J 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 1960 2019 4 LW 418 Shankarcharithran19 Msrclorg 20231109 083027 1 46
J 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 1960 2019 4 LW 418 Shankarcharithran19 Msrclorg 20231109 083027 1 46
plaintiff's right to exploit the works composed or claim conflicting rights and
cost of the suit.
3. Heard the detailed submissions of Mr. P. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel for Mr.
Ilaiyaraja/D1 in the 1st suit/plaintiff in the 2nd suit, Mr. Anirudh Krishnan, learned
counsel for D1 & D4 in the 2nd suit/plaintiff in 1st suit and Mr. Sathish Kumar for D4 in
the 2nd suit. There is no representation for the other parties despite service being
complete on all. The 2nd suit has been dismissed for default as regard D1 on
29.09.2016.
4. I start the narration of facts with the submissions of Mr. Ilaiyaraja, despite the
fact that he is the plaintiff only in the second suit. This is for the reason that the entire
lis revolves around the ownership of the Intellectual property in the music
compositions/musical works of Mr. Ilaiyaraja. The Annexure to the 2nd suit contains
reference to 1074 compositions. The Schedule and Exhibit to the Sound Recording
Licence Agreement dated 27.11.2007 relied upon by Agi Music Sdn Bhd refers to 678
films in which 3811 songs have been composed by Mr. Ilaiyaraja and the Annexure to
the written statement filed by Echo, D2 in the 2nd suit, refers to Agreements with
Producers in relation to 310 films in which Mr. Ilaiyaraja has composed music, of which
259 have been filed and marked as evidence by Echo. It thus seems appropriate to me
that the narration of facts commences with his submissions.
5. The plaint pleadings (2nd suit) are not very detailed at all and are supplemented
in great detail by the submissions of Mr. P. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of Mr. Ilaiyaraja, assisted by Mr. S.P. Vijayaraghavan and for Mr. S.K.
Rakhunathan and Mr. S. Kingsten Jerald. The stand of Mr. Ilaiyaraja, in both suits is as
follows:
(i) Mr. Ilaiyaraja is a renowned music composer, acknowledged to be one of the
finest in the world. As on date of institution of the second suit, his compositions
number in excess of 4,500 songs for more than 1000 films. The genres that he
has composed in include films, popular music, western music, orchestral, folk,
religious and world music, choral music and oratorios. His music has been an
intrinsic part of several films in many languages. He contends that he is the sole
and absolute owner of the rights subsisting in the ‘musical work’ and ‘sound
recordings’ contained in the films as well as stand-alone independent
compositions, in terms of the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as
‘Act’).
(ii) The plaint sets out his achievements in the music world in extenso, pointing out
that he is celebrated throughout the world for the creativity and depth in his
compositions. He has been awarded the Padma Bhushan by the Government of
India. He asserts his right in law to the music composed by him as well the right
to assign the right of reproduction, exploitation and use thereof to anyone, at his
discretion.
(iii) As far as Echo Recording Company Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘Echo’) is
concerned, the plaint is absolutely bereft of details. There are no pleadings that
are specific to, or descriptive of the specific cause of action pleaded as against
Echo, except in the concluding portion of paragraph 3 where he states in general
terms as follows: ‘According to the act the plaintiff is the sole and absolute
owner of the right in respect of the musical works sound recording contained in
the films and as well as the independent artistic composer. In fact the plaintiff
has absolute right for production reproduction, use and sale to anybody on
whatsoever manner work performed by the plaintiff on the artistic and musical
manner. The plaintiff has every right assign the same to anybody on his choice
for the consideration or by assignment. The precondition for the same is that the
royalty of the same assignment should be paid the author viz., plaintiff. As per
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the act the plaintiff is the exclusive copyright holder of the musical works
performed in the films including the right to make and release the copies of the
said works by eluting the works any manner.’
(iv) Paragraph 7 of the plaint, detailing the cause of action, states that the plaintiff
has been carrying on business of composing music in Chennai from 1974 till date
of suit. There is also reference to the defendants having approached Mr.
Ilaiyaraja seeking exploitation of his ‘musical works’ and ‘sound recordings’ and
him having granted them permission upon condition that royalty be paid to him.
A generic statement that no royalty has been paid is made but no details of
defaults are provided.
(v) Though he states that he holds complete and absolute right over his musical
works, on account of the paucity of time to devote to more mundane or material
pursuits such as distribution, exhibition or exploitation thereof, Mr. Ilaiyaraja, on
27.11.2007, executed an Assignment Agreement assigning to his wife, Mrs.
Jeevaraja, all and complete rights in his musical works/compositions detailed in
Exhibit A thereof.
(vi) Mrs. Jeevaraja, in turn, licensed the rights of exploitation of the same to Agi
Music Sdn Bhd, at the behest of the latter (Agi Music Sdn Bhd/D1 & D4 in the 2nd
suit/plaintiff in 1st suit and is hereinafter referred to as ‘Agi Music’), vide a Sound
Recording Licensing Agreement (referred to hereinafter as ‘SRLA’), upon
condition that royalties be paid to Mr. Ilaiyaraja.
(vii) A Sub-Publishing Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘SPA’) dated
24.11.2007 was also entered into by and between Raja Music Universals, by Mrs.
Jeevaraja, as its owner and Agi Music, as sub-publisher, to the effect that the
latter was granted world rights to print, publish and vend the compositions listed
in the Schedule/Exhibit A thereto for a period of 10 (ten) years upon payment of
royalty.
(viii) An Addendum dated 06.01.2010 had been executed, according to Agi Music,
to both the SRLA and SPA making some additions to the main agreements. The
Addendum has been denied outright by Mr. Ilaiyaraja who contends that the
document was illegal and the signatures therein said to be those of his wife as
well as the initials therein said to be his, constituted a rank forgery.
(ix) I must digress at this juncture to state that the factum of assignment of
copyright to Mrs. Jeevaraja or the subsequent licensing of the rights by her to
Agi Music does not figure in the suit pleadings. This has led to a serious objection
by Agi Music that Mr. Ilaiyaraja is patently guilty of suppression of facts
particularly seeing as the 1st suit has been filed by Agi Music making claims
based upon the aforesaid agreements even as early as in 2013 in which
summons had been served upon Mr. Ilaiyaraja by the time the 2nd suit came to
be filed. I will deal with this objection in due course.
(x) To continue with the narration, though the SRLA and SPA stipulate a period of
ten years for their validity, no period is stipulated in respect of the Assignment to
Mrs. Jeevaraja. The argument of Mr. Ilaiyaraja is that the provisions of Section 19
(5) of the Act provides for a period of five (5) years, by default, if the agreement
for assignment of copyright was silent as to the period of such assignment. Thus,
according to Mr. Ilaiyaraja, by statutory mandate, the assignment of the rights to
his wife was for a period of five years only. Consequently, both the SRLA and SPA
dated 24.11.2007 cease to have any effect from 27th November 2012. In any
event, Mrs. Jeevaraja had passed away on 31.10.2011 and thus the assignment
dated 24.11.2007 could not have survived thereafter post her demise. For these
reasons, Mr. Ilaiyaraja contends that the assignment of his copyright and sound
recording rights as well as the subsequent licenses/rights came to an end on
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(ii) Echo was started, according to Mr. Ilaiyaraja, only by him and owes its fame
solely to the successful music created/composed by him for the film ‘Moondram
Pirai’. This was done solely to encourage and help Mr. Subramanyam, who
started Echo.
(iii) Echo has no permission from Mr. Ilaiyaraja to exploit his works and no
document has been produced in this regard.
(iv) Detailed reference is made by Mr. Ilaiyaraja to the provisions of the Act to
establish that he is the legal owner of the copyright in the music composed by
him, used as ‘sound recordings’ in several cinematographic films, specifically
various clauses of section 2 as well as Sections 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 51 and 55.
(v) The provisions of the Copyright Act make it clear that Mr. Ilaiyaraja, as the
‘author’, is the sole, exclusive and absolute owner of all rights contained in his
‘musical works’ and ‘sound recordings’. According to him, such rights extend to
the right to produce, reproduce, use and sell such works to any person or entity
of his choice, upon such terms as he may think fit.
(vi) Echo was started as a sole proprietorship in 1981 by one, Mr. Subramanyam. It
was converted into a private limited company in the year 1988. It is a recording
company in the business of purchasing ‘sound recordings’ from producers of
cinematograph films and using the same to manufacture cassettes and compact
discs for sale.
(vii) Echo states that it has obtained licenses/assignments for the ‘sound
recordings’ based on the ‘musical works’ of Mr. Ilaiyaraja from various producers
of the films, who, according to it are the owners of the such recordings.
(viii) According to Echo, the suit is entirely misconceived as Mr. Ilaiyaraja is
incorrect in the appreciation of the factual and legal position in issue, to the
extent to which he believes that it is the composer of the music who holds the
copyright in this regard.
(ix) The suit is also contested on the ground of lack of maintainability stating that it
is bad for the misjoinder of parties.
(x) The Act provides that a ‘sound recording’ right vests only in the producer, who
is both its ‘Author’ as well as ‘First Owner’. Mr. Ilaiyaraja has been engaged by
various producers to compose music for the films they produce. He thus,
according to Echo, enjoys only the status of an employee, employed to compose
music for their films and holds no other right barring the aforesaid. Once the
musical work has been commissioned for the purpose of a specific film, the
composer receives adequate remuneration in this regard from the producer.
Thereafter, no rights can be said to enure to the music composer. The evidence
recorded clearly establishes that Mr. Ilaiyaraja has received remuneration for all
the assignments including royalty therefrom, as extracted below:
Cross Examination by Echo, D2, on 25.02.2016:
…… I admit that I received the remuneration of my work whenever I composed
music for films. Usually the producer will disperse my remuneration.’
The aforesaid is, according to Echo, the correct legal position and there is thus no
statutory support for the argument of, and entitlement claimed by Mr. Ilaiyaraja.
(xi) Though no agreements have been produced as between Mr. Ilaiyaraja and
Echo, Echo has made continuous remittances of royalty till 1990 and stopped
thereafter. This confirms the factum of acceptance and acquiescence of Echo that
Mr. Ilaiyaraja holds rights in the ‘sound recordings’. Evidence in this regard has
been let in, in the form of invoices/vouchers for payment of royalty to Mr.
Ilaiyaraja (Exs.A.12 to A.40, A.42 to A.71, A.73 to 78, and A.81 to A.87).
