Received July 2, 2020, accepted July 22, 2020, date of publication July 27, 2020, date of current version

August 11, 2020.

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3012295

Blockchain Application for Central Banks:

A Systematic Mapping Study
NATALIA DASHKEVICH, STEVE COUNSELL , AND GIUSEPPE DESTEFANIS
Department of Computer Science, Brunel University London, London UB8 3PH, U.K.
Corresponding author: Steve Counsell ([email protected])
The work of Natalia Dashkevich was supported by a Ph.D. Studentship from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(EPSRC), U.K., under Grant EP/R512497/1.

ABSTRACT Blockchain is a novel technology capturing the attention of Central Banks and a technology
with significant disruptive potential. However, a gap in research effort between practitioners and academics
seems to have emerged. This paper analyses and maps that gap by exploring trends in peer-reviewed research
contributions through thematic categorisation of academic literature on Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT) use-cases for services, operations and functions performed by central banks. Furthermore, this paper
provides summaries of opportunities and challenges for central banks arising from blockchain adaptation to
each of those use-cases. To achieve this goal, we utilise a Systematic Mapping Study approach. The paper
presents an in-depth assessment of statistical and thematic analysis of research maturity and the types of
researchers, with specific emphasis on types of central bank use-cases considered for blockchain adaptation.
Our work contributes to an understanding of where the most or least attention is directed, allowing for
identification of gaps and opportunities for both academics, practitioners and combinations of each. Results
show that the research topic is a comparatively new domain. It confirms the gap between depth and volume
of the research provision from industry and academia, with industry leading the trend. Our study also found
that the most research-intensive use-cases are those for: 1) Central Bank issued Digital Currency (CBDC),
2) Regulatory Compliance and 3) Payment Clearing and Settlement Systems (PCS) operated by central
banks; a comparatively low engagement was found in the areas of 4) Assets Transfer/Ownership and 5) Audit
Trail.

INDEX TERMS Assets transfer, assets ownership, audit trail, blockchain, CBDC, challenges, central bank,
central bank digital currency, distributed ledger technology, DLT, financial regulation, literature review,
mapping study, opportunities, payment clearing and settlement, PCS, regulatory compliance, research
maturity, research trend, use-case.

I. INTRODUCTION technology and its reach continues to impact IT and a multi-

Interest in the application of blockchain technology comes tude of other areas [102], [105].
from various and diverse communities. Amongst others are Over recent years, the banking industry has started explor-
law, real estate, energy sector, insurance, security, diamond ing various ways of leveraging blockchain. Industry partic-
identification, the Internet of Things, computer gaming and ipants see an opportunity to apply it to their products and
finance [1], [103], [104], [106]. Academics, policymakers services [2] and develop coordinated solutions [2] that could
and market participants, ranging from technical enthusiasts, help overcome existing industry challenges by providing
software developers, start-ups, large enterprises to public greater transparency and improving conduct. A recent study
authorities, banks and financial regulators [1] are all exper- by Ben Dhaou and Rohman et al. [3] highlights a critical view
imenting with this innovation to enhance their functionality that interest in this technology is linked to economic crises
and operations. Blockchain is emerging as a truly disruptive and to the fact that current monetary tools are running out of
solutions, while showing signs of obsolescence [3].
Since blockchain offers a recorded, mutually agreed,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and immutable and cryptographically secured trail of digital
approving it for publication was Sabu M. Thampi . events that can be shared and maintained by multiple
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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participants, banking industry actors are looking at ways find and systematically map all available scientific papers
of taking advantage of those components. The Bank for to empirical and non-empirical research approaches. Identi-
International Settlement (BIS) [53] states that application fication of the scope for blockchain use-cases, applicable to
of DLT to banking could fundamentally change how assets the business of central banks, allows us to determine what
are stored and maintained, obligations are discharged, con- problems have already been investigated, yielding a theo-
tracts are enforced and risks managed [53]. The hype of retical understanding or practical contribution. Furthermore,
blockchain technology promises to build secure value transfer we provide narrative summaries of opportunities and chal-
systems, streamline business processes and/or create new lenges to businesses and operational performance of central
ones, increase transparency and ease auditability, thus reduc- banks from hypothetical adaptation of blockchain for each of
ing the trust gap [4]. These promises have pushed financial the identified use-cases: 1) Central Bank Digital Currency
actors to revisit their antiquated infrastructure, business prac- (CBDC); 2) Payment Clearing and Settlement (PCS) systems
tices and re-evaluate their priorities [2]. operated by central banks; 3) Assets transfer and ownership;
Furthermore, a financial system’s participants rely heavily 4) Audit trail; 5) Regulatory compliance (Regulation).
on numerous financial intermediaries and third parties such In this study, we are not aiming to promote or highlight
as central banks, Central Securities Depositories (CSDs), any particular approach, a benefit or a challenge, but to help
Central Counterparty (CCP) clearing structures, centralised academics and practitioners identify where the greatest or
collateral management systems [55] and so on. Those organ- least effort has been directed by the research community,
isations, amongst other things, are responsible for the pro- understand where the gaps for future exploration could be and
vision of trust functionality for financial market actors such provide a starting point for further systematic discussion. To
as management of collateral of partner banks, clearing and achieve those goals, we adopt a Systematic Mapping Study
settlement of payments, transfer of legal assets ownership (SMS) research methodology that follows the guidelines of
versus payments, tracking, recording and reconciliation of Petersen et al. [6], [7]. Below, we present a short introductory
transactions in centralised and own ledgers [58]. All these summary of gains and limitations for each of the identified
create a risk of data duplication, latency in liquidity turnover, blockchain use-cases for central banks:
numerous fees and further obstacles. Moreover, the impor- CBDC models are often seen as the next milestone in the
tance of integration of data generated on blockchain into evolution of money. Academic publications focus on design
existing financial Big Data analytic practices for filtering and characteristics and country-specific requirements of CBDC
signal extraction for the banking industry is growing [89]; to guide its potential application and adaptation. Overall,
such data could be stored and shared via an instantly accessi- CBDC promises to provide central banks with a reliable
ble Blockchain-ed platform [90] to improve intelligent audit- close to real-time ‘window’ on economic activity to guide
ing or tracing functionality [90] for regulators, promoting monetary policy. However, the trade-off between the risks and
cooperation among regulatory agencies and the overall finan- benefits of such systems are still unclear, because, despite the
cial markets. Central banks and the research community are promises of various benefits and reduction of particular risks,
both looking at ways to harvest blockchain’s technological other new unknown risks could emerge, some of which could
promise, to substitute some of the trust functions performed stem from immature blockchain technology and/or lack of
by financial intermediaries and third parties and to improve empirical research; some could also arise from operational
financial data management. However, the full potential of or security risks stemming from technological disruption.
blockchain technology is still largely unknown [3] and there In relation to hypothetical blockchain underpinned Pay-
are various limitations to current blockchain architectures. ment Clearing and Settlement (PCS) system, operated by a
Understanding the implications of such technology requires central bank, researchers predict that such a system could
a multidisciplinary approach from the scientific perspective generate value by improving efficiency via modernisation
of academics together with policy-makers [3]. of underlying technology of financial markets infrastructure.
Adaptation of the scientific community to this topic has These present the possibility of reduction of costs for trans-
been comparatively slow and resources have been limited actions, reconciliation, clearing and processing, together with
to Bitcoin source code, blog and forum posts, mailing lists reduction of legal, settlement, operational and financial risks.
and other online publications [1]. Following the work of On the other hand, researchers are sceptical about the full
the ‘Bitcoin White Paper’ [5], the majority of blockchain- substitution of well-established, collective infrastructure and
based innovation was provided not via peer-reviewed sci- processes, built by banks with currently available blockchain
entific publishing, but directly by interested industries [1]. protocols. The lack of incentive for alternative systems is
Although this reduced time-to-market for blockchain, it has driven by inefficiencies arising from high set-up costs and
also lead to deficits in systematisation and a gap between already existing network effects. Additionally, a one-size-
practice and the theoretical understanding of this novel field fits-all approach of blockchain application to PCS activities
[1]. The purpose of our study is to reduce that gap by pre- raises a broad range of further challenges.
senting a thematic overview of peer-reviewed publications Transfer and ownership of assets through central bank-
on potential application of blockchain technology to the maintained systems has also been claimed as a hypothetical
functions performed by central banks. The objective is to beneficiary from blockchain adaptation. Researchers insist

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that the assets-agnostic nature of DLT can provide trusted, disruptive technology of blockchain could influence practices
time-oriented, immutable, shared databases for recording of central banks has the potential in the future to shape
transfer of assets and change of ownership, without relying those banking practice and the implications of these factors
on numerous specialised third-party infrastructures and inter- is essential for highlighting problems and areas for progress
mediaries, reducing intermediation costs and risks. On the in this domain. The third component of a technical argument
other hand, serious outstanding questions are raised by some is ‘‘prognosis’’. Although it is difficult (as for most things
researchers. Current laws do not define DLT-based proof of in life) to predict the likely outcomes of blockchain use in
ownership and overall legal validity of financial instruments central banking, not least because the field is advancing so
issued on the blockchain. quickly, we highlight throughout this mapping study the areas
Small numbers of research studies have been devoted to the that could be exploited, the areas that come to the fore and
enhancements of the regulatory audit trail from blockchain those that present new challenges and that can be extended.
application. Regulators could attain a real-time opportunity The final component is an explanation of ‘‘why the status quo
to monitor, supervise and audit trades through a blockchain- is not good enough’’. Blockchain provides a wealth of oppor-
based ‘global audit log’ which promises to ensure integrity tunities for the banking sector and the impact of exploiting
of records through the integrity of the blockchain ledger those opportunities is extensive. As such, the inadequacies of
itself. Furthermore, such a system could promote the reduc- current systems should not be seen as problems necessarily
tion of multiparty multi-intermediated reconciliation costs reflecting a poor situation, but as exciting ideas for the future.
and risks, by automating and streamlining it. However, some The work in this mapping study brings these ideas to the fore
researchers highlight issues of ensuring the validity and reli- through a complete study of industrial and academic work
ability of transactional records, because a DLT system does thus far.
not provide a mechanism for guaranteeing that the added The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The
information is correct. next section describes background information and related
Lastly, blockchain application for regulatory compliance work. It covers banking broadly and central banking specif-
has also been extensively covered in peer-reviewed litera- ically, what blockchain is and summarises the most closely
ture. Researchers suggest that financial regulation could be related surveys. Section III provides a detailed research
improved by automating mandatory regulatory reporting or methodology for the current study and includes research
through the creation of an algorithmic rule-following mone- motivation, research questions, the protocol for study selec-
tary authority on blockchain. That would facilitate embedded tion and data extraction. Section IV contains the results of this
supervision thus reducing some legal risks and deterring study. Section V provides an evaluation of threats to validity
avoidance of the regulatory arbitrage. Traceability charac- of the study and we discuss some key findings. Finally, in
teristics of blockchain can promote the reduction of risk of Section VI, we summarise the results and draw conclusions
fraud through automation of Know Your Customer (KYC), from the research.
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Anti-Money
Laundry (AML), tax misreporting and so on. On the other II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
hand, researchers also discuss a number of regulatory friction A. BANKING AND CENTRAL BANKING
points to blockchain adaptation. The effects of blockchain In this study, we focus on central banks, but it is important to
application for central banking are not currently covered understand the role of wider banking, as this should help to
by the existing regulatory framework, thus spanning new determine where and how innovative the blockchain technol-
legal issues. Current blockchain architectures provide limited ogy can potentially fit. According to Casu et al. [83] banks,
access to the regulators, leaving governance, risk allocation as other financial intermediaries, play a pivotal role in the
and consumer protection in the hands of the coding experts, economy by channelling funds from units in surplus to units
who might lack legal and/or financial expertise. Furthermore, in deficit. They reconcile the different needs of borrowers and
blockchain promising information transparency could cause lenders who do not know and do not trust each other. They
confidentiality and privacy loss leading to competition issues. transform small-size, low-risk and highly liquid deposits into
The notion of a ‘‘Technical Argument’’ [107] is also rel- loans which are of larger size, higher risk and illiquid. The
evant to the work presented in this paper and allows a dis- banking industry is broad and combines sectors related to
section of the different elements of why we undertake studies central banking, investment, corporate, commercial, retail
and the motivation for doing such studies. Such an argument banking and so on, differing by their business models and per-
has several components. The first is ‘‘a vision’’ for the work. formance goals. More specifically, a central bank, a reserve
From the point that we started this mapping study, we envis- bank or a monetary authority is a financial institution that
aged the work as potentially seminal and that it would be a manages domestic money supply, interest rates and oversees
source of reference for central banks to use for understanding a country’s broader banking system. According to Hayes
the state-of-knowledge in blockchain utilisation. The second [75] some functional dimensions that set a central bank apart
component of a technical argument asks ‘‘why progress is from other banks are that a central bank is a monopoly note
needed’’ in the area. So, we see central banking as a fun- issuer, the government’s banker, the lender of last resort, and,
damental part of society’s fabric. Understanding of how the in some cases, serves as a clearing house for settlement of

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payments - it is the banker’s bank [75]. For example, as a

clearing house, a central bank on a larger wholesale money
market scale reconciles the funding needs of the commercial
bank’s participants, each of whom might have different busi-
ness goals and do not trust one another. The other dimension
is that a central bank must maintain a non-competitive stance
and not seek profit maximisation. Most central banks also
have supervisory and regulatory powers to ensure solvency of
member institutions [52] and are seen in many jurisdictions
as the keeper of economic health, usually independent of the
government and trusted to deliver public interest and overall FIGURE 1. How a blockchain works.
economic welfare [66].
and limited collateral fluidity [64]. Overall, all payment sys-
B. CENTRAL BANKS: OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS tems suffer from settlement or payment risks for technical
These days, global central banks vary substantially in their or financial reasons, such as settlement, credit and market
structure and purpose [98]. They face complex issues in risks [101].
designing effective governance policies for each of their The aforementioned challenges have attracted the attention
major functions and to accommodate their many differences of the financial regulators and provide the context and oppor-
[98]. As a monetary authority, they sometimes fail to contain tunities for modernisation and improvements.
macro-economic crises [75] that could stem from incentivised
excessive risk-taking e.g., via unconventional monetary pol- C. WHAT IS BLOCKCHAIN?
icy tools such as negative rates or Quantitative Easing (QE). In this study, we use the terms Blockchain or Distributed
These, in times of financial distress and high volatility, exac- Ledger Technology (DLT) to mean the same thing. Although
erbate negative outcomes [75]. Further problems result from there is a thematic difference between those terminolo-
large numbers of financial intermediaries [55]. In addition to gies through their underlying architecture, it has become
high fees, service charges paid for financial intermediation a common practice in the industry to combine all those
and cost of regulatory compliance, there are delays, oner- meanings under the same umbrella. According to Hileman
ous paperwork and opportunities for fraud and crime [79]. and Rauchs et al. [4], at its narrowest possible definition:
Multifaceted linkage between banks and a variety of central ‘‘A blockchain is a special data structure - a database - that
intermediaries adds to current incomplete understanding of is composed of transactions, batched into blocks, that are
the post-crisis financial system; in particular, this relates to cryptographically linked to each other to form a sequential,
the concentration of the risk management of credit and liquid- tamper-evident chain events that determines the ordering of
ity risks in those intermediaries and the impact on systemic transactions in the system. In this context, a transaction rep-
risks [99], [100]. resents any change or modification to the database’’ [4]. More
Ben Dhaou and Rohman [3] suggest that there are issues broadly, blockchain is a type of peer-to-peer (P2P) distributed
with the banknote creation functionality of central banks, network of independent participants that generally broadcasts
when used as a main instrument of tax evasion, money all data to each other, each of whom may have different
laundering and the financing of illegal activities. Cash also motivations and objectives. They may not necessarily trust
limits the scope for monetary policies based on negative one another, but reach a consensus (a consistent agreement
interest rates, since it provides a zero-rate alternative that can about changes to the state of the shared database) on a linear
be stored [3] and it deteriorates rapidly, especially in high history of operations of that shared database [4]. A high-level
inflation countries [3]. workflow of blockchain is presented in Fig. 1.
The current set-up of the European post-trade market is still The key advantages of blockchain, in comparison to exist-
a legacy of earlier domestic market infrastructures [64]. The ing distributed systems and database technologies, is in the
problems stem from the lack of interoperability between cen- use of a specialised data structure which bundles transactions
tralised proprietary databases and that often restricts straight- into blocks, and/or the broadcast of all data to all participants,
through processing for a range of non-vertically integrated in its automated reconciliation mechanisms, together with
financial institutions [64]. This prolongs ongoing use of its resilience and transparent nature [4]. Some of the main
siloed digital records of ownership and requires manual components of a blockchain are: cryptography, P2P networks,
updating to be reconciled with any change that occurred in consensus mechanisms, the ledger, validity rules and access
the records of counterparties at different levels of the post- or permission types. There are general permission type dis-
trade value chain [64]. These escalate the cost of back-office tinctions for current blockchain architectures:
procedures and inflate certain risks such as: operational risk, • ‘Permissionless’, ‘public’ or ‘open’ refer to blockchains
chains of settlement failures (as delayed settlement of one where access is not restricted to a specific set of vetted
transaction may affect the settlement of trades with third par- participants [4]. In these types of blockchain, partici-
ties), human errors (the system being reconciled manually) pants do not know and trust each other, so the ‘‘good’’

