G.R. No.

L-49017 and L-49024 August 30, 1983

RIZALINA GUEVARRA, ELIZABETH MACLEAN and ZENAIDA MACLEAN Assisted by Their

Mother, Rizalina Guevarra, JOSEFINA DE GUZMAN, Assisted by Her Husband RAFAEL DE
GUZMAN, and JOHNNY LARA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Rizal, CRISTINA C. RECIO, ROQUE RECIO, Sheriff
RENE SALVADOR, Bailiff EUSTAQUIO ARADA and Deputy REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
MAKATI, respondents.

Juan P. Enriquez for petitioners.

Barredo Law Office and Roque Recio, as collaborating counsel, for private respondent.

VASQUEZ, J.:

Facts:
Petitioners: Rizalina Guevarra, Elizabeth Maclean, Zenaida Maclean, Josefina de Guzman, and Johnny
Lara
Respondents: Cristina C. Recio, Roque Recio, Sheriff Rene Salvador, Bailiff Eustaquio Parada, and the
Deputy Register of Deeds for Makati
Respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners, alleging the annulment of a deed of sale of a parcel
of land and the annulment of two deeds of sale of certificates of stocks.
Petitioners filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim and third-party complaint against the
Security Bank and Trust Company.
Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their first and second causes of action,
which was granted by the trial court.
Trial court ordered the annulment of the deed of sale and transfer of the property to respondent Cristina
C. Recio's name.
Trial court also ordered the annulment of the deeds of sale of the certificates of stocks and transfer of the
stocks to the respondent's name.
Trial court further ordered the restoration of the respondents to the rightful ownership of the properties
and awarded damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment, which was denied by
the trial court.
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal, a cash appeal bond, and a motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal.
Trial court denied the motion for extension of time and granted the motion for the execution of the
summary judgment.
Petitioners filed two separate petitions in the Court of Appeals for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.
Court of Appeals dismissed both petitions.
Petitioners filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed on time.
Whether a motion for reconsideration is essential before filing a petition for certiorari.
Whether the trial court's order for the payment of the Banker's Acceptance Certificate was valid.
Whether the summary judgment was validly rendered.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed on time.
The Supreme Court held that a motion for reconsideration is not essential before filing a petition for
certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order for the payment of the Banker's Acceptance Certificate
was not valid.
The Supreme Court held that the summary judgment was not validly rendered.

Ratio:
The evidence presented by the petitioners clearly showed that the omnibus motion for reconsideration
was filed on time.
A motion for reconsideration is not essential before filing a petition for certiorari. The purpose of a motion
for reconsideration is to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed.

The case at bar may not, even by the most liberal or strained interpretation, be considered as one
not involving genuine issues which need the presentation of evidence to determine which of two
conflicting assertions of fact is correct. A cursory examination of the pleadings will show that the
private respondents' causes of action are to annul documents of sale which were allegedly executed
by private respondent Cristina C. Recio on the ground of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and due
influence and intimidation. These allegations were all denied in the answer filed by the petitioners.
The issue thus raised may not be categorized as not genuine so as to dispense with a formal trial
and to authorize the rendition of summary judgment.

The invalidity of the summary judgment rendered by the trial court stems not only from the
circumstance that such a kind of judgment is not proper under the state of the pleadings filed in the
case, but also from the failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such a
judgment. 'Me motion does not contain a notice of hearing. After the private respondents filed a
motion to set the private respondents' supplemental counterclaim for hearing on May 22, 1975,
Judge Sison scheduled the said motion for hearing on May 28, 1975 "to coincide with the hearing of
the motion for partial summary judgment dated May 16, 1975 filed by the plaintiffs set for hearing on
the same date." Attys. Ferry and Galapon counsels for the herein petitioners, were served with the
said order of Judge Sison on May 25, 1975 and May 24, 1975, respectively, or only four and five
days, respectively, before the date of the hearing. This is contrary to the requirement under Section
3 of Rule 34 that a motion for summary judgment "shall be served at least ten days before the time
specified for the hearing." The minutes of the hearing held on May 28, 1975 show that the counsel
for the herein petitioners prayed that they be given up to June 3, 1975 within which to file appropriate
pleadings, after which the motion for summary judgment shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
(Original Record, Vol. II, p. 412.)

SEC. 4. Cases not fully adjudicated on motion.— If on motion under this rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel shag ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material
facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the
facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.It may not be said, therefore, that the questioned order of June 3,
1975 was an adjudication of the supplemental counterclaim filed by petitioner Rizalina Guevarra, nor
of the third-party complaint filed by her against the Security Bank and Trust Company. As already
mentioned above, the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court did not include such
claims which still remain pending and unresolved. Petitioner Rizalina Guevarra may properly seek to
set aside or modify the said order of June 3, 1975 in the trial court taking cognizance of Civil Case
No. 18522.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the decision of the former
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. SP-05555 and SP-05618; and annulling the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 18522, and the orders dated May 24, 1976 and May 31,
1976 issued therein. The private respondents shall pay the costs.