BHUTTO AND THE PPP'S SOCIALISM ?
Author(s): Babafemi A Badejo
Source: India Quarterly , July-December 1988, Vol. 44, No. 3/4 (July-December 1988),
pp. 240-252
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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BHUTTO AND THE PPP'S SOCIALISM ?
By Babafbmi A Badbjo*
It is not unusual for many a government in post-colonial states t
themselves tĶ socialist ." One such government was that of Zulfika
Bhutto in Pakisian. Not only did Bhutto acquire the nomencla
Quaid-i-Awam which in Pakistani parlance implies leader of the masses
the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) which he led maintained a socia
posture in and out of government . Our intent in this paper is to und
take a review of Bhutto and the PPP' s emergence in Pakistan , as
as the policy performance of Bhutto while in office. Consequent
such a review , we intend to posit that Bhutto's rise to power was a re
of intra factional struggle within the propertied classes in Pakis
And that socialism was merely expedient for such a struggle.
BACKGROUND
MUCH as a workas a result ofhasreligious
of religious beenThis
concern.1 doneschool
concern.1 that explains
of thought holds This school the creation of thought of Pakistan holds
that the Hindu and Muslim communities have always constituted two
nations, and Pakistan was the result of an inevitable Muslim political
consciousness.
Elsewhere, we have undertaken a critique of the religious bases of the
Pakistan position, and have instead reinforced the material interest argu-
ment.2 Though the dominated classes in Pakistan (peasants, the rural
and urban proletariat and the landless) might have been led into belie-
ving that Pakistan was being created to provide a homeland for South
Asian Muslims, there was no doubt that the drive behind the Muslim
League which championed the cry for Pakistan was led, not by spiritual
leaders, but mainly by merchant capitalists as well as landowners,
bureaucrats and other professionals. Bhatia provides an apt summary of
the interests of those behind the creation of Pakistan:
♦Dr. Badejo is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University
pf Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria.
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BHUTTO AND THE PPP'S SOCIALISM? 241
To the big landlords... Pakistan meant a state whe
allowed unfettered possession of their landed estat
of radical land reforms as the Congress had th
through when it came to power. Businessmen, b
trialists saw in Pakistan a country where they wo
competition from their much more advanced Hind
undivided India, and have therefore an absolutely f
wealth and prosperity. To the civil servants and
Pakistan meant rapid promotions and such high pos
could aspire in undivided India....3
With the realisation of Pakistan, however, the stru
rent shape. The demise of the two foremost leader
and the other through the bullet of an assassin led t
control of the machinery of the state. On the one h
strial capitalists who in terms of the numbers game
Pakistan since they migrated from India. And on t
landlords cum capitalist landowners who had claim t
new state. The civil bureaucrats, on whom the mant
the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, shared the sa
merchant industrialists, i.e., they were also immigran
to be more favourably disposed towards the industr
of public policy.4 Such struggle amongst the domina
continued unabated until Field Marshal Ayub Kh
intervened in Pakistani politics in October 1958. 5
While Ayub tried to mediate the intra-class str
dominant forces in Pakistan, his economic policies
the inter-class inequality in Pakistan. His developm
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few famili
shement of the peasants, the rural and urban prolet
less. This basic class contradiction that Ayub's d
entailed was also reinforced by a spatial contradicti
impoverishment of East Pakistan as West Pakistan b
ped. These circumstances as we have pointed out,6
tion of Ayub under a situation of strong political u
math of Ayub's departure was the promise of dem
the Yahya interregnum. We will now examine the e
relates to the rise of Bhutto in Pakistan, and this wi
analysis of the sort of specific interests that benefited
from policies made under Bhutto's Administration.
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242 BABAFEMI A. BADBJO
II
ELECTIONS AND BHUTTO'S EMERGENCE
Bhutto, since his Berkeley days, had been paying "lip
socialism. Whether this was a calculated and a long-term
strategy, or a matter of fundamental political belief is
Regardless of purpose and intensity, Bhutto continued to
list image while a Cabinet Minister under Ayub Khan. Bhu
rated political cunning in dissociating himself from the A
the unsuccessful war with India and the Tashkent Agre
though he had been an advocate of each.7 His pro-China, a
list rhetoric, his stint in jail and of course his steadfas
stance, endeared Bhutto to a nation which had been reared on anti-
Indian sentiment and was becoming disenchanted with the Ayub regime
and the international partners it had chosen to associate with.
