The Transition to Democracy in Brazil

Author(s): Scott Mainwaring

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , Spring, 1986, Vol. 28, No.
1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 149-179
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/165739

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 THE TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACYIN BRAZIL

by SCOTT MAINWARING

ON JANUARY 15, 1985, Brazil elected a new president, 74 y

Tancredo Neves, a moderate career politician who had been
the important leaders of the opposition to the military regim
took power in 1964. Tancredo died before assuming office,
elected Vice-president elect, Jose Sarney, took over the Exe
Office on March 15,1985, bringing to an end 21 years of military
Arguably, the transition in Brazil is the most important of the r
transitions in South America (Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Ec
and Bolivia), given the country's size, population, and influen
given the fact that Neves' election marked the demise of th
successful and long-lived bureaucratic-authoritarian regime
region.' As a result, the nature and implications of the Brazilian t
sition will have considerable significance for understanding t
litical reality of the region during the next several years.2
This article analyzes the transition to democracy in Brazil.
ing from the viewpoint that political liberalization was init
choice made by the military regime in 1974, the analysis ex
why the regime undertook that path and then traces the main ch
teristics of the transition during two periods: (1) March 1974
ber 1983, and (2) October 1983 - January 1985. The latter pe
which is examined in greater detail, is distinctive for the ext
which the regime lost its ability to dictate, or respond effectivel
political change. The following section then discusses the re
behind the rapid erosion of regime power during the 1983-85
The article concludes by assessing the effects on Brazil duri
first year of its transition to the new democratic regime.

LIBERATION FROM ABOVE: THE INITIAL IMPULSE

IN MARCH 1974, President Ernesto Geisel and Chief of Cab

Golbery de Couto e Silva announced their intention to promot
slow, gradual, and careful process of political liberalization.3 T

Scott Mainwaring is Assistant Professor of Government, and member o

Kellogg Institute, at the University of Notre Dame. He is author of
CATHOLIC CHURCH AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1916-1985 (Stanford
University Press, 1986) and has written extensively on social movements
and transitions to democracy.
149

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150 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

was not the first time the military regime had announced such an in-
tention. Presidents Castello Branco (1964-67), Costa e Silva (1967-
69), and Medici (1969-74) had publicly stated their desire to do so,
yet none was able to implement this goal.4 Furthermore, during the
course of the abertura there was a conflict between the push for lib-
eralization and the tightening authoritarian controls. Nevertheless, it
is possible to date the abertura from March 1974 because, despite
oscillations and regressions, from that time on the general move-
ment was towards a more liberal political system.
Why did the military decide to open up the regime?5 In contrast
to earlier coups, where the military had returned power to civilians
after a short interregnum, in 1964 the predominant thrust was toward
a long-term intervention (Stepan, 1971). Nevertheless, most leaders
of the regime never envisioned military rule as a stable, permanent
solution; the military was to restore order and eventually return
power to civilians. The regime defined itself according to Western
values, including that of democracy. Despite thousands of incidents
of torture and political assassination, the regime always maintained
some significant institutions typical of liberal democracy. In contrast
to the recent authoritarian regimes of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile,
the Brazilian regime closed Congress only twice (1968-69 and
1977), both times for relatively short intervals. Also, in contrast to the
other bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone, a
party system functioned throughout the entire authoritarian period.
The opposition party, the MDB (Movimento Democratico
Brasileiro), was created by the government in 1965. During the most
repressive years, 1969-74, the MDB had difficulty in functioning as
an independent opposition voice, but it always served as a channel
for some oppositon demands and, after 1974, became increasingly
autonomous and important.6
During 1968-74, some nationalistic, far-right elements of the
military initiated moves designed to increase the break with demo-
cratic institutions. Despite these efforts, and in contrast to the experi-
ence of other such regimes (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile), their initia-
tives were consistently defeated. The continued existence of
democratic institutions throughout the authoritarian period would
later prove important to the liberalization process. Despite the fact
that such institutions may have served the military mostly as a facade,
or as a way to facilitate continuation of civilian support, the existence
of parties, elections, and a constitution offered the domestic opposi-
tion space in which to maneuver and provided at least a minimal

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 151

continuity
continuity of democratic
of democratic
practicespractices
and leaders.and
Similarly
leaders.
in the
Similarly
past, in the past,
just
justasassome
some
continuity
continuity
had beenhadobserved
been inobserved
the transfer
in of
thepower
transfer of power
from
fromthe the
1945-64
1945-64
democratic
democratic
leadershipleadership
to their authoritarian
to their suc-
authoritarian suc-
cessors,
cessors, so,so,
too,too,
has there
has there
been a like
beencontinuity
a like continuity
as the recent military
as the recent military
regime
regime hashas
relinquished
relinquished
its power
itstopower
the nascent
to the
democratic
nascent democratic
government.7
government.7
An
Animportant
important backdrop
backdrop
to the abertura
to the was
abertura
the continuing
was the state
continuing state
of
oftension
tensiongenerated
generated
by theby
conflicting
the conflicting
pressures topressures
open up the tore-open up the re-
gime
gimeononthethe
one one
hand,hand,
and to and
keep it
toclosed
keeponittheclosed
other.on
However,
the other. However,
mere
mereexistence
existenceof such
of pressures
such pressures
does not sufficiently
does not sufficiently
explain why explain why
the
theliberalization
liberalization
process
process
grew after
grew 1974after
when 1974
it had when
failed toitdohad
so failed to do so
earlier. Four factors were crucial to the decision to liberalize at that
time.
First, since World War II, authoritarian regimes in the West have
had trouble in devising the appropriate symbols or discourse which
could win them widespread legitimacy. Initially, the Brazilian re-
gime constructed symbols of legitimacy which were almost exclu-
sively negative: anti-Communism, anti-corruption, and anti-chaos.
At the outset such symbols were very effective in winning the sup-
port of much of the population, particularly the middle and upper
classes. To remain credible for the long haul, however, there must be
a universally recognized and accepted threat of communism, cor-
ruption, or chaos. If an authoritarian regime should extirpate these
"evils," then its raison d'etre disappears; conversely, if the regime
fails to combat its enemies, it loses credibility owing to its inefficien-
cy. Paradoxically, it is precisely when the authoritarian regime meets
its goals of restoring peace and order most successfully that the chal-
lenge to its legitimacy is apt to be greatest. Regimes able to defeat the
Left and invigorate the economy will probably enjoy broader sup-
port than those regimes less successful in meeting stated objectives,
but they will often face more pressures, both internal and external,
to open up the political system (O'Donnell, 1982). After all, how do
you justify repression when there is no visible and plausible enemy?
The Brazilian government under President Medici turned to
more positive symbols for legitimacy, such as the themes of efficien-
cy, economic growth, and national aggrandizement. However, legiti-
macy based exclusively on performance is also precarious. Demo-
cratic legitimacy is based largely on procedure, even though
performance and charisma may play important roles. Procedure pro-
vides a more stable base for legitimacy than efficiency because it re-
quires mere acceptance of the rules of the game in order to survive.

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152 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

When
When legitimacy
legitimacyis is
based
based
on on
performance,
performance,
a regime
a regime
may encounter
may encounter
crisis
crisis when
whenperformance
performance declines.
declines.
At the
At same
the same
time,time,
a continued
a continued
out- out-
standing
standingeconomic
economicperformance
performance
can can
shiftshift
public
public
attention
attention
away away
from
from the
theprevious
previousfocus
focus
on on
economic
economiclife,life,
and towards
and towards
a deeper
a deeper
con- con-
cern
cern with
withother
otheraspects
aspects
of of
sociopolitical
sociopolitical
life. life.
Thus,Thus,
in theincontempo-
the contempo-
rary
rary West,
West,where
wheredemocratic
democratic
norms
norms
and and
procedures
procedures
have wide-
have wide-
spread
spreadlegitimacy,
legitimacy, either
either
goodgood
or bad
or bad
performance
performance
can undermine
can undermine
legitimacy
legitimacybasedbasedonon
efficiency.
efficiency.
In
In the
the Brazilian
Braziliancase,
case,
it it
waswas
precisely
precisely
those
those
sectors
sectors
whichwhich
bene- bene-
fited
fited most
mostfrom
from the
the
years
years
of the
of the
"economic
"economic
miracle"
miracle"
whichwhich
were the
were the
most
most vocal
vocalinindemanding
demanding a return
a return to democratic
to democratic
rule: the
rule:population
the population
of
of the
thelarge
largeandanddeveloped
developed cities,
cities,
and and
the middle
the middle
class (Lamounier,
class (Lamounier,
1980:
1980: 15-80).
15-80).InIn1964,
1964,
these
these
sectors
sectors
had had
led the
led demonstrations
the demonstrations
against
againstJoao
JoaoGoulart;
Goulart;in in
1984,
1984,
they
they
led the
led demonstrations
the demonstrations
for direct
for direct
elections.
elections.ByBy1974,
1974,when
whenthethe
abertura
abertura
began,
began,
the disaffection
the disaffection
of of
middle-class
middle-classBrazil
Brazil
was
was
already
already
apparent.
apparent.
SuchSuch
prominent
prominent
institu-
institu-
tions as the Brazilian Press Association and the Order of Brazilian
Lawyers played a major role in opposing the authoritarian abuses
(Dassin, 1984). The Catholic Church, which essentially endorsed
the coup in 1964, had become an outstanding source of opposition
(Mainwaring, 1986). Even some leaders of the industrial bourgeoisie
of Sao Paulo began to call for a move towards democracy (Cardoso,
1983). Furthermore, in the 1974 elections, the opposition trounced
the government party in the largest, most developed states
(Lamounier and Cardoso, 1976). The signs of disaffection and of de-
creasing legitimacy were most visible in the same sectors from
whom the regime had derived legitimacy during its earlier years.
The outstanding ideologue of the military regime, General
Golbery de Couto e Silva, recognized the need for legitimacy as the
main motive for promoting political liberalization. In a major speech
at the Escola Superior da Guerra (Superior War College), Golbery
argued that the extreme concentration of power had created the
threat of a "black hole," a vacuum resulting from the gap between the
major decision centers and civil society. Although he did not refer
explicitly to the notion of legitimacy, Golbery's speech indicated an
acute awareness of the problem.8
A second factor which contributed to the decision to liberalize
was the fact that the close identification between the military and the
government, necessary during the most repressive phases of authori-
tarian rule, had created problems for the military. There was an on-
going tension between the military as an institution and the military
as government. As an institution fundamentally oriented towards na-