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behaviour is incentivised through the existence of a life-cycle, such as problems of quality and completeness of
native token; messaging between systems, lack of reference data systems,
• ‘Permissioned’, ‘private’ or ‘closed’ refer to blockchains various problems with trade book-keeping, manual or even
where access is restricted to a specific set of vetted paper-based confirmations in some cases [97]. Integration of
participants [4]. These blockchains operate in an envi- a hybrid approach using elements of DLT in combination
ronment where participants are already known, vetted with more established technologies applied in new ways, plus
and there is a level of trust amongst them; this removes elements of Big Data analytics is necessary [97] to improve
the need for a native token to incentivise good behaviour. automatic intelligent trading, where customer- and trading-
Participants are held liable through off-chain legal con- related data is collected, stored and shared via an instantly
tracts and agreements and are incentivised to behave accessible Blockchain-ed platform [90]. These will improve
honestly via the threat of legal prosecution in the case intelligent auditing / tracing functionality [90] for regulators.
of misbehaviour [4]. Additionally, innovative combination of blockchain, Big Data
• ‘Consortium’ or ‘federated’ refer to a blockchain where and banking could promote the creation of shared value
the architecture could be private or hybrid (public and systems and improve cooperation among regulatory agen-
private) [2], [27]. This type of DLT uses features such cies and overall financial markets. This hybrid approach,
as: permission restriction, multiple controlling authori- where DLT is combined with Big Data has the potential to
ties; they allow easy, yet controlled information sharing replace the transparency and feedback loops, which would
between various stakeholders and more. ultimately reduce costs and operational risk [97]. The impact
Although we have identified a small number of that blockchain-based Big Data will have on banking data
research studies on the potential application of permis- analytics in future shows the increasing importance of a set
sionless blockchain for business of central banks [77], of common ‘‘harmonised industry standards’’ for data rep-
[101], the predominant consensus amongst the research resentation and consideration of costs for data storage and
community is that the permissioned access model is maintenance, as DLT will ‘‘make big data even bigger’’ [89].
the preferred type of blockchain by such institutions All these potential capabilities for BM innovation promise
[21], [22], [27], [36], [51]–[55], [57], [58], [58], [61], [66], to enhance the efficiency of the banking industry, have the
[69], [86], [101]. Consortium or federated blockchain access possibility to optimise financial infrastructure and play an
type was not available in the included peer-reviewed publica- important role in the sustainable development of the global
tions on DLT applications for the business of central banks. economy by creating shared value systems and improving
cooperation among banks, technology companies, regulatory
D. OVERALL IMPACT OF BLOCKCHAIN ON BUSINESS agencies, customers and the market overall.
MODELS OF CENTRAL BANKS
Business Model (BM) is a relatively new concept in man- E. RELATED AND EXCLUDED SURVEYS
agement studies [91], [92]. Although a specific definition has Four existing surveys discuss literature in the area of appli-
still to be found [91], [93], a BM has been identified as the cation of blockchain as financial technology (FinTech) for
‘‘story’’ that explains how an enterprise works [91], [94] and the central banking business. However, none of those surveys
also as the way firms do business – i.e. the rationale of how focus solely on peer-reviewed publications about utilisation
an organization creates, delivers and captures value [91]. BM of DLT by central banks.
represents an intermediate layer – the link between a firm’s Firstly, the work of Rio [8] reviewed stages of acceptance
strategy, processes and information technology (IT) [91]. of DLT by central banks between 2016 and 2017 for their
The major cornerstone of any bank’s operations is its busi- various systems and functions. The review was based on grey
ness model, such as processes and activity around payment literature, i.e., on a central bank’s own available publications,
systems’ infrastructure [91]. Blockchain innovation has the reports and press releases. The subset of utilised countries
potential to circumvent central bodies or legacy infrastruc- were those that belonged to the Organisation for Economic
tures [8] that surround trading activity, e.g. CSDs, clear- Co-operation and Development (OECD) and to the G20 orga-
ing houses, market data providers and so on [96]. Central nizations, including the Bank for International Settlement
banks could also innovate in those systems by creating new (BIS) and the European Central Bank (ECB), but excluded
blockchain-based business models, which in itself is believed European Union (UE) and countries outside the OECD. The
to be one of the major factors behind the push for DLT work concluded that, despite all central banks used in the
adoption by the banking industry [8]. These will allow for study expressing interest in DLT, not one had an operational
a fundamentally different way of conducting and tracking DLT-based system [8]. The reasons for the current unavail-
financial transactions and could thus challenge the centralised ability of live blockchain applications were due to issues
nature of existing financial systems in central banks [8]. with: ‘‘Speed, cost of processing, security, transparency and
Furthermore, for BMs related to current Big Data ana- privacy, legal settlement finality, scalability, network effects
lytics, the importance of filtering and signal extraction for and immature technology’’ [8]. The same research did not go
the banking industry grows [67], [89], [95]. The opportunity into the specifics of research trends and thus differs from the
here is to improve current limitations in the trade processing research approach and results of our study.

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Secondly, in a systematic literature review, Lutz [9] and surveys on the application of blockchain by industries
examined financial literature on the topic of: ‘‘dual or mul- other than banking or financial services.
tiple currency scenarios for privately issued cryptocurren-
cies’’ coexisting or competing with the central bank issued III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
fiat currency and suggested a coexistence theory [9]. The A. MOTIVATION
review was limited to a financial / economic perspective We selected and applied a Systematic Mapping Study (SMS)
and excluded ethnological aspects of blockchain as well as research methodology with the aim of describing the state of
its legal contributions [9]. The work provided a comprehen- knowledge about the interest in blockchain technology for,
sive, detailed overview and analysis of the relevant contri- and by, the central banking business. An SMS is a form of
butions on currency coexistence, competition and developed Systematic Literature Review (SLR), described by Kitchen-
a theoretical framework of the main ideas and functions of ham and Charters [11] and aims to give a broader examination
cryptocurrencies. The work concluded that: ‘‘little academic of a researched topic than an SLR. It is motivated by the
research looks closer on the existence, interaction and conse- need to understand trends through thematic categorisation,
quences, as well as on a possible set up of coexisting private a spectrum of publications and common or important topics
cryptocurrencies and central bank issued fiat currencies’’ [9]. and gain an understanding of the evolution of the field. The
This survey is different from our research since it focused on objective of the SMS was to find and map all empirical and
privately issued cryptocurrencies as competing and coexist- non-empirical peer-reviewed research on DLT to the various
ing with fiat currencies. areas of central banking. The outcome of this study provides
Thirdly, the work of Thakor [10] summarised theoretical an overview of the scope of the researched area; this will
and empirical literature on the interaction between novel allow identification of research gaps that could be considered
financial technologies such as blockchain, its cryptocur- for further examination. The study follows the guidelines
rencies and the banking industry. The study considered: of Petersen et al. [6], [7], utilising steps of the Systematic
‘‘Innovations in payment systems (including cryptocurren- Mapping Process (SMP) [6], [7]. The high-level steps for
cies), credit markets (including P2P lending) and insurance, the review were as follows: 1) define research questions;
with blockchain-assisted smart contracts playing a role’’ [10]. 2) conduct a pilot search for primary studies; 3) construct
The work debated the consequences for central banks, its search string; 4) search for all relevant papers; 5) keyword all
payments, clearing and settlement systems (PCS) from cryp- abstracts; 6) extract and classify data; 7) analyse the results.
tocurrency, created privately or by the banks themselves as a
competitor to fiat money. The survey focused on cryptocur- B. DEFINITION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
rencies and wider financial markets and is thus different from The first step of the SMP was to define research ques-
the current research. tions (RQs), which, according to Petersen et al. [7] and
Lastly, Hassani et al. [89] presented an example of a Kitchenham et al. [12] allow for a wide overview of the
comprehensive overview of increasing interest from a global available topics related to DLT for central banks. The research
banking industry towards the adoption of blockchain [89] and questions outlined below were motivated by the focus of this
presented a wide-ranging taxonomy of existing applications study - in other words, to review all peer-reviewed research
and relationships between blockchain and the wider banking available on the intersect of blockchain for central banks:
sector. The work summarised the opportunities and chal- RQ1 What are the trends in research on blockchain appli-
lenges from a banker’s perspective on blockchain adaptation. cation for central banks? This research question is
Furthermore, they elaborated on what future impact from Big motivated by the need to understand the comparative
Data generated on blockchain could have towards existing maturity of the topic, by examining where, when, how
practices of data analytics in banking. They highlighted the and by whom the research was communicated.
increasing importance of filtering and signal extraction for the RQ2 What potential blockchain-based use-cases for cen-
banking industry and also highlighted the lack of academic tral banks are addressed by the research community?
interest in this subject area [89]. This work was different This research question is motivated by the need to
from our research, because it covered research into wider the understand where DLT is seen to be suitable for appli-
banking business and blockchain adaptation, without specific cation for the central banking.
focus on central banking and only peer-reviewed research; in RQ3 Why or why shouldn’t blockchain be considered? This
addition to academic publications, they also included industry question is motivated by the need to understand why
wide reports, blogs and wider media sources on blockchain DLT was considered for each of identified use-cases
applications. and what challenges the application of blockchain
Surveys excluded from our study focused on wider appli- poses, but not to highlight or promote any specific
cations of blockchain other than those for central banks. More approach.
specifically, on economic aspects of cryptocurrency (without RQ4 What is the depth / breadth of the research for iden-
interaction with fiat currency), blockchain evolution and tech- tified use-cases? This research question is motivated
nological concepts, surveys that did not focus solely on the by the need to understand the comparative maturity
application of DLT for central banking or financial services and application specifics of each separate use-case.

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C. PRIMARY STUDY SEARCH AND SEARCH STRING ‘‘CBDC’’ OR ‘‘money supply’’ OR ‘‘monetary policy’’
To develop a rigorous search strategy, the next step of the OR ‘‘technocracy’’)
SMP was to search for all relevant papers. A pre-defined AND
search protocol that specified methods of undertaking the Step 2: Search further in the population of papers
search for the literature was established, to reduce the possi- obtained by the Step 1 for reference to blockchain tech-
bility of researcher bias and to allow for subsequent validity nology - intervention: (‘‘blockchain’’ OR ‘‘distributed
evaluation [6], [7]. The final search was conducted on 22nd ledger technology’’ OR ‘‘DLT’’ OR ‘‘smart contracts’’)
of June 2020 and included years between 2008 and 2020.
The current study used two common search strategies [6], D. SEARCH FOR RELEVANT PAPERS
[7]: database search and manual search. Leading academic Not all identified papers were relevant to the topic, so the next
databases were searched to obtain the literature for the study, phase was to evaluate the actual relevance of obtained articles
namely: IEEExplorer; ELSEVIER: Scopus, SSRN (includ- against what was known about the population of the topic of
ing JEL - Journal of Economic Literature), ScienceDirect; interest [7]. We achieved this by defining rigorous inclusion
arXiv.org; Web of Science; ACM. and exclusion criteria. Those criteria were applied to all titles,
The steps of the search were as follows: abstracts and keywords of articles obtained earlier with the
goal of identifying papers that were clearly in or out of the
1) following the guidelines of Petersen et al. [6], [7] an scope of the mapping study [7].
initial set of keywords was identified from the study Grey literature such as relevant government project
title: ‘‘blockchain’’ and ‘‘central bank’’; reports, working papers and evaluation documents available
2) a pilot manual database search was first conducted through earlier pre-specified databases was also included.
using those keywords, where additional keywords were Garousi et al. [14], [15] underlined the importance of such
derived from the known papers [7] and categorised literature to be used as an additional source for understanding
based on James et al. [13]. A Population Intervention the area of novel research. The topic of development, appli-
Comparison Outcome (PICO) approach allowed the cation and evaluation of blockchain technology for central
creation and structuring of the search string [6], [7]; banks is a novel research domain and inclusion of grey litera-
3) improvements in the search were implemented to find ture broadens the outlook for both the state-of-the art and the
more relevant papers per iteration [7] and update the state-of-practice in the area [15] by including wider research
search string. sources.
According to Petersen et al. [7], Population (P) and Inter- Inclusion criteria:
vention (I) are the most relevant for a SMS, since the other 1) English scientific and grey, empirical and non-
dimensions may restrict the search too much and remove empirical, peer-reviewed articles, conference papers,
relevant articles. As a result, only P and I dimensions were available through pre-specified databases;
applied for search string composition. In the current research 2) publications between 2008 - 2020 inclusive;
context, those elements are defined as: Population: an indus- 3) papers with research scope of blockchain technology
try group comprising a central banking business and its and sub-scope - the application of that technology for
underlying products and services; Intervention: blockchain the domain related to the central banking business.
technology as a software engineering tool considered for the Exclusion criteria:
application and adaptations for central banking functions.
1) papers without full text availability;
The decision not to use ‘‘cryptocurrency’’ and ‘‘Bitcoin’’
2) papers that were not written in the English language;
as keywords for the search string was based on our pilot
3) studies that were duplicates of other studies;
search results. Papers collected by the search tended to be
4) studies that were an older version of studies already
related to the economics of publicly issued cryptocurrencies
considered;
such as Bitcoin rather than aspects of underlying blockchain
5) the study was not a scientific study, such as editorials,
technology and its applications. The steps of composing a
summaries of keynotes, workshops, and tutorials;
search string and applying a database suitable variation of it,
6) studies that were book chapters;
using the P and I dimensions were as follows [7]:
7) papers that had some other meaning other than one
Step 1: Scope the search for banking industry related relevant to the application of blockchain technology for
publication: (‘‘banking’’ OR ‘‘bank’’ OR ‘‘central central banking.
bank’’ OR ‘‘reserve bank’’ OR ‘‘monetary author- The final ‘Database Search Results’ on 22nd of June 2020
ity’’ OR ‘‘monetary’’ OR ‘‘financial Intermediary’’ OR with the database specific search strings and automated (if
‘‘financial Intermediation’’ OR ‘‘clearing’’ OR ‘‘clear- database functionality permitted) or manual application of
inghouse’’ OR ‘‘settlement’’ OR ‘‘financial institu- inclusion/exclusion criteria on title, keywords and abstract is
tion’’ OR ‘‘FinTech’’ OR ‘‘financial technology’’ OR provided in Appendix A.
‘‘inter-bank’’ OR ‘‘IBPS’’ OR ‘‘real-time gross set- For borderline papers deemed relevant during the inclu-
tlement’’ OR ‘‘RTGS’’ OR ‘‘payment settlement’’ OR sion and exclusion, based on their title, abstract and

