Ï Transport

Canada
Transports
Canada

Aviation Safety

Letter
Learn from the mistakes of others; you’ll not live long enough to make them all yourself . . . Issue 2/2003

Overloading Keeps You Down

The following information was provided by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) for
promotional purposes.
A privately operated Piper PA-31
Navajo departed Charlottetown, NL, on
a day visual flight to Sango Bay. At
takeoff, the aircraft lifted off shortly
before the runway end, and was
observed to remain at tree-top height
until disappearing from view towards
rising terrain. The aircraft struck the
surface of a gravel road 1.5 mi. off the
end of the runway, then slid off the road
and struck a road embankment. The
pilot and two passengers died in the
crash, and one passenger received
serious injuries.
The aircraft was 260 lbs over its
maximum allowable take-off weight at
departure from Charlottetown, from a
2 500-ft gravel runway. On the previous
flight, the aircraft was estimated to be
940 lbs over its maximum allowable take-off weight residential area, narrowly missing housing. The air-
when it departed Gander from a 10 500-ft paved run- craft was estimated to be 425 lbs over its maximum
way. The cargo was not restrained, and shifted allowable take-off weight. The ferry tank system
forward during the impact, striking those seated in that the pilot had installed was not approved by
the back of the aircraft. Transport Canada. There were many articles of
Examination of the wreckage and the wreckage cargo on board that were not properly stowed or
trail showed that the aircraft hit the road surface in restrained, and some of these articles may have
controlled flight with the gear and flaps up. Ground interfered with the aircraft controls. The aircraft
markings showed that both engines were producing was outside of its approved centre of gravity
significant amounts of power, and both engine throt- limits, which would have adversely affected the
tles were found fully open. This was the second fatal controllability of the aircraft.
accident in the Atlantic Region in 2001 involving In both occurrences there was overloading and
overweight aircraft and cargo that was not loaded in incorrect stowage of cargo. In both occurrences lives
an approved manner. other than the pilots’ were placed in jeopardy. The
The other fatal accident occurred on disregard for safety whereby pilots continue to
March 13, 2001, and involved a Piper Comanche, operate aircraft in excess of the maximum allowable
which was heavily laden with fuel and cargo weight limitations is cause for continuing safety con-
(TSB Final Report A01A0022). The aircraft took off cern. The entire aviation community must sustain a
at night towards downtown St. John’s, NL, and relentless effort to improve operator awareness of
climbed to 1 600 ft ASL before losing control. The the hazards associated with flying overweight or
aircraft subsequently spun into the ground in a out-of-balance aircraft.
TP 185E
ISSN 0709-8103
 In-flight Break-up—Can It Happen to Me?
A sudden and catastrophic airframe failure is an
event which some pilots may call an act of God,
particularly if all operational limits are adhered to,
and the aircraft is properly maintained and
certified airworthy. However, there usually is a sci-
entific explanation for any such event, which means
we can prevent it. Granted, catastrophic airframe
failures (because they rarely end up any other way)
are rare, but when they do happen, they are likely
associated with one or more of the following
situations: violent manoeuvre induced by the pilot
(excessive “G” force imposed on a wing or tail, etc.),
violent manoeuvre caused by environmental
conditions (wind gust, turbulence), pilot-induced
overspeed, improper maintenance or maintenance
error, improper assembly, and last but not least,
material fatigue.
The good news is that we can control all of these
situations, especially when taken individually. The
not-so-good news is that if you combine any two or
more, you are looking for trouble. For example, if
you fly at or near maximum gross weight and you
willingly impose a violent load on your flight control that in terms of structural stresses, one firefighting
surfaces, you may be auditioning for a Darwin flight-hour is equivalent to seven “normal” flight-
Award. If you don’t break the airplane on your first hours), a deplorable safety record for aircraft and
try, you may end up stalling and getting results on helicopters used in fire management, cultural com-
your second one. placency and contractual cost-cutting. On “cultural
While certified aircraft are designed to maintain complacency,” the report states, “The [belief] that
their structural integrity above the limits imposed funding is never sufficient has bred a culture that
in the flight manual, flying at or near the certified accommodates risk…an admirable but hazardous
maximum gross weight should cause you to think ‘can-do’ ethos that pervades firefighting aviation.”
twice before yanking the controls around. The While the Blue Ribbon Panel report gave praise
airframe will let you know when you jostle the to the Canadian certification criteria for aerial fire-
controls at those weights (it is very likely that most fighting aircraft for going “well beyond” the require-
of you have experienced such jarring rides in the ments south of the border, these 2002 summer acci-
past). So, a word to the wise, if you’re flying near dents should remind our operators of the inherent
the top end of the envelope, take it easy on the dangers associated with this demanding type of
controls. operation, and the need to adjust the maintenance
Certain types of operations put a lot more stress accordingly. For pilots involved in such operations,
on aircraft than others, such as aerial firefighting, it makes sense to learn as much as possible about
heli-logging, crop-spraying and multi-cycle those requirements. (For more on the Aerial
operations of aircraft, which fly many short trips all Firefighting Blue Ribbon Panel, visit:
day long, in all kinds of conditions of weight and http://www.nifc.gov/blueribbon/index.htm.)
weather. A recent issue of Air Safety Week(ASW) What can pilots do about airworthiness and
(Dec. 9, 2002) was almost entirely dedicated to the metal fatigue?
safety record of firefighting aircraft and associated Pilots are usually unable to detect underlying
regulations in the United States. It followed the metal fatigue or airworthiness flaws visually.
release of the “Aerial Firefighting Blue Ribbon However, it pays huge dividends to learn more
Panel,” which had a mandate to assess the safety of about your aircraft and about your maintenance
federal aerial firefighting. This panel was team. Pilots who ask their maintenance staff ques-
established after two firefighting fixed-wing tions tend to be more knowledgeable about the air-
airplanes crashed when their wings broke off in craft and can develop a better feel for the overall
flight in the summer of 2002. Both accidents were airworthiness of the aircraft. As perplexing as it
videotaped and broadcast on national television. may seem to some, many pilots do not scrutinize the
The report highlighted several areas, including journey log book, and even when they do, they
(but not limited to) increased demand on an aging rarely enquire about unusual entries.
fleet of aircraft, accelerated wear (the report says The most critical requirement for pilots in this

2 ASL 2/2003
 area is the obligation to report it should be when performing a
Ï Transport Transports any airframe overload or pre-flight inspection on a Jet
Canada Canada
overstress they caused, such as a Ranger. Unfortunately, the main
high-G manoeuvre, a hard rotor stayed in place long enough
The Aviation Safety Letter is published quar-
terly by Civil Aviation, Transport Canada, and is landing or if any operational limit during the start to allow a hover
distributed to all Canadian licensed pilots. The is exceeded. If a pilot wilfully fails and a takeoff, but it soon
contents do not necessarily reflect official pol-
icy and, unless stated, should not be construed
to disclose a “small” deviation in departed and the helicopter broke
as regulations or directives. Letters with order to avoid retribution, it could apart in flight, killing both
comments and suggestions are invited. develop into an airframe failure occupants. While this is not
Correspondents should provide name, address
and telephone number. The ASL reserves the down the road. We all want to related to metal fatigue, it was
right to edit all published articles. Name and believe this kind of conduct does still sudden and catastrophic.
address will be withheld from publication at the
writer’s request. not exist within our ranks, but Stick to the limits!
very few could state with Staying within the operational
Address correspondence to:
Editor, Paul Marquis
certainty that it never happens. limits prescribed in the flight
Aviation Safety Letter Thorough pre-flight operation manual remains the
Transport Canada (AARQ) What can we add about the ultimate prevention tool. A few
Ottawa ON K1A 0N8
Tel.: 613 990-1289 pre-flight inspection that you years ago we experienced a series
Fax: 613 991-4280 don’t already know? Learn more of wing failures on ultralight air-
E-mail: [email protected]
Internet: www.tc.gc.ca/ASL-SAN about the work done recently on craft; some of the failures were
the aircraft, and improve your attributed to overload on flight
Reprints are encouraged, but credit must be
given to the ASL. Please forward one copy of
ability to inspect the airframe. control surfaces or improper
the reprinted article to the Editor. Ask an aircraft maintenance engi- assembly. If you elect to fly a non-
neer (AME) to do a full walk- certified aircraft, or if you are
around with you for the sole pur- building your own (and there are
pose of learning more. You will all many of you who do), take the
recall the Bell 206 accident in necessary steps to ensure your
Beloeil, QC, when the main rotor aircraft will give you maximal
mast nut had been removed for structural integrity. Transport
maintenance and the pilot had to Canada and the Canadian
do a quick flight to test another Owners and Pilots Association
unrelated system. To make a long (COPA) are two of the best
Paul Marquis story short, all defences—which resources you should draw on
could have stopped the when operating non-certified
Regional System Safety Offices
inevitable—failed, and the mast aircraft.
Atlantic Box 42
nut was not inspected visually, as
Moncton NB E1C 8K6
506 851-7110