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 153
MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL

tional
tional defense,
defense,the military
the military
required the
required
kind of the
discipline
kindand ofunity
discipline and unity
which
which waswas
threatened
threatened
by political
by political
divisions. Yet,
divisions.
as the holder
Yet,ofas the holder of
power,
power, thethe
armed
armed
forcesforces
were constantly
were constantly
being politicized
being
and sub-
politicized and sub-
jected
jected to to
internal
internal
divisions.
divisions.
These
These divisions
divisions
were were
especially
especially
apparent during
apparentthe presiden-
during the presiden-
tial
tialsuccessions,
successions,whichwhich
almost always
almost present
always dilemmas
present for authori-
dilemmas for authori-
tarian
tarian regimes.
regimes.
UnlikeUnlike
democratic
democratic
systems, which
systems,
have clearly
which stipu-
have clearly stipu-
lated
latedprocedures
procedures
for determining
for determining
presidentialpresidential
succession, succession,
authoritarian
authoritarian regimes
regimes
lack defined
lack mechanisms
defined mechanisms
for transferring
for
ex-transferring ex-
ecutive
ecutive power,
power,
and because
and because
power is power
usually concentrated
is usually inconcentrated
the in the
hands
hands ofof
thethe
executive,
executive,
the issuethe
of who
issuecontrols
of whothe succession
controls the succession
takes
takesonon great
great
importance.
importance.
The
TheBrazilian
Brazilian
regime
regime
was exceptional
was exceptional
in the way it
ininstitutiona-
the way it institutiona-
lized
lizedpresidential
presidential
successions;
successions;
still, every
still,
succession
every created
succession
serious created serious
tension
tension within
withinthe armed
the armed
forces. From
forces.
1965 From
until 1967,
1965 there
until
were1967, there were
conflicts between soft and hardliners as to who would succeed
Castello Branco. In 1969, this scenario was repeated when President
Costa e Silva died. Although hardliners took over during the Medici
presidency (1969-74), the group headed by General Golbery de
Couto e Silva immediately began to plan ways of returning to power
- which it did. During Geisel's presidency (1974-1979), the Minister
of the Army, General Silvio de Frota, attempted to undermine the
arbertura and become the next president. In 1978, the opposition
party chose a dissident general to run for president. Even though
Geisel and Golbery did not propose to relinguish power to civilians,
both were aware that political liberalization, which by its very nature
would allow greater separation between the military and the govern-
ment, could alleviate some of these tensions.9
Third, by 1974 the military had decimated the Left, had control
over popular movements and faced, a weak opposition. Peasant
movements, severely repressed in 1964, had never recovered. The
labor movement had been silenced since suppression of the strikes
at Osasco and Contagem in 1968; no major strike occurred again
until 1978. The opposition party had suffered many key losses due to
the repression, and ARN (Alianca Renovadora Nacional), the govern-
ment party, had easily won the 1970 elections. This situation led the
regime to believe that it could successfully control a liberalization
process, given the regime's strength, and the opposition's weakness
and moderate character. The regime opted to liberalize, therefore,
not because of weakness, but because of its strength.
This relative weakness of the opposition, and relative capacity
of the regime to control the political situation, were distinctive

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154 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

marks
marksof ofthe
theliberalization
liberalization
process
process
in Brazil
in Brazil
duringduring
the early
the
phases
early phases
of
of the
theabertura,
abertura, which
which
mademade
it differ
it differ
radically
radically
from the
from
situation
the situation
in in
Argentina
Argentinaand andBolivia
Bolivia
in the
in the
earlyearly
1970s,1970s,
wherewhere
active, active,
powerfulpowerful
op- op-
position
positiongroups
groupswere
were
ableable
to mobilize
to mobilize
to topple
to topple
military
military
governments.
governments.
This
This weakness
weakness ofof
thethe
Brazilian
Brazilian
opposition,
opposition,
however,
however,
by no by no
means
meansimplied
implied that
thatthetheregime
regime
enjoyed
enjoyed
sufficient
sufficient
supportsupport
to governto govern
without
withoutrepression
repression andandwithout
without
frequent
frequent
manipulation
manipulation
of electoral
of electoral
laws.
laws.From
From19741974 til til
latelate
1983,
1983,
political
political
liberalization
liberalization
was character-
was character-
ized
ized by
bythethecurious
curious situation
situation
whichwhich
enjoyed enjoyed
the support
the support
of powerful
of powerful
political
politicalactors,
actors, of of
a steadily
a steadily
increasing
increasing
(though(though
fluctuating)
fluctuating)
opposi- opposi-
tion,
tion,yetyetwas
wasunable
unable to topple
to topple
the regime.
the regime.
Fourth,
Fourth,the theeconomic
economic situation
situation
fostered
fostered
the regime's
the regime's
belief that
belief that
it
it could
couldafford
afford to to
liberalize.
liberalize.
SomeSome
authors authors
automatically
automatically
attributedattributed
the
the abertura
abertura totothetheendendof the
of the
economic
economic
miracle.'1
miracle.'1
In fact,Ineven
fact, even
though
thoughthe the1973
1973 oil oil
crisis
crisis
affected
affected
the Brazilian
the Brazilian
economyeconomy
adversely,adversely,
this
this argument
argument is is
difficult
difficultto sustain.
to sustain.
The mainThe architects
main architects
of the of the
abertura,
abertura,Geisel
Geisel andand Golbery
Golberyde Couto
de Couto
e Silva,
e Silva,
had planned
had planned
an or- an or-
derly
derlyandandcontrolled
controlled liberalization
liberalization
even even
beforebefore
the effect
the of
effect
the oil
of the oil
crisis
crisisbecame
became apparent.
apparent. Furthermore,
Furthermore, the Brazilian
the Brazilian
economy economy
was was
one
one of
ofthe
thefastest
fastest
growing
growing
in the
in world
the world
from from
1967 to1967
1974.to
Inflation,
1974. Inflation,
which had almost reached 100% when Castello e Branco took over
in April 1964, had been reduced to 20%. Finally, despite the decele-
ration in the rate of economic expansion after 1974, the Brazilian
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) continued solid growth (7% per
annum) until 1980, even though this growth increased the external
vulnerability of the economy, thus restoring order along the econom-
ic, as well as the political, front.

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, 1974-1983

EVEN THOUGH THE DECISION to liberalize originated with the

authoritarian regime, it created a new dynamic between the regime
and its opponents. Liberalization implied redefining the rules of the
game in such a way as to enhance the role of the opposition. Thus,
the 1974-1983 period inaugurated a stage of constant struggle and
negotiation between regime and opposition, constant efforts by the
latter to expand the cause of democracy, and constant attempts by the
former to contain it."
It is worth illustrating this point at some length to indicate the
flavor of the transition during those nine years. As part of its decision
to allow greater political freedom, the regime decided to allow more

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 155

competitive elections in 1974, anticipating a victory which would

confirm its legitimacy. In 1970, under the aegis of the "miracle," the
government party, ARENA, had demolished the MDB, creating the
expectation that it would win subsequent elections. Yet the opposite
happened: the opposition fared far better in 1974 than it had in 1970,
claiming many key victories. In the Senate the opposition won 16 out
of 22 disputed seats. The government overestimated its own strength
and underestimated that of the opposition, especially in the devel-
oped urban areas where the regime was soundly trounced. Demo-
graphic trends, notably a rapid growth of large cities, indicated that
the regime would likely encounter trouble in the 1978 elections.
Following a pattern which would be repeated over the years, the
regime used a combination of coercion and ingenuity to reassert au-
thority and its ability to control the liberalization process. In April
1977, President Geisel closed Congress to promulgate new electoral
legislation which enabled the government to maintain control of the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies in the 1978 elections.
Beginning in 1978, the regime faced challenges at both the in-
stitutional and popular levels. As the political arena opened wider,
the opposition demanded restoration of basic civil liberties, espe-
cially freedoms of the press and of speech, amnesty for political ex-
iles and an end to torture. While the opposition successfully generat-
ed discussion of these issues, the regime took the initiative in
responding to them. During his presidency, Geisel reduced the inci-
dents of torture despite resistance from the hardliners. In 1979, the
regime granted amnesty to exiles and abolished Institutional Act No.
5, responsible for eliminating important civil liberties. Also in 1979
the regime took the initiative in reforming the artifically imposed
two-party system, created in 1965. The opposition had long been de-
manding party reform, but the regime seized upon the issue as a
means to divide the opposition. Ironically, though perhaps typically,
when the reform finally came, it garnered more support among gov-
ernment leaders than among the opposition party.12 Equally instruc-
tive was the fact that the government included dissolution of the op-
position party as part of the reform. Even measures taken in the name
of liberalization (or democracy) were often imposed in manipula-
tive fashion.
An unexpected challenge came from popular movements. After
years of being virtually dormant as far as the public was concerned,
popular movements surged back with surprising vitality between
1977 and 1980. Most publicized was the auto workers movement of
Greater Sao Paulo, which staged major strikes in successive years be-

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156 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

tween
tween1978
1978and
and1980
1980(Humphrey,
(Humphrey,1982;1982;
Tavares
Tavares
de Almeida,
de Almeida,
1981). 1981).
Throughout
Throughoutthe the
country,
country,peasant
peasant
unions
unions
emerged
emerged
stronger
stronger
than at than at
any
any time
timesince
since
1964
1964andand
more
more
numerous
numerous
than ever.
than Neighborhood
ever. Neighborhood
associations and local movements for urban services also blossomed
all over the country (Boschi, 1983; Singer and Brant, 1980; Moises
1982a; Moises, 1978).
The government responded to these movements with varying
degrees of repression, cooptation, and concessions. Aware that its
political future depended upon maintaining as much public support
as possible, the government attempted to make new inroads into the
popular sector. Significant in this regard was the reformulation of
wage policy in 1979 designed to favor the poorest workers. Tradition-
al mechanisms, such as housing projects, left behind during the
most repressive period, resurfaced, but, in other cases, the regime
made clear that it wished to impose limits upon popular movements.
Every year repressive measures were employed against the auto
workers' strikes while violence against peasants was rampant in the
Amazon region (Martins, 1984 and 1980).
In urban areas, these policies often succeeded in containing the
challenges posed by popular movements. The regime prevented the
movements from becoming a determining element in the political
process, even though it had to reformulate its own policies and style
of decision making to do so. In the poorest states, the government
managed to retain its popular support. By 1982, urban popular move-
ments were on the decline, a result of the economic crisis, the atten-
tion commanded by the political parties, and government ability to
marginalize these movements. In many rural areas, especially fron-
tier regions, private and public repression remained the norm.
Every step in the abertura provided new possibilities for the op-
position and new dilemmas for the regime. The latter designed the
1979 party reform in such a way as to maximize its own prospects in
the 1982 elections. Its strategy was to divert the opposition into sever-
al parties, assuming that a large, malleable centrist party would
emerge. By 1981 it was apparent that the government would fare
quite poorly under the new electoral laws and party situation. The
centrist Popular Party (PP for Partido Popular) proved to be more
combative than the regime expected. Furthermore, the largest oppo-
sition party, the PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democratico
Brasileiro), proved significantly stronger than the government had
anticipated. As a result, in November 1981, the regime once again
turned to authoritarian means to impose changes in the electoral
laws, this time to prevent party alliances during the 1982 elections.

