say it definitely closed . A series of alternate

phases and variable degrees of depth of consciousness

are discernible, so that at times I have been more trans-

cendentally conscious and at others less so . A different

base of life and valuation has become normal, so that, in

one sense , the recognition has remained as a persistent

state . Yet there are notable differences of phases .

During the first ten days I was repeatedly in and

out, or more in and more out--I am not sure which is the

more correct statement--of what I have called the 'Life-

force' field . I soon found that the stronger intensity

of the field was a real strain upon the organism and so

I consciously imposed a certain restraint upon the ten-

dency of the states to deepen until I finally achieved a

certain adjustment and adaptation with respect to the

nervous organism . After the close of the first ten days

it was suggested to me that it would be well to keep a'

record of the effects of the transformation, and so at

that time I began to write and continued to do so for

about four months . While the effort at formulation was

a little difficult at first, the writing soon acquired

momentum , and presently I found ideas developing in my

consciousness faster than I could give them expression .

During this whole period there were many times when the

consciousness was dominantly on the noetic level, with

more objective intervals interspersed . At first the range

of oscillation was more notable than toward the end . In

the course of time , it seems, the personal consciousness

has gradually adapted itself to a. higher level, so that

the periods of inward penetration do not afford the same

contrast as formerly . The first period of a little more

than one month constitutes a phase which stands out by

itself, with a fairly sharp dividing line at its culmina-

tion between the 8th and 9th of September . During this

time the prime focus of my consciousness was toward the

transcendent , while in the subsequent phase , continuing

to the present , I have rather taken this transcendent

consciousness as a base and focused more toward the rela-

tive world . The consequence is that there is a sense in

which I look back to those first thirty odd days as a sort

of high point in consciousness , a seed- sowing period, from

which various fruitings have followed ever since . Frankly,

these thirty odd days constitute a period which I view as

the best I have ever known . Referring to a symbol that

Plato has made immortal , I would say that this was a time

when I stepped outside the 'cave ' and realized directly

the glory of the 'sun - illumined ' world, after which I

turned back again to the life in the ' cave ', but with

this permanent difference in outlook -- that I could never

again regard the 'cave -life ' with the same seriousness

that I had once given it . Thus , in this cycle , there is

something to be differentiated from all the rest .
 During that first month the current of bodily

life was definitely weaker than during the preceding and

following phases . The desire for sentient existence was

decidedly below normal . The spontaneous inclination was

all in the direction of the transcendent consciousness .

Physical life was clearly a burden, a sort of blinder

superimposed upon consciousness . I even felt a distaste

for physical food . I am convinced that if I had not sup-

plemented the weakened desire for physical existence by

a definite and conscious will-to-live, the body would have

started into a decline . I became hypersensitive and found

it very difficult to drive an automobile in traffic . I

had to exert the will consciously, where formerly I had

acted through automatic habit . But, on the other hand,

I found the will more effective than previously, so I was

enabled adequately to replace spontaneous inclination with

conscious control . Fortunately, my earlier studies had

prepared me for this state of feeling and I knew that I

was facing a temptation that others had faced before me .

For there is such a thing as a world-duty which remains

even after the desire for sentient existence has disappeared .

But this did not keep me from thinking of how delightful

it would be to abandon all to the transcendent conscious-

ness .
Concomitantly with the loss of desire for sentient

life there was a growth in the sense of power . I felt I

had a certain power of conscious control over forces that

ordinarily operate beneath the level of consciousness,

and my subsequent experience has tended to confirm this .

It is a sort of raw power without the detailed knowledge

of how to apply it . In other words, the knowledge of

effective practical use has had to be developed through

experiment . But I have found, very clearly, that I pos-

sess a power which formerly I did not know . I can choose

and will consciously, where formerly the current of un-

conscious-forces was determinant .

Before the close of the first month the decision

to continue as an active factor in the world-field had

become definite, despite the distaste I felt for this

domain . It felt like turning one's back upon a rich mine

of jewels after gathering but a handful, and then march-

ing back into the dreary domain of iron and brass . How-

ever, I found that it could be done, and then I accepted

what I thought would be a future in which the best would

always be a memory . I had found what I sought during many

years and could see nothing but anti-climax thereafter,

so far as the immediately realized consciousness values

were concerned . So the further Recognition, which closed

the first cycle, came as a complete surprise, for not only

did I not seek it, I did not even know that such a state

existed, or, if it existed, that it was within the range

of human consciousness . I had now already known a state

of consciousness that certainly had the value of Liber-

ation . A subsequent search through mystical literature

revealed that it was substantially congruent with mystical

experience as such and was distinctly more comprehensive

than many of the mystical unfoldments . So far as I was

familiar with it, the Brahmanical literature always repre-

sented the Liberated State as the end-term of all attain-

ment . In this literature I had found nothing requiring

more depth of insight than I now had glimpsed, although

there was a vast mass of psychic detail quite foreign to

my experience . So I was quite unprepared to find that

there were even deeper levels of transcendence . However,

had I understood a few obscure references in Buddhist

literature I would have been warned .

In order to reach some understanding of the cul-

minating phase of the Recognition, certain contrasting

facts concerning the first phase must be given emphasis .

As I have already affirmed, there is sufficient evidence

of the fact of mystical recognition, together with re-

ported affective value, to render it an object of pos-

sible desire . Long ago I had learned enough to realize

that it was desirable and had set forth in search of it .

There also exists a sufficient statement of the reasons

why an individual who has attained this Recognition

should turn his back upon it, as it were , to show that

such a course was desirable in its social bearings . But

there does not seem to be anything further which could

be conceived as an object of desire . Now, the culminating

effect of the present Realization with respect to desire

is that the latter has fulfilled its office in the indi-

vidual sense , and there is nothing more to wish for . I

certainly felt in the transcendent state abundant com-

pletion and vastly more than I had anticipated . So,

what more could there be?

I see now that there was a defect in this com-

pletion that kept it from being a full state of equili-

brium . It consisted preeminently of the positive end-

terms of the best in human consciousness . Thus it was

a state of superlative Joy, Peace , Rest , Freedom, and

Knowledge , and all of this stands in contrast to the

world- field as fullness contrasts to emptiness21 Hence

there did exist a tension in the sense of attractiveness

that was incompatible with the perfection of balance .

There was a distinction between being bound to embodied

consciousness and not being so bound that made a differ-

ence to me . I had to resist the inclination toward the

latter state in order to continue existence in the former .

In other words , there are in this earlier phase of Recog-

nition certain tensions that call for a higher resolution .

But it was the perspective of the culminating Recognition

that rendered all of this clear . The first stage did not,

of itself, disclose any further possibility of conceivable

attainment, and so I was disposed to give it a greater

terminal value than it really possessed .

So far I have outlined three progressively compre-

hensive l~ecognitions . Each was realized after a period of

conscious effort in the appropriate direction . In each

case I had some reason to believe that there was a goal

to be sought . In the first two instances I was aware that

there was something more remaining to be realized, because

the sense of incompleteness was only partly liquidated .

In the third instance this liquidation seemed to be com-

plete, and then I simply turned my back upon the full in-

dividual enjoyment of it for such period of time as might

be necessary to fulfil some more comprehensive purpose

reaching beyond individual concerns . In contrast, the

culminating Recognition came with the force of an unex-

pected bestowal without my having put forth any conscious

personal effort toward the attainment of it . Thus, in

this case, my personal relationship or attitude was pas-

sive in a deep sense .

During the day preceding the final Recognition I

had been busy writing and my mind was exceptionally clear

I

and acute . In fact, the intellectual energy was of an

unusual degree of intensity . The mood was decidedly one

of intellectual assertion and dominance . This feature is

interesting for the reason that it is precisely the state

of mind that ordinarily would be regarded as least favor-

able for the 'breaking through' to mystical modes of

consciousness . The rule seems to be that the thought

must be silenced or at least reduced in intensity and

ignored in the meditation22 . In the records of mystical

awakening it is almost always made evident that preceding

the state of Illumination there is at least a brief period

of quiescence of conscious activity . Sometimes this appears

as though there were a momentary standing still of all

nature . For my part I had previously been aware of a

kind of antecedent stillness before each of the critical

moments, though it was not translated as stillness of

nature . But in the case of the fourth Recognition the

foreground was one of intense mental tension and excep-

tional intellectual activity . It was not now a question

of capturing something of extreme subtlety which might be

dispersed by a breath of mental or affective activity .

It was more a case of facing an overwhelming power which

required all of the active phase of the resources of con-

sciousness to face it .
 The Event came after retiring . I became aware

of a deepening effect in consciousness that presently

acquired or manifested a dominant affective quality .

It was a state of utter Satisfaction . But here there

enters a strange and almost weird feature . Language,

considered as standing in a representative relationship

to something other than the terms of the language, ceased

to have any validity at this level of consciousness . In

a sense , the words and that which they mean are inter-

blended in a kind of identity . Abstract ideas cease to

be artificial derivatives from a particularized experi-

ence , but are transformed into a sort of universal sub-

stantiality . The relative theories of knowledge simply

do not apply at this. level . So 'Satisfaction ' and the

state of satisfaction possess a substantial and largely

inexpressible identity . Further, this ' Satisfaction',

along with its substantiality, possesses a universal

character . It is the value of all possible satisfactions

at once and yet like a ' thick ' substance interpenetrating

everywhere . I know how weird this effort at formulation

must sound , but unless I abandon the attempt to interpret

I must constrain language to serve a purpose quite out-

side normal usage .

-81-
 This state of 'Satisfaction' is a kind of integra-

tion of all previous values . It is the culminating ful-

fillment of all desires and thus renders the desire-

tension, as such, impossible . One can desire only when

there is in some sense a lack, an incompleteness, which

needs to be fulfilled, or a sensed goal that remains to

be attained . When in every conceivable or felt sense all

is attained, desire simply has to drop outer . The result

is a profound balance in consciousness , a state of thor-

ough repose with no drawing or inclining in any direction .

Hence, in the sum total, such a state is passive . Now,

while this state is, in one sense , an integration of

previous values, it also proved preliminary to a still

deeper state . Gradually the 'Satisfaction' faded into

the background and by insensible gradation became trans-

formed into a state of 'Indifference' ID For while satis-

faction carries the fullness of active affective and

conative value, indifference is really affective-conative

silence . It is the superior terminus of the affective-

conative mode of human consciousness . There is another

kind of indifference where this mode of consciousness has

bogged down into a kind of death . This is to be found in

deeply depressed states of human consciousness .- The 'High

Indifference', however, is the superior or opposite pole

beyond which motivation and feeling in the familiar human

sense cannot reach . But, most emphatically , it is not a

state of reduced life or consciousness: On the contrary,

it is both life and consciousness of an order or* superior-

ity quite beyond imagination . The concepts of relative

consciousness simply cannot bound it . In one sense, it

is a terminal state , but at the same time , in another

sense , it is initial . Everything can be predicated of

it so long as the predication is not privative, for in

the privative sense nothing can be predicated of it . It

is at once rest and action , and the same may be said with

respect to all other polar qualities . I know of only one

concept which would suggest its noetic value as a whole

and this is the concept of 'Equilibrium', yet even this

is a concession to the needs of relative thinking . It is

both the culmination and beginning of all possibilities .

In contrast with the preceding Recognition, this

state is not characterized by an intensive or active

feeling of felicity . It could be called blissful only

in the sense that there is an absence of all pain in any

respect whatsoever . But I felt myself to be on a level

of consciousness where there is no need of an active joy .

Felicity, together with all other qualities, are part of

the blended whole and by the appropriate focusing of in-

dividual attention can be isolated from the rest and thus

actively realized, if one so desired . But for me there

seemed to be no need of such isolation . The conscious-

ness was so utterly whole that it was unnecessary to ad-

minister any affective quality to give it a greater rich-

ness . I was superior to all affective modes , as such,

and thus could command and manifest any of them that I

might choose . I could bless with beneficent qualities

or impose the negative ones as a curse . Still the state

itself was too thoroughly void of the element of desire

for me to feel any reason why I should bless or curse .

For within that perfection there is no need for any aug-

mentation or diminution .

While within this state I recalled the basis of

my previous motivation and realized that if this state

had been outlined to me then as an abstract idea it could

not by any possibility have seemed attractive . But while

fused with the state, all other states that could for-

merly have been objects of desire seemed flaccid by com-

parison . The highest conceivable human aspiration en-

visages a goal inevitably marred by the defects of im-

mature imagination . Unavoidably, to the relative con-

sciousness the complete balance of the perfect conscious-

ness must seem like a void, and thus the negation of every

conceivable possible value . But to be identified with

this supernal State implies abandonment of the very base

of relative consciousness, and thus is a transcendence

of all relative valuation . To reach back to that rela-

tive base involves a contraction and blinding of con-

sciousness , an acceptance of an immeasurable lessness .

In the months following the Recognition, when I had once

again resumed the drama in the relative field, I have

looked back to that Transcendent State as to a conscious-

ness of a most superior and desirable excellence . All

other values have become thin and shallow by contrast .

Nevertheless I carry with me always the memory , and more

than a memory , of the immediate knowledge of it, and this

is something quite different from a mediately conveyed

and abstract portrayal of it as a merely possible con-

sciousness .

As an intimate part of that supernal conscious-

ness there is a sense of power and authority literally

of cosmic proportions By contrast , the marchings of

the Caesars and the conquests of science are but the

games of children . For these achievements , which seem

so portentous and commanding upon the pages of human

history , all inhere in a field of consciousness that in

its very roots is subject to that Higher Power and Author-

ity . Before mere cataclysms of nature, if they are on

sufficiently large a scale , the resources of our mightiest

rulers and of our science stand impotent . Yet those very

forces of nature rest dependent upon that transcendent

and seeming Void in order that they may have any existence

whatsoever . The mystery before birth and after death lies

encompassed within it . All of this, all this play of

visible and invisible forces seem no more than a dream-

drama during a moment ' s sleep in the illimitable vastness

of Eternity . And so , from out that Eternity speaks the

Voice of the never- sleeping Consciousness , and before the

commanding Authority and irresistible Power of that Voice,

all dreams , though of cosmic proportions , dissolve .

Now, as I write , there returns once again an adum-

brative Presence of that awful Majesty . This time, as I

am focused upon the problem of objective formulation, I

am less blended in the Identity , and sense IT as ' Presence' .

This mind , which once carved its way through the mysteries

of the functions of the complex variable and the Kantian

transcendental deduction of the categories , fairly

trembles at its daring to apprehend THAT which threatens

momentarily to dissolve the very power of apprehension

itself . Fain would the intellect retreat into the preg-

nant and all -encompassing Silence, where the 'Word -without-

form ' alone is true . This personal being trembles upon

the brink of the illimitable Abyss of irrelevance that

dissolves inevitably the mightiest worlds and suns . But

there remains a task to be done and there may be no dis-

embarking yet .

At the time of the culminating Recognition I found

myself spreading everywhere and identical with a kind of

'Space ' which embraced not merely the visible forms and

worlds but all modes and qualities of consciousness as

well . However , all these are not There as disparate and

objective existences ; they are blended , as it were, in a

sort of primordial and culminating totality . It seemed

that the various aspects and modes that are revealed to

the analysis of relative consciousness could have been

projected into differentiated manifestation , if I chose

so to will it, but all such projection would have left

unaffected the perfect balance of that totality, and

whether or not the projecting effort was made was com-

pletely a matter of indifference . That totality was,

and is , not other than myself, so that the study of things

and qualities was resolved into simple self -examination .

Yet it would be a mistake to regard the state as purely

subjective . The preceding Recognition had been definitely

a subjective penetration , and during the following month

I found myself inwardly polarized in an exceptional degree .

.In contrast , the final Recognition seemed like a movement

in consciousness toward objectivity , but not in the sense
of a movement toward the relative world-field . The final
State is, at once, as much objective as subjective, and

also as much a state of action as of rest . But since it

is all co-existent on'a timeless level, the objectivity

is not discrete and differentiated, and consequently is

quite unlike the relative world . The Godless secular

universe vanishes , and in its place there remains none

other than the living and all-enveloping Presence of

Divinity itself . So, speaking in the subjective sense,

I am all there is, yet at the same time , objectively con-

sidered, there is nought but Divinity spreading everywhere .

Thus the level of the High Indifference may be regarded

as the terminal Value reached by delving into that which,

in the relative world, man calls his 'I', and yet, equally,

the final culmination of all that appears objective . But,

this objectivity, in the final sense , is simply pure Divinity .

So the sublimated object and the sublimated self are one

and the same Reality, and this may be represented by the

judgment : "I am the Divinity ." The Self is not of in-

ferior dignity to the Divine, nor that Divinity subordinate

to the Self . And it is only through the realization of

this equality that it is possible for the individual to

retain his integration before that tremendous all-

encompassing Presence . In any case, the dissolving force

is stupendous, and there is no inclination to resist it .

 Throughout the whole period of this supreme state

of consciousness I was self -consciously awake in the

physical body and quite aware of my environment . The

thought-activity was not depressed , but, on the contrary,

alert and acute . I was continuously conscious of my self-

identity , in two distinct senses . In one sense, I was,

and am, the primordial Self and co -termin,6us with an un-

limited and abstract Space , while at the same time the

subject-object and self-analysing consciousness was a sort

of point -presence within that Space . An illustration is

afforded by thinking of the former as being of the nature

of an original Light , in itself substantial , spreading

throughout , but not derived from any center , while the

latter is a point -centered and reflected light , such as

that of a search -light . The search-light of the self-

analysing consciousness can be directed anywhere within

the primordial Light , and thus serves to render chosen

zones self-conscious . Through the latter process I was

enabled to capture values within the framework of the

relative consciousness and thus am enabled to remember

not merely a dimly sensed fact of an inchoate transcendence

but, as well , all that I am now writing and a vastly more

significant conscious integration which defeats all efforts

at formulation . The primordial consciousness is timeless,

but the self-analysing action was a process occurring in

time . And so that which I have been enabled to carry

with me in the relative state is just so much as I could

think into the mind during the interval of penetration .

Naturally, I centered my attention on the features which

to me as an individual appeared to be of the greater sig-

nificance .

It seems to me that this which I have called the

Primordial Consciousness must be identical with von Hart-

mann's 'Unconscious' . For what is the difference between

'consciousness ' and 'unconsciousness' if there is no self-

consciousness present? Sheer consciousness which is not

aware of itself, by reason of that very fact, would not

know that it was conscious . Thus, an individual who has

never known ill health or pain remains largely unconscious

of his organism . But with the coming of pain he is at

once aware of that organism in a sense that was not true

before . Then, later, with the passing of the pain, par-

ticularly if it has been of protracted duration, he be-

comes conscious of well-being in his organism . Well-

being has taken on a new conscious value . It is at once

suggested that self- consciousness is aroused through re-

sistance in some sense , an interference with the free flow

of the stream of consciousness . When this occurs, a dis-

tinction between consciousness and unconsciousness is

produced that had no meaning before . Now this line of

reflection has suggested to me that the real distinction

should not be made between consciousness and unconscious-

ness but rather between self- consciousness and the absence

of self-consciousness . When there is no self -consciousness

in a given zone there is then no more valid basis for

predicating sheer unconsciousness than there is for saying

that it is a zone of consciousness that is not self -conscious .

On the basis of such a view , would not the problem of in-

terpreting how the so -called ' unconscious ' enters into

consciousness become greatly simplified?

The Primordial Consciousness cannot be described

as conceptual , affective , or perceptual . It seems that

all these functions are potentially There, but the Con-

sciousness as a whole is a blend of all these and something

more . It is a deep , substantial, and vital sort of con-

sciousness , the matter, form , and awareness functions of

consciousness all at once . It is not a consciousness or

knowledge ' about ', and thus is not a field of relation-

ships . The substantiality and the consciousness do not

exist as two separable actualities , but rather it would

be more nearly correct to say that the consciousness is

substance and the substance is consciousness , and thus

that these are two interpenetrating modes of the whole .

It is certainly a richly ' thick'29 consciousness and quite

other than an absolutely 'thin' series of terms in rela-

tion .

While in the State I was particularly impressed

with the fact that the logical principle of contradiction

simply had no relevancy . It would not be correct to say

that this principle was violated, but, rather, that it

had no application . For to isolate any phase of the State

was to be immediately aware of the opposite phase as the

necessary complementary part of the first . Thus the

attempt of self-conscious thought to isolate anything

resulted in the immediate initiation of a sort of flow

in the very essence of consciousness itself so that the

nascent isolation was transformed into its opposite as

co-partner in a timeless reality . Every attempt I made

to capture the State within the categories of relative

knowledge was defeated by this flow effect . Yet there

was no sense of being in a strange world . I have never

known another state of consciousness that seemed so natural,

normal, and proper . I seemed to know that this was the

nature which Reality must possess , and, somehow, I had

always known it . It rather seemed strange that for so

many years I had been self- conscious in another form and

imagined myself a stranger to this . It seemed to be the

real underlying fact of all consciousness of all creatures .

I remembered my former belief in the reality of

suffering in the world . It had no more force than the

memory of a dream . I saw that , in reality , there is no

suffering anywhere , that there is no creature in need of

an aiding hand . The essential consciousness and life of

all beings are already in that State , and both never had

been , and could not be , divorced from it . The world-

field with all its striving and pain , seemingly lasting

through milliards of years , actually is, or seems to be,

a dream occurring during a passing wink of sleep . I

simply could not feel any need or duty that would call

me back to action in the world -field . There was no

question of departing from or deserting anybody or any

duty, for I found myself so identical with all , that the

last most infinitesimal element of distance was dissolved .

I remembered that it had been said that there were offices

of compassion to be performed in the world , but this idea

had no reality in the State because none there was or ever

could be who had need for ought , although those who were

playing with the dream of life in form might delude them-

selves with imagining that a need existed . But I knew

there was no reality in this dream .30

The imperative of the moral law no longer existed,

for there was not , and is not , either good or evil . It

seemed I could invoke power, even in potentially unlimited

degree . I could choose action or rest . If I acted, then

I could proceed in any direction I might select . Yet,

whether I acted or did not act, or whether I acted in

one way or another, it all had absolutely the same sig-

nificance . It was neither right nor wrong to choose any-

thing, or, putting it otherwise, there was neither merit

nor demerit in any choice . It was as though any choice

whatsoever became immediately Divinely ordained and

superior to the review of any lesser tribunal .

To me, individually, the State was supremely at-

tractive, and, as the period continued, I seemed to be

rising into an irrevocable blending with it . I recalled

that if in the self-conscious sense I never returned from

this state there would be some in this world who would

miss me and would seem, in their relative consciousness,

to suffer . Yet it was only with effort that I could give

this thought any effective force . For many years I had

known from my studies that reports existed of realizable

states of consciousness such that the relative state could

be completely and finally abandoned . I had also been

impressed with the teaching that it was a wiser course

to resist that tendency and hold correlation with the

relative form of consciousness . I had been convinced

by the reasoning supporting the latter course and had for

some time resolved to follow it, if ever the opportunity

to choose came to me . This doubtless established a habit-

form in the personal consciousness, and, so far as I can

see, that habit alone , or at least mainly , was the de-

cisive factor . For while in the State there simply is

no basis for forming any kind of decision , unless that

ground is already well established in the individual

consciousness out of the life that has gone before . As

a result , there was a real conflict between the attrac-

tion the State had for me , as a center of individual

consciousness , and the impress of the earlier-formed

choice , but I, in my inmost nature , was not a party

to this conflict , rather standing back indifferent to

the outcome , knowing quite well that any outcome was

Divinely right . The issue seemed to be a closely drawn

one, for as time went on--from the relative standpoint--

the organized man appeared to be vanishing , but not in

the sense of the disappearance of a visually apparent

object . It was more a vanishing as irrelevance may

cause an issue or a consideration to disappear . It was

as though Space were progressively consuming the whole

personal and thinking entity in a wholeness -comprehension,

beside which all particularities are as nought . Per-

sonally , I seemed powerless in the process , not because

I lacked command of potential power , but simply because

there was no reason --no desire--for rendering the potential

kinetic . In the end , I fell asleep , to awaken the next

morning in full command of my relative faculties, and

clearly the issue had been decided . Was it a victory?

From certain points of view, yes . Yet, as I recall the

profounder State of Consciousness, which has continued

ever since to seem close in the deeper recesses of my

private consciousness, I cannot say that in the ultimate

sense there was either victory :;or defeat . The choice

was right, for no choice could possibly be wrong,

The full cycle of this final Recognition lasted

for some hours, with the self- consciousness alert through-

out the period . But the depth of the State developed

progressively, and at the final stage entered a peculiarly

significant phase which strained my self-conscious re-

sources to the utmost . There finally arrived a stage

wherein both that which I have called the Self and that

which had the value of Divinity were dissolved in a Some-

what, still more transcendent . There now remained nought

but pure Being which could neither be called the Self nor

God . No longer was 'I' spreading everywhere through the

whole of an illimitable and conscious Space, nor was there

a Divine Presence all about me, but everywhere only Con-

sciousness with no subjective nor objective element . Here,

both symbols and concepts fail, But now I know that with-

in and surrounding all there is a Core or Matrix within

which are rooted all selves and all Gods, and that from
this lofty Peak , veiled in the mists of timeless obscurity

and surrounded by thick, impenetrable Silence , all worlds

and beings, all spaces and all times lie suspended in

utter dependence . On that highest Peak I could Know no

more, for the Deeps of the deepest Darkness, and the

SILENCE enshrouded in manifold sheaths of Silence rolled

over me , and self- consciousness was blown-out . But o'er

this I heard as the faintest shadow of a breath of con-

sciousness a Voice, as it were, from out a still vaster

BEYOND .

There remain to be considered the effects of

these Recognitions upon me as an individual center of

consciousness, thinking, feeling, and acting within the

relative world . Of course, in this, my own statement

is necessarily incomplete, since it is confined to an

introspective analysis, and lacks the objective valu-

ation which only a witness could supply . But it can

render explicit that which no one else could know, since

it reveals, as far as it goes , the immediate conscious

values .

The Recognition of September 8th and 9th initi-

ated a radical change of phase in the individual con-

sciousness as compared to the cycle of the preceding

month . As already noted, the latter was very largely

an indrawn state of consciousness, and the physical

organism tended to become overly sensitive to the con-

ditions of physical life . It was more difficult than

it had been to meet the ordinary problems arising from

the circumstances of the environment . The tumultus

forces of the modern city seemed far too violent to be

endured . Even though living in the relative isolation

of a suburban community, there still remained the irri-

tations of a mechanical age and subtle impingements of a

nature very hard to define . My natural inclination was

to seek the wilds where the competitions of objective

life-pressures would be at a minimum . It was a real

problem of endurance . In contrast, after the final Recog-

nition I noted a distinct growth of organic ruggedness .

And, although I have never come to enjoy the harsh dis-

sonances and regimented existence of modern town life,

yet I find I have a definitely increased strength for

the making of the various needed adjustments . There is

an increased capacity to assert command with respect to

the various environmental factors . I seem to have the

capacity to will embodied existence, regardless of in-

clination,

On the intellectual side, I have noted a definite

revitalization . I have found myself able to sustain

creative and analytic thought activity at a higher level

than formerly and for longer periods of time . Difficult

concepts have become easier of comprehension . The seem-

ing aging effect in the mind , that had been troubling me

for some time, passed, and in its place there came a very

definite increase of intellectual vitality , and this has

remained to the present hour as a persistent asset .

The affective changes are in the direction of a

greater degree of impersonality . There is certainly less

personal emotional dependence , and, as far as I can detect,

a practical unconsciousness of anything like personal

slights , if there has been anything of that sort . I do

care deeply for the growth of durable well -being , especially

for those who come within my orbit, but also in the sense

of a general social growth . Yet I find myself considerably

indifferent to, when not disgusted with , the rather trivial

foibles which make up so large a part of the day to day

life of most human beings . I am not yet superior to the

feeling of indignation , but this feeling is mainly aroused

when noting the rapid growth of wilful and violent irration-

alism which has so rapidly engulfed most of the present

world . However , I recognize this as a defect due to in-

sufficient personal detachment . For, philosophically, I

do realize that men have the right to learn the lessons

that folly has to teach , and it is but natural that a cer-

tain class of leaders should make capital of this fact .

Still , it remains hard to reconcile current morally deca-

dent tendencies with the decades and centuries of rela-

tive enlightenment that have been so recent . I find that

I had had too high an opinion of the intelligence of the

average man , and that the individual who is capable of

understanding the wisdom contained in the fable of the

goose that laid the golden egg is really quite above the

average in his level of intelligence . Frankly, I have

not yet completely adjusted myself to the disillusionment

which comes with a more objective and realistic appreci-

ation of what the average human being is, when considered

as a relative entity . This comes partly from an increased

clarification of insight , and while I am much more cer-

tainly aware of the Jewel hidden within the mud of the

personal man, yet I see more clearly also the fact of the

mud and itsinwholesome composition . It is not a pretty

sight and not such as to increase one's regard for this

world-field . All in all , the more objective my under-

standing of the actualities of this relative life, the

more attractive the Transcendent World becomes .

Probably the most important permanent effect of

the whole group of Recognitions is the grounding of know-

ledge , affection , and the sense of assurance on a base

that is neither empirical nor intellectual . This base

is supersensible , super-affective , and super -conceptual,

yet it is both conscious and substantial and of unlimited

dynamic potentiality . I feel myself closer to universals

than to the particulars given through experience, the

latter occupying an essentially derivative position and

being only of instrumental value, significant solely as

implements for the arousing of self-consciousness . As

a consequence, my ultimate philosophic outlook cannot

be comprehended within the forms that assume time, the

subject-object relationship, and experience as original

and irreducible constants of consciousness or reality .

At the same time, although I find the Self to be an

element of consciousness of more fundamental importance

than the foregoing three, yet in the end it, also, is

reduced to a derivative position in a more ultimate

Reality . So my outlook must deviate from those forms

of Idealism that represent the Self as the final Reality .

In certain fundamental respects, at least, the formulation

must accord with the anatmic doctrine of Buddha, and

therefore differ in important respects from any extant

western system .31

 Footnotes to Chapter II

lIn the symbolical language so commonly employed for

portraying the stages on the Way this 'critical point'
is represented by the desert symbolism . The field of
consciousness is watered by the stream of libido (the
term of analytic psychology), and when this stream is
turned off, the garden or jungle which filled that field
withers, leaving a desert . Between the turning off of
the libido-stream and its subsequent break-through on
another course there is a lapse of more or less time,
or at least so I found it . The resultant state is one
of aridity with no interest anywhere . Mystical litera-
ture is full of references to this stage .

2At this stage, encouragement from a Sage whom I knew

was an important, perhaps decisive, help . But while
this Sage encouraged and stimulated flagging interest,
he would not tell me what to do, leaving me to my own
devices .

31n the contrast between the theoretical acceptance and

the recognition I did not find any addition or diminu-
tion of thinkable content . But in the case of the
recognition the effect upon the mind was something like
an insemination--a vitalizing force . In addition to
the unseen inward deepening of value, there was an
objective effect, in that the thought flowed more
spontaneously, more acutely, and with much greater
assurance . The thought developed of itself, in high
degree, without the sense of conscious labor . At the
same time I knew the truth of the thought and did not
merely believe in it . Yet, everything that I could
think and say might very well have been worked out by
the ordinary methods of conscious intellectual labor .
But in the latter case the sense of assurance is lack-
ing, as well as the sense of supernal value . With these
recognitions there is, in addition to the transcendental
values, a genuine rejuvenation and vitalization of the
mind . This fact became extremely notable at the time
of the later radical transformation .

4The doctrine of the non-existence of the atman . This

is equivalent to the denial of the reality of the self,
either in the sense of the personal ego or in that more
comprehensive sense of denial of substantive self-
existence of the subject, whether pragmatic or trans-
cendental .
About two months prior to the 'break through', while
occupied with a course of lectures in a middle western
city! I experienced a three-week period of heavy drowsi-
ness . Except when actually on the platform, I desired
to sleep practically all the time . I simply had to
give way to this inclination a good many hours of each
day, but it did not seem that I could ever get enough
sleep . The condition broke very suddenly, and then
my mind became more alert than it had been for some
years . I was aware of a great inner excitement and
somehow seemed to know that I was near the day of final
success . In later studies of Dr . C . G . Jung's contri-
bution to the psychology of the transformation process,
at least something of the meaning of this stage seemed
to be clarified . In the language of analytic psychology,
the transformation is preceded by a strong introversion
of the libido, followed by a sort of brooding incubation .
Normal sleep itself is manifestly an introversion, and
so it is quite understandable that protracted introver-
sion of psychical energy should produce a state of con-
tinuous drowsiness . From the standpoint of analytic
psychology the introversion of the libido and the in-
cubation are the prior conditions of animation of con-
tents of the unconscious depths of the psyche . I do
not think that either von Hartmann or Jung has seen
into the nature of the Unconscious as fully as is pos-
sible, since their views are limited by the methodology
of objective empirical research, aided by intuition,
but, judging by the content of .their contributions,
lack the perspective of direct mystical realization .
None the less, I would judge the recorded studies of
these two men as lying on the highest level of Western
literature . I would rate Dr . Jung, by far, as the
greatest Western psychologist, and von Hartmann as a
philosopher deserving much higher valuation than he has
yet received .

6At the time of writing Pathways Through to Space , one

of the purposes was the keeping of a record, not only
of the inner processes as far as they lay within the
field of consciousness, but as well to note external
circumstances that might conceivably have some rele-
vance, I had been acquainted with this as a standard
practice of the psychological laboratory where subjects,
or human reagents, were required to note bodily and
psychical states of themselves, as well as more objective
facts as state of weather, external sounds, etc . This
data might or might not have a bearing upon the outcome
of a specific experiment, but the fact of its relevance
or irrelevance could not be determined until the re-
sults of experiment were later analyzed by the experi-
menter . I followed this rule of procedure in my record,
not necessarily implying that every noted circumstance
was significant, but rather aiming to record all that I
could think of which might subsequently prove to be
significant, although it might seem to have no bearing
at the time . One noted circumstance of this sort has
proved to be surprisingly significant . At the time of
the period of solitude, I was engaged part of the time
in the exploration of a gold prospect in the region of
the Mother Lode country of California . This entailed
considerable periods underground, and, while my thought
was necessarily engaged a good deal of the time with the
concrete details of what I was doing, yet my mind would
repeatedly return to reflection upon the material in
Shankara's work, which I was reading much of the time
when not actually otherwise occupied . At that time I
did not know that it was a standard practice in the
Orient to place candidates for the transformation in-
side caves at certain periods, and often for very long
periods . It does, indeed, appear that there is some
relation between the transformation or "rebirth" and
the entering into the earth .

Jung's researches have shown that in the symbolism of

the Unconscious the Unconscious itself is often repre-
sented by water and the earth, as well as by other
symbols, so that a dream or hypnagogic vision wherein
an individual appears to enter water or the earth carries
the meaning of introversion of the libido into the Un-
conscious . In connection with the transformation this
has the value of entering the womb of the Great Mother
Unconscious, preliminary to the Rebirth . Now, there is
some mysterious interconnection between the physical
ritualistic reproduction of the processes of transform-
ation in dreams and hypnogogic visions and those dreams
and visions themselves . That such is the case is at
least a tentative conclusion which is forced upon one
as he studies the Indian and Tibetan Tantric literature,
and the study of Western ritualism simply tends to re-
inforce this conclusion . As I, myself, have never been
oriented to ritualism and have never sought from it a
personal value, the conclusion forced upon me that it does
have important transformation value is quite objective,
all the more so as I find in retrospect that I actually
performed an exercise, unconscious of what I was doing,
which is a conscious practice in the Orient .
That entering the earth, literally, would have a sug-
gestive value to the non-intellectual part of the
psyche is at once evident . But I cannot escape the
conclusion that more than suggestion is involved . In
some manner , actual life springs from the earth and .
the sea and so there is a sense , more than figurative,
that the earth is, indeed, the Mother . Now, anyone who
has real acquaintance with the transformation literature
from the ancients to our day is bound to be impressed
with the widely current rebirth symbolism . Jesus, him-
self, said, "Ye must be born again" . But all life comes
from the womb . Nicodemus partly understood Jesus' dictum,
but, being a materialist, he could derive only a stupidly
literal interpretation . The real gestation of the new
Birth is in the womb of the Unconscious, and for this
the literal entering of the earth facilitates the pro-
cess . To find a rationale for this, one must turn to
the recurring content of mystical thought . The mystic
ever finds the world in complete correspondential rela-
tionship with inner psychical realities . Hence , objective
relations are not irrelevant, though the degree to which
they are determinant varies from individual to individual .
With some, slight contact with these objective factors
is enough ; for others, protracted discipline is necessary .

71t has come to my mind that the reader might be inclined

to question whether the above account may be called a
narrative description, as I did call it in the last
chapter, since so much of the writing is manifestly
discursive . However, it really is narrative descrip-
tion, on the whole, since it is a record of a process
of thought which took place and had vitally determinant
effects in the past . Only in subsidiary degree is this
autobiographical material related to the objective life of
a physical personality . In much higher degree is it an
autobiography of intellectual steps and processes . Thus
the discursive material which appears here is primarily
not interpretative after fact, but rather part of a
process in which interpretative factors were traceably
determinant in my own consciousness as it became more
and more oriented to the transformation . These inter-
pretations were pragmatically effective agents . Whether
or not they have a larger objective truth-value is not
the question that is before us at present . Later, I
shall return to this larger problem .

8At the time I was seated out of doors, a fact which may
prove to be of some significance . References to a value
attained by being under the sky with nothing intervening
 are to be found in mystical literature . Edward Carpenter
has said that he could not write in the vein of Towards
Democrat except when he was out of doors under the sky .
It is significant that the Sanskrit word Akasha means
"sky" as well as "space ", "primordial matter", and, in
a certain sense , the "higher mind" . The sky is the
matrix of Light . Thus the sun, the moon, and the stars
are embedded in the sky, and the whole sky, from the
perspective of the earth, is luminous . Thus, coming
from underground out to under the sky is symbolical of
leaving the dark place of gestation and entering the
Light-world of new birth . That which was hidden becomes
revealed ; that which was unconscious becomes conscious .

9The final thought before the "break through" was the very
clear realization that there was nothing to be attained .
For attainment implied acquisition and acquisition implied
change of content in consciousness . But the Goal is not
change of content but divorcement from content . Thus
Recognition has nothing to do with anything that happens .
I am already That which I seek and, therefore, there is
nothing to be sought . By the very seeking I hide Myself
from myself . Therefore, abandon the search and expect
nothing . This was the end of the long search .. I died,
and in the same instant was born again . Spontaneity
took over in place of the old self-determined effort .
After that I knew directly the Consciousness possessing
the characteristics reported by the mystics again and
again . Instead of this process being irrational it is
the very apogee of logic . It is reasoned thought car-
ried to the end with mathematical completeness .

10The Indian and Persian mystics have developed a sensuous

poetic imagery for suggesting supernal Value, which
reaches far beyond that of the representatives of any
Western race . To the Western mind these portrayals
seem extravagant . Actually, however, they are very
inadequate, since sensuous imagination is crippled at
its root by its medium . Mathematical imagination by
being freed from sensuous limitation soars much higher,
but nearly everybody fails to have an appreciation of
what has happened . As the reader may be interested in
a sample of the Indian imagery, I shall quote a few
lines from the opening part of the Mahanirvana Tantra
(translated by Arthur Avalon) :
 "The enchanting summit of the Lord of Mountains,
resplendent with all its various jewels, clad
with many a tree and many a creeper , melodious
with the song of many a bird, scented with the
fragrance of all the season's flowers, most
beautiful, fanned by soft , cool, and perfumed
breezes , shadowed by the still shade of stately
trees ; where cool groves resound with the sweet-
voiced songs of troops of Aspara , and in the
forest depths flocks of kokila maddened with
passion sing ; where ( Spring ) Lord of the
Seasons with his followers ever abide (the Lord
of Mountains , Kailasa) . . . . "

The "Lord of the Mountains " is the Door to the Transcendent .

11 The reader is warned that this is still part of the

record , and not the more systematic interpretation
after fact . The contents precipitated into the rela-
tive consciousness as a result of the first insight
had a more or less determinant part in preparing the
ground for the culminating Recognition which came
later , and thus are part of the aetiology of the process .

12
By "super-conceptual " I mean beyond the form of all
possible concepts that can be clothed in words . How-
ever , the nature of this knowledge is nearer to that
of our purest concepts than it is to perceptual con-
sciousness .

13Surely no one will be so clumsy as to suppose this

'universe sustaining I' is any more the personal ' V
than the reflection of the sun in water is the real
sun itself .

14 The residual personality continues to exist by karma,

and continues to pay prices and reap rewards . But all
this lies below the new base of reference .

151n my reading some years subsequent to writing the

above, I was particularly impressed by a reference to
the 'fire ' in C . G . Jung's Integration of the Personality .
Dr . Jung quotes an uncanonical saying attributed to t1
Christ , which runs as follows : "Whoever is near unto
me, is near unto the fire ." (p . 141) Here, also,
identification with the 'fire ' is implied , as well as
effects upon those who are near . Fire is that which
 burns up and so transforms ( sublimates ) everything
except the ash . To understand these mystical uses
of words one must isolate and idealize the essential
functions of the corresponding literal or physical
process .

16
At the time of the transformation I called this joy-
filled ' force ' the "Current " . The latter term broke
into my mind spontaneously and was not the result of
an objective reflective search for a descriptive term .
A 'sense of flow ' is an immediate fact of the state,
to be distinguished from the objective interpretative
judgment : ' it is a flow .' The step from the imme-
diately given to the conceptual interpretation in-
volves the problem of criticism which I shall have
to face later . But this much I may say here -- there are
interpretations which one feels at once are substantially
true to the sense of the immediate value, while others
falsify it . True , in this spirit , was the description
I gave of the seeming of the Flow . I said it was a Flow
which did not proceed from the past to the future, but,
rather , turned upon itself so that there was continuous
motion with no progress or decline . I later found that
this conception evoked no intelligible meaning in minds
that were mystically blind . Certainly , in the sense
of objective reference it is meaningless , nonetheless
I must still affirm its substantial truth with respect
to the sense of the immediate realization . At the time
I was not familiar with analagous references in mystical
literature , but I have found them since . Thus, in the
Secret of the Golden Flower the "circulation of the Light"
stands as the critical accomplishment of the 'Great Work' .
In this, among other effects , immortality is accomplished .
Now analysis of the symbols helps a good deal . Thus the
"circulation " suggests self-containedness, while the
straight line of chronological time has direction and
is therefore dogged by the pairs of opposites . The
time - line does not progress any more than it degrades .
It gives life and takes it away . Hence, the philosophic
pessimist is the one who has seen deeply . Only through
the "circulation of the Light " is the tragedy of world-
life mastered .

17The first time I experienced the consciousness of bene-

volence , certain consequences were striking . At the
time, I was sitting in a very humble shack , quite alone,
located on one of the creeks of the Mother Lode country
of east central California . Insects and other creatures
 were rather over - familiar companions . Spiders , scorpions,
daddy-long -legs ( in great numbers), centipedes , slugs,
gnats , and rattlesnakes were creatures one could never
safely forget . But when the state of benevolence was
superimposed upon my own private consciousness, it in-
cluded all these creatures as much as any other . My
good will included them equally with more evolved beings,
and there was nothing forded in the attitude . It was
no conscious moral victory , but just a state of natural
feeling . This state of immediate feeling is transient
just as is true of other phases of mystical states of
consciousness . But it leaves a permanent effect upon
the moral judgment . One can no longer kill anything,
no matter how repulsive or destructive it may seem,
without a feeling of guilt . This definitely increases
the difficulty of objective life . For when the individual
sees the objective realities clearly he finds that there
is no embodied living in this world which does not imply
killing , and, therefore , guilt . The farmer must destroy
the enemies of his plants and stock, or have the latter
destroyed , and without the farmer no man has food . And
then, within our blood there is constant war, with tiny
creatures being killed and devoured all the time . Hence,
all life here depends upon the taking of life . It is a
very ugly world that comes into view when the blinders
are removed from the eyes . Saints ( who continue to live)
and vegetarians share the guilt with all the rest . The
amount of guilt does zget vary , of course , but difference
of degree is not a difference of principle . All men who
live in this world inevitably share guilt , and thus there
are none who may cast the first stone . There are none
who may sit in judgment upon others , unless at the same
time they judge themselves and accept sentence along with
the others . Release from guilt lies only in the Beyond .

18There is at times a spontaneous up-welling which leads

to the most effective production , but at the same time
there is conscious selection and judging upon the part
of the mind that was trained in the schools . The re-
sultant product is thus a joint product of deeper and
more superficial levels , both part of myself . I might
suggest this compound action by a figure . If we were
to think of the mental accumulations of a life-time as
being filed away in a sort of hall of records in which
there is only a dim illumination so that, ordinarily,
much of the material is hard to locate , and therefore
not easily used, the state of illumination is like a
brilliant light suddenly appearing in that hall which
renders everything filed , at once available . The light
 has the additional effect of leading well nigh un-
erringly to the most appropriate selection of the
material which is pertinent to the problem in hand .
The once known and forgotten tends to become known
again, and all this without laborious trying .

19Thus, according to the handed-down record, Gautama

Buddha discouraged the practicing of the trance-state,
though He did not repudiate it as a possible means .
Yet, Samadhi is a fundamental part of the Buddhist
Way . The implication is that bodily condition is
essentially irrelevant .

20A study of the word "ecstasy" in an adequate dictionary

clarifies a good deal that is confusing about the word
as it is employed in literature, particularly that of
a medical sort. As the term is of high importance in
relation to mysticism, this study is very helpful .
The dictionary gives four uses which cover a wide range
of meanings, and I shall quote these in full .

Ecstasy is defined (See Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia )

as :

a . "A state in which the mind is exalted or

liberated, as it were, from the body ; a state in which
the functions of the senses are suspended by the con-
templation of some extraordinary or supernatural object,
or by absorption in some overpowering idea, most fre-
quently of a religious nature ; entrancing rapture or
transport,
b . "Overpowering emotion or exaltation, in which
the mind is absorbed and the actions are controlled by
the exciting subject ; a sudden access of intense feeling .
c . "In medicine, a morbid state of the nervous
system , allied to catalepsy or trance, in which the
patient assumes the attitude and expression of rapture .
('Ecstasis' is a synonym for this usage .)
d . "Insanity ; madness ."

Etymologically, the word carries the meaning of "any

displacement or removal from the proper place, a stand-
ing aside ":

From the external point of view all of the four meanings

are consistent with the etymological sense of the word .
But in the intensive sense the difference of meaning is
as great as the difference between a snake and an eel,
which are only analagous but nothomologous . In the sense
 of the . first meaning the "displacement from the proper
place " is true only on the assumption that personal
egoism is the proper place . It is a prime thesis of
mystical philosophy that this assumption is a funda-
mental error . The primary meaning of the Sanskrit
word " Samadhi" reveals a much more profound insight
into the real meaning of mystical Ecstasy . " Samadhi"
has the significance of "putting together , joining
with ; union ; combination ; performance ; adjustment,
settlement ;' justification of a statement ; proof ;
attention , intentness on ; deep meditation on the
supreme soul , profound devotion ." Thus the prime
meaning is that of ' bringing together of that which
is improperly separated'. This gives a value that is
highly positive and superior , while the etymology of
'ecstasy ' is depreciatory . It is a difference of
viewpoint that parallels that between the Ptolemaic
and the Copernican systems, with the profounder Indian
view corresponding to placing the center in the sun .
The typically ancient Greek orientation was not spiritual
but sensuous-materialistic , the philosophers of the
type of Plato and Plotinus being the exceptions . The
Greeks realized bodies rather than space . Hence a
consciousness which stood disassociated from bodies
appeared as not in the proper place . The general Greek
insight is not as profound as supposed . It is the
great exceptions who have lived to our day , just because
they have seen more truly , and while these have deserved
the honor we have given them , they have notjustified
us in extending that . honor to the Greek civilization
as a whole . Our own spatially oriented mathematics is
nearer to the feeling of the Indian than the typical
Greek.

21So long as there is contrast and not indifference to

the contrasting elements the state is not nirdvandva--
freed from the pairs of opposites . The feeling of
superlative value is , after all . ,a dualistic state .
In a genuinely absolute state there is not , and could
not be, any preference whatsoever . A consciousness
of Bliss , of All Knowledge , or of Compassion is thus
colored with something relative , so long as it is felt
or known that there is anything else with different
value . Any possible report of the state of nirdvandva
inevitably seems to the relative consciousness as
nothing at all . This adequately explains why the un-
illumined psychologists view the highest of mystical

-111-
 states of consciousness as identical with unconscious-
ness . There is a serious error in this interpretation,
but only he who has known the actuality immediately
can know, and he cannot tell what he knows to one who
does not also know . One can only categorically affirm :
"It is not unconscious ." However, it is as little like
what is ordinarily understood to be consciousness as
to be indistinguishable from unconsciousness as viewed
from the relative perspective .

22The manuals are generally , if not universally , insistent

upon mental quiescence and emotional calmness . I am
not here developing a critique of the manuals but simply
reporting what actually happened . But there may be a
valid need of such a critique .

2 3The reader must have patience with these unusual combi-

nations of conceptions if he would acquire any under-
standing at all . There is no word - combination that is
strictly true to the meaning intended , and so the common
medium is strained to suggest a most uncommon content .
In any case , there is mystery enough in the relation of
idea to its referent , even in ordinary usage . Habit has
caused most of us to neglect this mystery , but it has
led to the production of many volumes out of the minds
of philosophers .

24When to wish for is to have immediately , it is impossible

to isolate desire from possession . The awareness of
desire necessarily vanishes . Ordinarily we desire and
achieve the object only imperfectly after much effort .
Thus we are highly conscious of desire . If there were
absolutely no barrier to complete fulfillment, there
could be no more consciousness of desiring .

2 SThis is clearly a case of dialectic flow paralleling

the thesis, antithesis , and synthesis of Hegelian logic .
Corresponding to the thesis is consciousness conditioned
by desire , to the antithesis is the State of Satisfaction,
and to the synthesis the State of High Indifference .
Hegel is correct in viewing the process as autonomous .
However , I think we can trace the vital logic a little
more in detail . There could be no satisfaction without
an antecedent felt lack , from which desire grows . But
at the moment lack vanishes satisfaction withers as
does a tree of which the roots are cut . Then the dualism
is dissolved , leaving a non-dual state , which, affectively
 and conatively considered, is Indifference .

26At this point I must take radical exception with the

thesis of Dr . Jung given in the first chapter of
The Integration of the Personality . There Jung says :
n the end, consciousness becomes vast but dim . . 0 it
It is no more dim than acute . It is really nirdvandva,
and no contrasting description is really valid .

27Surely, no one would be so stupid as to imagine that

this is a personal power . The great power of the sun
is not wholly manifested in the image of the sun re-
flected in the drop of water . Inwardly, I am the Sun,
but as a personal ego I am the image of the Sun lying
in the drop .

28It was some time after writing the above that I become
acquainted with the one figure in Western history who
reveals something of the great Buddha's depth of pene-
tration . I refer to Meister Eckhart, recognized by
some as the greatest mystic of the middle ages, and in
my judgment one of the greatest in Western history . He
is the only instance I have found in the West, so far,
who reveals acquaintance with what I have called the
High Indifference . In other words than mine he has
expressed the same meaning as that given above, thus :
"For man is truly God, and God truly man ." Also, in
the same spirit some centuries later the poet Angelus
Silesius (Johann Scheffler) wrote in beautiful sim-
plicity :

"I am as great as God,

And He is small like me ;
He cannot be above,
Nor I below Him be ."

There are always to be found witnesses of the Eternal

Truth . (Quotations taken from Jung's Psychological
Types .)

29See James' use of the terms 'thick' and 'thin' in the

Pluralistic Universe .

30We are throughout all this presentation confronted with

the old philosophic problem of Illusion and Reality .
It is involved in all the great monistic philosophies .
It appears that William James, at one stage in his
philosophic life, earnestly strived to resolve certain
fundamental difficulties inherent in such philosophies,
at least in their Western form . His effort failed and
he gave u monism entirely, advancing in its place a
frankly pluralistic philosophy . While he did not dog-
matically close the door to the possibility of a specu-
lative resolution of the problem, he left the impression
of grave doubt that such resolution existed . James saw-
quite clearly that there are different . states of con-
sciousness which are ineluctable facts . If these are
represented by the twenty-six letters of the alphabet,
then the unity of them all would not be simply one fact,
but the twenty-seventh fact . Thus there is no resolution
of many-ness into unity .

James' critical analysis is acute and is probably sound

if we restrict ourselves to the limitations of Aristo-
telian logic . But this is not the whole of logic, as
is evidenced by the development of the logic of relatives,
not to mention the dialectic of Hegel* There is no good
reason to suppose that current Western knowledge of logic
is the whole of logic . Now there is a logical principle
which, I believe, so far clarifies the problem as to
render the speculative resolution much more probable .
I shall introduce the principle by reference to a very
common oriental figure .

People who live in a country where venemous serpents are

a serious hazard are familiar with the delusion of see-
ing a snake that is not there . We who have been much
in the wilds of the far West know this delusion quite
well . One early learns to be everlastingly on guard,
so that near the surface of his mind he is always watch-
ing for snakes . Often it happens that a stick, piece
of rope, or other long slim object will be perceived,
half unconsciously, and lead to a reaction of the organ-
ism before rational recognition of the object is possible .
One seems to see a snake, feels the shock, pauses, and
perhaps jumps, before a rational judgment is possible .
A moment later he sees his error . I have had,this ex-
perience many times, and on analysis find that it reveals
a great deal . The snake, at first seemingly seen, a
moment later is a stick, rope, or such other material
object as it may be . The question then is, what hap-
pened to the snake? Did a snake become a stick, etc .?
The final practical judgment is that the snake did not
become a stick, but never was there . Yet there is no
doubt that, in a psychical sense , experience of snake
was there . Well, then, what is the nature of its
existence ? We certainly do not attribute to it sub-
stantial reality . It assuredly cannot bite or other-
wise be dangerous in an objective sense . The moment
after the rational recognition and judgment, . there
simply is no snake . Further--and this subtle point
is the very crux of the matter-- the snake ceases to
have ever been . I know that the process works this
way since I have observed it again and again . It
remains true that there had been a state of psychical
delusion, yet there is a vitally important sense in
which the snake ceases to be, both as a present and
past fact . The delusion neither added anything to the

No*, thelsp~curative resolution of the monist's problem

is found by applying the above principle of interpre-
tation to the whole of relative experience . The latter
differs from the snake experience in that it is massively
collective and is generally not at once corrected by x
a rational recognition and judgment . It is to be viewed
as like unto a vast delusional insanity and is to be
corrected as a dream - problem is corrected , simply by
waking up . Human suffering is of like nature to the
suffering of the delusionally insane, and there is no
real cure in terms of the premise of the insane state .

But what is the difference between reality and delusion,

since the delusion is a psychical fact? Simply this .
The reality is substantial , while the delusion is empty.
In Buddhist terms, the only actuality in the delusional
modification of consciousness lies in its being of one
sameness with the essence of mind, but there is no
actuality of content . All experience is simply the
revelry of mind and has no substance in itself .

The adequacy of the snake-rope analogy has been ably

challenged by Shri Aurobindo Ghose in his The Life
Divine , with the consequent introduction of doubt as
to the objective validity of the figure . However, the
analogy does seem to be subjectively valid since the
relative consciousness tends to vanish, like the snake
into the rope, while the self-consciousness is immersed
in the Transcendent . It appears that Aurobindo has

-115-
 made necessary a re-examination of the classical
metaphysical theories grounded upon realizations of
the above sort . This subject will be considered
later in the present work .

31The main text of this chapter was written and com-

pleted toward the end of March 1937, just after
finishing the text Pathways Through to Space . The
footnotes were added seven years later . The latter
reflect the expanded perspective afforded by a quite
considerable study of the transfTmation-problem, both
in Western psychological sources and in Buddhist
sources which had not been available for me prior to
the cycle reported . Though the problem has not had
a wide consideration , it has attracted the attention
of some of the best minds the world has ever known .
I know now that although the ground covered has only
rarely been traversed as far, to judge by the mystical
records , yet all the Way has been pioneered long ago .
This simply reveals the fundamental universality of
the problem .
 PART II

THE APHORISMS ON CONSCIOUSNESS -WITHOUT-AN-OBJECT

Chapter /1" :3
The Levels of Thought

In the semi -esoteric psychology of Buddhism,

Vedantism , and Theosophy , there is to be found a division

of Mind into two parts or facets . 1 While it is affirmed

that the essence of mind is unitary , yet in the process

of manifestation mind becomes like a two -faced mirror,

one face oriented to the objective , the other to the

subjective . Since the mind functions in considerable

measure like a mirror, it takes on the appearance of that

which it reflects , and thus its own essential nature tends

to become hidden . The objectively oriented facet reflects

the world and is colored by the conative -affective nature

of the personal man . The inwardly directed facet, like

that which it reflects , is marked by the undistorting

colorlessness of dispassion .2 But since both facets are

of one and the same essence there is a native affinity

between them . Because of this, the consciousness of man,

by the appropriate means , is enabled to cross what would

otherwise be an impassible gulf of unconsciousness . This

is not to say that the empiric or personal man, if un-

possessed of mind, would actually have no connection with

his roots, but it would mean that the relation is un-

conscious in the strict sense . Through the doubly

reflecting mind of one essence it becomes possible, in

principle, for the personally integrated consciousness

to know the roots . Thus there is a Way whereby man may

know the transcendent .

For Western psychology and much of Western philos-

ophy the acquaintance with mind is restricted to the out-

wardly oriented facet of the oriental conception . This

is true for the reason that the exclusively objective

methods of occidental science, at the outset, exclude the

possibility of direct acquaintance with the more hidden

facet . There would be little or no harm in this if it

were realized that only a facet , and not the whole, was

the real object of study, but all too commonly it is

inferred that the method employed can provide conclusions

justifying privative judgments . Thus we have the widely

held attitude that the total possibilities of human con-

sciousness are exclusively of the type-that--are true

enough of the objective facet of mind . This standpoint

simply is unsound , and this unsoundness can be verified

by the appropriate means . Here science , in the familiar

Western sense , does not mean "to know fully", but rather

"to know restrictedly", and therefore does not justify

privative judgments . SCIENCE, in the sense of knowing

fully, cannot be restricted to objective material, but

must, as well , be open to other possibilities of aware-

ness . Western psychology is limited in its possibilities

through a restriction imposed at its roots by methodologi-

cal presuppositions . Accordingly, mind can never be

known in its totality by this means .

As it appears through the Western method of re-

search the mind tends to appear as quite lacking in self-

determination . Thinking seems to be entrained behind

wishing and unable long to continue on its own momentum .

Thus the conception has grown that thinking is only in-

strumental to action, the latter being the direct out-

growth of the conative factor in consciousness . Clearly,

such a view greatly restricts the supposedly valid zone

of the judgments of thought . Among other consequences

it excludes the possibility of a genuine knowledge of the

transcendent which is just the center of focus in the

present work .

It is a tribute to the relative competency of

Western psychologic methodology that the derived inter-

pretation of mind-functioning is in substantial agreement

with the oriental psychology with respect to the lower

facet . This latter is often designated kama manas, but

since kama is the Sanskrit equivalent of 'desire', we

derive the meaning of 'desire mind', and this is very

easily identified with thinking led by wishfulness . Wish-

fulness in thinking is undoubtedly a part truth, but it

is not the whole truth .

No one may validly affirm the truth of a read or

spoken statement merely because he has read it or heard

it . Western science is by no means more insistent upon

this than was the great Buddha himself . Indeed, the latter

was the more exacting of the two . The individual must

verify for himself, or at least be able to do so, before

he may justifiably accept, save as possibility . Thus

vie cannot affirm the actuality of the inner facet of

mind until we know it directly, as no more is ignorance

competent to deny its actuality . I affirm the actuality

of the inner facet on the ground of direct acquaintance,

and further affirm that it may be known directly through

the transformation process by any one who fulfills the

conditions .

There is another kind of thought, dispassionate

and self-directing, that stands in contrast with the

thought that is guided by wishing . It may be said that

this thought thinks itself, or tends to do so, depending

upon the degree of its purity . It is not concerned with

the preconceptions of the relative consciousness nor with

the pragmatic interest of man . It tends to be authoritar-

ianin its form, and, while possessed of its own logic,

yet ignores or tends to ignore that part of logical

process oriented to objective referents . Most readily

it expresses itself in aphoristic form , with more or less

dissociation of statement from statement . But this

dissociation is a surface appearance only . An analogous

form is to be noted in the groups of postulates which

form the bases of formally developed systems of math-

ematics that by themselves do not give an explicit

logical whole , but rather provide the components from

which a logical whole may be developed . However, the

genuine aphorism differs from most groups of mathematical

postulates in that the latter are generally inventions

of the unillumined mind, while the aphorism is a spon-

taneous production out of an illumined state . They could

well serve as postulates from which systematic logical

development could be constructed , in which case they might

well be conceived as authentic axioms and not merely as

fundamental assumptions . Something of the character of

this thought I have been able to isolate, and thus have

been enabled to see somewhat of the root whence springs

the aphoristic thought .

There are certainly four kinds of thought which

I find discernible , with various gradations and inter-

mixtures . Of these , three employ or can employ verbal

concepts with more or less adequacy . The fourth has no

relation whatsoever with any possible word-concept, as

far as its inner content is concerned . Thus the latter

is not related to communication as between different

centers of consciousness . The other three serve communi-

cation in some sense .

In its most lowly form thought is inextricably en-

tangled with bodily existence . Here thought serves organic

need and relation . It is the commonest thought of every-

body and is not wholly beyond the comprehension of animals .

This is the thought in absolute bondage to desire, which

has no value save as it serves organisms . Obviously it

has no eternal worth . Its language may be just as well

the grunt or the gesture as the more highly developed word .

Above this is a thought well known to cultured man .

It is the thought of the liberated or partly liberated

concept , and is thus the thought for which the word is the

peculiarly adapted vehicle . This is the thought out of

which grows science, philosophy, mathematics , and much

of art . It is extremely articulate . In some manifesta-

tions it attains a high order of purity, but may be more

or less contaminated with the inferior kind of thought .

Most actual human thinking is such a contamination . Even

those who have known this thought on its levels of greater

purity cannot maintain themselves at the requisite pitch

of discipline during a large proportion of waking con-

sciousness . It is consciously directed thinking and is

achieved at the price of fatiguing labor . The writing

here, at this moment, is of this class .

At the deepest level of .discernible thought there

is a thinking that flows of itself . In its purity it

employs none of the concepts which could be captured in

definable words . It is fluidic rather than granular .

It never isolates a definitive divided part but ever-

lastingly interblends with all . Every thought includes

the whole of Eternity, and yet there are distinguishable

thoughts . The unbroken Eternal flows before the mind,

yet is endlessly colored anew with unlimited possibility .

There is no labor in this thought . It simply is . It is

unrelated to all desiring, all images, and all symbols .

Between the deepest level of thought and the

conscious and laborious thought there is a fourth kind

which, in a sense, is the child of these two . In high

degree, this thought flows of itself, yet blends with verbal

concepts . Here the conceptual thought and the transcendent

thought combine in mutual action . But the lowly thought

of the organic being has no part in this . It is a thought

that is sweet and true, but fully clear only to him who

has Vision .

The best of poetry has much of this kind of thought .

It is the poetry that stirs the souls rather than the

senses of men . It is the poetry of content rather than

of form . But most of all from this level of thought are

born the aphorisms, that strange kind of thought which is

both poetry and something more . For it stirs the think-

ing as well as the feeling and thus integrates the best

of the whole man . Mystery is an inextricable part of this

thought .

#3 . It should not be hard to recognize in the trans-

cendental thought and the organic thought the purest

forms of the superior and inferior facets of mind . The

conceptual and aphoristic thinking are derivatives from

these .

It is a misconception that conceptual thought is

exclusively a child of the organic kind of thinking --

something which developed solely to serve the adaptation

of a living organism to its environment as the diffi-

culties became more complex . It has possibilities of

detachment that could never have been born out of organic

life . At its best, it is more than lightly colored with

the dispassionate other-worldliness of the transcendental

thought . Something of both the transcendental and the

organic is in it , sometimes more of one , at other times

more of the other .

It is in the realm of this kind of thought that

the West has out-distanced the East . It is peculiarly a

Western power . Its potential office in the transformation

process is not to be found in the oriental manuals . Here

we face new possibilities .

The aphoristic thought is the child of the trans-

cendental and the conceptual . This is the highest form

of articulate thought . He who would understand cannot do

so with his conceptual powers alone . He must also let the

understanding grow up from within him .

Footnotes to Chapter I

11n this instance I am using ' mind' as a synonym of ' manas' .

While this practice is quite common it is far from being
strictly correct . The Western definition and usage of
"mind" is a good deal wider than that of 'manas ', which
has a specifically restricted meaning . For fuller dis-
cussion of this see Pathways Through to Space , p . 193 .

2The distinction between the two facets of the mind seems

to be approximately, if not identically , that given by
Sri Aurobindo in his The Life Divine in his usage of
the conceptions of "surface mind and " subliminal mind ' .
 Chapter II

Aphorisms on Consciousness -without-an-Object

Consciousness -without-an-object is .

Before objects were , Consciousness-without-an-

object is .

3
Though objects seem to exist , Consciousness-

without-an-object is .

When objects vanish , yet remaining through all

unaffected, Consciousness -without-an-object is .

5
Outside of Consciousness -without-an- object nothing

is .

Within the bosom of Consciousness -without-an-object

lies the power of awareness which projects objects .

7
When objects are projected the power of awareness
as subject is presupposed , yet Consciousness -without-an-

object remains unchanged .

 8

When consciousness of objects is born then like-

wise consciousness of absence of objects arises .

9
Consciousness of objects is the Universe .

10

Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana .

11

Within Consciousness-without-an-object lie both

the Universe and Nirvana , yet to Consciousness-without-

an-object these two are the same .

12

Within Consciousness-without-an-object lies the

seed of Time .

13

When awareness cognizes Time then knowledge of

Timelessness is born .

14

To be aware of Time is to be aware of the Universe,

and to be aware of the Universe is to be aware of Time .

15
To realize Timelessness is to attain Nirvana .

16

But for Consciousness -without-an-object there is

no difference between Time and Timelessness .

 17
Within Consciousness-without-an-object lies the
seed of the world-containing Space .

18

When awareness cognizes the world-containing Space

then knowledge of the Spatial Void is born .

19

To be aware of the world-containing Space is to

be aware of the Universe of Objects .

20

To realize the Spatial Void is to awaken to Nirvanic

Consciousness .

21

But for Consciousness-without-an-object there is

no difference between the world-containing Space and the

Spatial Void .

22

Within Consciousness-without-an-object lies the

Seed of Law .
23
When consciousness of objects is born the Law is

invoked as a Force tending ever toward Equilibrium .

24

All objects exist as tensions within Consciousness-

without-an-object that tend ever to flow into their own

complements or others .
 25
The ultimate effect of the flow of all objects
into their complements is mutual cancellation in complete

Equilibrium .

26

Consciousness of the field of tensions is the

Universe .

27
Consciousness of Equilibrium is Nirvana .
28
AA
But for Consciousness -without-an-object theree
neither tension nor Equilibrium .

29
The state of tensions is the state of ever-becoming .

30
Ever-becoming is endless-dying .

31

So the state of consciousness-of-objects is a

state of ever-renewing promises that pass into death at

the moment of fulfillment .

32
Thus when consciousness is attached to objects :
the agony of birth and death never ceases .

33
In the state of Equilibrium where birth cancels

death the deathless Bliss of Nirvana is realized .

 34

But Consciousness -without- an-object is neither

agony nor bliss .

35
Out of the Great Void , which is Consciousness-

without-an-object , the Universe is creatively projected .

36

The Universe as experienced is the created negation

that ever resists .

37
The creative act is bliss , the resistance unending

pain .

38
Endless resistance is the Universe of experience ;

the agony of crucifixion .

39
Ceaseless creativeness is Nirvana ; the Bliss .be-

yond human conceiving .

40

But for Consciousness -without -an-object there is

neither creativeness nor resistance .

41

Ever-becoming and ever-ceasing -to-be is endless

action.
42

When ever-becoming cancels the ever - ceasing-to-be

then Rest is realized .

43

Ceaseless action is the Universe .

44

Unending Rest is Nirvana .

45
But Consciousness -without -an-object is neither

/ ct i on nor Rest .
46

When consciousness is attached to objects it is

restricted through the forms imposed by the world -contain-

ing Space , by Time , and by Law .

47
When consciousness is disengaged from objects

Liberation from the forms of the world -containing Space,

of Time , and of Law is attained .

48

Attachment to objects is consciousness bound with-

in the Universe .

49

Liberation from such attachment is the State of

unlimited Nirvanic Freedom .

50
But Consciousness -without-an-object is neither

bondage nor freedom .

 51
Consciousness -without- an-object may be symbolized
by SPACE which is unaffected by the presence or absence

of objects ; for which there is neither Time nor Timeless-

ness ; neither a world -containing Space nor a Spatial Void ;

neither tension nor Equilibrium :; neither resistance nor

6Creativeness ; neither ,gony nor Bliss ; neither Action nor

Rest ; and neither restriction nor Freedom .

52
As the GREAT SPACE is not to be identified with
the Universe , so neither is It to be identified with any

Self,

53
The GREAT SPACE is not God, but the comprehender

of all Gods , as well as of all lesser creatures .

54

The GREAT SPACE, or Consciousness -without -an-object,

is the Sole Reality upon which all objects and all selves

depend and derive their existence .

55
The GREAT SPACE comprehends both the Path of the

Universe and the Path to Nirvana .

56
Beside the GREAT SPACE there is none other .

OM TAT .SAT
+E

Chapter 3

General Discussion of Consciousness -without-an-object

The aphorisms which constitute the material of

the preceding chapter are to be regarded as a symbolic

representation of the culminating stage of the Recognition

reported in the second chapter of Part I . The direct

value of that Recognition is inexpressible and incon-

ceivable in the sense of concepts meaning just what they

are defined to mean and no more . Of necessity , all con-

cepts deal with content in some sense , as they are born in

the tension of a subject aware of objects and refer to

objects . Consciousness -without - an-object is not an object

on the level where it is realized . But just as soon as

words are employed to refer to it we have in place of the

actuality a sort of shadowy reflection . This reflection

may be useful as a symbol pointing toward the Reality, but

becomes a deception just as soon as it is regarded as a

comprehensive concept . Conceivable conclusions may be

derived from the original symbol, but the full realization

of That which is symbolized requires the dissolving of the

very power of representation itself .

There are two lines of approach to, and employment

of, the aphorisms . They may be regarded as seeds to be

taken into the meditative state, in which case they will

tend to arouse the essentially inexpressible Meaning and

Realization which they symbolize . This we may call their

mystical value . On the other hand, they may be regarded

as primary indefinables upon which a systematic philosophy

of the universe and its negation, Nirvana, may be developed .

In this case, they may be viewed as a base of reference

from which all thought and experience may be evaluated .

From the standpoint of strict logic, they would have to

be regarded as arbitrary in the same sense as the funda-

mental assumptions of any system of mathematics are logi-

cally arbitrary . For any individual to determine whether

they are more than arbitrary would require a direct Gnostic

Realization of the Truth symbolized by them, but, for the

individual lacking such a Realization, they may be evalu-

ated as any system of pure mathematics or work of art is

commonly evaluated . In the latter case they are justified

if they enrich the consciousness of man, entirely apart

from any determination of their ontological validity . I

offer the aphorisms to the reader in this sense, if he is

unable to find any more fundamental justification for them .

It is a fundamental principle of this philosophy

that the aphorisms are not derived from experience . In

its employment here I have restricted the term "experi-

ence" to-the meaning formulated in Baldwin's Dictionary

of Philosophy and Psychology . This rules out definitely

any state of consciousness which may have an absolute or

timeless character as being properly regarded as experi-

ence . It is a primary consideration that experience

should be defined as a time - conditioned state of con-

sciousness in which events or processes transpire .

Whether or not thought with its products may be regarded

as a part of experience , and likewise whether " experience"

is to be restricted to the "raw immediacy " of phenomena

before it is analysed by reflective thought is unimportant

for my present purposes . It is important , simply, that

" experience " should be understood as time -conditioned .

This seems to be sufficiently consonant with the meaning

of the term as it is employed in the various empiric

philosophies . So, when it is predicated that the aphor-

isms are not derived from experience , it is meant that

they are derivative from a consciousness which is not

conditioned by time . Of course , their formulation was

an event and a process in time , but it is only as symbols

that they are time - conditioned . Their meaning and author-

ity inhere in that which is beyond experience .

I am well aware that several philosophies affirm

or imply that all consciousness is of necessity time-

conditioned . But since this is undemonstrable it has

only the value of arbitrary assertion which is countered

by simple denial . This affirmation or implication is

incompatible with the basis realized or assumed here --

whichever way it may be taken . At this point I simply

deny the validity of the affirmation and assert that

there is a Root Consciousness which is not time-conditioned .

It may be valid enough to assert that human consciousness

qua human is always time-conditioned, but that would

amount merely to a partial definition of what is meant

by human consciousness . In that case, the consciousness

which is not time-conditioned would be something that is

trans-human or non-human . I am entirely willing to accept

this view, but would add that it is in the power of man

to transcend the limits of human consciousness and thus

come to a more or less complete understanding of the factors

which limit the range of human consciousness qua human.

The term "human" would thus define a certain range in the

scale of consciousness--something like an octave in the

scale of electro-magnetic waves . In that case, the present

system implies that it is, in principle, possible for a

conscious being to shift his field of consciousness up and

down the scale . When such an entity is focused within the

human octave it might be agreed to call him human, but

something other than human when focused in other octaves .

Logically, this is simply a matter of definition of terms,

and I am more than willing to regard the human as merely

a stage in consciousness, provided it is not asserted

dogmatically that it is impossible for consciousness and

self-identity to flow from stage to stage . On the basis

of such a definition this philosophy would not be a con-

tribution to Humanism but to Trans-humanism .

POO The Critique of Pure Reason I regard as a philo-

sophical work of very high importance . The most signifi-

cant conclusion of that work seems to be that the pure

reason, acting by itself, cannot solve the ontological

problems . The reason can work upon a material that is

given, but cannot, itself, supply the original material .

If material is given through experience, then the reason

can derive consequences that are also valid within the

field of experience . However, the reason operates within

the matrix of a transcendental base, and thus is something

more than experience, though it be ever so impossible to

recognize and isolate reason before the conscious being

has had experience . The transcendental base is a pre-

existence determined after the fact of experience . Now,

if we regard Kant's criticism as a sort of circumscription

of a certain field of consciousness, his work may well

be permanently valid in its main outlines . I am disposed

to think that it is . But I question whether his analysis

was broad enough to cover the whole field of human con-

sciousness . It would seem to fit more especially that

particular phase of human consciousness in which lies

Western scientific knowledge . In any case, it is not an

analysis of sub-human consciousness, such as that of the

animal, nor is it competent as a study of the forms of

consciousness realized in the various mystical states .

For my own part, I do not .contend that the pure

reason, either acting in a strictly formal sense or upon

a material given by experience, can demonstrate a tran

scendental reality . On the contrary, this reality must

be realized immediately, if it is to have more than a

hypothetical existence . But assuming that a given in-

dividual has awakened to a transcendental realization,

it is possible for him to reflect the transcendent through

concepts, when the latter are taken in a symbolic sense .

Such concepts may then serve as original material upon

which the reason can operate and derive consequences .

Some or all of these consequences may well prove to have

value within the range of relative consciousness, includ-

ing experience . I do not suggest that such a system will

necessarily prove competent to render experience, as such,

unnecessary . It may only supply that which experience,

by itself, cannot supply, i .e ., an integrative framework

capable of comprehending all possible experience however

unpredictable its specific ug ale may be . Experience as

raw immediacy does not define its own meaning . A given

u
raw immediacy " cast in the framework of traditional

Christian theology arouses a meaning that is quite dif-

ferent from that afforded when the base of reference is

such as is assumed by physical science . Neither of these

frameworks are derived from nor proved by experience .

Logically, they are simply presuppositions from which

observation, analysis, and interpretation proceed .

Historically, each has supplied human consciousness with

positive values, and for that reason has persisted over

considerable periods of time . But today we know that both

are inadequate . Our science has given command over ex-

ternal nature that the older theology failed to achieve,

but in turn it leaves a very important part of the demands

of human consciousness unsatisfied--a fact which is ex-

emplified by the growth of psychosis and parapsychosis .

A transcendental reality cannot be proved by logic

17-0
nor can it be experienced in the time-bound sense, but it

may be realized mystically . It is impossible to prove

the actuality of God, freedom, immortality, or any other

supposed metaphysical reality, in the scientific sense of

proof . With respect to these matters, either to affirm

or to deny is unscientific . The competency of any scientist

qua scientist need not be affected by either an attitude

of belief or of disbelief . But an attitude of belief or

disbelief may make a lot of difference to him as a complete

human being . There is an enormous divergence between a

human consciousness which is rich and filled with assurance

compared to one which is starved and uncertain , and this

difference is important to relative life itself even though

not affecting technical scientific competency . Practically,

men assume much which they do not know and which cannot

be known within the limits of the methodology of physical

science . In spite of themselves , men do act upon tran-

scendental assumptions , even when the assumption is in

the form of a denial of the possibility of a transcendental

reality. And all this does make a difference for life

as actually lived .
The man who has not realized the transcendental,

in the mystical sense of realization , is not freed from

the necessity of acting " as if" with respect to some

transcendental base which forms his outlook on life .

Barring mystic certainty , the relative merits of one "as

if" when compared to others is to be judged by the values

afforded for life as actually lived . No dogmatist,

whether ecclesiastical or scientific, has any right to

challenge the freedom of any man in the selection of his

purely transcendental "as if" . Such an "as if" can never

contradict the raw immediacy of experience, since the

former is related to value or meaning, which is another

dimension of consciousness entirely . For instance, a

scientific determination that the secretions of the duct-

less glands, in the case of a given individual, differ/

from the norm, proves nothing concerning the value of the

consciousness enjoyed by the individual . The deviation

from the norm may or may not be favorable for a long life,

but in any case this is irrelevant when we measure the

value of the consciousness in question . We are simply

dealing with another dimension of consciousness altogether .

The aphorisms may be regarded as affording a par-

ticular "as if" basis for integrating in terms of value

the totality of relative consciousness . In this case, it

is unnecessary to raise the question as to t1ather they are

true or false in the scientific sense . In fact, they are

neither true nor false when these judgments are employed

as they are in physical science . They stand simply as the

basis for the integration of relative consciousness . They

may be viewed as of only psychological significance, though

for me there is no doubt concerning their positive meta-

physical rooting . They are not a mere "as if" for me,
though I am quite willing to assume the "as if" status for
them as a minimal basis for the purposes' of discourse .

However, entirely apart from the question of metaphysical

actuality, it remains true that there is an enormous

practical difference between a self which is out of harmony

with the not-self and a self which has attained harmonious

integration with the not-self . The steps toward such

harmonious integration in their less comprehensive phases

are known as "conversion", and when more profoundly de-

veloped, as "mystical awakening" . That these aphorisms

have the power to produce such transformations I have

already demonstrated empirically in connection with others

than myself . This fact, alone, is sufficient to vindicate

their use as an "as if" basis, at least in principle .

In his Dance of Life Havelock Ellis has developed

the thesis that both science and philosophy are arts and

therefore have the same justification as any other art,

at the very least . This is to say that both are creative

constructions, whatever else they .may be . In this respect

Havelock Ellis' position is consonant with my own . It

simply means that a real philosophy is a Way of Life, how-

ever much it may also be a system of notions . I regard

the aphorisms as affording a base that is valid in both

senses . However, criticism may give them quite different

evaluation depending upon the sense taken . In any case,

I insist upon their value in determining a Way of Life .

That is to say, that before and above all other ways, they

determine a religious attitude . But for me, individually,

no religious attitude is satisfactory which is not, at

least, philosophically and mathematically adequate and,

ultimately, justly comprehensive of all phases of con-

sciousness . However, I ask the reader to view, and, if

possible, accept this philosophy as he would a work of

art, even though he can go no farther .

The basis of integration afforded by the aphorisms

is that of the radical assertion of the primacy of Con-

sciousness . In this respect the present thesis stands

in a position counter to that of the so-called scientific

philosophies . In the case of the latter, matter, things,

or relations are assumed as original, and then conscious-

ness is approached as a problem . "How did consciousness

spring up in the universal machine?" This becomes the

most baffling of mysteries . I affirm that this mystery

is purely artificial and grows out of assuming an in-

adequate base of reference . For 'matter', 'thing', and

'relation' are creatively constructed notions and by no

means originally given material . On the contrary, conscious-

ness is original and is presupposed in the very power to

recognize and formulate a problem . There is something

sterile in speculation concerning that which is eternally

outside consciousness . Just as light can never comprehend

 darkness, for the simple reason that darkness vanishes

as light penetrates it, so too the unconscious vanishes

as consciousness pierces it . Thus every element that is

brought into any speculation is, of necessity, within the

field of consciousness . The eternally unconscious is in-

distinguishable, at any rate, from absolute nothingness,

if it is not identical with it . It simply is not for any

practical or valid theoretical purpose . This much we know,

even though we know nothing else, "Consciousness is" . For

it is presupposed even in the acknowledgment of ignorance

and in the agnostical and skeptical attitudes . But while

every man is a living demonstration to himself that "con-

sciousness is", not every man has realized that "conscious-

ness -without-an-object is" . The radical element in my

philosophic departure inheres in the "without-an-object" .

Herein lies precisely the difference between a state of

consciousness that is only relative or saturated in raw

immediacy and no more, and one which involved profound

mystical realization . However, consciousness is the com-

mon denominator underlying the possibility of any philos-

ophy, world view, religious attitude, art, or science . I,

therefore, affirm the systematic primacy of consciousness

as such .

As soon as consciousness is concerned with objects,

.moo--„r° Q s and other complexities are introduced,

.I. h.-i Z - -fi e.iat t 0 ns
and, accordingly , all sorts of divergencies . Deleting

content , only Consciousness -without -an-object remains as

the common denominator . If approached in a purely theoret-

ical spirit , this might have merely the value of an ab-

straction . I have demonstrated its actuality as a direct

realization , but found it the most difficult of all things

to attain when starting from the basis of reflective con-

sciousness . However , when realized, it is the simplest

of all things . When I say that Consciousness -without-an-

object is , I imply its independence and self-existence .

Everything else may be only a symbol . Problems concerning

the genesis of specific symbols may become very difficult

and require all the resources of highly trained capacity .

But Consciousness -without - an-object is an unshakable base,

and thus is an assurance transcending both unverifiable

faith and relative knowledge .

As I assert the dependency of all contents upon

Consciousness -without -an-object , so likewise do I affirm

the concomitant dependency of the Self and all selves,

because the existence of a self implies the existence of

objects , whether subtle or gross , and, as well , the exist-

ence of objects implies the presence of a self which is

aware of them . The object and the self are polar exist-

ences which are interdependent . The notion of a self that

is conscious without being conscious of anything does not

correspond to any possible actuality . The object may be

very abstract, such as a bare field of consciousness viewed

as an object, but analysis will always reveal a polar

relationship . The subject is the inverse or complement

of the object, or, in other words, its 'other' . Thus, for

example, the object is the totality of all possible ex-

perience, and this is manifestly multiform and hetero-

geneous . In contrast, the pure self, conceived as the

polarized power to be aware , is unitary and homogeneous .

Taken in abstraction, the object, as such, is not a uni-

verse, but simply a multitude without interconnection and

therefore not even a collection . The universe is the

resultant of the interaction of the self and its object--

that is, a disconnected multiplicity integrated through

the unity of the self .

The technique of the higher Yoga would seem to

imply the isolation of bare subjectivity as Self-conscious-

ness totally devoid of content . The real meaning of this

technique is, however , a shifting of the focus of con-

sciousness toward bare subjectivity and away from objectiv-

ity, with the goal being in the nature of a limit which

may be approached with unrestricted closeness of approxi-

mation, but which is never actually attained so long as

any self remains . Fully to attain the goal is to destroy

the subject as well as the object , and then there remains

pure Consciousness-without-an-object--a state which is

equally pure Consciousness-without-asubject . But so

long as the movement is toward pure subjectivity the goal

is unattainable, just as the last term of an infinite con-

verging series is never reached through a step by step

process .

The aspirant to Yoga starts with consciousness

operating in the universe of experience and thought, and

in a state of a self entangled with objects . This is the

familiar state of human consciousness . The entanglement

with objects leads to the superposition upon the self of

qualities properly belonging to the objects alone . This

state is akin to that of hypnosis, and is real bondage--

the great cause of suffering . The first steps in Yoga-

technique have the significance of progressive disentangle-

ment of the self and of dehypnotizing the consciousness .

The process is one of radical dissociation of the self

from objects . At the completion of the first stage the

self stands opposed to and other than the universe of

objects . Objects, now, are simply witnessed as something

outside, and the identification is dissolved . This stage

may be represented by the judgment, "I am other than that"--

the "that" referring to all possible objects . The second

stage is ushered in by a radical readjustment in which the

self shifts to another plane or base, where relations vanish

and the self is realized as identical with content of

consciousness . Superficially, this may seem like a re-

currence of the original participation or entanglement,

but such is not the case as there has been a shift of

base . The content of consciousness now is the inverse

of that with which the aspirant originally started . The

difference may be suggested by conceiving all objects in

the original state as being vortices or voids in a super-

sensuous and continuous plenum . The consciousness with

which the Yoga-process starts is exclusively aware of the

vortices or voids--the whole world of supposed things--

while the culminating consciousness, thus far, functions

in the supersensuous plenum . That plenum is realized as

the Self identical with content of consciousness--the state

consistently reported by the mystics . It is as though the

., which in the original state was like a bare point

"Ill

within the universe and circumscribed by objects, had

suddenly transformed itself into a space that comprehended

all objects . But there still remains a self that is aware,

that maintains its own identity, and may be said to have a

content that is the inverse of experience ; for such a self

certainly realizes values such as bliss, peace, and freedom .

The more familiar name for this State is Nirvana .

Most of the literature on the subject represents

Nirvana as the final culmination, but this is an error .

Nirvana is simply the inverse of the universe --thus not

the ultimate transcendence of the pairs of opposites .

There is a still more advanced stage in Yoga . To facili-

tate understanding of this stage it may help if we review

the significance of the first step, considered as an effec-

tive transformation . In affective terms , the first step

is frequently called a renunciation of the universe, i .e .,

the breaking of all attachment to objects . The successful

accomplishment of the first step brings a very great re-

ward , that is, consciousness operative in a subjective or

inverse sense . The realization here is extremely attractive,

but attractiveness implies a self that remains identical

and which is still influenced by valuation . Now, the

final stage of Yoga involves the renunciation of Nirvana,

and that means the renunciation of all attractiveness and

reward . Such a renunciation implies the final annulment

of all claims of a self which remains in any sense unique .

Both consciousness as object and consciousness as subject

are now annulled . There remains simply Consciousness-

without-an - object which , in turn, comprehends both the

universe and Nirvana as potentialities . This stage is

the culmination of Yoga .

Modern physics and astronomy have developed a

X.
speculative conception which is, in some respects, an in-

verse reflection of the view elaborated here . This inter-

pretation is derived from certain facts which have come

to light in recent decades , partly as the result of the

development of instrumental aids to observation and partly

as the result of progress in interpretative theory . It

now appears , quite clearly, that the older conception of

matter as being composed of unchanging and indestructible

atoms does not faithfully interpret the facts derived

through experience' . It has become necessary to conceive

of the atom as composed of still finer units, such as

electrons, protons, positrons, etc ., and these in turn

as being subject to transformation under the appropriate

conditions . When the transformation takes place it appears

that ponderable matter assumes a state of radiant energy .

This process, seemingly, is proceeding in the stars con-

tinuously and is the source of the energy derived from

them upon the surface of the earth . Apparently, then,

the stars are disintegrating in the sense that matter con-

centrated in bodies at widely separated points in space is

being transformed into radiant energy which spreads through-

out all space . All of this suggests that the various

systems of stars will ultimately disappear as masses of

ponderable matter, and in their place will be a space

uniformly filled with radiant energy . On, the other hand,

observation of numerous extra-galactic nebulae suggests,

I

very convincingly, that both stars and systems of stars

1

are generated by an aggregation of more or less homogereczs

and amorphous matter into concentrated and more or less

organized form . These various facts from observation,

combined with theory, suggest the following conclusions :

a . That if the history of the stellar universe

were traced back far enough in time we would find a stage

wherein there were no stars, but only a more or less homo-

geneous matter and radiation spread uniformly throughout

space2 .

b . That if we could follow the life of the systems

of stars far enough into the future, we would come to a

time when most matter, if not all, would be reduced or

transformed into radiation extending throughout space .

c . That the two notions of conservation of mass

and of energy must be united into the conception of a per-

sistent Energy which may appear in the forms either of

ponderable mass or of field energy, the latter including

that which is termed radiation .

The above conceptions leave us with but one constant

or "invariant", i .e ., Energy,3 which may appear at certain

times as ponderable matter, and at others as transformed

into the state of radiant energy . If now we substitute

for "Consciousness-without-an-object" the notion of "Energy" ;

for the "Universe"--in the sense of all objects--the notion

of "ponderable matter" ; and for "Nirvana", the notion of

"state of radiation" ; we can restate our first aphorisms

as follows :

Energy is .

Before ponderable matter was, Energy is .

3
Though ponderable matter seems to exist, Energy is .

When ponderable matter vanishes, yet remaining

through all unaffected, Energy is .

5
Outside of Energy there is no matter .

11
Within Energy lie both ponderable matter and radiant

energy, yet for Energy these two are the same4 .

This physical conception has a high order of

theoretical beauty, and I regard it as one of the finer

products of scientific art . It effects a very great con-

ceptual simplification, and enables us to picture a wide

range of transformation in nature as experienced within

the organization of an essentially simply unifying concept .

However, what we have is a construction of the creative

intellect , in part operating upon a material given through

observation , and in part conditioning the observation . We

have no right to say that this theory , or any modification

which may take place in the future , is nature as it is

apart from the consciousness of all thinkers . Any question

of the truth or reality-value of the theory must be judged

in relationship to a conscious thinker . Further , we have

no right to assert dogmatically that , even though for our

science this theory should prove to be ultimately valid,

then it must necessarily be valid for any competent thinker

whatsoever . In fact , it is entirely possible , nay more,

quite probable, that the scientists of an entirely different

culture , although of comparable capacity and supplied with

comparable resources for investigation , would none the less

construct an entirely different theoretical structure for

the organization of their corresponding experience . Yet,

this would not discredit the relative validity of the fore-

going theory for our present culture .

The value of a theory or of any conceptual formula-

tion lies in the fact that it gives the intelligent con-

sciousness a basis for orienting itself and for achieving

either purposive control of , or intelligent understanding

in, the sea of existences . In the strictly metaphysical

sense , i .e ., in the sense that is not related to any con-

crete thinker, no conceptual formulation is either true

or false . It is simply irrelevant . Nor, on the other

hand, can experience prove the truth or falsity of any

fuhd.amental theory, though it can check the various deriv-

ative theories5 .

If we regard the fundamental theories--the orig-

inal bases or starting points--as only assumptions, then

the whole of science is grounded in uncertainty and affords

no security . But if the fundamental theories are grounded

in insight--a mystical function--then it is valid for

science to proceed with a basic assurance which is essen-

tially of the same type as that attained through mystical

awakening . All of which simply means that science completely

divorced from the religious spirit is no more than sterile

formalism . In point of fact, much of our science is far

from sterile, but then there is actually much real religion

in it . This factor should be given a larger theoretical

recognition and its significance should be more adequately

appreciated .

It is not difficult to see that the fundamental

theories of science are of the nature of consciousness,

since their existence is, for us, in thought alone--and

a conscious thought at that . But such theories contain

terms pointing to referents which in some sense have an

objective existence . At first, one may be disposed to

think that these referents must lie outside conscious-

ness . However, it can easily be shown that even here

we have actually drawn upon no material from beyond con-

sciousness, though it lies or rests in another compart-

ment of consciousness as contrasted to that of the inter-

pretative theory . We can illustrate this by reference to

what is one of the most objective notions of all physical

science . This is the notion of " mass" .6

When we ask , " What is mass ?" we find that it is,

in effect, defined in two ways, as follows :

1 . Mass is measured by inertia in the field of

a force .

2 . Mass is measured by weight in the gravita-

tional field of a standard piece of matter, i .e ., the earth .

"Inertia" is the name given to the resistance which

a body opposes to an effort ("force") to speed up its motion

or to retard its motion . "Weight" is the name for the

effort ("force") required to hold a body against the so-

called force of gravity . But what do we mean by resistance

and effort? Here we step out of the conceptual system into

the realm of data from experience . Resistance and effort

are sensory experiences, particularly involving the kin-

esthetic sense . Thus, at least insofar as man is concerned,

both of these 'forcesi' are existences in consciousness .

To predicate that they correspond to existences outside

of, and independent of, consciousness in every sense is

to create a speculative dogma which in the very nature of

the case can never be verified . For verification operates

only within the field of consciousness . This is simply

another instance of the principle that consciousness can

never know absolute unconsciousness, for where conscious-

ness is, unconsciousness is not . Undoubtedly, speculative

theory can proceed upon the assumption that there are

existences outside consciousness in every sense, but this

is the assumption of an "as if" which can never be verified,

either mystically or in any other way . The assumption may

have a relative value, but it lacks all authority, and,

properly, may not be invoked to oppose the rational right

of anybody to refuse to accept it .

We know immediately that consciousness is ; but we

do not know that mass is, immediately . All that we do

know concerning the latter is that systematic construc-

tions involving the concept of mass can be produced that

give to man a greater command over nature and establish a

greater harmony between conscious man and the apparent

environment in which he finds himself . Yet both of these

are values within consciousness .?

From the basis of Consciousness-without-an-object

there is no necessity of predicating absolutely unconscious

existences . There would remain a distinction to be : drawn

between different kinds and levels of consciousness, and,

in particular, the distinction between consciousness which

is not conscious of itself and consciousness which is

conscious of itself . This leaves plenty of room for the

existence of something beyond 'consciousness-which-is-

conscious-of-itself', or 'self-consciousness', and thus

there can be a flow into an'out of the field of reflective

consciousness . This, I submit, is all that science needs

to interpret the fractional character of the data from

experience . In addition, the view I am offering eliminates

the question : How is it possible for that which is wholly

outside consciousness, in every sense, to enter conscious-

ness? Primeval Consciousness is the all in all, and only

self-consciousness grows .

While it is a theoretical impossibility for con-

sciousness to comprehend that which is absolutely outside

consciousness, in every sense, there is no theoretical

barrier which stands in the way of self-consciousness

spreading out in Primeval Consciousness without limit,

for self-consciousness is composed of the very stuff of

consciousness itself . An extending comprehension of

Primeval Consciousness by self-consciousness is simply a

case of light assimilating Light . The light cannot know

darkness, because where light goes the darkness vanishes,

but light can, in principle , know the light as it is of

its own nature .

Opposed to consciousness as the only existence

there stands the counter notion of voidness . In this

sense the void is a somewhat which is not , or has no sub-

stance . Now, without voids there would be nothing within

the Primeval Plenum of Consciousness to arouse self-con-

sciousness into action . The voids may be regarded as

zones of tension wherein consciousness negates itself

and thus blanks itself out in greater or less degree .

Such voids have the value of disturbance in the primeval

equilibrium . We may regard this disturbance as acting

like an irritant which tends to arouse consciousness to

an awareness of itself . It is an instance of absence

arousing the power to be aware of presence . Here, then,

we have a basis afforded for interpreting evolutionary

development . Instead of that development being a means

whereby consciousness is finally evolved out of the

mechanical processes of dead nature , we have a progressive

unfoldment of self -consciousness within a matrix of Pri-

meval Consciousness . The play and interplay of voids,

instead of atoms of an external and dead matter , are the

background of the universe of objects . The voids arouse

attention within consciousness simply because of their

pain-value . The focusing power aroused by attention in

time becomes self-consciousness, or the power to be con-

scious of consciousness . The multiform combinations of

the voids produce all the configurations of experience

and thought, and these in turn have the value of symbols,

which in the last analysis are of instrumental value only .

The symbols indicate a pre-existent and formless Meaning .

When, for any individual center of consciousness,8 the

Meaning can be assimilated directly without the instru-

mentality of the symbols, then for that individual the

evolution of consciousness within the field of conscious-

ness of objects has been completed . But until that time

symbols are necessary .

Now we are in a position to see the metaphysical

function of science . It is concerned with the progressive

development of a system of symbols, the raw material of

which is given through experience . Science--at any rate

in the sense of physical science--is not concerned with a

study of actual existences . Its raw material consists of

voids or absences . These are formed into a system of

relations that has value in expanding self-consciousness

and in forming a symbol of hidden Meaning . So, from the

standpoint of this philosophy, the work of the scientists

is quite valid, regardless of the form of the working

hypotheses employed . The only point where this view could

come into conflict with the thought of any individual

scientist would arise in the case where the latter super-

imposes an extra-scientific interpretation upon the

material with which he works and upon his conclusions .

The technical functions of science do not require that

its materials should be a substantial existence . They

only require that that material should fit into an intel-

ligible system of relations .

#10 . The most fundamental principle of this philosophy

is that consciousness, as such, is original and primary,

and thus not merely an attribute of something else . But

as here understood, "consciousness" is not a synonym of

"spirit", since, generally, the spiritual or idealistic

philosophies have regarded "spirit" as primary and represent-

ed consciousness as an attribute of spirit . This leaves

the possibility that spirit, in some phase of its total

character, may be unconscious, so that consciousness is

reduced to a partial and derivative aspect . Let this be

clear, that here it is not predicated that any spiritual

or other kind of being is primary . On the contrary, Con-

sciousness is, before any being became . Thus "God",

whether considered as an existence or simply as an in-

tegrating concept, is, in any case, derivative . We may

very properly view certain levels of consciousness, which

transcend the human form of consciousness, as Divine . All

terms derived from the notion of Divinity certainly have

a very high order of psychological significance, at the

very least, and I do make use of them . But I do not re-

gard them as corresponding to the most ultimate values .

It seems to be in accord with well established

philosophical usage to regard "spirit" as having the same

connotation as either the "Self" or "God" . Following

this custom, we may say, when consciousness of objects is

born, spirit also is born as the complemental or subjective

principle . Objects being taken as the equivalent of mat-

ter, then spirit and matter stand as interdependent notions .

Neither of these is possible without the other, though

spirit may be regarded as positive, while matter is negative .

#11 . To predicate that consciousness is original and

self-existent does not imply that Being is dependent upon

being known . For while cognition is a mode of conscious-

ness , it is not identical with consciousness . Thus affective

and conative states are essentially non-cognitive, though

they are part and parcel of consciousness . I predicate

that pure consciousness is the self-existent antecedent of

all these modes of ordinary states of consciousness, also

of the less familiar mystical states, and likewise of the

forms of consciousness characteristic of non-human beings .

On the other hand, "to know" does imply being, but the

implication is of an antecedent, not of a consequent . To

become aware of knowing is to become aware of the reality--

in this case relative reality--of Being . The awareness

of this reality is something achieved, but the achievement

has not made the reality . However , to be known is to exist ,

and this is a true sequential or derivative existence .

Being is antecedent , existence derivative .

To be known is to be an object . Since by "universe"

I mean the totality of all possible objects, it then follows

that the universe is dependent upon being known for its

existence . The universe exists for one who experiences or

thinks, but for none other . Even the Naturalist, who

predicates the existence of things apart from all conscious-

ness, actually is dealing with a notion that exists only

in his consciousness . He has not arrived at something which

lies outside consciousness, and only fools himself when

he imagines that he has done so . Knowing is a Light which

drives away the darkness, and thus forever fails to compre-

hend darkness . It is useless to predicate existence in

the darkness of total and unresolvable unconsciousness,

in every sense , for it is an absolute impossibility to

verify any such predication . Such a predication is not

only unphilosophic, it is, as well, unscientific, for

science requires of all hypotheses that they shall be cap-

able of verification . In fact, science even goes fufther

than the mystic and requires that the verification must

be of a type that falls within the range of the modes of

consciousness of the ordinary non-mystical man . Thus the

scientist who blossoms as a naturalistic philosopher vio-

lates his 'own scientific canons in the most violent manner .

It is at this point that the Idealist is rigorous in his

methodology, and not the so-called scientific philosopher .

All things exist as objects , and only so . Espe-

cially is this true for him who experiences or thinks . To

anesthetize the powers of experiencing and thinking is to

destroy the universe, but this does not imply the annihila-

tion of consciousness in the Gnostic sense . Consciousness

remains in the Nirvanic State . If self-consciousness has

been developed to that degree of strength, such that it can

persist in the face of the process of anesthetizing, then

the resultant is an awakening to realization of the Nirvanic

State, otherwise this State is like dreamless sleep . But

dreamless sleep is to be regarded simply as a state of

consciousness where self-consciousness--that is, conscious-

ness that is conscious of itself--is unawakened . All men

are in Nirvana in the hinterland of their consciousness .

The Nirvani, in the technical sense , differs essentially

from the ordinary man only in that he has carried self-

consciousness over into the hinterland .

 Here I am introducing nothing that cannot be veri-

fied, for, by taking the appropriate steps, men can actually

take self-consciousness across into the hinterland . Ad-

mittedly, this is not easy to do . It involves a good deal

more than the process of verification adequate for the

checking of ordinary scientific hypotheses . But it has

been done . I have done it, and I find there is an abundant

literature furnishing the testimony of others who have

claimed to have done so . This literature springs up at

all periods, as far as we have historic records, and through

it all there is a common thread of meaning underlying a

wide range of more or less incompatible over-belief . Repre-

sentative men of all cultures, races, and creeds have

supplied this common testimony . They agree with respect

to a certain consciousness-quale and that the basis of this

consciousness was direct, individual realization, transcend-

ing both faith and authority . Thus, in the present thesis,

there is no violation of the scientific demand that a

judgment of actuality or reality must be capable of veri-

fication . But the verification does require going beyond

the ordinary modes of consciousness, and thus does tran-

scend the secondary requirement of Western physical science .

However, this secondary requirement restricts our a ;ience

to a delimited field and is of only pragmatic value so long

as it cannot be proved that the ordinary modes of human

-164-
consciousness are the only modes there possibly can be .

No such proof exists, nor can it be made, for the most

that any man could possibly say is that, so far, he,

individually, has found no other ways of consciousness ;-

and that proves nothing concerning consciousness per se .

#12 . Modern psychology distinguishes between objects

which it calls real and objects which it calls hallucina-

tions . From the standpoint of Consciousness-without-an-

object there is no important difference between these two

sets of objects . The so-called real objects are experi-

enced by groups of men in common, while the hallucinations

are generally private . This is merely a social criterion

of reality and has no logical force . Essentially it is

as meaningless as determining physical laws by popular

vote . Doubtless, if a Newton, with all his insight and

intellectual power unimpaired, were transplanted to the

environment of a primitive society and judged by his

milieu, he would be regarded as a fool whose consciousness

was filled with hallucinations . The social judgment of

reality would be against him . Our society has reached a

level where it can verify the insight of Newton, in consider-

able degree, but the validity of that insight exists in-

dependently of the social power to verify it . All of which

simply means that the fact that objects exist for a given
individual privately is not sufficient either to credit

them with reality or to discredit them by calling them

unreal hallucinations . The problem of reality is not to

be handled in any such simple offhand manner . In fact,

such a method is sheer intellectual tyranny . It is entire-

ly possible that society, and not the individual man, is

the greater fool . I am inclined to think so .

Objects , whether of the common social type or the

so-called hallucinations , exist for the powers of experi-

encing and thinking , and thus both are derivative . If by

"Reality " we mean the non-derivative, then both types of

objects are unreal . In the narrower or pragmatic sense,

the one type of object may be more real than the other,

when taken in relation to a given purpose . It may well be

that in the narrow sense of the purpose of Western physical

science, the social object is more real , but from the

religious standpoint , in certain instances at any rate,

the reverse valuation is far more likely to be true . But

here we have no more than valuation with respect to specific

purpose .

Some mystical states, probably the greater number,

involve the experiencing of subtle objects of the type

which the psychologist calls hallucination . Practically,

this has the effect of classifying the mystic with the

psychotic, apparently with the intent of common deprecia-
tion . Such a course involves both intellectual laziness

and a failure in discrimination . Since "hallucination"

merely means private experience as opposed to social ex-

perience, it constitutes no true judgment of value . There

is often a world of difference between one and another so-

called hallucination . The difference between the state of

consciousness of a drunkard, enjoying delirium tremens,

and that of a seer like Swedenborg, is as far apart as

the poles . All too often the psychologist calls both

merely states of hallucination, and acts as though he

thought that by giving a name he had solved the whole

problem . As a matter of fact, the real problem here is

one of valuation, just as it is with the social objects .

The vital question in either case is : How far and on

what level do the objects arouse the realization of Mean-

ing? The objects which do this in higher degree and on a

higher level may properly be regarded as possessing the

greater relative reality . Thus, in a given case , the so-

called hallucination may far outreach any social object

in the relative reality . In any case, the type of the

object, whether social or private, is not, by itself, any

measure of its value or reality . Neither type has non-

derivative Reality or Meaning.

#13 . That in some sense the Object exists cannot be

denied, for it is unquestionably a datum for immediate

experience . But to affirm further that the Thing exists

is to add an over-belief which is not necessary for either

experience or reason . As these terms are here employed,

the "Object" is to be regarded as always a content of

consciousness, and thus implies a relationship to or with-

in consciousness . In contrast, the "Thing" is that which

is supposed to exist, quite independently of any relation-

ship to or within consciousness . Thus the Thing is to be

regarded as a sort of thing-in-itself which stands apart

from any dependent relationship to consciousness as a

source of its existence . It is not the present purpose

to attempt to prove that a self-existent thing is impos-

sible, but simply that the supposition of its existence

is neither practically nor theoretically necessary, and

also that its existence cannot be demonstrated .

That the existence of the Thing cannot be demon-

strated is very easily shown . For demonstration never

gives us anything but an existence , a relationship, a

value, etc ., for consciousness . Hence, that which is

demonstrated to be is already a content for conscious-

ness, and, therefore, an object . Unquestionably, new

and unpredictable contents can enter empiric conscious-

ness . To assume that the sudden arising of the new con-

tents implies an existence wholly independent of conscious-

ness , in every sense, that merely happened to enter into

relationship with consciousness, may be natural enough .

But for logic this assumption is not necessary, and, by

hypothesis, it cannot be empirically verified . For, so

far as experience and logic can determine to the contrary,

it is as readily thinkable that when the new content of

consciousness arose it actually, then, came into existence

for the first time . No doubt, the notion of the birth of

an existence quite de novo or ex nihilo is repugnant to

the deep-seated conviction that all existences are trace-

able to causal antecedents . But, whatever validity may

attach to this conviction, it yet remains something other

than a derivation from either experience or logic . That

it is not a derivation from experience has already been

well established by the critical analysis of David Hume,

and, accordingly, further discussion of this point is not

necessary here . That it is not a derivation from pure

logic is also clear, as we now understand quite well that

logic supplies only the formal implications of the given

material upon which it operates . The innate material of

logic, itself, consists only of the original logical con-

stants, and, since the notion that every existence must

have a causal antecedent is not one of these, it follows

that this notion is neither a prerequisite of logic nor

a consequence to be derived from logical process alone .

-169-
 There remains the question of the claim imposed

by the conviction that there is no existence which does

not have an adequate causal antecedent, i .e ., that no ex-

istence can be ex nihilo or de novo . I assume the validity

of the claim of this conviction as a component part of .

consciousness , which is not derived either from logic or

experience . The question then arises : Does this con-

viction require that the antecedent of a newly arisen

object in relative consciousness shall be a thing existing

independently of consciousness in every sense? The answer

is 'no', since another adequate source is thinkable, and,

in addition, has already become a working hypothesis of

Analytic Psychology . We can conceive of the antecedent

of the newly arisen object as lying in the psychologic

unconscious . This interpretation is already commonly

employed in Analytic Psychology in the exposition of the

aetiology of the phantasy products of introversion . In

the case of the phantasy function, objects do appear sud-

denly from a hidden matrix, either in ideal or sensible

form . Analytic Psychology has found it unnecessary to

assume a causal antecedent of such objects in terms of

things existing independently of the psyche in every sense .

To extend this aetiology to the objects of the objective

senses involves no logical or empiric difficulty, and

merely extends a principle of explanation with radical

consistency .
 It may be objected that in introducing the notion

of the psychological unconscious as the causal antecedent

of the newly arisen object we have merely substituted a

logical equivalent of the Thing, existing independently

of consciousness in every sense . But this is not so .

For, as has been shown already at some length, the psycho-

logical unconscious does not imply unconsciousness in

every sense . It is merely that which is unconscious to

ordinary waking consciousness, which is quite different

from saying that it is unconscious with respect to con-

sciousness in every sense . For it is clear that conscious-

ness which is not conscious of itself is indistinguishable

from unconsciousness . Philosophically, then, it is possible

to affirm the exclusive existence of all objects and their

antecedents in consciousness and yet employ the notion of

the unconscious in the psychological sense .

From the foregoing it should be clear that the

demonstration of the existence of the independent Thing

is impossible . At the same time, in the latter part of

the above argument, it has been shown that its existence

is not a necessary assumption for logic, experience, or

the conviction that every existence must have an adequate

causal antecedent . For I have suggested a thinkable

aetiology which supplies what is necessary, and, yet,

dispenses with the notion of a thing existing independently

of consciousness , in every sense . This completes the formal

argument . Let us now examine the extra -logical consider-

ations which may bear upon this proposed aetiology .

The requirements of a physical science are funda-

mentally simple . Chief among these are the following :

(a) The objective content of the science must be of such

a nature that it can be perceived by the objective senses,

either directly or indirectly, through the intervention of

instruments ; and these senses must be exclusively those

that are active in the typical representative of our cul-

ture, or of the human race . (b) This material becomes a

science when , and only when , it has become organized into

a rationally thinkable system which possesses internal

coherence and which , in addition , makes possible the predic-

tion of future objective events in such a way as to render

either observational or experimental checking possible .

These are the two principal requirements of a pure physical

science . Applied science requires , in addition , that the

organization of the raw material of a science shall be such

that , at least , some degree of practical control of the

object is achieved . Any theory as to the real nature of

the objects which form the content of a science , that does .

not interfere with the action of these fundamental require-

ments of science, leaves to science the full freedom which

science qua science can claim . If the behavior of the

Object were wholly arbitrary or irrational in every sense,

no science , pure or applied , could ever be possible . A

science is possible only to the extent that the perceived

object can enter into some relationship with a rationally

thinkable system . It is not necessary that such a system

shall be the only conceivable one or that it shall be the

ultimately true or complete system . The objective of

physical science is partial . ( a) It does not aim to

comprehend the totality of all possible knowledge . This

is eviddnt from the fact that it arbitrarily excludes all

material which cannot be perceived directly or indirectly

through the objective senses of the typical representative

of our culture or our humanity . Thus , such material of

consciousness as there may be which is available only

through other doors or by other modes of consciousness

is extra-scientific-- in the Western sense --however much

such material may be an object for knowledge . (b) It

does not include in its structure those modes or aspects

of consciousness which are not to be classed as knowledge

of objective content . Thus Self-Knowledge or the feeling

of Love are not part of the structure of any physical science .

