This is the Fifth Edition of the Overarching Insights and Best Practices Paper on “Joint

Operations.” It is written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7
and released by the J7 Deputy Director for Joint Training.
Fifth Edition: November 2017

Scope:
1st- The paper is the overarching insights and best practices paper from the DTD.
2nd- It shares executive insights that are more fully covered in our functionally-based focus
papers; in current editions, in-progress revisions, or under-development new papers.
Table of Contents:
1.0 Executive Summary ....................................................................................................1
2.0 Global Integration ......................................................................................................4
3.0 Risk .............................................................................................................................5
4.0 Mission Command ......................................................................................................6
5.0 Authorities...................................................................................................................7
6.0 Interorganizational Cooperation .................................................................................8
7.0 GCC C2 Organizational Options ................................................................................9
8.0 Forming a JTF HQ ....................................................................................................12
9.0 JTF C2 and Organization ..........................................................................................13
10.0 Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm ..................15
11.0 Information Sharing ..................................................................................................17
12.0 Chief of Staff Roles and Functions at Joint Headquarters ........................................18
13.0 Command Senior Enlisted Leader ............................................................................19
14.0 Design and Planning .................................................................................................20
15.0 Assessment ................................................................................................................22
16.0 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) .....................................23
17.0 Intelligence ................................................................................................................24
18.0 Targeting ...................................................................................................................26
19.0 Joint Operations in the Cyberspace Domain .............................................................27
20.0 Communication Strategy and Synchronization .......................................................29
21.0 Sustainment ...............................................................................................................30

Terminology and Acronyms: Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are
used in this paper. They are defined in the glossary to increase readability for the intended
readership. We assume the reader has basic understanding of military terminology.
POC: Mr. Mike Findlay – DTD Email: [email protected]
Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, Joint Training
116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
Accessibility: This and other insight and best practice papers can be accessed on the internet
at the Joint Electronic Library site: http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers.aspx.
Disclaimer: The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense (DOD), or the United
States Government (USG).
Releasability: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
 PREFACE
This paper is our executive level insights and best practices paper on joint operations. It provides
insights useful to joint headquarters on topics such as mission command, authorities, Combatant
Command organizational options, design and planning, assessment, forming a JTF HQ, and the
role of a Chief of Staff. We capture these insights directly from the joint warfighters.
This paper may be beneficial to three main audiences:
• Joint operators as they enhance the readiness of their formations.
• Service partners that work in the joint environment.
• The education, doctrine, and concept community.
Four key insights are continually reinforced throughout the paper:
• Importance of trust and relationships. Relationships and mutual trust remain critical to the
concept of interdependence and effectiveness. Be inclusive versus exclusive with both
military and non-military partners.
• Value of commander-centric operations and mission command and its three attributes of
trust, understanding, and intent / empowerment to release the initiative of subordinates and
attain the necessary agility and adaptability necessary in today's environment.
• Importance of setting conditions for subordinates by operating within a comprehensive
whole of government approach, instilling an inclusive trust-based atmosphere and sharing
understanding of the situation, problem, and risk with stakeholders and partners, anticipating
requirements and prioritizing scarce resources, establishing clear command relationships,
providing mission type orders with intent and risk guidance, empowering subordinates, and
providing open channels for feedback.
• The important role of the staff in supporting commander timely decisionmaking,
subordinates, and sharing information with higher and adjacent mission partners.
Many of the topics in this paper are more fully addressed in our evolving base of 16 functionally­
based Focus Papers. The Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Division (DTD) gains insights on
operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant and operational level
commanders and staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations and exercises. The DTD
incorporates these insights in functionally-based focus papers, refines them through senior flag
officer feedback, and then shares them with the operational force, with joint lessons learned,
doctrine, and future concepts communities, and in senior leader education forums.
All of these unclassified papers are found on the publicly-available web site depicted on the
following page.
Please share your thoughts, solutions, and best practices as you think, plan, and work your way
through operational challenges to DTD's POC, COL (Ret) Mike Findlay.

�-1=N1/t?
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Director, Joint Training
Joint Staff J7
The figure below is a screen shot of the Joint Electronic Library web site depicting DTD Insights
and Best Practices papers (http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers.aspx). This web site is
publicly available.

There is a functionally-oriented paper for every section in this executive level document with the
exception of global integration, risk, information sharing, and cyberspace (and these are all being
considered). Please note that these insights are continually evolving. Most insights in this paper
come directly from the respective focus paper.

ii
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The military The nation is in the midst of the most
dimension of conflict remains a clash between volatile and complex security
hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each environment since World War II. CJCS
trying to dominate the other through violence or the
threat of violence. Enemies are continuing to search for, find, and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities in
peace, activities short of traditional conflict, and in war. Today’s conflicts remain rooted in the
human dimension like those before, and defy full understanding and scientifically derived
prediction and solution sets. Our leaders realize this; their insights are in this paper.
Our military has significantly evolved over the past 17 years as we have adapted to an
increasingly complex environment in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Europe, Africa, the Pacific, the
Korea peninsula, as well as supporting civil authorities in the United States. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has addressed this uncertain environment by emphasizing its transregional,
multifunctional, and multidomain characteristics, and highlighted the requirements for greater
global integration to meet today’s challenges.
Overarching Insights:
1) Importance of trust and relationships. Personal relationships and mutual trust remain
critical to the concept of interdependence and effectiveness. Personal relationships are
essential and together with trust, are the foundation for successful operations in the joint,
interagency, and multinational world. Be inclusive versus exclusive with both military and
non-military partners. Transparency with partners is a means to earn trust.
 Interdependence and Synergy. We fight as one team with our joint, interagency, and
multinational partners. Fighting as one team is not just a slogan; we depend on each
other to succeed in today’s complex environment - we call this interdependence. Access
to the unique capabilities or authorities possessed by our partners is often essential to
mission accomplishment. Some may view interdependence with our partners as a risk
since we may need to depend on capabilities that we do not necessarily command and
control. Gaining synergy and harmony with USG agencies and multinational partners can
be more challenging than with our joint partners since there may be no clear authority
directing command relationships. However, a joint force commander (JFC) can establish
an atmosphere of trust and transparency, identify and focus on shared goals, and
deliberately craft task organization and command relationships to increase harmony and
mitigate risks associated with interdependence. Some key insights:
 Continue to reinforce the value of gaining synergy and harmony with other USG
agencies, international partners, and the joint force based on shared goals.
 Develop strong personal relationships and the requisite trust and transparency to have
a broad understanding of each other’s perspectives and objectives. Some leaders use
terms like “HANDCON” and “WARCON.”
 Set conditions for success by establishing clear command relationships, particularly
supported/supporting command relationships between components of the joint and
coalition force. Foster and develop coordination and collaboration measures to
achieve unity of effort with our interagency partners.
 Recognize that you don’t need to own your partners’ assets to leverage their
capabilities if you have developed the requisite personal and command relationships.
 Inclusiveness: We have observed numerous best practices in the area of inclusiveness
with our interagency and multinational partners – our mission partners:

1
  Inclusiveness in understanding the complex environment and the problem. The
environment is more than a military battlefield; it’s a human-based network that is
beyond a military-only ability to fully understand, visualize, and influence. We need
to understand and consider the many perspectives of external stakeholders to perform
well in this environment.
 Inclusiveness in design, planning, and execution. The best plans and operations are
those fully integrated with the other elements of national and international power –
from the very beginning of design.
 Inclusiveness in assessment. External stakeholders have unique perspectives and
expertise and together they help build a more enriched overall assessment. Including
their perspectives and equities from the beginning in assessment, estimates, and
planning allow for a more complete understanding of the nature of the problem and
how to possibly solve it.
2) Value of commander-centric operations and mission command and its three attributes of
trust, understanding, and intent / empowerment to release the initiative of subordinates and
retain the necessary agility and adaptability necessary in today’s environment.
 The commander’s role - applying the Art of War - in this complex environment is
essential. Without exception, we find that commander-centric organizations outperform
staff-centric organizations – they maintain a bias for action. Clear commander’s guidance
and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience, instinct, and intuition are
ingredients found in high-performing units. Insights for commanders:
 Commander’s vision, guidance and intent provide clarity in a dynamic, ambiguous
environment. Mission-type orders are the key to success.
 Rely on your instinct and intuition while recognizing and leveraging the value of the
staff to assist in understanding a complex environment.
 Focus on unity of effort, not unity of command. Recognize the reality of different
capabilities, perspectives, and goals of your partners. Strive to arrive at a set of
common desired outcomes to promote unity of effort.
 Build a command climate and organizational capability that fosters inclusion with
your joint, interagency, and multinational partners in planning and operations.
 Decentralize and empower where appropriate to enable agility and speed of action
while recognizing that there are occasions where centralized control is necessary.
Instill the importance of disciplined initiative by subordinates. Understand that
different Services and Coalition forces may “fight” their capabilities differently based
on their philosophies, processes, and people.
 Too much organizational, personnel, and process structure in a headquarters can
impede information sharing and decision-making. Lean headquarters tend to be more
agile, have a bias for action, stay in their lane at the tactical, operational, or strategic
level, and continually assess the situation to retain focus on mission accomplishment.
 Commanders who work with their staffs and receive the benefit of their analysis
reach better solutions in less time.
 Mission Command: Our observations clearly reinforce the importance of commanders’
guidance and intent, applying their experience, instinct and intuition. Insights:
 Mission-type orders that lay out the “what” versus the “how” continue to be
important in today’s environment. Mission-type orders provide subordinates the
requisite latitude to adapt to fluid situations within risk guidance while providing