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 157

The
The 1982
1982elections
elections
marked
markeda new
a new
point
point
in the
in abertura,
the abertura,
since since
significant
significantdecision
decisioncenters
centers
were
were
at stake
at stake
for the
forfirst
the time.
first These
time. These
elections,
elections,forforstate
state
governors,
governors,
were
were
the first
the first
since since
1965 and
1965resulted
and resulted
in
in aa stalemate.
stalemate.TheThe
opposition
opposition
wonwon
mostmost
of the
ofmajor
the major
states:states:
Rio de Rio de
Janeiro,
Janeiro,Sao
SaoPaulo,
Paulo,Minas
Minas
Gerais,
Gerais,
as well
as well
as a number
as a number
of smaller
of smaller
states.
states.The
Theopposition-controlled
opposition-controlledstates
states
accounted
accounted
for 60%
forof60%
Brazil's
of Brazil's
population
populationand
and75%
75%of of
herher
GDP.
GDP.
The The
opposition
opposition
also far
alsooutpolled
far outpolled
the
the government
governmentininterms
termsof popular
of popular
votesvotes
for governors.
for governors.
Nevertheless
Neverthelessthe thegovernment
governmentcould
could
claimclaim
somesome
significant
significant
vic- vic-
tories
tories too.
too.ItItelected
electedgovernors
governors
of two
of two
important
important
states,states,
Rio Grande
Rio Grande
do
do Sul
Sul(in
(inthe
thefarfarsouth)
south)
andand
Pernambuco
Pernambuco(in the
(innortheast)
the northeast)
and it and it
won
won aamajority
majorityofof
states
states
(12 (12
out out
of 22).
of 22).
Thanks
Thanks
to thetocontinuous
the continuous
tam- tam-
pering
peringwithwithelectoral
electorallawslaws
(Fleischer,
(Fleischer,
1984a),
1984a),
and despite
and despite
havinghaving
a a
minority
minorityofofthe thepopular
popular vote,
vote,
the the
PDS PDS
(Partido
(Partido
Democritico
Democritico
Social) Social)
elected
electedaamajority
majority ofofrepresentatives
representativesfor the
for electoral
the electoral
collegecollege
which which
would
woulddetermine
determine thethe
presidential
presidential
election
election
of January
of January
1985. Many
1985. ob-
Many ob-
servers
serversassumed
assumedthat,
that,
bybygetting
getting
the the
majority
majority
of theofelectoral
the electoral
college college
votes,
votes,the
theregime
regime had
hadvirtually
virtually
wrapped
wrapped
up theup1985
the elections,
1985 elections,
two two
years
years and
andtwotwomonths
months before
before
it took
it took
place.place.
Indeed,
Indeed,
if theifregime
the regime
had had
played
playeditsitscards
cardswell,
well,
it probably
it probably could
could
have have
wrapped
wrapped
up theup 1985
the 1985
election,
election,thereby
thereby prolonging
prolonging its control
its control
of theofexecutive
the executive
office office
until until
1989
1989 or
or1991.
1991.
More
More than
thaneight
eightyears
yearsafter
afterbeginning
beginning
the abertura,
the abertura,
the regime
the regime
still
still retained
retaineda arelatively
relativelystrong
strong
position.
position.
This This
does not
doesmean
not that
mean it that it
was
was consistently
consistentlyable able
to to
impose
imposeits will
its will
throughout
throughout
the 1974-1983
the 1974-1983
period.
period.Indeed,
Indeed,it itgenerally
generally failed
failed
to control
to control
the events
the events
of political
of political
change
changetotothethedegree
degree it would
it wouldhavehave
liked.
liked.
Yet what
Yet what
was remarkable
was remarkable
about
about thetheBrazilian
Brazilian abertura
abertura waswas
the the
regime's
regime's
ability
ability
to respond
to respond
to to
new
new situations
situationsinin
ways
ways
enabling
enabling
it toitremain
to remain
in power
in power
and toand
limittothe
limit the
nature
natureof ofthe
thepolitical
politicalchange.
change.
Even
Even though
thoughstate
statepolicies
policiesreflected
reflected
the dialectic
the dialectic
between
between
the the
regime
regimeand andopposition,
opposition, thethe regime
regime
was was
able able
to ensure
to ensure
significant
significant
continuity
continuityininboth
both policies
policiesandand
leadership
leadership
duringduring
this period.
this period.
For ex-For ex-
ample,
ample,sporadic
sporadicrepression
repression continued
continuedagainst
against
popular
popular
movements
movements
and
and against
againstthe
theLeft
Leftduring
during thethe
Figueiredo
Figueiredo
administration.
administration.
Indeed,Indeed,
in in
some
some rural
ruralareas,
areas,especially
especially thethe
Amazon,
Amazon,
the level
the level
of violence
of violence
even even
escalated
escalatedafter
after1978.
1978.Figuieredo
Figuieredo employed
employed
clientelistic
clientelistic
practices
practices
and and
generally
generallyexcluded
excluded thethe
popular
popularsectors
sectors
fromfromthe decision-making
the decision-making
sphere.
The continuity of leadership during this period is remarkable, as
is the regime's ability to institutionalize regular presidential succes-

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158 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

sion.
sion. Such
Suchkey
keyfigures
figuresas as
Presidents
Presidents
Figueiredo,
Figueiredo,
Geisel,
Geisel,
and Medici,
and Medici,
Chiefs
Chiefs of
ofCabinet
CabinetLeitao
LeitaodedeAbreu
Abreu
andand
Golbery
Golbery
de Couto
de Couto
e Silva,
e Silva,
and and
Cabinet members Delfim Neto, Jarbas Passarinho and Mario
Andreazza, to mention only a few, played leading roles in lengthy
chapters of the regime's history. In many cases, the same figures re-
sponsible for leading the abertura had also been responsible for im-
plementing policy during the most repressive years.
This ability of the military government to provide continuity in
policies and to limit the nature of political change made the Brazil-
ian abertura singularly slow and protracted. The regime spent more
time evolving backwards towards a democratic regime than it did in
moving towards authoritarianism. Indeed, there may be no other
contemporary case where an authoritarian regime initiated a transi-
tion to democracy which took so long to complete. In the Spanish
case, for example, the transition began when Franco died in late 1975
and, for most purposes, was completed by December 1978 when a
democratic constitution was promulgated.
None of this is to dismiss the opposition's role in the arbertura
The opposition - whether through the MDB or its successors, the
Church, social movements, or other forces - constantly pushed the
regime into making new concessions. Indeed, the regime was as
successful as it was in restraining this impulse only because it was
flexible enough to meet some of the opposition demands. Over time,
the opposition's ability to affect the political arena increased signifi-
cantly; yet, until 1983, the opposition was incapable of toppling the
regime, either electorally or through mass mobilization.

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY,

October 1983 to January 1985

BEGINNING WITH OCTOBER 1983, the political process

changed in significant ways in relation to the first nine years of the
abertura. After years of responding successfully to a wide amalgam
of challenges, the regime lost its ability to control the presidential
succession, paving the way to an earlier transition to democracy than
most observers expected. Indeed, it lost its very ability to formulate
a coherent, articulate political strategy during this final period in
power. Whereas, in November 1982, the government seemed almost
certain to win the presidential election of January 1985, when the
score was finally tallied, it suffered an ignominous defeat. The
regime's decline and the opposition's ascension can be subdivided
into three short periods.

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 159

1.
1. Regime
RegimeErosion:
Erosion:October
October
to December
to December
1983. 1983.
Throughout
Throughoutalmost
almostitsits
entire
entire
course,
course,
the regime
the regime
had been
hadable
been able
to
to count
countononthe
the
government
government party
party
(ARENA
(ARENA
until 1979,
until PDS
1979,
after-
PDS after-
wards).
wards).The
Theparty
partyhadhad
always
always
beenbeen
the submissive
the submissive
partnerpartner
of a tan-
of a tan-
dem
dem --aaparty
partyofof
thethe
regime,
regime,
not not
a regime
a regime
of theofparty,
the party,
a party aofthe
party ofthe
government,
government,but but notnot
a party
a party
in government.
in government. Generally,
Generally,
the govern-
the govern-
ment
mentparty
partysupported
supported thethe
regime,
regime,
and itand
wasitnot
wasterribly
not terribly
consequen-
consequen-
tial
tial even
evenwhen
when it it
didn't:
didn't:thethe
regime
regime
imposed
imposed
its will
itsonwill
the on
party.
theThis
party. This
situation
situationchanged
changed in in
thethe
second
second
half half
of 1983.
of 1983.
In July,
In aJuly,
liberala faction
liberal faction
within
withinthethePDS
PDS wonwon35%35%of the
of the
votesvotes
in theinelection
the election
for thefor
Executive
the Executive
of
of the
thePDS.
PDS.This
Thisliberal
liberalfaction
faction
had had
already
already
clashedclashed
with Figueiredo,
with Figueiredo,
and
and the
thestrength
strength of of
thisthis
group,
group,
coupled
coupled
with with
erodingeroding
cohesioncohesion
with- with-
in
in the
thePDS,
PDS,led
led
Figueiredo
Figueiredo to threaten
to threaten
to resign
to resign
from the
from party.
the party.
The
The debate
debateover
overwagewage
policy,
policy,
in the
in midst
the midst
of theofsevere
the severe
reces- reces-
sion
sion which
whichbegan
beganin in
19801980
andand
reached
reached
a lowapoint
low point
in 1983,
inproved
1983, to
proved to
be
be the
theissue
issuewhich
whichprovoked
provoked
a PDS
a PDS
revolt.
revolt.
In July
In 1983,
July as
1983,
part as
of part
the of the
stabilization
stabilizationplan
plan
sponsored
sponsored
by the
by International
the International
Monetary
Monetary
Fund Fund
(IMF),
(IMF),the
thegovernment
governmentpresented
presented
a new
a new
wage wage
policypolicy
which which
would would
have
have resulted
resultedinin
enormous
enormous
erosion
erosion
of real
of earnings
real earnings
of vastof
sectors
vast sectors
of of
the
the society.
society.Congress
Congressrejected
rejected
successive
successive
government
government
proposals,
proposals,
under
underPDS PDSleadership,
leadership,
despite
despite
government
government
pressure
pressure
on its own
on its
be-own be-
half.
half. ItIttook
tookthe
the
government
government several
several
months
months
to getto
a proposal
get a proposal
finally finally
approved.
Another blow to PDS unity and ability to control the presiden-
tial succession occurred in late December. In his end-of-year speech,
President Figueiredo announced that he would not coordinate the
party's campaign after having previously agreed to do so, in May
1983. Coordinating the campaign was difficult in light of the pro-
found divisions within the party, yet his decision to abdicate from the
task of choosing a successor probably affected adversely the party's
chances of re-establishing some degree of internal cohesion. This
decision seemed to strengthen the candidacy of Paulo Maluf, thereby
increasing the feeling of the opposition that it could not negotiate
the choice of the next president. Figueiredo's decision marked a pro-
found change from past practices. Previous military presidents had
indicated, and actively campaigned for, their personal choice for
president - and, in the cases of Castelo Branco (1964-67), Medici
(1969-74), and Geisel (1974-79), they had won. It was within this
context of gradual erosion of the government's ability to manage the
political and economic situation, and of increased tension between
the PDS and the government, that the campaign for direct elections
began.

