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ISO-IEC-IEEE-15026-2 - Systems and Software Engineering - Systems and Software Assurance - Part 2 Assurance Case

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ISO-IEC-IEEE-15026-2 - Systems and Software Engineering - Systems and Software Assurance - Part 2 Assurance Case

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IEEE Standard—

Adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011

Systems and Software Engineering—


Systems and Software Assurance—
Part 2: Assurance Case

IEEE Computer Society

Sponsored by the
Software & Systems Engineering Standards Committee

IEEE
3 Park Avenue IEEE Std 15026-2™­2011
New York, NY 10016-5997
USA

11 October 2011

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IEEE Std 15026-2™-2011

IEEE Standard—
Adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011

Systems and Software Engineering—


Systems and Software Assurance—
Part 2: Assurance Case

Sponsor

Software & Systems Engineering Standards Committee


of the
IEEE Computer Society

Approved 10 September 2011


IEEE-SA Standards Board

Approved 24 January 2013


American National Standards Institute

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Abstract: ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011 is adopted by this standard. ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011 specifies
minimum requirements for the structure and contents of an assurance case to improve the
consistency and comparability of assurance cases and to facilitate stakeholder communications,
engineering decisions, and other uses of assurance cases.

An assurance case includes a top-level claim for a property of a system or product (or set of
claims), systematic argumentation regarding this claim, and the evidence and explicit
assumptions that underlie this argumentation. Arguing through multiple levels of subordinate
claims, this structured argumentation connects the top-level claim to the evidence and
assumptions.

Assurance cases are generally developed to support claims in areas such as safety, reliability,
maintainability, human factors, operability, and security, although these assurance cases are
often called by more specific names, e.g. safety case or reliability and maintainability (R&M) case.

ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011 does not place requirements on the quality of the contents of an
assurance case and does not require the use of a particular terminology or graphical
representation. Likewise, it places no requirements on the means of physical implementation of
the data, including no requirements for redundancy or co-location.

Keywords: adoption, argument, assurance case, claim, dependability, evidence, IEEE 15026-2,
property, reliability, safety, security, software assurance, software engineering, system
assurance, systems engineering

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.


3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USA

Copyright © 2011 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.


All rights reserved. Published 11 October 2011. Printed in the United States of America.

IEEE is a registered trademark in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, owned by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Incorporated.

PDF: ISBN 978-0-7381-6799-2 STD97161


Print: ISBN 978-0-7381-6800-5 STDPD97161

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No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without the prior written permission
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IEEE Standards documents are developed within the IEEE Societies and the Standards Coordinating Committees of
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Introduction

This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 15026-2-2011, IEEE Standard—Adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011, Systems
and Software Engineering—Systems and Software Assurance—Part 2: Assurance Case.

The IEEE Software and Systems Engineering Standards Committee (S2ESC) has undertaken a long-term
program to harmonize its standards with those of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7, the international standards
committee for software and systems engineering. In areas of overlap, one organization sometimes adopts
the relevant standard from the other organization, or the two organizations cooperate to produce a single
joint standard. In this case, S2ESC has chosen to adopt a relevant document from SC 7.

This IEEE standard is an adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011. References to some ISO/IEC standards
should be considered as references to the identical IEEE standard:

⎯ ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2008 is identical to ISO/IEC 12207:2008


⎯ ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2008 is identical to ISO/IEC 15288:2008
⎯ ISO/IEC/IEEE 16085:2006 is identical to ISO/IEC 16085:2006
⎯ IEEE Std 15026-1™-2011 is identical to ISO/IEC TR 15026-1:2010

It should be noted that IEEE is currently processing a standard that will be identical to the following
ISO/IEC standard:

⎯ ISO/IEC/IEEE 15289 will be identical to ISO/IEC 15289 when the former is approved.

It should also be noted that IEEE is currently planning adoptions of the other parts of the 15026 series,
namely, ISO/IEC 15026-3 and ISO/IEC 15026-4, after they are published as ISO/IEC standards.

It should further be noted that IEEE is currently planning to adopt ISO/IEC 25010:2011.

Notice to users

Laws and regulations


Users of these documents should consult all applicable laws and regulations. Compliance with the
provisions of this standard does not imply compliance to any applicable regulatory requirements.
Implementers of the standard are responsible for observing or referring to the applicable regulatory
requirements. IEEE does not, by the publication of its standards, intend to urge action that is not in
compliance with applicable laws, and these documents may not be construed as doing so.