In contrast to the specialized demands of a physical

science , philosophy has for its field all possible aspects

of consciousness . It is concerned with the religious,

ethical, and aesthetic values, just as truly as with the

general problems which are vital to the existence of

science . Further , its concern with the general problems

of physical science is not greater than with the similar

problems of any other possible type of science . That the

existence of sciences other than physical science is more

than an academic possibility is revealed by the develop-

ment of the psychologies with a s che 9 However, philos-

ophy overlaps the motif of physical science in that it

seeks a systematic objective .

All philosophies fail that do not take into account

every conceivable possibility of consciousness and also

grant to every possibility full freedom in its proper

domain . The current schools of philosophy , known as

Naturalism , Neorealism , and Pragmatism , have granted to

natural science full recognition . Insofar as the ethical

problem is conceived as a matter of social relationship,

Pragmatism has made valuable contributions to ethical

theory and interpretation . But all these philosophies

fail --some of them completely--to give adequate recognition

to the necessities of the religious and mystical states of

consciousness . They are , therefore , valuable only as

partial philosophies . Much of consciousness-value they

either ignore or treat with an unacceptable coercion .

They are all psychologically one-sided . They represent,

either exclusively or predominantly, the extraverted

attitude in individual or social psychology . They either

neglect entirely the values that are immediately apparent

to the introverted attitude, or they treat such values

with the condescension of extraverted pride that is quite

unacceptable to any well developed introvert . On the

other hand, the systems of philosophy classified under

Idealism, while they give with greater or less adequacy

recognition of the introvert and the religious and mysti-

cal values, yet they have failed with respect to the extra-

verted standpoint . Since these four types of philosophic

system cover the ground of Western philosophic contribution,

we must conclude that the West has not yet produced the

adequate philosophic statement .

Why is it that the Western mind so predominantly

attributes the reality-value to the material which is the

peculiar concern of physical science? It is not simply

because that material is given as-objectively sensible .

Ordinary phantasy often produces objects that are sensibly

apparent, yet commonly these objects are considered to be

unreal . It is not due to the fact that the material of

science lends itself to a logically systematic statement .

There are mathematical systems grounded upon freely cre-

ated fundamental assumptions that have the character of

logically coherent, systematic wholes . However, these

are not commonly considered to be possessed of reality-

value . It does not inhere in a positive demonstration

that science deals with a knowledge of existent things

independent of all consciousness as such, as has already

been shown . There seems to be but one fact of experience

that affords the explanation of this attribution of reality-

value to the material of physical science and that is that

this material is relatively common and constant with respect

to the vast majority of observers, and that, so far as is

commonly known, no individual can successfully act as

though this material were not . Here there seems to be

an objective somewhat with which the conscious being must

come to terms if he is so to adapt his life as to live

successfully .

Certainly, there is something or somewhat, in some

sense, with which the individual must make terms . But

this fact by no means implies that that something or some-

what is an independent self-existent reality . For we can

give it an interpretation which, while independent self- .

existence is denied of it, yet retains for it its con-

ditioning character with respect to the functioning of

conscious beings . We may regard it as a collective phan-

tasy projected from the collective unconscious and posses-

sing a relatively frozen or fixed form, which, in turn,

is but a measure of the stability of the collective un-

conscious . This would give to the projected phantasy

the characteristic of being an objective determinant,

and thus it is easy to understand why it should have

acquired the seeming of primary reality-value .

Is there any respect in which the above inter-

pretation of the objective somewhat would be incompatible

with the facts of experience ? There seems to be no

objection which will stand after examination . The

objective material of consciousness is given through

the senses and only through the senses . But the senses

supply merely the forms of one of the functions of con-

sciousness , namely , that of sensation . Here we are for-

ever confined to material which is reducible to sensation,

save insofar as material from other functions of conscious-

ness are added to it . Much material which has an objective

appearance is given in ordinary phantasy , even though it

is the general judgment that such appearance is not an

objective existence -in-itself . By the technique of hyp-

notism , similar appearances have been produced in the

consciousness of the subject through suggestion . Here,

again, there is no question of a corresponding objective

thing which is an independent existence - in-itself . Give

to such an hypnoidal appearance the character of being a

collective component of all human consciousness , and then

we may ask : In what way would it be distinguishable from

the material acquired by ordinary extraverted observation?

It would seem that every possibility of natural science

which now exists would still remain . The significance

of the scientific product, alone, would be changed . But

this level of significance-evaluation lies outside the

domain of scientific determination, as such, and thus

there would be no interference with the freedom of nat-

ural science in the field or sector of consciousness

available 'to it .

We should be forced to interpret the facts and

laws of science as being purely psychical existences,

though of an order of relative stability . The laws, as

well as the facts, would have their real abiding place

in the psychological collective unconscious .

I believe this philosophy allows to science all

requisite freedom to develop in its own dimension . The

interpretation of the significance of its facts, processes,

and products, alone, is changed . I merely challenge the

pretended right of the scientist to hypostatize the mate-

rial of his science into a supposedly substantial and

independent Thing . With the abandonment of this hypos-

tasis, there falls all right to the claim of any peculiar

reality-value attaching to the object of science or of

sensation in general . There remains a relative or prag-

matic reality-value which has validity within the restricted

sector of consciousness involved, but only that . In a

word, the accusation that a given content of conscious-

ness has a phantasy-origin would no longer, by itself,

be sufficient to establish inferior reality-value, as

compared with the products of physical science, since

this too rests upon essentially the same ground . Thus

the argument which serves to undermine the reality of

religious or mystical hypostasis would be a two-edged

sword which likewise undermines the reality of scientific

or sensuous hypostasis . Thus far, the content of mysti-

cal insight would have a right to claim reality-value

which is not inferior to that which the scientist or

extraverted consciousness may claim for his material .

In a word, the extravert must renounce his arrogant claim

to peculiar possession of the sense for reality . He is

oriented to a sector of relative reality, and only that .

It is by no means evident that this sector ultimately re-

leases the greater power . At any rate, this question

becomes an open one .

A vital consequence of the present thesis is that,

if there is any power which can consciously operate upon

the psychological collective unconscious, then that power

would be superior to any of the products of phantasy,

whether religious or scientific . For it would be a power

acting upon the root-source of all contents of conscious-

ness of whatever nature . Theoretically , such a power

would have the capacity of causing all the material of

objective perception, as well as of religious phantasy,

to vanish or to be transformed through processes which

could not be objectively traced . Such a power , it must

be understood , does not imply the capacity to destroy

consciousness as such, but simply to destroy, or , rather,

transform , all content . It should also be clear that

such a power would lie closer to ultimate Reality than

any of the content of consciousness over which it has

mastery .

The practical question is : Does such a power

exist? So far , at least, I do not find it possible to

give an objectively satisfactory answer to this question .

To my own satisfaction I have verified its existence, but

I do not find it possible to do more than build a more or

less satisfactory presumption for its existence, with

respect to empiric centers of consciousness other than

my own . It seems that there is a Transcendent Somewhat

which must be sampled , at least, to be known . While I do

affirm the reality of this Transcendent Somewhat and the

existence of a conscious Power which can operate upon the

collective unconscious of psychology, I do not claim the

capacity to coerce recognition of either .

#14 . The term "Universe " is here employed with the con-

notation of the Buddhist term "Sangsara " . Thus I do not

confine the meaning of " Universe " to the totality of all

objects of ordinary waking consciousness . It includes,

as well, the so -called hallucinations, dream states, and

any other possible states of consciousness during physical

life or after death in which there is consciousness of

objects . Opposed to this is the Nirvanic state of con-

sciousness in which there are no objects for the simple

reason that in that State there is no subject -object re-

lationship . Thus , Nirvanic Consciousness is not identical

with the totality of all mystical states of consciousness,

but, on the contrary is the culminating point of the mysti-

cal Path into the subjective pole of consciousness . Only a

few, even among the mystics , have gone this far, to judge

from the available records . It follows that there are

mystical states which do not transcend Sangsara , and, in

general, such are the more understandable to objective

consciousness .

But the further the mystic goes in his penetration

to subjective deeps , the less he can say in terms that are

intelligible to ordinary consciousness , when trying to re-

port the value of his realization . The higher the point

of attainment , the less effective does concrete sensuous

imagery become as a symbol of its value . Abstract concepts

remain as effective symbols longer , but in any case all

that can he said is of value only as a symbol . This is

necessarily so, since the representation must be in terms

of objects, whether sensory or conceptual, whereas the

actuality is not an object . A so-called hallucination

or phantasy may, in a given case, supply a truer symbol

than one formed out of the material of social experience,

though this is not necessarily so . In any case, the vital

point is that from the standpoint of Nirvanic Consciousness

everything supplied by the Universe or Sangsara is of

symbolic or instrumental significance only . At this

point I am in accord with the epistemology of the Prag-

matists, but I go further than any Pragmatist with whom I

am familiar, for I regard all experience, as well as intel-

lection, as being, in the last analysis, of only instrumental

value, and even regard experience as no more than a catalytic

agent, valuable as an arouser of self-consciousness .

It is only recently that Western scholarship has

begun to come to an intelligent understanding of the state

of consciousness called "Nirvana" . Recent translations of

authentic northern Buddhist canonical literature should go

far in the clarification of the older misconceptions . The

etymology of the term "Nirvana" is unfortunate . To be

'blown-out' naturally does seem like total annihilation .

But this is a great misconception . A truer understanding

is reached by regarding the Nirvanic State as that realized

when the powers of experiencing and thinking are anesthetized

without destroying self -consciousness . It is a way of

consciousness that is blown- out, not consciousness per se .

To unddrstand the idea in a form that is at all valid, it

is necessary to think of all form or objects and all

structures of thought and in consciousness , in general,

as being in the nature of limitations imposed upon the

play of consciousness . Remove the limitations, while

holding to self- consciousness , and the Nirvanic State is

instantaneously realized . Since this is a freeing of,con-

sciousness from limitation i t has been traditionally

called " Liberation" . Thus 'Freedom ' is the prime keynote

of the State . But from this Freedom , when realized,

affective and noetic values are precipitated . The latter,

in some degree , can irradiate both thought and experience,

and thus be an illuminating and blessing force within the

universe . Consequently , Nirvana is a State of conscious-

ness which can and does produce a difference of fact with-

in the universe of experience . This is sufficient to give

it pragmatic value . But this pragmatic value is merely a

derivative and transformed value and thus of only partial

significance .

A critical study of the use of the terms "Nirvana"

and "Moksha ", in Buddhist and Hindu literature, reveals

that the meaning intended is not always the same . At

I

times one receives the impression that Nirvana is Absolute

Consciousness, while at others one runs across a differ-

entiation between different degrees or levels of Nirvanic

Consciousness, and even the explicit statement that the

Nirvanic State is not an absolute state . Clearly, some

of the writers are stricter in their usage of the term

than others . If we view the term as sometimes used to

designate a genus, and at other times a species under

that genus, the apparent incompatibility of usage is

largely, if not wholly, clarified . The primary mark of

the genus would be that it is a state of consciousness

transcending the subject-object relationship, and there-

fore inevitably ineffable for relative consciousness .

Differentiation of this genus into various species implies

that within the consciousness transcending the subject-

object relationship there are differences of level or

phase, though these differences must remain unintelligible

for the subject-object type of consciousness, as such .

At the time of the deeper level of Recognition

which occurred to me spontaneously on the 8th of September,

I was completely surprised . Up to that time I had found

nothing in my readings which had suggested to me the

existence of such a state . I named it, tentatively, from

its affective quale, which had the quality of thorough-

going indifference . It seemed to Transcend Nirvana in the

usual sense , since the latter is always represented as

having the affective quale of super -mundane Bliss . I

had previously known such a State , but, while on the

level of the High Indifference , I realized Bliss as lying

below me , as something in which I could participate or re-

frain from at will . Subsequent to the period of being

immersed in the Higher State, while functioning on the

level of subject -object consciousness , I was somewhat

troubled lest I had made some error in my interpretationl°

To check myself I made a search of the available literature,

but I found no clear verification until I chanced upon

the translation of Tibetan Buddhism , which Evans-Wentz

has edited and published in English . Here I finally found

the references in which the Primordial Consciousness,

symbolized by the "Clear Light" and in other ways, is

represented as the container of the Nirvanic as well as

the Sangsaric State . This supplied a conceptual form

which confirmed my own interpretation of the culminating

stage of Recognition . It made clear , also, that "Nirvana",

as sometimes employed , is made to include the " Clear Light",

a state which is neither subjective nor objective, while

in other connections it refers only to the purely subjective

State . Finally, I developed the symbol of "Consciousness-

without- an-object " as a representation with a meaning or

reference analogous to, if not identical with , the "Clear

Light", and thus was enabled to add a noetic designation

to the ~v`ffective one I had already found .

Consciousness -without -an-object is the keystone

which completes the arch . It is the final step necessary

to produce a self-contained system of consciousness .

Nirvana stands as a phase of consciousness standing in

contrapuntal relationship to the sum total of all Sangsaric

states- - the consciousness behind the Self which is focused

upon objects . It is thus the 'other ' of all consciousness

of the subject -object type . But the predication or reali-

zation of any state and its other, in discrete stages, is

not a complete cycle, for the two imply a mutual container, ;,

This mutual container is found in Consciousness - without-an-

object, and this latter affords a base from which Nirvana,

as well as Sangsara , fall into comprehensive perspective .

Consciousness -without -an-object is neutral with respect to

every polarity and thus in principle gives command over

all polarities . It affords the basis for a philosophic

integration which is neither introversive nor extraversive .

This implies a philosophy which , as a whole, is neither

idealistic , in the subjective sense, nor realistic, but

which may incorporate both idealistic and realistic aspects .

It should be equally acceptable to religious and scientific

consciousness .
 The actual working consciousness of man is not

purely Sangsaric . Man's bondage to subject -object con-

sciousness inheres in the fact that , characteristically,

his analysis of consciousness has succeeded in capturing

only the Sangsaric element . For most men the Nirvanic

element moves in the darkness of the not-self-conscious,

such as dreamless sleep . In our Western philosophic

analysis of relative consciousness we have always come

ultimately to a blank wall , though even at that limit

consciousness is found to be a stream . Whence this stream

and whither ? For ordinary subject-object consciousness

the final answer is the Unknown and the Unknowable . But

this is correct only for the type of consciousness in

question . Consciousness in the sense of Gnosis can and

has gone farther , driving the Unknown far back into the
who
Transcendental Plenum . And who is there tbhaz can place

a final theoretical limit on this recession of the Unknown?

The Nirvanic State is not far away, but near at

hand, in fact far closer than the universe of objects .

There is no difference between the purely subjective

element of the subject - object consciousness and Nirvana .

And what is nearer to man than his most immediate Self,

that which he calls "I ", and which is always present, how-

ever much the content of consciousness may change? Man

has the power to see , yet he constantly projects himself

into the objects seen, and , complementarily , introjects

the object into himself , thereby superimposing upon him-

self the limitations of those objects . Every human problem

grows out of this, and the never -ending stream of unre-

solved or half-resolved problems cannot be eliminated

until this vicious habit is broken . Every other relief

is meliorative or palliative and no more . Mayhap melio-

ration does more harm than good . I am often inclined to

think so, for individual man might often try harder to

escape from a trap that had become completely unendurable,

and thus succeed in the resolution of the life problem

more frequently than he does . Merely making the trap

more endurable by melioration may well have the effect

of delaying the crisis , and so result in an increase of

the sum total of suffering . Let man so change the polar-

ization of his self-analysing consciousness that he may

see his seeing , as it were , and, at once , he breaks the

participation in objects . Of course, this seeing of see-

ing is expressed in the language of subject-object con-

sciousness , because we have no other language . In the

actual seeing of seeing , the self and the object become

identical .

When an individual has at last learned the trick

of dissociating his 'I' , or subject from the whole universe

of objects , he has, seemingly , retreated into a bare point

of consciousness . But the moment he succeeds in doing

this, the point is metamorphosed into a kind of space in

which the Self and the content of consciousness are blended

in one inseparable whole . I have called this the Spatial

Void . Now it must be understood that this is not a state

wherein the individual merely finds .himself in space, but

he is, as a Self, identical with the whole of Space . It

is not consciousness as functioning through bodies and

aware of objects, but a subjective state dissociated from

all bodies and not concerned with objects . Yet it would

be incorrect to regard it as a purely homogeneous conscious-

ness in the sense of a fixed state, totally devoid of

variety . For consciousness and motion, in some sense,

are inseparable .

To arrive at a symbolic concept which may fairly

suggest motion in the Nirvanic sense, it is necessary-to

analyse motion in the universe of objects and then develop

its inverse . The consciousness of objects is atomic . By

this I mean that it is in the form of a series of discrete

states or apprehensions, in the sense in which Kant spoke

of the manifold given through experience . This is well

illustrated by the cinematograph, where we actually have

a series of still photographs thrown upon the screen in

rapid succession . The spectator is not actually witnessing

motion, but merely a series of still images . Only a frac-

tion of the original drama was actually photographed . Yet

the effect upon the spectator is very similar to that

produced by original scenes enacted by living actors .

Now, actually the camera reproduces essentially the

process of visual seeing . A certain amount of time is

required before an image can be seen, and thus the sen-

sible motion of external objects is really no more than

a series of images with gaps between . All of which means

that we do not see continuity . The same is true of the

other sense-impressions , as there is always a time-factor

involved in any sensible recognition . Again, when we

analyse motion we always give it a granular structure,

even though our ultimate fixed elements are infinitesimals .

Thus, both experience and thought deal with manifolds,

and never with true continua . In this connection the

analysis of Weierstrass is profoundly significant . By

very careful thinking Weierstrass reached the conclusion

that there is no such thing as motion, but only a series

of different states or positions occupied by objects . As

a judgment or interpretation concerning the universe of

objects in its purity as abstracted from the whole, I do

not see how this statement can be seriously questioned .

It simply means that the ceaseless becoming and endless

dying, which mark the universe of objects, are series of

instantaneous states rather than true continua . This

would be the rigorous interpretation of being as it appears

to objective consciousness in isolation from other

dimensions of consciousness , and thus radically non-

mystical . It reveals beautifully the absence of depth

or substance in the universe when taken in abstraction

as only objective . The series of states are no more

than dead pictures, having no life or substance, but

are merely empty terms in relation .

The inverse of the phantasmagoric series, which

constitutes the universe of experience and thought in

its purity as abstracted, is the true continuum . The

one is a granular manifold, the other a flowing unity .

Now it is true that man has arrived at the notion of con-

tinuity, although, as Weierstrass has shown, he never

really thinks it . Continuity is the inverse . of the

manifold and is, of necessity, recognized at the moment

man became conscious of manifoldness, but this recognition

involves more than the action of consciousness in the

objective sense . Continuity belongs to the hinterland

of consciousness . This simply illustrates the eternal

fact, i .e ., that the actual consciousness of man continu-

ally operates in a Nirvanic as well as in a Sangsaric

sense . However, analysis has grappled fairly well with

the Sangsaric phase, but has remained generally not-self-

conscious with respect to the Nirvanic .

This all leads us to the point that the unity of

the Nirvanic Consciousness is better symbolized by the

notion of the true continuum than by the finite number 1

(one) . For the number one is a fixed entity representing

a single empty term , which in turn always implies the

manifold of all numbers . In other words , the unity of

numeral one is an abstraction and not a concrete actuality .

It is the unity of the continuum , in the true sense, that

symbolizes the unity of the Nirvanic State . The Nirvanic

Consciousness is not granular but flowing . It is without

parts , in the sense of finite proper parts , but is a cease-

lessly flowing and self - contained stream . It is not a

stream from past to the future , that implies division by

the point called the "present", but a flowing which com-

prehends the totality which appears in the universe of

objects as the temporal series .

That which appears in man as the persistent Self--

the Witness of the universe -drama--is the dividing and

uniting point of two worlds of consciousness . Before our

consciousness lies the universe of objects, but behind is

the hinterland of the Self, and this is Nirvana . But the

hinterland of the Self is also the hinterland of all

objects . In this hinterland we do not have merely empty

terms in relation , perceived by the Self ; we have a con-

tinuum in which the inverse of the self is identical with

the inverse of all objects . Here consciousness, substance

and energy, or life, are interchangeable terms . Here,

also, the sterile and empty terms-in-relation are re-

placed by a pregnant Meaning . Without this Meaning man

simply cannot live . The more closely man identifies him-

self with objects, or mere empty terms-in-relation, the

more starved he becomes, and in the end, if this condition

is continued too far, real death must follow . By real

death I mean the loss of self-consciousness .

Actually, man has rarely succeeded in completely

isolating himself from the inflow of consciousness from

the hinterland . For the greater part, he has simply re-

ceived this inflow and has not succeeded in being self-

conscious with respect to it . Unknowingly, he has re-

ceived some nourishment, otherwise life in the universe

of objects would have failed ere now . Yet, except for a

few among the human whole, the stream of nourishment has

been so poor that man suffers the travail of slow star-

vation . Great is the need that the stream be increased .

Now, this increase is accomplished by opening the gates

to the hinterland through at least some degree of Recog-

nition . This means becoming self-conscious, in at least

some measure, of the stream of Nirvanic Consciousness and

realizing oneself as identical with it . We need more

philosophy conceived as a Way of Life and less emphasis

upon systems of bare terms in relation .

#15 . It has been stated that the key to Nirvanic Con-

sciousness consists of an anesthetizing of the power of

experiencing and of thinking , combined with a continuing

of self-consciousness . This is the essential process

which reveals the significance of the step . Practically,

the process of transformation may or may not involve the

complete anesthetizing . If the anesthesia is complete,

then the consciousness of the universe of objects is wholly

annulled , either temporarily or permanently . This is the

mystic destruction of the universe and the Awakening to

the Nirvanic States . Objectively viewed , the individual

who does this appears to enter a complete state of ecstatic

trance , in which there is a suspension of vital and con-

scious process in the sangsaric sense . This is all that

the physical scientist qua physical scientist can observe .

And if the observer holds to the theory that the sangsaric

type of consciousness is the only possible consciousness,

then he would say the trance involved the total extinction

of consciousness in every sense . Some psychologists take

this position, but, since they are unable to trace what

they cannot see, they are quite unqualified to pass judg-

ment upon the state in question . ` For in this matter the

bare observer is entirely helpless . The realizer may re-

port the continuity of his self - consciousness , . but the

observer , as such , has no check whatsoever . If, in turn,

he should become a realizer in his own right , then he -

would Know, but that knowing would not be the result of

his observing external states of conditions . He would no

longer be a bare observer .

Now, it is possible, by a modified technique, to

become a realizer and remain , in some degree, an observer

at the same time . In this case, there is substituted for

the literal anesthetizing a process of dissociation of the

two kinds of consciousness . The thinking and experiencing

powers are set on one side , as it were , while the larger

portion of the self-conscious principle, but not all, is

withdrawn into the hinterland . In this case , there is no

black-out trance-state but a sort of slowing down of the

sangsaric consciousness and the objective life - stream. It

is a critical kind of balance to maintain, as there is a

constant tendency for the consciousness principle to 'flop

over' completely to the one side or the other . But if,

through steadiness of the will, the balance is maintained

and the self-analysing power functions with clear dis-

crimination , then it is possible to be conscious on two

levels without confusion . In this case, dissociation

accomplishes the essential effect of the anesthesia .

The latter technique has a decided advantage, in

that it effects a conscious bridging of two levels of

consciousness . This facilitates the construction of

interpretative symbols, and, as well, opens a door whereby

a stream of Nirvanic Consciousness may be made to penetrate

the universe of objects and be more or less consciously

directed .

#16 . From the standpoint of Consciousness-without-an-

object there is no problem concerning immortality . The

directly known truth is : "Immortality is, but no embodied

or object-bound stage of consciousness is immortal ." This

simply means that the Sea of Consciousness is without

beginning or end, being completely unconditioned by time,

but the various stages wherein that Sea supports objects

are temporary . Thus man as man is not immortal .- Here it

must be understood that 'man', as well as any other name

of an object, is only a designation for a stage along the

Way . Immortality attaches to consciousness as a principle,

not to the stages . Man may achieve immortality by super-

imposing his evolved power of self-consciousness upon the

Primordial Consciousness itself, but in this case he

simply ceases to be a man . The self-conscious Nirvani is

no longer a man, though in his case the differentiated

consciousness-principle once passed through the human stage .

Actually, the Nirvani is a Divine, rather than a human,

being . The consciousness-principle is the Pilgrim which

passes through many stages, absorbing from those stages

many values in terms of progressively awakened self-

consciousness . When man succeeds in assimilating the

Pilgrim by transference of his self-consciousness, then

his self-identity is one with immortal consciousness, but

the self-identity ceases to be merely human . Put in

other terms, all somatic stages are temporary ; the con-

sciousness stream is without beginning or end .

But while immortality ceases to be a problem, an

entirely different problem arises . This may be stated in

the form : "How is it possible, within a beginningless and

endless Primordial Consciousness , for transitory states

to arise?" I am not here attempting any solution of this

problem but simply indicating the shift of problem form .

This new problem, unlike the old one concerning immortality,

has no tragic implications . Reflective consciousness,

aided by insight and observation, may undertake its

resolution at leisure, with all the time in the world to

complete the search . For with the problem thus stated,

there is no deep religious or psychological need at stake .

The resolution of the problem would have theoretical and

working value, but there is no time-pressure to drive

reflective consciousness to a quick solution .

There is but one consideration that I shall suggest

here . It is unthinkable that the formless and attribute-

less Primordial Consciousness, all of a sudden, at a cer-

tain point started to project Itself into the subject-

object series of states . Rather, no beginning or end to

the series of states is thinkable, one state being always

the consequent of a preceding state and the cause of the

one that follows . Consciousness-without-an-object is not

a First Cause ; it is the substratum underlying all possible

states and causes .

#17 . For one who has made himself familiar with the

stream of Western philosophy from the time of the Greeks

to the present day it should be evident that there are

certain differences of base and valuation which have

divided philosophers throughout the whole of that period .

The development of scientific knowledge, of mathematics,

and of epistemological criticism has not succeeded in

bridging these differences so that a philosophic agreement

could be effected . All these developments have only had

the effect of changing the form in which the differences

appear, so that they have become more subtle and intellect-

ually sophisticated, but the essential differences still

remain, however much transformed in their statement . There

still are incompatible philosophic schools, represented

by men of comparable degrees of intellectual ability,

training, and knowledge . All of which reveals, clearly,

that the factors which make for philosophic differences

run deeper than the material with which science can deal

and resolve factually and interpretatively once for all .

Some psychologists have taken cognizance of these

philosophical tendencies and have shown that they are con-

nected with differences of psychological type . The im-

mediately taken base and the accepted values are not the

same for all men . And this immediate element belongs more

to religion, in the broad and fundamental sense , than it

does to science . It is something which precedes, rather

than follows, science . In fact, that attitude which makes

the scientific point of view itself possible is of the

nature of these more fundamental and extra-scientific

adjustments . Justice demands that we accept these dif-

ferences of adjustment as relatively valid and renounce

the hope and desire for universal philosophic conformity .

The conflict of philosophic schools is both desirable and

necessary .

Two important types of differences in valuation

and immediate insight will account for the principal dif-

ferences of philosophic systems . One is a difference in

the valuation of the two principal groups of objects, i .e .,

objects of sense and objects of thought . The other is a

difference in the valuation of objectivity, as such, as

contrasted to the subjective pole of consciousness . These

differences I shall discuss briefly so as to relate my own

system to them more clearly .

 Evidently the overwhelming majority of men in

thought and practice most of the time predicate sub-

stantial reality of the objects of sensation, parti-

cularly in terms of the social waking consciousness of

our ordinary life . Most, though not all, physical

-scientists take this position, as well as the majority

of the men of action . Among the current philosophical

tendencies Naturalism definitely, and sometimes quite

naively, taker this standpoint . This is also true in

considerable degree, but not entirely, of the represent-

atives of Pragmatism . The position of Nea-Realism is more

involved, in that, while it is highly objective, its

objects are not conceived as objects of sensation or of

thought, but as independent existences-, which, in their

real nature, are neither psychical nor physical, though

capable of passing through both psychical and physical

systems without being altered in their essential nature .

However, Neo-Realism is frankly and intensely objective

in its valuation, and therefore stands in closer relation-

ship to both Pragmatism and Naturalism than it does to

Idealism .

There is a smaller class of men who find the ob-

jects of thought more real than the objects of sensation .

These are represented in the philosophical systems of

rational Scholasticism, Rationalism proper, and in those

philosophical systems currently called intellectualistic .

There may be more or less blending between these philo-

sophic currents and Naturalism, Neo-Realism, and Idealism,

though they are definitely non-pragmatic, since the latter

school seems pretty thoroughly united on the principle

of anti-intellectualism, in the philosophic sense .

The two foregoing groups largely agree in that

they attach primary importance to objects, in some sense,

and may be divided by regarding one group as sensation-

alistic and the other as rationalistic or intellectualistic .

In contrast to both these groups there stand those

who attach the greater reality to the subjective pole of

consciousness . In the philosophies these are represented

by Idealism and Vedantism . However, this class seems to

be more widely represented by individuals whose : dominant

expression is not consciously philosophical . More often

their expression appears in the form of a mysticism which

is more poetic than philosophical . Yet, within the mysti-

cal group, there is a further differentiation to be made

between those who emphasize union with God and those who

emphasize union with the Self in a transcendental sense .

However, the whole mystical movement is in a subjective

direction, so, when the emphasis is placed upon more or

less Divine objects, these objects are subtle rather than

gross .
 In the present system all objects are regarded

as derivative, and therefore possessing, at best, only

a derivative or symbolic reality . Yet some objects may

have a higher order of relative reality than others . I

have already pointed out that the valuation here is

relative to purpose and not absolute . Thus, the ordinary

gross objects of sense, common to waking consciousness,

are given no superior status as such . Essentially, dream

objects and mystical objects are given the same validity .

Relative to a particular purpose, the one or the other

class of objects maybe judged as possessing the superior

order of reality . Concerning the two classes of objects,

i .e ., objects of sensation whether subtle or gross, and

objects of thought, the same principle applies . Objects

of thought, or some classes of the objects of thought, may,

in some purposive situations, possess an inferior reality

as compared to that attaching to the objects of sensation .

On the other hand, the reverse is equally true in other

purposive situations . To sum up : All objects of whatever

type, whether objects for sensation or for thought, whether

subtle or gross, whether abstract or concrete, in the last

analysis possess only a derivative reality, and thus may

be regarded finally as a seeming only .

There remains to be considered the view this system

presents concerning the subjective pole of consciousness .

In this, I am referring to that which is variously known

as the 'ego', whether in the personal or higher sense,

the 'I', the 'self', or the 'Atman', whether in the indi-

vidual or supreme sense . In this subjective pole there

are discernible differentia, just as there are between

different classes of objects . Now, in the present system,

the subjective pole, both in its inferior and superior

aspects, is viewed as the reflex or inverse of the object,

as such, though in the higher sense it is viewed as es-

sentially the higher pole . This means that the 'I', in

whatever sense whether empiric or transcendental, is as

much derivative as the objective world . Thus the present

system is not to be identified with either Vedantism or

current Idealism, though it is arrived at by a process of

passing through these schools of interpretation and thus

stands genetically, although not necessarily formally,

closer to them .

The final position is : The One, non-derivative

Reality, is THAT which I have symbolized by "Consciousness-

without-an-object" . This is Root Consciousness, per se,

to be distinguished from consciousness as content or as

state, on the one hand, and from consciousness as an

attribute of a Self or Atman, in any sense whatsoever .

It is Consciousness of which nothing can be predicated in

the privative sense save abstract Being . Upon It all

else depends , while It remains self -existent .

The question of the means by which any individual

may arrive at a direct Realization of Consciousness -without-

an-object is one that is very involved and the solution

has many variants , corresponding to the psychical status

of the various individuals . All evidence confirms the

view that it is reached by a progressive series of steps,

such that a lower attachment or identification is renounced

for one that is superior , the process being repeated again

and again until , from the vantage ground of a high tran-

scendental position , the final step can be taken . Beyond

this general statement the question of technique cannot be

entered into here .

Apart from the actual Realization of Consciousness-

without-an- object , it is possible to take the symbol itself

as an object of thought and use it for the purpose of

philosophical and general mystical integration . This is

the procedure of assuming the symbol as a fundamental premise

and then observing the consequences which follow . There is

some reason to believe that such a :method of procedure is

possible within the setting of Western culture , as might

not be the case for oriental culture or for any culture

that has preceded ours of which any record exists . This

possibility I see as growing out of our peculiar mathe-

matical development . In mathematics we excel all other

cultures, and, as I see it, all other genuine superiority

we may have has resulted from this mathematical excellence .

In other respects, as far as the greater and durable values

are concerned, there are other cultures in the Orient,

whether of the present or the past, that just as clearly

excel us . Now, it is by its power, and not its weakness,

that an individual or a class attains the best . Thus, I

would select the mathematical road as the one of pre-

eminent power so far as Western culture is concerned .

Now the validity of mathematics is established

upon a basis that is quite impersonal and universal . Its

authority is not dependent upon the name of any writer of

any mathematical treatise . In its purity it deals only

with the transcendental or ideal objects of the very high-

est order of thinkable abstraction or universality . In

high degree, the consciousness of the mathematician qua

mathematician is not concerned with either a self or ob-

jects . To be sure, this is not absolutely so, but this

position is attained in mathematical consciousness in

higher degree than anywhere else, except in states of

Samadhi of a high order . Herein is revealed the power

of pure mathematics as an instrument of consciousness-

transformation on a very lofty level .

-205-
 Again, pure mathematics is the only real invariant

that we have in the ever-changing phantasmagoria of experi-

ence . When an individual undertakes to chart an unknown

sea, he must have fixed bases of reference by which to

navigate his course, if he would not run the risk of being

hopelessly lost . To be sure, there is a profound sense in

which the pure Self is a similar invariant, but the peculiar

psychology of the West is too objective in its orientation

to permit this Self to be generally and effectively access-

ible . It is otherwise in India . This profound psycho-

logical difference renders it impractical to hope to graft

oriental method upon the Western man, save in some excep-

tional cases . That would be using the right method with

the wrong man, and such a procedure leads to wrong results .

Hence, the Western psychology being what it is, the avail-

able invariant seems to be pure mathematics .

I am not speaking with a naive ignorance of current

philosophic and logical analysis of pure mathematics . But

I shall not enter into this extremely technical question

at this time . I am well aware that the invariant element

does not lie in the fundamental assumptions, or so-called

axioms, from which a mathematical system starts . These

assumptions may be chosen as a largely free creative act,

but just as soon as the process of deduction of theorems

begins, free creativeness ceases . The law that governs the

flow of consequences is tougher than tempered steel and

harder than the hardest rock . Save in the Self, here,

as nowhere else, is there something to which human con-

sciousness can tie and give its trust, though all else

become fluid and confusing . And this invulnerable core

carries straight through to Consciousness-without-an-

object . Only at the very last does the logical invariant

vanish in the eternally Ineffable, but then the Wanderer

has arrived at the place of Final Security and Complete-

ness , beyond the relativity of all science, art, religion,

and philosophy .

And supposing the Wanderer has at last arrived,

is there nothing more than a ceaseless consciousness with-

out content? No, before him there stand all possibilities,

both those of the universe of objects, in every sense, and

also of Nirvana, likewise in every sense . But the arrived

Wanderer is now Enlightened and is secure against all

dangers and all possible entanglements in all kingdoms

or states of consciousness from the Heavens to the Hells .

He may produce creatively or not, but in any case He is

superior to either action or refraining from action . In

a word, He moves upon the plane of a higher order of evo-

lution . This is the meaning of Consciousness-without-an-

object .
 Footnotes to Chapter III

lit would be more correct to say that the older concep-

tion can no longer interpret the facts as simply as the
newer conception . It is always possible to make the
older conception work by adding intricate interpretations
through ad hoc hypotheses, but this is done at the price
of clumsiness and complication . It is not change in the
factual picture that compels change in theory but the
greater logical beauty and efficacy of the new theory .

2According to latest theory the radiation density at the

early highly condensed stage of the expanding universe
was much higher than the matter density . What matter
there was present was, however, spread out uniformly ..
At a later stage of expansion the radiation density had
dropped to equality with that of matter, and at this
point "gravitational instability" set in and the galaxies
began forming .

3Actually, the more generally valid space-time "invariant"

concept is that of the directed quantity "Energy-Momentum",
of which "Energy" is merely that part lying along the
direction of increasing time . For the sake of simplicity
of illustration we use only the more familiar term "Energy" .

4This analogue is not employed to suggest that the aphorisms

gain their authority from the physical conception . Physical
conceptions change and so constructions based upon them
are vulnerable . The real point made is that the aphorisms,
as concepts, are not nearly as strange as they may seem at
first . The above is a conceptual pattern which already
exists and is used, though in a somewhat different sector
of human knowledge . Of necessity, any conceptual symbol
must be composed in terms of the conceptualism of its
milieu, however unthinkable its roots may be in conceptual
terms .

5In this connection, by fundamental theory I mean one that

is a primary assumption of a given type of intellect--its
starting point for creative constructions . These funda-
mental theories are based in faith and really form part of
the essential religious belief of a given culture . In
order to think, we must always start with something that
we cannot prove either by logic or by reference to ex-
perience . This something defines the form of experience
as it becomes the material of thought, but it is not a
derivative from experience . Thus, for example, our
science rests upon a faith in the uniformity of nature .
Discredit this faith and the science falls as a whole .
Indeed, this faith may be perfectly justified, but it
precedes science- - it does not follow from science . In
psychologic terms, the fundamental theory wells out of
the unconscious .

6 This is perhaps the most concrete special case of the

energy-momentum concept described in a previous footnote .

7An implication of the foregoing discussion is that phys-

ical science does not give us noumenal , metaphysical,
or substantive knowledge . Rather it gives . an only posi-
tivistic kind of knowledge, but a positivism which is
logical as well as aesthetic .

8The following questions have been raised : "What is the

interpretation of an 'individual center of consciousness'?"
"Is it a void, too?" First, with respect to the indi-
vidual center of consciousness , it may be said that we
mean here the empiric cognizing entities which we com-
monly view as individuals, without raising at this point
the question as to the ultimate status of individuality .
But the second question raises problems having profound
ramifications which are given serious consideration in
the fourth part of this work . The whole issue between
the Atma Vidya of the Vedantins and the Anatmic doctrine
of the Buddhists is raised in this question . Briefly,
it may be stated that the position taken here occupies an
intermediate position . Thus it would be said that in the
relative sense the individual center of consciousness is
not a void or unreal as compared with the object, but in
the absolute sense it may be viewed as a void in the sense
of being ultimately derivative . It occupies a position
analogous to that of the concept of the parameter as used
in mathematics .

-209-
 9The older psychology without a psyche is merely a crude
physical science .

10
The assurance of the transcendental states is by no means
- a certainty that the conceptual interpretation is the
most correct possible . Interpretation is a relative
function subject to criticism .
 Chapter IV

Commentaries on the Aphorisms

on
Consciousness -without- an-object

Foreword

In their depths , feeling and thought spring

from the same root . This root , in its own nature as

unmanifested , has a character which appears to the

relative consciousness as both devoid of feeling and

without conceptual form . But, when realized, it has

the value of fulfilled feeling and completed thought .

Consciousness no longer feels a reaching out for an un-

attained completeness . With this, both thought and

feeling lose their differentiated and, therefore,

identifiable particularity . But when the root is pro-

jected into the actualizing consciousness it loses

some measure of its purity , since to actualize is to

particularize , even though on the most abstract level

of expression . The aphorisms on Consciousness -without-

an-object constitute such a projection . on a level of

exceptional abstraction and universality , whereby the

unthinkable becomes , in some measure , the thinkable .

But since , in this act, the universal comprehender ap-

pears in the field of the comprehended , we stand, in

the latter case, not in the presence of Truth herself,

but come into possession of a symbol of the Truth .

To step from the symbol to that which is symbol-

ized, though this does afford a peculiarly exacting

demand upon acuity of thought, yet requires much more .

Here, feeling, in the best sense , must fuse with the

thought . Thus the thinker must learn also to feel his

thought, so that, in the highest degree, he thinks de-

votedly . It is not enough to think clearly, if the

thinker stands aloof, not giving himself with his thought .

The thinker arrives by surrendering himself to Truth,

claiming for himself no rights save those which Truth

herself bestows upon him . In the final state of per-

fection he possesses no longer opinions of his own nor

any private preference . Then Truth possesses him, not

he, Truth .

He, who would become one with the Eternal, must

first learn to be humble . He must offer, upon the sacri-

ficial altar, the pride of the knower . He must become

one who lays no possessive claim to knowledge or wisdom .

This is the state of the mystic ignorance--of the emptied

heart . He, who has thus become as nothing in his own

right, then is prepared to become possessed by Wisdom

herself . The completeness of self-emptying is the pre-

condition to the realization of unutterable Fullness .

Thus mere 'knowledge about' becomes transformed into

Knowledge as Reality .
 To know THAT which the aphorisms symbolize is

to be possessed by THAT and, then, to be one with THAT .

Thenceforth, all thinking, all feeling, all particulariza-

tion, and all selfhood lie below . To be sure, all these

remain, but no longer as claimants to a Throne which they

could not possibly fill . They remain thenceforth as the

actors in the Divine Drama, but no more .

Before the candidate the ordeal of the mystic

death appears as a terror-inspiring apparition . But he,

who, with stout heart challenging the seeming of ultimate

dissolution, enters into the awful and terrible presence,

finds only utter Glory . Terror has become beatitude .

Only liabilities have been lost as he finds himself, not

lost in the Eternal, but become that Eternal Itself . All

the dangers of the Way are only ghosts, possessing no

power save such as the candidate has himself projected

upon them . However, since there is much darkness and

fear in the heart of man, there are apparitions of terrible

visage . But they have no power of their own and must vanish,

helpless before the will of the undaunted candidate .

He who receives the aphorisms as guideposts along

the Way will find in them powers to dissipate all ap-

paritions, whether of terror or seduction . The threaten-

ing appearance of darkness will be dissipated before him

as he journeys along his Path . In the end, the Door to

Glory will loom clear before his gaze, and he will know

no conflict with terror in any part of the Way . Yet he,

who does not find himself able to go so far, may yet find

in the symbols content for his thought which will illumine

that thought . Thought in the light is much better than

thought groping in darkness . To think from the base of

Light, though it be that that Light is not yet under-

stood, is far better than thought grounded in the dark-

ness of no vision . For upon some base all thought must

be grounded, if it is to be more than that absolute nes-

cience which leads in darkness from nowhere to nowhere .

To have more than such hopeless darkness, he, who is not

yet Knowledge, must base himself upon faith, whether it

be faith in the Eternal, or some lesser light . Lacking

Knowledge, man must have faith if he would not perish .

 1
Consciousness -without-an-object is .

The fundamental principle underlying all the

aphorisms is that Consciousness is the original and

self-existent Reality . This Consciousness is both Sub-

stance and Life . It would be possible to view the

Primordial Principle in terms of Life or of Substance,

as well as in terms of Consciousness, but I approach

the subject from the standpoint of Consciousness for

the reason that this is the phase of Reality of which

we are most immediately certain . Consciousness, Life,

and Substance are not to be regarded as three distinct

realities, but as merely three facets of the non-dual

Reality, as the latter appears to the analytic conscious-

ness .

The Primordial Consciousness is not to be regarded

as the consciousness of some transcendent being who is

aware of some content . Herein lies, perhaps, the main

difficulty with respect to understanding the idea con-

tained in the symbol of Consciousness-without-an-object .

We are in the habit of regarding consciousness as some-

thing derivative--a quality possessed by something else

or a kind of relationship . It is necessary to abandon

this view if the aphorisms are to be understood . Let

this Consciousness be considered as original, and then

both the subject and object become derivative . That

which is primary and original, then, is a great Void

of Consciousness, to all consciousness of the type that

depends upon the subject-object relationship . It is as

though that Consciousness were nothing, while actually

It is the all in all .

This Absolute Consciousness is, from the relative

standpoint, indistinguishable from unconsciousness . Most

generally, philosophy is written from the perspective

which views the ultimate as unconscious, whether of

psychical (e .g . Von Hartmann's view) or non-psychical

(e .g . the view of materialists) nature, and thus has taken

the relative consciousness as the ground of approach, but

the aphorisms are written as from the ultimate Transcenden-

tal Base, and, then, from that viewpoint the problems of

relative consciousness are approached . We are following

a deductive process of descent from the most universal

to the concrete or particular, rather than the inductive

method which is so characteristic of physical science and

much philosophy, including that of Von Hartmann .

An inevitable question is : How can this Primordial

Consciousness be known? To this it is answered, 'through

a Recognition transcending the Nirvanic State' . Complete

verification of the validity of the aphorisms requires

this . However, a partial or pragmatic verification may

be achieved through willing to accept them as though they

were true symbols of the Reality, and then drawing the

consequences which follow from them, finally noting how

they affect the problems of life and thought as prac-

tically experienced . If the investigator finds that they

tend to simplify the problems and to bring the self into

more harmonious adjustment with the not-self, then they

prove to be an orientation which enriches life, and are

thus pragmatically justified .

Naturally, it is implied that Recognition is a

human possibility . Otherwise, the aphorisms would have

to rest upon one or the other of two bases, (a) intel-

lectual speculation grounded exclusively in relative

consciousness, or, (b) external super-human revelation

beyond the possibility of human verification . Both these

standpoints are denied here, especially the latter . The

notion of external super-human revelation, when subjected

to analysis, does not possess any really intelligible

meaning, and belief in this tends toward both intellectual

and moral suicide . From this belief follows the attitude

made famous in the words of Tertullian : "I believe be-

cause it is against reason ." Such a viewpoint is utterly

foreign to the spirit in which the aphorisms are written .

It is affirmed that the aphorisms mean a content

given through immediate Knowledge, and that for the Realiza-

tion of this content the functioning of a generally latent

organ is the proximate means . Hence they are not to be

viewed as metaphysical speculations of which the concepts

would have no real content , as Kant pointed out in his

critique of pure reason in relation to metaphysical subject-

matter . Thus it is maintained that the aphorisms are not

mere developments of the pure reason and, accordingly,

avoid the-challenge of the Kantian criticism . Therefore,

philosophic criticism of the present philosophy , insofar

as it is strictly philosophical , must assume the actuality

of the inner organ .

The critical problem takes the form : Does the

inner organ or Samadhindriya--as it is known in Sanskrit--

exist? This is a psychological , or, rather , metapsycholog-

ical question . I have explored with care the possibilities

of logical proof that such an organ must exist, but have

been forced to conclude that no such demonstration is

possible . Yet logical disproof is equally impossible .

The only possible proof depends upon immediate experience

of the activity of the organ . On the other hand , empiric

disproof is impossible, since empiric disproof of any

supposed psychical function or organ presupposes demon-

strably complete knowledge of every psychical possibility .

I am not aware that any psychologist lays claim to such

omniscience .

Now, if any individual should have immediate ac-

quaintance with the functioning of a psychical organ,

which with most men either lies wholly inactive or func-

tions in such a way as to be unrecognizable to the rel-

ative consciousness of the individual, he would know as

a matter of genuine private knowledge that the function

or organ is an actuality . But if he sought to prove this

actuality to those in whom the function was wholly latent,

he would face serious difficulties . Anything which he suc-

ceeded in introducing into the consciousness of the lat-

ter would, of necessity, be in terms of the functions which

were already active in them . In general, this means in

terms of the so-called five-sense rational consciousness .

Anything more that was strictly peculiar to the new organ

would stand in incommensurable relationship and, there-

fore, be ineffable ; it could not be communicated at all .

But that which could be communicated would be, as said,

in terms of the usual five-sense rational content . And

this could always be explained away by the appropriate

ingenuity, so that it would appear to the unawakened con-

sciousness that the hypothesis of a new organ was unneces-

sary . The inventive ingenuity of the human intellect is,

undoubtedly, quite capable of inventing the appropriate

hypotheses . But if, for instance, the born-blind could

invent hypotheses which would explain everything that the

seeing ones could convey to their consciousness, in terms

that could dispense with the hypothesis that anybody had

sight, this might be quite convincing to other blind men,

but it would leave those who had sight quite unimpressed .

The result would be a stalemate .

That the conception of a latent mystical sense,

active in some instances but inactive with most men, can

be interpreted in such a way as to supply a sufficient

explanation of how a transcendental knowledge can be, I

have not yet found questioned by anyone . It is the ques-

tion of necessity that is raised . Now, if we assume the

actuality of the mystical sense in an active state in a

given case, then, although the content which could be con-

veyed into the zone of the ordinary five-sense rational

consciousness would not necessarily require the predica-

tion of the mystical sense for its interpretation, yet

there would remain the incommensurable or ineffable por-

tion of the original content or state which still would

require explanation . So far as I have found, the hypo-

theses of the five-sense rational consciousness imply

that the ineffable content or value is pure illusion .

To the mystic this is proof of the insufficiency of all

such hypotheses, since he claims a greater reality-quale

for the content or value realized through the mystical

sense than that possessed by all the other senses . Now,

how is the five-sense rational consciousness going to

challenge this? By basic assumption the mystic has the

five - sense rational consciousness plus all the conscious-

ness-value realized through the mystic sense , and, there-

fore, is in a position to establish a comparative valua-

tion, and this the exclusively five-sense rational con-

sciousness cannot do . At this point the less gentlemanly

of the psychologists descend to the street urchin's device

of labeling the other fellow with bad names , though usually

highly technical language is employed . I submit that this

is beneath the dignity of true scholars and gentlemen .

It is a principle of logic that a rigorous argu-

ment shall satisfy both the categories of necessity and

sufficiency . But this perfection is attained only in

pure mathematics . No inductive , hence no scientific,

hypothesis satisfies both these conditions . There is

no scientific hypothesis that is necessary in the logical

sense, since other hypotheses could be invented . But a

scientific hypothesis must pass the test of sufficiency,

i .e ., it must be such as to incorporate all relevant facts

into a systematic whole . Now, if we are to leave out

mutual name -calling as a valid line of argument as be-

tween the possessors of the mystic sense and those of the

exclusive five-sense type, then it is the five-sense type

of interpretative theory that fails to satisfy the canons

of scientific hypotheses . For these hypotheses do not

satisfy the condition of sufficiency .

 Aa:to the ineffable content or quality of mysti-

cal states of consciousness, it may be pointed out that

there is nothing at all strange about this . "Ineffable"

means unspeakable or incommunicable . But incommunicability

is not at all strange, for such a limitation attaches

even to sense-experience . The peculiar quale of one sense

cannot be communicated in terms that are understandable

with respect to another sense . And, indeed, there is

something fundamentally ineffable in the relationship be-

tween percepts and concepts . Concepts convey perceptual

values from one individual to another only to the extent

that the two individuals have a commonality of perceptual

experience . Since the referents are in common the con-

cepts convey meaning, but otherwise they do not . Now,

the mystic knows an ineffable content or quality in the

case of communication to a non-mystic , but, in general,

the concept, the sign, or symbol will convey this content,

more or less adequately, to a fellow mystic . It is just

a case of the concepts, signs, or symbols having a differ-

ent kind of reference and of two or more individuals having

common acquaintance with the relevant referents .

In the highest sense of Transcendental Conscious-

ness we have to abandon the whole idea of organ of con-

sciousness , since the notion of organ implies delimitation.

But so long as there are states in mystical consciousness

the idea of an inner organ is valid .

 2

Before objects were Consciousness-without-an-object is .

This aphorism emphasizes the priority of Conscious-

ness to content . But this is not a priority in time in

the sense that a causal antecedent precedes a consequent .

Primordial Consciousness is no more a cause of objects,

in the temporal sense , than is space a cause of the stellar

systems . But without space there could be no stellar

systems, and, likewise, there could be no objects without

the support of Consciousness . Hence Consciousness-without-

an-object is, not in the sense of a present which is a

mere point in the flow of the future into the past, but

in the sense of an Eternal Now . This 'isness' is a denial

of time . Consciousness-without-an-object is not a cause

which determines any particularization, but it is the

Causeless-Cause whereby all particularization is possible .

Here "Objects" must be understood in that most

general sense of any modification of consciousness what-

soever . It is not only objects as seen or thought, but :,

as well, any feeling-toned state of consciousness . For,

a feeling-toned state being recognizable, as such, is,

therefore, a content or object .

We cannot conceive of a first object, since be-

fore that object there must be its causal antecedent . The

stream of objects is a stream reaching from nowhere in

the past to nowhere in the future . There is no substance

in this time - stream , and hence an eon of eons is pre-

cisely the same as the smallest division of time, just

as a finite section in a line is as rich in points as

the infinite totality of the line . The drama of time

is played in the Sea of Consciousness, and yet it is as

though nothing at all had happened .

3
Though objects seem to exist, Consciousness -without-an-object is .

This aphorism relates to that state wherein ob-

jects, in any sense , appear to consciousness now, whereas

the preceding aphorism refers to that which seems to be

before the present appearance . All existence which ob-

jects may have is for the "now" only, though we may dis-

tinguish phases of the "now", such as , existence in memory,

existence as given in the present presentation, and ex-

istence in the imagination as future . There is a recog-

nizable qualitative difference between these three phases

of the "now", but no phase can be actually isolated from

the "now " of consciousness and still have existence, in

any sense, predicated of it . For predication is a present

act within consciousness itself .

-224-
 In the first part of this aphorism , the crucial

word is "seem" . No object requires more than seeming in

order to exist for consciousness . Existence conceived in

any other sense, than as for consciousness , is entirely

meaningless . For that existence is found to be dependent

upon being conceived , which , of necessity, is a conscious

act or state . In the strictest logical sense , therefore,

all objects rest upon the same base , i .e ., that of seeming .

To be sure , purposive interest will lead to the abstrac-

tion of certain objects as being important , while others

will remain in greater or less degree irrelevant . Rela-

tive to purpose , then , degrees of reality or unreality may

be predicated of the manifold of all objects . But this

predication is valid only in relation to the given purpose,

and confusion arises when this is forgotten . Thus, for

some purposes , the dream-object may be more real than the

objects of our so-called waking consciousness . For the

purposes of our scientific culture a certain class of ob-

jects belonging to the waking state are significant . We

have formed the habit of calling these real , and of think-

ing of them as being real in some non-relative sense . In

this we forget that the reality which they possess is rela-

tive only to our specific scientific purpose . Our psycho-

logists tend to distinguish between this class of objects

and all, or nearly all, other objects by calling the

latter phantasy . This is a terminology which is preju-

dicial to the latter class and is not logically justi-

fied, unless the condition is explicitly implied that

they are phantastic and unreal with respect to a certain

scientific interest . Considered as such , apart from any

purposive motive, we cannot distinguish any relative dif-

ference in degree or reality as attaching to any class

of objects when contrasted to other objects . All objects

are equal in that their existence is a seeming to conscious-

ness and no more . But whether there is one kind of pur-

pose or another , or a complete absence of all purpose,

consciousness , per se, is an indisputable reality . This

Consciousness is a Reality that unites , on the one hand,

the youngest child, the idiot, or the insane , with the

wisest and most developed intelligence, on the other . The

differences that mark the gulf between these extremes are

differences in content only, and not of Consciousness

taken apart from content .

There is no doubt but that a valid significance

attaches to difference in valuation of the various con-

tents of consciousness . But these valuations are always

relative to purpose and level, and not significant out

of relation to all purpose or perspective . Thus valua-

tion, itself, is but one of the derivative contents of

consciousness, subject to development and decay . Beneath

valuation , as the substratum which makes it, as well as

all else , possible , is pure Consciousness apart from

content .

When objects vanish, yet remaining through all

unaffected , Consciousness -without-an-object is .

Objects have vanished , when they are no longer

present to consciousness as currently present , or present

in memory , or, finally , present in imagination . The fact

of vanishing is not affected by the arising of other ob-

jects . Thus , vanishing operates as a principle , whether

it is complete or only partial .

Consciousness -without -an-object is the binding

principle underlying the progression and evanescence of

states or objects of consciousness . This binding prin-

ciple neither develops nor disintegrates . It is thus

the invariant element associated with all variation . At

certain stages in the analysis of consciousness it appears

as though the invariant element were the pure Subject or

the Self, but at this stage the analysis has not isolated

the subtle distinction between pure Subjectivity and Con-

sciousness , as such . It thus appears as though the pure

Self were a sort of permanent atomic nucleus , which is

persistent through all states . But, when analysis is

carried further , this notion is seen to fail . Ultimately

it is found that the Self is derivative as well as the

objective pole of consciousness . Thus , there remains as

the sole non-derivative principle the Pure Consciousness

Itself .1

Just as we must regard the presence of objects

as a seeming , and no more , so is the vanishing only a

seeming . The non-derivative Reality is unaffected in

either case .

5
Outside of Consciousness -without-an-object nothing is .

Within the widely current realistic and natural-

istic thought , both naive and critical , there is a deeply

imbedded habit of viewing objects as existing quite in-

dependently of consciousness . From this perspective,

objects are viewed as self - existent things . But this is

an hypothetical construction , in the invidious sense, for

the simple reason that it is incapable of verification,

either through experience or as a necessity of thought .

For verification necessarily implies the presence of con-

sciousness , and so the, so - called, independent thing is

reduced to the status of an object in dependent relation-

ship to consciousness , at the moment of verification .

There is no necessity , such as a logical necessity, which

requires the predication of the existence of things quite

independent of consciousness , in every sense , in order to

account for the arising of objects . For objects arise

and vanish with respect to a state of consciousness, and

merely cease to be traceable beyond the borders of that

state, for that state alone . Their continued existence

for another state beyond those borders is not only in

principle possible, but is verifiable through the use

of the appropriate means . Though logic and the principle

of.causal connection may require that the arising of ob-

jects shall not be completely de novo , it is not neces-

sary to predicate existence of things, totally independent

of consciousness, in order to satisfy this requirement .

Objects, for the state of waking consciousness,

vanish upon going to sleep, and an entirely different

state or system of objects is realized . But though the

system of objects that may be realized in the dream state

is quite different, the analysis of dreams has often

shown a connection between some of these objects and

the contents of the waking state . Some dreams reveal a

continuity of objects from past waking states, while

others are prophetic with respect to objects experienced

in future waking states . Here we have an instance of a

widely experienced movement of consciousness from state

to state with objects traceable in quite different systems

of objects . These two examples of specific states, admit-

tedly, are insufficient to trace the whole genetic and

disintegrative history of objects . But they do afford

empiric demonstration of the possibility of conscious-

ness to shift from state to state, and thus render con-

ceivable, in principle, the broader application of this

possibility . Thus, again, there is no logical or epis-

temological need to predicate the existence of things

apart from consciousness .

The aphorism goes further than barely to affirm

that the predication of the existence of things, out-

side consciousness in every sense, is unnecessary . It

asserts , categorically, that "outside Consciousness-without-

an-object nothing is" . This may be viewed as simply im-

plying a primary definition of "something" . Thus "some-

thing" is that which is an object in consciousness in

some sense . Actually, no meaning attaches to the notion

of "something" in any other sense . Such a notion is use-

less, as well as unnecessary . To say, "outside of con-

sciousness in every sense there exists thus and so" is-

just to produce a meaningless collection of words, like

the classical combination "the barren woman's son" .

 6

Within the bosom of Consciousness -without-an-object

lies the power of awareness which projects objects .

Pure Primordial Consciousness must be conceived

as enveloping the subjective power of awareness, in re-

lation to which objects exist . The subjective power of

awareness and the content of consciousness stand in a

relation of interdependence . In the most abstract case,

wherein there is a consciousness of absence of objects,

this absence has the value of content, since it stands

in polar relationship to the subjective power of aware-

ness . Thus there is no subject for which there is no

content, in every sense, or, stated conversely, where

there is no content, there is no subjective pole of

awareness .

Consciousness-without-an-object is not simply the

power of awareness for It comprehends the content along

with the power of awareness itself . The power of aware-

ness we may conceive as the first modification of the un-

modified . It has its roots in, and derives its being

from, the unmodified . It is this power which may be

regarded as the First Cause--a Power which is Ever-

Concealed, but renders possible the revealed and reflected .

Ordinarily we think of the power of awareness as

playing a purely passive or receptive role in the receiv-

ing of impressions . It is true that on the empiric level

it does function, in some measure , in the receptive

sense . But in the ordinary creative activity of men,

even, we can see that this is not its exclusive func-

tion . Thus, a work of art is first creatively imagined,

then projected into objective form, and, finally, re-

ceived back as an impression . In turn, the received

impression may arouse further creative activity and lead

to a repetition of the same process . However, in this

series, the function of the received impression is that

of a catalytic agent, which simply arouses the creatively

projective power . It is the impression from the object

that is passive and not the power of awareness . Clarity

with respect to this point is of the very highest importance,

as it is right here that the invidious participation in

objects begins . When an individual views the power of

awareness as standing in passive relationship to impres-

sions from objects, he places himself in a position of

subordination to objects, and this constitutes the essence

of bondage . The universe of objects then becomes a great

prison-house, instead of the playground of free creative

activity . As a prison-house, the universe of objects takes

on the seeming of evil--the great adversary of man--but as

the playground of free creative activity, it is an in-

valuable agent for the progressive arousal of self-

consciousness .

The projective power of awareness is a priori , i .e .,

it precedes experience . It is true that experience,,-rtt

reacts upon this power, but it acts as a stimulating,

rather than as an essential, agent . The whole externally

causal series consists only of such stimulating agents .

While the stimulating agent may be viewed as a sort of

trigger cause of subsequent creative projection, it is

not the material cause . The purely creative phase of

the projective power is a first cause from which effects

follow, but which is not itself an effect of previous

causes . At this point energy flows into the universe of

objects . It is a misconception that an equation may be

set up between any two states of the universe of objects,

as between any two such states there may be an actual

increase or decrease of content . The creative projection

effects an increase of content .

7
When objects are projected , the power of awareness
as subject is presupposed , yet Consciousness -without-
an-ob i ect remains unchanged .

The projected objects become the experienced ob-

jects, and the latter appear to be a restricting environ-

ment . The restriction is a constant irritation, and thus

is the basis of the ubiquitous suffering which runs through

the worlds of objective experience . The ultimate effect

of this irritation is to arouse the latent power of con-

sciousness to be conscious of itself, an effect which

could not be developed where there is no seeming of

restriction placed upon the free play of consciousness .

Out of consciousness of the consciousness of objects

there is finally aroused the inverse realization of the

subjective principle . We thus find the substratum on

which all objects rest . By superimposing an objective

character upon this substratum we evolve the notion of

an ego having an atomic existence analogous to that of

objects, save that we give to it a fixed character in

contradistinction to the ever-changing character of all

genuine objects . The ego is thus produced as a compound

of the atomic nature of objects and the relatively death-

less persistence of pure subjectivity . But this atomic

ago is a false construction, and not the genuine sub-

jectivity . It is, in fact, but another object in the

universe of objects ; however, it is the peculiarly in-

vidious object whereby consciousness is especially bound .

The true Recognition of the pure Subject is some-

thing quite different, in that the Self must be so recog-

nized as never to become a new subtle object . It is that

which underlies all notions, but is never itself a notion .

The aphorism reasserts the immutability of Con-

sciousness -without-an-object . The point is that no degree

of development of consciousness in terms of content, or

in terms of the recognition of the subjective principle

has any effect upon the pure principle of Consciousness

per se .

When consciousness of objects is born , then, like-

wise , consciousness of absence of objects arises .

To be able to cognize any thing or object implies

the isolation of it from that which it is not . While the

degree to which this is accomplished does vary, yet the

isolation must have proceeded to some discernible degree

before an object can exist, either for thought or per-

ception . Where an object is completely defined, the

isolation is perfected . In that case, the universe of

discourse is divided into two classes, i .e ., the class

of those instances which fall within the limits of the

definition and the class of those which fall outside .

But always, in order to form any definition, there must

be a cognizance of the excluded class as well as of the

included class . This is a process which proceeds con-

tinuously on the part of all individuals whose conscious-

ness is concerned with objects in any sense , even in the

case of those with whom the process lies very largely in

the background where it is more or less 'unconscious' or

'subconscious' .
 To have reached the point in the evolution of

consciousness such that the cognition of the class of

all possible objects, in any sense whatsoever, is born,

is also to have attained at least a shadowy awareness

of absence of objects, in every sense, as a state or

condition which stands in contrast . This awareness of

the absence of objects, in its purity, is not a cognition

of an object, but another form of consciousness that is

not concerned with objects . However, a reflection of

this state of consciousness may be produced so that a

special cognition arises, of such a nature that its con-

tent is definable as the inverse of all objects . This

produces a sort of ideal world which is neither the uni-

verse of objects, proper, nor Nirvana, but one which par-

takes, in some measure, of the nature of both . This sort

of ideal creation is very well illustrated in mathematics

in connection with the development of the notions of

negative, imaginary, infinitesimal, and transfinite numbers .

All these may be regarded as of the nature of inverse cog-

nitions . But they are not, therefore, cognitions devoid

of meaning ; however, their meaning is of a more tran-

scendental and ineffable nature than that which is con-

nected with the original positive real numbers, parti-

cularly the integers, which have been significantly called

the natural numbers . These inverse numerical cognitions

have been not only valuable but, in some respects, even

necessary for the development of certain phases of Western

culture . They are unquestionably significant .

Now, when the awareness of the absence of objects

has become embodied in a sort of inverse concept, the

latter has a different kind of meaning as compared with

that of the direct cognitions from which they rose genetic-

ally . This meaning stands in purely symbolic relationship

to the inverse cognitions and lies outside the definitions,

in a sense and degree, which is not true of the meaning of

the direct cognitions, where the meaning in some degree or

some sense lies within the definition . There is a sense

in which we may say that we comprehend the direct cog-

nitions with their meanings in a non-mystical manner, but

in the case of the inverse cognitions the meaning is re-

alized only through mystical insight . If, however, the

inverse cognitions are interpreted as comprehensions in the

non-mystical sense , then we have merely created a subtle

sub-universe of objects, with the consequence that the

consciousness-principle has not destroyed its bondage to

objects, as such, but merely sublimated the field of objects .

None the less, such sublimation may very well mean progress

toward true Liberation . It may serve very much like a

scaffolding, from the upper platform of which the step

to true Liberation may be much facilitated .

 The kind of consciousness symbolized by the

system of inverse objects is of a totally different

quality from anything entering into ordinary relative

consciousness . It is an ineffable State of the type

realized in the higher mystical states of conscious-

ness or in Samadhi .

9
Consciousness of objects is the Universe .

In one sense , this aphorism may be viewed as a

definition of what is meant by the term "Universe" . It

is that domain of consciousness wherein a self is aware

of objects, the latter standing as opposed to, or in contra-

distinction to, the self that is aware of them . In this

sense the Universe is much more than that which is con-

noted by the term "physical universe", since it includes

as its field, in addition to waking physical conscious-

ness , the fields of all dream objects, of all objects of

the type which psychologists call "hallucinations" or hyp-

nagogic visions, and of any other objects, which may be

experienced during objective life or after death, that

there may be . In this sense, the psychical states in

which the phantasies, so-called, are experienced are

classed as part of the Universe .

 Since the whole field of Western science is

restricted to the study of the objects of consciousness,

it can never extend into that realm of consciousness which

is other than the universe . This science takes as its

most primary base of operation the subject-object rela-

tionship in the structure of consciousness . This fact,

at once, defines the limits of its field of possible

action . Such delimitation does not exclude the possi-

bility that science, in the Western sense, may develop

without limit in the particular dimension defined by the

subject-object relationship, but this science, as such,

is forever excluded from the dimensions of consciousness

not conditioned by the subject-object relationship . Nor

is science capable of critical evaluation of its own base,

as this base is the original 'given' with which it starts

and is implied in its own criticism . Competent criticism

of this base is possible only from that perspective which

is freed from exclusive dependence tLpon the subject-

object relationship .

10
y
Consciousness of the absence of objects is Nirvana .

Here it is necessary to employ a Sanskrit term

to suggest a meaning for which no Western term seems to

exist . By "Nirvana" is meant a somewhat which has been

peculiarly baffling to Western scholars , as is revealed

in the preponderant portion of the discussion of this

notion . The reason for this is not hard to find . It

lies in the-typically intense and exclusive polarization

of the Western mind toward the object of consciousness .

Even Western mystics have rarely attained a degree of

subjective penetration sufficient to reach the genuine

Nirvanic State . Western subjectivity scarcely means

more than a domain of subtle objects , even with most of

the mystics , and this is a domain still within the range

of meaning of "Universe ", as defined in the last aphorism .

Etymologically, "Nirvana" means " blown-out", and

this , in turn, carries the popular connotation of annihila-

tion . It is true that it does mean annihilation in a

sense, but it is the annihilation of a phase or way of

consciousness , not of the principle of consciousness, as

such . A careful study of the Buddhist canon reveals quite

clearly that Gautama Buddha never meant by "Nirvana"'the

destruction of the principle of consciousness , but only

of consciousness operating in a certain way .

As employed in the present aphorism , 11Nirvanatt

means : that state of consciousness wherein the self does

not stand in the relation to objects such that the self

is to be contrasted to, and aware of , objects . Only one

part of the meaning of " Nirvana"' is suggested in thin

aphorism, i .e ., that "Nirvana" designates the conscious-

ness wherein there is absence of objects . Yet the sub-

ject to consciousness is not here supposed annulled in

the deeper sense . Something of this quality of con-

sciousness, but generally not in its purity, is to be

found even in Western mysticism . It is revealed in the

expressions of the mystics, wherein they report realiza-

tion of identity between themselves and content of con-

sciousness . This content is so often mixed with an ob-

jective meaning that the mystical states in question must

be judged as not pure, but, rather, a blend of a degree

of the Nirvanic State with the typical consciousness of

the universe of objects . Yet always, with the mystic,

there is an ineffable substratum which he never succeeds

in more than suggesting in his expression . Often his

effort to do justice to this substratum leads to form-

ulation which simply does not make sense, when judged by

the canons :of subject-object language . The result is

that only a mystic really understands another mystic .

The ineffability of the genuinely mystical con-

sciousness is not due to an imperfect knowledge of

language on the part of the mystic . While many mystics

have had a very defective knowledge of language, and are

consequently especially obscure-, yet others have not been

so limited in their equipment . However, in either case,

the ineffable and obscure element remains . The fact is,

this ineffability can never be conveyed through language,

any more than an irrational number can be completely

equated to a rational number . All our language, as such,

is based upon the subject-object relationship . Thus, con-

sciousness which transcends that relationship cannot be

truly represented through language built upon that base .

Therefore, the expressions of the mystics must be regarded

as symbols, rather than as concepts which mean what they

are defined to mean and no more .

The pure Nirvanic State of Consciousness is a

Void, a Darkness , and a Silence, from the standpoint of

relative or subject-object consciousness . But taken on

its ; own level it is an extremely rich state of conscious-

ness which is anything but empty . It cannot be conceived,

but must be realized directly to be known .

11

Within Consciousness-without-an-object lie both

the Universe and Nirvana, yet to Consciousness-
without-an-object these two are the same .

Superficially considered, nothing may seem more

incomprehensible than a state, of consciousness from which

two dissimilar states, such as the Universe and Nirvana,

have the same value . But, actually, the difficulty is

not so great when once analysis has led to the realization

that consciousness, as such, is unaffected by superimposed

states or forms . Neither the Nirvani nor the man in the

Universe are outside of Consciousness , as an abstract

and universal principle . If a conception from mathe-

matics may be borrowed , it may be said that the Universe

and Nirvana have the same modulus but are different in

sense . The notions of "modulus" and "sense ", as employed

in mathematics , have the following meaning : In the series

of positive and negative numbers we have an unlimited num-

ber of pairs of numbers having the same absolute magnitude,

but of opposite signs .2 In this case , it is said that the

members of such pairs have the same modulus but are opposite

in sense . Applying this analogy , the modulus which is

common to both the Nirvanic State and to consciousness

in the Universe is the common quality of being Conscious -

ness . The difference in "sense" refers to the opposed

qualities of being objectively polarized , in the case of

consciousness in the Universe , and subjectively polarized,

in the Nirvanic State . Now, when the "modulus" of a number

alone is important , then the positive and negative " sense"

of the number is irrelevant and, therefore , may be regarded

as having the same significance . By applying this analogy,

the meaning of the aphorism should become clearer .

There is a profound Level of Realization wherein

the two states of the Universe of Objects and Nirvana,

instead of seeming like forever separated domains , become

interblended co-existences . In other words, at that

Level of Recognition, consciousness of objects and con-

sciousness of absence of objects are known to be mutually

complementary states, the one dependent upon the other,

S
just as the notion of negative numbers it dependent upon

the notion of positive numbers, and vice versa . And just

as the student of mathematics very soon reaches the point

where the notion of number, as such, comprehends the posi-

tive and negative "sense" of number, so that he no longer

thinks of two distinct domains of number, so, also, is it

at that higher Level of Recognition . Nirvana and the

Universe of objects are simply phases of a more ultimate

Reality .

Consciousness-without-an-object is not simply con-

sciousness of absence of objects . It is THAT which is

neutral with respect to the presence or absence of objects .

As such, IT stands in a position of Indifference to this

presence or absence . In contrast, the consciousness of

absence has a positive affective quale , just as truly as

is the case with the consciousness of presence of objects,

and this is not a state of indifference . The actuality of

positive affective quale both during presence and absence

may be noted by studying the effect produced after the

performance of a fine musical composition . If a period

of silence is allowed to follow the performance, and the

listener notes the effects upon his consciousness, he

will find that there is a development of musical value

in that silence . Actually , this value has a greater

richness for feeling than the music had as audible sound .

Further , that silence is not like any other silence, but

on the contrary has an affective quale that is specific-

ally related to the particular composition that has been

rendered . We may call this the nirvanic aspect of the

given musical selection . Now, Nirvana , as a whole , stands

in analogous relationship to the totality of the Universe

of Objects . The Universe of Objects is an affective

privation , which becomes a corresponding affective rich-

ness in the Nirvanic Aspect . Also, the form-bound know-

ledge of the Universe of Objects becomes the free-flowing

Gnosis, having inconceivably rich noetic content . But

Consciousness -without-an-object stands in neutral re-

lationship to both these aspects .

In the strict sense , from the standpoint of Con-

sciousness - without-an-object , objects are neither present

nor absent . Presence or absence has meaning only from a

lower level . The older notion of space , as being that

which is affected neither by the presence nor absence of

bodies , suggests the idea .

 12
Within Consciousness -without-an-object
lies the seed of Time .

Although consciousness -as-experience is time-

bound , Consciousness , as such , is superior to time .

That this is so is revealed in the fact that intel-

lectual consciousness has been able to isolate and

cognize time , and then, in turn ,, analyse it into its

component parts as past , present , and future . This is

further evidenced in analytic mechanics wherein time

appears as a contained conception . It is impossible to

analyse that which is superior to the level on which,

in a given case at a given time, the consciousness-

principle is operating . The roots of any mode or form

of consciousness are dark with respect to that particular

mode or form . If, at any time , consciousness becomes

aware of those roots and succeeds in analysing them, it

is of necessity implied that the principle of conscious-

ness has risen to a perspective superior to the mode of

consciousness in question . Thus , while consciousness-as-

experience is time -bound , yet, as thought , it has risen

to a level where it can apprehend the time -binding roots .

In this instance , we do not have to call upon the deeper

mystic states of consciousness to reach to the necessary

superiority of level . It is to be found in philosophy

and theoretical mechanics . This is enough to show that
consciousness , as such, is not time -bound but only con-

sciousness -as-experience .

Time is thus to be regarded as a form under which

certain modes of consciousness operate , but not as an

external existence, outside of consciousness in every

sense . This idea is sufficiently familiar since the time

of Kant not to require extensive elaboration . In the

terms of Kant , time is a transcendental form imposed upon

phenomena . But, it follows , consciousness , insofar as

it is not concerned with phenomena , is not so bound .

The "seed of Time" may be thought of as the pos-

sibility of time . Time is an eternal possibility within

Consciousness-without-an-object . Time is not to be thought

of as something suddenly brought to birth, for the notion

of "suddenly" presupposes time . On the time-bound level,

time is without conceivable beginning or end . It is in

the deeps of consciousness that time is transcended . It

is quite possible so to penetrate these deeps that it is

found that no difference of significance attaches to the

notions of an "instant of time" or "incalculable ages of

time" . Yet, all the while on its own level, time continues

to be a binding form . We have here one of the greatest

of mysteries .
 Through time it is possible to reconcile judgments

that would otherwise be contradictory . This principle

is so familiar as not to require elucidation . But he

who reaches in Recognition to Consciousness-without-an-

object finds that the logical law of contradiction no

longer applies .3 Judgments which otherwise would stand

in contradictory relationships are brought into recon-

ciliation without the mediation of time . This is an even

greater mystery than the mystery of time .

13
When awareness cognizes Time then knowledge
of Timelessness is born .

This aphorism exemplifies another application of

the principle which governs the action of consciousness

that was discussed in the commentary on aphorism number 8 .

We are able to recognize time as a distinct form only when

we are able to isolate it from what it is not . This is

done not only in philosophy , but, as well , in many of the

theoretical constructions of science . In these cases,

however , we have an isolation for thought . The immensely

important philosophical question then arises as to how

far, or in what way, a necessity or possibility for thought

or for reason is likewise an actuality . This question

is so fundamental that it seems advisable to discuss it

at some length .
 The issue involved here is essentially identical

with that present in the ontological argument for the

existence of a Supreme Being . This argument is based

upon the assumption that the existence of an idea implies

the existence of a reality corresponding to it . Hence

the idea of a Supreme Being implies that such a Being is!

The analysis to which Kant submitted this argument is a

classic in philosophical criticism, and it is generally

felt that Kant has, once for all, undermined the force of

this argument . Yet, despite all this, it continues to

have psychological force and has reappeared more than

once since Kant ' s time .

The aphorisms and the philosophy surrounding them

do not makeuse of the notion of a Supreme Being , though

they leave open the possibility of evolved Beings that may

very well be regarded as God-like when contrasted to man . 4

But this philosophy establishes its base upon the reality

of a Transcendental Principle . Hence , the essential

problem involved in the analysis of the ontological argu-

ment arises here . So, to bring this question out into

clear form the following quotation is taken from Kant :

"Our conception of an object may thus con-

tain whatever and how much it will ; neverthe-

less we must ourselves stand away from the con-

ception, in order to bestow existence upon it .

This happens with sense-objects through the

 connection with any one of our perceptions

in accordance with empirical laws ; but for

objects of pure thought there is no sort of

means for perceiving their existence because

it is wholly a priori that they can be known ;

our consciousness of all existence, however,

belongs altogether to a unity of experience

and an existence outside this field cannot

absolutely be explained away as impossible .

But it is a supposition we have no means of

justifying ."

Let us , for the present purpose , assume the general

validity of this argument . Then, in simple terms, the

conclusion reached is that for an object of the reason

or thought to have, or correspond to, an existence, in

any other sense , that existence must be determined through

some other mode of consciousness . In the case of experi-

ence , the senses perform this necessary function , in that

sense -impression is necessary to determine experiential

existence . At the close of the quotation, Kant admits

that the possibility of a non-experiential existence can-

not be denied , but goes on to say that we have no means

of justifying this supposition . Now, so far as the field

of consciousness which is the proper field of physical'

science is concerned , Kant ' s conclusion seems to be valid

enough . But the domain of consciousness comprehended by

science is only a part of the sum -total of all possible

consciousness . Once this is granted , then , in principle,

it must be admitted that the supposition of a non-

experiential or transcendent existence or reality can

possibly be justified . Epistemological logic does not

rule out this possibility ; it simply establishes the point

that by means of pure conceptions and logic alone, tran-

scendental existences or realities cannot be proved .

In the present philosophy , all effort to establish

such a proof is abandoned . Logic and analysis of con-

sciousness are employed simply to build a reasonable pre-

sumption , without laying any claim to coercive demonstra-

tion . It is, however , asserted that direct extra logical

and extra-empirical verification is possible . All of this

implies that there is a way of consciousness which is not,

on the one hand , to be regarded as presentation through

the senses , or in the form of conceptions , on the other .

Nor, further , is it to be regarded as no more than af-

fective and conative attitude . It is , rather , a way of

consciousness which sleeps in most men , but has become

awakened and active in the case of a small minority, which

is to be found represented by individuals scattered thinly

throughout the whole span of history . This way of con-

sciousness has been known by different designations, but in

the West it is most commonly called "mystical insight" .

 In introducing this notion of another way of con-

sciousness, called "mystical insight", certain obvious

difficulties arise, owing to its not being a commonly

active mode of consciousness . The individual in whom

this insight is sleeping is necessarily quite incapable

of evaluating it directly . To be sure, he may study the

phenomena connected with the mystical function, as ex-

emplified in historic personalities, as has been done by

some psychologists . But this is a very different matter

from the direct epistemological evaluation of the noetic

content of the mystical insight .5 A work like that of

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason can be accomplished only

by a man who finds in the operation of his own conscious-

ness the very contents that he is analysing . The study of

the forms and processes of consciousness is, of necessity,

only in subordinate degree a matter for observation . In

the present case it depends preeminently upon the intro-

ceptive penetration . As a result, the psychologist, who

is not himself also a mystic, is not competent in this

field, for he of necessity judges from the base of a con-

sciousness operating through the senses and the forms of

the intellectual understanding alone, so far as cognitive

content is concerned . Recognizing this difficulty, I have

abandoned in the present work the effort to force agree-

ment by means of logic and reference to a widely common

ground of experience .
 However, the possibility of a noetic insight must

be indicated . The chapter on "A Mystical Unfoldment" was

introduced early in this work to meet that need . Admit-

tedly the reader is in a difficult position when it comes

to the question of evaluation of the honesty and competency

of the writer . in the forming of his interpretations in this

chapter . But there simply is no way of presenting .the

material and processes of mystical insight in terms that

are generally objective . The record of historic instances

of mystical insight which have led to the formulation of a

noetic meaning adds to the presumption of the validity of

the insight, but does not help the reader directly unless

he, too, has known at least some modicum of the mystical

sense . Consequently, all that can be asked of the general

reader is that he entertain the idea of the possibility of

mystical insight, and then judge the philosophic conse-

quences from that base .

It is predicated here that one important consequence,

which does follow, is that an existence or reality outside

the field of experience through the senses can be justified

directly without falling into the error of the ontological

argument . It would follow that Kant's Critique of Pure

Reason is , in principle, valid only with respect to the

relationship between the understanding and the material

given empirically through the senses . But mystical in-

sight gives another order of material or viewpoint which,

also, in combination with the understanding has noetic

value . Undoubtedly there are problems concerning possibly

valid and false interpretations here , analogous to those

that arise in the relationship between understanding and

experience through the senses , that Kant treated ;rso tren-

chantly . But only the mystic who is also a critical philo-

sopher could possibly be qualified to handle these . In

this domain Kant hardly seems to qualify , for his is the

scientific , rather than mystical, mind .

Once it is granted that there are two domains from

which the material filling of conceptual consciousness may

be derived, instead of the one through the senses alone,

then the field of cognition has a three -fold, instead of

a two-fold , division . There would then be the domain of

pure understanding or conceptual thought in a sort of

neutral position , with material through the senses stand-

ing on one side , and material or viewpoint from mystical

insight on the other . This, in turn , would lead to some-

thing like a division in understanding , which may be called

the higher and lower phases of intellection . Another con-

sequence is that some men may have the lower phase of in-

tellection , which operates in connection with the material

given through the senses , developed in high degree, and

yet remain quite blind to the higher phase . More than

extensive scholarship or superior scientific ability is

required to awaken recognition of the higher phase . On

the other hand, there is a considerable dearth of superior

intellectual training among those who are, in some measure,

awakened to the higher phase of intellection, though

history affords us some brilliant exceptions . Thus,

there are not many who realize that here, too, is a

problem for critical philosophy .

In any case, the aphorisms must be taken as material

derived from mystical insight . As a consequence, their

verification in the full sense is possible only from the

perspective of a similar insight . Logic and experience

can provide only a partial presumption for them, at best,

and that is all that is attempted in these commentaries .

14

To be aware of Time is to be aware of the Universe,

and to be aware of the Universe is to be aware of Time .

This aphorism emphasizes the interdependence of

consciousness under the form of time and of consciousness

of objects . Formerly, in the days when our scientific

thought was governed by the Newtonian mechanics, we were

in the habit of regarding time, space , and matter as three

independent existences . Explicitly, Newton held the view

that these three were not interdependent . However, as

knowledge of the subtler phases of physical nature has

grown , it has become evident that this view is no longer

tenable . The new relativity, which has been largely

developed through the insight and coordinating thought

of Albert Einstein , definitely asserts the interdependence

of these three notions of time , space, and matter . Now,

while this integrating conception was developed to unify

actually existent knowledge of physical fact, it is, at

the same time , the formulation of a profound metaphysical

principle . The notion of time is meaningless apart from

the notion of change . Further, there is no change save

in connection with objects . Thus , at once , it should be-

come clear that awareness of objects implies change and,

consequently , time , while on the other hand time becomes

existent only in connection with objects .

It should be clearly understood that the ground

on which this aphorism is based is not the above theory

of mathematical physics, but is genuinely transcendental .

However , the physical theory is a beautiful illustration

of the essential idea .

15
To realize Timelessness is to attain Nirvana .

In this work the terms " realize" and " realization"

are used in a special sense , which is to be clearly dis-

tinguished from "perception" and "conception " . Whereas .

the latter two terms refer to a relationship between a

self and objects, whether in the form of sense objects

or ideas, the terms "realize" and "realization" are em-

ployed to designate a mode of consciousness wherein there

is identity between the self and content, in other words,

a state of consciousness not concerned with objects in

objective relation . Thus "realization" means a mystical

state . The Nirvanic State is not something conceived or

perceived, though it is possible to conceive or perceive

a symbol which means the Nirvanic State . If the latter

possibility did not exist, it would be impossible to say

anything at all in reference to Nirvana .

The realization of Timelessness should not be con-

fused with the concept of timelessness which frequently

occurs in philosophy, nor with the notion of simultaneity

which is employed in classical theoretical mechanics . In

the case of the mere concept of timelessness, the thinking

and experiencing self is actually, in terms of awareness,

moving within the time-world of objects . Thus his creating

of the concept is a time- process . In this case, the self

is not fused into identity with that which it has con-

ceived . But when genuine realization has been attained,

the self is found identical with Timelessness . The dif-

ference here is of crucial importance, though one that is

difficult to convey adequately with ideas . Not only is it

not merely "knowledge about", but it is an even more in-

timate state than "knowledge through acquaintance", such

as . that which comes through immediate experience . It is,

rather, a state of "Knowledge through Identity" . This

consciousness has a peculiar quality which is quite in-

effable, but it may be suggested in the following way :

If we may regard all concepts and percepts as being a

sort of "thin" consciousness of surfaces only, then the

state of realization would be like a "thick"--substantial--

consciousness extending into the "depth" dimension . All

presentation and representation deals with surfaces only,

and all expression in its direct meaning is solely of this

nature, whatever its symbolic reference may be . But the

realization gives "depth-value" immediately . It may,

therefore, be called substantial in a sense that may never

be predicated of mere presentations or representations .

This "depth-value" actually feeds that which some modern

psychologists have called the "psyche" . On the other hand,

mere experience and intellection do not supply this nutritive

value . They may arouse self-consciousness and afford some-

thing which has the value of control, but they do not them-

selves give sustenance .

To attain the Nirvanic State is to reach the source

of sustenance for the psyche . This is the genuine goal

of the religious effort, however inadequately that goal
may be envisaged in the majority of religious conceptions
and programs . Religion is concerned with the sustenance

of the psyche ; it is a search for a durable "Manna" .

To realize Timelessness is to transcend the tragic

drama of Time . Time is tragic because it destroys the

beloved object, and because it is constantly annulling

the unused possibilities . In the Timeless State there

is none of this tragedy ; hence it is a State of Bliss

without alloy . But Bliss without alloy is simply another

name for Nirvana .

16

But for Consciousness -without- an-object there

is no difference between Time and Timelessness .

This is another instance wherein the meaning is

more easily seen by consideration of the fact that Con-

sciousness as a principle is unaffected by the nature of

content or state . But this is not the whole meaning of

the aphorism, for Consciousness-without-an-object is not

merely an analytic abstraction from the totality of common

consciousness . It is also a symbol of That which may be

directly realized . On the level of That there is no dif-

ferentiation of Significance . In other words, it is

neutral with respect to Meaning as well as to affective

value . It is a level above all relative valuation, both

in the affective and noetic senses,. Stated in another way,

all differentiation has the same significance, and this

significance is simply irrelevancy .

Consciousness-without-an-object represents all pos-

sibilities, but is specifically identified with no partic-

ular possibility . If IT were especially close to any one

tendency, then IT would cease to be perfectly neutral .

Thus all judgment or valuation lies on some lesser level,

wherein the principle of relativity operates . But this

lesser level depends upon the superior for its possibility

and existence .

17
Within Consciousness-without-an-object lies
the seed of the world-containing Space .

"Space" is a generic concept, as there are many

kinds of space . Thus the perspective-space of the eye

has characteristics quite different from those of the

space with which the engineer works . The latter is

generally the familiar Euclidian space . But, whereas

we formerly thought that the Euclidian space was the

sole real space, today we know there are many kinds of

space . Most of these exist only for mathematics, but

within our own day we have seen one of these purely

mathematical spaces become adapted to the uses of math-

ematical physics . So, now the notion of a multiplicity

of types of spaces is definitely extended beyond the

domain of pure mathematics .

 In the present aphorism, the reference is to the

space in which all objects seem to exist . In the broadest

sense , this is not a single space, but several sorts of

spaces, all having in common the property of containing

objects . Two of these spaces which are generally familiar

are, (a ) the ordinary space of waking consciousness, in

which all physical bodies from the stars to the electrons

rest, and (b) the spaces of the dream-world, wherein dis-

tance takes on quite a different meaning . It is character-

istic of these spaces, at least as far as we are commonly

familiar with them, that distance and quantity are sig-

nificant notions . Such notions, however, are not essential

to space as such , as is revealed in the mathematical inter-

pretation of space as "degrees of freedom" .6

Space is to be regarded as the framework or field

of each particular level of differentiated consciousness .

The world-containing space is that framework in which

objects appear . The normal framework of the space of

waking consciousness vanishes for the dream-state, and a

space having discernibly different properties replaces it .

The latter is a space filled with objects quite distinguish-

able from the objects filling the space of waking con-

sciousness, even though they may be related . Different

laws of relationship and operation apply .

-261-
 The superiority of consciousness to a specific

space is revealed in the fact that the external space

of waking consciousness can be annulled by the simple

act of going to sleep . The dream space is annulled by

the reverse process of waking to the external space .

This fact, which is part of the common experience of

all men, is of profound significance, for it reveals

the over-lordship of the principle of consciousness with

respect to these two kinds of space . It is a constant

reminder that, in reality, man as a conscious being is

not bound to the space which defines the form of his

experiencing or thinking while in a particular state .

The delusion of bondage is truly a sort of auto-hypnosis,

produced through man's predicating of himself as a sub-

jective consciousness-principle those spatial dependencies

which apply only to objects, including his own body . In

reality, the consciousness-principle supports and con-

tains the universe, instead of the reverse being true,

as commonly supposed .

The world-containing space is derived from, and

is dependent upon, Consciousness -without-an-object . The

latter comprehends the former, both as potentiality and

as actuality .
 18

When awareness cognizes the world-containing

Space the knowledge of the Spatial Void is born .

As the underlying principle of the complementary

or inverse awareness has already been discussed in the

commentaries on aphorisms 8 and 13, it will not be fur-

ther considered here . Our attention will be devoted to

the meaning of the Spatial Void .

The Spatial Void stands in polar relationship to

the world-containing Space . The latter is preeminently

a space with content involving the notions of quantity

and distance . The Spatial Void is without content and

involves no notion of quantity and distance . The more

qualitative spaces of mathematics suggest the idea . It

is predominantly Space as Freedom , and not space as restrain-

ing and constricting form . Any differentiation which

would apply here would be analogous to that which attaches

to the notion of trans :finite numbers , and not like the

sharply bound differentia of finite manifolds .

.The direct realization of Consciousness as the

Spatial Void has an inconceivably lofty value . It is a

state in which the lonely self has found its own other

in the fullest possible sense . Symbolically expressed,

it is as though the lonely self, regarded as a bare point,

had suddenly been metamorphosed into an unlimited space,
wherein content -value and the subject --the "I"--were

completely fused and co-extensive . More commonly, this

is expressed as union with God . The latter statement

is sound enough so long as it is understood as a symbol

and does not assume an arbitrary pre-interpretation . The

Reality realized is Presence , in the sense of envelopment

in the Eternal Other . This is the final resolution of all

the problems of the tragic life in the world . It is the

Terminal Value , with respect to which all consciousness

concerned with objects is of instrumental significance only .

19
To be aware of the world-containing Space
is to be aware of the Universe of Ob .iects .

This aphorism asserts the interdependence of our

ordinary space and the objects contained within it . This

involves a departure from the older Newtonian view wherein

space was regarded as independent of the presence or ab-

sence of objects . While it is possible to conceive such

a space , it would be a space taken in a different sense

from that of the world-containing space . The view developed'

in the new relativity is consonant with the present aphorism,

for in this latter theory matter and space are viewed as

interdependent . This space is not simply an empty abstrac-

tion but actually has what might be called a substantial

quality . Thus , .the very form or "properties " of the space

It affected by the degree in which matter is concentrated

in different portions of it . It becomes warped in the

vicinity of large stellar bodies, so that the shortest

distance between two points is no longer a straight line,

in the old sense , but a curved line, analogous to an arc

of a great circle on the surface of a sphere . Modern

astro -physics has even developed the idea of an expanding

space, implying therewith the possibility of a contracting

space . This notion, at the very least, renders intelligible

and plausible in physical terms the ancient notion of a

pulsating universe on the analogy of a great breath .

Once we have the notion of a space expanding with

the matter , which is co-extensive with it , and the con-

sequent possibility of its contraction in another phase

of the life-history of matter, then there at once emerges

the further implication of the dependence of matter-space

upon a somewhat still more ultimate . For pulsation implies

a matrix in which it inheres . In these aphorisms, that

matrix is symbolized by Consciousness-without-an-object .

The objective phase of the pulsation, that which is marked

especially by the expanding of the universe, is the state

of consciousness polarized toward objects . The contracting

phase develops while consciousness is being progressively

withdrawn from objects . This may be viewed first as the

macrocosmic picture --a process in the grand cosmos . The

same principle applies to the microcosmic or individual

consciousness .

These two senses are not generally distinguished

in these commentaries , as the latter are concerned with

general principles that may be applied in either sense .

Thus , what is said may be interpreted either in reference

to an individualized human consciousness, or to conscious-

ness in the more comprehensive sense .

20

To realize the Spatial Void is to

awaken to Nirvanic Consciousness .

This aphorism effects a further expansion of the

meaning of Nirvana . The latter may be viewed as a spatial

consciousness , but not in the sense of a world -containing

space . Nirvanic Consciousness is not to be regarded as

simply the total consciousness of the manifested universe .

If such a total consciousness could be envisaged , it would

be very appropriate to call it Cosmic Consciousness, and

it would stand as a whole , in contradistinction to Nirvanic

Consciousness . These two , Nirvanic Consciousness and Cosmic

Consciousness , would contrast in the relation of polariza-

tion , analogous to the familiar polarity of subject and

object . In spatial symbols , the polarity is between the

world-containing Space and the Spatial Void .
 Now, a more complete interpretation of the pulsation

noted in the last commentary becomes possible . The expan-

sion of the world-containing Space corresponds to contrac-

tion of consciousness in the sense of the Spatial Void,

or a reduction of consciousness concerned with the Self,

while there is an expansion of consciousness in the field

of objects . In psychological terms, it is the predominantly

extraverted phase . While in such a cosmically expansive

phase, the balance of human consciousness , as of all other

consciousness , is bound to be predominantly extraverted,

yet particular individuals may be relatively only more or

less extraverted . In this setting, the so-called intro-

verted individuals are only relatively introverted, and

cannot be predominantly introverted so long as they possess

physical bodies . To become predominantly introverted is

to cease to exist objectively and, thus, to have conscious-

ness centered in the Spatial Void or Nirvana .

For most individuals the centering of consciousness

in the Spatial Void is a state like dreamless,sleep, in

other words, a psychical state which analytic psychology

has called the "Unconscious" . In this philosophy this

state is not viewed as unconscious in the unconditional

sense, but is conceived as a state of consciousness which

is not conscious of itself, and, therefore, indistinguishable

from unconsciousness from the subject-object standpoint .

It is possible , however , to transfer the principle of

self-consciousness into the Spatial Void, in which case

it is no longer a state like dreamless sleep . But this

is not an easy step to effect , as it requires a high

development of the principle of self- consciousness, com-

bined with its isolation from the object . If, in . the case

of a given individual , this power is sufficiently developed,

beyond the average of the race , it is possible for such a

one to become focused in the Spatial Void , in advance of

the race as a whole . 'When this is actually accomplished,

the individual is faced with two possibilities . Either he

may then become locked in the Spatial Void, in a'sense

analogous to that of the binding of most men to the universe

of objects , or he may acquire the power to move his con-

sciousness freely between the world -containing Space and

the Spatial Void . In the latter case , the individual's

base is neither the universe of objects nor Nirvana, but

lies in THAT which comprehends both these . The latter

is here symbolized by Consciousness -without-an-object,

which is neither introverted nor extraverted , but occupies

a neutral position between these two accentuations .

 21

But for Consciousness -without-an-object

there is no difference between the world-
containing Space and the Spatial Void .

In one sense there is no difference because Space

or Consciousness , in either sense , is irrelevant . From

the standpoint of a profound metaphysical perspective,

both are irrelevant, as the just forgotten dream is ir-

relevant to the consciousness of the man who has awakened

from sleep . Yet, while dreaming, the dream was real enough

to the dreamer . We can thus distinguish a sense in which

we would say the dream is not, i .e ., from the perspective

of the awakened consciousness for which it has been for-

gotten, yet, at the same time , in another sense , for the

dreamer while dreaming, the dream is a real existence .

Shifting now to the highest transcendental sense, we can

say that both the world-containing Space and the Spatial

Void both are and are not . In the sense that from the

level of Consciousness-without-an-object both the universe

of objects and Nirvana are not, there is no difference

between them .
It is possible for an individual to achieve a state

wherein consciousness is so divided that in one aspect

of that divided consciousness he realizes the irrelevance

or essential non-existence of both Nirvana and the universe

of objects, while at the same time in another aspect of

that consciousness .he is aware of the relative and inter-

dependent reality of these two grand phases of conscious-

ness . The synthetic judgment from this level of dual con-

sciousness would be : "The universe of objects and Nirvana

both are and are not ." There is something here that can

be realized immediately, but which defeats every effort

of the intellective consciousness to capture and represent

in really intelligible terms . However, there can be no

doubt of the superior authority of the State of Realization

itself, for the individual who has acquaintance with it .

To be sure, intellectual dialectic may confuse and veil

the memory of the immense authority of the Realization,

but this veiling process has no more significance than the

power of the ordinary dream to_veil the judgment of the

waking state . Whereas the dream is generally something

inferior to the waking intellectual judgment, the Realiza-

tion has a transcendent superiority with respect to the

latter . But can the intellectual consciousness of the

man who has had no glimpse of the Realization be convinced

of this? It is certainly quite difficult for the dreamer,

while dreaming, to realize the purely relative existence

of his dream . Has the waking intellectual judgment a

superior capacity with respect to the acknowledgment of

its own Transcendental Roots?

 22

Within Consciousness-without-an-
object lies the seed of Law .

Consciousness-without-an-object is not Itself

law-bound or law-determined . It is rather the Root-

source of all law, as of all else . Thus, when by means

of Recognition an individual self is brought into direct

realization of Consciousness-without-an-object, it is

found that that most fundamental of all laws, the law

of contradiction, no longer applies . Here no affirma-

tion is a denial of the possibility of its contradictory .

Also, Consciousness-without-an-object is that excluded

middle which is neither A nor not-A . Hence, the actuality

which Consciousness-without-an-object symbolizes is un-

thinkable, and so in order to think toward IT a think-

able symbol must be employed .

All law, conceived as law of nature, or of con-

sciousness in its various forms and states, or of re-

lationships, is dependent upon law of thought . For such

states of consciousness as there may be in which there

is no thought, in any sense, there is no awareness of

law, and, hence, no existence of law within the content

of such states . But for a thinking consciousness which

contains or is associated with those states, the opera-

tion of law is realized . Thus we may regard a law-bound

domain as a thought -bound domain , though such thought

is not necessarily restricted to the familiar form com-

monly known to men . This implies , among other con-

sequences , that there is no universe , save for a thinker .

23

When consciousness of objects is

born the Law is invoked as a Force
tending ever toward Equilibrium .

The school of English Empiricism performed a

fundamental service for philosophy , in a negative way,

by trying to interpret the mind as an empty tablet on

which uncolored impressions from objects were imprinted .

The culmination of this line of thought was finally

achieved by Kant when he demonstrated that the only

way to avoid absolute agnosticism was through the recog-

nition of a positive contribution by the mind itself,

that is , a contribution not derived from experience,

however much experience might be necessary for arousing

this factor into action . Kant showed that , part passu

with the development of awareness of objects through

the senses , there was aroused knowledge of a form within

which the objects were organized as a whole of experience .

This "organization as a whole of experience " is simply

the principle of Law in the general sense .

 The most fundamental meaning of Law is Equili-
brium . For equilibrium is that which distinguishes'a
cosmos from a chaos . The very essence of the notions
of "law" and "equilibrium " is contained in the notion

of "invariant " . The counter notion is that of an

"absolutely formless flux" . If we abstract from ex-

perience all the notion of law , then all that is left

is such a formless flux , devoid of all meaning . This

would be a state of absolute nescience . Therefore, the

existence of any knowledge , or of any dependability in

consciousness , implies the presence of law . But the

moment that we apprehend an object as object , we have

invoked both knowledge and dependability . This is shown

in the fact that the apprehension of an object implies

the subject , which stands in relation to the object .

Thus, Law appears as subject -object relationship . Now,

at once, the factor of Equilibrium is apparent , for op-

posed to the object stands the complementary principle

of the subject .

Laws are not discovered in nature , considered

as something apart from all consciousness . Rather it

is the truth that organized nature is a product of think-

ing consciousness . In a profound sense , the Law is known

before it is empirically discovered . This is revealed

in the fact , noted by psychology, that law-formations

are developed out of "phantasy " processes . In notable

instances , as in the case of Riemann , a form principle

was evolved as a purely phantastic geometrical construc-

tion, which several decades later supplied the form for

Einstein ' s general theory of relativity , to which current

physical experience conforms better than it does to any

preceding theory . The form which a given law takes when

constructed in relation to a certain segment of empiric

determination may be , and generally seems to be , inadequate .

However, this should not be understood as implying the

merely approximate or pragmatic character of Law per se .

It should rather be understood as an imperfect objective

apprehension of the law , ' known' prior to experience .

The real Knowledge of Law lies somewhere in what the

analytic psychologist calls the " Unconscious" . Man is

born with this hidden knowledge , which rises more or less

imperfectly to the surface as an intuition . Even when

scientific laws are interpreted as the product of a rela-

tive purpose , the notion of Law in the deeper sense is

presupposed . For the affirmation of a productive rela-

tionship between purpose and the scientific law implies

a deeper Law , whereon faith in that productive relation-

ship rests . Even the Pragmatist rests upon a base of

a non- pragmatic Assurance , however little the latter

may be in the foreground of consciousness .
 24

All objects exist as tensions within

Consciousness -without-an-object that
tend ever to flow into their own com-
plements or others .

The principle involved here is illustrated by

the law in psychology known as "enanteodromia" . This

is the law that any psychical state tends to be trans-

formed into its opposite . The operation of this law is

most evident in the case of those individuals who are

extremely one-sided , since they manifest correspondingly

exaggerated reversal of phase . But the principle always

operates , even in the most balanced natures , though in

these cases the two phases are conjoined and function

together .

The operation of the principle can be observed

quite widely. Thus , growth is balanced by decay, birth

by death , light by darkness , evolution by the reverse

process of involution , etc . A particularly impressive

illustration is afforded by the interaction of electrons

and positrons when coming into conjunction . Here we have

a flow of phase into counter-phase , resulting in mutual

cancellation and the production of a different state of

matter . The dialectic logic of Hegel is a systematic

application of this principle .

No object of consciousness is stable --remaining

ever the same --but is , on the contrary , a state of tension

which tends to transform into its complement . Con-

sciousness -without-an-object is the universal solvent

within which the centers of tension, or objects, have

their field of play . All tendency in that play is

counterbalanced by its counter-tendency, the culmina-

ting effect being an expression equated to zero . It

is the zero which symbolizes the durable Reality, or

Consciousness-without-an-object . Within the field of

Consciousness -without -an-object , in principle, any

creative tension may be produced , but, unavoidably,

the counter -tension is invoked . This is the reason

why all creativeness involves .a resistance which ren-

ders every construction something more than merely what

one chooses that it should be . From this there results

the positive consequence that any construction , however

phantastic, when taken in conjunction with its counter-

phase, is true , while every construction whatsoever,

when taken in isolation from its counter-phase, is

false . Thus ,' if the initial construction is even the

most phantastic conceivable , and as far as possible

from that which is generally regarded as reality,

nevertheless , if the counter-phase is given full recog-

nition , the resultant is durable Truth .' While, on the

other hand , if the original construction is in terms

of the generally conceded objective material, and
grounded in the most careful observation , but is not

taken in conjunction with the counter-phase , the re-

sultant effect is a false conception and, if believed

in, produces a state of real delusion . In this way,

it is possible for the so -called practical and scientific

man to occupy an essentially false position, while some

highly introvert poet, who lives quite aloof from the

so-called world of real experience and who allows the

initial impulse of his imagination the greatest pos-

sible freedom , but who , at the same time , carefully '

regards and incorporates the counter-phase of his
J
phantasy , will render manifest profound and lasting

Truth . Now, all this leads to a very important con-

sequence , namely, that starting from any state of con-

sciousness whatsoever it is possible to arrive at the

final and durable Reality and Truth , provided that the

resources of the counter -phase are incorporated in the

self- conscious consciousness . Thus , no particular merit

attaches to that peculiarly valued phase of consciousness--

the extroverted phase of the so-called practical and

scientific man--as a starting point for the attainment

of the Real . This base may serve as an effective start-

ing point , but, equally well, may any other . In fact,

it is quite possible that some present inmate of a_

psychiatric institution may out -distance all the philis-

tines in the world who pride themselves on their - sanity .

 25

The ultimate effect of the flow of all

objects into their complements is mutual
cancellation in complete Equilibrium .

The illustration of the positron and the electron

applies here . The state of each of these units, by

itself, may be regarded as one of tension, hence one

is called a positive and the other a negative charge

of electricity . For such isolated charges there can

be no rest, as each is driven ceaselessly toward its

own complement . So long as the goal of mutual fusion

is not effected, they operate as the dynamic forces

which underlie the existence of ponderable matter .

But because these units are in a state of tension, no

ponderable matter can remain stable . It is subject to

the disruption which results when the positive and

negative charges are fused . The labor of these charges

to gain the goal of fusion may be regarded as one aspect

of the dynamic force which manifests as evolution . To

such extent as the fusion is effected, visible evolution

terminates and ponderable matter vanishes . The resultant

of the fusion is a flash of radiation . The latter may

be regarded as the Nirvanic State of matter, for the

radiant state is one of freedom and equilibrium .

The radiant state of matter is just another name

for light . Now, while there is a wide range of wave-

length and wave -rate in the known scale of light-octaves,

there is one constant element which has become highly

significant in modern physical theory, and that is the

velocity of light . Regardless of wave -length, all light

travels at uniform velocity . Here we have a fact in-

timately related to the principle of equilibrium--a

most important invariant . When ponderable matter finally

vanishes, it enters a state subject to this invariant .

Wave-length is so equilibrated to wave -rate that the

resultant is always the same .

Now, as revealed in the modern theory of rela-

tivity , the constant velocity of light becomes determi-

nant of the form of the physical universe . It forces

the view of a finite world-containing space . While it

is true that from the standpoint of consciousness -bound-

to-objects the high velocity gives the impression of

enormous activity, with respect to which the object-

world seems relatively stable , yet, if we shift our

base and place our consciousness , as it were, in the

sea of radiant energy , the universe of ponderable mat-

ter has the value of violent turmoil .? For conscious-

ness thus centered , the high-potential of the radiant

state has the value of peace and equilibrium . Further,

radiant energy , through its property of uniformity of

velocity , has the effect of bounding the universe of

objects .
 In psychological terms, by means of the law of

enanteodromia one psychical state draws forth its op-

posite . Ordinarily, through the tension of these two

phases the restless movement of embodied consciousness

is maintained . This leads to the development of life

as experience . The self is driven by problems which

are essentially insoluble, but by ever striving to

reach the rainbow's end of a satisfactory solution the

self is forced by those problems to the development

of potential psychical powers . And when the phase and

counter-phase of psychical states are blended in the

Self, instead of continuing in a condition like that

of a dog chasing his own tail, the state of tensions

is dissolved in Equilibrium . In this case, the phase

and counter-phase cease to exist, just as the electron

and positron vanish when united, and in their place is

a state of consciousness of quite a different order .

Throughout mystical literature one finds an oft recur-

ring reference to this state as one of "Light" . Does

this not rather beautifully complete the analogy with

the corresponding radiant state of matter?

26

Consciousness of the field of tensions is the Universe .

This consequence follows at once when it is

realized that an object exists as a tension . Although,

in the ultimate sense, every tension is balanced by its

opposite phase, so the equilibrium is never actually

destroyed, yet consciousness, taken in a partial aspect,

may comprehend only one phase, or may be only imperfectly

conscious of the counter-phase . For this partial aspect

of consciousness equilibrium does not exist . The con-

sciousness of the universe of objects, taken in more or

less complete abstraction from the,totality of all con-

sciousness, is preeminently consciousness in the field

of tensions . One result is that any view of a segment

of the universe of objects gives an impression of develop-

ment, as in some direction . The usual scientific name

for this apparently directed development is "evolution",

and a familiar social interpretation is called " progress" .

Each of these terms reveals a recognition of a tension

in the field of consciousness or life that forces any

present given state to change into another . The fact

that this change can be described as evolution or prog-

ress implies, in addition, that some directedness which

is recognizable is involved in the change .

The more common view of evolution and progress

is of a form which may be called linear . By this is

meant a movement which could be represented approximately

by a straight-line vector, the direction being given

usually not only toward the future but also inclined

upward . This linear form of the interpretation seems

to be sustained when the segment observed is short

enough and appropriately selected . Larger segments,

such as those afforded through the study of geologic

records , reveal a periodicity more or less clearly,

and thus make it clear that the linear interpretation

must be modified . It is, in fact , a profounder view

to regard the form of change as like a pulsating breath

or heart beat , one phase being the diastole , the other

the systole . As a result , it is impossible to predi-

cate 'progress ' of the process taken as a whole . For

while an individual of the extraverted type might predi-

cate progress as characteristic of the diastolic phase,

he would be inclined to regard the systolic phase as a

regression , and, on the other hand , the introverted type

would most likely give a reverse valuation . For, to

predicate "progress ", some base of valuation is, of

necessity , assumed , and there is no one base common to

all individual valuation . Consequently , it is possible

only with respect to restricted segments of experience

and from the base of particular valuation to predicate

either evolution and progress or devolution and retro-

gression .

However , regardless of how the tendency of change

may be evaluated in any given case, the common fact of

experience is that objects and objective states of con-

sciousness are subject to a tension which continually

forces transformation, be the rate rapid or slow . In

other words, there is no rest or balance in the universe

of objects taken in abstraction . For individuals who

are in the more active phase of their interests, there

may be nothing profoundly distasteful in this fact, but

when they begin to feel the need of stability and rest,

the total significance of the universe of objects be-

comes tragic . These differences, probably more than

anything else, afford the explanation of why some men

are optimists in their attitude toward the universe of

objects, while others are pessimists . This difference

is also that which marks the general characteristic atti-

tudes of youth and maturity . It should be, noted that

pessimism and optimism are attitudes toward a phase of

consciousness , and not to be interpreted as general atti-

tudes toward all phases .