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1) Abstracts were read and searched for keywords and

concepts that reflected the contribution of the paper;
while doing so, the context of the research paper was
identified. When the abstracts provided no meaningful
category of keywords, the paper’s introduction and con-
clusion were also read;
2) Sets of keywords from different papers were combined
to develop a high-level understanding about the nature
and the contribution of published research. This pro-
cess produced a set of categories representative of the
underlying included studies;
3) All selected papers were then read fully. If a paper
FIGURE 2. Number of included articles during the study selection process. revealed some new important keywords in the text,
existing categories were updated [7];
4) The final set of keywords was then clustered and used
keywords, further reading of introduction, conclusion and, for categories of the current SMS [6].
if the decision was still unclear, full text reading was
conducted to establish relevance to the research questions F. DATA EXTRACTION, ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION
[3]. Excluded borderline papers had a primary focus on The aim of this step was to collect all the information required
1) blockchain application for the wider financial sector to structure the literature for this study in order to map it
other than central banks, i.e.: commercial banking, financial and to answer research questions. Following the guidelines
trading and/or exchanges (excluding Payment Clearing and of Petersen et al. [7], we developed a data collection form to
Settlement (PCS) infrastructure operated by central banks), enable data extraction from the included publications. Each
general economy, unbanked; 2) papers that provided pub- data collection field was populated with a data item (the
licly issued cryptocurrency economics and solutions, i.e., that column header – a category) and its corresponding values.
described it as a digital asset or private sector money, such as This allowed a check for the correctives of extracted data in
Bitcoin, not issued by the central bank; 3) wider FinTech and the collection form by tracking it back to its original paper.
blockchain regulation and legal implications for blockchain The development of the form was achieved in two stages:
and cryptocurrency other than those concerned with central 1) We itemised basic metadata available through pre-
banking activity. defined databases and populated the data form with
We also performed a forward snowballing sampling tech- corresponding values. The added data items were:
nique on the most cited papers [16]. Citing metadata is document title, authors, publication year, publication
available through the majority of the databases. A further venue, publication type and publisher. After reading all
13 studies were added through this technique [16]. The deci- papers, we added further fields, such as research type,
sion to use forward snowballing was underpinned by the research contribution. This step allowed development
focus on more recent and novel publications and to allow for of the facets for: ‘‘Topic-Independent Classification
theoretical validity evaluation. Schema’’ [7]. These facets enabled us firstly, to answer
Final quality assessment was performed on the set RQ1 and RQ4 and, secondly, to facilitate comparison of
of 72 primary studies. According to Petersen et al. [7] and the similar or same research in the different fields [7].
Kitchenham et al. [17], for SMS: ‘‘Quality assessment should This allowed us to gain insights into the comparative
not pose high requirements on the primary studies, as the goal maturity of the study area [7] and helped to improve
of mapping is to give a broader overview of the topic area’’ and clarify classification [7].
[7], [17]. The criteria for paper evaluation was whether the 2) Further categories were then added to the data collec-
knowledge claims made by the paper were interesting and tion form headers that emerged from keywording of the
justified by the research method Wieringa et al. [18]. Fig. 2 abstracts. This stage developed a schema representative
represents the final results for each step of the SMP. of the underlying publications: ‘‘Topic-Specific Clas-
sification Schema’’ [7]. This provided study specific
E. KEYWORDING OF ABSTRACTS categories [7] allowing us to answer RQ2 and RQ3
The next stage of the SMP was the keywording of abstracts and to map findings against the facets, identified in the
of the final set of relevant papers [6]. Keywording is a way previous stage.
to reduce the time needed for developing the classification The topic-specific classification schema developed could
schema and to ensure that the schema takes the existing scope be considered as an additional contribution on its own, since
of studies into account. it provides a framework for categorising and describing the
To build the current classification schema, we again fol- blockchain-based interest and application for central banking
lowed the guidelines of Petersen et al. [6], conducted through business in peer-reviewed literature. The full list of headers
the following steps: of the data collection form is provided in Appendix B.

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The data reveals that peer-reviewed grey literature con-

tributed the most research to this topic - 31 papers (or
43.06% of total), with academic articles being a close sec-
ond at 27 papers (or 37.5% of total), leaving just 19.44%
(or 14 publications) for Conference proceedings (Fig. 3 b).
Although the search included years 2008 - 2020, the data
shows that, across all pre-specified databases and including
manual search and forward snowball sampling, there were no
publications available reflecting the interest of the research
community in application of blockchain for central banks
until 2016 (bar chart of Fig. 3a). During that year, a total
of 11 publications (or 15.28% of total available literature)
were shared, with almost half provided by industry (grey
literature types), only two being a pure academic article
and four communicated as Conference proceedings. Over
FIGURE 3. Frequency of publications. the following two years, the overall number of available
papers steadily grew and peaked in 2018 at 22 papers (or
Categorised data then was used to visualise, summarise, 30.56% of total). For that year, grey literature provided a
analyse and draw conclusions in relation to the research slight majority of the research (nine papers or 40.91% for that
questions, to satisfy the aim of the research. year), closely followed by academic articles (seven papers
or 31.82% of 2018). Availability of Conference proceedings
IV. MAPPING RESULTS fluctuated over the years peaking in 2018 to 6 papers. The
A total of 72 papers were used in the completed review, with greatest number of academic articles was found in 2017
three categories for topic independent classification schema (9 papers), showing a steady decrease thereafter. Academics
and five categories for topic specific schema defined for provided more than half of all research for that year. For
each paper. The complete list of all included papers is pro- 2019, the results showed a total of 19 papers, almost half
vided in Appendix C. It is important to note that the current of which were grey literature sources (nine or 47.37% of
study does not represent a full and comprehensive review of 2019). In relation to 2020, only two papers were found as
how all central banks explore blockchain technology today. grey literature and one as an academic article, although it is
Such a review would require us, in addition to academic difficult to judge with confidence about the final trend for
publications, to consider industry reports, press releases, 2020 as there is still a considerable amount of time left in the
white papers etc., with emphasis primarily on grey literature year. Overall, these results show, firstly, that the interest of
sources. A good example of one such review is in the work of the research community in the application of blockchain for
Hassani et al. [89], where the authors summarised blockchain central banks is a very young; secondly, that the overall trend
adaptation for the wider banking community largely utilising of interest in this topic is potentially growing, and, finally, that
industry and media reports. The focus of the current study is there is a strong industry presence providing and potentially
to report the state of academic research. guiding such research, although participation of academics
and industry practitioners in research is somewhat balanced.
A. TOPIC-INDEPENDENT CLASSIFICATION SCHEMA
This section provides an overview of the data from included 2) FREQUENT PUBLICATION VENUES AND PUBLISHERS
literature allowing us to answer RQ1. This question is moti- Breaking down included literature by publication venue and
vated by the need to provide a comparison of similar research a publisher provided an insight into which one has poten-
in different fields [7]. Research facets identified in this section tially the most similar research. Fig. 4 shows the most fre-
will be further used in Section IV.B and IV.D to enable the quent venues (Fig. 4a) and publishers (Fig. 4b) for sharing
mapping of use-cases and to answer RQ2 and RQ4. peer-reviewed publications. Additionally, the bars are colour-
RQ1: What are the trends in research on blockchain appli- coded to demonstrate what type of literature was available
cation for central banks? through each of those sources.
The data indicates that publications related to examina-
1) FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATIONS AND LITERATURE TYPES tion of DLT for and by central banks have been published
Fig. 3 represents numbers for all publications identified in a very broad range of venues and by a wide variety of
between the beginning of 2008 and June of 2020. The colour publishers. Our study includes literature from 57 different
categorisation communicates the type of the peer-reviewed publication venues, including 48 venues that have only pro-
literature published, distinguished between: 1) conference vided a single paper. Furthermore, the research was pub-
proceedings, 2) grey literature and, 3) journal and magazine lished through 31 distinct publishers and 19 of those had
academic articles. The bubble plot in Fig. 3b shows the count only published one paper on this topic. The most frequently
and percentage of the total for each of those literature types. targeted journal that published both academic articles and

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FIGURE 4. Frequent publication venues and publishers.

grey literature was the SSRN Journal of Economic Literature

(JEL) – totalling four publications overall (Fig. 4 a). No
pattern for conferences was found, as all 13 provided one
publication each.
Fig. 4b shows that IEEE and Elsevier BV were the most
popular publishers and the former only focuses purely on FIGURE 5. Frequency of publications.
conference proceedings and the latter only on academic arti-
cles; a total of 10 and 9 papers were found over the period, 2) Method;
respectively. For the grey literature, the most frequently used 3) Proof of Concept (PoC);
channels for research outputs were the central banks them-
Theoretical (or knowledge) contribution:
selves - Bank of Canada, FED, BOE, BIS and so on. The full
list of venues and the publisher is provided in Appendix D. 4) Conceptual Framework;
5) Taxonomy;
3) RESEARCH TYPE AND CONTRIBUTION 6) New Knowledge.
In this study, we identified the research type facet This facet allows for comparison of papers with similar
that reflected classes of non-mutually exclusive research objectives.
approaches (or types), to which all primary studies could be As one paper can use more than one Research Type and
mapped. As this facet is general and independent of specific provide more than one Contribution to communicate the work
focus area [6], it allows for comparison with other fields. We of its authors, overall numbers for each of those facets are
utilised the research type categories from Petersen et al. [6] greater than the number of included papers. An important
and Wieringa et al. [18] and this facet captured six categories distinction for Evaluation research is that it involves industry
in total, further grouped into two broader categories: cooperation [6]. The contributions from Evaluation and Val-
Empirical Research Types: idation research types, in addition to new knowledge, could
1) Validation Research; also include a novel technique, such as a model or a protocol.
2) Evaluation Research; Although a Solution proposal is a non-empirical research type
Non-Empirical Research Types: [6], [18], in addition to new knowledge, it sometimes provides
3) Solution Proposal; a technological contribution in the form of Proof of Concept
4) Philosophical Paper; (PoC) – a model or protocol - but without ‘‘full-blown’’
5) Opinion Paper; validation [18]. Contributions of a Philosophical paper can be
6) Experience Paper. a new conceptual framework [6], [18] and / or taxonomy [6],
both of which are theoretical contributions. Opinion papers
Another facet was the research contribution facet, which
and Experience papers both contribute to knowledge, but in
represented non-mutually exclusive types of novel contribu-
contrast, Experience papers can involve experience reports
tions provided by the included papers to the research field
from industry practitioners [18], so often utilised for grey
and captured six categories in total. Those categories could
literature.
be more broadly divided into:
Fig. 5a represents the frequency of all contributions
Practical (or technological) contribution: (column headers), provided by each research type (colour
1) Model; coded pie charts). Results show that, overall, the dominating

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contributions to this topic are knowledge, framework and underlying research topic and maps the interest from the
taxonomy. We see that, overall, there are 10 novel models academic circles to utilisation of blockchain for services and
provided, five of those are communicated using Evaluation operations of a central bank. The schema allows us to answer
research type, the other two from Validation research and RQ2 by structuring the researched topic in terms of variability
three as Solution proposals. Evaluation research added the of themes in relation to the application of blockchain for
most novel protocols (three out of five). Solution proposals central banks in general.
added thee models, one protocol and six PoCs as practical After reading all included papers, it was evident that they
contributions, although those were not empirically validated. fell into the five following categories for DLT-based use-cases
Philosophical papers added 24 new frameworks and 18 new for central banks:
taxonomies. The data shows that theoretical contributions 1) Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC);
dominate the field, with technological artefacts appearing 2) Payment Clearing and Settlement (PCS) systems oper-
less frequently and predominantly provided with industry ated by central banks;
cooperation. 3) Assets transfer and ownership (Assets);
Fig. 5b shows the distribution of identified Research Types, 4) Audit trail (Audit);
represented as colour codded pie-bobbles, for each year. The 5) Regulatory compliance (Regulation).
size of each bobble shows a total count of papers and the
These use-cases provided another facet of our classifi-
colour of the pie is relevant to different research types. For
cation to map all included primary studies against earlier
example, in 2016 and 2019, Validation research type was
identified facets of: research type, research contribution and
utilised once in each of those years. Uses of Evaluation type
literature type and to answer RQ2 - RQ4.
peaked to five in 2018 from three in 2017. Opinion papers
Furthermore, after reading all papers, an additional two sets
peaked in 2017 at 11 and were utilised six times in 2018
of information emerged for each of the identified use-cases;
and nine in 2019. Philosophical papers were used the most
these broadly answered the questions of:
in 2018 (13 times) to communicate new findings, nine times
in 2019 and twice in 2020. Experience papers were utilised 1) Why DLT was considered for each of those use-cases?
the least overall. The data potentially points out, that, because and
the topic of this study is young, there is still little practical 2) What challenges the application of blockchain posed
experience to report on - the majority of work is still the- for those use-cases?
oretical. Communication of empirical findings on the other A narrative summary answering those questions (for each
hand, although significantly lagging, seems to be slowly but use-case) will be presented in Section IV.C of this study
steadily increasing over time. and allows us to answer RQ3. Additionally, after reading all
In Fig. 5c, a distribution of the cohorts of Literature Types papers it was evident that a single paper could span multiple
for each Research Type is given. Results show that, overall, use-cases, could utilise more than one research type and
the authors preferred to use non-empirical research types to provide more than one contribution. Therefore, the overall
communicate their findings. Only 13 times out of total (or number of studies across all categories is larger than the total
13%), was Empirical research used (11, or 11% of total, number of publications.
for Evaluation research and two, or 2% of total, for Vali- Lastly several technical variables emerged, most promi-
dation Research). The other times a non-empirical research nently discussed in the included papers. Tables 1 and 2 that
was utilised, with 38 (38%) for Philosophical, 34 (34%) summarise positive and negative opinions of the researchers
for Opinion Papers, eight (8%) for Solution Proposals and about application of those variables in the central bank set-
seven (7%) for Experience papers. Evaluation and Experience tings is presented in Section IV.C.6
research were mainly communicated via grey literature and RQ2: What potential blockchain-based use-cases for cen-
the same applied to Opinion and Experience papers. Half of tral bank are addressed by the research community?
the Philosophical papers were provided by industry (grey lit- Fig. 6 represents use-cases that were available in the
erature). Solution Proposal cohorts of the researchers appears included literature. Fig. 6b shows a distribution of identified
balanced. All Validation Research is available as Conference use-cases for each year, represented and colour-coded in pie-
proceedings. This data suggests that empirical research was bobbles for each use-case. The size of each bobble reflects a
mostly used by industry participants to communicate their total count of use-cases in that bobble.
findings. Non-empirical research was also noticeably dom- It is evident from the data (Fig. 6a) that CBDC is the most
inated by grey literature, making practitioners into prominent widely investigated and reported central bank use-case for
debate contributors. blockchain, with 39 papers (or 30.23% of total) examining
it. The number of those use-cases available in the included
B. TOPIC-SPECIFIC CLASSIFICATION SCHEMA: literature has been steadily growing over the years (Fig. 6b),
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED USE-CASES FOR CENTRAL BANKS with four papers discussing it in 2016, five in 2017, 13 papers
In this part of the study, we introduce a classification schema in 2018, peaking to 15 in 2019 and twice in 2020 so far. Over
that emerged from reading all paper keywords, abstracts half of overall research on CBDC was provided through grey
and full text [6], [7]. This classification is specific to the literature (Fig. 6 a) – 24 publications (or 61.54% of all CBDC

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proceedings. The majority of information on the topic of audit

trail was available through academic articles. The year-on-
year trend for both of those use-cases was similar, peaking
for both in 2017 and slowing down thereafter. The data indi-
cates that although these two topics show some interest from
researchers, that interest seems to be lagging behind, unable
to sustain an upward trend and potentially indicating another
gap.
C. OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FROM BLOCKCHAIN
ADAPTATION
This section provides a narrative summary of discussions in
the included literature for each of the earlier identified use-
cases answering questions of: 1)why DLT was considered
for each of those use-cases? and 2) what challenges the
application of blockchain posed for those use-cases?
RQ3: Why or why shouldn’t blockchain be considered?

1) CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY (CBDC)

‘‘Banknotes’’ and ‘‘commercial bank reserves/deposits’’ - are
both a form of central bank money, which is the main form
of the central bank’s liability and underpin nearly all other
forms of money in the economy. In the UK, over 98% of
FIGURE 6. All blockchain-based use-cases for central banks. sterling payments, by value, are made electronically, with less
than 2% made by banknotes, coins or cheques [19]. BIS [26]
research). The data indicates that interest in CBDC is growing states that the only way for the general public to own central
and industry is leading and influencing the trend. bank money is through physical cash. ‘‘If someone wishes
The second most popular use-case was Regulation, with to digitise that holding, they have to convert the central bank
37 publications (or 28.68% of the total). The largest propor- liability into a commercial bank liability (commercial bank
tion of that research was communicated via academic journals money) by depositing cash in a commercial bank’’ [26].
(17 articles or 45.95%), with grey literature a close second. Why was blockchain considered for CBDC?
Over the years, availability of information on regulation in Currently, CBDC models receive more serious consider-
academic print was consistently growing, peaking to 11 in ation [50] from the research community and central banks
2019 two more for the first half of 2020.The data suggests that themselves. 28 included papers argue about the potential
interest in regulatory compliance is expanding and participa- benefits from its hypothetical introduction, because CBDC is
tion between industry and academia is more geared towards seen as a potential next milestone in the evolution of money
the academic side. [23]; it is believed to provide a more stable unit of account, a
PCS was researched 20.93% of the time, totalling more efficient medium of exchange and a more secure store
27 publications, where academic articles were leading the of value [25], [50]. The focus of many researchers is on its
general trend (12 articles or 44.44%), with grey literature not application to the domestic economy [23], monetary supply-
far behind (9 papers or 33.33%). For this use-case, conference side considerations [39] and for promoting financial inclusion
proceedings appeared to be proportionally popular, compared [19], [43], [80] or as an enabler of cross-border payments
to some other use-cases, although still the least frequent [84], [87]. Some explore whether the introduction of CBDC
venue for research communication. Year-on-year change for could improve the efficiency of fiat currency function [41]
this use-case revealed that interest in this topic initially almost by providing a way to directly transfer central bank funds to
doubled from six papers in 2016 to 10 in 2017. 2018 provided households and firms [19], [101]. Arner et al. [101] argue that
eight papers, in 2019 there was only one publication available the replacement of cash with a cash-like CBDC can lower
and two in 2020. The data indicates that, although PCS the cost of maintaining the supply of physical currency and
was a popular topic, participation of researchers is subsid- protect it against counterfeiting [101]. Thus, the social value
ing, potentially indicating underlying lack of interest and/or of CBDC is believed to be in its ability to bring some of the
development of the gap in knowledge. anonymity of cash into the digital realm [101] or even blend
Two further categories had the least overall coverage in the the features of cash and deposits together [85]. In another
literature, with 9.30%, or 12 papers, for assets transfer and example, after studying the macroeconomic consequences of
ownership and 10.85%, or 14 papers, for audit trail. Research issuing CBDC, the BOE states that its introduction could
on assets was evenly divided between academic articles and promote financial stability by permanently raising ‘‘GDP by
publications from industry, with little input from conference as much as 3%, due to reductions in real interest rates’’ [22].

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A large proportion of included papers focus on design fea- when its design implementation can guarantee anonymity
tures of a hypothetical CBDC because, from the perspective [34], provide restricted access to a predefined group of
of central banks, the impact of CBDC introduction hinges economic agents and is applicable to a limited range of
on its design, country-specific economic and financial char- purposes [20], [24], [38], [44]. This type of CBDC design
acteristics [23], [41], [101] and reasons for its introduction could facilitate faster or immediate settlement [23], [41] or
[20], [41]. For example, a CBDC designed to provide a secure extended settlement hours [41] and could be accessed more
payments service could serve a different core purpose to the broadly than central bank reserves [21]. Khiaonarong and
one used ‘‘as an instrument of monetary policy’’ [20], or it Humphrey [39] provides an example of the Bank of Canada
could be designed in such a way as to blend a monetary and a exploration of DLT for digital representations of the Canadian
payment systems into one [101] and it could have a ‘‘separate dollar (called a digital depository receipt), used for wholesale
operational structure to other forms of central bank money’’, payments [39]. By improving efficiency and safety of both
(BOE) [21]. retail and large-value payment systems [41], [49], CBDC
In terms of payment economics, an important design con- could aid central banks in easing liquidity pressures and
sideration is what is verified on the blockchain – a token potentially help to curtail bank runs [23], [35].
(an individual receiving a token will verify that the token Another reported design feature of an account-based
is genuine [81]), or an account (an intermediary verifies the CBDC was that it could allow for interest payments - the
identity of an account holder [81]), i.e., an account-based interest-bearing CBDC, supplied by a central bank under
CBDC versus token-based CBDC. A token-based CBDC either a monetary quantity rule or a monetary price rule [21].
could extend some of the attributes and functionality of cash When CBDC is designed as non-interest-bearing, its similar-
for retail transactions [21], [23], [86], [101] and could be ity to cash becomes the sole design choice [85]. If a return
made widely available to the public as a general-purpose could be paid/earned on CBDC, the overall probability of its
currency [50], [86]. Universal access to this CBDC could introduction increases [34], because an optimally designed
be obtained through a digital signature and privacy will be interest-bearing CBDC could safeguard bank intermediation
ensured by default [86]. Khiaonarong and Humphrey [39] and protect the variety of payment instruments against net-
believe that the role of cash in the economy should be main- work effects [85]. Furthermore, being a liability of a central
tained [39]. However, CBDC could reduce the demand for bank [38], CBDC could be backed on the asset side of the
cash [4] or facilitate the gradual obsolescence of paper cur- central bank’s balance sheet by liquid federal government
rency [25], effectively reducing costs associated with main- risk-free assets [50], thereby serving as a secure store of
taining a cash-based system [4], [43], [101]. These would be value with a rate of return [25], [44] different to the rate
helpful in discouraging tax evasion, money laundering and on reserves [21]. By facilitating access to the balance sheet
other illegal activities [4], [25], [43], [101]. An account-based of a central bank, CBDC could promote contestability for
CBDC could be utilised with payments through the transfer banks and non-bank financial institutions [19]. It does not
of claims recorded on an account [23]. It is the preferred have to disintermediate banks in any way [35], [80]. If an
design choice of central banks [23], [25], [50], [101], because account-based interest-bearing CBDC is used by the general
it could provide them with a more reliable real-time window public as a viable option to bank deposits [29], [44], [101] it
on economic activity to guide monetary policy [43], [50]. could discipline behaviour of commercial banks [29], address
Academics further categorise account-based design competition problems in the banking sector [42], [43] and
depending on who has access to CBDC. The difference here compel commercial banks to raise their deposit rates [80]. If
is between retail CBDC which is issued for the general CBDC is used as reserves, it can increase overall lending by
public and wholesale CBDC, issued by financial institutions reducing a banker’s costs of holding those reserves in central
holding reserve deposits with a central bank [38], [44], [50]. banks via increases in the CBDC rate paid on those reserves
If anonymity is not seen as an issue, a central bank could [29]. As CBDC could also pay positive, zero or even negative
provide bank accounts for the general public [23], [24], [26], rates at various points in the economic cycle [80], it could be
in the same way deposit accounts are today [80] – the retail utilised as a tool for conducting monetary policy [25], [43].
CBDC. Those types of accounts could be made available Lastly, the underlying architecture of CBDC could differ
through public-private partnerships with commercial banks between centralized, fully decentralized and a hybrid sys-
or could be held by private individuals directly at the central tem [101]. A centralised system would be characterised by
bank itself [25]. ‘‘This is something that has been technically a permissioned blockchain, be account-based and provide
feasible for a long time, but which central banks have mostly direct access to a central bank, but lack cash-like qualities
stayed away from’’ [80]. This type of a central-bank-run such as anonymous exchange [101]. A decentralised CBDC
system would provide convenience, resilience, accessibility could be based on a permissionless blockchain where full
[86], opportunity to better track payments, making CBDC decentralization is achievable through tokenisation and could
widely accessible, held by anyone for any purpose [20], offer cash-like features [101]. A hybrid architecture is a blend
with ease of use to per-to-per cross border payments [84], of a centralized and decentralized CBDC. It may provide
[86]. On the other hand, a wholesale CBDC issued for large- central bank accounts for financial intermediaries, where
value wholesale interbank payments [24], [41] is considered other participants could use intermediary services to access

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CBDC-takens; these could represent the drawing rights on customer deposits could far more easily take flight to a central
the funds stored in the central bank accounts [101]. bank [24], [43], [49], [85], [87], CBDC could act as an
What challenges could the introduction of CBDC pose? accelerant of bank runs [23], [24], [43], [50], [87], [101],
A total of 32 papers discuss the potential negative side of ‘‘transforming an isolated concern about one bank’s solvency
CBDC introduction, as a large proportion of researchers agree into a system-wide crisis’’ [50].
that its net benefits for financial stability are not as clear cut. Key characteristics of current blockchain architectures,
This is because, while its adaptation could reduce some of the i.e., the anonymity of a beneficial owner of CBDC [19], [37]
existing risks, other novel and unknown risks could emerge – is another reported red flag [37] of CBDC design. If there
and it is not certain which would be greater [22]. were to be interest payments/charges on CBDC holdings [78],
Despite a range of pilot CBDC projects and theoretical it would be impossible for a central bank to sustain that
studies [101], a high price volatility [2], [3], [43] and low level owner’s anonymity [19], because the holder would need to
of acceptance of cryptocurrencies demonstrated that they fail be identified for income tax purposes [78]. Overall, a central
to satisfy full requirements of fiat money in their current form bank cannot issue CBDC in the sense of a truly decentralised
[2], [101]. If a hypothetical CBDC is to be introduced, it is and permissionless asset that permits its users to remain
still unclear what role should be taken by a central bank and anonymous [37], [101], because anonymous CBDC would
eventual intermediaries [4]. There is a possibility that CBDC facilitate criminal activity [19] leading to high reputational
introduction could create a parallel monetary system [3], [87], risks for central banks [37], [101]. Additional restrictions
which could pose risks to the central bank monopoly over and compliance costs would have to be imposed [19], [43],
issuing base money [49]. It is also uncertain whether CBDC such as KYC (Know-Your-Customer), AML (Anti-Money-
should complement or serve as a substitute for existing central Laundering) and CFT (Counter-Terrorist Financing) [37],
bank money [4]. If CBDC were to be designed as cash-like [43]. Another issue is that novel CBDC system will have
[85], it may lead to the reduction in demand or disappearance to contend with operational and security risks arising from
of cash, thus lowering the variety of payment instruments technological disruptions [3], [23], [37], [51]–[53], [101].
valuable to households with diverse needs [85]. Additionally, Overall, there is an agreement in the research community
such a system creates a risk of permanent loss of funds if that there is a need for more research on the impact of
end users fail to keep their private key secret secure [86]. a potential deployment of CBDC on monetary policy and
Furthermore, there are risks to price stability [49], to smooth financial stability [4], [101]. More work is required to assess
operation of payment systems [49], [62] and to the conduct of the full potential of CBDC [24], its technological feasibility
monetary policy [49], [87]. CBDC also could have a negative and operational costs [23], [43], [101] and country-specific
effect on seigniorage, the interest rates [19] as well as face circumstances [23]. There is a growing consensus amongst
numerous legal challenges [49], [87]. researchers that, due to outstanding uncertainties regarding
The next important challenge, reported in the included the design and architecture of the CBDC systems [4], [101],
papers was to establish who should get access to CBDC in to technical constraints [38] of current blockchain architec-
the first place: only commercial banks, financial institutions tures and maturing technology [3], [4], [19]–[25], [37], [40],
in general or even citizens [4]? If CBDC was to be issued [50]–[52], [64], [66], [75], that it is too early to draw firm
to the general public, who should run the nodes (end users conclusions on the real benefits of CBDC [19], [23], [101].
or money providers) and how off-line payments should be Today, the general view remains that such a move towards
processed [4]. CBDC adoption would be premature [50] and the risks con-
Some researchers believe that disintermediated public nected with issuing CBDC would outweigh the potential
access to the central bank balance sheet via interest-bearing benefits for society [39]; currently, no central bank has a live
CBDC could result in destabilizing consequences for the and operating CBDC system [4], [21], [38].
banking sector [49], [50], [85]. As a competitive and safe
and convenient alternative to commercial bank deposits [23], 2) PAYMENT CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
[43], [44], [50], [85], CBDC would likely to have a disruptive OPERATED BY CENTRAL BANKS
effect on financial stability of credit institutions [23], [44], Central banks play a fundamental role in supporting, regu-
[49] and key financial market infrastructures [24], [50] with lating and supervising payment systems [101], because such
contagion to the overall financial system [49]. Disruption of infrastructure stands at the core of monetary and financial
commercial banks’ business model [50] could lead to adverse systems by creating a linkage between them [101]. ‘‘In its
consequences for the real economy [45]. With a sufficiently simplest form, the PCS of a financial transaction, regardless
high CBDC interest rate [29] commercial bank reliance on of the asset type, requires: 1) a network of participants, 2) an
customer deposits as a major source of their funding [45] may asset or set of assets that are transferred among those partici-
become less stable [23], [85] and more expensive [23], [29], pants, and 3) a transfer process that define the procedures and
[43], leading to additional reductions in lending activity [29], obligations associated with transactions’’ [52]. Central banks
[43], [45], [85] or increased lending rates to general public facilitate settlement using central bank accounts to ensure
[23], [43]. Since in times of financial distress, commercial finality [101].

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Why was blockchain considered for PCS systems of central connection [2] between transacting parties. DLT can enable
banks? settlement to occur through consensual reallocation of the
Overall, 31 papers argue about the potential benefits of balances [62] as a decentralised settlement of a transaction
hypothetical blockchain-based PCS systems, operated by could be simultaneous with the validation process [69]. Fur-
central banks. Some researchers believe that DLT has the thermore, blockchain can improve end-to-end duration of the
potential to improve efficiency [51], [101] and bring greater settlement cycle [51], [52], where transactions could happen
value [82] to PCS [46] by modernising financial market in almost real-time and peer-to-peer [56], [101]. It could
infrastructure [45], [101] and revolutionising the underlying additionally provide a more flexible settlement [51], [54],
technology [67] underpinning those processes today. by extending settlement hours [41] or shortening settlement
Researchers argue that DLT is capable of enhancing ser- periods [2], [19], [26], [41], [51], [54], [61], [69] from the
vice and overall operational efficiency, safety [67], [101] and current standard of ‘trade date plus three days’ (T+3), to near
global reach [65] of Interbank Payment Systems (IBPS) [4], instantaneous settlement (T+0) [2], [26], [51], [58], [69].
[41], [56], [57], [63], [68] for large-value wholesale payments Faster transfer will allow participants of inter-bank market to
[26], [31], [41], [101]. By allowing point-to-point transmis- receive funds and securities more quickly, freeing up liquidity
sion [67] and straight-through processing of global [36], [68] that could be tied up in collateral [53]. Improved availability
financial transactions [66], DLT could reduce complexity for of assets and funds [52], could illuminate the shortcomings of
multiparty, cross-border [52] inter-bank payments and settle- fractional reserve banking [45], by facilitating more effective
ments [39] and allow for transfers in multiple currencies with use of collateral and regulatory capital [64], such as central
the use of a single transaction system [65]. Blockchain could bank reserves used for settlement of inter-bank payments
enhance efficiency of IBPS for cross-bank money transfers [61]. These provide a real opportunity to address the sepa-
[63] by speeding them up [2], [68], [101] to near-real-time ration between transactions (such as securities or derivatives
updating and 24 × 7x365 processing [61], [65]. Also, for transactions) and payment for those transactions, particularly
general application of Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS), at the wholesale level [101].
CBDC could be utilised to make it open access, allowing All the above have the potential for reducing costs of trans-
any financial agent to settle large value payments, achieving actions [2], [4], [67], [69], reconciliation cost [4], [51], [64],
finality in virtually real-time [19], [61], [65], [101]. For the clearing cost [63], processing cost [65] and overall settlement
inter-bank market, each bank can be a participant in DLT-PCS cost [4], [26], [41], [51], [52], [56], [68], [69]. Additionally,
and take part in the consensus process [56], thus eliminating blockchain could promote reduction of risks inherent in PCS
the intermediary link of third-party financial institutions [4], activities [52] such as legal and settlement risks [51], [52],
[27], [67], [101]. Blockchain can also eliminate the need for [54], operational risks [51], [52] such as risk of fraud [2],
centrally maintained back-up systems [51], [101], by creat- and financial risks [52] such as liquidity [68] or counter-party
ing decentralised, technology-led, automated IBPS [66] that risks [2], [4], [51], [56], [68], [69].
no longer require reconciliation between different databases The challenges that blockchain-based PCS systems could
[56], [101]. By tracking on blockchain [63], [101], a central face?
bank can oversee [75] payments, settlement and remittance The multitude of possible designs for DLT is an indica-
transfers [4], [68] of inter-bank cash flow [63] and ensure a tion that a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate for
delivery-vs-payment (DvP) by linking transfers of assets with addressing the broad range of challenges in payment, clearing
payments [51], [54]. and settlement [53], [101]. 15 papers discuss the potential
Another potential benefit of DLT cited by researchers is negative implications of blockchain adaptation for PCS.
that it could streamline a post-trade value chain [64] by Researchers are sceptical about full substitution [66] of
simplifying and automating many of the processes currently existing and well-established PCS process by currently avail-
involved in the post-trade cycle [51] such as clearing and able DLT architectures and protocols. High barrier to entry
settlement. For clearing, there is an opportunity to speed it was explicitly recognised as a critical factor influencing the
up to almost immediate [26], where a collection of DLT adoption of DLT for PCS processes [52], [69]. In jurisdic-
nodes could clear payments on a continuous basis [62]. As tions where banks have already built collective infrastructure
an example, Tsai et al. [55] propose a framework for a [66] for PCS, the lack of incentive for alternative equivalent
permissioned multi-blockchain clearinghouse that could be systems arises due to the inefficiencies of high set-up cost,
shared with exchanges, banks and regulators, thus provid- duplication [66] and because of its already existent network
ing redundancy, high speed processing and scalability. In effects [4], [46], [52]. Building these new networks through
relation to the inter-bank settlement of assets, issued and an alliance of incentives of different participants is a chal-
controlled by a central bank, DLT could reduce back-office lenging task [4]. The rationale for it is that the creation of new
costs by automating various settlement processes [58]. It networks of participants in such settings requires each party
could enhance settlement efficiency [24], [26], [51] and to give up some amount of existing control, combined with an
simplify procedures by reducing the number of intermedi- unwillingness to change well-established business processes
aries [69] because blockchain is capable of facilitating direct at their respective institutions [4]. The banking industry will