Copyrights
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private uses. These include both use, by reference, in laws and regulations, and use in private self-
regulation, standardization, and the promotion of engineering practices and methods. By making this
document available for use and adoption by public authorities and private users, the IEEE does not waive
any rights in copyright to this document.

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Updating of IEEE documents
Users of IEEE standards should be aware that these documents may be superseded at any time by the
issuance of new editions or may be amended from time to time through the issuance of amendments,
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amendments, corrigenda, or errata, visit the IEEE Standards Association web site at
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For more information about the IEEE Standards Association or the IEEE standards development process,
visit the IEEE-SA web site at http://standards.ieee.org.

Errata
Errata, if any, for this and all other standards can be accessed at the following URL:
http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/errata/index.html. Users are encouraged to check this URL for errata
periodically.

Interpretations
Current interpretations for this and all other standards can be accessed at the following URL:
http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/interps/index.html.

Patents
Attention is called to the possibility that implementation of this standard may require use of subject matter
covered by patent rights. By publication of this standard, no position is taken with respect to the existence
or validity of any patent rights in connection therewith. The IEEE is not responsible for identifying
Essential Patent Claims for which a license may be required, for conducting inquiries into the legal validity
or scope of Patents Claims or determining whether any licensing terms or conditions provided in
connection with submission of a Letter of Assurance, if any, or in any licensing agreements are reasonable
or non-discriminatory. Users of this standard are expressly advised that determination of the validity of any
patent rights, and the risk of infringement of such rights, is entirely their own responsibility. Further
information may be obtained from the IEEE Standards Association.

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Participants
At the time this standard was submitted to the IEEE-SA Standards Board for approval, the Life Cycle
Processes Working Group had the following membership:

James W. Moore, IEEE Computer Society Liaison to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7

The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.

Ed Addario Werner Hoelzl Gerald Radack


Edward Addy Glenn Hoffman Annette Reilly
Johann Amsenga Robert Holibaugh Robert Robinson
H. Stephen Berger Bernard Homes Randall Safier
Juris Borzovs Peter Hung Bartien Sayogo
Pieter Botman Atsushi Ito Robert Schaaf
Lyle Bullock Cheryl Jones Maud Schlich
Juan Carreon Piotr Karocki Richard Schrenker
Sue Carroll Dwayne Knirk Stephen Schwarm
Keith Chow Thomas Kurihara Gil Shultz
Paul Croll Susan Land Carl Singer
Geoffrey Darnton J. Dennis Lawrence James Sivak
David Deighton David Leciston Luca Spotorno
Sourav Dutta Daniel Lindberg Friedrich Stallinger
Andrew Fieldsend Greg Luri Thomas Starai
David Friscia Faramarz Maghsoodlou Elena Strange
David Fuschi Wayne W. Manges Walter Struppler
Ignacio Marin Garcia L. Tajerian Martinez Marcy Stutzman
Lewis Gray Edward McCall Anusheel Tandon
Ron Greenthaler Kathryn Moland Theodore Urbanowicz
Randall Groves James Moore David Walden
Jon Hagar Michael S. Newman Paul Work
John Harauz Mirko Palazzo Oren Yuen
Mark Henley William Petit Janusz Zalewski
Richard Hilliard Ulrich Pohl Wenhao Zhu
Iulian Profir

vi
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When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 10 September 2011, it had the following
membership:

Richard H. Hulett, Chair


John Kulick, Vice Chair
Robert Grow, Past Chair
Judith Gorman, Secretary

Masayuki Ariyoshi Jim Hughes Gary Robinson


William Bartley Joseph L. Koepfinger* Jon Rosdahl
Ted Burse David Law Sam Sciacca
Clint Chaplin Thomas Lee Mike Seavey
Wael Diab Hung Ling Curtis Siller
Jean-Philippe Faure Oleg Logvinov Phil Winston
Alex Gelman Ted Olsen Howard Wolfman
Paul Houzé Don Wright

*Member Emeritus

Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:

Satish Aggarwal, NRC Representative


Richard DeBlasio, DOE Representative
Michael Janezic, NIST Representative

Catherine Berger
IEEE Standards Project Editor

Malia Zaman
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program Development

vii
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IEEE Standard—
Adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011

Systems and Software Engineering—


Systems and Software Assurance—
Part 2: Assurance Case

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This standard is not intended to ensure safety, security, health, or
environmental protection. Implementers of the standard are responsible for determining appropriate
safety, security, environmental, and health practices or regulatory requirements.