Quebec 700 Leigh Capreol

IN THIS ISSUE Page
Dorval QC H4Y 1G7 Overloading Keeps You Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
514 633-3249 In-flight Break-up—Can It Happen to Me? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Recently Released TSB reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Ontario 4900 Yonge St., Suite 300
Toronto ON M2N 6A5 To the Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
416 952-0175 Accident Statistics—A Quick Look . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
The Danger of Power Lines: Balloon—Aerostar RX-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Prairie • Box 8550
& • 344 Edmonton St.
It Can Happen to You! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Northern • Winnipeg MB R3C 0P6 Accident Reports from the TSB , NTSB , and AAIB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
• 204 983-5870 Human Factors and Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
• 61 Airport Road
Is Your Life Hanging by a Thread? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
• General Aviation Centre The Hazard of Aircraft Refuelling with Plastic “Jerrycans” . . . . . . . . . . .10
• City Centre Airport Forest Fire Season Reminder! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
• Edmonton AB T5G 0W6
• 780 495-3861
COPA Corner—Let’s Stop Talking About Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Restricted Area—What Restricted Area? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Pacific 4160 Cowley Cres., Room 318 Time for Underwater Egress Training? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Richmond BC V7B 1B8
SARSCENE 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
604 666-9517
Lessons Learned in 2002? Read and Weep… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Sécurité aérienne — Nouvelles est la Pilot Information Kiosks: NAV CANADA Provides a New
version française de cette publication.
Way to Access Flight Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Agreement Number 40063845 Where You Park Can Leave Its Mark! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Mystery Damage in the Cargo Hold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

ASL 2/2003 3
Recently Released TSB reports
The following summaries are extracted from collision might have been averted had either the
Final Reports issued by the TSB. They have been de- R22 pilot or the person at the controls of the C-170
identified and include only the TSB’s synopsis and been aware of the proximity of the other aircraft
selected findings. For more information contact the through direct or indirect communication.
TSB or visit their Web site athttp://www.tsb.gc.ca/. Editor’s Note: In discussing this accident with
—Ed. colleagues, it was argued that the collision may still
have occurred had the person at the controls of the
TSB Final Report A01O0164—In-flight C-170 been properly licensed, but we will never
collision know. Nonetheless, this accident is blatant proof
On June 20, 2001, at 20:05 eastern daylight time that there are some people out there who disregard
(EDT), a Robinson R22 helicopter, with only the the system and play by their own rules, and
pilot on board, departed Lindsay, ON, for the ultimately put legitimate pilots and passengers at
Toronto/Buttonville Municipal Airport. At 20:22 greater risk. If you know of anyone flying who
EDT, a Cessna 170 took off on Runway 18 from a should not be, tell someone about it.
private grass strip, locally known as Sandford Field,
with only one person at the controls, who was TSB Final Report A01W0186—Collision with
never licensed as a pilot. This person planned to terrain
conduct one left-hand circuit and landing. At On July 26, 2001, a wheel/ski-equipped Cessna
20:25 EDT, the two aircraft collided in visual meteo- A185F departed Yakutat, AK, to pick up two glacier
rological conditions (VMC) at approximately 700 ft climbers who had been dropped on the Kennedy
AGL. The accident occurred near Uxbridge, over a Glacier, YT, several days earlier. When the pilot
farmer’s field 1 NM south of Sandford Field. The aerially inspected the base camp, located at the
helicopter’s tail and the main-rotor system 8 500-ft level, he noted that the climbers were not
sustained catastrophic damage, rendering the heli- there. After searching the area where the climbers
copter uncontrollable. The helicopter pitched intended to climb, he found them at the 12 000-ft
inverted and plunged to the ground, and the pilot level. Because of inclement weather, they had
was fatally injured. The C-170 sustained become stranded, ran low on food and fuel, and
substantial damage; however, the person at the con- were unable to descend to the base camp. The pilot
trols was able to control the aircraft and conduct a landed close to the climbers. Once all were on board,
forced landing in a nearby cornfield. the pilot commenced a take-off run. Before the
aircraft could become airborne, the ski struck snow
drifts and ridges associated with crevasses in the
glacier. The aircraft then nosed over and dropped
about 80 ft into a crevasse. When the aircraft did
not return to base, a search was initiated. The
aircraft, which was substantially damaged, was
found the following day. Both climbers sustained
serious injuries. The pilot sustained a fatal head
injury.
The pilot had dropped off the two climbers on the
Kennedy Glacier on July 10, 2001. Arrangements
had been made with the pilot to be picked up at
base camp on July 26, 2001. Because of inclement
weather, the climbers did not return to the base
camp; instead, they set up camp in a conspicuous
location at the 12 000-ft level on Cathedral Glacier
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors— to await pickup.
Neither the R22 pilot nor the person at the controls On the scheduled day of the pickup, the pilot flew
of the C-170 saw the other aircraft in time to avert to the base camp, but could not find the climbers.
the collision. The design limitations of both aircraft After a brief search of the area, he found the
with respect to pilot visibility, combined with the climbers at the higher elevation. He then landed
intercept geometry, contributed to the R22 pilot and nearby and loaded the climbers and their
the person’s failure to see and avoid the other equipment. The pilot and the climbers discussed
aircraft. glacier conditions and crevasses nearby, some of
Findings as to Risk—The person at the control of which were covered with snow.
the C-170 was not licensed as a pilot, and the C-170 The takeoff began at about 18:15, opposite to the
did not have a valid certificate of airworthiness. The direction the aircraft had landed, at approximately
TSB also added that while there were no 12 000 ft ASL. The initial portion of the take-off run
requirements to broadcast their positions or was down a 10° to 15° slope before it flattened out.
intentions in the airspace they were flying, the This flat area was composed of smaller crevasses

