OSHA TECHNICAL MANUAL - SECTION IV: CHAPTER 3

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SECTION IV: CHAPTER 3

PRESSURE VESSEL GUIDELINES

Contents:

I. Introduction
II. Recent Cracking Experience in Pressure Vessels
III. Nondestructive Examination Methods
IV.
Information for Safety Assessment
V.
Bibliography

Appendix IV:3-1. Recordkeeping Data for Steel Vessels and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks

1. INTRODUCTION.

1. Recent inspection programs for metallic pressure containment vessels and tanks have revealed
cracking and damage in a considerable number of the vessels inspected. Safety and hazard
evaluations of pressure vessels, as also presented in OSHA Instruction PUB 8-1.5, need to
consider the consequences of a leakage or a rupture failure of a vessel.

2. Two consequences result from a complete rupture:

■ Blast effects due to sudden expansion of the pressurized fluid.

■ Fragmentation damage and injury, if vessel rupture occurs.

3. For a leakage failure, the hazard consequences can range from no effect to very serious
effects:

■ Suffocation or poisoning, depending on the nature of the contained fluid, if the leakage
occurs into a closed space.
■ Fire and explosion (physical hazards for a flammable fluid).
■ Chemical and thermal burns from contact with process liquids.

4. Only pressure vessels and low pressure storage tanks widely used in process, pulp and paper,
petroleum refining, and petrochemical industries and for water treatment systems of boilers
and steam generation equipment are covered in this chapter. Excluded are vessels and tanks
used in many other applications. Also excluded are other parts of a pressure containment
system such as piping and valves.

5. The types and applications of pressure vessels included and excluded in this chapter are
summarized in Table IV:3-1. An illustration of a schematic pressure vessel is presented in
Figure IV:3-1.

NOTE: Though this review of pressure vessels excludes inspection or evaluation of safety
release valves, the compliance officer should be aware that NO valves or T-fittings should be
present between the vessel and the safety relief valve.

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OSHA TECHNICAL MANUAL - SECTION IV: CHAPTER 3

6. Most of the pressure or storage vessels in service in the United States will have been designed
and constructed in accordance with one of the following two pressure vessel design codes:

■ The ASME Code, or Section VIII of the ASME (American Society of Mechanical
Engineers) "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code."
■ The API Standard 620 or the American Petroleum Institute Code which provides rules
for lower pressure vessels not covered by the ASME Code.

In addition, some vessels designed and constructed between 1934 to 1956 may have used the
rules in the "API-ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and Gases."
This code was discontinued in 1956.

7. Vessels certification can only be performed by trained inspectors qualified for each code.
Written tests and practical experience are required for certification. Usually, the compliance
office is not equipped for this task, but is able to obtain the necessary contract services.
TABLE IV:3-1. VESSEL TYPES

Vessels included: Vessel types specifically excluded:

Stationary and unfired Vessels used as fired boilers

Used for pressure containment of gases and Vessels used in high-temperature processes (above 315° C, 600°
liquids F) or at very low and cryogenic temperatures

Constructed of carbon steel or low alloy steel Vessels and containers used in transportable systems

Operated at temperatures between -75° and Storage tanks that operate at nominally atmospheric pressure
315° C (-100° and 600° F)

Piping and pipelines

Safety and pressure-relief valves

Special-purpose vessels, such as those for human occupancy

FIGURE IV:3-1. SOME MAJOR PARTS OF A PRESSURE VESSEL.

2. RECENT CRACKING EXPERIENCE IN PRESSURE VESSELS.

1. DEAERATOR SERVICE.

1. Deaeration refers to the removal of noncondensible gases, primarily oxygen, from the
water used in a steam generation system. Deaerators are widely used in many
industrial applications including power generation, pulp and paper, chemical, and
petroleum refining and in many public facilities such as hospitals and schools where
steam generation is required. In actual practice, the deaerator vessel can be separate
from the storage vessel or combined with a storage vessel into one unit.

2. Typical operational conditions for deaerator vessels range up to about 300 psi and up to
about 150° C (300° F). Nearly all of the vessels are designed to ASME Code, resulting
in vessel wall thicknesses up to but generally less than 25 mm (1 in). The vessel
material is almost universally one of the carbon steel grades.

3. Analysis of incident survey data and other investigations has determined the following
features about the deaerator vessel cracking.

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OSHA TECHNICAL MANUAL - SECTION IV: CHAPTER 3

■ Water hammer is the only design or operational factor that correlates with
cracking.
■ Cracking is generally limited to weld regions of vessels that had not been
postweld heat treated.
■ Corrosion fatigue appears to be the predominant mechanism of crack formation
and growth.