This IEEE document is made available for use subject to important notices and legal disclaimers.
These notices and disclaimers appear in all publications containing this document and may
be found under the heading “Important Notice” or “Important Notices and Disclaimers
Concerning IEEE Documents.” They can also be obtained on request from IEEE or viewed at
http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html.

1
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INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 15026-2

First edition
2011-02-15

Systems and software engineering —


Systems and software assurance —
Part 2:
Assurance case
Ingénierie du logiciel et des systèmes — Assurance du logiciel et des
systèmes —
Partie 2: Cas d'assurance

Reference number
ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

© ISO/IEC 2011

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ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

PDF disclaimer
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shall not be edited unless the typefaces which are embedded are licensed to and installed on the computer performing the editing. In
downloading this file, parties accept therein the responsibility of not infringing Adobe's licensing policy. The ISO Central Secretariat
accepts no liability in this area.
Adobe is a trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated.
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parameters were optimized for printing. Every care has been taken to ensure that the file is suitable for use by ISO member bodies. In
the unlikely event that a problem relating to it is found, please inform the Central Secretariat at the address given below.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT


© ISO/IEC 2011
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from either ISO at the address below or
ISO's member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
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Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11
Fax + 41 22 749 09 47
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Web www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland

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ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

Contents Page

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................iv
Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................v
1 Scope ......................................................................................................................................................1
2 Conformance .........................................................................................................................................1
3 Normative references............................................................................................................................1
4 Terms and definitions ...........................................................................................................................1
5 Use of this part of ISO/IEC 15026.........................................................................................................1
6 Structure and contents of an assurance case ...................................................................................2
6.1 General ...................................................................................................................................................2
6.2 Overall structure....................................................................................................................................3
6.3 Claims .....................................................................................................................................................5
6.3.1 Form of claim .........................................................................................................................................5
6.3.2 Claim contents.......................................................................................................................................5
6.3.3 Coverage of conditions.........................................................................................................................5
6.3.4 Justification of the choice of top-level claims ...................................................................................5
6.4 Arguments..............................................................................................................................................6
6.4.1 Argument characteristics .....................................................................................................................6
6.4.2 Justification of argument’s method of reasoning..............................................................................6
6.5 Evidence .................................................................................................................................................6
6.5.1 Evidence contents.................................................................................................................................6
6.5.2 Associated information.........................................................................................................................6
6.5.3 Associated assumptions ......................................................................................................................6
6.6 Assumptions..........................................................................................................................................7
6.6.1 Form of Assumption .............................................................................................................................7
6.6.2 Assumption contents............................................................................................................................7
6.6.3 Associated evidence .............................................................................................................................7
6.7 Justifications .........................................................................................................................................7
6.8 Combining assurance cases................................................................................................................7
7 Required outcomes of using Part 2 assurance case.........................................................................7
7.1 Outcomes ...............................................................................................................................................7
7.2 Mapping to this part of ISO/IEC 15026 ................................................................................................8
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................................9

© ISO/IEC 2011 – All rights reserved iii


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ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of
ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees
established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC
technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental
and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information
technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International
Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as
an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/IEC 15026-2 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 7, Software and systems engineering.

ISO/IEC 15026 consists of the following parts, under the general title Systems and software engineering —
Systems and software assurance:

 Part 1: Concepts and vocabulary [Technical Report]

 Part 2: Assurance case

System integrity levels and assurance in the life cycle will form the subjects of future parts.

iv © ISO/IEC 2011 – All rights reserved

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ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

Introduction
The purpose of this part of ISO/IEC 15026 is to ensure the existence of types of assurance case content and
restrictions on assurance case structure, thereby improving consistency and comparability among instances of
assurance cases and facilitating stakeholder communications, engineering decisions, and other uses of
assurance cases.

Existing standards addressing different application areas and topics related to assurance cases might use
differing terminology and concepts when addressing common themes. This part of ISO/IEC 15026 is based on
experience drawn from these many specialized standards and guidelines. It is applicable to any property of a
system or product.

NOTE It is intended that ISO/IEC TR 15026-1 will be transformed into an International Standard.