4 ASL 2/2003
that had been covered with snow down attitude, at approximately This would prepare the pilot for
and had the appearance of shal- 11 500 ft ASL. the likelihood that distant
low depressions. When portions of the take-off surface
the aircraft contacted the would not be visible during the
smaller depressions, it initial take-off run, due to sur-
began to skip and turned face undulations.
approximately 10° to the Findings as to Causes and
left, as shown by the Contributing Factors—The
tracks in the snow. series of small depressions in
The aircraft eventually the glacier surface and the
came into contact with 12 000-ft altitude most likely
the lip of an open prevented the aircraft from
crevasse, then with a becoming airborne before
large drift of compacted reaching the larger open
snow. The propeller and crevasses and the associated
the skis separated from Aerial view of slide path and aircraft at rest in crevasse. drifts of compacted snow.
the aircraft and were Findings as to Risk—At the time
found at this location. Shortly of impact, the pilot was not
after contacting this drift, the air- Glacier flying requires the wearing the shoulder harness
craft nosed over and fell into the pilot to identify the take-off path provided. This lack of physical
next open crevasse. The aircraft and to ascertain reference restraint contributed to his fatal
came to rest on its back at the landmarks that will be visible injuries when the aircraft struck
bottom of the crevasse, in a nose- from the ground before landing. the bottom of the crevasse.

to the letter
Lowering flaps after overspeed… Brakes freeze while sitting in slush
Dear Editor, Dear Editor,
I was somewhat concerned after reading the arti- The lead article “Just a Bit of Slush” by William
cle Wrapped Radio Cord Causes Control Problems in Ives, as published in ASL 1/2003, is excellent and
ASL 2/2002. In particular the line “During a long most informative. I can, however, add an additional
final approach, the instructor lowered the flaps in an “winter flying note” based on an experience I once
attempt to slow the aircraft to a lower touchdown encountered. The outside temperature was below
speed.” This is an aircraft that had just been freezing when I was cleared to taxi to Runway 24R
subjected to a serious overspeed condition. As was at Toronto’s Lester B. Pearson International Airport;
noted later on in the article, the flaps had been the taxiway was quite slushy and the wind was quite
“extensively damaged.” C150/172 aircraft have had a strong at the time. I was flying a Bellanca Crusair
number of flap asymmetry incidents due to damaged “tail-dragger” and as it did not have a steerable tail
flap tracks and an overspeed is an excellent way to wheel, considerable use of brakes was necessary to
do exactly this sort of damage. Lowering potentially keep the aircraft proceeding in a straight line to the
damaged flaps is, in my opinion, asking for take-off holding position where I had to wait for
problems. There is a risk of one flap lowering further several minutes for aircraft ahead of me to depart.
than the other resulting in an uncontrollable roll. Thus, it was quite an embarrassing moment for me
Additionally, there is a good chance of the damaged when the tower finally cleared me to the runway to
flaps jamming in position such that retraction might line up and hold, as even with full throttle the
not be possible even if the pilot had time to react aircraft would not budge. This dilemma was caused
given the low altitude (on final) at which flaps were by slush and snow on the taxiway being thrown
selected. Unfortunately, the Cessna 150 manual against the heated brake drums on the wheels.
gives very little guidance on emergency procedures During the 10-minute wait for take-off clearance,
following an overspeed, and as pilots, we have little with the help of the wind and below-freezing temper-
“official information” to go on in an emergency such atures, the liquid that impregnated the wheels and
as this. While this aircraft landed safely, it should be brakes froze solidly and prevented the wheels from
stressed that the procedure of lowering flaps (or turning. Luckily my passenger was another licensed
making any configuration change) after a severe pilot who was able to break the ice free at the wheels
overspeed is not advisable unless it is absolutely so we could continue our journey. Lesson learned—
critical to landing the aircraft. plan to keep those wheels constantly turning under
Phil Laird, P. Eng., Ste-Foy, Quebec such circumstances to prevent the brakes from
freezing.
Bill Peppler, Ottawa, Ontario

ASL 2/2003 5
Accident Statistics—A Quick Look
Two years ago, in ASL 2/2001, we discussed past two years has been registered in the private
accident statistics for the 1994–2000 period, indicat- sector.
ing the total number of accidents for Canadian- The commuter sector (fixed-wing only), for the
registered aircraft per year (excluding ultralights), 1998–2002 period, had 10, 13, 4, 8 and 6 accidents
the total number of fatalities per year, and the five- respectively. For the same five years, the air taxi
year average for each category. The numbers from segment (fixed-wing only) had 108, 70, 45, 37 and
1994 to 1998 are repeated here, but the keen reader 40 accidents. While the numbers have steadied-out
who will retrieve the 2/2001 issue of ASL will notice over the past two years, they are still below their
slight variations; the totals may vary with time as five-year average (1998–2002) of 8.2 for commuters,
the TSB updates the database as new information is and 60 for air taxi. Of particular interest, while the
received. The occurrence statistics can be found on total number of accidents keeps decreasing, the
the TSB Web site at http://www.tsb.gc.ca. numbers for helicopter accidents remain steady,
Up until 1998, the numbers were relatively steady with 57, 46, 53, 47 and 56 accidents for those same
and showed little movement either way. If anything, years. Therefore, the percentage of helicopter
the years 1997 and 1998 had us going the wrong accidents compared with the total number of
way—UP! However, starting in 1999 and continuing accidents is increasing every year (14.7% in 1998, up
in 2000, the numbers started a significant, constant to 20.5% in 2002).
decline. Well, the latest numbers have been released From 1998 to 2002, the private sector (including
and we are pleased to report that the downward flying schools and clubs) had 153, 171, 174, 168 and
trend, which started in 1999 in both the number of 139 accidents respectively. The 2002 total, 139, is
accidents and fatalities, has been convincingly the lowest on record since 1989, when the TSB
maintained. Just take a look: started recording these statistics.
Some amongst you may attribute these back-to-
Year Accidents Fatalities back declines to reduced flying after 9/11, but we
1994 381 80 can’t help to believe that a measure of these
1995 390 107 successes can also be credited to a variety of joint
1996 342 70 safety initiatives between industry (you, the
1997 356 77 operators, and private flyers), agencies (TSB,
1998 386 85 NAV CANADA, associations, unions, etc.) and
1999 341 65 finally the government. Recent initiatives, from the
2000 319 65 191 Moshansky Commission Recommendations
2001 295 62 (1989 accident at Dryden), to the 71 Safety of Air
2002 273 47 Taxi Operations Task Force (SATOPS) recommen-
dations, to “Flight 2005: A Civil Aviation Safety
Source: Transportation Safety Board of Canada Framework for Canada,” and no less than 431 avia-
(TSB) tion safety recommendations from the TSB and its
predecessor, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board,
The five-year average for accidents went from 371 for have all helped to positively affect safety attitudes
the 1994–1998 period, to 323 for the 1998–2002 throughout our industry.
period. The five-year average for fatalities, during But like they say, even if you’re on the right track,
the same time period, went from 84 to 65. Taking you’ll still be run over if you just sit there, so we
into account that these numbers are averaged over need to ensure that we attract, recruit and retain
five years, the decreases are noteworthy. They once quality people to fill all those shoes. This year’s
again indicate, as they did in 2001, that we are defi- Canadian Aviation Safety Seminar (CASS) is all
nitely on the right track. about people. Scheduled for April 14 to 16, 2003, in
In the 2001 report, there were substantial Montréal, Quebec, the theme of CASS 2003 is
decreases in the totals for the commuter and air taxi “Aviation Human Resources: The Core of Our
sectors of the industry, while the private sector had Industry.” It was developed to address the
registered increases to their five-year averages. This challenges the industry will face in the areas of
time around, while the commuters have remained on personnel selection and recruitment, training,
average and the air taxi segment has continued its retention and knowledge transfer. For more informa-
downward trend, the largest improvement in the tion, check our Web site: http://www.tc.gc.ca/CASS.

Need to Review Your VFR Minima?