(xii) As far as the payment of royalty to Mr. Ilaiyaraja is concerned, Echo admits the
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same. However, such royalty has been paid on the basis of the arrangement with
the producers and not on the basis of the alleged ownership of the work of Mr.
Ilaiyaraja.
(xiii) Echo confirms that it holds valid Assignment Agreements with different
producers, 310 in number, out of which 259, ranging between the years 1981 to
1991, have been marked and filed as documents. It was unable to locate 41
agreements on account of the distance of time involved. By virtue of the
Agreements, Echo has been given the right from the producers to exploit the
‘sound recordings’ based on the ‘musical works’ composed by Mr. Ilaiyaraja.
(xiv) Mr. Ilaiyaraja strongly disagrees with the interpretation canvassed by Echo.
His legal argument is that he has the unbridled right to exploit his ‘musical
works’ in his admitted capacity as the ‘author’ of such work. For this proposition,
he relies on the definitions of ‘author’, ‘cinematograph film’, ‘infringing copy’,
‘producer’, ‘sound recording’, ‘work’, ‘composer’, ‘musical work’ and ‘adaption’ in
sections 2(d), 2(f), 3(m), 2(uu), 2(xx), 2(y), 2(ffa), 2(p) and 2(a) of the Act.
(xv) Thereafter, detailed reference is made to Sections 13, 14 and 17 to establish
that he is the ‘first owner’ of the Copyright in the musical work, and thus is
vested with the right of reproduction or any other form of exploitation of such
work to the exclusion of any other person/entity.
(xvi) As regards the stand of Echo as well as the 259 Agreements relied upon by it
are concerned, the following specific arguments are advanced by Mr. Ilaiyaraja:
(a) The Copyright Amendment Act, 1994 substitutes the word ‘record’ wherever
it occurred in the main Act with the phrase ‘sound recording’. The use of the
phrase ‘sound recording’ is only prospective as seen in the notes of clauses
when the Act was amended. Thus, the agreements relied upon by Echo would
have to be read only as they are without interpolating the words ‘sound
recording’ therein. It is not the case of Echo that the words ‘sound recording’
have been substituted by way of an addendum to the original agreements and
thus the agreements do not protect, in any way, the claims of Echo.
(b) This argument of non-marketability of ‘sound recordings’ on the ground that
the agreements do not provide for the same, is countered vehemently by
ECHO pointing out that rights over ‘sound recordings’ and ‘musical works’
have been provided for ever since the inception of the Copyright Act in 1957.
The Act, as it stood promulgated in 1957, provided for the same rights as the
present Act does. In other words ‘sound recordings’ have always been intrinsic
part of the Copyright Act and the only change over time was the medium
upon which the sound is recorded.
(c) The version of the Copyright Act, 1957 as originally passed and the amended
Act notified on 09.05.1995 are compared to show that no new rights have
been created by the 1995 amendment in respect of ‘sound recording’ and
such rights are an intrinsic part and parcel of the original Act.
(d) The effect of the argument advanced by Mr. Ilaiyaraja would be to question
whether at all such a right, viz., ‘sound recording’ exists and who owns the
Copyright in that regard. This is inconceivable and a distortion of the law,
according to Echo. Echo states that the media upon which music is recorded
over time has changed in terms of advancement in technology and
refinements thereof. Music was originally recorded upon a ‘disc’ or ‘record’ and
connotes the medium itself upon which the recordings of sounds as well as
medium was understood in the 1950s when the statute was enacted.
However, the word ‘record’ connotes only the factum of recording thereupon
and reference to ‘sound recording’ should be read to be synonymous with the
word ‘record’.
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(e) With the passage of time, the media upon which sounds were recorded
increased manifold and as on date sound is recorded upon an extensive range
and variety of media. In fact, today, one does not even require physical
recording of sounds that can simply be downloaded from intangible spaces
such as the Internet or the Cloud. It is for this reason that legislature has
connoted the phrase ‘sound recording’ to merely indicate the act of
preservation of the sound, whatever be and without restriction, of the
medium.
(f) In summary, Echo canvases the position that ‘sound recordings’, though
recorded in different media, were always a subject matter of the Copyright
Act, such right vesting only with the producers and Mr. Ilaiyaraja or any other
composer for that matter did not retain any right over the same.
(g) Mr. Ilaiyaraja then argues that the agreements relied upon by Echo are
envisaged to survive, if at all, only during the existence of the Copyright Act,
1957 or modifications thereto ‘for the time being in force’, that is, during the
tenure of the agreements itself being between 1981 and 1991. No subsequent
amendments to the statute would impact the same. The agreements have
thus worked themselves out and do not, in any way, impinge upon the rights
of Mr. Ilaiyaraja.
(h) In the absence of evidence produced by Echo to establish that Mr. Ilaiyaraja
has transferred the rights in his music compositions to the producers, he
would urge that the Court eschew the argument of Echo to the effect that the
producer retains the rights in the music and sound recording in the films, to
his exclusion.
(i) If really the rights had thus been transferred, there would have been no
necessity to include Clause 6(b) in the agreements entered into by Echo with
the producers whereby the producers undertake to indemnify Echo against
any claims or damages arising out of the rights assigned/transferred.
(j) According to Echo, Mr. Ilaiyaraja being a composer of the stature that he is, is
fully aware of the fact that no rights vests in him, as far as the ‘sound
recording’ of his composition are concerned.
(k) According to Mr. Ilaiyaraja, it was he who had facilitated the business of
ECHO by requesting the producers to enter into sound distribution agreements
with it sans any consideration, on his personal request solely as a measure to
support to it. This, according to ECHO, reveals clearly that Mr. Ilaiyaraja was
quite aware of the legal position that no rights in regard to the ‘sound
recordings’ vest in him, since had it been otherwise, he would have
transferred such rights to sound recording companies, such as ECHO himself,
and there would have been no necessity to request the producers to do so.
(l) In response, Mr. Ilaiyaraja produces a communication issued by the Tamil
Films Producers' Council bearing Ref. No. 2011/2013-2014 dated 27.02.2014
(Ex.A1), extracted below, confirming that he is the author of the creations
mentioned in the list.
“To whomsoever it may concern
This is to certify that the list of names of films enclosed herewith have
Music Directed, Composed including Songs, Tunes, BGM's, Overall themes
Music, Orchestra, Creativeness, Recording & Re-Recording by the Legend of
the Indian Cinema “Maestro-Isaignani Ilaaraja”, S/o. Ramasamy (late)
residing at No. 38, Murugesan St., T. Nagar, Chennai 600017.
All the films mentioned in the list are belongs to “Maestro-Isaignani
Ilaiyaraja” who is also the author of above said creations.”
Sd/-
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A. Kothandaramaiah (K.R.)
President
(m) According to Echo, the above letter from the Producers' Council does
not impact the legal position that Mr. Ilaiyaraja does not own any of the rights
in the ‘sound recording’.
(xvii) Mr. Ilaiyaraja then argues that Section 13(4) of the Act specifically provides
for a separate Copyright in respect of any work or part of the work that has been
utilized as part of a cinematograph film. Thus, the copyright held by a creator of
a part of a film, would not be affected by the ownership of the Copyright in the
entirety of the film, even if the latter was held by the producer.
(xviii) He relies on the provisions of Section 17 read with Section 2(d)(ii) of the Act
that protects the right of the ‘first owner’ of the Copyright, which, according to
him, is himself. The producer could thus not have transferred non-existing rights
to Echo and the agreements are vitiated on these grounds.
(xix) According to Mr. Ilaiyaraja, though the producer of a cinematograph film holds
the right in respect of the film itself, it does not obliterate in any manner, the
separate copyright that exists in various components of the film itself including
the musical and literary works.
(xx) He relies on a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Madhu v.
Ramesan (CDJ 1987 Ker HC 557) for the proposition that it is the film producer
upon whom rests the burden to establish that he had commissioned the author
to compose the work in question for valuable consideration, which has not been
done in the present case by the defendants. Reliance is placed on a decision of
this Court in Lalgudi Jayaraman v. Cleveland Cultural Alliance (2008 5 MLJ 458)
to establish that where a right over an artistic/musical/literary work is claimed by
an entity, apart from the author, such entity is under a very heavy burden to
show that the work was commissioned by him, was created in the course of
employment by the author and that there was no agreement to the contrary. In
the present case, this burden has not been discharged by Echo and its case
would thus, have to fall.
(xxi) A comparison is made between the statutory provisions, as they stood prior to
amendment by the 2012 Act and subsequent thereto, to bring home the point
that the rights vesting in a music composer have expanded considerably after
the amendment and as such it was the music composer in whom the copyright in
such work vests and who holds the exclusive rights for the exploitation thereof,
as in the present case.
(xxii) It is contended that the making and exploitation of the sound recording de
hors the visuals that accompany the ‘sound recording’ in the cinematograph
films constitute a clear and categoric infringement of the authors' protected
right. As far as the producer is concerned and any other person/entity that
derives power from the producer, the right extends only to the reproduction of
the sound recording as part of the film itself. To clarify, only the
broadcast/telecast/exhibition of the sound recording along with the visual effects
that accompany it in the original cinematograph film is a permissible exploitation
and any exploitation de hors the visual effects and outside the setting of the
cinematograph films, constitutes rank infringement.
(xxiii) According to him, the beneficial interest claimed through the agreements
would tantamount to an actionable claim governed by Section 3 of the Transfer
of Property Tax, 1882 and the transfer of such actionable claims could only be by
execution of a non-testamentary instrument in writing as per Section 130(1)
thereof.
(xxiv) Reference is also made to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 to
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urge that though Echo asserts that it has the right to exploit the ‘sound
recordings’, such right being derived from the permissions granted to the
producer by the author, Mr. Ilaiyaraja, no proof of such permission/waver of right
has been produced before this Court. Thus, adverse inference has to be drawn as
the defendants have not established their rights at all. The producers have also
not been impleaded as parties to the suits to establish the veracity of the
submissions/claims of Echo.
(xxv) Finally Mr. Ilaiyaraja places great reliance upon an order of the Income tax
Appellate Tribunal, confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in M.
Subramaniam v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (272 ITR 525) to the
effect that Echo is only a licencee and not an owner of the intellectual property in
the ‘sound recording’ based on the music compositions of Mr. Ilaiyaraja. This
position was canvassed successfully by Echo before the Income tax authorities in
the context of proceedings under the Income tax Act, 1961 and Echo is thus
estopped from taking a contrary and contradictory view now, in civil proceedings.