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require an uptake from a critical mass of those participants of value, multiple financial market infrastructure is typically
for any application of new technology to be successful [52]. involved [53]. Hence, certain processes of the post-trade cycle
Furthermore, faster blockchain-based PCS processing, in the securities markets will still require involvement of
reduced reconciliation work and real- or near-real-time trans- intermediary institutions, irrespective of the market players
action time [53] will remove netting benefits that clear- involved and technology used [64].
ing provides, thereby increasing the ‘spot liquidity’ demand Despite the need for immutability that stems from irre-
for settlement [51]. A real-time (T+0) cycle would require versibility of a blockchain, there are further issues identified
prepositioning of cash or securities (collateral) in advance with self-executing code [3], [51], [53] where mistakes in
of a trade [51], thus increasing credit and liquidity needs coding may need to be corrected [53], [101]. In PCS systems,
associated with payment, clearing and settlement activity there is a requirement for error management [51]–[53], [101]
[51], [53]. in circumstances such as inadvertent errors [53], e.g.,
Another important issue is that an ultimate settlement mistaken or unauthorized payments [47]. Also, there are
of sovereign-backed currency, in accounts held at a central requirements for maintenance [66] of PCS, management of
bank is fundamental to social confidence and trust [66]. A technological failures or misuse [66] and fraud [52], [53],
blockchain-based settlement is probabilistic [53], [58] - in [101], as currently existing and well-established PCS systems
other words, the payment is therefore never fully settled secure public interest objectives in stability and anti-abuse
because there is always a small probability that the payment and are subject to regulation as a critical financial market
could be reversed [58] due to forking [46], [51], [54]. infrastructure [66].
It is also suggested by some researchers that opera-
tional capacity and performance-based scalability of current 3) ASSET TRANSFER AND OWNERSHIP
blockchain designs is a further concern [3], [4], [53]. This is Comparatively smaller numbers of papers available in the
based on limits of the size of the blocks in a blockchain [47]. included literature discusses how introduction of blockchain
As only a limited number of simultaneous transactions can could effect current processes for asset transfer and owner-
be written into the blockchain at any given time, a block’s ship in central banks.
capacity to grow and accommodate more interactions is not Why was blockchain considered for asset transfer and
promising [2]. Current PCS systems are capable of handling ownership of central banks?
a significant fluctuation in volume of transactions, which Nine publications deliberate on the potential improvements
impose a requirement on blockchain-based PCS systems to from blockchain. The capabilities of DLT such as its ability
be operationally scalable to accommodate processing large to provide record-keeping, storage and transfer of any type of
daily volumes and peak volumes in times of market distress or asset (such as securities, commodities, derivative transactions
volatility [53]. As hundreds of millions of daily transactions and so on), make it asset-agnostic [52].
are processed through current PCS [52], any novel system that A key innovation of blockchain is that it can offer, via
fails to meet these requirements will weaken the safety of PCS shared database [54], a time-ordered and immutable record
system activity [53]. of transactional history [61], [69], security ownership [4],
Moreover, when DLT-based settlement is compared with [52], [69] and all transfers among all participants in the
existing centralised RTGS, BIS highlights that it may take payment system [2], [52], that can be updated without rely-
longer to achieve settlement on blockchain [53], thus actu- ing on multiple, specialised intermediaries or a third-party
ally decreasing the speed of transactions [27], [51]. This is infrastructure [54]. When financial institutions trade with one
because technically, to update and synchronise state changes another through IBPS, all relevant counterparties would have
to a ledger, the process for validating a transaction and reach- a copy of that ledger.
ing a consensus across all nodes in DLT is potentially more These could also involve asset issuance and servicing
complex than with a centralised entity [53]. Combined with [2], [62] such as creation of assets, enablement of trading
cryptographic verification, such settings introduce latency between partners and liquidation of positions [62]. For exam-
and limit the number of transfers that DLT can process con- ple, Chen et al. [71] outlined a blockchain-based financial
currently [52]. product information management platform that allowed for
Another essential requirement of any PCS system is trade multi-institutional update of multi-dimensional and diversi-
matching of transactions over a large number of attributes fied financial product information.
with complex rules and cross-dependencies [51]. Blockchain There are also implications when protection of business
does not necessarily have the functionality to compare dif- sensitive information, such as the appropriate level of infor-
ferent data domains, to address contract mismatches or to mation is shared on the ledger and which participants have
process exceptions [51]. Furthermore, operational settle- the ability to read or write to [52]. Even if all nodes have
ment becomes even more complex if it involves delivery-vs- a complete copy of the ledger, it is technologically possible
payment (DvP), payment-vs-payment (PvP) systems [47] or that some of the data on the ledger is encrypted so that
delivery of one asset against another [53] and so on. ‘‘Central only authorized participants can decrypt and read the under-
matching may continue to be required as pre-ledger process- lying information [52]. This way, the system could facili-
ing’’ [51], because in arrangements involving an exchange tate a tamper-resistant [71] direct ownership [52], reducing

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intermediation costs for investors, together with legal, oper- infrastructures [52] of many of the hundreds of data interme-
ational and overall systemic risks [61]. ‘‘This will improve diaries [74] that play a significant role in reconciling costly
accounting, auditing and regulatory supervision functions and potentially conflicting, risk prone non-standard data [69],
while increasing transparency of ownership’’ [2], [51], [71]. [74] in different locations by automating that reconciliation.
What challenges could blockchain-based asset transfer Moreover, the immutable [51]–[53], tamper-resistant [33],
and ownership impose? [52] nature of the DLT enables greater transparency [4], [51],
There are also four papers that discuss potential issues [73] and traceability [4], [33], [51], [53], [57], [58], [73] of
with utilising DLT for assets transfer and ownership. The history of any flow of funds or securities [51], [57], where
concern is whether a DLT entry legally constitutes a proof data cannot be unilaterally changed once recorded [51], [53],
of ownership. For ultimate and legal settlement, there must [58]. Immutability is crucial for safety as it relates to data
be a formal, i.e. legally defined, indication of transfer of integrity [53] and gives participants the assurance that every-
ownership, once securities and cash have changed hands one is storing, seeing, using and processing the same data
[51]. There is an uncertainty in regards of legal validity of as everyone else [2], [4]. As any amendments to the ledger
financial instruments issued on a DLT, because such legal are traceable [51], there is a possibility of reduction of data
ownership [45] is not defined and elaborated by law [47] and falsification and manipulation [3] resulting in reduction of the
not assured by the regulators and supervisors [45]. Propri- risk of fraud [2], [4]. While this refers mostly to the payment
etary rights [45], [47], [53] and obligations, associated with systems currently operated by central banks, it could in theory
DLT representation of assets [45], as well as the liabilities be extended to any DLT-based system to which central banks
and enforceability [53] of the rights of transacting parties would be granted access to, such as internal bank ledgers [4].
are unclear [47], [53]. However, it is a legal requirement for What challenges could blockchain-based audit trail
those to be articulated clearly, understood by all participants impose?
and supported by applicable law [53]. ‘‘As things stand now, Four publications also mention issues associated with DLT
there is not even a standard satisfactory definition as to what and audit. Although it is expected that integrity of records
constitutes a digital asset, not to mention an elaboration of its in the ledger is ensured by the integrity of the ledger itself,
relationship to the physical asset it represents’’ [47]. a trusted body may still be needed to guarantee the validity
Furthermore, for transactions that take place across borders [51] of that data. The reason for this is because the existing
or in multiple jurisdictions [51], [53], there are currently no legal regime cannot assure the reliability of those records [45]
laws that underpin the activity ‘‘in ways that are mutually and that the entered common information is correct [52] when
compatible’’ [53]. ‘‘Decentralisation further challenges tradi- large number of participants have an ability to write to the
tional methods of the enforcement of ownership judgment, as ledger without some kind of supervision. The decisions on
well as of a security interest, because, without the cooperation who and how provides accuracy checks on information stored
of the owner of an asset, placed on the blockchain, the asset in the system [52] and still requires regulation to accom-
may not be accessible’’ [47]. modate record-keeping and to provide for the reliability and
authoritativeness of those records [45] on blockchain.
4) AUDIT TRAIL
There are several papers that provide a high-level discussion 5) REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
on potential improvements or limitation to current auditing A comparatively larger proportion of publications provide
practices from blockchain innovation in central banking set- a discussion of various aspects of regulatory compliance of
tings. blockchain adaptation for central banks. More specifically on
Why was blockchain considered for audit trail of central blockchain’s intersection with regulatory compliance, CBDC
banks? impact onto Monetary Policy and regulation of blockchain-
Thirteen publications mention some potential improve- based PCS systems of central banks.
ments. Researchers argue that blockchain can enhance audit Why was blockchain considered for regulatory
and regulatory functions [2] by providing the opportunity to compliance?
monitor, supervise and audit trades and agreements in real- Overall, 25 papers present thoughts on general aspects
time, which drastically improves regulatory systems in place of regulatory improvements through blockchain. Adoption
today [4] and assists central banks with their supervision role of blockchain for central banking business depends on its
[4], [73]. The global shared audit log [4], [52], provided by ability to comply with the existing regulatory framework
the use of a DLT ensures the integrity of records through the [45], [87], therefore wider financial industry participants
integrity of the ledger itself [51]. ask for updates in regulatory guidance and legal structure
Another cited advantage is reduction of reconciliation [69], [78]. Researchers debate on how to facilitate ‘‘embed-
cost [4], [51], [52], [64]. The majority of back office costs ded supervision’’ [76] by automating mandatory regulatory
are tied to manual reconciliation of conflicting trade data reporting [88], a process which is currently complex and
[69]. Blockchain promises to eliminate manual reconcili- tedious [4], [76]. Central banks foresee the potential of
ation processes [51], [74] across multiple record-keeping DLT to ease regulatory compliance [88], e.g., automatically

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enforce market regulation [2], [4]. To create an algorithmic concentrated in the hands of coding experts who do not
rules-following monetary policy [75] regulators could partic- usually possess governance expertise in areas of risk location
ipate as a node in DLT [55] and have full authority to set initial and determination, consumer protection rights, financial and
blockchain rules, the right to veto against existing blockchain legal expertise [66] etc.
codes, the power to enforce, update and change rules when Blockchain application for central banking business poten-
necessary [79]. tially generates new services and involves new players [47],
Automation of ‘terms and conditions’ of legally binding [52] and therefore creates new legal issues [4], [49], [51],
agreements could reduce some legal risks [53]. To achieve [53], [70], [87] that require additional supervision [27]. Cur-
those goals, researchers argue for development of shared rent regulation and supervisory policies that govern financial
technical interoperability standards [2], [4], [51]–[53], [65], systems and the prevailing financial market architecture are
[67], [69], [70], [73], [74] which can provide a base layer not generally intended to favour a particular electronic tech-
of connectivity; this could help lower implementation and nology [52]; unclear regulatory environment [4] is one of the
integration costs [53], halt avoidance of regulatory arbi- important reasons preventing blockchain from adoption [77].
trage [2] and provide access to more granular standard- Another important issue is that today, the interdependence
ized transactional data [73], [74], [88]. A current absence of existing financial systems suggests that issues arising in
of standardization still makes necessary and important the any one area of the wider banking ecosystem could result
manual post-trading validation processes [69]. Overall, estab- in the transmission of risk to other financial market infras-
lishment of technical standards may encourage broader adop- tructures, leading to systemic damage at national and even
tion of DLT in the financial system that could potentially international levels [2]. There is a diverse set of participants
bring network scale efficiencies [53]. In combination with interacting within a single financial market or across differ-
cost-effective and secure data storing solutions [65], there ent financial markets [52]. Because of this interdependence
is an opportunity to facilitate quicker reconciliation, reduce of legacy payment systems, adaptation of blockchain-based
data discrepancy and demanding back office activities [53] solutions for one area of central banking business could
important for regulatory reporting. Additionally, some papers interrupt existing processes [77] and drastically affect a wide
propose establishment of a regulatory ‘sandbox’ model [2], range of interconnected financial markets and infrastruc-
[28], [67] as a facilitative approach to FinTech; this eases tures, including payment systems, stock exchanges, central
regulation in the testing, development and partial delivery to securities depositories, securities settlement systems, trade
the public of new technologies, promoting the most suitable repositories and others [2]. Moreover, interoperability across
approach to regulating blockchain technologies [2]. blockchains [4], [52] or between DLT and legacy systems
The traceability feature of blockchain could potentially [51], [52], [66], [69] is crucial to the efficient functioning of
reduce the risk of fraud [2] by designing a legal framework the wider financial system [52]. Currently, interoperability is
[2], [77] for automating the connection of real-world identi- still in its infancy [4] and the risks are further enhanced by the
ties to cryptographic identities in a database [2] for customer technological complexity of blockchain systems, including
protection, KYC rules [2], [24], [36], [53], [67], AML [2], use of strong encryption, decentralised governance structures
[24], [36], [53], CFT regulations [2], [24], [53], tax, capital and its status as software [2]. Furthermore, as market partic-
and credit management [2], [24], [53], [67], [77] and overall ipants are developing their own niche DLT systems [69], the
monetary policy [2], [24], [53], [77]. This would remove current landscape is fragmented and comprises a variety of
duplication efforts in identification across institutions and incompatible protocols [4] leading to additional complexity,
enable encrypted sharing [2], [60], [62], [77] costs [52] and operational risks, due to incompatibility issues
What challenges could blockchain pose to regulatory com- [69]. Should widespread implementation of these systems
pliance? occur, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [2] warns,
A total of 18 papers discuss some regulatory frictions scenarios where blockchain technologies become simultane-
from DLT. First of all, traceability should be weighed against ously ‘‘too big to fail, yet too complex to resolve’’, could
privacy and the need to keep certain information confidential potentially arise [2].
[2], [24], [53]. On a blockchain, all information in the ledger
a: MONETARY POLICY AND CBDC
is typically observed by all participants [58], [69]. When such
arrangements are applied to financial markets, this informa- Monetary Policy is the macroeconomic policy laid down by
tion transparency might cause privacy loss, confidentiality or the central bank. It involves management of money sup-
competition issues [3], [4], [50], [69] and should be balanced ply and interest rates and is used by the government of a
against data protection and applicable privacy laws [45], country to achieve macroeconomic objectives like inflation,
[51]–[53], [58], [69], such as the General Data Protection Act consumption and liquidity growth.
(GDPR), the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or others. In total, 14 papers elaborate on positive implications from
Furthermore, blockchains of today are incapable of being introduction of CBDC onto Monetary Policy operations.
influenced by governmental controls and provide limited Overall, CBDC is seen by researchers as an appropriate
access to regulators - read-only mode [3]. In such a set- policy response to payment innovations [41], [43], because
ting, the governance and regulatory enforcements are solely a CBDC based monetary policy framework could foster