Go To A.I.P. RAC 2.7.3 or read CAR 602.114 and 602.115
6 ASL 2/2003
 Recreational Aviation
by Serge Beauchamp, Section Editor

The Danger of Power Lines: Balloon—Aerostar RX-7

The pilot checked the weather three times before
departure. The weather forecast for the flight was:
winds from 280° true at 10 kts; visibility greater
than 6 SM; a broken cloud layer at 3 000 ft AGL;
and, temporarily [from 17:00 to 20:00 eastern
daylight time (EDT)], visibility 6 SM in light rain
showers. The winds, as measured at takeoff, were
from the north-northwest at approximately 3 kts.
During most of the flight, the weather was
favourable, however towards the end of the flight,
the pilot saw that the sky to the east of his intended
flight path was getting dark, so, he decided to land
as quickly as possible. He reported that the winds on
landing were approximately 4-6 kts (7 mph) and had approximately 15 ft, and fell to the ground. The
been relatively constant throughout the flight. balloon drifted with the wind, and became entangled
The initial landing site was at a distance of about in the power lines. An electrical arc occurred and the
600 ft upwind of a road and some power lines. The gondola caught fire. There were injuries and one
landing was a little bumpy but the basket did not tip casualty.
over. The pilot, who had over 500 hours of The balloon flight manual suggests maintaining
experience, then established the balloon in at least 100 ft of horizontal separation from power
equilibrium and the ground crew walked the balloon lines for each mile-per-hour wind at the landing site.
closer to the road for ease of recovery. Upwind of the The location of the initial landing site was close to
road and approximately 240 ft upwind of power this requirement; however, when the balloon was
lines, a second landing was made and the deflation walked closer to the power lines, the separation was
process initiated. Suddenly a gust of wind picked up lost. As winds associated with towering cumulus
the balloon with the pilot and two passengers in the clouds can be unpredictable, better use of the
gondola and one ground crew hanging on the outside recovery truck might have averted disaster.
of the basket. The ground crew let go at a height of Source: TSB file A01O0200.

It Can Happen to You!

No one is immune to the danger that foreign object
damage (FOD) represents.
An experienced aerobatic pilot had performed a
thorough pre-flight inspection of a Cessna 152 before
setting out on a flight. While performing a roll manoeuvre
at an altitude of approximately 4 500 ft, the ailerons
jammed in the full-deflection position. The pilot tried
repeatedly to return the ailerons to the neutral position,
but to no avail. Fortunately through the use of
considerable force, at an altitude of approximately 3 500 ft,
he managed to turn the control wheel to neutral and with
the skilful use of the rudder, he was able to land safely.
Following examination of the controls by an aircraft
maintenance engineer (AME), an upholstery screw was found lodged in the aileron control chain on the con-
trol column. Further inspection revealed that several upholstery screws were missing from upholstery trims
and interior panels. The screws had probably fallen out because of the plane’s vibration and because the
screw holes were enlarged from repeatedly removing and installing the upholstery trims and panels. FOD is
dangerous and can bring about complications that will render an aircraft or system unserviceable. Always
make sure that your aircraft is free of foreign objects. After a long period of non-aerobatic use, dust, dirt and
even pieces of aircraft material will often accumulate in the cockpit, so you must take care to clean, vacuum
and inspect it carefully for any loose or missing screws and upholstery trim. A tragedy was averted here
through the will to survive, along with a little luck.
Source: TSB file A02C0226. ASL 2/2003 7
Accident Reports from the TSB, NTSB 1, and AAIB 2
Watch out for power lines : Avian Balloon Skyhawk. Mid-air collision : Nova Axon. While soaring at
The pilot was proceeding to land in a field when he 100 ft with several other paragliders and a couple of
observed power lines in the landing path. The pilot hang gliders, the pilot heard shouting but was
and a passenger chose to jump to the ground before unable to determine where it was coming from. He
the balloon collided with the power lines. While the looked over his shoulder just as a hang glider’s
passenger sustained minor injuries, the pilot was wing tip hit the back of his harness. He landed
seriously injured. The balloon was not damaged. immediately without injury but the hang glider
Winds were 100° at 5 kts. Power lines are very pilot continued his flight for another 15 min. Flying
difficult to see, but if a pilot concentrates on looking calls for the highest degree of safety and can only
for pylons and power line poles, he will improve his be assured through methodical re-evaluation of all
chances of avoiding such obstacles. A pilot may also of the factors that come into play. Both pilots
elicit the help of his passengers to signal any safety should have landed immediately and reviewed the
matter that they may observe during the flight, as event to find out what led to the collision. A review
this will increase the level of safety and ensure a of the incident through group discussion would cer-
successful and memorable outing. tainly benefit all who fly that type of aircraft and
Unqualified pilot, medication and unapproved would help to considerably reduce the risk that
modifications : A student pilot chose to fly his such an event would recur.
newly purchased, second hand, Rans S4 Coyote—con- Wonderful emergency parachutes : Icaro Mr 2000.
trary to the direction of his instructor. The pilot was At the end of a two-hour thermal soaring flight, the
fatally injured when he crashed immediately after pilot initiated a high-speed dive. As the pilot slowed
takeoff. Aside from contravening the privileges of his the glider, it pitched up to 90° and then tumbled.
Student Pilot Permit, two other factors may have Although the glider righted itself, the right wing
played a role in this fatal accident. It is reported that had broken during the tumble. The pilot deployed
the pilot suffered from a viral infection and may his emergency parachute and landed safely on a
have been under the influence of cold medication. It grassy slope. This might have been a condition
is possible that he may also have experienced where the pilot exceeded the maximum speed and
difficulty with the flight control system at takeoff, a structural load factor allowed by the manufacturer,
situation that may have been related to contact and possibly weakened the structure to the point of
between the seat and the aileron control torque tube. failure. Fortunately, he had sufficient height and
Mixing an unqualified pilot with medication that control to release the emergency parachute and
may impair one’s ability to operate machinery is a averted disaster. Pilots of ultralight airplanes
recipe for disaster. Relying on an unqualified pilot to should be vigilant and refrain from performing any
ensure that all components of an unfamiliar aircraft manoeuvres that might inflict an overload on the
are installed and operating properly can lead to structure. Furthermore, a careful inspection of the
problems too. All pilots, including students, must aircraft should be carried out at regular intervals
respect the privileges of their licences and permits. If and any time one feels that the structure might
you fly, exercise care when using over-the-counter have sustained an overload. This will go a long way
medication. If any doubt exists, consult your Civil towards ensuring the continued airworthiness of
Aviation Medical Examiner. the aircraft. Emergency parachutes have been
See and avoid : Piper Pawnee and KA13 Glider. The found by many pilots to be well worth the
Piper Pawnee tow aircraft had just released a glider investment, and the weight penalty, as they have
and was slowly making its way to the airport with saved numerous lives and aircraft from destruction.
its towrope hanging from the tail hook. The glider Carburetor heat and full harness : Jabiru UL.
was orbiting close by and each pilot saw the other, When carburetor heat was applied at 500 ft AGL on
from a distance of approximately 200 m, closing in the approach to the microlight strip, the engine
head on. In spite of rapid avoidance manoeuvring, lost power. A forced landing was carried out on a
the towrope hit the canopy of the glider, causing ploughed field and the microlight overturned. The
damage to it and to the wings. Both aircraft landed full harness prevented injury to both occupants.
without further damage or injury. Tow pilots should Normally the use of carburetor heat is
be especially vigilant when returning to the field, recommended whenever the risk of carburetor icing
and take extra care to avoid manoeuvring in the is present or suspected, and when at pattern
vicinity of gliders approaching for landing. Gliders altitude before landing. In this case, the selection of
flying in the pattern do not usually have the luxury carburetor heat several times during the flight, and
of speed, altitude and manoeuvrability to enable at traffic altitude, might have alerted the pilot to
them to easily avoid other aircraft or obstacles. As a the presence of ice in the intake and to the
tow pilot, make it a habit to ensure that all possibility of power loss upon approaching for
incoming traffic is identified and cleared before landing. It should be noted that unless a pilot holds
proceeding to land. an ultralight airplane instructor’s licence, he is
8 ASL 2/2003
prohibited from carrying a passenger. The flight ultralight airplane became airborne at a nose-high
has to be for training purposes, unless the attitude after a ground-run of 100 ft. The wings
passenger also holds an ultralight airplane pilot rocked from side to side at an altitude of 25 ft and
licence, or a private- or higher-qualification pilot the aircraft descended to the runway, inverted. The
licence approved for the type. Legislation to permit pilot had purchased the aircraft recently and only
the carriage of a passenger in an ultralight airplane had 15.4 hours of experience. This seems to be a
and a training syllabus for pilots is under review at case of insufficient training, limited knowledge of
the present time. We will keep you posted. the aircraft specifications and flight characteristics,
Loss of control on takeoff : Interplane SkyBoy. A as well as the requirements of the regulations to
pilot received serious injuries and the ultralight air- operate as pilot-in-command of a new aircraft. The
plane was substantially damaged following the loss loss might have been greater had he lost his life!
of control during takeoff. The pilot reported that he Proper training from a qualified instructor would
failed to maintain optimal climbing speed before the have ensured countless hours of safe flying in his
aircraft rolled to the right and to the left and newly acquired aircraft.
contacted the ground. According to witnesses, the
1 National Transportation Safety Board 2 Air Accident Investigation Branch