2
 senior leaders the decision space to engage with national leadership and mission
partners.
 Broad latitude for subordinates is essential; guard against the temptation to attempt to
scientifically model outcomes and centrally control operations.
 We have seen that successful commanders exercise mission command by building
personal relationships, coaching and mentoring, inspiring trust and confidence,
leveraging the ability of their staffs, prioritizing limited resources, empowering
disciplined initiative of their subordinates, and instilling an atmosphere of command
and feedback (versus an emphasis on control).
 There are some mission areas in which positive control of operations is required:
defense support of civil authorities where financial accounting of expenditures must
be directly tied to official requests and nuclear command and control.
3) Set conditions for subordinates by operating within a comprehensive whole of government
approach, instilling an inclusive trust-based atmosphere and sharing understanding of the
situation, problem, and risk with stakeholders and partners, anticipating requirements and
prioritizing scarce resources, establishing clear command relationships, providing mission
type orders with intent and risk guidance, empowering subordinates, and providing open
channels for feedback. Insights:
 Dialogue with national leadership to understand, frame, and reframe the problem. Assist
in clarification of national strategic objectives, risk, policy, strategic narratives, and
development of feasible military options within a comprehensive whole of government
approach.
 Senior leaders have an important role in providing Best Military Advice (BMA) as part of
setting conditions. Consider including risk, assumptions, priorities, and options in BMA.
Identify feasible options, but also recommend which option you think is best suited. Take
care to protect your integrity, credibility, trust, and non-partisan stance. Keep BMA
within the chain of command. Be discreet and provide BMA in writing.
 Stay at the appropriate level to focus on setting conditions for subordinates’ success, i.e.,
the theater-strategic level for Combatant Commands and operational level for JTFs.
 Integrate military actions as part of a comprehensive, whole of government, and coalition
approach to achieve strategic objectives while accounting for the potentially different
goals, authorities, and the capacity limitations of us and our partners.
4) Role of the staff in supporting commander’s decision making, supporting subordinates, and
sharing information with higher HQs, stakeholders, and mission partners. Insights:
 HQ form follows function. Review both HQ organization and staff processes to enhance
their support to commander decision-making. The Chief of Staff must drive and
discipline both the HQ organization and processes.
 HQs support more than the Commander. They also support and enable subordinates, and
are an important information conduit to higher HQs and mission partners. Commanders
and Chiefs of Staff must emphasize this, lest the staffs become singularly focused and
forget their responsibilities to the larger team.
 Ruthlessly limit HQ growth. Stay focused on providing agile and adaptable support to the
commander. Do not allow growth or complex processes to impede support.

3
2.0 GLOBAL INTEGRATION.1
Two broad observations:
 First, future conflict will likely be transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional. This
is a marked shift from the more regionally-focused conflicts in the past. Our adversaries are
opportunistic; tomorrow’s conflicts may quickly escalate across geographic boundaries,
domains, and functions; we are moving away from a strictly regional orientation.
 Second, our approach to the military dimension of conflict has traditionally been either at
peace or at conflict. This approach is changing to deal with actors that seek to advance their
interests while avoiding our strengths by competing asymmetrically short of traditional
conflict.
Challenges:
 Changing the paradigm of visualizing and fighting from a Geographic Combatant Command
regional orientation to a broader more balanced global and regional perspective. Our
adversaries will likely take advantage of any regional conflict by pursuing opportunities
elsewhere; we must expand our competitive space geographically, domain-wise, and
functionally. We have already started acting globally; consider the global perspective of the
CJCS, SecDef, and POTUS, increased cross-CCMD coordination, and increased importance
of the Functional Combatant Commands. We are starting to integrate cyber and space into
what was previously a land, maritime, and air domain fight.
 This change from a regionally-oriented paradigm has implications for how the Joint Staff is
organized. The Joint Staff has traditionally been closely aligned to the geographic AOR
boundaries in reporting, analysis, and recommendations. It is evolving to better synthesize
regional perspectives to a global view and develop recommendations to help senior leaders.
 The ability to anticipate, plan, and integrate operations globally during crisis and
contingencies to support POTUS, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR decisions at the pace of the
challenge. Agility and adaptability are critical in today’s age.
 Recognizing, anticipating, communicating, and mitigating risk to our interests from
adversaries’ activities short of traditional conflict – the gray area in which they often thrive.
Insights:
 Recognize the role of the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the Services to help “set the globe”
in force management, force readiness, and force movement by providing a global perspective
on risk, assumptions, priorities, and options to inform SecDef decision making and set the
conditions for CCMDs.
 Enhance the agility and adaptability of the global framework to enable the Secretary of
Defense to anticipate and make timely decisions at the speed of the problem.
 Continue the cooperation and collaboration among combatant commanders, sustain and
codify supported and supporting relationships, and be prepared for ruthless prioritization to
defend our national interests, including designation of a main and supporting efforts, and
economy of force roles.
 Anticipate and acquire necessary authorities and permissions to gain comparative advantage
across the military dimension, particularly in areas short of traditional conflict.

1
A focus paper is currently being considered for this topic. A good discussion of this is in JP 5-0.

4
3.0 RISK.2 The concept of risk is integral to design, Risk: Probability and severity of
planning, assessment, execution, and command. loss linked to hazards JP 5-0
Commanders at all levels are increasingly
focusing on three areas of risk – risk to
what, risk from what, and duration of risk.
They also address the temporal aspect to
risk by considering both current and future
risk to balance mitigation of current risk
with potential future risk. The CJCS
Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk
Analysis addresses this construct of “risk
to what” and “risk from what” (see figure).
We find an increased recognition of the
need for planning agility and adaptability
with regard to risk framing and mitigation. Commanders “In broad terms, Commanders own
are tempering the traditional heavy emphasis (and staff risk to force, political leaders own risk
size) oriented on detailed planning recognizing that it to mission. But at the end of the day –
may be counterproductive to overthink what is inherently risk is shared.” -Senior Flag Officer
complex and uncertain. They are emphasizing more “Risk to force’ and ‘risk to
timely assessment and adaptation to better respond to mission’ assessment by the
unforeseen changes in the environment. This starts to get at the executing commander often fall
“why” for some of our earlier key insights: importance of short of satisfying the
commander-centricity and smaller staffs – to increase agility information requirement and
and adaptability of HQs. concerns of the national level
leadership” -Senior Flag Officer
Challenges:
 Linking operational-level risk and mitigation to strategic risks to our national interests. Lack
of action could lead to escalation or destabilization, engagement may lead to counter-action
or unforeseen second order effects, while too much or too little commitment could risk
strategic or operational failure. [Consider recent tactical events that have had a CNN effect.]
 Desensitization of a perception of risk over time and resultant decrease in mitigation efforts.
Insights: Protection -- Joint Function:
 Frame risk over time “to what, from what, and duration” – Preservation of the effectiveness
and share your understanding up, down, and across. and survivability of mission-
 Having authority to do something does not mean that the related military and nonmilitary
risk is not shared. What may appear to be operational or personnel, equipment, facilities,
tactical-level risk may have strategic implications; over- information, and infrastructure
deployed or located within or
communicate and socialize potential risks with superiors.
outside the boundaries of a given
 Provide decision makers an honest assessment of the costs operational area. DOD
and potential consequences; operate within a command
and feedback philosophy versus command and control. [discussed in next section]
 Retain a J36-like staff section focused on protection in the HQ and leverage a force
protection working group to focus on mitigating risk to force. Recent lesson: ensure unity of
command for base security; specify who is responsible for each base and empower them.