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160 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

2. Mobilization of the Opposition: January to April 1984

The opposition parties had long proposed direct elections for
president, but the massive public campaign for direct elections
began only in January 1984. The first demonstration took place in
Curitiba, the largest city of the southern state of Parana, on January
12, with approximately 30,000 people present. Over the next three
and one-half months, there were literally hundreds of demonstra-
tions all over the country in favor of direct elections. Never before in
Brazilian history had so many people demonstrated for anything.
The largest masses gathered in Rio (about one million people on
April 10, 1984) and Sao Paulo (over one million people on April 16,
1984). Even occasional warnings by military leaders that demonstra-
tions for direct elections could endanger the abertura failed to di-
minish the opposition's resounding success in mobilizing the Brazil-
ian population. As early as January 25, when 200,000 people
gathered in the rain in Sao Paulo, even some PDS Congressional
leaders announced their support for direct elections.
As the campaign for direct elections accelerated, the regime
began to disintegrate visibly, and an increasing number of PDS
members began to support direct elections, including, on February
8, Vice-President Chaves himself. Before the turn of the year, the
PMDB presented an amendment in Congress for direct elections
which seemed to have no chance of passing. The opposition needed
the support of 2/3 of both houses in order to win. This meant getting
320 votes in the Chamber of Deputies and 46 in the Senate, although
the opposition parties controlled only 244 seats in the Chamber and
24 in the Senate. But what the regime had dismissed as impossible
inJanuary, when the campaign began, began to seem quite plausible
by mid-March. Several PDS members in the Congress predicted that
the Amendment for Direct Elections would pass.
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the campaign for direct
elections. The campaign's success gave the opposition a confidence
it had not known since 1968 and led to an unprecedented crisis with-
in the regime. As the campaign proceeded, many PDS leaders came
to feel that the regime needed to negotiate a way out. Led by
Aureliano Chaves, Chief of Cabinet Leitao de Abreu, the (PDS) head
of the Chamber of Deputies, and the Ministers of the Air Force and
the Navy, this group reckoned that if the regime elected the next
president under the conditions then prevailing, the country would
enter into an unprecedented political crisis. This faction felt that, at
the very least, the regime needed to reduce the mandate of the next

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 161

president
president to
toaamaximum
maximumofoffour
four
years.
years.
Another
Another
faction,
faction,
led by
led the
by the
Chief
Chief of
of the
theNational
Nationalinformation
information
Service,
Service,
thethe
Minister
Minister
of the
of the
Army,
Army,
the
the Minister
Ministerof
ofJustice
Justiceand
and
thethe
other
other
twotwo
candidates
candidates
for for
president,
president,
fiercely
fiercely opposed
opposedthis
thiskind
kindofofnegotiation.
negotiation.They
They
believed
believed
thatthat
the the
re- re-
gime
gime could
couldweather
weatheroneonemore
more crisis,
crisis,
after
after
which
which
things
things
would
would
return
return
to normal.
Throughout 1984 tensions between these factions remained
high, with leaders of the groups insulting one another publicly in a
way unprecedented for the authoritarian regime. The Minister of the
Navy was fired in late March as a result of his outspoken views on be-
half of the more liberal faction in these conflicts. In mid-April,
Theodorico Ferraco, a PDS Deputy from Rio, described the govern-
ment as a group of "a half dozen irresponsible people who are lead-
ing the country." Meanwhile, Vice President Chaves, who had previ-
ously announced his support for direct elections, recommended that
they be held in 1984.

3. The Electoral College: April 1984 toJanuary 1985.

As the date approached (April 25, 1984) for voting on the
amendment to re-establish direct elections for president, regime
intransigents won out. President Figueiredo declared emergency
measures to be in effect in Brasilia and ten nearby cities to abort the
possibility of demonstrations. In addition, he mobilized all the sup-
port he could muster in Congress to defeat the amendment. When
roll call finally came, the amendment fell 22 votes short of the 320
needed to pass the Chamber of Deputies.
As the campaign for direct elections went on, the PDS set about
attempting to find a candidate for president. The three main candi-
dates were Vice President Aureliano Chaves, Minister of the Interior
Mario Andreazza, and Federal Deputy Paulo Maluf, ex-Governor of
Sao Paulo. Aureliano Chaves, the most liberal of the three, had the
most popular support by far, but he lacked support within the party
machine. Andreazza was Figueiredo's preferred candidate, and, dur-
ing the early stages, it appeared he had good chances of winning.
However, by April the most likely winner seemed to be Maluf, who
was anathema to the moderate factions of the party as being notori-
ous for egregious corruption.
With these possibilities in mind, the moderate factions began to
flirt with the idea of supporting Tancredo Neves, even though he was
not officially a candidate. Two days following defeat of the amend-
ment for direct elections, 8 of the 9 governors from the impoverished

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162 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Northeast,
Northeast,all
allPDS
PDSleaders,
leaders,
pledged
pledged
their
their
support
support
to Tancredo,
to Tancredo,
an ava-
an ava-
lanche
lanche of
of defections.
defections.InInmid-June,
mid-June,when
whenit appeared
it appearedcertain
certain
thatthat
Maluf
Maluf would
wouldwinwinthe
thePDS
PDSconvention,
convention,
notnot
onlyonly
did did
the the
President
President
of of
the
the PDS
PDS resign,
resign,but
butthe
theGovernor
Governorof of
RioRio
Grande
Grande
do Sul,
do Sul,
also also
from from
the the
PDS,
PDS, announced
announcedhishispreference
preferencefor
forTancredo
Tancredoover
over
Maluf.
Maluf.
The The
last last
week
week of
of June,
June,these
thesedefections
defectionswere
were
consecrated
consecrated
by the
by the
formation
formation
of of
the
the Liberal
LiberalFront,
Front,headed
headedbyby
moderate
moderatePDSPDS
leaders
leaders
whowho
supported
supported
Aureliano
Aureliano Chaves
Chavesand
andhad
hadvoted
voted
for
for
direct
direct
elections.
elections.
By mid-July,
By mid-July,
the the
Liberal
Liberal Front
Fronthadhaddecided
decidedtoto
vote
vote
forfor
Tancredo,
Tancredo,
whowho
increasingly
increasingly
ap- ap-
peared
peared to
to be
bethe
thelikely
likelyopposition
opposition candidate,
candidate,
regardless
regardless
of whom
of whom
the the
PDS
PDS nominated.
nominated.Consequently,
Consequently,the
the
opposition
opposition
seemed
seemed
to have
to have
a a
good
good chance
chanceofofwinning
winningthe
the
election,
election,
a situation
a situation
which
which
paved
paved
the the
way
way for
for increasing
increasingacceptance
acceptanceofof
indirect
indirect
elections
elections
except
except
for for
mostmost
of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) and the PDT (Partido
Democratico Trabalhista).
From this point on, unity within the PDS became progressively
eroded. Aureliano Chaves withdrew his candidacy and began to
work openly for Tancredo, an old political rival. Some regime mode-
rates continued to put their hopes on Andreazza, but the PDS con-
vention, held the second week of August, closed that question: Maluf
won, 493 to 350, leading some of Andreazza's coterie to defect to the
enemy camp. Among the most important of these was the ex-
Governor of Bahia, Ant6nio Carlos Magalhaes, who, in September,
gave an unprecedented lambasting to the Minister of the Air Force
for having called the PDS defectors traitors. Maluf's victory implied
virtual defeat for the PDS in the January election.
Meanwhile, Tancredo Neves embarked upon construction of a
broader network of support, aiming his campaign at both the mem-
bers of electoral college and the public at large. Equally important,
Neves was busy persuading the military not to intervene. The success
of his campaign on all fronts is undeniable: by January 15 he came
out ahead, 480 to 180, in the electoral college, and averted the possi-
bility of a coup. Through this double victory, he became the first ci-
vilian elected to the presidency since 1960. Having briefly outlined
the main developments of this period, we can discern the most im-
portant political changes in relation to the previous 1973-83 period.

a) Erosion of consensus in the upper echelon of the regime.

The leaders of the military government had always experienced
some internal tensions, usually between the hard-line and the mod-
erate authoritarian factions. These tensions were generally accentu-
ated during periods of debate over the presidential succession.

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 163

Nevertheless, until 1982, the level of agreement and unity, both with-
in the armed forces and within the government, was striking. Con-
flicts notwithstanding, all the presidential successions were handled
in ways which managed to avoid crises for the regime.
In 1983-84, the presidential succession provoked an unresolv-
able crisis. For the first time, the regime found itself unable to agree
upon an acceptable candidate. The major leaders were split not only
over whom to choose for president, but over whether to shorten the
mandate for the next president, and whether to hold direct elections
in future presidential contests. Ex-President Geisel and Chief of the
Cabinet Leitao de Abreu supported Vice President Chaves;
Figueiredo supported Andreazza; and ex-Chief of the Cabinet
Golbery supported Maluf. Chaves' supporters generally favored a ne-
gotiated settlement with the opposition, including a reduction of the
presidential mandate and an assurance that the next presidential
election would be direct. The supporters of Andreazza and Maluf
generally preferred a hard line approach: impose a PDS victory now,
and make concessions later. But, whereas Maluf's supporters urged
Figueiredo to play a neutral role in the succession question,
Andreazza hoped the president would force his nomination to go
through. Equally significant in revealing the profound schisms with-
in the uppe; echelons of the regime were the tensions evident be-
tween the president and the vice president. Even though Chaves
served as interim president on two occasions when Figueiredo un-
derwent his operations, the president never seemed to trust, or work
with, his running mate, and the friction between the two was exacer-
bated during the campaign for direct elections.

b) Inability of President Figueiredo to lead the regime.