27
Consciousness of Equilibrium is Nirvana.

The idea of "Nirvana", as employed in the present

exposition, is not a notion of exclusively religious

significance . Unquestionably, in the historic sense,

this notion has been given a predominantly religious

and religio-philosophical value, but, when the two fol-

lowing considerations are taken into account, the reason

for this should become clear . In the first place, the

notion is introduced to the West from the East , and the

oriental focus of interest is predominantly religious .

In addition, the Nirvanic State is more readily access-

ible to the introverted type of individual polarization

in consciousness, and the typical focus of interest of

the introvert is more religious than scientific . As a

consequence, the full value of the notion of "Nirvana"

has not so far been developed . It is significant for

the scientific focus of interest , as well as the reli-

gious, and is, in fact , implied in the development of

science , though in this connection it is more deeply

buried in the so -called "unconscious " than is the case

where the focus of interest is in the direction naturally

taken by the more introverted religious type . The scienti-

fic importance of the notion is nowhere more clearly re-

vealed than in the value the idea of "equilibrium" has

for scientific thinking . The profound tendency to find

equilibrium in an hypothesis , theory , or law , that is

so strongly manifested in the great coordinative scienti-

fic thinkers , reveals this fact . The objective material

with which science is concerned never gives the hypo-

theses , theories , and laws . These are actually created

out of phantasy , using the latter term in the sense

employed by analytic psychology . To be sure , the selec-

tion of the form of the phantastic creation is guided

by a due consideration of data from experience, but it

is a creative act, added to pure experience , that pro-

vides the form . Now, as one studies the various hypo-

theses , theories , and laws of all departments of science,

a very important tendency in the selection is noted .

This tendency gains its clearest and most perfect ex-

pression in mathematics and mathematical physics, but

is nonetheless recognizable in the other sciences . It

is the tendency to express the unification of the ori-

ginal collection of scientific data in the form of

equations . So far has this gone in modern physics--

the most fundamental of natural sciences --that the cul-

minating statements are more and more in the form of

differential equations , with sensuously conceived models

occupying a progressively inferior place of importance .

Now, what is the psychical significance of the equation,

as such? It is simply this, that in the equation we

have manifested the sense or feeling for equilibrium .

So long as a segment of experience is not reduced to an

equation , the state of consciousness is one of tension

and restlessness , and not of equilibrium . The investi-

gator is driven on because his current position affords

no resting place , and, therefore , no peace . But when an

adequate equation has been found , then there is a sense

of conquest , rest , and peace . There is no need in man

more profound than just this . If no success in this

direction were ever attained, life would become un-

endurable, sooner or later . The sense of hunger for

the equilibrating equation is simply one phase of the

hunger for Nirvana--that inner Core which sustains the

whole universe of experience .

The less there is of realization of equilibrium,

the more painful life becomes, and, likewise, the more

realization of equilibrium achieved, the greater the joy

and peace . Without consciousness of equilibrium, life

is only a painful battle and a storm of conflicts that

leads nowhere . This is Suffering, spelled with a capital

"S" . On the other hand, the more complete the realiza-

tion of equilibrium, the less the suffering, until, in

the culminating state of pure Nirvanic Consciousness,

there is total absence of suffering . The great diffi-

culty is that, whereas suffering tends to stir self-

consciousness into wider and wider fullness, the State

of Equilibrium tends to lull it to sleep . The latter

is usually the state known as dreamless sleep, when taken

in its purity . But when self-consciousness has been

sufficiently developed so that it can resist the lulling

effect of Equilibrium, then the purely Nirvanic State

can be entered without loss of self-consciousness . This

is the Great Victory, the reward for the travail of

living-form down the ages .

 Some writers conceive Nirvana as being like the

state of the newly born infant, wherein there is little

or no self- consciousness . Thus it is seen as a retreat

to a purely nascent consciousness , which is much inferior

to genuine adult consciousness . -In this view there is

a part-truth and a great error . Without full self-

consciousness , this state may be likened to a sort of

original nascent consciousness , such as must precede

the development of organized consciousness . It is

entirely possible for an individual who is not suffi-

ciently developed in the capacities of organized con-

sciousness to sink back into such a nascent stage .

Therefore, Nirvana is not the immediate Goalfbr immature

men and women . In fact, the immature entering of the

state is a sort of failure . But the situation becomes

wholly different when the debt to life, in the essential

sense , has been completed . When any human being has

reached the stage wherein experience has been substan-

tially exhausted as a source of vital value, when this

pasture has become a desert with only a few scattered

bunches of grass in isolated corners , and when, in addi-

tion, the capacity for self-consciousness has been highly

developed, then the only remaining significant Path lies

in or through the Nirvanic Domain of Consciousness .

Nirvana, in this case, is transformed from a nascent

state of consciousness to the Supreme human Goal, where-

in at long last the insoluble problems of life receive a

final resolution and the greatest possible richness of

consciousness replaces the old poverty .

This work is not written for immature men and

women . It is believed that the inherent difficulty of

the subject, when viewed from the standpoint of the in-

tellect, will automatically serve as a means of selection,

so that only those will read and understand who are pre-

pared to do so . For the others--the immature ones--

there are other . needs which may often, for a time, seem
to lead in quite different directions . Such are not the

special concern of the present work . Largely, instinct

and the lash of both circumstance and ambition will per-

form that function which the immature still require .

But those who have attained substantial maturity,

whether in the scientific or religious direction, reach,

sooner or later, a cul de sac wherein further develop-

ment in the old directions has only a sort of meaning-

less 'treadmill' value--a place wherein all action means

little more than ' mark-time march' . When this time comes,
the only hope for the avoidance of a life in utter poverty

of consciousness -values lies in a shift in the focus of

consciousness . In the end, this shift will lead to

durable and adequate results only by attainment of the

Nirvanic State with full self-consciousness .

 28

But for Consciousness -without-an-object

there is neither tension nor Equilibrium .

This is true for the simple reason that Conscious-

ness -without-an-object can never be comprehended by any

partial or fractional phase of consciousness . Any phase

implies its other, and Consciousness-without -an-object

is their mutual comprehender , or, rather, the conceptual

symbol of that forever inconceivable Reality which under-

lies and envelops all partial aspects . Where there is

no awareness of tension , no meaning attaches to equilib-

rium . Here we may think of the '" equals sign' in math-

ematics as symbolizing equilibrium , while zero symbolizes

Consciousness -without -an-object . As an actually realized

consciousness the distinction here is extremely subtle,

and yet of vital significance . It is very easy for the

mystic to combine these two states into one and simply

call them both "Nirvana " . In most, but not all , litera-

ture on the subject this seems to have been done, and the

result on the whole seems to have been confusing, at

least to the Western mind . For this treatment gives to

the Reality an overly introverted interpretation, and

this is quite naturally repugnant to the extremely extra-

verted West . On the other hand, when Consciousness -without-

an-object is distinguished from the purely subjective

Nirvanie phase , a kind of mathematical clarity results .

The subjective and objective are then seen to inhere in

a neutral and more primary principle , and thus they ac-

quire a more thinkable perspective . In the final analysis,

this means that the peculiar genius o f neither the East

nor the West is nearer the ultimate Reality . Both are

seen to stand as partial phases of a more comprehensive

whole . Each has a half-truth, which is unavoidably

blended with error when taken in the partial form alone .

And each must add its neglected half to its recognized

half to find the ultimately durable .

29
The state of tensions is the
state of ever-becoming .

A state of tension is a state of instability,

since it implies a tendency to become other than what

it now is . Every state of relative balance which is

under tension can never be permanently durable, since

the ever -present tendency to breakaway from the balance

will become actual at the first opportunity . All the

balance we find in the universe is of this sort, as is

easily seen by considering that the atom exists as a

state of tension between the nucleus and the surrounding

electrons .

Since a tension is a tendency to become other,

it follows readily that a state of tension implies be-

coming . Nothing in the worlds of experience or thought

remains permanently stable , but is ever subject to be-

coming something else . Some elements remain relatively

stable , while others change rapidly . But every objective

"invariant" is, in the last analysis, only stable in the

sense that a parameter is fixed for a certain phase of

mathematical analysis , while for the completed analysis,

it also changes . All objective life or experience is

thus a process of becoming other , and, taken by itself

in abstraction, it is a becoming other which leads nowhere .

30
Ever-becoming is endless -dying .

That which becomes ceases to be that which it

was . The flash of radiation which was born upon the

coalescence of the electron and the positron implies

the death of the units of ponderable matter . The acorn

ceases to be as it becomes the oak . As the man comes

forth, the child , which was , is no more . As a new social

organization occupies the field of the present, the old

society is entombed in the pages of the historic past .

No form or state in the empiric field is permanent, but

ever develops into something else . The passing may be

as imperceptible as the changes of massive geologic

transformation , or as the birth and decay of stars, yet

it may be as inconceivably rapid as that of the most

instable species of radium . But, in any case , all things

change . This is an ineluctable law of all empiric ex-

istence .

At every moment a new child is born out of a

dying past . But if the death implies a birth, it is

equally true that the new birth implies death . And

what is good and valued in the old dies along with the

not-good and that which is not valued . So long as we

are restricted to objective consciousness , this dying

is a tragic finality .

31
So the state of consciousness -of-objects is
a state of ever-renewing promises that pass
into death at the moment of fulfillment,

Because of the law of becoming , that which we

wish for and work for will ultimately come forth . But

also because of this same law, that which is thus brought

forth will not endure . Since becoming and dying never

cease , the fulfillment of the new born is also the moment

at which it begins to decay . The beloved leaves us at

the moment she is found , never to be regained as just

that beloved object .

With much effort we climb to the top of a high

mountain , and at the very moment we have attained the

heights and cry, "Eureka , I have attained the goal", at

that very moment only depths reaching down into darkness

loom before our vision . Only descent is possible after

attaining the crowning heights . Attainment ever initiates

decline .

The vitalizing current of embodied life rises up

within us whispering, "hook out there and see the vision

of my new promises ." And we look out and behold the

vision of just what we wish, the value which we have

cared for so dearly . Then we move toward it . At first

the travel may not be so hard, but in time we face diffi-

culties which we must needs surmount . But the vision

holds, and seems well worth the effort . Yet, beyond one

difficulty there lies another, and still another, mount-

ing in ever larger and larger proportions until, finally,

we can overcome only by straining our last resources .

But at that moment the vision has become actual as our

accomplishment . And then we say, "Aye, this is good",

and we rest in contemplation of the hard-earned accomplish-

ment . Then as we hold the object of fulfillment in our

hands, feasting our heart upon it, we feel it melting in

those hands, like a beauteous sculpture of ice in a warm

place . It melts and melts and our heart grieves, and we

pray to the powers that be that this desired object of

beauty shall not leave us . But all this is in vain .

Despite everything it melts and melts away, until, in

the end, the fulfilling object of promise is no more .

And then we are cast down for a season, until once more

the current of embodied life rises and bids us look forth

again and see still another vision . Then, again, we pro-

ceed as before, to achieve as before, and to lose as be-

fore . So it is throughout the whole of outer life, and,

mayhap, a long series of outer lives .

In the end, the wandering soul after many ages

learns to abandon all hope . But this hour of deep despair

brings the soul close to the Eternal . Vision of another

Way begins to clear .

32
Thus when consciousness is attached to objects
the agony of birth and death never ceases .

That birth and death are ceaseless follows from

aphorisms 29, 30, and 31 . But birth and death are also

agony . That this is a fact, in the familiar biological

sense , is very well known indeed . Creatures are generally

born through suffering and die in suffering . And beyond

this physical or sensuous suffering there is a more subtle

suffering which envelops all becoming, whether physical

or ideal . The loss of the valued object is suffering,

and the dying to a world of valued objects is likewise

suffering . And in travail new ideals are born . On one

side of its total meaning,the whole drama of becoming

is one grand symphony of agony .

 The attainment of a desired object is the birth

of an object for the self that seeks . But the process

through which this object is born rests in a field of

desire-tension . When there is desire, there is want or

craving, and this is a state of suffering . Then when

the desired object is born to the individual as posses-

sion, forthwith it begins to die as the no-longer-wished-

for. . Attainment becomes boredom . This, again, is suf-

fering .

Attachment to objects is, in all ways, a state

of suffering, lightened only briefly by satisfaction at

the moment of success . But the satisfaction is born to

bloom for but a fleeting moment , then to decay in the

long dying of boredom . Suffering reigns supreme over

the wof;ld-focused consciousness .

33
In the State of Equilibrium where birth cancels
death the deathless Bliss of Nirvana is realized .

Birth and death are strung on a continuum of

Life which is not born, nor ever dies . Life does not

come into being with birth, nor does it cease with death .

It is the living object that is born and dies . In the

end, death just equals birth, and that which underlies

remains unaffected . Here Equilibrium reigns eternally

and unaffected . When self- consciousness abides in the

underlying Life, birth and death are realized as just

cancelling each other, and so have no reality . Thus,

there is no suffering, but only the eternal Bliss of

undying Life . This is Nirvana .

34
But Consciousness-without-an-object
is neither agony nor bliss .

Agony or bliss are experienced or realized

states, but the experiencing and realizing inhere in

pure Consciousness . The latter is unaffected by that

which it contains . Like Space, It is an universal sup-

port which remains ever the same no matter what the

nature of the supported may be . When self-consciousness

fuses with the pure Consciousness, no longer is modi-

fication or coloring of consciousness known . Hence,

there is neither agony nor bliss, but only eternal

possibility .

35
Out of the Great Void, which is Consciousness -without- .
an-object, the Universe is creatively projected .

THAT, which is here symbolized by "Consciousness-

without-an-object", has long been called the "Great Void" .

It is the "Shunyata"--Voidness--of the Buddhists, and the

"Nothing" of Jacob Behmen . It is that which, when defined

exactly rather than represented symbolically, is desig-

nated only by the negation of every possible predicate .

But that of which only negations are strictly true can

seem solely as nothing at all to relative consciousness .

Hence IT has been, repeatedly, called the "Void" or the

"Nothing" . IT is not a possible content of any concep-

tion whatsoever . For thought, and also for sense, IT

truly is Nothing . But to say, therefore, that it is

nothing in every sense whatsoever is to imply that all

being is necessarily a being for sense or thought . No

man has the knowledge which would enable him to say,

justifiably, that thought and sense comprehend all possi-

bilities of Being ; while, on the other hand, there are

those who know that there is Being beyond the possibility

of sense and thought . Kant implied such Being in his

"thing-in-itself", and Von Hartmann located it in the

collective Unconscious, while Schopenhauer called it

"Will" . The mystic has proclaimed it in the most ancient

of literature, and reaffirmed it from time to time down

to the present .

"Creative projection", as here understood, is

wholly other than the theological conception of "creation-

ism" . There is here no creative act of a Deity which

stands, essentially and substantially, separate from the

created, nor does the creative projection produce souls

de novo . Essentially, "creative projection" is identical

with " emanation ", but with the additional implication

that the emanation depends upon an initial act of will,

which was not necessary . That is , the act of will is not

necessary in the sense that it might not have been, but

necessary in the sense that without the act of will there

would have been no universe . An absolutely necessary

emanation would not be a creative projection .

The standpoint here is in substantial agreement

with that of Von Hartmann , in that the Universe as its

possibility is predetermined by the ideas which lie in

privation of form eternally in THAT , but as to its

actuality is the effect of a free act of Will . Since the

Will is free , it could have failed to will actualization .

But It has so willed , and thereby invoked necessity as

the law which determined the form of the Universe . Science

discovers , or, rather , uncovers , the necessity in the

Universe , but never finds the Thatness without which there

never would be any actuality whatsoever .

This creative power does not transcend man when

man drives his self-consciousness to his ultimate roots .

But as long as man is in a state of consciousness seemingly

isolated from the Roots , he seems to be merely an effect

of causes which transcend him . Hence it is only for man

as isolated--as the Great Orphan--that the Divinity appears

transcendent , i .e ., lying at a distance . However, when

man has carried self -consciousness into the ultimate Roots,

he becomes , in his own right, a potential center of creative

projection , and consciously so . At this inmost state of

consciousness he may choose to will actualization, or may

refrain from so choosing . If he chooses to will actuali-

zation, he creatively projects , in conformation with the

idea which he thinks . Thus , finally, it is seen, man is

his own creator .

As conscious creator, man is God-man ; as the cre-

ated , he is creature , in the sense long used by the mystics .

In the mystic Way, the denial of creature -man is but pre-

liminary to the realization of the God-man . Theistic pre-

conception has led many Christian mystics to misinterpret

the real meaning of the deepest phase of their realization,

but they have reported the schematic pattern correctly .

Actually, in the state of ultimate realization it is not

Otherness -- i .e ., God--who replaces the man, but the true

self- identity of man replaces the false image which led

man to conceive himself as creature only . It is true that

mystical insight is a revelation of Man , rather than a

revelation of God, provided the total meaning of "man" is

sufficiently deepened . But "Man" , understood in this

adequate sense , is as much inaccessible to objective

psychology as ever was the God of the Theists .

 36
The Universe as experienced is the
created negation that ever resists .

The creative act is entirely free or spontaneous,

but the created effect is subject to the law of neces-

sity . The creative act may be quite consciously chosen,

yet the necessity invoked may be only imperfectly under-

stood . In this case, I find that I have willed more than

I knew, and thus face compulsive necessity in the environ-

ment which I have creatively produced . As a result, further

willing is conditioned by this necessity . Hence, the

created projection resists me . I must conform to its

conditions, though I was its source .

37
The creative act is bliss, the
resistance unending pain .

In creativeness the stream of Life flows freely,

and the free-flowing is Joy . The Bliss of the mystic is

consciousness fused with the free-flowing Life . Before

embodied life was, the free-flowing Life is . Though

embodied life seems to exist, yet the free-flowing Life

continues, quite unaffected . And when embodied life is

no more, still the free-flowing Life remains as always . .

The ordinary consciousness belongs to the somatic life,

but the mystic consciousness is part and parcel of the

germinal Life . Creativeness is of the very essence of

germinal Life, while the somatic life is bound by the

restraint of form . The one is all-bliss, the other all-

enveloping pain . Since the consciousness of the concrete

man is mainly, but not exclusively, somatic, there are

brief moments of joy in the usual life, but pain pre-

dominates, overwhelmingly . This, any man can see, if he

looks at his empiric life objectively and realistically

without any of the coloring cast by hope .

38
Endless resistance is the Universe of
experience ; the agony of crucifixion .

Frustration is of the very essence of objective

existence . That the consciousness of embodied man is

not wholly frustrated is due to the fact that actual

ordinary consciousness is not wholly objective . Glim-

merings from the Roots do arise from time to time, and

they cast transcient sheaths of joyousness over the

objective field . But generally the source of these

glimmerings is not known for what it is, and so the

objective field is credited with value which of itself,

taken in abstraction, it does not possess . The purely

objective is a binder or restricter which denies or in-

hibits the aspiration of the soul . The creative drive

from within can find room within the objective only by

the rending of constricting form . Hence it is that the

fresh manifestation of Spirit is always at the price of

crucifixion . The birth of the Christ within man is ever

at the price of rending apart the old man of the world .

39
Ceaseless creativeness is Nirvana ; the
Bliss beyond all human conceiving .

Creativeness, taken in isolation from the created

effect, is unalloyed Bliss . A Nirvanic State which is

taken in complete isolation is pure Bliss, quite beyond

the conception of ordinary consciousness . But this is a

partial consciousness, standing as the counter-part of

isolated objective consciousness . It is not the final

or synthetic State, and thus is not the final Goal of

the mystic Path . But it is a possible abiding place, and

it is possible for the mystic to arrive in, and be en-

closed by, the Nirvanic State in a sense analogous to

the ordinary binding within objective consciousness .

There is a sense in which we may speak of a bondage to

Bliss as well as a bondage to pain . It is, unquestionably,

a far more desirable kind of bondage than that in the

dark field of the object, but the bound Nirvani is not

yet a full Master . To be sure, he has conquered one

kind of bondage, and thus realized some of the powers of

mastery, but an even greater problem of self-mastery re-

mains unresolved .
 The attainment of Nirvana implies the successful

meeting of all the dark trials of the Path . The struggle

with personal egoism has resulted in a successful issue ;

the clinging to objects has been dissolved ; the battle

with temptations and threatening shadows along the Path

has been successfully fought ; and resolution has been

maintained firmly ; but there still remains the task of

rising superior to Glory . The little appreciated fact

is that the Goal of aspiration may become a possessor of

the Self, and something like spiritual egoism may replace

the old personal egoism .

It is easy for many to understand that dark ten-

dencies in the soul should be overcome, for with many the

light of conscience at least glows in the consciousness .

These may, and generally do, find it difficult to overcome

the dark tendencies . Quite commonly, we find ourselves

doing that which we would not do and leaving undone that

which we unquestionably feel we should do . The undesira-

bility of such tendencies we recognize , but find difficulty

in knowing how to deal with them . The better part of our

innate moral sense certainly supports the discipline of

the Way which leads to Nirvana . Yet beyond this there

lies an unsuspected and, inherently , more difficult problem .

We may think of Nirvana as the State in which all

of highest excellence or value is realized, and in a form

that is not alloyed with any dross . It is, indeed, the

Divine Presence of the Christian mystic . It is quite

natural to conceive of this as the Ultimate, beyond which

there is nothing more . But there is a defect . For here

is a State which I enjoy and to which I tend to cling,

and thus it involves a kind of selfishness, though it is

a spiritual kind of selfishness . Thus I am possessed,

even though possessed by That to which I give highest

value and honor .

After all, Bliss is a valued modification of con-

sciousness . But where there is valuation there is still

duality--a difference between that which is valued and

that which is depreciated . The highest State transcends

even the possibility of valuation, and its complementary

depreciation . The Highest Perfection finds no distinction

whatsoever . This is the State in which there is no Self

of any sort, whether personal or spiritual, and where

there is no embodiment of Supreme Values or God . It is

the Vast Solitude, the Teeming Desert .

To turn one's back upon the best of everything is

intrinsically more difficult than to turn away from those

things and qualities which one's moral judgment and best

feeling condemn readily enough . But it is not enough to

arrive at the Place beyond evil ; it is also necessary to

transcend the Good . This is a dark saying, hard to under-

stand, yet it is so . But he who has found Nirvana is safe .

 40

But for Consciousness -without- an-object there

is neither creativeness nor resistance .

One might say that IT is both creativeness and

resistance, but in the last analysis this is a distortion

of the Reality . To be sure, IT supports both possibilities,

but as directly realized IT is a Consciousness so utterly

different from anything that can be conceived by the rel-

ative consciousness that only negations can be predicated

of IT . As it were, the creating and the creation are

simply annulled . From that standpoint it is equally true

to say that the universe is and yet it is not and never

has been, nor ever will be . And, equally, it would have

to be said that there is not, never has been, nor ever

would be, any creativeness . It is quite useless to try

to conceive this, since there is no substitute for the

Direct Realization .

41

Ever-becoming and ever-ceasing-

to-be is endless action .

That ever-becoming and ever-ceasing to be is

action is self-evident . But the aphorism implies more

than this . It defines the nature of action . Action is

not merely a moving from here to there ; it is a dying

of a "here" together with a birth of a "there" . To act

is to destroy and beget . To act is to lose that which

has been, though it replaces the old with something new .

 42

When ever -becoming cancels the ever-

ceasing- to-be then Rest is realized .

This seems self;-evident, as Rest is clearly the

other of all action, whether in the positive or negative

sense . But one might draw the erroneous conclusion that

Rest and Action exist exclusively in discrete portions of

time . Actually, Rest and Action may be realized at the

same time . At a sufficiently profound level of realiza-

tion, ceaseless Action leaves the eternal Rest inviolate .

The disjunction of these two complementaries is valid

only for partial consciousness .

43
Ceaseless action is the Univerwe .

The Universe or Cosmos is the active phase or

mode of THAT of which neither Action nor Rest may be

predicated, when conceived as-a totality .

44

Unending Rest is Nirvana .

Since Nirvana , as here understood , is ever the

complementary other of the Universe , it is that which

the Universe is not . Hence, with respect to Action,

Nirvana has the value of Rest .

It should be clearly understood that with respect

to the present aphorisms the conception of Nirvana is not

necessarily identical with the definitions'of the oriental

usage of the term, though there is at least a considerable

degree of agreement in the meanings . The term is here

used to represent meanings born out of a direct Realiza-

tion which may not be wholly identical with any other that

has been formulated .

45
But Consciousness-without-an-object
is neither Action nor Rest .

Both Action and Rest are rooted in THAT, but of

THAT as a whole neither Action nor Rest can be predicated .

THAT is all-embracing but unconditioned . Thus, since any

positive predication is a conditioning because it defines,

and gives, to that extent, a delineation of nature or

character, thereby implying an Other which is different,

it follows that no such predication can be valid . On the

other hand, negative predication is valid if it is clearly

understood that it is a restriction which is denied, and

not a Power .

46

When consciousness is attached to objects it is

restricted through the forms imposed by the
world-containing Space, by Time, and by Law .

Space, Time, and Law condition the contents of

consciousness but not the consciousness itself . And when

any center of consciousness is attached to, and thus

identified with, contents or objects , it seems to be

likewise conditioned . Thus to the extent man is so

attached he is not free but is determined . The doctrine

of determinism, therefore , does express a part truth,

i .e ., a truth that has pragmatic but not transcendental

validity . So he who feels himself wholly conditioned

is highly attached . But the concrete consciousness may

be in a state that is anything from slightly to highly

detached , and thus have a corresponding experience of

freedom, which we may view as determination through the

Subject, rather than conditioning through the Object or

environment . Mankind as a whole knows little genuine

freedom, but lives conditioned in part by the objective

environment'and in part by psychical factors, which are

none the less objective because of being subtle . But

authentic freedom is possible .

47
When consciousness is disengaged from objects
Liberation from the forms of the world -containing
Space , of Time, and of Law is attained .

Disengagement or detachment from objects does

not necessarily imply the non-cognition of objects . But

it does imply the break of involvement in the sense of

a false identification with objects . It is possible to

act upon and with objects and yet remain so detached

that the individual is unbound . Thus, action is not

incompatible with Liberation . One who attains and main-

tains this state of consciousness can achieve an authen-

tically willed action .

48

Attachment to objects is conscious-

ness bound within the Universe .

The meaning here with respect to consciousness

is to be understood in the sense of an individual center

of consciousness, not consciousness . in the abstract or

universal sense . Further, it is not stated that attach-

ment to objects produces the Universe, but simply that

consciousness--in the sense of individual center of

consciousness--is bound within the Universe . Thus, this

aphorism does not lead to the implication that the Universe,

as such, is necessarily an illusion devoid of all reality

value, but rather affirms that attachment produces a phase

of bondage with respect to individual consciousness . Un-

doubtedly this does result in a state of delusion, but

this may be no more than a mode of the individual con-

sciousness , with respect to which the judgment that the

Universe, as such, is unreal would be an unjustified

extrapolation .
 49
Liberation from such attachment is the
state of unlimited Nirvanic Freedom .

That the Nirvanic State of Consciousness is one

of Liberation or Freedom has long been the traditional

teaching . The aphorism accentuates the fact that this

Freedom depends upon detachment from the object, but

does not imply that such detachment is the whole meaning

of the Nirvanic Freedom . It does imply that, while reali-

zation of the Nirvanic State is dependent . upon detachment

from the object, it is not dependent upon non-cognition

of the Object . For simple cognition of the Object does

not necessitate attachment to it . Thus realization of

Nirvana is, in principle, compatible with continued cog-

nition of the World, provided there is non-attachment to it .

The Nirvanic State of Consciousness when realized

in its purity does imply non-cognition as well as detach-

ment from the Universe of Objects . Possibly this is the

more frequent form of the realization and there exists the

view that this is the only possible form of the realiza-

tion . But this is an error . If this were the truth,

then Nirvana could only be a realization in a full trance

of objective consciousness, or after physical death. But

a more integral realization is possible, such that the

Nirvanic State may be known together with cognition of,

and even action in, the world, provided there is detach

went . Confirmation of this may be found in several of

the northern Buddhistic Sutras and in the writings of

Sri Aurobindo .

Detachment is a negative condition of the realiza-

tion, but positively more is required in order that the

realization may reach into the relative consciousness .

A new power of cognition must also be actuated , else the

realization is incomplete . This new power is born spon-

taneously , though there may be a time -lag in the adjust-

ment of the relative consciousness . However , the aphoristic

statement is not concerned with psychological detail of

this sort , no matter how great may be its human importance .

Actually , the aphorisms are a sort of spiritual mathematic

dealing with essential relationship, rather than with the

more humanistic factors .

50
But Consciousness -without- an-object
is neither bondage nor Liberation .

First of all this is true for the general reason

that pure Consciousness is not conditioned or determined

by either or both members of any pair of opposites . But

without the pure Consciousness there could be neither

bondage nor Liberation . Only because of the experience

of bondage is it possible to realize Liberation ; likewise,

without knowledge of Freedom there could be no cognition

of a state of bondage . Movement, development, or process

appear to our relative consciousness as either determined

by law or a manifestation of free spontaneity, but these

are only alternatives of the relative consciousness and

not ontological forms . To any given center of conscious-

ness Being may appear either as absolutely conditioned or

as a freely playing spontaneity, but the fact that it so

appears to such a center tells us something about the

individual psychology of the latter, and does not reveal

to us the nature of the Ultimate as it is in itself .

51
Consciousness-without-an-object may be symbolized by a
SPACE which is unaffected by the presence or absence of
objects ; for which there is neither Time nor Timelessness ;
neither a world-containing Space nor a Spatial Void ; neither
Tension nor Equilibrium ; neither Resistance nor Creative-
ness ; neither Agony nor'Bliss ; neither Action nor Rest ;
neither Restriction nor Freedom .

This together with the following aphorisms, intro-

duces an alternative symbol for Consciousness -without-an-

object, i .e ., the symbol of SPACE . No form, either con-

ceptual or aesthetic, can possibly be an adequate repre-

sentation of the all-containing Ultimate Reality, since

such form is a comprehended or contained entity . But a

form may serve as a pointer to a meaning beyond itself

and thus fulfill an office in the human consciousness in

the sense of orienting the latter beyond itself . The

effective symbol must possess the dual character, (a) of

being in some measure comprehensible by the human con-

sciousness , and (b ) of reaching beyond the possibility

of human comprehension . In the literature dealing with

Realization many symbols may be found which have served

this office . But in time symbols tend to lose their

power as the evolving human consciousness approaches a

comprehensive understanding of them . Then new and more

profound symbols must be found to replace the old . Con-

sciousness -without -an-object is such a symbol for the

more subjective orientation of human consciousness, while

SPACE is a corresponding symbol for the more objective

orientation . The notion of "Void " or "Emptiness" has

been used , but has the weakness of suggesting to many

minds complete annihilation , hence the more positive

symbols of Consciousness -without -an-object and SPACE are

used here .

"Space " is a symbol that has been used before,

and one of the best explanations of it is to be found in

The Secret Doctrine . Thus : "The 'Parent ' Space is the

eternal , ever-present Cause of all -- the incomprehensible

Deity , whose 'Invisible Robes' are the mystic Root of all

Matter , and of the Universe . Space is the one eternal

thing that we can most easily imagine , immovable in its

abstraction and uninfluenced by either the presence or

absence in it of an objective Universe . It is without

dimension , in every sense, and self-existent . Spirit

is the first differentiation from 'THAT ', the Causeless

Cause of both Spirit and Matter . As taught in the Eso-

teric Catechism, it is neither 'limitless void', nor

'conditioned fullness', but both . It was and ever will

be ."8

"Space", as used for the symbol, is not to be

identified with any of our perceptual or conceptual

spaces which are conceived as having specific properties,

such as three dimensional, "curved", etc . The notion

must be understood in the most abstract sense possible ;

as the root or base of every specifically conceivable

space . Nor is it to be conceived as either "fullness"

or as "voidness" but rather as embracing both conceptions .

It thus is a better symbol than either "voidness" or

"plenum" .

But while the interpretation of THAT as either

voidness or plenum is not ultimately valid, yet relative

to the needs of different types of human consciousness the

symbol is most effective when taken in one or the other

of these two aspects . When the approach is predominantly

negative with respect to relative consciousness, naturally

the symbol is conceived under the form of the Voidness,

as in the case of Shunya Buddhism . But in this work the

accentuation is positive, and thus "SPACE" or "Conscious-

ness-without-an-object" is conceived provisionally as

substantive, with the acknowledgment that this orientation

is not ultimately valid .

 As the distinction between these two aspects or

emphases is of considerable importance , some discussion

of them may be valuable . Technically , the distinction

has been given the form of Substantialism v . Non-

Substantialism . Thus , quoting from Hamilton : " Philo-

sophers , as they affirm or deny the authority of con-

sciousness in guaranteeing a substratum or substance'to

the manifestations of the Ego and Non-Ego, are divided

into Realists or Substantialists and into Nihilists or

Non-Substantialists ."9 It is easy to see that under the

class of Non-substantialism also belong the philosophies

classed as Positivism, Phenomenalism , Agnosticism, and

Aestheticism . )O As examples of the substantialistic

philosophical orientation , particular attention may be

drawn to the philosophies of Spinoza and Sri Aurobindo

Ghose ;ll while as examples of non- substantialistic phi-

losophies we may cite those of August Compte*and the

Taoist , and most of the Buddhist , particularly Zen Buddhism .

One fact which stands out is that the contrasting

views , while quite understandably exemplified in various

speculative philosophies , are also to be found among

philosophies based upon realization . This may strike

one with the force of considerable surprise . For, if

realization is an authentic insight into Truth , should

it not lead to fundamental agreement when manifested as

philosophic symbols? Offhand , one may quite reasonably

expect such to be the case, yet a fairly wide acquaintance

with the literature reveals divergencies sufficiently

wide as to appear like contradictions . Since this can

be a stumbling-block for the seeker, it is probably well

to give the question some consideration .

One reaction to this apparent contradiction, on

the part of the seeker who has attained some degree of

realization, is to view those formulations which are most

consonant with his own insight as revealing an authentic

Enlightenment, while the incompatible statements are re-

garded as in essential error and thus not the expression

from the matrix of a genuine Enlightenment . As a result,

we may have the development of a considerable degree of

separative intolerance at a relatively high level . While

all this may be quite understandable as a subjective

phenomenon and may serve certain psychological needs,

none the less, objectively considered, it is less than an

integral view . Or, even if the seeker does not take so

extreme a position, he may view his own expression and

those of similar form as necessarily the more comprehensive,

while viewing opposed expressions as inferior insights .

In general, such attitudes are simply not sound, for even

a considerable degree of Enlightenment is compatible with

a failure to transcend one's own individual psychology .

Indeed, the Transcendental Consciousness as it is on its

own level is inevitably stepped-down and modified by the

psychological temperament of the sadakh1 ,2, and, if the

individual has not become cognizant of the relativity of

his own psychology , he can very easily fall into the error

of projecting his own attitude as an objective universal .

Actually , opposed interpretations may be just as valid,

and even more valid , and, in any case, an Enlightenment

which is sufficiently profound will find a relative or

partial truth in all authentic formulations .

The philosophic expressions , whether Substantial-

istic or Non- Substantialistic, are, in any case, but

partial statements , expressions of one or another facet,

and are valid as long as taken in a provisional sense .

One may know this and acknowledge it and then proceed

with the development which accords the better with his

Vision . Then there need not be any fundamental conflict

with counter-, yet essentially complementary , views . Of

necessity any formulation must be partial and incomplete,

however wide its integration .

52-
As the GREAT SPACE is not to be
identified with the Universe so
neither is it to be identified with any Self .

The SPACE of the symbol is here called the GREAT

SPACE to emphasize the fact that it is to be understood

as space in the ultimate or generic sense , in contra-

distinction to the special spaces of perception and con-

ception . Further, IT-is neither an objective nor a sub-

jective space and hence may not be designated as either

the Self or the Universe .

53
The GREAT SPACE is not God, but the comprehender
of all Gods as well as all lesser creatures .

The GREAT SPACE transcends and embraces all

entities, even the greatest . There is a sense in which

we may validly speak of the Divine Person, but, under-

lying, over-laying, and enveloping even This, is THAT,

symbolized by the GREAT SPACE .

54
The GREAT SPACE, or Consciousness-without-an-object,
is the sole Reality upon which all objects and all
selves depend and derive their existence .

The essential additional affirmation of this

aphorism is that the GREAT SPACE is the sole Reality .

What this means seems evident enough until one stops to

think about it, and then at once difficulties appear in

both the notions " sole" and "reality" . First of all,

"sole" suggests the meaning of "one", which is clearly

abstracted from a matrix which also embraces the notions

of "many" and "plurality" . In this sense , a sole reality

would exclude the possibility of multiplicity, and we

would still find ourselves within the dualistic field .

Actually THAT must be conceived as both not many and not

one, when speaking in the strictly metaphysical sense,

but, unless we would abandon the effort to build a think-

able and psychologically positive symbol, we must go fur-

ther than purely negative definition . Actually, the

symbol is a psychological value which serves the orienta-

tion of individual consciousness and thus is something less

than metaphysical truth . Therefore , the accentuation of

soleness or oneness is to be conceived as a corrective

to the states of consciousness which lie in bondage to

the sense of manyness . It is thus not an ultimate con-

ception. However , soleness may be conceived in a sense

having a higher , as well as in a sense having a lower,

relative validity . So we should think of the soleness as

having a unity more like that possessed by the mathematical

continuum than that of the bare number "one" . For .the

continuum is a Votion of a unity of a totality composed

of infinite multiplicity but not involving relationships

between discrete entities . This appears to me the best

positive conception as yet possible for suggesting the

Reality underlying the negative definition of "not one

and not many" .

With respect to the notion of "Reality ", we have

even greater difficulties , for whether used in the philo-

sophic or the pragmatic senses it has had , historically,

several meanings . Most commonly , at least in Western .

thought, this notion has been employed in relation to

supposed objective existences , and this is obviously

not the sense that could apply to the Great Space which

is neither objective nor subjective . We must, therefore,

undertake some effort to derive the meaning which is

valid for the aphorism .

Ordinarily, we think of "reality" as in contrast

to the notion of "illusion", but this hardly leads to a

clear understanding , since each notion becomes negatively

defined by the other, and we are little, if at all, ad-

vanced to a true conception of what we feel in relation

to these notions . 13 Pragmatically , we generally have

little difficulty in differentiating between many illusions

and relative realities , such as a mirage lake and a real

lake , but this is not enough to define for us what we mean

when these terms are extended to a metaphysical usage .

For, clearly, as a bare visual sense -impression the

mirage lake is as authentic as a real lake . We might

say that as aesthetic modification of consciousness the

one is as real as the other , but the distinction of reality

versus illusion arises when some judgment is added to

the pure aesthetic modification . But a judgment does

not give reality ; it gives either truth or error . If

the judgment produces an error, then we are obsessed by

an illusion ; otherwise there is no illusion .

 It would appear that this identification of il-

lusion and error leads to the conclusion that the other

of illusion is not reality but truth, and this opens a

door for analysis that is much more fruitful . In support

of this view, attention is called to the following quota-

tion from Immanuel Kant : "Still less can appearance and

illusion be taken as identical . For truth or illusion is

not to be found in the objects of intuition, but in the

judgments upon them, so far as they are thought . It is

therefore quite right to say that the senses never err,

not because they always judge rightly, but because they

. ,14
do not judge at all

If the other of truth is illusion, then it at

once becomes evident that the other of reality is appear-

ance , the latter notion not implying illusion unless an

erroneous judgment has been made concerning it, and, in

that case, the illusion has been produced by the mistaken

judgment and is not a property of the appearance as such .

We can now derive a meaning for "reality" which is valid

with respect to the usage of the aphorism . "Reality"

becomes identical with "Noumenon", and its other, "appear-

ance" , with "phenomenon" . With this the distinction be-

comes epistemologically defined and acquires a certain

clarity of meaning .
 In the history of Western thought the most im-

portant development of the contrasting conceptions of

"Noumenon " and "phenomenon " has been in the Greek philo-

sophies and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant . The mean-

ings given in these two usages , while fundamentally re-

lated , are not identical ; a result growing out of the

critical thinking of later times . With Plato , in parti-

cular , the noumenon designates the intelligible, or the

things of thought, but which are not objects for sensi-

bility . The latter are phenomena and are of an inferior

and even undivine order . With Kant , the noumenon is

generally equivalent to the thing-in-itself as it is in

abstraction from the intuition of the senses , while the

phenomenon remains , as it was with the Greeks , the sen-

sibly given object . But unlike the Greeks , Kant did not

view the noumenon as an existence given through the pure

reason . Pure thought might find it a necessary or useful

conception but did not , by itself , give it existence .

What Kant has to say here is quite valuable as pointing

to a conception which is of fundamental importance in

the present work , and, accordingly , the following quota-

tion is worthy of special attention .

In the Critique he says : "If I admit things

which are objects of the understanding only, and never-

theless can be given as objects of an intuition , though

not of sensuous intuition . . . such things would be
called Noumena . . . Unless, therefore, we are to move

in a constant circle, we must admit that the very word

phenomena indicates a relation to something the immediate

representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which

nevertheless, even without this qualification of our

sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is

founded), must be something by itself, that is, an

object independent of our sensibility . Hence arises

the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not positive,

nor a definite knowledge of anything, but which implies

only the thinking of something without taking any account

of the form of sensuous intuition . But, in order that

a noumenon may signify a real object that can be dis-

tinguished from all phenomena, it is not enough that I

should free my thought of all conditions of sensuous

intuition, but I must besides have some reason for admit -

ting another kind of intuition besides the sensuous , in

which such an object can be given, otherwise my thought

would be empty, however free it may be from contradictions . 1 r15

Kant's significant addition to the Greek concep-

tion is the statement that if the noumenon is to be re-

alized as real, and thus more than a formal conception,

there must be an intuition of it other than sensuous in-

tuition . This is clearly the intellectual intuition of

Schelling and other subsequent philosophers . In the

present system such a function is affirmed but has been

called "introception ", for reasons discussed later .16

At last we are in a position to define " Reality"

as the noumenon which is immediately cognized by Intro-

ception, or Knowledge through Identity , while "phenomenon"

means the sensuous appearance . A third form of cognition

would be conceptual representation which occupies a posi-

tion intermediate between the phenomenon and the noumenon .

But we must take a further step , since the Subject or

Self , neglected by the Greeks and treated as a constant

by Kant, becomes for us a component that is constant and

primary only in relation to the object , but in relation

to Pure Consciousness is derivative . We might view this

Subject as a sort of transcendental phenomenon, i .e .,

transcendental with respect to the object but standing

in something like a phenomenal relationship to Pure Con-

sciousness .

55
The GREAT.' SPACE comprehends both the Path
of the Universe and the Path of Nirvana .

Essentially this aphorism is a re-assertion of

previous formulations in terms of Consciousness -without-

an-object . The two Ways of the Subjective and the Ob-

jective are embraced in the one Way of the universal and

transcendental comprehender . A consciousness which is

sufficiently awakened would find Nirvana and the Universe

to be co-existences capable of simultaneous realization .

56
BESIDE THE GREAT SPACE THERE IS NONE OTHER .

Footnotes to Chapter •IV `E

1The Subject or Self occupies a position analogous to

that of the parameter in mathematics . In simple and
general terms, the parameter may be thought of as a
local invariant that varies when considered over a
larger domain . With respect to a specific case of a
given curve, it stands as the invariant element, but
in the generation of a whole family of curves of a
given type, it is a variable . The ultimate invariant
is the plane or space in which the curves lie . This
supplies us with a thinkable analogue .

ZThese are the plus and minus signs .

'Anyone who has read any considerable amount of mystical

literature can hardly fail to be impressed with the
frequent affirmations and denials of the same predi-
cate . Often an assertion made is immediately denied,
or a counter assertion is made .: which logically implies
the negation of the first . The effect is naturally
confusing and can, quite understandably, lead the
reader to question the sanity of the writer . But the
fact is that the mystic is seeking a formulation which
is true with respect to his realization, and he finds
that his first statement, while partly true, is also
a falsification . The denial or counter assertion is
then offered as a correction . Too often the reader
is offered no rational explanation and is left to draw
his own conclusions, which are all too likely to be
unfavorable to the mystic and to mysticism as such .
And, indeed, what is the good of a statement if one
cannot depend upon it so as to draw valid conclusions
which can be different from other ideas which are not
true to the meaning intended? Or, if the credibility
of the mystic is not questioned, then it may be con-
cluded that the reality which the mystic is reporting
is a sort of irrational chaos , something quite in-
compatible with the notions of harmony, order, and
equilibrium-- a somewhat which not only defeats all
possible knowing but is quite untrustworthy as well .

Now, the fact is, the Gnostic Reality is not a dis-

orderly chaos but is of such a nature that a valid
representation cannot be given in our ordinary con-
ceptual forms . These ordinary forms come within the
framework of the logic of identity, or, otherwise stat-
ed, the logic of contradiction . The primary principle
here is classification in the form of the dichotomy,
i .e ., all things are either A or not-A . There is im-
plied the exclusion of all which is neither A nor not-A,
or is both A and not-A . This is known in logic as the
principle of the "excluded middle", and is employed
considerably in reasoning with respect to finite clas-
ses . But this is by no means our sole logical prin-
ciple employed in scientific : thought . Thus, mathe-
matics requires the use of logical forms which cannot
be reduced to the logic of identity, nor is this ade-
quate for problems dealing with processes of becoming,
as in organic evolution . As a consequence, there are
logicians who seriously question the universal validity
of the principle of the excluded middle . Thus it ap-
pears to be unsound when applied to infinite classes,
as in the case of the trans-finite numbers . As a con-
sequence, then, the mystic may well be justified in his
effort to get around the excluded middle, without there
being any implication of defect of sanity on his part
or lack o orderliness in the Reality he is trying to
represent .

Actually it is not hard to see how the logical dichotomy

falls short of being all-embracing . Thus, the two,clas-
ses of A and not-A, which are supposed to embrace all
that is, actually do not embrace the thinker who is
forming the classification . This is true even when the
two classes consist of the Self and the not-Self . The
Self in the classification is a projected Self, and
therefore an object, and thus is not the actual cog-
nizing witness . The latter embraces both classes, but
is not contained privatively in either one . Therefore,
it can lie only in the excluded middle .
4-The reality of God as the Supreme Value is not ques-
tioned here . The Supreme Value exists in the human
soul and may be realized directly . It is the Other
which completes the lonely self . The Supreme Value
is the Presence in mystic realization . The error of
many unphilosophical mystics lies in interpreting the
Presence as an existence in re, that is, as an ob-
jective thing . In the true understanding of the real
nature of God, Meister Eckhart reveals himself as one
of the clearest seeing of all mystics . For Eckhart,
God is the other of the self, and these two stand in
a relation of mutual dependence . Hence , God is not a
non-relative primal principle . This primal principle
Eckhart called the God -head , a notion which is used
by him in a sense analogous to the Buddhistic Shunyata .

5That mystical insight is a source of knowledge is a

primary thesis of the present work . The correctness
of this thesis may be, and has been , challenged both
on epistemological and psychological grounds . The
justification of the thesis thus consists of two parts,
(a) justification as against philosophic criticism, and
(b) justification as against psychological criticism .
The justification as against philosophical criticism
is dealt with in various places throughout the first
three Parts of this work . The second justification
is not needed on the level of Recognition itself, but
only for the strictly relative type of consciousness .

6See Section LX , " The Symbol of the Fourth Dimension"

in Pathwayai Through to Space .

7This alteration of the location of apparent activity

is illustrated by the familiar experience of seemingly
seeing surrounding objects move when one looks forth
from a train that is starting to leave a station .

8 The Secret Doctrine , 3rd Ed . p . 67

9Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and

Psychology , p . 614 , Vol . II .
10For an able discussion of Aestheticism as the pre-
dominant form of oriental philosophy , see F . S . C .
Northrop ' s The Meeting of East and West .

11 See The Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo , Chapter IX,

" The Pure Existent", p . 68 .

12The seeker or one who is practicing Yoga .

1 3For an illuminating discussion of illusionism, see

The Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo , Chapters V and Vi .
Book II .

14Critique of Pure Reason p . 293, Max Muller translation .

,,,

1 5Critiaue of Pure Reason , pp 217 , 219 ; Max Muller trans-

lation . Italics mine .

16See the discussion of "Introception " in the third part

of this work .
 PART III

INTROCEPTIONALISM

Chapter I

Introduction

Religion , Philosophy , and Psychology : these three

orientations of human consciousness in their total range

and meaning embrace fields of interest or attitude that

are, in considerable measure, identical, but each extends

into zones which are more or less disparate . Thus, the

distinctive uQ ale of religion remains forever outside the

zones of philosophy and psychology , so long as the latter

are conceived in their purity as abstracted from the

concrete totality of consciousness . . But it is no less

true that much of psychology is concerned with psychical

and psycho-physical fact and process which is of entirely

neutral concern with respect to the religious attitude,

and, likewise, has little or no value for philosophical

integration . Finally , philosophy expresses a mode of

consciousness which is not reducible in its inner content

to any possible psychology , however much its functions

employed may be objects of psychological interest, and

which is , in many respects , quite neutral with respect

to the religious Quale . But there is a common area of

human attitude and interest wherein these three fields of

human interest and function overlap and intersect, and

it is just in this common field that we find the most

vital and persistent problems and concerns which have

compelled the attention of man in all times and places .

We are probably quite safe in saying that all problems

and interests which lie outside this common zone are,

relatively, of only secondary or of transitory interest

and significance . Thus , if-mankind could conceivably

solve all of these secondary and .transitory problems,

but failed in dealing with the concerns of the common

field , then it would have failed in the most profound

sense and would find its successes empty and futile .

For while the successes might mean a conquest of a world

and the preservation of a vital animal existence, yet the

adjustments necessary to a healthy and happy soul would

be lacking and the basis for a higher culture would be

lost, and, therefore , the achievements , such as they

might be , would be but a vain success . A world thus

conquered and possessed and a vital life thus maintained

would be empty and valueless , with nothing to offer for

inner adjustment or to serve the yearning soul . So, be-

fore and beyond all other considerations , we must face

and master , if possible , the great common concerns which

lie equally before philosophy , religion , . and psychology,

giving to other affairs the residual attention which is

their due . Succeeding in this , then we may die, early

or late , rich or poor in outer possessions , with much

or little factual information , but in any case Victor

in the larger issues .

In an earlier chapter there was described, at

some length and in considerable detail, an instance of

a transformation in consciousness , which is , unquestion-

ably, part and parcel of the most central religious prob-

lem, as that problem is understood by the greater reli-

gions . But it is equally a problem of profound concern

of that phase of psychology which has sometimes been
d-a t k
called psychology" . Finally, it implies a theory

of knowledge and a metaphysics , and, therefore , affords

a subject -matter for philosophy . Thus this transformation

satisfies the conditions which place it within the zone

of coalescence of religion , philosophy , and psychology,

and gives to it a value that may well prove to be of

central importance .
In the present portion of this work it is proposed

to devote the primary attention to the philosophical

implications , with the psychological and religious aspects

occupying only a subsidiary position . It is not intended

to depreciate either the religious or psychological values

and attitudes in any ultimate sense, but merely to sub-

ordinate them for the present purposes . The question as

to which of these three deals with the most fundamental

problems , interests , or attitudes is not raised at all .

Probably , the relative valuation of these three can never

be separated from human subjectivity, so that always

some men will value the one more than the other two,

and yet there will always be men who give a reversed

valuation . Perhaps it is pertinent to an evaluation of

the whole present discussion that the writer should

acknowledge that , for him, the problem of transformation

has always appeared as primarily a question of philosophy,

with the religious guale present as undertone , while the

pertinent psychological interest in the transformation

developed mainly after the event . The factors which

played the leading part in the individual consciousness

before the event were primarily philosophical , so that

philosophy enters the picture as an effective agent,

and not exclusively as an interpretation afterwards .

But spontaneous --i .e ., not individually and consciously

y

willed--factors . entered into the total picture , with the

result that-a final world-view emerged which is not

identical with the one which helped to initiate the

transformation process . In some sense or degree, there

is incorporated or permitted within the present system

of thought something of all the leading current-philo-

sophical schools, whereas the earlier orientation was

almost exclusively Idealistic . Yet, despite this broaden-

ing and modifying effect , the Idealistic orientation

was most largely confirmed, though the present philo-

sophy does not seem to be completely congruent with any

other extant system . Thus , for example , the present

system is non-relativistic in its profoundest ramifi-

cations and yet it may not be called absolutistic, if

the latter term is to be understood as predicating that

the Ultimate is an absolute Being . The Root of All is

conceived , not as an Absolute , but as an unconditioned

Non-Relative , which may be viewed as an Absolute ness

which is ever unknowable to relative consciousness, but-

which may be Realized through a process that essentially

cancels relative cognition .

No orientation which properly may be called philo-

sophical may ignore or disparage the functions of logic .

But philosophy is more than bare logic, for the reason

that it deals with content in some sense that is not

exclusively identical with pure logic . The formal or

logical relations which unite variables are necessary

but not sufficient for the formation of a real philo-

sophy . A real or vital philosophy , of necessity, must

give to these variables some particular or general valu-

ation or meaning . But these valuations or meanings can-

not be derived by logic operating exclusively by itself .

Something more is required. Now, this " something more"

transcends the necessities of logic and may well open

the door to all those human yearnings and needs that

would be closed if the necessarianism of logic alone

were valid . When both are properly understood, reli-

gious need and human purpose do not require the repudi-

ation of logical necessity in order to realize their

proper freedom . We can build conceptual figures which

unite apparently incompatible lines of development, or

forms of experience , and logical requirements by intro-

ducing the notion of multiple dimensions . Thus, while

within its own dimension , logic has the final say and

wields an unequivocal authority , but the variables which

enter into logical relations may have any degree of extra-

logical development within other dimensions . Hence, it

is quite conceivable that certain attitudes , interests,

or modes of consciousness may focus themselves in dimen-

sions wherein logic is quite irrelevant , yet this fact

would not at all render necessary a repudiation of the

authority of logic within its own realm . However, an

attitude to which logic is irrelevant is simply not philo-

sophy, though it may form part of the subject-matter . of

philosophy . The philosopher , perforce, must think and

produce within the framework of logic as one of his

determinants , though he may carry into this structure

extra - logical components of unlimited richness and variety .

 The content, quality, mode, or way of conscious-

ness which is the ultimate product of the transformation

process , previously reported, will supply here the parti-

cular valuation or content given to the logical variables

insofar as such material may be conceived as an instance

of terms in relation or of implicatory development . All

this is a content or material given through immediacy .

But, whereas the immediate material which enters into

by far the greater part of philosophic literature is of

the nature of experiential data of quite wide general

occurrence in the consciousness of human individuals,

it must be recognized that much of the material which is

introduced here is not part of widely common experience .

To be sure, much of it is not without representation in

extant and even current literature, but these literary
references are, relatively, far from numerous , and they
are often distinctly obscure and baffling to the rational
mind . A large proportion of the immediacy which is here
the primary referent is not a sensible datum, but rather

implies the activity of some function of consciousness

other than the four which supply most of the content of
modern analytic psychology .1 As a consequence we are
faced with a real practical difficulty . The typical

content of philosophy is not a self-determined whole .

There is, in the formulation, an inevitable reference

to a meaning which derives its content from the congruence

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of experience common to both the writer and the reader .

Philosophy is not written like rigorous and formal math-

ematics , wherein all implicit intuitions are thoroughly

expunged . Thus the reader understands a philosophy--as

far as he does understand it--because of a content immedi-

ately known and. beyond the word , and which is known as

well and in the same sense by the writer . This , together

with logic, supplies the common domain of discourse es-

sential for the uniting of the writer and the reader .

But when the philosophical content becomes available

only through a psychical function which is not commonly

active , then, in general , the philosophical writer and

the reader will not hold much more in common than the

logical structure of the discourse . This , in turn, places

the critic at a real disadvantage , for, while he may

supply a critique of the purely formal logical struc-

tures, he often will prove unqualified in an evaluation

of the immediate content itself . If the requisite psy-

chical function is not in some measure active within his

own consciousness , he can neither affirm nor deny . the

actuality of the immediate content in other than arbi-

trary ,or dogmatic terms , since for him the affirmed con-

tent is not known immediately , and, therefore , the material--

as distinguished from formal or logical relations--must

fall short of being wholly clear .

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 Much of the criticism of philosophic Idealism

centers in the contention that this philosophy has

developed into an airy abstraction wherein nothing but

a formal statement without real content remains . In

terms that William James has made famous in philosophic

literature , Idealism has seemed to many to have become

so "thin " that it has lost all substantiality whatsoever .

This would seem to imply that James views Idealism as a

formal philosophy without real content . Now, if we are

to view all content as necessarily being - of a sensible

or experiential nature , then there is much justice in

James ' criticism . Idealism in its ultimate and most

rigorous formulation is, in high degree, empirically

empty . But there remains the question whether empiric

emptiness implies emptiness in every sense . The thesis

here is that such is not the case, but rather that through

a latent psychical function non-empiric but substantial

content may be realized in a sense that is not less

compelling than immediate experience--it being under-

stood that the .word " experience" is limited in its reference

to a psychical state or modification of consciousness

produced by sensation in the time-stream ." To one who is

oriented to the trans -experiential content, then the

apparently empty abstractionism of rigorous Idealism

may become transformed into an abundant fullness and

"thickness ", in contrast with which it is just precisely

the empiric philosophies that tend to seem empty, shallow,

and "thin" . Since I have known this to be the case in

my own private reading of Idealistic philosophies, I

feel justified in suspecting that the Idealistic philo-

sophers--or, at least, some of them--refer to a content

which is not explicit in their systems . In a word, it

appears that there is more back of these systems than

the formal logical structure which is available for the

critical evaluation of all readers . Thus, Idealism may

be an expression which is true to its own substantial

and immediately realized meaning, and so have a value in

the supermundane sense greater than that of any other

school of Western philosophy .

Some proponents of objective Absolute Idealism

have endeavored to establish their thesis as a necessity

which may be made manifest by a sufficiently acute anal-

ysis of the common elements of consciousness . But criti-

cism seems to have established very clearly that this

endeavor has failed . It does not appear that it is

possible to derive from the common features of a mundane

consciousness either the actuality or the necessity of

a supermundane consciousness . The attempt to do so is

an analogue of inductive reasoning, which .never can prove

the universal validity of its generalizations . From the

base of a transcendent consciousness it may be possible

-338-
to infer the actuality, or, at least, the possibility,,

of a derived mundane consciousness, but from the latter

as an initial premise it is impossible to deduce a more

comprehensive root-source . Hence, one either knows the

Transcendental Reality immediately or he does not know

It-at all, and consequently such a Reality is not dis-

cursively provable from the ground of common experience .

It can be speculatively affirmed, but this is less than

knowledge, though consequences may be deduced from the

affirmation which may be verifiable . It must be Realized

to be known . Therefore, the effort to establish the

thesis of Idealism by dialectics alone is bound to fail .

But if the effort to establish the thesis of

Idealism by dialectics has failed, we are left with but

two alternatives ; either we must abandon the thesis

entirely or ground it upon the authority of direct

Realization which is an outcome of a transformation in

individual consciousness . We are thus forced to face

the question : Is it a valid endeavor to formulate a

philosophy which is oriented to a private Realization
which is held in common with a small minority of fellow

human beings? No doubt this question is debatable .

Clearly, if the private Realization had no chance of
receiving a sympathetic response in the heart or mind

of any other human being, there would be little reason

for producing a philosophic formulation, save as an act

of artistic production . But if one searches the appro-

priate literature he will find that this private Reali-

zation-is not so private as at first it may appear, for

there are others who have written from the base of com-

parable realizations, and that which some among the human

whole have realized is, by the sheer fact of the realiza-

tion itself, shown to be a possibility of the human psyche

as such . To learn of this possibility may, indeed, be

enough to supply the impulse toward'further instances of

Self-Awakening, or may strengthen the assurance of those

who have had partial glimpses of a Beyond, but are not

yet well grounded on the new Base . To be sure, this pur-

pose may be achieved through art, poetry, religious prac

tice, and other non-philosophic means , but it still re-

mains true that for some natures the Path to Self-

Realization or to the Higher Consciousness is through

philosophy . These facts would seem to justify an affirma-

tive answer to the question .

In any case, if it is once granted that there is,

or may be, another way of consciousness, outside the field

of common experience, then this is a matter of real con-

cern for any psychology or philosophy which seeks to

achieve a comprehensive view of all the possibilities of

consciousness . Of course it is possible to build philo-

sophies and psychologies upon the bases of arbitrary

assumptions which exclude from the first the possibility

of the Realization of a Transcendent Reality, but this

would be valid only as a conceptual exercise . Thus, we

may say : "Let us assume mechanism as a universally and

comprehensively valid principle and see what consequences

follow ." From this we would derive some form of Natural-

istic philosophy, and this might prove to be an interest-

ing, and, in some measure , useful excursion . But it is

quite another matter when one, instead of assuming, dog-

matically affirms, mechanism as .universally and compre-

hensively valid . Such a standpoint is at once seriously

challenged when any individual says : "I have immediate

knowledge of that which cannot be comprehended within the

limits of mechanism ." Likewise, one may assume the stand-

point which affirms the categories of empiric life as

fundamental and from this derive the anti-intellectualistic

instrumentalism of pragmatism . The resultant philosophies

are unquestionably valid for considerable sectors of ex-

perience and thought . But when such presuppositions are

taken an universally and exclusively valid, they arbi-

trarily rule out standpoints from which Mechanism and

Pragmatism are seen to have a validity which is only

derivative and partial . Affirmation of acquaintance with

such larger perspectives at once challenges the universal

validity of the lesser standpoints . Thus, if there is a

perspective from which the whole of empiric life may be

viewed as derivative and but a partial manifestation of

a larger Reality, then Pragmatism would have only a prag-

matic validity, i .e ., a stepping stone to something more

durable, and only that . Finally, it is possible to assume

that ultimate reality is such that it makes no difference

whether it is known or not . With the Neo-Realists, one

may .say that this reality can enter into relations with

consciousness, or can be considered in relation to con-

sciousness, and, yet, again be treated as quite independent

of consciousness, in either case remaining unaltered in

its own nature . But here we have little more than a

logical exercise relative to an essentially unknown and

unknowable somewhat, since knowledge cannot be derived

from beyond the field of consciousness . To be sure, this

point of view may well have some pragmatic utility, but

it does not wield metaphysical authority . As a universal

and exclusively valid philosophy, it would deny forever

all hope to those who yearn for certainty, giving in place

of this the inflated and unsecured currency of mere probable
or possible truth . He who says, "I KNOW", challenges all

this .
In what follows it will not be attempted to prove

a point of view as the only possible or valid one . It is

granted that men may be scrupulously logical and think

otherwise . But it is also insisted that a Realization in

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Consciousness which finds no place or adequate recognition

in other systems proves the inadequacy of these . The

universally valid system , if such may ever be found or

created , must embrace the rarer contents of consciousness

as well as those which form the mass of common experience .

It is proposed here to present the outlines of a system

which, while not excluding the contents of the more common

experience , yet embraces the wider ranges opened by the

Door of Realization . But, first , to prepare the ground

and to make evident the need of a further formulation,

there will be a brief survey of the principal schools of

modern Western philosophy , with a view to showing wherein

they fall short of adequacy as a philosophic form for the

present purposes .

Footnotes to Chapter I

1The four are Thinking, Feeling, Sensation , and Intuition .

See C . G . Jung's Psychological Types .
 Chapter II

The Four Schools of Modern Philosophy

When human consciousness at some time in the un-

known past reached that point in its development where it

turned a reflective vision upon its experience, taken as a

comprehensive totality, it early discovered two seemingly

opposed, yet complementary, components, which are ineluct-

ible parts, like poles, of that totality . These we know

today as Spirit and Matter, or as Purusha and Prakriti, in

the terminology that is most widely employed . Reflective

man, ever conditioned by his own individual psychology,

has tended to realize and value one or the other of these

components most completely . Some, indeed, have seen them

as interdependences inhering in some common root, while

others, less integral in their vision, have seemed to find

the ultimate in the one or the other pole . And even those

with the more integral vision have tended the greater ac-

centuation to the one or the other component . Inevitably,

then, when man became philosophically conscious he tended

to divide into schools of thought in which the common

denominator of emphasis or even exclusive recognition was

either Matter or Spirit, however these two may have been

conceived . Thus even a casual perusal of the history of

philosophy leaves the student with the strong impression

that there are always, in varying terms and forms, two

main patterns conditioning the orientation of the world

view of reflective man .

In modern Western terminology the division and

contrast between these diverse lines of philosophic

orientation is commonly represented by words such as

Materialism, Naturalism, Realism, standing in contrast

to Spiritualism, Idealism, and Subjectivism . In schools

of thought these diverging and opposed orientations are

most forcibly represented in the modern West as Naturalism

and Idealism, the former lying closer to science and the

latter to religion . But in addition to these most rad-

ically contrasting systems of philosophy, within recent

decades two other schools have arisen which occupy posi-

tions intermediate between the more extreme formulations .

One of these, Neo-Realism, occupies a position definitely

closer to Naturalism than to Idealism, but conceives its

objective . reality as something considerably more subtle

than that of Naturalism, while the other, Pragmatism,

diverges from Neo-Realism to a viewpoint rather closer

to Idealism, though definitely less absolutistic and more

empiric than the latter . These two later schools maybe

said to be more humanistic than the older and more classi-

cal ways of thought, in that they more definitely restrict

themselves to the actual human processes of cognition,

feeling, conation , with the corresponding contents and

valuations . But in any case the divisions between these

various schools are sufficiently notable to justify a

four-fold classification , based upon a root two-fold

division .
All these systems or ways of thinking bring into

relief by accentuation authentic elements or complexes

which are to be found in actual human experience or con-

sciousness . Thus none may be wholly neglected, and a

truly synthetic philosophy , when and if it is ever written,

must do justice to, or at least find room for, the positive

values of each . But there is a strong tendency on the part

of representatives of these various schools to formulate

their positions in more or less exclusive or privative

terms , and this produces features which must be expunged

if there ever is to be a synthetic system . It is proposed

here to examine the primary features -- i .e ., those held in

common by various representatives of a school -- of these

various schools , with the central purpose of showing in

what respect they are inadequate for the purpose of an

integration sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the

values and knowledge derived from Gnostic Realization .

The purpose of this is to clear the ground for the formu-

lation which will follow , and, as well, to show that a

-346-
need for such new formulation exists . The discussion

will start with Naturalism , pass through Neo-Realism,

Pragmatism , and Idealism , culminating in Introceptualism,

the term by which I have designated the systematic con-

tribution, which is in some sense and degree new .

 Chapter III

Naturalism

Naturalism, as it is understood in philosophical

usage, has three distinguishable connotations, all of

which have in common the meaning of an attempted specu-

lative explanation of every component of experience by

means of existences and forces which are viewed as natural

or mundane, the latter conceptions being understood as

excluding everything which may be regarded as spiritual

or transcendental . The three meanings of the term may be

classified as, (a) general, (b) Materialism, and (c)

Positivism . We shall proceed to a brief consideration

of these three meanings .

(a) In its more general and less objectionable

sense, Naturalism is the more or less philosophical view

which attempts to explain everything by reference to

natural causes or processes in the sense of that which

is normal . It thus eliminates as a factor in explanation

any event or process which may be called supernatural or

supernormal ., It consequently excludes any interpretation

which may be based upon the miraculous, mystical insight,

or enlightenment, and, in general, any factor which may

be viewed as transcendental . But in this sense Naturalism

does not imply an attempt to explain everything in ex-

elusively physical terms , particularly mechanistic physical

terms . Mental and biological phenomena , as they are found

to exist normally , are accepted as natural , though unre-

ducible to ultimate physical conceptions . Thus , the em-

phasis is upon the norm rather than upon the conception

of the ultimate reducibility of everything to matter and

force . Naturalism , in this sense , is very widespread and

appears to be the normal view among the professional

classes whose orientation is to natural science either in

the pure or applied sense .

Naturalism in this most general sense can and does

have positive value as long as it is viewed'as no more

than an heuristic principle . It often serves as a salutary

protection against over -imaginative and superstitious

tendencies and attitudes , which are often far from whole-

some . But this positive value is lost and this Naturalism

may and does become actively malicious when, instead of

serving as a simple heuristic principle , it is raised to

the dogmatic thesis that the natural is the all in all--

capable of serving as the ground of interpretation of all

elements and complexes of human experience .

The naturalistic attitude is of very wide occur-

rence among biologists , psychologists, and sociologists of

the present day, as well as in the engineering profession .

But it appears as an interesting and very significant fact

that the naturalistic tendency appears to be weakening

among those who form the vanguard of that most advanced

of natural sciences , i .e ., physics . Much in modern

physics sounds even more like Transcendentalism than like

Naturalism . Perhaps the other professional groups may

discover the implications of this tendency in another

century or so .

(b) In contrast to Naturalism in the first sense,

that may mean only an heuristic attitude, Materialism is

a metaphysical theory . It is "that metaphysical theory

which regards all the facts of the universe as suffi-

ciently explained by the assumption of body and matter,

conceived as extended, impenetrable, eternally existent,

and susceptible of movement or change of relative posi-

tion ." 1 In particular, Materialism attempts to explain

all phenomena, including psychical phenomena and the

phenomena of consciousness in general, in terms of trans-

formations of material molecules . It was Materialists

who said that thought was secreted by the brain as bile

is secreted by the liver, and that man is what he eats .

On the whole, the materialistic philosophy is so crude,

undiscerning, and uncritical that it scarcely rates

serious philosophical attention . Today, pure natural

scientists, though often Naturalists in the philosophical

sense, only exceptionally are crude Materialists, for

they know too well the essentially postulational charac-

ter of their concepts to fall into the error of hyposta-

tizing them into absolute metaphysical existences .

However, while free scientists are rarely philo-

sophical Materialists, none the less, Materialism is to-

day of enormous importance in the field of sociological

theory and practice . The vast current of Marxism or so-

called scientific socialism is explicitly and dynamically

materialistic . In fact, it is even designated "Dialectic

Materialism" . But here we have a materialism which is

not quite identical with the mechanistic materialism of

the above definition, nor is it wholly identical with the

biological materialism that has grown out of the findings

and teachings of Charles Darwin . However, Marxism is ex-

plicitly materialistic in three specific senses which are

of philosophical importance :

1 . It affirms an anti-positivistic, realistic

epistemology . The meaning intended is rendered explicit

by a quotation from Lenin, who has said : "For the sole

'property' of matter--with the recognition of which

materialism is vitally concerned--is the property of being

objective reality, of existing outside our cognition ."

While the phrase "existing outside our cognition" does

not by itself necessarily mean existing outside conscious-

ness in every sense , yet the general context of dialectic

-351-
materialism reveals that this is implied . Further,

since the standpoint is non-positivistic , the complete

implication is of an independent self -existent matter .

This is enough to define an essential materialism .

2 . Marxism especially affirms a dialectical

movement in nature and society which is explicitly con-

ceived in the materialistic sense . The conception of

the dialectical movement was taken from the philosophy

of Hegel , but given a radically inverted meaning . This

is evident from the following quotation from Karl Marx :
"For Hegel the thought process , which he transforms into

an independent subject under the name idea, is the creator

of the real, which forms only its external manifestation .

With me , on the contrary , the ideal is nothing else than

the material transformed and translated in the human brain .„2
3 . Marxism affirms the labor theory of value,
which means that value is produced by labor in such a
sense that all productive activity whether manual or

mental can be reduced to some multiple of the simplest

form of manual production . This conception is by no
means original with Marx , but its implications are car-

ried out by him with the greatest consistency . It stands

opposed to the psychological theory of value in which it

is affirmed that it is human desire which gives value to

prdduced objects , a view essentially non-materialistic

since a factor in consciousness is regarded as the value

producing determinant . One consequence of this view is

that , in the Marxist program , exercise of individual wish

or preference in the consumption of economic objects tends

to be curbed , since the value to be consumed is produced

by labor , not by the desire of the consumer .

While most ideological Materialism , as distinguished

from practical non-reflective materialism, is not an

important social or philosophical force , yet in the Marx-

ist form it is today an extremely important social, pol-

itical, and economic movement . We have now a rare opportu-

nity for observing just what materialism in action can and

does mean . The ethical characteristics of this movement,,

as actually revealed , are not something extraneous added

to the original idea . The student of dialectic materialism,

who is familiar with the enunciations of Marx and Lenin,

is rather impressed with the consistency of the develop-

ment . We have , indeed , a rare opportunity for a pragmatic

evaluation of materialism in action .

(c) The third , and philosophically more important,

form of Naturalism , is that which is known as Positivism .

Positivism differs from Materialism in that it does not

hypostatize the conceptual entities of physical science

into substantive metaphysical existences . It is no less

grounded upon natural science than Materialism, but it

may be said to be oriented to the method of science rather

than to the substantive content of science . It is es-

sentially " the theory that the whole of the universe or

of experience may be accounted for by a method like that

of the physical sciences , and with recourse only to the

current conceptions of physical and natural science ; more

specifically, that mental and moral processes may be re-

duced to the terms and categories of the natural sciences .

It is best defined negatively as that which excludes

everything distinctly spiritual or transcendental ."3 It

is thus evident that Positivism excludes , in theory at

least, from the realm of valid knowledge every element

that is a priori or speculative . Also, since it views

the terms , categories , and methods of science as the ex-

clusively valid source of knowledge , it provides no place

for a kind of knowledge which may be derived from a third

or other ways of cognition .

Commonly the word "Positivism " is associated most

closely with the name of Auguste Compte , but in terms of

the more generalized meaning given here it is not so re-

stricted . Thus , in this wider sense Locke , Hume, and

Spencer are Positivists , as well as several other thinkers

who, while naturalistic in their orientation , are yet too

critical in their thinking to fall into the naive errors

of Materialism . Positivism may be said to differ from

naturalism in the first sense largely in that it is more

systematically and philosophically developed .

Of all philosophies Positivism is probably most

closely married to natural science . However , it differs

from the special sciences in that it extends or extrapo-

lates their methods into ultimately and exclusively valid

means for the attainment of knowledge . The program of

the special sciences is much less pretentious in that

each merely integrates its knowledge of fact by means of

hypothesized postulates which possess only a pragmatic

validity that may , indeed , have no more than a transitory

life . Thus the special sciences cannot lay claim to having

discovered the true truth of phenomena , but only warranted

assertibility, to use the term of John Dewey . The ques-

tion as to whether warranted assertibility is the final

possibility of knowledge cannot be answered by any of the

special sciences . This is preeminently a question for

philosophy , and, before the latter can hope to achieve

an ultimately satisfactory answer , it must at least con-

sider the claim that there is such a thing as a mystic or

gnostic cognition falling quite outside the methodology

of all natural science . At any rate, Positivism is a

philosophy which , basing itself on scientific method,

affirms that the warranted assertibility of science is

the last word of positive knowledge that is possible .

-355-
 Positivism does not so much assert that there is

no metaphysical or noumenal reality as take an agnostic

attitude with respect to the possibility of such an ex-

istence . At times , as in the case .of Spencer, it is

simply called the Unknowable, and then dropped as not

relevant for human concerns . We can readily agree that

such a noumenal Reality is unknowable by the cognitive

methods of natural science , and if the Positivist meant

no more than this he would be correct enough . But he

goes further and both dogmatically and arbitrarily affirms

that the scientific form of cognition is the only possible

form of cognition , and thus the unknowable for . natural

science is an absolute Unknowable of which we cannot even

predicate substantive existence .

A critique of Positivism involves more than a

critique of natural science, for the latter critique does

not resolve the question as to whether the scientific form

of cognition is the only possible form of knowledge . It

gives a delimitation and evaluation of scientific know-

ledge as such , and, in general, affords us an objective

perspective with respect to it . It can be contrasted

with other, at least supposed , kinds of knowledge such

as Gnosticism , and so we are enabled to see just what

science is . So far we have determined that warranted

assertibility is the lastword of natural science, but we

have not ascertained that warranted assertibility is the

final possibility of all knowledge . However, it is just

the question as to whether warranted assertibility is

final that constitutes the crux of the critique of Posi-

tivism and , indeed , of Naturalism as a whole . In general,

the Positivists have not dealt with this question, or at

least they have not done so adequately .

One may perhaps suggest that it is possible to

investigate the problem as to whether there is an extra-

scientific way of knowledge in the scientific spirit .

Would not such a procedure be more in conformity with

the fundamental assumption of Positivism than that of

dogmatic affirmation without investigation ? A way or

ways of cognition could conceivably be a proper object

of scientific study . To be sure , a positive finding of

such a - study would be in the form of a warranted asserti-

bility, since this is all that scientific method can give,

but it would be a scientific recognition that a way of

cognition other than scientific cognition probably exists .

And such a recognition would give the same justification

for at least the attempt in the form of practical pro-

cedure in terms of the probably existent way of cognition

that science gives for such procedure in other fields .

Such an additional way of cognition could not become part

and parcel of scientific cognition without altering the

form and nature of scientific knowledge more or less

radically, but at least the .factuality of other possi-

bilities of cognition would be determined as far as is

possible for natural science .

As a matter of fact, there exists today, and has

existed for some years , a study of the type suggested
above . I refer to the investigation of extra- sensory

perception . The subject-matter of this study has embraced

telepathy, clairvoyance, pre-cognition, and telekinesis,

and, while these supposed functions or faculties involve

less than the cognition implied in the notion of a gnostic

knowledge, yet, if existent, they transcend in their con-

tent and procedure the way of cognition of natural science .

The results of this investigation to date have been strongly

positive, but the conclusions have been reported in the

form of a warranted assertibility, rather than as a cate-
gorical judgment , as is quite sound . But the degree of
assertibility is represented as an explicit mathematical

probability which is rendered possible by the methods

employed . It is difficult to see how the results of

these experiments can be seriously questioned as long as

the theory of the mathematics of probability is viewed as
sound . The final consequence of this research is that

we may view the factuality of extra-sensory perception

as scientifically established to a degree of reliability

that is not inferior to much of the body of general

scientific knowledge .

What becomes of the positivistic assumption that

the onlytype of possible knowledge is the scientific kind

of knowledge when science establishes in the sense of

this knowledge the factuality of a non-scientific type

of knowledge ? For now doubting the factuality of this

non-scientific kind of knowledge implies a doubt of the

reliability of scientific knowledge itself . There are

those who have found this dilemma quite disturbing . The

alternatives are either a thoroughgoing agnosticism with

respect to all cognition , including scientific knowledge,

or the positive acceptance in principle of non -scientific

cognition along with scientific knowledge .

The conclusion which seems to be constrained by

the foregoing argument is that Positivism, in so far as

it asserts or implies the categorical denial of the possi-

bility of a metaphysical , transcendental , or spiritual

knowledge , is simply unsound , and stands condemned by

the voice of the science to which it appeals for its

authority . For the establishment by scientific method

of the factuality of a non - scientific kind of cognition

of any sort simply forces ajar the door of possibility

for any other sort of non -scientific cognition for which

existential claims may be advanced, particularly if made

by individuals of proven intellectual competency . How-

ever, Positivism may-well remain valid as an heuristic

attitude, provided it is reasonably flexible ; and it may

render valuable service as a check against a too active

and too credulous will-to-believe . Beyond all doubt,

.scientific method is a valuable monitor of human cogni-

tion so long as it does not presumptuously arrogate to

itself the voice of an authoritarian dictator .

Viewing Naturalism as a whole, rather than in

terms of its three specific forms, we can identify its

general cardinal principle as Realism . By Realism in

the modern, as distinguished from the medieval, sense

is meant "the doctrine that reality exists apart from its

presentation to, or conception by, consciousness ; or that

if, as a matter of fact, it has no separate existence to

the divine consciousness, it is not in virtue of anything

appertaining to consciousness as such . ,4 Realism is the

view that ultimate reality is not consciousness nor de-

pendent upon consciousness for its existence . But Realism

is not simply another name for Naturalism, as it has a

much wider comprehension ; in fact, the philosophic school

known as the New Realism and the, perhaps, more developed

wing of Pragmatism would have to be classified with

Naturalism in this respect . Of the three schools,

Naturalism is the most obviously and intensely realistic,

and thus stands at the opposite pole with respect to

Idealism . Also, of all the types of philosophy which

have developed in the West, it stands in the strongest

contrast to the thesis affirmed in the second part of

the present work . It will, therefore, be necessary to

prepare the ground for the present philosophy by a polemi-

cal examination of these opposed realistic systems, but

inasmuch as this critique will be centered upon the

realistic standpoint , as such , it is postponed until

we take up the discussion of the New Realism .

As is in general true of all schools of philo-

sophy , Naturalism has features in which it is relatively
strong and offers a positive contribution and even atti-

tude , but it is no less marked by inadequacy with respect

to its treatment and offering in other respects . With

regard to its contribution relative to the factual or

empiric side of science , it does have a degree of posi-

tive value , provided its too categorical and unsound

generalizations are properly pruned . But even as a

development grounded in natural science , Naturalism fails

to consider , or at least to consider adequately, phases

or aspects or perspectives which are ineluctable parts

of the total discipline or meaning which we agree to call

science , and which are of no less importance than the

empiric or factual . Science is not simply a body of

empiric fact ; it is , as well, a logically organized

conceptual system , grounded upon a particular kind of

orientation of consciousness . It is thus a compound of

fact , system , and orientation . As a consequence, an

adequate scientifically grounded philosophy must deal

with the systematic and orientational as well as the

factual aspects of the scientific totality . It must

incorporate a critique and due appreciation of the

orientational and systematic , or logical , components as

well as an appreciation of the purely factual . This

Naturalism fails to do , or at least fails to do in ade-

quate terms . By this it is not meant that naturalistic

philosophers lack orientation or are necessarily defi-

cient in logical capacity , but, rather , that they fail,

more or less completely , to consider logic and orienta-

tion as objects for critical examination and evaluation .

In this respect the remaining three schools of philosophy

are more complete , and, therefore , sounder .

Even as a philosophy based upon the factual side

of science , Naturalism, in the technical sense, is in-

complete , for its general orientation is to those branches

of science known as "physical" . It would be possible for

a naturalistic philosophy to be oriented to the biological

sciences , or even to the sum -total of all forms of science .

We would thus have a broader and sounder Naturalism, and,

in fact, we do find a considerable degree of this en-

riched Naturalism in both Neo-Realism and Pragmatism .

Indeed, much of Pragmatism may be viewed as a Naturalism

primarily based upon the biological sciences . But in

this respect technical Naturalism is highly deficient .

If we are to consider man in the totality of his

consciousness , experience , interest, attitude, etc ., as

constituting the proper subject -matter for philosophy,

then any philosophic system which is exclusively oriented

to the scientific dimension of human interest is far from

complete . . For human consciousness as a comprehensive

whole cannot be equated with that part of it which is

scientific in its orientation . Man is a vital and mental

being as well as an embodied creature , and in these larger

dimensions of his nature he has interests and attitudes,

both rational and irrational , that are not comprehensively

embraced by the scientific dimension of his total interest .

Thus there are dimensions of human consciousness , such

',y
as

the ethical , aesthetic , the spiritual or religious, etc .,

that are essentially other than science . To be sure, all

these aspects of the complete consciousness of man, with

their objective manifestations , may be and have been ob-

jects for scientific study . But the last word of science

here is of value only as giving objective factuality , U-/IIJA

nothing of the inner meaning . On the other hand , philo-

sophy is in duty bound to deal, in so far as lies in its

power , with this inner content as well as with the ob-

jective factuality . In this respect Naturalism, in the

technical sense , is almost a complete failure . References

to this other side of man are to be found in the writings

of the Naturalists , but not in such a way as true insight

would dictate . It was a Naturalist who said : "Religion

is the opiate of the masses ." Now, while there have un-

doubtedly been manifestations classed as religious which

are little better than an opiate , yet to judge religion

as a whole in such a way is just as stupid as the evalu-

ation of a savage who regards a mechanistic construction

of applied science as a form of ceremonial magic . In

these dimensions Naturalism fails , sometimes even egre-

giously , and so we may leave this subject , giving due

appreciation for the positive contributions of this school,

but recognizing its more notable inadequacies and incom-

petencies .

Footnotes to Chapter III

' Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology .

2Quoted from article on "Socialism " in ninth edition of the

Encyclopaedia Britannica .

3 Quoted from Baldwin ' s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology .

4Quoted from Baldwin ' s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

 Chapter IV

The New Realism

In a history of modern philosophy in which the

systems and schools were arranged in chronological order,

the New Realism would be the last of the four schools

discussed, since it arose, in large measure, out of a

polemic directed against the other three . But if the

treatment of the subject is based upon classification

by similarity of content, evaluation, and orientation,

it seems quite evident that the New Realism would have

to be placed in a position intermediate between Natural-

ism and Pragmatism, for, like the former and one wing of

the latter, it is quite naturally realistic in its orienta-

tion . This defines a general attitude toward the office

of consciousness which, for the present purpose, is the

feature of most importance . To be sure, there are im-

portant differences in the form and nature of the reality

as conceived by the different schools, but all agree in

viewing the object as transcending the subject, and both

Naturalism and the New Realism alike affirm the transcend-

ence of the thing or the existent with respect to con-

sciousness in any sense .

For Realism, in the modern sense , there is no such

thing as a physical or metaphysical self-existent substance,

and thus it defines a position of greater similarity to

Positivism than to the other forms of Naturalism . Repre-

sentatives of this school seem generally to have an acute

feeling for the limitations in the empiric knowing process,

and so have clearly perceived that, in its ordinary mani-

festations at least , cognition does not supply us with an

immediate knowledge of substance in any sense , but only

with relations connecting various terms . Much of its

destructive analysis parallels that of the Pragmatists,

but it differs from Pragmatism in not granting to activism

the status of immediate authority . Like Naturalism, it

very largely discredits intuitive insight, but, unlike

Naturalism , its primary orientation is not to a sensual

datum . As compared to Naturalism , the thinkers of this

school reveal a far superior philosophic acuity, and as
a result the claims of logic and of ethics are given a

recognition that is hardly , if any , inferior to that given

to those of physics and biology . In the relative importance

attached to logical entities and processes this school oc-

cupies an outstanding position . On the whole , as a line

of thought, both critical and constructive, it offers

much of interest and value .

The New Realism , like all modern and self -conscious

philosophy , begins with a consideration of the problem of

knowledge . Since the time of Immanuel Kant , it has been

realized that it is impossible justly to evaluate the

meaning of knowledge unless the thinker has first be-

come familiar with the nature and limits of knowledge .

In other words , knowledge as such, together with the

knowing process , must themselves be objects of study

before a valid evaluation of the cognitive content can

be achieved . . Otherwise one may fall into the error of

projecting the meaning of the content beyond valid limits .

Clearly, no part of the philosophic discipline is more

important than this , since obviously it is useless to

define Reality in terms of knowledge if we do not know

the nature of knowledge qua knowledge . Further, the

problem presented is not one of interest exclusively for

technical philosophy but has ramifications bearing upon

the office of knowledge in all domains , including the

scientific , the religious , and the pragmatic utilitarian .

Thus , for example , in the case of the special sciences,

even though great critical care has been employed in

technical observation and in theoretical construction,

the question remains as to the essential meaningfulness

of the knowledge produced . Does it give a substantial

truth? Is it, perhaps , merely a useful symbol? Or, is

it an essentially meaningless formalism that is not true

knowledge at all? Since a great mathematiciann like

Hilbert has affirmed the last view concerning the con-

structions of that most rigorous of all sciences, i .e .,

mathematics , we cannot , offhand , exclude the possibility

that all scientific constructions are no more than such

meaningless formalisms . In support of such a general

view*it might be well to recall that the Zen Buddhists

seem to hold 'a view relative to all conceptual knowledge

which is essentially of this sort . It is not my purpose

here to suggest that Hilbert and the Zen Buddhists are

necessarily correct in their evaluation, but simply to

point out how vitally important the epistemological problem

is . Thus , although the great driving motive of all philo-

sophical effort is the determination , and even the realiza-

tion , of ultimate Reality, yet before such a search can

hope to attain dependable results there must be a critical

evaluation and examination of the instruments employed in

the search . It is , consequently , very much to the credit

of the New Realism that it recognizes the methodological

primacy of the epistemological problem . Whether or not

the solutions offered are adequate is quite another matter .

For an intelligent understanding of the New Realism

it is absolutely essential to comprehend the theory of

external relations , since this plays a vital part in the

Neo-Realistic conception of knowledge and reality . The

peculiar feature of this theory of external relations is

the doctrine that the elements or terms which enter into

various relations with each other are not altered in

their intrinsic nature by reason of entering into the

relationship. Thus, if an object a enters into a re-

lationship of effect with respect to another object b,

in one instance, and into a relationship of consciousness

with respect to another object c, then, in both cases

a remains precisely the same in its own essential nature .

This gives to terms, of which a is a general sign meaning

any entity whatsoever, a fixed definitive character which

remains forever unaltered . The opposed view is that terms

cannot be completely separated-from their .relations since

the meaning and even the content of the term is in part

determined by the relations into which it enters . This

is the viewpoint which is known as the theory of internal

relations, and when it is consistently developed results

in an absolute Monism, whereas the theory of external

relations results in a world-view that is pluralistic,

since the multitude of terms really form independent self-

existent entities . The theory of external relations is

characteristic of the New Realism, while the theory of

internal relations plays a notable part in the develop-

ment of absolute Idealism .

In large degree the theory of external relations

is intimately related to the analysis of the logic of

pure mathematics, and in this field it does appear to have

-369-
at least a large degree of validity . Whether or not from

the standpoint of the profoundest understanding of the

nature of pure mathematics this theory will remain as the

final true truth , still it has some measure of truth .

Thus a numerical entity , such as the number 2, for instance,
may well seem to be identically itself and unaltered whether

it stands as an element in relational complexes which de-

fine various infinite series , either cardinal or ordinal,

or is the designation of the class of classes in which all

members possess the characteristic of consisting of two

terms . It would seem that in all the relational complexes

of which 2 is an element , 2 remains unaltered.ly 2, i .e .,

unaffected in its intrinsic character by differences in the

complexes . But is not this , perhaps , only a surface appear-

ance? Let us see . Of the class of classes whose number is

2 let us take two members , one of which consists of two atoms

of a mon-atomic gas, such as helium , and the other of two

animals of the same species but of opposite sex . Can we

say that the total significance of 2 is precisely the same

in the two cases? In the one case 2 remains 2 indefinitely,

but in the other 2 ,is a dynamic potential tending toward

numerical increase . Again, consider 2 as the limiting value

of the geometrical series 1 +'A + Y4 + ------ + Yzg + -----

and as the second member of the series of natural numbers

1, 2,-39 4, 5, --------, n, ------- oo, and in each case 2

gives or reveals a meaning which is not identical with that

-370-
 1,

of the other instances . Now, in addition, in all these

cases 2 and the relational complexes in which it is a

member stand in relation to consciousness, at least in

the sense of the consciousness of the writer and the'

reader . It does not appear that the Neo-Realistic theory

would deny that there are differences in the above com-

plexes, but would assert that the meaning in each case

would reduce to a combination of 2 and a relation, with 2

remaining intrinsically the same--as is also true of any

other term to which it is related--and with nothing being

added over and above the unchanging meaning of the relation .

Criticism of a theory like this is difficult since

there appears to be a reference to immediate experience

which is not explicit . If the theory were in the nature

of a formal mathematical exercise, the critique would con-

sist merely of an examination of the logical development

with respect to terms that are explicitly defined and with-

out immediate experiential content . But Neo-Realism is

supposed to be a philosophy dealing- .'with empiric actuality,

and thus the terms and relations are supposed to be real

and not solely ideal . It is difficult, if not impossible,

to avoid the feeling here that there is something in the

thinking that is arbitrary and artificial . Something in

the immediately given, before analysis, is lost--something

which is like vision that is not completely reducible to

analysis and formulation . Can we say, for instance, that

the total meaning of water is reducible to the chemical

addition of oxygen and hydrogen ? No doubt the theory has

a partial validity and utility, but only as an abstraction

from the concrete actual for certain purposes ; hence when

the Neo -Realist goes further and claims comprehensive

validity, it is not
t easy to avoid the feeling that the

theorist suffers from a partial blindness .

As a correlate of the theory of external relations,

the new Realism affirms the complete validity of analysis .

Analysis serves the office of breaking down given complexes

of experience into their ultimate elements or terms, which

are conceived as forming the wholes of experience by enter-

ing into various relationships . But, since relationships

are external , the wholes of experience consist of the sum

of the terms and relations and no more than that . Thus,

the whole is not more than the sum of its parts . Sheer

wholeness does not add any new qualitative character which

vanishes in the process of analysis . Therefore, analysis

is competent to find all that reality is , and, consequently,

there is no need for a mystical immediacy to know the final

reality .

The ultimate nature of terms and relations is con-

ceived as essentially logical . In their intrinsic nature

they belong to a neutral region which is neither mind nor

body, neither consciousness nor matter . But the terms may

enter into relation with consciousness or with the world of

-372-
physical things , in either case remaining unaltered in

their essential nature . A conscious being must come into

adjustment with the terms and relations , since they are

real and not merely the creative projections of a con-

sciousness .

This theory of the New Realists is largely true

with respect to a fundamental experience of any mathe-

matician , i .e ., that the material with which he works is,

in some sense , highly compulsive . Although the funda-

mental assumptions of a mathematician may be free cre-

ations--even fantasy constructions --yet, as soon as he

begins to deduce consequences he is not at all free to

think as he pleases . The consequences have the inevita-

bility of an absolute necessity . The thinker must conform

to this necessity ; he cannot make it other than what it is .

So while . some element of invention no doubt enters into

a mathematical system , such as the conventions of mathe-

matical language and the formulations of the fundamental

assumptions , yet the effect of constraint by an absolute

necessity is a most significant part of mathematical ex-

perience . Perhaps more than in any other field of human
effort mathematics carries the thinker on a voyage of
discovery , with the creative element occupying a sub-

ordinate position . The resistance of the rocks of the

earth or of the unconscious factors of the collective

psyche are less ineluctable , or, at least , are not more

insistently conditioning. It is not the will that deter-

mines what mathematics .shall be, once the fundamental

postulates are given, but it is mathematics that sets

limits to the path which the will must follow if it is to

orient itself to something more than a fantastic illusion .

But while it is no doubt true that the determinations of

mathematics are objective with respect to the private wish-

ful consciousness of the individual, it does not follow that

these determinations are existences outside consciousness

in every sense . We can conceive --and there are realizations

very strongly confirming the conception -- of a primary and

universal consciousness which conditions the merely private

personal consciousness, and so we may view the essence of

mathematics as being of the nature of this primary conscious-

ness without the mathematical determination losing one whit

of its authority and objective power .

As one studies the philosophy of the- New Realism

he is impressed with a certain congruence with Naturalism .

As was noted in the preceding chapter , Naturalism grew out

of an orientation to natural science, and particularly that

part of science which we commonly think of as physical .

Neo-Realism has a similar orientation to mathematics and

logic , and so we may say that what Naturalism is with re-

spect to physical --as distinct from biological -- science,

this Realism is with respect to the normative sciences .

Thus we may say that the Neo-Realists are oriented to a

much more profound necessity than that envisaged by the

Naturalists . Both these schools recognize a valid fact

of experience , i .e ., the experience of dealing with a com-

pulsive necessity , a somewhat which is more determining

than any wishfulness . It is precisely with respect to this

experience that the Vitalists give the least satisfactory

answers in their philosophies . Whether it is Vitalism or

Realism which has in this respect the more fundamental

vision may be a question that cannot be answered in terms

which transcend the relativity of individual temperament .

For my own part, I find myself in closer agreement with

the realistic view with respect to this issue . In any

case , the trength of the New Realism appears to consist

mainly in its treatment of logical necessitarianism, while

its principal weakness is to be found in its depreciation

of another fundamental of no less importance, i .e ., the

fundamental of consciousness .

For the New Realist, consciousness is only a re-

lation, and, like other relations, it is external in the

sense that the terms which enter into consciousness do not

acquire their intrinsic character or being by that relation .

Consonant with a conception developed by David Hume,-the

Realists maintain that the actual entities themselves enter

consciousness and leave consciousness , remaining essentially

the same . When in consciousness we may call them "ideas",

and when outside , " things ", but these words are merely

different names for the same persistent and unaltered

realities . A fundamental implication is that consciousness

does not creatively determine its contents ; it has only a

selective relationship to them . Some entities may be

selected and others neglected , but they always remain just

what they were in either case . The selection of conscious-

ness may build compounds of elements through the selection

of various relations , but the compounds are conceived as

completely reducible to the various terms and relations,

with nothibg left over as characteristic of the compound,

which is lost as a result of the analysis . Thus the ex-

perience of an immediate affective or noetic value in the

compound--which is lost in the analysis--is simply denied

by this theory . But does this denial have greater signi-

ficance than that of a psychological confession ? The ques-

tion as to whether the compound or complex of experience

has what we may call an "over-value" which is lost in the

analysis is really extra-logical . Our judgment must rest

upon the testimony of immediate experience . If there are

those who do not find this over -value in their experience,.

then they are justified in reporting that so far as their

personal consciousness goes it does not exist . But this

could be a fact of importance mainly for psychology . The

testimony of others who said that they found the over-

value lost in the analysis would have no less validity .'

The issue between these two testimonies cannot possibly

be resolved by a logical theory .

Since consciousness is conceived as a non-

substantial and non -determinative relation , it is quite

natural for the New Realist to develop a psychology and

philosophical view in which consciousness is quite irre-

levant . Thus we get the behavioristic psychology , in which

the determination of psychical fact is conceived as fully

available for objective research without the use of intro-

spective methods . The mind is conceived to be-simply what

it appears to be in objective behavior . Although it may

be possible to proceed by this method and build a schema

which is logically self -consistent , yet that is not enough,

to render it comprehensively true . The immediacy of inner

consciousness does not cease being a fact simply because

some methodological theory has no place for it . Again we

have an issue which cannot be resolved without reference .

to testimony grounded upon immediate experience .

A particularly fundamental feature of the Neo-

Realist's polemic against the Idealist is the contention

that the latter has not proved that there can be no being

wholly outside and independent of consciousness . No doubt

the Idealist cannot prove this , for it is essential to the

very nature of proof that in the act of proving it carries

its material into the field of consciousness . But the

Idealist may very properly reverse the charge and challenge

the Realist to prove the independent being of a supposed

that which is not knowable in any sense , or of a supposed

thatness existing at any time outside consciousness in

every sense . He may also quite reasonably contend that

the burden of the proof rests with the Realist , since the

latter is affirming a thatness beyond the range of direct

epistemological determination and thus involving hypostati-

zation beyond all possible experience . In the attempt to

show that it is possible to know beyond the range of con-

sciousness the Neo -Realist has given an illustration which

at first seems quite impressive . We know , for instance, the

general solution of the algebraic equation of the second

degree because we have proved its correctness by rigorous

logic . Therefore , we know that this solution provides a

formula which will give a correct solution of every speci-

fic equation of the second degree by making the appropriate

numerical substitutions for the letters representing con-

stants in the general formula, and we know this even in the

case of those equations of which no man has ever thought .

Hence we know the actuality of an existence which has never

been thought or experienced . But here two lines of possible

criticism arise . First, a radical empiricism might well

-378-
question whether such supposed knowledge is authentic

knowledge at all . He might say that though itae formula

was found invariably valid in all the thousands of specific

instances to which it has been applied, this gives no real

knowledge concerning the infinity of cases to which the

formula has not been applied, but in these cases our con-

viction of the validity of the formula is only grounded

upon belief . Second, granting that the assurance of valid-

ity given by the general proof for the infinity of equations

not actually solved is authentic and justified, yet this

does not imply knowledge of an actuality lying outside con-

sciousness, but only of one lying beyond consciousness in

the form of specific thought and experience . In a word,

the whole meaning of consciousness as such is not restricted

to consciousness in the form of thought and experience .
The discussion of the preceding paragraph leads to
a question of general epistemological interest which ex-
tends beyond the field of Neo-Realistic theory, and is one
of considerable importance . It is a fundamental character-
istic of the :mathematical use of logic to develop proofs in

general terms, which are completed within the limits of a

finite apprehension, but which, nevertheless, are conceived

as giving an infinitely extended knowledge, since the

specific cases included in the general proofs are, more

often than not, infinite in number . It is unquestionably

true that the typical mathematician feels an assurance of

-379-
validity extending over the whole infinity of special

cases , and it would appear that the Neo-Realistic phil-

osophers as a class also share this assurance . Is this

assurance justified? It is clear that this question is

not one which can be resolved by logical proof, since it

is essentially a query relative to the validity of proof

itself . It introduces a problem which requires for its
resolution an examination of the very roots of cognition

and an evaluation of conceptual cognition . This leads us

into the sea of epistemological theory with all the vari-

ants characteristic of different philosophical schools,

not to mention the vaster variations introduced by indi-

vidual philosophies . This task will not be attempted

here, but a little will be offered by way of suggestion .

There are at least three possible forms which pro-

posed answers to the question may have . These we may call
the empiric, the formalistic, and the gnostic . None of
these forms of the answer can be dialectically justified
in the complete sense which would finally dispose of the
question, since the differences in the forms are grounded
in differences of point of view or perspective, which in
turn are reducible to a matter of individual psychology or
of insight . In the end, it appears that we are faced with
the fact of philosophically significant psychological dif-

ferences which are irreducible within the limits of present

-380-
understanding . But we may with profit make a brief sur-
vey of the three views suggested .

(a) The thoroughgoing empiricist typically denies

that the authority of logic extends beyond the possibility

of experiential verification . Logic may well be a valuable

aid in a process of thought which leads on to a fuller

experience , but its value is essentially conditional or

heuristic . It does not wield an original or primary author-
ity in its own right , but only one derived from experience

ultimately . Hence , a finite logical process cannot give

an infinitely extended knowledge , and consequently the real

justification and proof of a general mathematical formula

is the fact that it is effective in the specific instance .

In a word , mathematics does not give us true knowledge of

the infinite . The great difficulty with this point of

view is that it fails to give us any adequate explanation

of the success of mathematical thought in even the empiric
field . The vast bulk of mathematical creation has been
quite unrelated to empiric application ; it has been a pure

development for its own sake alone . But again and again

these pure constructions have supplied subsequently--

sometimes after the lapse of considerable time -- the theoret-

ical framework which organizes the data from experience .

This fact has led no less a person than Albert Einstein to

ask the question : " How can it be that mathematics, being

after all a product of human thought independent of ex-

perience , is so admirably adapted to the objects of reality?"

It is certainly difficult :; if not impossible , to see how

such a pure thought could reach ahead of experience if it

is no more than a derivative from experience .

(b) The formalistic view maintains that mathemati-

cal entities , processes , and conceptions are essentially

meaningless , and thus the whole mathematical development

is merely a formal structure . Of course , this would imply

that mathematical thought does not really give knowledge at

all, not even as much as the empiricist would grant . This

view is not in conformity with the realistic conception,

since the mathematical entities would not be real . It

does not cast any light upon the question asked by Einstein .
On the whole , this theory does not appear to be fruitful,

but it is worthy of note since no less a mathematician

than David Hilbert subscribed to it .

(c) The third view , which is here called the

"gnostic ", maintains that mathematical , and therefore

logical, knowledge is essentially a priori , by which is

meant that it exists independent of experience . However

true it may be that this knowledge does not arise in the

relative consciousness, in point of time , before experi-

ence , yet it is not derived from experience , however much

it may employ a language which is derived from experience .

It is thus .in its essential nature akin to mystical

cognition--and hence gnostic in character--rather than

similar to empiric knowledge . This view would explain

how it is possible for the pure mathematical thinker to

have pre-vision of the future in formal terms which sub-
sequently become empirically concrete as experience gradu-
ally advances with its slower trend . It also explains

the strong feeling of assurance extending over infinite

implication which follows upon the recognition of mathe-
matical proof . Finally, it implies that mathematical
knowledge is authentic knowledge, grounded upon an ori-
ginal authority . The full conception maintains that the

root of mathematical knowledge is identical with the root

of empiric knowledge, but that neither is derived from
the other . It thus is the identity at the root source

that explains how pure mathematical thought can be rele-

vant to the material given by experience .
These three views are barely sketched here, and

therefore are given primarily as suggestions . However,

the third view is the one held by the writer, and its

justification will be more fully developed in general

terms in what follows . Inasmuch as the Neo-Realistic

philosophers seem typically to accept the assurance of

logical demonstration, the writer stands in agreement

with them in this respect, but he does not find that the

Neo-Realistic theory supplies adequate justification for

the acceptance of the assurance .

-383-
 The outstanding peculiarity of the New Realism

does not lie in its affirmation of the independence of

things with respect to consciousness, for this doctrine

is a characteristic part of all realism in the modern

sense . The differentiating contribution of the New Realism

is to be found in the doctrine of immanence . This is the

theory that the actual things or terms enter into con-

sciousness without being made over by consciousness . Thus

the idea of a thing is the thing itself, when in the re-

lationship of consciousness, and, consequently, the idea

and the thing are not two entities but one . In this way,

it is believed, the duality between mind and body is over-

come, and, likewise, the duality between knowledge and

things . But all the while the thing remains independent .

Thus we may isolate as the cardinal principle of the New

Realism the idea of the independence of the immanent .

Part of this conception suggests a similarity to

the identity of the knowledge and the known which is a

characteristic part of mystical states of consciousness,

but the theory of the independence of the immanent marks

a radical divergence . The mystical state leads to a doc-

trine of inter-dependence, not only of the knowledge and

the known, but of the knower as well .

In order to bring the more fundamental teachings

of the New Realism into clear relief, they are listed in

brief form below :

1 . The subject to consciousness can become in

other connections the object of consciousness .

2 . Mental action is a property of the nervous

organism .
3 . Mental contents consist of portions of the

surrounding environment , illumined by the action of the

organism .

4 . The content of the mind is that portion of

the environment taken account of by the organism in the

serving of its interests .

5 . Ideas are only things in a certain relation .

6 . In the case of immediate knowledge , the thing

and the knowledge are identical .

7 . In other connections than those of immediate

knowledge , the thing is the thing in itself .

8 . In mediate knowledge the thing thought about

and the , thought are both experienced , but the thing tran-

scends the thought .

9 . The thing is independent of experiencing as

well as of thought .

The last thesis marks an important point of de-

parture between Neo-Realism and the more realistic wing

of Pragmatism . In both these schools the conceptions of

,the office of thought and of mediate knowledge do not
diverge radically, but Pragmatism tends to identify the
real with experiencing . It is also true that the Neo-
Realistic and the Pragmatic tests of truth and error are
not so far apart . The former simply attaches less im-
portance to the subjective factor . For both, truth is

a harmony between thought and things, in the one case

the things being independent of experience, while in the

other their nature is determined through the experiencing .

Further, the test of truth is practical, i .e ., is relative

to a grouping of interest and circumstances for the purposes

of action . In neither case is truth an internal coherence
of ideas or things . Thus, in both cases , truth may be

thought of as a function or relation of a thinking con-

sciousness, or organism, with respect to something other,
be it immediate experience or independent things .

The fact which stands out with especial force in

connection with the New Realism is its enormous deprecia-

tion of the significance of consciousness . An examination

of the numbered items above gives the impression that con-

sciousness is a sort of by-product of the effort of organ-

isms to attain adjustment in a pre-existent unconscious

environment . To be sure, consciousness is not so un-

important as to be a. mere epi-phenomenon which accidentally

happened in a mechanistic universe, for it serves the

-386-
function of adjustment for organisms . It, therefore,
makes some difference in the world of living creatures .
But it is the lesser fact in the midst of an all-surrounding
and compelling necessity .
Particularly notable in the New Realism, as in
Naturalism, is the depreciation of the subjective com-
ponent of consciousness . The subject is even viewed as
potentially capable of becoming an object of consciousness
in certain relations . Now, in conformity with the episte-

mology of Neo-Realism, the subject that has become an object

is not merely a symbol representing the subject, but is
the actual subject itself . Here we have exemplified a very

common error of the extraverted orientation in the indivi-

dual psychology . For whatever it is that has become an

object, its status as object implies a relation to a sub-

ject which is not the supposed subject that has become

object . To be sure, something subtle associated with the

true subject may become an object, but the subject proper

remains the witness in a relationship of witnessing with

respect to this subtle object, and thus does not itself be-

come an object . We may project the conception of a subject-

object relationship, but the subject itself has not been

projected in the conception, remaining still the hidden

witness of the conception . This point is of extremely

vital importance and must be understood by him who would

himself attain self-realization, or would seek to comprehend .

the philosophical developments based upon self-realization .

 In contrast to its relative superiority in the

interpretation of mathematics and logic, the New Realism

seems somewhat less than satisfactory in its treatment of

ethics and religion . Here we find much the same inadequacy

which was so notable in Naturalism . The reader at times

has the feeling that these subjects enter into the total

philosophical picture as more or less troublesome addenda .

One in whom the ethical and religious motives are strong

tends to feel frustrated or belittled . The impression is

produced that the real order of being is aloof and un-

responsive to human purpose and aspiration . While, no

doubt, there is a dimension of being which has this char-

acter, or, rather, appears to have this character, yet

there is far too much immediate insight which gives the

real a quite opposite character to permit the Neo-Realistic

view an exclusive validity . After all, the assurance of

logic and of sense-impression is not such as to deny other

forms of assurance equal right to recognition . So we must

conclude that the New Realism has offered an interpretation

which is partly true, but no more than that . It has not

succeeded in evolving a conception competent to circum-

scribe the whole of the real and possible . Important

dimensions of awareness are not recognized at all, and at

least some of these dimensions embrace that which large

portions of mankind value above all else . Philosophy, if

it is to fulfill its full office, must recognize and do

justice to these dimensions of being as well as those upon

which the New Realism is focused .

 Chapter V

Pragmatism

Life , as we know it and as it appears to have

always been , j udged by the record of history , has con-

sisted most largely of an effort by living creatures to

survive in an environment which , while in part friendly,

has yet been in large degree unfriendly , toward that sur-

vival . The life-story of man appears to be no exception

to this rule , and so the preponderant thought and effort

of the human kind have been devoted to the practical or

mundane interests of securing food and protection from

the elements and living creatures , including man himself .

But from a day at least as ancient as the formulation of

the Vedas there have always been a few among the human

whole who have devoted a portion of their time and effort

to a profounder querying of nature, with a view to the

resolution of more ultimate questions, such as the mean-

ing and purpose of life , the nature of being , etc . Out

of this deeper and relatively detached questioning has

finally developed the profounder part of both religion

and art , and nearly the whole of what we today know as

science and philosophy , in a word , all that which we class

as culture and which contributes the larger part of the

graces and values of living . Those who have led in the

cultural side of life , either as originators or as con-

tinuers, have never constituted more than a small pro-

portion of the human whole, but they have formed an es-

pecially significant part, and, while they have known

their share of resentment and persecution by the non-

understanding mass of mankind, yet, in the end and on

the whole, they have received appreciation and even recog-
nition as forming a genuine aristoi, a sort of informally
recognized class-status distinct from other men .

Among the bearers of culture there have inevitably

grown attitudes toward life and thought and forms of formu-

lation or expression that tend, more or less radically, to
diverge from the attitudes and forms natural to the com-

monality of mankind . This has led toward a separation of

interest and sympathy which at times has amounted to a
social bifurcation, so that the languages, as well as the
attitudes, of the smaller class tended to become strange
and foreign to the collective mass . This inevitably re-

stricted the service which the former could render to the

latter, and so from time to time there arises the necessity
of re-establishing an integration or working relationship
between the two parts .
In the field of philosophy, which most particularly
concerns us here, the specialization of interest, way of
thinking, of attitude, and of language is especially notable .

