A History of Psychology

in Ten Questions
This student-friendly book on the history of psychology covers the key historical
developments and controversies in all areas of psychology, linking history to the
present by focusing on ten conceptual issues that are relevant today.
How did psychology become a science, and what kind of science did it
become? How do psychologists measure and explain the fact that in some
ways everyone is unique? Is psychoanalysis scientific? Why did cognitive
science replace behaviorism? This book addresses all these questions and
more, covering the whole range of psychology, from neuroscience and artificial
intelligence to hermeneutics and qualitative research in the process. Drawing
on the author’s experience of how to make the subject interesting for students,
the book is structured around ten key questions that engage with all the core
areas of psychology and the main schools of thought. Showing how each of
the different approaches or paradigms within psychology differ not based on
data but on assumptions, Michael Hyland provides an engaging introduction
to debates from history and in contemporary society.
Including boxed material on hot topics, historical figures, studies/
experiments, and quirky facts, this is the ideal book for undergraduate students
of psychology taking CHIPS and other history of psychology modules.

Michael Hyland was a lecturer and later professor of health psychology at

the University of Plymouth, retiring in 2018 after 44 years teaching history and
theory in psychology. He is currently a part-time professor of health psychology
at Plymouth Marjon University.
A History of Psychology
in Ten Questions

Michael Hyland
First published 2020
by Routledge
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© 2020 Michael Hyland
The right of Michael Hyland to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
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To Orin and Theo
 Contents

Preface���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ix

1 What is science and what do scientists do? ������������������������������������������� 1

2 How did psychology become a science and what kind of
science did it become?������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25
3 How did psychology become an applied science and
what is the relationship between applied and non-applied
psychology today?������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 47
4 Why did behaviourism occur, what forms did it take, and
why and how was it replaced by cognitive psychology as
the dominant paradigm in psychology?����������������������������������������������� 67
5 Is psychoanalysis scientific, what are its assumptions, why
is therapy effective, and what is the legacy of psychoanalysis
today?������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99
6 What is the relationship between psychology and physiology,
will neuroscience replace psychology, and what is biopsychosocial
interactionism? ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 121
7 How has the heredity-environment controversy been represented
in the history of psychology and how is it informed by the person-
situation debate and modern understanding of epigenetics?��������������� 141
8 How do psychologists measure and explain the fact that in
some ways everyone is unique?��������������������������������������������������������� 159
9 What are the assumptions of psychologists who use qualitative
research methodology and what are the alternatives to treating
psychology as a natural science? ������������������������������������������������������� 177
10 Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts? From gestalt
psychology to artificial intelligence.��������������������������������������������������� 193
11 The changing assumptions of psychology.����������������������������������������� 215

References ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 219

Index��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 237
 Preface

Student satisfaction ratings are now an important part of university life. They
were not used when I started teaching 40 years ago, but if they had my ratings
would have been poor. I had no interest in history, and my own recent experi-
ence as a student had been entirely negative. The course taught by a young
lecturer when I was an undergraduate went something like this:

There was Fechner, yeah, and he was early and then there was Wundt.
Wundt was important. Yeah, yeah, really, really important. Then there
was Watson, he was also important. He started behaviourism, like . . .

I am sure it wasn’t that bad, but that is how I remember it. My early courses
were only a little better. I taught history from a respected textbook on the his-
tory of psychology, but I had no love for the subject. Over time, things changed.
In the year I retired from the University of Plymouth, the average overall satis-
faction for my course was 4.7 out of 5, with an interest rating of 4.6. Freetext
comments from students showed that many anticipated the course to be boring
because of its title only to be surprised by how interesting they found it.
Some people find history interesting. The majority of psychology students
do not. They have come to study modern psychology. They have not come to
study history. When presented with the term ‘conceptual issues,’ most students
don’t know what it means and lack interest. However, students will find these
topics interesting if they are presented in a way that is relevant to their under-
standing of modern psychology. To be successful in teaching historical and
conceptual issues in psychology (CHIPS), the topic must be linked to existing
concepts that students find interesting. This educational principle is not new!
There are two ways of teaching CHIPS. One way is to provide a historical
introduction to each topic that makes up a psychology course. For example,
social psychology courses start with a historical introduction to social psychol-
ogy, and developmental psychology courses start with a historical introduction
to development psychology. The advantage of this approach is that it avoids the
negative ratings that can accompany CHIPS courses. There are two disadvan-
tages. One is that students continue to perceive psychology as a set of discon-
nected topics rather than a whole that has evolved over time. A second is that
this approach neglects the broader conceptual issues.
An alternative is to teach CHIPS as a separate course. If not done well,
students will find it uninteresting, but if done well, this approach can cover the
broader conceptual issues and provide a sense of psychology as a whole. In this
x ◆ Preface

book, conceptual issues are presented in the form of questions. This technique
enables students to learn with a purpose – an idea that predates the founding
of academic psychology in Leipzig (Parsons, 1873). Each chapter deals with a
different conceptual issue, with a historical introduction, and then shows how
that issue is relevant today. Many of these conceptual issues have to do with
the different assumptions of different groups of psychologists, assumptions that
have changed over time.
In writing this book I have been mindful of the fact that many students have
studied psychology, including the history of psychology, at school or in some
introductory course. Students find repetition tedious. The content of this book
is selected to avoid repetition. For example, students will have a basic under-
standing of behaviourism and cognitive psychology but be unaware that each
answers a different type of question using a different type of theory. Students
will have been introduced to some of Freud’s ideas but not know why some
are true, some are false, and some are unfalsifiable. Students will know about
the heredity-environment controversy but not that modern epigenetics shows
that it is based on a false premise, nor will they know how it is informed by the
person-situation debate. Students will know about neuroscience but have little
understanding of biopsychosocial interactionism. Students will know about
qualitative methods but not know the different assumptions of those who use
qualitative methods in different ways.
The book is also suitable for anyone wanting to gain an overall understand-
ing of the conceptual issues in psychology, and in particular for undergraduates
taking a CHIPS course on a psychology degree. There is some advantage in
having some experience of psychology before reading this book, for example
having studied psychology at an advanced level in school or equivalent. The dis-
cipline of psychology is like a jigsaw puzzle made out of many pieces, and it is
good to have at least some understanding of the pieces in order to see the picture
as a whole. Some of the conceptual ideas are more challenging than others, but
there is enough in each chapter to be of interest to all students.
This book does not provide the kind of historical detail that is more suited
for a specialist course on the history of psychology. I have selected some per-
sonal historical detail, but only where it is useful or interesting for students. I
refer to events in William James’ life to show that even famous psychologists
can have mental health problems. I refer to Watson’s sacking from his uni-
versity for the less good reason that students will find the gossip interesting. I
mention that Wundt was a nice guy, because I like nice guys. I refer to racism
in psychology because it tends to be airbrushed out, but it is relevant to the
heredity-environment controversy. I refer to personal details if it is relevant to a
person’s theory or research or because it is pertinent in some other way. There is
some historical detail along with the conceptual issues, but the historical details
are not as thorough as will be found in proper histories of psychology, written
by proper historians. I don’t mention where Wundt was born, nor reports of his
performance at school – interesting as those may be.
 Preface ◆ xi

Any book reflects the personal interests of the author. My PhD was theoreti-
cal, and as a young lecturer I was instrumental in setting up the International
Society for Theoretical psychology. However, I have spent most of my working
life as a health psychologist trying to solve practical problems by using new
theories or new applications of old theories. I developed an interest in the his-
tory of psychology through teaching the subject. Readers may detect a sympa-
thy with applied psychology, a fascination with theory, and an interest in the
quirkier aspects of history.
This book is written for a specific purpose: to show how conceptual issues
that are relevant today have developed over the history of academic psychol-
ogy. My hope is that this book will help other lecturers provide interesting
and inspiring lectures, and for students to enjoy a subject that can inform
their understanding of the subject they have chosen to study: the discipline of
psychology.
 1
What is science and what do
scientists do?
2 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

This chapter covers two topics: the philosophy of science and the psychology
of science.
How do you know if something is true? That question is particularly
pertinent in a world where news is sometimes described as ‘fake news.’ To
know whether something is true it is necessary to have criterion, a crite-
rion that can distinguish truth from falsity. But how can you tell whether
the criterion is true? The answer is that you cannot tell, because if there is
a criterion for the criterion, then you don’t know whether that criterion is
true. Knowing whether a criterion is true or not is called the problem of the
criterion. Although philosophers have discussed the problem of the criterion
for at least two thousand years, in this book two criteria for knowledge
will be assumed to be true. These are the logical criterion and the empirical
criterion.
The science of psychology, like any other science, is based on the empirical
criterion. However, the empirical criterion has a logical basis, so this chapter
starts with a brief discussion of logic.

Logic
Imagine you have a pack of cards face down in front of you. You take the first
card from the pack, and you find that it is the ace of hearts. Let me explain,
in case there is any doubt, that this is an ordinary pack of cards, and there is
only one ace of hearts in the whole pack. Now, consider the two following
statements

The next card you draw will be the ace of hearts.

The next card you draw will not be the ace of hearts.

You, the student, will know straight away that the first sentence is false and
the second sentence true, and you know this without having to look. You
know this without empirical evidence. The reason is that you are applying a
logical rule. The logical rule is this: Something cannot be in two places at the
same time.
Logic is based on the application of rules, the rules of logic. There are
many different logical rules and few will be discussed here. However, students
will already have come across logical rules in statistics. Null hypothesis testing
is based on the assumption that a hypothesis is either true or false – but not
both true and false at the same time. Statistical tests give the probability that
a hypothesis is not true (e.g., two groups are not equal); statistical tests apply
the rule that a hypothesis can be either true or false, but not true and false. The
process of science is a logical one; it is based on following certain accepted rules
of practice.
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 3

What is the logic of science?

What is the logic of scientific enquiry? Philosophers and historians of science
observe what scientists do and provide an answer, but that answer has changed
over time. In the 19th century the view was that science was based on the logic
of induction. In the 20th century the view was that science is based on the logic
of deduction. Both types of logic will be examined separately before a psycho-
logical analysis will show how both types are used in science.

Induction and inductive laws

The logic of induction is based on the assumption that general laws can be
‘induced’ from facts, or, to use the more technical term, singular occurrences.
Here is an example of how it works. Suppose you are travelling round the coun-
try and you see a white swan. The observation of the white swan is a singular
occurrence. You go a little further and see another white swan. You keep on
travelling seeing one white swan after another until you are ready to induce a
general law:

All swans are white.

The rule of induction can be summed up as this:

If something has been observed to occur regularly in the past, the same
will occur in the future.

Inductive rules are therefore useful for predicting and controlling the world in
which we live. Inductive rules make practical sense.
In the example of the swans, induction has produced the statement ‘all
swans are white,’ but is this statement true? In any group of psychology stu-
dents, there will be some who know that not all swans are white – swans in (or
originating from) Australia are black. So, after observing some black swans, it
is possible to conclude that the original law – all swans are white – is false; it is
now possible to write a new statement:

All swans are either black or white.

Again, it is possible to ask, is it possible to prove this statement true, in the sense
that is known to be 100% true? The answer is no. It can never be proved with
100% certainty that all swans are either black or white as there may be some
hiding away somewhere in the undergrowth that are not black or white. You
may be interested to learn that the statement ‘all swans are black or white’ is
in fact false. The reason is that in a far-away galaxy, on the planet Zog, there
Naughty green swan hiding from scientists on planet Zog.
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 5

are a group of swans that are pink with blue spots. You don’t believe me? You
cannot be sure that there are no pink and blue swans any more than I can be
sure that there are.
OK, so now it is possible to generate another rule:

Some swans are white.

This rule can be proved true, but it cannot be proved false. The same applies to
the following statement:

Some swans are green.

It is always possible that there are some green swans hiding away somewhere –
not necessarily on the planet Zog, so this statement can never be shown to be
false.
From a psychological perspective, the statement that ‘some swans are white’
is a lot less interesting than the statement ‘all swans are white.’ Imagine being
told this:

After careful consideration and observation, I have come to the conclu-

sion that it sometimes rains in England.

This conclusion would be true, but it is also obvious and therefore uninterest-
ing. Thus, the type of inductive generalisation is important. One criticism of
the assumption that science is based on induction is that scientists do not col-
lect facts randomly. They collect the facts on the basis of ‘ideas’ about what is
interesting. The collected facts should be important or interesting in some way.
Some swans are white is a lot less informative than all swans are white – even
though the latter is false.

Prediction and explanation

Inductive rules describe what happens in the world in which we live. They
do not explain what happens. They describe the ‘what’ but not the ‘why.’
Because these rules describe regularities in things that happen, they can be
used to predict the future. However, the prediction is limited to the rule
of what has happened before. Explanations will be described in the next
section and permit prediction of things that have not happened before.
The early history of psychology was largely one of induction – of finding
regularities but not providing explanations. The later history is one where
greater emphasis is placed on explanation.
6 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

The logic of deduction and hypothesis testing

Karl Popper (and others) (Popper, 1935/1992, 1963) argued the logic of sci-
ence is not based on induction. Even when scientists collect facts, they don’t
do so randomly. Data collection is always based on a hypothesis or conjecture.
Instead of science being based on induction, Popper suggested that the logic of
science was based on deduction.
In science, deduction is the process of making a prediction on the basis of
a theory. The theory explains the regularities in things that happen. Again, it is
best illustrated with an example. Instead of starting with an observation, let us
start with a theory, the theory of gravity. It is possible to deduce from the theory
of gravity that if I let go of my keys, they will fall to earth. This prediction is of
a singular occurrence or fact. The next step is used to test whether the singular
occurrence, predicted by the theory, actually occurs. I hold out my hand hold-
ing my keys. I let the keys go. They fall to earth showing that the prediction of
the theory is true.
Deduction is a logical rule that can be summed up as this:

On the basis of these theoretical assumptions the following events will

happen.

Has the simple fact of my dropping the keys proved the theory of gravity? The
answer is no. Even if I keep dropping my keys and collect a sizeable pool of
data supporting the theory, the theory of gravity can never be proved to be true,
because there is an alternative explanation. The reason that keys keep falling
to earth is nothing to do with this strange thing called gravity. There is a much
simpler explanation. It is caused by a gravity monster who sits at the centre
of the earth and waves its tail. Whenever the gravity monster waves its tail, it
attracts objects to its tail. That is the real reason why things fall to earth. And
the gravity monster is always waving its tail. Or is it?
The reality is that when data confirm a theory – i.e., when singular occur-
rences are consistent with the prediction of a theory – it is always possible that
the same data can be explained by another theory. It is always possible that
some data will be found in the future that cannot be explained by the theory.
Therefore, theories can be confirmed but never proved to be true. Data do not
prove theories. Scientists try to rule out competing hypotheses by setting up
experiments where the competing hypotheses make different predictions. In
principle, it takes only one observation that cannot be explained by the theory
to show that a theory is false. Of course, as more and more data of different
kinds are found to support the theory, the more the theory is corroborated
by those data. So, some theories can be well confirmed, but they can never be
proved to be true.
Popper suggested that science proceeds through a series of ‘conjectures and
refutations’ – which is the title of one his books (Popper, 1963). Scientists have
a hypothesis or conjecture. They test the hypothesis and for a while the data
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 7

confirm (but never prove) the theory. Eventually data are found that falsify the
theory and so it is necessary to develop a new conjecture or hypothesis. Science
proceeds by a series of conjectures and refutations; each time the conjecture
becomes more ‘true’ than the conjecture before. In practice, scientific advance
is not quite the elegant process suggested by Popper. Disconfirming evidence
usually leads to changes rather than the rejection of a theory, or simply rejection
of the disconfirming evidence.

Theories that are eventually found false

Newton developed a mathematical theory to explain the relationship
between force, mass and velocity. Newton’s theory explains many things –
from how cars move in collisions to the orbits of planets. Everyone was
so convinced by this theory, and the way they predicted things accurately,
that they became known as ‘Newton’s laws of motion.’ However, when
mass becomes very large or when it is very small, Newton’s laws no lon-
ger apply. Einstein predicted that space was curved by mass, a theory first
tested by observing the position of the sun during an eclipse. Other theo-
ries of classical physics have been shown to be false by quantum mechan-
ics. Of course these classical physics theories are true in the sense that they
apply under most conditions, but the fact that there are exceptions shows
that they cannot be treated as the universal laws they once were.

The key difference between the earlier inductive view of science and the
­deductive/falsification model proposed by Popper is that the latter involves
theories, and theories provide explanations as well as predictions. The theory
provides an explanation of why something happens. The explanations have one
key advantage over predictions based on inductive generalisations. They allow
novel predictions. The ability of theories to make novel predictions is not some-
thing that is automatic. Humans are needed to make novel predictions. Science
is a creative activity involving the insight of people.

Metaphysics versus science

Popper used his idea of conjectures and refutations to provide a logical criterion
for science. An alternative is to use a social criterion, such as scientists are those
perceived by ordinary people as scientists. Popper’s criterion was based on the
application of rule – i.e., on a logical rule. Popper’s criterion of science is this:

Scientific statements are those that can be shown to be false through

observation.
8 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

Statements that cannot be shown to be false through observation

are not scientific statements but metaphysical statements.

This criterion, known as the criterion of falsifiability, distinguishes what Popper

called science from metaphysics. Metaphysics, according to Popper, consists of
statements that cannot be shown to be false through observation, and therefore
are outside the realm of science.
There are a number of different types of statement that cannot be shown to
be false by observation, and one of these has been presented already. The state-
ment ‘some swans are green’ cannot be shown to be false through observation,
whereas the statement ‘all swans are white’ can be shown to be false. The latter
sentence is therefore a scientific statement – but false – whereas the former is not
even scientific according to Popper’s criterion. There are many types of state-
ment that are non-falsifiable. One particular type relates to religious beliefs.
Consider the following statement:

God exists.

What kind of evidence is there that God does not exist? It is possible to cite
miracles and other kinds of evidence suggesting that God exists, but there is no
type of evidence that could prove – i.e., show with 100% certainty – that God
does not exist. So, the statement that ‘God exists’ is therefore unfalsifiable, and
the statement is metaphysical rather than scientific. It is also, note, impossible
to falsify the statement that ‘somewhere there are swans with pink spots on a
green background.’ Statements that, on logical grounds, cannot be shown to be
false are not scientific.

Science and religions

Religious beliefs are metaphysical beliefs and therefore outside the realm
of science. Some scientists are religious, and believe in God. Some scien-
tists are not religious and do not believe in God. Some scientists believe
that religion is a dangerous illusion. Some scientists (and some psycholo-
gists) study how other people practise and believe in religion. Discussion
of these different views is beyond the remit of this book but forms an inter-
esting point of discussion as students themselves will have different views.

Falsifiability and the strength of prediction

Popper makes one additional point in relation to his criterion of falsifiabil-
ity. The degree of falsifiability determines the strength of a theory. Again an
example will illustrate how this works. Imagine that you are in England (where
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 9

it rains a lot) and you want to do your washing and hang it on the line to dry.
Consider the following two statements:

It will be dry on one day and only one day next week.
It will be dry on Wednesday and only on Wednesday next week.

Both statements are falsifiable. If it doesn’t rain or if it rains on more than one
day, then both statements are false. Both are scientific rather than metaphysi-
cal. Both show that washing is possible on one day next week. But the second
sentence is a lot more useful in helping you decide when to do your washing.
The second sentence is also more falsifiable, in the sense that it is more likely
to be wrong if weather is random. The second sentence gives a more powerful
prediction.
Popper distinguishes between strong theories that are highly falsifiable
and weak theories that are falsifiable in principle, but difficult to show wrong.
Note that the degree of falsifiability has nothing to do with whether the theory
is actually false or not, which is something that is determined through obser-
vation. The strength of a theory is something that can be evaluated without
observation. The degree of falsifiability or strength of the theory is an ‘internal’
property of a theory and not an ‘external’ property, which is a theory strength
that can be determined independently of the observation that tests. Strong
theories are easily shown to be false, but if they are not shown false then they
provide more useful information than weak theories that are less likely to be
shown false.
Some theories are falsifiable but so weak – so difficult to show false – that
they are not very useful. The strength and therefore usefulness of psychological
theories is something that will be discussed later in this book. One of the criti-
cisms against Freud’s theory is that it is almost completely unfalsifiable. Others
have argued that his theory is in fact unfalsifiable, and therefore metaphysical.
Both arguments cannot be true, but they certainly need consideration in relation
to both psychoanalytic and other theories in psychology.

Prediction and explanation

Theories explain why things happen. They do this by introducing ‘explanatory
concepts’ that then explain the regularities that have been detected through
inductive inference. Explanatory concepts are also known as theoretical terms.
In physics, examples of theoretical terms include molecules and electrons. In
psychology, examples of theoretical terms include memory and cognitions.
The theoretical terms explain why things happen in the way they do. However,
explanatory terms can also be used to predict things that have not been observed
before. So, theories enable scientists to predict – and therefore ­control – the
world they know. Inductive rules also enable scientists to predict what happens
10 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

next so long as it has happened in the past. Theories enable prediction of things
that have not happened in the past.
One way in which theories differ is whether they make quantitative predic-
tions. Compare the following two statements

It will rain tomorrow in my village.

Two inches of rain will fall tomorrow in my village.

The second statement makes a stronger prediction and it makes a quantitative

prediction. If only one inch falls or three inches fall, then the prediction is false.
Some sciences make quantitative predictions, some make (on the whole) qualita-
tive predictions. Psychology and medicine fall into the latter category. Physics
and chemistry in the former. Theories of physics are typically represented by an
equation. For example, Boyle’s law predicts how much a gas will expand when
heated. Hooke’s law predicts how much a spring expands with different weights.
In medicine, theories typically predict change but not the amount of change. So,
for example, antibiotics reduce infection, but there is no prediction about the rate
of reduction of infection. In psychology, research shows that childhood trauma
leads to behavioural problems, but the behavioural problems are not quantified.

Quantitative predictions in psychology

Although a minority, they do exist: in psychophysics (see Chapter 2,
Weber’s fraction and Fechner’s law), in behaviourism (see Chapter 4,
Hull’s theory), and in mathematical psychology (see Chapter 4, Luce’s
choice axiom).

Theories that make qualitative predictions – such as those in psychology and

medicine – use statistics to test whether the qualitative prediction occurs or
not. As an example, imagine a qualitative prediction that exam performance
is enhanced by a mind-altering drug. A study is conducted where students are

Effect size
The degree of difference is indicated by the statistic called effect size. A small
effect size between two groups is more likely to be found to be statistically
significant if the sample size is large than if it is small. Hence, studies that
employ very large samples will reveal effects that are statistically significant,
but may have little practical significance. Guidelines for psychological jour-
nals increasingly require authors to quote effect size along with statistical sig-
nificance. This information is useful as it provides quantitative information.
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 11

randomly assigned to receive the drug or a placebo and their performance com-
pared, statistically, to see if the probability of the drug and placebo having the
same effect is sufficiently low (e.g., p < 0.05%) for the alternative hypothesis to
be accepted. Statistics are used to test whether a difference occurs or not, not to
test the degree of difference.

Induction and deduction together: the psychology

of scientific discovery
To sum up so far: Inductive rules are created from data; the logic of deduction
is used for testing theories. One view puts the primary unit of science as data,
the other the primary unit of science as theory. Both views can be supported
by examples from the history of science. As a general rule, inductive inference
is more common in less developed or historically older sciences. Explanatory
theories – from which deductions can be made – are a feature of more advanced
or more recent sciences (Royce & Powell, 1983).
Popper was a philosopher rather than a psychologist. He never provided
an answer to the question, where do the conjectures or hypotheses come from?
Hypotheses must come from the minds of scientists. So how are hypotheses
formed?

Where do theories come from?

The following is a quote from Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery
published in 1935 (Popper, 1935/1992):

The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man –

whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific
theory – may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.
(p. 7)

The story of the discovery of penicillin provides one possible insight into the creative
process of hypothesis formation and the relationship between theory and data.
Alexander Fleming, a Scottish researcher, was growing bacteria on a petri
dish. He came back from a two week holiday in 1928 to find that one of his
dishes had been contaminated with what looked like mould, and no bacteria
were growing where the mould had contaminated the petri dish. One pos-
sible reaction would be to say “bother, my petri dish has been contaminated.”
12 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

Instead, Fleming made a connection with something outside his experiment. He

hypothesised that the mould had killed the bacteria and the mould could there-
fore have therapeutic properties. This hypothesis was tested initially by Fleming
and then by others. The stage of data collection took time. It wasn’t until 1942
that the first patient was successfully treated with penicillin.
In this example, there is a chance discovery that creates an observation.
Fleming then formed a mental link between that observation with other knowl-
edge that he had but was irrelevant to the initial experiment. The creative pro-
cess is one of forming links between ideas, of showing how existing ideas can
be combined in novel ways to form entirely new ideas. Creativity is a synthesis
of the many, and in science the many can come from many different sources.
These include chance discoveries, data that are recently available, past data,
past theories, past lived experience. The discovery of new theories is not a
mechanical process that can be easily taught. New theories come from simply
thinking about things. Testing of theories is also a creative process, because test-
able predictions require a person to deduce a prediction. Scientific development
is not a purely logical process!
Data and theory are inextricably linked in the minds of scientists to the
extent that inductive and deductive inference both feature in scientific discov-
ery. An understanding of data helps determine what questions are asked, but
the questions that are asked also depends on the scientist’s prior knowledge and
understanding of what is important and what is not. The modern view is that
theories rather than data are the basic unit of science, but the development of
those theories, and not only the testing of theories, is always linked to observa-
tion, observation that may occur over many years of a scientist’s lifetime.

Where do rules of logic come from? For curious students only

Science is based on the logical rules in induction and deduction. Are logi-
cal rules independent of observation? Consider the example used at the
beginning of this chapter where it was possible to tell that the next card in
a deck of cards is not an ace of hearts if it has already been drawn.
In everyday life we observe that something cannot be in two different
states at the same time. This rule can be applied to state of being alive
versus being dead. An animal is either dead or alive, but not both. The
rule is based on observation. However, in the world of the very small,
the world of quantum mechanics, something very odd happens. The prin-
ciple of quantum superposition makes it possible for something to be in
two different states at the same time. The example often used to illustrate
this principle is Schrödinger’s cat. A cat is placed in a sealed box where at
some random point in time a cyanide capsule will be released and the cat
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 13

will die. Common sense tells us that before the box is opened, the cat must
be either dead or alive. The principle of superposition says that before the
box is opened the cat is both dead and alive. Neils Bohr, one of the fathers
of quantum mechanics, said “If you are not shocked by quantum mechan-
ics, you don’t understand it.” If we experienced the world like it is in the
quantum world, perhaps our logical rules would be different! So logical
rules are based on observations about the universe in which we live. Sci-
ence is based on observation but the rules of science come, ultimately, from
observation as well.

Metatheory, research programmes, and paradigms

The story so far goes like this. Scientists test their theories with data. The theo-
ries are constructed on the basis of a mix of prior theories and data, including
chance observations, all informed by a lifetime of observation not necessarily
related to science; it is observation and thought that enable scientists to make
often intuitive guesses or ‘conjectures’ about how the world works.
The story continues like this. Although theories are tested by data, all theo-
ries are based on ‘metatheoretical assumptions’ that are never tested. These
assumptions are not tested because they are (or assumed to be) so obvious that
everyone thinks they must be true. Two historians of science have written about
these assumptions and their work will be described below. They are Imre Laka-
tos (Lakatos, 1970, 1978) and Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962).

Lakatos’ concept of research programmes

Science builds on previous knowledge. Read any psychology journal article
and you will find a list of papers at the end. The article you are reading builds
on previous research and the discussion section, in particular, makes the link
with previous research explicit. In fact, if authors fail to reference any earlier
research, then they are unlikely to get their papers accepted. Furthermore, the
article you have selected to read is likely to be cited by other articles that are
published subsequently, and those subsequent articles will also cite articles cited
in the article you have selected. Sciences builds on the past.
Lakatos suggests that, within a discipline, there are several strands of
research which he calls ‘research programmes.’ The research programme is
based on assumptions. Lakatos calls these assumptions ‘a positive heuristic.’
The word heuristic means a useful tool for discovery. What the assumptions
or positive heuristics do is to define what research questions should be asked
within the particular research programme and how to go about researching
those questions. The positive heuristic defines the underlying assumptions of
the strand of research that makes up a research programme.
14 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

For example, in the research programme of ‘early childhood trauma and

later poor health,’ the research programme defines that the area of interest as
that linking early trauma of varying kinds with later health of varying kinds. The
research programme also defines the different methodologies that investigate
the underlying hypothesis that early child trauma has negative consequences.
Lakatos distinguishes two types of research programme, those with a pro-
gressive problem shift, where theory precedes data, and those with a degen-
erating problem shift, where data precedes theory. The relationship between
these two types of problem shift, and inductive versus deductive approaches
to science could not be clearer. In the progressive problem shift programme,
research is based on hypotheses that are tested. Research follows the conjecture
and refutation approach suggested by Popper, and the creative part of theory
construction comes before data collection. In the degenerating problem shift,
research is based on careful data collection that then generates theory – the
approach suggested by the earlier inductive approach to science. The progres-
sive problem shift relies on the creativity of scientists, the degenerating problem
shift on their methodological rigour.
Lakatos was a historian of science. He provided evidence that the progres-
sive problem shift tends to produce better results than the degenerating problem
shift (and hence his choice of terminology). In the progressive problem shift, the
discovery of new data doesn’t lead to outright rejection of the theory but rather
modification that is then tested with more data. The theory progresses with the
data. The degenerating problem shift gets stuck in problems of methodology
because the focus is on examining data without developing a new theory.

Stages of a scientific discipline

Joseph Royce (Royce & Powell, 1983, p. 19) suggested that sciences go
through four stages of development “(a) prescientific philosophic specula-
tion, (b) empirical exploration, (c) sophistication of methods of controlled
observation and quantification, and (d) theoretical formalization and
unification.” Royce felt that psychology was between (b) and (c), but psy-
chology may have moved on since 1983.

The distinction between progressive and degenerating problem shifts is based on

whether research is theory-led or data-led. This distinction is not a binary one
but a continuum. In evaluating research in psychology and other disciplines, the
question to be asked is to what extent the research is theory-led versus data-led?
Are there examples of progressive and degenerating problem shifts in psy-
chology? In Chapter 4, I shall suggest that one of the reasons for the decline of
behaviourism was that it became a degenerating problem shift. Behaviourism
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 15

was largely data-led. Lack of theoretical development and decline characterises

other types of early psychology, such as the early German psychology of Wil-
helm Wundt (see Chapter 2). By contrast, theory plays a much greater role in
cognitive psychology, in neuroscience, and the more recent connectionist psy-
chology (see Chapter 10).
Theoretical physics is a much respected part of physics where speculative
theory plays a major part in empirical research. The Large Hadron Collider
was built at a cost of more than six billion pounds to test theories developed by
theoretical physicists. Theoretical psychologists lack that status in psychology.
The Center for the Advanced Study of Theoretical Psychology was founded
by Joseph Royce (1921–1989) in 1966 at the University of Alberta, Canada,
and closed in 1990, shortly after his death. Royce’s vision was to create the
psychological equivalent of theoretical physics. The International Society for
Theoretical Psychology, founded in 1985, has conferences every two years, but
much of the focus is on critiquing mainstream psychology rather than present-
ing new theories. Royce’s vision of a highly respected and influential theoreti-
cal psychology has not been achieved – but psychology is still a young science
compared to physics. Who knows what changes will be brought about by the
students of today?

Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions

Kuhn (1962) uses the term paradigm to describe the meta-theoretical assump-
tions that underpin theories. According to Kuhn, sciences go through stages.
When a science first develops there are often a number of competing meta-
theoretical assumptions. Kuhn calls this the pre-paradigmatic stage, because
no paradigm has become universally accepted. Then one or other of these
competing sets of assumptions becomes dominant, and the science has its first
paradigm. The paradigm defines the kind of theories that can explain the phe-
nomena under consideration, as well as defining the kind of phenomena that
require investigation.
Once the paradigm is settled, there is long period of normal science when
scientists investigate the theories within the paradigm. At some point in time, the
original assumptions are challenged in one way or another to the extent that they
are replaced by another set of meta-theoretical assumptions – i.e., new types of
theory and things to be investigated. This shift from one set of assumptions or
paradigms to another set of assumptions or paradigms is called a paradigm shift.
Researchers then work on the new paradigm until that paradigm is replaced by
yet another. Science therefore proceeds by a series of paradigms and paradigm
shifts.
When scientists are working within a paradigm, they are working within
what Kuhn calls normal science. Normal science consists of a series of ‘mopping
up’ studies to find out the answers to things that require an answer as defined
by the particular paradigm. When a paradigm changes, then this is called a
16 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

scientific revolution. So science proceeds by a series of periods of normal sci-

ence followed by a short scientific revolution and then a new period of normal
science.
Why do new paradigms occur? There are several possible reasons, but a
common one is that there is a body of data that simply cannot be explained by
any of the theories using the original paradigm. A good example of this is the
paradigm shift that led to the development of quantum mechanics. Light some-
times behaves as though it were a wave. It sometimes behaves as though it were
a particle. None of the explanations of classical physics could explain why light
could behave in different ways at different times.
Kuhn’s paradigms and Lakatos’ research programmes are similar. Both refer
to metatheoretical assumptions. The difference is that the paradigm involves a
more fundamental sort of assumption than the programme, but this difference
is best thought of as a continuum, rather than a dichotomy. The term paradigm
is often used for units of research activity that Lakatos would describe as a
research programme. The term paradigm will be used here in this more general
sense. Lakatos’ distinction of theory-led versus data-led research applies to both.

The psychology of scientific revolutions

One view is that science proceeds through the falsification and therefore
improvement of theories. One might imagine that scientists are therefore happy
for their theory to be proved false. Nothing could be further from the truth.
When a scientist develops a theory and then tests it, they will be hoping that the
results come back confirming the theory. Scientists like their theories. They like
to find evidence to support theory, not find evidence that shows that they are
wrong. Falsification of theories in psychology is surprisingly rare.

Falsification in psychology
Students reading this book might like to ask themselves what psychologi-
cal theories have been shown to be false. The issue of falsification is related
to the crisis of replication described later in this chapter.

However, when it comes to research paradigms, scientists are even more protec-
tive of what they have assumed in the past to be true. No one wants to find that
they have invested years of their careers carrying out research – or practice –
based on assumptions that are incorrect. So when paradigm shifts are proposed,
there can be strong resistance from scientists working in the older paradigm.
New paradigms are met with two kinds of response: enthusiasm from those
who believe that the new paradigm provides a novel solution, and hostility from
those who don’t. If the latter camp is stronger, the new paradigm takes longer
to become established.
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 17

The development of the paradigm of modern medicine is a good example of

how people can respond to a change in paradigm. Since the time of the Greeks
till the middle of the 17th century, medicine was based on assumptions that
originated with Hippocrates. Illness was believed to be caused by an imbalance
in four ‘humours’ that flowed round the body. The humours (in case you were
wondering) were black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm. An alternative
paradigm became available during the middle ages, as clockwork and mechani-
cal systems became more common. The body is a mechanical system and illness
is caused by faults in that mechanical system. The mechanical paradigm was
the new paradigm, and early evidence in favour of this new paradigm was pub-
lished by William Harvey in 1628 who described how the heart was a pump
that pumped blood round the body. Harvey wrote at the time that he expected
his discovery to be met with scepticism and downright hostility and that is
exactly what happened. The following (see text box) was written in 1647,
shortly before Harvey’s discovery became accepted.

Rejection of a new paradigm

The following is a translation of the original Latin written by Emilio Pari-
sano in 1647. Parisono was an eminent physician of Venice.

We have no problem to admit that, if the horse swallows water,

we can perceive a movement and we can hear a sound. But that a
pulse should arise in the breast that can be heard, when the blood
is transported from the veins to the arteries, this we certainly can’t
perceive and we do not believe that this will ever happen, except
Harvey lends us his hearing aid. But above all, we do not admit
such a transport of the blood. . . . If blood is transported from the
veins of the lung . . . into the branches of the arteries, how could a
pulse be felt in the breast, how a sound? I am completely innocent
of such subtle speculations. Above all, Harvey has it that a pulse
should arise from the movement of the blood from the heart into
the aorta – no matter from which ventricle. He also claims that this
movement produces a pulse, and, moreover, a sound: that sound,
however, we deaf people cannot hear, and there is no one in Venice
who can. If he can in London, we wish him all the best. But we are
writing in Venice.

There are two points to note about Parisano’s criticism of what is now uni-
versally accepted as true – the heart does actually pump blood. The first is
that the critics of the new paradigm deny that a pulse can be heard there. This
point illustrates a general principle known in the philosophy of science as
18 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

theory-ladenness of observables (Hanson, 1958). The principle of the theory-

ladenness of observables means that observation is always coloured by expecta-
tions about what is being observed. People perceive only what they believe to be
possible. Observation is not independent of theory. The principle of ladenness
of observable is represented in psychological theory (see Chapter 10) as part of
the gestalt movement – perception is based on hypotheses. The idea that science
is based only on induction does not stack up. Not only are data selected for
observation on the basis of theory, but what is seen is also informed by theory.
The physicians of Venice could not hear a pulse because they ‘knew’ that no
pulse existed!
The second point to note in this criticism is in the final sentence “but
we are writing in Venice.” In the 17th century, Venice was a magnificent
city, looking very much as it looks today, and was a centre of learning and
art. London was a hotchpotch of timber framed buildings, many of which
burned down in the great fire of 1666. Parisano is, in effect, telling Harvey:
“You come from an inferior place and should listen to us clever people from
a superior place.”
It is not unusual for paradigm shifts to be made from people working
in less prestigious institutions or who, at the time of writing, are less well
known, simply because they are less immersed in the old paradigm. Freud was
responsible for a paradigm shift where mental illness was treated by a ‘talk-
ing therapy’ and his work and legacy will be discussed in Chapter 5. Albert
Einstein published his theory of special relativity (and other ground-breaking
papers) while employed at a patent office and in the same year that he was
awarded his PhD in Zurich.

What paradigm does psychology have?

There are three possible views. One is that psychology as a discipline is pre-
paradigmatic. Another is that it does have a paradigm. And a third is that it is
a special case, and different from other sciences in having several ‘complemen-
tary’ (note, not spelt ‘complimentary’) forms of paradigm.
It cannot have escaped the notice of any attentive student of psychology that
their lecturers have different views about psychology, and that lecturers do not
always agree about the type of explanation psychologists should employ. Some
lecturers believe that explanations should involve the words and the meaning
of words that people speak. Explanations should be based on a description of
discourse, and interpretation of what that discourse means. Another group,
associated with cognitive psychology, believe that explanations should be based
on the description of information processes. Yet another group believes that
explanations should be based on the description of events in the brain. This
multiplicity of types of explanation can be used to conclude that psychology has
not formed an accepted paradigm, and is still pre-paradigmatic.
Disciplines shift from pre-paradigmatic to paradigmatic by one or other
of the original paradigms becoming universally accepted. Although there is
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 19

no universally accepted paradigm, some believe that there is a dominant para-

digm, a paradigm that is so dominant that others will eventually fade away.
That dominant paradigm is cognitive neuroscience. In cognitive neuroscience,
information processing is explained in terms of the physiology of the brain.
It is certainly the case that at the time of writing cognitive neuroscience is the
paradigm of psychology with the highest status. Papers in cognitive neurosci-
ence are often cited by other researchers and in public newspapers, and some
psychology departments have prioritised appointments in cognitive neuro-
science – even though the popularity of this topic varies somewhat between
students.
A third view is that psychology is special. The nature of psychology means
that it is impossible to explain all phenomena using a single type of explanation
and so complementary explanations are needed. That is, psychology is a science
that differs from others in that it requires multi-paradigmatic explanations as
a mature science, not as an immature, pre-paradigmatic science (further detail
about complementarity is found in Chapter 6).
Each of these three views has its adherents. At the end of this book,
the student should be able to form a view about psychology: Whether it
is pre-paradigmatic, paradigmatic, or necessarily multi-paradigmatic. And of
course, it is always necessary to remember that the answer to this question
attracts strongly held views – and strongly held criticism – so whatever conclu-
sion you come to will be both wrong and right according to other people!

What do scientific psychologists do?

Karl Popper paints a noble picture of what scientists do. Scientists come up with
conjectures or hypotheses. They then test these hypotheses rigorously, trying to
falsify them. Eventually the hypothesis is shown to be false and a new hypoth-
esis is proposed. Is this really what happens? The answer is, no.
Scientists, and that includes psychologists engaged in scientific enquiry, are
human. They have the same psychological characteristics as other humans.
One of these characteristics is confirmation bias. Confirmation bias means
that people tend to accept information confirming their existing hypothesis
and ignore or discount disconfirming information. This bias is compounded by
another factor. Psychologists, like other scientists, have an emotional attach-
ment to theories they are working on. Just as football enthusiasts will support
‘their’ team, so psychologists and other scientists will support ‘their’ theory. The
result is that evidence contrary to a theory may have less impact in developing
new theory than might otherwise be thought. If evidence is found contrary to a
theory, then a possible response is to doubt the replicability of the data – which
is not necessarily a bad thing to do, as will be shown later. Another response is
to find a way of modifying the theory to explain what is considered an excep-
tion. Yet another response is to simply ignore the data.
20 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

Here are two examples that illustrate this point. Both examples come from
theories that inform current practice:

Example 1. The serotoninergic theory of depression is that depression

is caused by low levels of serotonin in the brain and that drugs that
increase serotonin levels (antidepressants) reduce depression. Irving Kirsch
(Kirsch, 2010) and colleagues has shown that at least 80% of the effect
of antidepressants in clinical practice is due to placebo. These results
have been confirmed independently by other authors and, coupled with
data showing that antidepressants do not always resolve depression, this
finding provides evidence inconsistent with the serotoninergic theory of
depression.
Example 2. Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) is based on a theory devel-
oped originally by Aaron Beck that cognitions play an important role in
the cause of depression, and that changing erroneous cognitions leads
to improvement. Bruce Wampold (Wampold, 2013) and colleagues
reviewed several types of data to show that although CBT therapy is
effective, its effectiveness cannot be explained by cognitions having the
causal role as originally suggested. The findings reported by Wampold
and Wampold’s analysis have been confirmed by independent authors.

In both cases there is evidence that throws doubt against accepted and domi-
nant paradigms. The serotoninergic hypothesis is the basis for a multi-million-
pound drugs industry and CBT provides the accepted rationale for the funding
of talking therapies. This is not the place to provide evidence for or against the
various positions – which are robustly supported by both sides. Students may
wish to do this independently. The argument presented here is simply that the
issue of evidence and falsification of scientific theories is by no means a simple
logical process. Science involves humans. Humans are messy.

Mistakes, fraud, and scientific misconduct

A central argument of this section is that scientists are human and have the fea-
tures of other humans. What is the motivation of scientists? To a naïve observer,
the motivation of scientists might be to push back the boundaries of knowledge:
a pure, noble, and selfless motivation to improve knowledge and the lot of
mankind. I am sure there are scientists who are motivated in this way. However,
other motivations can come into play. Scientists can be motivated to demon-
strate that their theory or hypothesis is correct. Scientists can be motivated by
personal glory, and the status and regard achieved by scientific discovery. Some
are also motivated by money, though if one were motivated by money a differ-
ent career would seem a sensible alternative.
Mistakes can be made – it is human to err. Fraud is different. Fraud
involves an intentional flouting of the underlying principles of scientific enquiry,
namely, that of honesty. One of the best-known cases of fraud in the history of
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 21

psychology is that associated with the eminent British psychologist, Cyril Burt.
Burt published data supporting the idea that there was a substantial heredity
component to intelligence. In a study of 53 monozygotic twins reared apart,
Burt reported a correlation of 0.77 between the intelligence scores of twins
(Burt, 1966). These results were interpreted to support the view that intelligence
was largely inherited. Shortly after Burt’s death in 1971, Kamin (1974) and then
others (e.g., Hearnshaw, 1979) published critiques, arguing that the data had
been made up and that the research assistants Burt had cited as co-authors did
not exist.
Others came to the defence of Burt, the ‘missing’ research assistants were
found, and it was pointed out that data supporting similar correlations to those
reported by Burt were replicated by independent researchers (Rushton, 2002).
In 1980 the British Psychological Society condemned Burt as a fraud, but in
1992 revised this judgement, writing:

Council considers that it is now inappropriate for the Society as such

to seek to express a fresh opinion about whether or not the allegations
directed at Burt are true. Moreover, in the light of greater experience,
the British Psychological Society no longer has a corporate view on the
truth of allegations concerning Burt.

To his defenders, Burt was a good scientist who did not fake his data. Others
take a different view.
Burt is not the only famous psychologist subsequently accused of creating
fraudulent data. Hans Eysenck was a famous psychologist, best known for his
work on personality – he developed the Eysenck Personality Inventory. Eysenck
argued that personality was a major cause of fatal diseases such as cancer and
that the link between smoking and cancer was not because smoking caused
cancer, but because both correlated with a cancer-prone personality. Eysenck
collaborated with another researcher, Grossarth-Maticek, and together they
published cohort data showing an extraordinarily high association between the
cancer-prone personality and cancer, and published experimental data show-
ing that psychological therapy, either delivered through a therapist or through
bibliotherapy, had a substantial effect of reducing cancers in those with a
cancer-prone personality. That this research was funded by the tobacco industry
was an early indicator that it might be flawed and at worst fraudulent. Criti-
cisms and analysis of this case have recently been made public (Marks, 2019;
Pelosi, 2019). The story has further to go.
Burt and Eysenck were senior scientists. For junior scientists, personal
ambition can be a motivator for fraudulent activity (Steen, 2011). There is
increasing competitiveness in science between researchers competing for scarce
jobs and scarce research grants. University appointment policies and tenure are
often linked to publications. In a profession where time is often scarce, there
can be a temptation to short circuit the arduous business of collecting data
22 ◆ What is science and what do scientists do?

and to make it up (Aulakh, 2016). There is a societal component to fraud cre-

ated by a competitive research environment: Fraud is not entirely explained
by characteristics of some ‘rogue’ scientists. Although fraud is not common,
it occurs with sufficient regularity for it to be something to be taken seriously.
How frequent is fraud in scientific practice today? The term used nowadays
is scientific misconduct which is defined as (a) any aspect of falsification of data
or any other aspects of the study and (b) plagiarism – copying without citation.
Gross (2016) provides a useful review of the several studies that have been con-
ducted into scientific misconduct, which includes many based on anonymous
reporting by scientists. In this review, Gross reports one study of 99 universities
where 44% of students and 50% of staff were aware of scientific misconduct.
In a meta-analysis of 18 studies, 2% of scientists had admitted that they them-
selves had falsified data and 14% had observed others doing it. The frequency
of scientific misconduct varies between disciplines: It is most common in cell
biology and oncology, least common in politics and sociology, with psychology
falling somewhere in between (Gross, 2016).
Exposing others’ scientific misconduct carries risks. In one study of whistle
blowers, 60% of whistle blowers found that their actions had negative conse-
quences (Gross, 2016). When scientific misconduct is discovered, it has very
negative effects on the careers of perpetrators as well as innocent collaborators
(Hussinger & Pellens, 2019).
When journal editors become aware of scientific misconduct, they publish
a retraction of the original article. However, retractions can also be published
because the authors themselves note problems with the way they have reported
the study, and the authors themselves initiate the retraction. In a study of
2,047 retractions published in biomedical articles, only 21.3% were due to
error, whereas 67.4% were due to scientific misconduct (expected or proved),
of which 43.4% were due to duplicate publication (where the author submits
the same paper to two journals and both accept), and 9.8% due to plagiarism
(copying from someone else’s paper), the remaining 11.3% being unknown or
miscellaneous causes (Fang, Steen & Casadavell, 2012).
Even if findings are not the result of scientific misconduct or error, it does
not necessarily follow that they are true. If a probability of < 0.05 is used as the
criterion for significance, then 1 in 20 studies that are really non-significant will
appear to be significant. Journals are more likely to accept papers with signifi-
cant results compared to non-significant results, particularly if they are novel
results that are interesting in some way. The publication bias towards significant
findings means that there is a bias towards Type 1 error.

Type 1 versus Type 2 error

Type 1 error means that something is assumed to be significant when it
isn’t. Type 2 error means that something was thought not significant when
really it is.
 What is science and what do scientists do? ◆ 23

The possibility of Type 1 error in publications has led to something known as

‘the crisis of replication.’ Many studies are conducted – many more than are
published. There have been several instances where an initially interesting find-
ing fails to replicate. The interesting finding is often published in a high status
journal, because high status journals tend to accept only the most scientifically
interesting papers. The crisis of replication occurs across all sciences but par-
ticularly those that use statistical testing. This problem – the result of a combi-
nation of genuine chance events and publication bias – has become recognised
in recent years, and the issue of replication is accepted as an important part of
the scientific process (Zwaan, Etz, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2018).
The existence of fraud and the replication crisis could lead to the con-
clusion that science is fundamentally a flawed process. On the contrary, the
fact that these problems are aired in print shows that problems are being
attended to, problems that naturally follow from research conducted by
messy humans. In some areas of science where there are commercial interests,
such as clinical trials of new drugs, the regulatory requirements of conduct
and reporting make any kind of fraud very difficult, and the sponsors of such
studies are keenly aware of the very negative consequences should there ever
be evidence of wrongdoing. Science is not perfect, but just as theories become
improved over time, the process of conducting science is also improving.
Many journals now require scientists to make their original data available
for scrutiny. Conflict of interest statements are routinely required in medical
journals.

The rest of this book

One theme runs through the remaining chapters of this book. It is that dif-
ferent groups of psychologists have different assumptions about psychology.
These assumptions have changed over time, but differences remain in modern
psychology. There are differences about psychology’s status as a science, what
psychologists should be studying and the role and type of theory that is used
to explain psychological phenomena. Understanding the very different under-
lying assumptions that have been featured in the history of psychology and
remain today is a good way of understanding the discipline of psychology as
a whole.

Essay questions
1 What is the logic of induction and deduction and how are they used in
scientific enquiry?
2 What is a paradigm and what is a paradigm shift? Illustrate your answer
with examples with particular reference to the attitudes of those involved.
3 Focussing on just one of these two individuals, did Burt or Eysenck
commit scientific misconduct?
 2
How did psychology become
a science and what kind of science
did it become?
26 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

When asked, most people today would say that psychology is a science, and, by
implication, a science like any other natural science. Psychology certainly fulfils
the logical criterion of science, that of falsifiability, described in the last chapter.
However, in the distant past psychology was not viewed as a science like any
other, and even in the recent past it was viewed with some suspicion. When I
was considering which degree to study in 1967, I was advised to study a ‘proper
science’ like physiology rather than psychology – advice I ignored. Going back
150 years, psychology was not considered a science at all. Why was this and
how did these changes come about? Not all psychologists think that psychology
should be a science like any other natural science, and these other approaches
will be described in Chapter 9.