(xxvi) Mr. Ilaiyaraja relies on the following judgments to buttress his submissions:
(i) Dr. H.S. Rikhy v. The New Delhi Municipal Committee (AIR 1962 SC 554)
(ii) Provash Chandra Dalui v. Biswanath Banerjee (1989 Supp (1) SCC 487)
(iii) Modi Co. v. Union of India (1969 AIR (SC) 9)
(iv) Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez (AIR 1969 SC 1201(1)
(v) Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak ((2008) 1 SCC 1 : 2008 AIR (SC) 809)
(vi) The Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Subramaniam (272 ITR 525)
(vii) Ramswaroop Bagari v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2002 Rajasthan 27)
(viii) Sardar Bir Singh v. Noor Ahmed (AIR 1972 Gauhati 122)
(ix) Holy Faith International Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Shiv K. Kumar (2006 AIR (AP) 198)
(x) Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Haldwani v. Dhanram Singh (AIR 1990
Allahabad 104)
(xi) Madhu v. Ramesan (CDJ 1987 Ker HC 557)
(xii) Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Music Broadcast India Ltd. (Appeal
No. 615 of 2011 in Suit No. 2401 of 2006 dated 29.09.2011)
(xxvii) ECHO places substantial reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Eastern Indian Motion
Pictures Association (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPRS’) ((1977) 2 SCC 820 :
AIR 1977 SC 1443) as well as the following cases:
(i) Music Broadcast Private Limited v. IPRS (2011 (47) PTC 592)
(ii) IPRS v. Aditya Pandey (2012 (50) PTC 460)
(iii) Radio Today Broadcasting Ltd. v. IPRS (2009 (39) PTC 43)
(iv) Lahiri Recording Co. Ltd. v. Music Master Video Mfg. Co. Ltd. (2008
(37) PTC 121)
(v) Gramaphone Company of India Limited v. Shanti Films Corporation (AIR
1987 Cal 63)
(vi) Mathrubhumi & Malayala Manorama v. IPRS (unreported Kerala High
Court judgment in FAO Nos. 82, 83 of 2009 & 38 of 2010 dated 08.02.2011)
(vii) M. Padmini v. Raj Television Network (unreported Madras High Court in
O.A. No. 763 of 2013 in C.S. No. 686 of 2013 dated 13.4.2015)
(viii) Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society ((2014) 2 SCC 269 :
AIR 2014 SC 937)
(xxviii) On the basis of the aforesaid arguments, it is argued by Mr. Ilaiyaraja that
the exploitation of the ‘musical works’ authored by him in the form of ‘sound
recordings’, by Echo, particularly in the absence of any proof produced to show
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that the rights in such works have been transferred by him to the producers of
cinematograph films, amounts to infringement in terms of Section 51 of the Act.
B. Mr. Ilaiyaraja vis-a-vis Agi Music and vice versa
(i) According to Agi Music, the proposal to conditionally exploit Mr. Ilaiyaraja's
music commenced in 2004 and on 24.11.2007 a SRLA was entered into
between Mrs. Jeevaraja and Agi Music for a period of ten (10) years. The
agreement was accompanied by a compact disk (CD), a schedule and
Exhibit, and which contained a list of films and songs numbering 678 and
3811 respectively, to which the agreement related.
(ii) On the same day, a SPA was entered into between the parties enabling Agi
Music to exploit the music works for a period of ten (10) years. Both these
agreements had been drafted by Agi Music as admitted in evidence.
(iii) An addendum was entered into on 06.01.2010 reiterating the earlier
agreements and extending the scope of the same to the subject ‘music
products’ in digitized form also.
(iv) Though the SRLA provided for exclusive world right for exploitation of the
sound recordings of Mr. Ilaiyaraja, and contained a negative covenant as
per which Mrs. Jeevaraja would not grant rights to any other person or
entity rights inconsistent with the right granted to Agi Music, Mr. Ilaiyaraja
had proceeded to violate the same to the detriment of Agi Music.
(v) Thus, Agi Music seeks permanent injunctions as prayed for as well as
restitution for losses sustained by it.
(vi) According to Mr. Ilaiyaraja, the SRLA as well as the SRA have lapsed since
they were based upon an Assignment of his copyright to his wife, Mrs.
jeevaraja, for a period five years. Any licenses granted in excess of the
period of assignments were invalid. Admittedly, the deed of assignment
does not contain a term. In such circumstances, the provisions of Section
19(5) of the Act mandate that the period would be five (5) years. Thus,
according to him, the assignment agreement dated 24.11.2007 would
survive only for a period of five (5) years and has expired as on
23.11.2012.
(vii) Moreover his wife, Mrs. Jeevaraja, had expired on 31.10.2011 and with
her the assignment of the copyrights as well. Thus there was no force in the
contentions of Agi Music as no claims could be entertained on the basis of
lapsed documents. Even according to Agi Music Mr. Ilaiyaraja had
approached Modern Cinemas, D2 in the 1st suit, only in 2013 after the
assignment to Mrs. Jeevaraja had expired.
Single and composite transaction
(viii) Agi Music argues that the entire transaction as between Mr. Ilaiyaraja,
Mrs. Jeeveraja and itself be viewed as a single arrangement and an implied
term of 10 years be read into the Assignment Agreement. Exhibit A is
common to all three (3) agreements entered into leading to the conclusion
that the transaction was one single composite transaction. Thus, even the
assignment agreement would have to be construed as being in force for a
period of 10 years though the tenure is not specifically mentioned therein.
(ix) The composite transaction has also been understood by Mr. Ilaiyaraja to
be a single transaction and specific reference is made to a letter from Mr.
Ilaiyaraja dated 12.07.2011 confirming the ownership of copyright by him
and describing Agi Music as his exclusive licencee.
(x) Reliance is placed in this regard upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in
the case of Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanguine Publishers
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(1956 RTC 40). The agreement in that case did not mention a term and
thus the Delhi High Court embarked upon the interpretation of the phrase
used therein being ‘full right to publish throughout the world’. This decision
is distinguished by Mr. Ilaiyaraja on facts.
Payment of Royalty
(xi) That apart, Agi Music has defaulted in the remittances of royalty and Mr.
Ilaiyaraja has reserved his right to proceed against it in this regard. The
plaint is accompanied by a computation of the Royalties due and payable to
Mr. Ilaiyaraja for the period 2007 to 2014 when, according to him, his
intellectual property was being continuously exploited by Agi Music as
follows:
ABSTRACT LIST TOTAL PENDING DUE AS ON DATE
S. No. Year Share Amount Receipt Pending Due
1 Total revenue 66,00,000 Nil 66,00,000.00
share on 2007-
2008
2 Total revenue 66,00,000 1,49,271.81 64,50,728.19
share on 2009-
2010
3 Total revenue 66,00,000 3,83,577.00 62,16,423.00
share on 2010-
2011
4 Total revenue 53,00,000 1,24,000.00 51,76,000.00
share on 2011-
2012
5 Total revenue 53,00,000 7,00,000 46,00,000.00
share on 2012-
2013
6 Total revenue 53,00,000 NIL 53,00,000.00
share on 2013-
2014
Total 3,37,43,151.19
outstanding
due
Receipt on 10.06.2001 from MACP = 5,92,156.24
Receipt on 12.08.2012 from MACP = 11,80,264.73
Total outstanding to be payable by Agi Music SDN BHD.
= 3,37,43,151.19 - 17,72,420.97 = Rs. 3,19,70,730.22
(xii) As regards the issue raised about non-payment of royalties after 2013
and thus, facet acceptance of Agi Music that the assignment was only for 5
years Agi Music argues that the payments have admittedly been made till
2012. Normally the practice of Agi Music was to make the payments for the
previous financial year during the months of July to September. Thus, for
the financial year 2012-13 payments were due between July to September
2013. However, when Mr. Ilaiyaraja filed his written statement to C.S. No.
308 of 2013 contending that the agreement between Agi Music and Mrs.
Jeevaraja was only for 5 years, Agi Music did not make a serious attempt
thereafter to remit royalties only by virtue of the stand of Mr. Ilaiyaraja. In
fact, even after this an attempt was made on 04.08.2014 to deposit
royalties for 2013-14 but Agi Music was unable to do so, since Mr. Ilaiyaraja
had closed that particular bank account.
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(xiii) Agi also contests the 2nd suit on the ground of non-joinder of parties.
Though Mrs. Jeevaraja passed away in 2011 and the 2nd suit filed in 2014,
none of the legal heirs of Mrs. Jeevaraja have been made a party to the
suit. Thus, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Agi Music
also argues that the definition of the word ‘owner’ in the suit agreement
includes ‘successor’ and seeing as Mrs. Jeevaraja had passed away on
31.10.2011, the agreement would continue to bind her legal heirs including
her husband, Mr. Ilaiyaraja. This argument is negated pointing out that the
assignment to Mrs. Jeevaraja was itself only for a period of five (5) years
and even though upon expiry of the agreement, the rights reverted back to
Mr. Ilaiyaraja, there was admittedly no documentation entered into by Mr.
Ilaiyaraja with Agi Music and thus, the question of continuation of the
licence and publishing agreements does not arise at all. Though raised in
the written submission this ground has not been seriously pursued in the
course of arguments.
(xiv) In the course of the oral hearing, an argument is advanced by Agi Music,
sailing along with Echo in its stand that the copyright in a ‘sound recording’
vests only in the producer, that the words ‘sound recording’ appearing in
the SRLA and SPA be struck off adopting the ‘blue pencil principle’ and be
replaced instead by the words ‘musical works’. The argument is objected to
on the ground that it is an afterthought and does not find place in the
pleadings. In any event, and admittedly, royalty has been paid by Agi
Music pursuant to agreement dated 24.11.2007 and there is no prayer for
refund of the same.
(xv) Then again, a contradictory stand is taken by Agi Music by adopting in
full the arguments of Mr. Ilaiyaraja and supporting his stand that the music
composer has full rights vested in him in respect of the ‘musical works’ that
he composes. Reliance is placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this
Court in Muthooth Financial Ltd. v. The Indian Performing Arts Society Ltd.,
OSA No. 64 of 2009, order dated 9-9-2009 (Mad).
(xvi) The decision in Associated Hotels of India Limited v. R.N. Kapoor (AIR 59
SC 1262) and Didi Modes Pvt. Ltd. v. Hindi Trading Manufacturing Company
(AIR 96 Delhi 319) is referred to by Agi Music for the proposition that a
transaction should have to be determined in substance and not merely
upon the description of such transaction in the document. These cases are
distinguished by Mr. Ilaiyaraja who points out that they relate to leave and
licence under the provisions of the Delhi, Ajmer and Merwer Rent Control
Act, 1994 and interpret the phrase ‘a room in a hotel’. In the present case,
there is no room for such interpretation since the agreements are clear and
there is no room for ambiguity.