Philosophers tend to write for other philosophers and to

give exclusive attention to the conceptions evolved in the

detached philosophical consciousness . This is all quite

understandable since these conceptions are an inevitable

development for a felt need and they are adequately com-

prehended only by the trained philosopher . But there re-
mains a large sector of human concern which is left out,
and thus the practical office of philosophy becomes con-
siderably narrowed . In the classical culture, the isola-

tion of the philosophical world from the broader general

human world vas particularly notable . Such science as

there was developed in the milieu of the philosopher, de-

tached from practical life, with the result that, although
the Greek mind was able enough and theoretical understand-

ing was well advanced, yet there was relatively little

development of a practical technology . Abstract concep-

tions became objects in themselves, unrelated to empiric

utility . A distinction arose ultimately between two orders
of consciousness, the one, the more abstract or intelligible,

being, viewed as a higher more divine order, and the other,

the sensuous or empiric, being regarded as irrational and
evil . Apparently no culture has ever attained a greater

conceptual purity than that which was realized in Greece

at its peak of development, but it was a conceptuality un-
related to empiric life . Also, this was achieved at a
severe price . At the top of the culture we find an aristo-

cracy of beautiful intellectuality ; at the bottom, a massive

slavery of bound men ; a humanity bifurcated so that the

mass received little benefit from the best .

The Greek dominated Western culture up until that

day in the Renaissance when the immortal figure of Galileo

appeared upon the scene . In the hands of the scholastics

dialectical power had become refined and subtilized, but

largely empty of substance , and perhaps even more divorced

from the world of common experience than was true with the

ancient Greeks . However , with the appearance of Galileo

an old cycle was closed and a new one opened that has con-

tinued to the present time . The significant contribution

of Galileo was an insight which led to a marriage of a

highly developed conceptuality with sensuous experience,

the aspect of consciousness so despised by the typical

cultured Greek . Out of this marriage was born science,

in the modern spirit, and a vast extension of philosophic

subject-matter , but, most important of all from the prac-

tical standpoint , there came forth from this union tech-

nology in the modern sense , and with this vast alterations

in social organization and in ways of life .

Although it is inevitable that in the modern world,

as in the classical , the conceptions and language of tech-

nology , science , and philosophy should be developed with

due regard to the peculiar necessities of each discipline,

yet the attitude toward sensuous cognition was inevitably

radically altered, when contrasted to the attitude of the

classical thinker . The sensuous or empiric could no

longer remain the despised half of human cognition . In-

deed, it has often become the most valued half, with con-

ceptual theory falling heir to the old depreciation .

Important as experience no doubt is, yet even experience

has taught us that without adequate theory there can be

no true science, not even technology, so that today we

know that we advance in knowledge, as someone has said,

by two legs, one of observation and one of theory . There-

fore, we have not repudiated the sound features of our

inheritance from Greek culture, but by adding to it that

which the cultured Greek scorned we have transcended him

both in theory and in practice .

The rapprochement between conceptuality and sen-

suous knowledge has naturally involved more than a tech-

nical advance . A parallel increased regard for the ways

of cognition, interests, and attitudes of the common man

was probably inevitable . This, though particularly marked

in the zones of sociology and politics, has yet had its

effect in the more aloof field of philosophical speculation .

In our own day there has arisen a whole school of philosophy

which, questioning the soundness and reliability of lofty

conceptuality, has turned to the field of popular cogni-

tion and interest for its principal subject-matter and

basis of evaluation of the higher conceptuality . This

school is the one popularly known as Pragmatism .

-393-
 In the hands of the Pragmatist the kind of think-

ing, which is the only kind known to most men and the kind

which all men use most of the time , in the field of day-

to-day life - relations is given the dignity of philosophic

recognition . In this sense , Pragmatism is more popular

than any other philosophic school , and, indeed , has-been

peculiarly associated with the democratic spirit . But

though Pragmatism renders to the ordinary variety of

thinking a dignifying recognition, it would be a vast

mistake to imagine that the Pragmatist is merely an ordi-

nary thinker or that this school is popular in its tech-

nical methods . Popular thinking is an object for serious

study and evaluation , as viewed by this school , but the

problems considered are treated with all the technical

acuity of trained philosophers . Pragmatism deals in large

measure with popular thinking as a type , but is not itself

a form of popular thinking . Pragmatistic philosophers in

the technical development of their thought can and do be-

come just as involved and obscure as any other kind of

philosophy . They are by no means always easy to under-

stand, and so, despite the democratic orientation of their
thought , they themselves belong to the intellectual elite

like all others who think beneath the surface .

The popularity of Pragmatism is quite different

from the popularity of Naturalism . The latter accepts,

on the whole, an attitude toward the world-about which

is quite consonant with the general naive view that com-

monly holds before the development of reflective analysis .

But the philosophical Pragmatist, like most other profes-

sional philosophers, is intelligently critical of this

view . He is well aware that thinking and the other

psychological functions do make a difference in the con-

tent of human consciousness , or, at least, if they do not,

this fact must be established by careful study . Whereas

the Naturalist typically thinks in terms analogous to

those which have achieved success in the sciences of the

inorganic, and, as a thinker, very largely forgets that he

is a living being, the Pragmatist views life and the

sciences of the organic as nearer to the true nature of

man and as supplying a better key to the understanding of

the contents of his consciousness . Further, this life on

which the Pragmatist centers his focus is not an abstract

or Eternal Life, but the natural or empiric life seen all

about us . It is the life of plants, of animals, and of

men--just that which the biologist and the psychologist

study in its-physical and somatic manifestations, res-

pectively . Indeed, this fact implies that the Pragmatist

is also a Naturalist in his way, but instead of being a

physical Naturalist he might be called a biological Natural-

ist . He views biology, and, along with this science,

psychology, sociology, anthropology, politics, etc ., as

being essentially more fundamental than mathematics,

physics, and the more mathematical sciences generally .

In the implied relative depreciation of logic and mathe-

matics we find the primary point at which Pragmatism

departs from the New Realism, though in other respects

these two schools have many sympathies in common .

The central core of Pragmatic interest is the

human world, and not a supermundane Ideal or transcendent

Realization . No doubt empiric life involves more than

the exclusively human, since we have constant evidence
of other forms of life before our eyes, but Pragmatism

does not pretend to speak for the possible standpoint of

plants and animals any more than it does for a super-

mundane Divinity . All these living, or supposedly living,

beings may receive consideration in a Pragmatic philo-
sophy, but, if so, they enter into the discussion as
objects possessing an empiric human interest . Thus Prag-
matism is not, nor does it pretend to be, a comprehensively
inclusive system . Its validity, in so far as it is valid,

is maintained to be such for man as we know him here and now .

Indeed, Pragmatism does not pretend to be a philo-

sophic system, but is rather conceived to be a definition

of a method of approach to vital problems . Here philo-

sophy is viewed as an aid or guide to an empiric life so

that it may be lived more wisely, and on the whole more

happily . Thus it is more largely a philosophy of and

for life than a system-of ideas . It may be said that

its metaphysic is the least systematic of the four schools .

Pragmatism has many roots which reach back into

what is known as the English school of Empiricism : Like

Empiricism it gets its stuff, in largest degree, from the

raw material derived or given by the senses . But it de-

parts from the earlier Empiricism in that it is much more

activistic, that is, more concerned with purposive action

than with simple reception of impressions . The Pragmatic

world is much more alive than the older Empiricist world .

Man's consciousness is certainly considerably richer than

a mere blank tablet which is passively receptive to the

impact of theenvironment . Men do have interests and pur-

poses which lead to the selections of certain possibilities

presented by the total environment . It is to his interest

to survive as an organism, and, beyond this, it is manifest

that he seeks all sorts of objects and relationships from

the most banal up to the loftiest possibilities . It has

remained for the Pragmatist to isolate and accentuate this

aspect of human nature as a significant feature for the

understanding of him and as an important factor for the

facilitating of his growth in understanding . The Pragmatist

says that philosophy, even in its most abstract and other-

worldly aspect, is, after all, but an instance of human

interest and purpose . It is not here suggested that the

older philosophers or the representatives of the opposed

schools of the present day were or are unconscious of the

fact of interest and of selections guided by interest,

but it is simply true that generally this fact was neg-

lected as a determinant factor in evaluating philosophic

content . At this point the Pragmatist departs from the

non-pragmatic thinker , since he maintains that meaning

cannot be isolated from the influence of interest .

At this point the Pragmatist ' s characteristic

attitude toward the psychological status of ideas becomes

evident . Ideas enter into at least two systems . In one

aspect they are recognizable as psychological facts, that

is, as something having a history and standing in correla-

tion with a group of more or less observable relations in

some living mind , while in another aspect they carry a

logically significant content . For the greater part,

philosophy has been exclusively concerned with the logic-

ally significant content and defined meaning in terms

that are mainly logical . Pragmatism says that this is a

mistake . Even a perfect and logically complete content

would only be, at best , but partly competent in the deter-
mination of ultimate meaning , for the psychological fac-

tors of interest and purpose are also determinant . In

fact , one gains the impression that the Pragmatists charac-

teristically as a class attach the greater importance to

the psychological factors, with logic admitted only in a

subordinate office .

-398-
 One practical consequence of the foregoing the-

oretical evaluation of the psychological status of ideas

is that proposed conceptions may be valued as much or

even more by consideration of the purpose or motive of

the thinker than by a regard for the logical acuity •e- v'e

factual accuracy of the content . Thus psychological

facts true of the thinker become important in the philo-

sophical evaluation of the thought . There are connec-

tions wherein, no doubt, the psychological conditioning

of the thinker is determinant in such a way that the value

of the content of the thought is involved . This is clear-

ly true in all cases involving statement of fact , parti-

cularly where the fact is not easily verified by other

means , and no less so in instances where subjective deter-

minants form an important component part of the content .

In general , we may well recognize the psychological fac-

tors as possessing a constitutive importance in the zone

of reflection where the perceptual referent is correlated

with a conceptual statement . But there is a large range

of thought wherein the content is purely conceptual and

objective . Particularly is this true in the case of the

discovery and proof of a mathematical theorem , and only

somewhat less so in the theoretical development of any

science . In these latter instances the evaluation of the

thought content can be made in complete disregard of the

thinker as a person . His character may be noble or vile,

his personal psychology may be normal or abnormal, and

his attitude social or anti-social, but, in any case,

his thought is a presentation which can be judged as to
its soundness quite independently and objectively . Thus

it appears to be clear that the psychological evaluation

of thought has only a partial validity with respect to

the soundness or unsoundness of the content . The Prag-

matist has , no doubt , brought into . focus a part truth

which is philosophically significant, but appears to

generalize too far .

It is undoubtedly true that the philosopher, being

a man as well as a thinker , is, in his own person, con-

ditioned by psychological determinants which vary more or

less radically from individual to individual, and, equally,

there can be no doubt but that these factors play their

part in providing the basic orientation of the thinker

and in giving form and direction to the thought . Un-

questionably, criticism which is at all complete must have

a due regard for these factors as well as for the more

impersonal and rational elements , such as the factuality

of references and the soundness of the logic . But if too

much stress is given to the psychological determinants,

criticism can all too easily degenerate into the error of
the argumentum ad hominem , and thus we may see philosophy

fall from its lofty state of impersonal and detached aloof-

ness . Issues which otherwise would be worked out to agree-

-400-
ment, or agreement to disagree , on the high level of

the forum may well be carried to the arena for final

resolution . Logical issues are resolved in the forum ;

differences on the level of transcendental vision are

resolved by the greater Light manifested by the more

comprehensive Realization ; but differences based upon

psychological factors such as the purpose, interest,

and taste of the empiric man , when resolution becomes

desirable or necessary , cannot be inte rated by either

ZNQ.4,S ~a>6a
the forum or the Light . In the 1a e-r case resolution

at least tends to be worked out by force, either

physical or psychological .
An instance of the resolution of philosophic

difference by force, and one which today is deeply sten-

ciled on the world memory, is to be found in the incident

of German National Socialism . Despite all the crudities

of this movement, it was grounded in a philosophy . One

who has read and brooded upon both The Decline of the West

and Mein Kampf can hardly help but note practical impli-

cations in the latter which find their philosophical base

in the former . The Spenglerian philosophy is one of the

most consistent developments of the Vitalistic orientation,

in which conceptualism is given radical subordination to

the Will and to psychological factors generally . The

conclusion is drawn that war is well nigh the essence of

life, and there does not appear to be any ground for view-

-401-
ing this conclusion as something added to the ineluct-

able consequences of such an orientation . Logic stands

as incompetent to resolve fundamental issues . The wars

of creatures from the plant to man and of groups and

nations are the final determinants . No doubt Spengler

resented the form his thought took in the hands of the

vulgar Hitler, but this was more the resentment of one

with the taste of a scholar and a gentleman for the crudi-

ties of a vulgarian, who was no gentleman, than it was

for the essence of the Hitlerian philosophy . The fact

is that purely vital issues are resolved by conflict,

and thus the transcendence of conflict as an ultimate

determinant depends upon the subordination of the vital

by some higher principle, such as rationality or spirit-

uality . In this fundamental sense , the powers which de-

feated National Socialism upon the field of battle did

not thereby overthrow .or disprpve the primary thesis of

Mein Sampf , but merely denied survival to a specific

interpretation of that thesis . The irrationalism of a

psycho-vitalistic philosophy was not transcended by a

rationalistic power, acting in conformity with its own

nature, but a specific manifestation of this irration-

alism was overcome by a greater irrational power . The

total effect is in the form of a confirmation of the

primary thesis of Spengler .

 The foregoing illustration is pertinent to a

discussion of Pragmatism , since "Pragmatism " is, in one

of its aspects , but another name for "Vitalism" . In this

connection , " Vitalism" must be understood with a broader

connotation than is given the same term in more special-

ized biological theory . Vitalism , here , means a philo-

sophical orientation , such that the categories of life

are given priority overthe categories of the mind or

intellect . Now, while it is true that in some system of

thought Life-- spelled with a capital L--is viewed as the

ontological or transcendental principle , this is not the
sense which is meant by the Pragmatist . The life of the

Pragmatist is the natural or mundane life which we ex-

perience and know with our ordinary faculties --the life

which is studied by the biologist . In this respect the

attitude bf the Pragmatist parallels that of the Naturalist,

with the important difference that biological categories

are viewed as more fundamental than physical categories,

such as those which are fundamental in physics , astronomy,

chemistry, etc .

It is quite relevant to the attainment of an

understanding of Pragmatism to ask ourselves the question :

What do we mean when we speak of " life "? We find that be-

sides the conception of Life as a transcendental principle

there are at least two contrasted possible meanings . The

word may be conceived as meaning a privative concept, de-

-403-
fined to comprehend a certain kind of phenomena . In

this sense "life" is an object of scientific study of

which the end of the program would be an integration of

the facts of life within the limits of intellectually

comprehensible law . When biology is viewed as essen-

tially a special kind of manifestation of physics and

chemistry, this is the standpoint that is taken . The

underlying assumption implied by this attitude, either

implicit or explicit, is that life is no more than it

is conceived to be . It is just another case of know-

ledge which, while it may not be complete knowledge to-

day, is nonetheless regarded as capable of completion in

principle . This implies that conceptual thought has the

power to comprehend life and thus is a larger power and

not merely one which exists as an effect or by-product of

life . But we may think of "life" in quite a different

sense . The word may be viewed as no more than a sort of

pointer to a reality which, in peculiar degree, can never

be known in the conceptual sense . Thus, while we may know

mathematical and other logical entities with conceptual

rigor, life forever escapes this kind of knowing . What

we really do know of life itself, as distinct from a con-

ceptual symbol meaning life, is through an extra-conceptual

acquaintance, i .e ., through a way of consciousness that can

never be fully thought . Thus, around every conceptual

-404-
thought of life it is believed there lies a sort of

penumbral field which is not part of the central thought .

and which may escape clear analysis entirely , but may be

glimpsed , however dimly , in those moments when conscious-

ness turns upon itself , as it were , and glimpses a sort

of fleeting shadow . This shadow is a fringe about the

nuclear core of the concept , known darkly like an intui-

tion which defeats all definition . It may seem that this

fringe , rather than the central conceptual core, carries

the real secret of the meaning of life . There are many

who say that this is indeed so, and that the nature of

the fringe is such that no intellectual analysis , however

refined , can ever grasp its real nature, and this is the

case because it is an essentially inconceivable life which

so supports and envelops thought that the latter can never

by itself comprehend its living roots . Thus life is viewed

as master and thought the servant . This appears to be the

general view held by Pragmatism , and particularly by

Henri Bergson .
Doubtless , within non-philosophic and non -scientific
circles , the second view given above would generally seem

the more acceptable , since to view life as an object im-

plies a relatively exceptional detachment where thought

itself , or something greater than thought and empiric

life, supplies its own base, or some foundation other

than life . Far more commonly , life seems to the con-

sciousness to be a mystical somewhat which conditions

all else , but which is not itself conditioned, or, if

it'is , that higher conditioning is unknowable to the

conceptual mind . For the greater part , Western philo-

sophy has not assumed this point of view , but there are

philosophic thinkers who have maintained it, such as

Spengler and Bergson . These thinkers are classed today

as Vitalists .

While it is true that Pragmatism is a form of

Vitalism , it by no means follows that Vitalism is always

a form of Pragmatism . Thus in the case of Spengler,

while in this philosophy we find many features which re-

mind us of Pragmatism, yet the " Life" of Spengler is a

notion embracing a good deal more than the "life" of the

biologist . With him it is an ontological notion which

can be really apprehended only by a mystical intuition .

The Spenglerian philosophy is not restricted to the

empirically given , in the same sense or in the same de-

gree as is true of Pragmatism . To differentiate the lat-

ter more completely we must consider its development out

of epistemological considerations .

The epistemological definition of Pragmatism is

given very concisely by C . S . Peirce in Baldwin's Dictionary

of Philosophy and Psychology in the following words :

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have prac-

tical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception .

to have . Then our conception of these effects is the

whole of our conception of the object ." (Italics mine)

From the same source we derive a further elabora-

tion of the definition in the following words : Pragmatism

is "the doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception

expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences

either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in

that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be

true ; which consequences would be different if it were

untrue, and must be different from the consequences by

which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed . "

(Italics mine)

The second quotation above was contributed by the

late William James , and, inasmuch as C . S . Peirce and

William James were among the half dozen or so thinkers

who were most prominent in the early development of Prag-

matism as a philosophic school, we may, with substantial

reason, regard the foregoing definition as authoritative .

A close study of this definition reveals that four words

are crucial in the determination of its meaning . These

are : "practical", "conduct", "experience", and "whole" .

In order to arrive at reasonable precision, we will con-

sider their definitions as given in the same source .

 (a) The practical "covers all that is not theoret-

ically or cognitively determined, but which involves pur-

pose, teleology, striving, achievement, appreciation,

ideals ." This meaning is akin to that of practice , which

in turn is defined as "conduct or moral activity, as dis-

tinguished from the strictly intellectual life ."

(b) Conduct is "the sum of an individual's ethical

actions, either generally or in relation to some special

circumstance ." By this definition conduct is differentiated

from any kind of action as is the popular understanding of

the term .

(c) Experience is defined in two senses , psychologi-

cal and psychic or mental . (1) "Psychological : conscious-

ness considered as a process taking place in time ." (25

"Psychic or mental : the entire process of phenomena, of

present data considered in their raw immediacy, before

reflective thought has analysed them into subjective and

objective aspects or ingredients ." The last part of this

definition is contributed by William James himself, who

goes on to say that it is "exactly correlative to the word

Phenomenon " as "it is used in a colourless philosophic

sense , as equivalent to 'fact' or event--to any particular

which requires explanation ." The last portion of the

quotation is from John Dewey's contribution to the defini-

tion of the word Phenomenon .

 (d) Whole is to be understood in the sense of

entire or complete . Thus, "whole of our conception" and

"whole meaning" imply that there is no additional meaning

attaching to the conception over and above that given in

the definition .

From the above definitions we derive a very clear-

ly delimited meaning of Pragmatism . We can still further

clarify the conception by considering what is excluded by

Pragmatism in its use of meaning and truth . Meaning and

truth are denied to that which is exclusivelyy determined

by theory and cognition . This means, for instance, that

a self-contained and self-consistent mathematical system

which did not lead to anything beyond itself would not be

true or have meaning . Sheer self-consistency is .thus not

a criterion of truth . To be sure, such a system might

have an aesthetic value, in which case it would have a

degree of truth and meaning, but it would derive this from

the value it had for the aesthetic feeling, and not from

the purely theoretical or cognitive relations or content .

Thus, truth and meaning clearly depend upon a relation of

the cognitive factor to something other than the cognitive

thought itself . The word whole reveals the privative or

absolute character of the Pragmatic thesis . Truth and

meaning , as understood by the Pragmatist, do not have the

signification given above in addition to other applications,
but the practical or empiric significance is the whole

of their signification . Thus, one who accepted the above

definitions as substantially valid as a part truth, pro-

vided the word whole were .expunged, would not be a Prag-

matist .

Quite clearly, Pragmatism is anti-intellectualistic

as has been so frequently affirmed by its protagonists .

It is anti-intellectualistic both in the psychological

and philosophical senses , that is, it denies the theory

that the intellectual or cognitive functions are more

fundamental than the affective and conative, and, as well,

the view that the ultimate principle of the universe is

some form of thought or reason or the more modified view

that reality is completely intelligible to thought . Prag-

matism is also anti-conceptualistic in the classic sense

that universals .are real ante res , in rebus , and post res .

Further, it is anti-rationalistic in both the sense of

reason being an independent source of knowledge, distinct

from sense-perception and having a higher authority, and

in the sense of a philosophic method which, starting from

elementary concepts, seeks to derive all the rest by de-

ductive method, as is the process in mathematics .

So far as these determinations of what Pragmatism

is not are concerned, this school does not by any means

stand alone, since the older Empiricists maintained the

same attitude , and most of oriental philosophy would be

in agreement . Clearly, Pragmatism is empiric or aesthetic

and essentially nominalistic , but in taking its orienta-

tion upon the base of experience defined as a process in

time and restricted to the raw immediacy of the sense it

departs from the Oriental Aestheticism which embraces non-

temporal and non-sensuous aesthetic elements . Further,

in its assertion of anti-intellectualism and anti-

rationalism , Pragmatism has much in common with the volun-

taristic wing of Idealism and finds considerable support

in the final position of Immanuel Kant . But Pragmatism

departs from the general thesis of the older Empiricism

in the emphasis it places upon conduct and the practical .

The former held a relatively static view of Being, whereas

for Pragmatism real being approaches the meaning of acti-

vity or becoming, in this respect having a large agreement

with the philosophy of Spengler . With respect to volun-

taristic Idealism, Pragmatism stands in contrast both in

that it is much more realistic and because it is anti-

transcendentalistic, in the sense that the whole meaningful

content of conceptions consists in a reference to experience

and conduct . The antithesis of Pragmatism is to be found

in the Rational Idealism of Hegel , and even more so in the

highly pure conceptualism of Spinoza .

 The relative human consciousness manifests through

three fundamental modes which we may designate thinking,

feeling, and doing, or, more technically, cognition, af-

fection, and conation . In the history of human philosophic

thought each of these modes has, at one time or another,

been given the primary valuation, and not only in the sense

of a peculiarity of individual psychology, but even in the

ontological sense . Thus, with the main body of Greek

thinkers, the western Rationalists, and the rationalistic

wing of Idealism, cognition has been given a prime and even

ontological status, with respect to which the other modes

stand in either derivative relationship or are at least

subordinate . Likewise, with the voluntaristic Idealists

and the Vitalists conation generally occupies the position

of primacy, and even, as in the case of Schopenhauer, is

viewed as ontologically identical with original Being . It

would appear that there should be room for a school of

thought which we might call Affectionism, where the primacy

in importance would be assigned to the affections . Such a

school does not appear in the main stream of Western philo-

sophic thought, but it is to be found in India . Wherever

the hedonic tone of a state of consciousness is given prime

valuation, the philosophic formulation proper to such a

valuation would be some form of Affectionism . In the ex-

ceptionally comprehensive and able philosophy of Sri

Aurobindo Ghose we find precisely this kind of evaluation .

To bring out in clear relief this orientation, which is

unknown or virtually unknown in Western philosophy, the

following lengthy quotation is taken from Sri Aurobindo's

essay on Heraclitus :

"But there is one great gap and defect whether

in his ( Heraclitus ') knowledge of things or his

knowledge of the self of man . We see in how many

directions the deep divining eye of Heraclitus

anticipated the largest and profoundest general-

izations of Science and Philosophy and how even

his more superficial thoughts indicate later power-

ful tendencies of the occidental mind , how too

some of his ideas influenced such profound and

fruitful thinkers as Plato , the Stoics , the Neo-

platonists . But in his defect also he is a fore-

runner ; it illustrates the great deficiency of later.-. ., .

European thought, such of it at least as has not

been profoundly influenced by Asiatic religions or

Asiatic mysticism . I have tried to show how often

his thought touches and is almost identical with

the Vedic and Vedantic . But his knowledge of the

truth of things stopped with the vision of the

universal reason and the universal . force ; he seems

to have summed up the principle of things in these

two first terms, the aspect of consciousness, the

aspect of power , a supreme intelligence and a

supreme energy . The eye of Indian thought saw a

third aspect of the Self and of the Brahman ; be-

sides the universal consciousness active in divine

knowledge , besides the universal force active in

the divine will , it saw the universal delight

active in divine love and joy . European thought,

following the line of Heraclitus ' thinking, has

fixed itself on reason and on force and made them

the principles toward whose perfection our being

has to aspire . Force is the first aspect of the

world , war, the clash of energies ; the second

aspect, reason, emerges out of the appearance of

force in which it is at first hidden and reveals

itself as a certain justice , a certain harmony, a

certain determining intelligence and reason in

things ; the third aspect is a deeper secret behind

these two , universal delight , love , beauty which

taking up the other two can establish something

higher than j ustice , better than harmony, truer

than reason,--unity and bliss , the ecstasy of our

fulfilled existence . Of this last secret power

Western thought has only seen two lower aspects,

pleasure and aesthetic beauty ; it has missed the

 spiritual beauty and the spiritual delight . For

that reason Europe has never been able to develop

a powerful religion of its own ; it has been obliged

to turn to Asia . Science takes possession of the

measures and utilities of Force ; rational philosophy

pursues reason to its last subleties ; but inspired

philosophy and religion can seize hold of the highest

secret, uttamam rahasyam ."l

It is thus a fact that corresponding to the three

primary modes of relative human consciousness there have

been systems of philosophy which have given primacy of

accentuation to one or another of these modes . The two

schools heretofore discussed ; i .e ., Naturalism and the

New Realism, quite clearly give the primacy to cognition,

either perceptual or conceptual . But Pragmatism clearly

subordinates conceptual cognition to empiric or perceptual

cognition, and, by accentuating practice and conduct,

gives the primacy to the conative mode of consciousness .

Perhaps affection is here valued above cognition, but on

this point I am unable to arrive at a definite decision .

At any rate, conation receives the ascendent evaluation .

Pragmatism, then, may be classed as an empiric

Voluntarism, in contrast to transcendental Voluntarism,

such as that of Schopenhauer . But, being a form of

Voluntarism, the general implications of a voluntaristic

attitude, both positive and negative, follow . There is

a definite support and strengthening of those tendencies

in man which express themselves in performance, such as

conquest of nature, missionary zeal, melioration activi-

ties and movements, progressive education, promulgation

of propaganda of all sorts, selling, promotion, building,

etc ., etc . We may well agree that much of this is all to

the good, but there is another side to a Voluntarism which

is its own ultimate law . The will may and has success-

fully sought to impose its idea upon the other fellow,

group, or nation, either for, or not for, his own good .

It is of the very nature of Voluntarism to deny that there

is any moral maxim, conceptual law, or transcendental order

which can serve as a supreme court for the review of its

volitions . Whatever willed objective is successfully

effectuated is, by reason of that success, morally and

otherwise justified . Thus, a successful National Social-

ism would be righteous simply because it was successful .

It stands today repudiated, but on pure voluntaristic

grounds ; that repudiation does not rest upon moral, reli-

gious , or intellectual considerations ; it rests simply

upon the fact that in the trial by willed force National

Socialism was overthrown. Had the Nazis been strong enough

to succeed , they would have been justified

 It is quite understandable and in conformity

with expectation that , given the premises of Pragmatism,

there should follow the doctrine of the Will to Believe

as a justified form of cognition . But the will to be-

lieve, which, in the hands of a William James, a cultured

gentleman of superior tastes and ethical values, could

eventuate in a statement with which we can feel much

sympathy, is subject to no guiding modulus and both could

and would mean something very different when developed by

a man of quite different character and tastes , such as

Joseph Stalin . Here the successfully effectuated will

becomes the final authority . The good is that which the

will actually accomplishes, and only that . This is the

great dilemma of the Voluntarist . On one side, a com-

pletely free will, not subject to the review of any higher

authority--at the price of chaos ; on the other, a moral

and rational governing modulus--at the price of a cur-

tailed freedom . Howard H . Brinton, in his The Mystic Will ,

has shown how that greatest of voluntaristic mystics,

Jacob Boehme, becoming conscious of the dilemma, was

troubled, and therefore at times wrote like a rationalist .

Jacob Boehme, who although in his soul incarnating the

spirit of non-violence in such degree as to be the very

fountainhead of the non-violent tendency in the West,

none the less was likewise the fountainhead of that

voluntarism which is the ultimate base and justification

of all violence!

-417-
 The difficulties involved when Pragmatism is

understood as an orientation to pure activism has not

escaped the attention of one of the leading Pragmatists

and has caused him to feel some doubts . This self-

criticism comes from C . S . Peirce, who, at least in the

temporal sense , was the first of the modern Pragmatists,

and since his statement is trenchant and comes from the

ranks of .the Pragmatists, it will be quoted at length .

"This maxim2 was first proposed by C . S . Peirce

in the Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878 ;

and he explained how it was to be applied to the

doctrine of reality . The writer was led ,,the maxim

by reflection upon Kant's Critic of the Pure Reason .

Substantially the same way of dealing with ontology

seems to have been practiced by the Stoics . The

writer subsequently saw that the principle might

easily be misapplied, so as to sweep away the

whole doctrine of incommensurables, and, in fact,

the whole Weierstrassian way of regarding the

calculus . In 1896 William James published his

Will to Believe , and later his Philop . Conceptions

and Pract . Results , which pushed this method to

such extremes as must tend to give us pause . The

doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is

action--a stoical axiom which, to the present writer

-418-
at the age of sixty , does not recommend itself so

forcibly as it did at thirty . If it be admitted,

on the contrary , that action wants an end , and that

that end must be something of a general description,

then the spirit of the maxim itself , which is that

we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order

rightly to apprehend them , would direct us toward

something different from practical facts , namely,

to general ideas , as the true interpreters of our

thought . Nevertheless , the maxim has approved it-

self to the writer , after many years of trial, as

of great utility in leading to a relatively high

grade of clearness of thought . He would venture

to suggest that it should always be put into prac-

tice with conscientious thoroughness , but that,

when that has been done , and not before, a still

higher grade of clearness of thought can be attained

by remembering that the only ultimate good which

the practical facts to which it directs attention

can subserve is to further the development of con-

crete reasonableness ; so that the meaning of the

concept does not lie in any individual reactions

at all, but in the manner in which those reactions

contribute to that development . Indeed, in the

article of 1878, above referred to, the writer

 practiced better than he preached ; for he applied

the stoical maxim most unstoically, in such a sense

as to insist upon the reality of the objects of

general ideas in their generality ."3

Certain striking modifications of the original

conception of Pragmatism are revealed in the italicized

portion of the above quotation . First , since activism

appeals more to the man of thirty than to the man of

sixty, it appears that the activistic emphasis is no more

than a matter of individual psychology and thus may not

be validly extrapolated into an ontological principle .

Second , it appears that the essential meaning of the maxim

is not necessarily activistic but consists in the evalu-

ation of the given conception by its upshot --a view which

contrasts with evaluation by the source . (This would ap-

pear to be the most fundamental feature of Pragmatist method

which remains .) Third , it appears that the maxim is merely

useful in guiding empiric thought, but not , therefore,

necessarily an absolute criterion of truth . It is thus

reduced to a mundane heuristic principle . Fourth, it

appears that there is insistence upon the reality of

general ideas in their generality . This would seem to

bring us back to the standpoint of the Conceptualists,

and with that the distinctive quale of Pragmatism qua

Pragmatism very largely vanishes .

 With Pragmatism modified as above, it would seem

that we have left merely a useful method of heuristic or

pragmatic value only, and in that case the idea that the

whole meaning or truth of a conception is necessarily

found in consequences in terms of conduct , the practical,

and the empiric , would have to be abandoned . But in that

case Pragmatism would hardly have any reason for existence

as a philosophic school . With Pragmatism reduced to the

status of a useful modulus of procedure in the movements

of mundane consciousness , there does not appear any reason

why a protagonist of any school of philosophic thought

could not and should not also be a Pragmatist in some

phases of his thinking . Standard Pragmatism , by reason

of the privativity implied by the word "whole" in the

maxim, narrows the office of conception not only in the

sense already discussed but, even more seriously , excludes

the use of the conception in relation to a transcendental

meaning , and this is a matter of particular importance to

us here .

In conformity with Pragmatic epistemology, if

there is a consciousness which is not conceptual, or

merely conceptual , which is not in time , which is not an

immediate presentation of phenomena and is not related to

conduct as action, then the relationship of conception to

such a consciousness cannot be classed as truth or meaning .

Since the immediate content of at least some mystical or

Gnostic states of consciousness has such an immediate non-

temporal and non-sensuous character, or at least purports

to have such, it follows that the Pragmatist's epistemo-

logical theory either (1) implies denial of the actuality

of such a mystical content, or (2) granting that such a

content exists, then affirms that the relationship of a

conception to it may not be classed as 'meaning' or 'truth' .

This constitutes the second zone in which truth and meaning

are denied to a conceptual relationship--the first, it will

be recalled, being the zone of the relationship of concept

to concept in an exclusively conceptual system, such as

that of pure mathematics . Now it is true, as a matter of

fact, that historically, as well as currently, the notion

of 'truth' has been important, and even very important, in

both zones . The Pragmatist theory, therefore, must imply

that both of these uses of the notion of 'truth' are with-

out validity, and, therefore, that both of these types of

conceptuality are without meaning--a conclusion which is

not very likely to be acceptable to either the philosophic

mathematician or the philosophic mystic .

It is not here suggested that Pragmatism, 'as such,

or that all pragmatistic thinkers, necessarily deny the

actuality of mystical experience . Indeed, William James

has treated the subject very sympathetically in his Varieties

of Religious Experience , and has affirmed that it deserves

-422-
much more serious study . But the mystical consciousness

appears under two aspects , in that , in one sense it is an

experience , and, in another , it is an immediate content .

As an experience , it is an event happening to some subject

or self in time , and, as such , falls within the range of

psychological , physiological , and even physical observa-

tion . Further , the event may produce changes in the con-

duct of the individual involved , and this may be noted

and in some measure evaluated objectively . In this sense,

the mystical consciousness is a somewhat which may fall

within the range of evaluation in the pragmatic sense .

But the matter is quite different when we come to consider

the inward or immediate content -- the psychical as dis-

tinguished from the psychological -- of the mystical state .

This lies beyond the range of external observation, as

is also true of the immediate psychical value of any ex-

perience , such as the immediate quale of the experience

blue, for instance , and can be known only by those who

have realized the state . It is certainly true that historic-

ally such inward or psychical content has constituted the

meaningful reference of .-philosophies , especially in the

case of oriental philosophies . But this sort of truth-

reference is ruled out by the Pragmatist epistemological
theory. i
 Anyone who granted the validity of the mystical

or Gnostic content and of a truth - relation or of a meaning-

relation on the part of a conception to such a content,

but who at the same time accepted as valid the Pragmatist

definitions of truth and meaning in other relations, would

not be a Pragmatist in
n the sense of the definitions quoted

above . For then the whole meaning of a conception, or of

conception as such , would not be manifested in practical

consequences in terms of conduct and experience . At least

some of the meaning would be of a different sort . Super-

ficially , one might imagine that the removal of the word

'whole' from the definitions would resolve the difficulty,

but this is not so , since the independence and existence

of Pragmatism as a school actually hangs upon that word .

As an example , we can easily conceive of an Absolute

Idealist who would say, provided the word 'whole' were

removed from the definition : I also accept the Pragmatist

epistemology as an adequate description of conceptual cog-

nition in its relation to the relative realities of appear-

ance , but not in its relation to Ultimate Reality . In such

a way Absolute Idealism could assimilate the Pragmatist

epistemological theory as . a part truth , and there would be

no room left for Pragmatism as an independent school . How-

ever, the historic fact is that epistemological Pragmatism

came to birth as the result of a polemic directed against

 Absolutism . Thus its possibility as an independent ex-

istence lies in its emphasis of the word ' whole' in the

definitions . It appears somewhat ironical that Pragmatism,

i in order to establish a place opposed to Absolute Idealism,

had to invoke a sort of left-handed absolutism of its own!

The argument in support of Absolute Idealism, as

against that of Pragmatism , has opened a door within the

defenses of the latter whereby the former may possibly

once again establish itself , if it can show in any degree,

however small , that the use of the word ' whole' in the

Pragmatist definitions is not valid . This is the analogue

of William James' own thesis that Pluralism is established

if it can be shown , in even the smallest degree , that there

is something not contained in the Absolute One . Thus, if

a conception can mean a mystical content --as is indeed

implied throughout the philosophical Buddhist Sutras, to

name one instance --and this content is neither a time-

conditioned consciousness nor a perceptual experience, . in

the sense of the raw immediacy of sensual presentation,

then a breach is established in the walls of Pragmatist

epistemological theory . To be sure , this does not neces-

sarily imply the negation of the instrumental theory with

respect to the office of the concept . But if the instru-

mental theory is retained , or insofar as it is retained,

the concept would have at least a two-fold instrumental

office . One would be that so well developed by Pragmatism,

wherein the conceptual idea is instrumental to an experi-

ence , or practice , that always includes some degree of

the perceptual auale , and the second instrumentality

would be oriented to an immediate content which is non-

experiential --in the sense of the definition given above--

and non-conceptual . This latter content we may call the

Transcendental or Spiritual , in the Indian sense of the

term . The polemic of Pragmatism as against Absolutism

would have proved effective to the extent that it has estab-

lished that the theELs of the latter cannot be maintained on

the ground of pure . conception alone . Conception would have

to be differentiated from the transcendental content as

well as from the perceptual . The intellectualistic thesis

that the fundamental and ultimate principle of the universe

is some form of thought might well have to be abandoned,

and, whether or not the intellectualistic psychology , . which

places cognition above affection and conation , would be re-

tained , still the intellectual and conceptual would stand

below the Transcendental . In any case , the Pragmatist

thesis that conception is derived from perception could

be maintained no longer as exclusively valid . For, it is

at least possible that the concept has a hidden Father in

the Transcendental , as well as a revealed Mother in the

perceptual or experiential, and, on a Priori grounds,

it cannot be maintained that the nature of the concept

is necessarily in closer affinity to the Mother than to

the Father . Recognition of the actuality of the Father,

and, further, the realization that his nature is not less

native to the Son-concept than is the Mother-percept, is

all that the Transcendental Idealist needs .

The instrumental interpretation of intellectual

thought or conception, as developed by Pragmatism, is

based, in considerable measure, upon the thesis that the

concept is derived from the percept and serves as an office

for the latter . In this connection the percept is not to

be construed'as derived exclusively from sensation, but,

rather, something sufficiently comprehensive to include a

complex of feeling and intuition as well as sensation .4

Perception thus comprehends the material given by all the

psybhological functions except conceptual thinking, as

these functions are listed by C . G . Jung . This percep-

tion is conceived as prior to conception, both in the

sense of time and of epistemological value . With respect

to the notion of priority in time, the study of biology,

under the assumption of organic evolution, does build a

very strong presumption in support of the thesis . Investi-

gation of the psychical life of animals, particularly in

the case of the higher animals, gives convincing evidence

that they do have a perceptual consciousness in which

there is some form of sensation , feeling , and intuition .

But there is little or no reason to suppose that animals

think in the conceptual sense . Thus , in bio-psychology,

the qualitative differentiation of man from all other

animals . inheres in the development or presence of the

function or faculty of conceptual thinking . Man is dis-

tinctively man because , and to the extent , he thinks con-

ceptually . From the standpoint which regards the theory

of organic evolution as an all-sufficient basis of inter-

pretation , man and conceptual thinking are simply the

latest terms in the natural evolutionary series . If,

then, we view man as solely a biological entity, it is

clear that on the whole he has achieved the most compre-

hensive adjustment to environment , when compared to that

of any other animal . He commands the stage of life as

does no other creature . He can survive under far greater

diversity of conditions , and, in spite of the relative

atrophy of functional capacities that are strong in the

animals, he is lord over the whole animal world , and has

advanced far in the conquest of the inorganic . Despite

his many remaining and new problems , man constitutes an

advance over the purely animal kingdom in the art of ad-

justing life to environment . But the key to this unique

achievement of man clearly lies in the possession of the

faculty of conceptual thinking . Therefore , there can be

no doubt but that the concept does serve an office for life .

Does it therefore follow that the total signifi-

cance of the concept is that of an office for life? Even

though we grant that the given outline of the bio -historic

genesis of . the concept is substantially correct, we may

still ask this question . Here it is quite germane to point

out that the bio-history we refer to is itself a conceptual

construct, and not a pure perceptual fact . The history

known is a history for thought , whatever else it may be .

As a consequence , the reference to biologic evolution does

not supply us with a pure pre -conceptual root from which

the concept is supposed to be derived . The material with

which we are working is so compounded that the concept is

inextricably a part of it, and the problem of the inherent

nature of the concept simply reappears in a new form .

The thesis that historic genesis supplies the key

to significance is, itself , no more than a conceptual hypo-

thesis, a theory of interpretation . History can be inter-

preted in such a way that it loses all ontological value .

Thus it is possible to view . all events as merely supplying

occasions which arouse recognition of truth without being

their source . In such a case the bio-historic process

would have only the value of a sort of phantasmagoria

having only catalytic significance . A consistent inter-

pretation of history along this line is only a question

of skill . As a result, we could quite easily conclude .

that the primacy of perception in time'casts no effective

light upon the fundamental nature of conception . So, the

facts of biology do not'prove that the total significance

of conception is that of an instrumental aid to life or

experience, nor that its principal significance is such .

All that we can positively say here is that conception

does facilitate the adjustment of a living organism, though

it may have quite other and even much more important re-

lations .-
As far as I can see, the Vitalists have not esta-

blished their thesis for the derivation of the concept,

though, if they had, the conception of the exclusively

instrumental value of the concept with respect Co life .

might well follow . But although the vitalistic attempt

at proof may have failed, this does not, imply that the

instrumentalistic theory may not otherwise be established .

There is another line of approach to substantially the

same conclusion, which, in my opinion, carries much more

weight . This we may call the . psychological approach and

shall proceed to its consideration .

-430-
 The introspective observation and analysis of the

actual ua ale and functioning within consciousness can lead

to a philosophic statement , and this seems to be the most

distinctive approach to Pragmatism as exemplified by

William James . While one is immersed in a state of con-

sciousness or engaged in aopsychical process, it is pos-

sible to shift one's attention from the immediate enjoy-

ment or content to the observation of the state or process

itself . This step is sometimes quite difficult as the

shift of attention may, very easily , destroy the state

or erase the content, but with care it can be done . In

this kind of effort William James was undoubtedly endowed

with exceptional skill , and has unquestionably made highly

valuable discoveries . But not only did this sort of re-

search contribute an important part of his psychological

theory, it also formed a significant part of his philoso-

phical base . His theory concerning the nature and func-

tioning of perception and conception appears to be very

largely grounded on such research , and that is the phase

which concerns us most particularly here .

James ' root finding is probably best given by a

direct quotation of his own words . In his Some Problems

of Philosophy he has said :

-431-
 "If my reader can succeed in abstracting from

all conceptual interpretation and lapse back into

his immediate sensible life at this very moment,

he will find it to be what someone has called a

big blooming buzzing confusion, as free from con-

tradiction-in its 'much- at-onceness ' as it is all

alive and evidently there .

"Out of this aboriginal sensible muchness atten-

tion carves out objects, which conception then names

and identifies forever--in the sky 'constellations',

on the earth 'beach', 'sea', 'cliff', ' bushes',

'grass ' . Out of time we cut 'days ' and 'nights',

'summers' and 'winters' . We say what each part

of the sensible continuum is, and all these ab-

stracted whats are concepts .

" The intellectual life of man consists almost

wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order

for the perceptual order in which his experience
originally comes ."5

In a footnote James acknowledges the obvious fact

that this account of the 'aboriginal sensible flux' directly

contradicts that which Kant gave . As this contrast is

historically of prime philosophic importance and implies

quite diverse interpretations of the function of conceptu-

ality or understanding, I quote the relevant statement from

the Critique of Pure Reason :

-432-
 "But the conjunction ( conjunctio ) of a manifold

in the intuition never can be given us by the senses ;

it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form

of sensuous intuition , for it is a spontaneous act

of the faculty of representation . And as we must,

to distinguish it from sensibility , entitle this

faculty understanding ; so all conjunction--whether

conscious or unconscious , be it of the manifold in

intuition , sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several

conceptions --is an act of understanding . To this

act we shall give the general appellation of s7n-

thesis , thereby to indicate, at the same time, that

we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the

object without having previously conjoined it our-

selves ."6

James goes on to say , not quite consistently but

I think correctly : " The reader must decide which account

agrees best with his own actual experience ."

But despite James ' virtual acknowledgment in the

last quotation that there may be a relativity of individual

psychology involved in the differences in the formulations

of the sensibly given , as between himself and Immanuel Kant,

he proceeds in his subsequent philosophic development as

though his own finding were universally established fact

and thus would seem to be guilty of the psychologist's

-433-
fallacy- -his own designation--which he , himself , has de-

fined as " the confusion of his own--the psychologist's-- -

standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is

making his report ." It may , quite possibly , be admitted

that , given the perceptual base which James found through

the examination of his own psychical processes, much, if

not all , of his epistemological theory concerning the

office of percepts and concepts follows reasonably enough .

But can an epistemology of universal validity be estab-

lished in this way? Have we perhaps a statement which

is valid for an individual or a psychological type but

not valid as a general truth? Both Hume and Kant most

certainly found the given of sensibility in quite other

form, and this fact cannot be casually swept aside . The

contrast is radical ; for James a continuum of 'much-at-

onceness ' in which manyn ss is given , fused in an original +

J ~k,~ i rr o vac i- i caw "j h. P ey ' w4
power casts 'cuts ' whiSh are extracted as discrete enti-

ties , both static and timeless ; for Hume and Kant, a mani-

fold of atomic elements which, for Kant , are conjoined in-

to unified wholes by the conceptual understanding and the

transcendental unity of apperception of the Self . For

James , the conceptual function introduces separation into

discrete elements by abstraction from an original unified

totality, while , for Kant , the conceptual understanding

conjoins into the object from an originally given mani-

fold, and thus is a synthesizing function . From such

contrasted bases quite different epistemologies must

follow and correspondingly different metaphysical con-

ceptions .

Neither the descriptive picture of Immanuel Kant

nor that of William James stands unsupported by other

testimony . It is a historical fact that Kant's view was

largely accepted by Western philosophy since his day, but

the experience of the pure perceptual as given by William

James appears highly consonant with the view which holds

the predominant place in the Orient . We are indebted to

Dr. F . S . C . Northrop for bringing this characteristic of

oriental thought and valuation into clear relief in his

The Meeting of East and West . Indeed, Dr . Northrop builds

a convincing case for the thesis that just in this valua-

tion of the pure perceptually given we find the prime dif-

ferentiation in the psychical outlook of oriental and

occidental man . Therefore, we cannot in a quick or off-

hand manner decide that either view is exclusively true,

for here we do not have a conceptually deduced conclusion

available for objective logical analysis nor an objective

datum checkable by scientific method, since the given datum

is psychic in the sense of a conscious process apprehended

by itself, rather than psychological in the sense of being

apprehended by another . The self-observing consciousness

gives a material which is mostly beyond the reach of criti-

-43 5-
cism because it is subjective, and so, at least provision-

ally, we must accept it as valid for the individual re-

porting what he finds . Unquestionably, we must recognize

a difference in competency in the self-examination, yet,

regardless of whether the competency is limited or large,

the finding must be determinant for the individual him-

self . As a consequence, the epistemology and general

philosophy founded upon the psychic material may possess

a substantial validity for the individual and for those

of similar psychical type, and yet fail to authenticate

an extrapolated general epistemology . We must assume that

other self-determination of the psychic character of the

pure perceptual supplies an equally valid ground for a

quite different theory of knowledge and philosophical

development .

In my own finding with respect to the perceptu-

ally given, prior to the experience of the transformation

process reported in Chapter II of Part I, the material

seemed of identical nature with that described by Kant .

Subsequently, when reading James' report, I made a re-

examination and found the perceptual material to be con-

sonant with his statement . But repeated examinations

since then have given me either the continuum or the mani-

fold, and I do not find myself able to determine that the

one view is more profound or truer than the other . This

fact has forced the provisional view that the finding

is conditioned by individual psychology and that the

ultimate or objective nature of the pure perceptual is

such that it possesses both characters at the same time .

This seems like a contradiction and probably is a para-

dox, but it is scarcely more difficult to accept than the

physicist ' s experience of the phenomena of light which

requires a description in terms of both corpuscles and

undulating waves .

We derive from Kanti . and James two radically con-

trasting theories of the origin , office , and nature of

the conceptual understanding . For James, the concept is

derived from the percept , is at all times dependent upon

the percept for its ultimate meaning, and , in the end,

fulfills itself by eventuating in a perceptual state of

consciousness or experience ; but for Kant the conceptual

order,is a priori , that is, not derived from perceptual

experience, and though not known by the relative conscious-

ness prior to experience in time , is, nonetheless, tran-

scendental in its nature and thus prior in its essence ;

it integrates the raw perceptual material , depends upon

the latter for the predication of actuality , but not for

the determination of the form of understanding . There is

a considerable area of agreement between Kant and the Prag-

matists in that they both view the office of the concept

i

as related to the perceptual material . Indeed, it will

be remembered that the first statement of the Pragmatic

theory grew out of Peirce's meditation upon the implica-

tions of certain portions of the Kantian thesis . But we

can hardly conclude that this interpretation is true to

the whole meaning of the Kantian philosophy, since modern

Idealism is derived from this source, both in its Ration-

alistic and Voluntaristic forms . Truly, Kant conceived

a puissant and pregnant philosophy! It is true that the

Kantian treatment of the concept is moderately pejorative

when compared to the view of the older Rationalists, but

is much less pejorative than James' treatment, since the

latter views the concept as no more than a dependent at-

tachment to the perceptual order . For,-Kant ; the concept

had a transcendental genesis , and, therefore,• a degree .
of authority which was independent of the perceptual order .

Conceptual thought can develop a'-system in its-,

own terms, employing concepts,, liberated from'all`percep-

tual reference, as is done in the most formal and most

pure form of mathematics . In this case, the terms have

been viewed as 'meaningless ', and,certainly appear as
meaningless if 'meaning ''is restricted to a perceptual

referent . In terms of James!'view, the pure perceptual

continuum forms an order in itself which . has no need of

the intromission of any conceptual element in order that

-438-
it may have existence . This order, according to James,

has no meaning but is simply itself, or its own meaning,

if we may so speak . ' Meaning ', in James' sense of the

word, is an attribute or quality of the concept when it

serves the office of pointing to the perceptual order, or

some portion of it, and the terminal value of the concept

lies in the perceptual experience to which it points .

Now, in James' view, there are two interconnections be-

tween the conceptual and the perceptual, (1) the birth of

the concept out of the perceptual matrix, and (2) the re-

lationship of pointer on the part of the concept to the

perceptual in relatively or ultimately terminal phases .

That the concept can and does serve the office of pointer

to a perceptual experience is not questioned here, so long

as this 'meaning' of the concept is not taken in the priva-

tive sense . But can we truly say that the concept is born

out of the perceptual matrix? If it is in some sense born

out of that matrix, can we derive its complete character

and nature from the perceptual source? These questions we

shall proceed to examine .

If the conceptual were something exclusively de-

rived from the perceptual and dependent upon the latter

for its possibility, as the tail of a dog is dependent
upon the dog, then self-contained conceptual systems would

not be possible . But we do have such conceptual systems .

Further , when we consider the inner form or organization

of the conceptual systems and of the perceptual order,

we find radical discrepancies . One is not the duplication

of the other , as James himself has shown at some length .

Attempts to build a conceptualistic philosophy which shall

embrace the totality of the perceptual have failed, broken

by the dilemmas of many apparently unsolvable problems .

This we shall illustrate by one instance , i .e ., that of

the characters of the conceptual and the perceptual con-

tinua . The conceptual continuum consists of an infinity

of terms , no two of which may be selected in such a way

that there will not be an infinity of other terms between

them, yet each term is static and completely determinant .

There are no gaps in the continuum but also no flow or

flux and no becoming . In contrast , the perceptual con-

tinuum consists of no completely . determinant terms, but

only of parts which stand out in the sense of more or

less , and all inter-connected by a stream of becoming,

such that no term is identical to any other , or even with

itself , and stands in no fixed unchanging relationship to

any other . Clearly, these two continua are radically dif-

ferent . We cannot set up a two-term relationship between

the elements or parts of one and those of the other . We

cannot do this, as suggested by Dr . Northrop , even though

the two -term relationship is conceived as freely in the

-440-
form of one- one, one -many , and many-one . If the per-

ceptually given were in the form of a manifold , as Kant

found it to be, such . a two -term relationship might be

quitee conceivable, but we are at present viewing the

perceptually given in the form which James gave it . In

this form it is a flow or flux, and thus not consisting

of determinant terms with which a two-term correlation

is possible . So we must conclude that the inner form or

organization of the conceptual systems and perceptual

order are qualitatively different, and not merely dif-

ferent in degree but diverse in the sense of being in-

commensurable .

But while the conceptual and the perceptual are

orders or systems incommensurable to each other, so that

the one is ineffable with respect to the other, they un-

questionably do interact . Something in the conceptual

system is derived from the perceptual order . Of this

there can be no doubt . However, this fact of something

contained in the conceptual, which is derived from the

perceptual, does not imply that the conceptual in its

total or its essential nature is derived from the per-

ceptual . What we have, rather, is the meeting of two

powers or modes of the total consciousness that are in

their surface manifestation alien to each other, however

much they may be fused in their root source . What is be-

-441-
ing suggested here is a fusion or identity in a common

root combined with parallelity in manifestation, rather

than a causal connection on the surface . Because of the

commonality of the root, interaction is possible, but be-

cause of independence in essential development, each ac-

cording to its own law--or swadharma--there is an in-

eluctable incommensurability in the inherent character

of conception and perception . We can illustrate the

interaction combined with essential incommensurability

by the figure of conceiving of the perceptual flux as

stream or a sea of flowing currents into which the con-

ceptual enters as a determinate vessel and brings forth

a portion of the perceptual water . The concept in its

impure or mixed form consists of both the water and the

vessel . The water is derived from the perceptual, while

the vessel is not . Pure conceptuality is a development

in terms of the vessel alone, without the water .

When Kant said, "but, though all our knowledge

begins with experience, it by no means follows that all

arises out of experience ", he made one of the most pro-

found observations in the whole history of philosophy .

("Knowledge" here is to be understood in the sense of

conceptual knowledge .) The implication is that in the

conceptual and perceptual we have two orders, neither of

which is derived from the other . As a result, each is

capable of independent or autonomous development in ac-

cordance with its own nature . The perceptual does not

need the conceptual in order that empiric life may sur-

vive, as is abundantly demonstrated by the lower forms

of'organism . Likewise , however much it may be true that

within our ordinary experience the conceptual order does

not manifest until brought into contact with experience,

yet the conceptual is capable of operating in its own

terms and in accordance with its own law, in high dis-

regard for all perceptual elements . It does not even

need the Kantian transcendental forms of perception, i .e .,

space and time, as is demonstrated in the development of

formal mathematical systems . We do not need . to decide

that one order gives truth while the other does not, or

that truth attaches exclusively to a relationship between

the two ; nor do we face the necessity of concluding that

one is real while the other is unreal . Perhaps we are

not yet able to answer questions of this sort in the

ontological sense , but we can recognize that, relative

to individual psychology, the one or the other order

carries the greater, or even exclusive, reality-value

and truth-value, and thus open the door to a larger

mutuality of understanding and consideration .

Conceding that the perceptual and conceptual

orders are, as they stand manifested to our relative

consciousness, of distinct nature, neither, in its es-

sential character,, being derived from the other, then

we may well inquire as to the innate character of .each .

Is one substantive while the other is only functional,

or is each both functional and substantive, etc .? For

T
James, it is clear that primary substantiality attached

to the perceptual, as being both the source and the ter-

minal of the conceptual, while the conceptual entered in-

to the picture preponderantly as a function or active

agent which is valuable mainly as it leads to something

beyond itself--a something which is always perceptual .

None the less, the conceptual is granted a degree of sub-

stantive value, apparently in the form of vague images

which are associated with some--but not .all--concepts,

and can be objects of contemplation . But clearly a

'vague image' is not itself of conceptual character, but

a form of percept, and so we are forced to conclude that

James did not grant to the conceptual . order a conceptual

substantiality -qua conceptual . Thus the conceptual qua

conceptual appears as functional only . But it is quite

otherwise with the perceptual . It would appear that James

viewed the perceptual as primarily, if not wholly, sub-

stantive, as is indicated by the following quotation :

"The perceptual flux as such . . . means .nothing, and is

what it immediately is ."7 Yet there are interpretations

of the perceptual that vary radically from .this view, as

in the case of all those views therein the percept is re-

garded as merely the occasion which arouses the conceptual

understanding into waking consciousness . Clearly, on such

a view the perceptual serves a functional office, either

as a part or the whole of its significance . Likewise,

there are interpretations of the conceptual which give it

substantive value, even in the sense of prime or exclusive

substantive value, as for example is the case in the philo-

sophy of Spinoza . Clearly there are important differences

here, of interpretation or of insight, which require our

further consideration .

What do we mean by function and substance? Of

these two, the meaning of function is reasonably clear .

As used in this discussion, we may understand function
as an activity, process, or constituent, which is depend-

ent for its value, significance, etc ., upon something else .

Substance or the substantive is that which is to be under-

stood as in some measure the self-existent and the sub-

strate of properties or processes, thus terminal or rela-

tively terminal with respect to values, significance, etc .

There are philosophies which abandon the notion of sub-

stance entirely, as in the case of David Hume, much of

Positivism, and a large part, if not the whole, of Buddhis-

tic philosophy, but we shall not discuss this actualistic

theory at this time as it does not appear to be\meaning

affirmed by William James . Practically , from the psycho-

logical or psychic standpoint , we may view the distinc-

tion between the substantive and the functional as being

such that the substantive may be an object of contemplation

for its own sake, more or less completely , and thus rela-

tively or absolutely terminal, whereas the functional is

not such a contemplative or terminal object, but is only

a means for reaching such .

In the history of thought it is Rationalism or

Intellectualism that has affirmed Substantialism and the

state of contemplation as the final state of blessedness,

as is notable in the philosophies of Spinoza and of Leib-

nitz , Or, again , as brought out by Sri Aurobindo in the

following quotation : " For it is asserted to us by the

pure reason and it seems to be asserted to us by Vedanta

that as we are subordinate and an aspect of this Move-

ment, so the movement is subordinate and an aspect of

something other than itself , of a great timeless , space-

less Stability , sthanu , which is immutable , inexhaustible

and unexpended , not acting though containing all this

action, not energy, but pure existence ."8 In contrast,

it is empiric insight which has led to the non -substan-

tialistic or nihilistic view that there is nothing but

the movement , inhering in nothing else , as exemplified

by David Hume and the Buddhists .

 But though the vast rationalistic tradition af-

firms a substantive Existent , which is not revealed by

sensuous experience , however profoundly empiric insight

may be developed , the question arises as to whether this

existent is real , something more than a speculative .con-

struct, and, if it is real , is its nature conceptual?

That there is a real Existent , which is not given to the

sensuous consciousness , however acutely developed, is

affirmed by more than the pure reason . Thus, quoting

again from Aurobindo :

" But there is a supreme experience9 and supreme

intuition by which we go back behind our surface

self and find that this becoming , change, succes-

sion are only a mode of our being and that there is

that in us which is not involved at all in the

becoming . Not only can we have the intuition of

this that is stable and eternal in us , not only

can we have a glimpse of it in experience behind

the veil of continually fleeting becomings, but

we can draw back into it and live in it entirely,

so effecting an entire change in our external life,

and in our attitude, and in our action upon the

movement of the world . And this stability in-which

we can so live is precisely that which the pure

Reason has already given us, although it can be

 arrived at without reasoning at all, without know-

ing previously what it is,--it is pure existence,

eternal, infinite, indefinable, not affected by

the succession of Time, not involved in the ex-

tension of Space, beyond form, quantity, quality,--

10
Self only and absolute ."

Here we have affirmed a substantial Base, affirmed by

the pure reason, intuition and mystical realization,

but it is clearly not a Substance composed of conceptual

stuff any more than it is of a sensuous perceptual nature .

So, while on the whole the Western rationalistic thinkers,

who have affirmed the reality of the non-sensuous sub-

stantial, have given the impression of meaning a con-

ceptual sort of substance, this may well be an error of

interpretation and even of understanding on their own part .

In other words, the intelligibly or rationally given of

which they spoke may well have been Reason plus something

more . This I am convinced was the case . What they saw

clearly was that here was a somewhat which had no part in

.sensuous experience, in fact was quite other than that,

but which was certainly given to profound insight . Then,

if there is only perceptual and conceptual knowledge, it

belonged to the conceptual order . But it may belong to

another more transcendental order of consciousness which

is only isolated with difficulty . Provisionally, then we

may say that the pure Existent is neither conceptual nor

perceptual .

-448-
 Whether or not there is a conceptual substan-

tiality, of a nature not reducible to percepts or a

transcendental order, is a question we shall leave open

here . The essential point of the present critique of

the Pragmatist epistemology in general, and that of

William James in particular, is the thesis that the con-

ceptual order is not completely derivable from the per-

ceptual, and that its meaningful reference is not ex-

clusively to an ultimately perceptual referent . And

then there remains at least a possible a priori referent,

which the concept may mean, even though the whole office

of the conceptual order may be that of instrumentalism,

one way or the other .

There can be no doubt but that the fundamental

maxim of Pragmatism is of authentic utility in many appli-

cations . This is particularly true in the case of natural

science , but 'science' in this sense means a particular

way or form of knowledge, and not knowledge in every pos-

sible sense . Natural science is a body of knowledge de-

limited by its own methodology . This science is governed

by three heuristic principles, as follows : (1) The data

or material of scientific knowledge is grounded in sensual

observation, and restricted to the generally possessed

sensory equipment . (2) The organizational concepts or

theories introduced to form the mass of selected observa-

tion into a conceptually thinkable system are invented or

intuited postulations . (3) The interpretative postulates

must be of such a character that consequences may be in-

ferred of such a nature that they are verifiable or dis-

provable by an indicated observation either with or without

a devised experiment . But such a methodology uses con-

cepts in a way that satisfies the Pragmatic prescription .

Clearly, science in this sense is for a program or purpose

and not a detached presentment of the real as an object

for pure contemplation . Theory is an instrument toward

a practical end, in the philosophical sense of the term,

although, of course, this practicality is not necessarily

to be limited to the sense of a narrow utilitarianism .

Yet, although natural science is unavoidably a

source of truth only in the pragmatic sense, owing to

the limitations imposed by the methodology , nonetheless,

an analysis of the attitudes revealed by at least some

scientists suggests a feeling for knowledge in a more

ultimate sense , such as that of the Gnosis . Why else the

predominant preference for 'pure science ', as contrasted

to applied science , on the part of the greater scientific

thinkers? Here we have revealed an orientation to truth,

not as a means to some practical accomplishment , but rather

as an end or value in itself . Of course, a conceptual

formulation of truth is less than Gnostic Truth , and the

Gnosis is not grounded in a sensuous base, as natural

science is, yet the feeling for truth as a value in it-

self, however inadequately it may be conceived, is the

sign of an interest which is more than pragmatic . In

fact, it is a well recognized principle among the pure

research thinkers that a motivation guided by a consider-

ation of possible practical utility acts as a barrier to

successful research . The pure search for truth, what-

ever it may be, is the royal road to fruitful results,

not alone in the development of detached theory, but

even in the laying of the bases for future utilitarian

applications . We may even say that the pure scientist,

however much he may be restricted to the employment of

a pragmatic methodology, is, nonetheless, motivated by

a love of truth as a terminal value . Thus the Pragmatist

theory of cognition is not sufficient to explain the whole

of the scientific process, just as the logistic inter-

pretation of mathematics is inadequate to achieve an

understanding of mathematical creativeness .

The degree to which our scientific disciplines

confirm the Pragmatist theory of knowledge varies with

the sciences . The sciences most closely related to

empiric life, i .e ., the biological sciences and psycho-

logy, most largely confirm the Pragmatist theory, as

might well be anticipated, since this school is most

closely oriented to this division of science . But this

theory is progressively less adequate in the other sciences

as they become more and more mathematical , and it fails

most notably in the interpretation of pure mathematics--

the field in which the New Realism has its greatest strength .

Whether or not pure mathematics consists only of conceptual

elements, it certainly is freed from admixture with the

perceptual and thus is not subject to the methodology of

the empiric sciences . So the Pragmatist theory has only

a restricted validity even in the field of science itself .

The general thesis of Pragmatism, that there is a

non-intellectual form of knowledge or awareness, is one

which can hardly be questioned , but the further thesis

that this non-intellectual form is more fundamental and

comprehensive does not necessarily follow , or it may be

true in some respects and not in others . Further, the

Pragmatists class this other form as perceptive in the

sense of being experiential, with experience defined as

"the entire process of phenomena , of present data con-

sidered in their raw immediacy ." If then we take a concept

from out of a part of the perceptual flow, it is clear that

the total flux is more than the concept, but the latter in

its universality has an extension reaching far beyond any

particular concrete experience . Thus, in one sense the

perceptual is more comprehensive than the conceptual, but

in another sense the reverse is the case . Which kind of

comprehension is the vaster is a question on which we may

never find agreement , since the relativity of individual

psychology and insight is determinant here . Again, with

respect to the question as to which is the more fundamental,

much depends upon the theory of the origin of the concept

and percept which the thinker entertains . If the concep-

tual is viewed as wholly derived from the perceptual matrix,

then clearly the latter is more fundamental, but if both

are viewed as derived from a common source , but not the one

derived from the other, then there does not appear any simple

way in which we could determine that either is more funda-

mental in the ontological sense .

Pragmatism is not only anti-intellectualistic, it

is also pro-sensationalistic, or pro-vitalistic, or pro-

experientialistic, meaning by this that sensational experi-

ence and life are more fundamental and more bedded in the

Real than the concepts of the intellect, or the intellectual

order as such . One may agree with Pragmatism with respect

to its anti-intellectualism in the sense that intellectualism

means the identification of things with what we know of them

in reflective thought--with nothing left over--and yet diverge

with respect to the Pragmatist view relative to vitalism and

sensationalism . There is a Gnostic or supramental Knowledge

which is quite other than sensational cognition, or vital

intuition or perceptual intuition , yet this Knowledge

is`truly more fundamental and comprehensive than the

conceptual order . Pragmatism is not only anti-intellect-

ualistic but it is also anti - transcendentalistic, and

the primary focus of the present critique is aimed at

the latter feature .

Transcendentalism may be no more than a postulate

of the reason , in which case it is a speculative construct

not grounded in experience or any other form of immediacy,

but it may also be a conceptual construction based upon

direct Realization, such as may be known as Gnostic or

Mystical Enlightenment . For a consciousness that has no

acquaintance with direct Realization the notion of a tran-

scendental Reality tends to appear fantastic , since it does

not seem to be a content of common experience , and does not

seem to be a necessity for the reasoning process , except,

perhaps , in the restricted Kantian usage of the notion .

From this latter point of view , the hypothesis of a tran-

scendental :existent , however much it may facilitate a philo-

sophic formulation, suffers by the defect that it can never

be authenticated by common experience , and thus it appears

more in the spirit of natural science to abandon the notion

entirely and proceed to the construction of philosophic in-

terpretation exclusively in terms of concepts which mean

elements , complexes , relationships , or processes lying with-

in the limits of experience . But for a consciousness which

-454-
has had or possesses direct acquaintance with direct

Gnostic Realization , such procedure inevitably appears

to be arbitrary and inadequate . The latter may grant

that, if we cut off that section of total consciousness

which we may call the human empiric and conceptual con-

sciousness , then the Pragmatist epistemology and general

philosophy forms a substantially accurate interpretation,

but it would be only partial and could not satisfy more

than a part of human need , since a portion of the total

human need requires the Transcendental for its fulfill-

ment . From this standpoint , Pragmatism is inadequate,

and even in a measure malicious , since its orientation

to the empiric is exclusive or privative .

It may be contended that mystical or Gnostic Reali-

zation is a form of experience and may therefore be em-

braced within the Pragmatic meaning of the term, and there-

fore be a possible referent in the forms of Pragmatic

epistemology . The expression " mystical experience" does

occur in literature, as in the cases of both William James

and Sri Aurobindo , but to validate such usage the meaning

of the term " experience" must be widened substantially be-

yond that given in Baldwin ' s Dictionary and which appears

as the sense directly affirmed or implied in Pragmatist

philosophy . No doubt, mystical states of consciousness do

occur as events in the life of the individual , and to this

extent we are dealing with a process in time , and the event

itself is a phenomenon . To this degree we may validly

speak of a mystical or Gnostic experience . But it is

quite otherwise when we consider the meaningful content

of the states . At least some of these--and all that are

authentically Gnostic--have a content which is timeless

and Noumenal, and thus fall outside the definition . I

believe the definition of "experience" as given is per-

fectly sound and is in conformity with the general under-

standing of the term, but if we take "experience" in this

restricted sense , then it becomes necessary to recognize

other forms of immediacy, such as Gnostic immediacy .

A Gnostic immediacy may be the referent of a body

of conceptual thought, in which case we may regard the con-

ceptual or reflective thought as significant only in the

instrumental sense, but it would not be instrumental to an

empiric immediacy, and, therefore, not identical with the

instrumentalism of Pragmatic epistemology . But while this

is clear where the Gnostic Realization is sharply defined

as neither thought nor experience, as in the case of prepara-

tory meditation in which intellective and sensuous process

is silenced, there remains the case of Gnostic insight which

is not pure but mixed with conceptual or empiric elements,

or both, and in this case there can be confusion in inter-

pretation . The actual state of consciousness of an indivi-

dual may seem to be pure or simple, whereas, in point of

-456-
fact, sufficiently profound criticism will reveal that

it is a complex of functions or faculties . The Gnostic

and the empiric may be so fused as to seem to be of one

sameness with sense -experience , but this fusing may occur

between the Gnostic and intellective thought with the re-

sult that the whole complex appears to be simply the pure

Reason . Here lies the source of the self-evident truths

and innate ideas which formed so important a part of

Rationalistic thought before the time of Kant . But while

Kant made it clear what the pure reason qua reason is and

took a pejorative attitude toward the Transcendent in the

Gnostic sense , thus tying reason to experience in the nar-

row sense , the Reality for Gnostic Realization does not

therefore cease to be , nor does the fusion of a partial

Gnostic insight and reason cease to carry authority . What

he did , in this respect , was the isolation of reason qua rea-

son, and did not thereby invalidate the insight of the

Rationalists and the Platonists .

But whether or not the Platonic ideas or self-

evident truths or innate ideas are grounded in pure reason

or a combination of the Gnosis and reason , the rationalistic

method remains valid as a philosophic process , once the in-

sight is given . Philosophy can be , in some range of its

activity at least , a deductive development on the analogue

of mathematics . And it would b e no more necessary for this

kind of philosophy to justify its conclusions by reference

to a narrow empiricism than it is for pure mathematics .

We are by no means justified in assuming that all Truth

is correlated with the empiric in the narrow sense of the

definition .

What I am here suggesting is that the alternative

of Empiricism is not necessarily Intellectualism nor Ration-

alism in the sense of a pure reason, in the Kantian meaning

of the term , &s a source of knowledge independent of sense-

perception . The alternative may be a philosophy grounded

upon a third form of cognition which is more fundamental,

more primitive, and more authoritative than either sense-

perception--and likewise perceptive intuition and vitalistic

intuition--or conceptual cognition . The present work is by

no means unique in that it is a formulation of a philosophy

of that sort, as can be verified by reference to the main

streams of Indian philosophy and at least the philosophy of

Plotinus among the Greeks . The .standpoint is presented very

clearly in the following quotation from Plotinus .

"External objects present us only with appearances .

Concerning them, therefore, we may be said to possess

opinion rather than knowledge . The distinctions in

the actual world of appearance are of import only to

ordinary and practical men . Our question lies with

the ideal reality that exists behind appearance . How

-458-
does,the mind perceive these ideas? Are they

without us, and is the reason, like sensation,

occupied with objects external to itself? What

certainty could we then have, what assurance that

our perception was infallible? The object per-

ceived would be something different from the mind

perceiving it . We should have then an image in-

stead of reality . It would be monstrous to believe

for a moment that the mind was unable to perceive

ideal truth exactly as it is, and that we had not

certainty and real knowledge concerning the world

of intelligence . It follows, therefore, that this

region of truth is not to be investigated as a thing

external to us, and so only imperfectly known . It

is within us . Here the objects we contemplate and

that which contemplates are identical,--both are

thought . The subject cannot surely know an object

different from itself . The world of ideas lies with-

in our intelligence . Truth, therefore, is not the

agreement of our apprehension of an external object

with the object itself . It is the agreement of the

mind with itself . Consciousness, therefore, is the

sole basis of certainty . The mind is its own witness .

Reason sees in itself that which is above itself as

its source ; and again, that which is below itself as

still itself once more .

-459-
 "Knowledge has three degrees--Ollinion, Science,

Illumination . The means or instrument of the first

is sense ; of the second, dialectic ; of the third,

intuition . To the last I subordinate reason . It

is absolute knowledge founded on the identity of

the mind knowing with the object known ." ll

Here we have recognized three forms of knowledge,

i .e ., Opinion, or Perception in modern terms ; Science,

or Conceptual Cognition ; and Illumination, or Transcend-

ental Cognition, or Introception in the terminology of

the present work . Reason, Science, or Conceptual Cogni-

tion occupies an intermediate position between the other

two, but is seen as having its source in that which is

above, or Illumination, and stands in a relationship of

hierarchical superiority to the sense-perception which

lies below . Plotinus' philosophy is grounded upon Reali-

zation, and not upon mere inventive speculation, and,

therefore, what we have is a relationship in the hierarchy

of knowledge which is found by self-examination . Thus it

is grounded in a self-searching similar to that on which

William James grounded his theory of the relationship be-

tween the concept and the percept, though the found re-

lationship was radically antithetical . What are we to

conclude about such disagreement? Is one competent and

correct and the other incompetent and in error? Or,

shall we assume equal competency, but with difference

of results growing out of difference of perspective? I

think that an affirmative answer to the last question

will afford the juster view . At any rate, assuming that

it is the most just view, then it would follow that James'

view that concepts are born exclusively out of percepts

is a part truth, valid only if the word "exclusively" is

expunged . The authority of Illumination is too great to

be disregarded .

If reason, or the intelligible order, or the con-

ceptual order, is derived from a source above it, and is

in hierarchical transcendence with respect to the percep-

tual order standing below it, then it will most naturally

have affinity to the Illuminative order of cognition, greater

and more immediate than the affinity between the latter

and perceptual cognition, though there is abundant ground

for recognizing that a correlation of the latter sort,

which proceeds around or short-circuits the reason, does

exist . But the difference suggested as between these two

types of correlation is analogous to the difference in

military communications, known as communication through

channels and around channels .

A certain important consequence follows from the

inter-relationship of the three types of cognition as

given by Plotinus, and that is that the universal of

the conceptual order is in closer affinity to the Illu-

minative Cognition than is the particular . In other

words, that which appears from the standpoint of con-

crete sense-perception as abstraction away from the im-

mediately given, i .e ., the general concept, when viewed

from the perspective of Illuminative Cognition, is closer

to th6 immediately given, and is closest when the con-

cept is most general and therefore most universal . Since

it is from general or universal concepts that the largest

deductive development is possible, it follows that a philo-

sophy grounded on the Illuminative Cognition would elaborate

itself mainly as a deductive system, which does not derive

its authority, however much it may derive illustration, from

sense-perception, or from perceptual intuition or vitalistic

intuition . Here we can see the possibility of a mathematic

which is not mere logicism or formalism, but, rather, a

revelation of truth as it is behind appearance or phenomena .

These considerations should throw light upon the

philosophy of Spinoza, both with respect to its substance

and form . This philosophy purports to be a necessary de-

velopment, in mathematical form, of certain fundamental

conceptions, so ti.at the truth of the consequences depends

upon the truth of the antecedents, with no need of any

other kind of dependence . Truth in this sense may be

viewed as a legislative authority with respect to experi-

ence . Of course, for a consciousness which is grounded

solely in perceptual immediacy a development of this kind

seems peculiarly irrelevant, but to a consciousness that

commences with a mystical or Gnostic immediacy, of the

type reported by Plotinus, the case is quite different .

In the latter instance, the knowledge with which the

system begins is known originally and immediately and

with far stronger assurance and authority than anything

given through perception . From this standpoint a critique

of Spinoza would consist of the following three phases :

(1) Is the initial insight based upon the Reason alone,

or is it grounded on some other power of consciousness?

(2) Are the initial conceptions correct formulations of

an adequate insight? (3) Is the logical development

correct? The question would not arise as to whether the

conclusions were authenticated' by experience . They might

or might not conform to conclusions drawn from experience,

or, what is more likely, they might in part conform, in

part contradict, and in part have no relation to, common

experience. The only important practical or ethical ques-

tion would be : Do they serve to orient consciousness in

such a way that it tends to develop toward, or awaken to,

the initial Realization? There is something in this that

reminds us of the Pragmatist maxim, in that the practical

test of a truth is by a leading of consciousness to a
somewhat that is other than a concept, but this would be

an inverted Pragmatism .

Even though we assume that the Pragmatist has

been successful, or at least may . be successful, in show-

ing that there is no knowledge which has its original

source in the concept, or pure conceptual order, and that

no ultimate terminal lies in this order, yet this achieve-

ment, by itself, is not enough to prove that the sole origin

and the sole terminal lies in experience, in the sense de-

fined . To justify completely the maxim, the Pragmatist

must prove at the very least, that there is no such thing

as Illuminative Cognition in the sense Plotinus has for-

mulated . It is hard to see how this possibly could be done,

any more than could a supposed non-sensuous being prove to

our satisfaction that there is no such thihg as sensation .

The intellective power is simply not competent to disprove

the actuality of any immediacy, and the fact that a given

individual or a large class of individuals has not known

a certain type of immediacy is irrelevant so far as its

factuality is concerned . This constitutes the essence of

the present critique of Pragmatic epistemology ;

Our discussion of Pragmatism would be incomplete

if we failed to consider the idealistic wing of Pragmatism

-464-
as represented by F . C . S . Schiller . The view developed

by this philosopher , while in fundamental methodological

agreement with the conceptions of Dewey and James , differs

from that of the latter philosophers in that it abandons

their naturalistic Realism, a characteristic which is quite

explicit in John Dewey ' s Logic . Schiller starts with a

fact which has been of prime importance for all Idealism

since Bishop Berkeley . This fact is expressed explicitly

in the following words of Schiller : " The simple fact is

that we know the Real as it is when we know it ; we know

nothing whatever about what it is apart from that process ."12

This fact of cognition is with Schiller, as with the Ideal-

ists generally , the foundation stone of ontology, or the

theory of the nature of Being . Here we have a principle

of philosophic procedure of primary importance with a large

philosophic class , and we may profitably devote to it some

consideration in its general form before proceeding to the

discussion of the special form of Schiller ' s treatment .

It is a fact, recognized by the more thoughtful

Realists , as well as insisted upon by all Idealists, that

all that we ever cognize is an existent in consciousness .

Whether this existent is viewed as primarily a conception,

a perception, or a volition--differences of view thatLdave

led to the classification of Idealists into sub - schools--

in every case we meet this existent as a fact in con-

sciousness . Now, while the Realist who acknowledges . all

this would say that this fact is merely an incident charac-

teristic of the cognitive process, which leaves the real

Existent, as it is, unaffected, the Idealist insists that

the characteristic of Existence, as it is in conscious-

ness, is the characteristic of Existence as it is in it-

self, or per se . Certain Idealists have attempted to

prove logically this thesis, but with respect to this

effort at proof the Realistic criticism under the head-
ings of the so-called fallacies of the "fallacy of defini-

tion by initial predication" and the "fallacy of the ego-

centric predicament" does seem to be well taken . It will

profit us to consider these critiques .

'"Definition by initial predication" means the de-

fining of any idea, fact, or thing by the circumstances

of its first manifestation to our cognition . Thus my first

cognition of gravity might be the experience of seeing an

organic object, such as an apple, fall from a tree . If

then I defined gravitation in such terms that being an

organic object . was essential to the notion, I would have

defined by initial predication . There is an obvious error

in such a definition, since other than organic objects are

clearly subject to gravitation, and the valid statement

of the law must be such as will account for all instances

and exclude all that is not essential to the conception .

In the case of Idealism this criticism is applied in the

sense that the appearance of the existent in conscious-

ness is only the accident of the first appearance, and

may not validly be made a determinant of the Existent as

such . Therefore--, it is not proved that the Existent is

an Existent for consciousness and only for consciousness .

The force of this argument may well be granted, but all

it has achieved is disproof of proof in the logical sense ;

it has not disproved the fact that the Idealist maintains

it . Further, there is no second or other subsequent ap-

pearance or experience of the Existent which contrasts

with the initial experience in this respect . In the il-

lustration of the falling organic object the case is dif-

ferent, since we do have subsequent experiences of falling

inorganic objects . This fact makes a very important dif-

ference . The error made by the Idealist in this case was

the attempting logical proof where his real ground lies in

immediacy, just as the greenness of a green object subsists

in immediacy and cannot be proved .

The so-called "fallacy of the Ego-centric predica-

ment" is akin to that of initial predication . It is a fact

that it is impossible to conceive of anything apart from

consciousness , and, in particular, in terms of relative

consciousness , it is impossible to cognize anything that

does not stand in a conscious relationship to a knower, .

witness, or subject . As ordinarily conceived', this knower

or witness is viewed as the ego, and so we have the primary

fact of relative consciousness that all cognition,stands

in relation to .a conscious ego . By ordinary, non-mystical

means we cannot escape this . Thus, if we try to compare

the object of consciousness with what it may be supposed .

to be outside all relation with an apperceiving ego, we

are stymied at the very beginning of our effort . We may

compare an object as it is for pure perception with what

it becomes for conception , but in neither case do we get

something outside consciousness in every sense , nor do we

find anything that is not in relationship to a cognizing

subject . The critical Realist acknowledges the factuality

of the predicament but denies that this fact is sufficient

to justify that only ideas exist or that only objects for

consciousness exist . Again , we may grant the validity of

the criticism so far as the question of logical deduction

or induction is concerned . We may quite well grant that in

formal logical terms the Idealist does beg the question,

but this criticism carries force only if the Realist can

produce a conceptual system which does not involve an ana-

logous error of equal or greater importance .

But the Realist does beg the question much more

egregiously than does the Idealist . For if we do predicate

that there is an Existent outside consciousness in every

sense , then we are making a statement concerning that

of which we can never know anything whatsoever . As a

matter of knowledge, we cannot validly affirm even bare

existence of such an Existent . If we believe in it,

then that is an act of violent will to believe that can

hardly be surpassed by the most superstitious religious

belief . Further, what possible meaning attaches to the

notion of a forever unknowable unknown for every possible

form of cognition there may be? How can we possibly

distinguish between such a supposed existence and absolute

nothingness?

The Idealist is on quite unassailable ground if

he affirms only that which he knows, and which therefore

is an existent for consciousness, and makes no affirmation

or denial with respect to the supposed unknowable unknown

so far as its existence is concerned, but points out that

the notions of existence and non-existence are quite mean-

ingless with respect to such an eternally unknowable .un-

known. The predication of this eternally unknowable :un-

known may have, as Schiller quite rightly notes, a prag-

matic value as a convenient fiction, but it is the rp edi -

cation , not the supposed unknown, that has the pragmatic

value, and predication is an act within and of conscious-

ness . Still, if we can dispense with this predication and

replace it with another conception of such a sort that it

is in principle verifiable, and which has an equal or

greater pragmatic value, then we shall have established

our philosophy upon a sounder base than that known to

any form of Realism . Such a conception will be offered

later in this work .

So far, I believe the position taken by Schiller

is the soundest of all the Pragmatists, but as we follow

further his thought serious difficulties arise . In basic

conformity with the other Pragmatists, Schiller restricts,

or seems to restrict, consciousness to the notion of ex-

perience . Now, in addition to the general criticism of

this aspect of Pragmatism, given above, in the case of

idealistic Pragmatism there are further difficulties . The

'experience' of Schiller, as of other Pragmatists, is the

expeience of empiric human beings, and not a total experi-

ence of an Absolute . How does this kind of experience

become organized into a unity, social or otherwise? With

the realistic Pragmatist there is a possible unity provided

by the commonality of the supposed real order outside ex-

perience, but this order does not exist for the idealistic

Pragmatist . Absolute Idealism provides the organizing

modulus of either a Transcendental or of an Absolute Con-

sciousness, but such a modulus does not exist for Schiller .

As a result we are faced with a relativism of specifia•ex-

periencings, not unified by any rational or Transcendental

Principle . Schiller derives an ethical metaphysic, but

hardly provides any way of choosing between the empiric

ethical orientations for the social body, save that of

successful imposition . If the ethics of a Hitler were

successfully imposed by the sword, then Hitler would have

won the empiric argument, and there would be no higher

ground for an adverse moral judgment . The strength of

Schiller is his Idealism ; his weakness lies in restrict-

ing consciousness to the experience of empiric man .

It is not part of the present purpose of the writer

to develop either a comprehensive exposition or critique

of Pragmatism, nor, for that matter, to achieve complete-

ness in this respect relative to any of the current schools

of philosophy . The purpose is rather to clear the ground

for his own formulation which involves certain incompati-

bilities with many current views . Beyond this restricted

purpose there is no intention of trying to prove that any

extant system or philosophic orientation is completely

false or unsound .. It seems to the writer that all phil-

osophies, or at least most, constitute a valid formulation,

in at least some measure, of genuine insight into Being or

knowledge, or of acquaintance with fact or experience .

For the most part, error arises through giving a too sweep-

ing, or even exclusive, extension to views that are only

partial . Full recognition of the partial validities is

freely offered, along with the critique of important defects .

The writer feels that Pragmatism has made a dur-

able contribution to philosophic thought, a contribution

which may not be disregarded in any future philosophy, if

the latter is to establish itself upon a sound basis .

Thus the Pragmatist analysis of the percept and the con-

cept, with their-inter-relations, is a valuable continua-

tion and advance upon the criticism of Immanuel Kant, and,

like the production of the latter, must be taken into ac-

count in any future metaphysic . But by an exclusive ori-

entation to experience , so conceived as to close the door

to the Transcendental and the type of cognition which ren-

ders the Transcendental available to human consciousness,

Pragmatism so far restricts the field of human conscious-

ness as to close the gate to those values which form the

most essential part of the higher religion and religious

philosophy . As a philosophy which i s oriented exclusively

to mundane interest , Pragmatism has a great deal to offer

as a modulus in the field of action, but action is not the

whole of man . There are rich values to be known only in

a state of contemplation, and there comes at some time,

at least to some men , a felt need for these values that

transcends the desire for action . Here the orientation

is to the substantive rather than to the activistic or

functional . It may well be, as C . S . Peirce indicated

in the quotation given earlier, that Pragmatism is a phil-

osophy more adapted to the needs of youth than to the

spirit of age and maturity . Sooner or later we must all

face the mystery of death and the dissolution of at least

a phase : of organized consciousness . The philosophy which

provides the greater preparation for this transition, so

that it may be faced with confidence, trust, and even as-

surance, would seem to have met the greater need, since

after all the cycle of material activity plays but a small

part in the vast reaches of Eternity .

No doubt the supreme criterion of Pragmatist phil-

osophy is the principle of test by consequences , which

stands in contrast to test by source . Equally, there can

be no doubt that in many situations the test by conse-

quences is the only available method by which empiric man,

can evaluate offered conceptions . This is an application

of the old maxim, "by their fruits you shall know them",

but raised to a status of a universal and exclusively

valid principle . However, with all its unquestionable

utility, this criterion has serious limitations . A given

empiric consciousness, and indeed the whole of empiric

consciousness as a type, may fail to apprehend the full

range and bearing of the consequences, *11h the result that

a judgment of soundness, desirability, or "warranted as-

sertibility", or the opposite, may be made, while a full

knowledge would reverse the judgment . We may illustrate

the difficulty by a reference to Plato's figure of the

cave . The man who escaped from the cave and found the

light-world and then returned to the dwellers in the cave

with conceptions having their base in the light-world

would most likely find that his conceptions were not

acceptable to those whose cognitions were confined to

the shadow-world . Conceivably, some of these conceptions

might be verified by the test of consequences within the

terms of the shadow-world in some degree, but to the

largest extent they would fail of such verification . Un-

doubtedly, for the greater part they would seem like rank

heresy, with all the implications that follow from that .

Tested by consequences exclusively, such conceptions would

have little or no positive value for those who chose to

remain bound in the cave consciousness . Suppose, though,

that among the cave dwellers there was one or more who

accepted the man who returned as an avatar , or a divine

descent from a transcendent order, and then accepted in

faith the conceptions offered because of'their source,

and then proceeded to think and act in conformity with

the implications of the new and strange conceptions .

.The probable outcome would be ultimate escape from the

cave, with the subsequent verification of the conceptions .

 The great limitation of verification by conse-

quence lies in the fact that it assumes the understand-

ing and insight of the present, existing empiric man as

the power or standard for the evaluation of the conse-

quence . It is not hard to see how the greatest ultimate

good and truth could appear to the perspective of the

present empiric consciousness as something unattractive,

unsound, and even malign . There may well be conjunctures

in the history of empiric man when disaster can be avoided

only by the hieratic imposition of certain truths with

their implications . Changes wrought in the human con-

sciousness by this means can have the effect of rendering

the given consequences attractive, sound, and benign . In

the two situations the test by consequences leads to quite

divergent evaluations .

To be sure, the Pragmatic thinkers do quite gen-

erally accept the notion of evolution as an active operat-

ing principle resulting in the development of human con-

sciousness . Indeed, with John Dewey, development is a

fundamental conception . This implies that the valuation

based upon consequences is subject to progressive modi-

fication, but this development is, quite naturally, viewed

as a continuum in the evolving empiric consciousness . Yet,

while one may recognize a degree of validity in this con-

ception, the difficulty remains that it can be finally

valid only on the assumption that the sole process in the

transformation of human consciousness is in the form of

a continuous evolutionary development in the empiric field .

If it is true that the total process in the transformation

of human consciousness is in the nature of multiple con-

tinua in discrete relationships of transcendence with

respect to each other--as may be illustrated by the notion

of multiple dimensions--then the conception-of development

exclusively within the terms of one evolutionary continuum

fails of being adequate . It is reduced to a part truth,

which, by being insisted upon too 'exclusively, can retard

the realization of the higher possibilities of man .

A study of the history of Gnostic transformations

renders qutte clear the fact that here we are dealing with

alterations of states of consciousness and of self-identi-

fication that involve relationships of discrete tran-

scendence, often, if not generally, manifesting incom-

mensurability as between state and state . Here, then, we

have at least one field in which the test by consequences

fails .

The test by consequences, when viewed as the sole

criterion of truth and soundness, tends to the enthrone-

ment of the consensus pentium as supreme authority, and,

in the absence of universal consent, to the general exalt-

ation of majority opinion and evaluation . This tends to

drag culture down to the dead level of mediocrity, since

the valuation of the majority tends to be that of the

-476-
medial intelligence, character, and taste . Superiority

of truth-insight, moral standard, level of taste, etc .,

are not initially or naturally part of the medial level

of human consciousness, but are the contribution of the

few who stand or march in the van of human progression .

The valuations of the latter tend to fare ill before the

consensus gentium at the time of their presentation, how-

ever much they may slowly percolate into the common con-

sciousness in the passage of time . The result is that

the test by consequences, when too greatly exalted as a

truth and value criterion, tends to retard the develop-

ment of the higher possibilities in human consciousness .

If the goal of man is to exceed himself, if this goal is

such that he must leave behind what he now is in order

that he may become a something more, which, as yet, he can-

not understand and properly value, then the test by con-

sequences is not enough when applied by the consensus

gentium of the majority . It is here that Pragmatism fails .

Footnotes to Chapter V

1Heraclitus, p . 58 . Italics mine .

2See page 3Q6 . 007

3 Quotedfrom article on Pragmatism in Baldwin's Dictionary

of Philosophy and Psychology . Italics mine .
 LL
See William James' Some Problems of Philosophy , p . 48,
footnote .

5Pp . 50-51 .

6P . 129 Meiklejohn translation .

7Some Problems of Philosophy , p . 49 .

8The Life Divine , p . 70 .

9'Experience' as used by Aurobindo is not restricted to

the raw immediacy of the sense or a time conditioned
process, but embraces the ways of consciousness which I
have called 'Realization', 'Recognition', 'Enlightenment' I
etc .

'°The Life Divine , pp . 73-74 .

11Quoted from letter to Flaccus as given in Hours With the

Mystics, by R . A . Vaughan . Italics mine except the itali-
ciz~ed~''within' and 'known' .

12Quoted from the quotation in Perrey' s Present Philosophical

Tendencies , p . 217 .
 Chapter iM IG

Idealism

Does consciousness exist ? i=o ques i .li is a.ure

ably,.
fundamental than this, since conforn) ' .with the form

_M and substance in which the t1iinker answers it, so will

his philosophy be developed and so will his life be

oriented . To many, the writer among them, the question

seemti redundant, since no fact appears more :elf-evident

and certain than that consciousness does exist . But

serious and able thinkers, ~'Oilliam James among them, hive

questioned the existence of consciousness andd ultimately

arrived at a negative conclusion . This fact causes one

to pause and to question just what is meant :-hen the ex-

istence of consciousness is doubted and even .denied . That

some men should deny, while others affirm, l;he existence

off the world, is easy to understand, but teat the exist-

ence of consciousness should be in all seriousness denied

seems to be the ultimate in fantasy . . , f'or•

cert!uin states of consciousness the world, alid the whole

universe for that matter, appears to be no more than an

essentially meaningless phantasmagoria, yet consciousness

remainyas an indubitable and ineluctable fact . A_

highly important sector of Oriental thought takes its

stand upon this view, and not on the basis of mere specu-

lation, as is often the case with Occidental philosophers,

-479-
 d

but upon the ground of direct Realization . Thus the

fact that / serious negative answers to the question o+

exist, compels us to a careful consideration s '

.that do we mean by consciousness? A profound

study of the subject reveals the fact that here we are

dealing with a somewhat which is essentially indefinable

it is that which is presupposed in even the possibility

of definition, but is never itself the object defined .

Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate or point to

what-vie mean by consciousness by bringing this state

into contrast to a state of another sort . For a first

approximation, this has been done rather well in the

following words : "Whatever we are when we are awake,

as contrasted with wvnat we are when we sink into a pro-

found and dreamless sleep, that it is to be conscious .

What we are less and less, as we sink gradually down

into dreamless sleep, or as we swoon slowly away ; and

what we are more and more, as'the noise of the crowd

outside tardily arouses us from our after-dinner nap,

or as we come out of the midnight of the typhoid fever

crisis', that is consciousness ."' The experience de-

scribed is, no doubt, quite common -- though we do not

know enough to say that it is universal -- and, there-

fore, we generally know, with greater or less adequacy,

the distinctive reference of the notion of "conscious-

ness" . But a careful study of this experience as we

-480-
 actually pass through it raises considerable doubt as

to whether we have secured an essential contrast between

a real and complete unconsciousness and consciousness .

Thus the awaking may be from out of a dream experience ;-,

while a shifting in the mode of consciousness, with

a possible fading of the dream into irrelevance and even

complete disappearance from memory, is sharp and clear

with the apperceptive mass of the waking state suddenly

replacing the dream, yet both states with all their diver-

gencfes of content, affective quale and contative attitude

are, none the less, united in the common feature of being

conscious . Again, if one wakes from dreamless sleep, the

moment of transition, plus a usually brief interval while

waking consciousness assumes dominance progressively, may

\/+'t2- be marked by a/residual hedonic tone OXI Aal h,', which may

well lead one to regret the awakening . There can be a

more or less clear feeling of movement from delight to

relative pain , even though the ~~ r 4a tone of

the xaking consciousness at the time is of a superior and

positive sort . Thus the contrast , even in the awakening

from dreamless sleep , is not between an absolute uncon-

sciousness and consciousness . It appears , rather, as a

contrast , within a whole or common denominator of conscious-

ness , of one conscious state with another . Therefore,

the descriptive definition of Ladd more correctly isolates

a state of consciousness , rather than pure consciousness,

as such . however , there is a wide, if riot universal,

-481-
custom in Western philosophy and psychology of giving

to the word "consciousness" the meaning suggested by

Ladd, but, however much this may be justified from the

standpoint of a superficial psychology, it tends to

produce a restriction in understanding which renders

incomprehensible the very foundation of Idealistic

philosophy . We must, therefore, examine into the sense

in which the judgment has been made that consciousness

does not exist .

In the following quotation, taken from Ralph

Barton Perry's essay on "The Philosophy of William James" I

L
reprinted in the AppendOx of Present Philosophical

Tendencies , the sense in which consciousness is denied

existence is brought out fairly clearly :

"If by a thing's existence you mean its separate

existence, its existence as wholly other than, or outside

of, other things, as one planet exists outside another,

then consciousness does not exist . For consciousness

differs from other things as one grouping differs from

another grouping of the same terms ; as, for example, the

Republican party differs from the American people . But

this is its true character, and in this sense it exists .

One is led to this conclusion if one resolutely refuses

to yield to the spell of words . What do we find when vie

explore that quarter to which the word 'consciousness'

-482-
directs us ? Vie find at first glance some particular

character , such as blue ; and at second glance another

particular character , such as roundness . Which of these

is consciousness ? "_~vidently neither . For there is no

discoverable difference between these characters, thus

severally regarded , and certain parts of nature . Fur-

thermore , there is no discoverable community of nature

among these characters themselves . But continue the

investigation as long as you please , and you simply add

content to content , without finding any class of elements

that belong exclusively to consciousness , or any conscious

. ,2
'menstruum' in which the elements of content are suspended

The idea presented in this quotation sees to be

that consciousness exists in the nature of a selection

of one or more things, which then form the content of

consciousness , out of the totality of all things that

exist . These things are what they are and unaltered by

reason of existing inside consciousness or outside it .

Among all the things that one can select he cannot find

one thing or Croup of things which may be designated con-

sciousness , in contradistinction to other things . In

addition , it is affirmed that one cannot find "any con-

scious ' menstruum ' in which the elements of consciousness

LS-rrr~w . cr.s~rvk~ vea wn.c .Scr~~c~~

are suspended ."/ Thus, if we sum up in one sentence, con-

sciousness exists only in the sense of a selection or

relationship , within the existent , but does not exist as

-483-
a constitutive substance supporting things or as a

'g~r~ or field in which contained things or objects

are suspended .

The conclusion attained is reached through a

critical examination of experience in the form of a

searching of the mental or psychic status or activity

which the thinker actually finds within himself . Thus

it is grounded upon something more fundamental than

dialectic, i .e ., an immediate finding . But such im-

mediate finding is relative to the cognizing individual,

and nay not be safely universalized into a general judg-

ment . It certainly is a psychological confession, and

may have validity only for a psychological type . In

any case, it cannot rule out the possibility that a

self-searching by an individual of a different type or

of a different kind of power may lead to quite different

discoveries . As a matter of fact, other searchings in

this zone have led to quite diverse conclusions . Testi-

mony in support of this fact is to be found in the fol-

lowing quotations from Oriental sources .

In the general exposition of the philosophy under-

lying the Tantric works, She tchakranirupana and Paduka

Panchaka , as given by Arthur Avalon in The Serpent Power ,

we find the following statement : "The ultimate reality

is Pure Consciousness (Chit, Samvit) from out of which by

its Power (Shakti) Mind and Matter proceed ."3 Again,

from the great work of the present-day leading exponent

of the Indian Vedanta -- a different philosophic system

from the Tantra -- the following quotations are extracted

from out a large number of statements of similar import .

"It then becomes apparent that what we see as conscious-

nesst must be a Being or an Existence out of whose sub-

stance of consciousness all is created ."4 "It is true

that there is no such thing as an objective reality in-

dependent of consciousness ; but at the same time there is

a truth in objectivity and it is this, that the reality

of things resides in something that is within them and

is independent of the interpretation our mind gives to

them and of the structures it builds upon its observation .

These structures constitute the mind's subjective image

or figure of the universe, but the universe and its objects

are not a mere image or figure . They are in essence cre-

ations of consciousness, but of a consciousness that is

one with being, whose substance is the substance of Being

and whose creations too are of that substance, therefore

real . In this view the world cannot be a purely subjective

creation of Consciousness ; the subjective and the objective

truth of things are both real, they are two sides of the

same reality ."5

-485-
 These quotations from Indian sources are of

particular importance for the reason that typical Indian

philosophy is not of the nature of mere speculative

constructs, but are formulations based upon Realizations

or immediate insights . But the results are so different

from that given in the above quotation from Ralph Barton

Ferry as to lead to incompatible interpretations . Here

is an issue based upon immediate findings and,which,

therefore, cannot be resolved dialectically ., Mutual

recriminations between the two parties would be even

less fruitful . If, then, we are to assume, as I think

we must, that the findings of both parties were authentic,

as far as the searching extended, the remaining possi-

bility of a resolution of the difference lies in deter-

mining whether one insight is more comprehensive than

the other and provides a zone in which the latter has a

partial validity . These specifications are in fact met

by the second quotation from Aurobindo . Here the essen-

tial statement is that though there is no objective

reality independent of consciousness, yet from the

perspective of the surface human mind, and therefore of

the relative consciousness, there is an independent ob-

jectivity . Truly, consciousness restricted to the latter

sense is not a " ' menstruum ' in which the elements of con-

tent are suspended ." If the "consciousness" of the

Idealist is to be understood exclusively in this restricted

-486-
sense, then the critique of William James carries sub-

stantial force . But for him who knows consciousness in

the deeper sense, the figure of the 'menstruum' carries

considerable validity, for there are levels of direct

Realization in which one finds a field of consciousness

quite capable of dissolving the objects or contents sus-

pended within it . Thus, we may conclude that there are

fractions or forms of consciousness which do not have

existence in the sense that James denied existence for

them, yet in a deeper sense there may be a Consciousness

which is the substance and support of all things . it any

rate, the thesis that such a Root Consciousness is the

ultimate Reality is the cardinal principle of Idealism .

The word "Idealism" is not in all respects the

best term for the designation of our present school,

since the ultimate reference of "idealism", in the etymo-

logical sense, is to the "idea", while not all systems of

thouLht which are classed as Idealism are primarily ori-

ented to the idea , e .g ., the philosophy of Schopenhauer .

The common feature in this school of philosophy is an

orientation to consciousness, in some sense, or to some

element or elements or complexes whose nature is part and

parcel of consciousness . ~rherefore, all these philo-

sophies are, in the technical sense, to be classed as

spiritual, since the common meaning of "spirit" is "the

conception of that which is conscious" . Thus it would

-487-
appear .to be a better practice to class the school,

when considered as a whole, under the designation

"Spiritualism ", care being taken not to confuse this

meaning with the popular conception of supposed or real

communication by means of a medium with discarnate enti-

ties . But even this term , as commonly employed in

Western philosophic thought, is hardly broad enough to

embrace all philosophic orientations which find onto-

logical primacy in consciousness in some sense, for, in

general, "spirit" is viewed as that of which conscious-

ness-is an attribute , rather than consciousness itself

being spirit . It is for this reason that I have been

unable to class my own system simply as Idealism, and

coined the term "Introceptionalism" .

It is suggested here to use the term " Spiritual-

ism" for the whole school of thought which has oriented

itself to conscious being , regardless of phase of con-

sciousness which is given -primacy , meanwhile reserving

"Idealism" for the sub -class where primacy is {riven to

the idea in some sense . Spiritualism is negatively de-

fined as the orientation which stands in strongest

contrast to the views classed as T.;ater. ialism , I iaturalism

and Realism, the last term being understood i n the iodern

and not the medieval sense, which latter is really but

one of the forms of Spiritualism . Common to :aterialism,

Naturalism and Realism is the conception that the ultimate

reality is a non-conscious existence, -- not in the

sense of Von Hartmann's Unconscious --, and that con-

sciousness arises as something derivative, that may be

quite irrelevant or may be selective but is not either

creative or constitutive . ':We shall give our attention

first to the form of Spiritualism which most strictly

nay be called "Idealism" .

The roots of Idealism, so far as traceable in

the history of ;`:extern thought, are to be found in the

early or pre-Socratic philosophy of the Greeks, but at

this stage of reflective thinking the Idealistic and

Realistic tendencies are so far intermingled that the

share cleavage is lacking that is so notable today . The

first clear statement we have of Dhilosorhic :uteri s~lism

'':as given by Leucippus and developed b ;;r his better 1 nov~n

pupil Democritus, but paralleling this development we

have the first sharp delineation of the Idealistic ten-

dency in their younger contey :mporary, the justly famous

Plato . For the one, the prime fact ties found :ir! the

notion of body, for the other the ?~.rine reality vas seen

to be in eternal Ideas . Although these t ;-;o orientations

are traceable as the expressions of complementary atti-

tudes down to our own day, the predomin .3nt influence, so

far as religion and i.hilosophy are concerned, is unques-

tionably that of Plato .

-489-
 7,ith Plato we have the clear emergence of the

conception of ideal elements as ontologically significant

and determinant . As a matter of fact, we have conceptions,

such as, 'tree', 'table', 'goodness', 'truth', 'beauty',

'justice', etc ., but in the history of philosophy there

has been extended discussion, without final resolution

to this clay, as to the real status of these conceptions .

Are they notions corresponding to real existences or are

they nerely abstractions of common features from concrete

and particular experiences? It is unquestionably true-

that *so far as sensuous experience is concerned we do not

deal vith treeness, as such, or goodness, as such, etc .,

but with particular trees, good acts or rersons, etc ., and,

if one's feeling of reality is exclusively associated with

these particular experiences, then he is ..a:.i si. .osed to view

the general conceptions as only nominalistic abstractions,

valuable perhaps for communication or manipulation, but

not realities in themselves or corresponding to such self-

existent realities . But with some individuals, the feeling

of reality is associated, predominantly orr exclusively,

t.itb the general or, rather, universal qualities, and, in

this case, the universals seem self-existent and substan-

tial, -.-.here,-,.s the concrete presentments of experience seem

like shadows or mere phenomenal appearances of the pre-

existent universals . I:ow, each type of individual may

develop a philosophic world-view, in conformity with his

-490-
reality-feeling, and while argumentative conflict grow-

ing out of this divergence of view may and has-resulted

in the mutual perfecting of the respective systems, it

has generally failed in the conversion of the individual

of one type over to the view of the other . The si`ni-

ficance of this is that, although the representatives of

both types employ the same logic, they, none the less,

diverge in their primary insight and reality-feeling,

which is essentially extra-logical and of the nature of

aesthetic immediacy . If, then, vie are to core to an

understanding of the truth contained in these conflicting

views and achieve a just appreciation of their signifi-

cance, vie must find some other approach than that of

dialectic . In modern analytic psychology we have a means

to this end which goes far toward the resolution of the

problem .

But before we can properly appreciate the contri-

bution of modern analytic psychology v :e must step across

the centuries from Flato to Immanuel Rant, who gave to the

essential Platonic conception its most important modern

formulation . and, again, to understand the significance

of Kant's contribution it is necessary to realize some-

thing of its office in the stream of philosophic develop-

ment . `lt the time pant had appeared upon the scene, the

stream of philosophy had divided into two divergent, though

fundamentally complementary , branches, commonly known today

-491-
as Rationalism and Empiricism . Rationalism had culmi-

nated in the dogmatism of Christian Volff in which the

endeavor was to derive everything by a method of deduction

paralleling the processes of mathematics, but the result

was a system which was very largely unrelated to the

material of actual experience . The other, or empiric,

branch of the stream had flowed from Descartes through

John Locke and Bishop Berkeley to ')avid Fume where we

arrive at the conclusion that the sole reality consists

of a sequence of sense-iiapressions and inner introspective

states, without any material or mental substrate and

without any basis for supposing the sequence to be

governed by either natural or logical law . On one side,

a dogmatism from which, while there is an abundant emphasis

of a principle of organization and order, there yet is no

relatedness to actual experience, on the other, a scep-

ticism which, Chile it was closely bound to sensuous

immediacy and thus fully recognized the force of brute

fact, yet afforded no security or certainty with respect

to those values most vital in the consciousness of man,

such as uniformity and calculability of nature, the

reality and persistence of the Self or the actuality of

the Divine . Thus philosophy had core to a dead-end which

could satisfy neither the needs of a theoretical or system-

atic science nor of the religious consciousness .

-492-
 The high valuation which Immanuel pant has gen-

erally been given by the philosophers who followed him

is no more than just, if for no other reason than that

it ;:gas he who found the way out of the impasse which

philosophy had reached . find this remains true, even

though all his specific conceptions nay have to be nod-

ified in the light of a later and fuller understanding,

for he was the force which drew together the .divided,

but essentially complementary, streams of thought, and

gave new direction and vitality to future thought . But

pant is significant in a considerably larger sense than

that of being the synthesizing poliiii in the Clestern philo-

sophic sophic stream, for, in the end, it was he who opened the

way to the bridging of understanding between the Western

and oriental mind . This latter service wa, not so much

contributed directly by Kant, who was not and never claimed

to be e. metaphysician, as by the main stream of philosophy

which was founded upon and received impetus from his most

fundamental conceptions, i .e ., German Idealism or, rather,

Spiritualism . One who is familiar with the thought of Kant,

and with the Rational and Voluntaristic Spiritualism which

grew out of him, can turn to Buddhistic and Vedantist philo-

sophy and not find it wholly strange and meaningless . To

be sure, important differences remain, growing out of the

fact that the matter of the oriental philosophy is grounded

-493-
in Gnostic Realization at every step, while 71'estern philo-

sophy is more largely, though not wholly -- as indicated

by the influence of I'eisterckhart and Jacob Behmen upon

Ilegel --, guided by a logical modulus . But the parallel-

ism of the ultimate conceptions in these oriental and

iostern developments is sufficiently close, so that a

conceptual crossing without undue intellectual strain is

possible . ald this we owe in a profound sense to the

labors of Immanuel Kant, who thus may well be the greatest

synthesizing or integrating force in the whole history of

thought .