In addition to concepts and terminology, ISO/IEC TR 15026-1 provides background and a list of related
standards that could be useful in understanding and using this part of ISO/IEC 15026. Assurance cases are
generally developed to support claims in areas such as safety, reliability, maintainability, human factors,
operability, and security, although these assurance cases are often called by more specific names, e.g. safety
case or reliability and maintainability (R&M) case.

This part of ISO/IEC 15026 uses the terminology and concepts consistent with ISO/IEC 12207:2008,
ISO/IEC 15288:2008, and ISO/IEC 15289:2006. This part of ISO/IEC 15026 does not presume or require that
it is applied in conjunction with ISO/IEC 12207:2008 or ISO/IEC 15288:2008.

© ISO/IEC 2011 – All rights reserved v


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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

Systems and software engineering — Systems and software


assurance —
Part 2:
Assurance case

1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 15026 specifies minimum requirements for the structure and contents of an assurance
case. An assurance case includes a top-level claim for a property of a system or product (or set of claims),
systematic argumentation regarding this claim, and the evidence and explicit assumptions that underlie this
argumentation. Arguing through multiple levels of subordinate claims, this structured argumentation connects
the top-level claim to the evidence and assumptions.

This part of ISO/IEC 15026 does not place requirements on the quality of the contents of an assurance case.
Rather, it places requirements on the existence of the contents and structure of an assurance case. While
several notations and slightly varying terminologies are currently used in practice, this part of ISO/IEC 15026
does not require the use of a particular terminology or graphical representation. Likewise, it places no
requirements on the means of physical implementation of the data, including no requirements for redundancy
or co-location.

2 Conformance
An assurance case conforms to this part of ISO/IEC 15026 if it meets the requirements of Clause 6 and
Clause 7.

3 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document.

ISO/IEC TR 15026-1, Systems and software engineering — Systems and software assurance — Part 1:
Concepts and vocabulary

ISO/IEC 15289, Systems and software engineering — Content of systems and software life cycle process
information products (Documentation)

4 Terms and definitions


For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC TR 15026-1 apply.

5 Use of this part of ISO/IEC 15026


System- or product-related needs and requirements, interactions of the system or product with its environment,
and real-world events and conditions can result in an objective to obtain assurance that the system or product
achieves certain claims. To meet this objective, assurance cases support these claims concerning selected

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ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011(E)

properties of the system or product. While these properties may be selected for any reason, one commonly
selects them because they are risk-related and high confidence is needed in their realization in a system or
product. The results of developing an assurance case are the values and their uncertainties established for
each top-level claim's property. The uncertainties regarding the truth or falsehood of these claims are an
essential conclusion of the assurance case.

Stakeholders can evaluate the assurance case to determine the extent of achievement of the top-level claim
by the system or product and whether this achievement is shown within the allowable uncertainty or risk and
any related consequences. The results regarding the top-level claim and its support along with related
uncertainties and consequences constitute a basis for rationally managing risk, achieving grounds for
appropriate confidence, and aiding in decision making.

Generally, stakeholders can make better decisions about a system or product when the uncertainties of
conclusions regarding these properties are reduced. While an assurance case is useful for decision-making by
knowledgeable stakeholders (e.g., developers and service providers), often the primary motivation for an
assurance case is to support crucial decisions by stakeholders without this background, such as those
involved in certification, regulation, acquisition, or audit of the system.

How the assurance case is used and the amount of effort devoted to its formulation can vary greatly due to
the stringency of the properties selected, the applicable duration of the claim, the degree of uncertainty, the
scope of the assumptions made, and the risk or consequences involved. Thus, the content needed in an
assurance case varies depending on the stakeholder and evaluation context. For example, depending on the
system requirements and the property specified by the top-level claim, an assurance case could be used for
validation or verification purposes.

This part of ISO/IEC 15026 is intended to be utilized while developing and maintaining assurance cases.
When developing a new system or product or making a major change, the development of the assurance case
should be integral within processes, plans, engineering, activities, and decisions related to the development of
the system or product of interest.

In order to provide the needed flexibility and cover the many areas where assurance cases are utilized, this
part of this International Standard uses a general approach and calls for a mapping between it and the
contents of any conforming assurance case. The requirements for this mapping are in 7.2.