(xvii) Mr. Ilaiyaraja places reliance is placed on the decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Holy Faith International Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Shiv K Kumar
(33 PTC 456) to illustrate that if the transaction in question is not bona
fide, the Court will refrain from assisting such transaction. The decisions in
Samanth N. Balakrishnan v. George Fernandez ((1969) 3 SCC 238 : Air
1969 SC 1201), Laxmi Raja Shetty v. State of T.N. ((1988) 3 SCC 319 :
AIR 1988 SC 1274) and Ramaswaroop Bagari v. State of Rajasthan (AIR
2002 Rajasthan 27) have been relied upon to say that no averment without
proof and establishment of the same through evidence and witnesses is
acceptable, and at best, such information would constitute hearsay or
secondary evidence. In the present case no evidence has been let in by
either of the defendants in support of their arguments and their statements
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Mrs. Jeevaraja does not comply with the mandatory conditions for a valid
assignment under Section 19 that are, (i) the agreement should be in
writing and signed by the assigner or duly authorised agent (ii) It should
identify the work, the duration of the assignment and the territorial area to
which it shall apply (iii) It shall mention, the royalty payable. According to
Agi Music, these mandatory conditions have not been satisfied. The royalty,
in this case has also been received by Mr. Ilaiyaraja and, by conduct, the
agency has, in fact, been accepted by him. This argument is carried forward
by relying on the following cases as well as the definition of agency by
Bowstead:
(a) Wilson v. Tumman, [(1843) 6 MAN 236]
(b) Rodmell v. Eden, [(1859) 1 F&F 542]
(c) Surendra Nath Roy v. Kedar Nath Bose
(d) S.N. Soni v. Taufiq Farooqi [AIR 1976 Del 63]
(e) M.C.S. Rajan & Co. v. National Nail Industries
(f) G. Vasantha Bai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner Land
Reforms, [Madras 1998 (2) CTC 272]
(g) K. Santhanam v. S. Kavitha through her sub-power agent K. Seerappan
(xxiv) Specific reliance is placed on Section 196 of The Contract Act, dealing
with creation of an agency by conduct of parties. According to Agi Music,
Section 196 would apply even in those situations where, there was no prior
agency and the Court can infer a fresh or a new arrangement of agency,
where the circumstances so warrant.
(xxv) The argument on agency is opposed by Mr. Ilaiyaraja on the ground that
there is absolutely no material in support of the same. He argues that such
a relationship, premised on a legal understanding between the parties
cannot be assumed merely for the asking by the defendants. In fact, the
oral evidence by way of chief and cross-examination does not contain a
single question in relation to the existence or otherwise of the relationship
of agency and this argument is clearly an afterthought, liable to be rejected
in limine. It is clear from agreement dated 24.11.2007 Mr. Jeeva Raja was
nothing but an assignee of Mr. Ilaiyaraja and nothing more.
Restitution of losses
(xxvi) According to Agi Music, it is suffering substantial losses on account of
the injunction granted in favour of Mr. Ilaiyaraja operating against it from
20.09.2014 and is thus, entitled for restitution on account of this loss. All
the more so, since the delay in the present matter was only on account of
Mr. Ilaiyaraja, who had violated the timeframes set by the Division Bench in
O.S.A. No. 114 to 116 of 2015. The restitution is calculated by adopting an
average annual royalty for the period 2007 to 2012 amounting to Rs.
2,71,360/- per year for a period of three(3) years two(2) months coming to
amounting of Rs. 8,59,335/-. Alternatively, Agi Music states that the right
to royalty be extended by the period when the interim injunction was in
force.
(xxvii) With respect to the defence of restitution taken by Agi Music relying
upon the decisions of Southern East Coastfield v. State of M.P.((2003) 8
SCC 648) and Karnataka Rare Earth v. Senior Geologist, Department of
Mines ((2004) 2 SCC 783) Mr. Ilaiyaraja argues that he who seeks equity
must also act equitably. Agi Music being an infringer has no right to seek
equity from the Court.
(xxviii) Agi Music also relies upon a slew of decisions under the caption
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7. Should the 2nd Defendant be restrained from breaching the negative covenant
contained in Clause 2 of the SRLA?
8. Is the Plaintiff entitled to the reliefs sought for?
Issues in C.S. No. 625 of 2014:
1. Whether the suit is barred by law in view of the provisions of the Copyright
Act, 1957 especially with regard to “sound recordings”?
2. What is the role played by the plaintiff in the schedule mentioned
“cinematograph films” and whether that role entitles him to any right over the
said film songs and sound recordings under the Copyrights Act, 1957?
3. Whether the plaintiff is the “owner” of the “sound recordings” in the schedule
mentioned films?
4. Whether the 2nd defendant has obtained rights of the “sound recordings” from
various producers of the movies mentioned in “Annexure 1” of the Written
Statement?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief against the 2nd defendant in view
of the agreement entered into between the 2nd defendant and the various
producers of the movies mentioned in “Annexure 1” of the Written Statement?
6. Whether the 2nd defendant is entitled to exploit the rights over the “sound
recordings” with regard to songs/music of the movies mentioned in “Annexure
1” of the Written Statement?
7. Whether the Suit is liable for misjoinder of parties and whether the plaint
discloses any nexus between the defendants?
8. Whether the agreement between the plaintiff and his wife and consequently
the agreement between the plaintiff's wife and the 4th defendant is valid in the
eye of law?
9. Has the plaintiff assigned his copyright in relation to the songs which are the
subject matter of this suit to his wife vide Assignment Agreement dated
24.11.2007 and if so, what is the period of assignment?
10. Did the plaintiff's wife (as an assignee of the plaintiff) and the 4th defendant
enter into a Sound Recording Licensing Agreement (“SRLA”) dated
24.11.2007 and if so what was the period of such Agreement?
11. Does Section 19(5) of the Copyrights Act apply to the present facts?
12. Has the plaintiff breached the terms of the Assignment Agreement dated
24.11.2007 and/or SRLA?
14. To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled to?
18. Though extensive arguments have been advanced on agency, stating that Mrs.
Jeevaraja would constitute an agent of Mr. Ilaiyaraja, no issue has been framed in
regard to this. In the light of the provisions of order XIV Rule 3, I thus proceed to
frame an additional issue thus.
‘Is Mrs. Jeevaraja is an agent of Mr. Ilaiyaraja for the purposes of the transaction
between herself and Agi Music’.
19. Before I commence with the discussion and conclusions on the issues framed,
certain incidental points have been raised by both parties that, I believe, are not
intrinsic to the legal issues raised or to the conclusions thereupon. One such is the
absence of reference to the Assignment Agreement, SRLA and the SPA in the plaint of
Mr. Ilaiyaraja leading Agi Music to allege suppression as well as the argument of Mr.
Ilaiyaraja that the documents relied upon by Agi Music are forged. Having stated so,
he does not pursue the argument by seeking reference of the documents to forensic
examination. References have also been made by Agi Music as well as Mr. Ilaiyaraja to
text messages exchanged to which I have not adverted in the narration. This is for the
reason that it is the legal issues that have been pursued seriously by the parties in the
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course of the hearing and not the above fringe issues that are wholly immaterial to
determine the crux of the suits. Thus, I restrict the discussions and conclusions to only
the legal issues that arise and that have been argued before me. In any event, no
issues have been framed in regard to the fringe issues and a determination of the
same is thus unnecessary.
20. Many of the issues overlap and can be bifurcated into three (3) distinct groups
relating to a single issue each. I have hence demarcated the same into three (3)
separate sets.
21. The first set of issues is really the crux of the 2nd suit and a decision thereupon
would address the allocation of the rights under the Act to the various stakeholders
engaged in the creation and production of a cinematograph film, specifically, the
producer, though not a party before me, and the music composer.
1. Whether the suit is barred by law in view of the provisions of the Copyright Act,
1957 especially with regard to “sound recordings”?
2. What is the role played by the plaintiff in the schedule mentioned
“cinematograph films” and whether that role entitles him to any right over the
said film songs and sound recordings under the Copyrights Act, 1957?
3. Whether the plaintiff is the “owner” of the “sound recordings” in the schedule
mentioned films?
4. Whether the 2nd defendant has obtained rights of the “sound recordings” from
various producers of the movies mentioned in “Annexure 1” of the Written
Statement?
22. The second set of issues touches upon the interpretation of the statutory
provisions in order to determine the rights that vest in each of the parties. The
questions raised are, who can be said to be ‘owner’ of the ‘sound recording’ and
whether Echo has obtained any right in respect of the ‘sound recordings’ from the
producers of the scheduled films. For this purpose, one would have to examine the
sample agreement entered into by Echo with a production company and I extract
hereunder an agreement entered into by Echo with a production company in respect of
the film ‘Paasapparavaigal’, as a sample, all agreements filed along with suit being
similar/identical to the same:
‘An Agreement made this 9th day of December 1987 between ECHO Recording
Co. having its Office at Cisons Complex 2nd floor, 150, Montieth Road, Egmore,
Madras - 600008, herein after called “The Company” (which expression shall mean
and include its successors and assigns) of the One Par and
M/S. POOMPUHAR PRODUCTIONS,
No. 7, Second Street,
South Gopalapuram,
Madras - 600086.
Hereinafter called “The Producer” which expression shall include his/her
successors, his/her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns] of the Other Part.
WHEREAS:
a) The Producer is actively engaged, inter alia in producing cinematograph films:
b) The Company is actively engaged, inter alia, in the manufacture, marketing
and sale of records, and pre-recorded cassettes.
c) The Producer is desirous to assign and transfer to the Company, the rights
hereinafter mentioned:
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties hereto as follows:
INTERPRETATION: In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise admits the
following expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them:
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include, but not be limited to, the exclusive right to do, or authorise the doing of,
any other following acts:—
(i) to make any other record embodying the same recording;
(ii) to reproduce any or all recording(s) covered by this agreement on record
together with any other work(s);
(iii) to cause or permit performance of the recording(s) embodied in the records
in public, and/or to publish the musical, literary dramatic and/or artistic work
(s) embodied in the recording(s);
(iv) to communicate the recording(s) embodied in the record by radio diffusion;
v) to manufacture, market, sell, lease, licence, distribute, advertise, promote or
otherwise exploit in any manner in any fields of use, records produced
hereunder, and allow others to do so, at such prices and upon such terms and
conditions, and under such trade mark(s) or label(s) or name(s) as the
Company shall desire:
(vi) to control the physical property of the original recording(s). Reference to the
doing of any act referred to above, or to refraining therefrom, shall include
reference to the doing of, or refraining from, the act in relation to either the
whole or part of the recording(s)/record(s).