Human Factors and Accidents

Year after year, we hear about pilots who are invested if you booked a certified flight instructor
involved in accidents; sometimes even fatal ones. to review all aspects of flight with you, including a
Often the pilot’s family and friends are bewildered thorough ground briefing and a flight check. The
at the fact that this professional or private pilot second important quality of a good pilot is that he
was involved in an accident. We hear remarks is very familiar with the aircraft’s pilot operating
such as, “He was such a methodical pilot; he was handbook (POH) and uses a checklist during all
so careful, and he knew his airplane so well.” It is the necessary phases of flight. Before a flight, he
quite possible that he fell victim to a condition reviews the emergency procedures found in the
that afflicts us all—human errors. It may have POH and makes sure he is prepared, should it
been caused by fatigue, stress, complacency, lack occur. When you fly an ultralight, a trike, or a
of recent training, or illnesses. It could have been PPG, make up a checklist that covers procedures
physical, psychological or both, in nature. to follow in case an emergency situation occurs.
Flying is always a serious business. The Accidents usually happen because people fail,
environment and the qualities necessary for a and less often because machines fail. Consider the
successful flight are demanding, whether you are fact that any deviation from the prescribed
flying a trike, a hang glider, an ultralight, a regulations or the manufacturer’s instructions
paraglider or a powered paraglider (PPG). The may void the insurance policy and opens the
flight starts before you do the walk-around of your possibility of legal action against you or your
aircraft, and ends only after you have secured the family. The legal battles may go on for years, and
aircraft and have ascertained to a degree that you are not pleasant for anybody.
and your passengers are safely back home. Human factors affect our lives everyday, and as
This brings to mind two important qualities of pilots—whether we are flying professionally or for
a good pilot. The first is that he or she is serious fun—we must realize that flying takes practice
about his or her flying and he or she gets and abilities beyond those required for ordinary
recurrent training. Professional airline, commuter tasks.
and military pilots continually get training, and Such a realization will ensure the continued
the accident rate in those fields is very low. At pleasure and satisfaction we all derive from
least once a year, your money would be well aviation.

Is Your Life Hanging by a Thread?

Aircraft fabric is not like the of the fabric covering my airplane firm that your synthetic fabric is
cotton from a good old pair of is? I wonder if it’s still airworthy?” indeed airworthy. The life span of
pants or a comfy old shirt—it Since you’re the one responsible aircraft fabric is affected by its
won’t last forever. It isn’t sub- for the continued airworthiness of exposure to the elements, the kind
mitted to the same stress either, your ultralight, microlight or of flying that you do and the care
as it is subjected to constant loads amateur-built airplane, you that it receives. Initially though,
and changing weather conditions. should ask yourself those the attention given to the
How often do you ask yourself, “I questions at least once a year and manufacturer’s recommended
wonder what the life expectancy take the appropriate action to con- installation process is of

ASL 2/2003 9
paramount importance to Nylon. It may be called from molecular breakdown due
ensure that the fabric will last a Ceconite©, Stits PolyFiber©, to sunlight and if you let the
long time. The protective Nylon and other names but it aircraft sit outside in the
coatings (ultraviolet light (U-V) remains a synthetic fabric. The weather. The weight of the
blocker coatings and paint), the fabric can have a life span of protective coating on any
application process and the over 20 years if the installation ultralight or microlight airplane
cleanliness of the fabric before is done properly and it receives is negligible when you realize
painting are all extremely adequate care, but it may not that it is spread over the entire
important as well. Aircraft fab- last more than a couple of years surface of the wings and
ric usually consists of PolyFiber© if you fail to use the structure. Your safety resides
or Dacron®, but in some cases it recommended U-V blocker with you. Take action!
may be Tedlar® or RipStop coating that serves to protect it

The Hazard of Aircraft Refuelling with Plastic “Jerrycans”

Spring is almost with us, and so too is the
hazard of aircraft refuelling. When you refuel
your aircraft from a plastic container that is not
grounded to the aircraft, it creates a definite fire
hazard. Unfortunately, many aircraft have been
lost during this seemingly simple process.
Aircraft and lawnmower fuel tanks do not share
all of the same environmental factors that create
this hazardous situation. Nevertheless, the same
risk is present when you refuel a lawnmower.
The difference is based on the electrostatic poten-
tial of the two machines. Given the proper
temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and
wind conditions, the aircraft becomes electrically two structures. This occurs in microseconds and
charged because its wing and structure area are brings about a source of ignition of the fuel
exposed to air, which charges them electro- molecules in movement at the surface of the
statically. Likewise, the plastic fuel container gasoline and the ensuing potential for fire. So be
gets charged when being refuelled. If you do not careful, and make sure to ground the aircraft to
ground the container to the aircraft structure, or the ground and ground the fuel container to the
directly to the aircraft fuel tank, with the help of aircraft before refuelling. Using a metal fuel
a wire—preferably touching the bottom of the container, a metal funnel, bonding wire and a
plastic container—and a clamp on the fuel tank clamp to ground all articles to the aircraft should
before you start dispensing fuel, the difference in ensure safe fuel transfer. Equally important is to
electrostatic potential makes the charged have at-hand, a fire extinguisher of sufficient size
electrons race from the aircraft tank to the fuel to save your aircraft when refuelling. The value
container at an accelerated rate in order to estab- of your life and of your aircraft is worth countless
lish a balance of electron potential between the numbers of fire extinguishers. Happy flying!

Forest Fire Season Reminder!

Forest fire season is once again upon us, and while it concerns all of us, we had a special request by the
Forest Protection Division of the Province of Alberta to raise the awareness of this important safety issue.
They have concerns with aircraft violating the airspace in and around forest fires. This includes commercial
operators flying both private charters and/or fixed routes on a schedule, training school students, and also
the military. We urge all of you to be sensitive to the needs and requirements of those agencies involved in
fighting forest fires with aircraft.
Section 601.15 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) provides that no unauthorized person shall
operate an aircraft over a forest fire area, or over any area that is located within 5 NM of one, at an altitude
of less than 3 000 ft AGL. Refer to the “Take Five” published in ASL 3/99, which can also be found at
http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/syssafe/newsletters/letter/asl-399/english/T5_forestfire_e.htm.