Kant developed his synthesis of the two philosophic

currents by the acceptance of the determination as to fact

which had been formulated by . David IIume, along pith an

equal acceptance of the recognition of principle or law

that was the primary vision of the Nationalists . Kant ns

a physical scientist, concerned primarily with theoretical

development, was well aware that neither factor or component

could be disregarded without destroying the possibility of

any such science . But Hume's analysis had shown that on

the basis of experience through the senses alone we can

have no knowledge of law or assurance of an order in the

universe, yet despite all this, science, especially in

the form of the 1ewtonian development, had built theoretical

constructions which fitted with remarkable reliability the

matter subsequently given through the senses . Clearly,

-494-
there is some law or order, conforming in high degree

with our logical thinking, that governs somehow the

material supplied through the senses, or by sensuous in-

tuition, to use hant's own term . Now, if law or prin-

ciple is not given by pure experience, and, yet, is known

v;-ith an assurance not inferior to that of experience and,

in addition, is even empirically vindicated by the power

of theoretical science to prognosticate future experience,

from whence do we derive this knowledge of law and prin-

ciple? Kant's answer to this is, that our knowledge of

law, principle or order and , in a word, of all truth as

distinguished from knowledge of fact, is innate or a priori .

That is, vie carry in the subjective dimension of our con-

sciousness predetermining forms which, while they may not

condition nature as it may be supposed to be apart from

consciousness, none the less determine the form of our

possible experience of that nature . 'oIe are not born with

minds in the state of blank tablets, as John Locke imagined,

upon which the realities of the objective are written just

as they are, but cue carry a framework in our rinds which

predeterrine the limits of possible experience . In so far

as there may be supposed to be a nature o phase of nature

which could leave no impress within the terms of these

forms, we could never know of its existence . But w: e can

know the conditioning forms of our experience (transcendental

aesthetic) and of our thinking (the logical forms of the

-4 95-
understanding), because they are already present in the

mind, even when new-born . Thus it is possib-Le to build

a theoretical science, which is reliable with respect to

the phenomena given in experience, but we can predicate

nothing with respect to nature or the thing as it is in

itself . In a sense, which is not individually voluntary,

we legislate the law and order governing possible experi-

ence, and can, therefore, know it . It is of little

moment, as Kant pointed out, that we do not actually cog-

nize these forms and law, in point of time, before ex-

perience, but the essential point is that, instead of

deriving them from experience, experience is the occasion

on which the knowledge of them is born . In a word, they

are logically prior to all experience, however much actual

cognition of them may be temporarily subsequent to experience .

'.+ithout entering into the detailed development

of the idea, which is very complex and often difficult

to follow, ,.e now find ourselves with a Conception which

enables us to see how it could be possible for a human

individual to have an ordered experience and could know

necessary governing laws, so far as he individually is

concerned . But so far we are provided with only a private

or solipsistic field of ordered phenomena and, if we are

to conceive of mankind as a community of actual individuals,

and not merely phenomenal appearances within my unique and

private consciousness, then more is required . To meet

-496-
this difficulty Kant contributed what may well be his most

important conception, i .e ., the idea of a transcendental

Self or Ego, which may be called objective with respect

to the empiric or psycholog :ical ego of the individual,

since It conditions the latter . Here 'objective' is not

to be understood as objective in the sense tide apply this

notion to the not-self or non-ego or content of a conscious-

ness apperceived by a self or ego, but is rather to be

understood as an impersonal and universal Subject, such

as an Absolute Self or Subject . In some way the Tran-

scendental Self lays down the forms of possible experience

and thought, and the private or individual subject is as

much conditioned inwardly by this as it is by the matter

of external experience . Thus we have a basis for cognizing

forms and laws that are not merely private, but v :hich are

generally valid for all individuals and, indeed, we now

see the possibility of communication with mutuality of

understanding, and wbich is not wholly dependent upon a

commonality of the aesthetic component of experience . In

contrast, on the basis of the Iiumian conception, intellect-

ual communication would be impossible, and the only possi-

bility of conveying anything would be by evoking, as by

appropriate use of art, of similar aesthetic states of

consciousness . But, as a matter of fact, :,-e can communi-

cate intellectually and, in the purest forms of this com-

munication, as in mathematics and logic, there may be a

complete absence of all aesthetic evocation . Jith the

full Kantian conception, an explanation of how all this

is possible is provided, and thus Kant left us with a

conceptual framework which effected a vaster integration

for understanding than had ever been provided before him .

That I-ant's philosophy was not complete and, in

the sequel, proved in certain respects unsound, detracts

little, if at all, from its importance . It opened the

way to the most fruitful speculative thought that has ever

been known and, whether the subsequent thourht was built

upon the foundation of this philosophy or by an adverse

criticism of it, Kant has been, in either case, a philo'-

sophical stimulus of the highest power . There is some

reason for believing that no conception has ever Teen

produced or ever will be produced which will be eternally

and immutably valid . But whether this is true or not,

conceptions which widen and broaden the stream of thought

and understanding are to be regarded as among nan's most

precious possessions . In this sense, at'least, I :ant's

contribution is an enduring and lofty value, to be classed

liAth the earlier achievement of Plato, snd fernanent in

its effect, even though every particular Kantian concep-

tion is ulti_:?ately over-passed and even forgotten in the

foreground of consciousnes ! ;ven though the step .;, by

r:hich ~w-e climb the cliff of consciousness, in time erode

or break away below us, yet, but for those steps we would

-498-
not be where we now are . So, the steps that are -one are,

none the less, in a profound and occult sense, permanent

and enduring .

The two ?post primary conceptions of Rant, i . e . ,

the forns or ideas which underlie experience and the

Transcendental Self, are crucial determinants in the

development of the Srirituclistic philosophy which grew

out of him . Of these, ,;-e shall give fir : t consideration

to the Idea .

h,ant and Plato agree in attaching an a priori

primacy to certain Ideas which are of an cxtraordinary

universality, but there is a characteristic difference

in the way these Ideas are viewed . For Plato they appear

ac metaphysical self-existences, v;bile for Rant , ;hey appear

as epistemological -,re-determinants
. For Ilato the judg-

ments of knowledge and Being have not become clearly dis-

tinguished, but with Pant T ;:e have the fruit of two thousand

years of thought in the sharp recognition that metaphysical

actuality, as it is in itself, is something other than our

knowledge of it, at least in so far as our common non-

mystical forms of cognition are concerned . But despite

these important differences, the basic agreement that there

are fundaner_tal pre-existent Ideas entablishes a far more

important round of egreernent . Cozy ; equenntl,- the primary

question that must be met in the valuation off' the authenti-

city of Idealism is that as to whether such Ideas really

exist, and es to ho,,, ,- ;e determine that they are .

-499-
 One could easily imagine that these supposed or

real pre-existent Ideas existed only in the sense of a

speculative construct or postulate , introduced for the

theoretical handling of a problem in the sense that is

common in modern science . In that case, the only test

of their validity would be the pragmatic trial by con-

sequences . But they may be knowable directly through

insight, in which case they are much more than speculative

constructs and have a nore or less inelutable character,

analogous to that of well-attested facts of . experience .

It is upon the question of the status of these Ideas that

light is now shed by analytic psychology .

As man is born with. a characteristic anatomical

structure, which differentiates him from other animal

creatures, so also does he enter erbodied life with a

psychical organization, which predetermines the Ccneral

form in which his consciousness may develop, however much

the specific form of that consciousness may be conditioned

by environmental factors . Yodern analytic psychology,

through the development of methods adapted to the study

of this kind of subject-matter,, has afforded us a means

for an empiric investigation of psychic material so that

we are not now entirely dependent upon the insight of

Platonic or hantian genius .6 These conditioning psychical

forms, as reported in the works of Dr . C . G . Jung , differ

from the Abstract Ideas of Plato end the Categories of

-500-
Immanuel Kant in that they appear as concrete and col-

lective images which, because of the latter character-

istic, Jung designates as 'primordial' or 'archetypal' .

They are images which are not mere reproductions of ob-

jects, as given through the external senses, but are of

a . sort which arise spontaneously from an untraceable source,

and that is therefore called the 'Unconscious, -- and find

their analogue in the mythologies of the various peoples,

in alchemistic symbols and in the Ltandalas, which play so

important a part in the oriental psychology of the trans-

formation process . Their original character is similar

to perceptual images, rather than to the form of conceptual

ideas, but they differ from the external perceptions in

that they predetermine ways of viewing e .:perience, while

the latter present us with facts . As one becomes conscious

of external fact by an extraverted movement in conscious-

ness, so one may animate and bring above the threshold of

consciousness the primordial images or archetypes by a

process of more than usually profound introversion . lie

have, thus, a means of research in this subjective dimen-

sion that, in some measure at least, frees us from a more

or less blind acceptance or rejection of the €eneral con-

ception that there are predeterriniilg ; Ideas, as enunciated

by Ilato and Rant .

The primordial images of Jung differ from the

Platonic Ideas, not alone in the sense that they are in

-501-
their initial form quite non-conceptual, but in the fur-

ther respect that they are not truly eternal . They are

indeed very ancient, representing, as it were, the view

of a million-year-old consciousness for which the pheno-

menon of the passing moment would be rather improbable,

but they are conceived to be a deposit in tine . 'yith

respect to the fleeting elements or complexes of experi-

ence they are truly hoary, but since they are deposits in

time, although a vast time, they are less than eternal .

Thus they enter into the total picture of the empiric

consciousness in a sense that is analogous to the parameter

in mathematics ; they are relatively permanent with respect

to the current experience of any embodied .man, but are not

ultimately permanent . Clearly Jung does not give, nor does

he pretend to give, a description of the ultimate deri-

vation of the relative consciousness of rian, since he

restricts himself to statements that can be empirically

verified . But he has isolated by empiric means inagerial

factors which serve the office of pre -determinants, or

a priori components , in the present concrete consciousness,

and, in so doing, has gone far in confirming the primary

theses of Plato and Kant .

The fact that Jung speaks of 'primordial images',

while Plato and 3chopenhauer speak of then as 'Ideas' and

Iiant calls then 'transcendental forms of aesthetic intui-

tion' or 'categories of the understanding', does not con-

-502-
stitute a distinction of fundamental importance . The

fact of first importance is that, in any case, they are

a Ariori or preconditioning factors . Thus the psychic-

ally received and accepted world is not the world as it

might be known to an absolutely pure consciousness, --

a consciousness not subject to the condition of being an

object for a subject, -- but is a world which is mirrored

in the relative consciousness, and the mirror has a shape

or character largely defined by the a priori components .

The autochthonic primordial images are viewed by

Jung as the maternal soil from whence arise the general

conceptual ideas that have the abstract, definitive and

rational character, which is the typical mark of concep-

tual systems . Hence, the Idea, thus conceived, possesses

only a secondary or derivative character . Here Jung stands

in essential agreement with the thesis of Schopenhauer .

We are also reminded of the view advanced,by William James,

with the difference that while James appears to be speaking

exclusively of externally derived perceptions, or images

derived from the concrete and particular object, Jung on

the other hand, in so far as he is speaking of the Idea

derived from the primordial image, means a perceptual

matrix which is subjective and, while this matrix is also

concrete, it is none the less universal . The primordial

image, like the fundamental and essentially Platonic Ideas

of uchopenhauer, is a concrete universal, which stands

in the relation of source with respect to the abstract

conceptual universal . Now, while one may agree with both

Jung and James that in some sense the primordial image

and the particular percept, with objective reference,

both constitute material soils underlying the concept,

in the one case the more general ideas, in the other the

ideas with more particular and objective reference, --

yet it remains true that the concept, whether more general

or more particular, has, in its total character, features

which are not reducible to either matrix, such as being

more or less completely definitive . In both cases, as

between the concept and the primordial or the particular

percept, there is a relationship of incommensurability as

well as of meaningful reference . The matrix, in either

case, is aesthetic or irrational, yet the most notable

characteristic of the child-concept is rationality . In

a word, something is added in the concept which is not

reducible to the matrix .

It becomes evident that we must look further if

we are to complete the derivation of the abstract and

rational or conceptual . ideas, whether in the sense of the

a priori universal concept or the a post on concept

having objective perceptual referents . Though the primordial

image and the external percept together are, no doubt,

-504-
sufficient to maintain an embodied consciousness, that

consciousness would be something less than that which we

actually find manifested in the human being . It would be

an exclusively perceptual consciousness . It would have a

sense mind, but not an intellectual mind . In a word, the

being would not be capable of reasoning, though a perceptual I

and probably autonomous, thought would be possible for it .

The surface consciousness would be engaged in external

perceptions, but the subliminal mind, bearing the primordial

images , would remain hidden in impenetrable unconsciousness .

Vie can see how this equipment could be enough for meeting

the task of adjustment between a living organism and its

environment, for clearly .the animals are endowed with a

consciousness-organization of this sort, and the animals

have abundantly proven their ability to survive . It is

quite conceivable that an evolutionary development of this

type of organization could lead to the establishment of

entities much in advance of the animals as we know them ;

and with a capacity for quite superior states of conscious-

ness -- even states of consciousness which in the purely

spiritual sense could far transcend those attained by most

men . But despite all this, we would not have human beings

anywhere in the evolutionary series, since the power of

rational thought and of conceptual communication would not

have arisen . And, likewise, there would be lacking the

-505-
power to turn upon the states of consciousness for their

analysis and ultimate mastery .

Before proceeding to the derivation of the rational

component, which is the distinctive sign of man qua man,

it may profit us to reflect further upon what is achieved

by the addition of the primordial image to the external

perceptual equipment to which David flume reduced human

cognition . It will be remembered that Hume left us with

a wholly unpredictable and anarchic play of insubstantial

images without any possibility of integration in terms of

form or law . This feature is corrected, by the introduction

of the primordial image, to the extent that it now becomes

possible to see how a perceptual order or dependability is

possible . Part of the task which rant perforated is effected .

The conscious entity functions within a framework of order

and a kind of dependability within its world of experience,

though it would be lacking the powers of understanding dis-

crimination and judgment and could never construct a science,

nor even produce a Eumian philosophy . But with all this

limitation, which would eliminate the ;.:hole rational dimen-

sion of our consciousness so that there would be no science,

no mathematics, no philosophy and no art of the character-

istic ';Western sort, -- though a purely aesthetic art of

the type of the Zen Buddhist's constructions r :ig;ht con-

ceivably remain --, yet a kind of enlig ;htenrnent would re-

-506-
main a possibility, and so the possibility of a religious

motif would not be excluded . In fact, a careful study of

the Chinese Taoism and Buddhism, particularly in the cha'n

or Zen form, suggests that an important aim of that dis-

cipline is the elimination of the rational component from

consciousness so that we have left a consciousness composed

exclusively of the outer and inner perceptual factors . In

terms of these, the religious objective is the shifting

of identification from the external perceptual factor to

the inner, or primordial, and then transcending the latter

as image . Becoming conscious in this final stage is En-

lightenment . From the study of these Chinese Sutras the

Western reader may well derive the impression that the

writers viewed the development of a rational power in man

as unnecessary and even a mistake . But whether or not the

possession of a rational power, either as a faculty or

function, is necessary and desirable in the total consti-

tution of man, there can be no question but that man in

one side of his nature is a rational being and that this

characteristic is, at least, of considerable importance

and, accordingly, the determination of the status of this

function or faculty is .of prime concern for him who would

know the nature and significance of human knowledge .

-507-
 In the history of Greek thought the principle of

Reason, in the profoundest sense, is represented most com-

monly under the notions of Logos and Nous . While the sense

in which these terms are employed varies from thinker to

thinker, it is probably in accord with the most mature

usage to regard 'Nous' as an ontological or Divine Reason,

while 'Logos' enters into the picture in the sense of the

'Word', or the Reason become articulate, organized and

manifested . Although in the Greek thought the metaphysical

and the epistemological were not yet clearly differentiated,

so that 'Logos' can mean 'Word' as well as 'Idea', and is

even personalized in some developments, yet it is easy to

see in 'Logos' the original of the modern concept, and all

that is now understood under the designation of 'logic' .

This would naturally lead to the identification of 'reason',

in the more common sense of modern usage, vith the notion

of 'Logos' . This is 'reason' conceived as a ratiocinative

process , i .e ., reasoning . But the Greeks also conceived of

'Reason' in a more ontological sense, -- as is also mani-

fest in a modern thinker like Hegel --, and in this pro-

founder sense it is identical with the notions of 'Law'

or 'Order' conceived as governing , both teleologically and

structurally, the whole Cosmos . Reason , in this sense,

is identical with 'Nous' and, apparently, also identical

with the Indian conception of Buddhi , taken in the sense

-508-
of a Cosmic principle . Within the limits of human cog-

nition, the distinction between 'IVous' and 'Logos' seems

well represented by the differentiation indicated by

'apprehension' and 'comprehension', understood in the

more rigorous sense . Apprehension carries the meaning

of simple cognition, or what James called "knowledge

through acquaintance", whereas 'comprehension' is the

definitive "knowledge-about" .

In conformity with the foregoing discussion,

Reason, in the sense of IVous, is not identical with the

subjective ratiocinative process of human thinking, but

is rather a part or phase of higher Nature and, therefore,

objective . Ratiocination would be a stepped-down correlate

or reflection in the relative consciousness where the re-

lationship to knowledge would be one of seeking . Reason,

as Nous, is pre-existent with respect to the relative

consciousness . In this sense, Reason does not stand in

contrast with intuition, -- as is the case with ratio-

cination, -- nor with other forms of higher cognition,

such as Vision, Direct Cognition and Knowledge by Identity,

as differentiated by Sri Aurobindo . A perfect Rational

Intelligence would, for instance , embrace the whole of

extant and future mathematics as a unified totality with-

out passing through reasoned steps as a process in time .

-509-
 Reason, as Nous, must be conceived as pre-existent

with respect to all experience, however much the ratio-

cinative reason, or Logos, must wait upon experience be-

fore it can be manifested . Thus, however much the con-

cepts of the latter are dependent upon experience, either

in the sense of the primordial images or of the particular

images with external reference, for their substantive

content, yet the concept is not exclusively derived from

the percept but has, as well, a source in the primordial

Reason . This provides for a dimension in knowledge which

is other than experience in its Root, although actual know-

ledge as we know it in the relative field is so far an

intermixed mass of empiric and pure rational components

that their separation is a task of great difficulty .

Assuming the picture, as thus far delineated, at

least provisionally, we are in a position to deal with a

defect in the primordial image as given by Jung . This

image does not appear as an eternal or timeless archetype,

and thus absolutely a priori . It is rather a deposit over

a vast temporal range of experience, or the way a million-

year-old consciousness would perceive . It is relatively

a priori, but only relatively so . It may be viewed as

the conditioning factor in current particularized experi-

encing, that is itself a deposit from all past experience,

but does not provide the form whereby the initial experience

-510-
was possible . The root-form, making possible the initial

experience, cannot be itself a deposit of experience . This

form we here find in the notion of Reason as Nous .

For the consciousness of the extraverted empiri-

cist, and even for the introverted sensationalist, the

question quite naturally arises as to how a pure Reason

can be cognized, since it is not given by experience in

the restricted meaning of the term . To answer this query

we must at least assume the actuality of ways of cognition

other .than the empiric . For the purposes of formal dis-

course, once we assume or postulate the appropriate cog-

nitive means then the possibility of direct apperception

of a pure Reason, or of a Reason which is pre-existent

with respect to experience, can be accepted in principle .

But if we can go no further than this then the discussion

is only of academic interest . To advance beyond that

necessitates the immediate actuality of the required cog-

nitive power . There are those who have, or at least claim

to have, immediate acquaintance with cognitive powers which

are not active in all men and, therefore, when such formu-

late philosophies, grounded more or less upon these powers,

verification by strictly empiric means is impossible . Thus

the effective critique of these philosophies is impossible

by those who are strangers to the necessary cognitive re-

sources . The ultimate and vital question, therefore, is

-511-
whether or not these cognitive powers exist . It is the

same problem that arises in connection with the evaluation

of the states of consciousness of the mystic , only, in

this case , it occurs in connection with the cognition of

Reason itself . But here no attempt will be made to prove

the actuality of means of cognition which are not generally

active , since such proof i s quite unnecessary with respect

to those who have these powers , and it is impossible in

the case of those who lack them . It is merely pointed out

that the existence of such powers must be assumed if a

primary understanding of Idealism is ever to be attained .

We now possess at least a schema whereby the de-

velopment of universal conceptual ideas may be seen as

possible . These ideas are the product of the combination

of the primordial images and the pure Reason, whereby we

derive concepts which unite a perceptual context with a

logical order . Both components are necessary , since with-

out the substantive content supplied by the primordial

image, the logical form would lack all relation to ex-

perience , while , on the other hand , without the rational

component , the primordial image could never supply the

notion of law and organization . Because of these two fac-

tors we are enabled to cognize the externally riven as a

Cosmos , and not merely as an indeter n ina*tt Chaos .

-512-
 Having reached this point, the question arises as

to whether we have determined a truth concerning the nature

of the world or universe, as such, or only determined

conditions of human knowledge . It is clear that Kant

viewed his analysis as valid only in the latter sense,

since he explicitly said that it never occurred to him

to question the existence of a real world, in the sense

of an existent beyond all consciousness . He even called

himself an "empiric realist", though he acknowledged that

he was also a "transcendental idealist" . By this it is to

be understood . that he viewed the intuitions of the senses,

in their concrete filling as determined by an external

somewhat , or the thing-in-itself, which in its nature as

it is in itself is unknowable to human cognition . In this

sense he remained realistic, in his own opinion at least .

But the actual form of our experience he conceived as

determined by transcendental forms which, are pre-existent

in the knower . In this sense he was frankly idealistic .

Footnotes to Chapter VI

1quoted from Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory

as given in Baldwin s Dictionary of Philosophy and .Psychology
v/2 ilaM9`4PA
pp . 3y52-3 53•
Iii c d a~ 1-0(4,4 ~~+r e11 ! ~L a Ira
,~3 The Serpent Power ,' P-.-90 . ~ 44
. _ CU
ma,,, `
V(A i zj
4
The Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo, '~11- .

r 5 Ibidp`
. • 6` 3 T`
.4 fi c ~A ~z,? p, C e , ~` 'P130,
v16
See Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological
Types, particularly the definitions of "Image" and "Idea"
in the latter .
 Chapter V*

Idealism (Continued)

The Idealist affirms the primacy of consciousness

along with its subject . This is not to be regarded as

merely an arbitrary affirmation nor as a working hypoth-

esis, but as a direct or immediate recognition, something

which is beyond all doubt for the thinker himself . This

is so fundamental that the Idealist finds it confirmed in

the very denial of the denier, since the denial itself is

an act of consciousness . That which is wholly unconscious

simply could not deny anything . k8o when the Realist op-

*From the standpoint of one who appreciates systematic

organization the material in the present and subsequent
X chapters aF: will prove less than satisfactory .
Here there will be found an interplay between the in-
tellectual and introceptual functions, that, at times,
may seem somewhat like a contest . The one emphasizes
organization, the other, flow of consciousness ; the
former serves best communication to the trained mind, .
while the latter provides the fertile ground for preg-
nant ideas ; the first exemplifies discipline, the
second, freedom . Even for the writer himself, criti-
cism and reorganization of such material is difficult
and involves the danger of sacrificing substance to
form . Accordingly, it was decided to leave the com-
position unaltered, save in very minor detail . By
far the most valuable material in fit- to be
found found in the present and succeeding chapters .
-~..• s b~ o lc

-514-
poses the thesis of the Idealist, he has to invoke, how-

ever unwillingly, the very quality which the Idealist

affirms is . It never occurs to the Idealist to charge

the Realist with being unconscious, so he is perhaps

temperamentally incapable of getting the Realist's point

of view . To get his argument across effectively the

Realist should insist more explicitly on his own uncon-

sciousness . In this way he might succeed in not adding

fuel to the Idealist's fire .

Now, once one has the initial certainty of the sub-

ject or self and its consciousness the basic problem of

philosophy takes a characteristic form . So long as one

focuses his attention inwardly he has an immediate real-

ization of perfect freedom . His will and thought are

under no external constraint . Their activity is per-

fectly free . But when the focus of consciousness is turned

outward, the freely willed act becomes an objective deed,

which is confronted by all sorts of constraints . The'

deed is an action of what we commonly call an organism

which simply cannot do as it pleases since it moves in a

seeming environment which in innumerable ways restricts

the action of the organism . In this way the freely willed

act of the pure self is confronted with resistance . Ulti-

mately practical paths for the will can be found, it is

-515-
true, but these paths are, in part, determined by neces-

sity so that in the final form they are only in part the

expression of pure freedom . This necessity appears as

the objective world of mountains, trees, oceans, building,

etc ., just precisely that which the Realist takes as in

some sense the .ultimate and basic Reality itself . But

the Idealist knows immediately the conscious self and its

freedom, so the necessitarian charadter revealed in the

object raises a problem .

Details in the offered solutions of the problem of

necessity vary with the different idealistic thinkers, but

one feature is held in common by all representatives of

this school . It is this, i .e ., that the solution must be

found in the nature of consciousness itself . Manifestly

the only objective world we have is a world which exists

in and for consciousness . If we say that it inheres in

something independent and quite outside consciousness as

such, then we beg the whole question by a speculative

answer which can never be checked . For all checking is a

conscious act dealing with material which is already in-

side consciousness and thus nothing is proved as to the

existence of a somewhat absolutely outside consciousness .

To be sure, one can affirm this somewhat and thus take a

purely arbitrary and dogmatic position, but this, the

Idealist will say, is no true philosophic solution . The

-516-
only being we know is necessarily known and that is the

important fact . Therefore being is defined as identical

with being-known or as being for or in or of consciousness .

At this point the Idealist is vulnerable before

logical criticism, since he cannot prove that it is essen-

tial to being that it should be known or exist in conscious-

ness . As a matter of strict logic he begs the question .

Of course, the Realist is not slow to pick out this weak-

ness and accuses the Idealist of failing to prove his

thesis . It is perfectly true that the primary thesis of

Idealism is not proven logically and so there is no logical

compulsion to constrain all men to accept some form of

Idealism as the only possible true philosophy . But the

opposed philosophies face the same essential difficulty

in a different form . Always one can find root assumptions

which are not and cannot be proven logically . The Realist,

for instance, cannot prove the existence of his independent

reality and, so, also begs the question .

It is a fact that man has not and cannot build a

rigorously self-contained system wherein every element is

itself logically derived . The closest realization that

we have of this is to be found in some purely formal math-

ematical systems in which the elements are wholly meaning-

less terms . But here logic is always assumed, since its

first principles are not proven . Proof depends upon those

-517-
principles, but they are themselves outside proof . It

may be impossible to doubt them, but the ground of con-

fidence in them is immediate and original . But accept-

ing anything in this way is actually a begging of the

question when we assert that it carries the quality of

truth . So we must be content to start with something

immediate, be it experience or insight, and then after

that)rigorous logical demonstration is effective but,

yet, always relative to the original immediate ground .

We must accept the fact that different philoso-

phies, starting from different grounds given in some way

immediately, will develop in different directions and

exist side by side . Each one has at its roots a basic

logical weakness, with the result that mutual vulnerability

gives to all a right to existence relative to each other .

Jo, while logical soundness is indeed an important part

of every genuine philosophy, yet this is, not the whole

of the story . It is even more important that every philo-

sophy is the expression of an orientation that is extra-

logical . A philosophy is the expression of a View which

is more primary than the philosophy itself .

slow, although the Idealist cannot prove his primary

thesis and must counter the Realist by bringing the same

charge against the latter, yet the Idealist can make a

point favorable to his position that is particularly

-518-
strong . He can point out that when being is conceived

as identical with being known or with existing in and

for consciousness he has given a definition that has

some meaning . On the other hand, the notions of being and

existence have no intelligible meaning when they are

predicated of that which is outside of consciousness in

every sense . Vrhat in that case does it mean to be or to

exist? If anyone tries to give an answer to this ques-

tion he will only invoke a meaning which exists for con-

sciousness . His very answering and the content of the

answer is something in consciousness . uo the Idealist

may very well say that the only being and existence which

can possibly have any significance is a being and exist-

ence which is for consciousness of some sort . That which

is completely outside all consciousness is simply in-

distinguishable from that which is not . 3o we may just

as well disregard the whole matter .

But there is a difficulty which still remains .

The inward realization of freedom is offset by an out-

ward experience of necessity . The notion of an inde-

pendent and real world does have value in explaining

the necessity, for if living and conscious beings are

actually in a pre-existent and independent environment,

then it is quite easy to see how they will be constrained

by it . But this, in its turn, makes it difficult to see

-519-
how consciousness can have any real freedom . The direct

realization of freedom ultimately has to be reduced largely

to an illusion . But those individuals who have the greater

immediate certainty of .the freedom and have only a second-

ary or derived experience of the necessity will not .accept

this view . They certainly will not sacrifice the more

certainly known for that which is less certainly known .

So they ask, Is there not some other way of explaining

the necessity which will meet this difficulty?

Idealism does offer its answers and this leads us

into a veritable sea of philosophic theory and discourse

which many find quite difficult to follow . In the end

the Idealist believes that he has met the problem in such

a way as to save the freedom so that it remains as some-

thing absolutely real, and yet supplies a conceivable

explanation of the necessity . In this process a good

deal of conceptual simplicity is lost, as compared to

the statements of the Realists, but at least the baby is

not thrown away with the bath . . And the Idealist considers

the baby, freedom, to be so valuable as to be worth any

effort to save it .

In contrast, the Realist, whether oriented to a

mechanistic nature, to a logic of relations or to an em-

piric life, seems to be lost when he has too much freedom .

-520-
He seems to secure his comfort by anchoring himself to

something outside of consciousness . He may call this

something "matter", "terms in relation" or "empiric life",

but consciousness is an incident embraced by an envelop-

ing necessity whose nature is other than consciousness .

Of course, he too has the direct feeling of freedom,

though it can hardly be as decisive as in the case of the

Idealist, and he generally strives to find some room for

it . But it never rises to a commanding position . He has,

however, a very clear idea as to why we cannot always do

as we please .

Now an Idealist can never hope to be taken seriously

if he merely affirms his unconditional freedom and let it

go at that . If he did that he would be very subject to

the charge of uncritical subjectivism . There is far too

much evidence of a compulsive necessity which affects all

creatures, be they Idealists or not . So the Idealist must

take up the problem of necessity and the great Idealists

have given so much thought to this problem and have so

largely written concerning it that they often give the

impression of being necessitarians . But this is only the

outside of view of the Idealistic systems . The real heart

is a profound feeling for freedom . Perhaps one would have

to be something of an Idealist to be aware of this fact,

but it is possible for anyone to find the evidence if he

-521-
will but look far enough . I need but suggest the thought

of the greatest of all the Idealists, i .e ., Shankara,

with whom the summum bonum is explicitly given as Libera-

tion, spelled with a capital "L" .

To the philosophically naive consciousness of most

men it doubtless will seem harder to follow the more rig-

orous form of Idealistic philosophy than any other form

of thought . He is finally led into regions where the

familiar, so-called, real world is left far behind and

most of the judgments of his highly vaunted common sense

cease to supply any genuine help . He may be excused if he

is disposed to feel like a man out in space with no planet

to place his feet upon, nor solar system to give him bear-

ings . And then the content of the thought may often seem

as though it dealt with nothing that meant anything what-

soever and, least of all, have any bearing upon practical

human affairs . But deeper reflection will show him that

the Idealist does have genuine anchorage, does employ an

objective modulus and is deeply concerned with that which

in the end is of the profoundest and most vital interest

with all men . The anchorage of the Idealist is, as al-

ready noted, the immediate fact of consciousness and its

subject ; the objective modulus is the logical structure

of thought ; and the practical interest has the deepest

concern with the problem of death and immortality . On

-522-
the whole, it is true, the Idealist as a philosopher is

not greatly concerned with the practical problems of

finite life in this world . He finds plenty of able men

who are engaged with these problems and so rarely finds

the call of duty in this direction . But he sees beyond

the cycle of finite life a great problem which, if it is

not solved, renders the solutions of all other problems

unimportant . So, I submit, there is abundant reason to

bear with the intellectual processes of the Idealist if

he can offer any evidence of certainty where most men

only believe darkly within a cloud of doubt .

Let us, now, examine the main features of the ideal-

istic treatment of the problem of necessity . If there is

no world outside of consciousness and the essence of the

self is freedom, how, then, are we to account for the ex-

perience of necessity? The Idealist answer to this ques-

tion invariably takes us away from the material of object-

ive experience . With the exception of the pragmatic

idealist, the resolution of the problem either invokes

the Divinity or a transcendental SELF, which stands in

such a relation to the empiric self that it may be called

objective . But it is . not objective in the sense in which

sensible objects or-even ideas are called objective . Here

we have a notion that is quite subtle and ahich I think

is quite generally misunderstood by the critics of Idealism .

-523-
But first, let us see how the notion of the Divinity or

the transcendental SELF can help us with the problem of

necessity, leaving the problem of the reasonableness of

the notion until later .

In the case of Berkeley the notion'of the Divinity

was invoked quite simply to account for the ideas ex-

perienced . Berkeley's ideas, it must be recalled, in-

cluded all experiences, such as sensations, as well as

ideas in the conceptual sense . These ideas, he affirmed,

were not produced by something outside consciousness, such

as independent and real things, but many of them, at least,

had a character of being given quite independently of

individual volition . How were they placed in the con-

sciousness of the individual? The answer is that God

placed them there . The actuality of God is not ques-

tioned by Berkeley nor is the Divinity a real philoso-

phical conception with him . He seems simply to have ac-

cepted the God of Christian faith, with the result that

he left many logical problems unresolved . So this earlier

form of Occidental Idealism is mainly valuable for intro-

ducing the idealistic approach to the problem of philo-

sophy but does not leave us twith .a system that is highly

satisfactory .

Before leaving this passing reference to Berkeley,

it seems important to note the fact that this thinker,

-524-
like Schiller and Bergson of the pragmatist school, is

not classed as a member of the school of Idealism . Like

the two pragmatists named, he accepts the cardinal prin-

ciple of Idealism but does not accept another principle

which is of almost equal importance for the latter .

Basically the ideas of Berkeley are not concepts but per-

cepts . Thus his idealism may be classed as an empiric

or perceptual idealism, whereas the great school of

Idealism gives ascendency to the concept relative to the

percept . Berkeley's thought is anti-rationalistic as

well as anti-realistic whereas the main school of Idealism

is anti-realistic but highly rationalistic, even in its

voluntaristic form . For Berkeley the concrete idea or

perception has a reality-value which the abstract concep-

tion does not possess . He continues the psychological

orientation of the Nominalists of the T ;iiddle Ages . But

since the cleavage between Idealism and Realism is more

fundamental than that between Sensationalism and Ration-

alism, there is a significant reason for classing Berkeley

with idealism in the generic sense , though not with the

specific school of Idealism .

There is something naive about Berkeley's invocation

of the Divinity in order to explain the necessitarian and

orderly character of the perceived ideas . For this is

the inherited Divinity of Christian faith . It is not the

-525-
Divinity of direct realization nor as a necessity for

reason . It is thus not the kind of God which can prop-

erly enter into any philosophical system as a true agent

of integration . It is rather a general appeal to Prov-

idence for help when one's own individual resources prove

inadequate . Now it does appear that no man ever quite

succeeds in building a system of thought which completely

avoids the appeal to something which is the logical equiv-

alent to Providence, though he may call it by quite differ-

ent names such as "Chance" or "Nirvana" . This means that

something extra-rational has to be invoked sooner or later,

but some thinkers have been able to extend the limits of

rational thought much further than others . This, indeed,

has a great deal to do with the relative valuation of

the hierarchy of thinkers . The greatest thinker is he

who has been able to think furthest into the unknown .

Among philosophic thinkers Berkeley did not go very far

before he found his limits . The great Idealists went-

much further and gained profundity at the price of in-

creasing incomprehensibility . As a result they have

given us the most intellectually sound interpretation

of necessity which avoids the pitfalls of Realism .

Now, by a sufficient degree of inward penetration

in consciousness one can find the self as an immediately

known reality . This is not a process of simple intro-

-526-
spection as is commonly used in experimental psychology .

In fact, this introspection remains far too objective

to lead to the discovery of the self and the result is

that many psychologists never do find the true self .

They do find something which they call the subject but

they describe it in such terms as to show that they have

actually found only a subtle object . In fact, the Neo-

Realists explicitly state that this subject may enter

into the relation of an object for some purposes of

thought . This simply means that such psychologists are

talking of a subject of quite a different nature from

the self of the Idealist . This difference may be sug-

gested by the figure of a lamp with a light within it .

The subject of the more empiric psychologist is only the

lamp while the self of the Idealist is the light itself .

Actually introspection, in the usual sense, can go no

further than the lamp, since it is the light which il-

lumines and makes possible the subtle observation of

introspection . The light is back of the act of intro-

spection and only the lamp is in the foreground . So in

introspection, consciousness has not really turned upon

itself but merely established a kind of short-circuit in

the psyche . To find the self of the Idealist one has to

go a good deal further than this .

 The turning of consciousness upon itself is a

very mysterious process . To account for it I have be-

come convinced that we have to introduce the notion of

a function which is other than the four functions of

analytic psychology, i .e ., thinking, feeling, sensation

and intuition . I hold the thesis that it is the activity

of this function which constitutes the real base of

Idealism in the grand sense . Further, it is the more

or less complete inactivity of this function that de-

stroys the force of the Idealist argument for so many

thinkers and psychologists . Also, it would appear that

even with the Idealists in whom the function was active,

there was a defective knowledge of it as a distinct func-

tion, the result being that they often tried to explain

by pure reason something which involves more than logic

itself . It is right here that I would locate the great-

est failure of the occidental Idealists . But the failure

in terms of presentation does not imply unsoundness of

fundamental insight .

The above point is well illustrated in the case

of Fichte who may well prove to be the purest example

we have in the ','r'est of an Idealist . From the standpoint

of sheer insight I find Fichte very convincing, but his

attempt in the "Science of Knowledge" to derive that in-

sight as the necessary underlying implication of the

-528-
logical laws of thought seems strained and far from con-

vincing . Very possibly he has the substantially correct

view as to the source of the laws of thought, but it is

quite another matter to say that from the use of logical

principles he has proved the source . I am pretty well

convinced that Fichte did not discover the self or "ego",

as he calls it, by the method in which he sought to prove

it . I would say that lie really knew the self through

what we might call the fifth function, though it is

entirely possible that Fichte did not differentiate this

function in his analysis . In such matters the psychical

analysis of the Orient has gone much further than-either

the philosophy or psychology of the 'Nest .

Elsewhere I have suggested the word "introception"

to represent this fifth function . It is to be understood

as the process whereby consciousness turns upon itself

and moves toward its source . It is not the same as in-

trospection wherein consciousness merely s1--ort-circuits

itself to observe more subtle psychical objects, which

are generally unconscious for the extraverted attitude .

Introception, when successful, leads to a state such that

consciousness becomes its own content, that is, a conscious-

ness which is divorced from its objective reference . By

this means the self as source of consciousness can be

realized and without being transformed into a subtle

-529-
object as a me . This is identical with the Indian notion

of "meditation without a seed" , which is absolutely es-

sential for the attainment of Liberation or Enlightenment .

Buddhist use of the word "Dhyana " suggests very strongly

that it refers to an analogous ppocess . So it may be

said that by "introception" I mean substantially the

same higher psychical function as "meditation without a

seed" and "Dhyana" . It is this, I conceive, to be the

real source of the assurance of the originating idealistic

philosophers and as the ground for differentiating Idealism

proper from mere Intellectualistic idealism which latter

is more a reflection of a Light than an incarnation of the

Light itself . Introception gives immediate content just

as perception does but diverges at least es radically from

the latter as does conceptualism . If one divides the

functions of consciousness into two classes with percep-

tion, on one side including feeling, sensation and intuition,

and conception, on the other, then introception would ap-

pear lumped with conception . In this case a successful

critique of conceptualism would undermine the foundations

of Idealism, particularly in the case of the iibsolutistic

school . But if the true base of Idealism is the activity

of a function which ordinarily is latent and inactive,

then the real root of Idealism is untouched by a critique

of conceptualism considered in separation from introception .

-530-
 "Introception" is definitely not thinking, feel-

ing nor sensation . It is also definitely different from

"intuition" as that term is generally understood, though

translators from oriental sources have often used the

latter word . This, however, only helps to confuse the

situation for then we think of intuition as it appears in

analytic psychology or in usage such as that of Bergson .

It is a content coming into consciousness out of the dark

of unconsciousness, hence we have Bergson speaking of

grasping indefinite fringes around the core of conscious

ideas as intuition . But introception is a function op-

erating in the intensest kind of Light wherein one is

more completely conscious than ever before . Conscious-

ness turning upon itself is a very different matter from

contents rising into consciousness from out the uncon-

scious .

I submit that "turning inward", in the sense in

which Fichte speaks, must be understood in the sense of

introception rather than of simple introspection . Thus

no amount of bare introspection would be competent to

challenge what Fichte found . Introception is an exceed-

ingly profound act of introversion and the evidence would

indidate that it is quite rare . If introversion is car-

ried very far without the turning of the Light of con -

sciousness upon itself , the effect is of something in-

choate feathering out into the darkness of unconscious-

-531-
ness . But with the turning of the Light of consciousness

upon itself consciousness becomes vastly intensified with

the quality and ground of assurance much better established

than in the case of anything derived from experience . This

is something that must be borre in mind if one is ever to

understand Idealism of the grander style .

Introception renders the actuality of the self far

more indubitable than any content given through percep-

tion . This is the key to idealistic assurance and explains

why all the necessitarianism which inheres in the environ-

ment takes on the quality of subordination . In fact, the

intensified Light of the introceptive process gives to

all experience a dreamlike or unreal character . It is

like the sun quenching the light of the moon , or like

the waking state quenching the consciousness of the or-

dinary dream . This is not a speculation , it is something

which actually happens . The shift from introception to

perception is like the sun going under while the moon takes

over . The memory of the light of the sun, when the moon

is shining , is stronger than the memory of the light of

the moon , when the sun is shining . This alone gives a

determinate meaning as to which is relatively most real .

The first immediate content of successful intro-

ception is the realization expressed by the words "I am" .

This is not an inference from conscious activity, such

-532-
as that of Descartes when he inferred the being of the

self from the fact of thinking . The being of the self

is an absolutely immediate datum requiring no further

support . I repeat, the actuality of perceptually ex-

perienced content, taken in its most complete immediacy,

is much less decisively certain .

The being of the self, which for introception is

more unequivocal than the being or actuality of percep-

tion, is like an unsupported Light . It is "the Flame

which burns without wick or oil" . But it is so pure as to

be quite without the taint of personality . One nay con-

ceive of it as like a self - supporting Light within a more

or less differentiated lamp . The latter carries the

individual characters of personality . There is thus

something about the pure self which gives it the char-

acter of real impersonality . While in the rigorous sense

it is highly subjective, it is not e personal subject-

ivism . This is a point of the very greatest importance

for philosophy since the impersonality of the self gives

it a universal value . It is the ground for something a

good deal more than a merely personal philosophy .

We are quite right in valuing physical science be-

cause it gives us something more than merely the private

experience of the individual scientist . It gives general

truths whether they are interpreted in realistic, prag-

-533-
matic or other terms . It is for this reason that we call

it objective . Commonly we oppose to this, subjective

judgments that are so largely colored by personal feel-

ing tones that they have only a restricted appeal . That

which we call objective is believed to be in some sense

true for all men, while that which is subjective is not

true for all men, and may not be true at all . The self

of introception, being quite pure and impersonal, is not

subjective in the latter sense . It supplies a generally

valid base . Thus it is conceived by those who know it,

and if the non-idealist is ever to arrive at an under-

standing of the inner meaning of the Idealist, he .must

grant this point . The only possible verification is by

the path of introception itself .

The last statement implies a radical departure of

the idealistic theory of verification from that of Prag-

matism . The pragmatist dictum that a difference of truth

must make a difference of fact here, namely, in the world

of perception or experience, implies an exclusive one-

way reference of ideas . The idea means exclusively a ter-

minal content having a perceptual ug ale . Thus there can

be no verification save through experience . But the con-

ceptual content of the Idealist qua Idealist is purely

introceptive . If, incidentally, this produces a differ-

ence of fact in the field of experience,tha .t is merely an

-534-
addenda which adds nothing to the essential truth-value .

Actually, the introceptive verification may have reper-

cussions upon the empiric life of the individual with

the result that the latter may, more or less widely, in-

fluence other lives . These effects may or nay not be

valued positively or negatively in the pragmatic sense .

But all this is beside the point from the perspective of

introception . Introception supplies its own authority

and may very well, in some of its ramifications, move

into zones quite unrelated to empiric consciousness . In

such cases a difference of truth would produce no differ-

ence of fact in the perceptual field . Often, it is true,

a difference that is introceptively significant does have

effects that are significant for the perceptual field,

and may even be of momentous importance . Thus the Buddhist

introceptive insight has led to empiric ways of life that

are notably different from the ways of life of most men .

One effect is the reduction of militancy . This is some-

thing that does have a pragmatic value . But it would be

a vital mistake to regard such effects as the underlying

objective of Buddhist teachings . They are, after all,

only incidental . The real objective is the attainment

of Nirvana . If it were true that attainment of this end

implied violent militancy in the empiric field then, I

submit, that Buddhism would have to accept such violence .

-535-
 I think it mutt be clear that the fruits of the

introceptive orientation, in so far as they include ef-

fects within the empiric field, will not always be such

that they will receive favorable valuation from the

vitalistic pragmatist . :-:bile at times the good of the

one standpoint will over-lap the good as viewed from the

other, there are other situations in which this is not

the case . Here there arises an inescapable conflict of

valuation and direction . Fundamentally introception leads

away from experience and the empiric life, which define

just precisely the field of focus of the Pragmatist and of

the Realist . That the latter should judge such effects

adversely is not only understandable but is really in-

evitable . But the Introceptionist counters this with a'

comparable attitude in the reverse sense . He views all

valuation of experience and of empiric life which leads

to estrangement from Divinity or Spirit as a positive

evil, indeed as part and parcel of the only real evil ..

There is thus a limit to the possible reconciliations of

the different philosophic attitudes . Between Idealism

and the other three schools there is a gulf of incommen-

surability which implies ineluctable conflict and choice .

He who has opened the door of introception cannot possibly

be a Pragmatist or a Realist save only in his secondary

relations as an empiric entity, that is, exclusively in

those relations which he regards as of no primary importance .

-536-
 5
I

I have introduced this discussion of introception

into the general subject of Idealism since I conceive it

as absolutely essential to an understanding of the true

meaning of Idealism . I am not writing a mere history of

philosophy . If I were I should have to consider the

idealistic theories of knowledge as they have actually

been developed by the leading Idealists . It must be ad-

mitted that such theories have followed the intellectual-

istic pattern . In following this course the Idealists

have made themselves vulnerable to criticism and have

given a false impression of what actually is their base

of assurance . I believe that the great Idea .lists .would

agree, in their private hearts, substantially with what

I have said above . Perhaps they have hesitated to place

their systems frankly upon, what I have called, an intro-

ceptive base with the idea that such was an unseemly course

of a philosopher . It is also possible that there was a

defective differentiation between intellectual form and

introceptive content . The isolation of the purely log-

ical features of mathematics has given us today an ad-

vantage over the older writers . WM`e are enabled to see

that there is a vital difference between rigorously form-

al mathematics and mathematics which results from the

union of logic and intuition or introception . This shows

very clearly that something is stripped away when pure

mathematics is reduced to an exclusively logical formalism .

-537-
This something is in addition to the pure concept .

Now, the bearing of this point upon Idealism is very

vital . It means that rigorous logical system, by it-

self, does not give content . Content enters as some-

thing extra-logical or as indefinable in the logical

sense . The logical demonstration renders explicit a

truth implicit initially in the original content, but

does not supply the initial content . Once this is under-

stood, all reasoning becomes relative to a reference

supplied by some other means than reason itself . If,

now, it is assumed that perceptual experience is the

only possible extra-logical reference, then it readily

follows that all conceptual or rational thinking is

instrumental to empiric content .- But from perceptual

content the idealistic transcendentalism cannot be de-

rived by logical implication . As a result the Ideal-

istic thesis falls .

The strength of the pragmatistic polemic as against

Idealism lies in its criticism of intellectualism . The

case which Pragmatism builds here is very strong . If

the pure concept is really empty, save in so far as it has

a reference beyond itself, then it is impossible to prove

a substantial reality by concepts alone . Analysis seems

to have established the soundness of this point . But it

does not necessarily follow that perceptual meaning is

-538-
the only possible reference of the concept unless it

can be proven that consciousness contains no other pos-

sibility .

Indeed the anti-intellectualistic argument is a

good deal older than current Pragmatism and is to be

found highly developed in the thought of Immanuel pant

himself . His criticism of the ontological argument is

a classic of this type of thought . But he was forced

to leave a door open to extra-experiential possibilities .

The following excerpt from his thought is of particular

significance .

"Our conception of the object may thus contain what-

ever and how much it will ; nevertheless we must our-

selves stand away from the conception, in order to

bestow existence upon it . This happens with sense-

objects through the connection with any one of our

perceptions in accordance with empiric laws ; but for

the objects of pure thought there-is no sort of means

for perceiving their existence because it is wholly

a riori that they can be known ; our consciousness

of all existence , however , belongs altogether to a

unity of experience and an existence outside this

field cannot absolutely be explained away as impos -

sible . But it is a supposition that we have no

means of Justifying ."

-539-
 For our purpose the vital part of the quotation

lies in the words that have been italicized . It cannot

be affirmed that concepts derive their existential value

from perceptual experience alone, on purely theoretical

grounds . Granted that the pure concept does not give

existence, yet that existence may be grounded in some-

thing other than perception . It is affirmed here that

it is sometimes grounded on introception and that this

is the real foundation of the idealistic systems . By

this means the essence of Idealism remains untouched by

all the anti-intellectualistic arguments . This implies

that the alternative of anti-sensationalism is not neces-

sarily intellectualism but can be a third way of conscious-

ness which is direct and immediate in its own right .

One may agree with Pragmatism as to its general

theory of the instrumental nature of concepts, but radi-

cally oppose the specific theory that the instrumental

reference is always to a perceptual content . There may

be an introceptive reference as well . Granting the valid-

ity of introception, the central thesis of Idealism re-

mains unaffected . Also Idealism can develop a theory of

truth wholly at variance with the pragmatic test, in so

far as the latter is exclusively related to programs in

the stream of time and experience . There remains the test

of the psychological determination of the factual actuality

of the idealistic direct realization of the self .

-540-
 I have already argued that the pure self cannot be

found by the methods of introspection . Introspection

deals with objects, even though they are subtle ones .

At most it finds a me having enough of determinate charac-

ter to be an object in certain relations, as the Yeo-

realist says . This method fails to exclude other possi-

bilities, unless it can prove rigorously that the four

functions are the only possible trays of consciousness .

This it has not done and, from the very nature of the

problem, cannot do . I submit that introception is a fifth

function which renders available content which, otherwise,

cannot be known and, I affirm, that this supplies the base

upon which the whole structure'of Idealism rests .

It has long been a custom for philosophic systems

to include an outline of psychology as a component part .

Among the older systems it was frequently customary . to

introduce psychology as rational psychology . Today it

is empiric psychology, that is, the kind which results

from the application of scientific method . In intro-

ducing the discussion of introception as a way of con-

sciousness within the body of a philosophical exegesis

I am, therefore, proceeding in accord with well established

practice . For introception, considered as a way of con-

sciousness as differentiated from the content rendered

available by it, falls under the general head of psychology .

541
But it does not fall within the limits of the common

understanding of either rational psychology nor of

empiric psychology . Perhaps we may best regard it as

meta-psychology . Now the material of this psychology is

conceived as being, in principle, available for study,

provided the right conditions exist . It is not affirmed

that any subject at any time supplies the material in a

form available for his own investigation . It is simply

affirmed that there are instances ,:here it has been ren-

dered available, thereby proving a possibility of con-

sciousness sciousness as such .

Psychology is philosophically significant to the

extent that the existence of a way of consciousness must

be assumed before the content and inner relations of con-

sciousness can be analyzed and evaluated . The question

of the actuality of a way of consciousness is, properly,

a psychological rather than a philosophical problem .

The importance of this problem hardly . needs to be empha-

sized in a day when the positive appreciation of psychology

is so strong as it is with us now . Actually, it is philo-

sophy which has felt the force of relative depreciation .

This attitude is an expression of the widespread super-

ficiality of the age . For, manifestly, a way of conscious-

ness is only of instrumental value to the content which

it renders available . Now, the way of consciousness does

-542-
not define content save in very general terms, which are

always other than the distinctive ug ale of the content it-

self . The way of consciousness bears a strong analogy to

a route and method of travel . In fact, this analogy is

so strong that it is a general oriental practice to speak

of a way of consciousness as a "path" or "road" . If we

analyze a route and means of travel to some destination

we can say something about the possible values to be re-

alized at the destination, but not very much . Our know-

ledge of content is here mainly negative . Thus we can

know that if the route and means are exclusively those

of land travel, then we also know that the content of the .

destination will not include the values which can be

reached only by sea-travel . Otherwise the actual positive

content realized at the destination-is not knowxn by the

route or conveyance used . Thus one could know very tho-

roughly the road which leads to the Grand Canyon of the

Colorado and all that goes into the structure and opera-

tion of an automobile, yet this would give no knowledge

of the direct experience of the Grand Canyon itself .

hnowledge of the route and means of travel is psychology,

but the valuation of the direct content of a realized

consciousness, in so far as it is thinkable, is the con-

cern of philosophy .

-543-
 We have, now, left the problem of necessity, as

it appears to the idealistic perspective, suspended in

the air, as it were, for quite some time, meanwhile en-

gaging in a somewhat extensive review of a proposed fifth

function of consciousness . This seemed unavoidable for

two reasons . First, the actuality of the function, which

I have called introception, is not a generally recognized

fact, and it was necessary to build some presumption for

it . Second, .n the failure to establish its case upon

purely intellectual grounds, Idealism must invoke some

non-empiric and non-intellectual function, if it is not

to be cast aside as a vain speculation . If the reader

does not feel that the evidence in support of the actual-

ity of introception is adequate, then I suggest that he

assume its actuality during the examination of the thesis

of Idealism in order to see whether this is not enough to

support that thesis in principle . If the ultimate con-

clusion is positive then the problem of the status of .

Idealism rests upon the meta-psychological problem as to

whether introception is a valid way of consciousness to

be added to the four generally recognized functions .

I have already defined the distinctive character-

istic of introception as the "power of the Light of con -

sciousness to turn upon itself toward its source ." And

this, it will be remembered, was carefully differentiated

-544-
from introspection in that the latter is consciousness

concerned with an objective content, although it is a

content of a more subtle nature than the more outward

going consciousness known as observation . The success

of introception means that sooner or later a point is

reached wherein consciousness loses all content save

that of itself . auch a point, if absolute, is equivalent

to the complete disappearance of the world about . But

the fundamental effect may be achieved by a sort of diver-

sion of the major portion of the stream of consciousness

so that it turns about toward its source, while a resid-

ual portion continues to flow toward the object, i .e .,

the world-about . In this case, objective consciousness

continues in a kind of twilight in an inferior portion

of the total psyche of the individual . The diverted por-

tion of the stream becomes a consciousness without object-

ive content but with an exclusive awareness of itself and

its subject . Such a consciousness is•clearly not a mere

relation between two terms, a subject and an object, since

only one term remains . This is a point of very great

epistemological importance since it begins to cut under

the whole conception of consciousness as exclusively a

relation between terms . Here consciousness is realized

in a way independent of both time and space, at least in

so far as these notions are predicates of the world-about .

-545-
An individual consciousness in such a state would, in

particular, have no basis for time measurement and hence

there would be no basis for differentiation between in-

stantaneousness and eternity . If a portion of the stream

of consciousness continued to flow toward the object,

a correlation with the chronometer, which the cosmos is,

would remain, with the result that one would realize a

conjunction of consciousness as time conditioned, with

consciousness as timeless . This is a curious kind of

crossing of the gulf between the seeming incompatibles

of time and timelessness .

As I am speaking mainly from a direct knowledge of

an instance of introception, I am better able to state

what is possible than to define the limits of possibi-

lity . I do know, that as measured by the portion of con-

sciousness still related to the world about, the state

wherein the self and consciousness are the sole content

can be instantaneous followed by an immediate unfoldment

of another and very astonishing content of a character

incommensurable with objective experience . As this has

a very close bearing upon a very vital part of Idealistic

a
philosophy I propose to describe its principhls-feature,

so far as that may be .

The immediate effect of a state of consciousness

with a one-,aay dependence or relation to the subject and

-546-
no object is that of a vast Void . It is an "I" suspended
Nn c~5 S a O
in an utter Voidness . But at once a enantiodrom, . `

proceeds to transform the Voidness to the value

. A
of substantial Fullness . Here is a "thickness" which I i
C

am quite sure would much more than meet William James's

demand . I know of no empiric content which in the faint-

est degree suggests this quality of Fullness . Hown, this

Fullness is the actual palpable Presence of Divinity it-

self . It is not anything so crude as a vast man in space,

but a Presence which permeates the whole of space, inter-

woven throughout the objects of ordinary consciousness,

yet more completely present where those objects are not .

The effect is a radical reversal of all former values

and a resolution of many of just precisely the problems

to which empiricism can give no satisfactory answer .

There is very little in an introceptive realiz-

ation of this sort that suggests the-God-conceptions off

the traditional religions . Mostly such conceptions seem

to be little more than a stylized construct of the human

imagination . But the introceptive realization confirms

the actuality of the Supreme Value which the general faith

of mankind envisages, however defectively it may conceive

it . For both philosophy and psychology the various names

of the Divinity have simply the significance of a symbol-

ical representation of the Supreme Value . Proof of the

-547-
actuality of this Supreme Value is possible only by

direct realization . It may very well be reflected in

the practical or moral reason in the sense in which Kant

used those terms, but I suspect that a careful examina-

tion of the argument for God from the basis of the prac-

tical reason will prove it .defective just as truly as

Kant showed the ontological argument from pure reason to

be defective . Immediacy alone supplies proof, though

faith may very well be conceived as a sign-post .

There is excellent evidence, to be derived from

the content of the formulations based upon religious

mysticism, that the above stage in the introceptive pro-

cess may be relatively terminal . That is, consciousnes :::

may establish an anchorage at this point . But I know

that if the process is continued there are subsequent

enantjodrom • transformations which lead to consider-

ably more profound orientations . Ai latter stage is of

considerably more importance for the understanding of .

Idealism than the one now before us . However, before

continuing with the further development, it is important

to consider the effect of the present stage upon the

world-view.

As was noted above, the stage of consciousness

united with a self but with no object proved to be nascent

like that of a chemical atom just set free from one com-

-548-
bination but which immediately thereafter enters into

another combination . The self becomes united through

consciousness with a new object, but one which is no

longer the secular world . There is no transcendence

of dualism here, but the whole field defined by the

self, the not-self and consciousness is manifestly psychi-

cal . At this level there is no question of a non-psychical

existence for consciousness . But we cannot here say .that

it is a field wholly illumined by consciousness . The

Divine otherness includes vastly more than that compre-

hended by the conscious self . But one would not inter-

pret this as an independent, non-psychical existence in

the spirit of the Realist . One would speak, rather, of

the Unconscious in the sense of von Hartmann . This Un-

conscious is the surrogate of the Reap sts' independent

entities which carry the necessitarian factor . In a word,

we have arrived at a pattern for the interpretation of

necessity which can be formulated in purely psychical

terms, though we have not arrived at a complete deter-

mination by consciousness . It is thus a position of

modified Idealism but not of absolute Idealism .

Necessity may now be interpreted as the inherent

Law of the Divine Otherness, rather than as the inherent

structure of a secular nature . On the level of the intro-

ceptive realization itself there is no problem as to the

reconciling of freedom with the necessity of the Divine

-549-
 IL MIWL,
Law . Freedom becomes simply the freedomrto surrender

'Xto the Divine Law or

` . to affirm the autonomy of the Self .
If the course of surrender is tall-'en it is not to be con-

ceived at all as something hard to do . It is an act

most highly desired by the Self . Actually the affirm-

ation of the autonomy requires a distinctly austere act

of will . Lielf-surrender is sweet . The burden of problems

and responsibility drops away . The'universe as it really

is, is Divine and just what it should be . To move in the

current of this ' should be ' which is, seems as the most

satisfactory course which any man might desire . Freedom

is not an arbitrary doing as one pleases by a finite self,

but a surrendering to something far more adequate in every

sense . Actually, a certain glory is felt in the depre-

ciation of the self with respect to the Divine Otherness .

Anyone who is familiar with the literature of religious

mysticism will recognize this psychical pattern . Indeed,

the essential uale of this state leads to far richer ex-

pression in religious practices and poetry than it does

in philosophy . No one who knows will ever depreciate this

state, but as our concern here is primarily philosophical,

we must focus upon the more philosophical implications .

For the reflective consciousness the rroblen of

necessity really becomes the connection between the in-

herent Law of Divinity and the order of sensible nature .

-550-
We are not here concerned with the concrete resolution

of this problem, which can readily become a whole philo"

sophic work in itself . Z+e are concerned merely with the

pointing to a possibility of solution other than that of

the type offered by Realism with respect to the problem

of necessity . The present approach will, of course, have

its advantages and difficulties, but let us note what is

gained by the approach . In principle we have a resolution

of the problem of necessity without a stultification and

depreciation of the yearning for freedom, nor is the

actuality of freedom denied . Freedom becomes reduced to

freedom to affirm the self or to abrogate it, with the

latter appearing spontaneously as the more attractive

course . The union with the Divine necessity is thus an

act of freedom . The religious value is not lost nor re-

duced to a more addendullof a secular philosophical system .

The Divine Otherness is not something alien or unfriendly,

likeA,Realist' : world, but the very best of friends . All

of man's great problems are resolved in an aura of pro-

found Peace, through the expansion into the Divine Other-

ness which comes with the completeness of surrender .

The first stabilized stage of introceptive realiz-

ation does not lead to a monistic metaphysics and, there-

fore, is not to be classed with absolute Idealism . The

dualism of the individual self and the Divine Otherness

is not yet reduced to a true unity . In the language

-551-
religious mysticism such unity as there may be,'conceived

as the union of the Lover and the Beloved where, from

the finite point of view the lover is the individual self

and the Beloved is the Divinity . But as the relationship

is mutual, the Divine Otherness also appears as the Lover

of whom the object is the individual self . An important

part of the satisfaction of this state does lie in the

fact that the dualism still remainsas otherwise the re-

lationship of love would lose its objective meaning .

There is plenty of reason why this stage tends to become

a point of fixation - a station on a path which actually

reaches further . A study of the literature would indicate

that mystical states only exceptionally pass beyond this .

Indeed, there is much to be said for the view that the

term "mysticism" should be applied exclusively to this

stage, while deeper stages may be more properly classed

as Gnosticism . It is clear that if we do so restrict the

connotation of "Mysticism ", then mysticism is far more

significant for its feeling value than for its noetic

value . But, as we shall see later, this relativity is

reversed in the deeper and more Gnostic state . In the

narrower sense, then, 1?ysticism is of relatively minor

philosophic importance, though of vast religious import-

ance . However, it does clearly carry philosophic im-

plications .

-552-
 If we think through the implications of "ysticism,

in the narrower sense, we find that its dualism really

implies a kind of pluralism, for, if the self is not

conceived in the solipsistic sense, then we do have a

plurality of selves in relation to a Divine Otherness,

but not united in a Supreme SELF . In fact, we might

say that there is both a kind of unity as well as a kind

of pluralism, for there is a unity in the Divine Other-

ness and plurality in the multiplicity of selves . This

would account for the fact that, while analysis reveals

first a dualism and then a pluralism, yet the predominant

testimony of the mystics favors a monistic interpretation .

This is true for the reason that the real orientation of

the mystic is to the Divine Otherness, whose nature is

monistic and is clearly realized as such in the mystical

consciousness . But the objective character of the love

relation prevents the monistic character from being complete .

One may well ask what the offering is from this

state to objective scientific and %:orld-problems generally .

Frankly, it has no primary concern with such problems .

They cease to be any longer vital to the individual who

has attained the state, and human service is simply a

matter of helping others to attain the state likewise .

Success in this would solve the problems by their disap-

pearing . And this solution is quite adequate for all

-553-
those who can be induced to accept a positive orienta-

tion to the state . But beyond this limit it naturally

fails . But there is no logical nor moral reason why the

mystic should not feel favorable to a direct approach to

scientific and world-problems, and there is nothing in

his philosophy to prevent him from participating in such

work himself . But all this he would regard as simply of

pragmatic value in the sense of being only pragmatic -

a very different matter from being a philosophic Prag-

matist in the privative sense . Of course, there is

nothing in this attitude to provide a very deep concern

with the scientific or sociological problem as they have

too much the character of dream-problems . Yet, given

the will to deal with such problems, there is no reason

why a mystic should not achieve as much or more than the

non-mystic . Indeed, some of the very best of the scientists

have been a good deal more than a little mystical .

Now, what happens to the great philosophical problems

of the nature of truth and of reality? The answer is

really very simple . Truth and Reality mean virtually

the same thing and they have a significance which renders

it necessary to spell these words with capital initial

.Letters . Truth and Reality are identical with Divinity,

and the realization of Truth or Reality is not other than

the realization of and union with the Divinity . Clearly,

-554-
as concepts, these words do not have a truth-reference

in either the Pragmatic or the Realistic sense . They

have a substantial rather than a sign-pointer signifi-

cance . One finds the meaning, not through a successful

program of action, but by a meditative or introceptive

penetration into the essence of the word or concept .

And this may be said to be a general description of

the meaningful reference of concepts, in so far as they

have a mystical value . On the whole, I should say that

this enhances the value of concepts, as contrasted to

their value in either Pragmatic or Realistic usage .

Some words and concepts are important in such a way

that both the Realistic and Pragmatic use of then has

wet
the effect of serious depreciation . I doubt that

anyone who has the mystic flare would feel that there

is a distinct cheapening of value in all three of the

foregoing philosophies .

If an individual had before him a comprehensive-

selection of modern works on philosophy and he selected

at random a few volumes for reading, the probability is

that he would emerge with the impression that philosophy

is, first of all, the first effort of man to arrive at

science and, secondly, a child of science, in that it

is conceived quite frequently now as properly a general-

ization of scientific method . If, on the other hand,

-555-
this same individual had before him a selection of ex-

tant Greek and Indian contributions to philosophy to-

gether with Western works produced around the eighteenth

century , a similar reading would tend to give the impres-

sion that philosophy lies close to religion . The fact is,

philosophy as a whole reflects and comprehends both the

scientific and religious motifs . But in our present day

the scientific and worldly utilitarian spirit holds the

ascendant place in the reflective world with the conse-

quence that philosophy is viewed as more like science than

like religion . With Idealism the scientific side is: sub-

ordinated. to the religious motif, but still remains in so

far valuable that the religious element is married to

thought and not exclusively to feeling . Because the

present age is highly secular, with reli{-ion as the weak

sister if she is recognized at all, it is understandable

-that philosophy should be largely conceived in the sense

of secular speculation . This I conceive to be the real

psychological reason for the general current depreciation

of Idealism as a whole . With the realization of the fail-

ure of the too secular orientation - a fact which is be-

coming evident in the present world-wide moral debauchery -

there will be a return to a serious valuation of religion,

and then once more the idealistic type of philosophy will

return to the royal position it once held . For, in the

broad sense, Idealism alone among all the philosophies

really takes religion seriously .

 An acquaintance with the lives as well as the

works of the great Idealists is an illumining exper-

ience . 1.`ost generally they seem to be deeply religious .

natures . Berkeley, himself, was a bishop . The import-

ance of the religious side of Immanuel Kant is very

evident and seems to supply the deeper reason for his

having to supplement the negative effect of the "Critique

of Pure Reason" with a "Critique of Practical Reason",

so that a place for religious values might still remain .

Fichte comes very near being the pure devotee, as re-

vealed in the following quotation from "The Vocation of

Ian" .

"These two orders, - the purely spiritual and the

sensuous, the latter consisting possibly of an in-

numerable series of particular lives, - have existed

since the first r oment of the development of an active

reason within me, and still proceed parallel to each

other . The latter order is only a phenomenon for

myself, and for those with whom I am associated in

this life ; the former alone gives it significance,

purpose and value . I am immortal, imperishable,

eternal, as soon as I fore the resolution to obey, the

laws of reason ; I do not need to become so . The super-

sensual world is no future world ; it is now present ;

it can at no point of finite existence be more present

than at another ; not more present after an existence

-557-
 of myriads of lives than at this moment . IIy sensuous

existence may, in future, assume other forms, but

these are just as little the true life as its present

form . By that resolution I lay hold on eternity, and

cast off this earthly life and all other forms of

sensuous life which may yet lie before me in futurity,

and place myself far above them . I become the sole

source of my own being and its phenomena, and, hence-

forth, unconditioned by anything without me, I have

life in myself . My will, which is directed by no

foreign agency in the order of the super-sensual

world, but by myself alone, is this source of true

life and of eternity . " 'Y-

Now, if vie go back in time nearly two thousand

years, and far across the world, we find as an important

part of the Buddhist canon, the "Awakening of Faith" by

Ashvaghosha . From this let us select the following quota-

tion :

"First as to the unfolding of the true principle .

The mind has two doors from which issue its activities .

One leads to the realization of the mind's Pure Essence,

the other leads to . the differentiations of appearing

and disappearing, of life and death . Through each

door passes the mind's conceptions so inter-related

that they never have been separated and never will be ."

-558-
 Is it not as though one spirit were speaking far

across space and time, in different worlds and different

cultures?

Let us turn now to the opening words of a very

famous logic, the words of one of the greatest intellects

the .'lest has produced . I quote :

"Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other

sciences . It cannot like them rest the existence of

its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness,

either for starting or for continuing, nor can it as-

sume that its method of cognition, either for start-

ing or for continuing, is one already accepted . The

objects of philosophy , it is true , are upon the whole

the same as those for religion . In both the object is

Truth , in that supreme sense in which God and God only

is the Truth . Both in like manner go on to treat of

the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with

their relation to each other and to their truth in

(Italics mine)

Who but an Idealist would start a treatise on logic

in the spirit of an essentially religious subject? This

quotation is from Ilegel, the greatest of the idealistic

thinkers .

Clearly, he who would understand Idealism must have'

the feeling for the religious problem as the most funda-

mental of all problems . And the real significance of

-559-
Idealism is not to be judged by its offering to the

practical advance of secular science . This contribu-

tion is, admittedly,, but little if anything . It deals

with that which is forever outside the reach of science

so long; as it is restricted to current methodology . Our

science supplies us with many arts and material advantages

plus a most dangerous implementation of the will to war .

Perhaps the Idealist has good reason to feel proud that

he is excused from responsibility for this . Perhaps the

Idealist may be excused if he prefers other-worldliness

to a "real" world composed so largely of the irrational

and insane spirit of violence . Let those who desire some-

thing better look to Idealism .

When introception is carried to the stage where

the self appears as small and enveloped in a vast Divine

Otherness, we do not find a basis for absolute Idealism,

as has been already noted . At this point one could not

say with Fichte ; "I become the sole source of my own be-

ing and its phenomena, and, henceforth, unconditioned by

anything without me, I have life within myself ." The

mystical stage of introception places the source of life

and being in the Divine Otherness, and this is not in ac-

cord with Fichte's insight as implied above . So vie must

return to consider the further development of the intro-

ceptive process .

-560-
 The self, stripped of all extraneous elements, of

everything that can possibly be an object for conscious-

ness , is very small indeed . It is a bare point of Light,

the mathematical zero which forms the origin of the basis

of reference . It is that upon which further possibility

rests, but is itself no true content of consciousness .

But if at this point, the introceptive process continues,

as it will if the autonomy of the self is maintained as

against the surrender to the Divine Otherness, then there

follows a simply tremendous enanttodrom AI transformation .

The self as a bare point becomes an unlimited Space whose

nature is Light or Consciousness . Divinity fuses with

the self thereby becoming the SELF which is at once both

God and I . Again., this is not a speculation, it actually

happens . This changes the whole view of the nature of be-

ing and does supply, as we shall find, the true basis of

absolute Idealism .

Where the Divinity becomes co - extensive with the

SELF, Light spreads everywhere . This means that the Un-

conscious is absorbed by Consciousness . '.'e may conceive

of this Consciousness as Thought, though that is simply

to select one from among other possibilities . Conscious-

ness is Thought, and more besides . But consciousness as

Thought gives the world that peculiar coloring so that It

may be, for philosophy . The Divine Thought which is MY

Thought forms the only world there is . Thus the ;World is

Thought, before it becomes experience .

 For the man born into the empiric vorld, exper-

ience comes first in time, thought afterward . To see

thought in this sequence, and only in this sequence,

leads naturally to the view that thought was evolved

to serve experience, and that alone . Hence we have the

philosophies in which thought is only the little one,

the servant in the house who has no business sitting

upon the royal throne . Truly, in time, experience and

perception are the Mother of thought . But where there

is a mother there must be a father . Mythology and the

psychology of the unconscious tell us that earliest

natural man worshipped only feminine divinities, for

the child knows first and only the mother as an immediate

fact . The father is accepted later on the basis of a

more or less uncertain inference . The actuality of

fatherhood is an immediate realization only for mature

consciousness . Much of our modern philosophy is in the

state of primitive man in its acknowledgment of mother-

perception and its doubt or denial of the father . Indeed,

Pragmatism doubts that the father is even a valid in-

ference, much less an immediate realization . Thus Prag-

matism is the doctrine tht parthenogenesis or the virgin

birth is the universal and final truth!

Now, once it is realized that thought has a hidden

father as well as a revealed mother, it becomes evident

-562-
that the concept embodies a dual character . As derived

from the mother it leads to the object whose essence is

experience . •But as derived from the father it leads in-

ward toward an unseen substantiality . From this there

follows two quite opposed logical theories, each of which

is capable of validating itself from the ground which each

assumes . A life-time devoted to the elaboration of one

of these logics will never succeed in dethroning the

other . The comprehensive view which finds a place for

each is found only by consciousness moving within its own

roots . Mere experience can never supply the final answer .

The search for the roots of thought leads us veri-

tably into deep waters . It is easy to say that conceptual

thought is generated out of perceptual life by a process

of abstraction and then, having assumed such a €enesis,

to proceed to the development of a logic wherein the con-

ceptual order acquires significance only in relationship

to experience . But how is it possible that a living per-

ceptual flux or manifold - view it whichever way one will -

should lead to the abstracting process? Ilow, indeed,

does it become possible to rise out of the perceptual

stream or manifold to a super-perceptual order? This is

by no means a simple matter, and it is no more answered

by invoking the name of life, as is done by the Vitalists,

than it is by invoking the name of God . Both answers are

-563-
mystical in that negative sense whereby there is meant

a break-down of the intelligent will to carry through to

the end . In the answers to these questions we will find

just precisely the essential differentia between the

animal and human kingdoms . Is the difference between

the animal and the human but one of degree in an evolu-

tionary scale without a qualitative break and addition,

or does it form an incommensurable division bet„een two

orders? Is man merely a more advanced animal, or is the

total human being to be conceived as an sniiaal nature to

;which something transcendent has been added, a somewhat

which is more lordly and divine than anything which is

possible to the merely animal however highly evolved?

These questions are implied, for perception in the broad

sense includes the three functions of sensation, feeling

and intuition taken together in contrast -to conception,

and all three of these functions can be found, well or

poorly developed, in the animal soul, but conception is

alien . The beasts are dumb just because they do not have

the power bestowed by the concept . Is man merely the child

of the animal, or is he something added to the animal from

beyond? If he is only the child then he can hardly claim

the royal status in the kingdoms of living forms which

would rightly be his if his fundamental nature as man is

something bestowed from above . If he is only the child

 then, indeed, a thoroughgoing democracy night well be

the last word in social relations, but it would have to

be a democracy in which the animals, the dogs, horses,

tigers, lions and hyenas would have to be accepted as

the equals of men with the same right of political repre-

sentation . If, on the other hand, the quintessential

meaning of the words "human" and "man" is something

transcendental added to the animal-order, then the true

relationship of man to the aninal is royal or hierarchical,

and this would be true in a progressive series from the

most animalistic man up to the most human man ., So, in-

deed, what we find with respect to the roots of thought

has manifold bearings, not alone upon the form of philo-

sophy, but even reaching down into the determination of

the true social order .

How is it possible that man can receive the stream

or
V o.e manifold of ever-changing experience and yet not feel

completely alien? To be merely presented is riot enough

to supply the presented with recognition by human con-

sciousness /` Something is supplied by the human subject

so that the Presentation can be recognized as a percep-

tion, otherwise the human consciousness would have no

means of rendering an alien Other into something familiar,

understandable and even friendly . If one studies the

psychology of the more introverted phase of human con-

-565-
sciousness he does find, as Dr . Jung has shown, that in

the deeps of man there is a perceptual matrix of a pro-

foundly archaic nature . This appears, at times, as a

projected image, which is called primordial for the

reason that it is not reducible to a construct from the

objectively presented situation . This is something truly

a priori , something of the nature of the Ilatonic Ideas

which lie at the roots of the mind and which render pos-

sible, first of all, the integration of perception . As

Jung conceives it, the Idea proper is derived, from the

primordial image by a process of abstraction by the reason,

and thus the idea is not merely a construct from objective

perception, but, in relation to the latter, has something

of an innate or a priori character . But still the Idea

is derivative from the primordial image whose nature is

primarily perceptive . This view drives the problem to

a deeper level, but still does not answer how the abstract-

ing process of the reason is possible .

There is an impressive parallelism between the

views of Dr . Jung and those of Schopenhauer . The latter

philosopher, it will be remembered, maintained the thesis

that the primary root of being is not noetic but volun-

taristic . The ',,!ill is -primary while the Idea, which com-

poses the ,whole objective universe, is merely secondary,

being essentially an objectivication of the Will . But

-566-
the Idea exists in two aspects , a more objective and a

more subjective . The objective Idea is subject to the

principle of sufficient reason, is multiform and is the

source of all science . The subjective Idea is the primary

object , existing behind and prior to the principle of

sufficient reason, has a unified character and is re-

vealed most directly , not in science , but in art, in

other words , the deed . The subjective Idea is funda-

mentally identical with the primary Ideas of Plato, and

performs a function analogous to that of the primordial

image of Jung . Since the subjective Idea exists prior

to the principle of sufficient reason, it is useless to

hope to find a reason for it in the sense that its form

or actuality could be deduced from something prior to it .

It, thus, exists for reason as something immediately given .

I think that Jung is quite right in finding in

uchopenhauer's more subjective Idea a similarity to the

perceptive quale of the primordial image . The Idea of

Schopenhauer is very different from the Idea of Hegel,

for whom the Idea has a more original and self-existent

character . Here we have the conflict between voluntaristic

and noetic Idealism sharply drawn, - a conflict which even

helped to embitter the'life of Schopenhauer . The more

subjectivistic Idea is like a transcendental object which

is derived from a 'Xill antecedent to the subject-object

-567-
relationship . The Hegelian Idea is self-existent and

primary . My own view is that there is a part truth in

both standpoints, but that both are relative to a still

more profound actuality which occupies a neutral position

with respect to the Will and the Reason . This view I

shall develop later .

The thought of bchopenliauer is in fundamental sym-

pathy with the perspective of all those who find a primary

orientation in teleology or purpose, and it seems to be

quite generally true that for those who take this orienta-

tion there is something more fundamental in generic per-

ception than in conception . Perception is the root source

and mother of the concept and of the idea conceived as

conceptual . Jung has recognized something like a depend-

ence upon a feminine source as instanced in the following

quotation : "The primordial image is the preliminary stage

(% .V.
of the idea its maternal soil ."' But the notion of the

mother always implies the notion of the father, and so,

the account of the genesis of the Idea or concept is not

complete until vie find the father and isolate his function

also . I would suggest that one significant way of view-

ing the difference between Schopenhauer and Hegel consists

in interpreting the former's orientation as being more to

the feminine factor, while that of Hegel was more toward

the masculine factor . The whole Pragmatic-Vitalistic school

is closer to 3cliopenhauer than it is to liegel .2

-568-
 The present stage of our discussion leads us to

the necessity of considering the relation of "idea" to

"concept" . In a great deal of usage the notions are

used interchangeably, but we are forced to differentiate

a real difference in the meaning . The more subjective

Idea of Schopenhauer, and likewise the Idea of Hegel,

have a creative power, though the creativeness is under-

stood differently . Thus Schopenhauer's Idea is creative

in a more artistic sense, while that of Hegel implies a

creative reason operating through the dialectic process .

Now the concept is often, and perhaps more correctly,

understood as meaning rigorously just what it is defined

to mean* . Such a concept would not lead to possibilities

which could not be rationally inferred . A group of de-

fined concepts will lead to implications Vhereby rendering

)
something explicitly, but will give no m6re than was im-

plicitly present in the beginning . But .an Idea with

creative potential grows more like something that is

alive . It has possibilities which cannot be known by

pure inference alone . As I am acquainted with both kinds

of mental contents I am thoroughly convinced of the justice

of the distinction . It would follow, for one thing, that

Bergson's criticism of Intellectualism has a great deal of

validity with respect to the concept as outlined above,

but it would not be valid for the Idea, since the latter

-569-
has the power of growing beyond itself . But it would be

a serious misapprehension to regard Hegel's philosophy as

Conceptualism or Intellectualism in this sense, even though

he gives that impression to a merely surface view . There

is a creative potency in the Hegelian Idea .

Concepts which are taken as they are defined to

mean, and only that, stand in a position of disassociation

from the whole perceptual field . They are equally to be

differentiated from introceptive content . They stand in

a zone neither of the earth nor of spirit and lack that

which is necessary to predicate actuality in either sense .

They define forms of the possible for human consciousness

in its peculiar quality as human, taken in differentiation

from both-that which is animal and that which is spiritual .

But we are not justified in regarding this as a limiting

definition imposed upon the possibilities of consciousness

in its concrete totality without specific reference to a

human way of knowing . We may know a necessity for man as

man, but do not thereby have certainty relative to the nature

of other than human kinds of consciousness, whether of a

superior or inferior nature . To know the latter, the

consciousness principle in man would have to be shifted

to the basis of other kinds of beings . But the definition

of what is possible for the distinctively human kind of

consciousness is, no doubt, of great-importance for a

-570-
human being . The study of the nature and logic.-of a

pure conceptual order , taken in abstraction from both

perceptual reference and to introceptive content, is,

unquestionably , a valuable work . I would be among the

last to depreciate the value of logical investigations

such as that of Bertrand Russell ' s "Principles of Math-

ematics" . But it would be a mistake to conceive this

kind of logic as the'final word in logic .

Idealism in the noetic form has been conceived

far too often as the necessary implication of Reason .

Beginning with the primary thesis that Reality, what-

ever it may be, is not self -contradictory, an examination

of the specific contents of relative consciousness ap-

parently leads to a number of contradictions or anti-

nomies . In other words , relative consciousness . is self-

contradictory'and , therefore , unreal . Consequently,

Reality must be found by transcending the whole relative

world, including all finite thought . The total process

by which this conclusion is reached is very elaborate and

involves an extensive literature which, at times , becomes

highly recondite . We shall not here retrace steps which

are well known to philosophical students , but merely note

the outcome . Now, since the days of the great Idealists

we have come into a far better understanding of logical

possibilities through the logical analysis of mathematics,

-571-
and it appears that many of the supposed contradictions

of the relative field can be resolved, with the result

that the above argument loses its force . To be sure, the .

relative world may, indeed, be unreal but, if so, that

fact is not established by the formal argument from es-

sential contradictoriness of all relative consciousness .

Further, the assumption that Reality .is not self-contradictory

may be challenged, not by affirming that it may be self-

contradictory, but on the ground that contradictoriness

is a conceptual category which is not relevant in an

ontological sense . This form of challenge is typical of

the anti-intellectualists . So, in the light of these

criticisms , the case for rational , absolute Idealism

falls in so far as its case rests only on a logical thesis .

I am prepared to grant the force of the above argu-

ments, but deny that they touch the real ground of monistic

Idealism . When one reads the great Idealists, such as

Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer , he finds that there is a

good deal more present than a logical necessitarianism .

Particularly is this clear in the case of Schopenhauer

who is explicitly a voluntarist, but it is also true of

the other two . To be sure , they attached great importance

to the logical or rational factor and with a large degree

of justification . But, beyond this, there is the unmis-

takable evidence of insight, the "temper akin to genius",

-572-
to quote a phrase from Schopenhauer . These philosophers

spoke of something they knew , but not from perceptual

experience nor as a logical inference alone . And it is

from this something known immediately that Idealism of

the grand style derives its authority . Beyond perception

and conception lies introception which is the path to a

transcendental immediacy, and when introception is united

with conception then we have the basis of the Reason which

leads to Idealism .

In support of my present thesis I would call atten-

tion to the profound affinity between the Idealism of men

like Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer and an orientation

characteristic of the Upanishads . Particularly is this

affinity notable in the case of the philosophy of the

great Indian monist, Shankara . Here also , Reality is

supersensible and radically monistic . But one who studies

the philosophy and life of Shankara finds very clearly

that the logical presentation of his system is incidental

to a primary insight . In other words, the ontology is

not exclusively nor primarily a logical deduction .

Shankara went first to his Guru who did not teach him as

a modern professor of philosophy teaches his students,

but rather facilitated the awakening of a latent function

of consciousness . The successful awakening of the function

led to immediate realizations of a nature which is non-

-573-
perceptual and non-conceptual in their essential nature .

From this the philosophical system followed . I have

employed the term "introcept" for this kind of immediacy,

and "introception " for the process .

It has already been stated that when introception

is carried far enough , the self and the Divine Other

coalesce in a SELF having a highly transcendent char-

acter . This is a radically unitary SELF of so complete

an aloofness that personality simply doew not exist for

It . It is equally aloof from the empiric world . It is

the union of the subject to consciousness and its content .

It is not contained by space , time and the world of sen-

sible objects , but is like a Space which contained and

comprehended all these . From this state of introceptive

realization certain consequences follow :

1 . The SELF supports the universe , yet is not con-

ditioned by the presence or absence of the universe .

2 . The transcendent Thought of the SELF is the sub-

stratum of the universe which, later, is experienced by

the empiric self , with possibilities of distortion .

3 . This Thought defines necessity , whereby the freedom

of the empiric self is conditioned , so that for the empiric

self the inner sense for freedom attains no more than a

partial realization .

4 . This Thought is the noumenon of the laws of nature

which receive a statement from physical science of only a

pragmatic validity .

-574-
 5 . The . world of the empiric self , being only deriva-

tive, is no more than an illusion when it is conceived

as an independent self- existence .

.6 . Truth is a relation of congruency between empiric

thought or conception and the transcendental Thought .

7 . The laws of empiric thought are part of the neces-

sity imposed by the transcendent Thought .

8 . The Thought , which is both of and identical with

the SELF , serves the purpose of attaining complete SELF-

consciousness .
9 . The Thought of the SELF is pregnant with creative

potentiality so that It elaborates from within itself

possibilities which are more than may be formally deduced .

10 . This Thought is concrete in that it is totally com-

prehensive , but appears as abstract when contrasted to

empiric thought derived from perceptual experience .

11 . The development of this Thought , in so far as re-

9 va s
flected to objective thought, is enantodronai, i .e .,

follows the form of the triadic dialectic .

The above statements are not merely invented postu-

lates from which one might proceed to build a hypothetical

system, nor are they to be viewed as the necessary con-

sequences of either empiric or pure objective thought .

This is a very fundamental part of my whole thesis, and

criticism that does not bear this point in mind misses

-575-
the essence of the whole argument . They are ideas in

objective form derived from the Thought of the SELF .

They are not themselves the immediate form of that

Thought which, in its own nature, is independent of the

concepts and word- signs of objective thought . That

Thought in its own essence is forever incommunicable in .

the forms of relative consciousness . Thus the primary

postulates are rather precipitates within relative thought

of a Meaning prior to the latter and which are subject to

unavoidable distortion through processes whereby content

identical with the SELF is made to appear as an object of

consciousness for the empiric subject . The Thought of the

SELF is not an objective or empiric thought and it must be

conceived as such, that if realized by a non-thinking being

it would not appear as ,Thought at all . It is a potential

of many facets , of which Thought stands out as the most

significant to a predominantly thinking being . Doubtless,

through another appropriate facet It could appear as pri-

marily Willing . There is, therefore, a certain relativity

here which prevents us from reaching .an objective decision

as to the primacy of Reason and Will . We may simply say

that to a predominantly thinking being It appears as prim-

arily Thought, and from that perspective a characteristic

philosophy follows . The above postulates are, therefore,

affirmed as true but not as so exclusively true as to pre-

vent precipitation in other patterns .

-576-
 But whether one realizes the SILF as inherently

Will or Thought , the common implication of this stage of

introception is the identification of being with conscious

existence . That is, in the generic sense, the intro-

ceptive realization confirms the cardinal principle of

Idealism , but does not necessarily develop in the form of

Rational Idealism . However, it may take the form of

Rational Idealism , and the above postulates imply that form .

Even a brief examination of the postulates will

show that they confirm the major part of the Hegelian

thesis, though stripping from that thesis certain features,

including its privative character . To a degree the most

primary thesis of Hegel is confirmed, but not wholly .

Thus there is a sense in which Being is identical with

Thought, yet not identical with objective or empiric

thought . The Thought of the SELF is the noumenal Reality

underlying the sensible world, and the necessity inherent

in that Thought is projected as the constraint which sur-

rounds the empiric, subject . But that constraint is only

partly identical with the laws of empiric or objective

thought . We are dealing here with the Father of the con-

cept , but as the Father implies the Mother , so the total

character of the concept is no more given completely by

knowledge of the Father than it is given completely by

knowledge of the Mother . We have, in fact, a dual deter-

-577-
urination, the one introceptive and the other perceptive,

with the result that neither perspective alone can give a

privative view . Thus the fundamental criticism of the

privatism of Pragmatism applies equally, though in the

reverse sense , to the privatism of Hegelian Idealism .

The comprehensively synthetic philosophy requires a per-

spective so far neglected, at least in the Occident .

It is now evident that we must differentiate thought

into three forms or aspects . In its most familiar and

common form, thought is concerned with a content given

through experience . In this case,-the relatedness of

thought is to a perceptual datum, with perception, in the

broad sense which includes sensation, feeling and intui

tion, guiding the course of the thinking . This is the

only kind of thinking which is given recognition by the

Jmpiricists - including the Pragmatists and the Nominalists

as possessing genuine validity . It is clear that thought

in this sense is of only instrumental value in relation

to an experienced or perceptual content . But there is a

second kind of thought wherein the concepts are taken in

abstraction from meaningful, reference . In this case, the

process starts with concepts and ends with concepts with-

out implying a reference to anything else . In this case

the concepts do not mean anything that may be perceived or

experienced nor do they refer,to a spiritual essence .

-578-
There is thus no material, but only a formal, content .

This is the thought of symbolic logic and of formalistic

mathematics . In this case, the truth and existence of

a system lies only in the self-consistency of the system .

Such a body of thought is neither materialistic nor

spiritual, but lies in a realm between the transcendental

and the mundane . It really corresponds to the neutral

entities of the Neo-realists which are conceived as neither

body nor mind . If we call the first kind of thought empiric

or perceptual, we may call this pure thought . The third

kind of Thought is strictly transcendental and so I dif-

ferentiate it from the other kinds by spelling the word

with a capital T . Thought, in this third sense, does not

stand apart from the thinking subject, but is to be viewed

as identical with the SELF . Thus there is a sense in which

we may say the SELF is Its own Thought, and this Thought is

the SELF, and yet we may employ the two notions for the

purpose of emphasis - the word "SELF" referring to center

of consciousness in its purity, and the word "Thought" to

its quality as Meaning . Thought, in this highest sense,

may be conceived as pure Meaning stripped from all form,

whether conceptual or perceptual . Meaning in this sense

is to be conceived as unconditioned by time, space, and

experiencing . It is purely transcendental and pre-existent

with respect to all history of process . Neither experience

-579-
nor pure thought, by themselves, can lead to the transcend-

ental Meaning of the higher Thought . It can be attained

ohly through another function which I have called "intro

ception" .

Manifestly, for most individuals, introception is

not differentiated as a distinct conscious function . But

this by no means implies that it is wholly inactive . We

may conceive of it as being either wholly inactive or as

in some measure active without the individual being con-

scious of its operation . The latter case would parallel

the unconscious activity of the other four functions which

is already a known fact for analytic psychology . There is,

in fact, nothing strange about the notion of an unconscious

activity of .a function, as this is implied in all cases

where there is a content given to consciousness through a

function without there being consciousness of the function

itself . Actually, this would seem to be more the rule than

the exception . So I am not positing anything strange or

even unusual in affirming an unconscious activity of intro-

ception . But when the introceptive function operates in

this way the tendency would be to identify it simply with

intuition, which is merely a general name for all possi-

bilities .of psychical function which have not yet been re-

vealed to consciousness as distinct functions . I claim

merely to have isolated foi ; conscious recognition a func-

-580-
tion which has at all times operated more or less widely

among men . This function is to be regarded as truly in-

active, both in the conscious and unconscious sense, only

in the case of those men who have an exclusively mundane

or materialistic understanding . But when introception is

not consciously isolated and produces contents for con-

sciousness, the effect is a fusing of this content with

the content of the other functions with the result that

there is no clear understanding of the differentiated

reference of the total .complex content . The result is

wide-spread confusion of interpretation .

An indistinct feeling for or conviction of a spirit-

ual reality is proof of the activity of introception in

its unconscious mode . When introception itself has been

rendered conscious, the indistinctness disappears and is

replaced by a positive assurance resting upon a ground

which is also known . In the latter case an inchoate know-

ing is transformed into a clear knowing, fortified by know-

ing of the knowing and of the how of the knowing . But

the inchoate knowing which maintains a religious orienta-

tion in the face of the sharpest kind of criticism based

upon scientific enlightenment is the strongest kind of

indirect evidence of the existence of the fifth function .

Now, when the content through introception is fused with

the content of one or more of the other functions, without

knowledge of the activity of this function, there is a

-581-
general, and quite natural, tendency'to attribute the

content to the known fuhctions . We are here particularly

interested in the case when unconscious introception is

united with the content of thinking .

In the fusion of unconscious introception with con-

ceptual thinking, the individual tends, quite naturally,

to give to the concept a transcendental reference . This

is the real ground of the ontological argument for God and

for the metaphysical thinking of the scholastic and rational

type generally . The fundamental failure of this way of

thinking does not lie in the insight, but in the attri-

bution of the authority of insight to the concept itself .

Kant's analysis succeeded in differentiating the purely

conceptual factor, and his criticism of the rational-

scholastic kind of demonstration stands as valid in so

far as he showed that from the pure concept the conclu-

sions of Rationalism and Scholasticism do not follow . .

And yet Kant's criticism does not touch the real ground

upon which the scholastic and rationalistic insight rested .

Hegel felt this when he rebuked Kant for treating the con-

ception of God in the same way as the conception of a

hundred dollars in one's pocket which possesses everything

that may be thought of a real hundred dollars, but which

yet lacks something which the empiric hundred dollars

possesses . The point I would make is, that the idea of

-582-
Divinity or of any other metaphysical actuality contains

this actuality if the concept is fused with the introcept ,

but not otherwise . Thus the error of the metaphysically

oriented thought before Kant lay in a failure of epistemo-

logical analysis but not of insight, or, at least, not

necessarily of insight . That is, the Rationalists,, or at

any rate some of the Rationalists, may have been quite cor-

rect in their metaphysical conclusions, however much they

may have been in error in the methods they employed in de-

riving those conclusions .

Monistic Idealism, or rather the rationalistic wing

of monistic Idealism, is virtually a restatement of Spinoza's

metaphysics in the form which became necessary after the

criticism of .Kant . Hegel, who is the great continuer of

the Spirit of Spinoza, does not in the essential sense

alter the metaphysical outlook of Spinozaism . He mainly

changed the form of the statement so as to render it less

vulnerable before the Kantian form of criticism . The in-

sight is really the same ; the method of establishing the

insight is different . This a&fort of Hegel is enormously

important, for Kant's criticism left us without ground for

spiritual or metaphysical assurance . Kant himself felt

this and was clearly far too religious a man to like the

results and , in large measure , tried to correct the . effect

of his criticism in his "Critique of Practical Reason",

-583-
but with results that fell far short of supplying an

adequate ground for genuine metaphysical assurance .

Hegel, I believe , succeeded better but has, in his turn,

proved vulnerable before more modern criticism .

But modern criticism , like the earlier Kantian

criticism , has left us with only perceptual experience

and conceptual thought which either is related to ex-

perience or produces only an abstract construction with-

out real content . This leaves us without means for deter-

mining any metaphysical actuality since the metaphysical

is no immediate part of either the purely empirical or

the purely conceptual . The result is that religious con-

viction has , for modern enlightened consciousness , either

the value of superstitious fantasy, or else only a psycho-

logical value in the sense of Jung . Under such conditions,

the best that could possibly be said of such a religious

conviction is that it has a value for psychological thera-

peutics . Under such conditions religious conviction is

subjected to a simply terrible depreciation , since the

content of such conviction is valued, at best, as of only

instrumental significance , whereas the very soul of the

conviction is that its content is of terminal significance .

The would-be destroyers of Hegel are , in effect , the would-

be destroyers of religious insight, regardless of whether

these destroyers are Marxians , Naturalists, Pragmatists or

Neo-Realists .

-584-
 But all of the foregoing critiques constitutes

a delimitation of pure conception taken in abstraction

from all content . They have no bearing upon the content

which may be supplied to the concept through introception .

The authority of the introcept has quite a different

ground from the authority of the concept . So, granting

that conception qua conception can have only an instru-

mental value , it does not therefore follow that it is

.instbumental to an exclusively perceptual or experiential

content . Granted that conception in its purity by itself

is servant , yet that service may be related to a transcen-

dental as well as a mundane orddr Further , when .concep

tion is united to . the introcept it becomes a vice-regal

power in relation to the whole mundane field of perception

and experience . There is , thus , such a thing as a royal

thought , as well as a servant thought . The mundane philo-

sophies know only the servant thought, and though they may

have ever so correctly understood the nature of this kind

of thought , all of this is quite beside the point when we

are in the presence of thought invested with the robes of

true royalty .

The truly Royal Thought stands above the formalism

of words and concepts , though it may ensoul these . Let

it be clearly understood that I am not here speaking in

terms of a speculative abstraction but of something which,

-585-
under the appropriate conditions , may be known directly .

There is a state wherein one may be clearly aware of a

dual thought process within the mind which may even be

present concurrently . One, the deeper Thought, moves or

develops without words , concepts or images ., and reaches

into the more objective mind only through an incipient

and casual contact with conceptual fragments . It is a

thought of an enormous clarity and sweep . Until one has

had the impression corrected by subsequent experience, it

seems as though this thought would be very easy to formu-

late . But actually the formulation is extremely difficult .

It does not precisely fit any conceptual or word forms .

A pure meaning grasped almost instantaneously is only .by

laborious effort partially conveyed in a form which can

be written or spoken . Often very strange constellations

of conceptual forms are required to suggest the primary

meaning . Such constellations are of an order which make

little or no sense in terms of the more familiar conceptual

references . Thus , for example , ordinarily the notion of

"flow" implies a movement from a point here to a point

there , either in space or time . This is a fixed meaning

which we habitually give to the notion of flowing . It is

most certainly progressive , in some sense , rather than

static . But how would one convey an immediate value or

realization wherein the s tatic and flowing quality were

equally emphatic ? I used the notion of a life -current

-586-
constantly moving but, at the same time, so turning up-

on itself that there was no progress from a past to a

future .- I thought I turned the trick in giving a clear

formulation to an immediate content, until someone gently

suggested to me that it did not make sensel I caught his

point of view right away . Yet that did not change the

.fact that I knew what I knew . Actually, this difficulty

is not so strange, for if one manages to abstract his

purely perceptual consciousness from the ordinary complex

of concepts and percepts which form the manifold of daily

conscious content, and then tries to formulate'the raw

perceptual material in terms of concepts, then he finds

that the concept and word forms do not fit either . The

pure perceptual quale is more like impressionistic, futur-

istic or surrealistic art . Anyone who tries to capture

that sort of thing in terms of concepts and words so that

they will really make straight-forward and understandable

statement will have a real labor on his hands .

The Inner Thought is spontaneous in that it happens

of itself in so far as the objective or personal thinker

is concerned . It is not the product of a consciously

willed effort by the personal ego . Further, it is not a

content which stands out as clearly differentiated from

the self . Rather, the self and content are blended in

identity, a state which is very difficult to conceive from

the objective point of view . But, as a result of this

-587-
identity between the I and the content , there is no pos-

sibility of a content which is erroneous with respect to

the self . Hence there is real noetic certainty here,

without all the problems and uncertainties which grow

out of the trial and error method of empiric cognition .

There is no question of knowing correctly, until one seeks

to achieve a formulation through the objective mind . But

the latter process can be more or less correct or more or

less in error , and, withall is never wholly correct . And

right here lies the reason why the great idealistic philo-

sophies are , at the same time , always vulnerable before

criticism and, yet, in their inward meaning , are equally

invulnerable . The psychological , epistemological and

logical hackers may tear to pieces the formal garments .

of systems like those of Spinoza and Hegel all they please,

and yet never reach at any point the inner authority on

which those systems rest . For men like Spinoza and Hegel

know what they know ., despite the defects of their own formu-

lations and all the attacks of lesser men . He who has been

There is not to be moved by a mountain of denials of those

who have not been There , though he may be convinced that

he should alter his garments .

The inner Thought is , whether or not it has also

been thought conceptually . Also , whether or not it is

important to the inner Thought to have been thought con-

-588-
ceptually, it certainly is of the highest importance to

the empiric man that It should have been brought down

within the range of his conceptual reach . By having been

thought conceptually, the inner Thought ensouls the con-

cept, so that thereafter such concepts are powers in them-

selves . They are no longer merely sign -pointers to further

experience in the pragmatic sense . Doubtless many concepts

and words have merely a sign-pointer value , in this sense,

and perhaps all concepts may have such a significance as .a

phase of their total meaning . In so far , the pragmatic

theory of knowledge may well be correct enough, but it .be-

comes positively vicious when it abrogates to. itself ex-

clusive validity . The ensouled concept is a life-line from

Spirit to empiric man, - the wanderer in the confusing

forest of experience . But when such a concept is reduced

to a soulless sign-pointer in a purely mundane manifold,

it ceases to be a life-line to Spirit . .

With introception, conception and perception we

have three primary functional forms of consciousness, if

we take perception, in its turn, as consisting of the

complex psychical manifold produced from the psychological

functions of sensation, feeling and intuition . From the

three primary functional forms of consciousness we can

derive four secondary combinations which produce correspond-

ing fields having distinctive character . These four are

outlined as follows :

-589-
 1 . Introception combined with conception . This al-

ready has been partly discussed in its relation to ration-

al Idealism . This is Spirit descending to man from above

and thus appearing in the transcendental relation .

2 . Introception combined with perception . This is .the

foundation of mystical states of consciousness of the

alogical type .' In this case the psychological functions

of feeling and intuition play a far larger part than does

thinking . A study of mystical literature leads to the

conclusion that by far the larger portion of the mystical

states are of this type . In this case, it is reasonably

correct to speak of mystical experience , whereas the more

noetic quality produced by the combination of introception

and conception is not properly called experience, but re-

quires some other words, such as "recognition" . Here we

may speak of Spirit in the immanent relation to human

consciousness .
3 . Conception combined with perception . This is the

familiar relationship which forms the subject-matter of

the vast bulk of current philosophical and psychological

literature . It is entirely possible that the Pragmatist's

epistemological interpretation of this particular field

is, in large measure , correct . The field determined by

this combination is exclusively secular and practical in

the mundane or utilitarian sense . In this connection the

humanistic theory of value and ethics may be valid enough,

-590-
but the field of consciousness produced by this combina-

tion, when taken in abstraction from other possibilities,

is strictly non-religious . Since practically all of cur-

rent sociology is conceived in terms of this combination,

it is easy . to see why most of our social thought has an

exclusively secular orientation . It is conceivable that

in this combination primacy could be given either to per-

ception or conception . This gives us the following alter-

natives :

a . When perception is given primacy, conception

appears as only instrumental , with the pragmatic theory

of knowledge following as a natural consequence .

b . When conception is given primacy, the instru-

mental . theory of ideas does not follow or, at least, does

not necessarily follow . It appears to me that Neo-realism

does imply the relative primacy of conception when it af-

firms the independence of primacy of mathematical and

logical entities .

4 . Introception combined with both conception and per-

ception . This naturally represents the most comprehensive

field of all but supplies the most difficult problems for

philosophic integration . I do not know of any philosophy

which deals with the problem .in this complex form . It

does not seem to lend itself to any single and simple

theory of knowledge . It is more likely that all theories

-591-
of knowledge have a relative validity within this field .

But barely to accept this view can result in little more

than an eclectic syncretism which is, however , something

far too loose to be philosophically satisfactory . The

big problem would be the integration of the apparently

incompatible theories into a systematic whole, and cer-

tainly this is no simple matter .

If the three primary functional forms of conscious-

ness are each taken in isolation from the other two, dis-

tinctive fields of consciousness are also delimited . These

appear somewhat as follows :

1 . Perception taken in isolation . This corresponds to

sub-human consciousness , such as that of the animal king-

dom . This has its superior possibilities which do'seem
to be evidenced in some of the behavior of the higher
animals . Some. animals do indeed seem to have superiori-

ties in certain directions which would shame a good many

human beings . But, clearly, out of this field of con-

sciousness , no science or philosophy could ever be evolved .

Yet, at least, something of art could develop .

2 . Conception taken in isolation. This is clearly

the field of pure mathematics and pure logic , in the modern

rigorous sense . A mathematical philosophy is quite pos-

sible here, in complete detachment from consciousness in

either the perceptual or introceptional sense . When math-

-592-
introception and the combination of introception and

perception . The other four fields which incorporate

conception do present the possibility of a philosophical

problem and orientation . Our interest here falls within

the range of these four fields, to the exclusion of the

other three, save to recognize them as states in their

own right . One implication which follows is, that an

absolutely comprehensive system of philosophy .or science

is impossible, since it could not truly represent or

portray states wherein conceptual cognition does not

enter as a component part . In other words, a conceptual

monism would not be an universal monism, since it could

not incorporate the forms of consciousness wherein there

is a complete absence of the concept . Yet this does not

necessarily imply pluralism, since there may be an ulti-

mate non-conceptual unity .

Of the four current philosophical schools, three

are exclusively related to the field delimited by the

combination of conception and perception . These are

Naturalism, Neo-realism and Pragmatism . Idealism, alone,

is oriented to the combination of introception and con-

ception and to some extent, perhaps, to the combination

of introception, conception and perception . The religious

motif, therefore, is to be found dominant only in Idealism,

whereas with the other three philosophies it enters, at

-594-
most, as only an after-thought . With all of these

schools of philosophy there is a difference of .ac-

centuation in the relative importance of the functions

of consciousness . The relative emphasis is as follows :

1 . Naturalism . Perception under the ug ale of sen-

sation is given ascendency over thinking, while both

intuition and feeling are quite ignored as philosophically

significant .

2 . Neo-realism . Thinking is given ascendency with

sensation subordinate, though remaining a significant

constituent . Feeling is not wholly disregarded since

there is a neo-realistic theory of value . But on the

whole intuition seems to be rather despised .

3 . Pragmatism . Sensation, feeling and intuition are

all recognized as philosophically significant, with con-

ceptual thinking playing the subordinate or servant role .

The degree of importance attached to the three perceptual

functions varies with .the different pragmatic thinkers,

though all agree in subordinating conceptual thinking .

Intuition is accentuated with Bergson and Spengler . Ap-

parently, sensation carries the prior value with Dewey .

Perhaps James gives a larger recognition to the deter-

minate part of feeling, as compared to the other leading

Pragmatists, but I would not say he gives it first place .

He affirms the right of a will to believe and of "over-

-595-
belief" which implies a high valuation of the right of

feeling to play a determinant part . Possibly Schiller

gives as much emphasis to the constitutive part of feel-

ing as any . Quite frequently , too, Pragmatists affirm

the doctrine that all thinking is wishful thinking, and

this implies an attribution of -a predominant role to

feeling , at least in so far as conceptual thinking is

concerned . . It does not seem to be so well recognized

that there is such a thing as wishful sensation and wish-

ful intuition as well .

.4 . Idealism . Idealism divides into two branches

known as Rational Idealism and Voluntaristic Idealism .

My study of Rational Idealism leads me to the conclusion

that here conception is united with, but ascendent over,

introception . Voluntaristic Idealism , of which'Schopenhauer

is the greatest representative , combines , in my judgment,

introception , conception and perception , with perception

ascendent over both conception and introception . The "Will"

of Schopenhauer is really a reference to the perceptive

guale , with accentuation of its conative character .

(This accentuation of conation is likewise characteristic

of the Pragmatists .) In my opinion, no modern occidental

philosopher has actually given primacy to introception,

nor did Platd among the Greeks . This accentuation is to

be found in Shankara and Plotinus and, in Buddha . In our

-596-
culture, the predominantly introceptualistic philosophy

remains to be written .

The great philosophical achievement of Kant con-

sisted of two parts : - one positive and the other neg-

ative . He supplied a basis whereby we could have con-

fidence in the orderliness of experience, which is the

necessary condition of any possibility of science . But

on the negative side, he showed that pure reason or pure

conception could never lead to .a knowledge of metaphysical

reality . Yet the yearning for metaphysical certainty is

not only the greatest driving motivation of the philosopher,

it equally underlies the religious feeling . Kant, him-

self, clearly felt the desire for this certainty no less

than other men and so came to his negative conclusions

simply as an act of intellectual honesty . But while he

is forced to conclude that pure conception cannot prove

a metaphysical existence, yet it is equally impossible

for the reason to prove the non-existence of a metaphysical

reality . The incompetency, in this case , is merely suci

as that of the pure reason operating by itself . The pos-

sibility of some other way of knowing, whereby . metaphysical

reality may be the certain realization of man is not ex-

cluded . So in the absence of this other way of knowing,

man has a right to faith which the pure reason is incom-

petent to deny, so long, as the faith is oriented to a moral

-597-
 or spiritual order . But faith, by itself, justifies

only the postulating of a metaphysical reality . It is

less than knowledge and so may be conceivably grounded

on nothing better than a fantasy . Kant, like William

James , gives us a right to believe , but no real ground

of spiritual security .

We may say that the great purpose of the German

rV Idealists who followed Kant was to secure a more adequate

ground for the orientation to spiritual or metaphysical

reality than Kant left . The idealistic development was

certainly not necessary for establishing the ground for a

practical science, for Kant left this ground abundantly

secured . But the greatest yearning of the human soul can

never be satisfied by a practical science , however far it

may be developed . Practical science never answers the

question of the ultimate meaning of the whole of experience .

Now it is possible that philosophy might accept Kant's

conclusion as to the office of conception as final and,

discrediting faith as a valid sign-post of the transcen-

dental , then proceed to the general handling of those

problems which fall outside the range of particular

sciences . Both Neo-realism and Pragmatism are philoso-

phies that have followed this course , while the meta-

physical conclusions found in Naturalism are clearly of

the type that are untenable in the light of the Kantian

-598-
criticism . To Idealism, alone, fell the task of finding

a positive answer to the metaphysical or religious yearn-

ing of man in terms more positive than that of a permitted

faith, with a right to postulate that which man feels or

intuits .

Did Idealism succeed in its task? In the light of

modern criticism the answer seems to be negative . One can

find places in William James' writings where he says that

the Idealists may be right in their insight, but yet they

have not established that insight . He grants the right

of a will to believe, but nothing more positive than that .