The creation of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Bhutto's
strategy of mass appeal introduced populism as a powerful mediating
element in Pakistan's political life. The "populist" appeal of Bhutto was
not only for the dominated classes, it succeeded with leftist intellectuals
and professionals whose earlier attempt at organization got strangled in
infancy under the purges that followed the famous 1951 Rawalpindi
Conspiracy.8 The end product of the congealing of a "leaderless" as
well as unorganized group of leftists was Bhutto's Pakistan People's
Party. Heeger puts the argument this way: "The PPP was a synthesis of a
man looking for a party and a yet unformed party of diverse leftist
groups looking for a leader...."9
The benefits of the "development decade," as we earlier noted, failed
to trickle down to the dominated classes. The PPP recognised this situation
and exploited it with the promise of "Islamic Socialism." The core of
this ideology touched the raw spots that had sent the dominated classes
and their student supporters to the streets. For instance, the PPP Elec-
tion Manifesto in part states:
The ultimate objective of the party's policy is the attainment of a
classess society , which is possible only through socialism in our time.
This means true equality of the citizens , and fraternity under the rule of
democracy in an order based on economic and social justice. These
aims follow from the political and social ethics of Islam. The party
thus strives to put in practice the noble ideas of the Muslim faith.10
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BHUTTO AND THB PPP'S SOCIALISM? 243
Bhutto, reminding the working class and peasa
to them over the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, wen
mise of providing "roti, kapra, makaan" (food,
the people. In addition, Bhutto also assured the
bilities of the celebration of Sha ikat-i-Islam (vi
Kashmir.11 With such a manifesto and assuranc
rising that Bhutto soon came to be oft times refer
(leader of the masses).
Those elements that were on the streets and fo
flocked into the People's Party. The PPP came
leaders, industrial labour, students, agrarian, work
and ultimately, and very prominently, the land
it had demonstrated its viability of emerging
tion, or for other reasons, what is important
paper is to note that the People's Party also re
blessings of some important members of th
example, the PPP's real growth in Sind did not
Zaman Khan, one of the two principal pirs. (sp
lord) declared his support for the party.lS
III
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PPP POLICIES
Despite the links we have already established, the point that the PPP
was a landowners' party is best demonstrated by the social consquences
of the policies of the party after it attained office. In this regard, it
is being suggested in this paper that it is difficult in situations short of
revolution for any major faction of a dominant class to completely isolat
or subjugate another. The differences between the specific interests of
the landowning faction as opposed to that of the industrial faction can
only be seen in terms of which faction benefits most during a particular
regime.
Rupee Devaluation Favours Landowners
For instance it is not just a mere coincidence that one of the very first
actions of the Bhutto era was the devaluation of the rupee. On 1 1 May
1972, Bhutto devalued the rupee by 56.8 per cent. This new exchange
rate replaced the multiple exhange rate and Bonus Vouchers Scheme that
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244 BABAFEMI A. BADEJO
existed under Ayub. This action, r
from 1972-74. Pakistani goods, af
of the reduction in their internation
"Korean War Boom" Pakistan had
More important, however, devalu
ted in a large export boom which
porters could benefit from, it wa
rialists. First, imports into Pakistan as a result of devaluation
necessarily became more expensive. This meant more expensive raw
materials and machinery for industrial ventures. The foreign exchange
liability which industrialists had incurred through the Industrial Deve-
lopment Bank of Pakistan had to be met under the devalued rates. So
even when an iudustrialist had paid half of the loan he had taken
before devaluation, he still found himself liable for more than the
amount of foreign exchange loan he received as a result of devalua-
tion.15
Finally, the land-owning faction achieved pre-eminence. Booming
agriculture made lhe industrialists call for higher taxation on agricul-
tural incomes. But Chaudri Mohammed Zulfikar, Chairman, Central
Board of Revenue in the Bhutto regime replied to such demands thus:
...industrialists were living in a fool's paradise if they thought their
suggestion to tax agricultural incomes would be accepted.16
He elaborated the logic of his contention by observing that the agri-
cultural sector was politically stronger than the industrial sector.