6. The Producer hereby warrants and covenants with the Company as follows:—
(a) that the copyright assigned and transferred, or agreed to be assigned or
transferred, or intended to be so, hereunder, shall at all times, prior to its
being vested in the Company hereunder be the sole and exclusive right of the
Producer, free from all encumbrances;
(b) to have obtained approval and/or consent of the author(s) and performer(s)
or any other person(s) participating in any work(s) which is/are incorporated
in the cinematograph film(s) and/or the original recording(s) recognising the
respective copyright and the exclusive right(s) assigned and transferred to the
Company hereunder. The Producer further indemnifies, and holds indemnified,
the Company against all and any claims and damages arising out of the
exercise of right(s) assigned and transferred to the Company in this regard;
(c) to deliver to the Company photograph(s) or other likeness(es) of the artist
(s), performer(s) and the author(s) whose work(s) may have been
incorporated in the cinematograph film(s) and/or original recording(s),
together with their respective biographical material, with the right to
Company, accompanied, if so desired by the Company, by letters of consent of
such artist(s) performer(s) and author(s) to use the photograph(s) or other
likeness(es) or biographical material for advertising and publicity and for all
record sleeves and for any other matter connected with the making,
distribution, marketing and sale of records;
(d) to provide to the Company, at request, the Producer's logos, trademarks,
stylized lettering/designs etc. relating to the cinematograph film(s)/original
recording(s) for incorporating them on the labels, covers sleeves, catalogues,
etc. of, and for advertising the records, and to grant to the Company the right
to do so;
(e) not to do, either during the period of the Agreement or at any time
thereafter, any act or thing which may in any manner affect or prejudice the
right of the Company hereunder.
(f) to supply, simultaneously with or prior to, the delivery of each cinematograph
film/original recording, to the Company in writing the correct title(s), Score(s)
etc., of the work(s) recorded therein, and the names of the author(s) and
composer(s) thereof, together with any additional information such as the
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names of recording artists(s), year and place of such original recording etc.
7. (a) In full consideration of the assignment and transfer of rights by the
Producer to the Company under the Agreement the Company shall pay to the
Producer an all-in-royalty in respect of all records manufactured, sold and not
returned hereunder and calculated on the Company's domestic dealer price.
(exclusive of sales taxes, excise duty, octroi and other taxes and duties levied
and less a packaging deduction 20% of the dealer price for pre-recorded tapes). The
all-in-royalty shall be for each half-yearly accounting period:
12.5% if the total half yearly sales value is upto Rs. 2,00,000
13.5% if the total half yearly sales value is between Rs. 2,00,001 and Rs.
10,00,000.
14.0% if the total half yearly sales value is exceeding Rs. 10,00,001.
For the determination of the all-in-royalty rate applicable, the sales value will be
calculated at Company's domestic dealer price (exclusive of taxes, packaging
allowance etc. as above) of all records embodying the Producer's recordings,
including those of earlier contracts, sold by the Company and not returned. In
consideration thereof, this agreement shall supersede all previous agreements
between the Company and the producer, effective from the first half-yearly
accounting period after date of this Agreement.
The all-in-royalty on sale of records by the Company's licencees will be computed
separately on the same calculation basis as above.
(b) If the Producer's recordings are incorporated only in part of the records
made or lincensed by the Company, the all-in-royalty shall be calculated pro rata
according to the proportion of the Producer's recordings to the total number of
title on those records.
(c) Promotional records free or bonus records, as well as excerpts from the
recordings, used by the Company for publicity and advertising purposes or
otherwise, shall be excepted from payment of royalty.
(d) The royalty payable by the Company to the producer as herein provided
shall be the only consideration payable and the Producer warrants and represents
that he will satisfy all claims, if any, of third parties in connection with recording
(s) of which the record is made hereunder, and agrees to indemnify and keep
indemnified, the Company in respect of all demands, claims, actions and
proceedings in that behalf.
(d) The Company will pay royalties as long as the recordings covered by the
Agreement are sold by the Company or its licences, but not for longer than the
period for which the recordings are legally protected. However, in the event of
the producer committing a breach of the provisions of this or any other
agreement with Company, then, in that even, without prejudice to any other
rights or remedies which the Company may have in that behalf, the Company's
obligation to pay royalty to the Producer as herein before provided shall cease
until such time as the Producer may have remedied such default.
8. The Company shall furnish to the Producer for each half-yearly accounting
period statements showing the number and type of records made from the
Producer's recordings sold by the Company during the half-year and not returned,
and the amount of royalty due to the Producer in respect thereof, and the Company
shall pay thereafter the amount due to the Producer within 90 days.
Royalties payable for sales outside of India shall be accounted and paid for only
after the Company has received statements and payments from its clients/licenses.
If remittance to India is prevented by currency or other government restrictions,
royalty amounts due would be made available to the Producer in the country
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concerned as permissible by law. From such royalties the Company shall be entitled
to deduct all taxes and dues as demanded by the respective governments of the
countries in which such records are sold or accounted for. The Producer, at his/her
own expense, shall be entitled to receive upon so requesting, from the Company in
writing a certificate of the Company's auditors as to the correctness of any such
statements.
9. If the fulfilment of this Agreement or any part thereof shall become impossible
by reason of force majeure, or any other reason outside the control of the parties,
then either party shall be entitled (by giving notice in writing to the Other Party
hereof and without incurring liability for damages or any other compensation) to
suspend the operation of the Agreement or any part thereof until such time as such
fulfilment shall again become possible.
10. This Agreement shall be construed according to the law of India and all
matters, claims and dispute arising in respect hereof shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the relevant courts at Madras.
11. The invalidity of any one provision of this Agreement shall not invalidate the
Agreement in its entirety and any amendment, modification or alteration thereof
shall be valid and binding only if reduced into writing and executed by both the
parties.
12. Any notice arising from the terms of this agreement will be deemed to have
been duly served by either party on the other if it is sent by registered post to the
addresses entered herein above or to any other addresses which might have been
notified and duly acknowledged by the parties.’
23. Echo is the company and Poompuhar the producer, and the agreement is for
the assignment of the copyright for the exclusive right, unlimited in time, to make
records from the ‘sound recordings’ embodied in the film ‘Paasapparavaigal’ and the
‘sound recordings’ of any music, musical, literary, dramatic or artistic work that may
have been recorded by the producer with the intent of incorporating the same in the
film irrespective of whether or not it has been so incorporated.
24. The agreement proceeds on the assumption that the producer holds such right
to begin with and thus, there is no restriction or limitation placed upon him to effect
such assignment to the company. The assignment of the copyright entitles Echo to
make any other record embodying the same recording, to produce any other recording,
to cause or permit performance of such recordings, to publish the works embodied in
the recordings, broadcast the recordings by radio, to
manufacture/market/sell/lease/licence/distribute/advertise/permit or exploit the
recording in any manner whatsoever and permit others to do so such works and to
control the physical property of the original recordings.
25. The agreement required the producer to supply, simultaneous or prior to the
delivery of the cinematograph film/sound recording, the correct title(s), score(s) and
details of composer(s) thereof together with information such as the names of
recording artist(s), year and place of original recording and all other details relating to
the works themselves.
26. Royalty is to be paid to the producer by the company based on the sales of
records for which a methodology has been set out for the period when the recordings
are protected under the Act. These are the aspects of the agreement as relevant to
this matter.
27. The producer of the film has assigned the entire rights in the musical work and
songs in the cinematograph film to Echo. Obviously, the producer could not have
passed on a better right to Echo then what he had had himself to begin with, which
brings us to the legal issue of what the right is, that vested in the producer in the first
instance.
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28. According to Mr. Ilaiyaraja, Echo proceeds on the fallacy that the producer is
the owner of the ‘sound recording’/‘musical work’ comprised in the films. However,
since he has, at no point of time, assigned or transferred such rights to the producer,
he retains the right in his music compositions as the first owner of the copyright
comprised in these works. In such circumstances, he argues that when he continues to
retain such works, there is no possibility of such works having been assigned to Echo
by the producer, the latter not holding any right over the same.
29. Both Echo as well as Mr. Ilaiyaraja have referred to and relied upon the several
definitions and statutory provisions to support their respective stands. It is thus
necessary at this juncture to refer to the provisions of the Copyright Act to understand
the scheme of ownership under the Act. The statute uses two terms ‘author’ and
‘owner’, both having different and distinct meanings. The statutory provisions relevant
to the resolution of the lis are as follows:
2(d) ‘author’ means,-
(i) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, the author of the work;
(ii) in relation to a musical work, the composer;
(iii) in relation to an artistic work other than a photographer, the artist;
(iv) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph;
(v) in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, the producer; and…..
(the last w.e.f. 10.05.1995)
2. [(f) ‘cinematograph film’ means any work of visual recording [***] and
includes a sound recording accompanying such visual recording and
‘cinematograph’ shall be construed as including any work produced by any process
analogous to cinematography including video films;]
3. [(m)‘infringing copy’ means,--….
i. in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, a reproduction
thereof otherwise than in the form of a cinematographic film;
ii. in relation to a cinematograph film, a copy of the film made on any medium by
any means;
iii. in relation to a sound recording, any other recording embodying the same
sound recording, made by any means;…]
iv. if such reproduction, copy or sound recording is made or imported in
contravention of the provisions of this Act;]
2(uu) ‘producer’, in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording means
a person who takes the initiative and responsibility for making the work;
2(xx) ‘sound recording’ means a recording of sound from which such sounds
may be produced regardless of the medium on which such recording is made or the
method by which the sounds are produced;
2(y) ‘work’ means any of the following works, namely:—
(i) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work;
(ii) a cinematograph film;
(iii) a [sound recording];
2(ffa) ‘composer’ in relation to a musical work, means the person who
composes the music regardless of whether he records it in any form of graphical
notation;
2(p) ‘musical work’ means a work consisting of music and includes any
graphical notation of such work but does not include any words or any action
intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music;
2(a) ‘adaption’ means,
….