10 ASL 2/2003
COPA Corner—Let’s Stop Talking About Safety
by Adam Hunt, Canadian Owners and Pilots Association (COPA)

I recently had a non-flyer approach me and ask The first step is to acknowledge that there are
about learning to fly. He asked the usual questions risks in flying and that there are some activities
including the one I always hate to hear: “Is it safe?” that are more risky than others. Accident data tells
The easy answer is to reassure them, “Of course us where the risks are. For general aviation, flying
it is safe; otherwise the government wouldn’t let us light aircraft at night is more risky than flying dur-
do it, would they?” But that isn’t a truthful answer. ing the day, and instrument flying is more risky
It would be more accurate to say; “No, flying isn’t than VFR flying. Night IFR flying is a high risk.
safe,” but many people in aviation, particularly in Low flying is more risky than flying at higher
aviation safety, would consider that heresy! But the altitudes and flying really low is very risky. Flying
truth is, flying is not safe. while tired is more risky than flying while fresh.
Webster’s defines “safe” as “without risk” and And so on…
that was exactly what this person was asking me, The risks are different in each type of flying.
“If I take up flying, is it without risk?” The answer History has shown that for airlines, VFR flying is
is no, it is not without risk. unacceptably risky.
For years we have been talking about aviation Once you identify where the risks are, you need
safety as if it were the way to achieve flying without to add them up and see if they are too high. If they
risk. But that approach draws us away from the key are too high then you need to take steps to reduce
issue—it isn’t about being “safe,” it is about under- the risks to an acceptable level. Sometimes that will
standing where the risks are and managing them mean waiting rather than flying. A night VFR flight
effectively. home in a single pilot aircraft, in marginal weather,
Perfect aviation safety can only be achieved by after a 16-hour workday filled with meetings and no
locking the hangar doors, with the airplane inside. time for dinner might add up to too great of a risk.
Then you can have a situation “without risk.” Well, Perhaps that risk could be reduced by staying
except for hangar fires, I suppose. overnight and leaving in the morning, after a good
The truth is that all activities in our lives are night’s sleep.
risky to some extent. Canadians die every day from We don’t want to stop flying or taking showers.
smoking cigarettes, driving their cars, jaywalking But we owe it to ourselves, and those who depend
or even taking a shower. We don’t ask if taking a on us, to deal effectively with the risks of flying.
shower is “safe.” We take steps to manage the risks So what did I tell the prospective aviator? “Flying
that can occur when you mix soapy feet and has its risks, but almost all those risks are manage-
slippery bathtubs. We install non-slip surfaces, grab able. We learn to identify and manage risks. That is
handles or perhaps don’t wash our feet in the what learning to fly is all about.”
shower. That seemed to make sense to him.
We need to start looking at aviation the same More information about COPA is available at
way we do showers. We need to manage the risks, www.copanational.org
which isn’t a very difficult thing to do.

Restricted Area—What Restricted Area?

by Renée Sward, General Aviation Inspector, Calgary Transport Canada Centre
Every pilot learns about restricted areas when getting their licence. What they may not necessarily
know is that restricted areas aren’t marked out with big hash marks on the ground. Without using a
current aeronautical chart, and accurately knowing where you are, you can’t really tell if you are flying
in a restricted area. Just because you can hop in your aircraft, punch a few buttons, and fly directly to
your destination, does not mean that it’s a good idea to do it. Good route planning is essential for safe
cross-country flying.
Not only is flying through a restricted area without authorization a violation of the regulations, it can
be really hazardous. For example, the Suffield restricted area near Medicine Hat, AB is used for heavy
artillery practice. How heavy? Try to imagine an artillery shell weighing about 35 lb and traveling at
near 1 000 kts. Its trajectory takes it over 18 000 ft high and it lands more than 10 km (6 mi.) away. The
range personnel take every precaution to make sure the area is clear of all traffic before firing.
Unauthorized traffic that is seen by range personnel causes interruptions and delays. The result if the
firing range personnel do not see your aircraft could be far more serious. Please take the time to review
a chart, plan a smart route, and file a flight plan when you fly cross-country.

ASL 2/2003 11
Time for Underwater Egress Training?
Testimonials are often used by sales people to
pitch all kinds of products, from magic pills to fat-
free cooking…Of course, we as consumers must use
our own intuition and judgment to see if these are
genuine, or simply instruments to push the deal
through…But in our business, a testimonial about
how such or such service actually saved one or more
lives isn’t something to sneer at. This is why I keep
supporting companies who have put time, effort and
resources into offering underwater egress training
to the industry.
A Canadian underwater egress training company
had recently trained company pilots from a small
floatplane operator in the US, when two of those
trainees found themselves submerged and inverted Photo courtesy of Aviation Egress Systems.
in water during a dual training flight. The two
pilots were able to quickly egress from the cabin. “A dozen or so immersions in both single and
They unquestionably credited the training they had dual dunkers made me experience first hand how
received as invaluable, and largely responsible for one can become perilously disoriented and fixated
giving them the confidence and skills needed to face when upside down under water. I left the course
this real-life emergency. feeling exhausted, but more confident about my
One of the real advantages of many underwater ability to survive a ditching. I think this practical
egress training companies is that they can travel to egress training is essential safety training for any
you, as opposed to you having to travel to them. pilot who flies on or over water.”—Kathy Fox
They have transportable dunkers, which they bring An instructor also shared his concern about the
to a local public swimming pool. This drastically C-13 life vests such as the unit found in many
reduces the training costs—your training costs. Canadian registered aircraft. His personal
They also usually include a comprehensive ground experience while training is that less than 10% of
school portion, which addresses survival issues, life- pilots have ever felt one of these life vests out of the
saving equipment and how to use and take care of plastic package, or even given them much thought!
them. This could pose a problem when two people are hurt
Explaining the underwater crash panic which and three more are non-swimmers, and they all
takes place is not enough; pilots should experience depend on the pilot for guidance while floundering
it for themselves in a controlled environment, simi- around a sinking aircraft. He suggests that all
lar to practicing emergencies in a simulator. Most pilots who operate over water familiarize
people get disoriented and would have great themselves with that very important safety item,
difficulty getting out unless they experienced the and better yet, consider wearing one in flight.
training upside down in a pool. Ms. Kathy Fox, Also check your life vest’s last certification date.
Assistant Vice-President of Air Traffic Services at If it is out of date, get it inspected as it may let you
NAV CANADA and recipient of our 1999 Transport down when you really need it. Other styles of inflat-
Canada Aviation Safety Award, happens to be an able vests, which are wearable and comfortable,
active Flight Test Examiner, a competitive have recently been approved for aircraft use and
precision pilot and a very strong advocate of may become more accepted by pilots and
aviation safety. She experienced the practical exer- passengers. One final point the instructor wants to
cises in a pool in the summer of 2002. Here’s what make, which I also endorse, is that every
she had to say about the training: Commercial floatplane operator in Canada should
attempt to have all their crews properly trained in
underwater egress procedures.

SARSCENE 2003
The National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) is pleased to announce that
SARSCENE 2003, its twelfth annual search and rescue workshop, will be held in Kingston, Ontario,
October 15–18, 2003 . SARSCENE 2003 is where you’ll find participants from all across Canada and
around the world who will come to share their stories and learn more about new search and rescue
techniques, initiatives and products.
The local host organization will be the Ontario Provincial Police, with the support of the Ontario
Search and Rescue Volunteers Association (OSARVA). The workshop kicks off with the seventh annual
SARSCENE Games on October 15, followed by presentations, training sessions and the trade show over
the following three days. For more details, please call 1 800 727-9414 or visit the NSS Web site at
http://www.nss.gc.ca.