Despite their different styles and orientations, all previous mili-
tary presidents had come across as effective leaders. When
Figueiredo took office in 1979, it appeared that he would carry on
this tradition. The new president seemed enthusiastic, and his pro-
posal of carrying out the abertura appealed to the media. However,
Figueiredo's charisma wore off, and he increasingly appeared ill-
suited for executive office. In a major speech in January 1985,
Figueiredo asked the nation to forget him - hardly a request befitting
a president who hopes to be remembered as an effective leader.
Nowhere was Figueiredo's ineffectual leadership more appar-
ent than in the presidential succession process. In May 1983,
Figueiredo agreed to coordinate the PDS procedure for choosing

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164 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

the
the next
nextpresident.
president.Seven
Seven
months
months
later,
later,
however,
however,
he decided
he decided
against against
it,
it, contrary
contrarytotothe
the
practice
practice
of all
of his
all predecessors
his predecessors
in thein
military
the military
presi- presi-
dency.
dency.Coordinating
Coordinatingthethe
presidential
presidential
succession
succession
obviously
obviously
was more
was more
difficult
difficultinina atime
time
ofof
open
open
political
political
competition,
competition,
but this
butreversed
this reversed
de- de-
cision
cision revealed
revealeda vacillation
a vacillationuncharacteristic
uncharacteristic
of previous
of previous
administra-
administra-
tions.
tions. Effective
Effectiveleadership
leadership andand
campaigning
campaigning
on behalf
on behalf
of oneof
of one
the of the
candidates,
candidates,particularly
particularly if Figueiredo
if Figueiredo
had opted
had opted
for Chaves,
for Chaves,
could could
have
have helped
helpedthe
theregime
regime
avoid
avoid
some
some
of the
of schisms
the schisms
whichwhich
emerged.
emerged.
Particularly
Particularlysalient
salientin in
thisthis
regard
regard
was was
Figueiredo's
Figueiredo's
persistent
persistent
re- re-
fusal
fusal to
tosupport
support hishis
ownownvicevice
president.
president.
EarlyEarly
in 1984,
in 1984,
it was itclear
was clear
that,
that, in
interms
termsofof popular
popular support,
support,
Aureliano
Aureliano
ChavesChaves
far outdistanced
far outdistanced
both
both Maluf
Malufandand Andreazza.
Andreazza. In fact,
In fact,
surveys
surveys
showedshowed
ChavesChaves
as leading
as leading
all
all potential
potentialcandidates
candidates in ina direct
a direct
election
election
for president.
for president.Although Although
history
historycancanalways
always devise
devisestrange
strange
twists
twists
of fate,
of fate,
it seems
it seems
likely that,
likely that,
had
had the
theregime
regimechosen
chosenAureliano
Aurelianoas its
as candidate
its candidate
for president,
for president,
or or
negotiated
negotiatedwithwith thethe
opposition
opposition to agree
to agree
uponuponChaves,
Chaves,
it would it would
have have
been
been able
abletotoelect
electone
oneof of
its its
ownownfor for
president.
president.
Figueiredo
Figueiredo
was thewas the
only
only person
personinina position
a position to enhance
to enhance Chaves'
Chaves'
chances
chances
significantly
significantly
and
and he
heconsistently
consistently refused
refused to do
to so.
do so.

c)
c) Increasing
Increasingtension
tension
between
between
moderate
moderate
sectors
sectors
of theofPDS
the PDS
and
and the
thegovernment.
government.
Even
Even though
thoughARENA
ARENAandand
PDSPDS
leaders
leaders
sometimes
sometimes
expressed
expressed
frustration
frustrationatattheir
their
marginalization
marginalization
from from
the decision-making
the decision-making
proc- proc-
ess,
ess, few
fewmajor
majorconflicts
conflicts
between
between
the the
regime
regime
and the
andgovernment
the government
party
party had
hadoccurred
occurred prior
prior
to 1983.
to 1983.
ARENA/PDS
ARENA/PDSleaders
leaders
had consist-
had consist-
ently
ently gone
gonealong
alongwith
with
thethe
regime,
regime,
a situation
a situation
whichwhich
broke broke
down in
down in
October
October1983
1983when
whenthethe
party
party
rejected
rejected
successive
successive
wage packages
wage packages
proposed
proposedby
bythe
thegovernment,
government,
providing
providing
a forecast
a forecast
for the
for
even
thegreat-
even great-
er
er tensions
tensionswhich
whichsurfaced
surfaced
during
during
the the
presidential
presidential
succession.
succession.
Throughout
Throughoutthetheentire
entire
process,
process,
friction
friction
between
between
the moderate
the moderate
sec- sec-
tors
tors and
andmore
moreintransigent
intransigent
groups
groups
werewere
sharp.
sharp.
TheseThese
strained
strained
rela- rela-
tions
tions culminated
culminatedinin
thethe
decision
decision
of moderate
of moderate
PDS Congressional
PDS Congressional
leaders
leadersto
toabandon
abandonthe
the
party
party
to help
to help
create
create
the Liberal
the Liberal
Front,Front,
and to and to
vote for Tancredo Neves.

d) Unification of the opposition political parties around the

idea of direct elections (January to April 1984).
After the 1979 party reform, the opposition parties frequently
had difficulties in creating alliances against the regime. The regime

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 165

had promoted party reform as a method to divide the opposition, and

this strategy proved successful to a significant extent. After the merg-
er of the PP and PMDB in January 1982, in most states there was es-
sentially a return to a bipartisan system. However, in the campaigns
for the 1982 elections in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and
Rio Grande do Sul, where competition among opposition parties
was sharp, these parties campaigned against each other as much as
they did against the regime. In Rio Grande, these divisions were suf-
ficiently sharp for the PDS to win the election. As a result of the No-
vember 1982 elections the government lost its majority in the lower
house of the legislature (Chamber of Deputies) but managed to ally
itself with the conservative PTB in order to push through some im-
portant measures. At a local level, disputes between the various op-
position parties were an ongoing part of the political process, espe-
cially regarding leadership positions in unions and social
movements. At a national level, despite the relatively limited popular
support of their parties, both Leonel Brizola (President of the PDT
and Governor of Rio de Janeiro) and Lula (President of the PT) re-
mained important political figures.
The campaign for direct elections overrode these party disputes
and served to unite the opposition parties. Symbolically, this was visi-
ble in the moments when Lula, Brizola, Tancredo, and Ulysses
Guimaraes (leader of the center-left faction of the PMDB) joined
hands together. Only the PTB, a small conservative opposition party
with almost no penetration into social movements, failed to partici-
pate in the campaign for direct elections.
This unity of the opposition parties was an important compo-
nent in the success of the campaign for direct elections. It helped
generate the perception of a national consensus on the issue - a fact
supported by surveys which showed that, by early 1984, over 80% of
the population wanted the chance to vote for president (Soares,
1984: 60). The virtual unanimity of the opposition also denied the
government a legitimate interlocutor upon whom it could rely.
After the Amendment for Direct Elections was defeated on April
25, this unity of the opposition parties dissolved. Aware that it had a
good chance of winning in the electoral college, the PMDB became
less convinced of the need to have a direct election. When Ulysses
Guimaraes decided to renounce his own presidential pretensions in
favor of Tancredo Neves, the PMDB thrust all its energies into the ef-
forts to win in the electoral college. The PDT was ambivalent about
the indirect elections. It eventually decided to support Neves over

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166 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Maluf,
Maluf, while,
while,atatthe
the
same
sametime,
time,
Brizola
Brizola
attempted
attempted
to convince
to convince
Neves Neves
to
to shorten
shortenhis
hismandate
mandate to to
twotwo
years
years
and and
thenthen
call direct
call direct
elections.
elections.
The
The PTB,
PTB,who
whohadhadsupported
supported indirect
indirect
elections
elections
all along,
all along,
also voted
also voted
for Neves. The indirect election created an immediate crisis for the
PT After internal debate, the party decided to abstain; it then ex-
pelled the three Congressional members who voted for Neves, lead-
ing to important defections from the party.

e) Unity between opposition parties and social movements

(January to April 1984).
During the second half of the 1970's, a broad spectrum of social
movements provided some of the greatest opposition to the military
regime. Labor unions, peasant unions, Catholic base communities,
neighborhood associations, women's groups, human rights organi-
zations, ecology groups, and others worked towards constructing a
more democratic order.
Many observers expected these social movements to continue
to play an important, even dominant, role in the struggle for democ-
racy. In fact, many social movements declined after 1980. The rea-
sons were many, but among them was the fact that often there was
competition, rather than cooperation, between social movements
and political parties. Many leaders of social movements chose to run
for public office in the 1982 elections, leading to enervation of their
respective movements. With few exceptions, the movements opted
for autonomy in the 1982 elections, i.e., not supporting any particular
party. The campaigns attracted so much attention that movements
frequently ended up in a subordinate position.'3
The weak response of social movements to the November 1981
"electoral package," which the regime imposed in an attempt to en-
hance its electoral prospects'for the following year, already indicated
significant distance between movements and parties. This distance
was confirmed in the aftermath of the elections. Many such move-
ments had expected that the election of opposition governors, espe-
cially in Rio and Sao Paulo, would increase their own influence. They
were subsequently disappointed when the new administrations
failed to be as responsive to movement demands as they had
hoped.14
This gap between social movements and opposition parties nar-
rowed during the campaign for direct elections. The social move-
ments mobilized people to participate in the demonstrations. While
the primary responsibility for success of the campaign must go to the

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 167

opposition
opposition parties,
parties,
socialsocial
movements
movements
played anplayed
important
an important
secon- secon-
dary role.
This relative unity between social movements and opposition
parties eroded in the months following the defeat of the Amendment
of Direct Elections. Many movement leaders, following the general
line of the PT, were committed to holding direct elections. They felt
that the PMDB went too far in playing by the rules and did too little
to mobilize the population toward forcing the regime to give in on
this issue. Especially in the months immediately following January
15 when the new Cabinet was being discussed, the social movements
were discouraged by the conservative cast of the new government.

f) Effective leadership in the opposition, particularly

around the figure of Tancredo Neves (April 1984 to January
1985).
Neves was able to do something that perhaps no other opposi-
tion figure could: win the support of significant parts of the left,
center-left, and much of the center-right, while proving acceptable to
the military. Support of part of the left and center- left was indispensa-
ble in making possible an alliance between the PMDB and PDT, as
well as part of the PT, during his campaign. Support of the center-
right, which included mostly PDS people who defected to the Liber-
al Front, was necessary for his electoral victory. Finally, the fact that
Neves proved acceptable to the majority of military leaders avoided
an authoritarian objection or complication. A more progressive lead-
er (Brizola or Ulysses Guimaraes) might have induced a military
veto.