NOTE 1 The term “uncertainty” is used as a general term to mean "lack of certainty." Different communities restrict the
application of this term to limited usage, e.g., to predictions of future events, to physical measurements already made, or
to unknowns, but in this International Standard the term applies to any uncertainty.

NOTE 2 Selecting the top-level claim and the properties it involves is not restricted by this part of ISO/IEC 15026 but
may be specified in stakeholder requirements or established by an approval authority for the system or product. Top-level
claims might be a portion of the total requirements and specification but might be something internal to the system, related
to something the system depends upon, or only indirectly related to the primary system of interest.

NOTE 3 Limitations of a system’s or product’s assurance case should be reflected in the guidance; transition,
operations, and maintenance documentation; training; operator and user aids; data collection capabilities; and services
included in or accompanying the system or product. Knowledge of these limitations allows avoidance and recognition of
violations of relevant assumptions or the conditions related to the top-level claims.

NOTE 4 The text often refers to a single assurance case or to a single top-level claim; however, a system or product
may have multiple assurance cases, and an assurance case may have multiple top-level claims.

6 Structure and contents of an assurance case

6.1 General

This part of ISO/IEC 15026’s description of assurance case structure and contents uses the term
“components” for the main parts of an assurance case and describes the relationships among these
components. The following general requirements apply:

a) The components of an assurance case shall be unambiguous, identifiable, and accessible.

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NOTE Ambiguity may be avoided by associating a component with information on its context, such as:
definitions of the terms used, the environment of the system or product, and the identities of entities responsible for a
component’s development or maintenance.

b) Each component shall be uniquely identified and shall be able to have its origin identified, its history
ascertained, and its integrity assured.

c) For each component, the component's contents, the information related to it, and the other components
with which it has relationships shall be identifiable and accessible."

NOTE For each component, its description and needed other components, e.g., evidence for claims and related
information such as test case results, are identifiable and accessible.

d) An assurance case shall contain the auxiliary contents required by ISO/IEC 15289 for this type of
documentation.

NOTE This part of ISO/IEC 15026 places no restrictions on how these auxiliary contents are included and no
requirement that the assurance case be a separate document.

6.2 Overall structure

The five principal components of an assurance case are claims, arguments, evidence, justifications, and
assumptions.

Figure 1 describes the structure of assurance cases. It is not normative.

Claims

A claim is a proposition to be assured about the system of concern. It may be accompanied with auxiliary
information such as the range of some date mentioned in the proposition or the uncertainty of the
proposition.

Justifications, Arguments, Evidence and Assurance Cases

Justifications, arguments, evidence and assurance cases are defined mutually recursively in this figure.

Given a claim c, a justification j of c is a reason why c has been chosen.

Comment: Therefore, a justification is defined relative to a claim c. An argument (defined below) is also
defined relative to a claim, but it is different from justification because a justification is a reason for the
choice of a claim, while an argument is a reason why a claim is true.

Given a claim c and a set es of evidence, an argument that assures c using es is defined to be a reason why
the truth of c is deduced from the main part of evidence in the set es.

Evidence is either a fact, a datum, an object, a claim or an assurance case. A claim is called an assumption
if it appears in an assurance case as evidence. The main part of the evidence is defined according to the
form of the evidence; if the evidence is either a fact, datum, object or a claim, its main part is itself; but if the
evidence is an assurance case a0, its main part is the claim of a0.

Comment: It will be clarified below in this figure that the evidence of an assurance case is used by an
argument of that assurance case to assure that its claim holds.

Comment: A claim appearing as evidence is called an assumption because such evidence is a proposition
without any reason why it is true. When a reason for its truth is provided, it is expected that an assurance
case, whose argument is that reason, is constructed and provided as the evidence instead of providing only
the claim as evidence.

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An assurance case is defined to be a quadruple of a claim c, a justification j of c, a set es of evidence and an


argument g which assures c using es. Let a = (c, j, es, g) be an assurance case; c is defined to be the claim of
a; similarly, j is defined to be the justification of a, es to be the set of evidence of a, and g to be the argument
of a.

Comment: The definition of assurance cases depends on that of arguments, the definition of arguments
depends on that of evidence, and the definition of evidence depends on that of assurance cases. These
definitions, however, are not circular, but mutually recursive with each other.

Comment: For mathematically oriented readers, the following recursive definition of the set of assurance
cases might help. The set A of assurance cases and the set E of evidence are defined by the following
recursive equations.