2
We do not have a focus paper on risk. We may develop a risk-centric paper in the future.

5
4.0 MISSION COMMAND. Mission command has clear Definition: The conduct of military
utility as a command philosophy for most operations. The operations through decentralized
three attributes of mission command: trust, understanding, execution based on mission-type
and intent release the disciplined initiative of subordinates orders. JP 3-0
to operate at the speed of the problem while providing
senior leaders the decision space necessary to better set conditions. Mission command coupled
with an instilled sense of interdependence with partners achieves complementary versus additive
employment of capabilities to achieve synergy. “Mission Command enables speed,
Challenges: agility, and decisiveness at the
 Understanding the diverse perspectives, national interests, tactical level while providing the
authorities, capabilities, and policies of partners. necessary decision space at the
 Sharing the continually changing context within a higher level for the up and out
dynamic environment and crafting clear guidance and engagement to anticipate and set
intent to allow for empowerment and decentralization. conditions.” - Senior Flag Officer
 Operating within a pervasive information environment
that affects the tempo of operations, decision making, and real-time visibility of tactical
actions in the global media, coupled with the potential for severely degraded communication
systems that may prevent sharing of understanding.
 A false sense of needing to centralize decision-making to reduce risk – resulting in preventing
subordinates from taking advantage of chaos and opportunities at the speed of the problem.
Building trust and gaining shared understanding: Our joint commanders frequently highlight
the large number of mission partners with whom they work to build trust, share understanding,
and achieve unified action. They also note that senior leaders’ viewpoints and policies change as
they interact and learn. Building and maintaining trust, fostering dialogue and feedback, and
gaining shared understanding with many mission partners imposes significant time demands on
commanders and staffs at combatant commands and JTFs. This focus on relationships may be
greater than expected for those whose previous experience was at the tactical level, however, this
enables empowerment, harmony, and effectiveness.
Commander’s intent and empowering subordinates to act: Commanders are responsible to
provide quality guidance and intent to subordinates. This starts with insightful dialogue to inform
and be informed by national and international leadership. Guidance and intent (including risk
guidance) enables mission command, especially in a complex, fast paced and unpredictable
world. Commanders must share both context and their intent to successfully empower
disciplined initiative in their subordinates to operate at the speed of the problem.
Role of the support(ed/ing) command relationship and the establishing authority: The
support command relationship provides access to capabilities and reinforces horizontally-focused
interdependence. We find that the Establishing Authority is critical to success in their provision
of priorities, allocation of resources, and risk guidance. The Support Command Relationship
(COMREL) allows the Supported Commander to leverage the many capabilities from other
commanders and partners to be more effective.
Insights:
 Build and maintain trust and relationships. Empower and decentralize to enable initiative.
 Reach out to gain and share understanding. Instill an atmosphere for open feedback.
 Make time for strategic reflection in development of guidance and intent.
 Leverage the benefits of interdependence and multi-domain synergy.
 Plan for communication-degraded environments. Leverage mission-type orders and intent.
6
5.0 AUTHORITIES. The term “authorities” is commonly used by commanders and their staffs
but is not defined in doctrine. “Authorities” has multiple dictionary definitions encompassing
concepts such as power, permission, right, and ability. Authority emanates from many different
sources, including law, regulation, and policy while the sources of authority affecting military
operations continue to increase in both number and complexity. Additionally, a whole of
government approach to current operational challenges includes a still broader field of authorities
that cross many traditional boundaries. The network of authorities significant to the commander
expands yet again in the planning and execution of multinational operations where gaps and
seams exist between differing national priorities and societal norms. Gaining unity of effort with
partner nations, non-DOD agencies, international bodies, and nongovernmental organizations
requires an understanding of the authorities enabling and limiting the capabilities of all of these
groups.
Subordinates and mission partners are empowered when they understand the authorities that
support and guide their decisions and actions. Therefore, achieving a common and shared
understanding of authorities vertically across echelons of command and horizontally across
mission partners is key to the successful execution of mission command.
Legal, interagency, interorganizational, and policy advisors play an important role in identifying,
developing, and requesting mission essential authorities in support of military operations. They
are active participants in the design and planning process and operate within the commander’s
decision cycle. These advisors attend battle rhythm events, work as part of operational planning
teams, assist in developing plans and orders, and provide assistance and advice in areas well
beyond the confines of traditional Title 10 activities. Finding the right advisors to inject this
knowledge early in the design and planning effort is a key challenge.
The joint force Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) has a pivotal role in assisting the operational
planners to anticipate, understand, and pursue necessary authorities. Joint force commanders rely
heavily on their legal advisors for accurate, timely advice concerning authorities and limitations
that impact planning and execution. Their recommendations also help shape the commander’s
guidance and intent.
Insights:
 Recognize and leverage the many sources of mission essential authorities.
 Leverage mission partner capability and authority with a whole of government approach.
 Develop a shared and common understanding of authorities through horizontal and vertical
dialogue and translation.
 Delegate authority, as appropriate, to speed decision-making. Communicate clear guidance
and intent to minimize risk associated with delegation of authority.
 Anticipate and request mission essential authorities early in design and planning.
 Include internal and external policy and authority subject matter experts in planning.

7
6.0 INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION. Diplomatic, informational, and economic
factors affect national security in today’s
Unity of Effort: Coordination and cooperation
complex environment. We have observed toward common objectives, even if the participants
numerous best practices, all centered on a are not necessarily part of the same command or
whole of government(s) approach and an organization, which is the product of successful
atmosphere of inclusiveness, in how unified action.
operational commanders and our mission Unified Action: The synchronization, coordination,
partners work together to achieve and/or integration of the activities of governmental
objectives. This inclusiveness includes and nongovernmental entities with military operations
collaboration with international to achieve unity of effort.
organizations, nongovernmental Interagency Coordination: Within the context of
organizations, and the private sector in a DOD involvement, the coordination that occurs
between elements of the DOD and participating U.S.
broad comprehensive approach, bringing
government departments and agencies, for the
together all elements of national and purpose of achieving an objective.
international power to achieve strategic Interorganizational Cooperation: The interaction
objectives. that occurs among elements of the DOD; participating
Challenges: USG departments and agencies; state, territorial,
 Interorganizational cooperation is not local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and
as easy as one would like it to be. government agencies; international organizations;
nongovernmental organizations; and the private
There will rarely be pure “unity of
sector. Joint Pub 1-02
command” with one single authority
and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Achieving true “unity of effort” is difficult.
 Mission partners frequently do not have the funding, number of personnel, or the capacity of
DOD, particularly at the operational level. Interoperability of systems can be difficult.
 There is also the simple friction of working together with the different cultures of other
agencies and organizations. Their perspectives on a situation and possible solutions can be
different than our own. DOD may not be in the lead; other agencies use different planning
and decision-making processes than do military commands. We must be able to understand
and work within these other organizational cultures.
Many organizations recognize the value of the energy expended to better harmonize efforts
towards shared goals. Including other agencies and external stakeholders allows better shared
understanding of the situation and the broader problem (beyond a military-only perspective), and
helps lead to more sound solutions.
Insights:
 Personal relationships are key to coordination and unity of effort.
 Focus on common goals and objectives to attain unified action.
 Thinking “C5” (Command, Control, Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration) is more
conducive to gaining unity of effort than military terms like “Command and Control.”
 Think inclusion vs exclusion with stakeholders during planning, execution, and assessment.
 Understand the different roles, authorities, missions, culture, and processes of stakeholders.
 Maintain continuous effort to keep the coordination and execution with the numerous
stakeholders on track.
 Don’t overclassify. Recognize and mitigate classification and information sharing challenges.
 Retain effective relationships and coordination with lead federal agencies to gain situational
awareness of other stakeholders.

8
7.0 GCC C2 ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS. Senior leaders are charged with rapidly
responding to regional and transregional threats across a dynamic geo-political landscape where
the problem and mission partner interests, roles, and approaches are continually evolving. Within
this resource-constrained and complex landscape, commanders and staffs must anticipate and
determine effective and sustainable command and control (C2) constructs that add value to the
joint forces conducting the mission, can leverage other mission partners, while remaining agile
and adaptable to mission
requirements.
The figure depicts several CCMD-
level C2 organizational options and
examples. C2 and determination of
the most suitable option remain
“commanders’ business.”
Upfront.
 Spend time up-front anticipating
and determining viable and
sustainable C2 options. Consider
all options and their advantages
and disadvantages; don’t
immediately default to one
option. Design the C2 to
minimize unnecessary subsequent organizational changes, changes that can disrupt burned-in
C2 arrangements. However, change C2 if and when necessary. Adapting C2 with the least
amount of change permits more corporate-level focus on the enemy, problem, and mission.
The staff can help here; think C2 early on during planning and in assessments.
 Apply six proven considerations - effectiveness, responsiveness, readiness, agility,
simplicity, and efficiency - in determining the appropriate organizational option and HQ.
 Consider if and how an option will add value to the operation; it should be able to set
conditions for success by anticipating and supporting the subordinates’ requirements,
integrate force capabilities and actions, and provide decision space for the CCDR to interact
with national decision makers and focus on the broader AOR.
 Remember the larger team and how effective command relationships (including the support
command relationship) can bring their capabilities to bear in support of the supported HQ.
 Define the role and authorities of the respective HQ relative to its higher HQ, its adjacent
HQs, and its subordinates. Define its role and authorities with relevant USEMBs, with the
GCC’s other organizations (i.e., TSOC, Service and Functional organizations), and with
other supporting organizations (i.e., CYBERCOM and Combat Support Agencies).
 Avoid the tendency to form large HQs; they are not sustainable. Recognize the CCMD’s role
in reducing unnecessary burden on subordinates by minimizing reporting requirements, battle
rhythm events, and RFIs. Over-staffed HQs are often hobbled by their sheer size in sharing
understanding and purpose, lack a bias for action, have challenges communicating and
delegating authority, and develop extensive and often convoluted staff processes in an
attempt to achieve perfection. Guard against this tendency; focus on output and a bias for
action, and leverage reach-back to other capabilities versus building large HQs.

9
Challenges: POTUS
NSS
 Understanding: As crises occur, GCCs are CJCS / JS
OSD USG Agencies

challenged by gaining an appreciation of the International

Service HQs USEMBs Organizations
situation, informing and being informed by the
CCMDs CCMD Host
dynamic political and policy decisions, providing CSAs
Coalition
Forces Nation

a range of military options to national leadership

(providing what is deemed “best military advice”), Service JTF Functional Theater
Components Components SOC
and sharing with subordinates their understanding, Unified Action Stakeholders
visualization of the problem, and operational approach
(all key aspects of design). Understanding the situation includes understanding the adversary
and the many stakeholders, perspectives, roles, interests and interrelationships (See figures).
Understanding has a temporal component; as a crisis continues and our understanding of the
problem or requirement deepens, there may be a corresponding change in how we view
feasible C2 options.
 Strategic direction and interaction:
Senior leaders tell us that the intensity
of the strategic demand signal from
the POTUS, NSC, SecDef, CJCS, and
JS in real world operations can
consume a large part of a GCC’s
available bandwidth. Recognize this in
the development of C2 constructs and
empower subordinate commands to conduct operational level mission assignments so that the
CCDR and staff can have the decision space to successfully inform and be informed by
national leadership’s pursuit and implementation of viable options.
 Determining options: GCCs are challenged with anticipating and determining a viable C2
structure that accomplishes a specific mission while retaining agility to plan and execute other
ongoing and emergent AOR-wide missions. Effectiveness, responsiveness, agility, and
simplicity are important considerations. While the GCCs will attempt to determine and develop
the likely C2 structure in their theater campaign and contingency planning forums, they must
determine (or verify) the desired option during crisis action. They must clearly define HQ
roles, authorities, and responsibilities. They must determine when and how much authority to
delegate to subordinate commanders, direct specific command relationships, assess risk, and
prioritize efforts and support across the AOR. Furthermore, they make key decisions as part of
design and planning, including determining the operational approach, required forces and
operational areas. In addition, they adapt their HQ organization and processes (e.g., battle
rhythm).
 Retaining a Theater-Strategic focus: In the early stage, a crisis will tend to draw much of a
GCC’s attention away from its broader AOR responsibilities. The CCMD HQ and its
Components should be able to accommodate this early focus on the crisis while remaining
attentive to continuing AOR-wide mission sets. Any C2 organizational option must allow for
this initial natural tendency to focus on the crisis at hand while supporting a longer term,
conditions-based return to steady-state AOR-wide operations.