For years, Tancredo Neves had been an outstanding leader in

the moderate opposition. With the party reform of 1979-80, he be
came president of the center-right Popular Party (PP). In June 198
he suggested that the political parties come up with the next pres
dent. This idea of finding a "consensus candidate," to be coordinat
by President Figueiredo, met significant resistance among progres
sive opposition figures. Indeed, prior to 1984, Neves was not popul
with the more progressive opposition leaders. This situation
changed in 1984 when it appeared that his candidacy might be th
only way to defeat the regime.
Neves' well-established history as a moderate, flexible politi-
cian accounts for the fact that he proved acceptable to so many se
tors of the society. Tancredo ran a campaign of wide appeal, yet on
which did not make the kind of radical commitments that migh

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168 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

have
have provoked
provokedaamilitary
militaryveto.
veto.For
Forexample,
example, hishis
campaign
campaignempha-
empha-
sized
sized "an
"an atmosphere
atmosphereofofchange,"
change," but
butat at
thethe
same
same
timetime
he assured
he assured
the the
military
military that
thatthere
therewould
wouldbebenono
persecution
persecution
of of
military
military
leaders.
leaders.
While
While
promising
promising institutional
institutionalchanges
changeswhich
whichwould
wouldfurther
further
thethe
cause
cause
of of
democracy,
democracy, Neves
Nevesalso
alsomade
madeclear
clear
hehe
was
was
notnot
talking
talking
about
about
major
major
socio-economic
socio-economicchange.
change.
While
While it
it is
is important
importanttotoemphasize
emphasizeTancredo's
Tancredo's
role
role
in the
in the
period
period
which
which began
beganApril
April25,1984,
25,1984,hehenever
neverplayed
played
a central
a central
rolerole
in the
in the
mo-mo-
bilization
bilization for
forthe
thedirect
directelections.
elections.
According
According
to to
some
some
reports,
reports,
Tancredo
Tancredo never
neverbelieved
believedthat
thatthe
the
campaign
campaign would
wouldbe be
successful.
successful.
His His
personal
personal political
politicalstyle
stylewas
wasbetter
bettersuited
suitedto to
behind-the-scenes
behind-the-scenes
nego-nego-
tiations
tiations with
withpolitical
politicaland
andmilitary
militaryelites
elites
than
thanto to
mobilization
mobilization
of the
of the
masses.
masses. Furthermore,
Furthermore,heherealized
realizedthat
that hishis
ownownprospects
prospects
would
would
be be
enhanced
enhanced bybyindirect
indirectelections.
elections.

NOTES ON THE EROSION OF THE REGIME, 1983-1985

THE EROSION OF REGIME POWER during its last year and a half
was the result of a combination of legitimation problems, which
were fundamentally structural, and of government choices. For the
most part, the regime handled the transition with unusual political
perspicacity, avoiding the precipitous decline in legitimacy and in-
crease in political mobilization which usually accompany transitions
in the wake of regime collapse. It would be misleading to suggest
that the regime suffered a direct, steady decline in legitimacy after
1974. Its level of support followed a pattern somewhat akin to that of
the abertura as a whole; periods of decline, followed by other peri-
ods during which the regime renewed its appeal on the basis of its
initiatives. Yet the pattern of gradual decline is clear. The government
party, ARENA, won 50.5% of the votes for federal deputies in 1966,
48.4% in 1970, 40.9% in 1974, and 40.0% in 1978; its successor, the
PDS, won only 36.7% in 1982 (Soares, 1984: 51-52).
The difficulty that contemporary Western authoritarian regimes
have in developing formulas for legitimacy which are effective over
the long term has already been noted. In Brazil, this difficulty be-
came more acute the longer the regime was in power. It became easi-
er for the opposition to denounce the authoritarian measures still
being employed. At the same time, it became increasingly difficult
to justify these measures. There was no opposition in sight, since that
would be "disloyal" to the regime, and it became increasingly evi-
dent that most of the society yearned for a return to democracy. Be-
tween 1974 and 1985 the regime attempted to find new legitimacy

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 169

formulas as electoral politics became more central. Yet it could not

win elections without resorting to vast manipulation of electoral
laws. These casuismos, to use the Brazilian lexicon, kept the govern-
ment in power, yet, along with other authoritarian measures, they
clearly prevented the government from regaining legitimacy
through its attempts to restore democracy.
These casuismoswere profoundly ambivalent in their effects. In
the short run, they helped the regime retain power, but their long
term efficacy was dubious, for they were instituted in authoritarian
fashion and had an anti-democratic intent. Geisel closed Congress to
impose the April 1977 electoral package, which created "bionic"
senators (one-third of the Senate), elected indirectly to assure an
ARENA victory. In December 1979, in another blatant measure, the
government dissolved the MDB to enhance its own electoral pros-
pects, using party reform to divide the opposition. Two years later,
the November 1981 package also contained flagrantly manipulative
measures, such as imposing a straight party vote and not allowing
party identification on the ballots. All these measures provided the
opposition with ammunition with which to attack the regime's au-
thoritarian character. The government was moving towards demo-
cratic rule in its attempts to regain legitimacy, but this very move only
served to expose its authoritarian character the more. By the early
1980's, electoral manipulation seemed to have a limited future. The
question was not whether the regime would be able to perpetuate it-
self in power ad infinitum, via electoral manipulation; rather, it was
what would be the outcome for the regime if the system were to be-
come more democratic. The adverse impact of the casuismos and
other such measures became so apparent that, by early 1984, even
some leading figures in the regime (notably Aureliano Chaves) de-
cided to support direct elections for president.
By 1983, the economic crisis combined with a wave of corrup-
tion scandals to shrivel public confidence in the regime even further.
When the military took power in 1964, the armed forces had used the
twin issues of economic crisis and corruption to justify the overthrow
of Goulart. When the same problems erupted during the Figueiredo
administration, they rebounded against it. After basing their claim to
legitimacy on the principle of efficiency, the regime's credibility was
severely undermined by the severity of the domestic economic prob-
lems, and they appeared lame in attributing the cause to internation-
al factors beyond their control. The international conjuncture cer-
tainly contributed to the crisis - but this did little to convince most

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170 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Brazilians
Braziliansthat
thatthe
theregime
regime
was
was
efficient,
efficient,
given
given
the the
indications
indications
to theto the
contrary.
The economy entered deep, prolonged recession in 1980, but it
was not until after the November 1982 elections that the severity of
the debt crisis became apparent. After having denied the need to do
so, the government announced, immediately after the elections, that
it would resort to IMF loans and accept its stabilization program.
This action represented a political defeat for the regime, since it in-
volved making concessions to a foreign institution. Worse, the stabi-
lization program exacerbated the economic crisis.
Never before in Brazilian history had the economy suffered
through such a deep recession or such a high inflation rate. Between
1980 and 1984, per capital income fell approximately 15%. By 1983,
the inflation rate was well over 200% per annum. Meanwhile, the for-
eign debt increased from $6.6-billion in 1971 to approximately $100-
billion by 1984. It became apparent that some of the 1970's growth
had been purchased at the price of an increasing external debt
(Tavares and David, 1982; Lessa, 1983). Under other circumstances,
the economic crisis could have led to an authoritarian stance hence,
more rigid but, given the "tired" nature of the Brazilian regime by
1983, and the deep desire on the part of a divided society to restore
democracy, the opposite occurred. A series of disclosures of massive
fraud, embezzlement, and corruption within enterprises linked to
the armed forces darkened the regime's public image further.
Even though the gradual erosion of regime legitimacy was
clearly visible, the regime's displacement from power inJanuary 1985
was not inevitable. In retrospect, there may well be a temptation to
read backwards into the events of October 1983 to October 1984 the
unavoidable demise of an old regime in extremis Nevertheless, a
balanced analysis would have to emphasize both the strengths, as
well as the vulnerabilities, of the Brazilian regime in 1983. Consider-
ing everything it had experienced and the length of the abertura,
the Brazilian regime's capacity to remain in power while promoting
political liberalization stands out as exceptional.
While the slow decline in legitimacy set the stage for the more
rapid erosion of 1983-84, it was choices by both the regime and the
opposition which ultimately determined the latter's victory - and the
return to democracy - in January 1985. If the regime had played its
cards better, or if the opposition had played its cards worse, the for-
mer could have won the January 1985 election. In this sense, political
choice and leadership played a decisive role in enabling the transi-
tion to take place when it did.

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 171

Perhaps
Perhaps most
most
significant
significant
in this regard
in this
wasregard
Presidentwas Presid
Figueiredo's
Figueiredo's refusal
refusal
to support
to support
Aureliano Aureliano
Chaves as his Chaves
successor.as
If his succe
the
thePresident
Presidenthad done
had so,done
it is so,
likely
it that
is likely
Aureliano
thatwould
Aureliano
have won would ha
both
boththethe
PDSPDS
convention
convention
and the andJanuarytheelection.
January At one
election.
point, At one p
Figueiredo
Figueiredo considered
considered
holdingholding
primary elections
primary within
elections
the party
within
as the p
aa means
means of of
determining
determining
the candidate.
the candidate.
If this had happened,
If this had
every-happened, e
thing
thing indicates
indicates
that Chaves
that Chaves
would have
would
won. The
havePDS's
won.ultimate
The PDS's ul
choice,
choice, Maluf,
Maluf,
was by
wasfarby
thefar
worst
the
in terms
worst ofin
regime
terms
unity
ofand
regime
popu- unity and
lar support.
For the opposition, the most important choice was that of Neves
as the candidate to run against the PDS. As became clear during the
course of the campaign, Neves had an ability to placate the military
and to win support from former PDS leaders that probably no other
opposition candidate possessed. In this sense, the decision of pro-
gressive opposition leaders to accept Tancredo was an important
one. While this decision helped pave the way for the March 1985 tran-
sition, other factors, in particular the decisive voice of ex-regime sup-
porters and marginalization of the progressive sectors of the opposi-
tion, also marked the early days of the new democratic regime.