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true price stability [25], [87] by simplifying [37] and facil- the included literature that discuss regulatory approaches to
itating systematic and transparent conduct of it [25], [37]. DLT adaptation to central bank operated PCS systems. Only
CBDC could be utilised as an additional monetary policy tool six of those outline benefits to regulators from blockchain-
[22], [24], [78] that could strengthen monetary transmission based PCS. For example, PCS system implemented on DLT
mechanisms and simplify conduct of monetary policy [87], could provide a central bank with an enhanced regulatory
because a central bank could use it as a transmission channel audit function, as information is more easily tracked and
and directly manipulate account holder balances [20], [24], visible by all parties, enhancing resolution management capa-
[43], [45], [50]. Account-based CBDC could support uncon- bilities [2], [56], [62], [101]. Furthermore, the laws and reg-
ventional monetary policy [19] such as Quantitative Easing ulations applicable to DLT-based PCS can affect the manner,
(QE) [20], contribute to the stabilisation of the business cycle speed and extent to which any implementation or configura-
[22] or bring fiscal advantages relating to seigniorage [19], tions of DLT can be adopted [52], [53] by financial services.
[78]. Another example - a central bank could commit to A further 11 papers offer a deliberation on legal challenges
an algorithmic rate of money creation [24], [43], [44] by and risks from hypothetical DLT-based payment clearing and
directly manipulating account balances of electronic central settlement. Application of blockchain technology to PCS
bank money and/or the aggregate quantity of that money [20] activity is a new [53] paradigm, contrasting with current legal
via precise control over interest rates [22], [37], [46], [50] or frameworks, e.g., statutes, regulations, policy and supervision
overnight interbank rates [50], thus addressing or removing that are well established [52], and have specifically been
the limitations of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on those rates drafted to accommodate existing architectures of the system
[19], [23], [24], [44], [78], [87]. and hence the requirement for legislative adaptation to cover
In addition, 23 papers debate the range of challenges to DLT-based PCS [47].
architectures and operations of Monetary Policy from CBDC When entering into any financial transaction, the key
introduction. Because a monetary regime with CBDC has risk is that the final/legal settlement will not materialise
never existed [22] and technology to make it feasible and as expected [52]. ‘‘Settlement finality (or legal settlement)
resilient have not been available [2]–[4], [20]–[24], [37], [40], for post trade clearance and settlement is a legally defined
[50]–[52], [64], [66], [75], it is difficult to predict an impact of moment in time at which the transfer of an asset, a financial
CBDC [19], [23], [44] on the monetary transmission mecha- instrument, or the discharge of an obligation is irrevocable
nism [20]. From a monetary policy prospective, CBDC could and unconditional and not susceptible to being unwound
provide a dangerous widespread balance sheet exposition of following the bankruptcy or insolvency of a participant’’
an economy [20]. Also, its introduction might unexpectedly [47], [52], [53], [58]. It is typically supported by a statu-
affect the size and composition of the balance sheets of central tory, regulatory, and/or contractual framework underlying a
banks, commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions, given financial transaction [52]. Parties to a transaction and
households and firms [20], [21]. It is also unclear how CBDC their intermediaries rely on that definition and timing of
could effect a money supply and which algorithm or regula- settlement finality when they update their own transactional
tor/authority/group of entities would control the issuance of ledgers to measure and monitor various risks and determine
CBDC [101]. the ownership of assets [45], [52]. For a settlement to be
A central bank introducing CBDC would additionally face achieved on blockchain, legal settlement finality may not
legal challenges [49], [87], [101] and have to ensure the fulfil- be as clear. First, in arrangements that rely on a consensus
ment of AML / CFT requirements, as well as satisfy the public algorithm to effect settlement finality [47], [52], there may
policy requirements of other supervisory and tax regimes not necessarily be a single point of settlement finality, as there
[24], [43], [101]. Every jurisdiction considering a CBDC can be a gap between the period in which new additions to the
should carefully consider the implications before making any ledger are made and later confirmed into blocks [2]. Second,
decision [24], [101]. ‘‘There is very little historical or empiri- consensus protocols are probabilistic [45], [51], [52], [58],
cal material that could help understand the costs and benefits i.e., the payment is never fully settled because there is always
of transitioning to such a regime, or to evaluate the different a small probability that the payment could be reversed [58]
ways in which monetary policy could be conducted under it’’ due to forking [51], [54]. The existence of forks brings into
[22], [24], [40], [101]. A move toward CBDC adoption would question the nature of any claims and rights that depend on
be premature [19], [20], [23], [37], [50], as further analysis the ledger records for their proof and can pose serious legal
of technological feasibility and operational costs / benefit is risks for users [46]. If a group of nodes have a fundamental
required [23]. So far, no central bank has a live operating disagreement in the history of events and decide to create an
CBDC system [4], [21], [38]. alternative ledger causing a fork, it undermines the assump-
tion that there always will be only one reliable and author-
b: REGULATION FOR BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PCS SYSTEM OF itative ledger [66], failing the settlement. Even though the
CENTRAL BANKS settlement becomes increasingly certain as recorded trans-
Central banks have an objective of maintenance of public pol- actions become immutable over time, it never reaches the
icy interests through regulation of both large value and retail point of being irrevocable [51], [52], [58]. The applicable
payment systems innovation [66]. There are some papers in legal framework does not support a legal settlement in such

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cases [47], [53]. As it is a critical element of risk manage- TABLE 1. Technological benefits of blockchain.
ment, a legal basis is required to clarify when settlement
finality happens. This allows definition of the key financial
risks and obligations in the system, including the point at
which transactions become irrevocable [45], [47], [51], [53].
Furthermore, DLT-based PCS systems are exposed to
being hosted in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously [2]
which opens them to the risk of regulatory arbitrage, whereby
participatory nodes become concentrated in jurisdictions
with loose regulatory controls [2], [53]. Additionally, for
DLT-based PCS systems, compliance with the Bank Secrecy
Act (BSA) [47], [52], AML [45], [47], [52], [66], KYC
[45], [52], transaction monitoring and reporting of suspicious
activity [52] is not currently provided. For a large value
wholesale payment system, the need to keep transactional
data private from other parties is fundamental [51], [58].
‘‘This is necessary to prevent other participants from being
able to take advantage of this information. A participant’s
clients may also prefer or require this privacy’’ [58].
Lastly, as these technologies are not fail-safe, further risk
of greater expense in recovery or litigation if such technology
fails [66] cannot be overlooked. Decentralised systems do not
provide an independent regulatory party that can facilitate
dispute resolution [3] functionality, raising questions about
conflict of laws and jurisdictions [47] that determine the
nature and extent of rights and claims [66].
All of above-mentioned issues are costlier in a distributed
(no governing jurisdiction) and permissionless (no identi-
fiable responsible party) environment [47]. The questions
of how and when transactional certainty and security is
achieved, as well as responsibility and risk allocation among
participants [66] need to be considered prior to blockchain
adaptation. By itself, this is a costly operation [47]. One path
to manage those risks, could be an incremental adaptation of
blockchain for PCS [66].

6) TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
Understanding technological factors (or variables) is
important to any organisation whose business model relies
on technology. It enables development and exploration of
new opportunities and is an important source of competitive
advantage [108].
Tables 1 and 2 provide narrative summaries of the opin-
ions, expressed in the included papers. These relate to the
most prominent technical variables applicable to blockchain
technology in the setting of central bank application.

D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH TRENDS FOR

BLOCKCHAIN USE-CASES
This section provides a narrative summary and further statis-
tical insight into each separate use-case. Appendix E of this
study provides a matrix of our research.
RQ4: What is the depth / breadth of the research for
identified use-cases?

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TABLE 2. Technological limitations of blockchain.

FIGURE 7. Central bank digital currency.

1) CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY

According to a generalised definition, a Central Bank Digital
Currency (CBDC) is an electronic, 24 × 7, fiat liability of
a central bank that can be used as a digital account or as
an electronic token [19] to settle payments or as a store of
value [19]–[23] and could provide access to a central bank’s
balance sheet [22]. It is an electronic central bank or narrow
money [20]–[22], intended as legal tender [23], [24] that can
be exchanged [25] in a decentralised manner, known as peer-
to-peer (P2P). This means that all transactions occur directly
between the payer and the payee, without the need for a
central intermediary [26].
Fig. 7 shows representation of CBDC use-cases in the
included literature. Out of 39 publications (Fig. 6 a) describ-
ing CBDC, 11 publications employ Empirical research types
with nine publications using Evaluation and two Validation
Research approaches (Fig. 7 c). As contribution to techniques
(Fig. 7 a), Evaluation papers add four models [27]–[29],
[85] and two protocols [27], [28]; Validation research adds
two models [30], [31] and a protocol [30]. Interestingly, the
majority of Evaluation research was provided via grey liter-
ature and all Validation research was communicated during
conferences (Fig. 7 c). Over time (Fig. 7 b), the bulk of
industry and data driven papers (Evaluation) were available
in 2018, totalling 4. Validation research on CBDC was only
published in 2016 and 2019 - a single paper for each year. The
data indicates that empirical research on CBDC is steadily
growing, predominantly includes industry cooperation and
provides the largest contribution overall of novel techniques
and technologies.

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Amongst Empirical papers, the research of Hileman and two models [34], [35]. Those contributions are communicated
Rauchs [4] provides a wide global benchmarking study on as purely academic articles and via grey literature and the first
blockchain current areas of focus, attitudes toward the tech- was available in 2018 following the other three in 2019. There
nology and outstanding questions. Researchers use surveys are 19 Philosophical papers contributing 13 novel frame-
and focus groups to identify which overall blockchain use- works and nine taxonomies, as some of those contributed
cases were investigated by central banks (and a wider com- both. The majority of those are communicated from indus-
munity of practitioners), maturity and future roadmap of that try through grey literature and availability of those steadily
research. The authors establish that 82% of central banks growing each year, peaking in 2019 at seven publications
were investigating DLT as a platform to launch CBDC [4]. and two papers for half of 2020. Opinion research is also
Agur et al. [85] analyse the optimal CBDC design that heavily dominated by grey literature (12 out of 17 papers)
maximises social welfare by comparing non-interest-bearing and its availability grew constantly, with 2019 bucking the
versus interest-bearing CBDC and the degree to which the trend with eight papers and one in 2020. Experience papers
CBDC resembles cash [85]. Researchers evaluate impact only briefly appeared in 2017 (one paper), 2018 (two papers)
of those design choices onto cash, bank deposits and bank and 2019 (one paper) and all are provided as grey literature.
intermediation. The network effect lies in the core of their This data indicates that industry is also heavily involved in
model. They show that when CBDC is designed as non- the theoretical discussion about CBDC.
interest-bearing, its similarity to cash becomes the sole design Wu et al. [33] (Solution proposal) suggest using PoC, a
choice [85]. If CBDC is designed as interest-bearing, it safe- Bitcoin blockchain [5] based electronic currency protocol
guards bank intermediation and provides households with a to support anonymous payments. The protocol provides full
variety of payment instruments [85]. Chiu et al. [29], with access of transaction history to supervisors and auditors. The
cooperation of the Bank of Canada address implications of authors use blind signature technology, public key signatures
CBDC issuance for monetary policy and banking. They built and Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus. In another Solution
a ‘‘tractable model’’ to represent imperfect competition in Proposal paper, Borgonovo et al. [34] provide a ‘‘primer
the deposits markets of the banking sector. Using quantitative model’’ to analyse demand for CBDC by identifying drivers
analysis to demonstrate that an interest-bearing CBDC could of the political consensus in favour or against it. The research
promote bank intermediation, increase lending and aggregate uses a ‘‘financial portfolio approach’’ and assume that the
output, they showed that the design choice of CBDC, com- prospect of issuance of CBDC would influence individual
petition level in the deposit market and the interest rate on portfolio choices. Brunnermeier and Niepelt [35] provide
CBDC does effect the banking system and real economy [29]. a ‘‘generic model of money and liquidity which identified
Kang and Lee [31] develop a ‘‘search theoretical model’’, sources of seigniorage rents and liquidity bubbles’’ and apply
where public cryptocurrency is used as a medium of exchange that model in the context of CBDC introduction for the use
and coexists in an equilibrium and competes with central bank by general public. Their results imply that: ‘‘CBDC, coupled
issued fiat money, thus affecting monetary policy, overall with central bank pass-through funding, need not imply a
economic activities and welfare. Their quantitative analysis credit crunch nor undermine financial stability’’ [35].
showed that, provided there is a sufficiently high inflation rate Philosophical type is utilised in 19 papers to commu-
(to justify cryptocurrency mining fees), public permissionless nicate research approach and contributions to knowledge.
cryptocurrency is able to compete with fiat money. However, Amongst those, nine contribute taxonomies [23], [24], [26],
due to the inefficient cryptocurrency mining process, the [36]–[39], [86], [101] and 13 add new frameworks [19],
welfare in economy with both fiat money and cryptocur- [23], [24], [30], [35], [40]–[44], [84], [85], [101], three of
rency is lower than that in a money-only economy [31]. The which [23], [24], [101] contribute both. Out of nine novel
rest of the Empirical papers use permissioned blockchain as taxonomies, two papers provide taxonomies of potential ben-
a platform to launch CBDC, controlled by a central bank efits and cost for a central bank from issuing CBDC [26],
[27], [28], [30]. Two [27], [28] propose multi-blockchain [39]; the other two propose taxonomies of existing forms
models and evaluate their feasibility and scalability. Danezis of money in relation to CBDC [24], [37]; a further four
and Meiklejohn [30] propose two ‘‘thread models’’, where offer taxonomies of CBDC projects and ongoing technical
transactions were processed with and without minters. Two design efforts in other countries’ by central banks [38], [39],
papers use experiments [27], [30]; one use simulation [28]. [86], [101]; Auer and Böhme [86] sets out an additional
Sun et al. [27] propose a protocol for ‘‘inter-blockchain trans- taxonomy in the same paper for the underlying design trade-
actions’’, design of which was influenced by the Practical offs, that maps consumer needs hierarchy for designing a
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [32] algorithm and Bitcoin retail CBDC; Lipton [36] suggests a general taxonomy of
blockchain [5]; Tsai et al. [28] provide a consensus protocol potential blockchain applications to money and banking. Out
for two types of blockchain - a ‘‘trading blockchain’’ and an of 13 novel frameworks, eight papers offer new concep-
‘‘account blockchain’’; Danezis and Meiklejohn [30] also use tual frameworks to characterise various design features of
Bitcoin [5] as a consensus protocol for transaction validation. potential CBDC: Arner et al. [101] consider design parame-
Although not empirically validated, four Solution Proposal ters for CBDC such as: users, scope, architecture and tech-
papers (Fig. 7), provide a novel protocol and PoC [33] and nology, within which they envisage three alternative CBDC