10
Insights:
 C2: While we advocate “Get your C2 right up-front”, we find that C2 and COMRELs
(command relationships) will continue to evolve throughout the life cycle of a JTF. A key
consideration is getting initial C2 right to allow for subsequent flexibility and adaptability. In
determining C2 it is important to understand the dynamic nature of:
‐ The USG role relative to the international (and as appropriate - host nation) response.
‐ The US military role (and GCC mission) relative to the USG whole of government approach.
‐ The GCC role relative to other DOD organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and CSAs)
‐ Ongoing and anticipated AOR-wide missions and resources.
 The CCMD role: The CCMD may retain certain authorities and functions such as target
development or validation authorities based on the mission and initial capability limitations of
subordinate HQs due to manning or experience. This is a common practice but often
overlooked during crisis. Codify specifics in CCMD establishing directives/orders.
 Plan for C2: Anticipate transitions and potential future C2 constructs to retain agility and
avoid “shooting behind the duck” in the C2 construct. Consider all C2 options as part of COA
development, analysis, and recommendation. Ensure Operational Planning Teams (OPTs)
address this during both deliberate and crisis action planning. The C2 construct should also be
periodically reviewed during both execution and transition planning.
 Command Relationships: Time spent up-front determining the most appropriate COMRELs
that clearly lay out the roles and authorities of the various HQs will pay dividends during
execution and transition to subsequent phases. Establishing clear command relationships at
successive echelons helps ensure synergy and achieve unity of effort. Establishing directives
should provide further delineation of OPCON, TACON, and Support Command relationship
specific authorities and limitations.
 Global Integration: Any C2 option must account for the TMM nature of operations. Today’s
“battle space” is larger than any single AOR. Transregional challenges span GCC regional
boundaries. The traditionally solid black lines that define the AORs are much more dotted than
solid. The SecDef supported by the CJCS and the Joint Staff integrates multiple CCMD efforts
to address these challenges. We find key enablers to global integration include some form of
global common operational picture (COP), the ability to provide a global risk assessment, a
dynamic prioritization and allocation process, and a collaboration means for rapid sharing of
awareness.
 Interagency and Multinational implications: We’ve seen the value and challenges of a
whole-of-government(s) approach in advancing national interests as the military works by,
with, and through many mission partners and stakeholders. Our joint force routinely operates
in support of U.S. Ambassadors and Lead Federal Agencies. We recognize the power of
multinational operations; however, we have also seen the challenges of coordination,
synchronization, and information sharing with our interagency and multinational partners. C2
options need to operate within this construct. Direct and resource a capable coalition network.
 Training and Exercise Implications: This edition highlights the utility of exercises which:
‐ Replicate the complexity and ambiguity of the TMM environment.
‐ Operate within resource constraints.
‐ Stress interaction with SecDef, CJCS, and the JS.
‐ Demand agility, adaptability and coordination with mission partners.
‐ Provide feedback on efficacy and effectiveness of potential C2 options and HQ readiness.

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8.0 FORMING A JTF HQ. CCDRs may respond to crises by directing and employing forces
from their CCMD or subordinate HQs, by activating a JTF HQ, or a combination of these
options. A JTF HQ provides a CCDR the benefit of a HQ focused on a single but potentially
complex problem set, and the ability to closely integrate capabilities, assigned and allocated
forces, and coordinate with other joint, coalition, and interagency partners. JTFs help free up
decision space for the CCDR to engage up and out with national decision makers and partners to
better focus on the broader theater activities.
CCMDs can stand up a JTF and the HQ from assigned forces or request support via the Global
Force Management (GFM) process. In-theater HQs can often respond quickly; GFM solutions
will be slower. There can be significant sourcing, manning, training, and equipping challenges in
standing up a JTF HQ, especially in today’s resource-constrained environment.
The establishment of a JTF changes the Theater C2 construct and affects how the CCDR
exercises command and control and impacts how the Components operate. Any change in C2 is
significant, and if not understood can cause confusion and lack of synergy across the AOR.
Simplicity and unity of command, or at a minimum unity of effort, are essential for success.
CCMD-level Insights  Set the JTF up for success:
 Spend time up-front anticipating and determining feasible and sustainable theater C2
constructs. Minimize AOR-wide perturbations associated with continuous changes to C2.
 Establish and codify clear command relationships.
 Identify likely missions, sourcing options, expertise requirements, and readiness standards.
 Set the JTF up to operate as part of a broader coalition and USG interagency approach.
 Plan for transition from initial response HQs to follow-on entities.
 Share understanding of the problem, policy implications, intent, risks, and priorities.
 Assist (to include augment) the JTF HQ across the man, train, and equip spectrum.
CCMD Component and Theater SOC Insights Support the JTF:
 Anticipate some form of Supporting Command relationship with the JTF.
 Dispatch quality liaison teams to the JTF HQ to assist the HQ in understanding force
capabilities, other ongoing AOR activities, employment considerations, risks, and challenges.
 Support JTF HQ manning requirements as a bridging mechanism prior to JMD sourcing.
JTF HQ Insights Nest with CCDR intent and processes. Be a trusted team member:
 Prepare now; focus training on the most likely scenarios to increase readiness.
 Plan to operate as a coalition joint HQ together with USG interagency partners.
 Take the time prior to crises to develop trust-based relationships with mission partners and
stakeholders.
 Gain understanding of joint, coalition, and interagency perspectives, goals, authorities, and
capabilities to increase synergy and effectiveness of the broader team effort.
 Spend time understanding the political and policy aspects of the mission, and the CCDR’s
mission, intent, endstate, and processes to better define the JTF role and mission.
 Maintain a bias for action by developing a lean HQ organization, requesting necessary staff
expertise as necessary, leveraging an effective liaison network, and developing efficient staff
processes.
 Understand the range of joint enabling capabilities available to bring expertise to the HQ.
 Develop and gain approval of manning, training, and equipping plans.

12
9.0 JTF C2 AND ORGANIZATION. JTFs provide the means to closely integrate capabilities
and forces in the mission area. CCDRs often establish a JTF to focus on an emergent complex
mission set which provides freedom of action for the CCDR to continue AOR-wide focus and
shaping while also supporting the JTF.
JTFs plan and operate as one team with their joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational “In this age, I don’t care how tactically
partners. Each depends on the other to succeed in a or operationally brilliant you are, if
complex security environment. This is de facto you cannot create harmony - even
vicious harmony - on the battlefield
interdependence: the dependence on access (versus
based on trust across service lines,
ownership) to each other’s capabilities to succeed in across coalition and national lines, and
assigned tasks. This interdependence is a quantum across civilian/military lines, you need
mindset change from a vertical orientation - receiving to go home, because your leadership is
and accomplishing tasks directed by the higher obsolete. We have got to have officers
commander - to working more closely horizontally who can create harmony across all
with Joint and Service partners, and other US agency those lines.” - Senior Flag Officer
and multinational partners.
Insights:
 Gain and share understanding of how the JTF fits into the broader whole of governments,
transregional, CCMD, and multi-domain efforts. The JTF may lead the operation or be in a
supporting role. Anticipate and plan for extensive up and out dialogue/engagement to align
efforts. Request and leverage external assistance through the CCMD HQ.
 Build relationships and trust within
and external to the JTF. Transparency
and mutual trust are central to
interdependence and effective joint
operations. Credibility and trust
increase the JTF Commander’s
freedom of action in terms of mission
sets and delegated authorities.
 Anticipate C2 up-front to minimize unnecessary subsequent changes, changes that can
disrupt burned-in C2 arrangements. However, change C2 when necessary. Evolving C2 with
the least amount of change permits more corporate-level focus on the enemy, problem set,
and mission.
 Craft the task organization and battlespace geometry. The task organization will likely
include geographically-oriented forces (e.g., functional land component) and functional task
forces (e.g., special operations) that conduct assigned missions across the JOA. Battlespace
geometry provides the architecture for effective operations while COMRELs provide the
linkages that enable synergy.
 Codify COMRELs to achieve unity of command of the force and unity of effort with
partners.
 Understand and clarify the support command relationships and priorities of support with
external organizations: the CCMD components, other CCMDs, and CSAs. We’ve seen
confusion when these horizontal supported/supporting COMRELs and overarching
CCMD-level priorities of support are not clear. Request and leverage quality liaison
officers.

13
  Clarify your authority over OPCON or TACON forces with the CCMD and parent units in
terms of ADCON, tasking, positioning, prioritization, mission approval authorities, further
delegation of TACON or support command relationships, and force protection.
 Leverage the Support COMREL to achieve internal synergy. Condition and teach
subordinates to plan and execute within a trust-based, horizontally-focused framework of
access to others’ forces rather than requiring the ownership of the forces. Specify
supported commanders’ authorities and supporting commanders’ responsibilities.
Designate battlespace owners as Supported Commanders to empower them to achieve
unity of command in their operational areas. However, also empower certain functional
TFs as Supported Commanders for their specific missions. Direct priorities of effort so
subordinates can allocate efforts and resources between these geographic and functional
mission sets.
 Ensure clear responsibilities for force protection. C2 and force protection are interrelated.
Establish single commanders responsible for defense at each location and single
surface/ground force commanders for each operation. Clarify JTF authorities for use of
Theater response forces.
 Decentralize mission approval authorities to empower subordinates and key HQ leaders to
make decisions at the appropriate level to take advantage of fleeting opportunities and retain
the initiative.