When psychology was definitely not a science

The French philosopher Descartes had a problem. In 17th-century France,
the Roman Catholic Church asserted its authority over all knowledge,
including knowledge that would now be considered the realm of science.
Descartes wanted a diplomatic way of freeing science from the shackles of
religion without upsetting the religious authorities. He came up with the
following solution. There are two kinds of substance in the world. A mind
substance – which the Church could have jurisdiction over, and a body
substance – which was the remit of scientists. This solution helped establish
science as being independent of religion, but it had several negative conse-
quences. One, and only one, of these negative consequences was that it left
the study of the mind as being outside that of real of science. Psychology
translates from Greek as ‘the study of the soul.’ Psyche is the Ancient Greek
goddess of the soul who married Eros, the god of love. The link between the
soul, psychology, and religion is implicit in Descartes’ mind-body philoso-
phy, what is now called Cartesian dualism. Psyche is part of the irrational
world of myth and religion.
Over time, the influence of the church decreased, but from the middle of
the 19th century onwards there was a replacement: the religion of spiritualism.
The essence of spiritualism is that people have a universal soul. Manifestations
of souls of dead people in this world take the form of paranormal phenomena.
The concept of a universal soul, like the concept of God, is unfalsifiable. Even
after religion had lost its influence, psychology was seen as something separate
from science and was associated with the paranormal. During the middle of the
19th century until after the First World War there was a widespread interest in
contacting people who had died – people who were from ‘the other world.’ It
was considered normal to try to contact relatives either through mediums or
through other techniques at home such as the ouija board (pronounced weedy
or weedjy board). Although some of the early psychologists believed in para-
normal phenomena and thought they could be investigated, the association
Psyche studying Eros.
28 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

with the paranormal was associated, at least in the mind of the general public,
with non-science rather than science.

Contacting the dead

The ouija board is interesting in that it illustrates a psychological phenom-
enon. What happens is that the letters of the alphabet are arranged in a
circle on a table and an upside down wine glass is placed in the middle. A
group of people sit round the table, each placing one finger on the base of
glass. Someone calls out “is there a spirit who wants to talk to someone
here?” or some such statement. The glass then starts moving mysteriously
from letter to letter, spelling out words and messages for the group of
people. Everyone honestly believes that they are not pushing the glass. In
fact, people do push the glass. They are simply unaware of what they are
doing, and they spell out what they would like the spirit to say to them.
Other psychical phenomena of the time can also be explained by psycho-
logical mechanisms known today.

The society for psychical research was formed in Cambridge, England, in 1882
to investigate claims of the paranormal. The British Psychological Society was
formed in London in 1901.

Psychical versus psychological

There is a cartoon from the magazine Punch in the early 1900s entitled
“Dinner Dance of the British Psychological Society.” The cartoon shows
men and women dancing with invisible partners. The confusion between
psychical and psychological persisted for many years.

Very early beginnings

One of the points made in the previous chapter is that science is cumulative.
Research builds on previous research. Some textbooks provide a definite time
and place for the start of scientific psychology – such as the founding of the first
psychological laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879 in Leipzig – but it is never
quite that simple in practice. Wundt was influenced by others including but not
limited to earlier researchers at Leipzig.
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 29

The first psychology laboratory, given the name ‘new psychology’ by Wundt
to distinguish it from the old, came about from an integration of three strands
of thinking – it is too much to call them research programmes. These are
(a) developments from sensory physiology that provided a scientific approach
to the study of sensation, (b) contributions from the philosophy of mind that
showed that higher mental processes could be studied, and (c) medical findings
that higher or cognitive processes were linked in some way to the brain.

Sensory physiology, sensory psychophysiology,

and psychophysics
Ernst Weber (1795–1878) studied anatomy at university and completed his the-
sis on the anatomy and physiology of sensory nerves at the university of Leipzig.
As their name suggests, the sensory nerves are associated with psychological
sensations, such as touch. It was therefore a small leap for Weber to study how
stimulation of a sensory nerve gave rise to sensations and to study sensations in
their own right. During the 19th century, scientific advance was associated with
advances in measurement. Measurement was key. Hence, when Weber studied
sensations, his first reaction was to measure them. He called his new field of
research sensory psychophysiology.
Weber (Weber, 1834) developed a method for assessing touch sensitivity in
terms of the ability to discriminate the two-point threshold – i.e., to be able to
detect whether the skin is being touched by one or two points.

Weber’s method for assessing touch sensitivity

Weber’s two-point threshold demonstration is easy to do yourself with
the help of a friend. Weber used a draughtsman’s compass that had two
pointed ends, but it can be done just as well with a couple of pencils.
Ask your friend to look away and touch them on the skin with the pencil
ends about two centimetres apart, and ask your friend what it feels like.
Your friend will notice being touched by two pencils. Now place the ends
about 0.02 of a centimetre away: Your friend will now feel just one pen-
cil. Increase and decrease the distance until you arrive at the two-point
­threshold – the point at which your friend just notices that there are two
pencils rather than one. You can repeat this exercise on different parts
of the body, and you will find that sensitivity varies over the body. For
example, the back is much less sensitive than the hand.

Weber systematically measured the sensitivity of the skin across the whole of the
body, using an adjustable compass, which was given the rather dignified name
of an aesthesiometer (Weber, 1834/1978). He made a number of interesting
30 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

observations, for example, that we are less sensitive if the two compass points
are placed in the direction of the limb rather than across it. Having started with
the sensation of touch, Weber then went on to study the two-point threshold in
other sensory modalities, including weights, lengths of lines, and pitches.
In studying the sensory modality of weight Weber asked a person to com-
pare the weight of two objects (he got people to do this sequentially using the
same hand) and tell him if they seemed the same or one was heavier than the
other. The just noticeable difference (JND) was the smallest difference in weight
between the two objects that led to a person saying they were different.
Weber found that, irrespective of the sensory modality tested, there was a
relationship between a ‘just noticeable difference’ (or JND) between two stimuli
and the magnitude of the stimuli. Imagine a kilo bag of sugar, and another bag
that is 1.5 kilos. It is easy to tell the bags of sugar are different from their heavi-
ness (note they weigh different amounts and the sensation is also different).
Now imagine a 50 kilo sack of sugar, and another sack 50.5 kilos in weight.
It is now impossible to tell the sacks apart – they appear equally heavy. Weber
noticed that the ratio of the JND to the stimulus intensity was approximately
constant, irrespective of the stimulus intensity. So, for example, if the JND is 0.2
kg when the stimulus intensity is 1 kg (0.2/1 = 0.2) then the JND for a stimulus
intensity of 50 kg is likely to be 1 kg (1/50 = 0.2).
Weber studied the JNDs in other sensory modalities and found that the ratio
of JND to stimulus intensity was always approximately constant, though the
ratio differed between sensory modalities. Although the constants were differ-
ent all sensory modalities could be described by an equation

JND/stimulus intensity = Constant

This equation was described by others as ‘Weber’s law.’

Weber’s family
Weber came from an academic family. His younger brother was a famous
professor of physics. Measurement was a family business!

Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) was a student at Leipzig where he

learned about and was influenced by Weber. Fechner continued the work done
by Weber, promoted it more widely, and developed it. Whereas Weber called
this newly developing science ‘sensory psychophysiology,’ Fechner called it ‘psy-
chophysics,’ which is the name that it is known by today (Fechner, 1860/1996).
Fechner developed new methods for assessing thresholds first developed
by Weber. Weber had simply asked people to say whether two objects were the
same or not. Fechner developed two other methods.
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 31

Method 1: The person is presented with pairs of objects, such as a pair of

lines, and asked which one is longer. The person is told that they must say which
line is longer – they cannot say they are the same. If the lines are noticeably
longer, the person will always get it right. As the lines become more similar, the
person will tend to make errors. Fechner defined a just noticeable difference
(JND) using this method as the level of difference just greater than that which
produced a random result.
Notice that the advantage of this method is that it avoids a problem, later
noted in psychophysics, of people having different criteria for difference, which
is a problem with Weber’s method. If people are asked to state whether some-
thing is different or not, some people will be more prone to say yes only when
the difference is very clear. Others will say yes, even if there is only a slight sug-
gestion of difference. The criterion of difference is something that is not fixed.
The result is that ‘false alarms’ and ‘missed hits’ vary systemically between
people (this may be covered in more detail in your course under the heading
of signal detection theory). Fechner’s method simply relies on perception. His
method has been given a variety of names over the years – Fechner called it the
method of correct and incorrect instances.
Method 2: This method required the person to adjust a stimulus so that it
appeared to be the same as another. When a person does this, there is always
a small error, either greater or smaller. Fechner took the average of these two
errors as a measure of JND. Again, this method has been given different names
over the years, Fechner calling it the method of average error, others calling it
the method of adjustment.
A second development by Fechner was to show that Weber’s law followed
a logarithmic function, and could be expressed as

S = k log R,

Where S is the psychological sensation, which is equal to a constant (k) times

the logarithm of the physical stimulus intensity (R) (Fechner, 1860/1966). This
equation is called Fechner’s law – and it is recognised as a slight extension of
the earlier Weber’s law.
In addition to developing the science of psychophysics, Fechner developed
the experimental study of aesthetics (1865, 1871). For at least a thousand years,
there was an observation that a particular ratio had pleasing or divine proper-
ties. For example, consider the following three rectangles.

Which do you find most beautiful? Make a decision before going on to read
the next sentence. The underlying hypothesis of ‘the golden ratio’ or ‘golden
section’ is that rectangles where the ratio of the short to long side is 1 to 1.62
32 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

are considered most beautiful. Did you find the middle square above the most
beautiful?
Fechner developed methods used in psychophysics by asking people to
compare two rectangles and say which they thought more beautiful. His results
confirmed that the golden ratio is indeed 1 to 1.62. Later researchers, however,
showed that Fechner’s results were anomalous and that preference for a par-
ticular ratio depends on the method used (Höge, 1997). Despite later criticism,
Fechner is looked on as the father of experimental aesthetics.

Fechner and health

Illness struck Fechner in middle life, brought on by excessive work. He
became deeply depressed. His recovery came suddenly in October 1834,
and he embarked on writing books reflecting a deep spiritual conviction,
suggesting that consciousness pervaded the whole world. His book titled
The Little Book of Life after Death was published in 1835 under a pseud-
onym, the book being translated into English with an introduction by
William James some 70 years later (Fechner, 1904/2005).

There is one final point which is important to note in relation to Weber’s law
and Fechner’s law. Both of these laws make quantitative predictions. That is,
they present a theory where the prediction is not qualitative, but quantitative.
The theories do not only assert that a JND increases with the magnitude of the
stimulus. The theories predict precisely how much the JND should increase.
Weber and Fechner did not use statistical testing. (They did not have to attend
stats classes as students!) It is only later that statistics were used in psychology
to test qualitative predictions (see Chapter 1). Why did Weber and Fechner
propose quantitative theories? The answer is they were simply copying what
was done in physics at the time. Weber’s brother was a physicist. The theories
of physics in the 19th century were based on mathematical equations that
provided quantitative prediction. Weber and Fechner created theories just as
physicists were doing at the time.

British associationist philosophy

Although the scientific study of sensation is clearly part of the discipline of
psychology, psychology as a discipline is far wider. Where does higher level
consciousness, such as thoughts (or what are now called cognitions) come into
the story? The story of ‘thoughts’ starts much earlier with the work of associa-
tionist philosophers.
David Hartley (1705–1757) was born in Yorkshire, England, and trained
in medicine at Cambridge. Although he is now best known as a philosopher, he
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 33

worked on philosophy in his spare time. His ‘day job’ was that of a practising
physician. Although medicine was still at an early stage, Hartley would have
been well aware of the study of anatomy and pathology and the findings that
the body functioned as a kind of mechanical system (see Chapter 1). Hartley
was one of the earliest people to suggest that the brain and nervous system were
connected to thought. In earlier years, the brain had been dismissed as at best
some kind of cooling device as the soul or mind was assumed to reside in the
heart, not the brain.
Hartley believed that the brain, spinal cord, and nerves contained particles
that vibrated. He suggested that moderate vibration caused pleasure and large
vibration pain. Hartley’s assumption that the brain contained vibrating particles
arose from his observation of positive after-images. Hartley had noticed that if
he looked fixedly at a candle, and then closed his eyes, the image of the candle
remained. He assumed that this was because the vibrating particles continued
to vibrate for a short while after the cessation of a stimulus (Hartley, 1749).
Although Hartley’s theory is wrong, it adopts the correct metatheory that men-
tal events are the consequence of physical events. Theories can be wrong, even
though the metatheory is correct.
Hartley also believed, like others before him, that the mind of the newborn
baby was blank and ideas came from experience. Much of his writing is about
‘the association of ideas.’ He believed that ideas became associated with other
ideas to form new ideas. The result is that the ideas a person has are not just
the result of the experiences the person has, but from how the thoughts com-
bine. This emphasis on combination of ideas is given the label ‘associationist
philosophy.’

A blank sheet
The idea that the mind of the newborn baby is a blank sheet – or tabula
rasa – was first suggested by the philosopher John Locke (1631–1704).
The alternative view is that certain ideas – such as fear of spiders – are
‘programmed’ into the body. Thus, the tabula rasa hypothesis is relevant
to the hereditary-environment controversy (see Chapter 7). Those sup-
porting a tabula rasa interpretation place emphasis on the environment,
not heredity.

The idea that thoughts combine to form new thoughts was not accepted by all
philosophers. James Mill (1773–1836), best known at the time as a historian,
suggested an alternative in his book, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human
Mind, in 1829. Mill suggested that the mind was a kind of machine and ideas
came into that machine and were fixed in that machine. Note that whereas
34 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

Hartley was using a biological model to inform his understanding, Mill used
mechanism.
There were therefore two positions being presented by associationist phi-
losophers. Hartley’s view that thoughts combined to form novel thoughts was
called the ‘coalescence’ hypothesis. Mill’s view that thoughts always remained
separate was called the ‘brick wall hypothesis.’
James Mill’s son John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) (named after James Mill’s
benefactor, Sir John Stuart) agreed with his father’s brick wall hypothesis, but
changed his mind, largely because of evidence from chemistry. The science of
chemistry showed that, when combined, chemical substances could produce
entirely new chemical substances. Copper and zinc are both soft metals, neither
as strong as bronze, which is formed when zinc and copper are combined.

Testing the coalescence versus brick wall hypothesis

Lemonade is made from two substances: sugar that tastes sweet, and lem-
ons that taste sour. Is the sweetness of sugar and the sourness of lemon still
discernible in lemonade, or is lemonade an entirely new taste? Ask yourself
this question and try to come up with an answer. When I ask this question
to groups of students, about a third report that the lemon and sugar are
still discernible. These students are reporting an experience consistent with
the brick wall hypothesis. The remaining two thirds report that lemonade
is an experience that is entirely different from lemon and sugar, and the
experience of these students is consistent with the coalescence hypothesis.
This simple demonstration shows that ‘reality’ depends on the person
doing the reporting. Perhaps both perspectives are, in a sense, correct.

The coalescence and brick wall hypotheses reappear in several different forms
in the history of psychology. The gestalt movement is based on assumptions of
coalescence. Behaviourism is based on the atomistic assumption of the brick
wall hypothesis. Like many opposed views, the truth is neither exclusively one
nor exclusively the other.

The findings from neuroscience

The story so far goes as follows. Weber and Fechner had measured sensations.
The associationist philosophers had discussed thoughts, ideas, or cognitions. The
final building block comes from evidence that the brain is associated with the
higher mental content, and not only with sensations via sensory nerves.
Modern medicine developed from earlier discoveries in anatomy in the
17th and 18th centuries. Physicians compared the bodies of people who had
died from disease and those who died naturally and found that there were dif-
ferences. These differences – extended into tissue differences and then cellular
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 35

differences in the 19th century – were used to define disease. Each disease had a
different abnormality or pathophysiology. It was therefore natural for doctors
to also look for differences in the brains between patients and those who died
of natural causes.
Pierre Broca (1824–1880), who was chief of surgery at a hospital near
Paris, had a 51-year-old patient who could understand everything said to him,
but could never speak beyond saying “tan, tan” or when frustrated “Sacré
nom de Dieu” (Sacred name of God). When the patient died, Broca carried out
an autopsy and found an area missing (a lesion) in the frontal lobe – a part of
the brain subsequently called Broca’s area – which is responsible for language
(Sagan, 1979).
About ten years after Broca’s discovery, the German neurologist Carl Wer-
nicke (1848–1904) reported a patient fluent but with meaningless speech. Wer-
nicke found, on autopsy, damage to the top part of the left temporal lobe, the
part of the brain that connects speech with meaning. Broca and Wernicke had
both demonstrated localisation of function, i.e., the idea that different parts of
the brain do different things. These findings provided detail to the increasingly
accepted view that the brain was responsible for thought. If mental life is caused
by the brain, and the brain can be studied through natural science, then it fol-
lows that mental life can also be studied through the methods of natural science.
There is one other case that is so famous that it appears in many introduc-
tory psychology texts. Wundt also referred to this case in one of his early text-
books, and that is the case of Phineas Gage. The case is shown in the box here
for those who have not come across it.

The strange case of Phineas Gage

Phineas Gage worked at as quarryman in the USA where he was respon-
sible for setting explosives in holes that were drilled into the rock face.
One day, as he was pushing the explosive into the hole with an iron rod,
the explosive exploded prematurely, driving the rod out of the hole like
a bullet out of a gun. The rod entered Gage’s cheek and came out above
his right temple. To everyone’s amazement, Gage got off the ground and
looked around to see if he could see where the rod had got to. Phineas Gage
was taken to hospital where the rod was removed and he made a complete
physical recovery. However, his personality was changed. He was no longer
the hard-working quarryman he was before. He was irritable, and could
not settle to making any decisions. His friends said that he “was no longer
Gage.” Gage’s inability to settle to any decision is now known to be con-
sistent with damage to the prefrontal lobe of the brain. The ending of the
story is not a happy one. Gage spent some time appearing as a curiosity in
a travelling circus, but never settled to any form of work.
36 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

Later beginnings
Many textbooks on the history of psychology, as well as sources on the inter-
net, state that Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) was the founding father of modern
psychology. Why is that? After all, Weber had been conducting psychological
experiments many years earlier and Wundt was a student of Herman Ludwig
von Helmholtz (1821–1894) who, like Weber, conducted studies in the physi-
ology of sensation. Furthermore, as will become clear later, the discipline of
scientific psychology envisaged by Wundt is very different from that of today.
There are two explanations.

Explanation 1. Wundt deserves his reputation. Whereas others had con-

ducted experiments that would now fall within the remit of psychology,
Wundt defined the discipline of psychology – except that he called it
the ‘new psychology’ to distinguish it from the old psychology of para-
normal phenomena. Also, Wundt was an excellent lecturer and com-
municator and promoted psychology as a discipline. He trained many
psychology students who went to set up psychology laboratories in many
other countries. He played a pivotal role in developing psychology and
his reputation is deserved.
Explanation 2. Wundt’s reputation is the result of a much later interpreta-
tion of events. Events happen. Historians interpret those events, and later
historians rewrite history. Wundt’s fame is the result of historical inter-
pretation by later psychologists studying their discipline who are looking
for a neat starting point. In reality, Wundt was just one of several people
who helped found psychology.

Wundt and his contemporaries

How was Wundt perceived towards the end of his life? The following
comes from the 13th edition of the Enyclopaedia Britannica, which was
published in 1926 but written before Wundt’s death in 1920. This entry
was also written before the first textbook on the history of psychology
published by E. Boring in 1929 (Boring, 1929). The entry starts by stating
that that Wundt is a “physiologist and philosopher.” It notes that “his ear-
lier works deal chiefly with physiology, though often in close connection
with psychology.” Although the entry states that he “founded an Institute
for Experimental Psychology, the precursor for many other institutes”
the entry focusses on Wundt’s contribution to logic and ethics and the
relationship between ethics and psychology. “According to Wundt, the
straight road to ethics lies through ethnic psychology, whose special busi-
ness it is to consider the history of custom and ethical ideas from a psy-
chological standpoint” (Encylopaedia Britannica, 1926, vol. 28, p. 855).
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 37

Students should decide for themselves whether Wundt should be considered the
father of psychology at the end of this chapter.

Wundt and the first psychology laboratory

Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) trained as a medical doctor, receiving his MD
in 1855 from the university of Heidelberg where he then worked at the medi-
cal clinic. From 1857–1864 he was appointed as a lecturer, being appointed
to a more senior type of lecturer in 1864 to 1874, lecturing in medicine and
physiology. During his time at Heidelberg, Wundt assisted and worked with
Helmholtz.

Helmholtz
Herman Ludwig von Helmholtz (1821–1894), like Weber before him,
studied sensory psychophysiology. One of his achievements was to mea-
sure the speed of conduction of nerve impulses, both for motor nerves and
for sensory nerves. Helmholtz made significant contributions to the field
of vision, developing an early theory of colour perception. He believed
that illusions occur when visual conditions are not normal, but that these
illusions can provide insight into the normal functioning of the eye, an
idea adopted by much later researchers in the field of perception(Gregory,
2007). Helmholtz developed some interesting optical instruments such
as optometers, ophthalmometers, and ophthalmoscopes that are used by
scientists today to investigate the function of the eye (Pearce, 2009; Wade,
1994; Wade & Finger, 2001).

Wundt developed an interest in the link between physiology and sensory percep-
tion while at Heidelberg (Bringmann, 1975). He published a short monograph
on sense perception in 1862 (Wundt, 1862), publishing his book Principles
of Physiological Psychology in 1874 (Wundt, 1874/1996). It should be noted
that although this book includes the term psychology in the title, most of it is
about the physiology of sensory nerves, but with a section at the end devoted to
conation – i.e., to higher mental thought. Wundt showed how the experimental
method used in the study of physiology could be applied to psychology.
Although Wundt was developing a career in medicine and physiology linked
to psychology, he was also interested in philosophy. His skill and understanding
of philosophy developed independently of his employment in Heidelberg.
In 1874, Wundt accepted the post of professor in inductive philosophy at
the University of Zurich (note the term induction – see Chapter 1). He remained
at Zurich for only one year, because in 1875 he accepted the post of Professor
of Philosophy at Leipzig. As a professor of philosophy, Wundt published an
important work on Logic (Wundt, 1880–1883) followed in 1886 by a work on
38 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

Ethics (Wundt, 1886). At Leipzig, Wundt was at the same university as Weber
and Fechner, and was able to put his plan for a discipline of scientific psychol-
ogy into practice.
We know about Wundt as a person from the writings of others. Elwood
Worcester attended Wundt’s lectures in Leipzig and provided this description
in his own autobiography (Worcester, 1932). He describes Wundt as follows:

Clad in a conventional black frock-coat and black trousers, he would

steal into his great lecture hall, attended by his famulus, as if he wished
to avoid observation. As soon as his familiar figure appeared, applause
in the form of shuffling feet on the part of his hundreds of students
would greet him. . . . Utterly unmoved, as if he had not heard us, Wundt
would glide to his place on the dais, assume his accustomed position, fix
his eyes on vacancy and begin his discourse. There could not be a better
scientific lecturer. Without a scrap of writing, he would speak for three-
quarters of an hour so clearly, concisely, and to the point, that, in listen-
ing to him, one would imagine one were reading a well-written book in
which the paragraphs, the important text of the page, the small print,
and the footnotes were plainly indicated. Wundt told no stories, gave
few illustrations, scorned any attempt at popularity. His only thought
was to deal with the topic of the day as thoroughly and exhaustively as
the time permitted. . . . With all this, he was followed almost breath-
lessly, sometimes by eight hundred students, and, if the lecture had been
unusually amazing, they would burst into spontaneous applause. As
unconscious as at the beginning, Wundt would glide from the hall, and
another great and unforgettable experience of life had ended.
(p. 90)

Another of Wundt’s students, Bernhard Berliner, wrote in a letter (Boor &

Hamill, 1978):

He spoke without notes in the most beautiful German language. The

most fascinating part of his philosophy lectures was on the oldest Greek
philosophers for whom he seemed to have a special love.
(p. 191)

So, Wundt was an excellent lecturer, and he was an excellent lecturer not only
in psychology but also philosophy.

Wundt’s view of psychology

Wundt believed that there should be two different kinds of psychology. First
there would be experimental psychology (Wundt, 1862, 1874/1969) that would
be studied using scientific methods. Second, there would be Völkerpsychologie
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 39

or folk psychology that studied culture, rituals, religion, and so on, and which
did not use scientific methods – i.e., the experiment.

The meaning of the word experiment

In the 19th century, the term experiment was used slightly differently from
its use today. An experiment simply meant any active manipulation of a
variable by a scientist and the observation of that manipulation on some
other variable. The terms independent variable and dependent variable
appear only in the 1930s (Winston, 2004) at the same time that the idea
of control conditions appear in medicine.

Note that Wundt’s belief that there should be two different kinds of psychol-
ogy is a metatheoretical assumption (see Chapter 1). No evidence is presented
and there can be none. Wundt is suggesting that there are two entirely different
paradigms of psychology. In one paradigm, there is active manipulation of a
variable by an experimenter. The psychologist makes something happen and
observes the result. In the other paradigm, the psychologist simply observes
what happens and thinks about what is seen. The former is defined as experi-
mental psychology. The latter is not.
Wundt promoted the discipline of scientific (i.e., experimental) psychol-
ogy at the University of Leipzig. One thing he insisted upon was that study
of the paranormal was outside the field of his new psychology, because the
paranormal was associated with non-science. The paranormal was not stud-
ied in his institute for experimental psychology. He started a journal with
the title (translated from the original German) of Psychological Research,
because there was an existing journal with the title Journal of Psychology,
that was devoted to parapsychology. Wundt also defined psychology as a
pure rather than applied science for reasons that will become clear in the
next chapter.

Wundt’s experimental psychology

Wundt believed that only one part of conscious experience could be studied
experimentally: that of immediate experience. Immediate experience means
the immediate reaction of something independent of prior knowledge or inter-
pretation. Mediate experience refers to the reaction mediated by knowledge
and understanding. Most of our experience is mediate knowledge, as is the
knowledge of other natural sciences like physics and chemistry. By limiting the
study of experimental psychology to immediate experience, Wundt focussed on
the perception of objects – just as he had done when working earlier as Fech-
ner’s assistant. This focus also meant that psychology was different from other
40 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

natural sciences in that there was access to immediate experience, not just medi-
ate experience as in the case of natural sciences (Bringmann & Tweney, 1980).
As the historian Van Rappard (2004, p. 146) has pointed out:

The natural sciences study the objects of experience abstracting from the
subject and, since their perspective is mediated by this abstraction they
are called mediate. The significance of psychology may be seen in the
fact that that it nullifies this abstraction and thus studies experience in
its non-mediated reality.
(Van Rappard, 2004, p. 146)

Psychology was therefore ‘special.’ According to Wundt, the higher mental

processes (i.e., mediate experiences) were not amenable to experimental
investigation, but they could be studied non-experimentally, and so non-
scientifically, as Völkerpsychologie or folk psychology (Farr, 1983). Addi-
tionally, Wundt believed that psychological events had a form of causality
all of their own, which he referred to as psychic causality. Psychic causal-
ity exists in parallel with but cannot be explained by physical causality.
This idea is referred to as Wundt’s principle of psychophysical parallelism.

Immediate experience
A good way of characterising the difference between mediate and immedi-
ate experience is by examining the technique used by artists to paint repre-
sentational paintings. Suppose an artist wants to paint a yellow brick just
as it would look like in a photograph. The artist has to look at the brick
not as a brick but as a series of yellow rectangular shapes of slightly dif-
ferent colours. The artist then creates the impression of a brick by drawing
exactly what the eye sees. The artist does not say “I am drawing the feel-
ing of brickness” – at least not for representational art. The artist just has
to draw the immediate experience of the colours and shapes without any
interpretation of what those colours and shapes mean. However, artists
often do not just try to represent things as they appear visually. They also
want to draw the feeling of ‘brickness’ – something about the way a brick
feels rather just looks – and they do this either with abstract art or art that
differs from the photograph in some way. It is the difference between the
photograph and what the artist draws that captures the mediated experi-
ence of the brick, rather than immediate experience that is found in the
photography.
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 41

Some authors have suggested that Wundt’s psychology represents a dualist

interpretation of the mind-body problem, that is, there is a mind substance
and a body substance. This view is not correct. Wundt’s interpretation was
monist, i.e., one physical substance that manifests in terms of two differ-
ent kinds of causality (Van Rappard, Sanders, & Swart, 1980). Wundt’s
approach to the mind-body problem is consistent with more recent mind-
body theories, such as methodological complementarity (see Chapter 6).
Methodological complementarity derives from the suggestion of an atomic
physicist, Niels Bohr, that reality can only be fully described by several
mutually incompatible forms of description. The underlying reality is physi-
cal, but to describe that reality fully it is necessary to have psychological
description (see Chapter 6).
Wundt used a form of introspection to investigate immediate experience,
but his introspection was very different from that normally associated with
that word. Wundt did not use the word introspection; instead he used the term
inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung). Inner perception means focussing
on the experience of sensation itself – not any interpretation of that sensa-
tion. The ability to engage in inner perception was a skill only achieved after
lengthy training, because there is a natural tendency to report mediate experi-
ence rather than immediate experience. For example, if a table is presented
as a stimulus, there is a natural tendency to report seeing a table. However, if
immediate experience is reported, then the stimulus should be reported as a flat
plane under which are four cylindrical objects (assuming the legs are round)
of a certain colour.
Wundt developed scientific rules for his form of introspection, all based
on the procedure of presenting a stimulus to an observer. These were the
following:

First, the observer needs to be properly trained. It is interesting to note that

in Wundt’s laboratory there was no demarcation between participant
and experimenter. His students experimented on themselves!
Second, the observer knows when the stimulus is about to be presented.
The observer mustn’t be taken by surprise.
Third, the observer must be in a state of ‘strained attention.’ The observer
must be waiting and ready for the stimulus, so the stimulus and not some
memory of the stimulus is reported.
Fourth, the stimulus must be repeated several times, so that the description
of the stimulus can be ascertained with certainty.
The final condition introduces the importance of the experimental method:
the stimulus must be varied in some way and the effect of this variation
on immediate experience noted.
42 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

Observer, subject, participant

Wundt used the term the observer to describe the person who nowadays
would be called the participant. However, for much of psychology’s his-
tory, the term subject was used instead of participant. Subject implies
someone who is entirely passive – which is seen as demeaning of the
person taking part in the experiment. Hence, the change from subject to
participant occurred at least 20 years ago.

It will be immediately apparent that this form of introspection is very different

from simply examining the contents of consciousness. It is also worth mention-
ing that William James (see Chapter 3) considered Wundt’s internal perception
an exceptionally boring thing to do. However, this method of introspection
had one important characteristic: By insisting on rules and rigorous training, it
appeared to be a scientific activity. When psychology was in its infancy, ‘being
scientific’ was considered a very positive attribute.

Goals of psychology
Wundt used his form of introspection to achieve three goals of psychology.
First, to analyse the contents of consciousness into their basic elements; second,
to discover how these elements are connected; and, third, to determine the
laws that underlie the connections between elements (Boring, 1929). Wundt’s
approach to psychology was consistent with the 19th-century view that science
should be data driven. This purely inductive approach to hypothesis generation
does not generate explanatory theories. For Wundt, scientific psychology was a
matter of observing and cataloguing the contents of the mind. Wundt promoted
the idea of psychology as a science in a world where psychology and science
were viewed differently from what they are today.

The elements of consciousness: sensations and feelings

Wundt distinguished two elements of consciousness: sensations and feelings.
Every sensation is connected to a particular sensory modality – touch, hearing,
sight, smell, taste. That is, sensations are modality specific. Sensations are also
‘out there’ in the sense that they refer to some particular event that is occurring
in the observer’s environment.
Feelings, on the other hand, are not associated with any particular sensory
modality. Feelings are not ‘out there.’ Although an external event may trig-
ger a feeling, the feeling is not uniquely associated with that external event.
Wundt developed a three-dimensional theory of feeling. The dimensions were
­pleasurable – unpleasureable, exciting – depressing, relaxing – straining.
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 43

Association and apperception

Wundt suggested that the contents of consciousness were associated in two
ways. Associations occur where there is a passive association of one element with
another. Apperceptions occur where there is an active association. The difference
between association and apperception is that in the case of apperception there
is a feeling of intention. There is feeling of trying to find the connection rather
than the connection just occurring. Apperception requires attention, association
does not. This emphasis on intention and attention lead Wundt to describe his
system as voluntarism, because it reflected a voluntary act made by the observer.
Voluntarism reflects the fact that immediate experience reflects an active pro-
cess of intention (Danziger, 2001). In common sense terms, you can control your
thoughts. The idea of controlling one’s own thoughts is relevant to more recent
ideas in psychology, ranging from cognitive behaviour therapy (where the client
learns to avoid negative thoughts) to mindfulness meditation (where people learn to
focus on the present). The behaviourists (see Chapter 4) rejected the idea of volun-
tarism along with the introspection, leading to a negative attitude towards Wundt
amongst psychologists in the first part of the 20th century (Blumenthal, 1975).

How to experience associations and apperceptions

First, ask someone to call out a word and then say the first word that
comes into your head. The caller should use one of the following words:
table, up, or black. Likely associations are respectively table-chair, up-
down, black-white. These associations will spring spontaneously into your
mind. You do not have to try to do anything. Second, ask someone to call
out any number, and then say the number which is three more than the
number called. Any number can be called. For example, if 12 is called,
you must say 15. If you do this you will notice that you have to make an
attentional effort to find the number – it isn’t automatic. You are now
apperceiving, rather than associating.

Wundt suggested that when the elements of consciousness are associated or

apperceived, there is sometimes a creative synthesis. Wundt’s creative synthesis
is similar in some respects to the earlier coalescence hypothesis and the later
gestalt movement in psychology (see Chapter 10) though in other respects his
psychology was consistent with the brick wall hypothesis.

Völkerpsychologie
One mistake often made in describing Wundt was that his interest was lim-
ited to the rather narrow confines of what he called experimental psychology,
44 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

namely, the study of low level perceptual processes. This mistake arose from
using Tichtener’s account of Wundt. Edward Tichtener (1867–1927) was a stu-
dent of Wundt who moved to America, and did not agree with Völkerpsycholo-
gie; he therefore didn’t report this aspect of Wundt’s work. Some of the earlier
histories of psychology relied on Tichtener’s account of Wundt. In fact, Wundt
had wide-ranging interests in other aspects of psychology, but he believed that
higher mental processes could not be studied experimentally – i.e., from his
perspective, scientifically. Evidence for his interest in this ‘other’ psychology
is provided by work carried out in the last two decades of his life, when he
wrote the ten-volume Völkerpsychologie (Wundt, 1904) The content of these
volumes illustrates the topics Wundt studied. They consisted of two volumes on
language, two on myth or religion, two on society, and one each on art, culture
and law. Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie would now be recognised as more similar
to anthropology or ethnography than to psychology.
Wundt believed that, when trying to understand the subject matter of Völk-
erpsychologie, the most basic unit of thought could not be expressed by a word
or linguistic term but was a “general impression”(Gesamtvorstelling). That is,
this subject matter could not be explored with the scientific method because
it required an element of intuitive insight (Sabat, 1979). It was the intuitive
insight that Wundt rejected as unscientific (Greenwood, 2003). Later psycholo-
gists, including those using qualitative methods (Chapter 8) and humanistic
psychologists (Chapter 9) showed how it is indeed possible to study intuitive
insight scientifically. Although Wundt is often described as the founding father
of experimental psychology, in his autobiography, published in 1920, Wundt
wrote that Völkerpsychologie was the most satisfying part of his academic life
(Wong, 2009).

The impact of Wundt’s experimental psychology institute

Wundt starting giving lectures in experimental psychology in 1879, four years
after arriving in Leipzig. He encouraged his students to carry out experiments,
and initially four rooms were given over to this purpose, the space allocated
gradually expanding so that by 1897 there were 14 rooms. Wundt’s students
attended his lectures and he then encouraged them to carry out their own
research in the rooms made available. His students worked in pairs, one work-
ing as ‘the observer’ who did the introspection and one the experimenter. All his
students were first trained in the method of introspection described previously,
as this skill was required for any study of introspection, though not all experi-
ments required introspection.
Wundt taught many, many students both as undergraduates and postgradu-
ates for PhDs. Many of his PhD students went on to create psychology laborato-
ries in cities in their own countries. Misiak and Sexton (1966) report 16 students
who started psychology departments in the USA; 10 in Germany; 2 each in the
UK, France, Italy, Poland, and Switzerland; and 1 each in Belgium, Greece, and
 How did psychology become a science? ◆ 45

Russia. Most universities now have psychology departments, though the psy-
chology taught today is very different from that taught 100 years ago. The staff
are also different. Then psychology was dominated by men. Now psychology
is predominantly a female discipline – look around you during the next lecture.
Psyche was a female Greek goddess, so perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised.

Psychology as a science: looking forward

The status of psychology as a science has been lurking in the background
throughout the history of psychology. Behaviourism and neuroscience are
explicitly scientific (Chapters 4 and 5), but also humanistic psychologists and
those adopting qualitative methods (Chapters 8 and 9) have made it clear that
their kind of psychology is scientific, not the unscientific Völkerpsychologie
suggested by Wundt. Non-scientific psychology does exist in the form of her-
meneutical psychology (Chapter 9) but this is a small minority and in any case
very different from Völkerpsychologie.

Summary
In the 19th century, the term psychology was not associated with science. Psy-
chology, the study of the soul, was associated with the paranormal. Measure-
ment was a feature of 19th-century science. During the middle of that century,
sensation was measured in a variety of ways and called sensory psychophysiol-
ogy or psychophysics. Advances in medicine and earlier work in philosophy was
combined by Wundt with the emerging psychophysics to create what he called
the new psychology. Wundt’s goal was to make the new psychology a respect-
able science, and he therefore restricted psychology in ways that were consistent
with views of science at the time, rejecting the study of higher mental processes
as unscientific. Wundt wrote books on what he considered non-scientific, folk
psychology whose subject matter is consistent with the broader remit of some
of psychology today but is now treated scientifically. Students from around
the world studied psychology with Wundt in Germany, though many rejected
Wundt’s view of psychology and went on to study higher mental processes and
behaviour. Wundt made psychology a respectable subject for scientists to study
by being aware of what would be perceived as scientific or not in Europe at the
time. He was an excellent and much respected lecturer, but psychology today is
very different from what he proposed.
Should Wundt be considered the father of psychology? All the reports given
by Wundt’s students are of a very kind and generous human being. It is nice to
have people like that as the father of a discipline. But might that be a reinter-
pretation of history imposed by people looking for a good story?
46 ◆ How did psychology become a science?

Essay questions
1 How did 19th-century science influence the way Wundt defined his new
psychology?
2 Discuss arguments for and against the statement that Wundt was the
founding father of psychology.
3 What is the difference between association and apperception? Illustrate
your answer with examples that are relevant to modern psychology.
 3
How did psychology become an applied
science and what is the relationship
between applied and non-applied
psychology today?
48 ◆ Becoming an applied science

Let us begin with terminology: pure science versus applied science; basic science
versus applied science, fundamental science versus applied science. These words
have different connotations. Pure science is noble and good. If applied is the
opposite of pure, then applied must be dirty and bad. Basic science implies that
this is something that must be done first – something that is done before applied
science. Fundamental science implies the research deals with more general or
important issues than the (potentially dirty) applied science. Pure, basic, and
fundamental. All three words reflect different attitudes of those who want to
make this distinction.

Why ‘pure’ is better

When Wundt founded an experimental psychology laboratory in Leipzig, he
insisted that his new psychology would be a pure science, not an applied sci-
ence. Why was this? To understand Wundt’s reasoning, it is necessary to know
a little about social history in Europe.
Before the industrial revolution, there were two classes of people in Europe.
The landed gentry and aristocracy who did no work and everyone else who
worked and provided for those who did not work. What did the gentry and aris-
tocracy spend their leisure time doing? They did a number of different things,
none of which involved growing food, building houses, or serving others, but
they were happily involved in ‘non-applied’ activities, often with some intel-
lectual content. The upper classes did pure; the lower classes did applied. The
result of this social arrangement was that applied was seen as inferior. Applied
research and applied activity were seen as less noble than activity that had no
material benefit. Of course, this is pure snobbery and prejudice, and students
today may be surprised at this attitude. Nevertheless, it was a widespread
attitude and one which the author was well aware of both as a student and a
young lecturer. Academic snobbery is just another form of snobbery. Universi-
ties compete for status (there are league tables), and the status of courses within
universities are not equal.
The universities were set up as places of learning, originally, the learning of
the classics – i.e., the plays, history, and philosophy of the ancient Romans and
Greeks. The classics remained an important part of university life in the 19th
century and beyond. Almost all subjects that had practical applications and that
required some kind of practical skills were taught in technical institutes or tech-
nical colleges, not in universities. In the UK, the Science and Art Department
of the Board of Trade was founded in 1853 to promote applied learning, and
the Technical Instruction act of 1884 enabled local authorities to raise funds to
support technical education. Although medicine and engineering were taught in
universities in the 19th century, the latter had a very low status in England and
hardly featured in 19th-century university life (Albu, 1980). The history of uni-
versities is one where gradually more and more applied topics have been moved
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 49

from colleges, schools and technical institutes to within the university system.
Art colleges, colleges of agriculture, nursing schools, physiotherapy schools etc.
are now departments or schools within universities. Physiotherapy became an
all graduate entry profession in the UK in 1992, and nursing training became
degree level in 2000.
Wundt insisted that psychology should be a pure rather than an applied
topic because, by doing so, it would form part of the higher status university
life, rather than the lower status technical college life. If Wundt had suggested
that psychology should be studied in order to solve problems, his psychology
would not have fitted the ethos needed for a university science.

Applied results from Wundt’s pure research

Although Wundt defined scientific psychology as pure rather than applied,
the findings of his laboratory had applications. Research into reaction
time (called at the time ‘mental chronometry’) attracted the interest of
astronomers. Stars appear to move across the field of a stationary tele-
scope due to the rotation of the earth. Astronomers wanted to measure
the speed of movement by recording the time interval need for the star to
move between two parallel wires placed in the field of vision, by pressing
a button when the star traversed the first wire and then again for the sec-
ond. They found that different astronomers pressed at different times. The
study by psychologists in Leipzig provided insight into why this occurred.
People have different reaction times (Williams, 1912). Although Wundt
intended psychology to be a ‘pure’ rather than ‘applied science,’ a use was
soon found for it!

William James and the beginning of psychology in America

The social structure of America was different from that of Europe. Whereas
European wealth was based on hereditary entitlement, American wealth – and
therefore social class – was based on practical – i.e., applied – success of varying
kinds. The idea that ‘pure’ was better than ‘applied’ was therefore not part of
American thinking. Hence the development of applied psychology starts in the
USA, and the story of psychology development in the USA is connected strongly
to the application of psychology to real life problems.
Wilhelm Wundt can be described as the father of psychology in terms of
promoting psychology as an institution, and has a prominent position in the
history of European psychology. William James (1842–1910) can be described
as the father of psychology in America. James helped psychology become an
applied science.
50 ◆ Becoming an applied science

The first undergraduate course with the title Psychology was taught at
Harvard University in 1872 as part of a philosophy degree (Coon, 2000) –
note, this was five years before Wundt started teaching psychology at Leipzig.
However, that early psychology course at Harvard was not scientific psychol-
ogy. James had the same problem as Wundt in trying to make psychology a
scientific discipline, but his approach to the problem was different. In Amer-
ica, science solved problems. Psychology was a science because it too could
solve problems.
William James came from a wealthy liberal, intellectual, and artistic fam-
ily who travelled widely. James was educated at schools in Europe and in
the USA. His younger brother became a famous novelist (Henry James). The
young James was skilled in drawing and painting and, when young, decided to
be an artist. For unknown reasons (possibly parental pressure) he gave up this
career. Instead, he enrolled in a course in science and then studied medicine,
graduating with an MD in 1869. Throughout his schooling James suffered
from bouts of depression, gastric problems, and what was described at the
time as neurasthenia – now known as ME/CFS or chronic fatigue syndrome.
He considered suicide on many occasions. After being awarded his MD, he
lived at home due to illness for three years, taking up a lecturing post in 1872
at Harvard (Myers, 2001).
James was an excellent university teacher; he enjoyed the process of helping
a student develop, and his interest in psychology developed based on his own
personal experience and the experience of teaching others (Croce, 1999). James’
liberal education included philosophy. He was appointed assistant professor in
philosophy in 1880 at Harvard University, and full professor in philosophy in
1885. By 1889 he had changed his title to professor of psychology, changing it
back to professor of philosophy again in 1897. The 1926 Encyclopaedia Bri-
tannica describes James as a philosopher, though later interpretation is that he
remained a psychologist throughout his career (Taylor, 1996). James’ personal
life almost certainly influenced his view of psychology. He suffered illness even
when he was well established as an academic and published a paper in 1895
with the title “Is life worth living?” (James, 1895).
Throughout his life James was plagued with self-doubt (see James,
1895) and felt that his ability to write was poor. In fact, an internet search
of ‘quotes of William James’ will show how many well-written and sensible
suggestions he makes. James’ best known work is his The Principles of Psy-
chology, published in 1890. This book summarises much of what was known
of psychology at the time. However, James noted that people he talked to
were particularly interested in how psychology could be applied to problems
in life, and he wrote a much shorter book focussing on application that was
published in 1899. This book is based on lectures he gave to teachers, and
has the title Talks to Teachers on Psychology. Much of the early practical
application of psychology in America was on education and James was a
pioneer in this regard.
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 51

James and Wundt

James was aware of Wundt’s work in Germany. One of the first students to
attend Wundt’s lectures in 1879 was Stanley Hall. Hall had just completed
his PhD at Harvard supervised by James and did postdoctoral training
at Leipzig. Both Hall and James respected Wundt but had fundamental
differences with his approach to psychology. Apart from the difference
of practical application, James believed that Wundt’s attempt to identify
the components of consciousness was flawed, as consciousness flowed as
a stream. Whereas Wundt largely supported the ‘brick wall hypothesis,’
James supported ‘the coalescence hypothesis.’

William James and the function of psychology

William James’ psychology was influenced by two earlier developments in phi-
losophy and in science. One was Charles Darwin’s book The Origin of Species,
published in 1859. Darwin showed how the physical structures of animals were
adapted to their use. For example, birds evolved bills suited to eat food in their
environment. The second source of influence was that of the philosopher and
mathematician Charles Peirce (1839–1914), who, like James, was educated at
Harvard and was a friend of James. Peirce promoted a form of philosophy called
pragmatism. Pragmatism is based on the belief that for any living organism to
survive, it must develop habitual behaviour that would enable it to satisfy its
needs. Both Darwin and Peirce emphasised the importance that physiology and
behaviour must be useful – it must be adaptive in some way.
James took these ideas of Darwin and Peirce to suggest that the mind has
use and can be observed in use.

Our sensations are here to attract us or deter us, our memories to warn
or encourage us, our feelings to impel, and our thoughts to restrain our
behaviour, so that on the whole we may prosper and our days be long
in the land.
(James, 1899/1922, p. 24)
(Note the biblical ring to this quote – James’ father was an eccentric
theologian.)

James believed that consciousness has a function. Whereas Wundt studied

the structure of the mind for its own sake, James believed that the mind had
a function in that it controlled behaviour. This idea – that the mind had a
function – was to be developed by other American psychologists, and formed
52 ◆ Becoming an applied science

a distinction between Wundt’s type of psychology (given the label of struc-

turalism) and that of American psychology (given the label of functionalism).
Structuralism and functionalism were two competing paradigms for the
direction of psychology at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century.
Both placed introspection as the defining method of psychology, but used
introspection for different r­easons – i.e., had different assumptions about
how introspection should be used. Two psychologists at the University of
Chicago were responsible for developing James’ idea that the mind had func-
tion. They were John Dewey (1859–1952) and James Angell (1869–1949).
Angell was elected president of the American Psychological Association in
1906, and in his presidential address coined the term functionalism to dis-
tinguish the approach of many psychologists from the structuralist approach
advocated by students of Wundt.

Educational psychology: the contribution of James

James made several contributions to education. James provided advice to teach-
ers about how they should teach. Here is a summary of his advice.
James distinguished ‘native reactions’ from ‘habits.’ Native reactions are
instinctive responses to particular situations, and James makes a list of these
including curiosity, fear, imitation, and ambition. Some responses are therefore
simple ‘native reactions’ to a particular situation. Habits, on the other hand,
are acquired responses, which, once formed, occur without conscious inten-
tion. Much of James’ advice to teachers is how to form good habits in children,
which is done by exploiting the child’s natural tendency to behave in certain
ways, i.e., by building ‘habits’ from ‘native reactions.’

You may take a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink; and so
you may take a child to the schoolroom, but you cannot make him learn
the new things you wish to impart, except by soliciting him in the first
instance by something which natively makes him react.
(James, 1899/1922, p. 39)

James provides some practical suggestions about how to go about this. Chil-
dren have a ‘native reaction’ to movement and change. So the teacher should
move about and introduce novelty into the lesson. James states that voluntary
attention is of short duration, so the teacher should engage with the pupil by
introducing new ideas that are of interest.
What ideas are of interest to the child? James believed that learning was
based on the association of new ideas with ideas that are already established.
Therefore, learning is most effective if the new material can be linked with
the old. This idea of learning by association has been part of the earlier the-
ory of the German educationalist Johann Herbart (1776–1841), which was
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 53

acknowledged by James – note that Herbart does not feature in the early Ger-
man psychology as education was separate from psychology.

When we wish to fix a new thing in either our own mind or a pupil’s,
our conscious effort should not be so much to impress and retain as to
connect it with something else already there.
(James, 1899/1922, p. 143, emphasis in original)

James argues against ‘cramming’ as a way of teaching children. New ideas are
most effectively retained if they are associated with many rather than few ideas.
Therefore the most effective learning is that which is done gradually and where
numerous connections are made with the new material. This principle is now
accepted in modern educational theory and has been developed in several ways,
for example, problem-based learning.
Quoting experimental work by Herman Ebbinghaus (1850–1909), James
shows that forgetting occurs more rapidly at first, but the rate of forgetting
decreases with time. James used words such as ‘recency’ and ‘immediate mem-
ory,’ both of which will be familiar to modern students of cognitive psychology.
James showed that although a pupil may not be able to recall something, the
memory trace was not completely absent as memorisation would be faster the
second time. Recognition can occur even if recall does not – which is why exam-
inations (James points out) may not be the most effective form of assessment.
Finally, James provided advice about the will. If a child wants to do some-
thing that the adult disapproves of, then rather than inhibit the ‘native reaction’
of the child, the adult should find a substitution for that native reaction. This
substitute should be something else that the child is interested in. Modern child
rearing advice is similar – distraction is a very effective technique for managing
young children as parents soon find out.
From where did James get the advice he gives to teachers? Part of it is based
on his theory of habit, which he developed from the observation of people. Some
is based on a theory of memory, partially supported by research carried out by
others. What James does not do is test whether his recommendations actually
work. James’ recommendation that teachers should move around when teach-
ing was not based on any evidence and is not supported by any subsequent
research – even though teachers’ non-verbal behaviour is important (Gorham,
1988). James did not test his theory on children. His recommendations are
based on theoretical speculation, albeit sensible theoretical speculation. His rec-
ommendations are based on deduction from theory but without the subsequent
testing that is required in scientific research.

William James and Stanley Hall: Was this applied psychology?

William James was a teacher and educator rather than administrator. It was his
ex-pupil, Stanley Hall (1844–1924) who set up the first psychology laboratory
in the USA in 1883 at John Hopkins University, moving to Clark University at
54 ◆ Becoming an applied science

the time it was founded in 1889. While still at John Hopkins University, Hall
founded the American Journal of Psychology in 1887 and after moving to Clark
University founded the American Psychological Association in 1892.