FROM ELITE-LED TRANSITION TO ELITIST DEMOCRACY

OCTOBER 1983 USHERED in a new period in the democrat

of Brazil, with characteristics which differed markedly from tho
the previous years of abertura. We could describe the 1974-82
as a "transition from above" and the 1983-85 period as a "tran
through withdrawal" (Mainwaring and Viola, 1985). The critica
ference between the two kinds of transition lies in the regime's a
ty to influence the transition (greater in transitions from abo
in the degree of discontinuity in the political process (lesser in
sitions from above).
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to overstate the exte
which the post- October 1983 period represented a rupture in t
litical process. Even though regimes which effect transitions t
withdrawal lack legitimacy and the support of civil society, th
retain enough power to impose some limits on the kind of tra
that takes place. This ability may erode over time - the political w
is always dynamic and fluid - but it is almost certain to mark the
years of democratic rule. In this sense, it is significant that
though it suffered a major legitimacy problem by late 1984, th
zilian regime did not collapse. Equally significant is the fact th
opposition, despite a considerable degree of unity among ma

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172 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

position
positionparties
partiesand
and
thethe
social
social
movements,
movements,
was incapable
was incapable
of over-
of over-
throwing
throwingthe
theregime.
regime.Only
Only
by by
allying
allying
withwith
significant
significant
and substantial
and substantial
parts
parts of
ofthe
theregime
regimewas
was
thethe
opposition
opposition
able able
to come
to come
to power.
to power.
With- With-
out
out creation
creationofofthe
the
Democratic
Democratic
Alliance,
Alliance,
a coalition
a coalition
composed
composed
of of
parts
parts of
ofthe
thePMDB,
PMDB,the
the
PFLPFL
(Partido
(Partido
do Frente
do Frente
Liberal)
Liberal)
and the
andPDS,
the PDS,
the
the opposition
oppositioncould
could
not
not
have
have
wonwon
the the
19851985
election.
election.
This means
This means
that
that the
theleft
lefthas
hasbeen
been
excluded,
excluded,
while
while
the the
center-right,
center-right,
and even
andparts
even parts
of
of the
the right,
right,have
have been
been included.
included. ThisThis
alignment
alignmentof forces
of forces
becamebecame
clear
clear in
inthe
thenaming
naming ofofthethe
Cabinet.
Cabinet. Progressive
Progressive sectors
sectors
of theofPMDB
the PMDB
complained
complainedofofcontinuismo,
continuismo, i.e. i.e.
a basic
a basic
continuity
continuityin policies
in policies
despitedespite
the
the changes
changesininnames
names andand
faces.15
faces.15 TheThe
PDT PDTand PTandcomplained
PT complained
also also
even
even though
thoughthethelatter
latter waswas
embroiled
embroiled in internal
in internal
disputes
disputes
severesevere
enough
enoughto tothreaten
threaten itsits
very
very
existence.
existence.
Several
Several
current
current
cabinet
cabinet
minis-minis-
ters
ters held
heldpositions
positionsofof power
powerduring
duringthe the
military
military
regime,regime,
and one
and(the
one (the
Minister
Ministerof ofCommunications)
Communications) remains
remainsin thein PDS.
the PDS.
Although
Althoughpost-October
post-October 1983
1983 characteristics
characteristics differ
differ
fromfrom
those those
of of
the
the preceding
precedingliberalization
liberalization period,
period,the the
Brazilian
Brazilian
transition
transition
is rela-is rela-
tively
tively cautious.
cautious.Even
Even before
beforeMarchMarch 15, 15,
1985,1985,
it wasit apparent
was apparent
that that
major
major changes
changeswould
wouldbe be
confined
confined
to political
to political
institutions,
institutions,
while while
there
there would
wouldbebeminimal
minimalchange
change
in the
in the
socio-economic
socio-economic
order.order.
The The
elitist
elitist negotiations
negotiationsbetween
betweenthethe
PMDB,
PMDB,the Democratic
the Democratic
Front,Front,
the the
Democratic
DemocraticAlliance,
Alliance,
andand
thethe
Armed
ArmedForces
Forces
systematically
systematically
excluded
excluded
popular
popularparticipation.
participation.Considering
Consideringthe the
length
length
of the
ofelite
the political
elite political
domination
dominationofofBrazil,
Brazil,this
this
fact
fact
is hardly
is hardly
earth-shaking,16
earth-shaking,16
yet, consider-
yet, consider-
ing
ing the
theimportant
important role
roleplayed
played
by by
the the
popular
popular
mobilizations
mobilizations
of earlyof early
1984
1984 to
toreverse
reverseauthoritarianism,
authoritarianism, the the
return
return
to politics
to politics
as usual
as has
usual has
been
been aa disappointment
disappointment to to
progressive
progressive
segments
segmentsof the ofsociety
the society
- in- - in-
cluding
cludingsectors
sectorsofofthe
the
PMDB.
PMDB.These
These
had had
already
already
been been
sharply
sharply
disap- disap-
pointed
pointedby byactions
actions ofof
thethe
Montoro
Montoroand and
Brizola
Brizola
state state
governments
governments
fol- fol-
lowing
lowingthetheNovember
November 1982
1982
elections,
elections,
and and
by early
by early
1985 it
1985
appeared
it appeared
likely
likely that
thatthis
thisdisappointment
disappointment would
would
be repeated.
be repeated.
The
The transition
transitiontooktook anan
unexpected
unexpected twist
twist
whenwhenTancredo
Tancredo
Neves Neves
died
died before
beforehehecould
could
assume
assume office.
office.
The The
new new
president,
president,
Jose Sarney,
Jose Sarney,
embodied
embodiedthe
thefragile
fragileside
side
of of
thethe
Brazilian
Brazilian
transition.
transition.
Until Until
June 1984,
June 1984,
Sarney
Sarneyhadhadbeen
beenpresident
presidentof of
thethe
PDS,PDS,
and,and,
alongalong
with with
his PDS
hiscol-
PDS col-
leagues,
leagues,had
hadhelped
helpedbury
burythethe
Amendment
Amendmentfor Direct
for Direct
Elections.
Elections.
The The
fact
fact that
thatan
anold
oldregime
regime
leader
leader
became
became
president
president
of the
ofNew
the Republic
New Republic
was
was revealing
revealingofofthe
the
compromises
compromises
made
made
to depose
to depose
the military
the military
regime.
The political world is subject to constant change as actors modi-
fy their identities or as new situations emerge. This is particularly

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 173

true of democratic regimes during their foundation periods when

the groundwork is being laid for the future. Possibilities for alliances,
for changing political culture, for transforming social structures, for
rewriting constitutions, are greater in these periods than subse-
quently. Above all, it is during foundation periods that political iden-
tities undergo their most significant changes, for it is then that the
leading actors define their relationship to the rest of the polity. For
this reason, the political legacy inherited by the new regime matters
a great deal.
Thus, it is not surprising that the painfully slow transition, in-
volving so many elements of continuity from the military, has left its
mark on the first year of the government. The limits imposed by a ne-
gotiated transition, which can occur only with the consent of signifi-
cant sectors of the previous regime, were immediately apparent in
Neves' cabinet selection. Despite his talents as a negotiator, he was
subjected to extraordinary pressure to respond to traditional
clientelistic demands. The PMDB (in itself highly heterogeneous),
the PFL, and sectors of the PDT all scrambled for cabinet positions.
All of the country's regions demanded their share of the pie. Political
motives replaced competence as main criteria for nominations. This
scenario can best be understood in reference to Brazil's "patrimoni-
al" heritage of a strong centralized state combined with the relative
weakness of its civil society. However, the nature of the transition
also contributed to this application of patronage to the state
democracy.
The new regime considered three far-reaching reforms in its
first year. It virtually killed two of them and watered down the third.
Recognizing the desperate plight of millions of Brazilian peasants
and the explosive rural situation, Tancredo Neves had announced
his intention to initiate agrarian reform. The first proposal, formulat-
ed by the Minister of Agrarian Reform and the head of the National
Institute for Agrarian Reform, was quite ambitious. Badgered by the
rural elite and the military ministers, Sarney killed this proposal and
offered an alternative sufficiently diluted that the head of the Rural
Society of Sao Paulo grudgingly conceded that the measure wasn't
bad as agrarian reform programs went. Despite peasant protest, the
president failed to follow through with the initial proposal.
The Minister of Labor, Almir Pazzianoto, an ex-labor lawyer for
the combative metallurgical unions in the industrial region just
south of Sao Paulo, proposed major changes in the country's long-
standing corporatist labor laws. His proposal fared no better than that

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174 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

of his
his counterpart
counterpartatatthe
theMinistry
Ministry ofof
Agrarian
Agrarian
Reform,
Reform,
prompting
prompting
himhim
to remark,
remark, in
inNovember
November1985,
1985,that
that
the
thegovernment
government
waswas
likelike
John
John
the the
Baptist
Baptist in
in that
thatititannounces
announcesgreat
greatchanges,
changes,
butbut
does
does
notnot
putput
them
them
into
into effect.
effect.
The
The third
third potentially
potentiallyfar-reaching
far-reachingreform,
reform, a new
a newConstitution,
Constitution,
will
will become
become aareality,
reality,but
butunder
underconditions
conditions
designed
designed to limit
to limit
thethe
ex- ex-
tent
tent of
of changes.
changes.The
Thenew
newconstitution
constitution
will
will
be be
written
writtenby by
thethe
Con-
Con-
gress
gress after
after the
theelections
electionsofofNovember
November1986
1986
rather
rather
than
than
by by
an autono-
an autono-
mous
mous Constituent
ConstituentAssembly.
Assembly.The
Thenew
new
Congress
Congress
will
will
still
still
include
include
individuals
individuals elected
electedunder
underthe
theauthoritarian
authoritarian regime's
regime'selectoral
electorallegisla-
legisla-
tion,
tion, which
which severely
severelyunder-represents
under-represents thethe
modern,
modern, liberal
liberal
partsparts
of of
the country.
country. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,progressive
progressive forces
forcesareare
placing
placing
consider-
consider-
able
able hope
hope in
in the
theprospects
prospectsofofa anew
new constitution,
constitution, although
although thetheresults
results
are likely
likely toto be
bedisappointing
disappointingunless
unless thethe
November
November 19861986
elections
elections
bring
bring big
big surprises.
surprises.AsAsprogressive
progressive measures
measures getget
deleted,
deleted,other
othersigns
signs
of continuity
continuityremain.
remain.One
Onesuch
suchsign
signis is
the
the
president
president himself,
himself, who,who,
until
until mid-1984,
mid-1984,was wasan
anoutstanding
outstanding civilian
civilian
leader
leader
in in
thetheold old
regime.
regime.
Less
Less visible,
visible, but
butperhaps
perhapsmore
moreimportant,
important,
given
given
thethe
president's
president's
limit-
limit-
ed political
political base,
base,isisthe
thepresence
presenceofof
sixsix
ministers
ministers
carried
carried
over
over
from
from
the military
military regime,
regime,a anumber
numberprobably
probably unmatched
unmatched by by
anyany
other
other
democratic
democratic regime
regimeininthe theworld.
world.Sarney
Sarney frequently
frequently
seeks
seeks
thethe
council
council
of these
these military
militaryministers,
ministers,who,
who,inin
turn,
turn,
seek
seek
to to
influence
influence
thethe
presi-
presi-
dent.
dent. They
They helped
helpedtorpedo
torpedothe
theagrarian
agrarian
reform
reform
andand
thethe
newnew
labor
labor
law;
law; they
they also
alsoinsisted,
insisted,successfully,
successfully,that
that
members
members of of
thethe
armed
armed
forc-
forc-
es not
not be
be tried
triedfor
forpast
pastcrimes,
crimes,whether
whether torture
torture
or or
graft.
graft.
In addition,
In addition,
they
they blocked
blocked an
anamnesty
amnestywhich
whichwould
wouldhave
have
restored
restored
thethe
rights
rights
of of
2600
2600 military
militaryofficers
officersdismissed
dismissedfor
for
political
political
reasons
reasons
during
during
thethe
mili-
mili-
tary regime.17
In the Brazilian case, there are reasons to be skeptical about the
advantages of a conservative transition, despite it being the only tran-
sition possible at that time. The many concessions Neves made to the
center-right, and the marginalization of the left wing of the PMDB,
suggest that the government will be reluctant to redress the egre-
gious income distribution, extreme regional inequalities, and many
social injustices which plague Brazilian society.'8 While addressing
these problems is not critical to the stability of the democratic re-
gime, failure to do so will surely be decisive in determining the qual-
ity of democracy. The elitist nature of the political bargains which led
Neves to power do not augur well for a more participatory regime.
Are there any challenges to this new listless democracy which
is emerging from the old, tired regime? Yes - but they are overshad-
owed by the continuity that characterized the transition. Perhaps the