With Neo-realism the outlook becomes even more discouraging,

for here the logical outcome is the radical pessimism

without hope expressed by Bertrand Russell .3 Today the

philosophical standing of religion - by which I mean the

orientation to a metaphysical certainty - is very shaky

indeed . After all, faith is only a crutch or boat whereby

man may hope to cross the stormy sea of uncertainty to the

further shore of certain Knowledge . Within some reason-

able time faith must lead to transcendent Knowledge or

it must be judged as tried and found wanting . So every

truly religious man must feel the deepest wish for the

success of the proposed enterprise of the Idealist . For

any mah to feel happy in the .finding that Idealism has

failed is the- clearest proof that he lacks any real re-

-599-
ligious orientation . Intellectual honesty may compel

the man with genuine religious orientation to acknowledge

the force of modern criticism , but he must feel saddened

by its success . And in the face of this success he must

either feel a challenge to carry further the enterprise

of the Idealists , or else acquiesce in devastating defeat .

For no vital religious nature will ever be satisfied with

an ersatz substitute for certain metaphysical Knowledge in

the form of psychological permission to believe, since

psychology offers to the religious orientation no more

than a toy for quieting a wayward child . A real man will

insist upon the real thing or nothing . There either is a

Kingly Knowledge which can be known by man, or life is no

more than a barren waste filled with mirages wherein child-

ish souls disport themselves , and mature souls face despair

which they may meet heroically or not . Doubtless there is

something noble in the heroism which can face this despair

with firm, upright posture and a smile, but it is entirely

futile . Universal suicide would be a more rational answer .

The three mundane philosophies give us no valid

reason for eschewing wholesale racial suicide as the one

and only adequate solution of the problem of life . Suffi-

cient reason for another course can be found only in carry-

ing on the enterprise of the great Idealists, in the hope

of correcting their technical errors . Long ago I proposed

-600-
to carry on that enterprise and, finally, attained suc-

cess . I know that the Kingly Knowledge is and that it is

possible for man to know it . And I also know the Road by

which it may be attained so completely that faith is

finally consumed in certainty . But the Road lies in a

way of consciousness very hard to find for him who looks

forth exclusively upon the world -about, whether of sense

or ideas . Yet this Road is very close at hand, since it

lies locked in the psyche of every man . Looked for in

the right way it can be found . With all of our extensive

psychological and epistemological analys,s we of the West

have missed the greatest secret of the psyche . Now, once

this Kingly Knowledge is known then the problem of its

relationship to conception and the empiric world is only

one of detail . The problem may be technically difficult,

but since its solution is not vital , we have plenty of

time for its resolution .

In the next chapter I propose to outline a new

philosophic way .which, while it lies close to the spirit

and motive of Idealism , yet departs from the method of

the latter in certain important respects , and orients it-

self to an ultimate conceived in different terms . So far

I have simply traced a trail through the systems and ways

of thought now existing , removing, in principle , barriers,

where they appeared , and .emphasizing pointings to a similar

-601-
goal where they were found . With their ramifications in

directions neutral to the present purpose I am not here

concerned with the developments of extant philosophies .

I admit finding much of relative value in all, and in

many relations I may assume the attitudes of these other

philosophies, but I find all modern thought falling short

with respect to the great problems which man must solve

if life is to be more than the resolving of a meaningless

jig-saw puzzle . It is not enough somehow to wriggle

through the .span of life through the judicious employment

of innumerable games . Durable satisfaction can come only

when man has , at last , crowned his effort with the re-

alization of an all-inclusive and significant Meaning .

o h Footnotes to Chapter VII G J

1Quoted from " Psychological Types ",

V NI Ir(~ ~
iJ P!a vJE' l~iri+ . * ` J7rJ N C!
2This would even throw a light upon the feministico '4r~ 1'rwl,, 19,r)nc42
element that has been noted in the psychology of /q7/~
Adolph Hitler , with his strong deve l opment of in- ~.
tuition relative to reason.

3See the quotation on page 346 of "Present Philo-

sophical Tendencies " - Perry ; Longman ' s41912 ed .
0YO-A id

Q /tito .r. ~ by w 1 I/1 a

-rkk, va_0 .+
Tru nk,
40isOufft, toll

-602-
 T hl~~Z,4 C ~P~16~f~C,
t _Ylvl
pg? r

Chapter ' II
Introceptionalism

In the broadest use of the term, "idealism"

means any interpretation of being or of experience

wherein consciousness , in some sense, plays the deter-

minant part . But the manner in which consciousness

is determinant varies quite widely with different .

thinkers . Thus the external universe may be conceived

as composed merely of ideas , in the sense of percepts

or recepts , as in the case of Berkeley , or it may be a

system of Reason as conceived by Hegel , or, of a Will

lying behind the reason , as with ; Schopenhauer . Further,

the empiric activism of Pragmatism may be conceived es-

sentially in terms of consciousness , as was true in the

case of F . C . H . Schiller .,"r As in the instance of Kant,

the idealism may be of an epistemological character in

that it defines the form of . possible experience and know-

ledge, without saying anything about the nature of the

thing-in-itself . Idealism in this most general sense

stands as differentiated from Realism in its broadest

connotation wherein both primary existence and the con-

stitution of knowledge are conceived as independent of

consciousness . However , Idealism , in the sense of the

specific philosophical school known by that name, is more

-603-
definitely defined . In the latter instance, either the

Reason or the Will of a universal or absolute SELF con-

stitutes the metaphysical nature of the universe . So

the general affirmation that consciousness is .a primary

determinant is not sufficient, by itself, to lead to

the classification of any thinker as an Idealist in the

restricted sense of the idealistic school' . Idealism, in

the grand sense , is otherworldly as well as being oriented

to the view that consciousness is primary, while in the

more general sense of the term, the idealist can also be

an Empiricist .

In the philosophic view, of which I am here giving

an introductory outline, consciousness is again conceived

as primary and constitutive, but the point of departure

from the preceding philosophic theories is so considerable

that a new classification seems necessary . I ground my

thesis upon a new function of consciousness , which I have

called "introception", and which implies a function dif-

fering from both the empiric and the conceptualistic, as

those notions are currently understood . It also implies

a function more profound than the conative principle of

Will as understood by Schopenhauer . So I am calling this

view "Introceptionalism", in which the word "introception"

is given a dual reference , first, to a function of con-

-sciousness , and, second, to the content or state of con-

sciousness rendered accessible by the function .

-604-
 As has been already noted, the validity of the

present thesis rests upon the actuality of the function

of introception primarily . Without at least assuming

that actuality , the thesis loses its ground as a possi-

bility . But if the function is granted to be real, it

does not therefore follow that the theoretical statement

is necessarily correct throughout . It may be correct ass

a matter of fundamental principle , and yet fall short of

correct interpretation in detail . This is true for the

reason that all philosophical interpretation necessarily

involves a correlation-of the primary given material with

a conceptual organization , with the result that the im-

mediate element may not always be correctly conceived, or

the laws of thought may be violated in the development .

The latter is a problem for human skill, wherein the thinker

is limited by the relativity of his proficiency . It is

important that the critic should bear this distinction in

mind and not judge the reality of a function by either

the weakness or the strength of the proficiency in con-

ceptual interpretation . I am much more concerned that

introception should attain recognition as a genuine psy-

chical function than that this system of interpretative

ideas should be accepted .

-605-
 The function of introception has been defined as

the power whereby the Light of consciousness turns upon

itself towards its source . This statement , bare and

simple as it is , implies a good deal . For at once we have

the implication that human consciousness is not exclusively

of such a nature that it is dependent for its existence

upon the presence-of two terms , a subject and an object,

that it unites in a relation . As I understand the Neo-

realistic theory of consciousness , consciousness is con-

ceived as exclusively a relation between two terms and

not a self- existence nor a function of a subject taken in

abstraction from all objects . Upon the basis of such a

theory, the turning of the Light of consciousness upon it-

self and moving toward its source would be a meaningless

and fantastic conception . I am, therefore , forced to deny

at least the exclusive truth of the neo-realistic theory,

though it might conceivably have a relative validity as a

description of part of the total nature of consciousness .

It is further implied that human consciousness is

of such a nature that it may be conceived of as flowing or

streaming , in part at least , from the subject toward the

object . This , again , implies that consciousness is not

merely a relation , for a flowing involves the notion of a

something or a somewhat that is flowing . Even when we

speak of the relationship of flowing we do not mean that

-606-
the relation of flowing flows, but have merely abstracted

a feature from the total situation . So, while conscious-

ness conceived as exclusively a relation might bind sub-

ject to object, it could not flow from subject to object .

The whole notion of consciousness turning upon itself and

moving towards its source thus implies that consciousness

has a substantive character . This I shall later affirm on

immediate grounds and not simply as an implication from a

definition . Now, in implying that consciousness is sub-

stantive we are giving an affirmative answer to the ques-

tion which William James asked in the form, "Does con-

sciousness exist?" . Since James gave a negative answer

in the sense in which we give an affirmative one, it fol-

lows that here we depart radically from James ' position .

If, now, consciousness does flow from the subject

to the object, then it follows that the function of the

senses is not purely receptive . Although I am unable to

exclude the possibility that there may be also a flow of

consciousness from the object to the subject, in which

case there would be a sense or a degree in which the func-

tion of the senses is receptive, yet the flow from .the

subject to the object is the primary fact for our purposes .

This implies, then, that in some measure the individual

subject makes the object which is realized or experienced

by him . However, I do not mean to suggest by this that

-607
the object is, or necessarily is, a consciously willed

creation of the individual subject . It would be, at

least more usually, a .projecting process from the subject

which is unconscious to the individual ego . There is,

indeed, much evidence from analytic psychology which

gives substantial support to this idea . Especially do

we find in primitive psychology that the unconscious pro-

jecting of subjective elements upon the object plays a

highly important part in determining the nature of the

world-about as the primitive experiences it . We have the

advantage over the primitive that we are now able to iso-

late this function in some measure for analysis, so that

the world-about for us is something very different from

what itis for the primitive .

As said above, it is-possible that there is also

a flow of consciousness from the object to the subject,

thereby placing the subject in the receptive position .

Such a theory does exist in the Indian Tantra . But while

important implications would follow from this theory, I

shall disregard this feature for the present .

The idea that, at least in part, human conscious-

ness is of the nature of a flow from the subject to the

object, is, fortunately, available to a degree of verifi-

cation that can-be applied more or less generally . I

-608-
I have applied a test both to myself and others that has

afforded some very interesting results . The subject is

asked to attend to some fixed object, preferably some

seen object , and then, without changing the fixation of

the sense- impression , he is told to focus his attention

upon the perceiving rather than upon the object of per-

ception . This is an effort to perceive perceiving . I

find that mmst subjects report results having one or more

of the following features : The object tends to grow dim .

Often something like a dark shadow, which yet has a charac-

ter different from ordinary darkness, begins t .o grow over

the object . The object may disappear completely . A field

of light may replace the object . Along with this there is

very frequently a marked change of the affective state of

the subject . It is a more or less intense feeling of feli-

city, of the general type reported from mystical experience,

but not so far developed .

Of course, I am well aware that it is possible to

invent other theories to account for this kind of experi-

ence, for alternative theories for any experience what-

soever are always possible and only limited by the imagi-

nation of_the theorist . But this test at least implies

that the definition of introception as a turning of the

Light of consciousness upon itself so that it moves toward

its source, is a functional concept and, therefore, one

that is scientifically useful in some measure , at any rate .

-609-
 The facts of introceptive realization and ex-

perience definitely imply that human consciousness is

of such a nature that , under the appropriate conditions

or by the appropriate effort, it can be severed from the

object and exist with no more than a one -way dependence

upon the subject . Thishas a profound bearing upon the

nature of the ecstatic trance of the neo -Platonists and

of the Samadhi trance of the East Indians . Under the

assumption of the theory that consciousness is exclu-

sively a relationship dependent upon the two terms, known

as subject and object , then the ecstatic or Samadhic

trance would be interpreted as a state of complete un-

consciousness . Leuba in his "Psychology of Religious

Mysticism " has maintained this view . But manifestly his

view is prejudiced by his assumed theory of consciousness

and is not based upon knowledge . Both the neo -Platonic

and the Indian literature on the subject imply that the

state of ecstatic trance has a distinctly superior noetic

and affective value , which is quite incompatible with the

notion that it is a state of unconsciousness . The only

proof here is, of course , immediate experience or reali-

zation , and then the proof exists only for the individual

subject . My own experience has always been in the . form of

a separation in the flow of consciousness so that a minor

portion of the stream continued toward the object, the re-

-610-
suit being that objective consciousness . was dimmed but not

extinguished . The object was extremely depreciated in

that it lost all or nearly all relevancy , but always re-

mained as sensibly or conceptually available . But the

consciousness in the state of the reverse flow toward the

subject was like a Light highly intensified . All objective .

consciousness , relatively , is only like moonlight . contrasted

to bright sun-light in a dry desert atmosphere . I know

that the introceptive process is anything but a dimming

or disappearance of consciousness , but rather a radical in-

tensification of it . I must agree with the frequently re-

curring figure found in mystical literature wherein the

introceptive state of consciousness is likened to the

rising of . another Sun so bright as to dull forever there-

after the light of the physical sun . Most emphatically,

this experience of intensification of consciousness is

real enough, entirely apart from the interpretation of

its meaningful value for knowledge or feeling . A compre-

hensively true psychological theory of consciousness will

simply have to incorporate this fact .

So far I have not attempted to define consciousness .

As a matter of fact , I cannot any more define it than I

can the distinctive ug ale of any perceptive state . One

can, for instance , define a one-wave color as consisting

of a given wave length , of a given wave rate and of a given

wave form , but he cannot define the distinctive guale of

-611-
the color seen by an individual subject . This definition

gives that which a man born blind could understand, but

the distinctive guale of the color is something which can-

not possibly be conveyed to him save by immediate personal

experience . Consciousness, being of this same nature, is,

therefore, indefinable . We can point to consciousness by

saying that it is that which becomes less and less as a

man sinks into dreamless sleep and that which becomes more

and more as he slowly returns to waking consciousness,

and no man who has never had this experience or its equi-

valent could ever possibly know what consciousness is . Inn

other words, a state of continuous consciousness which

never had stood in contrast with unconsciousness in some

n
sense, could Sever be known as consciousness . It is thus

conceivable that there could be a primordial consciousness

that never knew its own conscious quality . Nay, more, even
the so-called unconscious of analytic psychology may very
well be simply a consciousness of this sort .
Now, while the starting point of the introceptive

process is human consciousness, it by no means follows

that our search will comprehend only human consciousness .

Human consciousness is a form or way of consciousness,

which is differentiated from animal and other possible

kinds of consciousness . If consciousness qua conscious-

ness is a continuum rather than a discrete manifold, then

the search may carry us to a place where we shall see . man

-612-
as simply a'zone of possible consciousness -forms among

others . Perhaps it is just the significance of Kant's

work that he delimited in principle - however defective

in detail - the characteristic features of a human qua

human consciousness while beyond there lay other possi-

bilities of consciousness he .eithdr did not consider or

did not know . Indeed , strange things happen when one

starts the introceptive process , things of such revolu-

tionary implication that the Copernican change in astronomy

or in Kant ' s thought is distinctly mild in contrast . The

would-be investigator may well think twice before he starts

upon the enterprise , if he fears the loss of his gods, be

they scientific or traditional , . for once the door is

opened, - there is no turning back .

When an investigator is presented with an affirma-

tion or evidence that there exists a psychological function

which is not generally isolated so that it is commonly

known, it is quite natural for him to question whether any

means exists such that this function may be rendered con-

sciously active . This is an enormously important question,

but I shall not here consider it more than briefly since

the present concern is oriented mainly to the-office of

introception and the significance of the content rendered

available by this function . The problem of how the func-

tion of introception may be aroused into conscious activity

-613-
is one of much difficulty and of vast ramification . There

is indeed quite an extensive oriental literature upon the

subject , much of which, being so , largely oriented to the

peculiarities of a psychical development foreign to the

occidental organization that it is practically useless

for the Western student . ., But even a . casual study of this

literature will convince one that the oriental sages have .

given the problem very serious and profound consideration .

There can be . no doubt . but that oriental students of the

subject were as thoroughly convinced of the value of the

investigation as we are of our own science . There is un-

mistakable evidence that positive results were attained and

that such results were valued by the Oriental above all

other achievements . The typical Western superciliousness

of attitude toward the Oriental will not survive a serious

study of Eastern wisdom . Oriental intelligence simply

developed in a different direction from our own and achieved

results in that direction which are in no wise inferior to

our own ahhievements . Where we have progressed in the

physical control of matter, the Oriental has progressed most

in the understanding and control of the psyche .

The problem of method , whereby the latent intro-

ceptive function may be aroused to conscious activity, is

peculiarly difficult, since the solution proves to be one

which can never be completely attained by method . Further,

-614-
effective method has been found to be relative to individual

temperament . The means which have actually proven effective

with an individual of one temperament , may fail completely

with another with a radically different psychical organi-

zation . Recent work with respect to the differences of

psychological types casts an illuminating light upon this

aspect of the problem . So, clearly , the subject requires

a vast amount of study .

But even though we knew the last word which could

be uttered with respect to method , we would then be placed

in control of only one side of the problem . The other part

of the arousing process is autonomous or spontaneous and

is thus something which no man can command by his consciously

willed efforts alone . To use a figure in the oriental

spirit, the individual through his faithful employment of

method merely prepares a cup which is filled when something

other, and quite beyond his control, acts on its own ini-

tiative . Sometimes it so happens that an individual may

have unconsciously prepared the cup and then received the

benefit of a spontaneous filling as a matter of complete

surprise . So the conscious employment of . method is neither

an absolute essential nor does it provide a positive assurance

of success within a prescribed , time . But the consensus of

oriental experience abundantly confirms the view that the

application of appropriate method vastly increases the probabi-

lity of success , so that work in this direction is well

justified .

-615-
 Back in the days when I was a university student

this problem came to my attention and so largely chal-

lenged my interest that it ultimately came to occupy a

central place . I finally proved that the discovery and

use of the appropriate method could eventuate in a suc-

cessful outcome , though success was not attained until

after more than twenty years . And, yet, today though I

am aware of the office of method and the meaning of what

it can achieve , I still find it impossible to define the

crucial step . In the end everything hung upon a subtle

psychical adjustment that is truly inexpressible, since

the very act of expression gives it a false appearance of

an objective character which is not at all true to the

real meaning . I found that the key consisted in attaining

a moment within which there is a thorough -going detachment

from the object and from the activistic attitude of ordinary

consciousness . The simplicity of this statement hides its

real difficulty for there is implied an uprooting of very

deep-seated inherited habits . There is a sense in which

we may say that thoroughgoing breaking of the dependence

upon the object and of the activistic attitude is like a

conscious dying , and long established psychical habits

tenaciously resist this . It may take a lot of work to

attain the critical state .

-616-
 Certain habits place the Western scholar at a

peculiar disadvantage . We have even made a virtue of

an attitude which operates as a fatal barrier so long

as it persists . This is the attitude of detaching intel-

lectual understanding or apprehension from oneself . 117e -

study, think about and gather endless information about

all-sorts of subjects and pride ourselves in standing

aloof from the content of what we study . With respect

to much material . this is a justifiable and useful atti-

tude, but it is not the way one attains a psychical

transformation . One can raise -a study to the status of

an effective transforming agent only by giving himself . to

it with the same completeness which is characteristic of

the more intense religious natures . Most scientific and

scholarly minds seem to be afraid of this as of the devil

himself . However , this fear must be mastered or the scholar

will remain a stranger to his most valuable inner resources .

Knowledge about becomes an effective agent only when it

is transformed into knowledge through acquaintance , with

the willingness to accept any practical consequences which

may follow . Beforehand , one does not know but that he may

lose just that which he values most , and it takes a good

deal of the faith-attitude'to face this . Of .course, what

does happen is a radical change in the orientation of valu-

ation , so that a vastly greater Value replaces the old

system of values . Thus it is not really value that is

lost , but an old orientation , which is quite a different

matter .

A secularistic kind of scholarship , no matter

how extensively developed , will leave the scholar outside

the sacred precincts , so long as the attitude remains

secularistic . It is just the subtle change implied in

the difference between secular and sacred which makes all

the difference in the world . In principle , anything what-

soever can acquire the sacred value, it is simply important

that the attitude of sacredness shall exist in some direc-

tion and shall absorb the predominant portion of the in-

terest . Sacredness implies self-giving , while secularity

implies self-withholding . In the transformation process,

everything else is incidental to the attaining of the self-

giving attitude . Mostly men attain this attitude only after

a desperately painful crisis , but if it can be accepted

without waiting for the crisis the individual simply saves

himself a great deal of discomfort .

With this brief and passing reference to the problem

of method I shall return to the problems of more specific

philosophical significance . Yet, it should not be forgotten

that philosophy itself becomes a part of method, provided

it is united with the religious attitude . Most of current

philosophic thought tends to destroy the sacred or truly

religious attitude . For instance , thought when viewed as

the Pragmatist views it cannot be used as an instrument

of introceptional transformation . Further, a philosophy

which views religion as merely a tagged-on incident of

human psychology, as is the case of all the three secular

philosophies, . does .not .in itself favor .the religious attitude .

It is possible, in considerable measure , to con-

sider the office of introception and also the content ren-

dered available by introception for philosophical develop-

ment , without having direct personal acquaintance with this

function . Admittedly', this-implies an entertaining of

abstract ideas in a sense that is different from abstrac-

tion based upon perceptual experience, but the intellect

has .abundantly proven its capacity to do this in the develop-

ment of pure mathematics . One can treat the philosophy as

if it were true and then follow out the implications to

see if they may not lead to results that can be directly

valued .
The turning of the Light of consciousness towards .

its source does not mean that the subject or "I" is trans-

formed into an object . For if the "I" were an object, then

it must be an object for another subject, with the result

that the supposedly objectified "I' .' actually is no more than

-619-
an abstract construct for the real "I" which now is in

the position of the new subject . It is utterly impossible

for the '" I" to be an object, unless consciousness attains,

a transcendental position in a more ' comprehensive SELF from

which it is possible to look down upon something like a

discrete self which is a reflection of the former . But at

the first stage of introception this transcendental perspec-

tive has not been attained . The process begins with the

consciousness of an individual human self and so there is

no adequate base from which that self can be viewed as an

object , since it does its own viewing . This is a point of

simply immense importance, since here we have one of the

most fundamental differentiating features of introception

as contrasted with the more familiar functions . It is

extraordinarily difficult to give this part of the process

a conscious recognition and then to interpret it in con-

ceptual language . Where the process functions unconsciously,

and this seems to be by far the predominant rule, the in-

dividual simply finds himself in the new orientation with

no clear appreciation of how he got there . (There are amusing

instances recorded where men-have wondered about their own

sanity .) The individual , in this case , is at one moment

in the familiar world- field, at the next , in something which

seems to bear no commensurable or intelligible relation to
it . The transformation just happened like an act of

Providence , and then everything : that was true of the old ,

world - field has suddenly become sheer nonsense - the

wisdom of worldly men is transformed into mere folly .

And if the transformed individual himself tries to speak

of his new way of consciousness he sounds nonsensical to

the worldly wise . The result is a more or less mutual

contempt .

St . John of the Cross in one of his poems has

effectively presented the inner effect of an unconscious

transformation . Below I quote a . portion of this poem :

"I entered in - I knew not where

And, there remaining , knew no more,
Transcending far all human lore,

" I knew not where I enter'd in .

'Twas giv'n me there myself to see
And wonderous things I learn ' d within
Yet knew I not where I could be .
I tell not what was shown to me :
Remaining there , I knew no more,
Transcending far all human lore ."

It is not surprising that a man who knows only the

more objective functioning of the intellect should regard

this sort of thing as a kind of intellectual suicide and

a general breakdown of organized consciousness . But the

fact that men like . St . John of the Cross have been enormously

influential , not before , but after and because of the mystical

transformation implies in itself that we are in the presence

-621-
of a highly significant process . They wield an immensely

potent power upon the consciousness and motivation of

their entourage;' one that is of a distinctly profounder

sort than the ordinary lines of influence . Both psychology

and philosophy fall short of performing their full responsi-

bility if they simply avoid the serious consideration of

the problems presented by this transformation process . Un-

questionably something does happen , even though our judg-

ment is based only upon observable effects . It is just

because of the transformation that men like Buddha and

Christ become the incarnations of the most far-reaching

powers known to history . Neither the personal lives of

these men nor their moral and metaphysical theories supply

us with any adequate basis for interpreting their influence . .

Actually , that influence operates mainly through the col-

lective psychologic unconscious , thus affecting men at the

very roots of their consciousness and motivation . It seems

to me rather foolish for the scientific mind to avoid deal-

ing with the problem presented , simply because it threatens

the comfortable enjoyment of accepted presuppositions .

The quotation of bt . John of the Cross is not beyond

the possibility of analysis if one is familiar with the

process . There is no necessary break -down of rational under-

standing here , provided the conceptual presuppositions are

-622-
appropriately altered . Let us attempt this analysis of

the portion of the, poem quoted .

"I entered in - I knew not where -"

Clearly here we have a transformation of base .

Familiar methods employed in mathematics prove of vast

help here . The base of reference in mathematics is the

beginning point,of . .an analytic process . The base is taken

arbitrarily - in the logical sense - while the following

analysis proceeds in strict logical form . But we may

change our orientation of the problem from one base to

another, .with a more or Aess radical change in the form

of the analysis of a given problem . If one viewed the

two treatments without knowledge of the change of base,

the effect might be in some cases distinctly confusing,

enough even to make the conjunction of the two treatments

to'seem irrational . . Now this situation is analagous to

the effect of an unconscious introceptive transformation .

One gets into a new field with its system of orientation

and valuation, but has no idea of how he got there . He

knows that he has entered into something, but has no idea

as to how or where . He knows immediately a new kind of

consciousness with its . content , or that which replaces all

content , but the connection with the old kind of conscious-

ness is completely broken . That is, .the process,of trans-

formation from one base of reference to another is uncon-

sciousnes,s, but the field defined-by each is immediately

realized .

"And*, there remaining , knew no more,

Transcending far all human lore" .

The "knowing no more" implies a destruction of

consciousness, but the "transcending far all human lore"

implies that consciousness still is . This seems like a

contradiction, but it is only a paradox . A contradiction

is the affirmation that A can be both A and not-A at the

same time and in the same sense , while a paradox implies

opposite affirmations when taken at different times or in

different senses , one or the other, but not both . This

distinction shows that we are not dealing with a break-

down of conceptual power, but are dealing with a new and

more comprehensive kind of thought . Actually, in the above

quotation, the "knowing no more" refers to the field de-

limited by the base of reference of ordinary consciousness .

The knowing was not in terms of the old pattern . But the

new position is transcendent with respect to the old . It

comprehends much more and, hence,-reaches far beyond "all

human lore" . That this superior state is not only not un-
conscious, but even~has'positive noetic value is implied

in the next portion of the quotation .

 "I knew not where I enter'd in .
'Twas giv'n there myself to see
And wonderous things I learnTd within
Yet knew I not-where I could be ."

St . John simply did not know how he got There, or

where he was . This was mystery . But he learned tremendously

valuable things, including the seeing of himself . This

seeing of himself is the first most significant and .dis-

tinctive fact of the introceptive process . The word "seeing",

used here, it deceptive since it suggests a perceptual process .

It is more like the seeing when one says " he sees an idea" .

It is a form of cognition which is neither perceptual nor

conceptual , but is another way of consciousness . In earlier

efforts to try to describe the process I found myself in

considerable difficulty, since the available language gave

.an impression different from that intended . The development

of the word "introceive" proved to be of substantial help

once it was defined to mean a process which is neither per-

ceptual nor conceptual . Strictly one should say "myself to

introcieve" rather than "myself to see ." This is genuine

acquaintance with the self or "I" without transforming it

into an object of consciousness . That is, it is totally

different from a perceptive process, which is confined ex-

clusively to contents other than the self or "I" . Percep-

tion is essentially extraverted and non-spiritual, even

though having relatively introverted and extraverted

phases, while introception is a radically introverted

process .

St . John affirms that he learned wondrous things

within . This is an explicit affirmation that the state

was not only one of consciousness, but also one possessing

the noetic quale .' (I-'am,- of course, assuming that St . John

was neither a fool nor a liar but, on the contrary, an

exceptionally intelligent and conscientious man .) How-

ever, the content of the new kind of cognition was beyond

the,powers of St . John to give it conceptual .formulation,

hence : "I tell not what was shown to me ." This, of course,

might be interpreted as a will not to tell, but one who is

.familiar with the state or withEthe .difficulties in expres-

sion mystics always manifest, will realize that the true

reason for not telling was the inability to tell . Concepts

simply do not conform to pure introceptive meaning . But,

equally, concepts do not conform to pure perceptive meaning .

They, rather, delimit fields of possibility in a certain way

of consciousness which may grow . They are forms in the,

Kantian sense which do not give actuality as it is apart

from conceiving . But they do give command, and that is an

office of the highest importance . We are generally familiar

with this office in relation to the world of perception,

but we are almost wholly ignorant of a corresponding

potential, office with respect to . introceptive cognition .

Too few mystics have also been masters of conceptual

thought, and so gave up the effort to tell even that

which could be told , if the appropriate skill were em-

ployed . The concept does not and cannot give the dis-

tinctive perceptive quale,`and the same is true with

respect to the introceptive quale . But it has an actual

or potential office both ways .

The "transcending far all human lore" carries an

implication of far - reaching importance . It carries the

meaning that a human-being can attain a state of conscious-

ness which is not a human kind of consciousness . Extensive

reading of introceptive literature , whether of the gnostic

or more narrowly mystical type, reveals that such trans-

cendence is quite generally implied or explicitly affirmed .

In other words , there is . a linkage between human conscious-

ness and other kinds of consciousness such that a human

self can either become more than a human self, or can parti-

cipate in a more than human kind of consciousness . Here

we see the reason why mystics are never Humanists, in the

modern philosophic meaning of the term, although they may

be highly humane and compassionate . Humanism conceives

human consciousness as exclusively human qua human and in-

capable of being or becoming anything else . The content
of the mystical realization is incompatible with this view

and even affirms that there is available to man a superior

kind of consciousness which is much more desirable than the

only human . To the mystic the merely human problem can .

never seem to be vitally important , save as it . may serve

as an instrumental office for the arousing of the superior

consciousness . In so far as human suffering may serve as

an instrument for awakening, the mystic would say that it

is good and should not be removed until it has completed

its office . This gives an impression of cool detachment

from human pain, but the real meaning is an heroic willing-

ness to permit a pain that serves the end that is conceived

as the only really desirable end . Some physicians feel the

same way about child-birth with considerable showing of

good reason for justifying their position .

In the sense of introception , the consciousness re-

lated to the " I" is not a consciousness of the "I" . It is

immediate "knowledge through acquaintance" in the most

rigorous sense . One might even speak of it as a sinking

into the "I", but the difficulty with all these formulations

is that they suggest a connotation in the ordinary sense

of language usage, which is'quite different to the real

meaning . " I am I" conveys the idea with more rigor, at

-628-
the price of meaningless tautology for ordinary thinking .

We might,say, "I .,am,and I,,am thus, without dependence upon

any objective setting ."*. I am known as I in an empty world,

which is empty because I am not projected as a not-self,

in the sense of Fichte,,while in the introceptive state .

It is I, together with consciousness that I am, immediately

known and not as a mere inference . To be conscious as the

pure "I" is to be conscious of Nothing, which yet is in-

finitely more valuable than any thing . I am the pure Light,

which by illuminating everything gives to everything exist-

ence for me, and save as things exist for me there is no

meaning in predicating existence of them .

Knowledge toward the self, in the introceptive sense,

may be likened to a . zero-state that is intensely illumined .

As it were, the world contracts to a zero-point and becomes

pure Light . Comparatively, the old world is darkness . The

immediate effect at this stage is of an absolute emptiness

filled with absolute value . We are here dealing with a very

profound conception where , again, it seems that only mathe-

matics can help us .

The one conception in mathematics which required the

greatest amount of genius for its birth, is the conception

of zero . This was the great mathematical achievement of the

 G` 1 C A, S
H4.4us . Here we have a notion which stands for nothing,

and yet becomes the most vital unifying conception of

mathematics . Zero is the foil which gives meaning to all

numbers . The step from 0 (zero ) to the numeral 1 (one)

is a leap across a whole universe . From one and zero we

generate infinite manifolds . Upon zero we build our

systems of reference , which is merely a way of saying that

with nothing as a center we have the fulcrum for control

of all elaborations inform . Zero is the bare point, having

only position, but no existence, on which we rest all else

in our analysis .
The pure "I" is the zero-point of organized conscious-

ness . It is the center of all systems of reference of our

human kind of consciousness . When an astronomer takes the

milky way as a base of reference, he really projects him-

self as a thinker to the milky way . This illustrates the

real independence of body which is characteristic of the

self or "I" . I am at the point where I center my . thought .

If I habitually center myself in the body then I am there

in an exceedingly narrow kind of bondage . (Such identifi-

cation with body is the essence of materialism .) But I

actually break this bondage every time I think myself away

from body, as to some other base of reference . We are

actually doing this sort of thing all the time, but commonly
without realizing the significance of what we are doing .

Simply to, .realize what one ..is doing in all this is to take

a long step in the liberating process . I literally am

where I think, or otherwise function .

If one sinks into his own pure self-consciousness

and carefully strips away all habitual or inherited inter-

pretations, he~will find that there is no meaning attaching

to the notion of body . He will find consciousness with

various modifications, and nothing else . He can call

certain modifications 'body' and by various other names,

but these are merely creative or fantastic constructs . He

knows only consciousness . And that consciousness is cen-

tered in its own subject, and nothing else . That subject

is, always has been and always will be perfectly free, and

unaffected by any objective conditioning . To the self, the

space outside and inside a granite mountain is one and the

same, and access is equally free in both cases . When a

surveyor establishes a point inside a granite cliff that

has been pierced by no tunnel, he has actually placed him-

self at that point . He has not placed another physical body

there ; he has placed his "I`there, and from that point in-

side the cliff of granite he can think further .

We often talk of unconsciousness ; we never experience

it . Dropping all inferences and habitual interpretations,

and watching as closely as possible, I never find one moment

of unconsciousness . I find thebeginning and ending of

states of consciousness, but I know nothing of unconscious-

ness . I find appearance and disappearance of contents, but

no unconsciousness . Some change of states I call going to

sleep and waking up - merely a habit - but not one moment

of unconsciousness have I found . Sometimes I remember from

one state to another .so that there is a cross -correlation

of content, but there is no change of consciousness - only

of content . If I predicate that which is true of content

as being true of "I", then I artificially bind myself

through a fantasy . I, in reality, am quite free from con-

tent, and never for one moment unconscious . Now, all this

any man can find it he will but just study himself with

clear discrimination .

We, who are born today into a world transformed and

molded by untold millenia of thought, find it exceedingly

difficult to imagine the state of consciousness wherein

thought has not yet arisen . Only with great effort during

the waking state do we silence our conceptual processes and

abstract from all experience the modifications of content

produced by thought, so that'we may once more regain the

ancient primitive consciousness . We acquire knowledge of

this state more easily when we recall our dreams during

sleep . While dreaming we are wholly in a state of pure

-632-
perception or, at least, nearly so . Here we have pure ex-

perience wherein the dreamer lives in an environment pro-

jected by his own psyche and where rarely is there a thought

which stands detached from the experiencing . The dreamer

moves in a self-produced environment, but he knows not

the nature of his own production, or even that he has

:produced ;it .. So .he becomes,the .victim of the projection

which seems to be not himself . Ordinarily he is quite

unable to will anything counter to the circumstances which

surround him, so he flows along as a conditioned pawn in

the stream of his experiences ., On awakening the dreamer

recalls his experiences with something of shame for exhi-

biting so little capacity of command , for proving to be such

an infantile weakling in the midst of mostly trivial cir-

cumstance . ; The waking man has long learned to conquer and

command his course of life in far more formidable circum-

stances than those presented in the dream . There is some-

thing appalling in the realization that the man awake should

be so strong , and yet so terribly weak when dreaming .

In our memory of the dream we have recaptured some-

thing of the pure perceptual-consciousness which was the

common form of consciousness of all earthly creatures be-

fore conceptual thought .was born . To perceive only is to

dream . To think primitively is to produce thoughts that

are perceived ; thoughts that are not yet freed from their

pre-natal., ,dependency . To live thus is to live the victim

of that which happens and not as a ruler in the kingdom .

This is the life in the mother's womb where the autonomous

forces of'life rule with unbroken sway . Through untold ages

did the race of men dwell as unborn infants in the womb of

pure perception,,and only very . slowly was the birth of a

self-determining will achieved . Even today, only the few,

relatively, have become freed from the ancient .racial womb .

Most men have scarcely learned more than to creep or to

walk a few steps on unsteady legs, ever ready at the first

portent of crisis to return to the encompassing protection

of the Mother . And this is why when surgings rise from the

perceptual depths of life the mass of men are embraced in

psychical currents over which they have no command . Whole

crowds, .even nations and races and humanities, are swept

away by currents of feeling over which their own half-born

ideas have no power . Thus, and thus only, arises the folly

of warring nations and classes . Only in the more peaceful

hours does the tender new-born life of thought possess a

fragile and uncertain direction of the individual lives .

So is it with the, overwhelming mass of men . But there are

a few who have grown sufficiently strong in the power of

self-directed thought that'they can face the surging storms

from the perceptual depths of life and maintain in the midst

of the hour of trial a .free judgment and a free will .

And this power which some have attained , all may some day

yet attain , . for no single man can achieve anything without

proving a general possibility for all men .

The child becomes the man only by leaving the home

of his birth and early protection and guidance , to go forth

into a strange world , there to :, achieve for himself a-place,

or to fail in the effort . The youth , standing midway be-

tween the child and the man, is called forth by the call

to adventure from the unknown and, yet , is called back by

his home -sick heart . As the adventure becomes the austere

trial of the solitary life which must rest upon its own un-

aided forces, the cry of the home-sick heart ever becomes

stronger , and racial man, far more often than otherwise,

heeds the cry of the heart and returns to his former home,

where for him only the Mother is known and not the Father .

In the life of a rising consciousness the home-sick yearning

is for the irresponsibility and protection of the pure per-

ceptual state . The austerity'of the conceptual craving has

proven too severe ; the responsibility of conceptual thought

too great . For when man conceives he builds his world ; he

becomes the architect of his own destiny . No longer does

he rest secure in an inheritance provided by his source .

And so it is that often, even men who have builded much

-635-
from their strength, come to a time when they direct the

lines of their structure so as to provide a way of return

to Mother perception . These are men who even philosophize

their way back, thereby forgetting their love of Sophia .

Great, indeed, must be the call of the Mother that her sons

of such maturity yet should feel so strongly the desire of

return to,the wombl . For conception, viewed as only in-

strumental to perception, is but a philosophic apology .

for the yearning for the womb . Thus the great labor of

conception is frustrated, since its first great purpose is

to build a bridge to. the realization of the unknown Father .

Man has become mature only when he has ceased to

dream, whether asleep or awake . He has become adult when,

instead of dreaming, he conceives and builds . To dream is

the easy way ; the way that grows of itself . To conceive

and build is the hard way of mature consciousness . It is

true that conceptual thought is instrumental, but it is not

true that its total meaning lies in finding a way of return

to mother-perception . It is also instrumental to the attain-

ment of the Father-consciousness, realized through intro

ception . And, finally, it is instrumental to a new-world

building wherein are compounded the consciously realized

forces of both the Father and the Mother . Here, through

conception, man produces his own future estate, a domain

which heretofore had abode in privation of form as a bare

possibility, awaiting the office of conception that it

might become existential . I do not oppose the instru-

mentalism of the Pragmatists as being in principle un-

sound, but as being far too narrowly conceived . The in-

strument of return to the Mother-perception is but one

possibility and, when this is given exclusive recognition,

man fails to assume his larger responsibilities . There

is more than one kind of Truth and Meaning .

When the Youth has gone forth from his ancient

perceptual home he carries with him an inheritance which,

if used with reasonable discretion, will prove sufficient

for him to build the bridge to the Father where he will

uncover illimitable resources . But if he fails to make

the crossing, then exhaustion will force him to return to

the womb, there to gather strength for a new trial for man-

hood . Thus it is that we see human culture rising out of

the matrix of life and, then, largely failing of its in-

tended destiny, it falls back into the matrix, to rise once

.
more in a new culture, and thus continuing time after time

This is the Vision that Spengler has seen so clearly . But

he saw only the periodic risings and the Material Soil . He

found nothing eternal but the Mother . This limits his Vision

and renders his philosophy only a part truth . He failed to

see that life below supplied the material, wherewith by

appropriate usage , Life Eternal might be attained . He

saw the rising and the failure and said this was all .
He missed the occasional successes which stand as earnests

of final universal achievement . Profane history is mostly

a . record of failure and thus . does not teach the more hopeful

lesson . For this reason history can become a dangerous

study,- .if<one fails to extract-the small amount of hidden

gold in the otherwise worthless ore . If one can find the

hidden gold in history, then, indeed, its study may prove

to be highly profitable . Otherwise, it is better not to

have consciousness too heavily laden with the vast record

of failure . The real meaning of history is the striving

of life for LIFE .

How is conception related to perception and to intro-

ception? This is a problem which ever grows in mystery the

more one studies it . In the more confused states of con-

sciousness where concepts and percepts are so inter-blended

that no clear distinction between them has arisen, the vast

distinction between the two is by no means clearly apper-

ceived . Only such a confusion could lead to the idea that

concepts are simply copies-of percepts . Once conception is

isolated and realized in its own nature it seems like a

world apart having no commensurable relation with perception .

There is, indeed, something transcendental about conception,

even though it is not wholly unrelated to the perceptual

order as is made evident by the command it . wields over

the latter . The-conceptual meaning can be defined, while

the perceptual cannot, since its peculiar nature ever lies

in that which the philosopher calls " u~ ale " . And, like-

wise, the up ale of the pure introceptual realization is

equally foreign in innate character from the conceptual

order . Yet, despite the fact that there is something in-

commensurable between these three orders, it is true that

somehow conception bridges the gulf between perception and

introception . The gulf between perception and introception

is far too vast for a self- conscious crossing to be effected

without aid . Somehow conception partakes more of the nature

of both perception and introception, than do either of the

latter two of each other .' In some sense , conception is the

child of both perception and of introception , yet possessing

something differing from both in its own right . Because of

the dual heritage , it can serve as the bridge across the

gulf between the Father and the Mother , though through its

own peculiar ug ale it differs from both .

Emanuel Kant ' s critical analysis of knowledge has

helped to clear up much of the problem of the relation of

conception to perception . Frequently it has happened that

men thinking in their towers of pure thought , without any

concern of possible bearings upon perceptual experience,

-639-
have defined the forms within which future experiences

developed . So impressive has this fact become in these

latter days of astronomic and intra -atomic rangings that

Sir James Jeans remarked in his "Mysterious Universe" that

the universe seems like the thought of a Divine Being who

thought like a pure mathematician . This does, indeed,

.impress one as a strange and mysterious fact when first

he contemplates its significance . Yet Kant ' s thought has

prepared the way for our understanding of it in principle)

-#or the basic structure of man ' s thought is an a priori

determinant of the world which he thinks . It is not a

question simply of thought conforming to a pre -existent

order in a perceptual manifold or flux, but the reverse .

The perceptual order manifests to the thinker only within

n

the forms which thought allows . Other forms would reveal

other worlds and have done so, within minor limits, in the

cases of other cultures . So the form of our conception is

the form of our possible thinkable experience , whatever the

experience of other types of consciousness may be . Thus

we can predict , when we think in conformity with the laws

of our thought , not because we have guessed correctly, but

because we have predetermined the possible . So, in a sense

we have created the world we later experienced , though there

is something that we as merely men have not placed there .

We cannot pre-determine the distinctive guale of experience,

nor can we make over the underlying structure of our thought

as we please . Thus'there is a sense in which we can truly

say that any self-consistent system of thought possesses

.existence and is real ., Who can say that any such system

will never be filled with a perceptive content? Thought

destroys something and yet creates something to take the

place of that which was destroyed . By thought some of us

have been led far away from the primitive maternal soil of

perception and, in that, we have known both impoverishment

and enrichment .

But'if man cannot live by bread alone, yet neither

can he live by concepts alone, nor by these two however

richly combined . Not all yearnings are fulfilled within

this compound zone and, as passing time brings maturity,

the unsatisfied yearnings grow in•number and with ever

larger intensity . More is needed to give the endless game

of life durable Significance . And the longer the yearning

lasts unsatisfied, the more empty becomes .the game and the

more insistent the demand for Significance . This yearning

is an earnest that the total•possible consciousness for man

is more than that which he has generally realized . He is

more than a,sub-human .perceiving creature that learned to

conceive .
That which all but the few have neglected is the

Father of consciousness,-introception . Here is that which

-641-
originally . impregnated :the Mother, and then was forgotten

in the inner depths of consciousness, and was even denied

by many . It is the return to the Father which completes

the first cycle of the Pilgrim in the journey to full

Enlightenment . Until mankind essays this final step there

can be no true Peace, but only the return to the pre-natal

stage of perception, when there is weariness from the labors

of conceptual creation . This latter return is a kind of

failure, though it may be unavoidable when weariness and

weakness has become too great . But he who, before his

powers have become too greatly exhausted, forces the Gate

of introception, .completes the first cycle of the Great

Work, and may rest, if need be .

To arouse self-consciousness is the great office

of the conceptual function . Within the dream - like state

of pure perception there can be no awakening of self-

consciousness . The child born in the womb is sustained

by the psychical forces which it does not control . It

is, but does not know that it is , and it is conscious. but

does not know its own consciousness . The labor- pains of

conceiving first arouses the power of consciousness to be

aware of itself . And when this power of consciousness to

know itself has grown enough the introceptive door may be

opened and , leaving even thought behind, consciousness may

r
still retain the power not only to be, but to be aware

of itself as well . Thus the crossing is consummated over

the bridge of conception . Beyond lie further possibilities ;

among them , the union of conception with introception .

Conception,is the son of the Mother, but the

daughter of the Father .- Thought gives eyes to blind per-

ception.-and so,leads it. . ;,But thought is led by intro-

ception and gives form to it . With respect to the trans-

cendent realm, thought gives form to unlimited formless

possibility . With respect to perceptual filling, thought

determines the range of possibilities . It clothes Spirit

in form and illumines the matter of perception . These are

the dual offices of conception in its relation to intro-

ception and perception .

When thought moves towards its own roots then it

comes hear to the-key which will open the door to the new

function . Kant came close to this key, but either neg-

lected it or did not use it aright . Those who received

his mantle most directly went far on the new road . Within

the writings of the post-Kantian Idealists there lies in-

dubitable evidence . of Vision, in the sense of Gnosis, but

it is not at all clear that these men of vision ever clearly

recognized that the authority of their insight actually

rested upon a new function . Perhaps Schopenhauer glimpsed

something of the truth when he grounded his world-view

upon the conative principle of Will, but I regard this

view as simply the accentuation of the activistic element

in consciousness which always stands as the other of the

contemplative . There is nothing inherently more profound

in activism than in contemplation . The emphasis of one

aspect or the other is more a reflection of individual

temperament than of absolute validity of insight . Actually,

Schopenhauer ' s Voluntarism is a metaphysical interpretation

of insight, and not the instrument of insight itself . The

function of insight gives a transcendental content which,

when reduced to an interpretive system, becomes subject to

the relativity of all subject-object consciousness . There-

fore, there can be no such thing as an absolutely infallible

interpretation . Thus we must distinguish between insight

and its formulation . The voluntaristic doctrine is simply

a formulation which gives accentuated valuation to the

conative element in consciousness and depreciates the rational

features . In the last analysis, Voluntarism is just as

relative as Rationalism , and is no 'more profound .

I believe, however, that Schopenhauer did, in a

measure , isolate the function . of introception when he spoke

of the intuition of genius . and of the " temper akin to genius" .

This is clearly the function of insight if one considers

-644-
the notion in the sense that Schopenhauer employed it .

It is not the ordinary kind of intuition, but intuition

moving toward the transcendental . Intuition is a general

notion applying to all forms of immediacy reaching from

the most primitive instinct up to the highest insight .

Clearly this is a collective rather than a definite notion

which will become more and more differentiated the more

our consciousness of the function grows . The "intuition

of genius" is not any kind of intuition, but a special

kind related to the truly metaphysical side of being . It

has a character which definitely differentiates it from

other kinds of intuition and thus deserves a special desig-

nation of its own . In Buddhistic psychology it is called

"Dhyana" . I have called it "introception" .

Before leaving this reference-to Schopenhauer it

seems well to call attention to a weakness in his system

which I am enabled to avoid . Schopenhauer gives to Will a

fundamental and constitutive metaphysical character . It is

the true nature of the underlying Reality . Spengler has

very correctly shown that this metaphysical conception by

no means implies Schopenhauer's ethics . In fact, Spengler

has really carried out the metaphysics of Schopenhauer with

fundamental consistency and derived an ethic, which, I be-

lieve, is a far truer derivative from that metaphysic than

-645-
Schopenhauer ' s own ethic . For my part, I would maintain,

in opposition to Spengler , that the really profound insight

of Schopenhauer is to be found in the ethics rather than

in the metaphysics , . and the ethics actually controverts

the metaphysics . For Schopenhauer affirmed in his ethics

that the feasible way to salvation lay in the thorough-

going denial of the Will ,• through the denial of the will-

to-live . The ultimate salvation is a state wherein the

Will is nullified . But if the Will can be nullified then

it is not the ultimate ontological p rinciple . There must

be something still more ultimate . If we turn to the very

end of Schopenhauer ' s t'The World as Will and Idea " we find

a very significant sentence and footnote . Here he says :

If
. . .we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire

abolition of will is for those who are still full of will

certainly nothing ; but , conversely , to those in whom the

will has turned and has denied itself , this our world, which

is so real , with all its suns and milky -ways - is nothing ."

So the world that rests upon the will is nothing while the

state which results when the will has turned upon and denied

itself is nothing for those who are still full of will . This

is not the same thing as saying that it is nothing , per se .

Its nature is simply a somewhat beyond all conception, but

the Root Source of every possibility . Clearly, Schopenhauer

reaches a somewhat which is more fundamental than the Will .

Here Schopenhauer and I converge to agreement, however far

.we may differ as to the relative status of the Will .

It is interesting and significant that in the second

clause of the above quotation Schopenhauer used the expres-

sion : "those in whom the will has turned and has denied

itself" . This'is a logical parallel of the "turning of

the Light of consciousness toward its source" and of the

,recurring phrase in the Buddhist Sutras, i .e ., "the turn-

ing about at the deepest seat of consciousness" . It is

this turning about which forms the very essence of Dhyana

and of the function which I have called introception .

Clearly, I am not discussing a merely private experience

but something which was recognized as crucial for both

religion and philosophy as much as 2,500 years ago and was,

at least in some measure , appreciated by one of our leading

Western philosophers . The "turning about" does involve

conative factors and so it may be viewed as a turning about

of the will so that it denies itself in its habitual move-

ment toward the object . This aspect of the function of

introception is certainly important and I shall discuss

it later, but since I view the conative element as instru-

mental to noetic content I have naturally placed the emphasis

upon the .latter . I conceive the "turning about" of the will

as more significant in relation to the problem of method

than it is to the question of the ultimate constitution

of Reality . In fact, Schopenhauer, despite his metaphysical

.theory, has implied this when he speaks of the will as

denying itself .

At the very close of his book, Schopenhauer makes

a very significant statement in the form of a foot-note

added to the sentence quoted above . This note is as fol-

lows : "This is also the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists,

the 'beyond all knowledge', i .e ., the point at which subject

and object are no more ." In other words, that which seems

like nothing-',to "those who are still full of will", is

precisely the same as the Prajna-Paramita . This leads us

to the question of just what is meant by the Prajna-

Paramita . As a matter of fact, the Prajna-Paramita is

the central core of the Buddhist philosophy and the sacred

objective of the religious practice . Everything else has

only a relative or derived reality, but this is absolutely

real . Through the realization of Prajna in the highest

sense of the Prajna-Paramita one attains Nirvana and states

of consciousness which are still more profound . I shall

later discuss this subject at some length, but here I shall

consider briefly whether this Is merely another name for

absolute nothingness .

-648-
 Something of the meaning of both Prajna and Paramita

can be derived from a study of exoteric Sanskrit sources .

Let us take . the dictionary definitions .

Prajna has the following meanings : ( as an adjective)

intelligent ; knowing, acquainted with . (As a noun of femi-

nine gender) information ; discrimination, judgment, Intel- .

. ligence,lunderstanding ; .wisdom, knowledge ; purpose, resolve ;

the Universal Mind ; the capacity for perception ; Consciousness .

Paramita has the meaning : (As a noun of feminine

gender) reaching the further shore, complete attainment .

•Prajna-Paramita is given the value : (as a feminine

noun) highest degree of knowledge or understanding .

We would reach even better the Buddhist meaning of

this compound term if we give Prajna-Paramita the value of :

the wisdom, knowledge or understanding attained by reaching

the further shore . It is otherwise known as "Transcendental

Wisdom" which is to be understood as radically different

from empiric or worldly wisdom or knowledge . In fact,

neither form of wisdom implies the other since each is at-

tained in different ways, yet one and the same individual

may attain both by .the appropriate effort in the two direc-

tions . The Indians differentiate between absolute Truth

or Knowledge , known as, Paramarthasatya , and relative truth

7'; ~
FJLsQ1-
-649- C4&k Wig
Skv0 Ml t"
or knowledge, known as, Samvrittisatya . This corresponds

to the difference between Transcendental Wisdom and empiric

wisdom .

It is clear that when Schopenhauer uses the phrase

"beyond all knowledge" in .his definition of Prajna-

Paramita it is to be understood in the sense of being be-

yond Samvrittisatya .or empiric .knowledge or wisdom . It

is not beyond Knowledge in the sense of Transcendental

Wisdom ( aramarthasatya) or of wisdom, knowledge and under-

standing attained by reaching the further shore .

Obviously .the .'Buddhists `do not mean by Pra jna-

Paramita an absolute nothingness, although they often do

use in this connection the term Shunyata, which means

literally Voidness . But the Buddhist Canon is clear on

the point that the Voidness may be attained and abided in

as a state for a great .period as measured by objective time,

and then may be left . Further, the realization of the Void-

ness may be the beginning point of a higher kind of evolu-

tion of such a nature that it simply cannot be conceived

by ordinary relative consciousness . Sometimes it is spoken

of as a super-cosmic evolution . All of this implies some-

thing totally different from an absolute annihilation .

However much the Western student may seem to be justi-

fied .in questioning whether the Buddhist sages know what

-650-
they are talking about, it is none the less perfectly

clear that they do not mean by Nirvana and Shunyata a state

of annihilation of all consciousness . On the contrary,

these terms refer to states which are or may be states of

consciousness and definitely possessing the noetic guale .

This would imply that one would arrive at a better under-

standing of . the Buddhist meaning by taking the metaphysics

of Hegel in combination with the ethics of Schopenhauer,

rather than by taking Schopenhauer's metaphysics and ethics

together . However, we have here only an approach to the

Buddhist meaning as the Hegelian Idea is something less

than Shunyata . So far, no Western philosopher has quite .

made the crossing to the "Further Shore" .

In my employment of the term "consciousness" in

the phrase "the Light of consciousness turning towards its

own source" I am implying something more fundamental than

either the noetic . or the .conative . Consciousness, in its

total meaning, includes these two aspects as well as feel-

ing tone and more or less undetermined other qualities .

Consciousness is the common denominator . of all . 'It is,

therefore, the best neutral term .

Unquestionably one must employ the will in the

appropriate way before the "turning about" can be effected .

-651-
The mystical participation in the object holds mankind

in an hypnotic spell which is harder to break than bars

of iron . To break this spell a strongly willed effort is

required . Actually no objective achievement requires an

equal degree of intensity and persistence of the will .

Will, both conscious and autonomous , rules the empiric

world and-,simply employs ideas or concepts as instruments .

The result is that in ordinary experience , the will never

has to face as great a battle as when it turns upon itself

for the purpose of effecting a neutralization of its long

established habit ..., of outward flowing . Ideation can achieve

a theoretical "turning about" much more easily and, if the

.will has been already trained to accept subservience to

ideation, then .the latter can lead the way in the "turning

about" and the battle of the will is substantially reduced .

But in this case part of . the battle was already won when

ideation achieved the subserviency of the will .

Without some degree of theoretical understanding of

the whole process, the "turning about" implies an almost

tragic climax, for from the standpoint of conative and

feeling consciousness the turning away from the object

seems like self-annihilation . The mystical participation

in the object involves both the will and the feelings far

more profoundly than it does cognition . The intellect has

already had so large a training in abstraction that it has

become familiar with objects of high tenuity . This affords

an enormous advantage , since between the object of highest

tenuity and true objectiessness the gulf is relatively

small . The labor whereby a man attains the point of working

with objects of highest tenuity*actually implies much of

the austerity requisite for the achievement of true object-

lessness . 1 The very " thinness " of concepts , that aroused

the protest of William James, actually becomes a superior

merit when the concept is .employed as an instrument for

arousing introception .

Again, I am implying that the office of conceptual

thought in relation to the function of introception is of

instrumental character . But this is instrumentalism inter-

preted in a very different sense from that of the instrument-

alism of the Pragmatist wherein conception is viewed as

serving solely the end of more experience in the perceptual

field . Actually, here , both knowledge and the conceptual

function are to be viewed as relatively terminal with

respect to experience . . The kind of conception which has

. With
transcendental roots is not derived from experience

respect to this kind of conception experience enters into

the picture solely as a catalytic agent which drops away

more or less completely as the conceptual process takes

-853-
hold on a totally different kind of base . One comes to

value experience for the knowledge it arouses and the

conceptual process which it helps to start, rather than the

other way around . The Pragmatist values knowledge and

knowing because of the further experience to which it

leads . Thus a radical difference of orientation is implied .

In the end the conceptual•` process leads beyond itself but,

in the case of introception , the end is a spiritual realiza-

tion , and not merely more experience . After the attain-

ment and anchorage in the spiritual realization, the con-

ceptual order may serve a new office , with bearings upon

the field of experience . . But in this case the relationship

is hierarchical with conception serving as'the law-giver

with respect to-experience and the perceptual order gen-

erally . But even in this case, conceptual knowledge iss

only a surrogate-for the introceptive content for such

individual consciousnesses as do not know the latter directly .

The "thinness " of concepts has a two-fold connota-

tion . In the one sense, which William James employed in

his "Pluralistic Universe" and elsewhere, the concept is

"thin" because it lacks substance . It is like the blue-

print and specifications of a bridge, building or machine,

since in this case it is a practical instrument for the

effecting of consequences in the realm of perceptual

existence . Everything that can be conceived of the bridge,

building, etc ., can be conceived of the blue-print and

specifications, but the . corresponding perceptual existences

have something which the latter does not possess . They

lend themselves to empiric use . It is this latter func-

tionality which constitutes the ."thickness" in James's

sense . But "thinness" takes on quite another meaning when

it is understood in the sense of the Voidness (Shunyata) of

the Buddhists . Shunyata is voidness only in its seeming as

it appears to relative consciousness , particularly in the

sense of perceptual consciousness . In its own nature it is

the one and only self-existent Substance . The spiritual

concept or, in other words, the concept when united with

introceptual filling, can be called "thin" only in the

Buddhist sense . Realized in its own nature it possesses .a

higher substantiality than perceptual experience . Thus it

is entirely possible to realize greater fullness, greater

substantiality, in the case of some concepts than that

given by experience . There is, consequently, a sense in

which the most abstract knowledge - just precisely that

which James would call most "thin" - is actually the most

concrete of all . Unless one appreciates this fact he will

miss the real force of the transcendentalistic thought .

 If by the meaning of a concept we understand a

perceptual experience, whether as an object for sensation,

a program of action, an adjustment of life, etc ., then in

this case we would not say that the concept enrobes its

meaning . It rather points towards its meaning . In much

discussion this is the only kind of meaning recognized,

but it is not the only sense,in which significance can be

understood . However, when concepts carry meaning only in

this sense they are only sign-pointers and thus are in- .

strumental relators exclusively . This is meaning taken

exclusively in the objective or extraverted sense . But

there is another form of significance which is related to

the subject, and here the relationship of the concept to

its meaning acquires quite a different form . It is not

a 'meaning objectively experienced to which the concept or

idea leads . The significance lies within the concept so

that we would properly speak of the concept as enrobing

the meaning, rather than pointing to it in the sense of

the figure of the sign-post . One finds this second mean-

ing, not by the appropriate kind of action, but by the cor-

rect kind of meditation, that is, by a process of intro-

ception . The difference between these two procedures is

simply of enormous importance . For one thing, one must

understand that introceptive meditation is not merely a

-656-
process of reflection about an object, whereby one deducts
or infers consequences . . It is a movement of conscious-
ness, such that, a successful outcome implies a transcendence

of both thinking and perception-so that consciousness enters

something like another . dimension . In fact, the inward

penetration into the significance of a concept is the

epistemological or psychological parallel o.f .the intro-

ceptive movement toward the self wherein the self is not

transformed into a new object, but remains unaltered in its

subjective character . This is not a conceptual relation

considered in either pragmatic or realistic epistemology .

A given concept may have both the perceptive and

.the introceptive kind of relations but, in general, it

seems clearly evident that some concepts possess more the

one kind-of meaning , while others are more valuable in the

opposite sense . We can say with a considerable degree of

generality that the more concrete the character of a

concept the more it may be taken as meaning a particularized

perceptual experience, while the more abstract it is the

more the reference is to an introceptive content . In other

words , increase in abstraction is a movement towards a

spiritual orientation . As an illustration we may take two

notions, such as , "a beautiful scene" and "beauty", the

former being the more concrete, the latter the more abstract .
Now the notion of a beautiful scene implies a judgment

related to a concrete perceptual object, while "beauty"

is an abstraction of a bare quality . From the standpoint

of a highly extraverted, concrete consciousness there is

an actual referent which corresponds to .the beautiful

scene , but no .such real . referent for the notion of beauty .

The latter notion'may'help to`further the process of thought,

but, taken by itself, has no real meaning , but only some-

thing like a flavor derived from concrete experience . At

any rate, from this viewpoint beauty is not a self-existence

apart from beautiful objects .' But no one-who has had any

considerable experience with introverted penetration will

agree with the above judgment . There is such a thing as a

direct realization of beauty quite apart from beautiful

objects . In fact, acquaintance with this realization leads

to the discovery that there is actually no such thing as

objective beauty . The beauty seen is superimposed upon

the object by the observer, though generally this process

is unconscious . Beauty cannot only be conceived in abstrac-

tion from objective content, it can also be realized directly

apart from all objects . This is part of what is accomplished

by the introceptive function .

-658-
 When a concept enrobes an inner Significance it

possesses. "thickness" or depth . In other relations,

the same formal concept may point, directly or indirectly,

to a perceptual experience . In this case, it has the

value of "thinness" . Thus the-"thinness" of a concept,

when viewed from the extraverted perspective, may be'

transformed into "thickness" when the same concept is

taken in an introceptive relation . Accordingly the "thin-

ness" and the "thickness" are relative to perspective

rather than being absolute or formal properties .

As the process of abstraction is'carried further

and further toward the limit of tenuity wherein conceptual

thought can function the growing "thinness", in the per-

ceptual sense, corresponds to a growing "thickness", in

the introceptive sense . There finally is reached a point

where thought continues without the use of concepts or,

at least, without the use of concepts which can be represented

in words . In mathematics this process has, long since,'

reached the stage where words, in the ordinary sense, can-

not express the thought, and only symbols can serve as the

conceptual instruments . But there ultimately comes the

point where there are no longer any symbols, even, that are
.
adequate . Thought then deals with a disembodied Meaning

At this point the " thinness ", in the extravert sense, has
 become absolute ; while the inner "thickness" has virtually

become infinite . This is an extremely pregnant Thought

for, in this sense , a single Idea may require even volumes

for its interpretation . Indeed, it is never wholly inter-

preted since no objectively thinkable elaboration can ever

exhaust its possibilities . We may think of it as being in

its own, nature . like the perfect summation of a converging

infinite series , whereas the objectively thinkable inter-

pretation is not more than approximation of that summation,

proceeding term by-term . At any point attained in the

second process , .there still remains an infinite number of

terms to complete the summation . So in speaking of the

inner Thought as infinitely richer than the objective

thought, the words "infinite" and ."infinitely" are to be

taken as strictly valid .

The relative substantiality of the inner disrobed

Thought may also be suggested by certain notions taken

from modern physics . Today we think of matter as composed

of atoms which, in turn , are composed of protons .electronsd

,

~/aeathe~l=emtrgrs.. The atom appears to be

organized with a nuclear center , consisting of protons and

re""/o~v,
neutrons, while there are a A-s-&-aA electrons na4mbi;aa-g 4:e

about the nucleus .- The total size of the atom is

_// conceived as the space circumscribed by the outermost

-660-
Now, within this space , the total volume actually filled

by electrons and protons is comparable to the space filled

by the sun,"planets, satellites, meteors, etc . In other

words, the unfilled space, even in the densest of matter

found in nature on this earth, is simply vast compared .to

the filled portion . Now, if protons, neutrons, or elec-

trons were actually packed tight so as to rest in contact

with each other, the resulting density would be almost

inconceivable to the imagination . In the case of some of

the heavy stars it appears that this state is, in high

measure, approximated , with the result that, according to

calculation, a volume the size of a pea would we g ons .

If we liken ordinary conceptual thought to the atomic

organization of matter as we know it here, then the dis-

robed or transcendent Thought would correspond to the

tightly packed protons or neutrons . It is immeasurably

more substantial . .
Another way of presenting the idea is to say that

the transcendental'Thought consists of Leaning in its

purity, disassociated from all form . And, in this sense,

even the most abstract mathematical formula must be regarded

as form . Clearly, this is not thinking in the familiar .

sense of the word, but, none the less, it is Thought,

though of another order . One is justified in calling it

-661-
"Thought" for the reason that it is a content most nearly

related to thought among the more familiar human functions .

We may call this the pure introceptive Thought, but it is

not to be understood as identical with the whole of intro-

ceptive content . For instance , there is, as well, an

introceptive quality that bears an analogous relation to

feeling with a corresponding degree of relative intensity .

If I have succeeded in conveying my meaning , it will

be understood that Voidness, in the sense of Shunyata, is

only the Suchness as it appears from the perspective of

relative consciousness . When It is realized in its own

nature, it is absolutely substantial . This shift of value

corresponds to a shift in the base of self-consciousness,

as from one to another system of reference, in the mathe-

•matical sense . The transformation is effected by means of

a reversal of the flow of consciousness , both in the sense

of the will turning about and nullifying its .normal flow,

and of awareness consummating the same turn .

 Jr
Footnote to Chapter VI*M

lOne of my teachers in mathematics once told me of the

psychological preparatory steps requisite for the
production of creative work in the field of the Theory
of Groups, a particularly difficult branch of mathematics .
This preparatory work required about three months in
which one studied his subject, worked on it, thought
about it and dreamed of it . Meanwhile he religiously
severed himself from any diversion, particularly . of a
type that was naturally attractive to him and which
could absorb his interest without great effort . Only
.after a protracted period of this kind of discipline
was the intellect enabled to move creatively in the
tenuous field of that kind of mathematical thought .
There was one case of a German professor who specialized
in the same field, but who also loved the opera . He
found that if he were going to continue his mathematical
work he had to renounce the opera . The interest in the
opera simply drew off too much of the libido, in a way
that was an essentially easy and spontaneous activity,
with the result that there was a fatal weakening of the
creative will in the more austere field .

Now this illustrates the real meaning of the austerity

requisite for the awakening of the introceptive func-
tion . The libido must be concentrated in the new direc-
tion until the function is awakened and established . All
that the above mathematicians needed to add to their
effort to effect the arousing of introception was the
spiritual polarization of consciousness . As it was, they
stopped somewhat this side of the Gnostic goal . But
otherwise they employed essential features of .the dis-
cipline necessary to break the mystical participation
in the object .
 ff
Chapter

Introceptionalism
II

Introceptionalism is a transcendental philosophy .

But since the notion of the transcendental has a number

of specific meanings in both philosophy and theology,

it is necessary to render explicit the sense in which

that notion is used here . In one sense, the trans-

cendental is conceived as knowledge or truth beyond the

range of human conception or acquisition . In this case,

the judgment that such a knowledge or truth exists is

based upon super-human revelation or upon the .universal-

ization of rational categories beyond the range of

possible experience . In a second meaning, we have the

use of the terms "transcendent" and "transcendental"

as employed by Immanuel Kant . Here the "transcendental"

is conceived as the a priori forms which delimit pos-

sible experience and what may be thought concerning it,

while the "transcendent" is that which lies beyond all

possible experience and, in conformity with the Kantian

thesis, can never ben an object of knowledge . In a

third usage, transcendental philosophy is the system-

atic development of the view that the subjective com-

ponent of consciousness stands as the determinant fac-

tor with respect to the objective, often implying that

1

the experienced world is dependent upon the activityy

of the treason . In a fourth sense , transcendentalism

is "any philosophy which emphasizes the intuitive,

spiritual and super- sensuous ; any mode of thought

which is aggressively non-empirical or anti-empirical ."

(Baldwin's Dictionary) .

The present transcendentalistic philosophy has

a good deal in common with all four of these uses of

the terms transcendent and transcendental, yet posses-

ses its own peculiar differentia . Introceptionalism

affirms a Truth and a Knowledge which is not derived

from experience and which is not dependent upon ex-

perience for its being . But it does not deny the ex-

istence of an inferior empiric sort of knowledge which

is grounded upon experience and valuable mainly, if not

wholly, . in its relation to further experience . From

the standpoint of the introceptive realization, empiric

knowledge may be valuable exclusively as a catalytic

agent which may, under some conditions, help to arouse

the introceptive activity, but in this case the empiric

factor supplies none of the content of the transcend-

ental .Truth or Knowledge, though it may supply symbolic

figures of speech in'connection with the problem of

-665-
suggesting a spiritual meaning . Thus experience re-

mains valuable essentially for no larger purpose than

supplying a language whereby hidden and pre-existent

Meaning becomes objectified .

But while introceptive Knowledge transcends

experience it does not lie beyond the possibility of

direct realization by .a human being . Since in quite

common loose usage, "experience" is . often given a con-

notation sufficiently broad to include what .I mean by

"introceptive realization", it is important to remember

that here "experience" is given a delimited meaning .

First of all I understand by experience, "consciousness

considered as a process taking place in time" . This is

the first sense given in Baldwin's Dictionary and it

seems to be accorded general agreement . Further, I

regard experience as the state of consciousness pro-

duced through the function of perception, into which

conceptual knowledge enters only as a ministering agent .

Finally, I view experience as a mode of consciousness

wherein the object is relatively ascendent with respect

to the subject . The latter emphasis appears to be a

necessary part of all empirical philosophy and consti-

tutes a primary differentiation between Empiricism and

Transcendentalism .

-666-
 In relation to all three phases of the defini-

tion of,experience, introceptional realization stands

decisively-differentiated . First of all, it gives con-

sciousness in a state such that time is not at all

relevant . Second, it is not a state of consciousness

based upon perception, but upon another function or way

of consciousness . Third, it definitely gives the sub-

ject the position of transcendency with respect to the

object . Thus the introceptive realization is to be

conceived of as something which can be known by a human

being, but cannot be experienced .

Pure conceptual knowledge is also a somewhat

which falls outside of experience in the above sense,

but it is also not to be regarded as identical with

introceptive realization . The distinction is highly

important, since, negatively considered, from the stand-

point of Empiricism, Introceptional .ism may appear to be-

identical with Rationalism . In Rationalism, the object

for knowledge transcends the object for experience,

but it by no means follows that the subject transcends

the object . Rational demonstration produces an effect

that is, indeed, closer to the subject, than any demon-

stration through experience, yet the most rigorous

-667-
reasoned proof has yet a quality of objectivity and,

therefore, of distance with respect to the subject .

For this reason one cannot by pure thought alone think

himself into the transcendental state of consciousness,

though he may attain a highly rarified surrogate of

that state - something which is far beyond the pos-

sibilities of mere experience . As a consequence it

requires more critical acuity to differentiate be-

tween this surrogate and genuine introceptive realiza-

tion, than it does between the latter and experience

proper . Thus, .for example, we can both conceive and

introceptively realize a timeless order, but we cannot

experience it, since a state of consciousness conditioned

by time is an ineluctable mark of experience as such .

As will be shown more fully in what follows, the

introceptive realization is a state wherein the subject

and the object become so far interblended that the self

is identical with its knowledge . This is a state of

intimacy which never can be attained by pure rational

demonstration alone . For this reason, the most rigorous

logical proof, however far it transcends mere . experience,

none the less, falls short of certainty . The subject

can be absolutely certain only of that knowledge with

-668
which it is itself identical .' This is characteristic

of introceptive realization, and thus differentiates

Introceptionalism from Rationalism, though there is

closer affinity between these two philosophic forms

than there is between either and any Empiric philosophy .

The introceptional transcendentalism is not to

.be conceived as-a form of revelation beyond the possi-

bility of verification by the self within a human being .

Revelation which cannot be verified directly, and not

merely pragmatically, wields no authority worthy of

philosophic respect . All religions based upon this

notion of revelation fall below .the level of philosophic

respect . Revelation, in this sense, implies acceptance

through,blind belief, which is something considerably

less than inner-faith, which may be regarded as an in-

tuition that has not yet-fulfilled itself as full know-

ledge in the Light of consciousness . Introceptiona-

lism affirms no knowledge, truth or reality which may

not be directly verified by the self resident within a

human being . It is even more antagonistic to the atti-

tude of blind belief than is physical science .

There is, a sense , however, such that the know-

ledge of introceptive realization is not to be regarded

as human knowledge . For this reason I use the form

"verified by the self resident within a human being", .

rather than simply saying "verified by a human being

or human subject" . In the end we will have to regard

the self as transcending the condition of being human .

The complete impersonality of the Light of conscious-

ness appearing as emanating from a self renders the

distinction of a human, a sub-human and a super-

human consciousness meaningless . It is only after

this pure consciousness has been modified by form, tone

or state that we are enabledd to classify it as being

consciousness of one or another order . Consciousness

as it is behind the categories of human consciousness

is no longer merely human consciousness, but simply

capable of assuming the form of human consciousness .

Critical philosophy has generally derived the

conclusion that a human consciousness can know only a

content which is capable of being experienced, save

that it may know also the a pr_ i__ forms which define

the limits of possible experience . Beyond this, human

consciousness has only moral intuitions or faith which,

while they give less than knowledge, yet provide an

orientation to a somewhat transcending human conscious-

ness . I am not only forced to agree with this conclusion,

.but would even affirm it independently if it did not
already exist .* Thus'the possession of a knowledge,e

which goes beyond experience and .the conceptual forms

which delimit possible experience , implies .a conscious-

ness which is more comprehensive than human conscious-

ness per se .•,If .the .self which is resident within a

human being is conceived as incapable of awareness in

any othery .than the restricted human form, then a

transcendental knowledge would have to be judged as

impossible . Anything derived from a transcendental

order would have to be regarded as a revelation which

man would have to accept. ..or-reject blindly, since he

could not himself verify it . But if, on the other

hand, the ultimate organization of consciousness in

such that it is possible for the self resident in a

human being to transcend the limits of the human form

of consciousness , then it becomes possible, in-prin-

ciple, for such a self to realize a transcendent know-

ledge and then, to the degree that the individual had

established a correlation between the transcendent and

the conceptual, expression could be given to this know-

ledge . . There would then arise the problem of how such

an expression is related to the transcendent content,

just as there is a problem of how conception is related

to a perceptual content, but at least a way of correla-

tion between transcendental content and human conscious-
ness is established in principle . In this way it'would

be possible for man to check directly the content of

purported revelation, thereby sifting the true from

the erroneous . It thus becomes conceivable that man

may consume faith and belief in the Fire of Knowledge .

Introception is the function whereby man trans-

cends the limits of the merely human . It is the way to

direct metaphysical understanding . But here sound

criticism must be careful to draw the distinction be-

tween the pure metaphysical understanding and the con-

ceptual framework which symbolizes it . What man can

think conceptually is not a true portrait of the trans-

cendent and never can be, for a conceptual order is

objective with respect to a thinking self while .trans-

cendental knowledge is identical with its subject . As

a consequence, the process of objectivication inevitably

implies distortion, however high the skill of the thinker .

However, the conceptual order is a symbol which means

the transcendent order, and defectiveness resident in

the symbol may not rightly be predicated of that which

is symbolized .

Of course, it is again clear that the conceptual

form is instrumental in its relation to the intro-

ceptional content, but here the reference lies in the

dimension of intensivity, rather than of extensivity

as in the case of the pragmatic theory of knowledge .

Further, a conceptual order, ' having introceptive
reference , when it is considered in its relation to

the field of perceptual experience, is,not a servant

function but a master-function . It legislates laws

governing the range .of :future possible experience . As

I have said before, .this kind of conceptualism is .a

surrogate for transcendental realization in the field

of experience for all consciousness which is not in a

state of .,direct realization itself . Conceptual cog-

nition, .in this sense, transcends experience and wields

an authority beyond the testing of experience . It sup-

plies the framework or .base of reference of future pos-

sible experience, but such conditioned experience can-

not check its own presuppositions, thereby rendering

an objective pragmatic testing impossible . Transcend-

ental insight alone is competent to test an intro-

ceptive concept, while, experience can test an empiric

concept by the pragmatic method . It thus follows that,

from the standpoint of Empiricism, the introceptive con-

cept bears a strong analogy to a rationalistic system,

though its real nature is totally different from that

of abstract Rationalism.
 We are now in a position to develop a theory of

both the doctrine of innate ideas and of natural rights .

Whenever any individual from the level of an introceptual

realization gives conceptual embodiment to a transcend-

ental content, he .imprints this as a form within the

collective psyche . Such concepts are peculiarly vital

forces . They are of a distinctly different order as

compared with mere working hypotheses, since the latter

are merely invented constructs designed to integrate

some empiric complex . Any number of working hypotheses

may be designed to deal with such complex situations,

and the choice among alternative hypotheses is governed

by purely pragmatic considerations, such as relative

simplicity of formulation and application . Such formu-

lations are proposed, used and abandoned, either when

they prove inadequate or when some alternative theory

offers superior advantages . Clearly, such constructions

supply little more than scaffoldings which facilitate

the growth of human understanding and command of the

environment . Probably the Pragmatists have interpreted

this process correctly enough . But a concept which is

the embodiment . of an introceptual realization carries

a force of quite a different nature .

-674-
 If a student can so far free himself from his

own cultural matrix such that he may view other cultures

with an attitude freed from prejudice, he will find

that other cultures have world-views and sciences of

a nature more or less incommensurable with our own .

He will find that many of the features of older cultures

which have formerly seemed merely crude or immature to

him actually have a good deal more of enlightened

sophistication than he had imagined . It will become

clear that there is simply a number of different ways

of viewing'the world and conceiving a science, and that

all such ways which have been part of an historically

significant culture have actually proved themselves

adequate by pragmatic tests . Our science and world-

view may seem obvious enough to us but quite different

orientations have seemed'~no less obvious to other peoples

and have been no less effective'in achieving an adjust-

ment between the living human-being and the world-about .

No one culture, not even our own, possesses the exclusively

correct world-view . Now, what is it that causes any parti-

cular : : world-view to appear to be obvious or natural?

This is a question which leads us down into the generally

unconscious determinants of the various ways of orienta-

tion possible to man . Some of these orientations we can

trace to historic sources thereby clarifying particular

instances of a general process .

 Men like' Pythagoras and Galileo are a good deal

more than scientific workers . They are, rather, men

of scientific deeds, in the sense of Spengler . They

established ways of approach to the problem of such a

basic source that those who followede in . the respective

cultures subsequently thought along the lines they laid

down ." Our science may'even-be called the Galilean

science , while that of the Greeks may be thought of as

the Pythagorean science . It is particularly signifi-

cant that the use or understanding of number in these

two sciences is so vastly .different that it is quite

difficult for one who belongs to the current of the

one kind of science to understand the number concept

of the other . These men actually established frame-

works of approach which became like self-evident truths

for those who followed in their foot-steps . We are not

merely convinced of the soundness of these truths, we

rather believe them with a religious sort of convic-

tion . -,Now, what such men have .actually done is to

imprint within the human psyche of their respective

cultures concepts which embody an introceptive reali-

zation . These concepts are pregnant and living and,

within their respective spheres of influence, they

-676-
possess the men who are subsequently born so that they

find it exceedingly difficult to free themselves from

the feeling that these concepts are necessary .

In the field of religion this process is even

more notable . Thus to the Christian Protestant of con-

viction the Lutheran doctrine of "justification by

faith" is not merely a philosophical theory to be

entertained among alternative theories ; it is rather

a necessary ground-principle which is believed by all

who realize the true doctrine . But this doctrine has

never been universally held, either in the historic

past nor at present, even among men of distinctly

superior religiosity . The opposed doctrine of mediation

appears to possess an even wider acceptance, and seems

quite as natural and obvious to those who accept it . .

What we have here is simply an illustration of a process

wherein a man of introceptive insight impregnated a

concept with that insight and thus predetermined the

view-point of large numbers of men who followed him .

Through the insight of Luther, "justification by faith"

became an innate idea . . .

Friedrich Nietzsche supplies us with another

instance of this same process, closer to our own time .

Nietzche has his own peculiar insight and gave it con-

-677-
ceptual form 'in his works, with the result that it also

possessed a sector of subsequent humanity within its

folds . It is easy to see how much of the orientation

of German National Socialism is predetermined by the

thought of Nietzsche . To many students, the thought

of Nietzsche may appear as merely another philosophic

theory, but, .for those who are possessed by it,-it comes

as an innate truth, regardless of whether they have

read Nietzsche or not .

Every significant philosopher and every important

social or religious leader has produced an impregnated

concept from out of the hidden heights or depths . Not

always are such concepts impregnated with Light, for

.they may also be born out of darkness . But they are

always more than bare conceptual frameworks or theories .

They always carry something of the nature of life within

their depths, be .it of a dark or luminous sort . As a

result of this there is, in addition to the explicit

logical consequences , an even more vital development

.such that they may grow in ways not foreseen by their

originators . Doubtless Nietzsche did not mean by his

"superman" the "super race" of German National Socialism,

but this would simply mean that his impregnated concept

had potentialities transcending his own private imagina-
tion . It is indeed a wise father who can foresee

everything his son will become . When one gives life

to anything he assumes a vast amount of responsibility .

He may have started something better than he thought,

but it may equally well-develop into . something con-

siderably worse .

The foregoing illustrations are instances of a

process within the range of historic observation . By

studying instances of this kind one may learn much of

the forces which predetermine the thinking and conduct

of men . . The consciousness of men moves within frame-

works which are quite generally not examined and,

frequently, not even known in their nature as frame-

works which stand in-contrast-to other possibilities .

Within those frameworks'the possessed individuals may

deal with their respective ;problems with greater or

lesser measure of critical rationality, but the accept-

ance of the framework is something either more or less

than rational . One can easily prove this point by sub-

jecting the more or less unconscious framework of

another to criticism in the presence of the latter .

Almost inevitably he arouses a state of consciousness

.highly toned with affect . He makes no headway at all

with his rational criticism and, in the case of the

less mature religious types, runs the risk of being
accused, of possessing a satanic disposition. On the

whole, this sort of thing is an unwise and dangerous

course of procedure . Generally, it is better to let

men sleep within their frameworks , so long as they are

not too dangerous to other men . In this matter the

Indiana are wiser than we are ,'for they say that it is

unwise ever forcefully to awaken a sleeping man . Rather,

let the man awaken naturally before trying to teach him .

The basic frameworks possess men and thus have

the nature of conviction , rather than of a theory which

is accepted through being convinced . Now, it is these

convictions which carry the force of innate or native

ideas .' A psychological or introceptive insight, which

has penetrated to deeper levels of consciousness than

the frameworks which predetermine the consciousness and

conduct of most men , leads to a knowledge of the relati-

vity of all such frameworks . Their innateness is thus

.only relative and not absolute . But they are properly

of the nature of innate ideas for those who are pos-

sessed by them, since these frameworks are not for the

possessed individual something derived from experience,

but rather underlie and predetermine the form of his

experience . It is impossible for the experience of the

possessed individual to disprove them, since they

automatically exclude all possible experiences which

are not . confirmatory . It is no easy matter to transcend
frameworks of this sort , since the transcending implies

something analogous to a dying process which precedes

a new birth , either in a minor or radical sense . In

this, the consciousness of the man of science is as

greatly bound as is the representative of any religious

sect . Transcendence of any sort is never easy , but all

real advance of human consciousness , that is more than

mere elaboration of old possibilities , is dependent

upon it .

Enlightenment is a process
. of transcendence of
old conditioning frameworks . It is not merely the fur-

ther development of possibilities subsumed by the frame-

works . To continue the further development of a science

delimited by the framework of Galileo ' s insight is not

a progress to new enlightenment , but is merely an elabora-

tion of Galileo ' s enlightenment . The enlightener always

speaks from out the transcendent , while the continuer

merely elaborates further or sustains . This is true

with respect to science , religion and social orienta-

tions generally .
Enlightenment may proceed far or only a little

way, but always something that formerly had seemed as

-681-
necessary and innate is transcended . Old anchorages

are broken while new ones are achieved . This is a

serious business , for while the greatest values men

have known have come by this road, yet every enlight-

enment is a destructive force with .respect to old,

more or less unconscious , presuppositions . For this

reason the enlightener is more likely than not to be

an object of persecution . He appears to his milieu as

the destroyer of established and precious values . In

some respects , he is fortunate who is not understood

in his own time .

Innate ideas are not derived from experience

but have their origin, either in_introceptive realiza-

tion or by penetration in the more or less shadowy

depths of the psychologic unconscious . They are thus

not merely logically presupposed in all experience,

but actually have a source in a realm other than that

covered by experience . In their higher form, they are

rooted in an introceptive realization and, therefore,

are truly transcendent, in the very sense of a transcend-

ent knowledge which Kant conceived as impossible . Ob-

jectively, such ideas can neither be proven nor dis-

proved . They are, thus, not to be judged as either

.true or false, but rather as the relative standard by
which the true and the false are measured . Consequently,

as an example , it is impossible to determine whether

the doctrine of natural rights is true or false . Rather

is it true that if this doctrine is a presupposition of

a social consciousness , then a way of social thought and

life follows as a consequence . There is excellent reason

for regarding this doctrine as defining the distinctive

meaning of the American way, since the moral ground for

American autonomy was grounded upon this doctrine . Thus,

if this doctrine is repudiated, then the distinctively

American way is overthrown, to be replaced by something

else, better or worse - probably the latter,

So far we have been investigating innate ideas

as particularizing frameworks whereby different human

cultures, religious sects and social movements are dif-

ferentiated . But beyond these limits mankind as a whole

has still deeper roots such that intercourse and cross-

understanding becomes possible . Various human groupings

are obviously different in innumerable ways, yet the

whole human family still remains one , having certain

similarities of feeling, thought and action in common .

It is because of this that we differentiate some creatures

as being human . How does a man differ from an animal

or other kinds of creatures of either an inferior or

-683-
superior order? The biologist would say that the dif-

ferentiation lies in a distinctive anatomy . This answer

is doubtless valid enough as~far as it goes , but it re-

flects the superficiality which confuses the incidental

with
fundamental
the,
.- :Actually, a creature , which pos-

sessed the anatomy normal to men but which possessed

the consciousness of,''and behaved like, an animal, would

be an animal in fact and not a man . Likewise , a creature

possessing a human kind of consciousness , but in the form

of one of the animals, would really be a human being . It

is unimportant that man should be defined as "a feather-

less plantigrade biped mammal of the genus Homo ", but it

is highly significant that the Sanscrit root "MAN" should

mean "think " or "the thinker " . An intellectual donkey

would be more of a human being than a stupid Australian

bushman . If the most primitive " featherless plantigrade

biped mammal of the genus Homo " does not think , then he

is not a man .
A human being is a man because he thinks conceptually,

and not because of any of his other functions , however

highly they may be developed . Now, the conceptual

thinker is one whose stream of consciousness is modified

by the framework essential to thought as such . This

-684-
framework includes the laws of thought in their totality

of principles which cannot be derived from any other

conception, save in the circular form of mutual implica-

tion . No one can repudiate these principles and continue .

to be a thinker, though he might .continue to be conscious

through the activity of other functions . These basic laws

of thought are not derivations from experience, but are

the ground-structure which renders the world-view charac-

teristic of the thinker possible . They are not necessi-

ties of "things" or of consciousness in its abstract or,

rather, concrete totality . Thus the laws of thought are

of ontological importance for conceptual thought, but

not for being as a whole .

The laws of thought are, thus, quite properly in-

nate ideas which cannot be thought away without thinking

away the very possibility of thinking . They are real and

objective enough for the thinker qua thinker . Thus to

attain an insight which so far transcends them that they

assume the character of relative determinants is to

penetrate into consciousness beyond conceptually thinkable

limits .

There are innate ideas truly enough, but they are

themselves dependent upon a Source beyond experience and

which is, therefore , genuinely transcendental . Within

the circumscribing limits of the framework of conscious-

ness predetermined by them they can only be known as

terminal or border-line conceptions . They are the

theoretical sum of an infinite converging series . While

confined within the limits of this framework man's con-

sciousness cannot pass beyond this border-line . But this

limitation passes when man finds a function by which he

can reach consciously beyond the border-line . Every such

movement is an act of transcendence . Now, if any man at-

tains the point of introceptive realization such that he

may look down upon the most basic principles which render

conceptual thought possible, then he has transcended human

consciousness in the rigorous sense . In terms of the

Indian symbolism, this is the transcendence of the Manu

or of Vaivasvata, in other words, it is a transcendence

of the root framework of consciousness which literally is

-the progenitor . of all thinking beings . Thus the laws of

thought are the seed of Manu .
It is indeed true that man cannot speculatively

determine what lies beyond the deepest roots of conceptual

thought . Kant's criticism is conclusive with respect to

this . Speculation is valid within the framework of the

thinker, but not beyond . But beside speculative thought

there is in man's total psychical constitution a func-

tion - generally latent- whereby he can reach above, and

not merely below thought . ( The processes described in

Jung's psychology of the unconscious mainly lead to

levels below conceptual thought . ) It is this function

which I have called introception . And by means of this

function . the self resident within a human being can know

and check transcendental realities . Here is something

a good deal more than faith , intuition or revelation .

It is . also not subject to the limitations which criticism

has imposed upon speculative thought . We have , thus, at

I

least a theory for an epistemological foundation for a

transcendental knowledge .
Through introducing the notion of the introcep-

tional function I have avoided, in principle at least,

the logical difficulties which have, heretofore , dogged

the heels of transcendental philosophy . The problem of

the genuineness of transcendental insight or presupposi-

tion is reduced to the'problem of the actuality of*the

function of introception as I have defined it . This is

not a problem for logic but for psychology in the sense

of meta-psychology . The actuality of the function must

be determined , either by a search of the historic evidence

 for its existence, or by direct individual arousing of

its activity . The latter method, of course, supplies

the only absolutely certain demonstration that the .

introceptive function is a fact .
~fihen the . Light, of consciousness turns upon it-

self toward its source, then if consciousness were

..dependent upon the ..object for its existence , the result-

ant state would be one of complete unconsciousness .

But actually the resultant state is, not only not one of

unconsciousness, but is,'indeed, a state of greatly

intensified consciousness . Thus if consciousness depends

upon anything at all it is exclusively dependent upon the

subject or self . Now, when consciousness turns upon it-

self the object vanishes, thereby proving the contingency

of the object . Whether or not there is an external world

existing as a thing, .outside the relation of being an

object for a subject, is really a matter of no importance .

Actually to predicate existence or non-existence of such

independent thinghood is a .meaningless judgment, since no

meaning attaches to the notion of existence apart from

consciousness . If anyone attempts to define such existence

he inevitably finds that in the very act of defining he

has transformed it into an object, that is, into a some-

what which exists for consciousness . The arguments for

-688-
the existence of the independent thing do not have any

sounder, logical basis than the old formal arguments for

the existence of God," that Kant criticized so effedtively .

The existence of the independent thing is not a neces-

sity for .thought, and that which actually takes place in

an introceptive realization shows that it is not a neces-

sity for consciousness .`` Thus it is wholly unnecessary

either to affirm or deny the existence of the independent

thing . It is simply irrelevant .

At the first stage of the introceptive transform-

ation the object . vanishes, while the subject persists .

This implies at least the relative transcendency of the

subject with respect to the object, a consequence of the

very highest importance, not only for philosophy and

religion, but for sociology as well . The relationship

between subject and object is not equalitarian but hier-

archical, with the subject occupying the transcendent

position . As between the subject and the object, author-

ity inheres in the subject . An instance drawn from history

illustrates the practical bearings of this relationship .

It is related that during or after his conquest of

India, Alexander the Great learned of the Indian Yogins

and their strange powers and was highly interested . Ul-

timately he had the opportunity of meeting one seated upon

 the bank of the river . The Yogin graciously condescended

to converse with Alexander and answered his questions at

some length . Alexander was greatly impressed and wished

to have the Yogin return with him to Macedonia, and so

proposed to the latter that he should follow this course .

But the Yogin refused . Alexander commanded, but the

Yogin still refused . Finally, Alexander threatened to

employ all the compulsive means he had in his power,

including the threat of death itself . But all this left

the Yogin as unmoved as ever . Ultimately, Alexander re-

treated in defeat . Though the great soldier could con

quer a world, yet he could not influence the will of a

single naked Yogin . Stated in psychological terms,

Alexander exerted the greatest power of his time over the

objective situation, but was powerless with respect to

the self, for the very essence of being a true Yogin is

single-pointed identification with the self . The world-

ruler, no matter how great or powerful, never commands

the Yogin, but in all relations with the latter seeks

from him what he may graciously bestow . Here the proud

ruler must play the humble part .

The objective situation dominates only those who

s are weak and deluded - .unfortunately the vast majority
i '
}r of human beings . The obJective situation does not

dominate because it transcends the Subject . Metaphor-

 ically stated the beggar (object) in life has abpa

the royal throne, . while the true ruler (the self) has

permitted himself to become the scullion who seeks

largess of the real beggar who appears in royal robes .

If one has a large wealth of compassion he may pity the

true royalty who imagines himself to be only the scul-

.!lion, but since the latter has no one to blame but himself

and could reaffirm his status at any time, he really

merits only contempt . 'When all this is clearly under-

stood our whole conception of social organization and

.method will be radically altered . Today because we have

permitted ourselves to fall under the hypnotic domination

of the object we conceive of government in terms which fit

only the psychology, of the deluded scullion . .

Philosophy has fallen far from its high estate

when it sells itself to the object . That physical science

should do this is not so surprising, but one expects more

from philosophy . Not only do the explicitly realistic

schools do this, but one even finds the Pragmatists assum-

ing the same orientation . Consider the following quota-

tion from William James : "As I myself understand these

authors, we all three (including Schiller, Dewey and James)

absolutely agree in admitting the transcendency of the

object provided it be an experienceable object - to the

-691-
subject, in the truth relation ."1 The final phrase sug-

gests that possibly the pragmatic theory does not affirm

.the transcendency of the object in all possible relations,

but it is clear that in that pre-eminently important re-

lation of truth it does . . What does this imply?

It certainly means that truth is not a transcendent

relation which exists prior to experience . The truth

relation is a function of experience and not of intro-

ceptive realization . One finds truth by an adjustment

to an objective situation, not by an inner and super-

sensual attunement . In the one case one attains truth

by achieving adjustment with an already existent world,

even though it is merely the world which is given through

perceptual experience, while in the other the realization

of truth actually destroys the world as possessing any

sort of real independence . Consciousness, as known through

the introceptual realization, is independent of the ob-

jective world, and merely permits the latter to be .

Knowing the true nature of this objective world is a

very essential feature of the truth of inner realization .

Awakened self-consciousness may choose to act as though

the objective world were real in itself and thus play the

game on those terms . In this case there are various re-

-692-
lationships , some of which may be called "correct" and

others "incorrect", but here we have something less than

the truth-relation . It would be better to speak of

empiric correctness and incorrectness , meanwhile leaving

the loftier term "Truth " for the more fundamental adjust-

ment which determines the real relationship between the

subjective order and the objective order taken as a

whole .

Footnote to Chapter IX

, '4'r(/ g
PC 44.4- •A a 9~
Meaning of Truth , pp xvii -xix, italics mine .
 I

-LE ~ o~ . ~Y=SIN X")' = PP- O Gi2.E S 5ION IN C ONTINU ITY

. O~ IN S'I'N`rt~NEOUS S'Tf~'TES O~ ~E~2.SONftL E G O
IN ~T' I ME .
IN X)=,PHYSICAL OBJRc rlv '.

J
 I

Chapter -r-

Substantiality-is inversely proportional to ponderability

In the psychology of the transformation process

it is a known fact-that the process is generally accom-

panied by a presentation , either i n the dreaming or wak-

ing state , of a series of-symbols that convey a partic-

ularly significant meaning to the individual . The cul-

minating:= symbols tend to take a form , technically known

as Mandalas , which are generally sensuous presentments

or actions . Once. the content of these symbols is ad-

equately assimilated the transforming process is com-

pleted and the individual has achieved integration upon

a new level . Both the Western psychology on the subject

and the manuals of Oriental Yoga agree that these sym-

bolic instruments are highly important . But it is not

Invariably the case that the symbol takes . a sensible

form, either as a recept or a sensible act . In my own
psychological organization there seems to be a distinctly

limited capacity for fabricating sensible images autono-

mously , with the result that I stand in a defective posi-

tion for the direct personal criticism of this process .
I-have never known visible or other sensible presentations
of this sort during the waking state and only rarely

even .in dreams . But I have ., had . acquaintance with con-

ceptual presentations of a semi-autonomous sort which

proved to be of enormous importance in the transforma-

tion process .

A conceptual presentation is not to be under-

stood as a conceptual representation since, in part at

least, it enters consciousness in much the way a percept

does . It is not more than partly a conceptual construc-

tion and may, indeed, apparently be an almost wholly

.autonomous development . As I know this kind of presenta-

tion it is marked by the complete lack of concrete per-

ceptual or sensible elements . It is more like a newly

born and full grown idea .- a birth well symbolized by .

the stepping forth of Minerva fully grown from the head

of Jupiter . It is highly abstract as though coming

directly from a consciousness to which what we call

abstract is more immediate and direct than the concrete

and particular . Here I must diverge from C . G . Jung

when he insists that the abstract idea is exclusively a

development from an .essentially concrete and perceptual

primordial image . As far as my acquaintance with this

kind of Idea goes it actually is so abstract in its

original nature that in order .to formulate it at all it

is more or less distorted by a process of concretion .

Our language fails because it is not abstract enough,

thus the distorting effect of conceptual representation

is the reverse of that which occurs when a concrete

perception is given conceptual formulation . I must

insist upon this point as it has an important bearing

upon one of my theses , i .e ., that our most abstract

language is the best vehicle of ultimate Truth .

The immediate conceptual presentation is much

more like the manifestation of a mature consciousness

than of the primitive . kind of consciousness suggested

by the primordial image . This leads to some very start-

ling implications for it seems to imply that in its total

meaning the collective unconscious is not merely filled

with a primitive kind of primordial content . Unquestion-

ably there is such a primitive primordial content, but

I see no good reason for doubting the equal existence of

a deposit in .the collective unconscious of ancient and

unknown culture of a very high order of maturity . Indeed,

the history of the past, in so far as we know it at all

definitely, does not reveal to us a stage when the earth

was without its Sages of a very superior order . Our

current idea of a development from exclusively primitive

-696-
roots is really little more than a mythical construct,

.probably very largely the result of prejudices induced

by the influence of Darwin . . The archetype of the wise

old man which Dr . C . G . Jung has isolated does not at

all carry the symbolic meaning of primitivity but, rather,

of something that is distinctly mature . It is not at all

improbable that there were ancients who were wiser in their

day than we are in ours . It is by no means a self-evident

truth that the process of time inevitably implies progress

in wisdom . Degeneration is just as likely and even be-

comes rather probable when we consider possible social

implications of the, .second law of thermo-dynamics .

I most certainly do insist that the Sage is the

child of introception rather than of perception, so that

Wisdom in thespiritual sense is a Root, rather than a

flower growing out of-perceptual experience . Thus Wisdom

descends from the sky and does not ascend out of the earth,

and without the down-pourings from the sky the earth

would be parched and cultured life would gradually dis-

appear . It is for this reason that earth-born philosophies

are sterile .
A'conceptual presentation differs from a concept-

ual representation in the further respect that it carries

an enormously clarifying authority . It is entirely pos-

sible that through unaided intellectual speculation an

individual might develop a formulation precisely the same

as that of a conceptual presentation , but the effect would

be entirely different so far as the transformation process

is concerned .. The speculative construct would be only a

theory , from which systematic conclusions could be drawn,

but it would not yield the authority of insight . The

thinker is not made into a different man by it . But a

conceptual presentation carries with it a superlative

order of assurance - one knows that without doubt here is

Truth . The Knowledge does not seem external to the self,

as is the case with purely speculative constructs . One

can transfer his anchorage to the conceptual presenta-

tion with the same certainty that formerly he viewed

himself as the world -bound man . Subsequently , the influence

of inherited and traditional ideas may introduce doubt

if the individual permits them to do so and , in that

case , the transformation process will be hindered if

not prevented entirely . Unquestionably mere habit and

tradition must be heroically depreciated . But here we

have merely the dangers which must be conquered along

the Way . At any rate , at the moment of the presenta-

tion itself the authority of the insight is unequivocal .

One has found a base on which he can stand against the

-698-
opinion of the whole world, if that is necessary . .

In my own experience the crucial key to the

transformation . process ' .lay :in-a sudden and highly

authoritive recognition which finally took the aphor-

istic form : "Substantiality is inversely proportional

to ponderability " . . At a particularly lucid moment

I simply . saw that .,,this .must,.be true . Sensible present-

ments and conceptual representations in that moment

acquired the value of voidness, surrounded by fullness

which is forever hidden to a consciousness operating

exclusively under those forms . In other words, I found

real fullness in just those zones where sensation and

conception reported absence of anything . This was a

radical inversion of all habitual values . But it re-

moved the remaining barriers to the awakening of the

introceptual process .

If one analyzes the aphoristic formula he will

find that it implies a phase of the process of "turning

about" . In terms of our ordinary understanding and

habits we conceive of all development and progress as

a movement toward further . elaboration of perceptual and

conceptual content ., We imagine that such content is,

of course , something and, indeed , something valuable .

Enrichment is a process of increasing it . But all of

this valuation is reversed . Both perceptual presenta

tion and conceptual representation have the significance

of an empty phantasmagoria of essentially no more sub-

stantiality than dream-stuff . . Particularly is this

true of sensible presentments, though it is somewhat

less emphatically the .case with concepts . Sensible

.fact,-instead of having the greatest reality-value, as

is the case with most men, is seen as most empty of

reality. All the relationships of the sensible world

are seen to have only the significance of a sort of

painful game , which doesn't lead much of anywhere .

But, in contrast, the . assurance of a super-sensible

actuality is much more profound than any former belief

in sensible reality . Here is indubitable evidence of

another way of consciousness which receives practically

no recognition in our psychology and philosophy .

I : conceive it to be highly significant that the

transformed point of view leaves the substance of the

logical processes of thought unaltered . The content

of meaning given to the indefinable terms which enters

into logical systems is simply given a new reference .

In other words, rational thought remains the mediator

between the perceptual and introceptual orders . We

can view the perceptual contents as negations, instead

of positive actualities, and then proceed with the

systematic development of either a science or a philo-

sophy as formerly . One can think as well or better than

ever before, but the valuation of the content of the

thought is radically altered . As a consequence this

transformation does not imply anything like an alogical

attitude* .` I feel, therefore,' justified in affirming

that there is more relative reality in logical process

and form than there is in any perceptual presentment or

experience . But even this reality is only relative .

It is not implied that experience is wholly with-

out value, but the value which it does have is symbolioal

and instrumental . A negation can very well serve as a

.symbol of that which is negated . It is all a question

of how the meaningful reference is interpreted . Ex-

perience simply is not an end-in-itself, nor does it

mean something which can be attained by more experience .

Its real reference is to that which is realized directly

only by the turning about in consciousness . Movement

of consciousness in the direction of experience ultim-

ately always leads to disappointment and frustration .)

But with the turning about the frustration and disap-

pointment vanish .
Of course, a theory of the nature and office of

experience is needed . Experience arises out of a cona-

tive attitude of hunger or craving . In a state of

complete satisfaction there is none of the desiring

or yearning which leads on to experience . But in the

absence of satisfaction all sorts of strivings are

aroused which are oriented in whatever direction it

may seem that satisfaction may be achieved . So long

as consciousness . is-oriented toward the object this

leads to a search for more and ever more experience .

But somehow every experience is a disappointment in

that it fails to supply the satisfaction sought, and

so the same effort is repeated again and again through

a seemingly endless series . But the content of experi-

ence is like a worthless piece of quartz rock in which

there once lay a nugget of gold , but where now there

remains only the mold . of that nugget . It is like the

gorgeous color on the inner pearly surface of a sea-

shell, which color is no substance in the shell but is

the light as it is refracted from the surface . It is

the rainbow ' s end of promise which ever recedes the

farther , the nearer it is approached . Yes, experience

ever gives endless promise of fulfilment, but which is

always snatched away at the moment of grasping . And

this is true since there is no substance in the content

of pure experience .
 The office of experience is to frustrate and to

cheat, and yet not for a malicious purpose . Experience

brings pain so that consciousness may be gradually awak-

ened to self-realization . For if consciousness flowed

freely toward the object and thereby found the fulfil-

ment of its yearning, there would be none of the shock

necessary, such that consciousness could become aware

of its own true nature . Empiric consciousness is like

an alien in a distant and strange land but who is yearn-

ing for all that has been lost . He seeks widely in this

land for the old companions but who are not to be found

anywhere in that region . To find these companions, con-

sciousness must return to the source from whence it

came, and it is the office of experience to lash the

wanderer until he finally awakens to the need for the

return .

The values which experience symbolizes lie behind

the outward flowing stream of consciousness, and thus

are actually closer to the wanderer than the objects

which lie before him . These values are just precisely

those which never are the content of any presentment nor

of any idea . They are thus symbolized by the void .of

unfilled space which seems to the objectively streaming

consciousness to be nothing at all . So experience gives

just that which Reality is not ; it is the thin and insub-

stantial surface which bounds and hides the Real . The

frame-work of empiric consciousness is such that it ever

veils the durable and substantial .

.It is characteristic of the critical analysis of

our day that it finds no substance anywhere . There is

real acuity of understanding revealed in this criticism,

for it is indeed true that the form of our outward-going

consciousness is just such that it never can give us a

realization of substantial actuality . Terms in rela-

tion are truly empty and as thin as a mathematical sur-

face and this is indeed all that experience ever gives .

But to say that this is all that there is or all that

may be realized is equivalent to saying that the experi-

ential kind of consciousness is the sole possibility .

However, he, who has once found the way to turn the

stream of consciousness backward toward its source,

knows that this is not so, and he who has not done this

is in no position to know . The denial of the actuality

of substance is valid for the zone delimited by possible

experience , but not beyond that .

In this day when one attempts again to re=

introduce the notion of substance into a philosophic

system he is moving against the current of the times .

.In the older philosophies the notion had an honorable
place , . but not so in our time . In part this may be

explained as a result of the development of critical

philosophy and in part as a result of change of the

psychological , focus of consciousness . When conscious-

ness is oriented more to the extraverted attitude there

is a tendency'to spread widely in .a consciousness of

surface, at the price of a loss of depth . This means

that content of consciousness becomes valued only as

experience or as mere terms in relation, with no under-

lying substantiality :'"'The result is'a state of essentially

.soulless consciousness , separated fromits ,ne

the sense of a conscious correlation with the roots .

In this case-knowledge-as Assurance . is lost and there

remains either only probable knowledge or a knowledge

which has only a tentative value because of its empiric

working . That there should be something substantial

behind this knowledge is an idea without weight . At

best it is an unknown and unknowable somewhat which is .

of no practical significance and certainly is not logic-

ally necessary . It appears as though all we had was

simply the play of phenomena and from this it is a short

step to the philosophic standpoint of Phenomenalism .

-705-
 I am forced to agree that if we restrict know-

ledge to the combination of pure reason and experience,

the notion of an underlying substance is reduced to a

speculative construct . And there is, indeed, much to

be said for the elimination of all speculative con-

structs which are not theoretically necessary . For

many purposes'no efficiency is lost if .we assume that

no substantial substrate exists behind either the

phenomenal object or the empiric subject to conscious-

ness . Further, this standpoint receives considerable

support from the better known doctrines of the most

philosophical of religions, i .e ., Buddhism . There is,

in fact, a very considerable rapprochement between

modern Western speculation and the phenomenology of

Buddhism, so we clearly face a problem which calls

for careful examination .

In its more important signification the concept

of substance means the substrate underlying all experi-

ence, which is not itself a direct object of experience .

Since the time that the problem of knowledge attained

recognition as being crucial, the notion of the substrate

has acquired two contrasted meanings . In one sense, it

is conceived as the underlying thing-in-itself and, in

the other, as a supporting and constitutive subject .

These contrasting substance -philosophies are respectively

realistic and idealistic In perspective , but both agree

in predicating a reality behind the scenes . Both also

agree in affirming a somewhat that is perdurable through-

out all change , such as, for example , the unchanging mass

of matter throughout all changes of state of matter, or

a persistent self • . which remains identical throughout all

modifications of consciousness .

Opposed to the substantiality theory is the view

that both the object of experience and the subject to

experience are merely complexes of insubstantial ele-

ments, either material or psychical . All entities are,

therefore , simply phenomenal effects of complexes , rather

than being perdurable substrates . It is interesting and

very striking that a doctrine as modern as this should

have been formulated by Buddha 2,500 years ago . It was

the main point of departure between Buddhism and Brahmanism

proper and seems to have been the source of considerable

bitter controversy . Since the practical ethical object-

ive of Buddhism was the dissolution of the complexes,

it is not surprising that the phenomenology of Buddha

should have suggested that the Nirvanic state was literal

annihilation . For .how could there be any real immortality

if there is no such thing as a perdurable self?

 I am not aware of any philosophy more subtle or
more difficult to understand than Buddhism if one is

solely familiar with the more public teachings . There

seems to be neither a subject nor a thing-in-itself

behind the phantasmagoric play .of phenomena . But the

Sanskrit Sutras, which were written down some five or

six hundred years after the final Nirvana of the Buddha,

reveal a much more positive metaphysical teaching . There

is something behind the .empiric subject and phenomena

that does endure, thereby giving to the Nirvanic state

a positive meaning, but it-is by no means an easy task

to isolate the logic of the total teaching . I doubt

that real clarity in this matter can ever be achieved

without passing through the process of the direct Realiza-

tion or Transformation individually . But, in any case,

the Buddhist philosophy does affirm a somewhat which is

-perdurable and thus does teach a substantialistic meta-

physics which is the counterpart of the phenomenologic

treatment of empiric consciousness .

The fundamental idealistic doctrine, that existence

is identical with being known or otherwise determined by

being in .and for consciousness, would lead to the most

rigorous kind of phenomenalism if knowledge were con-

ceived .as restricted to experience and the pure reason

alone . In this case , the notion of .substance would be

confined to the realistic view which held that there

were real existences independent of all consciousness

and were , in their own true nature , different from .their

appearance to consciousness . But a study of the ideal-

istic thinkers reveals , quite generally , either an im-

plication of'another way'of consciousness, or an explicit

reference to such . I have already referred to Schopen-

hauer's "intuition of genius " and "temper akin to genius"

as implying a kind of cognition other than either per-

ception or conception . Schelling is even more explicit .

