HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF AFRICAN

PHILOSOPHY

Prior to this approach, we have discussed the trends that focus more on documenting African

world- views and those that philosophically engage African concern: particularism and

universalism respectively. The former seeing African as primitive and inferior and the latter

ignore Africanness or Africanity in their discourse. This calls for the concern and rationality

of the hermeneutical approach. This approach is being propelled by the principle that the

lived historicity of Africans of which colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute an

essnential part should be the object of reflection for African philosophical thought. African

philosophical hermeneutics is necessarily connected to the question of African emancipation

In the contemporary Africa, the first and foremost step of African philosophical hermeneutics

is the acknowledgement for African traditions which should be however critically analysed.

According to Tsenay Serequeberhan African philosophical hermeneutics is therefore:

...reverent in that it is radically open and susceptible to that which is preserved

in its own cultural heritage. On the other hand, it is critical of tradition to the

extent that the cultural elements that have been preserved in it have ossified

and are a concrete hinderance (sic) to the requirements of contemporary

existence. This fruitful tension between esteem and criticism, when properly

cultivated, constitutes the critical cutting edge of African philosophical

hermeneutics.1

1
Tsenay Serequeberhan, The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.6.
Hermeneutical approach is indeed one of the most important trends in modern and

contemporary African Philosophy. The fact that philosophy is inherently interpretive implies

that it is the product of language, context, and history, and hence inextricably linked to

culture. Louis-Dominique Biakolo Komo was of the view that Culture is the expression of

human thought or creativity, as wherever human beings exist, they express their thought in

language and culture. It is therefore ridiculous to affirm that some human beings or human

societies, who have their own cultures and languages, do not think. Therefore, one can

understand

the important development that the Hermeneutical Paradigm in African philosophy has taken.

Gadamer opines that Hermeneutics as a concept is based on the comprehension and

interpretation is broadly construed as culture. Hence this enables intellectuals and

philosophers to refute allegations about the non-existence of an African philosophy through

an examination of the philosophical elements inherent in African cultures. Through the

exploration of meaning and symbols relying on

African languages and cultures - myths, proverbs, rituals, and others. This shows that

African people reason and therefore philosophize.

THE AFRICAN HERMENEUTICS

The ethnophilosophy is the genesis of African hermeneutics. Placide Tempel’s Bantu

philosophy, where he made an attempt to analyse the Baluba culture, show the connection

between Africa culture and African Philosophy. African Hermeneutics are understood as

African philosophers that made an attempt to articulate a genuine African philosophy within

African cultures, without eschewing philosophical tradition or exigencies. This concern is

present in the works of Theophilus Okere, Nkombe Oleko, Benoît Okolo Okonda and Tsenay

Serequeberhan.These works also distinguish themselves by the fact that they are rooted in the

western hermeneutical tradition, notably the German and the French traditions.
THEOPHILUS OKERE

The Hermeneutical School

The hermeneutical method which is a well- known method in biblical studies has to do with

“art of interpretation” or “science of understanding”. M. Inwood (384) understands the term

to mean “expression”, “explanation”, “translation” and “interpretation”. Its exponents include

Dilthey, Schleiermacher, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur and others. Though each

differ regarding what constitutes the hermeneutic methodology but they all agree that “any

genre of Philosophy is a project of interpretation mediated by one’s particular context that of

reflective individual subject” (Asiegbu, 45). Thus the hermeneutic method involves context

and reflection on the context.

Applying these methodologies, T. Serequeberhan in Hermeneutics of African Philosophy:

Horizon and Discoure, sees the African horizon, constituted by violence and counter violence

and occasioned by colonial experience as the context while, the reflective subject generates

an interpretation that becomes a philosophy (Asiegbu, 45).

Serequeberhan is actually propagating earlier position of T. Okere in African Philosophy: A

Historical Hermeneutical Investigation of the Condition and its Possibility where he

maintains that:

Philosophy is essentially an individual enterprise and is often a mise-en-cause, and a radical

questioning of the collective image. By reflection and the questioning of this image, one

makes an individual effort to find, that is, to give meaning to one’s world (7).