12 ASL 2/2003
Lessons Learned in 2002? Read and Weep…
The following occurrence descriptions were A Cessna 182 approached a 2 424 ft-long airstrip
randomly selected from the TSB’s Class 5 investiga- at a speed faster than normal after a parachute
tions for the year 2002. As you will see, there are very drop, floated a considerable distance before
few new accidents. The occurrences have been touchdown and overran the strip. The aircraft went
slightly edited and de-identified, just enough to pro- through a fence and came to rest in a ditch, sustain-
tect the innocent, the foolish or the simply unlucky ing substantial damage. The pilot was not injured.
aviators. Some locations were left in where needed Winds were light at the time of the accident.
for proper context. High and hot? Know when to abort! —Ed.
The pilot of a Piper PA 28-180 was attempting to
land on a road 10 NM south of Lloydminster, AB, An amateur-built Slepcev Storch was
when the aircraft came into contact with an manoeuvring at low altitude when the right wing
unmarked power line. The aircraft struck the tip hit a gate post. The aircraft looped to the right,
ground causing substantial damage to the wings, collapsing the right main gear and damaging the
engine, and forward fuselage. The pilot, who was cowling, propeller and firewall. The pilot, who was
the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries as a the sole occupant, was not injured.
result of the accident. Fuel was spilled, but there Must have been the Pearly Gate. —Ed.
was no post-crash fire. It was reported that the pilot
had landed on this road on several occasions. A Cessna 175 on a pleasure trip was at low
Should we mark all power lines near roads? —Ed. altitude to overfly a small road for landing in the
future, when it encountered rough air turbulence.
A Cessna 172M was departing Runway 25 at a Soon after, the aircraft flew into some dead air and
private airstrip with the pilot and two passengers was forced down. Power was applied simultaneously
on board. The winds were estimated to be from as the aircraft struck a power line. It then crashed
200° at 7 to 10 kts, the temperature was on a secondary road, and was substantially
approximately 24°C, and the surface of the airstrip damaged. There were four people on board. The
was soft, dry silt. The pilot selected 10° of flap for pilot was seriously injured but there were no
the takeoff and the aircraft became airborne after a injuries to the passengers.
sluggish ground roll, about 2 000 ft down the Low flying, rough turbulence, dead air, power
runway. On climb through 40 ft, the aircraft lines...nasty combination! If you’re going to test fate
encountered increasing performance wind shear in such a way, at least go by yourself. —Ed.
and the pilot selected the flaps up. Immediately
thereafter the aircraft encountered decreasing per- A Cessna U206G touched down at approximately
formance wind shear and the aircraft entered a full- the midpoint of the 2 800-ft long private airstrip
power departure stall. At that point the pilot elected and overran the end of the strip during the landing
to reject the takeoff/climb. The aircraft descended roll. The nose wheel dug into moss in the overrun
into the second growth vegetation on the departure area and the aircraft overturned and came to rest
clearway and came to rest upright approximately inverted. The pilot and two passengers were not
230 m beyond the runway end cones. The pilot sus- injured; however, the aircraft sustained substantial
tained minor injuries and the passengers sustained damage. The pilot had conducted the approach over
non-life-threatening, but serious injuries, including tall trees located near the threshold of the strip, in a
broken bones and lacerations. The aircraft was sub- light tailwind, and the surface of the strip was
stantially damaged. The runway is located at described as very wet and muddy.
1 910 ft above sea level and the aircraft was at or Tailwind approach over obstacles on a short, very
near gross weight at the time. wet and muddy runway...is it a surprise the aircraft
The pilot “elected to reject” after entering a full- overran the end? —Ed.
power departure stall...hmmm…This one is worth
discussing with your flight instructor, i.e. taking off A Cessna 150M was in descent when the engine
in hot weather, heavy aircraft, soft field, etc…and began to lose power. The pilot conducted a forced
also about the use of flaps. —Ed. landing on a dry shore area of a lake. After a ground
roll of approximately 60 m, the nose gear collapsed
A privately-owned Luscombe 8C was on a local and the aircraft nosed over and came to rest
flight at High River, AB. On landing, the aircraft inverted. The pilot was wearing a shoulder
bounced several times and the pilot elected to reject harness and was not injured.
the landing and go around. As the aircraft climbed An Ayres S-2R was on a crop-spraying run over a
out, the wheels caught a fence. The aircraft came pea field when the engine lost power. The pilot
around beside the runway and overturned. There jettisoned the remaining load and landed the
was one occupant and no injuries. aircraft straight ahead into the field where the
High fence or late abort? —Ed. aircraft flipped over onto its back. The aircraft was
ASL 2/2003 13
substantially damaged, and the pilot, who was aircraft was substantially damaged.
wearing a helmet and a four-point harness, Low speed low bank, high speed high bank… —Ed.
sustained minor injuries.
Two shoulder harness success stories...need I A King Air 100, on a flight from Comox, cancelled
say more? —Ed. IFR with the Quesnel Airport when they had
Runway 31 in sight. However, as fog patches were in
A Piper PA-34-220T landed to the left side of the process of forming, especially to the northwest,
Runway 03 in IMC conditions and struck a snow the Prince George FSS advised that the weather at
wind row. The left main gear detached from the Quesnel was below VFR, so the pilot asked for
aircraft, and the left wing and both propellers Special VFR, which was approved. Seconds before
sustained substantial damage. The pilot was not touchdown the pilot lost visual reference, and during
injured. The pilot had conducted an NDB approach the rollout, the pilot lost directional control. The
to the runway, and estimated the ceiling to be 550 ft aircraft went off the left side of Runway 31,
and the visibility to be 2 mi. in snow. AWOS ground-looped, and came to rest on a heading of
recorded the ceiling at 0 ft and the visibility as approximately 130° magnetic. None of the occupants
0.2 mi. at the time of the occurrence. The wind row were injured but the aircraft sustained substantial
was parallel to and about 25 m to the left of the left damage, mostly to the propellers and engines. A run-
edge of the runway. The edges of the runway were way condition report, issued 28 minutes before the
marked with flags and the surface of the runway accident, indicating somewhat slippery conditions,
was covered with 3 in. of snow. had not been passed on to the pilot by ATS.
Pilot reported 2 mi. visibility but still missed the A few issues here…unpredictable and last minute
runway laterally by more than 25 m...I’ll bet on the weather changes are not uncommon, so be prepared.
AWOS on this one. —Ed. Cancelling IFR too early in patchy conditions may
not be advisable. Also, always ask for a runway sur-
One pilot was checking out a second pilot on a face condition report. —Ed.
Cessna 210B. Following several circuits, and during
what was intended to be another touch-and-go, the A Cessna 180 on floats was departing Tofino
aircraft landed gear up. The pilots had been harbour. As the aircraft floats came out of the water
interrupted and distracted with ATC calls while onto the step, the right wing began to rise and the
performing the pre-landing checklist, and did not right float came out of the water. The aircraft began
lower the gear. The landing gear warning horn turning to the left towards a barge. The pilot
sounded during the flare and was mistaken for the reduced engine power to idle to abort the takeoff, but
stall warning. The propeller and lower fuselage was unable to avoid a metal beam sticking out from
sustained substantial damage; however, neither the barge. The left wing struck the metal beam and
occupant was injured. the right wing struck the water, causing it to bend
Good one to remember folks. It has happened up. There were no injuries to anyone on the aircraft
before, and it WILL happen again. —Ed. or the barge. The aircraft was towed back to the
docks.
After a short flight, the pilot of a Cessna 180 on This is a lesson for float operators…allow for as
floats landed on a lake and started taxiing to the much lateral space as you can, just in case. —Ed.
dock when the left float rapidly filled with water.
The aircraft nosed over and sank. The two occupants A DHC-2 Beaver on floats began to take off from
on board exited the aircraft safely and were taken to Victoria Harbour with two pilots and five passengers
shore by boat. There were no injuries. The pilot sus- onboard. During the latter stages of the take-off
pects the plug for the left front float compartment slide, the aircraft began to turn markedly to the left
went missing sometime during the brief flight. and the pilot aborted the take-off run. The pilot
This is the time to check the plugs on your floats taxied back to the start of the take-off area and
(and your boats for that matter…). —Ed. began a second takeoff. About halfway along the
take-off slide, the pilot was again unable to maintain
A Piper PA 18-150 Super Cub was overflying an directional control, and the aircraft turned quickly to
outfitting camp area to check on local conditions the left. The pilot aborted the takeoff but could not
when the pilot decided it was too windy to land. prevent the right wing from striking the water,
When turning around (at 45–50 kts) to return to causing the wing tip to dig in and the left float to
base, a gust of wind caught the wings and nearly become briefly airborne. The aircraft remained
inverted the aircraft. A recovery was attempted; upright and the pilot taxied back to the dock and
however, the aircraft stalled and there was deplaned the passengers. During takeoff, the pilot
insufficient altitude to recover. The aircraft collided reportedly had used full right rudder and full right
with trees and came to rest in a nose down position. rudder trim. At the time of the incident, the wind
The lone occupant received minor injuries but the was a direct left crosswind.