4. The failures and the survey results have prompted TAPPI (Technical Association of Pulp
and Paper Industry), the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, and
NACE (National Association of Corrosion Engineers) to prepare inspection, operation and
repair recommendations. For inspection, all recommendations suggest:

■ Special attention to the internal surface of all welds and heat-affected zones
(HAZ).
■ Use of the wet fluorescent magnetic particle (WFMT) method for inspection.

5. The TAPPI and the NACE recommendations also contain additional items, such as:

■ Inspection by personnel certified to American Society for Nondestructive

Testing's SNT-TC-1A minimum Level I and interpretation of the results by
minimum Level II.
■ Reinspection within one year for repaired vessels, 1-2 years for vessels with
discontinuities but unrepaired, and 3-5 years for vessels found free of
discontinuities.

2. AMINE SERVICE.

1. The amine process is used to remove hydrogen sulfide (H2S) from petroleum gases
such as propane and butane. It is also used for carbon dioxide (CO2) removal in some
processes. Amine is a generic term and includes monoethanolamine (MEA),
diethanolamine (DEA) and others in the amine group. These units are used in
petroleum refinery, gas treatment and chemical plants.

2. The operating temperatures of the amine process are generally in the 38 to 93° C (100°
to 200° F) range and therefore the plant equipment is usually constructed from one of
the carbon steel grades. The wall thickness of the pressure vessels in amine plants is
typically about 25 mm (1 in.).

3. Although the possibility of cracking of carbon steels in an amine environment has been
known for some years, real concern about safety implications was highlighted by a 1984
failure of the amine process pressure vessel. Overall, the survey found about 40%
cracking incidence in a total of 294 plants. Cracking had occurred in the
absorber/contactor, the regenerator and the heat exchanger vessels, and in the piping
and other auxiliary equipment. Several of the significant findings of the survey were:

■ All cracks were in or near welds.

■ Cracking occurred predominantly in stressed or unrelieved (not PWHT) welds.
■ Cracking occurred in all amine vessel processes but was most prevalent in MEA
units.
■ WFMT and UT (ultrasonic test) were the predominant detection methods for
cracks; internal examination by WFMT was the preferred method.

4. Information from laboratory studies indicate that pure amine does not cause cracking of
carbon steels but amine with carbon dioxide in the gas phase causes severe cracking.
The presence or absence of chlorides, cyanides, or hydrogen sulfide may also be factors
but their full role in the cracking mechanism is not completely known at present.

3. WET HYDROGEN SULFIDE.

1. Wet Hydrogen Sulfide refers to any fluid containing water and hydrogen sulfide (H2S).
Hydrogen is generated when steel is exposed to this mixture and the hydrogen can
enter into the steel. Dissolved hydrogen can cause cracking, blistering, and
embrittlement.

2. The harmful effects of hydrogen generating environments on steel have been known
and recognized for a long time in the petroleum and petrochemical industries. In
particular, sensitivity to damage by hydrogen increases with the hardness and strength
of the steel; and damage and cracking are more apt to occur in high strength steels, as
follows:

■ Significant cracks can start from very small hard zones associated with welds;
these hard zones are not detected by conventional hardness tests.
■ Initially small cracks can grow by a stepwise form of hydrogen blistering to form

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through thickness cracks.

■ NACE/API limits on weld hardness may not be completely effective in preventing
cracking.
■ Thermal stress relief (postweld heat treatment, PWHT) appears to reduce the
sensitivity to and the severity of cracking.

3. Wet hydrogen sulfide has also been found to cause service cracking in liquified
petroleum gas (LPG) storage vessels. The service cracking in the LPG vessels occurs
predominantly in the weld heat affected zone (HAZ). The vessels are usually spherical
with wall thickness in the 20 mm to 75 mm (0.8 in. to 3 in.) range.

4. Recommendations for new and existing wet hydrogen-sulfide vessels to minimize the
risk of a major failure include:

■ Use lower-strength steels for new vessels.

■ Schedule an early inspection for vessels more than five years in service.
■ Improve monitoring to minimize breakthrough of hydrogen sulfide.
■ Replace unsafe vessels or downgrade to less severe, usually lower-pressure,
service.

4. AMMONIA SERVICE.

1. Commercial refrigeration systems, certain chemical processes, and formulators of

agricultural chemicals will be sites of ammonia service tanks. Careful inspections of
vessels used for storage of ammonia (in either vapor or liquid form) in recent years
have produced evidence of serious stress corrosion cracking problems. The vessels for
this service are usually constructed as spheres from one of the carbon steel grades, and
they operate in the ambient temperature range.