Okere’s submission was actually a reaction against Tempels’ ethno-philosophy. Okere (x)

insists that philosophy consists in a reflective activity of the individual on the common

culture. Where the relation is anything but reflective then no philosophy may arise from there

whether the individual is an amateur philosopher or a babbling one. In Okere’s words:

of understanding, an effort therefore necessarily undertaken and realized by an “I”. This

means that philosophy is not a collective project. It is only when a collective culture is

laboured on by an “I” that the philosophical significance appears (xv).

What is referred to above is the hermeneutic method which Okere sees as the only reliable

route through which a rational African-philosophy can emerge. That is, a method of concrete

reflection. Philosophical reflection then is the process of explication as uncovering, a

disclosure, an unfolding of the meaning and sense implied in those objectivations of life

which are symbols. Reflection means “implicita explicarei- making the implicit, explicit.

African cultures have their own symbols pregnant with meaning. A reflection on these

symbols with a view to making the implicit meanings explicit would constitute African

philosophy” (Okere, African Philosophy: A Historico- Hermeneutical Investigation of the

conditions of its possibility,114- 115). Through this reflective method, philosophy is

prevented from becoming empty and sterile abstraction but interpretation at a certain level of

the various symbols and institutions of culture.

In support of Okere’s clarion call for interpretative and interrogative return to African culture,

Madu writes:

Okere’s insistence on culture which he termed ‘philosophemes’ as raw materials for

philosophical activities was a reminder of the important role through which pre-scientific or

traditional philosophies is one way of showing that existence assumes only speech, meaning

and reflection by a continuous exegesis (critical, analytical, and synthetic) of all the

significations which come to light in the world of culture. This sensitivity to what is African

is a way of showing how far philosophy is both cultures bound and intercultural (xxviii).

The idea of “pre-scientificity” above is not to say that pre-scientific or pre-philosophic

thought is an exclusive reserve of Africans as Okere has exposed some of these elements in
the thought of Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger. Commenting on this, Wiredu (29) notes that

“every traditional philosophy is essentially pre-scientific, and a stock of originally unwritten

proverbs, maxims, usages, etc., passed through successive generations from time when

societies were simple and organized science was yet unknown”

Deducing from the above position, Madu (xxix) cautions that “the advancing of philosophy

from the uncritical world views or cultural philosophemes is no ‘bricolage’, no mere

collecting of heterogeneous and prefabricated elements which belong to culture but rather

should be a thorough, rational and systematic criticism of these elements and concepts”. So in

all cases, it is important that these concepts undergo philosophical probes aimed at a

disclosure, a higher zone of meaning, a hermeneutic. This higher zone of meaning “is

achievable through an act of intellectual creation where the new creation is the meaning

created by a continuous exegesis of all the significations which come to light in the world of

cultures” (Madu, xxxi-xxxii). What is meant here is the rational ascendance to meaning,

rising beyond symbolic cogitation into seasoned philosophic and scientific stage of reasoning.

In Okere, I. Asousu (42) sees a “cultural philosopher” never tired of extolling the merits and

excellence of his Igbo (African) culture, but recognized the significance of mediating

between lived conditions and theory. However, Asouzu believes Okere has not done enough

to make African philosophy truly-critical and self-understanding. This self-critical task can

hardly be accomplished, when unintended ethnocentric commitment is adopted as a

methodological principle and is consistent with what is paraded as hermeneutical approach in

African philosophy. He sees in Okere a thorough going unintended ethnocentric commitment

and apparent self-contradiction. The counter-productive result of this form of unintended

ethnocentric inspired method of philosophizing is there to be seen.