James and Hall

William James came from a wealthy liberal family, Hall from a wealthy
conservative family. Despite James being Hall’s mentor, the relationship
between the two men was not good – Hall formed the American Psycho-
logical Association in 1892 when William James was out of town (Taylor,
1995)! William James was very close to his author brother Henry, and one
of Henry’s novels is really worth reading. The novel is called The Aspen
Papers and describes an academic who is ruthlessly pursuing his academic
goals while at the same time oblivious to the destruction he is causing to
the lives of others around him. A clever aspect of the novel is that it is
told in the first person from the point of view of the academic, who feels
completely justified in doing what he is doing because his academic goals
take precedence over everything else. My guess is that Henry knew about
academic competitiveness from his brother and wrote a novel about it. All
academics should read this novel and be warned!

Hall wrote a textbook on adolescence in1904 that influenced educational

policy. Hall argued that adolescence was characterised by heightened emotions
and vigour, something that is self-evidently true, but nevertheless worth saying.
Hall recommended sex-segregated schooling (Hall, 1906) in part due to his own
personal experience and guilt-ridden feelings concerning sex (Graebner, 2006).
Most modern educationalists do not support sex-segregated schooling, though
arguments for and against remain.
What is clear from reading the works of William James or Stanley
Hall is that these authors did not make a distinction between applied and
non-applied psychology. James refers to the nature of consciousness in the
same book that he makes recommendations for teachers. Hall points out that
adolescents have a heightened interest in sex, and recommends segregation,
but also points out that they have a heightened interest in spirituality without
making any specific recommendations. Their recommendations were based
on theory confirmed to some extent by experience. Neither attempted to
test their theories with children in educational settings. Modern research on
educational psychology is completely different in the sense that recommenda-
tions are based on evidence gathered from pupils. Is the work of James and
Hall ‘applied psychology’? Their psychology certainly had application, but
it would not have counted as applied according the writing of one of James’
colleagues, Hugo Münsterberg.
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 55

Münsterberg and forensic psychology

Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916) was German but criticised Wundt’s idea that psy-
chology should be a pure rather than applied science. Although Münsterberg had
set up a psychology department in the University of Freiberg, his negativity towards
Wundt’s ideas led to difficulties and, at the invitation of William James, Münster-
berg took up a post in Harvard in 1897. This invitation stemmed from the fact
that James was not personally interested in running a laboratory and he felt that
Münsterberg was the man for the job – because Münsterberg was a critic of Wundt.
Münsterberg has been described as the father of applied psychology because he
took a particular interest in the meaning and promotion of applied psychology.
Münsterberg is best known for his book On the Witness Stand, which
was published in 1908 but is based on essays written earlier. This book was a
bestseller in its day and was reprinted as recently as 1976. In the introduction
to this book, Münsterberg provides a clear distinction between experimental
psychology and applied psychology. The difference is one of the intent of the
researchers. This is what he wrote:

If experimental psychology is to enter into its period of practical ser-

vice, it cannot be a question of simply using the ready-made results for
ends which were not in view during the experiments. What is needed
is to adjust research to the practical problems themselves and thus, for
instance, when education is in question, to start psychological experi-
ments directly from educational problems. Applied Psychology will
then become an independent experimental science which stands related
to the ordinary experimental psychology as engineering to physics.
(Münsterberg, 1908, pp. 8–9)

So the difference between what Münsterberg calls experimental psychology and

applied psychology is whether the researcher is trying to solve applied prob-
lems, or is interested in psychological problems that may or may not have an
application. Münsterberg defines applied research in terms of intention, and his
comparison between engineering and physics shows how he perceives the dif-
ference. The difference is not so much pure and applied but basic and applied.
Although physics comes into many explanations of engineering, there will also
be explanations that are found in engineering but not physics. The applied sci-
ence solves problems that are not solved by the basic science, even though some
applied problems are solved by the basic science.
Münsterberg’s lasting contribution to the field of applied psychology was
in the field of forensic psychology. Münsterberg carried out experiments that
showed that witnesses were not reliable. The experiments took place during his
lectures. Münsterberg would arrange for a scene to be enacted – for example,
two students having a heated argument. Then he asked the other students,
who were naïve to this enactment, to write down what they had witnessed.
56 ◆ Becoming an applied science

Münsterberg showed that many of the descriptions were factually inaccurate.

Similar experiments were carried out by other researchers in other universities
leading to the same conclusion.
Münsterberg carried out other experiments with students. In one type of
experiment he showed students a picture and asked them to memorise the
content. Then he provided a list of questions that the students were asked to
answer. Some of the questions referred to objects that were in the picture. Some
of the questions referred to objects that were not present. Münsterberg found
that many students provided answers to the ‘not present’ objects, and therefore
made up content of the picture. He concluded that people were ‘suggestible’ and
he also showed that children were more suggestible that adults. The implica-
tions of this to modern research on false memory should be clear (Principe &
Schindewolf, 2012). Not only did Münsterberg demonstrate suggestibility, but
he also was able to show that prejudice could affect memory.

All our prejudices and all our convictions work as such suggestions.
(Münsterberg, 1908, p. 190)

As part of his work on suggestibility, Münsterberg studied false confessions

where someone says that they have committed a crime that they have not
committed. He provided examples of this happening in the American criminal
justice system and shows how people, when placed under pressure, can imagine
and therefore report what they have not done.
Münsterberg experimented with an early form of lie detection test based on
an association task. In this task, a person is asked to say the first word that comes
into their head when presented with a word. The rationale for this test was that
dangerous words (i.e., those associated with guilt) have longer reaction times.

A word which stirs emotional memories will show an association-time

twice or three times as long as a commonplace idea.
(Münsterberg, 1908, p. 86)

As part of his study into detecting lies, Münsterberg showed that safe words
tended to produce the same association when repeated, dangerous words pro-
duced associations that tended to change.
Münsterberg concluded his studies with principles that remain true in
forensic psychology today:

1 It is important to obtain eyewitness testimony as soon as possible after

the event as forgetting increases with time.
2 Leading questions should not be asked because doing so induces false
memories.
3 Witnesses can genuinely believe they saw something, and swear that
what they say is true, and yet their memory is false.
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 57

Münsterberg was at first a popular figure in American psychology and contrib-

uted to a number of different areas in applied psychology, including (though not
to any great significance) psychotherapy and industrial psychology. However,
over time he became a very unpopular figure, and in part this was due to his
personal style. Münsterberg never fully integrated into American society and
was always hoping for a post back in Germany. William James was irritated by
his vain and self-aggrandising personal style. The idea of Herr Doctor Professor
was not welcome in a society that was democratic. Coupled with Münsterberg’s
defence of German intentions just prior to the First World War, Münsterberg
became the object of ridicule, receiving letters addressed to Dr Monsterbug and
Baron Monchausen – named after the fictional character Baron Munchausen,
who told exaggerated stories of his ability (Landy, 1992). Münsterberg’s papers
were hardly ever cited after his death.

Witmer and the first clinical psychology clinics

In the 19th century, mental illness was treated by medical doctors who special-
ised in psychiatry. Although both Wundt and James had medical training – and
although James had experience of mental distress – neither contributed to the
study or the understanding of mental illness.
Lightner Witmer (1867–1956) trained under Wundt in Leipzig and on
returning to the USA in 1882 took up a position in the University of Pennsyl-
vania where he taught psychology, the kind of psychology taught by Wundt.
Witmer also joined the American Psychological Association (APA) as a charter
member when the APA was formed in 1892. In 1894, his university put on
courses for schoolteachers and Witmer became involved in teacher education.
One teacher described a boy who had difficulty learning to spell – what would
now be called dyslexic. Witmer met the child and tried to help him. Soon after
that, Witmer offered a course on how to work with students who were “men-
tally defective, blind, or criminally disturbed,” and formed the world’s first
psychological clinic at his university in 1896. Witmer coined the term clinical
psychology to name this new profession which he set about promoting, publish-
ing an article entitled “Practical work in psychology” in the journal Pediatrics,
also in 1896 (Witmer, 1896). In 1908 Witmer set up a residential school for the
care and treatment of children with intellectual or behavioural problems.
Although the diversity of Witmer’s clinical cases increased, there was always
an emphasis on education in his clinical psychology (Witmer, 1907). Witmer
emphasised measurement, in particular physical and neurological traits. Wit-
mer first believed that heredity was important for mental illness, but later came
to the conclusion that the environment was more important. Although many
people in the 19th and early 20th century believed that mental illness had a bio-
logical and hereditary cause, an alternative approach, called ‘moral treatment,’
had been developed and promoted by people from a religious or non-medical
58 ◆ Becoming an applied science

background. William Tuke (1732–1822) was a Quaker and philanthropist who

founded the York Retreat in England (Tuke, 1813/1964) for ‘insane’ people, as
he believed that contact and influence by a moral person would be helpful. Simi-
larity, in the USA, Dorothea Dix (1802–1887) campaigned for better treatment
of the mentally ill (Dix, 1843–1852/1971) in contrast to the asylums where they
were often incarcerated.
If mental illness is purely genetic, then there is little that can be done about
it, other than lock up the poor wretches out of harm’s way. However, if mental
illness is the result of an unsatisfactory environment, then improving the envi-
ronment of patients may help them get better. Whereas the environmentalist
approach had been associated with morality and religion, Witmer promoted
it in a way that brought the environmentalist approach within the scientific
sphere. Instead of moral treatment where the emphasis was contact with a mor-
ally superior person, Witmer proposed that mental illness was caused by a poor
environment and that the mentally ill could recover their health if exposed to a
better environment. This environmental and educational focus for the mentally
ill was consistent with the broader educational focus that was feature of late
19th-century and early 20th-century psychology. The related idea that mentally
ill people had learned things incorrectly was to resurface in the later behaviour-
ist approach to mental illness.
Witmer’s clinic was headed by a psychologist, was staffed primarily by
psychologists, and was a starting point for psychologists rather than medically
trained staff managing mental illness. Other and later clinics in the USA also
had a focus on mentally ill people. William Krohn started a laboratory for the
study of the insane in 1897 in Illinois, and in the early part of the 20th century
several hospitals in the USA introduced the practice of a psychological examina-
tion of patients on admission. Psychologists worked alongside psychiatrists in a
way that was later to be characteristic of clinical psychology in general. These
early psychologists provided ways of measuring mental illness, and although
there was no specific psychological treatment (Reisman, 1991), the introduc-
tion of measurement was the beginning of a scientific analysis of mental illness
provided first by psychologists. Note: Witmer was not influenced by Freud –
Freud visited the USA in 1909, though Freud had published much earlier – see
Chapter 5.

Scott and the beginnings of industrial psychology

Walter Dill Scott (1869–1955) obtained his PhD with Wundt, but like many
others rejected Wundt’s insistence that psychology should not be an applied
science. Scott was appointed Professor of Applied Psychology at Carnegie
University, and combined his academic with practical contributions to indus-
try. In 1919 he set up his own corporation which helped develop industrial
psychology.
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 59

Scott made two contributions to industrial psychology, the first being that
he was one of the pioneers of advertising (Scott, 1911). Scott believed that
“consumers are not rational beings and can be easily influenced” and so set
about finding ways of influencing consumers. Part of this was through adver-
tisements that provide a direct suggestion to purchase a product. For example,
he developed a successful advertisement that had a picture of Pears Soap, and
under which was written in large letters “Use Pears Soap.” He also introduced
advertisements aimed at women that had an emotional component as he felt
that feelings of sympathy were more likely to be responded to by women.
Finally, he introduced the idea of return coupons. Consumers were able to
return a coupon for a small free sample. Scott argued that this required positive
action on the part of the consumer, and so was likely to generate a positive pur-
chase at a future date. The idea of return coupons became particularly popular
in the 1960s – Green Shield stamps were introduced in 1958, and unused ones
are now collectors’ items.
The second contribution Scott made to industrial psychology was in the
field of personnel testing. Scott was interested in finding ways of distinguishing
good from bad employees, and developed his own way of researching this ques-
tion. He asked businessmen to rate their employees in terms of their usefulness,
and then gave the employees questionnaire-based tests. The tests were similar
to intelligence tests, except that they were administered in groups. Scott found
that some of the items in his tests distinguished the good from bad employees
(as rated by the employers), and then employed these items for his tests of
personnel selection. Like James, Scott used psychological theory to make rec-
ommendations without testing them, but like Witmer, he developed methods
of assessment. Psychological assessment was to become a major factor in the
development of psychology as a science in the early 20th century.

Binet and psychological testing

Alfred Binet (1857–1911) was born in Nice, France, the son of wealthy parents.
He was independently wealthy. He was appointed to the important but unpaid
post of director to the Laboratory of Physiological Psychology at the School of
Advanced Studies in 1894.
In the late 19th century, the French government introduced a law that all
children should be provided with (at least a limited amount of) education by the
state – i.e., the beginning of universal state education. However, a problem soon
emerged that some children had such low intelligence that they were unable to
benefit from the standard education in schools. In 1904 a government commis-
sion was set up to investigate the education of these pupils. Binet was appointed
a member of that commission, partly because he had started working in 1899
with a physician, Théodore Simon (1873–1961), on measuring people who
were called mentally retarded.
60 ◆ Becoming an applied science

The first test produced by Binet and Simon was produced in 1905 with
revisions in 1908 and 1911, the year Binet died (Binet, 1903, 1909/1975).
Binet introduced about 30 different tests to measure mental faculties, and these
included a kind of testing of higher mental facilities that are now recognised
as standard in intelligence tests. His tests enabled him to compare the ‘mental
faculties’ of different pupils. Binet assumed that there were many different
mental faculties, and that it was possible to be high on one and low on another.
So Binet was not measuring intelligence as a single concept. The concept of
general intelligence or g was introduced some 20 years later by Charles Spear-
man (Spearman, 1927). Binet believed that his tests could not “make us know
the totality of an intelligence.” Instead, Binet’s aim was to measure the many
mental faculties that he thought were important to guide the selection of pupils
through an educational system. Spearman used the finding that the scores on
the different mental faculties correlate (he used the method of factor analysis) to
infer there was an underlying construct of general intelligence that affected all
mental faculties. Spearman’s idea of general intelligence was used later to allo-
cate children to different schools in the UK – in contrast to Binet’s assumption
that differences in specific intelligence were important for allocating students to
different classes within schools.
When the author was young, intelligence tests were used to allocate pupils
to three classes of school in the UK: grammar school, technical school, and
secondary modern – this tripartite system was introduced in the education act
of 1944. The arguments for the early allocation of pupils to different types
of school was later condemned as discriminatory as well as being having sig-
nificant disadvantages in terms of the underlying assumption that intelligence
remains constant as children grow older. Comprehensive schools (i.e., schools
that were non-selective) were introduced in 1965 by the Labour government.
Some grammar schools still exist and have both supporters and detractors. The
several factors that inform this debate are beyond the scope of this book but
may be interesting for students.

The politics of applied versus non-applied research

In Europe in earlier times, pure research – i.e., research carried out for its own
intrinsic value – had higher status that applied research – i.e., research car-
ried out for commercial gain or for other practical reasons. That attitude still
remains amongst some people, primarily by those doing the pure research.
However, attitudes are changing, and for some applied research has higher
status. Differences of opinion between those supporting applied versus non-
applied research have a long history.
The author of Gulliver’s Travels, Jonathan Swift, was a satirist. His book,
published in 1726, describes several different lands, each of which is a satire
on some aspect of his society. One of the chapters, about the ‘flying island
Pure science: extracting sunbeams from cucumbers.
62 ◆ Becoming an applied science

of Laputa’ is a satire on the Royal Society – i.e., a society of scientists. The

inhabitants of Laputa are a nasty bunch. They have mastered levitation and
have created a flying island that they use to extract taxes from ordinary people
by hovering over towns and throwing rocks down if they are not given food
and drink. Other than that, they spend their time in useless pursuits, such as
extracting sunbeams from cucumbers and making marble soft so it can be used
in pillows. Swift wrote that there are no women in Laputa because they are too
sensible to live there. Swift spoke Spanish. His choice of name for this land was
not accidental. La puta means ‘whore’ in Spanish.
Although university authorities in the 19th century might consider Latin
and Greek the pinnacle of academic achievement, the need for applied edu-
cation at a higher level was clear to politicians. The 19th century saw the
formation of the first polytechnics in the UK. These provided education in
applied topics, but were few in number. The polytechnics awarded diplomas
but they did not have degree conferring status. In 1964 the labour government
created several new polytechnics to meet what was described by Prime Minis-
ter Harald Wilson, as “the white hot heat of the technological revolution.”
The intention was to shake up the educational system with brand new, shiny
polytechnics that would forge ahead with applied topics. At the same time
the Labour government formed the Council for National Academic Awards
(CNAA), a body that enabled the existing and newly created polytechnics to
award degrees validated by the CNAA. Only applied courses (including psy-
chology) were taught in these new polytechnics but with recognition of the
need for a broader, more liberal education within the curriculum. However,
the polytechnics were seen as having lower status than universities, possibly
because they lacked degree awarding status. The polys, as they were known,
never achieved that high status which was their original intent. The polytech-
nics were given degree awarding status and hence converted to universities in
1992. Although the ‘new universities’ as they were now called had an empha-
sis on technological subjects, the ‘upgrading’ of the old polytechnics to new
universities also meant that their original aim was abandoned. The universi-
ties, not the government, had won.
This is how the government eventually won. Universities receive money to
carry out research, money that is allocated to universities without any strings
attached to the type of research carried out (i.e., money in addition to money
allocated to teaching). The money comes from a block of money from the trea-
sury and the government had to find a way of allocating this money in a way
that would be perceived as fair, as some universities did more research than
others. The solution was the ‘Research Assessment Exercise’ (RAE), which
was invented and carried out every five years starting in 1986. The RAE was
in practice a type of competition between universities for research money, and
the assessment was based on the quality of research – as defined by the uni-
versities, and represented, primarily, in the form of published journal articles.
University authorities are (quite reasonably) interested in their funding, so
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 63

academics were encouraged to engage in high status research – high status as

defined by their university colleagues – and publish in high status journals. After
this competition had been running for several years, the government came up
with a novel idea: Why not specify that as part of the competition, universities
have to explain what impact their research has outside the academic field? The
RAE was replaced by the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in 2014. The
REF broadened the criteria for assessing research. Not only did the competing
universities have to specify their research outputs in the form of journal articles,
but they also were required to specify how their research had made a beneficial
impact on society at large.
The government got what it wanted. The universities were used to the idea
of competition for research funding, but now they had to compete for funding
on the basis of impact. When the REF was proposed, many academics were
highly critical. I remember one head of department saying that impact would
never catch on because there was so much criticism from other department
heads. On the contrary, the next REF, conducted in 2020 has a higher weighting
applied to the impact of research. University authorities (quite reasonably) are
interested in funding. The result is that applied research – or at least the impact
of research – has suddenly achieved a status it did not have previously in the
UK university system.

Research versus teaching

One of the consequence of the RAE and REF was that staff were encour-
aged to do research. However, if time is spent doing research it is possible
for less time to be spent teaching. Recently the government felt that teach-
ing quality was sometimes being sacrificed for research, simply because
universities were rewarded for the quality of research, not the quality of
teaching. The government had found that competitions between universi-
ties work. The teaching excellence framework (TEF) is the new kid on the
block. At the time of writing, the first TEF that was carried out did not
affect university funding. Watch this space!

What is applied research impact and how is it achieved?

What is research impact? The guidance provided by the 2020 REF committee
identifies two criteria, reach and significance. Reach equates to the number of
people who are affected by the change in practice. Significance equates to the
degree of change on those affected. An estimate of research impact is therefore
assessed by some (intuitive) combination of the number of people affected and
the degree to which they are affected by the change in practice. The guidelines
64 ◆ Becoming an applied science

make one more and very important requirement for impact: It must be based on
research. There must be a research paper or papers that provide a justification
or rationale for the change in practice.
According to these guidelines, neither William James nor Stanley Hall cre-
ated impact. It is certainly true that they influenced practice, and did so to a
large degree. However, the change in practice was not based on research, but
on observation-based theory. They developed theories on the basis of observa-
tion of people around them, but did not test those theories with independent
data. By contrast Münsterberg did carry out experiments, and his recom-
mendations for practice were supported by the evidence of his experiments.
Other psychologists (Witmer, Scott, Binet) developed methods of assessment
that were used where the method of assessment was based on research meth-
odology. If the criteria of impact are used, then applied psychology requires
underpinning by research.
What kind of research leads to impact? Chapter 1 provided an account of
two types of research and research programme. In one, theory is developed
inductively by collecting data relevant to a particular problem. This type of
research is data-led. In the other, speculative theory is tested using deduction to
provide tests of the theory. This type of research is theory-led. Data-led versus
theory-led is a continuum rather than a binary classification, though for sim-
plicity it is treated as such.
If research is data-led, then impact must come from research in an applied
field. Research in clinical psychology, health psychology, educational psychol-
ogy, occupational psychology, counselling psychology, and forensic psychology
need to be conducted with, respectively, people with mental illness, people with
somatic illness, children or students, workers, people with problems of varying
kinds, and perpetrators or staff involved in crime. Applied research in these
different areas of application is well established with journals specific to each
different type of application.
By contrast, if research is theory-led, then impact can come from a variety
of sources. One of the arguments for those carrying out or supporting pure or
non-applied research is that their research may have practical applications in
the future. The history of science provides examples of how research that had
no apparent use at first turned out to have use in the long run. When quantum
mechanics was first envisaged, none of the theoretical physicists thought that
their invention would be used in mobile phones almost a century later. However,
although mobile phones use quantum technology, other research was needed to
translate the original theory and fundamental research into something practical.
This ‘other’ research, research that develops an application from non-applied
research, is called ‘translational research.’ So, although the argument that ‘pure’
research can lead in due to course to applications, those applications require
the addition of another type of research, translational research. What happens
in the laboratory may not happen in real life. Translational research is needed
 Becoming an applied science ◆ 65

to confirm that the predictions deriving from non-applied research do actually

occur in real life.
Some psychological research is carried out using undergraduates as partici-
pants. It may be that some psychological phenomena observed in undergradu-
ates generalise to other populations, just as it may be that some phenomena
observed with rats generalise to people (see Chapter 4). However, translational
research is needed to confirm that theory and data obtained from undergradu-
ate students apply in other settings. Some applied journals will not publish
research that is carried out only on undergraduates. These journals have a
policy that they will publish studies only if the participants belong to the target
group of the applied journal.
Münsterberg defined applied psychology in terms of intention, the inten-
tion of trying to solve a practical problem. It is possible to distinguish three
types of research intention in psychology. The aim of non-applied, also called
pure, basic or fundamental research, is to understand psychological phenom-
ena for the intrinsic goal of advancing knowledge. There is no intention that
the research will lead to any extrinsic benefit. The aim of applied research is
to find a solution to a practical problem. Although intrinsic knowledge may
result from this research, the aim is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. The aim of
translational research is to use research findings developed by those motivated
by the intrinsic knowledge and provide evidence of extrinsic benefit. Most psy-
chological research falls into the first two categories: research carried out with
the intention of solving a practical problem and research carried out with the
intention of furthering knowledge.

Theory and application

Kurt Lewin’s famous dictum is “there is nothing so practical as a good
theory” (Lewin, 1943a, p. 118). A good theory is practical. In Chapter 1,
an account was provided of Lakatos’ analysis that theory-led research
programmes (progressive problem shift) were more effective than data-led
research programmes (degenerating problem shift). The conclusion from
Lakatos’ analysis is that theory-led research is better both for solving prac-
tical problems as well as scientific advances.

Both applied and non-applied research have value. As a science develops and
becomes more theoretical, the distinction becomes less important because there
is nothing so practical as a good theory. However, the distinction remains
important from a political perspective. If research is mostly funded, as it is
in the UK, by tax payers’ money, then tax payers expect their scientists to do
something more useful than extract sunbeams from cucumbers.
66 ◆ Becoming an applied science

Summary
Wundt presented psychology as a pure, non-applied subject in order to gain
intellectual acceptance in European society where applied subjects were valued
less. Psychologists developed psychology as an applied discipline in America.
William James and Stanley Hall developed theories based on observation and
used these theories to make recommendations in education, but did not attempt
to test their theories or the validity of their recommendations. Münsterberg
made an explicit distinction between applied and non-applied psychology
research, defining the former in terms of the intention of the researchers. Mün-
sterberg carried out experiments in applied settings and his recommendations
for forensic psychology were based on evidence, not only on theory. Other
applied psychologists also made empirical contributions to their fields. Witmer
developed the first clinical psychology clinics in America, focussing on measure-
ment and improved environmental conditions for the mentally ill. Scott pio-
neered organisational psychology, developing tests for personnel selection and
advertisements based on psychological principles. In France, Binet developed
the first intelligence tests, intelligence tests that exist with little modification
today.
The UK government has increased the status of applied research by intro-
ducing impact as a criterion for competitive university funding. Impact is
achieved most often when researchers have the intention of solving a practical
problem. However, impact can result from non-applied research with the addi-
tion of translational research.

Essay questions
1 How did Münsterberg define applied psychology and what was his
contribution?
2 William James provided advice to teachers about education. Evaluate
that advice in terms of modern theory and practice.
3 Imagine that you are in charge of all psychology research funding
in the UK. There is not enough money to fund all the good quality
research applications which divide into two main groups, those that
are primarily applied and those that are not. What proportion of that
funding would you allocate to applied psychology versus non-applied
psychology research topics? Justify the reason for your decision and
describe how you would assess impact.
 4
Why did behaviourism occur, what
forms did it take, and why and how was
it replaced by cognitive psychology as
the dominant paradigm in psychology?
68 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

This is a long chapter, the longest in this book. It covers a number of inter-
related concepts: Why introspection was rejected as a method by psychologists,
the assumptions and different forms of behaviourism, why cognitive psychol-
ogy replaced behaviourism as the dominant paradigm, and how cognitive psy-
chology differs from or is related to behaviourism.
From 1920 to 1950 most psychologists working in university departments
would have considered themselves behaviourists. Research psychologists wore
white coats and they worked in laboratories with cages of white rats. Psychol-
ogy was the psychology of the white rat. Behaviourism did more than anything
else to convert public opinion to the view that psychology was a science. When
a member of the general public evaluates whether something is a science, they
seldom use Popper’s criterion of falsifiability. If something looked like science –
and scientists wear white coats – then it must be a science. Even by the 1960s,
when the height of behaviourism was well and truly gone, rat psychology was
still an important part of the student curriculum. When the author was an under-
graduate in Bristol (1968–1971), the top floor of the three storey psychology
department (a converted Georgian house) was devoted entirely to animals – and
students were expected to get used to handling rats. I still remember the smell of
rat urine on sawdust that greeted you when entering the front door – entering a
pet shop brings back the memory of long ago.
Paradigms in psychology are based on assumptions, untested metatheoreti-
cal assumptions. Behaviourism was one of those paradigms. It is based on a
set of assumptions, the primary one being that human behaviour has the same
causes as that of rat behaviour. However, the assumptions of behaviourism
changed slightly as time went on, so although it is perfectly possible to write
about ‘behaviourism’ as a single ‘thing,’ this chapter tells the story of a series of
ideas that developed between the beginning of the 20th century till about 1950.
This chapter tells the story from the time before behaviourism started until after
it was no longer the dominant paradigm.
Behaviourism started as an explicit rejection of an earlier paradigm of psy-
chology. That earlier paradigm was psychology based on introspection. Wilhem
Wundt and his students defined psychology as the study of the structure of the
mind. William James and his students defined psychology as the study of the
function of the mind, including what the mind could tell us about behaviour.
The problem was that introspection, as practised in several laboratories across
the world, did not easily provide the answers that scientific psychologists (call-
ing themselves experimental psychologists) were looking for. Behaviourism
arose as an explicit rejection of introspection. That rejection was based on
evidence not prejudice.
There were two kinds of problem that arose using introspection as a method
of experimental psychology. One was that introspection as a method failed to
explain certain types of psychological problem. The second was that labora-
tories were coming to different conclusions using introspection and one of the
characteristics of a science is that the findings must be replicable. These two
problems are described before the description of behaviourism itself.
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 69

The failure of introspection

What introspection failed to explain

Wundt believed that the higher mental processes could not be studied through
experimental psychology. One of his students, Oswald Külpe (1862–1915),
disagreed, and when he set up his own laboratory in Würzburg, he and others
started using introspection to study higher mental processes.
One of the first studies of the Würzburg school was reported by Karl Marbe
(1869–1953) in 1901 (Marbe, 1901). Marbe was interested in the way people
form judgements of weight. Marbe asked people to lift two weights, one after
the other, and then say which was heavier. The task is simple enough. Marbe
expected people to be aware of some kind of residual mental sensation of the
first weight that could then be used to compare with the second weight. How-
ever, Marbe did not find this. He found that people could not really explain
how they could judge one weight heavier than the other. They just did it.
The finding that people cannot introspect judgements is important because
it suggests that introspection is not a useful tool in finding out how the mind
works. In fact, later cognitive psychologists studying reasoning have come to a
similar conclusion – the reasons we report for our actions are not necessarily
the reasons that actually direct our behaviour (Kahneman, 2011).
Other research conducted at Würzburg confirmed Marbe’s finding that
introspection did not always provide an answer when trying to understand
higher mental processes. H. J. Watt (1879–1925) investigated the way people
name objects. Watt found that people produce the name of an object without
conscious thought. It as though the name just appears in consciousness from
nowhere (Watt, 1913).
Narziss Ach (1871–1946) studied something that at the time was known as
‘the will’ but which is now known as motivation. Ach was interested in what
happens in consciousness when people engage in intentional behaviour. Com-
mon sense tells us that before we engage in an action, we ‘intend’ doing that
action. That common sense interpretation certainly does happen. For example,
if you hold your arm out and think to yourself ‘I intend to raise my arm’ you
will be aware of the intention before raising your arm. However Ach found
that sometimes goal-directed behaviour occurred without the need for prior
thought, and he called this a determining tendency (Ach, 1910a, 1910b).
Has the following ever happened to you? You intend to go to one place –
for example, to the shops – but you find you have gone somewhere else – for
example you have gone home. Most people have had an experience of this
kind. It is an example of a determining tendency. A determining tendency is a
tendency to achieve a particular goal but where there is no conscious awareness
of the intention when the action is carried out.
Ach presented people with two numbers written on a piece of paper, and
asked them to say the first number that came into their head. Before showing
the numbers, he presented them with one of four words: add, subtract, multiply,
70 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

or divide. The word presented before the task had an effect on the associated
number without conscious awareness. For example, when Ach presented the
numbers 6 and 2, if he had said ‘add,’ the associated number was invariably 8,
whereas if he said ‘divide’ the associated number would be 3. People’s behav-
iour was determined independently of introspection. Exactly the same phenom-
enon is sometimes used by magicians when they perform magic tricks of mind
reading.

Introspection produced different results in different laboratories

The imageless thought controversy was a controversy over whether it was pos-
sible to have thought without images. On one side of the argument were the
German psychologist Buhler and the American psychologist Woodworth. They
demonstrated in their laboratory that it was possible to have thought without
any images – i.e., imageless thought. On the other side of the argument was
Wundt in Germany and his student Titchener in America. They showed that
images always accompanied thought.
Part of the argument concerned the methods used for introspection. Bühler
and Woodworth argued that Wundt and Titchener’s introspectors were insuf-
ficiently skilled to detect imageless thought – despite the extensive training in
introspection that Titchner (Titchener, 1912) insisted upon for his students
(Schwitz­gebel, 2004). Wundt and Titchener retorted that Bühler and Wood-
worth’s reports of imageless thought were created by suggestion, and were
illusory. The controversy was never resolved. The problem is that if different
laboratories produce different results using the same method, then it is difficult
to see how that method could be described as scientific. The problems with
introspection were fertile ground for a new type of psychology, one that rejected
introspection altogether.

Precursors to behaviourism
Before the term behaviourism was coined, psychologists had started to do ani-
mal experiments. One of these psychologists was Edward Thorndike (1874–1949).
For reasons that are not entirely clear, Thorndike wanted to study animal
behaviour for his PhD at Harvard University – where William James was a
professor. The only problem was that psychologists didn’t study animals, and
biologists didn’t study behaviour. In the end Thorndike carried out his experi-
ments in William James’ basement – James was a generous person.
Although Thorndike is remembered for his animal research (1899, 1905),
he only spent a few years on it, as he soon “followed the path of least resis-
tance” as he put it and turned to research in educational psychology (Thorn-
dike, 1921, 1932). Educational psychology at the time was an important and
respected field of psychology (see Chapter 3).
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 71

As part of his research, Thorndike set out to discover how kittens or young
cats could open a ‘puzzle box’ (Burnham, 1972). There were various types of
puzzle boxes, each requiring a different solution to how it was opened. For
example, Thorndike would place a hungry cat in the box with food outside
and then time how long the cat took to open the puzzle box. What he found
was that over repeated exposure to this situation, the length of time to escape
decreased. That the animals appeared to learn gradually led to Thorndike for-
mulating his famous laws.
Thorndike suggested two laws, the law of effect and the law of exercise.
Thorndike defined the law of effect as follows:

Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are

accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will,
other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situa-
tion, so that, when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those
which are accompanied or closely followed by discomfort to the ani-
mal will, other things being equal, have their connections with that
satiation weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely
to recur.
(Thorndike, 1911, p. 244)

He defined the law of exercise as follows:

Any response to a situation will, other things being equal, be more

strongly connected with the situation in proportion to the number of
times it has been connected with that situation and to the average vigor
and duration of the connections.
(Thorndike, 1911, p. 244)

When students read these laws nowadays, common reactions are incompre-
hension and boredom. In fact, what they are saying is very simple. The law of
effect means that animals do more of the things they enjoy and less of the things
they find unpleasant. This is hardly a novel idea. However, what was novel
was the quasi-scientific way in which this simple idea was expressed. Calling
it ‘the law of effect’ meant psychology had its own laws, just as Newton had
invented the laws of physics. Well, almost! The law of exercise is an equally
unsurprising idea. The basic idea had already been expressed by William James
in his analysis of habit. Put simply, the law of exercise says that animals tend to
repeat behaviours that they have done before. Nevertheless, Thorndike’s laws
are important in that he expressed ideas that are self-evident in humans if one
focusses on consciousness, but may not be self-evident in animals. At the same
time, these laws must be contenders for the first prize for ‘The psychology of
the bleedin’ obvious.’
Student rat revising.
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 73

Problem with Thorndike’s laws

Are Thorndike’s laws always correct? The answer is no. Although the term
law sounds impressive, ancient Greek legend has it that whenever someone
becomes too cocky, the gods find a way to take them down – the gods
punish hubris (hubris = pride)! If a rat is placed in a T maze and always
is reinforced for turning right, then according to Thorndike’s laws, the rat
should always turn right. In fact, it doesn’t. At some point after turning
right on several occasions, it turns left. This is called spontaneous alterna-
tion and is explained in the following way. Whenever an action is carried
out, it generates ‘reactive inhibition’ to that action. Reactive inhibition
accumulates and dissipates with time (Zeaman & House, 1951). When
you start feeling bored with your revision, think on this: You are a big
rat without a tail and your boredom is caused by reactive inhibition. The
answer is simple. Don’t revise for long periods of time. Have a break, and
do something else.

Thorndike’s law of effect has one other feature that is worth noting. Thorndike
used the term satisfaction but without clearly defining what satisfaction is. In
fact, Thorndike’s approach to satisfaction was circular. If the probably of an
action increases, this indicates that the action was satisfying; satisfaction is
therefore defined in terms of its effect. However, the idea of ‘satisfaction’ does
imply some form of motivation, and this motivational aspect was developed by
later behaviourists.

The beginning of behaviourism: Watson and

methodological behaviourism
John Broadus Watson (1878–1958) came from a family background that was
rather different from other early American psychologists. His father was neither
wealthy nor a minister of the church; he was a confirmed atheist who did little
to help his family. Watson’s mother, who kept the family together, was deeply
religious and made Watson promise that he would become a Baptist minister –
Watson’s second name came from John Broadus, a well-known ‘hell-fire’ Bap-
tist minister. This was not to be, as Watson decided to work in psychology,
applying to the University of Chicago to do graduate work when his mother
died. Watson’s PhD and his subsequent work at Chicago involved rats – his dis-
sertation (Watson, 1903) was published in 1903 with the title: Animal educa-
tion: the psychical development of the white rat. Watson enjoyed studying rats
(Cohen, 1979).
74 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

Watson began to realise that the methods he used to study animals

could be applied to humans. In other words, it was not necessary to use
the method of introspection in order to be a psychologist. This rejection of
introspection was not based only on his dislike of the technique. As shown
earlier in this chapter, there were problems with the introspective method.
Watson’s solution to the problems of introspection was simple: Don’t use it.
He viewed introspection as an unreliable and esoteric form of analysis that
should have no place in a scientific psychology. Instead, Watson suggested
that psychology should use the methods developed in animal psychology
where introspection is not possible (Buckley, 1989). This type of behaviour-
ism is called methodological behaviourism because its rationale is based on
its method. Methodological behaviourism is based on the assumption that
objective observation is a better method for understanding psychology than
introspection.
Watson was happy at the University of Chicago, but he was employed at
a low grade of pay. In 1908 he was offered and accepted the post of profes-
sor and director of the psychological laboratory at Johns Hopkins University.
It was at Johns Hopkins that Watson made his mark (Watson, 1916, 1919a,
1919b).
The founding of behaviourism is often dated as 1913, the date that Watson
published an article titled “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It” in the jour-
nal, Psychological Review. The opening paragraph neatly sums up Watson’s
position:

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experi-

mental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction
and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its
methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the
readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms
of consciousness.
(Watson, 1913, p. 158)

Watson’s behaviourist psychology changed the goal of psychology. Whereas

Wundt and structuralists interpreted psychology as the study of the mind,
and James and the functionalists interpreted psychology of the study of how
the mind influenced behaviour, Watson rejected the mind completely. Watson
introduced a psychology that was without the mind and which was dedicated
to understanding and controlling behaviour (O’Donnell, 1987).
In 1914 Watson published a book Behavior: An Introduction to Compara-
tive Psychology, which applied behaviourist principles of learning to animal
behaviour. One of the developing assumptions of behaviourism was that it was
possible to understand humans by understanding animals: There is no funda-
mental difference between animals and humans.
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 75

Humans are like other animals

The assumption that there is no ‘dividing line’ between animals and
humans is an assumption that is shared with all the different versions of
behaviourism. It is a defining feature of the paradigm – or paradigms –
that make up behaviourism.

Watson’s ideas developed over time, but central to his theory was the idea of the
stimulus-response bond. The stimulus-response bond was responsible for hab-
its. Habits developed over the lifetime were responsible for much of behaviour.
The idea of a stimulus-response bond has clear links with Thorndike’s law of
effect and James’ concept of habit. However, Watson also linked his use of the
term habit with the phenomenon of conditioning that had been discovered by
Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) in Russia. In his well-known studies of dogs, Pavlov
showed that it was possible to form associations between stimuli – between an
unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food) and a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a bell).
Watson thought that habits could be conditioned by environmental circum-
stances, as these circumstances and consequent habits led either to a well-
adjusted person or a neurotic person. His strong belief in the environmental
determination of behaviour is summed up in his claim, made in 1924.

Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified

world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random
and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – a doctor,
lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even into beggarman and thief,
regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and
race of his ancestors.
(Watson, 1924/1970, p. 10)

Why did Watson think this possible? Although he did not use this modern termi-
nology, Watson thought that animals and humans were adaptive systems. That
is, it would be possible to mould people into different types of specialist because
they would adapt to the environmental characteristics of those specialists.
Watson gained psychiatric experience by working at the Hopkins’ Phipps
psychiatric clinic and it was there that he began to apply his ideas of condition-
ing to the development of neuroses. Watson demonstrated a conditioned fear
response in a young child. Watson’s study on the conditioning of fear was car-
ried out with Rosalie Rayner and published in 1920 (Watson & Rayner, 1920) –
the study would not obtain ethical approval these days, and it is referred to as
the study of Little Albert. Watson selected a ‘solid and unemotional’ child for
his experiment, Little Albert, who was about nine months old. Little Albert was
76 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

afraid only of a sudden loud noise, which is a normal fear response for children.
Two months later Little Albert started training. Training involved placing a
white rat in front of Little Albert, who showed no fear of the rat. Then, when
Little Albert reached out to touch the rat, as soon as he touched the rat, the
experimenters made a loud noise by striking a steel bar with a hammer. Little
Albert jumped at the loud noise. This was then repeated. A week later, there
were five more presentations of the rat and noise at which point Little Albert
was clearly afraid of the rat and would cry and crawl away. Five days later,
when the rat was presented and without the loud noise, Little Albert was still
afraid of the rat. Watson believed that this showed that neurotic responses in
patients were also caused by conditioning.

Who was Little Albert?

Detective work has led to two competing hypotheses, one that he was a
sick child with hydrocephalus called Douglas Merrit (Beck, Levinson, &
Irons, 2009) the other that he was a healthy child called Albert Barger
(Digdon, Powell, & Harris, 2014). The difference is not trivial in that, if
the former, then Watson’s description of Little Albert as healthy would
have been untrue, and finding a falsehood in his study would add to other
questions about the true reporting of this study.

The reporting of the Little Albert story has become elaborated over time like
a game of Chinese whispers (British English) or game of telephone (American
English). In fact, the conditioning effect was weak, and on subsequent occasions
Watson had to ‘freshen up’ (Watson & Rayner, 1920, p. 9) the original response
by repeating the loud noise. Watson and Rayner were able to show that the
fear did generalise – for example to a white rabbit, dog, fur coat, cotton wool,
and a Father Christmas. In later accounts of the experiment, fear was reported
as generalising to other objects not mentioned in the original paper. Watson
(1928/1972) mentions a rug, and inventions in textbooks include a furry glove
and even a teddy bear (Harris, 1979). Harris (1979) suggests that these addi-
tions were probably invented to make the story more acceptable and believable
to students and other readers.
Watson and Rayner not only collaborated on research together, but they
also became lovers. Watson’s marriage had not been good for several years, and
Watson found in Rayner the romance that he was lacking at home. In1920 he
divorced he wife and married Rayner. This action scandalised the authorities at
Johns Hopkins University, particularly as Rayner came from a family who had
given large sums of money to the University. Watson was dismissed from his
post. From then on Watson never obtained a good academic job, but for a short
time he continued to publish on his work on child rearing (Watson 1928/1972).
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 77

Invented history
Those interested in Watson’s personal life might like to note that Watson
was, in 1919, voted the most attractive male professor by female students
(Benjamin, Whitaker, Ramsey & Zeve, 2007). There is an interesting
postscript to Watson’s story. It was suggested that the real reason he was
sacked was not because of his affair with Rosalie Rayner, but because
he was conducting experiments investigating the physiological effects
of sexual intercourse – using himself and Rosalie as subjects. This story,
however, has been shown to be nothing more than that – just a story (Ben-
jamin et al., 2007), but the fact that the story is told shows how history
is elaborated to fulfil the perceptions of the teller – perhaps more so for
Watson than for others.

Out of academia, Watson developed a very successful career as a businessman

working in the field of advertising (Buckley, 1982). His strategy was to apply
behaviourist principles to advertising, in particular by using advertisements to
elicit emotions in the population. For example, Watson created advertisements
for Johnson and Johnson’s baby powder that stressed the dangers of infection
for babies and the ‘purity’ and ‘cleanliness’ of baby powder. In addition, Watson
used basic conditioning principles to associate celebrities with a product. Queen
Marie of Romania was shown endorsing Pond’s cold cream. Similar techniques
are used today.
With the arrival of two sons, Watson and Rayner applied behaviourist
principles to their upbringing. Watson’s book Psychological Care of the Infant
and Child, published in 1928, became a bestseller. Watson’s approach to child
rearing was based on the assumption that children were simply mini-adults.
Just as there was no fundamental difference in terms of conditioning principles
between a rat and human, so there was no difference between adults and chil-
dren. Watson believed that children should be encouraged to be independent
and the demonstration of emotion by parents would lead them to be overly
protective. He wrote in his 1928 book

Mothers just don’t know, when they kiss their children and pick them
up and rock them, caress them and jiggle them upon their knee, that
they are slowly building up a human being totally unable to cope with
the world it must later live in.
(Watson, 1928/1972, p. 44)

This harsh form of childrearing is now considered to be entirely wrong. It is

worth noting that both of Watson’s children experienced depression in later life,
and one committed suicide. Whether this was due to the style of childrearing
78 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

they received or influenced by the early death of their mother when she was 35
is unknown.
In summary, Watson introduced a new type of psychology that entirely
rejected the idea of the introspection as a method. Some of his ideas still have
currency today, such as the idea of a conditioned fear response, but others, such
as his beliefs about childrearing, are now rejected. His legacy is controversial.
Some considering him second in influence only to Freud whereas others see him
as just a footnote in the development of modern psychology (Weyant, 1968).

Skinner and radical behaviourism

Watson’s methodological behaviourism was based on his rejection of the intro-
spective method. Skinner’s radical behaviourism (Schneider & Morris, 1987)
was based on an idea from the philosophy of science: Theoretical terms are
redundant.

Explanatory fictions
The content of scientific explanations is made from two different types of term:
observation terms and theoretical terms. Observation terms refer to things that
can be seen (e.g., tables, chairs, dials, levers). Theoretical terms refer to things
that cannot be seen (e.g., electrons, atoms). The purpose of scientific explana-
tion (or one purpose of scientific explanation) is to predict cause and effect
relationships between observation terms. After all, it is the observation terms
that really matter in terms of everyday life. No one will worry if an electron is
misplaced, but they do if their car won’t start. For many explanations, theoreti-
cal terms intervene between the observation terms:

Observation terms → Theoretical terms → Observation terms

The following example comes from chemistry:

Add pink metal filings to copper plus

colourless liquid → sulphuric acid becomes copper sulphate → blue coloured
liquid

In most explanations involving theoretical terms, the theoretical terms provide

a rationale for the causal link between the observation terms. This link can be
stated in the general form:

A (observation) causes B (observation) because of C (a rationale based on a

theoretical level of description).
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 79

Exactly the same rationale of:

Observation terms → Theoretical terms → Observation terms

occurs in psychology, only the labels are different.

The first observation term is called a stimulus – S. The second observation
term is called a response – R. And the theoretical term is called an organism
variable – O.
So, in psychology, explanations have the form:

Stimulus → Organism variable → Response

Or

S→O→R

(Note: do not confuse ‘organism variable’ with ‘observation term.’)

The crucial question is this: What is the organism variable? As far as the
early functionalists were concerned, the organism or O variable was introspec-
tion. So, for example, a theory might be

Lion → Fear → Running away

However, the O variable does not necessarily have to be introspection. It could

equally well be a physiological variable, for example

Lion → Cortical activation → Running away

The distinguishing factor of the organism variable is that it is some kind of

theoretical term – i.e., it is not directly observable.
This idea of observation terms with intervening theoretical terms has been
widespread in science and psychology. However, there are those who object to
the use of theoretical terms. The objection is based on a simple argument called
the paradox of theorising. This paradox was described by Hempel in 1958, and
it goes somewhat like this:

1 The purpose of theoretical terms is to form links between observation

terms.
2 A successful theoretical term is one that links observation terms.
3 Once theoretical terms have formed those links, then these terms are
redundant as the links can be made between the observation terms
independently of those theoretical terms.
80 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

In terms of psychological theory, the argument goes like this:

1 An organism variable links stimulus to response.

2 Once the organism variable linking stimulus and response is known,
then the organism variable becomes redundant because the stimulus
and response can be connected directly.

That is, if a theory starts with the form

S→O→R

Then, once the connections between stimulus, organism, and response are
known, this relationship can be simplified to

S→R

In other words, if the organism variable does what it is supposed to do, then it
can be ignored.
Skinner argued that psychology should restrict itself to S-R links and
ignore psychological theoretical terms irrespective of their nature. Thus, Skin-
ner rejected physiological explanations just as he rejected mentalistic explana-
tions in psychology.
Skinner’s argument for a strict S-R psychology included a damning criticism
of the way organism terms are used in psychology, a criticism that theoretical
terms in psychology were ‘explanatory fictions.’
To illustrate the case of an explanatory fiction, let us return to the example
given previously:

Lion → Fear → Running away

Let us suppose that John sees a lion, becomes afraid, and so runs away. How
do we know that John is afraid? Because he runs away. If John approached
and stroked the lion, we wouldn’t suppose that John was afraid. John’s fear is
inferred from his behaviour, the same behaviour which the fear is being used
to explain.
To give a slightly more banal example, let us suppose that we observe John
smiling. We infer from this that John is happy. Because John is happy, therefore
he smiles. But we only know that he is happy because he smiles.
Skinner points out that the organism variable in psychology is an explana-
tory fiction. It masquerades as an explanation. It cons us into thinking that an
explanation is provided, when all it does is redescribe the behaviour. While
Skinner’s argument has merits, a later section in this chapter will explain what
it takes to make an organism variable not an explanatory fiction.
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 81

Skinner’s contribution
Burrhus Frederic Skinner, or B.F. Skinner (1904–1990) originally planned to
be an author, but after reading works by Watson and Pavlov he enrolled in
a graduate programme of psychology at Harvard in 1928 (Catania, 1992).
His career as a behaviourist psychologist lasted six decades and included not
only academic books and papers, but also many non-technical books written
for the general population, so that his original aim of being an author was in
fact realised (Bjork, 1993). Skinner’s book The Behavior of Organisms (1938)
was his major work. Although focussing on the behaviour of the white rat,
Skinner believed that humans were organisms just as the rat was. By organism
he meant a unified system of stimulus-response connections (Catania, 1992).
Skinner investigated the rat’s behaviour with an invention of his that is now
known as the Skinner box. The Skinner box consists of a box in which the rat
is placed with a lever on which the rat can press. The rat’s lever presses are the
response – and various stimuli, such as food or electric shock, can be applied
by the researcher.
Skinner’s main academic contribution to behaviourism was that he estab-
lished the idea of operant conditioning in contrast to respondent ­conditioning –
respondent conditioning was the form of conditioning studied by Pavlov.
Operant conditioning involved the shaping of behaviour through reinforce-
ment, and this idea is directly linked to Thorndike’s law of effect. That is, organ-
isms tend to do more of an action that is reinforced (i.e., creates satisfaction)
and less of one that does not. Behaviour is controlled by its consequences. The
astute student may query whether the idea of satisfaction is an explanatory fic-
tion. Skinner avoided this problem by simply identifying those conditions that
were reinforcing – i.e., led to an increase of a particular behaviour. However, in
contrast to Thorndike, Skinner believed that reinforcement was better able to
shape behaviour than punishment and so advocated the use of encouragement
rather than punishment for modifying human behaviour.

The two main assumptions of behaviourism

One assumption is that human behaviour can be predicted from observa-
tions made on animals. The second assumption is that behaviour is con-
trolled by its consequences.