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 175

most
mostimportant
importantchallenge
challenge
comescomes
from the
from Workers
the Workers
Party, a left-of-
Party, a left-of-
center
centerparty
partywith
with
a diffuse
a diffuse
ideology
ideology
and demands
and demands
consideredconsidered
mod- mod-
erate
eratebybycomparative
comparativestandards.
standards.
One ofOne
its major
of itsbanners,
major for
banners,
exam- for exam-
ple,
ple,giving
givingworkers
workers
the the
rightright
to organize
to organize
internal internal
factory factory
commissions,
commissions, waswas
conquered
conquered
by the
byArgentine
the Argentine
labor movement
labor movement
in in
the
the1940s.
1940s.Judging
Judging
by the
by election
the election
results results
of November
of November
1985, the PT's
1985, the PT's
popularity
popularity is is
growing
growing enough
enough
that itthat
coulditstimulate
could stimulate
changes inchanges
the in the
political
politicalsystem.
system. TheThe
left-of-center
left-of-center
(though(though
less so) PDT,
less headed
so) PDT,by headed by
Lionel
LionelBrizola,
Brizola, is also
is also
on the
on move.
the move.
Finally,Finally,
althoughalthough
the wide amal-
the wide amal-
gam
gamof ofsocial
socialmovements
movements have have
now become
now become
somewhat somewhat
isolated, po-
isolated, po-
litically,
litically,their
theirproliferation
proliferation
duringduring
the lastthe
decade
lastindicates
decade aindicates
latent a latent
capacity
capacityfor
for
strengthening
strengthening
of civil
ofsociety
civil society
vis-a-vis vis-a-vis
the state. the state.
The
Themost
mostencouraging
encouraging step step
takentaken
by theby newthe
democracy
new democracy
is that is that
it
it has
hasrespected
respected traditional
traditional
civil liberties,
civil liberties,
despite adespite
history aofhistory
contin- of contin-
ued
uedrepression
repression in many
in many ruralrural
areas. areas.
Furthermore,
Furthermore,
the high level
the high
of level of
continuity
continuity during
during and and
subsequent
subsequent
to the totransition
the transition
means thatmeans the that the
right
rightisisengaged
engagedin, in,
rather
rather
than outside
than outside
of, democratic
of, democratic
politics, a fact
politics, a fact
that
thatmight
mightaugur
augurwellwell
for the
forstability
the stability
of the new
of the
regime.
newSignificant
regime. Significant
changes
changesinin Brazil's
Brazil'sprofoundly
profoundlyelitist elitist
politicalpolitical
culture, orculture,
measures or measures
which
whichaddress
addressthethe
egregious
egregious
povertypoverty
that afflicts
that tens
afflicts
of millions
tens of of millions of
people
peopleinin what
what hashas
become
become
one of one
theof Third
theWorld's
Third richest
World's econo-
richest econo-
mies,
mies,still
still
have
havenotnotappeared
appeared
on theon horizon.
the horizon.

NOTES

1. In the Brazilian case, it is necessary to note one important caPeat.

Most of one small, but politically important, opposition party, the leftist PT
(Partido dos Trabalhadoresor Workers' Party), decided to boycott theJanu-
ary 15 election on the grounds that it was not truly democratic since it was
indirect. Thus, within Brazil there is not absolute consensus that the new
government should be considered democratic. The existence of some sig-
nificant legacies from the authoritarian period, such as the National Securi-
ty Law (albeit revised in 1983) and the authoritarian Constitution, contrib-
ute to this argument. Without detracting from the importance of these
observations, I would argue that the change in power marked the establish-
ment of a democratic regime.
2. In recent years, the subject of transitions to democracy has assumed
considerable importance. Among the most important works are O'Donnell,
Schmitter and Whitehead, forthcoming; Rustow, 1970; O'Donnell, 1979a
and 1979b; Herz, 1982, and Levine, 1973.
3. For a key speech by Geisel, announcing his intention to promote a
slow, gradual, and safe "decompression, see Opiniao (1974).
4. For a discussion of the liberal and authoritarian tendencies within
the armed forces, see Schneider (1971). For a good discussion of the whole

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176 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

period,
period,see
seeMoreira
MoreiraAlves
Alves
(forthcoming);
(forthcoming);
while an
while
important
an important
overview of
overview of
the
the 1964-77
1964-77years
years
is given
is given
by Flynn
by Flynn
(1979: (1979:
308-515).
308-515).
5.
5. This
Thissection
sectionowes
owes
a great
a great
deal deal
to discussions
to discussions
with Donald
withShare,
Donald Share,
with
withwhom
whomI address
I address
thisthis
question
question
in Mainwaring
in Mainwaring
and Share
and(forthcom-
Share (forthcom-
ing).
ing).For
Forimportant
importantinterpretations
interpretations
of why
ofthe
whyregime
the began
regimeto began
open up,
tosee
open up, see
Lamounier
Lamounierand andde de
Souza,
Souza,
1981;1981;
and Santos,
and Santos,
1978. 1978.
6.
6. On
Onthetheparty
partysystem
systemduring
during
the militaryperiod,
the militaryperiod,
seeJenksseeJenks
(1979) and(1979) and
Fleischer
Fleischer(1984b).
(1984b).TheThe
relative
relative
resiliency
resiliency
of democratic
of democratic
institutions
institutions
in Bra- in Bra-
zil
zil isisalso
alsohighlighted
highlighted in an
inexcellent
an excellent
articlearticle
by Trindade
by Trindade
(1985). (1985).
7.
7. This
Thiscontinuity
continuity in democratic
in democratic discourse
discourse
and institutions,
and institutions,
and the and the
parallel
parallellack lackofof
institutionalization
institutionalization by anbyauthoritarian
an authoritarian
regime was regime
noted was
by noted by
Linz
Linz(1973).
(1973).
8.
8. An
Anexpanded
expanded version
versionof the
of speech
the speech
was published
was published
in the book
in the
by book by
Golbery
Golberydede Couto
Coutoe Silva
e Silva
(1981).
(1981).
9.
9. For
Foran anexcellent
excellent discussion
discussionof the
ofmilitary,
the military,
see Stepansee (forthcom-
Stepan (forthcom-
ing);
ing);asaswellwellas as
de de
Goes
Goes
and and
de Camargo
de Camargo(1984:125-171);
(1984:125-171);
and Dreifuss
and and
Dreifuss and
Soares
SoaresDulci
Dulci(1983).
(1983).
10.
10. Although
Although it it
focuses
focuses
uponupon
the European
the European
cases (Spain,
cases Portugal,
(Spain, Portugal,
and and
Greece),
Greece),thethe
influential
influentialworkwork
of Nicos
of Nicos
Poulantzas
Poulantzas
(1976) adopted
(1976) this
adopted
per- this per-
spective.
spective.For
For
a critique
a critique
of the
of "economistic"
the "economistic"
understanding
understanding
of the abertura
of the abertura
and,
and,more
moregenerally,
generally,
of political
of political
life, see
life,
thesee
article
the by
article
Wanderley
by Wanderley
Guilherme
Guilhermedosdos
Santos
Santos
(1980)
(1980)
in dados
in dados
11.
11. This
Thissection
section
owes
owes
a great
a great
deal to
deal
discussions
to discussions
with Eduardo
with Eduardo
Viola; Viola;
our
our view
viewofofthe
the
Brazilian
Brazilian
abertura
abertura
is summarized
is summarized
in Mainwaring
in Mainwaring
and Viola and Viola
(1985).
(1985).
12.
12. For
Forexcellent
excellentdiscussions
discussions
of the
ofregime's
the regime's
strategy
strategy
during these
during these
years,
years,seeseeMoises,
Moises,1982b;
1982b;
and and
also Velasco
also Velasco
e Cruz eand
Cruz
Estevam
and Estevam
Martins Martins
(1983).
13. The relationship between social movement and political parties is
an important, though relatively understudied, subject which I address in
Mainwaring, 1985.
14. For an important evalution of the opposition governments, see the
various articles in Novos Estudos CEBRAP (1984), which is put out by the
Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planeiamento.
15. An interesting example is Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who helped
to write the platform of the PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrdtico
Brasileiro). In early 1985, Mangabeira Unger published a series of 12 arti-
cles in the Folha de Sao Paolo, criticizing the direction the PMDB had
taken.
16. An excellent recent discussion of Brazil's elitist political culture is
given by O'Donnell, 1984; and see Faoro (1958) for the historical formation
of these patterns. Important contributions are also made by Weffort (1984)
and Da Matta (1979).
17. Information on the military is derived from an oral presentation of
Alfred Stepan, which he delivered at the meeting of the working group on
"Dilemmas and Opportunities in the Consolidation of Democracy," which
was held in Sao Paolo, 16-17 December, 1985.

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 MAINWARING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 177

18.
18. Brazil
Brazilhas
hasone
oneofofthe
the
most
most
skewed
skewed
distributions
distributions
of income
of income
in thein the
world.
world. In
In1981
1981the
thewealthiest
wealthiest10%
10%
of the
of the
population
population
accounted
accounted
for 50.6%
for 50.6%
of of
total
total national
nationalincome
income (World
(WorldBank,
Bank,
1983).
1983).

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