The following quotations-from " Transcendental Idealism"

are impressive :

1 . "By this act of separation ( the two affirmations,

I am and There are things outside of me) .when it is

completed , one transports one's self in . the transcend-

ental act of contemplation , which is by no means a

natural , but an artificial one ."

2 . "The sole organ of this method of phiksophizing

is therefore the inner sense , and its object is of such

a nature that , unlike that of mathematics , it can never

become an object of external intuition ."

3 . "The whole object'of philosophy is no other than

the action of intelligence according to fixed laws . This

-709-
action can be conceived only'through a peculiar, direct,

inner intuition, and this again is possible only through

az I ; :.
production ."

4 . "For whereas production in art is projected out-

ward, in order to reflect the unconscious by products ;

philosophical production is directed immediately inward,

in order to reflect it in intellectual intuition ."

It seems to me abundantly clear that the phrases,

"transcendental act of contemplation", "inner sense",

"peculiar, direct, inner intuition" and "intellectual

intuition", refer to essentially what I mean by intro-

ception . This "inner sense "'is explicitly conceived

as an organ and, hence, implies a function of conscious-

ness . It is thus clear that this is not the same as

introspection, for the latter activity does not imply

a new organ essentially different from the functions

employed in ordinary perceptual observation . Intro-

spection is merely a kind of observation .

We have now arrived at a position such that we

can define the notion of substance in idealistic terms .

Substance in this sense does not mean an unknown sub-

strate, in every possible sense of knowing . It means,

rather, a substrate which cannot be known as an object

of perceptual experience, nor can it be known through

pure conceptual thought . It is known through the

introceptive function of consciousness , that is,

throw the process whereby consciousness turns upon

itself toward its source . There is thus a sense in
which substance . remains as the unknown perdurable

substrate , for .it is unknown so long as the intro-

ceptive function . is not .' awakened and active . At the

same time , in the more comprehensive sense , conscious-

ness remains as the constitutive determinant of being,

at least in so far as the notion of being can have any

conceivable meaning . Indeed, we may say that conscious-

ness is itself the substantial substrate, but not that

any given isolated phase or function of consciousness

is such ,a substrate .

We are now in a'position to define , in general

terms, how it is possible that the whole of being may

be constituted by consciousness , and yet may appear to

empiric man in part as objectively determined . The

objective world as a whole is a precipitate from Con-

sciousness in its most comprehensive sense , but it is

only partly determined by perceptual and conceptual

.consciousness . The precipitate from Consciousness be-

yond perception and conception appears as objective and

independent to the empiric individual . It is what it is,

 despite his individual wish and will . He must come to

terms with this objective appearance, and direct his

willing through various adjustments , rather than by

free action . But if any individual became completely

. conscious . there would

d be no longer any .-objective world,

save in so far as he willed it into being and voluntarily

accepted a degree,of .binding or veiling of his own con-

sciousness . But such an individual would have become

more than a mere private individual ; he would, indeed,

have'become identical with the collective Self of all

creatures .

Substance has the psychological value of depth ,

whereas the notions of terms in external relations and

of experience imply consciousness as surface exclusively .

Therefore , it may be said that substance philosophies

alone have soul, though in the case of materialism the

-soul would be dead , but not non-existent . There is soul

only when there is something more felt or realized than

that which appears upon the surface of consciousness

alone . Thus soul never can be a part of the material

available for objective analysis , with the result that

any philosophy ,which . views its whole problem as concerned

exclusively with material completely available for object-

ive analysis , in principle, must be regarded as soulless .

It is for this reason that a philosophy like the New

Realism is more deadly to the religious feeling than

even outright Materialism itself . It is better to

have a dead soul .than no soul at all .

The meaning of Depth , in the above sense, is not

easy to define , though it may be so clearly realized

or felt that its actuality is indubitable . A positive

and comprehensive definition is impossible , so that most

that can be said of a definitive character is mainly

negative . Thus depth is that which is not comprehended

by any concept , nor any part of experience, in the def-

initely delimited meaning we have given to the latter

term . It is that which is always " felt ", at least, in

every genuine religious experience . It is that for which

men would readily sacrifice their lives . It can be

directly and consciously Realized only by the conscious

introceptive movement , in which consciousness turns upon

itself toward its source . Here there is immediate , direct

and positive realization of the depth dimension in con-

sciousness . But this depth quale is just precisely the

inexpressible element in all Gnostic and Mystical Realiza-

tion . Every expression that has come out of such Realiza-

tions fails to convey . explicitly the depth quality .

The surface meaning of all such expressions can be

interpreted in such a way that there is no depth, but

in so doing the real meaning - is lost . One must always

be at least a near Mystic inorder to understand a Mystic .

The direct Realization of depth alone gives cer-

tain assurance with respect to perdurability . Without

this Realization there can be no certainty with respect

to immortality , however :. conceived . On objective grounds,

the notion of immortality can never be more than a

speculative extrapolation which reaches far beyond its

grounds . Even a`real'communication with disembodied

entities - assuming that such a communication could be

established would not provethat such . entities were

perdurable . Their existence might be as much conditioned

by time as embodied life in the world , and the affirma-

tion of a disembodied entity to the contrary is not suf-

ficient to establish any. certainty . To establish the

actuality of a disembodied entity would prove only that

living beings can exist in such a way that they are not

apparent to the normal sensorium . More is required to

give the notion of immortality a positive meaning .

It is equally true that the more event of physical

death is not sufficient to prove perdurability or immortal-

ity . There is no reason whatsoever to suppose that mere

physical dying is enough to awaken Consciousness in the

depth or transcendental dimension . One may die to find

himself still living, with much the same kind of con-
sciousness he had while in physical embodiment . With

most men this would still be a case of consciousness

moving on the surface . It is quite significant that the

Buddhists speak of the death of a Buddha as the final

Nirvana, but not so in the case of other men . The

direct acquaintance . with Depth not only may be attained

before death , but there is even no reason to believe

that there is any advantage for such attainment in an

after -death state . If we or if consciousness is per-

durable , we or consciousness are so now no less than

at any future time .

Kant was'quite correct when he viewed the problem

of immortality as belonging to metaphysics . Thus, save

in so far as man has awakened the function of transcend-

ental cognition ,, he can find no certain answer to this

problem . Beyond this , faith may build a positive pre-

sumption and considerations of practical psychological

therapeutics may render the inculcation of belief in

immortality an important heuristic method , as Dr . 0 . G .

Jung has found in his practice . But great as is the

psychological value of belief and faith they still fall

far short of supplying certainty . No truly rigorous and

heroic thinker can ever be satisfied with the crutch of

mere believing or disbelieving . Nor is the standpoint

of agnosticism better than a confession of defeat, if

it is accepted as more than a temporary position . It

is simply sound and conscientious thinking frankly to

acknowledge, after adequate search and analysis, that,

by ordinary means , knowledge . of the metaphysical cannot

be attained . But it is a moral failure to be willing

to accept~nescience in any dimension as a final state .

The true soldier in the ranks of inquiry will never be

content to rest short of certainty, in any direction,

be the results wishfully acceptable or not .

A resolution'of,the three metaphysical problems

recognized by Kant, i .e ., God, freedom and immortality,

is attained through the awakening of the function of

introception . Yet certainty thus attained by the awaken-

ing of this function cannot be conveyed merely by con-

ceptual thought, however skilfully developed, to one who

is introceptively blind . This is the analogue of the

similar impossibility to convey the immediate certain-

ties of ordinary vision to a man born blind . At best

one can suggest something of how it is possible that

introceptive insight can give certainty .

A rigorous analysis of the ordinary processes of

knowledge reveals that this kind of knowledge does not

give us certainty in any direction . Bertrand Russell

is quite correct when he says that this knowledge, at
best, gives us only probable truth . Why is this so?

The answer is really very simple . It lies in the fact

that, in the case of ordinary knowledge, the knower

stands in a relation of distance or difference from the

object of his knowledge . He has, therefore,, no ground

of certainty with respect .,to the content of his know-

ledge . But, in contrast to ordinary knowledge, intro-

ceptive cognition is in the form of an identity between

the knower and the known . Thus the certainty-destroying

factor of distance or difference is eliminated, with the

.consequence that introceptive cognition is absolutely

certain on its own level . Undoubtedly, subsequent error

can be introduced when one proceeds to a conceptual

interpretation of the introceptive content, but such

error does not attach to the pure introceptive cognition

itself . In fact, one can secure himself from error of

the interpretative type only by carefully avoiding say-

ing anything positive concerning introceptive content,

beyond saying that such content exists and is certain .

There would remain , then, only the task of the destructive

analysis of .all relative knowledge . However, I conceive

that the value of a conceptual interpretation outweighs

the evil of interpretative error .

-717-
 The Knowledge . . through Identity given by intro-

.ceptive cognition gives an immediate relation to a com-

prehensive content which would have for ordinary relative

knowledge the character of an indefensible extrapolation .

Thus the notion of the infinite , such as the idea of the

sum-total of all terms of an infinite series, is a border-

line concept . for relative thought . Ordinary conception

does not actually comprehend the infinite but projects

the notion as a logical extrapolation . But introceptive

cognition may be said to begin with just such border-

line concepts . as immediate and instantaneous realiza-

tions . The infinite-is not an extrapolation for intro-

ception any more than is the immediate content of ordinary

vision an extrapolation for perceptual consciousness . .

Perhaps for a being that lacked completely the power of

ordinary vision, but had the capacity for conceptual

thought highly developed, the actual content given by

vision would appear as an infinite or border -line con-

cept . The psychological significance of the notion of

infinity is by no means comprehended in the formal mathe-

matical definition of infinity . I submit that in terms

of its psychological significance , the infinite is the

border- line of any function, which may become the immedi-

ately comprehended content of another function . Thus

the seen world is infinitely distant from the world of

 sound , but yet is the immediately given for sight . If

one bears this point in mind he will realize that there

is no undue pretension in saying that introceptive cog-

S nition gives immediately that which for ordinary concep-

tion is the border-line notion of infinity . The immedi-

ate realization of infinity would not be the literal

.step by-step summation of an endless series .- an impos-

sible task - but would be the direct comprehension of

that which appears as an endless and, therefore, impos-

sible summation . This means that the notion of infinity

enters into the picture simply as an interpretative

device when one seeks to convey an introceptive content

within the inadequate form of ordinary conception .

To ordinary consciousness God appears as the In-

finite and immortality as an infinite extension of time .

In the light of .what I have said above, this means that

we are dealing with border-line concepts for a function

for which neither God nor immortality can be a direct

content . Except in so far as he is also a conceptual,

thinker, the introceptively awakened man would have no

need for the notion of infinity . God and immortality

are simply immediate realizations which have very little

to do with our ordinary theological notions on the

subject . Actually, .for instance, we can say that the

-719-
whole of- Eternity' can be :"realized in an instant . I

other words , the relativity of time as an infinitely

extended manifold is transcended .

We are now in a position to see why the post

Hegelian Idealists had to introduce the notion of in-

finite regressions . They were simply trying to convey

a meaning through conceptual thought which can be truly

apprehended only through introceptual realization . The

figure that they develop naturally seems impossible if

it is taken literally . It is indeed absurd to conceive

of the absolute consciousness as actually moving through

a process of infinite regression, and I do not believe

that the post-Hegelians ever meant anything like that .

.They are dealing simply with .a problem of interpretation

by a function that was inadequate for the content in

question . It is a serious error to predicate the un-

avoidable defects of a symbol as being a defect of that

which is symbolized .

The implications of the theorem, "Substantiality

is inversely proportional to ponderability", are indeed

far reaching and often startling from the standpoint of

habitual valuations . ',For here by., "ponderable" I mean,

not merely everything which can be measured in the usual

-720-
sense, but everything which can be an objective content

of consciousness , whether perceptual or conceptual . In

Y4

other words , everything objective and tangible is in-

substantial and, . therefore , ghost -like . The content of

empiric consciousness : is . .real emptiness . The empiric

world is a mirage , though innocent enough until it is

taken•4to-, .be .something real in itself, in which case it

lZecomes the source of all sorts of delusions and bondages .

To be sure, empiric man must come to terms with

his environment since by no ordinary means can he simply

imagine it as not there and then successfully act along

the lines of his imaginings . But the meaning of this

objective resistance, which forces man to meet its terms, .

does not consist in a thing which is independent of all

consciousness . It is rather a reflex of that portion

of consciousness which has not yet been awakened and

assimilated . The extent of man's awareness of the

universe is the measure of the degree of his own uncon -

sciousness . To the degree that man ' s consciousness

awakens,to that degree the universe tends to vanish until,

with complete consciousness , there is no universe left

at all . This is the stage wherein at last complete

freedom is attained . . Man is bound by unconsciousness,

and is conditioned by-nothing else . The completely

-721-
liberated man could , if he so chose, reintegrate his

universe , but this would not be a process of adding to

his consciousness . It would be very definitely by a

process of selective self -veiling . Being aware of an

external world would be achieved by narrowing the field

of awareness , and not by expanding it .

One may . object to the idea that the "extent .of

man's awareness of the universe is the measure of the

degree of his own unconsciousness " on the ground that

this implies that the increase of scientific knowledge

is tantamount to an increase of unconsciousness . But

if we analyze our most advanced special science, i .e .,

physics , we shall find that its-development actually

confirms my thesis .,. For the content for the physicist's

thought has become progressively etherealized and in-

tangible . Actually the ponderable universe has become

.very largely merely an appearance for the physicist, so

there is much in this science which sounds decidedly like

the Indian doctrine of Maya . Matter is first reduced to

and then
elemental parts , such as electrons and protons ,
these cease to be merely small hard balls . It is found

that they are essentially of the nature of electricity

and that their ' behaviour is such that it cannot be

represented through any sensible model . In the end we

-722-
i

find that the only effective description of this be-

haviour lies in a group of differential equations which

do not give a picturable meaning . Further, even the

electrons and protons can be destroyed as units, to

become flashes of radiation, spreading indefinitely

throughout space . Now all of this is simply a dis-

appearance f of the universe in the sense of being some-

thihg real as it appears, while that which remains

determinant is a mathematical statement , a somewhat

which exists for thought . This simply means that our

physicists have become highly conscious and thereby

.caused a substantial vanishing of the ponderable uni-

verse . Thus, so far from discrediting my thesis, ac-

tually the late development of our most fundamental

special science strongly confirms it .

As I use the term, the Substantial is that which

is Real, Perdurable and .Self- existent . In contrast, the

Phenomenal is that which depends upon something else

than itself as it appears . But the Phenomenal is not

conceived as a direct manifestation of the Substantial

so that by a direct movement of consciousness in the

direction of the noumenal the substantial can be attained

if the movement is but maintained far enough . Rather

the phenomenon is produced by what might'be called a

relative withdrawal of substance, so that a movement

of consciousness toward the phenomenal is equivalent to

a movement away from the Real . The Real is attained

by a movement of consciousness in the opposite direction

from that by which the phenomenon is experienced . The

key to the realization of the Real lies in the turning

about of the stream of consciousness towards its source .

The movement of consciousness toward experience

as an end-in-itself is equivalent to a growth of spirit-

ual poverty . The ultimate effect of this movement is

a state of complete slavish bondage to the object, in

which the entity becomes a mere appendage to appearance .

Consciousness in this state is quite without depth, i .e .,

it is a state of soullessness in the sense that all the

values'connoted by soul are completely unconscious . But

since the unconscious depths of the individual are by no

means inactive, simply because the individual conscious-

ness is not aware of them, it follows that one in this

state is completely at the mercy of autonomous psychical

forces . Individuals and nations in this state are con-

tinually drawn into impossible and tragic situations

wherein that is done or has to be done which one would

prefer to have been otherwise . . The conscious individual

-724-
or national will has no control over the factors which

are unconscious to it . The state of the world today

simply illustrates just how serious such a situation

can be .

Footnote to Chapter X

lIn this connection the reading of the fourth book of

Schopenhauer ' s "The World as Will and Idea" is an
illuminating experience .
 Chapter -M

The .Meaning of Divinity

When we come into the presence of the notion of

Divinity we face that which is both the Supreme Value

.for all consciousness and, yet, in most of its repre-

sentations the greatest source of evil . Far more often

than not, when we hear a man refer to God he is conceiv-

ing of only a human invention , which has been handed

down by religious institutions , and by traditions . Yet,

at times , this same word is,usea to designate the one

Reality which genuinely underlies all that is and which

may be directly known as the universal Substrate . Thus

it is meaningless either to affirm that God is or that

God is not , if one does not consider the specific sense

in which the term is employed . The God of direct mystic-

al or gnostic Realization is. very different from the God

of theological speculation and of priestcraft generally .

So we can define the term in such a way that it has the

highest philosophical and psychological validity, but,

in that case , we shall . mean something very different from

There is a mean-
the most common notions on the . subject .

ing centering around the notion of Divinity that I find

-726-
to be of the very highest importance and, yet, I could

equally well-employ or avoid words commonly used to

designate God . With either line of procedure diffi-

culties of a psychological sort are introduced, for,

on the one hand , if'familiar words are used with a

specially delimited connotation, still inherited pre-

suppositions in the mind of,-the reader are almost cer-

tain to confuse the issue, while, on the other hand,

the denial of any reality to traditional God-conceptions

is equally likely to be interpreted as a sort of athe-

istic materialism . And both views would be a false

understanding of my real meaning . I shall, therefore,

have to discuss the senses in which I find the notion

of Divinity sound , on one hand , and untenable, on the

other* .

There is one sense of the God-notion that can be

dispensed with very readily . Often in the history of

man priests and political rulers have invented or modi-

fied an already existing God-notion as an instrument of

psychological power and control over the human beings

that are ruled . That in this we have a supreme mani-

festation of evil intent I believe to be so self-evident

that little supporting argument is needed . In this .con-

nection it may be well to quote the words of a modern

Buddhist adept .
 "And now, after making due allowance for evils

that are natural and cannot be avoided, - and so few

are they that I challenge the whole host of Western

metaphysicians to call them evils or to trace them

directly to an independent cause - I will point out

the greatest , the chief cause of nearly two -thirds

of the evils that pursue humanity ever since that

cause became a power . It is religion under whatever

form and in whatever nation . It is the sacerdotal

caste , the priesthood and the churches . It is in

those illusions that man . looks upon as sacred, that

he has to search out the source of that multitude of

evils which is the great curse of humanity and that

almost overwhelms mankind . Ignorance created Gods

and cunning took advantage of opportunity . Look at

India and look at . Christendom and Islam , at Judaism

and Fetishism . It is priestly i mposture that ren-

dered these Gods so terrible to man ; it is religion

that makes of him the selfish bigot, the fanatic that

hates all mankind out of his own sect without rendering

him any better or more moral for it . It is belief in

Gods and God that makes two-thirds of humanity the

slaves of a handful of those who deceive him under the

-728-
false pretence of saving them . Is not man ever ready
to commit any kind of evil if told that his God or gods

demand the crime? ; voluntary victim of an illusionary

God, the abject slave of his crafty ministers .

I i ,-I-ta-l-ka nd`Slavdnian ieasant will st _ e him=

self n e Yiis family sta vin and nak " to feed and

clothe his cadretiandip_ope..,Fo two ousand years

fee"'W ng t ~fat_% . oyf the la ,-- an -t ° `ay~"fh~'-Th lowers

stand th.c~ae~o-faa`met~areeuttgg~e aEh=o~tle r's

throats`in-the names .oand

, . for the greater dory of

1heAr,• __re apecet .ive m hs . Remember the sum of h

isery will ne,6r be diminished ft to that day when\tne

better destroy s the name of T3guth,

morals port
, and on of universal humanity charity, the al ars of these
0/007
false gods ."
Thus speaks a representative of one of the

greatest religious philosophies . I think that, if we

can free our minds from inherited prejudice , we must

agree with this indictment . Today , one needs but to

observe the procedure of the totalitarian and other

nations to see how false gods are invoked to arouse

men to most inhuman and uncharitable action . The gods

the Col-
are variously named . They have been called , "
lectivity", "the Race-nation", "Shinto", "the white-

man's burden", and by other names . But the effect is

always . the same,-i .e .,'to cause men to act and think

unrighteously , though believing that they are righteous

in doing so . The most sacred motivation in man is

harnessed by a mundane will to accomplish the most

malicious : kind . of objective . . There is no evil greater

than this . If ever a nation would make war to enforce

its will with clean hands then it must carefully avoid

invoking the notion of Divinity as a means of building

. a fighting morale .
If divinities of the above type were the only

kind of divinities there are , then it would be better

that the God-notion should be completely eradicated

from the mind of man . But, fortunately , the God-notion

has a much more sincere meaning , even though in some

manifestations we will have to judge it unsound . Here,

at least , we move in a field of philosophical dignity .

When sincerely , but unsoundly , believed in, God

is the name of the unknown cause of effects men have

not been able to trace to their roots . In this sense,

"God" is only a speculative conception which comprehends

all that of which man is ignorant but which seems to be

necessary to account for that which is known to happen .
Thus, the "Independent Thing" of the Realist is actually

a God of this sort . So also is "Experience'!, when it

is spelled with a capital "E" . In this sense, God be-

gins where reason and knowledge end .

It is unquestionably true that, so long as men

have awakened only part of the functions of conscious-

ness , there are problems which cannot be solved . Ex-

perience and reason alone are incapable of resolving

the most ultimate questions, which can, nevertheless,

arise in the rational consciousness . In the presence

of such a situation there are three possible courses of
procedure

1 . A speculative construct may be invented which

is conceived to be such that it is the resolution of

the problem, but yet is of such a nature that it can-

not be directly . .verified . If one places unconditional

confidence in such a construct, it is a God-notion in

an unsound and indefensible sense .

2 . It is possible to conceive the resolution of

the problem as unknown and eternally unknowable . This

is systematic agnosticism and is a voluntary surrender

to ignorance .

3 . One may honestly acknowledge that at present the

resolution is unknown, and yet maintain the attitude

that possibly by appropriate means a resolution may

be possible . This is simply a tentative and honest

agnosticism , without implying the ultimate failure of

knowledge .

All three resolutions imply ignorance . The

first is proud and pretentious .in that it places be-

fore men a pretention,to knowledge which is not genuine .

The second is also proud in that the individual implies

that his own ignorance must necessarily characterize

all men, and not be merely the mark of the limitations

of particular functions of consciousness . The third

also implies ignorance , but it is frankly acknowledged

and humble , thereby supplying a condition most favor-

able to the awakening of a superior and more compre-

hensive knowledge .

In the case of a speculative construct which is

viewed only as a pragmatic device for handling some

practical problem, there is no objection to be raised .

Such a construct has the value of only a temporary

scaffolding and is known to be such . A positive evil

arises when such a construct is uncritically given a

transcendental authority and thus discourages a genuine

search for Truth and the acceptance of self-determined

moral responsibility . As a general proposition, it

may be said that the Gods of theology are of this sort

and are ,a hindrance,, rather than an aid, in the progress

of man toward genuine Enlightenment . It is better for

a man not to feel sure, provided he continues the search

.for certainty, than to .build his structure of assurance

upon the quicksand*of false gods .

Yet, though it'is true that most God-conceptions

will not withstand the light 'of critical examination,

still a psychological study of the religious conscious-

ness reveals that the general notion of God points'to

something genuine . There is a secular kind of conscious-

ness - the kind which most men possess most of the time;-

and there is a sacred kind of consciousness . The latter

always contains . some sort of super-mundane content or

reference . This content or reference is of a somewhat

which is of very superior value when compared to any of

the values of the ordinary secular consciousness . -In

this sacred consciousness there is That which stands

as the Supreme Value, often symbolized as the Jewel be-

.yond all price . It is entirely unnecessary to give this

Supreme Value any delimiting definition in order to

recognize that it exists and is of the highest moral

importance to the individual who is oriented to it .

.All of this, so far, is within the limits of fact avail-

able for the appropriate kind of psychological investi-

gation,, regardless of whether the introceptive function

is awakened and active within the investigator or not .

Now, this Supreme Value, when realized, may be, and

generally is, given the name for the Divinity that is

current in the society of which the individual is a part .

When used in this sense, the word "God", or any other

name for the Divinity, not only corresponds to a reality,

but it points to a Reality that is far more . important

than anything lying within the limits of secular ex-

perience . In this sense, the introceptive Realization

has the value of an indubitable proof of the reality of

God, for the individual who has awakened this function .

The God of Gnosis or of Mystical Realization is

not the God of theology or of priestcraft and political

rulers . So great care should be taken not to confuse

the one meaning of the word with the other . There are

God-conceptions which really are no more than opiates

for the dulling of the reason of dominated peoples .

.But there are also God-conceptions that are filled with

the brightest and purest kind of Light . Always is it

possible to find counterfeits of real values, but it is

ever necessary to be on guard against emotional reactions

.which all too easily lead the disillusioned man to dis-

card genuine coins once he-has been deceived by the

counterfeits . Here our means of discrimination be-

tween the true and false coins is fairly clear . The

true Divinities are known to be by direct and indi-

vidual realization, . and do not exact .from man blind

and undiscriminating belief . The false Gods rest upon

inculcated and constrained belief .' Further, the true

Gods never demand of man that he should commit rational

or intellectual suicide by arbitrary believing of

systematic absurdity . On the contrary, the more in-

telligent the devotion the more the true Gods are honored .
The Anostic Divinity may be quite properly known

by other names than those most commonly employed . It may

be with perfect justice called "LIFE", "CONSCIOUSNESS",

"TRUTH" or "SUBSTANCE", though always there is something

implied in these names when thus . used that reaches be-

yond any formal definition . The true Divinity can never

be completely dissected by conceptual analysis, and this

is,so, not merely because of a failure to think clearly,

but rather for the reason that more is involved than can

be comprehended by conceptual process alone . Analysis

can accomplish a great deal, but it still remains limited

by the fact that it is a functional modification of con-

sciousness that is, in important respect , less than the

sum-total of all consciousness . Whenever any indi-

vidual comprehends anything through his analytic power,

that which he comprehends stands on a lower level than

himself . So the .value of Divinity cannot be given to

anything which a man can analyze, for the whole notion

of Divinity implies something more comprehensive and

superior than the individual himself . Do I possess and

command Life, Consciousness, Substance and Truth, or do

they possess me? If they possess and fundamentally con-

dition me, then they stand in the relation of the Div-

inity to me . As some men possess and command far more

than others, it follows that the Divinities of some men

are equalled or even transcended by . other men . It is

quite possible for man to,transcend his former Gods .

So we are dealing here with a relative rather than an

absolute status .
It is an idea of the more evolved religious con-

sciousness , as exemplified in the case of true Buddhism,

that man can attain a position superior to that of his

Gods . From this superior level he can even become a

teacher of his former Gods . Thus we find the Gods pic-

tured as attending the discourses of the great Buddha

and even of others who have attained comparable status .

Of course, in such a case the man has become equal or

even superior to the Gods , and so they cease to bear

the former . relationship to him . Now, all of this gives

to the conception of Divinity a meaning quite different

from that common to our Western theology . The Gods

have a relative , rather than an absolute character .

But, on the other hand , their existence is much more

than an arbitrary predication of a speculative construct .

Their existence is known by direct realization and so

rests upon solid grounds .

To call Life , Consciousness , Truth or Substance

the Divinity implies that in these notions we are deal-

ing with something a good deal more than mere abstrac-

tions or hypotheses . In the true sense , that only may

be called Divine with which man may realize the most

intimate relationship , that is, a really vital relation-

ship . This is not true of a merely abstract construc-

tion . Of course, the notion of Divinity implies that

the Divine is also something superior and more compre-

hensive, . so intimacy of relationship is a necessary but

not sufficient condition . Now, we speak of life in

general as a sort of abstraction but so long as it means

only that to us it is not known as a Divinity . But if

one attained a state of conscious unity with universal

Life he would know God . He would be in the Awakened or

Enlightened state behind the scenes of empiric activity .
This means being conscious in just precisely the zone

which commonly is quite unconscious and this, in turn,

implies that such an individual can will and direct

subtle activities , where formerly he was merely acted

upon . Simply enormous implications follow from this,

for the individual who attains this state can, from a

personal standpoint which is quite rational and gov-

erned by law, produce effects which, from the perspec-

tivef
of others who are more largely conditioned by un-

conscious powers , seem to be actually magical or mirac-

ulous . Yet there is nothing more involved than the

awakening of a latent human possibility and an activity

which, on its own level , is completely rational and

governed by its own laws . A change of perspective is

equivalent to a magical transformation of,the world .

There is nothing here transcending the possibilities

of philosophic understanding .

I hope that what I have said will supply a more

intelligible and acceptable meaning to the idea of God-

consciousness . To be directly conscious of Life as

such, of Consciousness in its unorganized purity, or

of Substance as perdurable depth is to be conscious of

the Divinity and, possibly , even as the Divinity . There

is no question here of setting up a relationship with

an infinitely distant Being that stands apart from the

universe , a .notion that would be quite absurd . It is

all simply a matter of achieving a conscious relation-

ship with one's own supporting roots , and one could

even dispense with the language commonly associated

with religion , provided he did not depreciate the

significance of the roots . Often the awakened man can

afford to be privately amused or saddened by many of

the notions which many men view as sacred , though a

compassionate consideration may cause him to veil his

own feeling . For the feeling for the sacred is very

important , even though it is , oriented to inadequate

and even inferior notions .

Now, having said-this much concerning what I

mean when I refer to the Divinity, I trust that I

shall not be misunderstood in subsequent use of the term .

In the chapter onIdealism I have already noted

the fact that the state of consciousness wherein con-

sciousness is dissociated from the object and united

only with the subject is only transitory . Almost im-

mediately consciousness acquires a new kind of content .

But the new content is wholly of a sacred character and

is not the world as formerly known . What is meant by

this is very easily misunderstood since it does not

mean or, at least , does not necessarily mean that the

.photographic .image of the sensible world is altered .

I shall try to make the distinction between the new

and the old content clear .

.The transformation which I am describing has no

effect upon the sensible form of the world as it ap-

pears . If one were an engineer when he passed through

the transforming process and continued to function as

an engineer, his methods of practical operation upon

objective nature would remain the same . There would

be no reason for his dispensing with pragmatic con-

ceptions which had proven to be of practical value .

His superior insight might guide him to more effective

conceptions and methods, but still there is no reason

to expect that these would be of radically different

type as compared to those commonly used by engineers

_and scientists . The transformation affects the atti-

tude toward the sensible world, rather than its apparent

form . It is the reality-value which undergoes a radical

alteration . I may .illiistrate this by a familiar experi-

ence of the student of geometry . In the case of the

more familiar Euclidian form of geometry we conceive

of the various configurations as existing in a space

-7k0
which is unaffected by the presence or absence of

material bodies . The straight or other lines will

pass through the earth as little altered as when pass-

ing through so-called empty space . The surveyor

constantly makes use of this principle . But the

employment of this conception by no means interferes

with the power to perceive material bodies . Those

bodies are merely irrelevant to the geometrician .

For the sensible man they exist, but for the geometri-

cian they are unreal and are in no wise a barrier to

.his thought . Here we find that the object as seen is

one thing, while the object of thought is quite another .

For the concrete man, in this case , we have a practical

separation of the functions of perception and concep-

tion and, except for periods of special concentration,

both functions are active simultaneously but essentially

independently .

In the foregoing case , we have a situation such

that a problem of relative reality arises almost inevi-

tably . Two individuals of equal intellectual ability

may give to the geometric and sensible worlds diametri-

cally opposite reality valuations . One may say that

the sensible world is the more real while the other may

say that it is the geometric world that has reality .

In both cases some form of the problem of appearance

and reality arises and each predicates a reality-maya

contrast, though in the reverse senses . And this is

a difference which cannot be resolved either by logical

reasoning or by reference to empiric fact . For both

individuals may resolve the specific geometric theorems

equally effectively . : .And, further, a study of the

genesis of the original geometric conceptions would

not resolve the difference . Even though it is shown

that geometric conceptions first arise in .connection

with an empiric problem, this does not imply that the

geometric knowledge comes from the perceptual field .

The empiric situation may be interpreted as simply an

occasion which aroused into activity a latent geometric

understanding . No, neither a reference to fact nor

logical reasoning can resolve the difference between

the two valuations . The difference is one of funda-

mental attitude and, hence, essentially religious . The

one individual is more materialistic in his attitude,

the other more spiritual, although the intellectual

ability may be practically equal . But the significance

of the objective world in the two cases is totally dif-

ferent . The problem of adjustment takes quite diverse

forms .

-742-
 Now, in this instance , we have an illustration

of the effect of the introceptive transformation upon

the world-view . The new sacred content of conscious-

ness affects radically the reality - valuation without

altering the photographic image of the sensible world .

The consequences which follow are enormously important,

though they are of such .a subtle nature that they do

.not readily lend themselves to dewcription . For in-

stance , one knows the universe to be the best possible

world and everything . is as it should be, despite all

the seeming disharmony and barbarism . It is realized

that the seeming out-of - joint world is an effect of in-

complete consciousness - the kind of product one receives

by the collaboration of perception and conception when

the introceptive function is not awakened . The latter

is like the reverse side of an embroidered cloth where

the effect is chaotic and there are many loose threads .

But on the other side we have a perfectly orderly de-

sign . On the one side, it seems that mere chance ac-

counts for the,pittern and that man lives in an alien

world which has no inner sympathy with his purposes and

yearnings , while the other side reveals a perfect order

in complete sympathetic rapport with the deepest yearn-

ings and aspirations of the human being . In the sacred

world one feels himself to be perfectly at home, and

nothing is strange . There is no problem of melioration .

There is no problem of making a better world, since

that which is, is the best that possibly could be .

The practical moral problem is completely trans-

formed . It is no . longer oriented to meliorating condi-

tions or making the world better, but to the awakening

of a sleeping human consciousness . The transformed in-

dividual may devote himself to this moral problem in

the social body with all the energy of which he is

capable . In this activity he may will to face the

severest kind of hardship . His heart may be touched

most profoundly with sympathy for human suffering . But

his treatment is radically different from that of the

meliorator . He knows that mere melioration, which is

not united with an effort to awaken the introceptive

function, is merely a movement down a blind alley .

Indeed, there are even situations, such that, melioration

.will have a delaying effect upon the awakening process

and, in this kind of situation, he would view the meli-

oration as unwise and tending to delay the real resolu-

tion of the problem of suffering . To the all-too-human

consciousness he may even appear to be cold, though

actually his heart may be bleeding at the sight of what
he knows to be needless suffering . Indeed, the moral

problem tends to become more vital than it ever was

before,,but the way of . resolution is totally transformed .

The sacred universe is identical with Divinity

and is'exclusively Divine . There simply is nothing

else . For one who has been captured by the view that

the Divinity is merely a grand sort of entity designed

on the lines of the human being, the meaning of the

Divine universe , will be , almost inevitably, misunder-

stood . There is very considerable testimony that some

individuals have seen . appearances in the form of .vast

and grand human -like forms , but such are much less

than what I mean by the Divinity . At present I am not

discussing the significance of such appearances, though

there is evidence that they do have enormous significance,

at least in some cases . ''I am referring, rather, to a

substrate underlying all forms whatsoever . Subtle ap-

pearances of the above type may, indeed , enrobe an aspect

of Divinity, but no less is such the case of every visible

aspect of the universe . The Divinity is equally embodied

in a mountain - chain or in an ocean . The fact is that

all these appearances are simply symbols of a Reality

which, in its own true nature, is unseen , though it may

'be introceptively realized and thus known in the Gnostic

sense .
 . .Clearly what'I mean by Divinity is a somewhat

that is quite impersonal . Yet, this somewhat can be

directly realized by the function of introception and,

when so realized, it is found to be much the most in-

timate of all things . It is the fulfillment of all the

deep yearnings of . the human heart and it illumines the

mind with a Light which is far more brilliant than any

light of the intellect either operating in its purity or

in relation to experience . This combination of imperson-

ality and intimacy poses a real difficulty to unawakened

consciousness, for we commonly associate the intimate

.with the personal .`'But actually that which is personal

is segregated into a sort of differentiated cell, so

that between personalities there are always separating

boundaries . Mostly what we find in other personalities

is, at best, but 'a hidden aspect of ourselves . Between

us and the other, there is a distance which .is never

-crossed until mutual identity is achieved by the realiza-

tion of common roots . It is not difficult to see that

we are actually much more intimately related to space

than to any personality whatsoever, for space inter-

penetrates our being at every point . So is it when one

comes into conscious realization of the underlying

Divinity ; it interpenetrates our being with the same

completeness that space does our physical manifestation .

But whereas objective space seems to us as something

,quite cold, the,hidden Divinity is warm .

To'attain a direct realization of Substance, Life,

Consciousness or Truth is a good deal more than solving

a scientific problem . When one has solved a scientific

problem he has mastered something of instrumental value,

he has achieved a means for facilitating some human pur-

pose . But, clearly, this is much less than the ultimate

fulfillment . of purpose and yearning . The growth of

scientific knowledge is merely progress in a series

where each last term leads on to a new problem with,

apparently, no end . But the introceptive realization

provides a terminal value . At one step the individual

has reached the culmination of the infinite series of

relative consciousness . . This gives to the realized value

a unique significance . It is more than an instrumental

knowledge and more than the temporary satisfying of one

desire in an endless series of desires . Desire as a

genus is fulfilled, and the knowledge realized is cul-

minating . For this reason we are dealing with an order

quite other than that of secular consciousness . Because

I can find no other language which will suggest its mean-

ing I must call it the sacred order, and speak of the

content of this consciousness as Divine . Yet the common

attitude toward religious values suggests features which

I do not at all intend . Thus we often associate religion

with an attitude wherein discriminating thought is al-

lowed to take a holiday . . It is the zone where rational

men often allow themselves to take an irrational holiday

and are permitted a kind .of intellectual irresponsibility .

This is not at all true of the Gnostic realization, which

requires the most serious application of the will and the

exercise of the keenest discrimination . What I mean is

suggested by a combination of the religious motif with

scientific alertness and discrimination . Thus it is, in

a sense , neither religion nor science as ordinarily under-

stood, and yet combines features belonging to each .

For the individual who is both introceptively and

perceptually awake the universe is cognized in two ways

which may be more or less completely blended . As per-

-ceived, the universe is known to be a drama which is not

itself its own meaning, but as introceived it is known to

be an effect .of realities hidden to perception when func-

tioning alone or in combination with thought . One sees

the drama and yet is united with the consciousness of

the director . of the drama . He has an introceptive under-

standing of underlying purpose even though his power of

conceptual interpretation may be highly defective . He

-748-
may even Know, and know that he Knows, without being

able to conceive of what he inwardly Knows . For con-

ception in these matters requires all the skill of a

superior intellect, and it appears that skill of this

sort is by no means a condition of introceptive awaken-

ing . Hence we do have many inadequate interpretative

statements from those who have attained some degree of

this awakening . Perhaps, more often than not, the

Mystic does not possess the best conceptual understand-

ing of his own insight, and I believe that this is one

of the main reasons why genuine mystical consciousness

is so generally depreciated by scientific and philosophic-

al minds ., Yet rational man should make allowances for

this and not condemn a content because of inadequate

presentation .

The substantial substrate behind the perceptually

apparent world is the Soul of the Universe . Through the

introceptive union with this Soul it is-possible to es-

tablish an inner communion with all things . Through

man's own participation in that Soul, he partakes of

the soul of all creatures and things ; he finds a phase

of consciousness underlying all objects . So he finds

that the universe is, in reality, neither dead nor blind .

And so it results, that for him who has attained intro-

ceptive realization a mystical communion is, or may be,

-749-
established with all objects . They are no longer

merely lifeless values which may be substituted for

x in general propositions . They are rather parts of

a universal brotherhood, which is by no means ex-

elusively confined to human beings .

J
 PART IV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF MYSTICISM

Chapter I
Judgments of Meaning and Existence

When we consider any conception)our way of view-

ing the .conception may be oriented to one or the other of

two attitudes, or to a combination of these .- We may think

of the conception as an existence in time and thus having

a history , possessing an externally observable constitu-

tion and standing in discernible relationships with other

conceptions , and all of this may be done without an inner

understanding of the significance of the conception . But

we may also think of the conception in the sense of its

meaning or value and from this standpoint it may be viewed

quite out of relation to its history and various external

relationships . Thus, for example, if the object of in-

.terest was some important theorem in mathematics we might

be, on the one hand, especially interested in its historic

development , the. psychological processes which led to its

discovery and the part which it played in its impact upon

the social body . Conceivably, the historian or the psy-

chologist might proceed with a reasonably comprehensive

and competent investigation of these circumstances without

being able to understand the theorem itself . The theorem

-751-
would be simply a non-understood somewhat which had had

such and such a history and influence upon life in general,

and possessed of more or less determinant psychological

antecedents . . But,''in contrast to all this and, indeed,

with complete ignorance of all these facts , the student

of the theorem might be interested exclusively with re-

spect to its inner content , its logical development and

its relationship to other parts of mathematical theory .

For this purpose , it would be a matter of no moment

whether the theorem had a human history or had been pre-

cipitated "out of the blue", as it were , and was somehow

there before consciousness . Indeed, most of the math-

ematician ' s interest in pure mathematics is of this lat-

ter sort . l

These two ways of thinking of a conception are

recognized in logic and supply judgments of two different

orders . The first kind of judgments may be called a

"judgment of existence" and the second a "judgment of

significance or value " . The former is a determination

that a somewhat is, and traces its observable history

and relations , while the latter is a determination of

what a somewhat is, thus giving its inner meaning . We

might say, the first deals with considerations of fact,

while the second is concerned with Truth value . However,

in saying this I acknowledge that I am forming an evalu-

-?52-
.ation judgment as to the relations of the two types of
judgment . Other philosophic orientations exist that

would not support this judgment, but as we must all as-

sume , consciously or unconsciously, some philosophic

orientation in the approach to the subject-matter under

consideration, I conceive it to be better to be frank

about the matter at the beginning, rather than to hide

oneself under the appearance of a false omniscience .

As William James has clearly stated in his first chapter

of "The Varieties of Religious Experience ", the one type,

of judgment does not lead immediately to the other, at

least in so far as our relative experience goes . Thus,

any judgment as to how the one type of judgment is re-

lated to the other is, itself, a judgment of value, in-

volving subjective factors, and is not an objective

determination of fact .

It appears to me that the . relationship between

judgments of existence and judgments of significance is

not a uniform one for-all possible kinds of objects which

.may come under consideration . Thus, if the object is of

that sort which Spengler has called "physiognomic" or

"political", it may well be that the existential judgment

is, in high degree, determinant with respect to the judg-

ment of significance . For, in this domain, a difference

in history clearly effects a difference in meaning . But

-753-
in the domain of the "systematic", in Spengler' s sense,

the existential and meaningful judgments may be nearly,

and possibly wholly, independent . Certainly, the in-

dependence is very clear in an instance such as that of

the mathematical theorem . For the truth-value of the

theorem has nothing whatsoever to do with the background

of its discovery . Whether the-psycho-physical condition

of the discoverer was judged pathological or normal has

not the slightest bearing with respect to the soundness

or value of the theorem .

The great discoveries and creative developments,

which so largely differentiate the life of man from that

of the animals , are usually the work of genius . But the

study of geniuses , as psycho -physical existences, has

demonstrated that , in this sense , genius , as a whole,

stands closer . to the pathologic types who occupy asylums,

than it does to the ordinary normal man . Thus , from the

standpoint of the valuation which views organic adjust-

ment to environment and fitness to survive in the biologic

sense as the adequate measure of the worth of a man, the

genius would be judged in the same way as the ordinary

psychotic . In this sense , genius is a weakness and li-

ability which might better be exposed to death in child-

hood, as was the custom of the Spartans . But, from the

-754-
standpoint of the valuation of one who sees the contribu-

tion of genius as affording the highest of all values for

individual and social consciousness, it might well appear

that the worth of the psycho-physical normalcy of the

philistine is'very much .in doubt .

The issue we face here is, whether , on the one hand,

'We shall take our stand with or near those who give ex-

clusive approval to survival and adjustment value of a

psycho-physical organism, or, on the other, shall we stand

with those who give exclusive or primary value to the mean-

ingful offering for consciousness . Not all men agree, or

can be brought to agree, as to which point of view to

adopt . Some , in essential agreement with the former German

National Socialists, will take the stand that fitness for

psycho-physical survival is all important, while the con-

tribution of genius is to be tolerated only in so far as

it contributes to biological survival . Others, in essential

agreement with the philosophical mystic and the pure math-

ematician, will affirm that enrichment of consciousness is

all-important ;'and bio-physical existence is of worth, only

in an instrumental sense . Unequivocally, I take my stand

with the latter group and affirm, categorically, its super-

iority-since there is no . logical way to prove that super

iority to the satisfaction of all men . I would not deny

to those with the bio-physical orientation the right to go

to perdition by their own route .

 The psycho-biological study of genius has not

generally led to a depreciation of the contribution of

genius as a result of the general finding of an abnormal

psycho-physiological make-up in the constitution of genius .

The worth of genius to the sciences and arts is a too

well attested fact to permit a serious consideration of

such a ,judgment . In fact, the psychological and bio-

logical sciences owe their extence far too much to the

achievements of genius for such a judgment to be a safe

weapon . Indeed, it would prove to be a boomerang, since,

if the soundness of the' contribution of genius is con-

ditional upon the soundness of psycho-biological constitu-

tion of the genius himself, then many of the conceptions

fundamental to biology and psychology would be vulnerable

before such a criticism . Hence, the psycho-biological

judgment would be self-destroying . So, on the whole, this

kind of study has not led to a confusion of existential

and meaningful judgments . But in one particular field

this discrimination has not been consistently maintained .

That . is the field of religious genius . Here, in instance

after instance, the psycho-physical facts in the lives of

religious genius have been employed to evaluate the con-

scious value produced by the genius, and generally in the

direction of depreciation of that value .

-756-
 Both consistency and integrity are violated in

;-arbitrarily-treating religious and other genius by divergent

canons of interpretation . This arbitrary discrimination

in treatment is .not a .manifestation of an impersonal

scientific . spirit ._ It reflects , rather , the personal

prejudice of the investigators and is less than ethical,

to say the least . It is simply a manifestation of wishful

thinking in an anti-religious . direction .

Psycho-biological investigation has been extended

beyond the special study of genius . It is assumed, with

considerable justification, that all states of conscious-

ness , with whatsoever content and of .whatever value, are

associated with psycho-physical states or modification of

function . Hence, it appears, a correlation may be estab-

lished between conscious attitudes and contents, on the

one hand, and the psycho-physical states and modification

of function . There is substantial evidence to support

this view as a general principle, and there is no logical

reason to suppose that it is not universally true with

respect to all embodied consciousness . But the establish-

ing of the .fact of such a correlation is by no means

equivalent to a determination of the nature of the cor-

relation . Thus , the relationship might be one of paral-

lelism or of causal connection , and if the relationship

is causal, there are then three possibilities of inter-

-757-
pretation . The causal priority may be biological, or it

may be psychical or, finally, it may be an interacting

combination of these two . Further, the question arises,

Is the causal connection essential and constitutive, or

is it like a catalytic agent ? It is no simple matter to .

answer these questions satisfactorily so that objective

determinations become . decisive . On the whole, it appears

that personal predilection or, possibly, insight determines

the manner in which the correlation is viewed .

Now, in so far as the psycho-biological approach

has been employed in the study of mystical states of con-

sciousness , whether or not the subjects of study were

geniuses , there has been a strong tendency to interpret

mystical content from the perspective of observed psy-

chical and physiological states and modifications . There

is a quite considerable tendency to view the psychical

and physiological as causally determinant, and largely

the doctrine of organic evolution is assumed as a valid

interpretative principle . As . shown in the first chapter

of the present work, .there is much in this that is simply

assumption and, therefore , much less than proven fact .

One is not less scientific because he does not accept

these assumptions, provided he can proceed from another

basis with logical consistency and does not affirm a

position incompatible with determinant fact .

-758-
 In the present psychological critique of mystical

states of consciousness I shall assume as a working

principle the primacy of conscious-content to psycho

biological state and function . This is equivalent to

affirming that significance is primary and determinant,

while fact, in the sense of objective . determination, is

derivative and secondary . Applying this principle in

the case of mathematical production, we would start with

the theorem, . and its directly known value, and from that

perspective, interpret the psychical and biological facts

that are observed in the study of the productive mathe-

matician. . This I conceive to be a much more significant

approach than the'reverse . For we are much more certain

about the theorem than we are relative to the psychical

and biological, facts If there 'is 'room to doubt mathe-l matical assurance, there is certainly much vaster reason

for doubting the empiric'determination of fact . Further,

I would assume ,° . as a,starting point, the mathematical

understanding of the best developed mathematical genius,

and would determine such genius by the general consensus

of mathematicians , and not of,psychologists and biologists .

I believe . the foregoing principle of selection is

generally recognized in the professional world as the only

valid one for the valuation of special talent . I simply

propose to apply this principle consistently in the field

of religious mysticism .
 This is frankly an approach, to the subject from .

the perspective of the greatest and most perfect mani-

festations of the mystical consciousness . It, therefore,

is a radical divergence from the approach of both

James H . Leuba and William James who explicitly start

with inferior manifestations, though arriving at divergent

conclusions . It also varies from the approach of Dr . Carl G .

Jung, but not so radically . There will be many points

.in respect to which I shall stand in Agreement with the .

conclusions of both William James and ] )r . Jung, though

my conclusions and treatment will diverge fundamentally

from that of James H. Leuba .

As a case of a rather extreme divergence from the

standpoint taken here, I shall have occasion to give

special attention to the thesis of James H . Leuba as

developed in his "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism" .,

In this work Leuba claims to find the root-sources of

mystical states of consciousness in the practices of

barbaric peoples, this being based upon the assumption

that these barbaric peoples are true primitives . I be-

lieve this assumption to be in error, and conceive the

truth to be that these peoples are degenerates, rather

than primitives, and, accordingly, the seemingly mystical

practices of such are degraded end-terms and counterfeits

of the real practices, rather than the root sources . The

justification of this viewpoint I have outlined briefly

in the first chapter of the first part of this work . I

do not believe that an adequate understanding of a true

and sound coin can ever be achieved through the perspective

afforded through the study of counterfeits . The base

metal of the . counterfeit may well contaminate the under-

standing so that the power to recognize the essence of

the true coin is lost . This contamination very clearly

colors Leuba's work .

Footnote to Chapter I

1An instance'is afforded in the case of the Relativity

Theory of Einstein . An aspect of that Theory leads to .
the formula , E = mc2 where E represents energy, m is
mass and c the velocity of light in centimeters . This
formula led to the development of the atomic and hydrogen'
bombs .. The impact of these upon history and the mass-
psychology of the world is an all too painful present
fact . The historian and psychologist is, no doubt,
abundantly aware of all this and, yet, this by no means
implies that they have a ,competent understanding of the
inner content of the Special and General Theories of
Relativity, of the complex conception of simultaneity
with respect to bodies in different velocities with
respect to'each other, of the increase of mass toward
infinity as velocity approaches the speed of light or
of the properties of a non-Euclidian geometry .

-761-
 Chapter II

Christ, Buddha and Shankara

In the great Indo-European rred.i block, to

which most of us of the West belong, it is not difficult

to pick three mystical geniuses to which general and

competent consensus of opinion would grant the status

of primacy . These three are Christ, Buddha and Shankara .

Christendom would obviously accord such a status to

Christ, and with this judgment Christian mysticism

agrees . The same status is granted Buddha in the vast

Buddhist community and, also, by a number of Western

scholars and aspirants . Shankara is granted a com-

parable position in the Brahmanical community and,

especially, by those who follow the Advaita Vedanta.

I know of no evidence which would support any claim

of superior mystical profundity on the part of any

peo Ylcs
generally known Sage of the non-Aryan uses . Of the

non-Aryans, I know of but one of comparable stature,

i .e ., Lao-tzu, but we do not know him well enough, nor

is his meaning clear enough to our non-Mongolian minds,

for Him to serve our present purposes satisfactorily .

The question as to whether these three great

religious geniuses and leaders are actually instances

of mystical realization is not one, as I think,

rp ' to delay us for long . None the less, for the

 purpose of clarity, I shall briefly outline the ground

for classifying Them as mystically awakened Men . For

this purpose it will be necessary to define just what

is meant by "mystical consciousness", etc .

The words "mystic" and "mysticism" have both a

wider and narrower definition . There is, in addition,

a loose usage in which "mystical" is understood as mean-

ing a reproach thrown "at any opinion which we regard as

vague and vast and sentimental, and without a base in either

facts or logic" . (V. of R .E . p . 38Q) But this usage is

of no use to us and is, in addition, quite incompetent .

The word as employed here has a much more definite refer-

ence . I shall give several definitions derived from

standard sources . (a) The Century Dictionary gives the

following : "Mystic" means "hidden from or obscure to

human knowledge or comprehension ; pertaining to what is

obscure or incomprehensible ; mysterious ; dark ; obscure ;

specifically, expressing a sense comprehensible only to

.-a higher grade of intelligence or to those specifically

initiated"
. "Mysticism" means, (1) "Any mode of thought,

or phase, of intellectual or religious life, in which re-

liance is placed upon a spiritual illumination believed

to transcend the ordinary powers of the understanding",

and (2), "Specifically, a form of religious belief which

is founded upon spiritual experience, not discriminated

or tested and systematized in thought ." (b) The Dictionary

of Philosophy and Psychology gives as the preferred mean-

ing : "Those forms of speculative and religious thought

which profess to attain an immediate apprehension of the .

divine essence or the ultimate ground of existence ."

This source notes , but does not recommend , a usage which

defines "Mysticism " as "any philosophy which does not

limit itself to the world of 'the visible ' and 'our

logical mensurative faculty' " . It is further noted that

several mystics or mystically oriented thinkers insist

upon a special organ, faculty or mode of apprehension,

other than the senses and discursive intellective, as

the means of mystical apprehension or realization . Thus

we have the " scintilla " or "spark " of Bonaventura, the

"Funklein " or "spark" of Eckhart , the "intellectual in-

tuition" of Schelling and the similar requirement of

Schopenhauer . ( c) Leuba in his " Psychology of-Religious

Mysticism " defines mysticism , for the purposes he has in

hand , as "any experience taken by the experiencer to be

a contact ( not through the senses , but "immediate", "in-

tuitive" ) or union of the self with a larger-than-self,

be it called World-spirit , God, the Absolute , or other-

wise ." ( d) James in "The Varieties of Religious Experience"

defines mystical experience by four marks , two of which

are essential and sufficient , while the remaining two are

generally present . The two essential and sufficient marks

are (1 ) "ineffability" as marking the quality of the state

of consciousness immediately experienced by the mystic,

and (2 ) "noetic quality" of a sort "unplumbed by the dis-

cursive intellect" . The secondary marks , not necessary but

usually present are (1 ) transiency of the state of mystical

experience , and (2 ) passivity of the individually directed

will or activity in the presence of a superior power which

takes over .

In India the word " Yoga" carries the meaning of

our "mystical practice" and "mystical realization" .

Deussen-in his "The System of the Vedanta " defines Yoga

as "preparation " ( for union with the world ' s spirit),

but the term is also used to designate the realized

state of union itself . In India also the actuality

of a mystical organ , faculty or mode of apprehension is

affirmed . Thus "Samadhi " and "Dhyana " both refer to a

"concentration" or "meditation" as a process other than

sensual reception or intellective activity which leads

to realization of the "Supreme Soul" or, as with the

Buddhists, " the Prajna Paramita ", . or Transcendental

Wisdom . Specifically the term "Samadhindriya" means

the organ of ecstatic meditation .

One who is familiar with the mystical state of

consciousness as a type , either through objective study

or, especially , through direct acquaintance with the

state itself, will recognize these definitions as all

substantially correct with respect to either some phase

of the state, or to the thought oriented to such a state .

However, the' definitions are manifestly not identical .
In fact, a careful study of them reveals definition from

three points of view, as follows : (a) The religious

(also possibly the metaphysical) . Mystical realization

or Yoga, conceived as "union" with the "World-Spirit",

the "Void", the "Absolute", the "Divinity", the "Supreme

Self", or any supernal Largeness that is to the personal

self as the Infinite is to the finite,involves the very

essence of the religious spirit . This is definition by'

a conceptual reflection of the immediate value which the

state has for the mystic himself . (b) The epistemological .

In this case , the definition is by means of the instrument-

ality whereby the mystical consciousness is attained, not

in the sense of a practice, but in that of an organ,

faculty or mode of apprehension other than those of the

senses and of intellectual functioning . Definition from

this angle emphasizes the poetic quale of the mystical

state . The consciousness is conceived as possessing an

immediate , but non-sensuous , noetic value, which may serve

as the fountainhead of philosophic systems . Mystical

states that are mainly or wholly . states of feeling are

not adequately comprehended by this definition . (c) The

-766-
psychological . The definitions of Leuba and James fall

primarily in this category . In this case, the state is

approached primarily as an '" experience ", and hence some-

thing which may occur in the lives of empiric men as they

live in time . This is not definition of the state from

the perspective of the realized content nor from that

of an awakened way of consciousness . It is rather

mysticism as viewed from the outside, i .e ., as it can

be observed by a consciousness which has no immediate

acquaintance with the state . This is the objective view,

but is not restricted to the extreme objectivity of the

behaviouristic psychologist . It includes introspective

observation, but not the introceptive insight which is

essential for the study of, what we might call, the meta-

psychology of the process .

The ordinary-psychological approach - excluding

metapsychology - is largely dependent upon the auto-

biographical'material of actual mystics that have in-

cluded more or less introspective material . Unfortunately,

the Orientals have supplied us with almost none of this

type .of material . There are elaborate rules governing

practice, metapsychological descriptions of the processes

and interpretations in .the abstract of the resultant, but

almost no report in objective terms of what happened in

the experience of an individual . Material of this sort

from Western mystics is also restricted, and, in the few

cases where it is fairly ample, we do not have .the most

mature development of the consciousness .

The immediate purpose in developing an adequate

definition of mystical states of consciousness is that

of justifying the selection of Christ, Buddha and Shankara

as the outstanding exemplars of such states . But, in

as much as we do not seem to have any introspective

material from any of these Men , satisfactory .identifica-

tion of these Men as mystics from the standpoint of

Western psychology is not easy . Especially is this true

from the standpoint of the test to which Leuba seems to

attach chief importance . I refer to the test of the

ecstatic trance .

So far as I know, there is no clear evidence that

either Christ or Buddha entered into the full trance state .

The references in the Gospels to Christ's going into the

wilderness to pray for protracted intervals almost cer-

tainly means periods of meditation rather than prayer in

the common sense . But meditation can lead to Samadhi

without black- out trance . The Buddhist Sutras do distinctly

speak of the Master as being at times in states of deep

Samadhi , particularly at the time of the initial Transforma-

tion . But, again, Samadhi does not necessarily imply

black-out trance, and, judging by the record as given in

the Sutras , Buddha regarded trance as unnecessary and did

-768-
 not recommend it, though not repudiating it . Some in-

cidents in the biographical account of Shankara's life

do imply full trance, but in these cases it appears to
have been a deliberate transference of consciousness for

a specific purpose, rather than for the attainment of

spiritual insight . Since Patanjali was Shankara's Guru,

it is not unlikely that the early Recognitions of Shankara

might have involved trance states . But it is known that

in his own teachings Shankara did not recommend the methods

of Patanjali, but rather a technique of exceptionally keen

intellectual discrimination .
We are faced here with a problem of major importance .

Are, trance,.states,',of`greater or less degree, essential to

the Yogic and Mystical Awakenings, even of the highest

` order?,heuba seems to .regard this test as decisive as he

develops his case throughout his book, though this criterion

is no part of his definition . He starts with drug-

intoxication and colors the whole subject with that

perspective . I believe him to be guilty of gross mis-

representation here . I appreciate the methodological

convenience of the test, since .a trance state can be

objectively determined, but such procedure is equivalent

to sacrificing substance to method . . It is not exactly a

case of throwing out the baby with the bath but, rather,

throwing out the baby and keeping the bath . I am well

aware that some Yogic techniques do develop trance of

extreme degree, but these techniques fall under the

general group known as Kundala Yoga . I have found no

evidence that Yoga -practice of the type known either

as Jnanayoga or Dhyanayoga necessarily implies trance,

and it is just this latter form of Yoga which, it is

said, can reach to the highest Samadhi . Finally, my

own experience is a clear confirmation of the view that

black-out trance is not necessary , at least as far as

my consciousness reached . Now, how does that state

which I realized appear in the light of the above defini-

tions ? First, take the four marks listed by William James .

( 1) The immediate content of the state was ineffable .

( 2) It had most positive noetic value . ( 3) The periods

of penetration were temporary . ( Indeed , I found it

necessary to restrict the period because the state does

impose a subtle strain upon the nervous organism .)

(4) There is a flow of consciousness that is autonomous,

and even when in the personal sense I initiated a thought,

it developed of itself without intellectual labor . Second,

judging by the Leuba test, dearly the consciousness

involved union of self -identity with an Other which was

larger than the personal self , though in the first in-

stance It was a Transcendent , Self, and later transcended

all selfhood and all being . Third , by the more philos-
ophical standard of definition , I believe that what has

been written in the three earlier parts of this work

clearly places the speculative treatment within the
class of mystical conception . Further, I know that

the most profound state , if formulated strictly , rather

than symbolically , can only be represented by absolute

negation of every possible conception . I confess, if

I had in former years come across such a definition or

description of a state , it would have seemed to me to be

simply unconsciousness , for that would have been the

only thing I,could have imagined as satisfying the

description . However, I know it is very highly con-

scious .'and the "difficulty lies in the limitations of
conceptual imagination . In any case , the state goes

far beyond one in which subtle appearances of beings

would have been imagined to be substantial realities .

Yet, through all this , objective awareness of the sensible

environment remained unbroken and relative thinking

continued , either in a subdued form , or even as a rather

intensive activity . I know the state is possible in

the presence of other persons, and even on the lecture

platform , and can be analyzed and discoursed upon to

those who are present , and without breaking the state

if care is used . There is in this, however, a dissociation

in consciousness so that two and even three parts are

recognizable . Discrimination must be employed to keep

the two .or three phases isolated . This, I think, ac-

complishesthe essential office of the trance .- Further,

consciously self-directed bodily motion is possible .

But the dynamis in the motor sensory and intellectual

fields is, generally, definitely reduced . However, I

do not find that the energic reduction in the sensory

field is greater than that involved in any heavy in-

tellectual abstraction , as is required in mathematical

thinking, for instance . It is not a state favorable

for close objective observation, for this requires

concentration in the sensory field . But the objective

sensible images , as seen, do not seem to be less clear

than in the normal state . They are, however, quite

empty in the sense of having no relevance whatsoever .

They are seen clearly as a definitely defined mirage

is seen clearly, but they have as little reality as a

mirage that is known to be a mirage . Thus, there is a

subtle sense in which the objective world is destroyed,

but not as a perceptible sensible fact .

In the light of all the foregoing, I am forced to

be positive in saying that Leuba's trance test is not

necessary . Later I shall analyze its sufficiency . Here

I shall anticipate my conclusion by saying that I believe

that I can show that it is not sufficient, since trance

consciousness may include many states that are not
truly to be classed as mystical, except in a loose
sense .

Without more ado I shall abandon the tests of

Western objective psychology for justifying the in-

clusion of Christ, Buddha and Shankara among the

mystics . I shall judge Their mystical status by Their

lives and teachings .

A. Mystical signs in the life and teachings

of the Christ .

In considering the life of the Christ as repre-

sented in the records that have come down to us , I shall

disregard entirely the miraculous powers He is said to

have possessed and manifested , since it is not my in-

tention to deal with the sensible theurgic side of

mysticism at all . We do not have any way of dealing with

the problem of theurgy which is scientifically adequate .

For the most part we can only accept or reject theurgic

claims or reports blindly, and that is not at all satis-

factory . Further, I am convinced that the mystical state

can be vindicated entirely apart from any consideration

of sensible powers . Finally, I do not consider myself

competent on this question, at least in so far as theurgyy

is concerned with phenomenal effects . In any case, I do

not consider that the record of sensible miracles either

adds to or detracts from the stature of the Christ . The

non-sensible theurgic powers are , however , quite a dif-

ferent matter . They are important . Magical effects

which produce moral and spiritual revolutions in the

entourage are of the highest importance . This is one

of the major mystical signs, and in the case of the

Christ they are particularly outstanding . There is no

question but that innumerable human beings in the past

1900 years have become changed as to the center of their

motivation and valuation as a result of the influence of

the Christ . And this has been brought about in a way

that is much more magical than intellectual . On the

whole, the change has been in a direction of greater

selflessness of attitude , . together with a shift from

worldly to other-worldly orientation . As this is

definitely in the direction of the norm of the inner

state of mystical realization , we have indirect evidence

of the mystical character of the Christly consciousness .

This is simply a massive instance of the "leavening" or

"inducing " power of the mystical consciousness . It is

highly contagious .
Enhancement of moral energy in the character of

the followers is further evidence of prime importance .

The strength of character with which the Christians

faced their centuries of persecution is a major miracle

in itself - one, in fact , that is a good deal more sig-

nificant than the feeding of the 5000 . As contrasted

with what we might call the counterfeit or "mystoid"

states , such as those induced by drugs , true mystical

consciousness leads to increased power of self -determined

will - a will that is all the stronger because it does

not have an egoistic centering .

One who reads the record of the life and teach-

ings of the Christ objectively, and then proceeds to

integrate the whole about a single idea which shall

reflect the primary significance of that whole, finds

that it consists almost wholly of an ethical teaching

and a personal exemplification of that teaching . One

does not find philosophical interpretation nor psychological

analysis , though there is an implied philosophy and an

implied psychology . Christ did not teach the doctrine

of the absolute primacy of ethics , as such , but, rather,

a specific kind of conduct and moral orientation, which

He exemplified in His own life in extraordinary degree .

It is the kind of morality inculcated and exemplified

that is significant for our purposes . There have been

various types of moral orientation promulgated by men,

and there have been innumerable individuals and groups

-775-
who have organized their lives around one or another of

these systems quite heroically . The exemplars of Christic

and Buddhistic morality have no monopoly of moral heroism,

The history of the world has afforded us a number of

examples of professional soldiers who have thoroughly be-

lieved in the militarist's moral code and made their

lives .to conform with it as thoroughly as has any Christian

co n,avas~C1
or Buddhist saint in his ral-orientation . The

thorough-going militarist is not without a code, but his

code is diametrically opposed to that of the Christs and
Buddhas . Indeed, morale may mean as much to the militarist

as it does to the saint , but it is a radically opposed

kind of morale . A quite different philosophy is implied .

So, for us , it is the kind of ethics taught and practiced

by the Christ which is significant , rather than that

ethics , as such , was given prime importance .

The Christic ethics centers around four inter-

connected principles or foci that are of the highest

significance . These we shall consider in sequence .

1 . First of all the Christic morale is cen-

tered around primary consideration for otherness and is,

therefore , radically anti -egoistic . In this respect it

is in complete accord with Buddhistic morality which is

explicitly and emphatically anti-egoistic . Self-
depreciation is implied in the concern for the good of

others that shall at least equal one's concern for his

-776-
own good . This exaltation of otherness has two phases,
(a) the primary self-giving to the God or Transcendental

Principle, and (b ) the valuation and regard for the

neighbor that shall be not less than the valuation and

regard for one ' s self .

2 . The Christic morality implies a denial of

the will-to-live, or of the desire for sentient existence .
There must be no thought for the morrow ; no provision
for one ' s own sustenance or self-protection ; no thought
or action motivated by prudential considerations . This
is mystically equivalent to a will-to- die, and , again,

is identical with the Buddhistic motivation . Life is

to be lived so long as the automatic dynamis supports

it and external circumstance permits it, but there must

be no egoistic clinging to life or striving to maintain
it . There is no teaching that life should be hated and,

hence, destroyed, but, on the contrary, all manifesta-

tions of it outside of one's self are to be carefully

cherished . The total attitude is one of compassionate

indifference . That which comes, is to be accepted, but

with loving compassion , not with cold stoicism. .,

One who succeeds in living this kind of life

reasonably well will find that it is full of rich com-

pensations . He will . become seemingly defenseless and

harmless , but actually more secure than ever before and

a particularly potent force with respect to his milieu .

He will feel more secure with the doors of his house un-
locked than when they are locked . He will feel more

secure without weapons than when armed . He will feel

more secure and be more certainly provided for when he
is unconcerned about money, than when he concentrates
upon . the securing of it . He accepts what comes and
will be surprised to find that , while some painful ex-
periences do come , yet, on the whole , he lives more .
happily and more comfortably . than ever before . He will

feel relieved of a great load ., He will also find that

he wields a deeper influence upon those who come near

to him than do any of the men of great worldly power .

We have in all this the very essence of the mystic

morality . There is , in addition, another effect which

is of the greatest social importance , particularly in a

war-torn world . The, exemplar of the Christic morality
will find that fear dies in him , and with the death of

fear the major cause of cruelty is destroyed . The

primary cause of the cruelty of our present dark age is

really fear . The hurting of the feared'object has the
psychological significance of wielding power over that
which is feared . But as the real cause of fear does not

lie in any object but in the inner psyche , the wielding

of power over the object never brings the security sought .

There are always new objects on which to project the fear,

and thus always something to be fought and to be treated

cruelly . Proceeding in this direction there is no peace

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anywhere, but only periods in which it is no longer

possible to fight - for a season . But he who has re-

nounced the clinging to life has destroyed fear at its

source, and then there is nothing outside to be feared .

3 . The third principle of Christie morality,

is orientation to other-worldliness . Christ often said,

"My Kingdom is not of this world ." The moral practice

which is equivalent to a denial of the will-to-live in

the objective world, implies, in positive terms, a will

to live another life in another world . Properly under-

stood, Christ ' s attitude toward this world is just as

pessimistic as was that of Buddha , though the latter was

more explicit . Fundamentally , Christ taught an ascetic

attitude toward objective life, but not active self-

flagellation . The true discipline is moral, and not

bodily torture . Detachment toward the objective is the

real key , and detachment is the essence of asceticism .

True asceticism is much less painful than joyous . Bodily

self-torture grew out of literalistic materialism .

4 . The doctrine of .other-worldliness implies

the possibility and need for the second-birth . Jesus

said, "Except a man be born again , he cannot see the

kingdom of God ." . As the doctrine of the second-birth

is of first importance as revealing the mystical character

of the Christ's, teaching, I quote the whole of the relevant

passage . When the'above words aroused in Nicodemus "

mind only a .literal . meaning, the Master said : "Verily,

verily , I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water

and of Spirit , he cannot enter into the kingdom of God .

That which is born of the flesh is flesh ; and that

which is born of the Spirit is spirit . Marvel not

that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again . The

wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the

sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh, and

whither it goeth : so is every one that is born of the

Spirit ." (St . John, III : 5-8) The Christic morality

is negative with respect to life as will-to-live, but

this is so in order that the dynamis may be given another

polarization or direction . The positive meaning of the

morality is found in its effect of directing the vital

dynamis toward a new birth . The real meaning of all of

Christ's teaching lies in the idea of the second birth .

Melioration in the objective life is only incidental .

In fact, some of the words of the Master are more than a

little severe as they express His attitude toward the

purely objective field, as when He said, "Let the dead

bury their dead" ; and again, "If any man come to me,

and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and

children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own

life also, he cannot be my disciple ." (Luke - 14 :26)

Christ' s moral teaching is not pragmatic , but uncompro-

misingly other-worldly . And in this there is revealed

in the clearest possible terms the mystical motif, for

genuine mysticism is always uncompromising with respect

to fundamentals . It does not work out diplomatic deals .

It cuts sharply like pure logic . One must choose mammon

or God ; he cannot cling to both at the same time . He is

either for or against ; there is no neutral point between .

The compromisers are the luke -warm, and Christ clearly

preferred the cold ones to such .

In the above quotation from the discourse held

with Nicodemus there are two statements of peculiar sig-

nificance . First , to enter the kingdom of God man must

be born of the water and of Spirit ; and second , one that

is born of the Spirit is likened unto a wind that bloweth

where it listeth , and though its sound may be heard, the

hearer cannot tell its source or whither it goes . The

latter statement clearly identifies the spontaneous charac-

ter of the new-birth . He who is born anew is possessed

by a Power beyond his personal self, and this Power is a

law unto itself, i .e ., cannot be commanded by any man .

Any man who is familiar with the mystical transformation

will readily recognize the truth contained in this state-

ment .

-781-
 The being born of water and of Spirit is a highly

significant statement which is clarified by psychological

analysis . ;It is,-.a fact, well known in analytic psychology,

that "water" is one of the most important symbols of the

Unconscious . In the terms of analytic psychology the

new-birth is viewed as the establishment of a new Self-

center, located in the Unconscious, and that is quite

other than the personal ego which rules the conscious

attitude of the unregenerate man . I do not find, how-

ever, that our present analytic psychology has . discovered

the meaning of "Spirit" in the above quotation . In the

"Integration of Personality", Dr . Jung briefly discusses

the idea of a Super Consciousness, differentiated from

the Unconscious, but while he does not exclude the pos-

sibility of such a Consciousness, he views its actuality

as not yet empirically determined . If we turn to the

psychology of the Indian Tantra we have more light thrown

upon this . In this system, it is easy to identify "Spirit"

with Pure Passive Consciousness or Shiva, which corresponds

to the top of the head in the subtle body . Also, "water",

as the feminine counter-part of Shiva, is identifiable as

Shakti in the sense of Kundala, or the Power aspect of

consciousness . In the Kundala Yoga, Shakti is awakened

and caused to arise from her resting place in the lowest

Chakra and to ascend to the place of Shiva, thereby bringing

about the union which accomplishes the new-birth for the

individual .
 While it is true that church council theology

has given to the life and teachings of Christ an ex-

ternalistic interpretation , revealing thereby the great

ingenuity of man in working out artificial interpreta-

tions, yet the truly valid interpretation is mystical .

This fact is virtually self - evident to one who is ac-

quainted directly with the mystical consciousness it-

self , but I believe, as a matter of simple logic, that

the Gospel record fits this interpretation better than

any other . Of course, it implies that Christ was not a

unique Son of God in a sense that could not possibly be

true of any other man . Christ was simply an exemplar,

in extraordinary degree , of that which is possible to

man as such .

Mysticism , in the comprehensive sense , is not merely

an attained state of consciousness, but includes , as well,

a philosophy and a method . As to philosophy , Christ is

silent , and He says little concerning the ultimate State,

save in a few parables . His practical teaching falls in

the field of method, and His method is almost exclusively

ethical . In the emphasis of the ethical He is in primary

agreement with Buddha , but the latter gave fuller inter-

pretations and very keen psychological analyses , in addi-

tion . Christ does not give the rationale of His ethics,

nor do I find Buddha wholly clear with'respect to this .

But if one turns to the Vedantic teaching of Shankara,

he will find the rational ground of the morality very

clearly presented ., However , this rationale becomes

clear in the light of a well-developed philosophy.

In the philosophic form of Shankara, the goal of

Yoga is the realization of the Supreme Self . The Supreme

Self is related to the empiric self in a way analogous

to that which correlates the sun to its image in a drop

of water . The only reality possessed by the little sun,

seen in the drop , is the great sun of which it is an

image . The object of devotion of the Yogin is the

Supreme Self or Great Sun . To be attached to the little

sun, or personal self , is a barrier to the realization

of the Great Sun . So there must be a demotion of the

little personal self from the false position of royalty

which, in the ordinary state, man gives to it, yet all

honor must be given to its original , the Supreme Self .

The Supreme Self is one with its reflection , but no more

so with one reflection than with another . Thus the ulti-

mate Self , which I am , is identical with the ultimate Self

of every creature . It follows , therefore , that I cannot

honor the Supreme Self truly unless I regard equally the

empiric selves of all creatures . That which I really am

is not different from what all creatures really are . Hence,

regard for the Other is identical with regard for Myself .

The good of all men and all creatures is identical with

my own good . From this follows both the Christic and

Buddhistic moral practice .

In the "Psychology of Religious Mysticism" Leuba,

in speaking of the Yoga of Patanjali, says : "--the

removal of all ethical considerations would leave its

essential structure unaffected ; for, after all, ethical

considerations have no logical place in a system that

aims at the breaking of all bonds connecting the indi-

vidual to the physical and social world ." (P . 45) I re-

gard this statement as revealing the grossest misunder-

standing of the real nature of mysticism . Certain it is

that in the techniques of Christ , Buddha and Shankara

practical ethics is given a place second to none . Patanjali

aimed at the same end , the only differences lying in

methodological emphases . In fact , Shankara was his

greatest Chela, and one who always honored him, though

differing with him on points of method, a purely technical

question . But on the question of ethics all four of these

great religious leaders stand together . And this is so

for a reason more profound than the high moral character

which each of these men possessed in his own right . The

moral practice is a logical part of the whole practice .

In fact, I very much question whether without the mystical

ground there ever could be developed a true morality,

that is, .a morality that was other than mere social ex-

pediency . The mystic ' s morality would be just as im-

perative for the last man in a dying world as for a man

in the midst of a living , society , while mere sociological

morality would , have no ground whatsoever in such a setting .

Stated in terms of the logic of classes , the mystic's

attitude toward the class of The Other is the same

whether that class contains members or is empty . And

this is so because the attitude is a fundamental both of

the process and of the attained state, entirely apart

from objective empiric considerations . If there is no

objective situation , the attitude remains the same, but

is not manifested in action , while if there is an objective

situation , then, without any alteration of the attitude,

it is manifested in practical action . I believe the logic

of mystical ethics is adequately outlined in the last

paragraph .
In the question of the relation of ethics to

mystical consciousness I believe that we are dealing not

only with an important part of the whole problem but,

indeed, with the very heart of it . It is certainly not

empiric science that can bring any indictment here . The

real guilt lies on the other side, and this , I believe,

is not hard to show . Authentic mysticism affirms the

primary unity of all, and this implies that the Liberating

 or Enlightening Truth can only be known to the whole

man, not toAmere functional part of him . And this ap-

plies , not only in the sense of a necessary unity as

between man and man , but equally in the sense that one

psychical function needs the collaboration of its com-

panions . Thus , a science that is grounded on the in-

tellect and sense , but divorced from a spiritually

oriented ethics, can achieve only a distorted knowledge .

All such learning lacks something essential to . the very

constitution of the knowledge itself . It is not so much

that there is effected a difference in the bare fact or

that the formal logic is altered , but rather that there is

a change in the perspective which affects the total in-

tegration of knowledge . There is a fundamental difference

`' Q&V&
A in its meaning . Outstanding examples of the

of ethical perspective is found in the practice of vivi-

section and in military science . Thus in vivisection

moral regard for the creature experimented upon is re-

pudiated . Inevitably this results in the callousing and

blinding of the experimenter . His vision is narrowed as

well as hardened in an invidious sense . As a result, he

cannot see the processes he studies in their relation to

the whole . He may acquire considerable command over the

physical manifestation of disease , yet, with that , he will

simply drive the pathological condition into a more hid-

den place in the psyche . He may be enabled to free bodies

from physical symptoms at the price of increased psychical

sickness, ..particularly,in the sense of moral blinding and

stultification .. From the standpoint of mystical or spirit-

ual morality such a, condition is infinitely worse than a
very high death- rate'and'a very low life-expectancy at

birth, combined with much physical suffering from disease .

Such is the valuation which the mystical consciousness
places upon morality .

In the instance of military science the case is

even worse . The practice of thinking of the most out-

rageous moral action in terms of cold calculation is

probably the most effective existent way of destroying

the moral sense . The mystic, or spiritually oriented

man, would. say that the physical death of an individual,

group , race, or nation is preferable to any survival based

upon such thinking . For such survival would be at the price

of spiritual death . Man, in such a case , progressively

ceases to be a spiritual and human being , and becomes

more and more . a mere animal with an unillumined intellect -
a creature that is more a curse than a blessing to himself
and those around him . There are values infinitely more
important than physical survival .
 .One needs but look at the world today'to see what a

curse science can become when it is only an intellectual

achievement divorced from spiritual morality . It has be-

come more an instrument of darkness than of light . No

longer are we civilized . One must go back to the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries to find a reasonable degree

of civilization . And in this progress in degradation our

science must share a large , if not a principal , part in

the responsibility . Again, this is not due to science,

as such, being anything bad, but to the severance of the

intellect from spiritual ethics .

It is far better to over-emphasize the ethical

factor than to .undervalue .or .neglect it . There is an

error in such over- emphasis , but it does not produce a

serious problem . . Over-emphasis is possible since ethics

is not the whole of being . Knowledge and aesthetic appre-

ciation, for instance, are equally a part of the whole,

and, since the mystical spirit is integrative, these and

all other parts must be included . At this point, the

teachings of Christ, as given in the record, are open to

criticism . The Christie message is defective from the

standpoint of noetic need . But this simply means that

the offering of Christ should be supplemented . . Trouble

arises only by trying to make the Christ the all in all .

It is not necessary or desirable that He should be regarded

as all in all . He can be accepted along with other pos-

sibilities of consciousness .
 B. The Mysticism of Buddha .

That the Great Buddha was a Mystic, in the pro-

foundest . and highest sense of the word , is a fact so

evident from a study of His recorded life and teachings

that no'time .need be given to demonstrating it . The

Illumination under the Bodhi Tree is explicitly through
the mystical meditation process . The Doctrine teaches

the attainment of Nirvana through a righteous living,

thinking and feeling which destroys the Sangsaric state .
The religious method was exclusively Yogic in the highest
sense . Since the time of Buddha corruption has entered
into parts of the Buddhistic community by the accretion
of foreign elements, so that in modern Buddhism there is
a good deal of tantric ritualism . But this is no more a
true part of the Buddha's doctrine than was the Inquisition
a part of Christ's teaching . Real Buddhism is to be under-
stood as it left the hand of its Founder and was continued
by Those who attained the Buddhistic Realization in the
centuries that followed . In the light of these sources

Buddhism, as a religion, is the purest sort of non-tantric

;Yoga . Hence , here, as nowhere else , it is possible to

determine just what Yoga or Mystical Realization is .

The two great factors which implement .the motiva-
tion underlying the drive toward Mystical Realization are
(1) love of Truth , and (2 ) Compassion. He who is moti-
vated by a desire for Bliss will fail, since such a motive

is selfish . Desire for voluptuous pleasure may lead to

practices , such as the use of drugs and certain psycho

physical performances , which will induce temporary experi-

ences of the type sought , and at the price of intellectual

and moral degradation . This voluptuous pleasure is as

different from the Beatitude of true Yogic Realization as

is a sensuously seductive dream different from the state

of aesthetic delight realized by a mathematician when he

has made a new integration in thought . The voluptuous

state may be mysticoid , but it is as different from a true

mystical state as is a base counterfeit from a true coin .

The Beatitude of the Genuine Mystical State is a fruit of

renunciation of all personal satisfaction and attainment .

It is very real, but is-an effect , not a valid objective .

Compassion and-love of Truth are the only valid and effec-

tive motivations , and the Compassion mutt be utterly self-

disregarding , and'the seeking of Truth must be so pure

that every pre - conception is offered up on the altar of

sacrifice .

From the record of the early life of Gautama, as

well as from the subsequent life and teachings of the

Awakened Buddha , we know that the central motivation was
Compassion . There probably never was a life less frustrated
than was the early life of this Prince . He seems to have
been a well-nigh complete stranger to suffering on his

own account , and for the first 29 years of his life did

not know of the suffering involved in human life in general

since his father saw to it that he should not know . But
when he did learn of human suffering he simply had to start

on the search for the means whereby suffering could be

destroyed . This entailed the search for Truth , not so much

as an end in itself, but more as a means to serve the office

of Compassion . He sought assiduously for seven years, in-

cluding a six-year unsuccessful experiment with extreme

asceticism , and finally achieved Realization of Truth

.through mystic meditation by his own method . Through the

Realization He organized His redeeming doctrine and devoted

the balance of His life to spreading the doctrine among

men . The one purpose of the teaching was relieving mankind,

as far as might be, .from the ubiquitous burden of suffering .

But since relief from suffering is equivalent to attainment

of Transcendental Wisdom , or Prajna Paramita , the doctrine

lends itself to the more positive interpretation of attain-
ment in terms of the Noble Wisdom . But the emphasis of

Compassion is the pre - eminent character of this Great Buddha,

although He is also the wisest of the Wise .

From the study of the authentic Buddhist Sutras one

achieves probably the best understanding of the profoundest

development of the Mystical Consciousness that is to be had
anywhere , provided the student can understand them . . Un-
fortunately they are excessively obscure, and it is doubtful
if anyone who is not himself a - mystic could possibly under-

stand them. . Other treatments of the subject , particularly

-792-
that of Shankara , are much more comprehensible to an in-
telligence in which the mystical door has not yet opened .
This Buddha did not have the best skill in cross -translation

for a ,thinking consciousness and, as a result , He was not

.wholly successful . This is clear in view of the fact

that vast groups among His followers have understood His

Nirvana as meaning literal annihilation in the absolute

sense , though it is perfectly clear that Buddha did not

mean that at all , if one but studies the Sutras deeply

enough . Since able Western scholars have fallen into

the same error and several other mystics , including the

pseudo Dionysius , have fortified the impression, it is

necessary to give this misconception some serious attention .

In the Sutras, over and over ' again ,' one finds

descriptions of the Ultimate in the general form of the

following logical pattern . . The Ultimate is not -A, where

A is any predicate whatsoever ., Then, , it ;is said, IT is

not not -A, nor is it that which is neither A nor not-A,

nor is IT that which is both A and not -A . Now, if one were

to define absolute nothingness , in every possible sense,

that is, absolute annihilation or absolute unconsciousness,

without any potentiality in it, then he would find the

above definition just about perfect . The definition fits

absolute annihilation , beyond question . But it does not

follow that it does not fit a Somewhat which is not absolute

annihilation . Now, just what is it that is negated in such

a thorough fashion? The answer is really very simple .

.It-is simply . the conception as a type, not particular

conceptions, but the thinkable conception as such . This

is not a denial of Being as other than thinkable conception,

unless it were proven that Being in the absolute sense

is thinkable conception . But there is no such proof .

The positive meaning, then, comes out at once : Enlighten-

ment is transcendence of thinkable conception . Now, since

anything that can be imagined is a thinkable conception,

it follows that the State of Enlightenment cannot possibly

be imagined . But this does not preclude the possibility

of realizing the Enlightened State, provided the means are

other than relative thought as well as other than sensation .

If we conceive of a mystical organ or faculty, such as the

Samadhindriya, we have a schematic clarification .

No mystic was ever more rigorous in his use of lan-

guage than Buddha, but that rigor is well-nigh devastating

to anyone but 'a near-Arhat . This means that, pedagogically,

Buddha was less than successful, but in the ethical dimension

no man has ever been more successful, not even Christ .

Indeed, the reports of adequate observers indicate that even

to this day the followers of Buddha live more nearly con-

sistently by the Buddhistic ethics than do the followers

of Christ, or of any other great religious and moral leader .

It seems that they even do this when they expect to achieve

absolute annihilation! . For instance, through the centuries

the Buddhist community has been far less a community of

killers than has been the Christian community, yet the

morality of Christ, no less than the morality of Buddha,

implied non-killing . Of all religious leaders, Buddha

has had the greatest success upon the visible plane, even

though He had His failures .

That Buddhism is fundamentally Yogic or mystical in

its method and objective is further revealed in the follow-

ing quotation from the "Buddhist Catechism" of Subhadra

Bhikshu :

"Buddhism teaches the reign of perfect goodness and

wisdom without a personal God, continuance of individuality

without an immortal soul ; eternal happiness without a local

heaven, the way of salvation without a vicarious Saviour,

redemption worked out by each one himself without any

prayers, sacrifices and penances, without the ministry of

ordained priests , without the intercession of saints, with-

out Divine mercy . Finally, it teaches that supreme per-

fection is attainable even in this life on this earth ."

From this quotation it is clear that the Buddhistic

redemption of attainment does not depend upon external

revelation or authority ; nor upon the use of ritual or

other formal religious practices ; nor upon the inter-

mediatory function of any human agent ; but is something

achievable by each individual directly . While various

subsidiary aids of this sort may be employed and may be

of assistance to certain or even most individuals, yet

none of these are, in principle , necessary . This means

that the essence of Buddhism is individual realization,

and that is Yoga or mystical awakening purely . and simply .

Without Yoga no man would ever have attained Buddhahood

nor would there be any Buddhism . Hence, he who . would know

just what Yoga or . Mysticism is, in its essential and purest

form , should study Buddhism .

It may be objected by the Western scientist that this

is impractical because the Buddhistic consciousness,

practice and doctrine are too foreign to the understanding

of the scientist ' s mind and thus supplies no usable base -

,for research . It is suggested that since the mystic-like

state of drug -intoxication is closer to the understanding

of the Western scientist it affords a better starting

point . Well, it may be that some scientists'are in closer

rapport to the states induced by drug- intoxication than

they are to Buddhism , but, for my part , I have a better

opinion of the Western scientific mind taken as a whole

than that . At any rate, the minds of our mathematicians

and modern theoretical physicists seem to me to rest in

closer rapport to Buddhism than they do to the state of

drug -intoxication , however it may be with our more material-

istic physiological psychologists . Doubtless we can learn

something concerning psychical states from the study of

-796- ;
drugged and other abnormal consciousness , but there is

a fundamental danger in drawing conclusions concerningg

the normal and proper from the pathologic . It is the
danger of distortion and of drawing unsound conclusions

from improper or inadequate perspective .

Authentic Buddhist teaching and practice does not

at all encourage soft or dreamy -mindedness , but, on the

contrary , calls for the keenest analytic discrlmLnation .

As little does it encourage the cultivation of empty-

mindedness , as one finds quite evident when he reads of

the scorn the sixth Chinese Buddhist Patriarch had for

such practices . The following quotations should make

this clear : " People under delusion believe obstinately

that there is a substance behind appearances and so they

are stubborn in holding to their own way of interpreting

the Samadhi of specific mode , which they define as,

'sitting quietly and continuously without letting any

idea arise in the mind ' . Such'an interpretation would

class us with inanimate objects ; it is a stumbling block

to the right Path and the Path should be kept open ."

"Some teachers of concentration instructed their disciples

to keep a watch on their minds and secure tranquility by

the cessation of all thought , and henceforth their disciples

gave up all effort to concentrate the mind and ignorant

-797-
persons who did not understand the distinction became

insane from trying to carry out the instruction literally .

Such cases are not rare and it is a great mistake to teach

such practice .", ("A Buddhist Bible", p 523 .)

True Buddhist Yoga, as well as other authentic

Yoga, requires accentuation of intellectual'discrimina-

tion and concentration, while drug-intoxication and the

conditions produced by false ascet'iaism lead to intel-

lectual dullness and to all sorts of confusion .

In the final conclusions which he draws from his

study of mysticism, as given in "The Psychology of Reli-

gious Mysticism", Leuba states that he finds himself in

agreement with Henri Delacroix and George A . Coe as to the

illusory nature of the mystical claim . He then quotes

the following from Coe's "The Sources of the Mystical

Revelation" (Hibbert Jr . vol . VI, p 367 .) ; "The mystic

acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-

mystical neighbor does, namely through tradition and in-

struction, auto-suggestion grown habitual, and reflective

analysis . The mystic brings his theological beliefs to

the mystical experience ; he does not derive them from it ."

Now there can be no doubt but that much of the interpreta-

tive teaching given by the general run of mystics is more

than a little colored by the general background of .instr+uc-

tion and tradition . Interpretative differences as between

-798-
different mystics of different times and cultures, when

such interpretations are in conformity with the beliefs

of the milieu, indicate at least some such coloring . But

when we study the really great mystical geniuses we are

impressed with a reverse tendency . Such is the case with

the three figures we are especially studying in this chap-

ter . Each ' one did mo re ' or less violence to the current

convictions ' of, his milieu and, at times , diverged radically .

Both Buddha and Christ called down upon themselves or upon

their following active persecution just because of such

divergence . Let us consider the principal doctrinal

divergence of Buddha .

Two of the principal tenets of Brahminism, the

religious setting in which Buddha was born , are reincarna-

tion and the doctrine of a permanent and unchanging indivi-

dual Atman, or soul , which persists from incarnation to

incarnation . It is this permanent soul which, persisting

as a sort of central core, takes on the clothing of various

embodiments , both subtle and gross . According tp the

record, when Buddha first started on his search he queried

certain Brahmin Pundits and they propounded to him the above

doctrines . Buddha, through the powers of concentration
and meditation , penetrated into these doctrines and pro-
nounced one sound and the other false . He said reincarnation

is undeniable , but there is no persistent Atman or individual

 soul . This is the point of most radical divergence be-

tween exoteric Brahminism and Buddhism, both exoteric

and esoteric . It proved to be a . serious bone of contention
and affords one of the main reasons why Buddhism never
has taken a firm hold in the land of its birth . This

doctrine is, perhaps, the most obscure phase of Buddhist

psychology, but I shall do what I can to outline it, since

it is, most emphatically, not a teaching taken into the

mystical state from the instruction and tradition of the

.milieu, but is born out of the insight .

Buddha taught that the self or "I am" is not per-

sistent from incarnation to incarnation and, indeed, if
it were , there could be no liberation from the cycle of
birth and death and endless sorrow . The doctrine is thus

of absolutely central importance . The man that is born

is a congeries of psychical functions or faculties which

integrate an illusive personal self which lasts only as

x long as this congeries persists . At times the congeries

separate and, after a period of rest, reintegrate to form

a new personality having a new ego, or I am . The following

quotation from "The Gospel of' .Buddha", as told by Paul Carus,

presents the argument and teaching in especially clear

form . The words are given as the words of the Buddha .

"People are in bondage, because they have not yet

removed the idea of I .

-800-
 "The thing and its quality are different in our

.thought, but not in reality . Heat is different from fire

in our thought , but you cannot remove heat from fire in

reality . You say that you can remove the qualities and
leave the thing, but if you think your .theory to the end,

you will find that this is not so .

"Is not man an organism of many aggregates? Do we

not consist of various skandbas, as our sages call them?

Man consists of the material form , of sensation , of thought,

of dispositions , and, lastly, of understanding . That which

men call the ego when they say 'I am ' is not an entity be-

hind the skandhas , it originates by the cooperation of the

skandhas . There is mind ; there is sensation and thought,

and there is truth ; and truth is mind when it walks in the

paths of righteousness . But there is no separate ego-soul

outside or behind the thought of man . He who believes

that the ego is a distinct being has no correct conception

of things . The very'search for the atman is wrong ; it is

a wrong start and it will lead you in a false direction .

"Is not this individuality of mine , a combination,

material as well as mental? Is it not made up of qualities

that sprang into being by a gradual evolution? The five

roots of sense -perception in this organism have come from

ancestors who performed these functions . The ideas which

r
I think,, came to me partly from others who thought them,

and partly they arise from combinations of these ideas

in my own mind . Those who used the same sense -organs,
and thought the same ideas before I was composed into

this individuality of mine are my previous existences ;

they are my ancestors as much as I of yesterday am the

father of I of today, and the karma of my past deeds

conditions the fate of my present existence ."

In a later discussion Buddha uses the figure of

a candle which is lighted, the flame representing the

self, and the candle the congeries of skandhas or psychic-

al elements that make up the entity . Then, if the flame

is extinguished and lighted again, the question is,

Is it the same flame? Buddha says it both is and is

not . It is not because there is a break in continuity,

but it is the same in the sense that it has the same

size sand quality as' .the original flame, in that it comes

from .the same source . Then, further, if there is a group

of candles of the same"composition size and shape, then

their flames are'and are not the same flames for identical

reasons .
Any creature, animate or inanimate, is the product

of past causes, and the father of future effects, with no

conceivable beginning or ending point in time . But the

congeries of elements which constitute these beings are

eternally inter-weaving in a process of becoming and dying

in the resultant . phenomenal effects . The phenomenal ef-

fects float like mirages upon this,inter-weaving stream,

-802-
and, likewise, the discrete series of personal egos are

born upon this stream as the counterpart of the mirages .

There is thus a subjective and objective phantasmagoria,

one the series of personal egos, the other, the various

appearances of the phenomenal universe . Both of these

have no substance in themselves . The relatively durable

thing-in-itself is the inter-weaving congeries . But the

stream of congeries is compounded and therefore subject

to birth and decay and the cause of all suffering . The

really durable is the Uncompounded, and this lies behind

the congeries as their support . The realization of this

is Liberation and Enlightenment .

We have here a conception which definitely dif-

ferentiates Buddhism from all .other religions and from

the Western philosophies . It differs from Brahminism in

that there is a denial of a permanent Self, though there

is agreement as to the mayavic character of the objective

universe . It diverges from Christian theology which grants

reality to the objective world, and predicates a permanent

soul . It is different from Western Realism in that it

grants no substantial existent thing, and from Western

Idealism in so far as, that, Idealism centers around a per-

sistent transcendental Subject . However , much of Schopenhauer

is congruent with Buddhism,,though'I do not find his Will

as carrying the same meaning as the Buddhist " Essence of

Mind" or-Shunyata . In some respects Von Hartmann is closer

to the Buddhist position .

-803-
 Prior to the Recognition of September 1936 I had

never been able to grasp the anatmic doctrine, but as a

result of that Recognition I saw the necessity of the

doctrine and for the first time realized the relativity

of Nirvana in the simplest sense . This Recognition con-

firmed a conception which, only later, I found in the

Sutras of Northern Buddhism, unknown to me up to that

time .

Now, the point of this rather lengthy argument

is that here we have a case of knowledge not derived

from instruction and tradition, but originating in mystical

insight . It is not a case of taking into the mystical

state the conceptions,which are born forth from it . It

is, in my mind, most positive evidence that the mystical

Door is one from whence comes new Knowledge which makes

a difference in thinkable concepts . Undoubtedly, im-

perfectly'developed mystical states can be misinterpreted,

and the sense of certainty may be incorrectly predicated

of the erroneous interpretation . All of which simply

means that there is a need for a critique of mystical

consciousness , just as we have found a critique of the

reason necessary . But just as the latter critique showed

in what way we may trust the intellect, as well as in what

ways it cannot give reliable knowledge, the same is true

of a mystical critique . Later I shall consider this sub-

ject in more detail .

-804-
 Before entering upon the discussion of Shankara,

a brief discussion of the Buddhist conception of rein-

carnation will prove to be of value . In both the Western

Christian and scientific worlds the conception of rein-

carnation has been unpopular, and sometimes is even op-

posed with affective reactions . However, the idea is

not wholly foreign to indigenous Western thought, quite

apart from the acceptance of the idea on the part of some

due to the introduction of it through the Theosophical

Movement . It is often more than implicit in the writings

of the German Idealists from rant onward . Thus, consider

the following quotation from the third Book of Fichte's

"The Vocation of Man" : "These two orders - the purely

spiritual and the sensuous , the latter consisting possibly

of an innumerable series of particular lives , - have

existed since the first moment of the development of an

active reason within me, and still proceed parallel to

each other ." Yet, on the whole,-the idea is unacceptable

and even repugnant to Westerners, for reasons that I have

not yet been able to fathom . Now, it is true that, in

cases where the idea'has been accepted, it has often been

F

misconceived . It seems to be a process that is untrace-

able by the,Western intellect and, therefore, must be ac-

cepted,or .rejected blindly . To the scientific mind it

generally seems better to believe too little rather than

believe too much or, rather, better to deny with inadequate

reason than to affirm with inadequate reason . This atti-

tude is extra -logical , but it exists none the less . I

believe that the Buddha's conception of reincarnation may

prove less unacceptable , since the process in this case

is partly traceable objectively .

The Buddha'.s conception is that where in the historic

stream we find individuals manifesting essentially the

same character , with a quality of feeling of the same

form , and of largely identical intellectual quality, the

later individuality time' is a reincarnation of the earlier.

But the personal ego of each is different, in the sense

,
that the ego is a sort of epiphenomenal effect of the

character without possessing any substance in itself .

Since the stream of existence is a process of development,

or decay , the identity of character or individuality would

not be absolute , but there would be a root - similarity .

Now such similarities , approaching identities , are some-

times traceable when the necessary historic records exist .

One might very well , for instance , consider the similarities

in the conceptions of Cardinal de Cusa and Copernicus and

reach the conclusion . that the latter was a reincarnation

of the former , or that Joseph Stalin is a reincarnation

of Genghis Khan . Basic similarity of character , thought

and feeling would be the criterion . Now, since in the

Buddha ' s sense, it is a character or individuality that

reincarnates , rather than an egoistic self , recognition

of similarity of character and individuality is all that

is necessary to determine a case of reincarnation . It

is not said that the two personal egos are the same .

Taken in this sense , it appears to me that reincarnation

is objectively provable .

There are certain other implications which follow

from the Buddhistic conception . There may be such a thing

as fusing of individualities, characters, conceptual forms,

modes of feeling, etc . A given physically embodied in-

dividual may manifest one character at one time, and

another at other times, he may manifest quite different

modes of feeling in what we call different moods, and he

may think in one pattern at one time and in quite others

on other occasions . In extreme cases , he may exhibit

quite discrete differences of personaliLy,'such as in

the instances of multiple personality . This leads to the

idea that reincarnation is not restricted to a one to one

correspondence between different embodied entities at dif-

ferent places in time, but that there is also such a thing

as conjoint reincarnation of two or more in one, of temporary,

partial and superimposed reincarnation, and also of one in

Lwo or more, either permanently or temporarily . On the

whole, the idea becomes very complex, but it is more readily

understandable in the light of objective experience . In-

deed , much that the chemist observes in the life history

of chemical substances parallels the above patterns . The

chemist finds persistence through all sorts of transforma-

tions which can be quite well viewed as chemical reincar-

nation in the Buddhistic sense .

It is said that the mystic sense includes, among

its various possibilities, the capacity to trace backward

the stream of transformation of the psychical congeries .

Thus identity with other incarnations can be established,

.,but, this' would by . no. means necessarily imply a unique one

to one relationship . He who unites in himself , either
temporarily or relatively persistently , several psychical

currents, would find himself ident44al with many who lived

in the past, even contemporaneously . It would be possible

even to acquire incarnations in the past by assimilating

the corresponding psychical current out of the past . In

the extreme ideal case, it would even be conceivable for

one living now to find himself formerly incarnated in all

men and being born again in all men of the future . Whether

or not any being has ever succeeded in achieving such an

integration, I would not presume to say, but the theoretical

possibility is contained in the Buddhistic conception . In

any case, it is certainly interesting to conceive of the

possibility of attaining additional incarnations in the

past as well as indefinitely laterally expanded incarna-

tions in the future, perhaps, in the end, actually to live

in all men . Thus it is that the Sage, the Saviour or the

Guru is born in and lives in His disciples, more or less

completely as the latter assimilate His consciousness,

character and individuality ., So there would be, on this

view, a valid sense in which the Christian mystic puts

on Christ , as St . Paul said . And all of this becomes

quite reasonable and intelligible once we have broken

down the egoistic delusion and see that the Christ, in

,essential reality, is not a particular personal entity,

but a continuity of character , individuality , thought,

feeling, etc . The Christ literally lives in His followers

to the degree and extent they have assimilated this

character., individuality, thought and- feeling . Thus

interpreted , I believe the not infrequent claims of Christian

mystics are not unreasonable . And that which is true of

this example would also be true of all others, even-when

the discipleship does not lie in the realm generally re-

garded as -religious .' Newton would live again in his fol-

lowers just as truly .

This interpretation " clarifies greatly the Buddhist

doctrine of .the multiple incarnations of the Nirmanakayas .

The Nirmanakayas are said to be those who have attained

full Enlightenment but have refused complete withdrawal

from objective relationship . But such Beings abide at

the very roots of Consciousness itself and , hence, are-

present in a latent sense in all embodiments of conscious-

ness . Thus he who pierces inwardly into the depths of his

own consciousness will find himself identical with the

Nirmanakaya and, thereby, conversely, becoming an embodi-

ment of the Nirmanakaya . In general, the deeper the

level at which an individual integrates his consciousness

and individuality, the wider the field of his future

incarnation .

Now, bearing in mind that which has just been

said , it is easy , to'trace a tie-in between the three

great individualities who form the subject of . the present

chapter . The extreme moral and spiritual similarity be-

tween Buddha and Christ clearly identifies the latter . as

an incarnation of the former, in exceptional degree . We

will'find a corresponding identity between the Buddha

and Shankara, though in this case the similarity is more

predominantly evident in the noetic agreement . Thus we

may say that, in exceptional degree , these three are one

entity, even though each may have ramifications of indi-

viduality developing in different directions . Other

great Sages have lived who are not so closely conjoined

as these three . These three stand as one in peculiar degree .
C. The Mysticism of Shankara .

Of all the great Three, Shankara's life and teaching

is most explicitly Yogic in the technical sense . However,

He deals with Yoga, or Mystical Realization, exclusively

in the highest sense, since He is interested solely in

the final Liberation and seems to scorn any attainment

less than that . Now, Shankara discourses upon the tech-

nical problems of method and philosophy to a degree not

found in the teachings of Christ or even Buddha , for the

two-fold reason , ( 1) He was qualified for this by Brahman-

ical birth and training , and (2 ) He worked exclusively

with a public which needed and could understand this

treatment . He is, of all men, the philosopher Sage,

par excellence . Apparently , He did not attempt to reach

simple minds , but was rather a Teacher of Teachers . -In

principle , Buddha spoke to all men , but due to certain

temperamental and intellectual barriers , was not accept-

able to the more learned , with some exceptions . Christ

frankly oriented Himself to the lowly of this world and

thus reached some , at the price of being unable to reach

others . But the saving Wisdom is for all men, and is not

the exclusive right of the simple'and lowly . However, no

one embodiment of,the Sage can reach ' all equally, hence
the Divine Wisdom incarnates in many forms which, while

seemingly different, are really complementary .

Shankara ' s philosophy is not presented by Him as

something original and de novo . On the contrary, He

presents it as a clarification and explicit logical develop-

ment of the Vedic meaning . But the Veda is not to be

understood as exclusively the recorded literature which

goes by that name . It is even more fundamentally the in-

nate'Wisdom resident in the depths of all consciousness .

Hence, by means of Yoga, the Yogin attains realization

of the Veda quite independently of all scholarship, though

such attainment does not of itself imply mastery of the

best formulation . As a result, the best statement is

the resultant of Yogic penetration, scholarship and the

development of intellectual acuity and profundity . I

terms of this combination, Shankara is'the greatest of

all exemplars . Yet Shankara is not wholly satisfactory to

the modern Western mind . For one thing, He is not con-

cerned with science in the modern sense, and, indeed, there

was no such science in His day . For another, there is

a good deal of the scholastic form in his reasoning .

e--se

'fo~m in h a --- -- But then, for that matter, there

is a good deal of the scholastic coloring to be found in

the rationalistic language of Kant, yet Kant is the gateway

to post-rationalistic and post-scholastic thinking . The

similarity to Kant runs even deeper . Shankara, too, is a

critical thinker, at a time on the order of two thousand

years earlier than Kant, a4 fact which makes Shankara all

the more remarkable . In a third respect, Shankara is not

altogether satisfactory to the modern Westerner in that He

continually introduces references to the written Veda as

an authenticating argument . It sounds to us too much like

the theological argument which justifies a thesis because

of statements in the Bible. But, - ip. this connection, it

must be remembered that Shankara spoke, to a public for

whom the Veda was regarded as authority , and no hearing

could be attained save by conformation with Vedic author-

ity. But Shankara is never content to rest His case on

the visible Veda alone . The Vedic argument does not stand

by itself . He establishes His thesis , point by point, by

reference to reason and experience independently of the

written Veda . Clearly, for Himself, His source is not

the written Veda, though the record of His life indicates

that He was thoroughly familiar with it from childhood .

The real source is Yogic Realization - attained while a

Chela of Patanjali . Thus He writes meanings which, while

reconcilable to the written Veda, could have hardly been

derived from it by the methods of unaided external scholar-

ship .

We are here , again , brought face to face with the

question which forms a central interest of the present

volume . Is the Mystic Realization an authentic source

of Knowledge or Gnosis ? That it is such, is well nigh

the main thesis of Shankara, after the importance He

ascribes to Liberation . Indeed , He even says that the

Gnostic Knowledge is not merely a means to Liberation

but is Liberation . To deny the validity and actuality

of Mystical Knowledge would be equivalent to denying

all significance in the work and thought of Shankara .

With no man , so far as I know, is the poetic element in

the Yogic consciousness so fundamental . Further discus-

sion of this question is indicated .

Von Hartmann said, "Gnosis is knowledge acquired

by immediate perception (intuition) instead of by intel-
lect ." (From criticism of "Esoteric .. Buddhism" by Sinnett,
published in er Zeitung", reprinted in "The Theoso-

phist" for May 1885 .) But Von Hartmann continues that

if this direct perception stands alone it may be so

colored and dominated by a preconception that it may be-

come quite unreliable and needs the correction of intel-

lectual examination and of any other source of knowledge

there may be . Mohini Chatterji in his criticism of

Von Hartmann's criticism admits the justice of the above

statement and proceeds to say that Oriental Esotericism

does not teach the exclusive dependence upon the "immediate

perception" . The test of reason is applied and the in-

sight of one individual is checked by that of others, just

as is the case in Western science . When a body of philosophico-

scientifico-religious teaching or doctrine is established,

it is the combined product of many highly trained minds

in all of which the mystical sense is highly developed as

well as the intellect . It is true that in many instances

the mystical insight may be prepared for by previous study

and the'content'of the insight may be in accord with the

-814-
study . But this does not mean that the mystic merely

takes out of the state that which he brings to it . The

mystical knowledge is of another dimension . Chatterji

gives a very suggestive illustration from Western science .

Thus, a mathematical astronomer might --as has been done -

calculate the location and determine the existence of a

formerly unknown planet, through analytic interpretation

of the perturbations in the orbits of known planets .

Following the directions resulting from the calculation

the same man , or another astronomer , might then direct a ,

telescope to the indicated portion of the sky and see

with the eye that which had been predetermined by calcu-

lation . ( This has actually been done .) Now, would we be

justified in saying that the observing astronomer merely

took such knowledge from his observation as he took with

him in the first place? In the purely schematic sense,

the answer might be "yes " . But he did acquire new per-

ceptual knowledge , that which James called "knowledge

through acquaintance" . The looking through the telescope

did more than simply to add feeling tone to an already,

existing knowledge . He added perceptual knowledge to the

formal schematic knowledge of the intellectual calculation .

Now, in this illustration , the telescope represents the

mystic sense which gives a dimension of knowledge as much

different from the intellectual conception as is the per-

ception . Something is added, even though subsequent in-

tellectual formulation might differ in no way .whatsoever

from already extant teaching or doctrine . Essentially

the new knowledge is as incommensurable with intellectual

conception as the latter is with sensible perception .

But in several ways the two can cooperate just as the

percept and the concept can cooperate, and do so con-

tinually in our daily lives .

Once I had a dream-experience which I think is

illustrative of the difference in dimensions of two kinds

of related sense . Some years ago a group of us had .

planned an extended trip through the Painted Desert of

northern Arizona . Our proposed course was to take us

over . the Mormon Dugway which gave access to the Lee's

Ferry crossing of the Colorado River - the only crossing

then in a distance of hundreds of miles . This approach

was one of the most nerve-racking for drivers, due to its

narrowness , its winding roughness and, most of all, the

very rapid current of the Colorado River below . I had

been over this course formerly and knew that it was a

trial . Well, one night, while lying in bed waiting upon

sleep, I was thinking of this drive, outlining the course

rather clearly in my mind . During the process I feel

asleep, as I found out later . But there was no break in

my mental continuity ; I simply found myself actually

driving a car over the course concerning which I had been

-816-
thinking . I was driving along nearly, or quite, identic-

ally in the way I had been thinking, that is, driving

slowly and carefully as was the way one would be com-

pelled to do actually . In the dream, the road wound

in and out, around coves and points, and climbed upward,

essentially as I knew it did from my previous experience .