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architectural approaches: 1) central bank accounts with gen-

eral access, 2) central bank accounts with intermediated
access, and 3) new digital forms of fiat currency. By doing so,
they analyse the impact of DLT and blockchain onto mone-
tary and payment systems [101]; Engert and Fung [19] set out
a framework of the features for a benchmark CBDC that are
similar to cash; Agur et al. [85] build a theoretical framework
tailored at analysing the relationship between CBDC design,
welfare analysis, the demand for money types and financial
intermediation; Han et al. [84] provide a theoretical guidance
for a three layered blockchain-based CBDC framework that
includes supervisory, network and user layers, incorporating
account-based and wallet based mainstream models; Cœuré
and Loh [24] and Pfister [44] propose conceptual frameworks
for understanding the difference between a retail or general
purpose CBDC and a wholesale CBDC; Kahn and Wong [42]
provide a theoretical framework for account-based, token-
based and delegated (i.e., as custodians and intermediaries)
CBDC schemas; Koumbarakis and Dobrauz-Saldapenna [43]
set out a framework and formulated broad design principles
for CBDC in line with the central bank’s function as a Lender
Of Last Resort (LOLR). Furthermore, Griffoli et al. [23]
offer a conceptual framework to compare different forms of FIGURE 8. Payment clearing and settlement systems operated by central
banks (PCS).
money and another framework that provides an understanding
about the roles of CBDC from a user prospective. Fung and
Halaburda [41] propose a framework for central banks for ‘‘Central banks have traditionally played an important cata-
accessing why and how they should consider issuing CBDC. lyst role in payments and settlements’’ [53]. PCS processing
The same framework can be used by the general public systems of today are cumbersome and involve lengthy rec-
to make payments and could be implemented to improve onciliation tasks [51]. Finally, operational, settlement, legal
the efficiency of retail payment system. Brunnermeier and and financial risks are inherent in the conduct of PCS system
Niepelt [35] provide a general framework for the analysis of activities [52], [101].
monetary economics in the context of introduction of CBDC. Fig. 8 represents a blockchain underpinned PCS use-
Their framework: ‘‘Augments the standard asset pricing for- case in the included literature. There are 27 papers
mula with a liquidity kernel’’. Danezis and Meiklejohn [30] (Fig. 6 a) providing various contributions (Fig. 8 a).
present the first cryptocurrency framework ‘‘RSCoin’’ that Empirical Research is only presented in three Evaluation
provides control over issuance of CBDC and the monetary papers [4], [52], [54] – 9% of all papers on blockchain appli-
policy to a central bank. cations for PCS and those papers were available between
The remaining papers – Opinion [19], [25], [37]–[39], 2016 - 2018; two of them are grey literature. There is no
[42], [43], [45]–[50], [87], [101] and Experience [19], [24], Validation research available in the included publications.
[42], [44] papers provide a discussion on design charac- One model is added as a technological contribution by Chiu
teristics of CBDC [25], [37], [38], [43], [44], [47], [50], and Koeppl [54]. The remainder of all research only make
[101], why and how a central bank should issue CBDC theoretical contributions. The data indicates that, although
[19], [24], [42], [45], [48] and potential hazards from CBDC comparatively small, all empirical research has industry input
issuance [19], [46], [47]. or drivers, because the Evaluation research approach involves
industry participation [6].
2) PAYMENT CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS As a step towards understanding the implications of DLT
OPERATED BY CENTRAL BANKS deployment to PCS systems and to identify the opportu-
Payment Clearing and Settlement (PCS) systems of a cen- nities and the challenges facing its long-term implementa-
tral bank are characterised by processes, such as payments tion and adoption, a research team of the Federal Reserve
(i.e. order management, including trade validation [51]), post- Bank (FED) [52] conducted interviews with focus groups
trade securities clearing (i.e. the calculation of counterparties’ interested in participating in, or otherwise contributing to,
obligations [51]), and post-trade settlement (i.e. the final the evolution of DLT [52]. In their report, the team sum-
transfer of assets [51]). Those systems also involve several marised the approaches taken by industry to investigate the
different types of financial intermediaries [52], [101] and potential of blockchain [52]. Hileman and Rauchs [4], also
infrastructures invoked from the time a trade in a financial based on the results of surveys and focus groups, report
security is agreed to the time when it is finally settled [51]. that overall: ‘‘55% of central banks are exploring DLT-based

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payment systems for remittance transfers, inter-bank pay- [66]–[70], [101] and three Experience papers [24], [52], [58]
ments, and other uses’’ [4]. The only model contributed by provide a discussion on the potential impact of DLT on PCS
Chiu and Koeppl [54] investigates the extent of potential processes.
financial gains or losses, if financial securities were to be
settled on blockchain. The distinctive technological features 3) ASSET TRANSFER AND OWNERSHIP
of blockchain are explicitly modelled for asset settlement Any financial instrument, such as a monetary instrument,
[54]. They investigated, both qualitatively and quantitatively, security, commodity or derivative is an asset [52]. ‘‘PCS
using mathematical analysis: its feasibility, optimal block size systems are typically organised around a specialised third-
and time. The authors chose to consider a permissionless parties called Central Securities Depository (CSD), which
blockchain, which ensures delivery-vs-payment (DvP) by are responsible for transfers of legal ownerships of securi-
linking transfers of assets with payments and where updating ties/assets against payments’’ [54]. Additionally, a variety of
of records is based on a proof of work (PoW) protocol. financial intermediaries, on behalf of their clients, can hold or
Three papers utilise Solution Proposals for research com- trade those assets or securities [52]. In today’s markets, it is a
munication of PoCs [55]–[57], all of which are proceedings of common occurrence that investors are not the direct owners of
conferences, one in 2017 and two in 2018 (Fig. 8). 42.42% (or the traded assets, but they hold them indirectly through chains
14 publications) are Philosophical papers which provide nine of financial intermediaries that operate between asset issuers
novel frameworks and seven taxonomies, with two adding and those investors [51]. ‘‘This is partly a legacy from the time
both [24], [53]. Over time, the addition of those papers to where securities were issued as paper certificates and had to
research was steady, with four for each of 2016 and 2017, be immobilised to facilitate their trading through book-entry
increasing to six in 2018; the variety of literature types is transfers’’ [51].
relatively balanced, with grey literature slightly leading that Fig. 9 shows a representation of the assets use-cases for
trend. A third of publications (or 11) are Opinion Papers blockchain in the included literature. Out of 12 papers (Fig. 6
rising in availability in 2017 and being the only paper pub- a), describing assets transfer and ownership, one adds a model
lished for 2019 and for 2020. Those papers are principally (Fig. 9a). There are only two Evaluation papers published
shared as pure academic articles. Three experience papers [4], [54] as an article and as a grey literature, one in 2017
[24], [52], [58] are all shared as grey literature, one for and another in 2018; one contributes a model [54]. There are
each of 2016 - 2018. This data indicates that the theoretical no Validation papers on this use-case. Overall, the data on
elaboration on the topic of utilisation of DLT for PCS is empirical papers does not provide a particular pattern, apart
consistent and well-balanced between academics and indus- from that its availability is low and all available research
try. However, there are potential early signs of reduction in has industry involvement. This might indicate a potential
interest due to lack of availability of new research and the knowledge gap for empirical research.
creation of a gap in the state of knowledge; as for the majority Out of two Evaluation papers, Hileman and Rauchs [4]
of 2019, there were noticeably few new research engagements state that only 23% of central banks were investigating the
on this topic. ownership record management capabilities of blockchain.
Out of three Solution proposals, two [56], [57] explore Chiu and Koeppl [54], whilst explicitly modelling feasibility
application of blockchain for ‘‘inter-bank payment systems of blockchain for assets trading, establish that the key innova-
(IBPS)’’ and one explores use of blockchain as a ‘‘clear- tion from blockchain to their model is that it provides a shared
inghouse’’ [55]. For their project, Tsai et al. [55] adopt a database of security ownerships [54] that can be updated
permissioned DPT (Double-chain Parallel-processing Tech- without relying on multiple, specialised intermediaries or a
nology) developed at Tiande to facilitate a ‘‘multi-blockchain third-party infrastructure [54].
clearinghouse’’ experiment and demonstrate its feasibility One solution proposal [71] provides a PoC in 2018 via a
via PoC. Wu and Liang [56] utilise a Bitcoin blockchain conference (Fig. 9). The same paper also adds a framework.
[5] to build a distributed ledger prototype system for credit The majority - 69.23% or nine - are Opinion papers, four of
matching of trading system for X-Swap and [57] use Hyper- which were published in 2017, with 2018-2020 supplying one
ledger Fabric [59] to develop an end-to-end IBPS prototype additional papers for each year. One of those papers came
to design a fund transfer functionality enabling gross settle- from a conference, with industry and academics providing
ment for Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) systems. A an additional four each. There is no Experience research
total of 14 papers use Philosophical methods to communicate available for this use-case. This data indicates that theoretical
new knowledge. Amongst those, nine add new frameworks discussion on this topic is mainly hypothetical as there is no
[24], [41], [53], [55], [57], [60]–[63] and seven contribute practical experience available upon which to draw justifiable
taxonomies [24], [36], [51]–[53], [64], [65], with two of conclusions.
them [24], [53] contributing both. Out of nine frameworks, Chen et al. [71] utilise two research types for their paper
two papers offer multi-blockchain frameworks for integrating to communicate two contributions, a Solution Proposal for
DLT into PCS processes [55], [62]. Three papers consider PoC, where they propose a ‘‘financial product management
blockchain-based IBPS frameworks [57], [60], [63]. The platform’’, that provides capabilities for multi-function finan-
remaining papers, such as 11 Opinion [2], [3], [45], [51], [64], cial data inquiries, routine maintenance of financial products

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FIGURE 9. Assets transfer and ownership (Assets).

FIGURE 10. Audit trail (audit).

and multi-institution traceability. Their platform is based on sophical papers all add frameworks in 2018 and 2019, two
Hyperledger Fabric [59]. The researchers also construct a in journals and one through a conference. 50% of all papers
‘‘financial product management framework’’ for deployment are Opinion papers, peaking in 2017 at four publications;
of transactional logic for blockchain. Opinion papers provide one more was added for 2018 - 2020. Interestingly, there
a high-level discussion of both hypothetical benefits and are two Experience papers published as grey literature at the
limitations from application of blockchain to asset transfers beginning of the period in 2016 and 2017. The data indicates
and ownerships [2], [45], [47], [51]–[53], [62], [69]. that, although comparatively low, theoretical discussion on
this topic has been underpinned by some practical experience
4) AUDIT TRAIL
from industry practitioners, although academic journal arti-
The BOE states that as part of a central bank’s accounting cles are now leading the conversation.
reporting procedures, it: ‘‘Has a responsibility for reviewing Both Solution proposals utilise Hyperledger Fabric [59]
the findings of internal and external auditors and monitoring for their underlying architecture. Chen et al. [71] propose
outstanding actions. It receives and reviews reports on the risk a ‘‘financial product management platform’’ that provides
profile of a central bank and inter-bank market participants’’ a multi-institution / multi-function data audit capability.
[16]. A large number of auditing processes believed to be Wang et al. [57] introduce an ‘‘end-to-end IBPS protocol’’ -
simplified or even eliminated by automation of the audit trail that provides provenance tracking functionality for auditors.
on blockchain [72]. By leveraging the immutability of blockchain ledger, their
Fig. 10 provides a representation of the audit trail use- protocol equips auditors with the ability to trace back the
cases for blockchain in the included literature. Out of 14 history of records and conduct reconciliation [57]. There
papers (Fig. 6a), exploring the influence of blockchain on are three papers that contribute via frameworks. Chen et al.
auditing performance of a central bank (Fig. 10 a), one adds [71] and Wang et al. [57] construct frameworks for auditors
a protocol. There was only one Evaluation paper available in to track financial product data provenance on a blockchain.
2017 which only contributes to discussion via an academic Kavassalis et al. [73] provide a framework for financial
journal [4]. There are no Validation papers for this use-case. transactions as well as financial risk reporting; they report
The data indicates that empirical research is comparatively a transactional audit trail to the qualified authorities about
low (signalling a potential knowledge gap), purely theoretical all significant circumstances under which a transaction took
and, again, only with industry cooperation. The only available place [73]. Eight Opinion papers [2], [3], [45], [51], [53],
Empirical paper by Hileman and Rauchs [4] established that [64], [69], [74] and two Experience papers [52], [58] provide
only a comparatively small proportion of central banks (18%) a high-level discussion of how implementation of DLT in
had specifically mentioned that audit trails, e.g., tracking of central banks could affect their auditing capabilities.
payments, are under investigation [4].
Two papers provide Solution proposals (Fig. 10), via PoC 5) REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
[57], [71] through a journal and a conference in 2018 and Hayes [75] states that the most visible function of a central
2019, and one of them provides a protocol [71]. Three Philo- bank is that of a monetary authority. A generalised legal

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provides for economic finality in a permissioned market with

decentralised verification. A CBDC protocol proposed by
Wu et al [33], based on a Bitcoin blockchain [5], provides
supervisors with ability to oversee unanimous payments via
unrestricted access to the blockchain ledger. 15 Philosophical
papers mostly contribute frameworks - 10 papers [40]–[42],
[55], [60], [62], [73], [75], [76], [84], vs. four taxonomies
[24], [51], [52], [77]. Four of those papers [40]–[42], [84]
propose frameworks that utilised CBDC as a transparent
transactional ledger visible to regulators, e.g., ‘‘custodians
and intermediaries CBDC schemas’’ of Kahn and Wong [42]
or the three-layered CBDC framework of Han et al. [84]
that includes a supervisory layer. Two other papers utilise a
blockchain-based PCS architecture as ‘‘a promoter of regula-
tory informant’’ [62] or as a participating regulatory node in
DLT-based PCS [55]. Two further papers offer frameworks
for central banks and regulators to assess legal risks from
blockchain, such as risks to legal settlement finality, issues
with a management and protection of data, connectivity with
legacy systems, standards development [53] and suitability
FIGURE 11. Regulatory compliance (regulators). for KYC compliance [60]. Hayes [75] provides a conceptual
framework for a workable decentralised central bank (DAO
bank) to perform functionality of a ‘‘technocratic, rules-
consideration for a central bank acting as a financial regulator following monetary authority’’. Kavassalis et al. [73] pro-
consists of a legal framework which includes general laws, pose a novel framework for a ‘‘regular technology (RegTech)
regulations, rules, procedures and contracts [53]. approach for financial transactions, as well as financial risk
Fig. 11 represents the regulatory compliance use-cases reporting, which is based on distributed computing, decen-
for blockchain in the included literature. In total, 37 papers tralised data management technologies such as blockchain,
(Fig. 6 a) examine the impact from blockchain on the func- distributed storage, algorithmic financial contract standards,
tionality of a central bank as a financial regulator (Fig. 11 a). automated legal text and document engineering methods and
Only one publication is empirical - an Evaluation paper [4] in techniques’’ [73]. The researchers provide a proposal of:
2017 via a journal. The only Empirical paper of Hileman and ‘‘How to develop a new layer of algorithmic regulation func-
Rauchs [4] reports a response from surveys and focus groups tionality, that enhances a supervisor’s capacity to monitor the
that: ‘‘36% of central banks have been investigating DLT for evolution of risk in the system’’ [73]. Auer [76] makes a ‘‘case
regulatory compliance, such as automatically enforce market for embedded supervision, i.e., a regulatory framework that
regulation’’ [4]. This data reveals that empirical research provides compliance in tokenised markets to be automatically
is comparatively low and only with industry cooperation, monitored by reading the market’s ledger, thus reducing the
signalling a potential knowledge gap. need for firms to actively collect, verify and deliver data’’
Two Solution Proposal papers [33], [76] contribute two [76]. Out of four taxonomies Nguyen [77] classifies overall
PoCs and a model in 2019 as a pure academic article and legal and policy challenges about potential blockchain appli-
as grey literature (Fig. 11). Over a third of all papers on this cations for banking. In relation to potential implications from
topic (15 publications) are Philosophical papers adding nine the regulatory point of view onto blockchain-underpinned
novel frameworks and four taxonomies via diverse literature PCS, Benos et al. [51] provide a taxonomy of potential regu-
cohorts. Most of those papers were published in 2016 and latory improvement, whereas Mills et al. [52] offer a set legal
2018. Over half of all regulation use-case papers are Opin- challenges. Cœuré and Loh [24] categorise Monetary Policy
ion papers (22 in total), with almost half of those available aspects for CBDC issuance.
as academic articles, presenting a somewhat steady trend Out of 22 Opinion Papers, seven discuss various ways of
in popularity over the years. There are also a total of four how DLT could be approached from a regulatory perspective
Experience papers added in 2016, 2018 and 2019, with three [2], [37], [45], [67], [69], [74], [88], four examine impact
of those represented by practitioners via grey literature and of blockchain on Monetary Policy and Monetary Reforms
one as a purely academic article. This data indicates that the [2], [3], [69], [78], seven deliberate on regulatory motiva-
theoretical discussion on this use-case is ongoing, diverse tion for CBDC issuance and its effects on Monetary Policy
and potentially underpinned by practical experience from transmission [24], [25], [42], [49], [50], [87], [101] and four
industry practitioners and academics. Auer [76] using PoC, reflect on the role of regulators for DLT-based PCS [51],
models a blockchain based automated ‘‘embedded supervi- [53], [66], [70]. Also, four Experience papers [24], [44],
sion’’ functionality for novel distributed markets. The model [52], [79], discuss questions that need to be considered by