Skinner’s contributions were not only in the academic sphere (e.g., Skinner,
1935, 1957, 1984a), he also made contributions in three other ways. First, he
wrote a number of books and articles that provided a blueprint for a ‘better way
of life’ based on behaviourist principles (Skinner, 1938, 1953, 1974). His novel
Walden Two published in 1948 describes a happy society based on principles
82 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

of positive reinforcement (Skinner, 1948). A similar idea forms the basis of a

book by Aldous Huxley, called Brave New World, except that Huxley’s title
is satirical as he wanted to expose the emptiness of a happy life controlled by
others (Huxley, 1932). Skinner’s book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner,
1971) suggests that these two emotions, freedom and dignity, are both illusions
and happiness is increased by avoiding these often sought goals. This book was
on the New York Times bestseller list for 26 weeks. It is worth noting that in
his personal life Skinner was an unassuming man who kept his many honorary
degrees in a box in his basement, and whenever he allowed himself to be inter-
viewed it was not to promote himself but to promote behaviourism. He believed
strongly that the application of behaviourist principles could increase human
happiness (Skinner, 1976; Wiener, 1996). People who knew him have told the
author what a charming man he was.
As a second practical contribution Skinner invented something called the
‘baby tender’ and later renamed the ‘aircrib.’ The baby tender consisted of a
box with sound absorbing walls and a large picture window. Heated, filtered,
and moistened air was pumped into the box, which had a tightly stretched
canvas floor, which was made from a long strip of canvas that could be
cranked so that a fresh section could be easily put in place. The baby tender
followed Skinner’s principle of providing children with a pleasing environ-
ment, and he used it for his first child, a girl called Deborah – apparently
this device was designed because his wife did not like looking after children.
Deborah spent her first two and a half years in the air crib and grew up to be
a happy and successful adult – whether this was despite of or because of the
baby tender is impossible to say. Skinner tried to sell his baby tenders – which
were renamed as aircribs commercially. Although about a thousand aircribs
were sold, with satisfied owners, the idea never really took off (Benjamin &
Nielsen-Gammon, 1999).
As a third applied contribution, Skinner applied behavioural principles to
education. After noticing that some children in a class completed work early
and so waited, looking bored, whereas others were rushed, Skinner reasoned
that the pace of learning should be adjusted to each individual student’s rate of
working. In addition, he reasoned that learning should involve immediate feed-
back about whether a solution to a problem was correct, rather than the child
having to wait till the end of the lesson or some time on a future occasion. Skin-
ner applied these two principles (individualised rate of working and immediate
feedback) to developing teaching machines. Although IBM and other American
companies expressed interest in marketing these machines, negotiations came to
nothing and in the end this educational innovation never materialised. A final
invention of Skinner’s that has received little attention is that of the ‘summator.’
In essence, the summator was a kind of auditory ink-blot. It consisted of barely
audible sounds that Skinner assumed would be associated with verbal content
that had meaning to the person. Hence, by describing what the sounds ‘were
saying’ the person provided a description of their latent behaviour. This idea
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 83

was taken up initially by physicians (it was renamed the tautophone), but again,
never really caught on (Rutherford, 2003).
Skinner was a multi-faceted person. His contribution included a philosophi-
cal perspective on psychological theory, the application of psychological theory in
the form of operant conditioning and several applications of behavioural princi-
ples to real life situations. That these applications were not particularly successful
were a great disappointment to Skinner. Why they were not successful is a matter
of speculation and a useful topic for discussion. Despite his earlier popularity, by
the 1960s popular opinion was moving away from a mechanistic view of people
as mindless machines to one that was more in line with the liberalism of the time –
where flower power and free love were the new idiom (see Chapter 9). Skinner’s
interpretation of psychology was criticised in the popular press (Rutherford,
2000). Nevertheless, he has had an immense influence on psychology with the
central belief that people are the product of their environments. At the age of 86
he was still working on the final correction on a paper entitled “Can Psychology
Be a Science of Mind?” the evening before he died (Fowler, 1990).

Neobehaviourism: Hull and Tolman

Methodological behaviourism and radical behaviourism both rejected the use
of theoretical terms or organism variables. Nevertheless, despite the paradox of
theorising and despite the problem of explanatory fictions, organism variables
have a value. It is this value, the value of theoretical terms, that was responsible
for the development of a type of behaviourism called neobehaviourism.
Imagine a rat placed in a maze. In this experimental situation, the stimulus
is the maze and the response is how the rat runs in the maze. If naïve rats are
placed in the maize – naïve in the sense that they have not had experience with
mazes before – then they will engage in a variety of exploratory responses. The
stimulus-response link can be represented as this:

Stimulus of maze → exploratory responses

Now, imagine what happens if non-naïve rats, rats who have learned where the
goal box is, are used instead. The non-naïve rat will run straight to the goal box
where a reward of food is waiting. The prior history of the rat makes a differ-
ence. Equally, if a rat is hungry because it has not been fed, this rat will behave
differently to one that is satiated because it has just been fed. Again, prior his-
tory makes a difference. It seems that any explanation of the behaviour of a rat
must take into account prior history.
The radical behaviourist solution to the effect of history on present behav-
iour was to incorporate the historical stimuli into the explanation of stimulus
and response. The stimulus-response links of the non-naïve rats on the occa-
sions before the test period become part of the explanation.
84 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

The radical behaviourist solution retains the original objective of avoid-

ing organism variables. However, the problem with this solution is that it is
very cumbersome. A rat may have a long history of maze running, and so to
describe the rat’s behaviour it is necessary to describe a long list of prior stimuli
and responses. Thus, although radical behaviourist solution ‘works’ it is not
particularly practical: It is inconvenient. It was this particular problem of incon-
venience that faced the neobehaviourists.
The neobehaviourist solution was simple: Allow in certain organism vari-
ables, but only those that had passed a test. The test the organism variable
had to satisfy was that it was operationally defined. So, there are some ‘good’
organism variables you can use and some ‘bad’ ones you can’t. An operationally
defined organism variable is one that is defined in terms of its operations. Defin-
ing something in terms of operations means defining it in terms of observation
terms – i.e., defining the organism variable in terms of what it does in terms of
observable effects or what observable events cause it. Thus, operational defini-
tion means that the organism variable is defined in terms of objective observa-
tion. The particular solution of operational definition differed between the
different neobehaviourists, and two different ones will be considered here: the
theories of Hull and of Tolman.

Hull’s quantitative theory of animal behaviour

Clark Leonard Hull (1884–1952) is remembered as a behaviourist, but his ear-
lier works had a wider focus, including a book Aptitude Testing published in
1928 and one on Hypnosis and Suggestibility published in 1933. These works
appeared at the same time he was publishing on learning theory (Hull, 1929,
1930, 1945, 1951). Hull is best known for his book Principles of Behavior
published in 1943, and his final book A Behavior System, which was published
the year he died (Hull, 1952).
A distinctive feature of Hull’s approach to psychology is that he proposed a
quantitative theory, one that involved mathematical formulae. Hull’s theory of
behaviour ‘grew’ over time.
There are three organism variables in Hull’s theory, each of which is operation-
ally defined. The first is called net reaction potential and is given the expression

SER

SER or net reaction potential is the potential to engage in a particular behaviour.

The reaction potential is not exactly the same as the behaviour, as the rat may
be prevented from engaging in the behaviour, but it can be treated as more or
less equivalent with behaviour. Thus, SER is defined operationally in terms of
behaviour:

SER is approximately equal to behaviour.

 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 85

Mathematical psychology
Hull was one of the first psychologists to introduce quantitative theory
into psychology in a way that mimics the quantitative theories of physics
and chemistry (but see also Weber’s fraction and Fechner’s law, Chap-
ter 2). Although a fraction of psychological theories are quantitative, the
Journal of Mathematical Psychology was first published in 1964 and con-
tinues publishing articles to this day. Although some papers relate to rein-
forcement, others describe human behaviour. For example, Luce’s choice
axiom (Luce, 1977) provides quantitative predictions about choice. If,
for example, the proportion of people choosing chicken over beef in a
restaurant is X/Y, then, if pork is added to the menu, although the abso-
lute number of people choosing chicken and beef reduces, the proportion,
X/Y, remains the same. The theory is tested not with statistical hypothesis
testing but by a quantitative estimate of the extent to which that propor-
tion, X/Y, remains the same under different conditions of choice.

The second of Hull’s organism variables is called drive, and given the
expression

D or drive is operationally defined in terms of the number of hours the rat has
been without food. Hull thought that there was one central drive, D, that moti-
vated all behaviour, and that when D was high the rat was more likely to engage
in behaviour, any behaviour.
The third of Hull’s organism variables is called habit, and given the
expression

H or habit is operationally defined in terms of the number of occasions the rat

has performed that behaviour in the past.
Using these three organism variables, Hull then proposed the following
theory

SER = D × H

Or net reaction potential equals drive times habit.

What this theory suggests is that rats are motivated to behave as a function
of the level of drive (otherwise they just sit doing nothing), but the direction
86 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

of behaviour (i.e., what they actually do) is determined by habit. That is, drive
energises behaviour and habit directs behaviour.
Notice that Hull’s three organism variables are operationally defined in
terms of external observable variables. Drive is not some internal physiologi-
cal state, and habit is not a pathway in the brain. These concepts are entirely
described in terms of objective external conditions. Notice that this form of
description of organism variables is not very different from Skinner’s proposal
that there should be no organism variables at all. Because drive is only the num-
ber of hours without food, it would be possible to dispense with the concept
of drive and rely only on the number of hours without food. That is, it would
be possible to include the historical stimuli (number of hours without food)
with the present stimulus of the maze in order to explain the rat’s behaviour.
Hull’s organism variables are simply a convenient summary of the external,
objective stimulus. He does not make the error criticised by Skinner of creating
an explanatory fiction by supposing that there is an internal state, called drive,
that ‘makes’ the rat run. Drives are simply convenient summaries of the external
objective data.
In a typical behaviourist experiment conducted by Hull, a rat would be
placed at the beginning of a maze. There was food at the goal box at the end
of the maze. The behaviour of the rat would be observed. It was found that the
rat ran faster if it was deprived of food, and it would be more likely to go to the
correct goal box if it had received food there in the past. However, over time
Hull found that other variables would affect the rat’s behaviour. For example,
the attractiveness of the reward would make a difference, as well as the amount
of effort needed by the rat to achieve the goal. These additional variables could
not be explained by his initial theory of

SER = D × H

As a consequence of this, Hull introduced new concepts. New concepts began

creeping into the theory. Initially there was the concept of incentive, given the
letter K, and then the amount of work, given the letter W. Then other organism
variables had to be added so that the equation ended up looking very complex
indeed. This gradual increase in organism variables was the inevitable conse-
quence of how the theory developed. At first Hull was interested in a relatively
limited laboratory setup. Over time, that setup became more complex, with the
consequence that he had to make the theory more complex. This additional
complexity results because of the very nature of Hull’s theory. Hull assumed
that behaviour could be explained atomistically. That is, the various determi-
nants of SER are simply added up together, and the whole is not more than the
sum of its parts. The eventual outcome of this kind of theorising is that one ends
up with an incredibly complex theory.
The reason a theory is useful is that it helps people make sense of the world
in which we live by simplifying the complexity that people observe around
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 87

them. However, as Hull’s theory grew it became less good at simplifying and
making sense. The more comprehensive the theory became – and Hull wanted
to explain all behaviour – the more unwieldy it became. As a theory for explain-
ing a limited number of events in a restricted setup, the theory was very suc-
cessful. But as a theory of all behaviour, Hull’s approach failed to be successful.
There is a reason for focussing on Hull’s theory. The historian Imre Lakatos
observed that research programmes that are driven by data are less successful
than those driven by theory (see Chapter 1). Lakatos used the term ‘degenerat-
ing problem shift’ to describe research where theory lags behind data. Lakatos
did not refer to Hull’s theory as an example of a degenerating problem shift, but
it is an excellent example of what happens. Theoretical terms were introduced
to explain behaviours of the rat that were observed and could not be explained
by the existing theoretical terms. To be successful, a theory needs to be able to
simplify behaviour, not just redescribe each behaviour using a different theo-
retical concept. Despite its influence in its day, nowadays Hull’s mathematical
theory is largely forgotten (Mills, 1978).

Tolman’s purposive behaviourism

Edward Chace Tolman (1886–1959) was influenced by the work of Gestalt psy-
chologists, particularly Kurt Koffka and Kurt Lewin, and spent time working
with Koffka. However, Tolman was also influenced by animal psychologists,
and it is in this field that he made his name (Tolman, 1922, 1932, 1948, 1959).
Nevertheless the Gestalt influence is evident throughout his work. This Gestalt
influence makes Tolman a transition figure between behaviourism and cognitive
psychology.
One important difference between Hull and Tolman was that Tolman
believed that behaviour should be treated as a molar event – hence the term
molar behaviourism is sometimes used to describe Tolman’s approach. Hull
treated the rat’s behaviour as a sequence of actions. For example, the rat would
take two steps forward, then three to the left, then another four forwards and
so on until the goal is reached. Each step is an action. The central argument of
Hull and other behaviourists was that it is the action that is reinforced by the
goal in the goal box. By contrast, Tolman refers to acts meaning that it is ‘the
arriving at the goal box’ which is the act. Thus, Tolman describes behaviour
in terms of a larger unit than that used by Hull (acts versus actions). However,
there is an additional implication of the idea of an act. It is that an act is defined
in terms of a goal or purpose. Tolman’s behaviourism is referred to as purposive
behaviourism.
Hull and Tolman had different views about the nature of learning. Accord-
ing to Hull’s theory, learning was associative and incremental. That is, habits
were gradually strengthened by repeated actions. By contrast, Tolman believed
that learning could be ‘all-or-nothing’ where there was a rapid change in
behaviour. In all-or-nothing learning, the animal either knows or it does not
88 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

know – there is no point in between. Tolman had worked with Koffka, and
Koffka had worked with Köhler who had demonstrated that apes could learn
through insight learning (see Chapter 10). So, Tolman was maintaining the
tradition started by the Gestalt psychologists (see Chapter 10) whose theories
focussed on wholes rather than on parts. By contrast, Hull was maintaining
the tradition started by Wundt of associationism. In Hull’s case, association
is a gradual process. The all-or-nothing versus associative or gradual learning
controversy was a major point of discussion at that time (Bruce, 1998).
The difference between Hull and Tolman about incremental versus all or
nothing learning lasted for many years. Each side found that ‘their’ rats per-
formed in the way their theory predicted. When placed in a maze Tolman’s rats
looked around, and (according to Tolman) formed a cognitive map of their
environment, and once they had formed that cognitive map, then they always
went straight to the goal. Note the term cognitive map – Tolman’s theory
anticipates cognitive psychology. By contrast, Hull’s learned gradually, making
progressively fewer and fewer errors. Just as the debate was becoming irrelevant
(with the advent of cognitive psychology) a possible reason for these different
results emerged. Hull and Tolman were using different strains of rats. Hull’s rats
had been selectively bred to be unemotional. Tolman’s rats were more closely
related to the emotional rats that are found in the wild. Tolman’s rats were
more afraid, and more hesitant and so went to the goal box only when they had
learned where they were (Jones, 2003).

The author’s rat, Sheila

Rats are bred to be genetically consistent, but they actually do not behave
in exactly the same way. As a student, the author was allocated a rat. She
was a female, and he called her Sheila. Sheila was not like the other rats.
She was neurotic and didn’t want to be handled. The author understood
how Sheila felt and gradually got her used to a hand being placed close by.
The technician who was in charge of the students looked in and told the
author he was far too slow, and put in his hand to pick up Sheila. Sheila
bit the technician. The author is ashamed to admit that he felt a degree of
smug satisfaction at this turn of events.

Like Hull, Tolman introduced organism variables, and these organism variables
included expectancy, purposes, cognitions, hypotheses, and appetite. To illus-
trate what is meant by expectancy, Tolman suggested that when a response is
rewarded, then rats develop an expectancy that the response is going to lead to
another response. Although this idea of expectancy may appear to be mentalis-
tic, in fact Tolman was careful to avoid treating organism variables in that way.
At least he was careful to make sure his concepts were operationally defined,
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 89

which he termed intervening variables. However, in a final paper appearing in

the year of his death (Tolman, 1959), Tolman reconsidered his own position and
suggested that his concepts should be treated as hypothetical constructs rather
than intervening variables – following a distinction that had been made some
ten years earlier, see the next section. Tolman used concepts that were later used
by cognitive psychologist. In retrospect, it is possible to see that Tolman was
conflicted between the dominant paradigm and assumptions of behaviourism
and the very different assumptions and paradigm of gestalt psychologists with
whom he had worked when young.

Hypothetical constructs and intervening variables

Behaviourists allowed only certain sorts of organism variable into their theo-
ries, namely those that were operationally defined. The implication is that there
are other organism variables, those that are not operationally defined, and
which by implication the behaviourists disapproved of. However, it was not
until 1948 that this distinction was made formal and this was done in a paper
by MacCorquodale and Meehl published in Psychological Review. Their paper
was titled “On a Distinction Between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening
Variables.” MacCorquodale and Meehl proposed two things: First that two
distinctly different kinds of organism variable were being used in psychology,
and second there should be a linguistic convention for describing these different
kinds of organism variable.
MacCorquodale and Meehl’s (1948) central argument is that if one accepts
the operational definition of a term, then one also has to accept that the term
does not refer to an entity that has independent existence beyond its definition.
This is not an easy concept for students to grasp, so the easiest way to explain
it is to take an example. The example is the concept of intelligence. Intelligence
can either be treated as an intervening variable or as a hypothetical construct.
Consider two statements:

1 Intelligence is what intelligence tests measure. (Here intelligence is

treated as an intervening variable.)
2 Intelligence tests measure intelligence. (Here intelligence is treated as a
hypothetical construct.)

Statement 1 is an example of an operational definition, because intelligence

is defined in terms of its operations, namely, the way it is measured. That
is, intelligence is defined by the intelligence test. Intelligence is nothing
more than the information provided by the intelligence test – it does not
exist independently of the intelligence test.
Statement 2 provides a description, not a definition, of how intelligence
is measured. It is measured by an intelligence test. But if intelligence is
90 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

measured by an intelligence test, then intelligence must exist indepen-

dently of the intelligence test.

The key point made by MacCorquodale and Meehl is that if there is nothing
more to an organism variable than its procedures for measurement, then the
organism variable should be treated as an intervening variable – i.e., a short-
hand summary of that measurement procedure. However, if the organism
variable has properties beyond that of measurement because the organism
variable is hypothesised to exist, then the organism should be called a hypo-
thetical construct. The crucial issue is the hypothesis that something exists
independently of its measurement procedures. Hypothetical constructs are
organism variables that are hypothesised to exist independently of measure-
ment. They are there whether or not you measure them. Intervening variables
are only there if you measure them. They exist only because of the measure-
ment procedures.
Hypothetical constructs are assumed to exist as entities. The technical term
is that hypothetical constructs have ontological status – there is something
‘there.’ What exactly it is that is there can be disputed, but the assumption is
that there is something there. By contrast, intervening variables do not require
the assumption of an entity and they do not have ontological status – there is
nothing there other than the measurement procedure.
There are two additional features that distinguish hypothetical constructs
and intervening variables. First, the description of an intervening variable is
precise in that it is defined exactly by its operations. There is nothing more to
add than the operational description. Hypothetical constructs are not precisely
defined by describing what they do. Hypothetical constructs have ‘surplus
meaning.’ Surplus meaning refers to ways of describing the hypothetical con-
struct without referring to what it does. So, for example, if we were to say
that there is a motive, a hypothetical construct, called achievement motivation
which motivates people to achieve, the implication is that achievement motiva-
tion does things other than motivate people to achieve – for example, it may
make them more prone to write stories about achievement. The surplus of the
hypothetical construct acts as a heuristic that guides future research, and in
particular is a source of inspiration for developing new empirical predictions
(Hyland, 1981, 1985)
There is yet one more difference between hypothetical constructs and inter-
vening variables. The measurement of the intervening variable is precise; in
the case of the hypothetical construct it is only approximate. If it is said that
intelligence is what intelligence tests measure, then the measure of intelligence
tests provides an exact account of a person’s level of intelligence, because that
is exactly what intelligence is. There is no measurement error. However, if it is
said that intelligence tests measure intelligence, then it is assumed that intelli-
gence exists independently of the test, and the test will never be able to provide
a perfect description of that independently existing entity of intelligence.
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 91

Why was the paradigm of behaviourism rejected and

what is its legacy today?
History is written by the winners. Behaviourism lost its status as a dominant
paradigm, cognitive psychology won. Several authors have suggested that
Chomsky’s criticism of Skinner’s explanation of language was the catalyst for
change (Virués-Ortega, 2006).

Skinner and Chomsky

Skinner published his book Verbal Behavior in 1957, in which he suggested
that human language could be understood using the same behavioural
principles that governed animal behaviour. The book is largely theoreti-
cal. Skinner’s book on verbal behaviour (Skinner, 1957) was criticised by
Noam Chomsky (1959). Chomsky believed that language developed due
to an innate language acquisition device, and so could not be explained
simply in terms of associative learning. Although Chomsky’s criticisms
were themselves widely criticised on the basis that he failed to properly
understand learning theory, nevertheless his criticism is widely believed to
have heralded the demise of behaviourism (Virués-Ortega, 2006).

The controversy between Skinner and Chomsky was over the explanation for
the development of language. Skinner took an environmentalist position that all
that was needed were principles of reinforcement and the right circumstances.
Chomsky argued that there is a genetic difference between humans and animals,
humans having a ‘language acquisition device’ that enabled the formation of
language. Skinner’s view was not as simplistic as it is often made out to be
(Skinner, 1984a, 1984b), and he did provide a way of explaining language using
behaviourist principles. The problem is that just because a theory can explain
something does not make that theory true (see Chapter 1). The difficulty Skin-
ner’s theory faced was not why humans had language but why other animals,
when given all the advantages of language development that humans have
(e.g., dogs reared in domestic household), do not develop language. The theory
explains some but not all parts of the phenomenon of language.
Given the dominance of behaviourism, given the ubiquity of psychology labs
full of rats, is it really likely that the empire of behaviourism was demolished by
one theoretical controversy? There are two other good reasons for the demise of
behaviourism, one cultural and the other related to types of explanation.

Cultural factors in the rise of cognitive psychology

Behaviourism developed at a particular time in western history. It coincided
with the introduction of production lines in factories. In production lines of
the 1930s, most workers made simple repetitive movements. Factory workers
92 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

needed little cognitive input when working. If one is interested in simple repeti-
tive movements, then the assumptions of behaviourist theories make sense. A
modern and more familiar example of a simple repetitive movement is that
needed when gambling with a slot machine. Research using rats shows that a
variable reinforcement schedule produces the most amount of work without
reinforcement. So, if a gambling machine is set up to pay out on a random
basis, then this is more likely to produce compulsive gambling than one with a
fixed reinforcement schedule. Gambling machines are based on reinforcement
principles. Reinforcement does work. Furthermore, as the behaviourists found
with rats, reinforcement is a better way of controlling behaviour than punish-
ment for humans.
Computers were being developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Computers
process information, information that cannot be represented in the form of
stimulus-response bonds. A computer stores information that can then be
combined with the input to make an output, an output that corresponds to a
solution of some problem. The development of computers coincided with the
development of cognitive psychology. The technological developments led to
a new kind of question that was asked: How do people process information?
How do they remember things? The principles of association – the bedrock
of behaviourist theory – could not explain information processing. Cognitive
psychology differed from behaviourism in that it explained a type of behaviour
that behaviourism did not explain.

Behaviourism and cognitive psychology

Behaviourism and cognitive psychology differ in two ways. One is the type
of question which is being asked. The other is the type of answer that is
being provided. The Skinner-Chomsky debate was a rare case where both
were explaining the same phenomenon. The rise of cognitive psychology
was not that it was a universally better way of explaining things – it was
a new type of question.

Donald Broadbent’s book Perception and Communication (Broadbent, 1958)

was an early influential work in cognitive psychology. Note that this book was
written before the Skinner-Chomsky debate about language. The titles of its
chapters will be recognised as relevant to a modern psychology course in cog-
nitive p
­ sychology – e.g., Chapter 2, ‘Selective listening to speech’; Chapter 9,
‘Immediate memory and the shifting of attention’; and Chapter 10, ‘The selective
nature of learning.’ Broadbent makes explicit reference to computers in this book
showing how ideas developing to understand information processing in comput-
ers can be applied to humans. Cognitive psychology, the paradigm to replace
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 93

behaviourism, arose not because behaviourism was shown to be wrong, but

because it addressed a type of question that was relevant to the information age.

Memory versus learning

As an undergraduate I remember being puzzled by two courses with
similar names. The course labelled ‘learning’ taught us about animal
learning, and the effect of different reinforcement schedules. The course
labelled ‘memory’ taught us about the difference between long-term and
short-term memory in humans. What I did not realise at the time was
that one course provided an answer to the question ‘how is information
retained?’ The other answered the question ‘how does an animal adapt to
its environment?’

Types of explanation
A second reason for the demise of behaviourism was mentioned previously in
the evaluation of Hull’s theory. The behaviourists did not try to understand
underlying mechanisms. By limiting theoretical terms to those that were opera-
tionally defined, research took the form of observation followed by explana-
tion. Research was data-led rather than theory-led. Lakatos (see Chapter 1)
provides a description of research where theory lags behind data. He described
these as having a degenerating problem shift, in contrast to the progressive
problem shift where theory precedes data. Cognitive psychology arose from an
attempt to try to understand the mechanisms that were responsible for informa-
tion processing. They speculated about mechanisms.
The idea for a new type of mechanism or a new type of explanation for
cognitive science predates Broadbent’s (1958) publication by 15 years. Kenneth
Craik (1943) provided an elegant argument, which goes like this: The brain
controls behaviour, but it is difficult to understand what is happening in the
brain. The brain is able to manipulate structures in the outside world through
its effect on behaviour. Because events in the brain parallel those external struc-
tures, it should be possible to use the structures themselves as the elements of
a theory without having to understand the minute details of what is happening
in the brain. It is this idea that Broadbent adopts in his book Perception and
Learning but citing Craik (1948) only in relation to Craik’s description of a
self-correcting or control system.

Control systems
The idea of a control system is a good example of the application of a mechanical
concept to psychology. The feedback loop, the basis of a common thermostat,
has been used in several different ways, including motor control (Todorov &
94 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

Goal Decision Motivation Behaviour

Stimulus, Environment
sensory input

FIGURE 4.1 
This figure shows how psychological concepts can be ‘modelled’ onto the form of a
control system.

Jordan, 2002); social, personality, and health psychology (Carver & Scheier,
1982, 1990); and depression (Hyland, 1987). The set point in the thermostat
corresponds to a person’s goal. The thermometer in the thermostat corresponds
to the sensory input. The central heating boiler corresponds to behaviour, and
the room temperature to the environment (see Figure 4.1).
Unlike behaviourists, the new cognitive psychologists were comfortable
with terms that were not operationally defined, and which MacCorquodale and
Meehl (1948) would have been classified as hypothetical constructs but were
later referred to as ‘person variables’ (Hyland, 1985). The hypothesis of, for
example, working memory, is based on the assumption that people really do
have working memories. Working memory is a structure that has ontological
status and is an idea that is derived from computers. The acceptance of person
variables soon spread to the rest of psychology. Personality theorists assume
that personality constructs really do exist. The term personality construct
derives from the word hypothetical construct. One of the authors in the Mac-
Corquodale and Meehl (1948) paper provided an early definition of construct
validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). The theoretical terms that come after the
behaviourist era are not just a description of data; they provide an explanation
in terms of a hypothesised mechanism.
The introduction of the new hypothetical constructs used by cognitive
psychologists coincided with the introduction of a new term, psychological
model. The term psychological model is rare before 1950. What does the term
psychological model mean?
A model car has four wheels like a proper car. The relationship between the
four wheels is the same, as is the relationship of the wheels to the rest of the car.
Almost everything in the model car looks the same as a proper car, except that
the model car is smaller. The relationship between the parts remains the same
but the parts themselves are different.
The word model is used as a synonym for theory, when the theory is ‘modelled’
on something else, such as a physical structure. The cognitive theory has the same
form as the physical technology (i.e., the same relationship between the parts), but
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 95

different content (i.e., the parts are actually different). The word psychological
model therefore refers to the similarity in form between the psychological theory
and something else. In the case of the control theory examples, the psychological
theories have the same form as a thermostatic control system, but the content of
the theories is different because they refer to the control of psychological phenom-
ena rather than temperature control. The hallmark of cognitive psychology and
the new theories that replaced behaviourism was that they used technology as a
heuristic for understanding human behaviour (i.e., for modelling theories) and,
specifically, information processing (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960).

Behavourism and cognitive psychology

Although behaviourist psychologists investigated topics that were largely out-
side the remit of modern cognitive psychology, some of their findings were
developed subsequently using the theoretical terms of cognitive psychology. For
example, the original work on learned helplessness theory was conducted with
animals (Seligman & Maier, 1967; Seligman, 1968). Subsequent research with
humans showed that learned helplessness altered attributions which then had
negative consequences (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).
Cognitive psychology developed in order to explain how people process
information, which was something reinforcement theories were unable to ade-
quately explain. In doing so, cognitive psychology shifted attention away from a
notable achievement of behaviourism. Since the work of Thorndike, behaviour-
ists have been able to show that behaviour is controlled by its consequences, so
that in their natural habit animals become better adapted to their environment.
This idea of adaptation underpins the concepts of reinforcement and habit and
can be traced back to the ideas of Darwin (see Chapter 3). An information
processing device such as a computer does not behave. The computer does not
alter its external environment. Computers do not learn from the consequences
of their decisions. They do not adapt to the behaviour of their user – at least,
not until very recently (artificial intelligence is discussed in Chapter 10).

Cognitive psychology experiments

Most undergraduates will have been a participant in a cognitive psychol-
ogy experiment. The student comes into the lab, takes part in a study of
learning, reasoning, perception, or whatever cognitive processes are under
study, and provides responses, typically on a computer. At the end of the
study, the student leaves the lab and gets on with life. There is no long-
term change. If you were a rat and reinforced in a T maze for turning left,
from then on you would prefer to take left-hand turns. Your behaviour
would have been changed.
96 ◆ Why did the behaviourism story occur?

Although cognitive psychology has not provided a focus on how people adapt
to their environments, the theoretical approach initially developed by cogni-
tive psychologists provided the impetus of doing just that, under the heading
of deep learning that forms part of artificial intelligence (see Chapter 10). The
mechanical analogy can be used as a way of understanding adaptation, but it
took the invention of robots for a technology to develop that was capable of
behavioural adaptation.

Final thoughts
Behaviourism was an important stage in the development of psychology. It lost its
position of dominance because it was no longer seen to be relevant to questions
that were being asked as psychology developed. It was a research programme
that ran out of steam. Behaviourism was never ‘proved wrong’ – only shown to
be irrelevant to some important questions in psychology, but it developed ideas
that are relevant today, and may be relevant for the future. To conclude, here is
a quotation from Tolman. Students should interpret it as they wish.

Rats live in cages; they do not go on binges the night before one has
planned an experiment; they do not kill each other off in wars; they do
not invent engines of destruction, and, if they did, they would not be so
inept about controlling such engines; they do not go in for either class
conflicts or race conflicts; they avoid politics, economics, and papers
on psychology. They are marvelous, pure, and delightful. And, as soon
as I possibly can, I am going to climb back again out on that good old
philogenetic limb and sit there, this time right side up and unashamed,
wiggling my whiskers at all the silly, yet at the same time far too com-
plicated, specimens of homo sapiens whom I shall see strutting and
fighting and messing things up, down there on the ground below me.
(Tolman, 1945, p. 166)

Summary
Behaviourism arose because of a failure of the introspective method to explain
behaviour. Behaviourists shared the common assumption that animal and
human behaviour had the same causes, and so the study of rats could be used
to develop explanations of human behaviour. Methodological behaviourism,
radical behaviourism, and neobehaviourism are based on different assump-
tions. These assumptions relate to the type of the theoretical term, if any, used
to explain behaviour. Behaviourism was superseded by cognitive psychology
because the former failed to adequately account for information processing,
an aspect of human behaviour that became increasingly important after the
development of computers and because the operational definition of theoretical
 Why did the behaviourism story occur? ◆ 97

terms created a degenerating problem shift. Cognitive psychology introduced

mechanistic person variables into explanations, using theoretical terms that are
described in terms of technology including the technology of computers.

Essay questions
1 Why did Skinner reject theoretical terms? What were the advantages
and disadvantages of doing so?
2 Compare and contrast methodological behaviourism, radical behav­
iourism, and neobehaviourism.
3 Why did cognitive psychology arise, and how and what does it explain?
 5
Is psychoanalysis scientific, what
are its assumptions, why is therapy
effective, and what is the legacy of
psychoanalysis today?
100 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

To many members of the general public, Freud is the most famous psychologist
of all time. Yet, Freud was not a psychologist, and some academic psycholo-
gists have a very low opinion of Freud. This chapter examines the concepts that
underpin psychoanalysis and describes their origins and relevance today.

Paradigms of medicine
Freud’s significance in the history of science is that he initiated a paradigm shift.
It was a paradigm shift within the discipline of medicine, not within psychol-
ogy. Freud trained as a medical doctor: He received no training in psychology.
To understand what this paradigm shift was and why it was so significant, it is
necessary to know about the medical paradigm that Freud rejected.
The paradigm of modern western medicine is based on the assumption that
the body is a kind of biological machine. Like any other machine, the body
develops faults, and these faults can be corrected by doctors. The faults are
referred to as pathophysiology. Diseases are defined by different types of fault,
each disease having its own, unique and specific pathophysiology. The theories
of medicine are biological theories, each theory showing how different parts of
the body can go wrong to create disease.
The paradigm of modern western medicine developed gradually, starting in
the 17th century. Early support for the paradigm came from the observation
that there were anatomical differences between people who were healthy and
those with disease. Later, tissue differences and eventually, with the develop-
ment of powerful microscopes, cellular differences were discovered between
those with and without disease.
Before the 20th century, the main alternative to modern western medicine
was Hippocratic medicine. Hippocratic medicine assumes that to be healthy
it was necessary to balance the four bodily humours, black bile, yellow bile,
phlegm, and blood, and that the same imbalance can create many different
diseases. Hippocratic medicine had lost favour by the end of the 19th century
when Freud was working. The pathologist Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) was
famous for his declaration that there was no such thing as a non-specific illness
(the basis for Hippocratic medicine) only specific illness (the basis of modern
western medicine).
Nearly all diseases known today had been identified by the end of the 19th
century. However, there was a group of diseases where, despite best endeavours,
there was no evidence of pathophysiology. This group of diseases was given the
collective name of ‘nervous diseases’ because it was assumed that they were
diseases of the nervous system. Nervous diseases included melancholia (i.e.,
depression), mania, hysterical paralysis, and lunacy. Only one nervous disease
had its pathophysiology identified – the one named after its discoverer, Alois
Alzheimer – and that discovery was published in 1906, a short while after Freud
had presented his new ideas.
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 101

Doing more harm than good

Homeopathy was another contender for a paradigm of medicine in the
19th century. In fact, homeopathy was particularly successful in treating
typhoid. The reason was this. Those working in general hospitals noticed
that people sweated a lot when they had typhoid. They reasoned that
the bodies of people with typhoid had too much water, and so treatment
involved depriving the patient of drink. Homeopaths did not deprive
patients of water and gave treatments that were ultra-diluted and therefore
did no harm (they may even have done good via the placebo effect). Much
of medical treatment in the 19th century did more harm than good. This
example illustrates an important principle (also relevant to Freud): Just
because the paradigm is a good one, it does not follow that the theory is
correct.

Freud’s new paradigm

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) studied medicine at the University of Vienna,
receiving his MD in 1881. As a student, Freud had worked on the structure
of nerves, but would have been aware that no pathophysiology had been
discovered for nervous diseases. In 1893 Freud formed a friendship with
a Viennese physician, Josef Breuer (1842–1925) who had been treating
patients with neuroses with a ‘talking cure’ and learned how Breuer had
treated Anna O. In 1895–1896 Freud was awarded a research grant that
enabled him to visit J. M. Charcot (1825–1893) in France who had been
treating symptoms of hysteria with hypnosis. Charcot, however, assumed
a purely biological cause – his research included detailed photographs of
his (largely women) patients, because he felt the physical appearance of the
patients held a clue to their illness (De Marneffe, 1991). As a young man,
Freud had been exposed to two worlds, one where nervous diseases were
treated as a fault with the nerves, and one where non-biological treatments
had benefit.
In 1895 Freud completed two works, one based on the existing paradigm
and the one for which he was to become famous. In his Project for Scientific
Psychology (Freud, 1895a) (but published posthumously), Freud predicts that
the brain would provide the answer to ‘psychical’ phenomena – and therefore
nervous diseases. This work presents the standard medical paradigm (Lothane,
1998). However, he also published a book with Breuer, a book with the title
Studies in Hysteria (Breuer was the first author), where several case histories are
explored, each being successfully cured by the talking cure, and where Freud
presents ideas about a new way of understanding nervous diseases (Freud,
1895b).
102 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

The paradigm shift initiated by Freud was simple. Instead of assuming

that symptoms were caused by a biological abnormality, the abnormality
should be described in terms of psychology. That psychological abnormal-
ity, for example, repressed memories, results from events in the patient’s life.
The abnormality could be corrected by talking about those events. Freud
was aware that the two paradigms were competing ways of explaining and
treating nervous diseases. Notice that the new psychological paradigm was
consistent with the biological paradigm of modern western medicine in
defining disease with a specific abnormality associated with symptoms – in
contrast to Hippocratic medicine where the imbalance was non-specific. So,
although Freud’s paradigm was new, it shared something with the old – the
idea of a fault.

Hippocratic medicine
According to those working in the Hippocratic tradition of the early 19th
century, madness was caused by excessive phlegm. So were respiratory
problems. Madness and respiratory problems were treated by the same
‘cure,’ the vomiting cure, where the patient was made to vomit. If some-
one was made to vomit every time they exhibited mad behaviour, it is not
too surprising that this ‘cure’ sometimes worked. As for respiratory com-
plaints, there is no possible reason why vomiting could help.

Historians have speculated as to why Freud rejected a biological interpretation

of what came to be known as mental illness, and instead adopt a psychological
one. They are just speculations, but here are two of them.
The first is that Freud was aware of the very harmful effects of those who
were using biological interventions. At least, he would have become aware from
his association with Wilhelm Fliess (1858–1928), a nose and throat specialist in
Berlin. Fliess attended one of Freud’s lectures and struck up a friendship. Fliess
believed that all manner of problems were caused by the nose – he even oper-
ated on Freud’s nose. It wasn’t long before Fliess convinced Freud that nervous
diseases had their origin in the nose. Freud sent Fliess one of his patients, Anna
Eckstein, whom Freud had diagnosed with hysteria. Fliess operated, but within
a month Anna was at the point of death due to a botched operation – some
gauze was left in her nose. The relationship between Freud and Fliess cooled.
Fliess accused Freud of stealing his theories, and Freud asked for all correspon-
dence between them to be destroyed (which wasn’t possible as Fliess had sold
them). Perhaps, because of this, Freud was aware of the danger of biological
treatments for nervous diseases (Zucker & Wiegand, 1988).
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 103

A second possible reason that motivated Freud to reject a biological expla-

nation was that the biological explanation was strongly connected with the view
that mental illness was hereditary (see Chapter 7). There was then a widespread
view in Vienna that Jews were degenerate, and that they suffered from mental
illness because of their poor heredity. Hitler did not invent anti-Semitism. Hitler
visited Vienna in 1908 and was impressed by the mayor’s strongly expressed
anti-Semitic views. Freud was Jewish – though non-practicing – and he was
aware of anti-Semitism and this negative view of Jewish heredity. Explaining
mental illness in terms of events, not heredity, therefore provided a counter-
argument to the view that Jews tended towards mental defectiveness.
Freud introduced a new paradigm where mental illness was explained in
terms of psychological theory, but he also introduced a theory within that
paradigm. It is that theory that is controversial. Later psychologists used the
same paradigm of a psychological fault, but with different theories and differ-
ent types of fault. For example cognitive psychologists explained mental ill-
ness in terms of erroneous cognitions. It is possible that even if Freud had not
developed his theory and paradigm, later psychologists would have developed
their theories of mental illness anyway. It is impossible to tell. An environmen-
tal approach to treating mental illness was developed in the USA in the early
20th century independently of Freud (see Chapter 3), but there was no specific
treatment other than the idea of an improved environment. The early American
clinical psychologists measured but did not treat patients.
Although Freud was not a psychologist, his reputation became such that he
was invited to visit the psychologists at Clark University in the USA in 1909.
The invitation was given by Stanley Hall, the American who founded the
American Psychological Association (see Chapter 3). The invitation included
one of Freud’s students, Carl Jung, who was also becoming well known. Psy-
choanalysis soon became part of the content of psychology courses, so it comes
as no surprise that Freud was and is perceived as a psychologist by the general
public. By the 1920s Freud’s and Jung’s theories featured in standard text books
in psychology, such as Tansley’s The New Psychology (Tansley, 1920) and
McDougall’s Outline of Psychology (McDougall, 1923).

Freud and the unconscious

In addition to suggesting that mental illness had a psychological cause, Freud
also proposed the idea of the unconscious. To what extent was this idea novel?
Psychologists working within the Würzburg school had already established
that some voluntary action and some kinds of problem solving were carried
out without conscious awareness (see Chapter 4). The idea that people were
not able to introspect some psychological processes was already established,
though it is unlikely that Freud would have been aware of this research. If
the term unconscious is equated with non-introspectable then the concept is
104 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

uncontroversial and consistent with ideas in current psychology. For example,

Kahneman (2011) showed that there are two ways in which people make
judgements, one non-introspectable, fast and ‘automatic,’ called System 1,
and one slow and deliberate in the sense that the process can be introspected
and reported, called System 2. Non-introspectable intuitive processes are also
a feature of connectionist psychology (Greenwald, 1992). The idea of implicit
attitudes and the implicit attitude test (IAT) are based on a theory that people
have attitudes that are not introspectable, or at least, that they do not report
accurately. These later authors did not derive their ideas from Freudian theory,
but the parallel with Freud is obvious.
The idea that some mental processes are unconscious or non-introspectable
is only part of Freud’s concept of the unconscious. Not only did Freud suggest
that people had unconscious desires but he also suggested that these desires
were in conflict with other desires. One novel feature of Freud’s theory of
the unconscious was that it was a theory of mental conflict, a conflict that
occurs at an unconscious level. The idea of conflict between desires is not spe-
cific to Freud. Ethologists subsequent to Freud noted that animals exhibited
‘approach-avoidance conflict’ when a goal has both positive and negative con-
sequences, and psychological conflicts whether conscious or not also feature in
modern psychotherapeutic approaches. The uniqueness of Freud’s contribution
is not in the existence of the unconscious, nor in the existence of conflict, but it
is in the specifics of each of these.
In summary, Freud not only presents the idea of the unconscious, but also
the idea of particular mechanisms occurring at an unconscious level. The idea
of mechanisms occurring at an unconscious level is not only plausible but sup-
ported by evidence. The autonomic nervous system is complex and functions
without the help of conscious awareness. However, the unconscious mecha-
nisms used in later theories are very different from the mechanisms proposed
by Freud. It is Freud’s mechanisms in the unconscious, not the concept of the
unconscious or non-introspectability, that are controversial.

Freud, sex, and the seduction hypothesis

It cannot have escaped the notice of even the most inattentive student that
Freud’s theory has a strong emphasis on sex. Why is this and where did it come
from? To understand the sexual element of Freud’s theory, it is necessary to
know something about Viennese society at the end of the 19th century.
Nineteenth-century Vienna was a mix of two societies. The first was the estab-
lishment made up of people whose parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents
lived in Vienna. The establishment was bourgeois in the sense that it was respect-
able and comfortable with its respectability. The Hapsburg court was at the top
of the establishment and presented itself as very respectable. Sex before marriage
was not considered respectable. It was a society of ‘high moral fibre.’ The second
society was made up of immigrants from the East. These immigrants, mainly
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 105

Poles and Jews, came to Vienna for the same reasons immigrants travel today: a
mix of economic opportunity and escaping from danger. It was more dangerous
to be Jewish in the East than in Vienna in the 19th century (in Russia, Jews were
massacred through pogroms). Freud was born in Czechoslovakia and his family
arrived when Freud was four years old. The immigrants brought with them new
energy and creative ideas in art. These immigrants included Gustav Klimt and
his student Egon Schiele. Klimt shocked Viennese society by his art, which was
modern and sexually explicit in a way that had not been seen before. Schiele also
painted pictures that were at the time considered pornographic.
There was therefore a mix of two societies in 19th-century Vienna. One
respectable, rule following, and sexually inhibited, and the other rule breaking
and sexually liberated. It will immediately strike the student of psychology that
there is a parallel between this society and Freud’s concepts of the id and super-
ego. The conflict between sexual energy and repression was all around him. There
is also an interesting development in Freud’s concept of the id. The id is a kind of
instinct: It makes you want to do things. Freud originally thought there was one
desire called the Libido. The Libido is the sexual instinct. Later (after 1921) Freud
thought there were two instincts, Eros and Thanatos. Eros is similar to the Libido
in that it drives people to sexual activity. Thanatos is the death instinct – it drives
people to kill others. Thanatos as a concept arose after the First World War, a
war when people killed each other but in greater numbers than before. It would
appear that Freud’s theories mirrored his experience of society.
Later authors working within the psychoanalytic tradition accepted the idea
that there was a ‘bad’ element to people, but did not assume the over-arching
connection with sex. For example, Jung proposed that each person had a
‘shadow.’ The shadow was bad in the sense that it encouraged bad desires that
were not necessarily sexual. Jung proposed that recognition of these desires
(‘confronting the shadow’) is important for well-being.
Where Freud got his concept of the id from is unclear. A similar idea had
been proposed shortly before by the philosopher Schopenhauer, though Freud
reported that he had not read Schopenhauer. However the idea of ‘the bad
within all of us’ is repeated many times in literature and philosophy. In book
9 of Plato’s republic (Plato, 380 BCE approximately) there is a description of
desires that occur when people dream.

When the rest of the soul, the reasoning, gentle and ruling part of it is
asleep, then the bestial and savage part . . . begins to leap about, pushes
sleep aside, and tries to go and gratify its instincts. . . . It does not shrink
from attempting incestual intercourse in its dream, with a mother or
with any man or god or beast. It is ready for any deed of blood, and
there is no unhallowed food it will not eat.
(Plato, book IX)

The relationship with the Oedipus complex is clear from this quote, and
Freud reported that he based his concept of sexuality on Plato’s concept of
106 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

Eros – though there are clear differences (Sandford, 2006). The idea of the ‘bad
within’ is also a feature of Buddhist philosophy which presents the idea that
people have bad desires and that controlling these desires is important to hap-
piness: Desire is the root of sorrow (Rahula, 1959)
In addition to philosophers who recognise that people have a ‘dark side,’ this
idea appears in literature. The short novel The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr
Hyde was published by Robert Louis Stevenson in 1886 (Stevenson, 1886) and
anticipates Freud’s ideas. The story tells of a good man, Dr Jekyll, who, with a
mysterious medicine, is transferred into a very bad man, Mr Hyde. The assump-
tion that humans are basically bad assumes a degree of genetic determinism that
may not (or may) be entirely justified, but it is clear that the idea of a bad part of
the psyche, which is a characteristic of both Freud and Jung, has a long history.
It is easy to dismiss Freud’s preoccupation with sex as a reflection on his own
life and society, but the evidence suggests that Freud did find references to sex in his
sessions with patients. Among the more controversial of these references was that
young women would report sexual contact with adults when they were children.
Freud interpreted this child-adult sexual contact as damaging to the child, and the
idea became referred to as the seduction hypothesis. Freud later changed his mind
suggesting that women imagined sexual abuse rather than experiencing it.
Historians have disagreed as to why Freud changed his mind. Masson
(1984), in a book entitled The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the
Seduction Theory, argues that Freud abandoned the idea because of social pres-
sure from his colleagues who were unwilling to countenance the possibility of
sexual exploitation of children. Freud certainly refers to negative reactions in
some of his letters. More recently Esterson (2002a, 2002b) argued that child
sexual exploitation was recognised at the time but that Freud’s colleagues
rejected it as a cause of mental illness. According to Esterson, Freud’s change
of mind reflected Freud’s own conviction that his original interpretation was
wrong. Whatever the reason, Freud changed his mind on this point, but the
association between sexual abuse of children and mental health problems
had been established. In the novel written by F. Scott Fitzgerald, Tender Is
the Night, published in 1934, part of the story concerns a young psychiatrist
who treats a young woman who has been sexually molested by her father with
resulting mental illness. Thus, although Freud may have retracted his theory, he
drew attention to something that eventually became recognised as true and is
reflected in the literature on child abuse today.

What was the talking cure?

Freud influenced others through his books and other forms of writing. Like
health professionals who write books for the general public today, some of
those books included accounts of ‘patients I have treated and cured.’ It is these
case studies that provide insight into how Freud treated his patients.
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 107

When Freud referred to his patients, he gave them pseudonyms to protect

their identity. Later historians have been able to track down who these people
really were and find out more about their history – and whether Freud really
cured them. The following are a selection of case studies published at different
times in Freud’s career.

The case of Anna O

The case of Anna O is one of the best known of Freud’s case studies and is the
first case where he describes the success of the talking cure. Anna O was treated
initially by Breuer and described in Breuer and Freud’s 1893 and 1895 publica-
tions (Breuer & Freud, 1893/1955, 1895/1955).
Anna O was really Bertha Pappenheim, a young Jewish woman who devel-
oped symptoms that included a nervous cough while caring for her seriously ill
father. Because of her cough, Bertha was prevented from caring for her father.
She first visited Breuer in 1880. Her symptoms progressed, including paralysis
and mood fluctuation, deteriorating still further, including anorexia, when
her father died in 1881. Breuer introduced Bertha to Freud in 1883, but had
stopped treating her in June 1882. Breuer stopped treating Bertha because the
amount of time he devoted to Bertha (who was an attractive young women)
had come to the notice of his wife. Also, Bertha felt an emotional bond with
Breuer. Correspondence between Freud and Breuer’s wife shows how Freud first
noticed what he later called transference and counter-transference, something
that Freud was to develop in his later work. These terms refer to the observa-
tion that patients can transfer their affections to the therapist, and therapist can
reciprocate with feelings towards patients, both of which can create consider-
able problems. The evidence from correspondence shows that Breuer behaved
professionally throughout but felt guilty about the situation (Forrester, 1986).
Breuer and Freud wrote in their ‘preliminary communication’ published in
1893:

For we found to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysteri-
cal symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had
succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which
it was provoked and in arousing the companying affect, and when the
patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had
put the affect into words.
(Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955, pp. 6–7)

Ellenberger (1972) however, suggests that although some symptoms did sub-
side, the overall treatment of Bertha by Breuer was not successful. There are
three factors that lead to this conclusion. First, although notes were taken dur-
ing consultation, the case was written up many years after Breuer and Freud
had stopped treating Bertha. Second, Bertha was prescribed morphine and chlo-
ral hydrate (probably by Breuer) and she was maintained on these drugs till she
108 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

recovered. Third, despite starting treatment with Breuer in 1880, she was hos-
pitalised in 1881 – her name appears in the register of patients in a hospital
in Vienna. It was only in 1882 when she was in hospital that any attempt was
made to wean her off the drugs – which may have been contributing to the
worsening of her symptoms in the first place.
De Paula Ramos (2003) says “After a review of Bertha’s clinical picture, it is
clear that the vast majority of her symptoms . . . are compatible with dependence
on a nonbarbiturate sedative and narcotics” (p. 46).
Despite later evidence that Bertha’s treatment was not as successful as
Breuer had suggested, this early case provided the impetus for Freud to develop
his later theories and treatment. It is significant, however, that Breuer notes in
this case study that “the element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped.”
The emphasis on sexuality, which forms an important part of Freud’s later case
studies, is missing in this first case study.