Continuing in the same line of thought, M. Osuagwu in Philosophy of non-Philosophy:

Okere’s Trilogy on African Philosophy and other critics like Agbakoba sees Okere’
hermeneutic approach as nothing other than patriotic romanticism, that has nothing in mind

than extolling African culture and most especially Igbo culture. Osuagwu (59) further

contends that “one might very well doubt if Okere succeeded in the long run, in escaping the

ethnological or ethnophilosophical pitfalls that he, with good reasons, criticized so

vehemently. This must have informed F. Njoku’s (101) remarks that Okere’s position as well

as the ethnophilosophers approach which the former criticized is one and the same thing. It

was merely a matter of scratching at the same place at different times. Hence, the universal

character of philosophy seemed to be lost in Okere, the greatest master of the African

hermeneutic school of philosophy.

The unintended self-immolation in Okere above can be rectified according to Asouzu, if we

seek a comprehensive universal complementary future not necessarily relative to one’s own

circumscribed location. Thus Asouzu submits;

Hermeneutics of culture in Okere must be complementary in orientation. Only in this way

can it be complete and attain the objective it sets for itself: In this way, culture can be grasped

adequately within the context of the actors and factors that determined the idea of a thinker

and of those individuals and communities under consideration (43).

P. Iroegbu (128) sees Okere’s hermeneutic method “as the attempt to interpret African

concepts, linguistic tools and cultural data with the methodological tool….” This method was

employed to address the issue as to whether there is, there can be, and how there can be

African philosophy. For Okere, according to Osuagwu (114), the controversy over the

question of the possibility and impossibility of African philosophy is basically concern with

the problem of method and especially the hermeneutic one which as interpretation is notably

logical and epistemological; positively, aiming to attain truth, meaning and understanding

and on a negative role aims at eliminating error, ignorance or nonsense. From this point,
philosophy can be seen as an epistemological, enterprise for interpretation and meaning of its

subject matter.

Okere seems to have taken the existence of African philosophy for granted. Instead of

establishing what African philosophy is, he plunges himself into the problem of method as if

the latter was possible without the former. Again, Okere’s over emphasis on perspectivity,

specificity and situatedness as characteristic of all interpretations, though plausible, swiftly

questions the notion of universal truth, thus culminates in relativism; a situation which arose

when he accorded all cultures equal attention, acceptability and genuineness in their right.

Truth therefore, arising from these different backgrounds are truth in a qualified sense of the

word, relegating truth to a matter of will-o’ the –wisp. Okere’s relativism overtly classifies

African philosophy to “closed classed” discipline, a caste philosophy exclusively for

Africans.

At some point, Okere (98) resorted to tu quoque instead of addressing the stack issues. For

instance, rather than attempting an answer to what African philosophy is, he would recourse

to attacking Hegel and Bruhl whom he believes philosophize using their religious

proclivities. If this methodology is not a valid process, why, one would tend to ask did he

turned round to employ the same method in his hermeneutics?

With ferocious vehemence, Okere (xii) criticized ethno-philosophers (Tempels, Kagame, and

Mbiti) of philosophical deficiency, exaggerated ethnicity and crude ethnology. However, the

paradigmatic status of his hermeneutic approach still made appeal to elements of ethnologic

culture as the instigator of philosophy. He submitted ego-logic for ethno-logic which

culminated in his over emphasis on personalization of thought, hence opinionated and

relativizes knowledge. While one may not downgrade the hermeneutical method as a

veritable method of doing African philosophy, their penchant for individualism, a re-egoing

of Cartesian philosophy has telling implications of diversity and multiplicity of routes which
none can be deemed as right or wrong, true or false. The contextual similarity of the

individual philosophers would necessarily have produced similar philosophy but this is

usually not the case as evident even among the proponents of hermeneutic methodology.

They all differ in perspectives.

TSENAY SEREQUERBERHAN

Tsenay Serequeberhan is renowned for his hermeneutic approach – either as an ‘African

Hermeneutics’ or his concept of ‘heritage’ – as a means for Africans and others living within

the postcolonial fallout to find a pathway to self-determination. Critical of past and present

African approaches to philosophy, Serequeberhan often concerns his work with the tandem

notions of understanding one’s own existence and one’s own historico-cultural situatedness

(i.e. an ‘effected-historical consciousness’) as essential components to one’s own self-

determination.