The industrialists' demand for taxation of the incomes of the land-
owning faction is significant for our analysis because it brings out more
clearly the question of who benefited from Bhutto's devaluation.
Increases in the import prices of machinery as a result of the devaluation
no doubt cut into the industrial profits. Such an effect however, was
minimal since higher costs of production normally passed on to consu-
mers in the form of higher prices. The devaluation, however, as we
have suggested resulted in a high export boom and hence higher incomes
for landowners. If agricultural incomes were to be taxed as suggested
by industrialists, some of the landowning factions' income would have
been diverted into government coffers as used to be the case in the pre-
Bhutto era. But since this was not the case because landowners were
now politically stronger, the landowning faction of the dominant class
necessarily reaped the full benefits of devaluation.
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BHUTTO AND THB PPPV SOCIALISM? 245
Promises Decreed by Land Reforms Come to Nought
Bhutto, in order to give credibility to one of his maj
mises, decreed a land reform. The reform as will be esta
effect the changes it promised. Martial Law Regulation N
limits of land that an individual could own at 150 acres
land, and 300 acres for un-irrigated land. The surplus a
to have been generated by these ceilings, except for
administered 'tribal areas' where these provisions were n
to be resumed by the government and distributed at
peasants.i7 The decree, unlike the Ayub land decree,18 o
pensation to landowners for resumed land. All land a
the previous regime as well as land transactions after 20
were nullified.
This reform like Ayub Khan's reform was significant for the fanfare
that accompanied it - a fanfare that generated initial support from the
dominated classes. The interest of the landowners, however, was well
protected by this decree.
The fact that the period fixed for the nullification of land transactions
was 20 December 1971, when Bhutto came to power, and not 7 Decem-
ber 1970, when the PEP won elections in West Pakistan, offered subs-
tantial time for land distribution within families. An enormously
important provision of the decree was that land ceilings were for indivi-
duals, not families.
Herring and Chaudhry have shown that by 1974, just 1 per cent of
cultivated land had been redistributed.10 And by the end of 1977 -
despite a further reform law just before the 1977 elections - land distri-
buted to 135,598 farmers totalled 1.44 million acres. 0 This amounts to
an average 10.5 acres for the microcosm of the tenant/landless farmers.
10.5 acres it must also be noted is 2 acres less than the minimum subsis-
tence holding of 12.5 acres promised by the PPP.
The landowners as a whole lost little if at all under the reform. The
peasants and the landless in the rural areas that had thought that a
victory for the PPP meant a victory for the "people" against the land-
owners set out to grab lands. They were, however, met with the brute
force of the police backed by the government.
So a land reform meant to bring change actually brought little or no
structural change to Pakistan. This point is evident from one of
Bhutto's statements:
Pakistan will continue to be a country in which a large number of
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246 BABAFEMI A. BADEJO
cultivators will own land in small hold
owners will have a significant proportion
Moves Against Industrialists Cosmetic in
Some actions were taken early during
interpreted as moves against the indu
on 3 January 1972, Bhutto arrested some
twenty-two families in Pakistan and rele
This action, and some of the more sub
shortly, were in the large part wind
consumption of the dominated classes.