The case of Dora

The case study of Dora (real name Ida Bauer) was published by Freud in 1905
(Freud, 1905/1955). It is in this publication that Freud suggests that dreams
represent repressed desires and that hysterical symptoms are the result of
repressed desires. Dora – or Ida – fitted the description of a hysterical girl. She
was 18 years old, was depressed and had episodes when she lost her voice. By
all accounts her family life was chaotic – including a father who was having an
affair with the wife of the couple for whom she babysat, and where the husband
of the couple propositioned her from the age of 14. Ida first visited Freud in
1898. Freud analysed her dreams and interpreted her problems as being due
to repressed desire for her father, and both members of the couple for whom
she babysat. Ida rejected this interpretation and ceased analysis. However, her
father encouraged her to return in 1900. After further analysis of her dreams,
combined with Freud’s interpretation, her symptoms reduced and Freud reports
that she felt there was some truth in what Freud had said. Others have suggested
that this case illustrates that Ida got better when she matured sufficiently to
stand up to Freud and the group of dysfunctional characters who made up her
life (Decker, 1991). This case is often cited because Freud emphasises a sexual
element that at first the patient rejects and then comes to accept.

The case of the wolf man

Freud published the case of the ‘wolf man’ in 1918 (Freud, 1918/1955). The
wolf man was in fact Sergei Pankejeff, a Russian aristocrat. Sergei came to
Freud because he was very depressed and constipated. Both Sergei’s father and
sister had committed suicide due to depression, and, when young, Sergei had a
fear of animals. The label ‘wolf man’ comes from a repeating dream reported
by Sergei where he saw six or seven white wolves outside his bedroom window.
He was afraid of being eaten by the wolves, screamed, and woke up. Freud’s
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 109

interpretation was that the source of Sergei’s problems was his relationship with
his father, who Sergei admired because he believed him to be a perfect gentle-
man. Freud believed that in reality Sergei suffered from castration anxiety, was
frightened of his father and interpreted this dream as being caused by Sergei
seeing his parents having sexual intercourse – though he later suggested that
Sergei might have witnessed copulation between animals that then generalised
to his parents. Sergei was not impressed by this interpretation. After all, young
children in well-off families did not sleep in the room of their parents but with
a nanny. Freud treated Sergei over a period of four years (1910–1914) and
claimed to have cured him, but the evidence suggests that Sergei was in and out
of treatment throughout his long life – he lived until he was 92 years old (May,
1990).

The case of Little Hans

Little Hans (in fact Herbert Graf) was a four-year-old boy who developed a fear
of horses. Freud treated Herbert primarily using the father as an intermediary,
and published his analysis in 1909 (Freud, 1909/1955). Freud was convinced
that this fear of horses stemmed from hostility towards the father and an unre-
solved Oedipal conflict. Herbert had pointed out to his mother that horses
have ‘widdlers’ and that his mother did not have one – i.e., he was aware of
sexual differences. His mother had previously told Herbert not to play with his
­widdler – “If you play with your widdler, Dr A will cut if off and then what will
you have to widdle with?” This admonition by his mother led to an association
of castration anxiety and horses. Freud believed that Herbert associated horses
with his father as Herbert told him he particularly didn’t like horses with black
bits in their mouths – which Freud assumed was a symbolic representation of
his father’s moustache. According to Freud’s interpretation, whenever Herbert
saw a horse he was reminded of his hostility towards his father, his love for his
mother, and this produced fear of castration. The very long and detailed case
history provides lengthy descriptions of conversations with Herbert and his inter-
est in widdlers, and who did or did not have them. Herbert is unlikely to be the
first young boy who, when presented with a younger sister, was surprised to find
she had no widdler – or as Herbert put it, “it is very small but it would grow.”
An entirely different explanation might be that Herbert saw a horse and
cart fall down in the street and became afraid simply due to associative learning
(compare with Watson’s account of Little Albert, Chapter 4, children are afraid
of loud noises). Students can make their own mind as to whether the Freudian
or behaviourist explanations of Little Hans is more likely.
There is a rather nice postscript to the Little Hans story, as most people
reading it would have assumed that Little Hans would grow up to be a big
Hans with lots of psychological problems. In fact, in 1922 Herbert Graf visited
Freud at the age of 19 and told him that he was Little Hans – Freud having lost
contact for at least 10 years. Herbert Graf (or big Hans) was a perfectly happy
110 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

and well-adjusted young man. So, if a child of yours develops an interest in his
widdler, there is nothing to worry about.
Freud concludes his case study with this postscript that was added to the
original case study:

One piece of information given me by little Hans struck me as particu-

larly remarkable; nor do I venture to give any explanation of it. When
he read his case history, he told me, the whole of it came to him as
something unknown; he did not recognize himself.
(Freud, 1909/1955, p. 148)

Whereas Freud interpreted this as amnesia associated with the case, students
might like to come to their own conclusion.

Why does the talking cure work?

Despite doubts over some of Freud’s case studies, Freud was undoubtedly suc-
cessful in treating patients. He was nominated for the Nobel prize 13 times
between 1915 and 1938 but was never awarded it (Stolt, 2001). His reputation
would not have occurred without success as a therapist. Freud described his
psychoanalysis as a form of archaeology. He tried to find out what happened
in the past to the patient, primarily using dream analysis but also by examining
other forms of description provided by the patient. This type of analysis has
three important features. First, Freud provided his patients with a narrative.
The narrative explains how patients got ill and how they can get better. Second,
Freud provided patients with an opportunity to talk about themselves. Patients
talked about themselves to someone who was prepared to listen, someone who
was prepared to take a good deal of interest in the life of the patient. Third,
Freud provided patients with the expectation that they would get better as
Freud was perceived as an expert. These three features are in fact shared with
all psychotherapies. Whatever the approach taken by psychotherapists, there
is always a narrative, there is always a relationship with a clinician, and there
is always the expectation of therapeutic benefit. One possible interpretation is
that the success of psychoanalysis is not in the truth of the particular narrative
given, but the fact that there is a narrative, and the narrative is accompanied by
a caring health professional who gives the patient the expectation of recovery.
By the 1930s there was a sufficient variety of different types of psycho-
therapy for Saul Rosenzweig to carry out a review. His review was published in
1936 with the title Some Implicit Common Factors in Divers Methods of Psy-
chotherapy: “At Last the Dodo Said, ‘Everybody Has Won and All Must Have
Prizes.’” Rosenzweig was quoting from the children’s story Alice in Wonder-
land, and illustrated an extraordinary finding: All the different psychotherapies
were equally effective.
Talking therapy.
112 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

The finding that ‘all psychotherapies produce equivalent outcomes’ has

come to be known as the Dodo bird effect. Despite the invention of newer thera-
pies, the results have remained the same: Recent reviews and meta-analyses
come to the same conclusion, and the Dodo bird effect remains alive and well
today (Wampold, 2013). Irrespective of whether the psychotherapy is psycho-
analytic, or cognitive (for example, cognitive behaviour therapy) or humanistic,
the results, on average, are similar and possibly identical. All therapies work,
and any differences, on average, between the effectiveness of different therapies
is small. Interestingly, believing in your therapy is one factor that seems to help
the outcome – and this is known as the allegiance effect. Therapists need to have
‘allegiance’ to a therapy to be effective (Wampold, 2013). The common factors
explanation of psychotherapy (also known as the contextual model) is that it
is the factors that are common to all psychotherapies, not the therapy-specific
factors that create therapeutic change.
So what are the common factors of psychotherapy? These have been identi-
fied (Frank & Frank, 1991) as

1 An emotionally charged, confiding relationship with a helping person.

2 A setting where the patient believes they are being helped and therefore
expects to get better.
3 A rationale, conceptual scheme, or myth that provides a plausible
explanation for the patient’s symptoms and prescribes a ritual or
procedure for resolving them.
4 A ritual or procedure that requires the active participation of both
patient and therapist and that is believed by both to be the means of
restoring the patient’s health.

Frank and Frank (1991) argue that the narrative or conceptual scheme does not
have to be true. It just has to be accepted as true by the patients. It is clear from
Freud’s case studies that Freud provided all of the above. Patients describe their
dreams. Freud provides a conceptual scheme for analysing the dreams that is
then discussed with the patients. Freud undoubtedly helped patients with his
talking cure and at the very least spared them some of the more harmful forms
of biological therapy – vomiting therapy, nasal operations, strong psychoactive
substances etc. – that came from a biological explanation of nervous diseases.
Freud introduced the idea of a ‘talking cure’ to the world of medicine. Talking
therapies are now an accepted part of treatment for people with mental illness,
but exactly why talking cures help is a matter of considerable debate even today
and is beyond the scope of this book.
One of the lasting contributions of that Freud introduced were the concepts
of transference and counter-transference (see the case of Anna O). Modern
psychotherapists and counsellors are taught to recognise that patients can
develop emotional feelings towards their therapists, and that therapists can
develop emotional feelings towards their clients. Freud’s recognition of this
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 113

phenomenon – and the need to manage it – provides evidence that he had

insight into the therapeutic process and an ability to recognise that which may
not always be comfortable to recognise.

Scientific status of Freud’s theories

Freud was writing books before Karl Popper proposed the criterion of falsifi-
ability as a criterion for science. When Freud was writing, the assumed scientific
model was one of induction. Theories should be induced from data. This point
needs to be borne in mind when evaluating the scientific status of Freud’s work.
Freud’s theories have been criticised in two different ways. One criticism is
that the theories are unfalsifiable and therefore unscientific. The other is that
the theories are false – i.e., that there is evidence that is inconsistent with the
theory and therefore falsifies it. At first sight both criticisms cannot be true. If
something is false, then it has been falsified, so it cannot be unfalsifiable. Both
criticisms could be true because Freud presents a number of different ideas.
Freud’s ideas are based on assumptions. Some of these assumptions are
the same, albeit with different theories, as those of modern psychology. There
is an assumption that mental illness can be explained with non-biological or
psychological concepts, and that events in a person’s life can predict mental
illness. There is an assumption that psychological processes can occur without
conscious awareness. There is an assumption that talking therapies are effective
for mental illness. These metatheoretical assumptions are comparatively uncon-
troversial because they are accepted today, though with other theories. It is the
specifics of the theories themselves that create problems in terms of scientific
evaluation.
Some of Freud’s ideas can be inferred from his case studies where he inter-
prets symptoms in terms of a narrative, a narrative that typically involves sexual-
ity. These interpretations are unfalsifiable. The statement ‘some swans are green’
is unfalsifiable because there may be green swans on planet Zog (see Chapter 1),
and so is the statement ‘sex is sometimes an important factor in a patient’s symp-
toms.’ Also, Freud asserts that the psychoanalyst has superior insight into the
patient’s mind, so whatever the psychoanalyst says is true. The psychoanalyst’s
conclusion is unfalsifiable. If tonight you dream of a pen, it may be that the pen
is a phallic symbol. Alternatively, it may that a pen is simply a pen. There is no
independent criterion for establishing whether either statement is false. If you
call me a grumpy old man, and I tell you that you are projecting your own faults
on me, there is no criterion for you to argue that my criticism of you is false.
Their unfalsifiability makes Freudian statements of this kind difficult to counter.
Freud’s theory is not so much a theory as a narrative that is used to inter-
pret observation. Much of it corresponds to what Royce and Powell (1983) call
‘philosophic speculation’ (see Chapter 1). There is not much theory in Freud’s
theory.
114 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

Freud’s idea of psychic energy is based on the concept of catharsis. Freud

suggested that psychic energy accumulated and that this energy required a
release in some form or another, and failure to release this energy creates
symptoms. Sublimation is an acceptable way of releasing energy. For example,
playing football is a way of ‘sublimating’ the aggressive energy of the id. The
prediction from catharsis theory is that people should be less aggressive after
playing football. Despite considerable cultural support for the idea of catharsis,
experimental research has found the reverse to be the case (Bushman, 2002;
Bushman, Baumeister, & Stack, 1999). The theory of catharsis as part of Freud’s
theory is false, even though talking about traumatic events can be helpful.

History of catharsis
The idea of catharsis stems from the days of Ancient Rome. The rulers of
Rome believed that the common people were happy fighting wars and if
there were no wars, the people would become restless. The assumption of
the Roman Games was that if the common people saw something aggres-
sive happening, then they would be less likely to be restless and aggressive.
Seeing Christians thrown to the lions would make the common people
more docile and more easily managed by their rulers

Much of Freud’s theory of personality is unfalsifiable. According to this theory,

the oral, anal, and phallic personalities form due to either under- or over-­
stimulation at each of the stages of the erogenous zones. So, for example, the
oral personality (needy, dependent on others, always pleading for help) is the
result of either too little or too much oral stimulation below the age of two
years, the anal personality from too harsh or too lenient potty training, and
the phallic personality from failure to resolve the Oedipus conflict. It should be
apparent that determining over- or under-stimulation is more or less impossible.
This aspect of the theory is so weak (see Chapter 1) that it amounts to being
unfalsifiable. Additionally, Freud’s theory of personality suggests that certain
personality traits go together. So, for example, tidiness, meanness, and obsti-
nacy are the features of the anal personality – also referred to as the ‘anal triad.’
If these three traits are found to coincide, then the conclusion drawn is that the
person is the anal type, but if they are not found to coincide, then the conclusion
is that the person is not the anal type. Whatever is found is consistent with the
theory and so this aspect of the theory is also unfalsifiable.
One final empirical argument in support of Freud’s ideas is that psycho-
analysis is effective, as demonstrated by the continuation of psychoanalysis as a
form of therapy today. The counter-argument is that psychoanalysis is effective
because the common factors model applies to any psychotherapy. Cognitive
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 115

behaviour therapy (CBT) is sometimes described as the most tested and vali-
dated of all psychotherapies. This is perfectly true. More studies have been con-
ducted showing that CBT is effective than the number of studies showing that
other types of psychotherapy are effective. What the data do not show convinc-
ingly is that CBT is more effective than any other psychotherapy (Wampold,
2013). The finding that therapy is effective provides only weak corroborating
evidence for both psychoanalysis and CBT.
A possible conclusion about the scientific status of Freud’s ideas is that some
of them are true, some of them are untrue, and some of them are unfalsifiable.
Freud did not test his ideas with independent data, but he was writing at a time
before the scientific criterion of falsifiability was proposed and accepted. Freud
followed the science of the time in making observations and then providing a the-
ory that was consistent with those observations. The need to test that theory, the
hallmark of modern science, came later. With the hindsight of history, it is pos-
sible to say that Freud was a good scientist in developing speculative theory. His
failure was in assuming that theory was correct. It is the ability to speculate, to
test, to find lacking and then to start again or modify that makes a good scientist.

Freud, Jung, and their theories of personality

Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) studied medicine at the University of Basel,
obtained his degree in 1900, and became a lecturer in psychiatry at the same
university in 1905. Jung read Freud’s book Interpretation of Dreams in 1900,
and the two men began corresponding in 1906, with Jung meeting Freud for
the first time a year later. The two set up an immediate friendship. Together the
two men were invited to attend a conference organised at Clark University by
Stanley Hall in 1909 – but with the recognition by Hall that Freud was the more
eminent of the two (Evans & Koelsch, 1985). During the trip over the Atlantic,
the relationship between Freud and Jung began to break down. According to
Jung, this was due to Freud’s refusal to be analysed by Jung – Jung had been
analysed by Freud but Freud felt that the reverse was unacceptable due to his
higher status. There were several other reasons for the breakdown between the
two men, including personal issues – Jung felt Freud’s addiction to smoking was
bad and Jung disagreed with Freud’s emphasis on sexuality.
The relationship between Jung and Freud was to break down fully in 1912.
In a letter to Freud, Jung wrote

If ever you should rid yourself entirely of your complexes and stop
playing the father to your sons, and instead of aiming continually at
their weak spots take a good look at your own for a change, then I will
mend my ways and at one stroke uproot the vice of being in two minds
about you.
(Jung on December 18, 1912)
116 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

Freud and Jung both developed theories of personality that were in some ways
similar and some ways very different. Both theories were type theories. Both are
inventions by their respective authors on the basis of their personal experience,
but without independent data. Freud’s types were the oral type, the anal type,
and the phallic type (see the previous section). Type theories can be contrasted
with trait theories. Modern theories of personality are trait theories. In a type
theory a person is either the type or not the type – it is a binary classification.
For example, a person either has the oral personality or doesn’t have the oral
personality, but cannot be somewhere in between. In the case of modern per-
sonality theories (e.g., the Big Five personality theory), a person varies along
a dimension such as extraversion-introversion. Type theories reflect a medical
tradition of diagnosis. A person either has a disease or does not have a disease.
In fact, for some diseases (e.g., asthma) it is possible to be have ‘a little of the
disease’ whereas others are clearly binary (e.g., Type 1 diabetes), but neverthe-
less the medical tradition is one that puts people into categories. Where there
is a physiological continuum (as in the case of asthma) medical doctors apply a
cut-off point to determine whether or not the person has the disease.
Jung’s personality types are different from Freud’s in that there is no attempt
to explain them in terms of developmental stages. Jung distinguishes four types
of mental function, Thought (i.e., rational judgement, true or false), the oppo-
site of which is Feeling (i.e., emotional judgement, nice or nasty), and Sensation
(i.e., understanding the detail of things), the opposite of which is Intuition (i.e.,
understanding the inner potential of things).
Jung suggested that whatever function occurs in the conscious, the opposite
occurs in the unconscious. So the personality type of a person who is dreaming
is different from the personality type of a person when awake. In addition to his
four psychological functions, Jung proposed two mental attitudes (again, these
are types not traits). The mental attitudes were extraversion (i.e., a tendency
to respond positively in uncertainty) versus introversion (i.e., a tendency to
respond negatively in uncertainty).

Jung’s theory has a number of other differences from Freud’s. Jung was
interested in similarities between different cultures and hypothesised the
existence of a ‘collective unconscious’ which he distinguished from the
‘personal unconscious.’ The collective unconscious is responsible for sym-
bols that are universal to all people. The idea of a collective unconscious is
dismissed by most psychologists today, though a minority claim empirical
evidence in support of the concept (e.g., Ivonin et al., 2015; Rosen, Smith,
Huston, & Gonzalez, 1991).

Freud’s theory of personality is not used in personality assessment today, but

Jung’s theory of personality is. The Myers-Briggs personality inventory is a
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 117

widely used personality questionnaire used in industry. Few of those using this
questionnaire realise that it is based on the theories of Jung.

The Myers-Briggs personality inventory

The Myers-Briggs personality inventory was developed by Katherine Briggs
(1875–1968) and her daughter Isabel Myers (1897–1980). Neither were edu-
cated as psychologists and neither had faculty positions. Katherine Briggs’
interest in personality developed on meeting her future son-in-law (nickname
‘Chief’) in 1917, who was so different from other members of her family. She
began developing a personality theory of her own but realised, on reading
Jung’s account of personality types, that his theory was more extensive and
better than hers.
Katherine Briggs’ work on personality development was extended by her
daughter, Isabel (who by now had married her ‘Chief’). Isabel Myers, who
also wrote two novels, gained experience working in a personnel department
of a large bank and became aware of test theory and test development from
the perspective of personnel management (see Chapter 3 and the development
of occupational psychology). The original Briggs-Myers scale was published
in 1942 with the name changed to Myers-Briggs in 1956. The Myers-Briggs
Type Inventory (Myers, 1962) is based largely on Jung’s ideas of types and
extraversion-introversion and four functions, but with a development of Jung’s
ideas to produce 16 different personality types, with names such as the giver, the
provider, the visionary, the supervisor, the idealist, and the mastermind. What is
particularly interesting about the scale is the way people have responded to it.
The Myers-Briggs Type Inventory categorises people into types – you are
either one thing or another. Psychologists have been almost universally rather
negative about the Myers-Briggs scale, both in terms of concept (type versus
trait) and theory. For example, McCrae and Costa (1989) conducted factor
analysis on the Myers-Briggs questionnaire and showed that this analysis pro-
duced a five-factor structure similar to that of the Big Five Theory of personal-
ity. Although McCrae concluded that the underlying theory used by Myers and
Briggs is wrong, an alternative interpretation is that trait theories of personality
and motive theories of personality, such as Jung’s and the Myers-Briggs, are
fundamentally different, so it is unfair to judge one by the other (Winter, John,
Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998).
Despite negative reaction by many academic psychologists, the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator, as it is known, is one of the most widely used personality scales
in the world – and possibly the most widely used as some claim. It is used in
personnel management and selection by a wide variety of different well-known
companies all over the world. Why is the Myers-Briggs scale so popular?
There are several possible reasons for the popularity of the Myers-Briggs
scale. One is that laypeople and users of the scale (who are typically not
118 ◆ Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective?

psychologists by training) find typologies easier to understand. A trait describes

how much you are of something. In the case of measures of the Big Five traits,
everyone is somewhere on dimensions of neuroticism, extraversion, agreeable-
ness, conscientiousness, and openness. Many people fall in the middle of these
dimensions – for example, being a little neurotic or a little extravert, with the
result that differences between people and descriptions of people are complex.
In the case of the Myers-Briggs, everyone is only one of the 16 types and this
produces a much simpler way of understanding differences between people.
Types are easier to describe and understand than traits, even though it is
implausible that personality differences are binary.
A second possible reason for the popularity of the Myers-Briggs Type Indi-
cator is that all types are positive in nature. With the Big Five, a person can be
neurotic, disagreeable, or un-conscientious. In Freudian theory, being described
as oral, anal, or phallic is not a compliment. No such negativity exists with
the Myers-Briggs, which has been likened by some critics to a Chinese fortune
cookie. All 16 types of the Myers-Briggs indicator are positive. Whichever type
a person is, the scale provides information that is nice and sufficiently vague to
appeal to everyone.
Students should try to decide for themselves why the Myers-Briggs scale has
been so popular (details of the scale can be found online). Perhaps you don’t
need to be right to be successful! Alternatively, the questionnaire may reflect a
more useful motivational approach to personality that is lacking in trait theo-
ries (Winter et al., 1998). Jung never actively supported Briggs or Myers or their
scale, even though Myers wrote to him about it.
Theories of psychoanalysis are seldom taught in psychology degrees today.
Students taking psychology degrees will be trained in statistics and perhaps
trained in psychophysiological measurement, but not trained in dream analysis.
One possible reason why psychoanalysis plays a minor role in psychology educa-
tion today is that some of it is inconsistent with the accepted view that psychology
is a science. The theories of psychoanalysis are at best weak theories, sometimes
they are wrong, and the different theories developed by psychoanalysts after
Freud can be very different from each other. Compare, for example, the person-
ality theories of Freud and Jung. Could any two theories of personality be more
different? Both were simply guesses by each man about personality, but without
any attempt to test their theories with data. It is the lack of independent evidence
that leads to some psychologists being unsympathetic towards psychoanalysis.
We should not be too harsh on Freud and Jung. They were writing at the same
time as Hall and James, and although the ideas of the latter are more consistent
with modern psychology, none used independent empirical testing of their ideas.
Science proceeds best when there is a combination of brave theoretical
speculation and rigorous theory testing. Chapter 4 demonstrated the disadvan-
tage of a paradigm where data collection was rigorous but there was an absence
of theoretical speculation. This chapter demonstrates the disadvantage of bold
theoretical speculation with the absence of rigorous theory testing.
 Is psychoanalysis scientific or effective? ◆ 119

What is the greatest impact of Freud and Jung today? Is it the continuation
of psychoanalysis as a form of therapy, is it the concept of mental illness, is it
the talking cure that is now used in one form or another in all psychotherapies,
or is it the Myers-Briggs inventory? Students should decide for themselves.

Summary
Sigmund Freud qualified as a doctor of medicine and at first accepted the
dominant paradigm that ‘nervous diseases’ could be explained in terms of the
pathology of nerves. He developed an alternative paradigm, hypothesising that
‘mental illness,’ as it came to be known, could be explained in terms of psycho-
logical pathology. This psychological paradigm forms the basis of all modern
psychotherapies. Freud treated patients with ‘the talking therapy’ and reported
how this helped patients. Later evidence shows that some of Freud’s claims of
treatment success were over-optimistic. There are two possible explanations
why psychoanalysis is helpful – the theory of psychoanalysis and the common
factors model. The possibility that common factors are responsible for thera-
peutic benefit is a potential criticism of all psychotherapies, including cognitive
behaviour therapy. Carl Jung was influenced by Freud but developed a different
kind of psychodynamic theory and theory of personality. Jung’s theory of per-
sonality influenced the development of the Myers-Briggs scale, a scale that is in
general use today but criticised by modern personality theorists.

Essay questions
1 How did Freud’s personal experience shape the theory he proposed?
2 Is Freudian theory falsifiable?
3 To what extent are concepts used in psychoanalysis shared with later
psychologies? Give examples and justify the reasons for your choice.
 6
What is the relationship between
psychology and physiology, will
neuroscience replace psychology, and
what is biopsychosocial interactionism?
122 ◆ Psychology and physiology

Wilhelm Wundt trained in physiology and had a medical degree. His early
books described the physiology of the sensory nervous system (see Chapter 2).
How did Wundt view the relationship between physiology and his new experi-
mental psychology?
Wundt assumed that mental content was the result of the body’s physiology,
but could not be described in terms of physiology. For example, the image of a
chair is represented somewhere in the brain, but that biological representation
does not describe what a chair actually looked like. Wundt’s approach to the
mind-body problem is referred to as psychophysical parallelism. Mental events
occur in parallel with physiological events. Psychophysical parallelism is a phi-
losophy of science based on materialism (also called physicalism), a philosophy
that assumes that only the physical world exists. Although mental events occur
in parallel with physiological events, the material world is the only ‘stuff’ that
exists. There is no ‘mind stuff.’ The experience of mind is a consequence of the
physical world.
Materialism is not the only philosophy of science. The philosopher Des-
cartes had suggested some years before that mind stuff and body stuff both
exist, and that the mind – or soul – exists after the body is dead (see Chapter 2).
Although several of the early psychologists were sympathetic to the idea of an
independent soul, this hypothesis will not be explored here, though most reli-
gions assume some form of independence of the soul or mind from the body.
If the soul exists independently of the body (and can exist after death) then
theories about the body will not be able to explain the phenomena associated
with the soul. Although religious views and dualism are accepted as true by
many people, the examination of how psychology relates to physiology in this
chapter is limited and based on one simple assumption: Minds do not exist
without bodies.

Alternatives to materialism in science

Materialism is the dominant assumption of science, but it is not the only
possible assumption. A minority of scientists believe that mind is not
secondary to the physical world but has some independent effects, albeit
in a non-regular fashion, possibly linked to quantum mechanics. Those
supporting this alternative paradigm cite anomalies including reports of
near death experiences, children’s reports of past lives, and other parapsy-
chological phenomena in support of their theories (Walach, 2020; Walach
et al., 2019). Those operating within the dominant materialist paradigm
believe anomalies to be artefacts and therefore not real. As ever, scientists
interpret the world according to their assumptions. Taking a view that is
opposed to the dominant paradigm, particularly one as fundamental as
this one, can be unhelpful for academic careers.
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 123

Like Wundt, Sigmund Freud had a degree in medicine and was trained in physi-
ology. Freud initially assumed, like everyone else, that nervous diseases, as they
were then called, were the result of nerves. Because no abnormality of nerves
could be discovered, Freud adopted a psychological explanation for nervous
diseases (see Chapter 5). The psychological explanation led to a new way of
thinking about and describing symptoms. The term and concept of mental ill-
ness replaced the earlier term and concept of nervous diseases. The first effective
psychoactive drugs were developed in the 1950s, providing clear evidence that
nervous diseases/mental illness was indeed due to something wrong with the
nerves. One might imagine, therefore, that if mental illness is due to something
wrong with nerves – as it must be if one assumes materialism – then mental
illness should be treatable through biology and one can forget about talking
therapies. This has not happened. Will it happen in the future? These and other
questions are explored in this chapter.

A brief history of physiology and psychology

The relationship between psychology and physiology can be approached from
several different perspectives, and different words have been used to describe
these perspectives. They are psychophysiology, physiological psychology, psycho-
neuroimmunology, and neuroscience. Terminology has changed over the years
and the term neuroscience has replaced many of the older terms and is sometimes
used as a generic term for any relationship between psychology and physiology.

Psychophysiology: electroencephalography (EEG) and functional

magnetic resonance imagery (fMRI)
The aim of psychophysiology is to measure the activity of the brain, and match
that activity with psychological events, typically using non-invasive technology.
Electroencephalography or EEG measures the minute electrical currents that
are generated by the brain and detected by electrodes placed on the scalp. The
Scottish physiologist Richard Caton (1842–1926) was the first person to notice
that the brain generated spontaneous electrical activity. He discovered this using
two electrodes placed on either side of the head of dogs and monkeys and found
that the electrical current increased or decreased depending on whether the
animal was awake or asleep, and disappeared when the animal died. His work
was published in the British Medical Journal in 1875 (Caton, 1875). However,
the discovery of the EEG is attributed to Hans Berger (1873–1941), a German
psychiatrist. Unlike Caton, Berger measured the EEG of humans in 1924, but
delayed publication until 1929 when he published the first EEG trace – the trace
was taken from his young son (Brazier, 1961). Since then there has been a steady
stream of research using the EEG. There are two limitations of this research.
The first is that EEG trace is very complex and information often needs to be
extracted by complex statistical procedures. The second is that although the
124 ◆ Psychology and physiology

position of the electrodes gives some information about the activity of different
parts of the brain, because of the way electrical signals travel through the brain,
it is not a very accurate measure of the localisation of function (Haas, 2003).
In 1990 a new technique for investigating the brain was published, called
functional magnetic resonance imaging or fMRI. This technique enables
researchers to measure blood flow through the brain. This is possible because
the water molecules in the brain act as very weak magnets. By briefly disturb-
ing the magnetic field in the brain, the water molecules shift, and the energy
released as they regain their original position is detected. fMRI can be used
to generate pictures of brain activity and can provide accurate localisation of
function. fMRI gives a time-based picture of the activity of different parts of
the brain.
What do EEG and fMRI tell us? They tell us where things are happening in
the brain when certain sorts of mental activity are taking place. Knowing the
position of a book in a library catalogue will give some information about the
content of a book. For example, if the book is in the poetry section, then it is
likely to contain poems. However, the location of a book in a library does not
provide information about the detailed contents of the book (it does not tell
what poems are in the book or whether they are beautiful). The same can be
said about the EEG and fMRI. They provide information about which parts of
the brain are active, but they do not provide the fine detail of description, nor do
they provide the kind of psychological account that Wundt believed psychology
was able to provide.
There are two reasons why psychophysiology is important despite its limita-
tions. The first is that the demonstration that brain and psychological phenom-
ena are correlated has had a substantial impact on the perception of psychology
by the general public. The reader will recall from earlier chapters that the his-
tory of psychology is one where psychologists have felt the need to present what
they are doing as a science. The demonstration that there are correlates between
mental events and physiology shows that psychological phenomena are ‘real’
in the minds of those who believe that the only reality is physical. Of course,
students will be aware that there must be correlates of physiological events with
psychological events. Minds do not occur without bodies. So the impact of
what is now referred to as ‘neuroscience’ on how psychology is perceived by the
public may seem surprising, but it would be wrong to underestimate the social
impact neuroscience has had on the perception of psychology. Psychologists are
sometimes described as ‘cognitive neuroscientists’ when they do not even take
physiological measurements.
The second reason why psychophysiology – or neuroscience – is important
is that measurement techniques are improving. As techniques improve, more
and more detail is provided about what happens in the brain when thoughts or
tasks take place. Knowing where something happens in the brain is like know-
ing where a book is in a library. However, as the detail gets finer and finer, the
position of the book gets more and more accurate so that not only do we know
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 125

Physiology makes psychology real

The author was at a conference on placebos where there was a presenta-
tion on the neurological changes that take place when a placebo is given.
The results showed that when a person took a placebo, there were changes
in the brain that mimicked the effects of the active drug. These findings
were welcomed by the audience. The research showed that placebos were
‘real’ because they produced biological effects. But placebos must have a
biological effect. Minds do not occur without bodies. The author was sit-
ting next to a friend who remarked drily “where else would you expect a
placebo to create a physiological effect? In a person’s toe?”

that a book is in the poetry section, but which poet it is, and eventually which
poem it is. Some believe that eventually, with increasing accuracy of measure-
ment, it should be possible to associate particular thoughts with particular
events in the brain so that thoughts and indeed the whole of psychology can be
explained by physiology. The contribution of psychophysiology to psychology
and whether it is possible in practice or in principle to replace psychology with
physiology will be examined later in this chapter.

Physiological psychology: the development

of psychoactive drugs
The aim of physiological psychology is either to alter the physiology of the brain
through chemicals (drugs) or other means and then measure the psychological
consequences, or to measure chemicals in the brain and relate those chemi-
cals to psychological phenomena. Whereas psychophysiology uses primarily
non-invasive measurement, psychophysiology is interventionist. Techniques of
altering the brain include electrodes that are inserted in the brain, more recently
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Walsh & Cowey, 2000) and perhaps
most important in terms of impact, the use of drugs.
The mind-altering effects of certain drugs have been known for thousands
of years. The effects of alcohol and the opium poppy did not wait for discovery
by scientists, and these and other mind-altering substances were used to treat
nervous disease from the 19th century onwards. Up to the middle of the 20th
century, patients with mental health problems were treated with a variety of
chemicals, most of which did more harm than good. This unfortunate situation
arose because there was no credible biological explanation for what were then
called nervous diseases (see Chapter 5). Chemical treatment was based on spuri-
ous theories or chance experimentation.
Around 1950 there was a ‘pharmacological revolution’ when three chemi-
cals were discovered that were effective as antipsychotics. These chemicals
126 ◆ Psychology and physiology

were lithium salts, chlorpromazine, and reserpine. There was still no biological
explanation for psychosis, and the antipsychotic effects of these drugs were dis-
covered by accident. For example, chlorpromazine comes from a class of drugs
originally developed for the dyeing industry. These dyes were used to stain spec-
imens that were examined under a microscope. Evidence from these specimens
seemed to indicate that the stains also had anti-microbial effects, though this
was later not confirmed. So chlorpromazine had biological effects, but it was
a drug looking for a treatment. Experimentation showed it had antipsychotic
effects (López-Muñoz et al., 2005).
Reserpine was another drug that was discovered as part of that pharma-
cological revolution, and again its discovery occurred without any theoretical
rationale as to why it should have antipsychotic effects. The chemical property
of reserpine is such that it depletes mono-amines and this was known by chem-
ists at the time. Because the experimental use of reserpine for psychosis also
seemed to cause depression – though the depressive effect of reserpine has been
questioned (Baumeister, Hawkins, & Uzelac, 2003), a theory was proposed that
depression was caused by lack of serotonin and dopamine. This hypothesis,
called the serotoninergic theory, led to the first serotonin-enhancing drugs for
treating depression in the 1960s. New types of serotonin-enhancing drugs were
developed over the years. So, unlike antipsychotics, antidepressants were devel-
oped on the basis of a theory of a biological cause of depression (Hillhouse &
Porter, 2015).
Serotonin-enhancing antidepressants are widely used today. Is the sero-
toninergic theory of depression correct? Certainly undergraduate students are
often taught that it is correct. However, several authors have questioned this
theory, in part because increases in levels of serotonin have a relatively small
effect on depression – at least 80% of the effectiveness of antidepressants is
due to the placebo effect (Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholls, 2002; Kirsch,
2014). Perhaps if depression were just a lack of serotonin, depression would
be less of a problem than it is today (see Chapter 1). So, like antipsychotics,
antidepressants affect the mind but the underlying theory remains less secure
than many believe.
Since the 1950s many different pharmacological agents have been developed
that alter the chemistry of the brain and hence alter a person’s p ­ sychology –
including new recreational drugs. What does this demonstrate? It shows that
psychological phenomena have a biological basis. This demonstration is hardly
new. The biological basis for mental phenomena was assumed by Wundt.
Despite continuing problems, the fact that drugs do have effects on mental life
opens the possibility that mental illness could one day be treated successfully
with drugs and talking therapies would become a thing of the past. Equally,
some might argue that the failure to determine the chemical basis of mental
illness and find a definitive form of treatment, despite more than a century of
looking, might suggest that another type of theory and therapy, i.e., psychology,
is needed.
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 127

Psychoneuroimmunology
The term psychoimmunology was coined by the psychiatrist George Solomon
(Shubla, Solomon, & Dosli, 1979), but the term soon changed to psychoneuro-
immunology – a change that reflects the status given to the term neuro but also
because the link between the brain and immune system was now included in
investigations. Whereas physiological psychology examined the effects of drugs
on the brain – and the effect of behaviour on chemicals in the brain – psycho-
neuroimmunology examined the relationship between the mind, the brain, and
the immune system. Amongst other things, the research shows the effect of stress
on the immune system and the effects of the immune system on the psychologi-
cal state. Research shows, for example, that stress increases inflammation in part
through an increase in pro-inflammatory cytokines (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004).
Cytokines are the messengers in the immune system that tell other parts of the
immune system that there is infection. The inflammatory effects of pro-inflamma-
tory cytokines exacerbate a number of disease processes, (e.g., cancer, heart dis-
ease, asthma, multiple sclerosis) with the result that there is now a well-established
relationship between stress and disease (Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & Miller, 2007).

Stress → inflammation → disease

The pro-inflammatory cytokines also have effects on the brain and hence psy-
chological state, causing, amongst other things, fatigue and depression. One
might imagine that there should be a one-to-one relationship between particular
cytokines and particular mental states, but this has not been found to be the
case. It is not possible to say, for example, that depression is caused by one
pro-inflammatory cytokine and fatigue with another. What seems to happen is
that all pro-inflammatory cytokines increase with fatigue and depression, but
in a way that is not consistent across people. As with physiological psychology,
there is a relationship between physiology and psychology, but not one that is
very precise, and certainly not one that allows a one-to-one linking of psychol-
ogy with physiology.
Psychoneuroimmunology has played an important role in the story of phys-
iology of psychology, and has had an effect on the way psychology is viewed
by those outside the discipline of psychology. It showed that psychology was
relevant to the cause and mechanisms of somatic diseases, and not only men-
tal illness. Whereas psychophysiology and physiological psychology focussed
on the relation between the brain and psychology, psychoneuroimmunology
showed that the immune system was also part of the equation when trying to
understand the physiology that underpins psychology. The relevance of psy-
chology to the body therefore increased. Clinical psychology as a sub-discipline
dates from the early 20th century. The sub-discipline of health psychology is a
new kid on the block and developed in the 1980s.
Psychoneuroimmunology added the immune system to the psychology-
physiological relationship. Yet later research focussed on other parts of the
128 ◆ Psychology and physiology

body, such as the gut. The gut has been described as the ‘second brain’ as the gut
contains more nerves than the spinal cord, and the gut is also the primary site
of immune learning. A happy gut makes a happy mind and vice versa. Because
the health of the gut is associated with the gut biome (the gut microflora) the
gut biome of bacteria and viruses also has an effect on psychological state
(Ridaura & Belkaid, 2015). Other mind-body interactions such as kinaesthetic
feedback also feature in modern thinking so that the overall effect of these new
developments is that the psychology-physiology relationship should be consid-
ered in terms of the mind and body, not the mind and brain.

Reductionism
If one had perfect understanding of the physiology of the whole of the body,
would it then be possible to explain psychology in terms of physiology? And
if so, is it possible to replace psychology with physiology? Can psychology be
reduced to physiology? Reductionism is a type of relationship between two sci-
ences. The most commonly accepted definition of reductionism is that provided
by Nagel:

A reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the secondary

science (and if it has an adequate theory, its theory as well) are shown
to be the logical consequences of the theoretical assumptions (inclusive
of the coordinating definitions) of the primary science.
(Nagel, 1961, p. 352)

In practical terms, this means that reductionism is not about finding correla-
tions between physiological and psychological events. It is not about finding
that drugs have psychological effects. Reductionism concerns the relationship
between theories from two different disciplines, what Nagel refers to as the
primary and secondary science. Finding that a particular part of the brain
lights up when a person has a particular thought does not constitute reduc-
tionism. However, if all the theories of psychology can be shown to be the
logical consequences of theories of physiology, with the addition of some
‘bridging theories,’ then psychology can be reduced to physiology. Note that
the requirement for reduction is not that psychological theories should be the
logical consequence of physiological theories, but rather that they should be
the logical consequence with the addition of some additional theories that link
them together. For reduction to occur psychological theories must be capable
of deduction from physiological theories with the addition of a few extra
bridging theories (Nagel, 1998).
Reductionism is a metatheoretical assumption, an assumption that, when
applied to all science, is referred to as ‘the unity of science’ (Kemeny & Oppen-
heim, 1956). The unity of science concept is based on the assumption that
People as biological machines.
130 ◆ Psychology and physiology

sciences occur in levels: atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociol-

ogy, and that each discipline at a higher level can be reduced to the theory at
the lower level. So, taken to its extreme, humans are simply machines made out
of bundles of atoms and everything we do can, ultimately, be explained by the
way those atoms interact.
If humans are simply a bundle of atoms that obey the laws of physics, one
interpretation is that psychology should be replaced by physiology and physiol-
ogy should be replaced by chemistry and chemistry by physics. However, even
if one accepts a reductionist position, not all reductionists share the view that
reduction eventually leads to replacement.
The counter-argument that reduction does not necessarily mean elimination
is given by Hilary Putnam (1973), who compares macro and micro accounts of
the same phenomenon. Imagine a board with a square hole and a round hole
and a square peg that fits into the square hole but not the round hole. We can
explain why the peg fits into the square hole. The reason is that the peg is also
square. Now imagine, that this phenomenon is reduced to the atomic level.
There are three clouds of atoms whose shape is determined by forces of vary-
ing kinds, the round and square holes and the peg. A full understanding of the
forces between atoms at the micro level will enable us to know what the shape
of the atomic clouds are, and therefore be able to deduce the shapes the clouds
will take and therefore that the square shaped cloud will go into the square
shaped hole but not into the round shaped hole. The macro level can be logi-
cally deduced from the micro level. The micro-level account explains why the
square peg behaves as it does but does not add anything more than is provided
by the macro level. Putnam’s argument is that even if reduction occurs, it may
be better to explain things at a macro level, even though the same things can be
deduced from the micro level.
Although reduction does not necessarily mean the elimination of psy-
chology, the question still remains: is it possible to reduce psychology and
physiology? The question is important because if psychology can be reduced
to physiology, but not eliminated, then it becomes unnecessary to test psy-
chological theories. All that is needed is to establish the veracity of the
physiological theory and then the veracity of psychological theories that are
deduced from the physiological theory is established by default. So, although
Putnam’s argument provides a justification for the continuation of psychol-
ogy, if reductionism occurs, as proponents of the unity of science would sug-
gest, then the status of psychology and psychological research is very much
diminished.
There are several arguments against the possibility of reductionism
between psychology and physiology, and they fall into two categories. One
argument is that although reduction is possible in principle, it will not hap-
pen in practice. The other is that reductionism is neither possible in principle
nor practice. The next section examines why reductionism is not possible in
principle.
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 131

Arguments against reductionism in principle

There are three linked arguments against reductionism in principle between
psychology and physiology: (a) complementarity, (b) functional versus struc-
tural description, and (c) emergentism.

Complementarity
Complementarity is a philosophical principle that owes its origins to quantum
mechanics. The basic idea is that it is the nature of reality that phenomena can
be explained only by using more than one incompatible theory. This principle
has been demonstrated in quantum mechanics in several ways that need not
concern us, but one that can be accepted as true. It is also possible to apply
the same principle of complementarity to the relationship between psychology
and physiology – even though neither are quantum theories. Methodologi-
cal complementarity was proposed by Kirsch and Hyland (1987) as a way of
understanding the relationship between biological and psychological theories.
Methodological complementarity is based on the following argument. When
discussing reductionism, what matters is the relationship between the two types
of theory. The exact nature of consciousness and of physical reality can be put
on one side. Psychological theories and biological theories describe different
types of entities, entities that have a different ontological status. ‘Ontological
status’ refers to the way something exists. So mind states and physiological
states exist in different ways.
Multiple uses of the same word can lead to confusion. The word cause
is used in more than one way. When used informally, the word cause simply
refers to the temporal sequence of events. If A is always preceded by B, then it
is possible to say that B causes A. This informal sense is used when events are
described as opposed to explained (as in inductive generalisations, see Chap-
ter 1). By contrast, if cause is used in an explanatory sense (i.e., in terms of a
theoretical mechanism that explains the observed events), then the term cause
also has the requirement of connectivity. Connectivity means that there is some
sort of connection that links the two events. For example, if ball A hits ball B so
that ball B rolls away, then it is the physical contact between the two balls that
is the connection. In the case of mental events, ideas can be connected in content
when one idea leads to another. So both physiological and psychological mecha-
nisms involve connectivity, though each has a different kind of connectivity.
When used as part of an explanatory mechanism, causal relationships can exist
only between entities that have the same ontological status – because causality
requires some form of connection between the causally connected events.
The conclusion from this is that, if the term cause is used in a formal
explanatory sense, then minds do not cause bodies nor bodies cause minds.
Although mind states and physiological status exist in different ways and can-
not cause each other, they can be identified with each other. That is, whenever
132 ◆ Psychology and physiology

there is a mind state there is a unique and corresponding body state (note the
opposite does not always occur – variation in physiology does not require varia-
tion in psychology). The statement that stress causes inflammation which then
causes disease (as suggested earlier) is a description of a causal sequence, not
an explanation. From a formal, explanatory perspective, psychological stress
is identified with a biological state that causes biological illness. The authors
of methodological complementarity argue that although ‘mind causing body’
and vice versa statements are commonplace, they confuse two different ways of
using the word cause – cause used in the informal and formal senses.
Methodological complementarity paints a picture of the relationship
between psychology and physiology that is very similar to Wundt’s idea of psy-
chophysical parallelism. Psychological events and physiological events occur in
parallel. Methodological complementarity adds the idea of identity relations
that occur from time to time in the mutual causal sequence of events. Every
psychological event must, in principle, be identified with a physiological event
as otherwise the assumption of materialism is broken. However, there may
be physiological events that are not represented psychologically, so not every
physiological event is identified with a psychological event.
Methodological complementarity (Kirsch & Hyland, 1987) was a simplifi-
cation of an earlier proposal of complementarity (Hyland, 1985) where there
were three parallel levels of explanation: physiological, mentalistic, and mecha-
nistic. The mentalistic and mechanistic levels provide a distinction between two
types of psychological explanation. The mechanistic level corresponds to the
type of constructs used in cognitive psychology (see Chapter 4), whereas the
mentalistic constructs are those used in humanistic psychology (see Chapter 8).
Methodological complementarity focussed on the mentalistic and physiological
relationship rather than considering the mechanistic concepts that were pro-
posed originally by Craik (1943).
Kirsch and Hyland argue that psychological description (i.e., mentalistic
description) cannot be reduced to physiological description, even if there is a
one-to-one relationship between psychological events and physiological events.
The reason is that a one-to-one relationship requires a bridging theory. A reduc-
tion is effected if the theories of the secondary science can be deduced from the
primary science with the addition of bridging theories. Although one cannot

Psychological level: X1 X3 X5

Physiological level Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5

FIGURE 6.1 The idea of methodological complementarity.

A causal sequence of five events shown at the psychological (X) and physiological (Y) level with
identity relationship between three of the events. Not all physiological states can be identified
with a psychological state.
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 133

know what bridging theories are going to be discovered in the future, there are
several possible reasons why bridging theories can never provide a logical (i.e.,
one-to-one) link between concepts in psychology and physiology. Two of these
reasons are described in the next section.

Fodor’s functional description

Fodor’s argument is based on a difference between structure and function
(Fodor, 1968). Physiology provides a description of the structure of the nervous
system; psychology provides a description of its function. Physiologists might
object to this characterisation, arguing that physiology describes the function of
the nervous system whereas anatomy provides a description of its function, so
Fodor’s argument needs a little refinement: Psychology provides a description
of the function of the nervous system in terms of behaviour.
Fodor states that although structure and function are linked, they are not
logically related. As an example, consider the term mousetrap. A mousetrap is
an object described in terms of its function: catching mice. There are several
different types of mousetraps with different structures. There is the widely used
‘little nipper’ that kills the mouse with a mental bar. There is a ‘humane mouse-
trap’ that catches the mouse alive and allows the human to release it away from
the house (at least that is the theory). There are other designs of mousetrap – an
online search of images of mousetraps will illustrate how many there are. So it is
not possible to know the exact structure of a mousetrap by the functional word,
mousetrap. What about working in the other direction? Is it possible to look
at the structure of a mousetrap and know, logically, that its function is to trap
mice? The answer, again, is no. Looking at the objects of mousetraps viewed
online, I am struck by their beauty. Why not have a mousetrap as a work of
art? Or use a mousetrap as a paper weight? After all, there is no accounting for
human taste, and someone somewhere might well use a mousetrap for some-
thing other than trapping mice.
Fodor (1968) argues that the brain has structures and these structures have
functions. In a later work (Fodor, 1983), Fodor suggests how these functions
can be represented as modules. Fodor developed his theory of the modular-
ity of the mind to resolve two different approaches to perception, one where
the stimulus has a direct link to perception and the other where perception
depends on prior knowledge. Fodor’s idea of a module is best expressed in his
own words:

One can conceptualize a module as a special purpose computer with a

proprietary database, under the conditions that: (a) the operations that
it performs have access only to the information in its database (together,
of course, with specifications of currently impinging proximal stimula-
tions); and (b) at least some information that is available to at least
some cognitive process is not available to the module. It is a main thesis
134 ◆ Psychology and physiology

of Modularity that perceptual integrations are typically performed by

computational systems that are informationally encapsulated in this
sense.
(Fodor, 1985, p. 3)

The word computer is revealing in this quote. The modularity approach to the
mind is one that treats humans as a kind of information processing system.
Computers are information processing systems. The underlying assumption
of the modularity approach is that an understanding of the function of a com-
puter aids the understanding of human cognitive function. It is not unusual for
new theories to be influenced by new technology. Desktop computers started
appearing in universities in the late 1970s and early 1980s, just at the time that
Fodor developed his theory of modularity. Fodor’s theory is influenced by the
structure and function of a computer. A computer’s hardware is related to its
software, but the hardware of a computer is not logically related to its software.
If physiology is equated with the hardware of a computer, psychology can be
equated with its software. The importance of computers in the emergence of
cognitive psychology was described in Chapter 4.

Sperry’s theory of emergentism

Roger Sperry (1913–1994) received a Nobel Prize in 1981 for his work on split
brains, that is, brains where the corpus callosum joining the two hemispheres
of the brain were cut. Sperry examined the effect of ‘splitting the brain’ on con-
sciousness, and it was these observations that led him to formulate a theory of
consciousness.
The central idea of Sperry’s theory of consciousness is that mind and body
are at different levels of organisation. Note that the term level is not used in
the sense of ‘bigger or smaller than.’ The mind isn’t ‘bigger’ or smaller than the
body. When the idea of levels is applied to minds and bodies, Sperry suggests
that consciousness is an emergent property of a lower level of organisation, that
of physiology or ‘bodies.’ That is, the central idea is that mind ‘emerges’ from
bodies.
There are two important features to note about Sperry’s theory of emer-
gentism. The first is that the theory preserves the assumption that there is noth-
ing in the world other than the material world. There is no ‘mental substance’
floating around. Sperry’s theory adopts a materialist position (see previous
sections). The second feature is that Sperry’s theory rejects the unity of science
hypothesis. The idea of emergent properties at the ‘higher’ level will always
mean that the higher level cannot be reduced to the lower level.
So what are emergent properties and why do they occur? This topic will
be returned to in the last chapter: The idea of emergent properties has a wider
application than between psychology and physiology. Sperry, however, has a
slightly different take on emergentism. A conventional view is that the emer-
gent property at the higher level emerges from the lower level system, but
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 135

that emergent property did not have a ‘downward’ effect on the properties
of the lower level system. Sperry argued that emergent properties did have a
downward effect. The consequence was that mind could ‘cause the body,’ even
though the mind is not independent from the body.
Sperry illustrates this argument with the case of a wheel. A wheel has sev-
eral parts – there are the spokes, the hub, and the rim. When all these parts are
assembled in the correct way, then the wheel can roll along the ground. The
property of ‘rolling’ is an emergent property of the parts of the wheel that is
achieved only when the parts are in the right places. However, when the wheel
rolls along, the position of the individual spokes are determined by the emer-
gent property of rolling. The position of the parts is determined by the whole.
Sperry argues that emergent properties such as the mind can have a downward
effect on the physiology of the brain. Sperry’s argument seems to make sense. If
people engage in positive mental activities, such as meditation, then this leads
to positive physiological changes, such as a reduction in stress.
Sperry’s argument of cause between a higher and lower level – and more
generally, between levels – is inconsistent with the argument, presented in
methodological complementarity (see earlier) that, to avoid confusion, the
term cause should be used in only in the formal sense, the sense where there is
connectivity between events. In Sperry’s example of a wheel, if the term cause
is used in the formal sense, then the spokes of the wheel are caused to move by
their two attachment points. In methodological complementarity, the idea that
‘mind causes brain’ is represented as identity relations, and this form of repre-
sentation can easily accommodate the idea of emergent properties. The brain
has emergent properties that are identified with psychological states. The state
of the brain that generates those emergent properties has a causal effect within
the brain. In summary, there is a compelling argument for treating emergent
states at different levels as causally independent but connected by identify rela-
tions, even though the state at the lower level creates the emergent property that
may defy description.