Deeply political and personal, Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics have been widely influential

throughout philosophy at large, and African philosophy in particular. However, this influence

mostly engages his notion of history, heritage, and one’s own situatedness. This comes at the

expense of his concept of a ‘lived existence’ as a starting point to genuinely recognizing

one’s own effective-historical standpoint and thus one’s own heritage. Tsenay

Serequeberhan, an Eritean philosopher, gives a more concrete definition of African

Philosophy. He argues that such a philosophy must be textually based: in other words, the

literature of African philosophy is a body of texts produced by Africans (and non-Africans)

directed at philosophically engaging Africans problems and documenting the philosophies of

African peoples.

Serequeberhan’s conception of African philosophy emphasizes the following:

point raises eye-brows especially for those of us who are familiar with the Western

philosopher Socrates, who presented his philosophy orally.

 African philosophy should not be abstract. It should reflect on verities of history in an

attempt to resolve and explain problems experienced.

 Authorship of African philosophy is broader. It is open to non-Africans. In

consideration that we live in a globalized world.

His philosophy is similar to that of Hountondji but different because he kept it open to non-

Africans as well.

In his conception of a lived existence, Serequeberhan addressed the question: where does

philosophy begin and where should it go, particularly when rationality has been historically

denied? This reveals the problem of where to even begin philosophizing: where do we even

begin when considering concepts like personhood and community when the larger (that is,

western) philosophical tradition has denied or devastated these essential concepts for many

throughout its dominance?

Tsenay's Hermeneutic Approach

Tsenay's hermeneutic approach to African philosophy emphasizes the need for scholars to

engage in a careful study of African texts, oral traditions, and cultural practices in order to

gain a deeper understanding of African philosophical thought. He believes that by

approaching African philosophy with an open mind and a willingness to engage with

different perspectives, scholars can come to appreciate the richness and complexity of

African intellectual traditions.

In all, Tsenay's hermeneutic approach to African philosophy highlights the importance of

cultural sensitivity, open-mindedness, and a willingness to engage with diverse perspectives

in order to truly and appreciate the philosophical traditions of the African continent.
BENOÎT OKOLO OKONDA

Okolo Okonda assumes Okere's assertion of the necessary and inherent link between

philosophy and culture. He also shares German and French hermeneutical traditions

respectively represented by Heidegger and Gadamer, on the one hand and Ricœur on the

other. He is convinced that African cultures provide different meanings and horizons. In

order to illustrate this thesis, he proposes the reexamination of two important notions in many

African cultures: tradition and destiny. He thinks that these two notions are generally

evaluated by Africans in accordance with a western background or horizon, but which often

lead them to false conclusions and considerations. The Western background portrays a

culture based on tradition as conservative, devoid of change and development, and lacking

reflective thinking. Beliefs and practices inherited from ancestors are said to be preserved

unchanged. They are handed down from one generation to the next without any modification.

Knowledge therefore remains unchanged and innovation is condemned and criminalized. For

its part, the belief in destiny is portrayed as encouraging abandonment to determinism and

fatalism according to which “what will be, will be”. The two combined conceptions of

tradition and destiny are supposed to inhibit development and individual initiatives.

Considering African cultures or horizons in relation with the views of Hermeneutists evoked

above, Okolo Okonda disagrees with the idea that tradition is based on unchanged beliefs and

practices. According to him, tradition in African contexts does not simply mean transmission

and reception without change. Unlike the western perspective, tradition for Africans means

interpretation and reinterpretation by many people. So, traditions are always changed by

different individuals and in different historical contexts. Because new interpretations are

always made, it is therefore an error to think that tradition is opposed to change and

invention. Tradition is then fatally condemned either to be eliminated or to be amended as

time passes: The tradition, essentially defined as transmission, constitutes a hermeneutic

climbing the whole chain of interpretations all the way back to its originative starting point;