2. The water and oxygen content in the ammonia has a strong influence on the propensity
of carbon steels to crack in this environment. Cracks have a tendency to be found to be
in or near the welds in as-welded vessels. Cracks occur both transverse and parallel to
the weld direction. Thermal stress relieving seems to be a mitigating procedure for new
vessels, but its efficacy for older vessels after a period of operation is dubious partly
because small, undetected cracks may be present.

5. PULP DIGESTER SERVICE.

1. The kraft pulping process is used in the pulp and paper industry to digest the pulp in
the papermaking process. The operation is done in a relatively weak (a few percent)
water solution of sodium hydroxide and sodium sulfide typically in the 110° to 140° C
(230° to 285° F) temperature range. Since the early 1950's, a continuous version of
this process has been widely used. Nearly all of the vessels are ASME Code vessels
made using one of the carbon steel grades with typical design conditions of 175° to
180° C (350° to 360° F) and 150 psig.

2. These vessels had a very good service record with only isolated reports of cracking
problems until the occurrence of a sudden rupture failure in 1980. The inspection
survey has revealed that about 65% of the properly inspected vessels had some
cracking. Some of the cracks were fabrication flaws revealed by the use of more
sensitive inspection techniques but most of the cracking was service-induced. The
inspection survey and analysis indicates the following features about the cracking.

■ All cracking was associated with welds.

■ Wet fluorescent magnetic particle (WFMT) testing with proper surface
preparation was the most effective method of detecting the cracking.
■ Fully stress-relieved vessels were less susceptible.
■ No clear correlation of cracking and noncracking could be found with vessel age
and manufacture or with process variables and practices.
■ Analysis and research indicate that the cracking is due to a caustic stress
corrosion cracking mechanism although its occurrence at the relatively low
caustic concentrations of the digester process was unexpected.

3. Currently, preventive measures such as weld cladding, spray coatings, and anodic
protection are being studied, and considerable information has been obtained. In the
meantime, the recommended guideline is to perform an annual examination.

6. SUMMARY OF SERVICE CRACKING EXPERIENCE.

1. The preceding discussion shows a strong influence of chemical environment on cracking

incidence. This is a factor that is not explicitly treated in most design codes. Service
experience is the best and often the only guide to in-service safety assessment.

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2. For vessels and tanks within the scope of this document, the service experience
indicates that the emphasis of the inspection and safety assessment should be on:

■ Vessels in deaerator, amine, wet H2S, ammonia and pulp digesting service.
■ Welds and adjacent regions.
■ Vessels that have not been thermally stress relieved (no PWHT of fabrication
welds).
■ Repaired vessels, especially those without PWHT after repair.

3. The evaluation of the severity of the detected cracks can be done by fracture mechanics
methods. This requires specific information about stresses, material properties, and flaw
indications. Generalized assessment guidelines are not easy to formulate. However,
fortunately, many vessels in the susceptible applications listed above operate at
relatively low stresses, and therefore, cracks have a relatively smaller effect on
structural integrity and continued safe operation.

7. NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION METHODS.

Of the various conventional and advanced nondestructive examination (NDE) methods, five are
widely used for the examination of pressure vessels and tanks by certified pressure vessel
inspectors. The names and acronyms of these common five methods are:

■ Visual Examination (VT)

■ Liquid Penetrant Test (PT)
■ Magnetic Particle Test (MT)
■ Gamma and X-ray Radiography (RT)
■ Ultrasonic Test (UT)

VT, PT, and MT can detect only those discontinuities and defects that are open to the surface
or are very near the surface. In contrast, RT and UT can detect conditions that are located
within the part. For these reasons, the first three are often referred to as "surface"
examination methods and the last two as "volumetric" methods. Table II of PUB 8-1.5
summarizes the main features of these five methods.

1. VISUAL EXAMINATION (VT) is easy to conduct and can cover a large area in a short
time. It is very useful for assessing the general condition of the equipment and for
detecting some specific problems such as severe instances of corrosion, erosion, and
hydrogen blistering. The obvious requirements for a meaningful visual examination are
a clean surface and good illumination.

2. LIQUID PENETRANT TEST (PT) depends on allowing a specially formulated liquid

(penetrant) to seep into an open discontinuity and then detecting the entrapped liquid
by a developing agent. When the penetrant is removed from the surface, some of it
remains entrapped in the discontinuities. Application of a developer draws out the
entrapped penetrant and magnifies the discontinuity. Chemicals which fluoresce under
black (ultraviolet) light can be added to the penetrant to aid the detectability and
visibility of the developed indications. The essential feature of PT is that the
discontinuity must be "open," which means a clean, undisturbed surface.

The PT method is independent of the type and composition of the metal alloy so it can
be used for the examination of austenitic stainless steels and nonferrous alloys where
the magnetic particle test is not applicable.