What can neuroscience add to psychology?

If one starts from the position that reductionism is not possible in principle,
then an entirely different question arises. How are these two disciplines related
and how does physiology in the form of modern neuroscience contribute to
psychology? Before answering this question, here is a reminder of the meaning
of explanation.

Explanation explained
There is a difference between description and explanation (see Chapter 1). A
description of events is provided when an account of those events is given only
by observation terms and words describing how those observations are related.
136 ◆ Psychology and physiology

Description simply means describing what is observed and reporting on that

observation. Explanation will always require description of those observations,
but it includes something else. Explanation provides an account of why the
observable events happen in terms of some kind of ‘other’ event. These other
events are described in terms of non-observables, i.e., through the use of theo-
retical terms. The explanation therefore provides an account of what is happen-
ing using the theoretical terms plus observation terms plus the terms connecting
them. The explanation provides a story using theoretical terms.

Psychology, physiology, and explanation

When someone asks you to explain something, a possible reply is “what kind of
explanation would you find acceptable?” The reason is that there are different
kinds of explanations. Explanations consist of theoretical terms, observation
terms, and the words connecting them, and together they provide a kind of
story. Explanations can be considered a type of story, a story of how something
happens using an additional narrative that is not found in the observation terms
themselves.
Novelists sometimes write a story using the following format: Events are
described, but in each chapter the events are described by a different person.
The novel therefore becomes a series of stories about the same events, each story
being valid in its own way, but each story being different because it comes from
a different perspective. The same can happen with explanations. There can be
different stories, using different sorts of theoretical terms. There are (at least)
two kinds of story to explain behaviour, one type of story being psychological
and the other biological.
One idea (hinted at earlier in this chapter), is that biological explanations
have some kind of precedence over psychological explanations in terms of
‘goodness’ of explanation. That is, if a psychological explanation and a biologi-
cal explanation were both offered, then the biological one appears to be better.
The biological is the better story because it is based on something tangible,
namely biology. Is this true? Research does show that, whatever the truth of the
matter, people have a preference for biological explanations. In a paper entitled
“Superfluous Neuroscience Information Makes Explanations of Psychological
Phenomena More Appealing,” the researchers demonstrated exactly what is
described in the title of the paper. Adding irrelevant neuroscience into a story
helps the psychological story seem real to ordinary people (Fernandez-Duque,
Evans, Christian, & Hodges, 2015).
The bias towards biological explanation is a psychological phenomenon. It
has no basis in logic. One theory is better than another only if it is more useful
than the other, for example, by making more powerful or more useful theories.
If biology provides a better kind of explanation than psychology, then it must
be able to provide superior predictions. As psychology cannot be reduced to biol-
ogy, a working hypothesis is that neither psychological nor biological explana-
tions are intrinsically better than the other one. Instead, they provide different
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 137

types of explanation – stories from different perspectives – and their usefulness

depends on the context in which they are used. The question that needs address-
ing is this: How do biological explanations add to psychological ones?
There are several ways in which biology can be useful to psychological
understanding. Here are three examples.

Example 1. Although there is no logical relationship between structure and

function, they are statistically related. Suppose that psychologists are
interested in determining what psychological mechanisms are respon-
sible for two cognitive tasks. If different parts of the brain are active for
the different tasks, then it is reasonable to infer that the tasks involve
different psychological mechanisms. On the other hand, if the same part
of the brain is active for the two tasks, then this leads to the possibility
that the same psychological mechanism is responsible for both tasks.
An example of this is found in research demonstrating the independence
of short-term and long-term memory using neuroimaging techniques
(Jonides et al., 2008).
Example 2. Psychological interventions can be assessed with physiologi-
cal outcome measures. When a psychological therapy is used to reduce
distress, it may be that people report less distress because of the demand
characteristics of the intervention. A biological assessment of stress can
provide greater certainty that the intervention was effective. An example
of this type of research is the considerable evidence that meditation can
reduce the shortening of telomeres that are associated with aging (Le
Nguyen et al. 2019), a finding which shows the biological advantages of
a psychological technique.
Example 3. More controversially, neuroscience can aid judgements when
combined with non-biological evidence. Research shows that, on aver-
age, people who commit crimes have biological features that differ, on
average, from those who do not commit crimes, with an estimate of up to
60% of criminal and anti-social behaviour being heritable (Fox, 2017) –
but see caution about this kind of estimation discussed in Chapter 7.
Although crime-disposing biological features may be used as part of the
evidence in criminal cases, the use of evidence in this way is controversial
(Greely & Farahany, 2019; Vincent, 2010).

Biopsychosocial interactionism
The term biopsychosocial was introduced by George Engel in 1978 (Engel,
1978). Engel’s use of the term was purely practical and was aimed at medical
education. Medical doctors are trained in biomedicine – also referred to as the
medical model. Disease is understood and treated in terms of pathophysiology.
Engel worked within that medical model but wanted to alert physicians and
138 ◆ Psychology and physiology

surgeons to the psychological needs of patients. Put simply, his message was
this: Think also about patients as people and think about their psychological
and social circumstances. Engel suggested several levels that were relevant to
treating the patient – levels that are different from but bear some relation to
the levels cited in the unity of science hypothesis. Engel’s levels were commu-
nity, family, two-person, person, nervous system, organ system, tissue, cell, and
molecule.
Psychological care has always featured in good treatment by doctors and
nurses, but its recognition was certainly stimulated by Engel’s use of a catchy
word. Subsequent to Engel, the term biopsychosocial interactionism has been
used to describe a theory where psychosocial and biological elements are
included. Several biopsychosocial theories have been proposed, and in each case
the end state, typically some form of health variable, is affected by both biologi-
cal and psychological variables.
This idea of applying different types of theory to the same context is also
not new. It is an application of the idea of methodological complementarity
described earlier in this chapter. Using this approach, there are two separate
types of theory, one biological and one psychological, and each provides infor-
mation about the treatment of the patient. One of the criticisms of biopsycho-
social interaction is that it is not a theory (Pilgrim, 2015). It does not integrate
biology and psychology at a theoretical level. It is simply the combination of
two different theories in the same context. In biopsychosocial interactionist
theories, psychological and biological processes add, they do not interact.
Biopsychosocial interactionism suffers from a theoretical problem. At an
empirical level, it is clear that mind variables and body variables interact sta-
tistically. The effect of psychological stress on the body depends on the state of
the body. A body that is stressed (high autonomic arousal) will exhibit a greater
reaction to stress than a body that is not stressed. So, at an empirical level,
minds and bodies are interactive rather than additive. However, if mind states
do not cause body states or vice versa then it is not possible to represent the
observed statistical interaction in terms of theory.
The solution to this problem is to propose another theoretical level, a level
that intervenes between the biological and psychological levels of description
(Hyland, 2017). This intervening level can be described in different ways but
most usefully as a level of information. Both psychological and biological events
can be identified with the events in the information level. So, events that cannot
be causally connected because they are different levels of description and exist
in different ways, can be connected once those events are represented in a com-
mon level of description.
The intermediary level in Figure 6.2 is similar in many respects to the type
of theoretical construct that is characteristic of cognitive psychology, that
is, the mechanistic level of person variables (see Chapter 4) (Hyland, 1985).
There are, however, two differences between the way mechanistic concepts
are commonly used in cognitive psychology and how they should be used in
 Psychology and physiology ◆ 139

Psychological level: X1 X2 X5

Intermediary level Z1 Z3 Z4 Z5

Physiological level Y1 Y2 Y4 Y5

FIGURE 6.2 
The intermediary or computational level of information that is between the
psychological and physiological levels. The intermediary level provides theoretical
concepts (Z3) that are unique to that level.

terms of biopsychosocial interactionism. First, the mechanistic concepts used

in cognitive psychology are informational, but informational only in relation
to inputs that are mediated psychologically – i.e., through the five senses. The
information is ‘psychological information.’ In the intermediary level, informa-
tion is encoded from both biological and psychological inputs. The intermedi-
ary level combines psychological information and biological information. The
second difference is that the information level is assumed to have the property
of intelligent adaptation (discussed further in Chapter 10) and therefore has
the properties of connectionist rather than modular cognitive psychology (dis-
cussed in Chapter 10).
The idea that the body is capable of intelligent adaptation (i.e., intelligence
is not a property only of the brain) has been proposed under the heading of
‘body intelligence.’ The concept of body intelligence has been proposed in
several different ways, both in the context of conventional medicine (Hyland,
2001, 2002, 2011) and complementary medicine (Adelman, 2006; Rangel,
2005). A theory of biopsychosocial interactionism that combines inputs from
psychology and biology can therefore be achieved so long as one makes the
(reasonable) assumption that biological events are capable of encoding infor-
mation, and that the biologically encoded information is then combined with
the information processing that forms part of cognitive psychology. It is only
by treating biological inputs as a form of encoded information that biopsycho-
social interactionism becomes an interaction rather than an addition of biology
and psychology.

Summary
Physiology plays an important part in the history of psychology. Modern psy-
chology emerged from individuals who were trained in physiology, and the
relationship between these two disciplines has continued and expanded to the
present day. Scientists working on the relationship between psychology and
physiology can focus on different aspects of this relationship. Some focus on
measurement, some on intervention, some on only the brain, and some on the
brain, immune system, and other parts of the body.
140 ◆ Psychology and physiology

The unity of science hypothesis suggests that psychology can be reduced to

physiology and that, ultimately, psychological phenomena can be reduced to
clouds of atoms, because the ultimate reality is that humans are merely clouds
of atoms. There are several arguments against reductionism: methodological
complementarity, Fodor’s functional modularity, and Sperry’s emergent proper-
ties. Physiology adds to the story of psychology in a number of different ways,
but it does not replace it. The contribution of a biological perspective to psy-
chology (or vice versa) is reflected in the practical application of biopsychosocial
interactionism to modern medicine. Although biopsychosocial interactionism
provides a useful way of combining psychological and biological factors to
affect outcome, there is a theoretical challenge in representing a mechanism
where causality occurs between psychological and biological events, but this
can be done by treating biological inputs as providing information to an intel-
ligent system.

Essay questions
1 What does neuroscience add to psychology?
2 What evidence is there for and against the claim that drugs will one day
replace the need for psychotherapy for mental illness?
3 Compare and contrast the different meanings of the term biopsychosocial
interactionism.
 7
How has the heredity-environment
controversy been represented in the
history of psychology and how is it
informed by the person-situation
debate and modern understanding
of epigenetics?
142 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

The heredity-environment controversy is often presented to students as an

argument based on data. Although data are undoubtedly relevant to this con-
troversy, the controversy is underpinned by differing underlying assumptions.
These different assumptions support different political systems. The term politi-
cal systems means methods of organising and regulating society. The methodol-
ogy and assumptions of the heredity-environment controversy are discussed in
this chapter.

Social systems and the heredity-environment

controversy
Nineteenth-century Europe was a class-based society in which people were
born into different stations in life. The Indian system of caste is based on the
assumption that heredity determines the kind of work a person is fit to do.
Class and caste systems are based on the assumption that special people, such
as kings, dukes, earls etc. have some special inherited characteristic that makes
them fit and deserving for their particular station in life. The idea of being born
to a ‘station in life’ is based on assumptions about the importance of heredity.
In 19th-century Europe, marrying above or below your station was considered
undesirable. Even today in India, some people have strong views that people
from one caste should not marry into another caste. Belief in the importance of
heredity is also part of a system of differentiating different groups of people, for
example, people of African heritage or Jews, and forms the basis of racial and
other forms of discrimination.
Although many political systems are based on assumptions of heredity, oth-
ers assume that it is the environment that is important. John Ball’s sermons in
1381 provide an early example of the rejection of heredity entitlement. Ball is
reported to have preached “when Adam delved and Eve span, who was then
a gentleman” (O’Brien, 2004: iv). Karl Marx’s manifesto of communism was
based on the assumption that all people were born equal, and therefore do not
have privileges by virtue of birth. Socialist and communist political systems are
antagonistic to the idea of inherited inequality. The rich don’t deserve to be rich
just because they have rich parents. If environment determines outcome, then
poor people are not destined always to be poor because of their heredity, and
their lot can be improved by exposure to a better environment. The American
Head Start and the British Sure Start programmes (Glass, 1999) were based
on the assumption that the early environment of children is important to their
development and so providing a better environment for poorer children would
help society overall. If madness is not hereditary, mad people should not be
locked away in lunatic asylums but instead treated in a caring environment. In
sum, politics and social policy are based on assumptions of heredity and envi-
ronment. The heredity-environment controversy is relevant to psychology but
has far wider implications.
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 143

Nature
The idea of heredity is not new. Since recorded history, people have noted that
children resemble their parents, as do the offspring of cattle, dogs, and cats.
It takes only a small leap of imagination from the observation that body type
is inherited to the conclusion that psychological characteristics are inher-
ited. Madness is a psychological characteristic. The concept of madness as a
hereditary characteristic appears in several works of literature. For example,
in Charlotte Brontë’s novel, Jane Eyre, Mr Rochester marries Bertha Mason
but is unaware that there was ‘madness in the family.’ Bertha becomes mad
and is hidden away and confined to her room. The story revolves round this
hidden secret of Mr Rochester – that he is married but wants to marry Jane.
Madness in families was often hidden because it affected the marriage pros-
pects of other family members. It comes as no surprise that scientists in the
19th century assumed that psychological characteristics were influenced by
heredity.
Francis Galton (1822–1911) was born in Birmingham, England, and
was related to Charles Darwin – his mother was the half-sister of Charles
Darwin’s father. Like William James, Galton was profoundly influenced by
Darwin’s The Origin of Species (Pearson, 1914, 1924). Darwin’s theory
is based on an assumption of heredity. Natural selection occurs because
offspring resemble their parents. Galton wrote a book entitled Hereditary
Genius in 1869 (Galton, 1869), some ten years after Darwin had published
his Origin of Species. Galton put forward the argument that genius, like
any other human or animal characteristic, was inherited. Consequently, if
genius was an inherited characteristic, then genius should run in families.
In order to demonstrate that genius was inherited Galton showed that the
people who achieved eminence (i.e., whose contributions were recognised
by others) tended to come from about 300 families. Galton established an
anthropometric laboratory in 1884 at the International Health Exhibition
in London where, for a small fee, people could have their ability measured.
This very early type of intelligence test relied on some simple tests such as
reaction time and sensory acuity, as Galton assumed a simple physiological
basis underlying all ability.

Paying participants
Nowadays, psychologist pay the participants or provide some other form
of inducement for participants to take part in studies. Galton actually
charged people. Why did that work then and would it work now?
144 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

Galton introduced the idea of measuring differences between people, and

also helped in the creation of a statistical methodology for individual differ-
ences (Galton, 1883). Galton plotted the relationship between the height or
weight of parents with the height or weight of their children, using scatter
plots. He realised by looking at these scatter plots that the children’s heights
and weights tended to be closer to the mean than their parents’ – there was, as
he put it, a regression towards the mean. Galton urged a follower of his, Karl
Pearson, to develop a statistical formula for describing these scatter plots, and
Pearson developed an index, called the Pearson product-moment correlation
­coefficient – a statistic that is well known to undergraduate students.
Galton introduced the terms nature and nurture (Galton, 1874, 1875). The
phrase ‘nature and nurture’ is a convenient jingle of words, and in proposing
his extreme nature viewpoint, Galton also recommended selective breeding or
eugenics as a way of improving the human race, as well as sharing the widely
held view at the time that Europeans were superior to ‘the savage races.’ Selec-
tive breeding of animals had been practised for centuries and was responsible
for the breeds of farm animals known today. In suggesting eugenics, Galton
applied what was appropriate for animals to humans. Whether humans should
be treated like animals in this regard is another matter. Modern society takes a
very different view towards both eugenics and racist assumptions. Both eugen-
ics and racism are predicated on the assumption that inherited differences
between humans are important.

Racism in psychology
Racism was commonplace in the 19th century. Slavery was abolished in Britain
in 1833 and in the USA in 1865, but this does not prevent assumptions about
racial differences. Racism is based on the assumption of genetic differences
between races which confers superiority of one race over another. In Europe
and America, racist beliefs were applied in particular to Jews and people of
African heritage. Winston (1998, p. 28) writes that “The widespread antisemi-
tism in the United States between the world wars is well documented . . . as are
the discriminatory practices of universities in admissions and hiring.” Edward
G Boring (1889–1968) was one of a small number of people who helped place
Jewish students and academics (not always successfully) into American Univer-
sities when the Nazi party in Germany banned Jews from universities. Boring
had to certify that the Jews did not have ‘Jewish characteristics’ (Winston,
1998). However, feelings towards African Americans were considerably more
negative to the extent that black psychologists were more or less non-existent
until the 1960s. African Americans were segregated from European Americans
in parts of the USA until the 1960s, and were subject to unequal treatment in
many other ways.
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 145

African American psychologists

Robert Guthrie (1930–2005) wrote in 1976 (Guthrie, 1976) how when he
enrolled for a master’s course in Kentucky, USA in 1955 he was the only
black face in a sea of white. The title of his book was Even the Rat Was
White. Guthrie refuted the theory that was suggested then and subsequently
that people of African heritage where less intelligent than those of European
heritage, but his book also provides a revealing story about attitudes and
behaviour towards African Americans in universities and elsewhere.

The race-intelligence controversy

The race-intelligence controversy was based on how to interpret data. The data
was uncontroversial. The data showed that African Americans, as a group, had
lower mean scores in IQ tests compared to white Americans. Some thought that
the differences were genetic. Others thought that there was no genetic difference
between races, and that differences in mean scores were due to two environmen-
tal factors. One reason for the lower scores in African Americans is that tests tend
to favour the dominant culture, i.e., IQ tests are biased in favour of the cultural
features that are found in white but not African Americans. The second (and
possibly more important) factor is that the IQ is affected by environment, and
that African Americans, as a group, were exposed to an environment that was
less beneficial to development of the kind of skills measured in an intelligence
test than whites. Even controlling for wealth or education, it can be argued that
African Americans experienced problems not experienced by whites. The hered-
ity and environment explanations of racial differences in IQ scores reflect deeper

Where do races come from?

The oldest skull of anatomically modern humans dates from 190,000
years ago, in North Africa. All non-Africans originate from a small band
people who left Africa about 70,000 years ago, a band that would have
numbered about 200 individuals. The light skin colour of some people is
explained by evolutionary pressure. Light skin colour improves vitamin D
production in northern regions, and having low levels of vitamin D pro-
duces rickets which reduces survival and reproduction – there is evidence
of rickets in early European bones. However, many other physical features
that distinguish races are difficult to explain – such as the almond shaped
eyes of Chinese people.
146 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

assumptions about humanity and biases that are sometime implicit rather than
explicit. It should be said, however, that the current consensus amongst psycholo-
gists is that there is no genetically conferred difference in intelligence between
races of humans.

Nurture
Although some psychologists had racist views, many others took an entirely
different approach and emphasised the importance of nurture. The stron-
gest environmentalist view (i.e., supporting the nurture position) came from
behaviourists.
The following quotation from J. B. Watson is repeated from Chapter 4.

Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified

world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random
and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – a doctor,
lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even into beggarman and thief,
regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and
race of his ancestors.
(Watson, 1924/1970, p. 10)

Watson and other behaviourists assumed there was no dividing line in terms
of psychological processes between animals and humans. If there are no
differences between animals and humans, then there can certainly be no
differences between different humans, whether or not they come from dif-
ferent races.
Although behaviourists took an extreme nurture position, other early psy-
chologists also favoured the effects of the environment over heredity. Witmer
(1907) first assumed that mental illness was due to heredity, as did others at that
time, but changed his mind, believing that mental illness had an environmental
cause (see Chapter 3). The switch from a nature to nurture interpretation of
mental illness had an impact on the way mentally ill patients were treated. If
it is the nature of some people that they are mentally ill, then nothing can be
done about it. However, if mental illness is caused by nurture, then there is the
possibility that nurture can cure it.

What is inherited?
If a puff of air is blown into a person’s eye, the person blinks. This is a reflex
response. Everyone does it. It is inherited. Non-human animals inherit many
complex patterns of behaviour, and these are called instinctive behaviours.
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 147

For example, when ducklings hatch out of the egg, they become imprinted on
the first moving object. That is instinct. Every duckling behaves in this way.
Humans differ from animals. Apart from reflexes, they do not exhibit instinc-
tive stereotypical behaviour.
Rather than inheriting stereotypical behaviours, humans inherit capacities to
behave in particular ways. Inherited capacities have evolutionary advantages in that
they enhance the ability to adapt to changing environments – and humans evolved
in a changing environment caused by periods of glaciation (the ice ages that started
about six million years ago). Human capacities can be treated in two ways: capaci-
ties that are shared between all people and capacities that differ between people.

Capacities that are common to all people

The capacity for language is inherited and is common to all people. Just
as the blink reflex is inherited and a feature of all people, so is the ability
to learn language – a characteristic that is lacking in the rat. These com-
mon inherited characteristics and their evolutionary antecedents are studied
under the heading of evolutionary psychology. For example, the tendency
for people to prefer their own kin and members of their group (Smith, 1964;
Wilson, 1975), altruism (Silk & House, 2016) and cognitive biases (Buss,
2015) can be explained in terms of their survival advantage to our human
hunter-gatherer ancestors.
Evolutionary psychology contributes little to the heredity-environment con-
troversy because of its focus on generalities, but it acts as a heuristic in two
ways. First, genetic variety is important for evolution, so genetically conferred
individual differences of one kind or another is to be expected. Seconds, humans
evolved as hunter-gatherers in a Palaeolithic environment, and so it is likely that
humans are adapted for that environment. Humans may be happiest when their
psychological environment corresponds to that of the Palaeolithic – i.e., sup-
ported within a socially cohesive group. Anatomically modern humans (includ-
ing those in the Palaeolithic) differ from their hominid ancestors in having a
lengthy post-reproductive period, so what creates happiness in old age may
therefore differ from what creates happiness in younger people. Evolutionary
psychology provides useful heuristics for theory development, but the testing of
those theories requires independent testing with modern people.

Capacities that differ between people

Everyone has the capacity to learn but some people may have a genetically
conferred capacity to learn faster than others. People who have the capacity
to learn faster will develop into people who are different from those who learn
slower. The differences that arise from differences in capacity lead to differences
in disposition. The dispositional differences are commonly described under two
headings, intelligence and personality. Assumed differences in capacity lead to
148 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

the linked questions such as these: How much is intelligence determined by

heredity or environment? How much is personality determined by heredity or
environment?

A problem
The following statement was in an earlier paragraph: People who have the
capacity to learn faster will develop into people who are different from
those who learn slower. Dig a little deeper and you will see that this state-
ment is an over-simplification. People with different capacities to learn
will develop into people who are different in a learning-rich environment.
But what about a learning-poor environment? In a learning-poor environ-
ment, the ability of the genetic capacity to affect outcome will be reduced.
Heredity and environment interact. The relative contribution of heredity
and environment depends on the type of environment. More detail about
this interaction will be provided later in this chapter under the topic of
epigenetics.

Intelligence, heredity, and environment

How much is intelligence the result of heredity and how much environment?
The question arises because different answers support different social and
political systems. It seems reasonable, therefore, to answer the question using
data, and twin studies form an important part of that data.
If one measures the intelligence of identical (monozygotic) twins raised
together, the correlation between the scores of the two twins is high. This high
correlation can be attributed to both heredity and environment. However, if one
compares the correlation between identical twins raised together with the cor-
relation of identical twins raised apart, then the difference between the two cor-
relations must be due to the effect of the environment. So, the logic of this type
of study is to compare two types of twin: (a) Those twins brought up together
and who will have equal heredity and equal environments, and (b) those twins
brought up separately who will have equal heredity but different environments.
The closer the correlations are together, then the greater the impact of heredity.
In Burt’s study (see Chapter 1) (Burt, 1966), the correlation between the mono-
zygotic twins reared apart was 0.77, which is a high correlation particularly if
one considers that a correlation cannot be higher than the test-retest reliability
of the test. It was so high that others questioned whether it was fake (Kamin,
1981). Nevertheless, later research shows that there is only a small decrease in
the correlation between identical twins raised apart versus together, leading to
the conclusion that the contribution of heredity is large.
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 149

What is the problem? Although the decrease in the correlation between

twins raised together versus those raised apart is due to the environment, the
environmental difference between the two pairs of twins may be very little. If
the twins raised apart are raised in similar environments, then it is hardly sur-
prising that the two correlations, between identical twins raised together and
apart, are similar. There are two reasons why the environments of twins raised
apart are similar. The first is that identical twins share the same placenta. Identi-
cal twins have the same environment at a crucial point of human development
(see later section on epigenetics). The second reason is that adoptive parents
are not randomly selected from the population. If adoptive parents have similar
characteristics, then they will bring up their respective twins in a similar way.
Just because two children are raised in different families, it does not follow that
they differ in the environmental factors that affect intelligence. The estimate
of the relative contribution of inheritance versus the environment is based on
assumptions about the environments of both sets of twins. It is impossible to
quantify how similar are the environments of twins raised apart versus together.
A second type of study examines the correlations between identical (mono-
zygotic) twins and fraternal (dizygotic) twins raised together. The assumption
underpinning these studies is that these two sets of twins have the same envi-
ronment but different genes. Again, the assumption of this research runs into
problems. Identical twins do not have the same environment as fraternal twins,
even if they are brought up together. The reason is that identical twins share the
same placenta, whereas fraternal twins have different placentas. As the nutri-
ents received by the foetus depends on the state of the placenta, and because
placentas vary, it follows that the early environment of the fraternal twins is not
necessarily the same. There are also social reasons for doubting the assumption
that the two sets of twins share the same environment. Identical twins can be
treated (and dressed) differently from fraternal twins.
In conclusion, the underlying assumptions of the twin studies can be chal-
lenged in a way that would suggest a bias towards overestimating the contribu-
tion of inheritance. Although twin studies can be a useful way of examining the
relative effects of inheritance and environment, this potential bias should lead
to caution when interpreting results.

The person-situation debate

The heredity-environment controversy cannot be understood properly without
an understanding of the person-situation debate. In the person-situation debate,
the term situation can be treated as equivalent to the term environment in the
heredity-environment controversy. The person, or personality is the result of a
combination of heredity and environment. If the heredity-environment contro-
versy is combined with the person-situation debate, then the causal sequence is
that shown in Figure 7.1.
150 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

Heredity Environment (situation)

Personality Situation (environment)

Behaviour

FIGURE 7.1 The antecedents of behaviour.

It can be seen from Figure 7.1 that behaviour is affected by the situation (or
environment) in two ways. The situation affects behaviour indirectly through
its past contribution to personality and the situation affects behaviour directly
by its present influence on behaviour. It follows that the more behaviour is
determined by events in the present, the less it can be affected by heredity,
irrespective of the relative contributions of heredity and environment to dispo-
sitional factors such as personality or intelligence.
In 1957, Lee Cronbach (1957) wrote a paper with the title “The Two Dis-
ciplines of Scientific Psychology” in which he drew attention to a split between
two types of psychological research. One type used correlational methods to
examine differences in people’s behaviour that were (assumed) consistent across
situations. The other type used experimental methods to examine differences
across situations that were (assumed) consistent across people. One focussed on
the person; the other on the situation. This distinction remains to today. Social
psychologists research the effects of different social environments on people and
publish the research in social psychology journals. Personality psychologists
research how people differ in the same environment and publish in personality
journals.
Cronbach argued that this split in psychology was unhelpful and that
a combination of the experimental and correlational methods was needed.
For example, experimental methods will reveal that one treatment is better
than another when people are considered as a group. However, it may be
that some people respond better to one treatment and other people better
to the other treatment. Cronbach – and others – argued the concept of the
‘best treatment’ was based on a false assumption and suggested instead that
it is necessary to determine which treatment is best for whom. Cronbach’s
suggestion that correlational and experimental methods should be combined
reflects earlier theoretical work by Kurt Lewin (1943a) who interpreted
behaviour resulting from an interaction between the person and situation.
The idea of integrating personality psychology and social psychology eventu-
ally became accepted. The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology was
first published in 1965.
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 151

Personalised medicine
Despite Cronbach’s logical argument against ‘the best treatment’ concept,
that idea still dominates medicine, and to some extent clinical psychology.
Recently, ‘personalised medicine’ provides an alternative to the assump-
tion that there is a best treatment for any disease. Personalised medicine
is defined as “treatments targeted to the needs of individual patients on
the basis of genetic, biomarker, phenotypic, or psychosocial characteristics
that distinguish a given patient from other patients with similar clinical
presentations” (Agusti et al., 2016, p. 410).

If behaviour is influenced by both the situation and personality, then this leads
to an obvious question: Which is more important? The person-situation debate
arose over this question. Initially, there was an absence of consensus with per-
sonality theorists claiming that personality was more important, and social and
experimental psychologists suggesting that the situation was more important.
Consensus was reached by a position known as ‘interactionism.’ Behaviour is
the result of an interaction between the person and the situation (Magnusson &
Endler, 1977; Epstein & O’brien, 1985).
The consensus that persons and situations interacted – i.e., interactionism –
has implications for the heredity-environment controversy. In both debates
there is ambiguity about what exactly is being explained. In both debates it is
behaviour that is being explained, but behaviour can be described in different
ways. The behaviour under consideration is crucial to both debates.
The conclusion from the person-situation debate is that both the personality
and psychologists and social psychologists were correct, but they were claim-
ing different things and are therefore correct in different ways. They are cor-
rect depending on what is meant by behaviour. Does the word behaviour refer
to a single instance of behaviour, or is it an aggregation of many behaviours?
The consensus reached was that if one tries to explain a single behaviour, then
in most cases that single behaviour is explained entirely by the situation, and
personality plays only a minor role. However, if one tries to explain an aver-
age of several different behaviours across different situations, then personality
does indeed explain that behaviour. So personality explains general trends in
behaviour but is very poor at explaining individual behaviours. The situation
explains individual behaviours but is poor at explaining trends in behaviour. If
one considers that personality traits are defined in terms of ‘behaviours that are
consistent across situations and time’ then it is not surprising that this is exactly
what personality does. Some behaviours are consistent across situations and
time, some are not. Those behaviours that are consistent across situations and
time make up personality.
152 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

Not only does the answer to the person-situation debate depend on whether
the behaviour is an aggregation or not, the result also depends on the particu-
lar behaviour. Consider how people respond when driving and they see traffic
lights. Everyone stops at red, and goes at green. The behaviour at traffic lights
is not determined by personality or intelligence. However, the results from a
maths test result will differ between people as a function of mathematical abil-
ity, and behaviour at parties will differ as a function of sociability.
The non-linear interaction of person and situation (NIPS) model provides
a theoretical framework for understanding whether situations and persons
play a greater or lesser role in determining behaviour (Blum, Rauthmann,
Göllner, Lischetzke, & Schmitt, 2018). According to this model, situations
can be described as either strong or weak, where strong or weak refers to the
affordance of the situation. In common sense language, the term affordance
means the situation is ‘telling’ the person something. For example, a red traffic
light has a strong affordance – it signals that you should stop. There is only one
behaviour associated with the red traffic light, namely stopping. The red traffic
light is a strong situation. A mouse that appears suddenly in front of you, on
the other hand, can lead to a number of behavioural responses. You could jump
on a chair, run away, try and catch it, or simply stand still and watch what it
does. The mouse is a weak situation. According to the NIPS model, in strong
situations, personality is unimportant in determining behaviour. Everyone stops
at a traffic light irrespective of their personality. And if a person does not stop –
for example, a bank robber fleeing from police – then it is not personality that
is determining their behaviour at that particular moment in time. However, in
weak situations, personality plays a much greater role. People high in neuroti-
cism may behave differently to the mouse compared to those low in neuroticism.
The NIPS model also makes a distinction between strong and weak persons.
Strong persons tend to behave in the same way irrespective of the situation. For
example, some people are always aggressive or always non-aggressive what-
ever the situation. Such persons are described as strong. Others are sometimes
aggressive or not depending on the situation. Such persons are described as
weak. So, if a person exhibits cross-situationally consistent behaviour, then they
are described as strong and for such people personality has a greater impact on
behaviour that those weak persons whose behaviour varies with the situation.
The conclusion from NIPS therefore is that it is meaningless to talk about the
relative contribution of persons and situations to behaviour because it depends
on the person and situation.
There is one more piece to the jigsaw that needs putting in place, and that
is an explanation of the word interactionism. Interactionism is the resolution
of the person-situation debate. The person and situation do not add to produce
behaviour: They interact. What this means in practice can be illustrated by the
following example of the interaction between neuroticism and stressors. A per-
son high in neuroticism shows a large autonomic response to a mild stressor,
but shows no autonomic response in the absence of any stressor. A person low
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 153

in neuroticism has no autonomic response to either the mild or no stressor.

Whether or not different situations affect behaviour depends on the person. It
is precisely this point that was made by Cronbach in that early paper when he
suggested that the two disciplines of scientific psychology should be working
together. Interactionism provides a theoretical framework that is not provided
by either personality psychology or social psychology (Fleeson, 2004)

Genetics and epigenetics

The heredity-environment controversy is based on an assumption. The assump-
tion is that heredity and environment are independent contributors to the phe-
notype or behaviour of a person. The genes and environment add to produce
the phenotype. This view is not correct: Genes and the environment interact.
Genes can be switched on or off by the environment. Not only can genes be
switched on during the lifetime of an individual, but switched on or switched
off genes can also be inherited. Epigenetics is the term given to the study of how
genes are switched on or off.
The following example illustrates how genes and environment interact.
Let us suppose that there are genes for musical ability. A person with musical
genes will develop musical skills only if exposed to music. A person may have
tremendous genetic potential for playing the violin, but they will not play well
if they have no access to a violin. It is only when musical genes are combined
with musical education that musical skill develops. In families where there are
genes for musical ability, then the parents of children are likely also to be strong
in music and provide a musical environment for their children. If children with
musical genes are not exposed to music, then their musical ability is limited.
Thus, although it appears that ‘music runs in families’ and is due to genetics, in
fact the environment is playing a role by interacting with genes.
Genes and environment do not simply add up to produce the phenotype.
They interact. The same argument applies to the person-situation debate. Per-
son factors and situational factors interact rather than add.
There is an additional factor that needs to be taken into account in an
understanding of gene-environment interactions. If the environment of a group
of people is very similar, then heredity is more important to outcome compared
to an environment that differs between groups of people. If everyone is exposed
to the same musical experience, then only musical genes will determine out-
come. However, if some people are exposed to a musical environment and some
not, then it is the interaction between genes and the environment that deter-
mines outcome. The proportion of variance attributable to heredity therefore
depends on the variability of the situation.
The variability of the situation is relevant to an interesting phenomenon
relating to the effect of age. The contribution of heredity to body weight
decreases as people age. As people get older, their environment – i.e., what
The gift of inheritance.
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 155

they eat – has a cumulative effect on their body mass. However, in the case of
intelligence, the contribution of heredity increases with age. Results using twin
studies show that the heritability of intelligence at age 5 years is estimated as
0.22, by age 16 it is 0.62, and at age 50 years it is 0.80 (Sauce & Matzel, 2018).
The reason is that people high in cognitive ability seek situations of cognitive
stimulation over the lifespan, and as they do so, more and more cognitively ori-
ented genes become switched on. The environment is not random. People seek
environments that are consistent with their genes, so the environment becomes
more matched to their particular genotype. Gene-environment interactions are
not only passive; they also are the consequence of an active process of behav-
ioural choice.

Impact of the early environment on epigenetics

The prenatal environment is particularly important to the way genes are
switched on or off. Some of the early research was conducted by David Barker
(Barker, 1992) who used the records kept in India on birth weight to predict
later health problems. The ‘Barker hypothesis’ is that low birth weight is
associated with foetal stress and foetal stress switches on a variety of genes,
including those associated with inflammation. The switched on genes then
lead to later health problems 50 years later, because systemic inflammation
increases diseases. (Many diseases have an inflammatory component, includ-
ing mental illness.) Research supports the Barker hypothesis. Low birth weight
is associated with mental health problems (Schlotz & Phillips, 2009) and
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children (Mick, Biederman,
Prince, Fischer, & Faraone, 2002) and adults (Halmøy, Klungsøyr, Skjærven, &
Haavik, 2012). Low birth weight is associated with greater hostility in the adult
and greater adult weight (Rkkönen et al., 2008). The incidence of schizophrenia
increases if, during pregnancy, the mother was exposed to psychological stress
(particularly in the first trimester), including bereavement, war, famine, and
natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes (Malaspina et al., 2008). There
are critical periods when the genes are particularly prone to being switched on –
such as the first trimester of pregnancy. These switched on genes then affect the
person for the rest of their life, including psychological characteristics (Jones,
Moore, & Kobor, 2018).

Trans-generational effects
One final factor must be added to the heredity-environment debate. There is evi-
dence from animal models, and to some extent humans, that epigenetic effects –
i.e., the switching on of genes – can be passed from one generation to the next.
These effects are called trans-generational epigenetic effects. There is growing
evidence that environmental influences can be passed from one generation to
156 ◆ The heredity-environment controversy

the next – a form of Lamarckian inheritance that was thought to be impossible.

Not only are the foetus’ genes affected by the maternal environment, but the
maternal environment can also affect the eggs in a female foetus’ ovum that
then affects the maternal grandchildren. Although trans-generational epigenetic
effects are well established (Bošković & Rando, 2018; Heard & Martienssen,
2014; Veenendaal et al., 2013), their impact on psychological factors is still at
an early stage of understanding.

Summary
The heredity-environment controversy has been motivated by values and debate
about the advantages or disadvantages of different political and social systems,
and in particular privileges provided by inheritance.
How much is behaviour determined by heredity and how much by the
environment? Percentage estimates of the relative contribution of heredity and
environment to intelligence are based on twin studies, where the methodology
creates a bias in favour of heredity. However, the main problem with hered-
ity-environment controversy is not empirical but conceptual. The controversy
is based on the assumption that a certain percentage of variance of behaviour
is due to heredity and the remainder to the environment. This assumption is
untrue as the relative contribution of heredity and environment depends on a
variety of different factors. The correct conclusion of the heredity-environment
controversy is that ‘it depends’ (Sauce & Matzel, 2018).

1 It depends on how behaviour is described. Single behaviours are largely

determined by the current situation and therefore unaffected by heredity.
Aggregated behaviours are determined by personality/intelligence,
which result from an interaction between genes and the environment.
2 It depends on the type of aggregated behaviour. The aggregation of a
person’s response to traffic lights is unaffected by variation in heredity,
whereas the aggregation of a person’s responses to maths tests is.
3 It depends on the situation. Environments that are very different will have
a greater impact on behaviour than environments that are very similar.
4 It depends on the person. The NIPS model shows that strong people are
more likely to exhibit behaviours reflecting personality (and hence to
some extent genetics) than weak people who are more likely to be
influenced by the situation.
5 It depends on the interaction between heredity and environment. Some
genes will not express themselves except in certain environments. The
contribution of heredity depends on the environment.

The correct answer to the heredity-environment controversy is ‘it depends’

because the underlying question is based on a false premise – that heredity and
 The heredity-environment controversy ◆ 157

environment are independent and additive contributors to behaviour. Why is

this controversy important? Why is it that every undergraduate psychology stu-
dent has heard of it? The reason is that the controversy is important to political
debate, and about the role of inherited wealth and power. Do the data provide
any insight that can help resolve that debate? Evolutionary psychologists argue
that kinship preference had selective advantages (Smith, 1964), so it is not sur-
prising that there should be a preference to allow children to inherit from their
parents. Inheritance of wealth is a characteristic of almost all societies. At the
same time, evidence supports the importance of the environment, particularly
with regard to epigenetics – so there is a justification for an inheritance tax, a
tax that tends to produce greater equality between citizens irrespective of the
wealth of their parents. The level of inheritance tax and policies that affect the
degree of equality in a society are not influenced by the findings of the heredity-
environment controversy. They are based on values, and it is values that spurred
the controversy in the first place. If there is anything to be learned from the
debate it is the importance of improving the environment for everyone, not just
those who are better off.

Essay questions
1 What is the person-debate and what are its implications for the heredity-
environment controversy?
2 What are the advantages and disadvantages of twin studies in studying
heritability?
3 What is epigenetics and what is its relevance to the heredity-environment
controversy?
 8
How do psychologists measure and
explain the fact that in some ways
everyone is unique?
160 ◆ Everyone is unique

In some ways everyone is the same. In some ways everyone is different but like
some other people. In some ways everyone is unique.
Social and experimental psychology and many other branches of psychol-
ogy provide an account of why people behave in the same way in different
situations. Personality psychology and the psychology of individual differences
provide an account of why people behave differently in the same situation. It is
a self-evident truth that in some ways everyone is unique. Uniqueness is one of
the ideas explored in humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychology developed
in the late 1940s and 1950s (i.e., in the dying days of the empire of behaviour-
ism and before the dominance of cognitive psychology) describing itself as
‘the third force in psychology’ – the other two forces being behaviourism and
psychoanalysis. This chapter describes the methodology used by humanistic
psychologists, some of their achievements, and its relevance today.

Humanistic, phenomenological, and existential

The terms humanistic, phenomenological, and existential psychology are
sometimes used in different ways and sometimes interchangeably. The
terms phenomenological and existential derive from philosophies, both of
which share the idea that the mind provides important insights. The term
humanistic psychology was the term used by USA psychologists in pro-
moting phenomenological and existential psychology, and was the name
given to Division 32 of the American Psychological Association when it
was founded in 1971. Nowadays, the term humanistic psychology is used
as a general category that includes almost all those approaches that focus
on consciousness and the conscious mind.

Idiographic versus nomothetic science

The German philosopher, Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) distinguished two
types of knowledge: nomothetic and idiographic (Lamiell, 1998). Nomothetic
knowledge occurs where general laws can be formed about objects because
those objects have common properties. Natural science is nomothetic. An atom
of carbon is the same as any other atom of carbon. (Knowledgeable chemist:
please do not split hairs about different atomic weights – the logic remains
the same.) An atom of oxygen is the same as any other atom of oxygen. So,
any theory about oxygen applies to any atom of oxygen, any theory of carbon
applies to any atom of carbon, and any theory of carbon dioxide applies to any
molecule of carbon dioxide. Most of psychology is nomothetic. If a theory does
not apply to all people, at least it applies to some people. Theories of personality
place individuals on a scale, a scale that applies to all people. Although people
 Everyone is unique ◆ 161

may fall at different places on that scale, given a large enough sample, some
people must be at the same point on that scale as other people.
Windelband contrasted nomothetic science with idiographic science. Like
nomothetic science, idiographic science has laws or theories, but different theo-
ries are needed for different situations. The idiographic approach lacks the uni-
versality of laws that is a feature of nomothetic science. Each event in history is
unique, so it is possible to treat history idiographically as well as nomothetically
where the latter describes general trends (Lyman & O’Brien, 2004). Equally,
each person is unique so it is possible to treat psychology idiographically as
well as nomothetically. Each person requires a unique form of description and
explanation, but it is an explanation or theory that follows the rules of science
in being falsifiable.
Humanistic psychology is not the only approach within psychology that
assumes the uniqueness of the individual. Hermeneutical psychology is also
predicated on the assumption that each person is unique. However, hermeneuti-
cal psychology rejects the scientific rational that is accepted by humanistic psy-
chologists. The hermeneutical approach to uniqueness is discussed in Chapter 9.

Measuring uniqueness
The concept of a trait forms the basis of modern personality theories – hence the
term personality trait. Neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness
and agreeableness are all traits. So are the traits of aggression, silliness, and lazi-
ness. Traits are almost invariably treated as a nomothetic concept in the sense
that every trait applies to everyone. For example, everyone can be placed some-
where along a dimension of neuroticism. Everyone can be placed somewhere
along a trait of aggression. Each trait dimension applies to everyone.

Personality traits from an idiographic perspective

Allport (1962) proposed that traits should be considered idiographic rather
than nomothetic – he applied Windelband’s distinction to personality theory.
Allport’s argument is as follows. A trait describes a pattern of behaviour that is
consistent over different situations and over time. So, for example, if someone
has an aggressive trait, then one would expect that person to be aggressive at
work, at home, in the park, and on holiday. By contrast a person who has a
non-aggressive trait would be non-aggressive at work, at home, in the park, and
on holiday. In both cases the behaviour is consistent, and it would be reasonable
to describe the two people as being aggressive and non-aggressive respectively.
Now consider another person who is aggressive at work and in the park but
not at home or on holiday. Or another person who is aggressive at home but
nowhere else. These individuals cannot be described as falling anywhere on the
trait of aggressiveness, because their behaviour is inconsistent across situations.
Allport argued that traits sometimes apply to a person and sometimes not. So,
162 ◆ Everyone is unique

each person can be described by an array of traits that may differ from the array
of traits used to describe someone else. Each person has their own unique (or
reasonably unique) array of traits. When a trait applies to a person, then that
person can be represented on that trait with a number. So Allport’s approach is
both idiographic and quantitative.
The idiographic approach to traits is based on the assumption that some-
times it is the situation rather than a trait that determines behaviour. A similar
idea is found in the non-linear interaction of person and situation (NIPS) model
that was described in Chapter 7. According to NIPS, strong people exhibit the
same trait in different situations. Weak people vary their behaviour according
to the situation. However, there is a difference between Allport’s idiographic
traits and NIPS. In the case of NIPS, the terms strong or weak people refer to
a tendency that occurs across traits; it is a nomothetic concept. By contrast, in
Allport’s idiographic trait theory, a person can be weak in regard to one trait
but strong with regard to another.
Despite being theoretically plausible, Allport’s idiographic approach to
traits never caught on. It is so much easier to explain personality in terms of
dimensions shared by everyone rather than dimensions that are unique to each
individual. In addition, personality theorists argue that people are in fact rea-
sonably consistent across situations for the higher order traits, such as the big
five traits of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, and agree-
ableness, so it is meaningful to treat them nomothetically. Of course, they would
say that wouldn’t they! Personality theory is based on a nomothetic assumption.
The NIPS model would suggest that consistency of behaviour across situations
applies only to some people, namely, strong people. Perhaps both are correct to
some degree. Students should come to their own conclusions.

Personal construct theory

Personal construct theory is an idiographic and quantitative approach to mea-
suring personality that is still in use today. Proposed by George A. Kelly
(1905–1967) the theory is based on the assumption that there is no objective
reality. Instead, people construct a reality based on their experience. Reality is
subjective and each person creates their own reality. Kelly suggests that people
are naïve scientists: They form hypotheses about the world on the basis of
observation, because ordinary people, like scientists, are trying to predict and
anticipate events. (Kelly, 1955, 1963). Kelly is described by some as a humanis-
tic psychologist; to others he is an early cognitive psychologist who focussed on
perception. Kelly himself resisted being labelled with either category, consider-
ing his own work unique (Benjafield, 2008).

The personal construct

Kelly’s theory of personality is based on the idea of a ‘personal construct.’ A
personal construct is a way of construing or interpreting the world. People
have different ways of construing or interpreting the world, that is, they have
 Everyone is unique ◆ 163

different personal constructs. By understanding personal constructs psycholo-

gists are able to understand how people function and how they differ between
themselves.
A personal construct is a dichotomy that is used to make sense of the world.
That is, it is a form of judgement that we make about the world. The dichotomy
has two poles, a similarity pole and contrast pole. Any object is classified either
in terms of the similarity pole or the contrast pole. This may sound complicated,
so the easiest way to understand a personal construct is through an example of
how they are discovered.
Imagine three objects:

A whale
A rat
A trout

In what way are two of these objects similar and one different? There are several
possible answers, but suppose you replied with this:

“A whale and rat are mammals whereas a trout is a fish.”

In this example, ‘mammal’ is the similarity pole of the construct and ‘fish’ the
contrast pole. The construct is mammal versus fish.
However another possible answer is this:

“A whale and trout live in water, a rat lives on land.”

In this second example, ‘lives in water’ is the similarity pole and ‘lives on land’
the contrast pole. The construct is lives on water versus lives on land.’
If students are asked to compare a whale, rat and trout, they usually create
many more constructs, e.g.,

Smooth versus hairy

Big versus little
Eaten by people versus not normally eaten by people.

A construct is like a theory. It has a focus in the sense that it applies to a par-
ticular kind of context. For example, the construct mammal versus fish applies
only to animals. When you see an animal, it is reasonable to classify it in terms
of whether it is a mammal or not. When you see a plant, you are unlikely to ask
yourself the question, “is this a mammal or not?”
Kelly’s theory suggests that

◆◆ An individual’s personality is their construct system

◆◆ People have different constructs: They construe the world in different
ways.
164 ◆ Everyone is unique

◆◆ Finding out about someone’s constructs tell us what that person is like
and how they will respond to different situations.

Kelly provided a counselling service to students and school children, and to help
in this he developed a method for understanding a person’s construct system.
He called this method the ‘repertory grid test’ or ‘rep test’ for short. Because
many student problems arise from their interactions with others, constructs
relating to the way a person views other people are particularly important.

Exercise to find out about your own constructs about people

The following procedure will allow students discover what constructs they use
in their relations with other people

1 Write down a list of six people you know (i.e., six real people such as
friends and relatives). For example, this might be Bob, Mary, Peter, Sue,
Alison, and Roger.
2 Take the first three people in the list, and ask yourself in what way two
are similar and one different? For example, you might say that Bob and
Mary have a sense of humour and Peter hasn’t.
3 Write down the similarity pole (the way two are similar) and the contrast
pole (the way the third person is different). For example, this would be
‘sense of humour versus no sense of humour.’
4 Now take another three people from the list. For example, this might be
Peter, Sue, and Alison.
5 Ask yourself again, in what way are two similar and one different? You
might say that Peter and Sue are old and Alison is young.
6 Write down the poles of the construct again, for example, ‘old versus
young.’
7 Now take a further three people and repeat the process. It doesn’t matter
which three people you compare as long as it is a different combination.
Continue doing this until you have made at least ten comparisons, or
until you are generating no new constructs.