14
10.0 JOINT HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION, STAFF INTEGRATION, AND
BATTLE RHYTHM. Without exception, we find that command-centric organizations
outperform staff-centric organizations. HQ organization, staff integration processes, and the
supporting battle rhythm directly affect quality of support to the commander and direction to
subordinates. Development and discipline of a HQ’s organization, its processes, and battle
rhythm are Commander, Chief of Staff (COS), and J-Director responsibilities.
Observations:
Over the past decade, our JFCs have increasingly integrated their operations with their
interorganizational and multinational partners as part of whole of government approaches across
the range of military operations. Growth in information technology and demands for real-time
information have also influenced the commanders’ decision-making processes as they apply both
art and science to understand the situation, identify the problem, plan, execute, and assess
operations.
Many commands have modified their HQ organization and processes to accommodate these
changes. In some cases, staff organizations have grown and processes have become more
complex. However, we find a continuing need to not allow HQ growth or complex processes to
impede agile and relevant support to the commander.
Many commands systematically review both organization and processes in terms of how
effectively they support the requirement to operate at the speed of the challenge. The COS,
Assistant COS, Director of Staff (in some HQ), the Secretariat of the Joint Staff section (SJS),
and Knowledge Management cell are instrumental in conducting these reviews.
Insights:
 Organizing. Not all joint HQ are the same. Mission requirements should drive required
capabilities, which in turn will drive organization, manning, and processes. The traditional J-
code structure remains the preferred organizing construct even though commanders will often
tailor the structure to their specific requirements. We find commanders focusing early on in
organizing the HQ, and getting key billet fills, subject matter experts, and external mission
partner representation that best support their decision-making and enable unified action.
 Staff Integration. Effective staff integration is achieved when functional expertise from across
the staff and from external mission partners is brought together in direct support of the
commander’s decision requirements. Thought-out interaction between J-codes, working
groups, operational planning teams, and decision boards leverage the analytical capability of
the entire staff and mission partners to support decision requirements. Use of staff integrating
elements (sometimes referred to as Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups
(B2C2WGs) and Operational Planning Teams (OPTs) makes staff coordination more routine,
facilitates monitoring, assessment and planning, and allows for the management of activities
across the three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans).
 Battle Rhythm. The battle rhythm provides the structure for managing the HQ’s most
important internal resource - the time of the commander and staff personnel - and integrates
commander decision making with mission partners. The HQ’s battle rhythm must not only
support decisions across the three event horizons, but also account for the battle rhythms of
higher and adjacent mission partners, all while enabling timely direction and guidance to
subordinate units. The logical arrangement of OPTs and B2C2WGs in support of each other
and commander decision-making is the mark of an effective HQ. Specifics:
 The COS should manage and enforce the battle rhythm, including vetting and
approving battle rhythm events through some form of a 7-minute drill.

15
 Identify the commander’s decision-making preferences and touch point requirements
to underpin the staff battle rhythm. Nest the battle rhythm with other HQs – both
higher headquarters (HHQ) and adjacent HQ, while best accommodating the needs of
subordinates. Key “anchor points” such as a SecDef VTC will drive the staff’s battle
rhythm.
 Ensure the staff battle rhythm has the flexibility to handle changes in mission
requirements and HHQ demands. However, ensure it has a structure and foundation
for staff and unit level interaction, planning and prioritization.
 Preserve white space for thinking/reflection, rest, exercise, crisis, and circulation.
 Tailor battle rhythm events to effectively and efficiently support all event horizons.
This will likely entail addressing more than one event horizon in a B2C2WG event.
 Identify key low-density staff areas and allocate them to key battle rhythm events.

16
11.0 INFORMATION SHARING.3 Sharing information and knowledge provides the common
understanding necessary to enable informed decision-making and execution. Two areas:
 Knowledge Management (KM) is a focus on organization and processes that directly support
commander decision-making. We stress the following:
 Supporting a commander-centric, mission command philosophy.
 Effectiveness and efficiency in staff processes to inform and support decision making.
 Information Management (IM) is the gaining, manipulating, and sharing of data and
information in support of the processes and across organizations.
KM is a Supported function and IM is a Supporting function. The KM Officer (KMO) supports
the COS responsibilities by recommending and overseeing structural and process aspects to
supporting Commander’s Decision making requirements and information flow to higher,
adjacent, and subordinate HQ. This includes ensuring the decision cycle (Battle Rhythm and
events) is properly aligned and focused on providing knowledge the commander and partners
need to make well-informed, timely decisions and execute operations. An IM Officer (IMO)
works in concert with the KMO to provide the necessary usable tools and rules to enable agile
information sharing and collaboration, both within the HQ and with external partners.
Challenges:
 Understanding and supporting decision making. Maintaining time for senior leader reflection,
circulation, and engagement, and staff work and collaboration in the battle rhythm.
 Aligning the KMO function correctly (under the COS) to ensure proper direction.
 Developing and disciplining use of simple tools for both information sharing and
collaboration – both for joint operations, but also with interagency and coalition partners.
 Writing for Release – staffs will default to over-classification unless this is enforced.
Insights:
 Instill a people-centric culture of sharing information. Gaining and sharing knowledge and
information is a behavior, not a tool or technology -- it is everyone’s business. Commanders
and staff must reach out to the many stakeholders, both within and external to their
headquarters to gain and share the knowledge necessary to make decisions.
 Be inclusive with mission partners to enrich shared understanding and enhance operational
effectiveness. This requires decisions and follow-through on necessary authorities, need to
know and write for release direction, liaison elements, system networks, tools, and training.
 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) communicate the needs of the
commander and can help focus staff efforts. If staffs do not understand what commanders
need, they will not optimally nor efficiently support the decision-making activities.
 The COS is the responsible entity for overseeing knowledge management in support of the
commander’s decision-making requirements.
 Assign the KMO under the COS or DCOS. Align the IMO under the J6.
 Define decision-making processes and inclusion requirements (e.g., coalition) before
determining information sharing rules, procedures, technical applications, and tools.
 Leverage both physical and virtual means to gain and share information with joint force,
interagency, and multinational partners. Continue with the basics, such as LNOs.
 Keep tools simple, such as “OneNote” for running estimates, the Portal, and a single
collaborative tool. Avoid using local drives as they impede sharing with partners.

3
A focus paper is currently being developed for this topic.

17
12.0 CHIEF OF STAFF ROLES AND FUNCTIONS AT JOINT HEADQUARTERS.
Today’s uncertain environment with the increased potential for a “fight tonight” has dramatically
changed the nature of combatant command, component, and even JTF HQs. These HQs have by
necessity increased their agility and bias for
“The COS is the commander’s most valuable
action to act at the speed of the challenges. player. He or she must have the right instincts
The role of the COS in these HQs has also and background, and accept being an inch deep
changed from somewhat of a manager of and a mile wide.” Combatant Commander
complex, bureaucratic processes to being a hands-on, tuned-in leader and synchronizer of a
complex HQ that agilely supports not only the commander’s decision requirements, but also
subordinate operational mission
“The Chief is a coach, directing the staff in order
requirements, mission partners, and higher
for the force to achieve the highest level of
headquarters’ information requests. battlefield harmony. Critical to taking advantage
We find that effective COS’s coach, mentor, of fleeting opportunities.” Combatant Commander
and lead the staff. The COS is also normally
empowered to make certain decisions to retain agility in decision making, such as in the areas of
targeting and messaging. Lastly, but very importantly, the COS is the staff integrator and
synchronizer to support the commander's decision-making requirements. This is achieved
through comprehensive understanding of the commander’s decision-making style, and the
development, management, prioritization, and synchronization of staff processes and efforts.
Challenges: Commanders and COS’s note the following common challenges.
 Ensuring common understanding within the staff on the roles and responsibilities of the key
leaders within the HQ - both within the command group and across the staff - to prevent
confusion, streamline operations, and improve overall effectiveness.
 The information environment. Today’s “The staff must be able to operate under degraded
24 hour news cycle and potential cyber communications or while its military planning and
intrusion challenges have the potential to execution model is being “whipsawed” by
disrupt efficient staff operations. newsworthy fact or fiction.” Combatant Commander
 Large HQs and complex processes that impede operating at the speed of the challenge.
 The daily grind of staff churn can consume a HQ. It is often difficult to find time to identify
opportunities to streamline or eliminate unnecessary or redundant requirements / processes.
 HQ can get drawn into the close fight or current operations. It takes discipline to anticipate
and proactively plan in the future plans and future operations arena. This includes
prioritization and discipline of staff efforts across these three time horizons.
 OPTEMPO can hinder maintaining transparent and inclusive relationships with interagency
and coalition partners, and between the core staff of the HQ and individual augmentees.
 Ensuring common understanding through knowledge and information management, and
developing and maintaining an agile, adaptive battle rhythm that supports steady state and
crisis requirements by the commander, mission partners, and higher decision makers.
Insights:
 Confer with the commander to discern preferred decision-making styles and venues, and
roles of key leaders and staff. Codify this in some form of a terms of reference document.
 Synchronize versus overcontrol staff efforts to inspire initiative and agility within the staff.
 Take the time to develop and manage the battle rhythm. Be flexible. Adapt to the situation.
 Prioritize staff efforts to ensure they are supporting the most important tasks.
 Control growth of the HQ. Lean HQ retain a bias for action. Your staff will want to grow.