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[(v) in relation to any work, any use of such work involving its rearrangement or
alteration;]
30. The provisions of section 13 enumerate the various classes of work in which
copyright subsists, being original, literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works,
cinematograph films and sound recordings. Each of these works is a separate and
independent class of works and carries a distinct copyright of its own. The provision
reads thus:
13-Works in which copyright subsists.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this
section and the other provisions of this Act, copyright shall subsist throughout India
in the following classes of works, that is to say,-
(a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works;
(b) cinematograph films; and
(c) [sound recording]
….
(3) Copyright shall not subsist--
(a) in any cinematograph film if a substantial part of the film is an infringement
of the copyright in any other work;
(b) in any [sound recording] made in respect of a literary, dramatic or musical
work, if in making the [sound recording], copyright in such work has been
infringed.
(4) The copyright in a cinematograph film or a [sound recording] shall not affect
the separate copyright in any work in respect of which or a substantial part of
which, the film, or, as the case may be, the [sound recording] is made….
31. Section 13(4) specifically states that a ‘cinematograph film’ or a ‘sound
recording’ contain separate copyrights in themselves, not militating against the
independent and unique copyrights held by constituents of such film or recording,
each of which is entitled to, and holds a copyright of its own. This recognizes the
position that a cinematograph film comprises of various unique components, being
derivative rights, and as stated by the Supreme Court in the celebrated judgment of
IPRS (supra), is a ‘felicitous blend’, ‘beautiful totality’ and ‘a constellation of stars’ and
it is the coming together of these unique components that make it what it is.
32. Section 14 defines copyright itself as being the exclusive right to do or to
authorize various acts in respect of a work or a substantial part thereof. In the case of
musical work such entitlements are wide as set out under Clause iv to vii extracted
below:
14. Meaning of copyright.—For the purposes of this Act, “copyright” means the
exclusive right subject to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of
any of the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof,
namely:—1[14. Meaning of copyright.—For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”
means the exclusive right subject to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise
the doing of any of the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial part
thereof, namely\:—”
(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, not being a computer
programme,—
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in any
medium by electronic means;
(ii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in
circulation;
(iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the public;
(iv) to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the
work;
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the reproduction of the work for the purpose of its being so published, but in
all other respects the author shall be the first owner of the copyright in the
work
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), in the case of a photograph taken, or
a painting or portrait drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph film made,
for valuable consideration, at the instance of any person, such person shall, in
the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the
copyright therein;
(c) in the case of a work made in the course of the author's employment under a
contract of service or apprenticeship to which clause (a) or clause (b) does not
apply, the employer shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be
the first owner of the copyright therein;
. . . .
[Provided that in case of any work incorporated in a cinematograph work, nothing
contained in clauses (b) and (c) shall affect the right of the author in the work
referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13;
34. The proviso to Section 17 sets out the exclusions to the application of the
provision. Proviso (a) deals with literary, dramatic or artistic works and is not relevant
to this case. Proviso (b) addresses painting, portrait, engraving or a cinematograph
film made for valuable consideration at the instance of any person (in this case the
producer), and states that such person (the producer) shall, in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary with the creator of such painting, portrait, engraving or
cinematograph film (that includes a sound recording), be the first owner of the
copyright therein Proviso (c) talks about a work created in the course of the authors'
employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship to which Clause (a) or
Clause (b) does not apply and states that in such cases, unless the author has
reserved his right to such copyright, the first owner of the copyright shall be the
employer.
35. In the suits before me, the producers have not been made parties. No material
has been placed on record by any of the parties to produce evidence or establish a
contract between Mr. Ilaiyaraja and the producers, either of
employment/apprenticeship or of retention of rights in the ‘sound recording’. It is also
the specific stand of Mr. Ilaiyaraja that he had never worked under a contract of
service or apprenticeship with a producer. In the absence of the producers, this
position is not verifiable. However, bearing in mind the stature of the composer and
his pleadings in this regard, I proceed on the basis that the employer/employee
relationship does not apply in the present case and for that reason, proviso (c) is not
applicable.
36. A contiguous reading of the above provisions is called for to reconcile the issue
before me. Section 2(d) defines ‘author’, in relation to a ‘musical work’, as the
‘composer’ and in relation to a ‘cinematograph film’ or ‘sound recording’ as the
‘producer’. A ‘cinematograph film’ is defined in 2(f) to mean ‘any work of visual
recording, which includes a sound recording’ and a ‘sound recording’ is defined in (xx)
to be ‘a recording of sounds from which such sounds may be produced regardless of
the medium on which such recordings is made or the method by which the sound are
produced’. A producer in relation to a ‘cinematograph film’ or ‘sound recording’ is a
person who has taken the initiative and bears the responsibilities for making a ‘work’,
such work being defined in Section 2(y) to include a ‘musical work’, a ‘cinematograph
film’ and a ‘sound recording’.
37. The provisions protect the authors of original musical works, cinematograph
films and sound recordings. There is an overlap in so far as a ‘cinematograph film’
contains within itself ‘sound recordings’ based on the ‘musical works’ of the composers
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that are distinct assets on their own, though wholly integrated into the cinematograph
film itself. The fact that these assets have been subsumed into the main asset,
however, does not take away their individuality or claim to a separate copyright that is
statutorily protected by virtue of Section 13(4) as well as the proviso inserted in 2012
at the foot of Section 17 that states that in case of any work incorporated in a
cinematograph work, nothing contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 17 shall
affect the right of the author in the work referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
Section 13, being all original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. Thus, these
rights are concurrent and operate simultaneously as well as separately. (see
Gramaphone Co. Ltd. v. Stephen Carwardine & Co. (1934 1 Ch.450)
38. The Supreme Court in the case of IPRS (supra), was considering an appeal filed
by various film producers. The background to the appeal was that the Indian
Performing Rights Society, that had as its members composers of musical works,
authors of literary and dramatic works as well as artists, published tariffs laying down
the fee structure for the royalties that it proposed to collect for grant of licenses for
performance of the works of the members in respect of which it claimed assignment
from them.
39. The tariffs fixed had been objected to by the producers of cinematograph films,
who claimed ownership of the films including the musical works comprised therein.
The producers had averred that the musical works had been commissioned by them
for use in their films and had been utilized and incorporated in the sound tracks of the
films. According to them, the rights in the entire film, including the sound track,
vested in them. Their objections were rejected by the Copyright Board that was of the
view that the composer of the music and the musical works retained the copyright in
their works and that they could thus assign the same to the IPRS. In appeal, the
producers had challenged the decision of the Copyright board before the High Court,
Calcutta, which allowed the appeal holding that unless it was proved that the
composer had reserved his right to the copyright in his work, he does not acquire any
copyright in respect thereof, in terms of proviso (b) to Section 17 of the Copyright Act
and the owner of the film, at whose instance the composition was made, became the
owner of the copyright in such composition.
40. An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by the IPRS that was dismissed,
confirming the right of the producer to the copyright in ‘sound recording’ as part of a
‘cinematograph film’. While speaking on whether the producer of a cinematograph film
could defeat the right of a music composer or a lyricist by engaging him to compose
music or lyrics, the Court found the solution in provisions of Section 17 and the
provisos therein in the following paragraphs:
‘Whether in view of the provisions of the Copy Right Act 1957 an existing and
future rights of music composer, lyricist is capable of assignment and whether the
producer of a cinematograph film can defeat the same by engaging the same
person.”
………………
It is the second part of the question which has been a hot bed of controversy
between the parties that has got to be tackled. The main point for determination in
regard to this part of the question is whether the composer of lyric or musical work
(which in terms of section 2(p) of the Act means only a notationally written, printed
or graphically produced or reproduced music) retains a copyright in the lyric or
musical work if he grants a licence or permission to an author (owner) of a
cinematograph film for its incorporation in the sound track of a cinematograph film.
For a proper appreciation and determination of the contentions raised before us, it
is necessary to notice certain provisions of the Act.
………………..
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This takes us to the core of the question namely, whether the producer of a
cinematograph film can defeat the right of the composer of music …. or lyricist by
engaging him. The key to the solution of this question lies in provisos (b) and (c) to
section 17 of the Act reproduced above which put the matter beyond doubt.
According to the first of these provisos viz. proviso (b) when a cinematograph film
producer commissions a composer of music or a lyricist for reward or valuable
consideration for the purpose of making his cinematograph film, or composing
music or lyric there-fore i.e. the sounds for incorporation or absorption in the sound
track associated with the film, which as already indicated, are included in a
cinematograph film, he becomes the first owner of the copyright therein ‘and no
copyright subsists in the composer of the lyric or music so composed unless there is
a contract to the contrary between the composer of the lyric or music on the one
hand and the producer of the cinematograph film on the other. The same result
follows according to aforesaid proviso (c) if the composer of music or lyric is
employed under a contract of service or apprenticeship to compose the work. It is,
therefore, crystal clear that the rights of a music … ..composer or lyricist Can be
defeated by the producer of a cinematograph film in the manner laid down in
provisos (b) and (c) of section 17 of the Act.
We are fortified in this view by the decision in Wallerstein v. Herbert (1867) Vol.
16, Law Times Reports 453, relied upon by Mr. Sachin Chaudhary where it was held
that the music composed for reward by the plain-tiff in pursuance of his
engagement to give effect to certain situations in the drama entitled “Lady Andley's
Secret”, which was to be put on the stage was not an independent composition but
was merely an accessory to and a Fart and parcel of the drama and the plaintiff did
not have any right in the music.
………..
41. Though the judgment was rendered Per Bench, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer
delivered a separate and supplementing footnote where he states thus:
A cinematograph is a felicitous blend, a beautiful totality, a constellation of stars,
if I may use these lovely imageries to drive home my point, slurring over the rule
against mixed metaphor. Cinema is more. than long strips of celluloid, more than
miracles in photography, more than song, dance and dialogue and indeed, more
than dramatic story, exciting plot, gripping situations and marvellous acting. But it
is that ensemble which is the finished product of orchestrated performance by each
of the several participants, although the components may, sometimes, in
themselves be elegant entities. Copyright in a cinema film exists in law, but s. 13
(4) of the Act preserves the separate survival, in its individuality, of a copyright
enjoyed by any ‘work’ notwithstanding its confluence in the film. This persistence of
the aesthetic ‘personality’ of the intellectual property cannot cut down the copyright
of the film qua film. The latter right is, as explained earlier in my learned brother's
judgment, set out indubitably in s. 14(1)(c). True, the exclusive right, otherwise
called copyright, in the case of a musical work extends to all the sub-rights spelt
out in s. 14(1)(a). A harmonious construction of s. 14, which is the integral yoga of
copyrights in creative works, takes us to the soul of the subject. The artist enjoys
his copyright in the musical work, the film producer is the master of his
combination of artistic pieces and the two can happily co-exist and need not
conflict. What is the modus vivendi?