Having created your list of constructs, now change roles and imagine you are
the examining psychologist. The examining psychologist gains insight into the
constructs that lie behind the words used by the client. The examining psy-
chologist uses this insight to advise the client. If you are continuing with this
exercise, you will be able to give yourself some sound advice.
First, the examining psychologist needs to find out how many constructs
the client has. Sometimes the client uses different words for constructs that
have similar meanings. For example, a client might present three sets of
similarity and contrast poles: ‘intelligent versus not intelligent’ and ‘educated
versus not educated’ and ‘thick versus bright.’ A moment’s reflection will show
 Everyone is unique ◆ 165

that these different words refer to one underlying construct dealing with
intelligence, so the examining psychologist should interpret these as one. The
more constructs the person has, the more adaptable the person is in a complex
world, so people who have many constructs usually do better in social contexts
than those who have few.
Second, the examining psychologist interprets how the person construes the
world in order to give advice. This involves the psychologist trying to interpret
how the client views the world the world about them from the constructs that
have been produced. Again, it is easiest to understand this with an example.
Imagine you are an examining psychologist and have been presented by the
following constructs of a client:

Easy going – hypercritical.

Feels inferior – feels confident.
Socially skilled – unpleasant.
Tense – easy to be with.
Maladjusted – easy going.
Understanding – hypercritical.

The client’s constructs relate to issues of perceived criticism and being criticised
by others. The client has issues concerning self-confidence. The psychologist
will also note that a therapist will be judged using exactly the same constructs
as the client uses for other people. The psychologist will have to make a special
effort not to appear critical and provide a way of helping the client become less
defensive.
Kelly helped clients by advising them to try using other constructs. In prac-
tice, this meant asking clients to pretend to be someone else in a therapy session
and try out what it feels like to take the role of someone else – hence, the name
of his therapy, fixed role therapy. Kelly’s method and theory show that it is
possible to measure the mind, but at the same time accept there is an aspect of
uniqueness to every person.

Modern use of personal constructs and comparison

with nomothetic techniques
The rep test is used today, not necessarily by psychologists and not necessarily
in a clinical context. It is a useful technique for understanding the constructs
people use in different contexts. For example, the rep test has been used to
find out how ordinary people attribute meaning to buildings. By finding out
what constructs people use when they judge buildings, architects are able to
take the perceptions of ordinary people into account in architectural design
(Bannister & Fransella, 2019). The rep test has been used to find out how
people construe meaning in different types of work-related organisations so
that managers can better understand how workers respond to their decisions
166 ◆ Everyone is unique

(Bourne & Jankowicz, 2018). The rep test has been used to find out what
constructs people use when they come to a museum, to help in the design
and management of museums (Caldwell & Coshall, 2002). In these cases, the
researchers refer to the ‘rich meaning’ that the technique provides, and in each
case people, ordinary people, are presented with three buildings, three organisa-
tions, three museums, or whatever is the focus, and asked in what way two are
similar and one different.
The use of the rep test in applied contexts can be contrasted with the equiva-
lent use of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1967). The
semantic differential is based on the assumption that everyone uses the same
dimensions of judgement. These dimensions are:

Evaluation (good versus bad).

Potency (strong versus weak).
Activity (active versus passive).

The semantic differential is based on the assumption that everyone uses the
same constructs when judging objects, and uses the same constructs irrespective
of the object being judged. Personal construct theory is based on the assumption
that people use different constructs when judging objects. To some extent both
views are true. To some extent people have common characteristics when judg-
ing objects. However, the ability of the rep test to find out how different types
of constructs are used in different situations enables the technique to provide
a more situation specific analysis of the attribution of meaning. It is the situ-
ational specificity of the rep test that makes it most attractive to those working
in applied contexts. Furthermore, if different people use similar constructs to
judge a particular type of object, then it is perfectly possible to use those con-
structs to develop a scale that is used nomothetically. Idiographic research can
inform nomothetic research.

Being uniquely happy

Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) was one of the founders of the ‘third force
in psychology’ (see introduction to this chapter), but died shortly before the
founding of the humanistic psychology division (Division 32) of the American
Psychological Association in 1971.
Maslow is known for his hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954, 1968), an idea
that has been described as the best-known incorrect theory in psychology (Hoff-
man, 1980). The hierarchy is (from the top) self-actualisation, esteem, belong-
ingness and love, safety, physiological needs. Maslow proposed that lower
level needs require satisfaction in order for the higher level needs to emerge.
In fact, the theory describes only a general trend. People who are struggling
to keep family and home together can have little time for themselves, though
Self-actualisation.
168 ◆ Everyone is unique

an artist can self-actualise while starving in a garret. It is certainly possible to

self-actualise when hungry.
It is Maslow’s concept of self-actualisation, at the top of the hierarchy, that
has had the wider impact. This concept features in the work of just about every
humanist psychologist.
Self-actualisation means that you strive towards becoming the person you
really are. There are two main characteristics of the concept of self-actualisation.
The first is that it breaks with the causal tradition that characterises both psy-
choanalysis and behaviourism and replaces it with a teleological alternative. In
the case of behaviourism and psychoanalysis, a person is thought to be caused
to do things because of prior events. In the case of psychoanalysis these prior
events are early childhood experiences. In the case of behaviourism they are
previous patterns of reinforcement. In both cases the person is driven to behave
by prior causes, that is, by things that have happened in the past. Maslow sug-
gests that people behave in the way they do because they are trying to achieve
something in the future. That is, people strive towards future states, rather than
being driven by prior states. The use of a future state to explain behaviour is
referred to as a teleological explanation. Teleological explanations (i.e., saying
what someone is trying to achieve) are fundamentally different from the causal
explanations. Only causal explanations are used in the physical sciences, and
so the use of teleological explanation marks a distinct break with the natural
science tradition on which much of psychology is predicated. The teleologi-
cal explanation is a psychological explanation and not found in the physical
sciences – one does not refer to atoms ‘wanting to do something.’ So, the first
feature of self-actualisation is that this is something people are striving towards,
rather than something people are driven to do.
The second feature of self-actualisation is the assumption that each indi-
vidual is unique and different. Self-actualising is not a matter of becoming a bet-
ter person, but rather becoming the person ‘you are supposed to be.’ This idea
of ‘supposed to be’ assumes that by nature people have characteristics which
make them unique. That is, the real you is genetically determined, rather than
something that can be cultivated by nurture. Because people differ, any action
is potentially self-actualising. Self-actualising behaviours can be defined only in
relation to a particular person. What is self-actualising for one person may not
be for another.
Maslow’s emphasis on positive goal satisfaction is reflected in more recent
works on goal satisfaction, including that of positive psychology (Csikszent-
mihalyi & Seligman, 2000), a movement that emphasises what is good in life
rather than what needs to be changed because it is bad. Maslow even used the
term positive psychology in the 1950s (Froh, 2004).
In his later works Maslow suggested that people self-actualise in two ways,
one with and one without spiritualism or transcendence (Maslow, 1970). For
some people spirituality is an important part of self-actualising, but for others
 Everyone is unique ◆ 169

Origins of self-actualisation
Maslow was born in Brooklyn, New York, and was the eldest child in a
large family of immigrant Russian Jews who lived close to the border with
Poland. The following story is told of Rabbi Zusya (unknown–1800) of
Hanipol, Poland: When he was dying he expressed concern about meeting
God and said to those about him “When I reach the next world, God will
not ask me, ‘Why were you not Moses?’ Instead, he will ask me, ‘Why
were you not Zusya?’” Why were you not the person you were meant to
be? It is highly likely that Maslow would have known about Rabbi Zusya
as well as the Hasidic tradition that Zusya represented. Hassidism includes
two ideas that are common in humanistic psychology. One is the joy of
living; the other is the acceptance of suffering.

it is not. Spirituality is not just a matter of spiritual religious or beliefs – but

rather a sense of awareness of the ultimate. Maslow believed that Einstein was a
spiritual self-actualiser because in thinking about physics Einstein had a concept
of ultimate reality.
The idea that spirituality forms part of high level goals was developed inde-
pendently by Viktor Frankl (1905–1997) who felt that this aspect of human
existence was neglected by other humanistic psychologists (Pytell, 2006). Frankl
was Jewish and living in Germany at the time of the Holocaust. He survived but
his entire family did not. Frankl is the originator of ‘logotherapy,’ an approach
to therapy based on understanding the clients’ meaning of life (Frankl, 1959,
1967, 1969).

Frankl’s personal experience

Pytell (2000) points out that although Frankl’s book Man’s Search for
Meaning implied he was in Auschwitz for a good deal of time, in fact he
was only in Auschwitz for three days. Nevertheless, his experiences as
one of the few survivors of a concentration camp formed the basis for his
theory.

Frankl suggested that the human super-ordinate goal was to find meaning in
life. For him, self-actualisation meant meaning in life. Frankl distinguished
three categories of the meaning of life.
170 ◆ Everyone is unique

◆◆ First, there is meaning that is based on what one accomplishes or gives

to the world. Our work can give us a sense of meaning, whether it is
paid employment, a hobby, being a parent or helping other people.
◆◆ Second, there is the meaning that comes from our experiences with the
world. These experiences include things that are beautiful as well as
the experience of love. The nature lover who looks from the top of a
mountain, the gourmet who enjoys food, and the lover gazing into the
loved one’s eyes all gain a sense of meaning from those experiences.
◆◆ Third, there is the meaning that comes from our approach to suffering
and those things that cannot be changed. This last meaning has
particular resonance with Frankl’s experience in a concentration camp
where those who found meaning, including those who found meaning
in future revenge, survived best. Frankl believed that there was meaning
in demonstrating that one could suffer with dignity (Yalom, 1980).

Self-actualisation from a nomothetic perspective

Each person’s meaning in life, or each person’s self-actualisation, is unique. A
common theme in humanistic psychologists is that finding meaning in life is
important. Later authors have shown that it is possible to measure the degree
of meaning or self-actualisation using nomothetic techniques. The ‘meaning in
life questionnaire’ (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006) asks people to rate
their satisfaction with the meaning or purpose of their life. The scale produces
a score that reflects a person’s meaning of life, without that person having to
define what that meaning is. The satisfaction with life scale measures a person’s
satisfaction with life (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). The ‘sense
of coherence scale’ (Antonovsky, 1993) provides a similar sort of measure in
that people are able to rate satisfaction with aspects of life that give it meaning.
Research shows that people who feel that their lives have meaning, whatever
that meaning is, are happier and healthier than those who do not. The silver
lining questionnaire measures the extent to which people find meaning in illness
(Sodergren, Hyland, Crawford, & Partridge, 2004). Research shows that find-
ing meaning in illness promotes recovery (Hyland, Sodergren & Lewith, 2006).
Other recent authors have examined which goals, when satisfied, lead to
happiness. Self-determination theory suggests that happiness is achieved through
the satisfaction of three goals: autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci &
Ryan, 1985). Self-determination theory is based on the nomothetic assumption
that there are ways of achieving self-actualisation that are common to all people,
but that they involve other subgoals, autonomy, competence, and relatedness.
In summary, the insights gained in humanistic psychology have influenced
other areas of psychology. Ideas developed by humanistic psychologists that
were developed originally within an idiographic framework have subse-
quently been used by other psychologists who used nomothetic measurement
and research.
 Everyone is unique ◆ 171

Treating people uniquely

Every psychotherapist would (or should) say that they treat each client as a
unique person. The recognition of the uniqueness of the person is implicit in
the talking therapy of Freud who suggested he was acting as an archaeologist in
uncovering a person’s past. Everyone has a unique past. Everyone has a unique
present. When training a psychotherapist, it is impossible to prepare them in
advance for all the different unique cases they will meet, but it is possible to train
them in features that are common to all or some clients. Amongst the various
humanistic contributors to advances in psychotherapy, Carl R. Rogers (1902–
1987) stands out. Rogers is considered the founder of counselling psychology.
Rogers believed there were three types of knowing (Rogers, 1942, 1951):

Subjective knowing: The knowledge we have of our own consciousness and

which is unique to us. Rogers referred to this as the phenomenal field.
The term phenomena – meaning mental content – derives from the phi-
losopher Husserl (1910/1965).
Objective knowing: The shared knowledge we have of the outside world,
i.e., the kind of knowledge from observing things around us.
Interpersonal knowing: Interpersonal knowledge is the understanding of
one person’s phenomenal field by another person. Rogers’ approach to
psychotherapy focusses on interpersonal knowledge, how a therapist can
understand the phenomenal field of a client. Rogers believed that it was
possible to form and test hypotheses about the interpersonal field of a
client, and so interpersonal knowledge is a falsifiable science and in that
regard like any other science.

Rogers believed that humans are basically good. They are good when they
are free or mature and they are only bad when they are neurotic. This idea of
the fundamental goodness of Rogers’ approach can be contrasted with that of
Freud who thought people were driven by fundamentally bad instincts and only
good because they were constrained to be good by society.
Rogers adopted the idea, proposed by Maslow, that people strive towards
self-actualisation and believed that self-actualisation always manifested itself
positively in one way or another. It is only when people are neurotic that they
deviate from this pattern of goodness. Unkindness and cruelty are a deviation
from the natural human state, not part of it.
Rogers noticed from his clinical practice that clients often referred to them-
selves. They would say things like, “I have not been feeling myself recently” or
“I am not happy with the way I am.” Rogers inferred that the self is something
that is perceived. The self is an organised conceptual gestalt. It is not made
up from lots of different bits and pieces, but is organised as a whole. Further-
more, this whole that is the self can grow and change and yet retain the same
identity. The student applying to go to university is the same person when they
graduate. The phenomenal field of the self remains the same.
172 ◆ Everyone is unique

Are humans good or bad?

The question of whether people are fundamentally good or naturally bad
was debated long before the development of psychology. The Christian
idea of ‘original sin’ suggests that people are basically bad (due to the fall
of Adam) and are redeemed only through the mediation of Jesus Christ. By
contrast, the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) supported
the idea of ‘the noble savage’ who was pure and noble in the natural state.
Rousseau believed that society corrupts what is otherwise a noble human.
The Freudian view coincides with that of Christianity, whereas Rogers’
view is consistent with that of Rousseau. The modern view is that humans
have the capacity for good or evil, and that this capacity is influenced
by environmental factors. There is evidence of a biological bias towards
goodness or badness in some people (Fox, 2017), but the issue of heredity
and environmental contributions to behaviour is complex (see Chapter 7).

Two types of self

Rogers distinguishes two types of self:

The self, also known as the actual self or the real self, refers to the way cli-
ents describe themselves as they are now.
The ideal self refers to the self clients would like to be.

One aim of Rogerian therapy is to reduce the discrepancy between the self and
ideal self. The therapy is linked to the idea of uniqueness of people: The self that
is right for one individual may be different from the self that is right for another.
Rogers’ aim in providing therapy was to help a person become the person they
really are and be satisfied with the person they really are.

Measuring self-ideal–self-discrepancy
The Q-sort technique, used by Rogers, is based on 100 statements that
describe a person, for example, the statements might be ‘am generally
happy’ or ‘get upset easily.’ The statements are written on cards. The client
is first asked to sort the statements into two piles, those that are ‘like me’
and those that are ‘unlike me.’ The cards are then shuffled and the client
is asked to sort the statements into two more piles, those that are ‘like the
ideal me’ and those that are ‘unlike the ideal me.’ The number of differ-
ences in the card allocations between the first sorting and second sorting
determines the discrepancy between the self and ideal self.
 Everyone is unique ◆ 173

Self-consistency or congruence
Rogers adds one more idea to the distinction of the self versus the ideal self.
The client develops the concept of self on the basis of experiences about the
self. For example, if whenever you met someone, they said to you ‘you are
amazingly beautiful,’ you would begin to believe that you are amazingly
beautiful. The concept of congruence is about the relationship between the
perception of yourself, and the objective data with which you are presented.
So, for example, if everyone says ‘you are amazingly beautiful’ and you
believe that you are beautiful, then that is congruence. But if everyone says
‘you are amazingly beautiful’ and you believe that you are ugly, then that
is incongruence. A modern and more easily understood example of incon-
gruence is provided by anorexia. People with anorexia think they are fat,
whereas the objective data – and what everyone else is saying – is that they
are very thin.
Rogers believed that incongruence resulted from childhood experiences and
was unhealthy because it creates a distorted sense of reality, a distorted sense that
can lead to anxiety and depression. Rogers distinguished two ways of bringing
up children: with unconditional positive regard and with conditional positive
regard.
Children brought up with conditional positive regard are disciplined with
the withdrawal of love as a means of punishment. That is, when the child is
naughty, the parent becomes distant and unloving. Children brought up with
unconditional positive regard are not disciplined with withdrawal of love as a
means of punishment. When the children are naughty the children are disci-
plined in one way or another, but the children always believe that they as indi-
viduals are loved – it is the behaviour not the individual that is being punished.
Rogers believed that conditional positive regard was very damaging as children
brought up in this way would learn to believe a reality – the parent’s reality –
that is not their own. That is, in order to regain the parent’s regard, the child
learns to distort reality.

Other selves
Later authors have developed Rogers’ theory further with additional self-related
concepts. Higgins (1987) introduced the distinction between the ideal self (what
you would like to be) and the ought self (what others would like you to be). The
ought self is particularly relevant to feelings of dissatisfaction a person has that
comes from social comparison. Higgins suggests that the discrepancy between
the self and ideal self leads to depression whereas discrepancy between the self
and ought self leads to anxiety. Another approach taken by Markus and Nurius
(1986) is that there are several possible selves, including the past self and future
self. Although people are free to create many sorts of possible self, the self they
create is bound by their circumstances. Later authors have emphasised the mal-
leability of the self concept. This idea of malleability is also found in the fixed
174 ◆ Everyone is unique

role therapy of George Kelly (see earlier in this chapter). A person can become
a different person by choosing to become a different person.

Therapy
Rogers (1957) suggested that six conditions were needed for therapy to be effec-
tive. This is how Rogers defined them:

1 Two persons are in psychological contact.

2 The first, whom we shall term the client, is in a state of incongru-
ence, being vulnerable or anxious.
3 The second person, whom we shall term the therapist, is congruent
or integrated in the relationship.
4 The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client.
5 The therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client’s
internal frame of reference and endeavors to communicate this ex-
perience to the client.
6 The communication to the client of the therapist’s empathic under-
standing and unconditional positive regard is to a minimal degree
achieved.
(Rogers, 1957, p. 96)

Note how Rogers’ definition uses jargon in a way that gives the impression of
a science. ‘Two persons in psychological contact’ simply means that two people
are communicating in some way. Although Rogers presents his theory as scien-
tific, he was aware of the tension between being scientific and a purely human
sense of understanding other people, a tension he discussed in 1955 (Rogers,
1955). During its history, psychology has needed to present itself as a science
in order to gain acceptability within a culture that is dominated by science.
Humanistic psychologists maintained the scientific status of psychology despite
the fact that each person is unique. The tension, between the purely intuitive
and the scientific, is discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of hermeneutical psy-
chology, an approach that rejects the scientific model entirely.
Rogers originally called his therapy non-directive therapy because he wanted
to emphasise the fact that the therapist is not directing the client to a particular
fixed goal. However, he found that other therapists were not as successful as he
was, the reason being that non-directive was being interpreted as disinterested
or even stand-offish. So, in his later writing, Rogers called his therapy client
centred therapy to emphasise the unconditional positive regard and empathic
understanding that was central to his therapy.
Rogers’ client centred approach underpins the common factors or contex-
tual model of psychotherapy (see Chapter 5). The description given by Rogers
 Everyone is unique ◆ 175

earlier about what is needed for effective psychotherapy is very similar to that
described by Frank and Frank (1991) and quoted in Chapter 5. The underlying
assumption shared by Rogers as well as the common factors model is that it
is the therapeutic context that is therapeutic rather than anything specific that
happens in the therapy session. Rogers stresses the importance of the relation-
ship in psychotherapy. The common factors model includes other components,
including the cognitive component of expectancy.
Given the evidence supporting the common factors or contextual model
in contrast to specific models of psychotherapy (Wampold, 2013), one might
wonder why specific models of psychotherapy, such as cognitive behaviour
therapy (Beck, 1967) are more popular and more respected than contextual
models. The reason has to do with one of the weaknesses of the contextual
model, namely that it does not provide an explanation consistent with the
dominant paradigm that symptoms are caused by faults and removed by the
correction of faults.
The dominant paradigm owes its origins to modern western medicine,
which is based on the assumption that symptoms are caused by diseases that
are caused by specific faults (pathophysiology) in the body (see Chapter 5). The
contextual model has difficulty answering this question: What is wrong with
the client and how does the context help? Rogers explains that unconditional
regard might have been lacking in the client’s life, and that the therapist’s
unconditional positive regard helps. But why positive regard has this thera-
peutic function is never fully explained. In the case of response expectancy
theory (Kirsch, 1985), which is one of the other components of the contextual
model, expectancy fails to explain the underlying pathology even though it
provides an explanation of benefit. The components of the contextual model
provide only a partial account of fault and the correction of fault. By contrast,
cognitive behaviour theory (Beck, 1967) explains symptoms as resulting from
erroneous cognitions and that it is the change in these cognitions that then
produces therapeutic benefit. The cognitive behaviour model is based on the
assumption of a specific form of fault that is corrected by a specific interven-
tion, and in this regard is consistent with the assumptions of modern western
medicine, as are psychoanalytic explanations of psychopathology (see Chap-
ter 5). The weakness of the contextual model, the model most associated with
Rogers, is not that it doesn’t work nor that it is inconsistent with the evidence.
Its weakness – if it is a weakness – is that is inconsistent with the assumptions
of a dominant paradigm.

Summary
Nomothetic science explains the generality of people and events. Idiographic
science is the science of the uniqueness of people and events. Most of psychol-
ogy is nomothetic. Experimental, social, developmental, health, and many other
176 ◆ Everyone is unique

topics in psychology provide an account of the ways in which people respond

in the same way to different situations, people respond differently to the same
situation or some interaction of the two. However, every human is unique in
some way and the uniqueness of humans is studied in humanistic psychology.
Allport reinterpreted the concept of a trait from an idiographic perspec-
tive. A trait applies to a person only if the person’s behaviour is consistent
with regard to that trait. Kelly’s theory of personal constructs is based on the
assumption that everyone construes the world in a different way. A person’s
constructs could be assessed through the rep test.
Several authors assume that people are motivated by a goal of self-actualisation
or a search for meaning. People self-actualise in different ways, just as people
can find meaning in their lives in different ways. Although there is uniqueness
in self-actualisation, meaning, and life satisfaction, these concepts can be mea-
sured nomothetically by allowing people to provide their own definitions of
meaning and life satisfaction.
The uniqueness of people is recognised in all psychotherapies, even though
general principles of pathology and health also apply. The uniqueness of the
therapeutic encounter is emphasised in Roger’s psychotherapy, an approach
that underpins modern counselling and the contextual model of psychotherapy.

Essay questions
1 How have psychologists assessed people from an idiographic perspec­
tive and what are the advantages and disadvantages compared with
nomothetic assessment of individual differences?
2 What is self-actualisation, how can it be measured, and what are the
consequences of achieving or not achieving self-actualisation?
3 How has Rogers contributed to the contextual model of psychotherapy
and what are its advantages and disadvantages?
 9
What are the assumptions of
psychologists who use qualitative
research methodology and what
are the alternatives to treating
psychology as a natural science?
178 ◆ Qualitative methods

Whatever exists at all exists in some amount. To know it thoroughly

involves knowing its quantity as well as its quality.
(Thorndike, 1918, p. 16)

Much of psychology uses quantitative measurement of variables in the research

process. Quantitative measurement means that a number can be assigned to the
variable in question. The quote from Thorndike reflected his belief that psy-
chology should employ quantitative measurement, like other natural sciences.
At the same time, the quotation by Thorndike refers to quality. For him, the
understanding of quality was taken for granted.
All quantitative variables differ in terms of quality. Theoretical terms and
observation terms (see Chapter 4) need to be described in terms of qualities.
There are many reasons why qualitative description is part of all sciences.
However, qualitative methods are something more than the qualitative descrip-
tion of quantitative variables, however important that might be. Qualitative
methods are one of the methods used in the discipline of psychology, but these
methods can be used in different ways and with different underlying assump-
tions. The aim of this chapter is to (a) describe the different assumptions of the
different types of use of qualitative methods and (b) describe approaches to
psychology where psychology is treated as something that is different from a
natural science.

The Romantics
The idea that there is a form of non-numeric meaning in the world is a fea-
ture of 19th-century German Romanticism exemplified in Goethean Sci-
ence (Steiner, 1883/1988). Goethean science involves examining objects as
they are and trying to intuit their essence. The essence cannot be ascribed
a number. It is a purely intuitive process of feeling. In Goethean science,
the colour white is a colour which has its own properties and ‘feels’ differ-
ent from other colours. In Newtonian science, the colour white is simply
a combination of all the colours of the rainbow and does not exist as a
distinct colour.

The origin of qualitative research methods

Qualitative research methods do not originate in academic psychology.
They were developed by psychologists who worked in a commercial set-
ting in market research companies. In the 1950s there were two types of
market research and two types of market research company: quantitative
 Qualitative methods ◆ 179

and qualitative. Quantitative market research involved questionnaires that

were used to record people’s quantitative response to particular questions.
For example, a person might be asked how much they would like to buy a
product, or whether they thought a product was useful, with the response
recorded, quantitatively, on a numeric scale. Students may be familiar with
quantitative market researchers who stop them in streets and shopping malls
with a clipboard and who ask them if they could spare a few minutes to
answer some questions.
The method used by qualitative market researchers was different from
that of the quantitative researchers in that no questionnaires were used. Ernest
Dichter (1907–1991) is credited with being the founder of qualitative market
research (Stern, 2004). Dichter was trained in psychoanalysis in Vienna and
obtained a doctorate in psychology in 1934. The Dichters were Jewish (at
one time he lived across the street from Freud, their houses being 18 and 19
Bergasse, respectively) and Dichter originally planned to be a psychoanalyst.
However, he was financially unsuccessful and started working for a market
research company in Vienna. After he was arrested in 1937 (the market research
company was accused by the Nazis of subversive activity), he and his wife fled
to Paris in 1938 and then to America. In America, Dichter joined a market
research company and developed his own unique and different way of finding
‘motivational triggers.’ He set up a consultancy business in 1939 and founded
The Institute for Motivational Research in New York in 1946. Other institutes
using his methods soon appeared.
Dichter was strongly influenced by Freudian theory and so he assumed that
the reason why someone liked a product might not be available to that person’s
conscious. The reason why someone liked something had to be inferred from
the way they talked about it, rather than asking the person directly, and in
particular, how they talked to each other about it. Advertising could then be
linked to the reason someone liked something. For example, Dichter analysed
why people liked soup in order to advise soup manufacturers about advertising
strategy. This is what he wrote:

Soup is endowed with magic power. . . . It protects, heals, and gives

strength, courage and the feeling of belonging. . . . Magic arises from
the brewing together of special ingredients.
(Dichter, 1964, pp. 67–68)

The Campbell soup manufacturing company developed a series of advertise-

ments based on Dichter’s advice. For example, they used the slogan “good for
the body, good for the soul” to market their soups. They also used Dichter’s
interpretation in visual displays involving cherubic looking, rosy cheeked,
happy toddlers where an emphasis was placed on the nourishing bond between
mother and child, all of which was enhanced by the ‘magic’ of Campbell’s soups
(see examples in modern advertising at www.campbells.com).
180 ◆ Qualitative methods

Another example from more recent times illustrates the importance of

hidden meaning in qualitative market research. In the 1960s coffee drinking
was beginning to replace tea drinking in the UK as the socially upward mobile
drink of choice, in part due to the convenience of instant coffee that had been
developed by the company Nestlé. The instant coffee produced by Nestlé was
a brown powder. Also in the 1960s, and in recognition of the popularity of
instant coffee, Nestle developed a granular form of instant coffee that had a
better flavour. However, some people continued to buy the original powder
form and Nestlé wanted to find out why as there was a market for both types
of coffee.
The market researchers used the same technique used by Dichter, namely,
the focus group. The powder coffee drinkers described their coffee as being
“not bitter” and that it “didn’t upset my stomach,” as well as other descriptives
that were all about what the coffee did not do in comparison to the coffee gran-
ules. The researchers inferred from these focus groups that the powder coffee
drinkers didn’t really like coffee – they drank it because it was socially more
acceptable to drink coffee rather than tea. The powder coffee drinkers did not
refer to the social aspects of drinking, but this was inferred by the researchers.
Nestlé used this research to reposition their powder coffee as ‘mild coffee’ and
advertised it with pictures of women in nice, middle class kitchens drinking
coffee with other nice women. The marketing pitch was “this coffee is a good
social activity, rather than this coffee tastes nice.”

Psychologists’ earlier contribution to advertising

W. D. Scott was the first psychologist to develop the science of advertis-
ing, using direct suggestion as well as features of the target group (see
Chapter 3). J. B. Watson (see Chapter 4) had a career in advertising after
he was excluded from universities. Watson advertised products by asso-
ciating them with other positive images (e.g., an attractive woman with a
car). The motivational researchers went yet further by selecting objects to
associate with the product that had the same motivational features as the
product.

Dichter and other market researchers not only tried to understand the moti-
vational basis for consumer objects, they also came up with slogans and strat-
egies for improving sales. When he first moved to America, Dichter advised
Proctor and Gamble on how to sell their soap. He came up with the slogan
“wash your troubles away.” A Proctor and Gamble executive acknowledged
his creativity by writing “You s.o.b., you are really a copy writer” (Stern,
2004, p. 166).
 Qualitative methods ◆ 181

Qualitative research as part of quantitative

natural science
One of the arguments proposed by Karl Popper (Popper, 1963) (see Chapter 1)
is that science proceeds through a series of conjectures and refutations. The con-
jectures are hypotheses about the world. Where do those conjectures come from?
In part, conjectures come from observations. That observation can be accidental
or it can be systematic. When Fleming discovered penicillin (see Chapter 1), his
observation was accidental. However, it is perfectly possible to generate hypoth-
eses by observing the world systematically, and qualitative methods can be used
to assist that systematic observation. Used in this way, qualitative methods are
part of the process of quantitative research and their only aim is to assist quan-
titative research.
A good way of understanding how qualitative research helps quantitative
science is with an example. New pharmacological treatments had been devel-
oped to treat people with severe asthma. A quality of life questionnaire was
needed to assess outcome in clinical trials of these new treatments, but a suit-
able questionnaire was not available.
In order to develop the questionnaire, the researchers needed to find out
how severe asthma affected people’s lives. One possibility was to guess, or to use
clinical experience. Another possibility, and the one used by the authors, was to
find out directly from patients using qualitative research. The authors recruited
a number of people with severe asthma and interviewed them, asking about the
various ways in which asthma affected their lives (Hyland, Whalley, Jones, &
Masoli, 2015). The researchers then constructed a questionnaire on the basis of
those interviews. In order to construct a questionnaire that was written in a way
that patients would find most comfortable, the authors then asked patients to
evaluate their questionnaire using focus groups (Hyland, Lanario, Pooler, Masoli,
& Jones, 2018). In the focus groups, the patients read the questionnaire, com-
mented on it and suggested modifications that were then adopted by the research-
ers. Finally, the patient-modified questionnaire was used to collect quantitative
data validating the questionnaire. It was only after the qualitative and quantita-
tive research that the questionnaire was ready for use for its original purpose as
an outcome measure in clinical trials of new asthma treatments. So interviews
and focus groups were used in the research process, but the qualitative methods
were not an end in themselves, but only to help produce valid quantitative data.
There is an important difference between how qualitative research is being
used in this example and how it was used in earlier qualitative market research.
In the case of questionnaire construction, the statements of patients were taken
at face value. If they said that their sleep was disturbed by asthma, then a ques-
tion on sleep was added to the questionnaire. If they said that one word was dif-
ficult to understand and another was better, then the word was changed. Used
in this way, the patients are simply acting to help the researchers carry out their
182 ◆ Qualitative methods

Qualitative research in drug regulation

The American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published guidelines
for the construction questionnaires measuring ‘patient reported outcomes’
in 2009 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
Administration, 2009). These guidelines identify three stages. The first
stage is concept definition. The second stage occurs when the domains of
quality of life are discovered through qualitative research with patients.
The third stage of quantitative research with patients establishes the reli-
ability and validity of the questionnaire. Prior to that date, many research-
ers published questionnaires without either reporting or carrying out
qualitative research. The FDA guidelines emphasised the importance of
qualitative research in medicine.

research. In fact, many medical grant giving bodies require that patients should
be involved in the design of the research. The technical term for this is patient
public involvement, or PPI. However, psychologists who specialise in qualita-
tive methods would draw a clear a distinction between this kind of informal
use of qualitative research, such as PPI, and their own methodologically more
rigorous use.
When used in questionnaire design there is no attempt to find hidden mean-
ing in words. The term thematic analysis is used to describe an analysis of dis-
course that focusses on the surface meaning of words (Clark & Braun, 2013).
The methodology of thematic analysis involves attention to detail and to coding
of the detail. As the name suggests, thematic analysis is an analysis of themes
in discourse, but without any a priori theoretical assumptions. Words reveal
nothing more than the literal interpretation of what is said. Thematic analysis
could also be described as an application of common sense to understanding
the discourse of others.
Qualitative research can be used to develop methodology, as shown in
the earlier example, but it can also be used in hypothesis generation. Talking
to people can provide information that stimulates hypothesis generation. Of
course, hypothesis generation comes not just from observation but also from
the person doing the observation (see Chapter 1). The really difficult and
important skill of scientific research, the skill that makes an immense differ-
ence to reputation, is in getting the right question. It takes experience to know
what right questions to ask. The most impactful research questions are often
not those that are being asked now, but those that will be important in a year
or two when the data are collected, analysed, and the paper submitted. There
is a purely intuitive process in developing research questions that depends on
the person. Quantitative science depends on an intuitive process that involves
qualitative understanding.
 Qualitative methods ◆ 183

Social constructionism and the theoretical rationale

for qualitative methodology in psychology
The use of qualitative methods in support of quantitative methods is based on
the standard assumptions of quantitative science – if something exists it can
be measured. However, there are those who believe that quantitative measure-
ment destroys or at least obscures some of the essential meaning of something.
Words spoken by people may reveal truths that could not be obtained by asking
direct questions and recording the answers numerically. For these psychologists,
qualitative research should be used as an end in itself, not in support of quan-
titative research.
Social constructionism provided a major impetus to the development of
qualitative methods in academic psychology. It did so because of an explicit
theoretical rationale that supports qualitative methods as an end in themselves.
The term social constructionism is used in several different senses and is used
by both psychologists and sociologists. The term first appears in the title of a
book The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowl-
edge written in 1966 (Berger & Luckman, 1966), and, as the title of the book
implies, it is used in the context of sociology. Social psychologists later used the
term. The term social constructivism has been used to emphasise the develop-
ment of an individual’s meaning in a social context, and therefore to represent a
psychological versus sociological interpretation, but the reality is that the terms
are not used consistently. The term social constructionism was linked with psy-
chology at least by the early 1980s (Gergen, 1985).
The underlying assumption of social constructionism is that the mind, by
which is meant emotions and other conscious experiences, is constructed out of
a social reality that involves other people. That social reality can be explored by
examining people’s conversations or discourses. Qualitative analysis provides
an account of the deep meaning of reality which is not otherwise obtained
by quantitative methods. The focus is on understanding the meaning of what
people say.
Social constructionism represents a movement rather than a unified school
of thought. Edley (2001) suggests that there are two forms of social construc-
tionism, which he calls ontological and epistemic, each of which is based on
a different set of assumptions. The term ontology refers to the study of how
something exists – it refers to existence, becoming, or reality. The term epis-
temology refers to the study of how things acquire meaning. The difference
between the ontological and epistemic forms of social constructionism depends
on whether one believes social (or other) objects exist independently of the
way they are socially constructed by people. The ontological interpretation
is that social construction ‘brings’ objects into existence, and they would not
exist without the people to construct them. The epistemic interpretation is that
objects exist independently of people, but people give meaning to those objects
184 ◆ Qualitative methods

by virtue of the social interactions between people. Edley argues that many of
the criticisms of social constructionism are based on the assumption that social
constructionists support the ontological form whereas he argues that few actu-
ally do. He writes:

Contrary to the view of some critical realists, most social construction-

ists do not see language as the only reality. When they travel to confer-
ences or go on holiday, for example, they consult their map books just
like everybody else. They do not suppose that, say, Nottingham appears
in the middle of the M1 motorway because it says so on the page and
neither do they imagine that it somehow springs into existence at the
moment it is mentioned. . . . Instead, a constructionist might point out
that Nottingham is a city by virtue of a text (i.e., by royal decree) and
that its boundaries – where it begins and ends – are also a matter of
negotiation and argument. The argument is not, therefore that Not-
tingham doesn’t really exist, but that it does so as a socially constructed
reality.
(Edley, 2001, p. 439)

Although social constructionism has its critics (sometimes of the ontologi-

cal rather than epistemic type) the claims made by (the majority of) social
constructionists are consistent with well-established ideas in the philosophy
of science. The idea that meaning is theory laden is not new. Social construc-
tionism can be seen as an extension of the ‘theory ladenness of observables’
proposal of Hanson (1958) (see Chapter 1), who argued that people interpret
the world in terms of their theories. Social constructionism adds a social
aspect to the idea of theory ladenness. People interpret or construct the world
on the basis of social interaction. If socially acquired meaning is bound up
with the description of humans, then an analysis of meaning should be cen-
tral to any analysis of humans. Although meaning can be analysed through
quantitative methods (e.g., the semantic differential, personal constructs),
some would argue that a better way to understand meaning is by listening and
hearing what people say in natural settings. Hence, a major contribution of
social constructionism is that it promoted a form of methodology, qualitative
methodology, that is now accepted as one of the methodologies available to
psychologists.

Academic qualitative methodology versus commercial

qualitative market research
The focus group method was developed by psychologists working as com-
mercial market researchers. That and other methods of analysing talk was also
available to psychologists who wanted to use qualitative methods as a research
 Qualitative methods ◆ 185

tool in an academic setting. The academic psychologists had a problem not

experienced by those working in qualitative market research. In order to fit in
with the presentation of psychology as a science, qualitative researchers had to
show that the qualitative analysis of discourse was a science. (Note: discourse
includes spoken and written speech.) There were three linked requirements to
overcoming this hurdle. The first was to specify a methodology, a methodology
that was accepted by consensus by other researchers. The second was that the
methodology had to ensure the replication of results. Replicability is achieved
when researchers follow the same methodology. The third was a consistent
form of documentation. Documentation provides the basis for replication and
evaluation by others. In order to be accepted and taken seriously by other psy-
chologists – who had defined psychology as a science – qualitative researchers
reinvented the earlier, commercial work as a rigorous qualitative methodology.
The methodology of qualitative research became ‘scientific’ by virtue of its
analysis and documentation (Willig, 2001).
The difference between academic qualitative research and commercial
research is not only one of rigour. The difference is more complex. The basis of
academic scientific research is that it is replicable. Two people in two different
laboratories should get the same result. The attention to method is designed in
part to achieve this replicability of results, so that different researchers produce
the same results, despite those different researchers being different people with
different skills. In commercial market research, however, there is recognition
that the moderator can bring something unique to the focus group, such that
some moderators and the companies they work for provide more insightful
descriptions of products than others.

Qualitative research as a scientific end it itself

Two approaches can be distinguished in those using qualitative research as a
scientific end in itself. First, there are those who use discourse as a way of mak-
ing inferences about the content of the mind. This use is based on the same
assumptions that guided the earlier qualitative market researchers. Discourse
needs to be interpreted to reveal hidden meanings. Methodologies such as
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and interpretative phenomenologi-
cal analysis (Smith, 1996) fall within this first category. Grounded theory is a
theory that is inductive – i.e., induced from qualitative data by a detailed and
systematic examination of the themes and ideas expressed in the discourse.
Interpretational phenomenological analysis draws attention to the study of
phenomenology, the role of the other, and the recognition that researchers
should suspend their own beliefs so they can hear what the other person is
saying. A key feature of both these approaches is that discourse can reveal the
hidden meaning in what people say. This is particularly true of interpretative
phenomenological analysis, though some, who describe their methodology as
186 ◆ Qualitative methods

interpretive phenomenological analysis, do not in fact search for hidden mean-

ing (Brocki & Wearden, 2006).
Second, there are those who study discourse as a form of behaviour where
the detailed description of that behaviour provides insight into the ordinary
interactions between people. In this second approach, the meaning is not
assumed to be hidden in the minds of people. Conversational analysis provides
an example of this second approach. Although there is no search for a person’s
inner meaning, conversational analysis can reveal meaning in the conversation
that may not be apparent to those involved in the conversation. This meaning is
revealed by a detailed analysis of the words themselves. This second approach
is illustrated with the following example.
The mental capacity act of 2005 states that all people, whatever their intel-
lectual impairment, should have the right to make their own decisions, and this
is reflected in the policy of institutions caring for people with mental impair-
ment. Antaki and colleagues (Antaki, Finlay, Walton, & Pate, 2008) wanted to
examine how this was implemented in a particular residential home. In order
to do this, they recorded the conversations between carers and residents and
then analysed these conversations using the techniques of conversational analy-
sis. The authors found that in some cases the carers provided choice in a way
that the residents could understand and could make an informed choice, but
in other cases staff presented choices in a way that the residents found confus-
ing. For example, some staff repeated the choices after the resident had made
a choice, which was interpreted by the resident as a criticism of the resident’s
first choice. The researchers were therefore able to advise the managers of the
care home about training that would enable better interactions between carers
and residents.
Conversational analysis requires training in a form of analysis that provides
a detailed written representation of discourse. An example of text using this
methodology taken from the research described is reproduced here (Antaki
et al., 2008, p. 1172):

8 → Kath [chicken, or beef, (1.0) [or (.) lamb.

9 Vic: [°(beeh-)°
10 Kath: lamb.
11 → Vic: ((nodding)) lah.
12 (0.7)
13 Kath: lamb.
14 (0.5)
15 Kath: ((leaning head right)) or beef.
16 → Vic: ((nodding)) (beeh-) °lahm°,
17 Kath: ((leaning head left)) or chicken,
18 → Vic: ((moves hand forward to point to picture)) (mickeh).
19 Kath: which meat do you want.
20 Vic: ((points to a different picture)) (°mickeh°).
 Qualitative methods ◆ 187

21 Kath: chicken.
22 Vic: ((leans back)) yeh ((nods))
23 Kath: °okay:° ((turns away from Vic)

This text illustrates three features of conversational analysis. The first is that
this form of analysis provides the kind of methodological rigour one would
expect from a science. The second is that discourse is being treated as a form
of data without any attempt to find hidden meaning in the minds of those tak-
ing part. The third is that meaning can be found in the discourse itself that was
not apparent to those taking part. The meaning that this analysis reveals is in
the conversation, not in the minds of those taking part. The conclusions drawn
by the researchers will be clear to anyone reading that extract. Although Kath
wants to make sure Vic is making an informed choice, Vic is having difficulty
negotiating what he is being asked to do because of the way it is being asked.

Psychology not as a science: hermeneutic psychology

The qualitative methods described earlier provide general statements about the
world, statements that, as in the case of the aforementioned example, can be
helpful in a practical sense. These statements are also falsifiable. The data are
replicable, and any conclusions can, in principle, be falsified. The qualitative
methodology used by the majority of psychologists therefore meets the criterion
of a science, that of falsification. However, there are also those who believe that
humans should not be understood in terms of falsifiable statements.
The word hermeneutic derives from the god Hermes, the messenger of the
gods, who transmitted the thoughts – or meaning – of gods to humans. The cen-
tral idea of hermeneutics is that meaning is transmitted between people, and it
is possible to understand another person using intuition. Hermeneutics assumes
that it is possible to take part in the inner life of another person through intu-
ition. A shared understanding of the world makes intuition possible. It is a fea-
ture of being human that allows us humans to ‘rethink’ what the other person
is thinking. The focus on intuition rather than method is something that makes
hermeneutic psychology distinct.

Hermeneutic philosophy does not aim at objective knowledge through

the use of methodical procedures but at the explication and phenom-
enological description of [the] human.
(Bleicher, 2017, p. 2)

Hermeneutic psychology owes its origins to hermeneutic philosophy developed

by the German philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1883–1911). Dilthey (1894/1977)
provided an alternative to the historical analysis of the time where historians
were trying to understand history in terms of general laws. Dilthey suggested
Hermes taking the thoughts of humans to gods.
 Qualitative methods ◆ 189

instead that history should be understood by rethinking the thoughts of histori-

cal characters. He believed this is possible because humans share characteristics
that enable them to have insight into each other’s minds. The understanding
that Dilthey proposed was not based on falsifiable statements, but on the intui-
tive understanding of others. It was based on the imaginative re-creation of the
inner contents of a person’s thoughts based on sympathy borne out of shared
lived experiences (Bevir, 2007).
An important feature of this intuitive approach is that there is an explicit
recognition that the context is important. The context includes the person who
is trying to understand the other. So rather than thinking of ‘understanding the
other’ as being something that can be objective and context free, there is recog-
nition that it involves a relationship with an observer and the context in which
the interaction take place. We cannot be dispassionate observers of each other
(Slife & Christensen, 2013).
Hermeneutic enquiry accepts the relativism that characterises social con-
structionism, but adds one additional feature, sometimes called ‘the criterion.’
Although all interpretations are relative, they are not equally good. The cri-
terion is the extent to which a person is able to gain hermeneutical insight of
another. Characteristics that help hermeneutic enquiry include lack of self-
ishness, open-mindedness, self-effacement, tolerance, and a sincere desire to
understand another person. Harmful characteristics include self-righteousness
and “conscious or unconscious resentment of ideas and positions which differ
from the more common ones, and especially from those held by the observer”
(Bleicher, 2017, p. 34). The quality of the intuitive understanding of the other
depends on the observer, and the extent to which the observer meets the crite-
rion, a criterion that involves a state of mind. All observers are not equal.
The idea of ‘understanding the other’ in an intuitive way is part of Rogers’
approach to therapy (see Chapter 8). However, Rogers presented his work as
part of the scientific tradition in psychology and his theories consist of general
(nomothetic) statements that can apply to all people. Rogers was aware of the
conflict between the intuitive and the scientific. This is what he wrote in one of
his later works in what he described as a personal statement:

I have felt an increasing discomfort at the distance between the rigorous

objectivity of myself as scientist and the almost mystical subjectivity of
myself as therapist.
(Rogers, 1955, p. 267)

And

The essence of some of the deepest parts of therapy seems to be a unity

of experiencing.
(Rogers, 1955, p. 267)
190 ◆ Qualitative methods

Rogers’ description of the therapeutic process in this paper is the same as that
found in hermeneutics – and is at odds with his earlier descriptions of the pro-
cess of psychotherapy as a scientific endeavour. A unity of experiencing does
not produce falsifiable theories. Rogers’ recognition of the tension between
the scientific and non-scientific was made possible because he inhabited both
worlds, a world where psychology was justified to others in terms of science and
an intuitive world of trying to understand the minds of his clients.

Psychology as politics: critical psychology

The term critical psychology is used to describe an approach to psychology that,
as the word suggests, is strongly critical of the way psychology is practised.
As the above sections of this chapter have shown, the dominant scientific and
nomothetic approach to psychology has been criticised in a variety of ways.
However, critical psychology is very critical of psychology.
Why is critical psychology critical of psychology? There are two reasons.
The first and less important reason is the same as that given by those who use
qualitative methods as ends in themselves. Psychology is following the path of
a natural science and in so doing misses the deep meaning that is formed in
social discourse. Critical psychologists therefore support the general criticism
and solution provided by social constructionists – i.e., the rigorous, positivistic,
quantitative methodology so beloved by many psychologists should be replaced
by a more humane, qualitative methodology. The second reason is the one that
really defines critical psychologists. They point out that the practice of psychol-
ogy isn’t some abstract activity that is carried out in an ivory tower. On the
contrary, psychology is a political activity, and that psychologists, often unwit-
tingly, play a political role in society.
There are two consequences of psychology’s failure to appreciate its politi-
cal role. First, psychologists contribute to an unfair and unequal relation-
ship between groups of people, a relationship that can be exploitative. For
example, occupational psychologists help capitalist masters make their workers
work hard, thereby helping the profit of the capitalist masters but not help-
ing workers themselves. There is at least some truth in this criticism. Work
stress is undoubtedly bad for health, but stressed workers can, under some
circumstances, produce more. The reference to capitalism reflects a tendency
in critical psychology to support a Marxist view, or at the very least one that is
collectivist rather than individualist. Other unequal power relations are found
in the relationship between psychotherapists and their clients, between psychia-
trists and their patients, between social workers and their clients, and between
teachers and their pupils. Again, there is some truth in this sort of criticism,
though it certainly does not apply to all therapeutic relationships. As pointed
out in an earlier chapter, Rogerian therapy is based on an explicit rejection of
the idea that the therapist is in control of the patient. Another unequal power
 Qualitative methods ◆ 191

relationship is found between men and women, and this forms part of the focus
of criticism in feminist psychology (Wilkinson, 1996). Feminist psychology also
draws attention to other gender imbalances in psychology – for example, that
whereas the majority of psychology students are female, the lecturing staff in
some universities are (or used to be) predominantly male. Feminist psychol-
ogy is not only critical of the male bias in academic psychology, but also of a
male bias in society which, as in the case of critical psychology, emphasises the
unequal power between two groups of people.
The second consequence of psychology’s failure to recognise its political
role means that that political role is not properly studied. Critical psycholo-
gists therefore aim to remedy this deficit by providing an academic study of the
political role psychologists play. The first issue of the journal Annual Review of
Critical Psychology was published in 1999, and contains a manifesto for what
critical psychology should do (Parker, 1999). The manifesto draws attention to
four components that could be considered to form the subject matter of critical
psychology:

1 How psychology operates to serve those in power.

2 How psychology is culturally constructed and operates within a
historical context.
3 The way people are regulated, manipulated, and surveyed by others.
4 The study of ordinary, everyday practice by psychologists.

Critical psychology can itself be analysed from a political, cultural, and his-
torical perspective. Critical psychology is primarily a UK and to a lesser extent
European phenomenon. It became a recognised contributor to psychological
thought at a time in history when there was a new type of political development
in the UK, called Thacherism. Thacherism was named after the British Prime
Minister 1979–1990, Margaret Thatcher who famously said “There is no such
thing as society.” Margaret Thatcher espoused a form of individualism that
many, including the critical psychologists, felt was wrong. Some undergraduate
psychology courses do not cover critical psychology, though the argument that
psychologists are part of a political and historical context is as true now as it
was in the past.

Summary
Qualitative research methods were first used by psychologists working in
applied settings, not academia, who conducted motivational research to exam-
ine people’s buying habits. Qualitative research can be used by academic psy-
chologists in several ways with different types of assumptions. First, qualitative
studies are used within the context of quantitative science where researchers
use it for hypothesis generation and the refinement of the quantitative research
192 ◆ Qualitative methods

process. When used in this way, i.e., as help in natural science, most researchers
do not search for deep meaning in what people say.
Second, qualitative research is used as an end in itself to answer theoreti-
cal or practical questions. There are several different methodologies that can
be adopted for this purpose, but they all rely on analysing the meaning of
discourse rather than on quantitative assessment. The methodology selected is
carefully selected and followed, and researchers provide a scientific study that is
replicable by others. Discourse is analysed to discover meaning using a process
of inference and hypothesis generation. Qualitative research used in this way
meets the requirements of falsifiability and replicability that are the hallmarks
of a science, but it is a different type of science to natural science. One difference
between qualitative researchers is whether or not the discourse reveals hidden
meanings in the minds of the participants, or whether the meaning of discourse
when used in natural conversation can be inferred from detailed analysis of the
words themselves.
Third, there are those whose approach to qualitative research is explic-
itly non-scientific and who rely on human intuition, using a hermeneutical
approach that is not restricted to the discipline of psychology. In hermeneutic
psychology there is an explicit recognition that their understanding of people
should not be considered a science.
Finally, there are those whose qualitative methodology is part of a rejection
of mainstream psychology in favour of a distinctly political agenda.
This chapter has provided examples to show that qualitative methods, how-
ever they are used, can provide information that cannot be obtained through
quantitative methods. The inner meaning of soup is not revealed by a question-
naire asking people how much they like soup. The words of a questionnaire do
not write themselves. Conversations can create problems of understanding that
are not apparent to those taking part in the conversation. Quantitative research
answers some types of questions; qualitative research answers other types of
questions. Both are useful methods used in psychology.