18
13.0 COMMAND SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER. The Command Senior Enlisted Leader
(CSEL) is a key advisor and sounding board for the commander and the command. The CSEL
can also serve as a trusted observer of activities within the operational area on behalf of the
commander.
The traditional NCO role takes on increased importance in multi-service organizations, and is
further complicated when blended in a multinational force. NCO leadership in individual training
and readiness, quality of life issues, adherence to joint force policies, participating actively in
large-scale training exercises and mission rehearsals, and sustaining a warrior ethos through
Service cultures, is an essential force multiplier. Today’s CSELs are never off duty and their
responsibilities may extend beyond their own Service. Set against a backdrop of a complex and
rapidly changing global operational environment, today’s CSELs must appreciate the operational
and strategic problems that their commanders face.
Effective CSELs are joint and combined team builders and must possess political, social, and
strategic perspectives. They must also understand the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational (JIIM) environment; the effects of all instruments of national power—diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic (DIME)—as well as the political, military, economic,
social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) construct. A CSEL must have the ability to look
“up and out,” while simultaneously remaining focused “down and in.” CSELs anticipate and
adapt to surprise and uncertainty, recognize change, assist in transitions, and fully appreciate the
attributes of mission command—understanding, intent, and trust. CSELs make ethical decisions
based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms and think critically and strategically in
applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations in support of their
commanders’ decision cycles.
While design, planning, and operational art have largely been the exclusive realm of senior
commanders and their staff officers, a CSEL’s access, perspectives, and relationships have the
potential to significantly contribute to the commander’s assessment.
Insights:
 Effective CSELs possess an appreciation of the JIIM, DIME, and PMESII constructs.
 Understand combined and joint doctrine, C2 options, the value of relationship building, and
combined and interagency capabilities and cultures.
 Develop capacity and capability by focusing on personal and professional growth as well as
team building in a JIIM environment.
 Prepare early for eventual assignment as a JTF CSEL.
 CSELs assist the commander by providing a grounding in the “down and in” perspective of
the command while aware of the “up and out” implications of the commander’s decisions.
 CSELs must be prepared to operate beyond their conventional comfort zones—this is critical
to success as a joint CSEL.

19
14.0 DESIGN AND PLANNING.
Operational Design and Operational Art. The concept of operational design and operational
art have moved the joint force away from a planning-centric, checklist mentality to a more
commander-led, artful analysis of the environment, questioning of assumptions, focus on
framing (or reframing) the problem, identification of current and future risk, and the
development of an operational approach to guide subsequent planning. Key thoughts:
 The purpose of operational design and operational art is to produce an operational approach
that translates broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks to
produce an executable plan.
 Design is a cognitive process that centers on understanding the strategic direction and
guidance, the strategic environment (policies, diplomacy, and politics), and the Operational
Environment (OE). It ultimately serves to define the problem that joint planning must
address.
 Operational art is used
by commanders and
staffs to develop
strategies, campaigns,
and operations. The
application of
operational art focuses
on integrating and
linking ends, ways,
means, and risks to
organize and employ military forces and attain the desired endstate.
 Both of these efforts culminate in the development of an operational approach to resolve the
problem and corresponding guidance to focus planning efforts.
Planning. The Joint Planning Process (JPP) is a key to setting conditions for the success of
subordinates and unified action with mission partners. JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical
steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative Courses
of Action (COA); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. Key thoughts:
 Joint commands leverage the up-front design work to guide planning.
 Operational design and operational art do not replace planning, but planning is incomplete
without them.
 Planning is enhanced when planners stay in constant contact with the direction the
commander is taking through “touch points” – focused meetings, “huddles”, and decision
boards – to gain guidance or direction.
 Operating in three planning “event horizons” of Future Plans (FUPLANS), Future Operations
(FUOPS), and Current Operations (CUOPS) helps to maintain a balanced perspective in
setting conditions and facilitate the large number of planning efforts.
 The COS or the J3 leading the management of the large number of planning efforts in the
headquarters through a plans management board is a best practice.
 Commanders should include a discussion of current and future risk (to what, from what,
duration) in their interaction with DOD senior leaders in discrete, concrete terms that enable
and support decision making.

20
 The commander’s vision of how a campaign or operation should unfold drives decisions
regarding phasing. The “six phase” defined phasing model (Phase 0 through 5) has been
recently deleted
from joint doctrine,
however, the
concept of phasing
and its use is still
relevant and
recommended to
synchronize the
concept of
operations in time,
space, and purpose.
Insights:
 Commander-led understanding of the environment, identification of risks and the problem,
and development of an operational approach better focuses subsequent planning efforts.
 Gaining an understanding of the environment and identifying the problem requires
significant dialogue with senior leaders, mission partners, and stakeholders. Assist in
clarification of national strategic objectives, risk, policy decisions, messages, and
development of feasible military options within a whole of government approach.
 Commanders have an important role in providing Best Military Advice (BMA) as part of
dialogue with their senior leaders. Include risk, assumptions, priorities, and options in BMA.
Take care to protect your integrity, credibility, trust, and non-partisan stance. Keep BMA
within the chain of command; be discreet, and provide BMA in writing.
 Design actions generally consist of more dialogue, questioning, and critical and artful
thinking, whereas planning actions consist of more deliberate analytical thinking and detailed
production of plans and orders.
 Recognize the value of design and planning, their relationship, and how they continuously
feed each other. Getting design right is important to ensuring successful planning.
 The expression “failing to plan is planning to fail” may be true, but a commander must think
through how much planning is required and to what level of detail. In planning, it may be
counterproductive to overthink what is inherently complex and uncertain. A commander
should maintain a balance between proactive planning with that of timely adaptation to
unforeseen events as the OE changes and the adversary and competitors adapt.

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15.0 ASSESSMENT.
Assessment is a continuous activity that supports decision making by ascertaining progress
toward accomplishing a task, an objective, the mission, and attaining end state. Assessment helps
deepen understanding of the OE and informs commander’s intent and guidance for design,
planning, prioritization, and execution to make campaigns and operations more effective.
 Assessment enables adaptability and agility in HQs. It instills a bias for action, and focuses
the HQ on adapting to the situation rather than just executing a plan.
 Assessment informs decision-making by answering the assessment-essential questions:
Where are we? What happened? Why do we think it happened? So what? What are the
likely future opportunities and
risks? What do we need to do?
 Commander involvement in
assessment is essential; assessment
plans should focus on support to
commander decision making.
 Assessments are more effective
when echelons of command are
linked and subordinate
commanders are involved.
 Assessment process is optimized
and understanding of the OE is maximized when integrated: across the staff, with the
planning process, with the commander’s decision cycle, and with host nation, multinational,
interagency, private sector, and nongovernmental partners.
 Measures of performance (MOP) are indicators used to assess friendly actions tied to
measuring task accomplishment. Help answer the question, “Are we doing things right?” or
“Was the action taken?” or “Was the task completed to standard?”
 Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are indicators used to help measure a current system state,
with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the
achievement of objectives and attainment of end states. MOEs help answer the question,
“Are we doing the right things to create the effects or changes in the conditions of the OE
that we desire?”
Insights:
 Assessment development should begin during design and planning.
 Focus assessment effort to get beyond a measurement of “what happened” to the analysis that
answers “so what”, “what are future opportunities / risks”, and “what do we need to do.”
 Build in time and codify a process to do thorough and thoughtful analysis of data.
 Ensure military and nonmilitary subject matter experts validate conclusions.
 Balance of qualitative and quantitative assessments is essential to developing accurate
conclusions that are not skewed by too much data or too much conjecture.
 Use caution when seeking to quantify data related to social phenomena / human behavior.
 Use caution in establishing cause and effect. Recognize the risk in drawing erroneous
conclusions particularly in the case of human behavior, attitudes, and perception.
 State your degree of confidence in assessment conclusions and recommendations.

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16.0 COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (CCIRs).
CCIRs help focus information management and
help the commander assess the OE, validate (or
refute) assumptions, identify accomplishment
of intermediate objectives, and identify
decision points during operations. The
Commander and staff develop and update
CCIRs throughout the design, planning, and
execution process. CCIRs focus decision-
making information requirements. They can
also articulate information requirements critical
to addressing key assessment indicators,
required contingency preparations, deterrent
opportunities, and the critical vulnerabilities of
actors within the OE. Key thoughts:
 CCIRs at most operational level headquarters are developed to support two major activities;
understanding the environment and commander decision making.
 CCIRs at the operational level support assessment that deepens understanding of the OE and
problem, and inform planning guidance, hence increasing agility and adaptability of the HQ.
 CCIRs are often linked to branches and sequels in support of decision points.
 Commanders’ direct involvement in guiding CCIR development provides the necessary focus
for collection, analysis, and information flow management to support decision making.
 CCIRs help prioritize allocation of limited resources. CCIRs, coupled with operational
priorities, guide and prioritize employment of collection assets and analysis resources, and
assist in channeling the flow of information within, to, and from the headquarters.
Insights:
 CCIRs support commanders’ situational understanding and decision making at every echelon
of command. They help a HQ maintain a bias for action with the associated adaptability.
 A traditional, tactical view of CCIRs supporting time sensitive, prearranged decision
requirements is often too narrow to be effective at the operational level. Operational CCIRs,
if focused at specific subordinate-level events, have the potential to impede subordinate’s
decision making and agility.
 Consider CCIRs which capture an understanding of the OE or that direct collection, analysis,
and dissemination of information supporting assessment activities.
 Develop CCIRs during design and planning, not “on the JOC floor” during execution.
 A codified process to hand off CCIR and their management, from planners in FUPLANS or
FUOPS to current operations personnel optimizes situational understanding and commander
decision making during early phases of crisis operations while the plan is being developed.
 Differentiate between CCIRs and other information requirements like “wake-up criteria.”
 Answers to CCIR should provide understanding and knowledge, not simply data or isolated
bits of information. Providing context is important.
 CCIRs may change as the phases, mission, priorities, or operating environment change. Have
a process to periodically review and update CCIRs.