rather, it is to properly recreate the chain in actualizing it. In the same vein, Okolo Okonda

asserts that destiny, as far as African cultures are concerned, has nothing to do with the

determinism and fatalism present in Hegel’s thought. According to Hegel (1965), History is

realized by the World Spirit through human passions and interests. So, the willingness of the

subject is not important and History has to be achieved regardless. Unlike Hegel’s

perspective, destiny for Africans involves their vision of the world and represents their

history and culture. It refers to a “narrative identity”, not a “distributed identity”. “Distributed

identity” refers to the fixed identity, the one assimilated to an eternal and immutable

substance, while “narrative identity” refers to historical and self-conscious identity.

“Narrative identity” implies historical responsibility (Okolo Okonda, 2010:105). The analysis

of the concept of destiny in the Yoruba culture, made by Segun Gbadegesin, seems to

confirm Okolo Okonda’s view. Gbadegesin affirms that, according to the Yoruba people,

“destiny expresses only a potentiality which may fail to be realized... If a person has a good

destiny but is not dynamic, the destiny may not come to fruition. So individual destinies

express the potentialities of becoming something, of accomplishing a task” (Gbadegesin,

2002:226-227). After analyzing Kagame’s Compared Bantu Philosophy, Hountondji

expresses a worry: Kagame gives the impression that, if for all our theoretical issues we were

using categories of our languages, we may think otherwise (Hountondji, 1976:25). Following

the preceding analysis of tradition and destiny, we can say that Okolo Okonda may agree

with Kagame that our cultures provide different theoretical horizons. Okolo Okonda also

faces the problem of universality and difference. Unlike certain African hermeneutists who

only insist on difference, he thinks that the difference cannot ignore universality. It is in the

articulation of both that one can have the real meaning of difference. So, although he insists
on difference or on the necessity for African philosophy to become a hermeneutics, Okolo

Okonda is not calling for Africans to remain enclosed in their cultures. He believes in

universality which is only possible through “interculturality”.

JOHN MBITI'S CONCEPT OF TIME

John Mbiti’s conception of time is a significant aspect of his philosophical

work, particularly in the context of African philosophy. Mbiti presents a two-

dimensional view of time, which includes a long past, called Zamani, and the

present, known as Sasa. According to Mbiti, the African conception of time is a

composition of events that have occurred, those occurring now, and those that

are about to occur.

In his view, the future is virtually non-existent because it is not yet an event and

therefore cannot be considered as time. Thus, the future is not real yet because

nothing has happened there. So, we don’t think of it as time. In Africa, people

care a lot about the past and what is happening now. They don’t worry much

about the future. This is different from how some other places (westerners

especially) think about time. For them time like a line from the past, through

now, to the future. Zamani is the period that accommodates all past events,

which are no longer in the physical realm but continue to influence the present.

Sasa, on the other hand, covers the period of immediate experience—the

‘now’—and the events that are just about to happen.

African societies, where the past and the present hold significant value, and the

future is not a primary concern because it is beyond the immediate experiences

and events. This perspective contrasts with Western notions of time, which

often emphasize a linear progression from past to future. Mbiti’s work

highlights the importance of understanding different cultural conceptions of

time, especially in the context of African communities and their approach to life

and existence.

Selected References

1. Hegel, G.W.F. (1965). La Raison dans l’Histoire : Introduction à la philosophie

del’Histoire, trad. K. Papaioannou, Paris : Plon.

2. Okolo Okonda, B. (2010). Hegel et l’Afrique : Thèses, critiques et dépassements,

Argenteuil : Le Cercle Herméneutique Editeur.

3. Gbadegesin, S. (2002). “Ènìyàn : The Yoruba Concept of a Person”, in P.H. Coetzee and

A.P.J. Roux, The African Philosophy Reader, Cap Town: Oxford University Press of South

Africa, pp.208-228.

4. Hountondji, P.J. (1976). Sur la « Philosophie africaine », Paris : François Maspero.