14 ASL 2/2003
Pilot Information Kiosks: NAV CANADA Provides a New Way to
Access Flight Information
by Ron Doyle, Director of Safety and Service Design, NAV CANADA
NAV CANADA’s Pilot Information Kiosks (PIKs)
offer pilots a new way to access important flight plan-
ning information from convenient airport locations.
The new kiosks provide fast and simple access to
NAV CANADA’s Aviation Weather Web Site
(AWWS), which offers all of the latest weather and
flight information pilots require when developing
their flight plans.
The kiosk also offers toll-free telephone access to
professional interpretive weather briefings provided
by Flight Service Specialists.
New resources, new sources —The PIK program
is part of the $27 million Flight Information Centre
project, a multi-year investment by NAV CANADA
into improving pilot access to vital flight information
services across Canada.
Kiosks are being installed at convenient locations
in airports where pilots gather, including Flight completed in the summer of 2003. Each kiosk will be
Service Stations (FSS), flight clubs, and training backed by maintenance services, including remote
schools. monitoring and local support.
Housed in a metal casing, the stand-alone kiosk Roll-out strategy —At this time, NAV CANADA is
features Internet connectivity to NAV CANADA’s installing approximately 77 kiosks at airports with
AWWS, a 17-inch colour touch screen, a full-size key- FSSs. We must point out that the kiosk is most effec-
board, a thermal printer, a touch pad and a telephone tive with a high-speed Internet connection. The
handset with speakerphone capabilities. An attached unavailability of suitable Internet connections at
table provides a stable surface for writing and for lay- some airports will determine kiosk locations. For
ing out maps and other documents. those airports that only have dial-up Internet service,
Pilots will be able to browse the AWWS and select data download times will be slower. There are
user-defined weather and flight data, including currently 48 kiosks at selected airports, with more
NOTAM, for their specific flight route, a regional being installed every month.
area, or local data tied to a particular airport. Pilots To find out where kiosks are located at airports
will also be able to create a personal profile through near you, check the Canadian Flight Supplement or
“My Weather Data,” enabling them to save and visit the NAV CANADA web site at
access customized weather information. www.navcanada.ca (Under “Service Projects,”
Using the kiosk to access briefing services —To “Pilot Information Kiosks”).
assist pilots in analyzing weather data, a telephone is Future improvements —NAV CANADA is planning
provided at each kiosk with a toll-free direct line to additional improvements to its AWWS, which will
Flight Service Specialists, who will provide a variety provide new products and improve the site’s function-
of information and interpretive briefing services in ality and ease of use. Many of the planned changes
response to the pilot’s requirements. To facilitate will respond directly to suggestions made by pilots
information exchange, Flight Service Specialists will who use the site.
have access to the same data and maps being For additional information please contact
reviewed by the pilot. John Foottit, Manager Aviation Weather,
Pilots can print material at the kiosk for future NAV CANADA at 613 563-5603 or
reference, and then file their flight plan over the [email protected] or contact NAV CANADA
phone. A project that will allow pilots to file a flight Customer Service at 1 800 976-4693.
plan over the Internet is currently scheduled to be

While you are taxiing, the tower signals you with a FLASHING WHITE LIGHT.
What should you do?

ASL 2/2003 15
Where You Park Can Leave Its Mark!
On August 8, 2002, a Beech 200 came in to park
at a fixed-base operator (FBO) at a major Canadian
airport, and was marshaled to a parking spot by an
FBO employee. After shutdown, the crew noticed
that they had been parked tail-to-tail with a
Boeing 727, with about a 100-ft separation. As this
was to be a brief holdover, the crew left the aircraft
control locks off in case the FBO had to move their
aircraft.
The crew returned a few hours later, and did not
notice anything unusual during the walk-around or
the pre-flight control checks prior to departure.
After an uneventful takeoff, the crew noticed the
rudder pedals no longer lined up and the rudder
trim could not be adjusted. The crew consulted the
pilot operating handbook (POH) and the minimum
equipment list (MEL), and called their
maintenance department via cell phone. After con-
firming they had positive directional control, they The company had made a conscious decision to
elected to continue the flight to their home base. leave the aircraft control locks off for brief
Maintenance found considerable internal damage holdovers in case the aircraft had to be moved,
to the rudder system, including cracks in the trim which in this case would undoubtedly have been a
jack housing, sheared rivets at the base of the rud- good idea. The company now uses control locks on
der spar, torn skin on the rudder at the hinge all holdovers and places a ‘No Tow’ flag on the nose
points, and distorted bolt holes in the torque tube. gear to prevent someone from moving the aircraft
In discussions between the Transportation when the locks are engaged.
Safety Board (TSB), System Safety personnel and For outsiders looking in, likely without all the
the management of both the aircraft operator and exact facts, it would be easy to blame any or all of
the FBO, all agreed that the situation could have the people involved in this situation. Instead, let’s
been avoided, and had the potential to be an live by our motto and simply learn from this event.
extremely serious event. It was determined that the As pilots and aircraft captains, we are ultimately
rudder damage, which occurred during the short responsible for the proper care, and parking, of the
night holdover, was most likely caused by the jet aircraft under our guard. Always make sure your
blast of the departing 727. Given that most of the FBO has a total understanding of your aircraft and
damage was internal, it would have been very diffi- what needs to be done to protect it, including spac-
cult for the pilot to find it during the walk-around if ing between other aircraft. Let’s never for a
he didn’t know what he was looking for. It also took moment relinquish this responsibility to a stranger
place during a calm night where external damage with two flashlights in his hands!
was not expected.

Mystery Damage in the

Cargo Hold…
Guess what caused this damage inside this forward bulk com-
partment of a Boeing 757? A detonation? Wrong. Explosive
decompression? Try again. A mad Pit Bull? You got it! A Pit Bull
in serious need of TLC escaped from his kennel in the forward
bin and decided to chew through reinforced fiberglass, coaxial
cables and other wires. The flight reportedly lost TCAS, both
ATC transponders and a VHF/VOR receiver. The damage was
so serious, it caused the operator to establish a new policy of not
accepting animals of any kind with the potential of doing such
damage.
Dangerous cargo takes a whole new meaning…

16 ASL 2/2003