On 14 January 1972, the Bhutto Ad
managing agency contracts. These contr
by industrial capitalists for the avoida
which were owned by industrial capitalis
industrialists also owned controlling s
of sales and purchases, profits of the
payments for the services of the agencie
Later in 1972, Bhutto nationalized ten
were deemed of strategic importanc
capitalists. The industries affected were
heavy engineering, motor vehicle assemb
basic chemicals, petro-chemicals, cement
During 1973, he further added the follo
rice exporting ; vegetable ghee : petrole
shipping. And finally, Bhutto's "New Ye
1 January 1974 was the nationalizatio
owned banks.24
The policy of nationalization, La Porte
form of nationalization, since only the
affected not the ownership."25 The sam
termination of management agenc
government did was to provide new per
industries while the dividends still went
"new" personnel in some cases, were
jubilation and fanfare by the do
"revolutionary" nature of the nationaliz
were not hurt by Bhutto's actions, Reg
faction might have responded to announ
industrialists remained the owners of th
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BHUTTO AND THB PPP'S SOCIALISM? 247
notes that when the Karachi Stock Exchang
"nationalization," the share prices of the "nati
decline. This meant the owners did not try
because they were confident that the situation
fact, by 1976, despite all the rhetoric, Bhatia c
cent of industrial investments still remained in
included the important textile sector.10
With the bank nationalizations, the Bhutto Ad
on a policy of ensuring that "new entrants" w
banks. Our field interviews in Pakistan revealed
entrants" turned out to be landowners who to
industrial ventures in the 1970's. Such industrial ventures were mostly
agro-based and included wool and textile spinning, straw board
manufacturing, ginning factories, dairy farming and rice husking mills.
Some of the major landed families that received loans then were the
Qureshis of Multan, Syeds in Jhung, Tarars from Gujranwala and the
Noons of Sargodha.
The PPP had already won the support of industrial labour on the
promise of higher wages and better working conditions. Bhutto's
Administration actually increased wages. Burki notes that a govern-
ment report on the issue showed the cost of implementing these wages
to be Rs 250 million.29 But the consequences of other policies, and
especially the devaluation, was inflationary. Evidence available suggests
that workers were worse off because real incomes actually dec-
lined.30
So, despite the fact that Bhutto was Quaid-i-Awam the masses did
not fare better under the People's Party Administration. As Lodhi puts
it : "The non-elite groups who were strong supporters of the PPP
before it came to power (landless peasants and industrial workers),
failed to receive any significant benefits from the 'reforms' of the
Bhutto Government."31
But much more important was the alienation of the leftists in the
party by the "PPP's decision to employ strong methods to bring about
industrial peace...."32 Leftists who were alarmed by the dominance of
the landowners in the PPP were forced to leave, purged, or put in jail.
Of such people were Muktar Rana, a former Labour Union organizer,
and Meraj Mohammed Khan, a student leader. Both were sent to jail.
J. A. Rahim who had approached Bhutto in Geneva about the need for
a Socialist Party33, which materialised in the PPP, the first Secretary
General and the architect of its ideological stance, was also cast out
after he had been severely beaten by Bhutto's Federal Security Force.
Rahim's "offence" was that he opposed the reorganization of the PPP
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248 BABAPBMI A. BADBJO
to include landowners, industrialists and earlier discredited
bureaucrats.34 Mubashir Hassan, a prominent PPP member, Finance
Minister in Bhutto's Administration and Rahim's successor as PPP
Secretary General, was also asked to go and by 1976 he set about
organizing a socialist bloc to "save Bhutto" from the clutches of the
landowners.
From the above analysis it is clear that Bhutto only used ideology to
deliver the Pakistani electoraie for the specific interest of the social
force he represented - the landowning faction. The landowners were
largely able to retain their lands, while the land tenure system remained
the same. The devaluation of the rupee without commensurate taxation
by Bhutto's Administration left the landowners much wealth. While
industrialists might not have accumulated at the rate they were used to,
they did not lose under Bhutto. It was the dominated classes that
experienced a reduction in real income. This fact, made Bhutto's
socialist pronouncements suspect. However, Bhutto himself had been
frank to his close associates that his espousal of Socialsm was simply
for what economists would term "product differentiation."35 As Gerald
Heeger also notes :
Despite the concerted campaign for Socialism conducted by the
Pakistan People's Party during the 1970 Elections, the Constitution
of Pakistan, authored by Bhutto and the PPP leadership and endorsed
by a National Assembly, in which the People's Party held over
a two-thirds majority, omits the term completely, even in its more
acceptable lower-case guise, 'Islamic socialism.'36
By the time Bhutto called for the 1977 Elections, he realised that he
had "milked the socialist cow" dry. So, to ensure the continued
dominance of the landowners, the PPP could not but change tactics.