……….
The solution is simple. The film producer has the sole right to exercise what is his
entitlement under s. 14(1)(c) qua film, but he cannot trench on the composer's
copyright which he does only if the ‘music’ is performed or produced or reproduced
separately, in violation of s. 14(1)(a). For instance, a film may be caused to be
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exhibited as a film but the pieces of music cannot be picked out of the sound track
and played in the cinema or other theatre. To do that is the privilege of the
composer and that right of his is not crowned in the film copyright except where
there is special provision such as in s. 17, proviso (c). So, beyond exhibiting the
film as a cinema show, if the producer plays the songs separately to attract an
audience or for other reason, he infringes the composer's copyright. Anywhere, in a
restaurant or aeroplane or radio station or cinema theatre, if a music is played,
there comes into play the copyright of the composer or the Performing Arts Society.
These are the boundaries of composite creations of art which are at once individual
and collective, viewed from different angles. In ‘a cosmic perspective, a thing of
beauty has no boundary and is humanity's property but in the materialist plane on
which artists thrive, private and exclusive estate in art subsists. Man, the noblest
work of the Infinite Artist, strangely enough, battles for the finite products of his art
and the secular law, operating on the temporal level, guardians material works
possessing spiritual values. The enigmatic small of Mona, Lisa is the timeless
heritage of man-kind but, till liberated by the prescribed passage of time, the
private copyright of the human maker says, ‘hands off’.
………
Therefore, copyrighted music is not the soulful tune, the superb singing, the
glorious voice or the wonderful render-ing. It is the melody or harmony reduced to
print, writing or graphic form. The Indian music lovers throng to listen and be
enthralled or enchanted by the nada brahma, the sweet concord of sounds, the
rags, the bhava, the lava and the sublime or exciting singing. Printed music is not
the glamour or glory of it, by and large, although the content of the poem or the
lyric or the song does have appeal. Strangely enough, ‘author’, as defined in s.2(d),
in relation to a musical work, is only the composer and s. 16 confines ‘copyright’ to
those works which are recognised by the Act. This means that the composer alone
has copyright in a musical work. The singer has none. This disentitlement of the
musician or group of musical artists to copy-right is un-Indian, because the major
attraction which lends monetary value to a musical performance is not the music
maker, so much as the musician. Perhaps, both deserve to be recognised by the
copyright law. I make this observation only because act in one sense, depends on
the ethos and the aesthetic best of a people; and while universal protection of
intellectual and aesthetic property of creators of ‘works’ is an international
obligation, each country in its law must protect such rights wherever originality is
contributed. So viewed, apart from the music composer, the singer must be
conferred a right. of course, law-making is the province of Parliament but the Court
must communicate to the lawmaker such infirmities as exist in the law extant.
42. A sound recording is a conglomerate of various invaluable contributions. If one
were to trace the evolution of what eventually comes to be known as a ‘sound
recording’, it all commences with the melody that flows when the muse inspires, the
reduction of the same to notation, fleshing out the melody with lyrics, leading to
songs, then instrumentation and orchestral arrangements, in all, one complete
‘felicitous blend’. Sometimes, melody is set to lyrics and other times, lyrics are set to
fit within the contours of melody. A ‘sound recording’ incorporates both melodic as
well as lyrical contents. The playback artists and accompanists then deliver the song
which would be recorded in a studio and embodied as sound in a master medium on a
master tape or digital media.
43. Irrespective of the medium of delivery, it is the sum-total of all the aforesaid
elements that constitute a ‘sound recording’ and it is in respect of this ‘sound
recording’ that the producer lays claim, accorded to him in terms of the statute. To
this end, the submission that a ‘sound recording’ has always been covered as a
subject under the Copyright Act, though referred to earlier as a ‘record’ is in order.
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However, the 2012 amendment makes it clear, by way of tightening the statutory
protection extended to artists, that the right of exploitation of a ‘work’ shall,
prospectively, be restricted only to the specific mode or medium of exploitation
stipulated in the Assignment Agreement and none other.
44. The rights of the other stake holders including and specifically, the performer,
are separate and entitled to protection. The right of the producer in the sound
recording as a conglomerate unit does not militate against or compromise the rights of
these individual constituents whose rights are identifiable, distinct and enforceable.
45. In my view, Section 17 is key to the adjudication of the lis before me. Section
17 vests the ‘author’ of a ‘work’ with the first ownership of copyright. There are six
exclusions. Proviso (b) and (c) are relevant in the case of a music composer.
46. I have held earlier that Proviso (c) would not stand attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. This Proviso applies to situations not coming within
clause (a) or (b) and states that in the case of a work made in the case of the authors'
employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, the employer shall, in the
absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein.
A suggestion was made by Echo that the facts of the present case would be covered
by proviso (c) and there being no agreement to the contrary furnished by Mr.
Ilaiyaraja, the employer shall be the first owner of the copyright therein. I reject this
contention outright.
47. There is nothing to suggest an employer-employee relationship in this case vis-
a-vis the music composer and the producer. The engagement of Mr. Ilaiyaraja, to my
mind, is as a stand-alone professional, and his services, commissioned, as such. We
have been privy to many situations where it is in fact, his music that has carried the
movie. Otherwise eminently forgettable movies are made memorable by the
outstanding musical scores that they contain. Though not a rule of thumb, the stature
of the music composer before me dictates that that the arrangements as between
himself and the producers are not one of service or apprenticeship but one of Principle
to Principle.
48. Proviso (b) addresses a situation where an expert in his or her field has been
engaged and certain ‘works’ commissioned. This proviso addresses the making of a
cinematograph film that includes, by definition, a ‘sound recording’, of a ‘musical
work’. The producer of the ‘cinematograph film’ will, in the absence of any agreement
to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein including such ‘sound
recording’. It is this clause which, in my opinion, is applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present cases.
49. As stated earlier, it is unclear as to whether Mr. Ilaiyaraja has reserved his
rights by way of agreements with the producers of the films. The producers are not
before me to either confirm or deny this position. Mr. Ilaiyaraja also has not produced
any documentation in support of this position. Though Agi Music states in its pleadings
that it has seen fifty (50) such agreements out of a hundred and eighty five (185)
agreements that form the subject matter of C.S. No. 187 of 2010, there is no evidence
before me to support such a position in the present case. Moreover, the songs in the
259 agreements annexed to the written statement by Echo have been distributed in
public domain, thanks to Echo, for the last several years. No objection has been raised
by Mr. Ilaiyaraja till date of filing of the suit. If at all he was of the view that the
exploitation of the ‘sound recording’ by Echo constituted an infringement, it was
incumbent upon him to have taken action in a timely fashion. This has not been done
and the plaint does not even mention any communication to Echo or a cease and
desist notice having been issued to Echo. By conduct, Mr. Ilaiyaraja appears to have
acquiesced to the actions of Echo. I also draw no adverse inference from the fact that
there are 41 agreements that have not been produced by Echo. The explanation
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because in the Copyright Societies all the producers control the Copyright Societies
because the provision said that the owner of the copyright shall be in the
management of the Society and because of Section 17(1)(b), the producer became
the owner of the copyright. So, the authors were thrown out of the Copyright
Societies and only the producers became owners of the copyright societies and they
decided to negotiate with music companies and they decided to sell those works,
especially Hindi songs which are famous throughout the world to music companies.
They made a killing on them and the poor artist was left in the lurch.
The fact of the matter is that a time has come to correct all these things.
All over the world, there is equitable distribution of royalties. But unfortunately
this is not what has been happening in India. Actually, I wanted to give this right to
the principal director of films as well. Ultimately, in a film, who are the real artists?
They are those who sing songs, those who perform, and those who direct the film.
Now a Director is kept out of any profits of the film. He is the one who actually
creates the architecture of the film. But unfortunately he does not share any part of
the royalty because there is no risk capital involved. It is the producer who risks his
capital. Though I made this recommendation to the Standing Committee that the
principal director should also partake of the profit, the Standing Committee had
thought in its wisdom that the time has not come for the principal director to be
included and he too share in the profit of the business. So, I have, in fact, dropped
those amendments and I have not pressed on them.
60. According to him, the very purpose of the 2012 amendments are to ensure the
protection of the intellectual property of a composer, to see that the ownership as well
as the right of exploitation thereof, remains within his possession and that of his legal
heirs. He draws attention to the amendments to various section of the Act particularly,
the proviso to Section 17 inserted in 2012, that states that in the case of any work
incorporated in a cinematograph film nothing contained in clauses (b) and (c) shall
affect the right of the author in the ‘work’ referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
Section 13. He also draws attention to sub-Clause (e) inserted in Section 14 dealing
specifically with sound recording and reading thus:
14. Meaning of copyright.-
(e) in the case of a sound recording,—
(i) to make any other sound recording embodying it including storing of it in any
medium by electronic or other means;
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for such rental, any
copy of the sound recording;
(iii) to communicate the sound recording to the public.
61. A combined reading of the aforesaid makes it clear, according to him, that after
the amendment of 2012 it is the composer in whom vests the full ownership and right
of exploitation of his ‘musical works’ including that of a ‘sound recording’ based on his
musical work. At first blush, it is an extremely attractive argument and one that I am
sorely tempted to accept. We, as a society, have not been kind to our creators and
geniuses. The tendency is to place them on a pedestal and revere them while they are
in their prime, while, simultaneously and ironically, finding every method possible to
exploit their work to generate profits for corporate interests, to their exclusion. Many of
India's finest Artists thus languish in their old age, without any means of accessing
the fruit of their labour. This is a deplorable situation and a clarion call for remedy.
62. The amendments to the Copyright Act in 2012 are an attempt to redress this,
in some measure, in balance with the rights of other entities as well. The producer of a
cinematograph films is the brain behind the film, undertaking the risk and
responsibility of the venture. It is in recognition of the enormous risk taken by the
producer that statute vests in him the copyright in the entire film as well as the ‘sound
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recordings’ that constitute an intrinsic and integral part of the film. This position, in
my view, has not been tampered with or altered by the 2012 amendment. The
protection afforded to the author of the ‘musical works’ is by insertion of the clauses as
we have seen above, as well as the three provisos after Section 18(1) dealing with
assignment of copy right, and the amendment effected to Section 19(3).