Suddenly, as I rounded a point of rock, I saw way up on

the furthest visible portion of the road another car

coming toward me . But it was a very strange car, such as

I had not then seen ., It was extremely streamlined, very

much like the designs of the racing cars later used on

the Salt Lake salt-flats . And this car was coming toward

me with unbelievable speed, indeed fully as fast as the

fastest racing car, taking the turns with great precision .

To my consternation, Mephisto was driving the car - and

he was a magnificent driver . There was no place for a

passing and no time for me to do a thing . I saw that I

would be struck, which then happened, the strange car and

Mephisto passing right through me and my car . With which

I woke up . I then had the chance to analyze what had

happened .

In the first stage, while awake, I had been think-

ing of a process in terms of idea . There was the normal

dual consciousness of thinking, with an undertone of aware-

ness of myself as an organism . There was the normal clear

differentiation between a process thought about and a

process performed by the activity of the organism . Then,

without knowing the shift, I was actually performing the

process with the consciousness of the organism lying in

bed dropping .away .*entirely . The idea had become performance ,

in another state of consciousness , but in harmonious con-

formity with the previous purely ideational process . Now,

this was a different state of awareness , not simply one

state of awareness with a different feeling tone . I was

aware of a content in a different way which I believe is

quite validly defined as an addition of another knowledge,

even though not diverging in pattern from the original

schema . But there was also something added, that was

not in the original schema . I had not at all anticipated

Mephisto and the wonderful car . This became new material

for my intellect to think about . And the "Old Boy" poses

some very intriguing problems . In fact, he added much to

my interest in Jung's treatment of the transformation

process when I read the latter some years later . Definitely,

I did acquire something valuable for thought out of the

experience .
It is not suggested that this bit of dream-experience

has anything of the mystical about it . The whole incident

falls in the range of the subject-object type of conscious-

ness . There is no ineffability save that which always is

present in the relationship between the perceptual and

conceptual orders . It is offered simply as an illustra-

tion, (a) of how a conceptual series may become a per-

ceptual series which is a schematic duplicate and yet

adds new knowledge, and (b) of how in addition such a

perceptual series may react upon the conceptual to add

new material for thought . The whole is a schematic pat-

tern of the relation between conceptual and mystical

knowledge . The same principle is involved in the figure

of the telescope used to verify the existence of a planet

predetermined by mathematical calculation . In this case,

the cognizing of the planet as a perceptual object may

well have added nothing necessary for the purposes of

calculation . Calculation determined a somewhat which

might be called n and probably could establish both orbit

and mass, so that n .thereafter was as fully known as was

necessary for all purposes of"calculation alone . But such

a knowledge of n is not sufficient for the establishment

of all significant astronomical knowledge relative to the

new body . It would not give data, such as temperature,

amount and kind of light radiation and possible chemical

composition as the latter might reveal . For this purpose

n must be realized as an object for perception, directly

or indirectly . Hence , n, as perceptually realized, be-

comes a source of possible additional development of con-

ceptual knowledge which could not have been derived from

calculation alone . So experience of the planet adds

to the knowledge of the planet through pure calculation

two increments of knowledge, as follows : (a) It added

knowledge as perceptual cognition, and, (b) it added

physical'and chemical knowledge, in the conceptual sense,

which .could`not have been derived from calculation alone .

There is some dispute as to whether perceptual

.cognition may properly .,be called "Knowledge" . As a mat-

ter of general practice, "knowledge" is defined as "the

cognitive aspect of consciousness in general", of which

two forms are recognized, i .e ., "knowledge of acquaintance"

or perceptual cognition, and "knowledge about", or con-

aeptual cognition . Thus, "to know may mean either to

.perceive or apprehend, or,-to understand or comprehend" .

A blind man could not know .light in the first sense, but

he could know about light in the second . But while this

division of knowledge into two classes is a matter of

general practice, yet John Dewey challenges the correct-

ness of calling "knowledge through acquaintance" knowledge

at all . He calls it " experience " and restricts "knowledge"

to the conceptual order . Of course, this is largely a

matter of definition . It is certainly clear that simple

perceptual awareness is distinguishable from conation or

will and affection or feeling . If, then, we are to follow

the more general practice of classification of the modes

of the mind into two or
r three modes , ( a) cognition and

conation , the latter including affection , or (b) cog-

nition, conation and affection , perceptual awareness,

apart from all feeling tone and activistic element in

consciousness , is certainly a cognition . Thus percep-

tion is a kind of knowledge . In my discussion I am

following the general practice rather than that of

John Dewey, particularly as his practice is part and

parcel of a philosophic interpretation and attitude

with which I do not agree .

Of the two branches of knowledge, the mystical

recognition is most nearly like "knowledge through

acquaintance " and hence bears a relationship to con-

ceptual knowledge analogous to that of perception . But

there are important points of departure . Thus the per-

ceptual awareness is closer to the conceptual parti-

culars and singulars than it is to general and uni-

versal concepts . The reverse is the case with mystical

recognition , for this kind of cognition comes into

closest affinity with the most universal and most ab-

stract conceptions . The more general a conception the

further it is from the perceptual order and the closer

it lies to the mystical . In the thought which reoognizes

solely the perceptual and conceptual , only particular

concepts have true referents , i .e ., perceptual existences

which they mean . The general concepts are viewed as

lacking true referents, and are regarded as valuable

only as instruments in the manipulation of ideas which

ultimately lead to concrete ideas having perceptual

referents . But to the mystic, at least of the pro-

founder, sort, the reference of the most universal con-

cept is most immediate and, therefore, most concrete .

The particular concept and its referent have the value

of abstraction away from concrete reality and, hence,

greater or less'.unreality . Such value as the latter

have is instrumental only .

There is another respect in which mystical recog-

nition diverges from perceptual awareness or "knowledge

through acquaintance", in the usual sense, and that lies

in the fact that the mystical consciousness, when

developed deeply enough, is not concerned with an

object . The general definition of "Cognition" is,

"the being aware of an Object" . In the well-developed

mystical state subject and object fuse or coalesce, so

that the normal relationship of experience and thought

does not exist . So cognition or knowledge, in the

sense of being aware of an object, as distinct from

the subject, is not a mystical kind of knowledge .

Hence, knowledge in the sense of "Gnosis" or "Jnana"

is knowledge of a different sort . It falls outside

current philosophical definition . Yet the use of the

-822-
word, in this sense, goes back to the ancient Greeks

and Indians and thus has a hoary justification . "Know-

ledge" in the sense of "Nous" and the adjective "Noetic"

has the essential meaning of "Gnosis" and "Jnana", being

a non-discursive knowledge in which the knowledge and the

thing known are identical . The denial of "Nous" is a

denial of mystical knowledge, and vice versa, and this

denial is equivalent to materialism in the invidious,

though not in the technical, sense .

We now face this fundamental question : Are we

justified in viewing a state of consciousness in which

there is a coalescence of subject and object, of know-

ledge and thing known, as a case of knowledge? So long

as the state stands in complete separation from relative

consciousness, the answer is "No" . But equally we cannot

predicate affection or conation of such a state . It is

simply beyond all relative predication and can only be

defined by universal negation . But the pure mystical

state may impinge upon the relative consciousness in

greater or less degree, producing effects for the latter .

The resultant is a compound consciousness in which either,

(a) the mystical and relative form an impure effect, or

(b) the two forms of consciousness exist side by side .

In either case, the relative consciousness is affected .

It is the relative consciousness that experiences

(a) Bliss or Beatitude , .( b) reorientation of the will,

and (c ) a new noetic orientation and content . In terms

of content , the relative consciousness now knows, as an

object, the state , of consciousness in which subject and

object , and knowledge and thing known, both merge . This

is an increase of relative knowledge of most profound

significance , both in the theoretical and pragmatic

sense, since it ;tends to make an enormous difference

in life and conduct, in valuation and meaning . The

new orientation is like changing the base of reference

.in mathematical-analysis . The material of relative

consciousness enters into a new , perspective which tends

toward radical difference in theoretical organization .

There is thus addition to knowledge in the conceptual

sense both in the sense of content and of altered

theoretical organization .

A discussion of the foregoing sort is quite ap-

propriate In connection with the study of Shankara .

Whether or not He wrote the parallel of this argument

in its entirety , I do not know , but it is improbable

that He ever did since the intellectual nexus of his

time was different from our own . It is rather the way

Shankara would have written were He living today .

The problem of Liberation is preeminently a

problem of ]Knowledge for Shankara, both in the sense

that knowledge is the primary means and , in the deeper

sense, that Knowledge itself is Liberation . With Christ

the compound mode of affection-conation was given nearly

exclusive emphasis, while with Buddha it was given

primary emphasis, at least in the popular discourses .

But Buddha did give substantial attention to the Noetic

factor, particularly in the discourses to advanced

disciples . This difference, in the orientation to the

problem of Liberation, Salvation or Enlightenment, proves

to be a matter of very .considerable psychological and

speculative interest . For one thing , it correlates
beautifully with the hereditary background of, these three
Men, as given in the record . Buddha was a Prince ; Christ,
according to the Gospel account, was a descendent of David
and thus also a Prince of the blood ; while Shankara was
a Brahmin . This would give to Buddha and Christ the

normal perspective of hereditary rulers, thus contrast-

ing to Shankara who belonged to the caste preeminent in

metaphysical thought . But to the natural ruler , will and

feeling have ascendency and leadership over thought, while

with the natural thinker the reverse is the case . It is

significant that the largest influence in the extensive

sense was ultimately won .by Buddha and Christ, while

Shankara ' s influence was more restricted and specialized .

In terms of emphasis , the contrast between Christ and

Shankara is most marked , while Buddha occupies a more

intermediate position .
 We are presented , here, with one .of the most dif-

ficult recurring problems of philosophy and psychology .

'Which is most fundamental in the constitution of the

universe , Will or Idea? 'Which is most determinant in

the life of an individual, knowledge or feeling-conation? .

There is good reason for reducing the three modes of

cognition, affection and conation to two by combining

feeling and will . For manifestly there is a very close

connection between pleasure and desiring while pure know-

ing may leave desire largely unaffected . Ethical con-

sciousness as an attitude is a manifestation of the will,

and depends upon the intellect simply for the resolution

of ethical problems . Hence accentuation of the ethical

is equivalent to giving primacyy to the will . Of course,

in the present discussion will must be understood as in-

eluding the whole of the activistic element in conscious-

ness, and thus includes desire and the autonomous will-

to-live . It is not restricted to conscious volition .

The usage is close to, if not identical with, that-of

Schopenhauer . Buddha's emphasis of the destruction of

the desire for sentient existence seems to place Him

somewhat closer to the emphasis of Christ than to Shankara,

but, on the other hand, the doctrine of the Prajna

Paramita accords more closely with Shankara .

-826-
 Modern philosophy has not finally resolved the

problem of the relative primacy of Will and Idea . The

impact of Hegel and Schopenhauer does not destroy either

contestant . The Truth would seem to be, much as Von

Hartmann suggested , that Will and Idea are component

parts of a more ultimate incognizable reality . There is,

then, no ultimate primacy for either the Will or the Idea,

but relative primacy in different contexts, in stages

of processes and in individual organizations . In the

very practical question of which way will lead success-

fully to Yoga with a given individual, we must consider

whether Will or Idea dominates the individual life .

Method must be adjusted accordingly . Unquestionably,

with the overwhelming mass of people, Will does dominate

and, hence, ethico-affective techniques are indicated .

But there .is a smaller number of individuals with whom

the cognitive development is not only large, but also

occupies the commanding position in life- determination .

In such cases the Will has been brought into subjugation

to the Idea . Hence , in such cases , the problem of Yoga,

as a means , becomes simply the achievement of the right

conception , there being no effective autonomous resistance

on the part of the Will . With most men right conception

is not enough because the amount of undomesticated auto-

nomous Will is far too large .

 Schopenhauer'is right when he says emancipation

depends upon the reversal of the Will, so that will-to-

live becomes denial of the will-to-live ; though I do not

find that he has adequately established how such a re-

versal is possible if Will is the all-powerful . When

Will is subjugated to Idea, practically as well as

theoretically, the problem of reversal reduces to

realization of the conception of what is to be done and

how to do it . Now, Shankara is not concerned with Yoga

in all its ramifications as method, but primarily with

the problem as it appears after subjugation of the Will

to Idea has been already achieved . Explicitly, He does

not view all men as possible candidates for this at their

present stage of development . They must have qualifica-

tions . The nature of these qualifications is indicated

explicitly in the following quotation from Shankara's

"Discrimination of Spirit and Not-Spirit" ("Atmanatma

Viveka") .

After stating that the unredeemed state of man is

due to Ignorance , Shankara goes on to say :

"Therefore it is clear that Ignorance can only be

removed by Wisdom .

Q. How can this Wisdom be acquired?

A . By discussion - by discussing as to the nature of

Spirit and Not-spirit .

-828-
 Q . Who are worthy of engaging in such discussion?

A . Those who have acquired the four qualifications .

Q. What are the four qualifications?

A . (1) True discrimination of permanent ' and impermanent

things ; ( 2) Indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits
of one ' s'actions both ', here'and hereafter ; ( 3) Possession
of Sama ( calmness ) and''the other five qualities ; (4) An
intense desire of becoming liberated (from material
existence) ."

Clearly one who has these four qualifications has

already gone a considerable way on the'Path . Somehow

or other much self-discipline has been achieved, pas-

sionateness has been quieted, the direction of desire

has been reversed and the habit of discriminative analysis

developed . The anti -egoistic ethic is presupposed . It

is possible that various technical means have been em-

ployed to achieve the four qualifications . At any rate,

from this point on, Shankara abandons all ritual, sacri-

fice, technical expedients - in a word, all objective

sensible action , or works , as agencies that are, in

principle , necessary . An intellective process of dis-

crimination , including discussion, is well -nigh the only
agency . In the end , when this diseximination has completed
the final preparation , the Realization comes at its own
time, spontaneously . All preparation has the value of
purification or destruction of barriers , but is not a

magical agent which commands the Realization . The

-829-
Awakened State'is not an effect of causes set up by

the candidate , for It has nothing to do with conditions .

It is as though ' at'some moment in the process of prepara-

tion the right balance is achieved and an obscuring

curtain drops , simply revealing what has always been

there, and has always been the Truth . Indifference to

specific method or technique is not only allowed ; it

is mandatory . For by attaching importance to any means,

the candidate is clouding his mind-with the delusion of

efficient causal connection . Meditation ceases to be a

matter of set method or of specific seasons, but becomes

something spontaneous and capable of being super-added

to reflective process or even objective activity . The

Samadhi that is attained is the Nirvikalpa or undif-

ferentiated Samadhi, which by no means necessarily

implies black-out trance . For, to require trance is

to impose a visible means as causally effective, and
this is contrary to the primary principle that the State

of Realization is not the effect of a relative cause .

It is a significant fact that the Highest state

of Samadhi may appear to the incompetent observer as

the most casual and indistinguishable from ordinary

consciousness . Actually , it effects an integration

such that the usual and ordinary is seen as of one same-

ness with the undifferentiated , and the practitioner

may not know the difference between meditation and not-

meditation. The practitioner has transcended the duality

of this , as ordinary consciousness , and that , as mystical

consciousness , and the one sameness of the permanent and

undifferentiated is known to underlie and interpenetrate

all states . The state of ,consciousness is peculiarly

indescribable'and obscure .'` It is no more disembodied

than it is embodied , no more of one aspect of any duality

than it is of the other . About all that one can positively

say is, "IT IS ", but IT cannot be imagined . The man of

such Realization is no longer identical with his embodi-

ment ; he is both there in the body and not there, and

the activities and death of the body are merely events

within him and , therefore , not involving him .

There is a seeming discrepancy between Buddhism

and the teaching of Shankara'of high importance . It has

been already shown that the doctrine of anatman, or the

non-reality of the self, is fundamental to Buddhism . I

contrast , Shankara taught the Atmavidya , or Knowledge of

the Self . In fact, the name of the source of the above

quotation , " Atmanatma Viveka" may be translated " Discrimina-
tion between the Self and Not-Self" . Shankara gives the

positive value to Self -Realization . But, in other respects,

the fundamental similarity between Shankara ' s teachings

and Buddhism has been well recognized . Here is a subject-

matter that calls for serious investigation.

-831-
 There is no reasonable ground for doubt that the

Way taught by the Buddha served as an effective means

whereby an undetermined number of individuals achieved

Enlightenment . This Way, in so far as it involved an

orientation by a doctrine, involved the teaching of

anatman . This, at the very least, gives the teaching a

pragmatic justification, since it facilitated the primary

objective of the Buddha's mission . But the same may be

said of Shankara's teaching of the Atmavidya, or Know-

ledge of the Self . This, also, has provided an effective

Way . Further, I know that it can initiate a process

which, in-its final stage, gives the Buddhistic State of

the two-fold egoselflessness . The implication is that

the apparent incompatibility of the two teachings is not

a real contradiction .

For my part, I am convinced that the apparent con-

tradiction is actually a paradox . Now the paradox is a

very common conceptual form employed by mystics, and a

very fruitful source of misunderstanding indeed . It is

necessary to attain an appreciation of its logical sig-

nificance . First of all, the mystical state of conscious-

ness is, integrative in lesser or greater degree depending

upon the relative depth of mystical penetration . It is

integrative in the sense that elements, or phases or states

which are mutually incompatible when apprehended by ordi-

-832-
nary consciousness, .actually do become compatible parts

of a larger whole . Just as the dynamical conception of

the parallelogram of forces achieves a logical integra-

tion of forces operating more or less in opposition,

such as the centrifugal and centripetal forces, so the

mystical state effects analogous integration for con-

sciousness . But a purely mystical .integration, without

the collaboration of the intellect, is not a logical

conceptual integration, . as is the case in the instance

of the parallelogram of forces . It is an immediate

integration through what we have called the mystical

sense . It is quite possible that when the mystic at-

tempts to express conceptually the value of the mystical

insight he finds his intellectual capacity inadequate

for the task of constructing a logically connected symbol .

In this case, the intellectual level, being correspond-

entially inferior to that of the insight, the formulation

appears in paired statements that seem to negate each

other, or in the form of substantives seemingly contradicted

by adjective modifiers, such as "the teaming desert",

"the whispering silence", etc . But through competent

analyses, these apparent contradictions are found not to

be true contradictions, for they do not affirm that A can

be both A and not-A at the same time and in the same sense .

Usually they mean that .the±realization is like a somewhat

which in one sense is A, but in another sense is, or in-

corporates, the opposite of A, and all at the same time .

That which is separated, and of necessity must be separated,

in ordinary experience, because of the structural frame-

work of that experience, is united in simultaneity in

the mystical state . There is no logical contradiction

in this .

At times in the development of physical science the

scientist may become aware of new phenomena which, in part,

conform with previous conceptions, but, likewise, in part,

violate those conceptions . This is recognized as a sign

that there is need for a new conception on a higher level

which shall incorporate both forms of the behaviour of the

phenomena in a logical whole . The same need arises when

the doctrines coming forth from authentic states of mystical

insight result in an unresolved paradoxical complex . The
mystical insight may have developed well ahead of the in-

tellectual evolution of the individuals or even of the race

as a whole . In that case, the paradox remains until such

time someone with the requisite intellectual development,

perhaps at a much later stage of human history, deals with

the problem and who, if successful, resolves the problem .

The development of the logical sense in modern mathematics

renders possible the resolution of many a paradox that had

to remain a paradox for centuries and even millenia, as is

illustrated by the paradoxes of Zeno . I believe we have

today developed the necessary logico - oonceptual equipment

for the resolution of the seeming contradiction of the

anatmic doctrine of Buddha and the Atmic doctrine of

Shankara . At any rate , if the resolution is not complete,

it will be substantial though, I confess, far from simple .

First of all, let us return to Buddha's conception

of the "ego", "the self" or the "I am" as employed in the

Suta from which our quotation was taken . From the con-

text, the reference is primarily to the personal ego,

that which I mean when I speak of myself as distinct from

other persons and that which has various desires, inclina-

tions, points of view, etc ., which differentiate me from

other beings . It is the manifest ground of competitive

activities of all sorts, including the wars of nations .

This it is that Buddha affirms is impermanent and, con-

cerning which, He says it is the cause of ubiquitous suf-

fering which can never be destroyed so long as bondage to

this egoism remains . In the Sanskrit Sutras, which largely

constitute the basis of departure of Northern from Southern

Buddhism , there are at least implicatory references to a

higher egoism and so the profoundest states of Enlighten-

ment involve the realization of twofold egolessness . But

this portion of the full conception we shall leave for the

moment, and focus upon the'simple personal egoism .

-835-
 Now, what is the ego in the simpler sense? We find

that Emanuel Kant and Dr . C . G . Jung, among other Western

thinkers, give us much help here . This ego is a power of

subjective awareness . It is I, who sees ; it is I who hears

and otherwise senses ; and it is I who thinks, who feels,

who intuits, and who wills .' At least it seems so . But

there is more than pure awareness involved in this complex

process . The, sensing, intuiting, feeling, thinking and

willing involve forms of being aware . The awareness

operates in certain ways which by psychological and epistemo-

logical analyses,\even we of'the West have been able to

study in considerable measure . :But a way or form of

awareness is distinguishable from pure awareness in the

abstract . Abstract awareness is without any form or con-

ditioning whatsoever ; it could not be described as think-

ing, sensing , intuiting, feeling, willing or as conditioned

by any other possible mode . ,If .we mean by subjectivity

this, and only this, then it is not the same as the ego

or the subject in the concrete sense . If we conceive of

Shankara' s Atman as pure subjectivity, or the bare power

of awareness unmodified by any form whatsoever, then it

is clearly distinguishable from the'egoism of Buddha, both

in the lower and higher sense . Bare subjectivity, being

uncompounded, is not subject to change and, therefore,

neither grows nor decays . But the concrete subject is

compounded and, thus, subject to process . Hence, bond-

age to the concrete subject involves unending suffering .

Full analysis shows that we must make a further

distinction between the concrete subject and the ego

proper . The ego appears to stand as a sort of framework

or form through which the concrete subject operates upon

the objective, in so far as the process falls within the

field of the personal consciousness . There remains an

undeterminate zone in which the interaction between the

concrete subjective and the objective takes place without

passing through the personal ego . This is the zone of

the psychologic unconscious . Much of the adjustment of

the individual entity to the environment in which it lives

does not pass through the framework of the conscious per-

sonal ego . From time to time, incursions from the un-

conscious enter into the egoic field of consciousness

without being integrated by the ego and often without being

capable of such integration unless the egoic framework is

dissolved . The literature of both psychosis and of the

transformation process is full of references to such in-

cursions . We must, therefore, enlarge the conception of

the concrete subject quite beyond the limited field com-

manded by the individual personally conscious ego .

Concrete subjectivity, in addition to the abstract

power of pure awareness, includes innumerable forms and, .

therefore, may be said to have a structture . Ordinarily

the individual is not conscious of these forms directly .

They enter into determining the form of experience, but

are not immediately apparent to the individual conscious-

ness . -Seemingly, this consciousness contains only the

objective content as something given from outside . The

view, either naively believed in or theoretically affirmed,

that the content is exclusively objectively determined,

is materialism. Strong conviction of this sort has

serious effects which will be considered later . But

analysis does not have to go very far for one to see that
actual experience is a compound effect of a subjective and

objective determination . For instance, an individual who

has a defect of vision which is corrected by glasses,

most of the time when reading or looking at the objects

of his environment is either not at all, or only slightly,
conscious of his glasses . He might imagine that his ex-

perience,,of the seen world was only objectively determined .

But let him remove the glasses and the seen-world is altered,
probably becoming quite blurred . His actual experience

is changed, but not by a change from outside . If, in

addition to his ordinary glasses, he were to put on

various colored glasses, or glasses producing distorted

images, he would find his actual experience changed in

each case . From this it is easy to take the further step

of realizing that the way of seeing as conditioned by the

structure of the eye plays its part in determining the

world as seen . The eye of a fly would give a different

kind of world . But, still, back of the conditioning

imposed by the visual organ there are determinants of a

more psychical nature . Seeing, as a function, has laws

other than the optical limitations of the eye . We see

in the form of the visual kind of space . The objective

as experienced in terms of seeing must fall within this

kind of space . Whatever there may be that cannot fit

~a .u.
within that kind of conditioning could never b n seen,

in the visual sense*

Now, the foregoing illustration applies to all the

senses and to thinking as well . So'the actual conscious

content of our experience and our thought is the mutual

product of subjective and objective factors . But in

order that there may be mutuality of interaction the

subjective and the objective must have a common sub-

stratum . They cannot be of wholly disparate natures .

r
As a result, the'objective can be introjected into the

subjective and the subjective can be projected into the

objective, facts which are well known to analytic psychol-

ogy . Ordinarily this happens only with respect to part

of the contents, . but once the actuality of the complementary

processes of introjection and projection is recognized,

it is then seen that a thoroughgoing reversal is, in prin-

ciple, possible . In such case, that which was objective

becomes subjective and . that which was subjective, becomes

objective .

-839-
 When the focus of consciousness is extraverted, -

the predominant state of most objectively embodied waking

consciousness most of the time, - the egoic consciousness

is solely aware of objective content . For such conscious-

ness, introversion into sleep is equivalent to personal
egoic unconsciousness, for the field of established con-

sciousness has vanished . But going to sleep-"is equivalent

to a fairly thorough reversal of the subjective and ob-

jective . When the . objective of waking consciousness has

become the subject, this objective has become the unseen,

i
'in the same sense that the subjective of waking conscious-

ness is unseen . Now, the extravert consciousness is

<typically not conscious of the subjective determinants

during'the waking state and thus has not built the power

of personal'`egoic'awareness in the objective of the sleep-

ing state . . What dreams there may be then are projections

of the sleeping subjective, - identical with the waking

objective, - into the sleeping objective, - identical with

the waking subjective . As a result, such dreams are com-

posed of distorted objective forms, that is, objective in

the sense corresponding to the waking state . This is the

kind of dream Freud analyzed .

Now, in the case of individuals who are more or less

familiar with conscious introversion, either spontaneous or

deliberate, the waking subjective is not a wholly unfamiliar

field . They are more or less conscious of the subjective

structure and may have acquaintance with the archetypes of

the unconscious which Jung has discussed in the "Integra-

tion of Personality" . In such cases, the sleeping state

may be more than a state of personal unconsciousness or
dream, but may be from slightly to wholly conscious, -

this latter being possible as a result of superior attain-

went . In this case, the conscious experience during sleep

is not a dream, but is as objectively real as ordinary

waking experience . No superior reality value may justly

be predicated of the objective waking experience as com-

pared to this .

The possibility of reversal of the objective and the

subjective implies certain important consequences relative

to pure abstract subjectivity and abstract objectivity .

Without a common ground - that .which the Hindu calls Sat

there could be no reversal . This common ground is pure

subjectivity and pure,'objectivity combined . In other

words, it is pure subjectivity when underlying concrete

subjectivity and, .pure .`objectivity, or the bare field of

consciousness, when underlying concrete objectivity .' I

Itself It is neither .'' Its character as subjective or

objective is functional , not substantial .

Death has the value of a profounder introversion

than sleep, . but psychologically it has essentially the

same significance as going to sleep . But, whereas sleep

is a state wherein certain unconscious psychological pro-

cesses continue in the extraverted sense - namely, those

that maintain the organism as a breathing and living

entity - death involves the introversion of .all psychol-

ogical processes , both conscious and unconscious . In

death , then, the reversal of the subjective and objective

is more complete . That which was objective for the out-

wardly living man becomes the subjective in terms of both

the conscious and unconscious psyche . In turn, the former

subjective , just as completely , becomes the new objective .

These reversals are not merely successive introversions

and extraversions , but they are compound introversion-

extraversions and extraversion-introversions . One side

.introverts coincidentally with the extraversion of the

other side . It is both a successive and coincidental

diastole " and systole .

We are now in a .position to deduce certain neces-

sities of after -death states . First, the introversion of

the objective implies that , in its essential nature, the

objective body becomes subjective . The visible matter

of the body is not involved in this , for it simply dis-

integrates into physical elements or compounds . But it

is easy to see that the objective body is not merely the

visible matter . It is known that the physical matter of

which the objective body is composed does not remain with

.it permanently during life . This matter passes into the

body and, then , after remaining for a time , passes away,

being replaced , by other matter . Thus this physical mat-

-842-
ter may be viewed as streaming through the body. The

relatively persistent factor is the form and appearance

of the body, though this also changes from birth to death,

but always within the limits of a recognizable human

pattern . The relatively persistent element is an un-

seen form or paradigm , without which new accretions of

matter would develop .anarchically, as illustrated in the

case of cancer-growth . This form is an energic zone and

its pattern is essentially of the nature of an idea,

objectified . It is this which becomes subjective in the

death transformation , along with other psychical elements .

That which was subjective, during objective visible

existence , becomes objective after death . Henceforth the

egoic,state has three possibilities . It may be simply un-

conscious , it may be aware as in a dream , or it may be awake

to relative realities'that are not inferior in their reality-

quale to objective,realities during objective life . These .

states depend upon the preparation during objective life .

An exclusively extraverted orientation of egoistical con-

sciousness during physically visible life is not aware of

the introverted part of the diastolic and systolic pulsa-

tion . Part of the pulsation is quite unconscious in the

egoistic sense . In rational man, however , there is one

.relatively introverted activity of which he is conscious

even when the orientation is strongly extraverted . For

rational man thinks as well as experiences . . As thinker

he is more introverted than as experiencer . In the re-

versal of death, this thought becomes objective as ex-

perience . As he has thought he subsequently experiences .

Hence , one who during objective life thought strongly and

persistently that death was wholly annihilation, experi-

ences complete unconsciousness , until' such time as the

energy resident in the thought is, exhausted . If, however,

without this idea''he' yet was wholly objectively oriented

's during life', -the' only'' consciousness he can know after

death is a dream . Not having developed consciousness of

the subjective during objective life, the only possible

content which can exist for him in the new objective,

after death, - which is the old subjective become objective, -

is projected contents from the new subjective, - which is

the old objective become subjective . These contents have

only the value of dreams ; they are parts of the old waking

life, experienced over again but'guided by the thought

conceptions held during life . Hence , inevitably,'such a

one experiences in the forms of the religious teachings,

if any, which he has accepted and believed in during life .

But their nature is that of dreams . In the case of one

who has become discriminatively conscious of the subjective

determinants during objective physical life, the new ob-

jective experience, after death, has material around which

to develop which is no less real than the experience of

physical life . Disc nation continues beyond death and,

consequently, this state becomes ` more than a dream -state .

It is said that those who have aroused into activity

the appropriate mystical organ can trace these processes

after death by means analogous to physically objective

observation . What I have said, above, does not depend

upon this as far as it goes . It is in the nature of de-

duction from primary premises . If it is called a kind of

seeing, it is so in the same sense that the mathematician

saw Neptune by calculation alone . The seeing as through

the appropriate mystical organ would be like the seeing

of Neptune through the telescope and would involve the

corresponding problems of mastery of technique in handling

the telescope and of interpretation of the image seen . An

amateur with-the :telescope .might get the wrong object and

fail to understand what he saw, even if he got the right

object . But, none the less, he would have an invaluable

instrument the functions of which can be only partly re-

placed by calculation .

This rather extensive digression into sleep states

and after-death states serves the two-fold purpose,

(a) of preparing the way for a more complete understanding

of the mystical function, and (b) of preparing the way for

a clearer'understanding of egoism both in the lower and

higher senses .

-845-
.4

As here employed, the term "mystical" carries a

compound meaning including states and functional forms

of consciousness . It is recognized, even by Western

psychologists, that mystical consciousness may be more

or less developed, and consequently deal with more than

only one exclusive possibility . Qualitative differences

there certainly are in different mystical states, and it

is only in the profoundest development that we find

identity or approach to identity of meaning . So, the

mystical sense may be, in a given case, of a minor order .

But there is a psychological similarity in all mystical

development . It is always a process of introversion

which reaches a level more interior than conceptual

thought . . Thought stands, as it were, in the center with

the mystical, on one side, and the perceptual on the other .

To penetrate mystically is to become conscious, in greater

or less degree, of the subjective . It is reversal of

direction of the libido, which, most commonly in waking

consciousness, moves toward the perceptible object . It

is a "turning about" of the focus of consciousness . For

this reason, the mystic tends to become conscious in the

realm of life commonly called sleep and death, and in

grand mysticism the process goes much, much deeper . But

the mystic differs from his non-mystical brother in that

he does this while yet alive in the objective sense . There

is, undoubtedly , a tendency towards the trance state,

since beyond a certain critical point the libido tends

to burst out completely in the new direction . But it

is possible by conscious control to keep the stream of

the libido divided, in which case the objective and sub-

jective states can be experienced simultaneously . But,

in many respects , the man in trance is just where the ordi-

nary man is when we call him dead , save that self-conscious-

ness at least tends to be much greater . However, as I

have said repeatedly, the trance is not essential and

undoubtedly it is easier to maintain critical self-

consciousness without it than with it . In any case,

i
the mystical'movement-is an exceptional introversion with

self- consciousness .

In one of its lesser significances , mystical develop-

ment is a preparation for

4
death . It prepares the way for

an after-death state for which there is bona fide reality-

quale, not inferior to the objective perceptual reality,

and thus guards against a state of mere dreaming or one

of complete egoistic unconsciousness . Preparation for

death is a matter of exceedingly great importance, and

should be the prime interest of the latter half of life .

Dr . Jung is emphatically right on this point . We of the

West have been very foolishly negligent with respect to

this matter .

-847-
 We come now to the crudial consideration of egoism .

Analytic psychology has, quite correctly, differentiated

the personal ego from the subject . The subject includes,

in addition to the conscious field of the ego, an indeter-

minant zone, which to the personal ego is quite uncon

scious ._'Analytic psychology conceives of the transforma-

tion as the establishment of a new self-center in the un-

conscious , behind the ego, as . it were . This process is

fundamentally mystical . It places the personal ego in a

,position of objectivity with respect to the new subject .

Much that was formerly unconscious to the personal ego

becomes conscious . But, in order to take this step in

transformation, attachment to the personal ego must be

weakened, at least, if not wholly severed . So far, this

is certainly in line with the Buddhistic process . The

ego that has become possessed by me is no longer a fixed

determinant . Instead of taking the false valuation of a

sun, it is reduced to its proper status of a planet moving

in an orbit about the self or subject . The ego continues

to condition the appearance to the milieu of the individual

entity, but is not identical with that entity . Now, the

ego, as contrasted to the objective contents of conscious-

ness, has a relative fixity and unity . It is not a true

invariant, but is rather like a parameter, in the sense I

have already discussed (p ) . From birth to death,

man does not remain identically the same man . In the

sense of egoic continuity he is the same man, but his

personal character is subject to change , generally more

or less imperceptibly , but, in the aggregate, often con-

siderably and, at times, even catastrophically . The man

who gets up in the morning is not quite the same ego he

was the night before, and close self -analysis , as well

as observation , will disclose this . Actually , the ego

may be viewed as a continuum in time that is, at every

point, the center of a flowing world of experience . Ex-

perience may thus be viewed as a continuum centering upon

another continuum which, at every point , is relatively

fixed with respect to the former ..- The conception-here is

schematically familiar to much of mathematical thinking .

Thus, in mathematical . language , experience is a locus of

a locus . We may view the ego as a locus of a point which

is a variable dependent upon the self behind the ego .

We may now abstract two continua , one the continuum

of the stream of experience , the other the continuum of

the ego . In order to represent the systolic-diastolic

movement in which the objective becomes subjective and

the subjective becomes objective in a periodic rhythm

we may construct two sine curves, as given in the ac-

companying figure . In this case the two curves will be

drawn symmetrically with respect to the X-axis . The

origin , Zero , will be taken arbitrarily at any point
where the broken line E crosses the X-axis and rises

above the axis . The Y- axis will represent the field

of,Consciousness ,' both subjective and objective . +Y

will represent the subjective field during waking

physically embodied . consciousness , while -Y will repre-

sent the objective aspect of the field during waking

consciousness . The X -axis will represent Time , -X time

in the past with respect to the arbitrary point of begin-
ning, +X the future with respect to that same point .

The broken curve E is the continuum of the ego, this

curve being of the form sine x . The solid curve 0

is the continuum of experience , the curve being of the

form - sine x . From mathematics it is known that these

curves will intersect the X-axis at Zero, at TT and at

any integral multiples of . "R' .

The point Zero is the moment of birth of a new

ego and the simultaneous beginning of experience , repre-

sented by line P . This is the experience of embodied

objective life . The rising of the egoistic curve repre-

sents the maturing of egoistic consciousness , followed

by its normal recession in old -age up to death . The

descent of the curve of experience marks intensification

of experiential content, followed by a corresponding

decline . IT is the point of death of the objective phase

and the transition point to the reversal of the subjective-

-850-
objective . Between ~F and 2 -T the curve of the ego

lies in what was the objective phase of physically em-

bodied consciousness . The, experiential curve moves in

symmetrical balance on the opposite side of the X-axis .

Zero to -17
covers the cycle of embodied experience,
while to 2-7.7 covers the cycle of after-death con-

sciousness or experience . In the second cycle that

which was thought or contained in the subjective in

the first , becomes objective as experience , and vice

versa .

I am indebted to Mohini Chatterji for the initial

suggestion that the permanent ego of an incarnation may

be viewed as the time integral of all the instantaneous

states of the ego through the continuum of a life-time .

I have found that the use of the definite integral in

this connection brings out a fuller-figure . If we take

the definite integral of the curve E between Zero and (T

we get the area enclosed by this arc of the curve and

the X-axis . Curiously , it has the value of 2, quite an

interesting fact since we are dealing with dualistic or

subject- object consciousness . We may regard the definite

integral, or the above area , as the total unified ego of

the incarnation . In other words, the "I am", which in the

first instance seemed like a point, fixed at any instant,

but actually flowing in time, becomes as a totality,

space-like . Psychologically, its significance shifts

-851-
from the significance of the contained , to the container .

But it is the container of subjective psychical contents .

If we take the definite integral from jt to 2 Il we have

the same result in the reverse sense . So the definite

integral from Zero to 2 7 has the value of zero . This

is the conclusion of the cycle of the given ego . The fol-

lowing new birth is the beginning of a new ego which may

be viewed as the son of its predecessor . This is in con-

formity with the Buddhist doctrine of the ego .

The constant factor throughout all this process is

the Field of Consciousness which takes on subjective and

objective coloring depending upon whether It appears as

objective as .the ground of experience , or as subjective

as the ground of the ego . In Itself in Its own nature,

It is neither subjective nor objective, but only appears

as one or the other depending on the coloring given by

the approach . Approached through the ego, It appears as

Pure Subjectivity .

The approach of Shankara is through the ego and,

hence, the Ground is reached as pure subjectivity or

the potential of all awareness - an absolutely permanent

principle containing time . The diametrically opposite

approach , by piercing through the objective , is suggested

as a theoretical possibility .

To approach the ultimate through the subject appears

to me the easiest way . Pure subjectivity , when reached

or realized, by its own nature transforms into the sub-

jective-objective, and then to Its real nature as neither

subjective nor objective, and then there remains only

the ineffable Ground of Consciousness-without-an-object

and without-a-subject .

The Ground lies outside all conditioning and there-

fore may not be said to develop .or evolve . . Evolution or

development has a one-way dependence upon the Ground .

The cycle of progression of the personal egoic conscious-

ness is an endless series in its own dimension . Yet

there is such a thing as real progression . But this we

must conceive, not as continuation along the line of the

sine curves, but as a progressive integration rising in

another dimension in such a way that earlier stages are

embraced within the later .

It is readily suggested to us that if we take the

indefinite integral of the sine curves we would arrive at

a higher integration . I did this and in working out the

consequent interpretations I had several surprises . Some

of the consequences were quite at variance from certain

preconceptions which I had held, but, in studying the logic

of the whole complex, I reached the conclusion that my

preconception had been in error . Actually, a number of

mystical elements began to slip into place in a larger

thinkable whole . I do not by any means suggest that we

have in the final effect the whole picture, but I do find

-853-
the integration quite remarkable . As a thinkable schema

the whole is pretty complicated, however simple the direct

Realization itself is .

The indefinite integral of sinx dx is -cos . x . This

gives the broken curve HE in ink, with respect to which

the solid curve in ink, marked G, corresponds in the same

relation that curves E and P have to each other . It will

be noted that these curves are at their respective maxima

and minima at the points Zero, W, 2 1,----n 71 ; the pre-

cise points at which the curves E and O .intersect the X-

axis . Similarly, at points Z, 21 etc ., where curves

E and 0 are at their respective maxima and minima, the

curves HE and G intersect the X-axis . HE represents the

Higher Ego and the curve G represents'the Divinity or God,

or the Higher Ego in its aspect as'objective . Since sub-

jectivity by itself is an abstraction, but no real exist-

ence, all entities are subjective-objective . This prin-

ciple would have to apply to the Higher Ego as well as the

lower ego . 'Thus, just as the lower ego , when objectively

considered, is man, so also the . Higher Ego would have its

objective counter-aspect . For reasons that will become

.clear later, I have,called this the Divinity or God .

The points , -T,'3, ---(2n + 1) T, are the points

,in time' ;of .the death of the personal man, though in a more

superficial interpretation', they are also the points of

going to sleep,'and in a profounder sense, they are the

points of mystical death . The complex of curves is thus

a generalized schema lending itself to major and minor

interpretations . It will be noted that, fundamental to

the whole i nterpretation , the curves stand in relationships

of perfect symmetry , which is just another way of saying

that they represent processes in perfect equilibrium .

Hence, this symbolism is consonant with the conception

that Equilibrium is the essence of Law, an idea developed

in the commentaries on the "Aphorisms on Consciousness-

without -an-object ."

The Points Zero, 2 y1, 4 7 ,---2n I

;, are the points

in time of the birth of personal man, of the waking up

from sleep, and of return from the mystic state to ob-

jective polarization of consciousness, corresponding to

ordinary waking consciousness . The points 3 T, 2j T,

4)1 -7, ---(2n + 14) 7, are the points in time of the birth

of the God , in the phase analogous to the birth of the

personal man . The points lyz i3-, 3 ---(n + l)1) 71-9

are the points in time when the . God dies objectively . It

must be kept in mind constantly that birth in one phase

is, at the same time, death in the opposite phase, and

vice versa . The words "birth" and "death" thus refer to

transition in phase, and not to de novo becoming or .to

extinction .
 In studying the E curve we find that when personal

egoism rises to a maximum the objective life of man is in

its objective development . In terms of psychical energy,

the libido has developed furthest into the objective .

This corresponds to the lowest point of the curve 0, which

means that the seen man is then at his prime . But at this

point the curves HE and G intersect the X - axis, the point

of greatest recession of psychical energy in the divine

counterpart of man . At this point , 7, the God dies

inwardly , and thenceforth grows outwardly as the man de-

creases toward outward death . At this latter death, the

transference of the Libido to the outwardly manifest God

is at a maximum .

At the moment of personal death the God is objecti-

fied in maximum degree . In other words , the introversion

of the personal life corresponds to the infilling of the

God with life , while extraversion draws life from the God .

This leads to a remarkable clarification of the famous

dictum of Nietzche : " God is dead " . The God is dead when-

ever the individual or collective man achieves maximum

extraversion . Fixation in extraversion is equivalent to

killing the God . This will explain the spiritual barren-

ness of the more intensively empirical sciences . Darwinism,

in the philosophic sense, is equivalent to the death of

the God , i .e ., loss of spiritual consciousness, since

Darwinism , in this sense , . is the acme of materialism .

-856-
 Our primary interest here is connected with the

mystical processes, rather than with the ordinary period-

icity of birth and death . We must generalize our con-

ception of time represented by the X-axis . This time in

some situations, such as ordinary birth and death, night

and day, etc ., may well be regarded as identical with the

cosmic or objective time determined by the stars. But

this is a sort of collective time which may not synchronize

with the individual time sequence . The base of time is,

succession of states of consciousness . In the case of the

mystic, the time sequence is not identical with the time

of the objective stars . The succession of his states of

consciousness introduces a periodicity of its own which,

while symmetrica7Lly balanced in its own scale, may appear

asymmetrical in its relation to objective star-time . 'When

the succession of states of consciousness is very rapid,

in-terms of the objective star-time, the life-cycle may

appear very short, and vice versa . Hence, the oscillation

of the mystic may be - indeed is - a true periodicity,

even though the arrangement of phases in terms of star-

time, as noted by the observer, may be quite asymmetrical .

If, in the mystic's, development a certain step in trans-

formation takes ten years, in one case, and ten minutes,

in another case, in the mystical sense the time interval

in the two cases is the same . The life of the mystic,

-857-
qua mystic, is to be isolated from the visible cycles

of the visible man . We shall consider the complex of

curves in relation to the mystic, in abstraction from

the ordinary lives of men .

The moment of mystical death, - which is identical

with the moment of inward birth, - is the moment of ex-

treme introversion when life in the man is reduced to a

minimum and the life of the God reaches a maximum . God

is the Presence realized by the mystic and, with some

psychical organizations, can be a seen Presence . It is

easy to identify this Presence with the Heavenly Father

of Christ . This is the pattern normally followed by

those whose reality orientation is primarily objective .

For those whose primary orientation has been to the sub-

jective, the realization is equivalent to identification

with the Higher Ego, which is the same as being identical

with the God, rather than experiencing Him as Presence .

Mystical reoords give the two patterns . Christian mysti-

cism is mainly of the former type .

'If we integrate the curves HE and G we get the

original curves E and 0 . This implies that the pairs,

E and HE,'0 and G, stand in interdependent relation to

.each other .-The higher and lower egos are not separable

and, in the last analysis, the distinction of higher and

lower is not absolute . This conclusion is sound . "High"

and "low " have meaning only from the perspective of a

-858-
relative base . From the standpoint of the ultimate Ground

there is no meaning in this relativity . The same point

applies in the relationship between God and man . The

obvious conclusion may be somewhat shocking to some

pietists , but it has strong mystical support . It is

significant that it is said that Buddha taught the Gods

as well as men . Also Meister Eckhart said " For man is

truly God , and God truly man ." Angelus Silesius said :

"I am as ' great as God , and He is small like me ; He can-

not be above, nor I below Him be ." It is , indeed, true

that man's reality is not a whit greater than that of God,

but man ' s ;reality = is as,great as God ' s . The mystical need

is mutual . Only the God-man attains superiority , for only

He has attained the dual consciousness , synthesized . Only

He has freed himself from dependence upon the cycle of

evolution . In so far as He continues in the interweaving

of evolution , it is as a process within Him, not as some-

thing which possesses Him . This is the Liberated State .

From the standpoint of the Ground , all Gods and all

men, all egos, whether higher or lower, inhere in the Ulti-

mate which is neither subjective nor objective . Meister

Eckhart reveals his profundity'in that he has realized the

relativity of God and man and also the ultimate inherence

of both in the Godhead , which is not subject to becoming .

This Godhead is identical with the Ground, or Consciousness-

without- an-object and without -a-subject .

-859-
 Just as the complex of sine and cosine curves ex-

tend to plus and minus infinity , so also, evolution has

no beginning nor end . But the Enlightened One is free

just because He is consciously one with the Ground and

so the evolutionary stream flows within Him , instead of

He upon it . It is a mistake to think that the evolution-

ary stream ceases , after full Enlightenment . It remains

as it always has been and ever will be, but for the En-

lightened One it is no longer a source of bondage, no

longer a well of sorrow, but it is, as it were, the revelry

of the Eternal . The two Doors of Ashvaghosha are, neither

of them , ever closed .

The foregoing is not a metaphysical dissertation

.but, rather , a determination of how a metaphysical reality

and experience is possible . If we regard the physical

as the objective of ordinary waking experience , then we

may regard the metaphysical as the objective in the in-

verse phase or after-death consciousness . In another

sense , the metaphysical is the objective aspect of the

.consciousness of God, but it must be remembered that God

and man are interdependent phases of one entity . The

Ground underlies both the physical and the metaphysical .

-860-
 This discussion is psychological in the sense of

Metapsychology . By "Metapsychology" I mean that portion

of psychical structure which is not accessible to objective

empirical methods, as such . Empirical methodology, being

limited by sensible determination, is delimited to a zone

of possibility and, though development in this zone may

be indefinitely extended, it can only give a certain type

of knowledge . Immediate acquaintance with the material

of Metapsychology is possible only through the arousal and

a .
development of the mystical organ in the appropriate degree .

Something of indirect, .acquaintance with Metapsychology is

possible through what we might call the "eye" of mathe-

matics . Just as through mathematics we can " see" into

the structure of matter further than it is possible to

follow with the senses , so likewise , may we "see " in this

same way into the more ultimate structure of the total

man's psychical nature . It is not a total knowledge,

just as the knowledge of Neptune through calculation is

not total, but in its own dimension it may develop with-

out limits, save that of the capacity of human understand-

ing . There is a view, held by some , that no science be-

comes truly science until it achieves mathematical formu-

lation . The premathematical stage of a science might be

viewed as its adolescent phase . When the concepts assume

mathematical form, then the science achieves maturity . I

have always been a friend of this view .

 'Why is it that men may think in terms of pure

mathematical construction, without thought of any ap-

plication beyond mathematics itself, yet later this

structure proves . valuable for other than purely math-

ematical ends? The geometry of Riemann was such a

structure, yet it rendered possible, much later, the

conception of the general theory of relativity . Einstein

supplied the necessary integration with physical deter-

mination , but independently, as pure thought , Riemann

supplied the structural form . And this is by no means an

isolated instance of this sort . Since the development

of the non-Euclidian geometries it has been evident that

mathematics is not an existence beyond thought . In other

words , it is not a structure in an external and independent

nature . It is rather the necessitarian aspect of thought .

But a necessity of thought is also a necessity of nature

just so far as nature is determined by thought . Certainly

nature derives a portion of its determination , as experi-

enced by us, through our thinking . So, I believe we may

say with justice that the "eye" of the mathematician actu-

ally sees into the deep structure of the subjective psyche,

although the formal mathematician may not realize the

psychical significance of his construction . Dr . Jung

calls attention to the interesting fact that the profound

poet, following only an aesthetic ideal, so far as his

-862-
personal consciousness is concerned , actually reveals

truth of great psychological significance . It may re-

quire great psychological understanding to interpret the

poem , but when this is done, meaning is revealed of which

the poet creator knew little or nothing . Thus is it also

with the pure mathematician, I believe, in even profounder

degree . Even though the mathematician may start with

seemingly meaningless phantasy, yet the thought does not

develop arbitrarily, but in the line of rigorous neces-

sity . . In this we have revealed underlying law in its

nakedness . The pure thought of mathematics is actually

a study of the ultimate nature of that total being, re-

vealed to us objectively as man . May it not be that the

mathematical thought is the speech of the Divinity in

the inner consciousness of man? Then the mathematical

thought is inner communion .

In this discussion of Christ, Buddha and Shankara

I have dealt but lightly'with the lives and teachings of

the Great-Men . `,I'have striven to show that these out-

standing- fountainheads .- . of religion and philosophy are

surpassingly great' exemplars of grand mysticism . Because

of the lack of introspective biographical material, I

have not been enabled to employ the methods so dear to

the heart of the empiric psychologist . I have derived

the evidence of the mystical quality of the Men through

the following kinds of manifestation : (a) The external

evidence from the biographies of the men so far as they

exist relative to the period prior to the beginning of

their missions . The record is silent concerning this

significant part of the life of Christ . Buddha clearly

employed the samadhi-method under the Bodhi tree, and

Shankara was the Chela of Patanjali, one of the leading

authorities of Yoga-technique . (b) The evidence from

the lives-lived ; during the fulfillment of the missions .

Each of them lived the typical life of the Sannyasin,

and that is'ideritical with the life of the Yogin .

(c) The evidence from the type of influence exerted upon

the entourage .` There was developed in the followers a

desire for the mystical realization, which in many in-

stances was fulfilled . The influence-was only in part

through the teachings but, perhaps, more largely through

the personality of the Teachers . (d) Evidence from the

inner content of the teaching . This evidence is decisive .

All teach the objective of other-worldliness . The methods

of attainment taught varied, but the objective had the

same essentiality . The conceptual interpretation of the

end varied both inform and extent of development, but I

believe I have shown the essential congruence of all .

-864-
 The approach to mysticism, here, as a psychological

problem has been governed by the two following canons ;

(a) That the understanding of any way of consciousness is

better achieved by dealing first with the inner meaningful

content, and then proceeding to its more objective be-

havioristic'aspects . Thus the content stands as monitor,

rather than the behavior that forms the material of empiric

psychology . (b) That it is better to look high first, be-

fore looking low, since thus our view is the broad one of

the mountain' top ; rather than the restricted one of the

valley, often a .narrow ravine .

The popular hypothesis of development associated

with the name of Darwin is repudiated . . It is maintained

that, in the abstracted naturalistic sense, the tendency

of life and consciousness is toward degradation, in con-

formity with the second law of thermodynamics . Hence,

actually experienced progress in superiority is evidence

of the in-pouring of energy from a transcendental source .

Thus the flow is from the high to the low, and from this

it follows, just understanding can be attained bnly by be-

ginning with the high, and not with the degraded end terms .

Having established our base of approach, the next task

will be the consideration of detailed psychological criticism

of the mystical states of consciousness . This I shall do

in the remaining chapters, following primarily Leuba's crit-

icism as given in "The Psychology of Religious Mysticism" .

 Chapter III

On the Nature of Mystical Knowledge

The central interest of the present work, taken

as a whole , is concerned with the noetic value of mystic-

al states of consciousness . Almost wholly the preceding

discussion deals with poetic content , either as native to

the mystical state, or as a precipitated effect within

the intellectual consciousness . Some attention, parti-

cularly in the last chapter , has been given to a critical

consideration of the problem as to whether we are justified

in viewing the noetic element as true knowledge or only a

delusion . The time has come ' when we must deal with this

problem more completely and more systematically . This I

propose to do in the present chapter .

In his " The Psychology of Religious Mysticism",

James H . Leuba has devoted much research and thought upon

the problem of mysticism and in the end comes to the con-

clusion : "For the psychologist who remains within the

province of science , religious mysticism is a revelation

not of God but of man . Whoever wants to know the deepest

that is in man, the hidden forces that drive him onward,

should become a student of mysticism . And if knowing man

is not knowing God , it is nevertheless only when in posses-

sion of an adequate knowledge of man that metaphysics may

expect to fashion an acceptable conception of the Ultimate ."

(p . 318 ) . This is by no means a denial of all value to

mystical states of consciousness . Indeed, it gives a much

-866-
higher valuation than one who read through the book would

have expected , since the general effect of the book is a

rather radical depreciation of the mystical state with

its contents . Anyone who has read through this present

work and its companion, "Pathways Through to Space", and

who has understood the real meaning of what has been said,

will not find any interpretation of the mystical state as

meaning an authentication of an extra-cosmic , anthropo-

logical'or personal God . The'word "God" has been used to

symbolize the Supreme Value, in human consciousness, but

not as meaning a self -existence in the sense of a being or

entity which'; serves as the Ground of the universe . The

conception of "God " as a personal force which can inter-

fere with the operation of ."law" has been repudiated either

directly or by implication . I am quite willing to agree

.with Leuba when he say* mysticism is a revelation of man,

provided "man" is not defined beforehand in such a way as

to be prejudicial to such revelation of him as mystical

insight may give . In such case-we must be prepared to

find that " man" may mean as much, or more, than the theistic

religions have attributed to "God" . In that case, "man"

is immeasurably more than a "plantigrade , featherless,

biped mammal of the genus homo" .

Also, I do agree that it is "only when in possession

of an adequate knowledge of man that metaphysics may ex-

pect to fashion an acceptable conception of the Ultimate" .

-867-
But,it'must , indeed, be an adequate knowledge . The

assumption of an unsound epistemology would destroy .

the adequacy of the knowledge gained . The epistemo-

logical assumptions of physical science are, themselves,

subject to criticism . They have not been held eternally

in the past , but are the result . of development . It is

sheer egotistical conceit for the physical scientist to

imagine that his knowledge is the ultimate end-term of

such development .,' Thus , if the subject - object framework

of .knowledge is,a distortion of Ultimate Truth, as the

mystical philosopher maintains it is , then physical science

as a whole is such a distortion , along with all other cog-

nition of the relative sort . To know in a traps -subject-

object sense is to know mystically, regardless of whether

there is a trance - state or not .

So the study of mysticism , in order to know man,

must be much more than the study of mysticism from the

outside by the methods of scientific methodology which

are grounded in certain epistemological assumptions . One

must have himself achieved directly the inside view of

the mystical state, and not content himself with the con-
ceptual reports of the mystics . It is as little possible

to derive the state from the conceptual portrayal of it,

as it would be for a man born blind to know the immediate

actuality of light from the conceptions related to light .

Much that we know of the light -world depends upon the im-

mediate sensuous intuitions of the light - world, and these

intuitions are a component part of most that we actually

say about light . Undoubtedly we can write a mathematics

of light phenomena which .would not involve this intuition

and which could be understood by a blind man who had the

mathematical ability . But the mathematical letters or ex-

pressions would have no referent for him . If he imagined

a referent•'that'satisfied the mathematical definitions,

and then somehow acquired sight, he would almost certainly

find the actuality in its immediate quale wholly unexpected .

The quale of that which he had imagined would be conditioned

by his sensuous imagination in terms of the senses he

already p ossessed . The experience of the immediate value

of the seen-world might well add nothing to the purely

mathematical conception of light-phenomena, though it might

suggest further development, but the non-mathematical know-
ledge of the light-wa'ld would be vastly extended . There

could, for instance, be an experience of beauty, quite

other than the intellectual beauty which might be contained

in the mathematical conception, and there could be a

development of aesthetic criticism, that was quite impos-

sible for the born-blind who had not gained vision .

Taken with the above reservations and interpreta-

tions, I am prepared to accept Leuba's final conclusion,

as far as it goes . But, before he reaches this final

conclusion he develops a searching critique of the signi-

ficance of the mystical state of consciousness which, in

-869-
the end, is a virtual denial of all spiritual value for

it, particularly in the sense of spiritual knowledge .

Further, he orients his whole approach through the pheno-

mena of drug-intoxication . Now, entirely apart from the

methodological criticism of this kind of approach which

I have already developed, there is something in it that

hits one with the force of a moral shock . From the evi-
dence, there are mystoid states which can be induced by

the use of certain drugs and other chemical substances,

but to imply that these states are substantially identical

with the realizations attained by most exacting moral,

spiritual and intellectual discipline involves something

that is little, if any, less than profanation . It is rank

injustice, to say the least, for the investigator to as-

sume there is no fundamental difference between a drunkard

and men like Christ , Buddha and Shankara . Morally} the

atrocities of the Japanese soldiers upon helpless civilians

is less outrageous than this . It is , like classifying an

honorable and upright householder with the panderer to the

lusts . How must one feel who has striven for decades to

live by the exacting moral code of Yoga, when he finds his

ultimate realization thus evaluated? Remember, the price

of true attainment is always high . The Way is straight

and narrow . The aspirant must be prepared to offer all

upon the altar of sacrifice ; his private yearnings and

loves, his ambitions and fond convictions, his life and

-870-
worldly honor and, in the end, even his hope of attaining

the Goal . Only thus is the barrier of personal egoism

dissolved . Then he must labor as the ambitious labor,

but without the urge of personal ambition . . He must study

assiduously as the .-scholar, without hope of professional

recognition . . He must maintain a compassionate consider-

ation for the suffering of a7,1 other creatures, and deal

sternly with his own private suffering . He must be pre-

pared-to'pass through the valley of despair and yet

keep on . Indeed , on occasions , he may skirt the abyss

of madness and yet - falter not . Not with all is the

trial the same, nor equally severe, but, always, of all

labors known to man, it is the most severe . In the end,

after many years, perhaps near the end of life, he stands

before the Gate, which opens not until the consummation

of the final renunciation . This is the realization there

is nothing to be attained, with which the candidate abandons

his search , content that the Gate should never open . But

at that moment he has turned the Key . The mystic Gate

has opened ! Is it not the acme of unwisdom to imagine

that all this brings no greater fruiting than the dream

of the drunkard and the drug-addict? Shame to him who

thus suggests . Not worse did the lust -ridden monsters

of Nero's Rome do to the followers of the Christic light .

Real search into the nature of the states of con-

sciousness induced by narcotic and hypnotic drugs, anes-

thetics and alcohol is possible only by him who has

passed through them . In this I am not qualified and

am quite unwilling to ;pay the frightful price in the

way of damage to the mystic organ in order to qualify .

The only experience Ihave had with a drug effect was

from, three one - fourth grain tablets of codeine taken

over a period of some nine or ten hours to relieve ex-
treme pain from an injury, some twenty years ago . By

the end of this period I decided that the pain was less

painful than the effect of the drug . At about the close

.

of the above period I experienced psychical effects in-

duced by the drug . The intellectual, judging conscious-

ness was present and, while not capable . of concentrated

and clear-cut effort, still knew that the psychical state

induced was an illusion and was interested in it in a

half amused fashion . I was lying in bed when I found

myself also outside the window by the bed . Then, con-

tinuing conscious in the bed all the while, I was over

by the east corner of the house and saw there an immense

hawser lying in a somewhat serpentine line along the

ground . Presently, this was the Von Hindenberg line in

western Europe of the First World War . The hawser being,

rather than becoming , the Von Hindenberg line seemed

perfectly reasonable to the state of consciousness .

Yet, all the while, the intellectual consciousness in

the bed knew this was an hallucination . Qualitatively,

-872-
the state had no pleasant value . The feeling might be

likened to the way one would feel if he were immersed

in a mucky , muggy pool of a sticky , viscous liquid . It

was intensely unpleasant .-" Nothing that I know of is so
completely the opposite of the state of genuine mystic

realization ' as this , in its affective and noetic effect .

It was a~blurred , twilight kind of consciousness, and if

that is the sort of thing Leuba means by trance -conscious-

ness, his characterization of it as degraded is quite

justified . But it is as little like the genuine mystical

state as essence of skunk is like attar of roses, or

modern swing music is like a Bach Fugue . I do not con-

sider that the true approach to the understanding of fine

perfumes lies in a self -saturation with essence of skunk,

or that just evaluation of lofty classical music can be

attained by attending the maudlin orgies of swing . Yet,

all too often, such seems .to the predilection of the

physiological psychologist .

The state of mystical realization , as I know it,

is in a measure comparable with an experience , known by

some , that is not generally classed as mystical . In my

academic life there were occasions when I had to master,

or wished to master , conceptions which I could not under-

,stand at all at my normal level .of concentration . I

shall describe the process involved in two instances of

-873-
this sort . Once I had to prepare a paper on Kant's

transcendental deduction of the categories, and on

another occasion , in a class in the Theory of Groups,

l had to read an article in a mathematical journal and

prepare an analogous paper which was possible only by

understanding the article . In both cases at first read

ings,,at the normal level of concentration, I simply got

no understanding at all . Later, in each case, .I con-

centrated to an extreme intellectual pitch and, in the

resultant state which had a luminous value, I was able

to assimilate the articles and write my theses, which

passed the criticism of my instructors . Yet, this did

not mean that at the normal level of concentration after-

ward I understood either what I read or what I wrote .

Some "pitching up" still remained necessary . All of

which suggests differences in intellectual level which

can be crossed by the appropriate effort and by the will-

ingness to pay the price exacted . One gets a pain in the

head , literally, and the organism takes quite a bit of

punishment . But at the level of high pitch certain values

are known that are not realized at other times . There is

asense of light and , at times, of ecstatic beauty when

integrating conceptions are born in the mind . This comes

the nearest to paralleling the mystical state of anything

that I know . The main difference is that the mystical

state has a much greater luminous value, the intellect

-874-
sees deeper and more keenly, the ecstatic value is vastly

greater and includes moral beatitude and all of this

develops in a state of relaxation with no intellectual

strain . The organism gains refreshment rather than takes

a beating .'

There'is a difference between "clear-seeing" with

the "eye" of the mind when the intellect is relaxed but

alert, and intellectual seeing under the strain of heavy

concentration, In both cases, one may gain understanding

of the same conceptions, but, in the former case, the

understanding is not something forced but, in large measure,

spontaneous . In the latter . case, one is operating on a

lower level of mind and straining to reach above himself ;

in the former case, he stands on a higher level and uses

resources below that level with ease . This is part of the

meaning of mystical awakening . Something, which may be

likened to a new organ, begins to function .

Here we are not dealing with the ultimate depths

of the mystical consciousness nor, from the records, would

I judge it a part of all mystical experiences . Vaughan

in his "Hours with the Mystics" distinguishes between the

mysticism of sentiment and of thought . My own study has

led me to feel that there is justice in this distinction .

It appears that the mystical Gate opens into a realm of

many possibilities . Some of these I know directly while

of others, that I have found reported, I can see the pos-

sibility . For all who know this land, there is a common

basic language , the sign of a common brotherhood . But

to be born into this realm is not enough to be master of

all .its possibilities . One proceeds to the sub-regions

for which he is naturally best fitted and to which his

inclination leads . Doubtless , here, as in the ordinary

world , there are those who feel most and know little,

but there are those who value most the mystic knowledge,

colored by the mystic feeling . In the far distance of

that mystic land there rise the snowcapped mountain peaks,

and, among them , that vast mountain of mountains which

reaches beyond the vision of relative consciousness into

the sky of the inconceivable . Here only does definition

by absolute negation strictly apply .

There is a mystic thought, which is by no means the

same as the objective-language of words in which the

mystic writes or speaks his thought , more or less crudely

or more or less well . There is a thought beyond all

words and this thought is like a stream within the mind .

It has no part with definable concepts . With respect

to this supernal realm the definitive concept may be

likened unto a vessel immersed in the sea . The form

of the vessel is the definitive concept while the water

which it contains is its substantive meaning . But the

water, in its own nature , has not the shape of the con-

cept . The concept has truth bestowed upon it by reason

-876-
of the water which it holds, but . many vessels may hold

water . The thought which is of identic nature with the

sea is like the oceanic currents which flow from shore

to shore, distinguishable as currents, yet not distinguish-

able from the whole ocean 'as water . In the end the flow

of any current mingles indistinguishably with the whole .

He who finds thought thus thinking within him discovers

no words therein nor concepts which his personal under-

standing can embrace . But the truth of the thought he

knows and that remains with him . Then, later, out of this

thought is born another thought, which partly thinks it-

self, and partly he thinks with his own contributed effort .

It is all exceedingly clear and employs word-concepts,

seemingly as one might speak or write . But they are not

yet speakable or writable . They are thoughts of which

the words are the cream of human abstraction . They fly .

like the royal bird from peak to peak of the best of
mundane apprehension . The continuity is the flight of the
bird, and for this, mundane human verbal construction

fails . Once again it must be thought, this time by labori-

ous effort, tracing the way from peak to peak through the

stony valleys between, and,, at last, there is the thought

of words and syntax . . But, ; at best, this is only a poor

product, a~fraction of a fraction, in which some drops of

.the supernal waters remain .

It is the self-moving, inarticulate, flowing thought

.which constitutes the primary ground of the noetic aspect

-g77-
of mystical consciousness . I do not see any possible means

of achieving direct acquaintance with this thought, save

by deep introversion . It may . well be an unseen determinant

in all thinking, and it is not inconceivable that a suf-

ficiently acute analysis of objective thinking might have

to hypothesize such an unseen thought . At present I am

unable to speak more positively with respect to this pos-

sibility . In any case, by means of sufficiently profound

introversion this inner spiritual thought may be known

directly . It certainly is not under the direction or control

of the personal ego . At the appropriate level of mystical

penetration wherein both the personal egoic thought and

the higher thought are conscious , within a common zone of

consciousness , the personally directed thought may query

the higher thought, either by a direct question or tentative

predication, and this will initiate a responsive activity

in the higher thought . The effect of this process is partly

assimilable by the personal mind, but it continues on into

depths that the latter cannot follow . But the effect upon

the personal mind .is that of unequivocal demonstration not

unlike and not .less convincing than rigorous mathematical

demonstration ., . At this level the mystic can say he knows

in the identical sense that the mathematician can say he

knows after the formal demonstration of a theorem . The

logic of the higher thought is, to the one who stands con-

sciously in its presence, manifestly no less conditioned

by logical inevitability than is the case with the more

objective mathematical thought . Is one justified in

calling this "knowledge", and the determination of the

thought, "truth"? Unconditionally, I would say that it is

no less "truth" and "knowledge" than is the process of

demonstration and the consequent of pure mathematics legi-

timately viewed as "truth" and "knowledge" . But does pure

mathematics give truth and knowledge? This question leads

us into already extant philosophic controversy . In the

most general sense , it leads to the perennial dispute be-

tween Rationalists and Empiricists . Of course, I shall

not attempt to do what no philosopher has yet been able

to do, i .e ., to achieve a final resolution of the issue

which shall be universally acceptable . In this, I simply

take my stand with the Rationalists and deny the adequacy

of the Empiricist's definition of "truth" and "knowledge",

letting the issue rest there . All that I seek to establish

at this point is that the question as to whether mystical

content is noetic is identical with the issue as to whether

the content of pure mathematics is noetic and, hence, be-

comes a logico-epistemological question, rather than one

of physiological :psychology . The controversy is thus

raised to a level of much higher dignity .

In the above thesis I have affirmed direct acquain-

tance with a thought process which is accessible at a

-879-
 I

certain level of mystical penetration and, so far as I know

and can see, only thus accessible . From the standpoint

of general discourse it is, admittedly, unsatisfactory to

introduce as a necessary constituent an element which not

part of common acquaintance . The higher thought is not

discursively proven to be an implication from commonly

known elements . Of course, as a matter of formal dis-

course there is a begging of the question here . I admit

all this . I simply oppose to this the fact that in the

anti-mystical view of the physiological psychologist

analysis will also show analogous, conscious or uncon-

scious, philosophical presuppositions which also beg the

question . Every philosophy and every philosopher is vul-

nerable before this charge . It is a common liability in

all discourse which is carried to root attitudes . All I

hope to prove is a way, if not the way, in which noetic

mystical content is possible in principle and, in the

negative sense, to disprove the anti-mystical pretension

of`disproof of 'the possibility . Success in this would

mean that, henceforth,'for discourse, the issue is an

open one, and incapable of being closed by the methods

of physiological, psychology . In the zone wherein dis-

course must be neutral faith or predilection has the

logical right to be determinant in the personal attitude .

In this case the anti-mystical attitude is unassailable if

it grounds itself in mere wishfulness, but in this case the

position has lost .all right to pretend to scientific and

discursive dignity .

-880
 An objectively formulated thought, i .e ., a thought

in terms of word-concepts and conforming to the rules of

syntax, that has its source and reference in the trans-

cendental thought has only incidental relationship to

sensible objects and relatives . A fruitful source of .con-

fusion lies in the fact that, in large degree at least,

the word-concepts have a perceptual derivation and are

mainly employed with a perceptual reference . Hence the

objectively formulated mystical thought, on its surface,

appears to be a statement concerning the objective world .

One who assumes this kind of meaning for this thought

will scarcely find anything intelligible in it . It will

not . have any conceivable relationship with actual objective

experience . Hence, it is easy to judge it as meaningless

phantasy . The judgment of non-relationship to empiric

content is largely true, but the further judgment of

meaningless'phantasy .is .wholly false . Again we find our

parallelism in,pure .mathematics . Here also we have a

language which, in part, is .composed of word-concepts

normally having a perceptual reference, but the mathematical

reference is non-perceptual . Indeed, it is for this reason

that mathematics has been humorously defined as the science

of simple words with hard meanings . A mind which is in

too great bondage to the empiric is hopelessly lost in the

thought of pure mathematics and, for substantially the

same reason , it is lost in the mystical thought . The

weakness here does not lie in the pure mathematical

thought nor in the mystical thought but in the intellect

which is in bondage to the empirical .

From the standpoint of active participation in the

external world of affairs the mystical thought may render

little'or no assistance . It may even lead to a discon-

nectedness with external affairs . This , however, is quite

as irrelevant as the similar effect which pure mathematical

thought has upon the mathematician . Pure mathematicians

are rarely ever effective , in their own persons, in the

field of affairs . .(In this, the German mathematician,

Leibnitz , is an outstanding exception .) With them absent-

mindedness with respect to the objective is notorious .

From the perspective of the standard of values of the

pugilist or soldier they are apt to seem mostly like in-,

effective babes . But'none of this is relevant in the

'estimation'of their true altitude . Too much of the real

power of pure mathematical thought has been precipitated

through applied mathematics into the field of empiric

powers for the intelligent non-mathematician to deny the

worth and potency of the pure mathematical thought . The

same power, in another dimension, exists in the mystical

thought, though its demonstration to the empirically bound

mind is considerably more difficult . However, the in-

fluence of the Buddhas and the Christs does constitute

part of this demonstration .

-882-
 The second sense in which I affirm mystical conscious-

ness manifests noetic value is related to the ultimate

stage of mystical penetration . In this case, I mean

"ultimate" from the standpoint of the objective witness .

I do not mean that there are not still further depths, as

I know the reverse to be true . But from the objective

standpoint the ultimate is the point of universal negation

of everything relative . To the objective consciousness,

the language of the mystic at this point suggests absolute

unconsciousness, though the inference that it .is simply

unconsciousness is not logically necessary nor true in

point of fact . It will not profit us to consider whether

the state of consciousness beyond the point of disappearance

may be called one of knowledge or not . For objective con-

cepts simply have no relevance'there . But may it be viewed

as -a state of~knowledge ii its relation to the relative?

I think we must, say "yes", quite positively . It is know-

ledge as negation of everything relative . It is genuinely

knowledge because to know as negation is as truly knowledge

as to know as affirmation . We may take as an illustration

the case of a man who perceives what actually is a mirage,

but which he does not yet know is a mirage . In affirm-

ative terms, he says : "There is a lake, with boats upon it

and trees along its border ." This is like knowledge in the

ordinary empiric sense . But later the man recognizes that

the seeming objects are only a mirage and then he says :

 . Is
"There no lake, not-boats and nortrees ." This is like

the mystical negation of all discursive concepts and all

sensible perceptions . But it clearly is an accession of

knowledge,'even though relative to the earlier state that

cognized a lake, boats and trees, it is knowledge as pure

negation . Actually in our common practice in such a situ-

ation we do not regard the man who cognizes a lake, boats

and trees as the man of knowledge, but rather we call him

the true knower and discriminator who realizes "it is only

a mirage ." Here attainment of knowledge is equivalent to

absolute negation of the earlier state . To know that

formerly believed -in being is , in reality , non-being )is

attainment of true Knowledge .

There is a third sense in which mystical orientation

affects knowledge and .therefore, is a knowledge determinant .

To one who has had no more than passing mystical glimpses

.we may properly, speak of such as experiences , since the

orientation still remains centered in the personal ego .

We have simply what seems a strange content which cannot

be successfully integrated in the old system . It remains

as an unassimilated irritant which tends to raise doubt

as to the socially inherited reality-orientation . But he

who has passed through the mystical transformation has

shifted his center of self-reference . In mystical language,

-884-
he has perished and been born again . In so far, this is

not change of content of cognition, but change of base

of orientation to cognition and is, therefore, not experi-

ence, . Again, disregarding the relationship of the new-

born to the proper content of the mystical consciousness,

we have to consider the effect of the change of base of

,self-identity to relative cognition . Henceforth, from the

time of the new birth, . when thinking in terms of his

essential reality thought, - but not in his more or less

frequent as if thinking from the base of the old ego, -

the mystic integrates the whole of relative cognition

about a new center or base of reference . This is equi-

valent to a radical alteration in the significance of the

whole body of relative . cognition . Shift in significance

is a noetic alteration and, hence, accession of knowledge .

May'the .shift .in base of reference be called, validly,

change of knowledge? Excluding the readl possibility of

new content becoming possible directly as the result of

change of perspective, we have two components which I be-

lieve are to be viewed justly as noetic . First, change in

meaning . Second, acquaintance with the fact of base of

reference and its determinant place with respect to cog-

nitive content and, also, with the possibility and actual-

ity of more than one base of reference . The above question

has its analogues in the three following related to events

-885-
in the history of science and philosophy : (a) Was the

Copernican change in astronomy, considered exclusive as

a change of base of reference from the earth to the sun,

an addition to knowledge? (b) Was the analogous shift in

base in the Kantian philosophy an addition to knowledge?

(c) Is the concept of base of reference, and the use of

change of base, in mathematical analysis properly a part

of knowledge? I .can see no possible valid ground for

denying a noetic accession in all three of these instances .

If, then, the answer in these three cases is "yes" then

consistency' demands an equally affirmative answer with

respect to the effect of the mystical shift of base .

Let us consider briefly the function of the base

.of reference,-in mathematical analysis . The analytic formu-

lation of a problem invariably depends upon a base of

reference, most commonly in the form of rectilinear

Cartesian coordinates . Generally, this base is no ex-

plicit part of the analytic development, but is implicit

in the very form of the development . The expressions and

equations are what they are, partly, because the chosen

base of reference is what it .is and, partly, because of

the specific nature of the configuration analyzed . A

transformation of base changes the analytic development .

Now if we think of the analytic development as thought-

content, then the base of reference does not appear ex-

-886-
plicitly in the content . Yet the specific pattern of

that content stands in functional relationship to that

base . Now, if the noetic element were conceived as ex-

clusively the content, then the base would stand apart

from knowledge . But if the noetic .is understood as in-

cluding its own roots as well as the content, then the

base of reference is part of the noetic order . I be-

lieve the latter conception is the sounder . So, in that

sense, we may affirm that the mystical change of base is

noetically significant .

. So far,I~believe I have'established, either pre-

sumptively or definitely, three senses in which noetic

value may be` predicated 'of, mystical consciousness . In

summation, these three are :

A . The .transcendental thought which, at a

certain level of mystical penetration, is realized as

a self-moving process, in terms of a stream-like cog-

nition incommensurable with the granular relative con-

ceptions which are capable of definitive differentiation .

This thought may be precipitated in such a way as to

determine a pattern of relative thought, using word-

conceptions ; which thought, however, has an exclusive

or predominant transcendental, rather than a perceptual,

reference .

-887-
 B . The noetic value of the knowledge of the

negation of all relative predication and of sensible pres-

entation . This is the noetic value, appertaining to

the highest discernible ascension of mystical conscious-

ness from the relative perspective, in its relationship

to all relative cognition .

C . Noetic value growing out of the New Birth,

in the sense of change of base of reference, with mani-

fold effects in the meaningful evaluation of all relative

knowledge .

Leuba's anti-noetic argument relative to evaluation

of .the mystical-is sketched most clearly in the twelfth

chapter, headed "Religion, Science and Philosophy" .' The

central burden of his argument is concerned with the

actuality of God as determined by experience and, more

especially, mystical "experience" . Leuba quite clearly

views belief in such a God as central in all historic

religions and, accordingly, the ground of such religions

would be undermined if the belief is shown on scientific

grounds to be untenable . Leuba's position is made defi-

nite in the two following quotations : "The question

raised by the affirmation we are discussing is that of

the relation of science to the belief which makes the

-888-
religions possible , i .e ., the belief in a sympathetic

God _
in direct
(Page
communication with man"
301,
.

italics mine .) " The God to which this dominant trend

of metaphysics points is an impassable , infinite being -

a being therefore who does not bear to man the relation

which every one of the historical religions assumes to

exist and seeks to maintain by means of its system of

creeds and worship ." ( Page 304, italics mine .) -

Before proceeding with the outline' of the argu-

ment there are two points to be clarified, one a gross

error of fact in Leuba`ts statement, and, the other, the

divergence of our position from the assumed position

of Leuba,

First of all, it simply is not true that "every

one of the historical religions" assumes the existence

of a "sympathetic God in direct communication with man" .

The teaching of Buddha and, so far as I know, of all

the illumined Buddhistic Arhats affirm an atheistic

(Nastikata) position . The central religion's objective

is the attainment of the State of Enlightenment . Buddhism

does not, in principle, deny the existence of beings ,

invisible to the gross physical senses, but these are

in no sense equivalent to the Gods of Christianity,

Judaism and Mohammedanism . For Buddhism there is no

God in the sense of root causal source or as an inter-

mediator who can intervene and set aside the action of

law, either in'response to prayer or otherwise . I trust

that Leuba will grant that a religion 500 years older

than Christianity is an historical religion . This error

is hardly excusable on the part of one who is a special

student of the psychology of religion . Buddha is the

outstanding psychological analyst in the religious domain

in all history .

As my own position with respect to this point is in

fundamental agreement with the thesis of Buddha, Leuba's

argument relative to the empiric Gods does not score in

connection with the thesis of this work . But, schematic-

ally, his thesis is identical with the denial of noetic

value in the mystical state and thus is, in so far, relevant .

The essential steps in the argument of Leuba I shall

give in a series of numbered statements in italics with

corresponding page references .

1. The Gods of religion are not beyond scientific

investigation unless they are exclusively transcendental

objects . (Page 300)

No exception can be taken to this statement as in

principle correct, so far as I can see, for whatever is

experiential in the strict sense of being a content

determined by the senses falls within the field of empiric

or physical science, as a general possibility . Method-

ological difficulty may place portions of such subject-

-890-
matter out of the range of our science as it is at present

developed . But it is always possible the development of

method will correct this limitation, so we are not justi-

fied in setting an a priori limitation upon scientific

possibility within the limits of this circumscribed domain .

But a transcendental object or state is, by definition, un-

available to empiric method and, therefore, not a potential

object of investigation by empirical science . We should

recall also that since the analysis of Kant it is known

that the pure reason is incapable of reaching the Trans-

cendent . Thus, if it is assumed that sense and reason are

the only avenues of knowledge, then the Transcendent can-

not by any possibility be known ever . There would be no

logical or other right to affirm its existence or possi-

bility . If there is a transcendent Reality which may be

affirmed it must be realizable by a way of consciousness

which is neither sense nor reason . Such a way of con-

sciousness , in its up rit4 , would not be empiric nor con-

ceptual system . It is my thesis that mystical realization

or introception is such a way of consciousness . Thus, by

hypothesis, such a way of consciousness would be inacces-

sible by the methods of empiric or physical science . But

a mixed consciousness which is partly introceptual and

partly empiric would be somewhat accessible to empiric

science, though it .would be a borderline zone in which

physical science could never be sure of its determinations .

-891-
 2. Belief in God which is derived as the result

of naive interpretation of phenomena and inner experience

is accessible to empiric science . (Pages 302-304)

In principle, no objection can be taken to this

statement .

3 ., Should there be no ground of belief other than

physical phenomena and inner experiences , then, for those

who are acquainted with the modern scientific conceptions ,

there could be no belief in God . (Page 304)

Superficially, this statement seems to follow from

the foregoing, but as a matter of logic it does not . Be-

cause a subject-matter is available for the investigation

of empiric science, it does not follow that the concep-

tions which the scientific investigator presents carry

authority . The inherent limitations of inductive method

are such that no conception derived through this method

is ever authoritative, but only has the character of

"warranted assertibility", .to use the terminology of

John Dewey .' Warranted assertibility is always only

tentative . There is ever the possibility that it may be

so, altered that, while remaining conformable with the

scientific determinations, it is also consonant with an

extant or future God-conception, without the latter being

exclusively transcendental . Further, scientific investi-

gators are as much subject to the limitations imposed by

predilection as are men of religion . Over and over again

-892-
this influence is traceable in the offered theoretical

constructions . These men have their over-beliefs as well

as men of religious feeling . Some of these men simply

replace belief in God with a belief in the Darwinian ape

which they worship in their peculiar ways . I do not see

that Gargantua has any logical advantage over God, but

it certainly does possess large aesthetic and moral

disadvantages .

4. When one believes with the mystics that God ,

the Absolute , the Ultimate Reality ---- is directly ex-

perienced in ecstatic trance and nowhere else , it would

seem to follow that knowledge of the trance-consciousness

includes a knowledge of God . (Page 305)

From a study of this statement one begins to gain

a pretty clear idea of the line which Leuba is following .

Careful study of the statement, however, reveals that

there is much ambiguity in it, so that, as a matter of

strict logic, the implications are not clear . None the

less , Leuba apparently means - and this is borne out by

what follows later in the book -that-by the study of

the trance one can gain a true evaluation of the meaning-

ful aspect of the consciousness, without the investigator,

himself, realizing directly the trance state, or else,

possibly by realizing it in one way he has the key to

its nature as a whole . This is borne out by the follow-

ing quotations : "However it may be produced,' ecstasy is

ecstasy, just as fever is fever whatever its cause . The

truth-kernel of religious ecstasy is, as we have shown,

no other than the truth-kernel of narcotic intoxication

and of the ecstatic trance in general ." (Page 309) In

discussing two ways of unification Leuba says with respect

to the second way : "The terms may lose their individual

features and be degraded to a level of undifferentiated

simplicity . That, as we have seen, is the mystical way

of producing "harmony' or 'unity' . It is a way which

does not secure any knowledge . "

As a matter of strict logic, the terms "trance-

consciousness", "ecstatic-trance" and "ecstasy" are not

necessarily identical in meaning, but the study of the

book forces upon one the conclusion that Leuba employed

them as synonyms . In the analysis I shall assume this

as his meaning . Thus the clause, "ecstasy is ecstasy"

would stand identical with "trance-consciousness is trance-

consciousness" . The over-all implication is that if one

has psychological acquaintance with trance-consciousness

in any form he has the key to the meaning of religious

mysticism, however highly developed, in so far as its

source lies in the ecstatic state . Thus the differentia

between mystics as to their doctrines, feeling valuations

and moral conceptions and practices are factors from out-

side the trance that have colored its meaning . I believe

I have justly presented Leuba's meaning in this abstract .

 There are a number of assumptions in this which, I

believe, break down completely under analysis . Thus, are

we justified in saying ecstasy is always a trance-conscious-

ness and, conversely, that a trance-consciousness is always

an ecstasy? This is like asking : Is gold always a glit-

tering yellow substance and, conversely, is a glittering

yellow substance always gold? One who has had experience

with mining placer gold will rise up and shout a most

emphatic "NO" . By reason of an error in his conceptions

in this matter many an amateur has expended painful labor

gathering worthless mineral while he has thrown away real

gold . (Just precisely what Leuba has done in his book, as

I believe .) Gold may appear as a glittering yellow sub-

stance, as it does do when it is perfectly pure and un-

coated . But in nature it may be black with a coating of

manganese oxide or with a red rusty stain, or so alloyed

and even chemically combined with other minerals that it

does not at all look like real gold . Further, mica, in

certain lights, and pyrite may look for all the world like

gold . The experienced miner soon learns to discount ap-

pearances and comes to judge by fundamentals such as speci-

fic gravity and chemical reactions . Here we are presented

with the real test . That is gold which means the group

of qualities which belong uniquely to gold . And, likewise,

that is mystical insight which gives the mystic meaningful

value`, whatever the appearance of the process .

 To be sure, the above illustration is by no means

logical demonstration that " seeming " is never dependable .

It is possible that there may be subjects of which the

seeming is so unique that the logical proposition may be

converted simply . But this can never be assumed justi-

fiably . Yet, everlastingly, the inductive thinkers do

just this . That master logician, Bertrand Russell has

said : "What is called induction appears to me to be

either disguised deduction or a mere method of making

plausible guesses " . QThe Principles of Mathematics",

page lln .) The aim of the inductive thinker is the justi-

fication of a universal proposition from one or more ob-

servations which lead to particular judgments . There is

manifest logical error in a step of this sort . The ob-

servations themselves do not give any universal whatso-

ever . But through the imagination of the scientist,

working in directions suggested by the observations, a

general hypothesis is invented of such a nature that the

consequences of observation can be deduced . If, then,

the hypothesis suggests further consequences which can be

checked by observation, and the results of such checking

are positive, a presumption is built for the hypothesis .

The only differences between an hypothesis of this sort

and scientific theories and laws is that the latter have

stood such checking over a wider field and during a longer

period of time . The difference is only one of degree .

There is no guarantee that the so-called "law" is truly

such, i .e ., one having ontological character from which

there could be no deviation by way of exception . From

the standpoint of logic the supposed "law" of science is

only a lucky guess . The history of science shows that

such "laws" often fail, even after they have stood the

tests of generations . Then the advance of theoretical

science marks time until some genius comes along who can

make a better guess . But a'guess is a guess no matter

how brilliant the genius .

Quite commonly, if not always, the scientific

problem has the following form .. It is desired to in-

vestigate some zone of manifested fact which we will

designate by the letter "A" . But A, it so happens, is

of such a nature that it cannot be directly known by

means of,scientific observation . However, it may be

determined that A is associated generally with certain

phenomena of a sort that can be observed, which we will

call "B" . We have then the initial proposition 'A is B"

or, more exactly, "The class A is a member of the class B" .

Then instances of B are studied by the methods of scienti-

fic observation . Some uniformity of character is found

in these observed instances . These are generalized as

always true of'B . Then the original proposition is con-

verted simply and we get "The class B is a member of the

glass g" . This, of course,,is an elementary logical fal-

-897-
lacy, but science justifies herself by securing a number

of results that do work . -But this means that the justi-

fication of scientific results is pragmatic only . Empiric

science does not determine Truth and Law in an objective

or ontological sense .

Leuba employs the above method with respect to

religious mysticism and trance-consciousness . He takes

as his primary proposition, "Religious mystical insight

is a member of the class of trance-consciousness" . He

adds as an arbitrary affirmation that "Ecstasy is ecstasy,

just as fever is fever whatever its cause" . We have seen

that he means by this, "trance-consciousness is trance-

consciousness" . The assumed truth of this proposition

justifies the further conclusion : If we can explore one

or more cases of trance-consciousness by scientific means,

then we know the nature of trance- consciousness as a whole .

Thus we will find the real nature of mystical ecstasy as

isolated from content derived from the individual charac-

ter, beliefs and knowledge of the mystic . The next ques

tion is : How can we secure instances of trance-conscious-

ness that are suitable for scientific observation and ex-

periment? Manifestly the moral disciplines of Yoga are

far too exacting for this purpose . They would require

that the scientist would have to become a superior kind

of,saint before he'could~investigate, and not many scien-

-898-
tists are so great lovers of truth that they are willing

to be that heroic . Further, the process is very slow,

in general, and may need .not less than the whole of a

lifetime . So that method of experiment is not chosen .

Now, the student of the appropriate literature will find

that statements of certain kinds of psychotic persons,

epileptics and the users of some drugs and other chemical

substances, have certain similarities to the expressions

of genuine religious mystics . It is, perhaps, expecting

too much heroism of the investigator to become a voluntary

psychotic, and one can hardly become an epileptic at will .

The remaining route to the trance-state, then, is through

chemical intoxication, that is, scientific research by,

becoming drunk! It is easy to do and not too heroic,

like becoming a saint .

Undoubtedly it is possible to determine certain

neural and other physiological alterations in connection

with chemical drunkenness . I am not at all surprised

that Leuba should view the psychical condition as one of

degradation . Any other conclusion I .would have found un-

expected . But it does not therefore follow that all psy-

chical states which for a distance parallel these are

moving towards degradation . .Thus, in the case of insects

and some other :,creatures, the transformation from the

larva to the chrysalis involves a process very much like

-899-
a degradation, though it does not have the significance

of death or decline, but of transformation to a higher

form . The meaning of a butterfly is not identical with

that of a drunk caterpillar, nor with that of a cater-

pillar that is simply degenerating . The road to rebirth

is not through intoxication, even though there may be a

psychical parallelism for a distance . Dissolution as

part of the process of new integration means something

very different from mere dissolution alone .

The important point is,that the assumption that

trance-consciousness, as such, has a uniform significance

is not justified . A man in a cataleptic state may be,

superficially, indistinguishable from .a dead man, but

actually his state has a very different meaning . The

whole process of reasoning is unsound . So obvious is

this the case that one suspects that wishful thinking

guided the whole research . If William James is vulner-

able before the charge of wishfulness by Leuba, no less

is James H . Leuba himself, but in an opposite direction .

Two ships at sea, having quite different points . of

departure and equally divergent destinations, may, none

the less, move in the same identic course for a portion

of -a total trip . :, He who has knowledge only of the co-

inciding portion of the two courses and the points of

departure and destination of one of the ships cannot

-900-
.deduce the point of departure and destination of the other .

So is it true that the end of_ a process cannot be known

without full consideration of the means . Where wholly

different means are employed resulting in passing stages

that are similar, it is impossible to deduce identity of

ends . So he who becomes a mystic by means of protracted

exacting moral discipline and keen intellectual discrimina-

tion is moving toward something vastly different as con-

trasted to the instance of the man who is merely intoxi-

cated with chemicals .

In the end, we are forced to the conclusion, based

upon logic alone, that knowledge of any kind of trance-

consciousness is not sufficient to give us knowledge'of

God or, more correctly and more generally, knowledge of

the values and noetic elements of bona fide mystical ,_

states . But there is also another error made by Leuba .

He has confused judgments of existence with judgments of

meaning or value . Trance-consciousness, in so far as it

is available for study by empiric psychology, is only a

temporal phenomenal existence . The inner meaningful con-

tent of the consciousness is something quite different

and ..is not at-all to be judged by the state of the organism .

5 . By all odds, the most important argument ra- .sed

by Leuba'concerns the step from immediate state of con-

sciousness 'to ;the predication of an objective existence

-901-
corresponding thereto . In the case of mystical states

of consciousness it is not questioned that there is

generally, at least, the following qualitative modifica-

tions : ( a) A sense of Presence, (b) A sense of Illumina-

tion, (c) A sense of Communion, (d) A feeling of recon-

ciliation, (e) A conviction of vastness, (f) A sense of

repose, .(g) A feeling of safety, (h) A sense of union,

(i) A feeling of harmony . The state in its immediacy is

thus qualified and this is attested so overwhelmingly that

its actuality is not questioned . But, apparently more

often than not, the mystic, himself, goes beyond these

immediate qualities and predicates objective existence

corresponding to them . Very often, he says, in effect,

all this means .direct knowledge of and relation to God,

or some other metaphysical existence, thus imposing upon

the unquestionable immediacy an objective interpretation .

Leuba then says, in effect : The objective . interpretation

does not possess the invulnerability of the immediacy and

is subject to rational criticism . This takes us to the

heart of the problem relative to the authority of the

mystical state .

Here, Leuba's criticism is a just one as far as it

goes . It is true enough that we are in the habit of ascrib-

ing an objectively existent cause for experienced states

of consciousness .! We do this continually in the field of

-902-
ordinary consciousness . For instance, perhaps we feel a

sensation, which we call a blow upon the arm ; at the same

time, we have a visual experience which we call a falling

limb of-a tree . 'We infer the conclusion that an external

existence, called "a limb of a tree", fell and hit us on

the arm . We have thus projected-an objective cause to ex-

plain a group of sensible experiences . We have explained

an immediate state by a somewhat which involves more than

the immediacy . Most mystics unquestionably do the same thing .

The statement which says that the predication of an

objective existence from immediacy is not justified is one

with which I quite agree . The immediacy itself is the only

certainty . The criticism is quite valid, so long as it is

applied with absolute consistency . But when it is applied

to that which one does not like and not applied in the

direction of one's preferences, it becomes merely vicious .

The predication of an external physical world, in

the last analysis, is grounded only upon psychical immediacy .

It thus rests upon the same base as the metaphysical world

predicated by the uncritical mystic . The logical analysis

which discredits the metaphysical existence, when applied

consistently, equally discredits the objective physical

world . The fallacy of hypostatization arises just as much

in the one instance as the other . Strictly, then, the only

thing we know beyond all doubt is immediacy . All else rests

-903-
upon an "as if" basis . We can act as if there were a

physical world which served as the cause of certain im-

mediate psychical states . But, also, we can act as if a

metaphysical reality, such as God , caused other of our

immediate psychical states . The . logical ground of either

position is equally weak .

If Leuba had been consistent in the refusal to ac-

cept hypostatization he would have won my respect as another .

Buddhist . But he was not consistent . He repudiated the

Gods of the mystics but proceeded to replace these with his

own hypostatization in the form of a psycho-physiological

existence . This is just another kind of god which serves

the habit of seeking an external cause of an immediate

state . Well, Leuba has a right to his god, if he likes

that kind, provided he grants equal logical right to the

mystic to choose his own kind of God . For my part, I do

not admire the kind of taste which prefers what Shankara

calls "a compound of skin, tissue and bones , filled with

odure , urine and phlegm " . It smacks too much of the refuse

pile .

The one indubitably sound position is to repudiate

all hypostatization, whether physical or metaphysical .

Then we ground ourselves upon pure immediacy . Law becomes

the necessary connection between various states of con-

sciousness, both of a more objective and more subjective

-904-
sort . But when one has arrived at this position he has

become a Buddhist, regardless of whether or not he ever

heard of Gautama Buddha or of the Buddhistic religion and

philosophy . Here, we have actually retained only that of

which we are absolutely certain and which is absolutely

necessary'. The immediate qualities of conscious states

are their . own,existences ;`they do not depend upon or hang

upon either a physical or metaphysical somewhat beyond

themselves . Consciousnessis the one self-existent Reality .

The goal of religion and practical philosophy is not union

with a metaphysical Being, but realization of the state of

consciousness known as Enlightenment ., This is the word

of the greatest mystic of all and, I submit, no standpoint

has ever been more logically'rigorous .

In conclusion, we may say that the final knowledge of

the mystic takes the following form : (A) Negatively, it is

a denial of all substantial reality to all worlds, physical

or metaphysical and an equal denial of all selfhood in the

same sense . (B) Positively, it affirms the indubitable re-

ality of consciousness and of all its immediately realizable

states . In the as if sense there may be all sorts of worlds,

objective and metaphysical, with their corresponding kinds

of beings and selves . This supplies everything that is

necessary for all kinds of possibilities .

-905-
 Chapter IV
The Meaning of -the Immediate`Qualities of Mystical States

We know with unequivocal certainty the immediate

content and toning of our various states of consciousness .

When we interpret these states as inhering in, derived from,

or meaning a somewhat, other than consciousness itself, we

are moving beyond the range of true knowledge . The states

imply only that which is absolutely necessary to their ex-

istence . Beyond this, our thought is merely speculative or

the extrapolation of wishful thinking . These considerations

are of universal validity and, as we have seen, extrapola

tive interpretation or explanation is as unsound in the case

of the immediately given of ordinary experience as it is

in the case of mystical states of consciousness . The predi-

cation of the unreality of the'world, as is done in the case

of the illusion or maya-philosophies, is not a denial of the

presence of the immediate states . It is a denial of thee

extrapolative construct which, though occasionally it is

conscious speculation, is mainly an automatic habit handed

down by social heredity . Among these philosophies, those,

which have been thought through consistently, deny reality

not only to the assumed physical world beyond immediacy but,

as well, the similar metaphysical existences . But this

thoroughly consistent and rigorous viewpoint and orientation

of life is actually accepted both as a way of thought and

-906-
as a~way i of life by only`the relatively few among mankind .

Both consciously and, unconsciously other attitudes and

,interpretations are assumed .

Beside this rigorously consistent standpoint three

or four other interpretative orientations can be isolated

and classified .

A . The extrapolated physical world of things and

human society may be viewed as a . real existence while the

metaphysical order is viewed as unreal . This is the stand-

point of materialism in both the technical and practical

senses . In its more extreme and naive development those

who hold this view may regard the supposed external exist-

ence of things and men as the only real existence, while

the immediacy in consciousness is viewed as a dependent

effect . All such thinking is an effort to explain the

.clearly and immediately known by that which is unknown

and theoretically, as well as practically, unknowable .

It is thus interpretation and orientation .of life through

the myth of external things . This is a standpoint and

attitude of extremely wide currency and colors much of

scientific thought, particularly that part which is not

philosophically self-critical . The Marxist social philo-

sophy assumes this standpoint both in practice and in con-

scious theory . But this extreme position may be modified

'by-the recognition of ordinary sensuous immediacy as it

is found variously toned by feeling .

-907-
 B . The extrapolated metaphysical worlds of the

Gods may be viewed as real in'itself, while unreality is

predicated of the physical universe . This is the stand-

point of Spiritualism, using this word in its original and

proper sense . For those who are thus oriented, the Gods

are real-in-themselves while physical men have only a

shadowy existence . It would appear that not many in this

class are to be found in this world .

C . Both the physical and metaphysical worlds may be

viewed as real in themselves . This seems to be the stand-

point of most of the religions, including Christianity .

For such, both Heaven .and this world are actual external

existences in themselves . It would appear . to be the most

general, naive popular view . It has, however, the merit

of being more consistent than either of the preceding

views, but shares with them the error of viewing as given

that which is really only an extrapolation .

D . The fourth viewpoint is that already discussed

in the first paragraph and is the perspective of this whole

philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-object . One who is

familiar with the "Essence of Mind" of the northern Buddhist

Sutras will recognize the similarity of the conception .

While this philosophy affirms that appearance is the sole

nature of existence of the physical and heavenly worlds and

of their respective denizens, yet, in terms of such existence,

-908
it affirms equal reality of both orders . When truly under-

stood, it will be found that this philosophy involves the

loss of no real value, but it does strike away the chains

l

of bondage and,fear which .are the cause of perennial human

suffering .

Toward :the,close' •of the last chapter I listed nine

modifications of consciousness which are, admittedly, quali-

tative characterizations of mystical states of conscious-

ness . It may be that not all of these are present in a

given single instance, but some of them always are and, in

the sum total, they characterize the state as,to its most

common features . Here I propose to interpret these quali-

ties in the light of the present philosophy .

First of all, the reason why so many efforts at

interpretation of these realizations has led to indefensible

consequences lies in the fact that the problem has been

falsely conceived . It has been assumed that the meaning

of the state of consciousness lies in something other than

itself . Actually, it is its own meaning . Imagined, sup-

posed, or seeming otherness acquires its meaning from the

immediately realized state,' and not the other way around .

Thus , Presence does not mean God , but the God-notion or God-

appearance means Presence . The Presence is real, while the

notion or appearance is .a construct . It is not necessary

to interpret Presence as meaning something beyond itself .

-909-
It is the superlative value itself, without the intervention
of agency . He who has realized Presence needs no God . He ,

himself, is the reality that has been called Divinity .

Presence is Identity, not relationship . Conceiving it as

relationship produces delusion . Presence is fullness of

life or of Consciousness . It is the normal condition and,

for a being that had always been normal, the idea of Presence

could never have arisen . Only those who were deluded through

abnormal existence could ever feel the arising of a state of

Presence, because, when realized, there is produced a con-

trast with the abnormal state . The realization of Presence

is the sign that an insane man as at last become sane . It

is conceived as a rare and strange state of consciousness

in this world because this humanity has the perspective of

the inmates of a lunatic asylum . For the truly normal it

is so natural as not to be noticeable .

In our ordinary usage we think of "presence" in the

sense of "presence of" . It is thus conceived as the "presence

to a self of someone or some thing" . This is not the mean-

ing .of the mystical realization of Presence though, I must

confess, a mystic who did not discriminate clearly between

the mystical state, per se, and a subsequent complex of the

memory of that state together with the ordinary conscious-

ness might confuse the meaning . The mystical significance

is nearer to the dictionary meaning as "the state of being

-910-
present" . The mystic is in the state of being present to

himself, that is, in concentric relationship, rather than

in the ordinary state of ecentric relationship . Becoming

consciously centered .in the Center is to realize Presence .

s
In the discussion of the subject of Presence both

James H . heuba and William James correlate the mystical

realization of Presence with a " sense of presence " fairly

frequently experienced , wherein the subject feels that

some one or some thing is somewhere in his vicinity . Very

often and, perhaps, typically, there is a sense of a some-

what localized somewhere near .inx.space . Connected with

this there are various reported sensations of a more or

less indescribable sort and, quite often, a sense of fear

which may approach the intensity of terror . This effect

has been produced experimentally . For my part, I do not

remember ever having had an experience precisely of this

sort, but there have been a few rare experiences that seem

to be related . Once at night near a mountain stream, when

in the company of others, I heard a distinct shout, which

I thought at the time might be a call by a man who was ex-

pected to arrive about then . The .shout had not been general-

ly heard by the others, though it had seemed very clear to

me . -Investigation did not uncover any normal physical

source of the sound . But the curious part of the whole

experience was an impression of a series of cold shivers

-911-
passing up and down the spine with a tendency toward ter-

ror panic which I found rather difficult to control .

Ratiohalianalysis had no effect upon the affective re-

action . Only by abstracting the mind and use of will was

a
I able to achieve control . Intellectually, at the time,

I did not view this as7a,presence of something, .but as

a psychical curiosity of .some interest . But, autonomously,

another part of consciousness seemed to feel as though

something alien and inimical were present . The descrip-

tions of the experience .of localized presence include

certain qualities so much like what I experienced that I

suspect the phenomenon was of a similar sort . If such

is the case, then I can say quite definitely that it is

not at all like the mystical realization of Presence . It

is more like the diametric opposite of that . It had a

felt-effect like invasion by the alien or, rather, threat-

ened invasion . It was definitely distasteful . In con-

trast, the genuine realization of Presence might be said

to have the value of escape from the alien , and centering

in the proper . (These words used in approximately Spengler's

sense .) If the mystical realization of Presence may be

called centralization, the other sense of presence had

the value of eccentralization . The first had integrative

value, the latter a disintegrative tendency . The realiza-

tion had the value of being Home, in the most fundamental

-912-
sense possible, of being right at last, of "being on the

beam", in terms of modern technical slang, of everything

being just what it should be, of at last being truly ra-

tionally attuned, and in every way in all stages, at the

time, and ever since, it was most welcome . Thus the con-

trasts between the two states is radical in a most profound

sense . Scientific research that follows the line of "sense

of presence", as contrasted to realization of Presence,

is definitely off the track, so far as understanding real

mystical consciousness is concerned .

Meaning and Value are achieved when the seemingly

distant and alien are transformed into the near and proper .

Thus explanation and other labor has performed its office

when the distant and mediate are elevated to the immediate .

Thus it is not the immediate value in consciousness which

needs explanation and justification . These are , what they

are, as given. The immediate modification of conscious-

Iv of
ness can possibly carry any injurious potency, since the

whole support of its existen ce is . consciousness itself .'

The modification of consciousness cannot destroy . consciousness .

The immediate experience of the mystic is,its own

justification and its own authority .` . Thus the realization .

of Presence is the realization of all it implies . It'is

Reconciliation, Repose, Security, Union, Harmony and the

rest . It is not that in the mystical state something new

-9 1 3-
is gained or attained, but a false condition, like the

above belief in the snake, is lost . It is because men

had been in a deluded state in which they felt unrecon-

ciled, restless, insecure,, lost and at war with them-

selves, that the mystical awakening takes on the positive

values'corresponding .to the negative conditions of the

deluded state . The mystical realization does not prove

a metaphysically existing God, but it disproves the mirage

of the world .

In much of our thinking we have confused means and

ends . Thus food is not an, end, but a means . Nutrition

is the end . The relationship with the other fellow is

not an end, but a means . Communion ..is the end . Travel

is not an end, but a means to filled or enriched conscious-

ness . God is not an end, but a means to the realization

of Presence . So we can list all the searchings and striv-

ings of ordinary human life and find that all of them are

valuable only as they lead to an enhancement of immediate

consciousness . But he who has found the key to all the

immediate values directly has no longer need of the means

which so occupy the thought and effort of men in the state

of delusion . The genuine mystical awakening achieves just

this . And that is why its Assurance is absolutely justi-

fied . It is not an assurance as to external relations

which compose all the various means of life, but it is

Assurance in the sense of realization of all ends . The

science which is competent only in the world of means or

instruments is wholly impotent when it attempts to assail

the immediate Assurance of the mystic .

It is true that when the mystic steps out of the

immediate mystical state and attempts to interpret its

meaning in relative terms he may make errors in discrimina-

tion and thus develop interpretations which will not stand

objective criticism . By mystical awakening he has not

acquired authority to pronounce what is so in the realm

of the science of means . He has a perspective from which

he may approach the problems of physical science which

may give him superior advantages , but he will have to

labor with the resources of non -mystical men . His pure

knowledge as mystic is of quite another order .

William James , in his search for the unassailable

kernel of mystical consciousness , found what he called a

"higher power", which possessed , over-shadowed or enveloped

the mystic . In analyzing this, Leuba points out that in

the conception of "higher -power" we have more than pure

immediacy . There is involved a judgment of comparison as

between something lower and something higher . This criti-

cism is valid . The immediate . content of the pure mystical

state does not give the sense of higher power . As the state

deepens toward purity the capacity to apprehend in the

comparative sense tends toward dissolution . I am suffi-

-915-
ciently familiar with this tendency to be able to analyze

a good deal of it . It is as though there were a process

in which, in intellectual terms, there was a progression

in an infinite series which the intellectual side of the

mind followed as far as ,it .could . The conceptual side'be-

comes more and more subtle and the concepts less and less

granular or definitive until, at the utmost limit of ab-

straction , the concepts together with the process of con-

ceiving and judging begins to dissolve into a state where-

in there is no more thinking . At this point I stopped the

further process , since I was interested in maintaining the

intellectual continuity . .' But the direction of the develop-

ment ment is intellectually clear in much the sense that the

thinking mind can apprehend an infinite series from the

nature of a developing progression . By such a process we .

are able mathematically to sum an infinite series without

actually passing over the infinitely large number of terms

in the series . The summation is a reaching beyond the con-

sciousness of the concrete mind, but its truth and actual-

ity is not , therefore , less certain to the mathematician .

Now, we may liken the pure mystical realization as the

actual culmination of that, which to the intellective con-

sciousness is a converging infinite series . Thus the in-

tellect can apprehend the culmination in the mathematical

sense . The final term is the point wherein intellection

-916-
is reduced to zero . The extent to which this process can

be followed with conscious intellection depends upon the

equipment of the individual mystic .

For the pure mystical state there is no high nor

low, since it transcends relativity ., Evaluation is intel-

lective . To a consciousness dwelling on earth it is natural

to take the earth as the base of reference . From that base

we are in quite general agreement in regarding that as low

which is in the direction of the "pull" of gravity, and

that is viewed as high which'stands up against gravity .

Hence, the submarine descends while the airplane rises .

But if we abstract the world from'these two objects while

in their relative motion of descent and ascent , we would

no longer have any ground for saying that one was going

down while the other was going up . They would simply be

tending in opposite directions . It is movement relative

to the direction of gravity that defines the meaning of

up and down . Now, in terms of conscious states, gravity

is orientation to•objects' .and negation of gravity, or

levity, is orientation away from objects . The mystical

movement is away from objects, as can be observed by the

witnessing intellect . Hence, in the familiar sense of

"high" and "low", it is movement to the higher . In terms

of "power", then, it is movement toward "higher power" .

But in the absolute sense there is neither higher nor-lower .

-917
 There is another sense in which we commonly dif-

ferentiate between higher and lower . We say that con-

sciousness which comprehends more,-as compared with

another consciousness which comprehends less, is higher

than the latter . In conceptual terms, that concept which

subsumes more is higher than the concept which subsumes

less . Hence, the genus is higher than the species . Now,

as the intellect joins flight with the mystical sense it

clearly soars into greater comprehension and so the judg-

ment of a higher consciousness is quite consonant with

common' evaluation .

Here%I have been speaking of deepening mystical

process . In the strictest sense there is no process but

only sudden Enlightenment which is absolutely complete .

The effect'of process belongs to the conjunction with

the intellect . Inevitably all that can be said in these

matters is valid only with respect to a sort .of compound

consciousness which, in part, is mystical and, in part,

is intellective . The only absolutely perfect "Word" is

absolute silence .