A0 = C × { j0  J (c0) | c0  C } × ധ f (E) × { g0  G (c0, es0) | c0  C, es0  ധ f (E) }

A = { (c, j, es, g)  A0 | j  J (c), g  G (c, es) }

E=F+D+O+C+A

where

J(c) is the set of all justifications for a claim c;


C is the set of claims;
ധ f (E) is the set of all finite subsets of E (finite powerset of E );
G (c0, es0 ) is the set of arguments which assures a claim c0 using a set es0 of evidence;
F is the set of facts, D is the set of data;
O is the set of objects;
M×N is the direct product of M and N, for any sets M and N; and
M+N is the discriminated union (direct sum) of M and N for any sets M and N.

Figure 1 — Structure of assurance cases (informative)

The following requirements apply to the structure of an assurance case:

a) An assurance case shall have one or more top-level claims that are the ultimate goals of its
argumentation.

NOTE Multiple top-level claims are equivalent to their conjunction.

b) An argument shall be supported by one or more claims, evidence, or assumptions.

NOTE 1 An argument is used to show how the components directly underlying it relate to a claim or set of claims.
The set of underlying components for an argument comprises a collection of evidence, assumptions, or lower-level
claims.

NOTE 2 Since one argument cannot directly support another argument; a lower-level argument should attach to a
lower-level claim that in turn attaches to the higher-level argument.

c) A claim shall be supported either by just one argument, or by one or more claims, evidence, or
assumptions.

NOTE Every claim in an assurance case requires support, which can take different forms. Therefore, a claim is
never a bottom component of an assurance case. One (and only one) argument can be used to support a claim.
Alternatively, a claim can be supported (directly, and not via an argument) by some collection of evidence,
assumptions, or lower-level claims.

d) A claim, argument, evidence, or assumption shall not support itself either directly or indirectly.

NOTE A single claim, argument, evidence, or assumption may be used to support multiple components.

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6.3 Claims

6.3.1 Form of claim

A claim shall be a true-false statement that states the limitations on the values of an unambiguously defined
property—called the claim's property, limitations on the uncertainty of the property's value meeting the
limitations on it, and limitations on conditions under which the claim is applicable.

6.3.2 Claim contents

As indicated in the following list, a claim shall have the required contents and may have the optional contents:

a) Claim's property (required).

b) Limitations on the value of the property associated with the claim (e.g., on its range) (required).

c) Limitations on the uncertainty of the property value meeting its limitations (required).

d) Limitations on duration of claim's applicability (optional).

e) Duration-related uncertainty (optional).

f) Limitations on conditions under which the claim is applicable (required).

g) Condition-related uncertainty (optional).

h) If a property in a claim applies to some subset of systems, products, or their elements, their identification
including relevant versions or instances (conditionally required).

i) Consequences or risks if they are relevant to claim (conditionally required).

NOTE 1 The term "limitations" is used to fit the many situations that can exist. Values can be a single value or multiple
single values, a range of values or multiple ranges of values, or multi-dimensional. The boundaries of these limitations
sometimes involve probability distributions, are incremental, or have other fuzzy aspects.

NOTE 2 Uncertainties also may be associated with the duration of applicability and the stated conditions. Particular
claims need not include all possible uncertainties and commonly include only one. Where accurate, uncertainties may be
zero.

6.3.3 Coverage of conditions

The conditions, including any specified durations, covered by the combination of assurance case components
supporting a claim shall together cover the conditions, including any specified duration, for which the claim is
applicable.

6.3.4 Justification of the choice of top-level claims

Because the choice of a top-level claim and its property is critical in order to meet the objective of an
assurance case and drives the assurance case's formulation, a top-level claim shall have a justification for its
choice.

NOTE Justification for the top-level claim serves as a means for communicating risk among stakeholders of the
system and for recording agreement.

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6.4 Arguments

6.4.1 Argument characteristics

An argument is used to show how the components directly underlying it relate to a claim or set of claims. An
argument can be particularly useful if it is in the form of an engineering calculation or logic proof and not in the
form of an assurance case.

An argument has the following characteristics:

a) The argument shall be stated in a manner that uses the components directly below it.

b) The argument shall reach a conclusion or conclusions that relate to each claim it supports.

c) The argument shall establish the uncertainties of each conclusion it reaches.

d) The argument shall contain the information needed to establish its effect on uncertainty.