63. The first proviso to Section 18(1) states that an assignment made shall apply
solely to the exploitation of such work upon such medium or mode of exploitation in
existence or in commercial use at the time when such assignment was made or if such
assignment specifically referred to such medium or mode of exploitation. The second
proviso states that the author of a literary or musical work, included in a
cinematograph film, shall not assign or waive the right to receive royalty, to be shared
on a equal basis with the assignee of the copy right for the utilization of such work in
any form other than for the communication to the public of the work along with the
cinematograph film in a cinema hall, except to the legal heirs of the author or a
copyright society for collection and distribution. The third proviso is similar to the
second proviso, except that it deals with literary or musical work included in a ‘sound
recording’, but not forming part of a cinematograph film.
64. Provisos 2 and 3 thrust royalties upon the authors of ‘musical works’. This
serves, in my view, to address concerns that established production houses negotiate
unfairly with a music composer, bearing in mind the unequal status of the two parties.
By the insertion of the aforesaid provisos, the right to equal royalty in the ‘sound
‘recording is ensured. Section 19(3) also stands amended along similar lines. Whereas
the section earlier provided for the assignment agreement to specify ‘the amount of
royalty payable, if any’, it now provides that the assignment agreements ‘shall specify
the amount of royalty and other consideration payable to the author or his legal heirs
during the currency of the agreement’, thus making the payment of royalty,
mandatory.
65. In summation, the 2012 amendment does take into account the interests of
authors of ‘musical works’ by ensuring the payment of equal royalty to them and legal
heirs, and not by shifting the basis of ownership of copy right as it exists presently.
66. In the light of the discussion as aforesaid and a concurrent reading of the
statutory provisions, I answer the issues in this category stating that (i) it is the
Producer of the cinematograph films who holds the copyright, by default, in respect of
the ‘sound recordings’ that the film contains and an inference otherwise would arise
only if the author of the ‘musical work’ produces evidence of reservation of his right to
such ‘sound recording’ and (ii) Mr. Ilaiyaraja holds complete Special and Moral rights
in regard to the ‘musical works’ composed/created by him entitling him to the
protection afforded under Section 57 of the Act, being claim to authorship of his work,
all measures necessary to preserve the integrity and purity of his work, honour and
reputation and the right of exploitation of his ‘musical works’ in any manner as he may
desire, only barring in the form of the ‘sound recordings’ that already stand integrated
in the cinematograph films. This category of issues is answered accordingly.
67. The second set of issues relate to the question of assignment of copyright of Mr.
Ilaiyaraja to his wife Mrs. Jeevaraja and subsequent licences issued by her vide
documents executed by her in 2007 being the SRLA and the SPA and the Addendum
executed in January 2010. Having held that Echo is the legal owner of the ‘sound
recording’ the resultant conclusion would be that the assignment of the copyright to
Mrs. Jeevaraja would have no statutory sanction. The entire transaction as regards Agi
Music would thus fail at the threshold. However, if at all any party could have
questioned the assignment of the ‘sound recoding’ right to Agi Music, it is Echo. Echo
has chosen to remain silent notwithstanding the evident exploitation of the ‘sound
recording’ right by Agi Music between 2007 and 2012. Echo has thus, in my view,
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acquiesced to the assignment of the sound recording right to Mrs. Jeevaraja and the
subsequent exclusive assignment of the right to Agi Music. Even in the pleadings as
well as arguments before me now Echo does not very seriously question the right
granted to Agi Music, merely stating that it is the legal owner of the ‘sound
recordings’. I thus, disconnect the sets of facts, the lis as between Mr. Ilaiyaraja and
Echo and the lis between Mr. Ilaiyaraj and Agi Music for the purposes of present
proceedings and answer the two sets of issues separately.
68. The second set of issues are as follows.
C.S. No. 308 of 2013:
1. Has the 1st Defendant assigned his copyright in relation to the songs which are
the subject matter of this Suit to his wife vide Assignment Agreement dated
24.11.2007 and if so, what is the period of assignment?
2. Did the 1st defendant's wife (as an assignee of the 1st Defendant) and the
Plaintiff enter into a Sound Recording Licensing Agreement (“SRLA”) dated
24.11.2007 and if so what was the period of such Agreement?
3. Does Section 19(5) of the Copyrights Act apply to the present facts?
4. Is this a fit case to read in an implied term into the Assignment Agreement in
relation to the term of the Agreement?
C.S. No. 625 of 2014:
10. Did the plaintiff's wife (as an assignee of the plaintiff) and the 4th defendant
enter into a Sound Recording Licensing Agreement (“SRLA”) dated 24.11.2007 and
if so what was the period of such Agreement?
11. Does Section 19(5) of the Copyrights Act apply to the present facts.
Additional Issue:
‘Is Mrs. Jeevaraja is an agent of Mr. Ilaiyaraja for the purposes of the
transaction between herself and Agi Music’.
69. Mr. Ilaiyaraja does not dispute the Assignment Agreement dated 24.11.2007
extracted below for the sake of completion of narration:
‘ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND SOUND RECORDING RIGHTS
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, the undersigned assignor,
Name: ILAIYARAAJA
Address: 38, MURUGESAN STREET, T NAGAR
City: CHENNAI
STATE: TAMIL NADU, ZIP: 600017, Country: INDIA
Does hereby assign, transfer and se over to the assignee (wife of the assignor)
Name: JEEVARAJA
Address: 38, MURUGESAN STREET, T NAGAR
City: CHENNAI
STATE: TAMIL NADU, ZIP: 600017, Country: INDIA
Hereby, the assignor as the copyright owner and sound recording rights owner,
assigns all of his rights including sound recording rights, publishing rights, public
performances rights, digital media rights, new media rights, caller tunes, ring tones
rights, true tones rights, all titles and interest in and to the musical compositions
listed in Exhibit A, composed, produced and arranged by ILAIYARAAJA aka
ILAIYARAJA ka ILAIYARAJA together with any and all assignor's existing
copyright therein throughout the India and the World, and any and all assignor's
rights of every kind, nature or description attaching to or which may attach to said
musical composition and/or embraces or included in the copyright thereof in the
India and entire world, which said composition the undersigned was originally
assigned on 24th November 2007.
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13. Has the 4th defendant infringed the copyright of the plaintiff?
14. To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled to?
C.S. No. 308 of 2013:
5. Has the 1st Defendant breached the terms of the Assignment Agreement
dated 24.11.2007 and/or SRLA?
6. Has the 2nd Defendant infringed the copyright which was exclusively
granted by the 1st Defendant's wife to the Plaintiff?
7. Should the 2nd Defendant be restrained from breaching the negative
covenant contained in Clause 2 of the SRLA?
8. Is the Plaintiff entitled to the reliefs sought for?
76. My answers to the third set of issues are in seriatim below and may be read
along with my conclusions in the first and second set of the issues as well, paragraphs
23 to 65 and paragraphs 67 to 72.
77. There is no discrepancy with regard to the array of parties and the suit is held
to be maintainable.
78. As regards the SRLA between Mr. Ilaiyaraja and Agi Music and the
interpretation thereof, nothing survives therein in the light of my conclusions to issues
(1), (3), (4) and (11) in the second set of issues above. Consequently, issues (8), (9),
(12) and (7) are answered accordingly.
79. As regards the entitlement to relief as against Echo as well as Agi Music, Mr.
Ilaiyaraja has reserved his right to claim damages for infringing his copyright,
accounting and other reliefs under the copyright law and other provisions of general
law in A. No. 7701 of 2014. This Application has been allowed by the learned Single
Judge on 03.03.2015 and this order has not been disturbed in intra court appeal.
Thus, the reservation to sue is reiterated, to be exercised by Mr. Ilaiyaraja, in
accordance with law.
80. Only those decisions as are relevant to the issued discussed by me have been
referred to in the course of the discussions above and not all decisions as cited by the
parties.
81. My conclusions in regard to the issues that arise in each suit are as follows:
C.S. No. 625 of 2014:
(i) The second defendant, Echo, has obtained rights in regard to the ‘sound
recordings’ comprised in the films covered under the Agreements in Annexure 1
to its written statement and is entitled to exploit the same, specifically and
strictly in the form and manner as contained in the respective cinematograph
films only.
(ii) The plaintiff is entitled to Special, Moral rights in regard to the ‘musical works’
composed by him upon which the ‘sound recordings’ in question are based, in
line with Section 57 of the Copyright Act. This entitles him to claim authorship of
his work, take all measures necessary to preserve the integrity and purity of his
work, honour and reputation and exploit such ‘musical works’ in any manner as
he may desire, only barring in the form of the connected sound recordings that
are an integral part of the cinematograph films, for which Copyright is held by
the respective producers of the films.
(iii) The plaintiff has reserved his right to initiate proceedings for damages and
other monitory reliefs as against the respondents in Application No. 7701 of
2014, which application was allowed on 03.03.2015. In the light of the said
reservation, the right of the plaintiff to urge reliefs as reserved, in accordance
with law, is reiterated.
C.S. No. 625 of 2014 is decreed in the aforesaid terms. In the light of the facts
and circumstances of the case and the discussion as noted above, there will be no
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order as to costs.
C.S. No. 308 of 2013:
(i) The Assignment Agreement and Sound Recording Licensing Agreement, both
dated 24.11.2007, are valid.
(ii) The period of the Assignment Agreement is five years and the provisions of
Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act 1957 apply to the present facts.
(iii) Consequently no implied term may be read into the assignment extending its
term beyond the period stipulated under the statute.
(iv) Mrs. Jeevaraja is not an agent of Mr. Ilaiyaraja and is only an assignee.
(v) There is no breach of the negative covenant contained in Clause 2 of the SRLA,
or any other terms thereof, by the first defendant.
C.S. No. 308 of 2013 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
82. The Maestro, Mr. Ilaiyaraja, strode the music world like a colossus,
incorporating several novel elements from folk tunes as well as western sensibilities,
merging notes, words, feelings and emotions, seamlessly. To the thousands of his
admirers, the author of this judgement included, the music of the Maestro was simply,
sheer magic. It dissolved barriers, made the incomplete, complete and the world an
infinitesimally better place to be in. Nowhere is this more apparent than from the fact
that all counsels who argued the matters, though divided in their interpretation of the
law, were united in their adulation of his music.
83. My sincere appreciation to the assistance rendered by Mr. Perumbulavil
Radhakrishnan, Mr. Satish Kumar and Mr. Aniruddh Krishnan.
———
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