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17.0 INTELLIGENCE.4 Successful “The joint intelligence process provides the basis for
joint HQs instill an intelligence- common intelligence terminology and procedures. It
driven operational mindset to support consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence
agile decision-making. A forward- operations characterized by broad activities conducted by
looking, proactive J2 staff with intelligence staffs and organizations for the purpose of
routine commander touch points providing commanders and national-level decision
optimizes support to not only the HQ makers with relevant and timely intelligence.” - JP 2-0
but also the subordinates. Our insights
are aligned to understanding the operational environment (first figure), integrating and focusing
the intelligence enterprise, and implementing the six categories of the joint intelligence process
(second figure):
Insights:
 Understand the Operational Environment: A complete, comprehensive Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) which addresses all domains and can be
effectively described to the commander and
Holistic View of the Operational Environment
staff sets conditions for understanding the
OE. The J2 traditionally coordinates this
effort, but the entire staff should be
involved in this broader analysis as the
products developed during the JIPOE
process support a range of staff functions
and are crucial to effective planning,
targeting, execution, and assessment. Many
commands struggle through the JIPOE
process resulting in analysis that is limited
in scope, does not address all domains, or
does not fully analyze all aspects of the OE
in sufficient detail to support decision-
making. Many CCMDs routinely update a “baseline” JIPOE for all relevant aspects of the OE.
 Integrate and Focus the Intelligence Enterprise: Based on the scope of the mission
requirements, the intelligence enterprise may include any number of the 17 Intelligence
Community (IC) members, as well as other joint, multinational, and interagency partners.
Effectively integrating and focusing the intelligence
enterprise to maximize capacity requires a thorough
understanding of mission partner capabilities and
authorities. While this understanding is difficult to attain
in a time-constrained environment, a federated approach
is more efficient in order to analyze aspects of the OE
(e.g., the information environment - cyber, social, media,
etc.) versus developing an organic capability. J2 staffs are
challenged to understand requirements and capabilities of
the larger intelligence enterprise. This can lead to ill-
defined responsibilities internally and across echelons,
resulting in missed opportunities. Successful J2 staffs

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This focus paper is being updated. These insights form the basis for the in-progress revision.

24
 overcome this challenge by defining linkages and support relationships early in the planning
process, and establish Terms of Reference to outline staff responsibilities in relation to
mission partners.
 Plan and Direct: A key responsibility of the J2 is the overarching planning and direction of
the J2 staff and supporting intelligence enterprise to not only support the commander, but also
subordinates and key mission partners. Prioritization continues to be one of the JFC’s major
responsibilities for apportionment and allocation of limited resources – for collection as well
as Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED). As an element of CCIR, Priority
Intelligence Requirements (PIR) should focus on the commander’s critical information
requirements. This focus may be on enhancing understanding or on key decision points by
operational phases or efforts. We observe many PIRs that are overly broad, not focused on
CCIR, and not updated as the operation evolves. Successful J2s implement a formal PIR
review process within the battle rhythm so that the re-prioritization of intelligence resources
and activities keeps pace with mission and OE changes.
 Collect: ISR employment is an operation and must be deliberately integrated into all aspects
of the planning process. Collection priorities must be synchronized with operational
priorities. Successful CCMDs and JFCs orchestrate this function as an operations-intelligence
teamed effort, rather than simply delegating collection management responsibilities to the J2
collection manager. The development of PIRs and other prioritization frameworks ensures
operational priorities drive collection priorities and optimizes the allocation of limited
resources.
 Process and Exploit: J2 staffs must consider available resources and capacity, then augment
organic PED with federated reachback to ensure speed and depth of analysis and support.
Successful JFCs and J2s tailor intelligence capabilities to support their operation. This
ensures the location and capacity of resources are consistent with the command’s personnel
and communications infrastructure, and optimizes intelligence support to decision making and
targeting requirements.
 Analyze and Produce: Providing analysis and finished intelligence products at the appropriate
level is critical to effective decision-making. Many J2 staffs tend to focus on tactical details,
and are often challenged to integrate all aspects of the operational environment into organic
analysis and production. Successful J2 staffs are able to provide the “so what” tied to PIR, in
order to facilitate commanders’ decision-making at the operational and strategic levels.
 Disseminate and Integrate: In current Coalition environments, JFC staffs must establish robust
Foreign Disclosure Officer/Foreign Disclosure Representative programs and facilitate a
culture of “write for release” in order to share intelligence, operations, and planning
information with Coalition and Interagency partners. To facilitate dissemination, ensure
supporting organizations provide tear-line reports that are applicable to the environment
within which the command is operating. Consider where on the staff to place the FDO and
FDRs to best facilitate dissemination and enable “write for release” by all staff directorates.
 Evaluate and provide feedback: To keep pace with changes in the OE and mission, the entire
staff must actively provide input to the J2 throughout the intelligence process. The J2 staff
must also self assess their performance in terms of effective use of ISR, the PED process,
refinement of PIR, and focused analysis that supports the commander, higher, subordinates,
and mission partners. This assessment and feedback enhances the J2 staff ability to facilitate
accomplishment of the mission.

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18.0 TARGETING.5 Targeting is a subset of planning. It continues the planning efforts to
integrate all actions toward the attainment of objectives. Effectively integrating all actions (see
below figure) continues to challenge commands across the joint force. Consider all capabilities
available at the inception of design, planning, and target development to resolve much of the
confusion surrounding the integration
Targeting: the process of selecting and prioritizing targets
of all actions. Foundational
and matching the appropriate response to them, considering
integration during planning enables operational requirements and capabilities.
and informs integration and Joint Fires: the use of weapon systems or other actions to
synchronization during operations. create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target
Challenges:
 A singular focus on select capabilities (such as only kinetic/lethal) instead of multi-domain
capabilities decreases the ability to achieve the objectives.
 Singular focus increases risk, degrades risk mitigation, escalates conflict, and accelerates
expenditures of critical resources.
An optimal approach to targeting begins by asking, “What option or options produce the desired
effects (think outcomes) that achieve mission objectives?”
A holistic approach to integration includes the full range of available military and
interorganizational capabilities and authorities, to include diplomatic, informational, and
economic elements of national power. Unity of effort relies upon this whole-of-government
method, and places priority on sustaining popular support and legitimacy while engaging the
adversary. This comprehensive whole of
government approach enhances
available options and encourages sound
strategy-to-target logic. In concert with
comprehensive targeting is the
importance of a cradle-to-grave mindset Operational
Environment
that includes planning, targeting,
execution, and an assessment feedback
loop.
Insights:
 Adhere to Commander’s guidance and the operational approach to provide the basis for
subsequent integration and target development.
 Nominate and develop targets early in design and planning relevant to target systems and
functions; focus on synchronizing actions across domains, rather than fixating on
lethal/nonlethal/kinetic/non-kinetic distinctions. Think multi-domain.
 Designate senior representatives empowered by the Commander with coordinating authorities
and resources to orchestrate integration.
 Codify roles and responsibilities to organize staff functions and facilitate cross-staff
relationships to effectively manage the joint targeting process.
 Synchronize strategic and operational level action to avoid fratricide of desired outcomes.
Delegate detailed tactical-level synchronization to subordinate units and mission partners.
 Tailor the HQ organizational structure and processes according to operation scope and type.
 Enforce a staff-wide disciplined critical path to enable targeting.

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19.0 JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN.6 The cyberspace domain
supports military, governmental, and commercial activities. It is globally interconnected by
design, has low barriers of entry, and is highly contested. Cyberspace operations and cyberspace-
enabled activities are integrated into the commander’s decision cycle using a comprehensive
approach. There are three types of cyberspace operations, all of which are activities conducted by
cyberspace forces where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace:
 Department of Defense
Information Network
Operations (DoDIN Ops)
are actions taken to
operate, extend, and secure
DOD networks to support
military missions,
functions and tasks.
 Offensive Cyberspace
Operations (OCO) project
power in and through
cyberspace, and are
integrated with the
command’s targeting
processes.
 Defensive Cyberspace
Operations (DCO) are
measures taken to prevent
or counter adversary
activities in friendly
cyberspace. DCO requires
close coordination among intelligence, operations and information system support functions to
assure missions, and manage risk.
Cyberspace-enabled activities, such as operating a C2 system, sending an email, or completing
on-line training are not cyberspace operations, but carry inherent risk.
Maturation of cyberspace operations has increased a commanders’ ability to build domain
awareness and to integrate theater and global cyberspace operations. We have observed
maturation in doctrine, terms of reference, lexicon, force employment models, and capability
development processes. However, the complex nature of cyberspace complicates integration
across domains, command relationships and authorities. Combatant commands integrate and
deconflict theater and global operations with cyberspace activities conducted by mission partners.
Combatant Commands use Joint Cyber Centers (JCC) to develop cyberspace domain awareness
and integrate cyberspace activities into joint operations. JCCs enable commanders to integrate
cyberspace operations with other domains to achieve theater or functional objectives. We’ve
observed commanders tailor JCCs to support regional or functional focus and priorities.
Insights:
 Incorporate cyberspace operations in design to ensure multi-domain integration at all stages of
planning and execution; and in coordination with mission partners.
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A focus paper is currently being developed for this topic.

27
 Empower JCC directors to coordinate J2, J3 and J6 efforts to improve situational awareness,
sieze opportunities and manage risk across the cyberspace domain.
 Integrate OCO into the command’s targeting process by incorporating cyberspace domain
analysis in JIPOE and target system analysis (TSA).
 Set conditions for success in DCO during steady state operations by ensuring interoperability
among theater cyber security service providers (CSSP), components, and cyber protection
teams (CPT), and mission partners.
 Cultivate a culture of cybersecurity throughout the staff and components to manage risks
introduced by cyberspace-enabled activities.