6.4.2 Justification of argument’s method of reasoning

An argument shall have an associated justification for the validity or merit of its method of reasoning (e.g.,
calculating or arguing).

NOTE A variety of methods of reasoning can be used within arguments. These methods, including the tools they use,
vary in their applicability, power, resulting accuracy and uncertainty, and ease of use. Arguments are used to support or
detract from claims. The claims, evidence, and assumptions underlying an argument have uncertainties associated with
them, and the argument might affect the uncertainty of the claim using it.

6.5 Evidence

6.5.1 Evidence contents

Evidence shall contain tangible data or information.

NOTE Many kinds of evidence exist. Among these are human experience reports, history, observations,
measurements, tests, evaluative and compliance results, correctness of design rationale, analyses, comparison of
artefacts, reviews, and defects and other quality assurance and field data. Evidence can already exist, be newly created or
collected, or be planned for the future. The evidence should support or detract from the claims in the assurance case. The
body of evidence can become quite large and should be organized, located, and presented to be understandable to those
who review, approve, or directly use it.

6.5.2 Associated information

Evidence shall contain or have associated with it information regarding its:

a) Definition.

b) Scope of applicability.

c) Uncertainty, including the reliability of its source (e.g., authenticity, trustworthiness, and competence) and
the measurement accuracy.

NOTE This information may take any form including one or more assurance cases or portions thereof.

6.5.3 Associated assumptions

Any assumptions related to evidence shall be included in the assurance case.

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6.6 Assumptions

6.6.1 Form of Assumption

An assumption shall take the form of a claim and a reason for it.

6.6.2 Assumption contents

An assumption can have one of three kinds of origins. Two kinds are inherently true given their context and
role within the assurance case. These are (1) an assumption implied by the specified conditions restricting the
applicability of the claim(s) it supports and (2) an assumption inherent in a method of argumentation, e.g., as a
statement of an alternative that is one of a set of alternative assumptions that together cover all the relevant
possibilities, such as stating each case in a proof by cases. These two kinds of assumptions have zero
uncertainty.

The third kind of an assumption is not inherently true; rather it is a claim not fully warranted by evidence. This
third kind of assumption shall:

a) Contain a claim and a reason for it.

b) Contain an indication, identification, or description of the basis of the estimate of the uncertainty regarding
the truth of the assumption.

NOTE For best results, such assumptions should have one or more of the following characteristics: have low
uncertainty or low risk because they are of low criticality in argumentation, have a weak impact on the argumentation,
have a weak effect on critical values or consequences, or are few in number.

6.6.3 Associated evidence

If an assumption is partially warranted or contradicted by evidence, this evidence shall be associated with it.

6.7 Justifications

A top-level claim has a justification for its choice (6.3.4) and an argument has a justification for its method of
argumentation (6.4.2).

6.8 Combining assurance cases

If an assurance case incorporates another assurance case, the incorporated assurance case's top-level claim
or claims shall each be placed within the original assurance case’s structure at points where claims are
allowed.

NOTE A portion of an assurance case may also be a part of other assurance cases.

7 Required outcomes of using Part 2 assurance case

7.1 Outcomes

Application of this part of ISO/IEC 15026 has the following outcomes:

a) An assurance case meeting the requirements of Clause 6 shall be provided as an element of the system.

NOTE As an element of the system, the assurance case is generally expected to be delivered with the system and
maintained as the system is maintained.

b) A logical mapping meeting the requirements of 7.2 shall be provided as a part of the assurance case.

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c) Records documenting the fulfilment of the requirements of this part of ISO/IEC 15026 shall be identified
and referenced by the assurance case.

d) Identification of the entity or entities asserting conformance shall be provided in the assurance case.

7.2 Mapping to this part of ISO/IEC 15026

An assurance case shall:

a) Include an unambiguous mapping to the components and relationships in Clause 6.

b) Cover all the contents specified in Clause 6 unless documented justification is provided for doing
otherwise.

NOTE 1 Because this mapping has to map from assurance cases that are developed within several specialities and
utilize many notations, the mapping may take any unambiguous form.

NOTE 2 The mapping may assign a meaning and mapping to a component that is missing if that mapping is
unambiguous. For example, if a particular kind of uncertainty is not explicitly specified, then the mapping might state that
this is equivalent to it being specified and equalling zero.

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1) To be published.

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