Essay questions
1 When might it be useful to search for the hidden meaning in discourse
and when might this not be useful?
2 In what ways is qualitative research useful?
3 What is the role of intuition in human understanding and research?
 10
Is the whole greater than the sum
of its parts? From gestalt psychology
to artificial intelligence
194 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

The question addressed in this chapter, the last chapter in this book, is in some
ways the most important question in psychology. It is important because an
answer ‘yes’ can be used to justify the existence of psychology as a discipline
separate from physiology. It is important because the difference between those
assuming yes and those assuming no fuels a controversy that runs throughout
the history of psychology. It is important because artificial intelligence and
therefore the future of humans is linked to the assumption of ‘yes.’ It is impor-
tant because artificial intelligence can act as heuristic for a new type of theory
in psychology, a type of theory that would create a paradigm shift from the
current neurocognitive paradigm – assuming that this is the current paradigm,
which by now the reader will realise is not assumed by all psychologists!
There are two ways of understanding the world: analysis and synthesis. The
process of analysis examines the different parts of something. After analysing
something into its separate ‘bits,’ the whole is found by adding the separate
bits together to make a whole. In the physical sciences this often involves
micro-analysis – i.e., finding the smaller and smaller parts, for example, the
genes in biology or fundamental particles in physics.
The process synthesis shows how the different parts of something interact
and combine such that the whole cannot be understood by the separate contri-
butions of the individual parts. Throughout the history of science, and in sev-
eral different disciplines, there is a tension between those who want to analyse
yet smaller and smaller parts of the jigsaw that is knowledge, and those who
want to see the meaning of the jigsaw as a whole.
The coalescence versus brick wall hypothesis was introduced in Chapter 2.
If the taste of lemonade can be understood as the combination of two separate
tastes, lemon and sugar, then the sensation of lemonade can be analysed into
its separate components. If, on the other hand, lemonade is a unique taste, dif-
ferent from lemon and sugar, then lemonade is a synthesis of sugar and lemon
and must be understood as such. The brick wall versus coalescence controversy
was a debate amongst philosophers in the 19th century, and it is a precursor to
a much more important movement in psychology, the gestalt movement.

The gestalt movement

The gestalt movement was never associated exclusively with one university or
person, nor was it associated with a particular type of psychology. Instead, the
gestalt movement represents an idea that predates the beginning of academic
psychology and continues to be important (Ellis, 1999). The assumption under-
lying the gestalt movement can be summed up in the phrase:

The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The word Gestalt is a German noun meaning shape or configuration – it does

not translate easily into English. The use of this noun reflects the idea that psy-
chological shapes or structures are more than the sum of their parts.
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 195

Phenomena that are now described as gestalt phenomena were discovered

in the middle of the 19th century, long before the gestalt movement was rec-
ognised. The Necker cube was drawn by Necker in 1832 and the old woman/
young girl illusion appeared on a German postcard in 1888. The significance of
the gestalt movement is that an explanation was provided for phenomena that
were previously interesting illusions. The gestalt movement provided theory.
The beginning of the gestalt movement is attributed to a chance observation
made by Max Wertheimer (1880–1943). In 1910, Wertheimer was travelling by
train from Vienna while on holiday, and noticed how an illusion of movement
was created by telegraph wires along the track. This illusion is familiar to many
train travellers – the wires seem to move up and down. The idea of apparent
movement was not new. There was a 19th-century toy called a stroboscope
that exploited this phenomenon, and Lumière invented the Cinématographe in
1895. Wertheimer realised that the phenomenon of apparent movement could
not be explained by the then current theory of movement perception that had
been proposed by Wundt (see Chapter 2) (Wertheimer, 1912). Wundt thought
that apparent motion was caused by the summation of eye movements – i.e.,
you perceive movement because the eyes move. Wertheimer felt and was even-
tually able to show that movement perception was something that ‘more than
the sum of the parts’ of any elements observed by the observer (Ash, 1995).
Wertheimer started to investigate this apparent movement, or the Phi phe-
nomenon as it was called, using himself and two colleagues as observers. Along
with Wertheimer, these two colleagues, Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967) and Kurt
Koffka (1886–1941), are looked on as the founders of the gestalt movement.
Wertheimer used an instrument called a tachistoscope that enabled images
to be presented on a screen at precisely defined times and for precise durations.
Tachistoscopes were standard psychology experimental equipment before the
introduction of computers. As an example of an experiment done by Wert-
heimer, imagine lines placed at slightly different angles, and which we can call
line A and line B, and which can be shown independently on a tachistoscope
screen or on a computer (Figure 10.1).
First, line A is shown on the screen. Then line A disappears, and line
B appears. Then line B disappears and line A reappears again, and so on.

A
B

FIGURE 10.1 Line A appears and then disappears and is replaced by line B, then vice versa.
196 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

Wertheimer was able to vary the rate of alternation between line A and B. He
found that as the rate increased, there came a point when it appeared that a line
was moving between A and B and something was actually visible between them.
The line appears to be rotating around the point where the two lines meet. In
fact, the same experiment is more easily demonstrated by two lights in a dark
room that are separated by a short distance. If the light alternates between A
and B, it appears that the light is moving between A and B and something is
visible between A and B. The demonstration of apparent motion is interesting
but was not novel. Wertheimer’s important contribution, which was published
in 1912 (Wertheimer, 1912), was a modification of this type of phi experiment.
Wertheimer used three lines, two of which are called A, and one B
(Figure 10.2).

B
A
A

FIGURE 10.2 Line B appears then disappears and is followed by lines A and vice versa.

As before, the A and B lines alternate on the screen, but in this case the two
A lines appear at the same time. The B line appears, then the two A lines appear
as the B line disappears, then the A lines appear again and the B line disappears.
This arrangement creates the peculiar impression that the B line moves in two
directions at once – it looks as though the B line splits and moves outwards.
Wertheimer realised that this impression could not be caused by eye movement,
because the eyes cannot move in two directions at the same time. His demon-
stration therefore showed that Wundt’s explanation of how we perceive motion
was false. Motion is not perceived because of the way the eye moves, but is due
the overall pattern of what we see. Why do we see movement from the overall
pattern? The answer is that perception follows certain rules, so that when a
pattern of a particular kind appears, then we perceive according to that rule.
The idea that perception follows rules or principles led over a short period
of time to the discovery of several gestalt principles. Students studying psy-
chology will already be familiar with these principles from the study of visual
perception. They include:

Figure-ground: Several examples of these exist, including the face-vase illu-

sion and young-old woman illusion.
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 197

Continuity: There is an assumption that lines that are interrupted are con-
tinuous (a principle exploited in the ‘three rope trick’ (search online and
you will find videos showing you how to do this).
Proximity: Objects close together are assumed to be connected.
Similarity: Objects that are similar are assumed to be connected.

Gestalt principles also are used in colour perception. The colours of the rain-
bow are well known: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet. So where is
brown? Where is gold? Where is silver? Gold and silver are the easiest ones to
explain. Gold is yellow and silver is light grey with particularly bright highlights
(highlights are the reflections that come off shiny objects). If you examine a
painting of a gold shield, you will see that from a distance the shield really looks
gold, but when you come up close it is simply yellow. The trick is that artists
puts in more highlights than are in the surrounding objects so that you assume
that the object must be shiny gold. Colours such as gold and silver show that
people infer colour not only from the colour impinging on the eye but from the
whole of the visual array.
Brown is a little more difficult to understand. If you have paints that are
red, orange, yellow, green, and blue next to each other, they look like those
colours – i.e., red orange, yellow, etc. However, if you take a colour such as yel-
low, and reduce the amount of light that is emerging relative to its surroundings,
then this ‘yellow’ looks brown. Brown (there are lots of different browns) is the
colour that we infer from knowing that relatively little light is being reflected –
of course, when no light is reflected, then we assume the colour is black. Colour
perception shows that colour is not just a matter of an addition of signals from
the cones in the eye but is an inference that is made from the total array of the
visual image.

Gestalt learning phenomena and other gestalt psychologists

Although much of the early research and phenomena labelled as ‘gestalt’ was
associated with perception, the idea of a gestalt obviously has a wider applica-
tion than perception. The perceptual focus of the early gestalt psychologists was
because most early psychology was perceptual, and the gestalt psychologists
were proposing a new, holistic way of understanding the psychology of the
time. Gestalt psychologists were also interested in learning.
Wolfgang Köhler was one of Wertheimer’s collaborators in his early experi-
ments (Henle, 1971). Köhler’s later work focussed on additional topics includ-
ing human values (Köhler, 1947, 1959, 1966). Köhler investigated insight
learning in chimpanzees (Köhler, 1925), working on the island of Tenerife
at the German Primate Research Centre. He conducted a famous study with
chimpanzees. The study took various forms, but in one form there is banana
outside the chimpanzee’s cage which is just out of arm’s reach. A stick is placed
in the cage with the chimpanzee. After a time, the chimpanzee will pick up the
198 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

stick and hook the banana inside. Repeated study shows, for example, that the
chimpanzee picks up the stick faster if the stick is between the chimpanzee and
the banana rather than at the other end of the cage. The significance of Köhler’s
studies was to show that learning happened in an ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion. At
one point in time the chimpanzee did not know what to do and at the next point
it did. This finding was important because it contradicted the more atomistic
theories of learning that were being developed by animal psychologists working
within the behaviourist tradition (see Chapter 4) where learning was believed to
be a gradual process of the strengthening of stimulus-response bonds. Köhler’s
research showed that learning could be all or nothing.

America
Koffka moved to America in 1924. Wertheimer, who was Jewish, moved
to America in 1933 when the German National Socialists dismissed all
Jewish professors from German Universities – including Nobel prize win-
ners such as Albert Einstein. Köhler published an article in 1933 strongly
criticising German discrimination against Jews (Henle, 1978). Köhler left
Germany for America in 1935. The three men were friends throughout
their academic lives (Brett & Wertheimer, 2005).

Kurt Koffka moved to America before his German friends. He was proficient
in English before he left (Koffka, 1922, 1924, 1935) and his proficiency in
English enabled him to promote gestalt principles in the English-speaking
world (Gibson, 1979). He influenced Tolman (see Chapter 4) and befriended
James J. Gibson (1904–1979), whose book The Ecological Approach to Visual
Perception, published in 1979, is viewed as an important culmination of the
gestalt approach. One of Gibson’s many ideas was that, when people look at a
visual array, they immediately register what objects are for. So, for example, if
a person sees something that has the structure of a path, that person will know
that the path is for walking on. The shape of a hammer will indicate that the
object is for hitting things with. Gibson described these ‘what things are for’ as
affordances.

A path affords pedestrian locomotion from one place to another. . . . An

obstacle can be defined as an animal-sized object that affords collision
and possible injury.
(Gibson, 1979, p. 36)

So an affordance is a gestalt – it is the whole that is perceived directly.

 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 199

Field theories
Many theories in psychology take the logical form of A causes B. The experi-
mental method is suited for assessing such causal statements. Causal statements
are important because they have practical implications. Does spaced learning
help a student revise more than massed learning? Do adverse childhood expe-
riences affect behaviour in later life? Does drinking alcohol on a regular basis
lead to greater happiness? Causal theories of this kind take the form of

S→O→R

Or more generally

Situation/stimulus/environment → person variable/mechanism/processing

→ response/behaviour/mental state

However, any causal relationship is just one of many, many different causal
relations that are happening at any one time. The assumption of the gestalt
movement is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That being the
case, it also makes sense to consider how all the many, many different causal
relations that are happening at one time interact to produce some kind of out-
come. Not only is perception and learning holistic, it also may be that one needs
holistic theories. Field theories are based on the assumption that theories should
explore how all the different causal relations occur together. In this section two
field theories are examined, the field theory of Lewin and inter-behaviourism.
Lewin (1890–1947) was Jewish and like Kofka moved to America in 1933,
as did other Jews who had university careers and had to leave Germany. Lewin
was familiar with gestalt psychology and refers to this in his field theory. The
following quote sums up the essence of Lewin’s field theory:

Whether or not a certain type of behavior occurs depends not on the

presence or absence of one fact or of a number of facts as viewed in
isolation but upon the constellation (structure and forces) of the specific
field as a whole.
(Lewin, 1939, p. 889)

Lewin suggests that behaviour is the result of different forces that result from a
person’s “life space” where life space consists of all the different experiences and
motives that make up a person. Lewin suggests that behaviour can be consid-
ered a path through this life space, and he gives a name to this space, hodologi-
cal space. Lewin was influenced by newly developed mathematics of topology
and he invented symbols to represent the various concepts in hodological space.
In his most detailed publication of his theory (Lewin, 1938), he provides four
200 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

pages of symbols that are used in the diagrams which he created to represent
hodological space. This type of representation looks very scientific!
Although field theory naturally stems from gestalt principles, field theory
was also developed by a behaviourist, Jacob Kantor (1888–1984). Kantor
had worked with Skinner (see Chapter 4) whom he admired, but felt that the
interactional nature of behaviourism was not sufficiently developed (Morris,
1984). Kantor proposed a form of behaviourism called inter-behaviourism
(Kantor, 1970). Kantor suggested there was a bidirectional causal connec-
tion between stimulus and response, instead of the single-directional, stimu-
lus-causes-response approach taken by other behaviourists. Kantor’s approach
is described as ecological behaviourism. He suggested that the stimulus-response
interaction takes place in a context and it is the context that is neglected in other
behaviourist approaches to understanding behaviour.
What these different field theories have in common is the idea that it is not
possible to isolate the organism and study it separately from its natural environ-
ment. It is the interaction with the natural environment that is important. The
idea of understanding behaviour in terms of a number of simultaneous causal
interactions is found not only in field theories of psychology, it is the most basic
assumption in the study of ecology. Ecologists study the mutual interactions of
species in the total environment. Some argue that experimental studies fail to
provide a true picture of the mechanism’s underlying behaviour because they
lack ecological validity. The term ecological validity is based on the assumption
that a valid – i.e., true – account of human behaviour requires investigation in
its natural setting, not in the laboratory
Field theories can be considered an extension of ideas first proposed by the
gestalt psychologists. Sharps and Wertheimer sum up the contribution of the
gestalt movement to modern psychology as follows:

Several points for modern psychology emerge from the Gestalt perspec-
tive. Phenomena should be studied within their full context; there is a
need to acknowledge the domain specificity of principles in experimen-
tal psychology; it is wise to study phenomena that either exist in the real
world or have close real-world analogues; psychology must recognize
interchanges between organisms and surroundings as determinants of
behaviour.
(Sharps & Wertheimer, 2000, p. 315)

Field theories in psychology are intuitively plausible. So why are they practically
unknown? Students reading this book could ask fellow students whether they
have heard of either Lewin or Kantor. Lewin and Kantor suggested how psy-
chology theory should be constructed. The problem is they never demonstrated
that this type of theory was able to solve problems that could not be solved by
other existing theories – despite Lewin being committed to the practical use
of psychology. The history of psychology is one where different people have
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 201

advocated different types of psychology. If all that is done is to recommend

a particular type of theory, then this advocacy eventually disappears. What is
needed is a demonstration that the particular approach or theory can provide
an answer not provided elsewhere. That is the reason this book has given exam-
ples of how particular approaches can be used in practice (for example, that of
conversational analysis in the previous chapter). Field theories were never used
in practice, despite their intuitive plausibility. They are important because the
problem of multiple simultaneous causes was eventually solved with the devel-
opment of connectionist psychology and artificial intelligence.

Why do emergent properties occur?

What is the difference between a living organism and a dead one? This question
is at the root of why emergent properties occur. Several explanations were pro-
vided for the difference between living and inanimate objects during the 19th
and early 20th centuries. A popular one was that living organisms have a ‘vital
force’ that leaves them when dead. This idea of a vital force was used by Mary
Shelley in her book Frankenstein. Shelley proposed that this vital force came
from a newly discovered force, the force of electricity.
The psychologist William McDougall (1871–1938) had a number of inter-
ests outside psychology. In his last book, The Riddle of Life (McDougall, 1938),
McDougall reviews several explanations for the difference between living and
inanimate matter. These explanations included animistic ones (such as that used
by Mary Shelley) which McDougall dismisses as being unscientific. One of the
explanations favoured by McDougall is that put forward by Max Loewenthal
in his book Life and Soul, which was published in 1934. Although Loewenthal
strays into animistic theories, which McDougall rejects, Loewenthal makes the
prescient suggestion that living organisms are different from non-living matter
because of organisation. The reason for this hypothesis is that snails can be
frozen to –120 °C when they appear dead but, if carefully thawed, come back
to life. As a ‘life force’ or any form of energy cannot exist at such low tempera-
ture, Loewenthal suggests that life must have something to do with structure, a
structure that is independent of temperature. The nature of this structure was
not known.
It is now known that it is a particular type of structure that makes life
possible. It is the same network structure that forms the basis for artificial
intelligence (AI) and a type of structure that gives rise to a parallel distributed
processing (PDP) system. A PDP system is one where processing is occur-
ring over the whole network at the same time. It is the existence of network
structure and parallel distributed processing that makes emergent properties
possible, including the emergent property of life. Research and understanding
of networks can therefore be seen as the solution to a problem that the gestalt
psychologists failed to answer: How exactly are patterns recognised as a whole?
Artificial intelligence.
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 203

Artificial intelligence (AI)

There are a number of key steps in the discovery of AI, and two are described
here, the work of the behavioural psychologist, Donal Hebb (1904–1985) and
the collaboration between the neuropsychiatrist Warren McCulloch (1898–
1969) and mathematician Walter Pitts (1923–1969).
Donald Hebb published his book, Organization of Behaviour: A Neuro-
psychological Theory in 1948. Hebb was interested in discovering what hap-
pened in the brain when learning took place, in particular the type of learning
known as classical conditioning. Hebb knew that the brain was a network of
inter-connected neurones, and came up with a simple proposition, a proposition
now known as the Hebbian learning rule. The Hebbian learning rule is that if
two neurones fire simultaneously, then the connection between those two neu-
rones strengthens. The rule is sometimes stated by the slogan:

Neurones that fire together get wired together.

Hebb showed that networks can adapt or learn if they follow rules. Several
other rules were later developed to show how networks could learn.

Different types of leaning rule

A distinction is made between unsupervised and supervised learning rules.
The Hebbian learning rule is unsupervised in that there is no external
agent giving feedback. Other rules can explain ‘supervised learning’ where
the network learns to recognise patterns on the basis of feedback from a
‘teacher.’ Supervised learning explanations are used in several applications
of AI, including pattern recognition and behavioural adaptation.

McCulloch and Pitts developed their ideas through the inter-disciplinary collab-
oration of neuroscience and mathematics (Abraham, 2002). Inter-disciplinary
developments can be some of the most important in the development of sci-
ence. The McCulloch-Pitts model is based a simple assumption (McCulloch &
Pitts, 1943). Suppose there is a network of neurones that are either ‘on’ or ‘off.’
Then assume that this on-off state of a neurone corresponds to true-false in a
logical argument. McCulloch and Pitts showed that variation in the connection
strengths between the neurones in a network could produce on-off or true-false
states that followed the rules of logic. The contribution of their approach was to
show that networks could solve problems, simply by the connection strengths
of the neurones.
204 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

The two pieces of the jigsaw, from Hebb and from McCulloch-Pitts, were
put together in what become known as connectionist psychology (Ellis & Hum-
phreys, 1999). A network system can learn and in doing so solve problems. In
adapting to their inputs, networks can learn to function better in their envi-
ronment. Connectionist psychology and artificial intelligence are based on the
same assumption. The assumption is that in order to understand or mimic the
intelligence of a human, it is necessary to have a structure of a network where
multiple, simultaneous causal connections occur. Pattern recognition is one of
the achievements of AI, and the way an AI system recognises a pattern provides
an answer to the question that the gestalt psychologists were never able to
answer, how patterns are recognised.
How is a pattern recognised? How do we recognise the letter A when hand-
writing differs so much between people? One way would be to have a series of
templates, of different kinds of A. For example, the following are the letter A
using different fonts

A  A  A  A  A

Any new letter could be compared with a storage bank of letters A to see
whether or not the letter was an A. The problem with the template approach is
that it will recognise the letter A only if it has been seen in that format before.
The templates here would fail to recognise a letter A that has never been written
before, but which you, the student, will recognise as a letter A.

Humans – and machines that mimic humans – are able to recognise the letter
A in a format that has not been seen before. Pattern recognition requires an
understanding of the relationship between the elements of the pattern – the
relationship between the lines that make up a letter A, for example.
Pattern recognition devices, i.e., devices capable of recognising a letter even
if that form of the letter has not been seen before – use neural network structure
similar to that shown in the Figure 10.3.

Input layer Hidden layer Output layer

O O
O O
O O O
O O
O O

FIGURE 10.3 In this figure, there are three layers of neurones, input, hidden, and output.
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 205

The input layer receives inputs from the external environment. Each input
node is either on or off depending on its input from the external environment.
Figure 10.3 shows only five input nodes, but there can be many more. The input
nodes could also be arranged in a two-dimensional array connected to detectors
that detect whether a point in a pattern is either black (i.e., a line passes through
that point) or white (a line does not pass through that point). Just one input
layer is shown in the figure, but additional hidden layers can be added one after
another, all connecting with each other.
The neurones in the output layer – just one is shown in the Figure 10.3,
but there could be more – provide the answer, for example whether the
pattern is an A or not. Figure 10.3 shows that information is processed in
parallel – hence a parallel distributed processing system, rather than a lin-
ear system where one logical process is followed by another. The perceptive
student will ask, “but how exactly does this parallel distributed processing
system provide the correct answer?” It does it by getting the correct strengths
of connection between the all three layers, input, hidden, and output. The
strengths of connection can vary and once they are exactly right, then the
system will correctly recognise patterns such as the letter A. The perceptive
student will point out, “yes, but how do you get the connection strengths
exactly correct? The diagram looks incredibly complicated and it looks
like an impossible task.” The answer is that a human does not work it out.
Instead the answer is provided from a type of machine learning, called super-
vised learning.
Supervised learning occurs when a network adapts on the basis of feedback.
First, the network needs to be trained. Training is achieved by presenting the
network with letters of the alphabet in different fonts, some of them being As,
and providing the network with information about whether the letter is an A
or not. Then, if the network adapts using a ‘supervised learning rule’ or algo-
rithm, then the connection strengths will gradually change so that eventually
they are just right to be able to detect whether a letter is an A or not. There are
several different possible supervised learning rules, but they all provide a way
of gradually changing the connection weights until they provide the correct
solution. So long as the network adapts – i.e., the connection strengths change –
in accordance with the learning rule, then, after training, the network will be
able to correctly identify the letter A, whatever form that A takes. This form of
learning is also referred to as ‘deep learning.’
Supervised learning or deep learning shows an important feature of artificial
intelligence. After training, a machine will be able to perform tasks that it has
not been programmed to perform. The human does not have to write the rules
for task performance. The machine learns those rules by itself. The machine is
capable of learning something that the human has not been able to make. The
science of artificial intelligence was motivated by a desire to create a machine
to do what humans are capable of doing. However, in creating artificial intel-
ligence, scientists have been able to demonstrate how humans do what they are
capable of doing.
206 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

Example of a learning rule

Supervised learning rules are based on mathematical rules and are beyond
the scope of this book. Here is one example, called the back-propagation
method. First, calculate the difference between the actual and desired out-
put and multiply this by some function of the inputs to that output unit.
This calculation creates an error term. Then, using that error term, adjust
the weights of the connections from the penultimate layer in the network
to the output unit. Repeat this procedure between the penultimate units
and the layer behind them, and then repeat back through all the other
network layers back to the input layer.

The human ability to recognise patterns, an ability demonstrated by the

gestalt psychologists, is possible because the brain uses a network structure.
Information is encoded in the connections between the nodes in the network –
as Hebb originally suggested. When people see a hammer, they realise that
it is used for hitting, and when they see a road, they realise that it is used
for walking because actions – i.e., affordances – are just some of the many
connections in the network of information that is encoded in the brain. It
is the network structure of the brain that gives humans (and other animals)
the capacity to process, understand, and respond to their environment in the
way they do.

Parallel versus sequential processing machines

Artificial intelligence is now part of everyday life and will become more
and more important as time passes. Phones and tablets provide predictive
text, where each device learns its own user’s use of language. Predictive text
is made possible because of a network architecture. Life is made possible
because of a network architecture. However, phones and tablets are not
alive. As everyone knows, iPhones do not grow up and become iPads. What
is going on?
Computers, tablets, and phones are sequential processing machines. They
have the same basic structure that they have had since the very first computers.
They perform tasks one after another. However, modern computers are very,
very fast. Because of their incredible speed, they can do the calculations that are
needed to simulate a parallel processing machine. Parallel processing is com-
plex, but is simply a matter of mathematics. The sequential processing machine
is sufficiently fast that it can give the appearance of doing the same tasks as a
parallel processing machine.
Your phone, tablet, and computer are not alive, and if robots of the future
are simply extensions of the same processing structure of modern computers,
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 207

then the robots of the future will not be alive. If, however, it becomes possible
to make a truly parallel processing machine in the way that humans are parallel
processing, then one can certainly raise the question as to whether the machine
is alive and should be granted the rights of ‘wet’ organisms. Who knows what
the future will bring? As a student watching episodes of Star Trek, I thought
the communication devices were an impossibility. Mobile phones are now
taken for granted.

Modular versus connectionist psychology

Cognitive psychology, like any other part of psychology, developed on the basis
of assumptions. The assumption of cognitive psychology is that the information
is processed in the brain in the same way that it is processed in a computer – a
sequential processing computer. This assumption forms the basis of Fodor’s
modularity approach to the mind. Information is processed in modules that
have different functions (see Chapter 6). Each process is completed in a module
before the next one takes place.
Connectionist psychology provides a challenge to the modularity theory of
mind (Massaro, 1990). Examination of this challenge falls outside the remit of
this book, but here is an example why connectionist psychology is a new con-
ceptual approach to information processing.
Suppose I ask you the question, “what is big, red, and found in Lon-
don?” You may guess straight away, “a London bus.” How do you do this so
quickly? What you do not do is search through a module of all big objects, a
module of all red objects, a module of all things in London, and find the one
object that is common to all three. A computer could do it this way because
a computer is incredibly fast, but it would take a human too long. People
immediately realise “a London bus” because information isn’t organised in
modules. Instead, information is organised as a network of concepts, where
concepts are nodes connected to other concept nodes with connections of
varying strengths. The word red is a node connected to everything that is red.
The word big is connected to everything that is big, and the word London is
connected with everything in London. When I ask you “what is big, red, and
found in London?” what happens is that the connections from all three nodes
become activated and the combined activations all link to one concept, that
of a London bus.
Modern pattern recognition devices use the same logic. They look for con-
nections not for templates in modules.

Networks, emergent properties, and the reduction

of psychology to physiology
Networks are intuitively difficult to understand because so many causal rela-
tions are occurring at the same time. It is easy to understand A causes B causes
C. But it is not easy to understand simultaneous cause between multiple nodes
208 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

in a network. One way of getting an intuitive understanding of networks is

to consider a flock of birds. Birds form flocks that fly through the air, often in
beautiful patterns. Have you ever watched a flock of birds and wondered how it
happens? How is it that different species of birds form flocks in different shapes?
It looks magical. Magic is simply a mechanism that is not understood. If you
don’t want the magic taken out of flocks of birds, skip the next paragraph.
The shape of a flock of birds is an emergent property. It is achieved because
each bird follows a rule. The rules are slightly different between species, but
they all involve some kind of copying of the behaviour of neighbouring birds.
The shape and behaviour of the flock are achieved by all the elements of the
network following the same simple rule. The shape of the flock of the birds is an
emergent property. It cannot be predicted from the behaviour of a single bird,
only from the behaviour of the flock as a whole. If the brain (and body) is a net-
work system, then there will be emergent properties that cannot be reduced to
individual neurones. The network structure and its consequent emergent prop-
erties therefore provides an explanation for why psychology cannot be reduced
to physiology. Psychology depends on physiology, in the same way that a flock
of birds depends on the individual birds themselves, but there are psychological
properties that cannot be predicted from physiology – assuming, of course, that
the underlying structure is one of a network.

Clocks versus flocks

A mechanical clock (the sort with six cogwheels) is a sequential process-
ing system. A flock of birds is a parallel processing system. If one cog in
the clock is damaged or missing, then the entire clock stops functioning. If
one bird in a flock of birds drops dead, then the flock continues without
interruption. Sequential processing systems are sensitive to local error.
Network systems are not. The fact that the brain has some, but not infi-
nite, plasticity when damaged might suggest that there is some modularity
and some connectionism in the way the brain works.

Robotics and psychology

There was a fundamental weakness of the field theories described earlier. These
theories presented an intuitively correct idea about simultaneous multi-causality
but did not develop useful theories, i.e., theories that were able to solve applied
problems (see Chapter 3). What about psychology and robotics? Robots are
particularly interesting because, unlike the computer that sits on your desk,
robots can engage in spontaneous behaviour. Robots may be driven by AI and
deep learning, but their ability to behave makes them more human-like than a
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 209

computer. Psychologists have already made contributions to the understanding

of human-robot interactions. The ‘uncanny valley’ hypothesis proposes that
there is a non-linear relationship between the human realism of a robot and
likeability (Mathur & Reichling, 2016). People prefer robots that are recog-
nised as non-human or robots that can be mistaken for humans. Robots that
are almost human (i.e., imperfect humans) are considered creepy.
Psychologists can contribute to the development and use of robotics, but
what about the other way round? Can an understanding of robotics help in
the development of psychology? The adaptive network theory is an example of
how AI and robotics acts as a heuristic for a new type of theory, with practical
application in helping people with somatic and psychological symptoms.

The adaptive network theory: an example of how AI can help

theory development in psychology
The adaptive network theory is based on the assumption that symptoms are
the result of biological symptom-causing mechanisms, but the mechanisms
form a network of nodes with connections between the nodes. This network
of nodes has emergent properties and so should be understood not in terms of
biology but in terms of information in a network (Hyland, 2011, 2017). The
information network is an adaptive system and receives inputs from informa-
tion that is psychologically mediated and biologically mediated (as suggested by
biopsycho­social interactionism, see Chapter 6).
In addition to having the structure of a theory consistent with biopsycho-
social interactionism, the adaptive network theory assumes that symptoms
and emotional states have the function of guiding behaviour. This additional
assumption is not novel. William James suggested it over a hundred years ago
(see Chapter 3). Symptoms adapt the body to the current environment and one
of their functions is to inhibit behaviour. The following is a list of symptoms
and how they are adaptive in inhibiting behaviour.

Pain – prevents injury.

Fatigue caused by infection or injury – enhances healing through resting.
Sadness – prevents continuation of unsuccessful activity.
Anxiety – prevents exposure to danger.

The novel part of the adaptive network theory is the proposal that the body
adapts when symptoms fail to have their intended function, and it adapts by
increasing the intensity of the symptom. If a person doesn’t listen and respond
to what the body is trying to tell them, then the body shouts louder. A simi-
lar idea had been presented some 30 years previously. The control theory of
depression suggests that failing to disengage from unattainable goals leads to
depression (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Hyland, 1987). The weakness of the con-
trol theory explanation of depression is that it did not explain why persistence
210 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

in unattainable goals leads to depression. The science of AI shows how this is

possible. Developments in AI show that if a control loop is part of an intelligent,
adaptive system, then this is precisely what will happen. The parameters of the
control loop will adapt if control is not being achieved.
The adaptive network theory provides a new paradigm for understanding
symptoms. Instead of viewing symptoms as the result of a fault that is either
psychological or biological, the theory presents symptoms as an adaptation
which, from the patient’s perspective, has gone wrong. The theory proposes
that non-adaptive psychological and biological states creates ‘stop signals’ in an
information network. The stop signals create symptoms that inhibit recurrence
of the non-adaptive states, for example, by creating short-term symptoms of
pain, fatigue, sadness, or state anxiety. The stop signal encodes the instruction
to ‘stop doing whatever you are doing’ and the stop signal and symptom dis-
appears once the behaviour stops. However, when stop signals and associated
symptoms repeatedly fail to stop behaviour, doing so over a period of time, then
the stop signals potentiate and become fixed to form a stop programme. The
stop programme encodes the instruction ‘whatever you are doing is unhelpful
so stop doing things,’ and the stop programme creates potentiated and persist-
ing symptoms such as unexplained pain, severe fatigue, depression, and trait
anxiety. The body has adapted in a way that inhibits any behaviour. A sche-
matic representation of the theory is shown in Figure 10.4.
There are several reasons why people will persist in activities despite stop
signals and symptoms that inhibit behaviour. People can ‘keep going’ despite

Psychological stressors: Short-term Chronic fatigue, pain,

danger, goal frustration,
sadness, state depression, trait
over-activity
anxiety, anxiety, altered
tiredness, pain cognitions

Stop signal Adaptation resulting Stop programme

from persisting
activity despite
symptoms

Biological stressors: injury, Short-term immune Persisting immune

infection, over-activity, activation, autonomic activation, autonomic
cold, hunger and endocrine and endocrine changes
changes creating causing chronic somatic
somatic symptoms symptoms

FIGURE 10.4 
Schematic representation of the adaptive network theory. Stop signals encode the
instruction to ‘stop doing whatever it is that you are doing at the moment.’ The stop
programme encodes the instruction to ‘stop everything that you are doing.’
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 211

pain and fatigue because of social obligations, because of work obligations,

because of educational goals, because they find something very interesting, or
because they find themselves in a situation where persistence is the only reason-
able response to a difficult situation. The message to students is the same one
that arises from the theory of reactive inhibition (see Chapter 4). Listen to what
your bodies are telling you. Don’t work too hard!
The theory can inform the treatment of any of the symptoms shown in
Figure 10.4 (symptoms that tend to covary), but is currently being used only
to treat unexplained symptoms of functional disorders (Hyland, 2017) where
biological and psychological interventions have limited success (Henningsen,
Zipfel, & Herzog, 2007).

Treatment
‘Body reprogramming’ is the name given to the educational intervention
based on the adaptive network theory (Hyland et al., 2016). The aim is
to explain to patients why they became ill and how they can help them-
selves by engaging in behaviours that do not create stop signals, see www.
bodyreprogramming.org. Patients are taught how to teach their bodies
that the world is a safe and rewarding place using evidence-based lifestyle
change such as relaxation, stress avoidance, positive experiences, exercise,
and nutrition.

The adaptive network theory provides a historical account of the development

of symptoms in terms of past events, and therefore adds to existing models of
illness. For example, Beck’s theory of depression (Beck, 1967) is based on the
hypothesis that depression is the consequence of erroneous cognitions, but does
not explain the historical antecedents to those erroneous cognitions. The adap-
tive network theory shows how erroneous cognitions can be one of the outputs
from a network that has adapted to a particular lifestyle. The adaptive network
theory adds to the kindling hypothesis of depression and other stress-health
theories as it predicts that the effects of stressors depend on how those stressors
are interpreted within an intelligent system. Consequently, predictions based
only on severity and frequency of stressors may be poor predictors of the health
consequences of stress (Monroe & Harkness, 2005).
The adaptive network theory can be used to illustrate many of the prin-
ciples covered in this book. First, science proceeds best by bold conjectures or
hypotheses, but the hypotheses must be tested (see Chapter 1), because bold
conjectures may be false. It is the lack of testing that was a problem with psy-
choanalytic theories (see Chapter 5). A therapy can be effective for any one of
many possible reasons, so evidence that therapy is effective provides only weak
evidence to support a theory on which the therapy is based (see Chapter 5).
212 ◆ From gestalt psychology to AI

There is evidence consistent with the predictions of the adaptive network theory
that is separate from effectiveness of therapy (Hyland, Lanario, Wei, Jones, &
Masoli, 2019; Melidis, Denham, & Hyland, 2018), but evidence merely cor-
roborates and never proves a theory. The existing data may be explainable by
another theory, and future data may falsify the theory. The adaptive network
theory is an example of a theory being used to solve an applied problem (see
Chapter 3), but its relative usefulness compared to other theories is yet to be
evaluated. The theory combines the idea of adaptation and information pro-
cessing (see Chapter 4) and provides a paradigm where humans are understood
in terms of a mechanism similar to that found in robots. Some may argue that
this paradigm is a travesty of what it means to be human, where humans have
spiritual needs (Chapter 8) and where deep learning is no substitute for deep
meaning (Chapter 9). Others may argue that in the long run developments
in neuroscience will provide a better understanding (in what sense better?)
of the phenomena explained by the adaptive network theory. The theory is a
biopsychosocial theory in that symptoms result from an interaction between
have psychological and biological causes. That interaction taking place in an
information level consistent with the mechanistic explanations of cognitive psy-
chology (see Chapters 4 and 6), but the usefulness of this approach in contrast
to a purely physiological or purely psychological one may prove in the long
term to be deceptive. The original hypothesis was informed by observation and
qualitative information from patients (see Chapter 8), but failure to do a proper
qualitative analysis is a shortcoming in any understanding of the phenomenon
of functional disorders. Finally, any theory, however ardently supported by its
inventor (as this one is) has a good potential for being wrong. Science advances
only when conjectures are found to be false and new conjectures proposed.

Exam anxiety
Many students experience exam anxiety. According to the adaptive net-
work theory, exam anxiety is caused by a history of exam taking. Each
time a child takes an exam, they are engaging in a behaviour that creates
anxiety. Their bodies are telling them to stop doing things that signal dan-
ger, but they keep on putting themselves in (what the body interprets as)
danger by taking exams. Social and other pressures cause people to ignore
what their bodies are telling them to do. The adaptive network theory
predicts that the degree of exam anxiety in students should be correlated
with the number of exams taken previously – a prediction consistent with
observation (McDonald, 2001).

The history of psychology shows that new technologies can provide the oppor-
tunity for new paradigms in psychology. The original aim of AI was to create
 From gestalt psychology to AI ◆ 213

machines capable of simulating the intelligence of humans. Those machines can

now do more than simulate what humans can do. The adaptive network theory
uses AI to develop a new way of thinking about how the body functions as an
adaptive system that is simultaneously biological and psychological. The origi-
nal aim of AI is reversed. Instead of modelling machines on humans, theories to
explain human behaviour can be modelled on what AI machines do. Whether
this approach will lead to a new paradigm in the future is impossible to tell.
One things that the history of science shows for certain: Paradigms do not last
forever. Science changes as it advances. Psychology will change.

Summary
The idea that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ was suggested by
gestalt psychologists using perception as an example of this phenomenon. Later
the idea was applied to learning to show that learning was (or could be) all or
none rather than incremental. This idea of holism influences field theorists and
underpins the idea of ecological validity. What happens in the laboratory may
not happen in real life. Finally, the emergence of network theory in the 1940s
and 1950s led to connectionist psychology in the 1980s and the start of the new
technological revolution, that of artificial intelligence.
The development of factory production lines coincided with rise of behav-
iourism. The sequential processing computer coincided with the rise of cogni-
tive psychology. Parallel processing, the basis of AI, is a new technology that
could be more revolutionary than the other two technological revolutions. Con-
nectionist psychology is based on the assumption that concepts form the nodes
of a network and the psychological processes reflect an underlying network
architecture. The adaptive network theory is based on the assumption that the
body is a network with emergent properties and that particular patterns of life-
style lead to adaptations that create symptoms.
The discipline of psychology has changed over the 150 years of its history,
and will continue to change. When historians of psychology look back in 50
years’ time, what will they see?

Essay questions
1 What were the main achievements of the gestalt movement?
2 What is machine learning and how has machine learning and artificial
intelligence contributed to psychology?
3 Scientific paradigms change. Behaviourism lasted about 50 years, and
cognitive psychology and humanistic psychology about the same length
of time. What do you think the discipline of psychology will be like 50
years from now?
 11
The changing assumptions
of psychology
216 ◆ The changing assumptions of psychology

This chapter provides a summary of the different assumptions that psycholo-

gists have made during the history of psychology up to the present day and
which have been described over the course of this book.

Science and psychology

Psychology is a science that makes quantitative predictions like physics or
chemistry and is tested by the extent that quantitative data are consistent
with the formulae that predict behaviour.
Psychology is a science that makes qualitative predictions like medicine
and agriculture and is tested by statistical tests involving quantitative
variables.
Psychology is a science but one that is fundamentally different from natural
sciences. Qualitative methods provide a systematic and replicable way of
interpreting discourse, in some cases finding the hidden meaning that lies
behind what people say.
Psychology is not a science but is an intuitive way of understanding other
people’s minds, which is made possible by shared human experience.

Types of research
Humans are fundamentally the same as animals and so animal research advances
our understanding of human psychology.
There are significant differences between humans and animals so animals
cannot form a substitute for people in the study of psychology.
Psychology is a pure science whose aim is to understand basic processes.
Psychology is an applied and non-applied science where non-applied theo-
ries can have application following translational research.
Psychological research conducted in laboratories and on undergraduates
generalises to the general population and everyday life.
Psychological research conducted in laboratories lacks ecological validity;
to be valid, research needs to be carried out in the context to which it is being
applied.

Aims of psychology
The aim of psychology is to document the elements of consciousness and the
connections between those elements.
The aim of psychology is to explain how associations (operant and classical
conditioning) lead to changes in behaviour and so enable humans to predict and
control behaviour.
 The changing assumptions of psychology ◆ 217

The aim of psychology is to understand the effects of the unconscious mind

on mental health and behaviour.
The aim of psychology is to explain how information is processed, how
memories are formed, and how decisions are made.
The aim of psychology is to understand how conscious experience (‘phe-
nomena’) affects what people do.
The aim of psychology is to understand the meaning of what people say.
The aim of psychology is to create change in society.
The aim of psychology is to understand the relationship between physiology
and psychological processes in order to predict behaviour.
The aim of psychology is to use the insights gained from the development
of artificial intelligence in order to better understand psychological phenomena.
The aim of psychology is to provide solutions to one or more problems
relating to mental health, somatic health, criminality, work experience, educa-
tion, and any other of the many problems afflicting humans.

Essay question
1 What assumptions do you support and why?
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 Index

Ach, M. 69–70 contextual model see common factors

adaptive network theory 209–212 control theory 93–95, 209
advertising 59, 77, 179–180 conversational analysis 186–187
aesthetics 31–32 counselling psychology 171–173
affordance 152, 198 Craik, K. 93
aircrib 82 creativity 9, 11–12, 14, 43, 105
Allport, G. 161–162 critical psychology 190–191
American psychological association 52, 54,
57, 103, 160, 166 Darwin, C. 51, 95, 143
antidepressants 20, 126 deduction see logic
antipsychotics 125–126 depression 20, 50, 77, 94, 108, 126–127,
anxiety 173, 209–210, 212 173, 209–211
apperception 43 Descartes, Rene 26
applied science 39, 48–49, 53–63 determining tendency 69–70
artificial intelligence 201–207 Dichter, E. 179–180
association 43; philosophy 32–34 Dilthey, W. 187–188
Dix, D. 58
behaviourism: methodological 73–78; neo- dodo bird effect 110–112
behaviourism 83–89; radical 78–83 dualism 26, 41, 112
Berger, H. 123
Binet, A. 59–60 Ebbinghaus, H. 53
biopsychosocial interactionism 137–139 ecological validity 200
body reprogramming 211 education 60, 62, 82
Boring, E. 36, 144 educational psychology 52–54, 58, 70
Breuer, J. 101, 107–108 effect size 10
brick wall hypothesis 34, 194 Einstein, A. 7, 18, 169, 198
Briggs, K. 117 emergentism 134–135, 201, 207–208
British psychological society 21, 28 Engel, G. 137
Broadbent, D. 92 epigenetics 153–156; trans-generational
Broca, P. 35 effects 156
Buddhism 106 Eros 26–27, 105–106
Bühler, K. 70 evolutionary psychology 147
Burt, C. 21, 148 existential psychology see humanistic
psychology
Caton, R. 123 experience: mediate vs. immediate 39–42
Charcot, J. 101 experimental method 37, 39, 41–42, 95, 199
child rearing 53, 76–77, 82, 173 explanation 9–11, 131, 135–137; explanatory
Chomsky-Skinner debate 91 fiction 78–79; teleological 168
coalescence hypothesis 34, 43, 194 Eysenck, H. 21
cognitive psychology 15, 87, 88–89, 91–93,
95–96, 132, 138–139, 207 falsification 6–9, 16, 19–20, 22, 26, 113–115,
client centred therapy see non-directive 161, 187, 192
therapy Fechner, G. 30–32
clinical psychology 57–58, 127 feelings 42–43, 51, 54, 59, 107, 112
common factors 112, 175 feminist psychology 191
complementarity 41, 131–132, 135, 138 field theories 199–201
congruence 173 Fliess, W. 102
connectionist psychology 204–207 focus group 180–181, 184–185
238 ◆ Index

Fodor, J. 133–134 James, W. 49; contribution 52–53; person 50

forensic psychology 55–57, 137 Jung, C. 105, 115–117
Frankenstein 201
Frankl, V. 169–170 Kantor, J. 200
fraud see scientific misconduct Kelly, G. 162
Freud, S. 100–110; case-studies 107–110; Kirsch, I. 20, 131–132
Freudian theory; paradigm shift 102; Klimt, G. 105
person 101, 179: scientific status 113–115 Kofka, K. 198
functional description 133–134 Köhler, W. 197–198
functionalism 52 Külpe, O. 69

Gage, Phineas 35 Lakatos, I. 13–15, 87

Galton, F. 143–144 Lamarkian inheritance 156
genes 149–156; environment interaction 151; law: of effect 71; of exercise 71
epigenetics 153–156 learned helplessness theory 95
gestalt: history 194–196; learning 197; Lewin, K. 65, 87, 150, 199–200
perception 194–197 lie detection 56
Gibson, J. 198 logic 2; deduction 6; induction 3–5, 18, 42
grounded theory 185 logotherapy 169
Gulliver’s travels 60–62
gut 128 McCulloch, W. 203
Guthrie, R. 145 McDougall, W. 201
Marbe, K. 69
Hall, S. 53–54 market research 168–170, 184
Hartley, D. 32–33 Maslow, A. 166
Harvey, W. 17 materialism 112
health psychology 94, 127 mathematical psychology 86
Hebb, D. 203 medicine: Hippocratic 100; paradigm 100;
Helmholtz, H. 36–37 personalised 151
Herbart, J. 52 metaphysics 7–8
hermeneutical psychology 187–190 methodological complementarity see
homeopathy 101 complementarity
Hull, C. 84–88; contributions 84–86 Mill, J. 32–33
humanistic psychology 160, 166–170 mistakes 20
hypothetical construct 89–90, 94 models 94–95
modularity 133–134, 207–208
idiographic: personal constructs (see personal moral treatment 57–58
construct); science 160–161; traits 162 Münsterberg 55–57, 65
imageless thought controversy 70 Myers, I. 117
implicit attitudes 104 Myers-Briggs inventory 117–118
incongruence 173
induction see logic nature 143–144
industrial psychology 58–59 neuroscience 34–35, 135; contribution 138
inheritance: capacities 147; intelligence 145; nomothetic science 160, 165–166; traits 161
Lamarkian 156 non-directive therapy 174
intelligence: artificial (see artificial normal science 15
intelligence); determinants 48–49; testing nurture 146
60, 89–90
interactionism: biopsychosocial (see occupational psychology see industrial
biopsychosocial interactionism) psychology
interbehaviourism 200 operant conditioning 81, 83
interpretative phenomenological analysis 185 operational definition 84–86, 88–90, 93
intervening variable 89–90
introspection 41–44, 52; problems with Paleolithic 147
68–70 paradigm see research
intuition 13, 44, 104, 116, 174, 178, 182, paradox of theorising 79
187, 189–190 parallel processing 201, 205–208
 Index ◆ 239

paranormal 26–27, 112 seduction hypothesis 104–106

pathophysiology 35, 100–101, 137, 175 self: actual 172; consistency 173; ideal 172;
patient public involvement 182 ought 173; past and future 173
Pavlov, I. 75, 81 self-actualisation 168–170
Pearson, K. 144 self-determination theory 170
Peirce, C. 51 semantic differential 166
penicillin discovery 11–12, 181 sensory psychophysiology 29–32
personal construct 162–166 Simon, T. 59
personnel testing 59 Skinner, B. F. 78, 81–83; contribution 81–83;
person-situation debate 149–153 person 81–82
phenomenological psychology see humanistic social class 142
psychology social constructionism 183–184
physiological psychology 125–126 Solomon, G. 127
Pitts, W. 203 Spearman, C. 60
Plato 105 Sperry, R. 134–135
politics 61–63, 65, 142, 157, 190–191 spiritualism 26–28
polytechnics 62 spirituality 168–169
Popper, K. 6–9, 11, 14, 19, 113, 181 statistics 2, 10–11, 32, 85, 123, 144
positive psychology 168 structuralism 52
pragmatism 51 synthesis 12, 43, 194
prediction 9–11
problem shift: degenerating 14, 65, 87, 93, testing 59–60
97; progressive 65, 93 Thanatos 105
programme see research Thatcher, M. 191
Putnam, H. 130 thematic analysis 182
psyche 26 theoretical psychology 15
psychical research see paranormal theory-ladenness 18, 184
psychoneuroimmunology 127–128 therapy 20–21, 112–115, 165, 169, 174–175,
psychophysical parallelism 122, 132 189–190
psychophysics see sensory psychophysiology Thorndike, E. 70–73
psychophysiology 123–125 Titchener, E. 44, 70
psychosis 126 Tolman, E. 87–89
Tuke, W. 58
quality of life 181–182 twin studies 148–149, 155
quantitative prediction 10, 32, 85
quantum mechanics 7, 12–13, 16, 64, 122, 131 unconscious 103–104; collective 116
unity of science 128, 130, 134, 138
racism 142–145; anti-Semitism 103, 142,
144, 198
rats 63, 73, 83, 88, 96 Virchow, R. 100
Raynor, R. 75–77 Völkerpsychologie 38, 40, 43–44
reactive inhibition 73, 211 voluntarism 43
reductionism 128–131, 207–208 vomiting cure 102
repertory grid test 163–164
replication crisis 23 Wampold, B. 20
research: impact 62–63; paradigm 15–18; Watson, J. B. 73–78; child-rearing 77;
programme 13–15; translational 64–66 little Albert 75–76; person 73–74, 77
robotics 209 Watt, H. 69
Rogers, C. 171–173, 189–190 Weber, W. 29–30
romanticism 178 Wernicke, C. 35
Royce, J. 14–15, 113 Wertheimer, K. 195–196
Windelband, W. 160
Schiele, E. 105 Witmer, L. 57–58
school types 60 Woodworth, R. 70
scientific misconduct 20–22 Wundt, W. 28; experimental psychology
scientific revolution 16–18 39–43; person 37–38; reputation 36, 44–45
Scott, W. 58–59 Würzburg school 69–70