Richter notes that the word "Socialism" was completely "dropped
from PPP literature and in its place was substituted the more
cumbersome phrase 'Musawat-i-Mohammadi' literally translated as
'equality of Muhammad,' that is, Islamic egalitarianism...."37
During the 1977 Elections, Bhutto invited the Imams at the mosques
at Medina and Ka' aba- which are the two holiest places for Muslims-
to visit in Pakistan. The dignitaries visited, led prayers and warmed the
hearts of the faithful in major cities.38 In addition, the Bhutto
Administration organized an International Conference on the Life and
Works of the Prophet.
This Islamic resurgence of Bhutto and the PPP, it is essential to note,
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BHUTTO AND THB PPP'S SOCIALISM? 249
was contradictory to the stance of the "Soc
votes of the masses in 1970. After all, the 197
"to the extent of declaring the question of Islam
politics since both the exploiters and the exploi
Whether Bhutto's PPP actually won the 1977
scope of this paper. Suffice it to note, however
elections were doubted, and after a bloody
military - this time led by General Mohammed
intervened.
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is not difficult to understand why Pakistanis flocked into B
PPP and Bhutto himself came to be called the Quaid-i-Awa
contradictions inherent in Ayub Khan's so-called "develo
decade" had become evident, and the Pakistani society was
polarized between the haves and the have-nots. Under these
circumstances it is not surprising that the landowning faction of the
dominant class, in an attempt to achieve pre-eminence over their
industrial counterparts, preached what people were willing to hear, that
is, a relegation of Islam to the background and a call for a change in
the economic conditions of the masses. With other landowners initially
under cover, it was easy for Bhutto to convince people that their
economic problems were largely a result of exploitation by the
industrialists. After all, the few industrial capitalists control most of
the financial institutions and industrial capital in Pakistan.
This is not the first time that ideology has been used to organize the
dominated classes along lines desirable for the material interests of the
dominant class. In fact, the creation of Pakistan itself constitutes one
of such uses of ideology. However, what is important is that this
happened to be the first time that a faction of the dominant class chose
a purely economic ideological stance. Since Pakistanis did not need
much convincing that their economic woes were a result of the policies
of Ayub that largely benefited industrialists, they flocked into the PPP
that purported to be a radical alternative.
The basic economic structure of Pakistan remained the same. The
reasons that Bhutto gave for the nationalization of a few industries was
not that he wanted to socialize production relations, but that the
industries were of "strategic importance." The banks were nationalized
in order to liberalize credit and ensure that "new entrants" got loans.
But who were the "new entrants" ? They were landowners, that is
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250 BABAFBMI A. BADBIO
members of Bhutto's faction of the
were also a sham. Instead of such
tiller or land belonging to society
ownership under which landowne
members of their families. The dom
nothing to show for their support
things turned out, the status-quo th
was different from the change desired by the masses. Thus
Bhutto'as Quaid-iAwam or the PPP as socialist were contradictions in
terms.
NOTES
1 This position is well represented by Ī.H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of th
Indo- Pakistani Sub-continent 610-1947 (Karachi, 1977). For a summary of the
various positions on the creation of Pakistan, see Wayne Wilcox, "The
Wellsprings of Pakistan" posthumously published in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph
Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggings (Eds.) : Pakistani The Long View
(Durham, 1977), p. 28.
2 Babafemi A. Badejo, "State and Class in Pakistan," unpublished doctoral
examination field paper, Los Angeles, November 1980. See also Wilfred
Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India : A Social Analysis (London, 1946), and
B.M. Bhatia, Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-1978 : The Failure of a
Strategy (New Delhi, 1979).
3 B.M. Bhatia, Ibid., p. 10.
4 For a review of the economic policies undertaken during this period see amongst
others, B M. Bhatia, Ibid., and Babafemi A. Badejo, "State and Class in Paki-
stan," n. 2.
5 See Richard Sisson, "Politics and the Military in Pakistan," in John p. Lovell
(Ed.), The Military and Politics in Five Developing Nations (Kensington, Center
for Research in Social Systems, 1970).
6 See Babafemi A. Badejo, "Pakistan: Ayub's Demise Revisited," Asian Affairs ,
March 1983.
7 See Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and Two," in
Lawrence Ziring, et. al. Pakistan : The Long View , pp. 75-76.