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the regulators when assessing adoption of DLT for financial snowball citation checking. Despite this thoroughness, there
markets [67], legal considerations for PCS and blockchain is always a possibility that some relevant articles were missed.
[52] and Monetary Policy implications of CBDC [24], [44].
B. RESEARCH MATURITY
V. DISCUSSION Although the hype about the capabilities of the blockchain
A. THREATS TO VALIDITY started between 2008 - 2009, when its novel implementa-
For any empirically-based research, we need to consider the tion through Bitcoin cryptocurrency reached worldwide news
threats to the validity of the work Petersen et al. [7]. The channels, it is evident from the data that the attention of
following types of validity have been considered, enabling research community to this topic is very recent, where first
awareness of the potential limitations to the classifica- publications were first available from 2016 (Fig. 3b). This
tion schema: theoretical validity, descriptive and interpretive falls in line with other researchers’ opinions, that the appli-
validity and possibility of missing relevant articles. cation of blockchain to the business of central banks is at
Theoretical validity: there is potential for researcher bias a very early stage [3], [4], [19]–[25], [37], [40], [50]–[52],
in the selection of the studies and reporting of the results [64], [66], [75]. Industry is still providing large proportions
as the majority of work for this SMS was conducted by an of empirical technological and theoretical contributions to
individual researcher. To reduce this threat and gain con- the field, with participation of academia predominantly on
fidence in the results, study identification was additionally the non-empirical side of the research. Furthermore, the data
evaluated through forward snowball sampling, where only implies that the overall trend of the engagement from the
13 new studies were identified, indicating no measurable research community is growing, although it is difficult to
change to the search results. Additionally, one should keep in judge with confidence about the trend for 2020 since our
mind potential for the publication bias, as new controversial database search was done during the beginning of the second
negative views are less likely be published [7]. To minimise quarter, where a proportion of papers are still unpublished,
this bias, only well-known scientific databases, in combina- but this does not invalidate the results we have presented.
tion with rigorously designed search protocol were used to As the topic of this study is a comparatively new area, there
collect as many as possible available papers. However, as the is also a distinct lack of validated research or data to sup-
research topic has proven to be a rather young research area, port hypotheses. As described in Section IV.A.3, Empirical
it is conceivable that further research has been administered Research was only used 13% of the times and the majority of
by the industry and potentially either published as the ‘‘white that research was Evaluation Research, involving participa-
papers’’ or kept confidential. SMS research on this topic tion of industry experts. The study has identified a clear need
using focus on grey literature as its source, could be an area for more quantitative/empirical work in the area to evaluate
for additional future research direction. aspects of blockchain. A common criticism of many areas of
Descriptive and interpretive validity: there is a poten- software engineering is that academic studies fail to appre-
tial threat to accuracy of data extraction, recording and ciate the demands and pressures exerted on industry. As a
description, since in this qualitative study those processes result, there is almost a chasm between what academic studies
are partially underpinned by the researcher’s knowledge do and what industry wants. The trend seems to be being
and understanding of the domain. To increase the descrip- repeated in this relatively new area. Empirical studies should
tive validity of the study and following the guidelines of involve industry and academia, address pressing issues in
Petersen et al. [7], a data collection form was designed and industry and focus on industrial impact. The results in this
implemented. This allowed us to make the data extraction paper show a mixed picture thus far.
process objective and, if necessary, amendable.
Possibility of missing relevant articles: The decision to C. USE-CASES
limit this mapping study to the literature published since Section IV.B showed that uses-cases for application of
January 2008 does mean that there is a possibility of missing blockchain for central banks belonged largely to CBDC, Reg-
some relevant publications from before this time. However, ulation or PCS. The largest proportion of empirical research
given that the results show that there was no literature avail- and novel technological contributions were applicable to
able even before 2016 on this topic, it is highly unlikely CBDC use-cases, where again, we can see a heavy presence
that even if there were potential unidentified papers avail- of grey literature. The regulatory compliance use-case for
able before 2008, that they would significantly impact final blockchain closely follows CBDC by the amount of interest,
conclusions. Furthermore, creation of a search phrase was a although the majority of that research is done utilising non-
challenging task, in particular the differences in functionality empirical methods to generate large ongoing discussion from
and sophistication between the different mainstream search a diverse cohort of researchers. Interestingly, although a very
engines, because each search engine required a different popular use-case from the onset of the research availability,
search expression syntax. To mitigate the challenges of the DLT-based PCS systems exhibit a sudden knowledge gap
search phase the search for relevant literature was conducted between 2019 and 2020. Further evaluation of the reasons
as thorough as possible, by including an automated database for this lack of interest from the research community could
search, followed by manual search, followed by forward reveal some hidden insights. In relation to asset transfer and

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TABLE 3. Database search results (Appendix A).

audit trail use-cases, both present somewhat similar trends, Discussion of each of the separate use-cases in
showing comparatively low engagement from researchers, Section IV.C indicates that, although there are numerous
providing non-empirically validated, theoretical views in the advantages from application of DLT to the business
main. of a central bank, potential limitations and issues

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constitute a comparatively large proportion of the TABLE 4. The full list of headers of the data collection form (Appendix B).
debate:
CBDC models receive attention from the research commu-
nity and central banks. Researchers are focusing on design
characteristics of CBDC such as account versus token based
CBDC or those designed for retail or wholesale money
customers. If CBDC could pay interest on its holdings,
researchers argue that it could remedy competition problems
in the banking sector and promote financial inclusion. How-
ever, the questions of the role for central banks, disruption
of commercial banks’ business models, risks to smooth oper-
ation of payment systems, conduct of monetary policy and
numerous legal challenges still remain unanswered.
In relation to hypothetical blockchain underpinned PCS
operated by central banks, it is argued that for inter-bank,
large-value wholesale payments blockchain could provide
faster, close-to-real time 24 × 7x365 processing, reducing the
need for centrally maintained back-up systems and reducing
the number of intermediaries. By streamlining and speeding
up post-trade value chain, PCS systems on DLT could free up
collateralised liquidity quicker, thus improving availability of
assets and resolving shortcomings of fractional reserve bank- base connectivity layer promises to lower technological inte-
ing. On the other hand, faster processing will abolish the net gration cost, provide access to more granular standardized
benefits for liquidity provided by the (T+3) days settlement data, thus bringing network scale efficiencies. Moreover,
cycle. Furthermore, the probabilistic nature of blockchain- establishment of regulatory sandbox models should ease reg-
based settlements is a serious issue. Other limitations of ulation in testing, development and delivery of blockchain
current blockchains are its operational capacity, performance- solutions for central banking. Nevertheless, if blockchain
based scalability, limitation of block size and issues with application were to create risks in one area of central bank-
self-executing code. Immutability of DLT is also a problem, ing through interconnection of existing financial markets
since PCS systems require a capability for error management, and interdependence of legacy payment infrastructures, these
maintenance and management of technological failures or risks will be transmitted to the whole financial system. Fur-
misuse. thermore, interoperability between blockchains and legacy
Transfer and ownership of the assets through central bank- financial systems or even between different niche DLT archi-
maintained systems has also been argued as a hypothetical tectures is still in its infancy, leading to additional complexity,
beneficiary from blockchain adaptation. The tamper-resistant incompatibility and operational risks.
nature of blockchain could reduce legal, operational and Influence of CBDC regime onto Monetary Policy opera-
overall systemic risks. Business sensitive information could tions is also discussed by the research as another aspect of
be protected through encryption, while improving regulatory financial regulation. On the positive side, CBDC is seen as an
supervision and increasing transparency of asset ownership. appropriate policy response to the payment innovation, where
On the other hand, issues with proprietary rights and obliga- it could be utilised as an additional monetary policy tool used
tions of assets on DLT and enforceability of the rights of the e.g., as a policy transmission channel, simplifying systematic
transacting parties in single or multiple jurisdictions are not and transparent conduct of it, or a type of QE. A Central Bank
assured by the current financial regulators and supervisors. can also commit to an algorithmic rate of money creation. On
There is not even a standardised definition of what constitutes the negative side, the highly discussed issues are the immatu-
a digital blockchain-based asset. rity of current blockchain architectures for CBDC adaptation
Small amounts of research are devoted to the enhance- and lack of empirical research on the impact of such CBDC
ments to the audit trail for regulatory purposes from regimes onto monetary policy performance. This leads to the
blockchain application. The immutable, tamper resis- conclusion that the move towards CBDC adaptation would be
tant nature of DLT promises to ensure traceability and premature.
transparency of audit for any history of funds and securities. Lastly, the discussion on how PCS application on
However, blockchain-based auditing still requires regulators blockchain can improve regulation concludes that there is
to accommodate record keeping by providing authoritative- an opportunity for central banks to enhance their regula-
ness and reliability checks for those records. tory auditing functions, utilising data visibility offered by
Blockchain innovation for regulatory compliance is also blockchain, hypothetically improving resolution manage-
extensively covered by the research. Development of ment capabilities. On the other hand, issues arising from such
blockchain-based technical interoperability standards, as a novel systems attracts more attention from researchers as

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TABLE 5. All included papers (Appendix C).

current legislation is not adopted to cover DLT-based PCS. In fact, the blockchain implementation for the central bank-
The other issue is the importance of legal settlement finality ing industry is one where practical application and theory
for PCS activities as a key element of risk management. both have integral roles to play in moving forward. The
Blockchain’s ability to sustain settlement is not clear, as theory can be supported well by research in best practice
current consensus protocols are probabilistic, further imper- and accompanied by sound and rigorous empirical studies
illed by the existence of forks. Furthermore, the ability to that evaluate and compare different strategies. We are at a
host those PCS systems in multiple jurisdictions opens them timely stage in blockchain’s evolution for these to be now
up to the risk of regulatory arbitrage, complications with mandated. One other criticism of some academic studies is
compliance with BSA, KYC, ALM, CFT, GDPR etc. As that they are often not trialled in the field and are conducted
these novel blockchain technologies are not fail-safe, opera- in the rarefied and some would say artificial atmosphere of
tional risks, recovery and litigation expenses could be greater the student classroom. While there is no disadvantage to
than the promised potential rewards from DLT-based PCS using non-industrial subjects per se, the industry knowledge
systems. transfer this creates is limited. If there is one over-riding

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TABLE 6. All publication venues (Appendix D). TABLE 7. All publishers (Appendix D).

lesson that this mapping study shows, it is that a co-ordinated

and collaborative approach should be adopted between indus-
try and academics to avoid the pitfalls of the past and to
generate knowledge that progresses blockchain application,
rather than widening the chasm that often emerges between
the two.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The purpose of this mapping study was to examine exist-
ing peer-reviewed publications concerning the influence of
blockchain technology on the business of central banks. The
particular emphasis was on identifying what type of use-cases
were considered for blockchain adaptation, what the research
trends were and who provided that research. Discussion about
why those use-cases were considered and potential benefits,
risks and issues arising from blockchain adaptation to those
use-cases were summarised using relevant literature.
The Systematic Mapping Study identified a spectrum of
existing blockchain-based use cases for central banks covered

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TABLE 8. Matrix of the research (Appendix E).

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by academic research and presented a detailed statistical and APPENDIX C

thematic analysis of those use-cases and of the overall topic. ALL INCLUDED PAPERS
Narrative summaries of contents of the research for each of Table 5
the identified use-cases was also provided. In respect of the
topic of this study, overall research maturity was established APPENDIX D
by presenting frequency of publications over time with papers PUBLICATION VENUES AND PUBLISHERS
categorised by research channels; research depth and breadth Table 6 and Table 7
is demonstrated via research types, research contribution and
cohorts of researchers. APPENDIX E
A critical discussion point in this review is the understand- MATRIX OF THE RESEARCH
ing of which exact areas and functionality of the central bank- Table 8 - the complete matrix of the research of all included
ing business is under the academic lens of interest. However, papers.
as the goal of the SMS was to provide an overview and to be
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NATALIA DASHKEVICH received the M.Sc.
degree in banking and international finance from
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London, U.K.: Pearson, 2006. the CASS Business School, City University of
[84] X. Han, Y. Yuan, and F.-Y. Wang, ‘‘A blockchain-based framework for London, in 2009, and the M.Sc. degree in data
central bank digital currency,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Service Oper. science from Brunel University London, London,
Logistics, Informat. (SOLI), Nov. 2019, pp. 263–268. U.K., in 2017, where she is currently pursuing the
[85] I. Agur, A. Ari, and G. Dell’Ariccia. (2019). Designing Central Bank Dig- Ph.D. degree with the Department of Computer
ital Currencies. [Online]. Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523125 Science, with a full-time scholarship awarded by
[86] R. Auer and R. Bähme, ‘‘The technology of retail central bank digital the Engineering and Physical Science Research
currency,’’ BIS Quart. Rev., Mar. 2020 Council (EPSRC). From 2014 to 2016, she was
[87] H. Nabilou and A. Prum, ‘‘Central banks and regulation of cryptocurren- a Proprietary Retail Options Trader at Charles Schwab Corporation and
cies,’’ Univ. Luxembourg, New York, NY, USA, Tech. Rep. 2019-014, Proprietary Trainee Futures Trader at FUTEX Live. Her current research
2019 interests include the prototyping of blockchain-based applications for central
[88] E. Micheler and A. Whaley, ‘‘Regulatory technology: Replacing law with banks and fiscal authorities, and blockchain compatible AI.
computer code,’’ in Proc. Eur. Bus. Org. Law Rev. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer, 2019, p. 1–29. STEVE COUNSELL received the Ph.D. degree
[89] H. Hassani, X. Huang, and E. Silva, ‘‘Banking with blockchain-ed big from the University of London, in 2002. He is a
data,’’ J. Manage. Anal., vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 256–275, 2018. Professor of software engineering with the Depart-
[90] H. Hassani, X. Huang, and E. Silva, ‘‘Fusing big data, blockchain, and ment of Computer Science, Brunel University
cryptocurrency,’’ in Their Individual and Combined Importance in the London, and the Head of the Brunel Software
Digital Economy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019. Engineering Laboratory (BSEL). He has published
[91] F. Holotiuk, F. Pisani, and J. Moormann, ‘‘The impact of blockchain over 175 research articles on topics, including data
technology on business models in the payments industry,’’ Wirtschaftsin- mining, software refactoring, software evolution,
formatik, pp. 912–926, Oct. 2017. and defect analysis. He has worked extensively on
[92] M. Al-Debei and D. Avison, ‘‘Developing a unified framework of the large research projects with industry in the past. He
business model concept,’’ Eur. J. Inf. Syst., vol. 19, 359–376, Dec. 2010. is a Fellow of the British Computer Society and was a software developer in
[93] B. W. Wirtz, A. Pistoia, S. Ullrich, and V. G. Ottel, ‘‘Business models: the industry prior to academia.
Origin, development and future research perspectives,’’ Long Range Plan-
ning, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 36–54, Feb. 2016.
GIUSEPPE DESTEFANIS received the B.E. and
[94] J. Magretta, ‘‘Why business models matter,’’ Harvard Bus. Rev., vol. 80,
M.Eng. degrees from the University of Pisa and
no. 5, pp. 86–92 and 133, 1–8, Oct. 2002.
the Ph.D. degree from the University of Cagliari.
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He is a Lecturer with the Department of Computer
2018. [Online]. Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072854
Science, Brunel University London. Previously,
[96] T. MacDonald, D. W. E. Allen, and J. Potts, ‘‘Blockchains and the bound-
he was a Lecturer with the School of Computer
aries of self-organized economies: Predictions for the future of banking,’’
in Banking Beyond Banks and Money (New Economic Windows). Science, University of Hertfordshire. He has been
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016, pp. 279–296. [Online]. Available: a Postdoctoral Researcher with Brunel University
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42448-4_14 London and the Computer Research Institute of
[97] M. Walker, ‘‘Bridging the gap between investment banking architec- Montreal (CRIM), Canada, and worked closely
ture and distributed ledgers,’’ R3, Tech. Rep. 03/2017, 2017. [Online]. with the Montreal aerospace industry to support testing activities during the
Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939281 development of flight simulators. While completing the Ph.D. degree studies,
[98] G. Ortiz, ‘‘Issues in the governance of central banks a report from the he visited The University of Auckland, New Zealand, and The Hong Kong
central bank governance group,’’ in BIS. Bank for Int. Settlement Central University of Science and Technology. His research areas focus on mining
Bank Governance Group, 2009, pp. 1–7. software repositories, empirical software engineering, agile methodologies,
[99] D. Domanski, L. Gambacorta, and C. Picillo, ‘‘Central clearing: Trends software metrics and patterns, blockchain, and cryptocurrencies.
and current issues,’’ BIS Quart. Rev., pp. 59–76, Dec. 2015.

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