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20.0 COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AND SYNCHRONIZATION. Success in military
operations can often be achieved or lost
“The political object is the goal, war is the means of
based on how regional, international, and reaching it, and the means can never be considered in
domestic audiences perceive our words isolation from their purposes.” - Carl von Clausewitz
and actions. Gaining the support of these
audiences and the defeat of the adversary’s message is often the critical battle – the one in which
we must be engaged and the one that has to be won for any lasting success.
Insights:
 Environment. Commanders and staffs work to understand the many audiences within the
operational area, across the broader region, and even around the world in order to develop a
compelling narrative and tailor messages in the fight for legitimacy, credibility, and influence.
 The Narrative. We have seen value in CCMD and Operational-level HQs developing
compelling narratives, themes, and messages fully nested with the strategic narrative to
advance the legitimacy of the mission while countering that of the adversary. A compelling
narrative guides planning, targeting, and execution, and can help prevent the “say-do” gap in
which our actions and words conflict in the eyes of the audience.
 Aligning and Synchronizing Activities. The narrative provides the overarching vision for
employment of information-related capabilities (IRCs). The communication strategy is part of
the Commander’s overall strategy and guides and regulates communication efforts as an
integral part of the design and planning effort. The Communication Synchronization process
synchronizes and directs actions during planning, targeting, and execution across the three
event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans).
 Engagement. Mapping the human networks, and planning, executing, assessing, sharing,
tracking, and refining engagements can help identify, inform, and influence key personalities.
 Assessment. Informs decision making. Key to assessment is Commander’s guidance, which
focuses the staff and subordinates, helps frame subsequent Commander’s personal
assessments, communications, and testimony, and informs planning and decision making.
 HQ Organization. The entire staff has a role in planning, directing, and assessing words and
actions. Do not simply delegate this to a single staff. However, assigning an individual or staff
organization such as a Deputy, IO officer, or PAO with responsibility for overseeing the
Commander’s communication strategy and synchronization can facilitate synergy of action.
The paper brings out the different perspectives and roles of CCMD and JTF level HQs:
 CCMDs retain an AOR-wide messaging focus and set conditions for subordinates by providing
intelligence, communication guidance, and information-related capabilities and authorities.
They interact with intelligence communities to better understand the environment and relevant
audiences. CCMDs interact with the JS, OSD, and numerous stakeholders to nest narratives,
themes, and messages. They resource subordinates and request necessary authorities.
 JTFs are often the “hub” that connect tactical actions with global or national messaging
activities. They execute within guidance and authorities. These operational level HQs align and
synchronize information-related capabilities to achieve effects beneficial to mission objectives
and strategic guidance. JTFs plan and execute a variety of activities, tasks, missions, and
operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and lethality. The Commander and staff focuses on
aligning words, actions, and images to achieve desired effects. They use specific battle rhythm
events and defined processes to synchronize these words, actions, and images in support of the
narrative and tactical action to create synergy.

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21.0 SUSTAINMENT.7 Sustainment is one of seven warfighting functions common to joint
operations and includes the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain and prolong
operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment
encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities (including supply, maintenance, deployment
and distribution, health support, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support
[OCS]) along with personnel support services that include human resources, financial
management, and religious ministry. The responsibility for these capabilities is typically spread
across multiple staff directorates and special staff sections (e.g., J1, J4, J7, J8, Surgeon, and
Chaplain). To further complicate matters, not all
joint force commands are organized alike. For
example, the joint HQ Surgeon section could be
organized under the J4, or be part of the
commander’s special staff. The staff engineer may
be organized under the J3, the J4, or as a special
staff section. This can make the integration of
capabilities more challenging, both vertically (HQ
to components), and horizontally (HQ to HQ, etc.).
Each functional area provides a unique view of
supporting operations; success entails effective
synchronization of these capabilities to support the mission.
Globally Integrated Logistics. Posturing and sustaining operations in an anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) environment will highlight the challenges for the military to aggregate, operate, and
disaggregate rapidly—the hallmarks of globally integrated operations. Critical access to the
global commons, air and sea ports—once taken for granted—could very well be contested.
Today’s joint operating environment places a significant burden on strategic and operational
level sustainment partners to ensure the Department of Defense’s ability to conduct multiple,
simultaneous (or near simultaneous) operations around the world. The Chairman’s 4+1 focus—
coupled with the trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-domain aspects of the operating
environment—necessitates a solid understanding of global sustainment requirements and the
ability to adjudicate the distribution of finite resources.
Joint Logistics Enterprise. Globally integrated operations require coordination and partnering,
incorporating multiple global logistics providers, both military and civilian. The sustainment
demands that result from complex crises (both kinetic and non-kinetic) require an “enterprise”
approach, as they often transcend the ability of a single nation, government, or organization to
address alone. There are multiple stakeholders, both military and civilian, that comprise the Joint
Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). The Joint Force’s ability to succeed requires this cross-matrixed,
multi-tiered network of key global providers to work cooperatively to achieve a common
purpose without jeopardizing their own mission and goals.
Understanding the players and their authorities, goals, and limitations as well as their willingness
to help in an operation are imperative to establishing effective situational awareness. This
situational awareness can enable sustainment planners to identify potential support opportunities
as well as potential resource conflicts. In foreign humanitarian assistance or DSCA missions,

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30
interagency and multinational partners may play
key or lead roles. A supporting joint commander
can help by coherently describing what
capabilities are available and how they can
support.
Sustaining globally integrated operations with
finite resources will require a robust and agile
non-organic vendor base. Combat support
agencies (CSA) can provide incredible
capabilities to the Joint Force Commander
through their extensive commodity and services
network. Joint sustainers must include both CSA inputs and commercial industry considerations
into planning efforts early to identify any gaps, seams, or shortfalls.
Commercial providers are also critical to supporting global operations. While the days of
building an “iron mountain” and full government mobilization of the industrial base (e.g., in
World War I/II) may no longer be realistic, the ability of the commercial industry base to flex
production to meet emergent demands remains a necessity. However, cost, production
schedules, and transportation requirements are all variables that will affect the ability of industry
to meet emerging requirements. The Joint Staff J4, on behalf of the Combatant Commander,
partners with OSD to influence commercial entities to meet mission needs.
Challenges:
 Anticipating requirements “what’s next” in an uncertain, complex and rapidly changing
operating environment.
 Integrating sustainment capabilities to support joint force/partner requirements.
 Leveraging Global Providers that are part of the JLEnt to ensure rapid and precise response for
the JFC.
 Understand the authorities, goals, and limitations of JLEnt partners early in the planning
process. This may expand capabilities and capacities, or it may restrict them.
 Providing support to other US Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
Insights:
 The involvement of the commander and the staff’s ability to anticipate requirements and
leverage available capabilities are crucial to both setting theater conditions and for successful
long-term force sustainment.
 Availability of limited global resources and time-distance requirements can become factors
early in a conflict or crisis. Coordination for and prioritization of critical resources are key
methods by which the HHQ can help set conditions for success.
 Sustainment actions (logistics, engineer activities, health services, and personnel support)
should be included in the theater campaign plan (TCP) objectives and the commander’s
communication synchronization narrative.
 Force accountability supports the commander’s concept of operation and is essential to make
informed decisions concerning force allocation and capabilities.
 Build relationships and trust with JLEnt partners before a crisis. During an emergent crisis,
involve JLEnt partners early in the planning process.

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 Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

A2/AD – Anti-access/Area denial JFC – Joint Force Commander

ADCON – Administrative Control JFCC – Joint Force Component Command
AOR – Area of Responsibility JIIM – Joint, Interagency,
B2C2WG – Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
and Working Groups JIPOE – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
C2 – Command and Control Operational Environment
CCDR – Combatant Commander JLEnt – Joint Logistics Enterprise
CCIR –Commander’s Critical Information JPP – Joint Planning Process
Requirement JTF – Joint Task Force
CCMD – Combatant Command KM – Knowledge Management
CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of KMO – Knowledge Management Officer
Staff MOE – Measure of Effectiveness
CJTF – Combined Joint Task Force MOP – Measure of Performance
COA – Course of Action NCO – Noncommissioned Officer
COMREL – Command Relationship NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
COP – Common Operational Picture NSC – National Security Council
COS – Chief of Staff OCO – Offensive Cyberspace Operations
CPT – Cyber Protection Team OCS – Operational Contract Support
CSA – Combat Support Agency OE – Operational Environment
CSEL – Command Senior Enlisted Leader OPCON – Operational Control
CSSP – Cyber Security Service Provider OPT – Operational Planning Team
CUOPS – Current Operations PAO – Public Affairs Officer
DCO – Defensive Cyberspace Operations PED – Processing, Exploitation, and
DIME – Diplomatic, Informational, Dissemination
Military, and Economic PIR – Priority Intelligence Requirement
DoDIN – Department of Defense PMESII – Political, Military, Economic,
Information Network Social, Information, and Infrastructure
DSCA – Defense Support of Civil PVO – Private Volunteer Organization
Authorities RFI – Request for Information
FCC – Functional Combatant Command SJA – Staff Judge Advocate
FDO – Foreign Disclosure Officer SJS – Secretariat of the Joint Staff
FDR – Foreign Disclosure Representative SOC – Special Operations Command
FUOPS – Future Operations TACON – Tactical Control
FUPLANS – Future Plans TCP –Theater Campaign Plan
GCC – Geographic Combatant Command TSA – Target System Analysis
GFM – Global Force Management TSOC – Theater Special Operations
HHQ – Higher Headquarters Command
IC – Intelligence Community
IGO – Intergovernmental Organization
IM – Information Management
IMO – Information Management Officer
IRC – Information-Related Capability
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
JCC – Joint Cyber Center

GL
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