8 For further information, see Tariq Ali, Pakistan : Military Rule or People's
Power (New York, 1970), n. 1, pp. 44-45.
9 Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan," in Helen Desfosses and Jacques
Lsavesque (Eds.); Socialism in the Third World (New York, 1975), P. 296. For
a similar position, see S. J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto , 1971-1977 (New
York, 1980), p. 50.
10 As quoted in Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and
Two," n. 7. p. 87 (emphasis mine).
11 See Sherifat Mujahid, "Pakistan: The First General Elections," Asian Survey ?
yol. XI, No. 2, 1971, p. 168.
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BHUTTO ANO THE PPP'S SOCIALISM? 251
12 Gerald A. Heeger "Socialism and Pakistan," n. 9, p. 300.
13 Ibid., p. 300, and Feroz Ahmed, "Structure and Contradiction in Pakistan" in
Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma (Eds.), Imperialism and Revolution in South
Asia (New York and London, 1973), p. 185.
14 S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto , 1971-77 , n. 9, p. Ill, B.M. Bhatia, Pakistan's
Economic Development 1948-78 , n. 2, p. 72 also notes the boom.
15 For a detailed explication of the effects of devaluation, especially in developing
countries, see Lance Taylor, Macro Models for Developing Countries (New York,
1979), pp. 49-66.
16 W. Eric Gustafson, "Economic Problems of Pakistan Under Bhutto," Asian
Survey , Vol. XVI, No. 4, April 1976, p. 369.
17 Bruce J. Esposito, "The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Pakistan," Asian Survey ,
Vol XVI, No. 4, April 1976, p. 431; and Nimal Senaratne, "Landownersand
Land Reform in Pakistan," South Asian Review , Vol. VII No. 1, October 1973,
p. 132.
18 For an analysis of Ayub's Land Decree see Babafemi A. Badejo, "Pakistan:
Ayub's Demise Revisited," n. 6.
19 Ronald Herring and M. Ghaffar Chaudhry, "The 1972 Land Reforms in Pakistan
• and their Economic Implications - A Preliminary Analysis, " Pakistan Develop-
ment Review , Vol. XÏTI, No. 3, 1974, p. 80.
20 B.M. Bhatia, Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-78 : The Failure of a
Strategy , n. 2. p. 165.
21 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches and Statements , Ministry of Information,
Rawalpindi, n.d., p. 44, as quoted in S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto , n. 9,
p. 139.
22 See Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege : Influence and Decision-Making in
Pakistan , (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1975), p. 109, Fn. 13.
23 For details on how this arrangement worked, see Lawrence J. White, Industrial
Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan's (Princeton, 1974), p. 143.
24 S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto , 1911-77, n. 9, pp. 114-118.
25 Robert La Porte, Power and Privilege : Influence and Decision-Making in
Pakistan, n. 22, pp. 108-109.
26 Ibid., p. 110.
27 Lawrence J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan ,
n. 23, P. 182.
28 B.M. Bhatia, Pakistan's Economic Development 1948-78 : The Failure of a
Strategy, n. 2, p. 83.
29 S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto , 1971-71, n. 9, pp. 120.
30 Ibid., p. 166ģ
31 Maliha Lodhi, "Pakistan in Crisis," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics. Vol. XVI, March 1978, p. 64.
32 Ibid., p. 65.
33 The author in an interview with J. A. Rahim confirmed most of the accounts in
Ziring's analysis (cited below) except for the fact that the idea of setting up the
PPP as a Socialist Party came up outside Pakistan. It resulted from a discussion
betwçen Rahim and Bhutto while the latter was on a visit to Switzerland,
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252 BABAFEMI A. BADBIO
34 See Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : T
Colorado, 1980), p. 123.
35 See W. Eric. Gustafson, "Econom
p. 367.
36 Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan," n. 9, p. 295.
37 William L. Richter, "Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," Asie . Survey , Vol. XIX,
No. 6, June 1979, p. 551.
38 S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto , 1971-77 , n. 9, p. 179.
39 Mohammed Ayoob, "Two Faces of Islam : Iran and Pakistan Compared," Asian
Survey , Vol. XIX, No. 6, June 1979, p. 537.
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