3. MAGNETIC PARTICLE TEST (MT).

1. This method depends on the fact that discontinuities in or near the surface
perturb magnetic flux lines induced into a ferromagnetic material. For a
component such as a pressure vessel where access is generally limited to one
surface at a time, the "prod" technique is widely used. The magnetic field is
produced in the region around and between the prods (contact probes) by an
electric current (either AC or DC) flowing between the prods. The ferromagnetic
material requirement basically limits the applicability of MT to carbon and
low- alloy steels.

2. The perturbations of the magnetic lines are revealed by applying fine particles of
a ferromagnetic material to the surface. The particles can be either a dry powder
or a wet suspension in a liquid. The particles can also be treated to fluoresce
under black light. These options lead to variations such as the "wet fluorescent
magnetic particle test" (WFMT). MT has some capability for detecting subsurface
defects. However, there is no easy way to determine the limiting depth of
sensitivity since it is highly dependent on magnetizing current, material, and
geometry and size of the defect. A very crude approximation would be a depth

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no more than 1.5 mm to 3 mm (1/16 in. to 1/8 in.).

3. A very important precaution in performing MT is that corners and surface

irregularities also perturb the magnetic field. Therefore, examining for defects in
corners and near or in welds must be performed with extra care. Another
precaution is that MT is most sensitive to discontinuities which are oriented
transverse to the magnetic flux lines and this characteristic needs to be taken
into account in determining the procedure for inducing the magnetic field.

4. RADIOGRAPHY (RT).

1. The basic principle of radiographic examination of metallic objects is the same as

in any other form of radiography such as medical radiography. Holes, voids, and
discontinuities decrease the attenuation of the X-ray and produce greater
exposure on the film (darker areas on the negative film).

2. Because RT depends on density differences, cracks with tightly closed surfaces

are much more difficult to detect than open voids. Also, defects located in an
area of an abrupt dimensional change are difficult to detect due to the
superimposed density difference. RT is effective in showing defect dimensions on
a plane normal to the beam direction but determination of the depth dimension
and location requires specialized techniques. Since ionizing radiation is involved,
field application of RT requires careful implementation to prevent health hazards.

5. ULTRASONIC TESTING (UT).

1. The fundamental principles of ultrasonic testing of metallic materials are similar

to radar and related methods of using electromagnetic and acoustic waves for
detection of foreign objects. The distinctive aspect of UT for the inspection of
metallic parts is that the waves are mechanical, so the test equipment requires
three basic components:

■ Electronic system for generating electrical signal.

■ Transducer system to convert the electrical signal into mechanical
vibrations and vice versa and to inject the vibrations into and extract
them from the material.
■ Electronic system for amplifying, processing, and displaying the return
signal.

Very short signal pulses are induced into the material and waves reflected back
from discontinuities are detected during the "receive" mode. The transmitting
and detection can be done with one transducer or with two separate transducers
(the tandem technique).

2. Unlike radiography, UT in its basic form does not produce a permanent record of
the examination. However, more recent versions of UT equipment include
automated operation and electronic recording of the signals.

3. Ultrasonic techniques can also be used for the detection and measurement of
general material loss such as by corrosion and erosion. Since wave velocity is
constant for a specific material, the transit time between the initial pulse and the
back reflection is a measure of the travel distance and the thickness.

6. DETECTION PROBABILITIES AND FLAW SIZING.

1. The implementation of NDE (nondestructive examination) results for structural

integrity and safety assessment involves a detailed consideration of two separate
but interrelated factors.

■ Detecting the discontinuity.

■ Identifying the nature of the discontinuity and determining its size.

2. Much of the available information on detection and sizing capabilities has been
developed for aircraft and nuclear power applications. This kind of information is
very specific to the nature of the flaw, the material, and the details of the test

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technique, and direct transference to other situations is not always warranted.

3. The overall reliability of NDE is obviously an important factor in a safety and

hazard assessment. Failing to detect or undersizing existing discontinuities
reduces the safety margin while oversizing errors can result in unnecessary and
expensive outages. High reliability is achieved through a combination of factors,
as follows:

■ Validated procedures, equipment and test personnel.

■ Utilization of diverse methods and techniques.
■ Application of redundancy by repetitive and independent tests.

Finally, it is useful to note that safety assessment depends on evaluating the

"largest flaw that may be missed, not the smallest one that can be found."

8. INFORMATION FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT.

This chapter and PUB 8-1.5 has a large amount of information on the design rules, inspection
requirements, and service experience, relevant to pressure vessels and low pressure storage
tanks used in general industrial applications. Though the compliance officer is not usually
qualified as a pressure vessel inspector, as a summary and a reminder, Appendix IV:3-1
outlines the information, data, and recordkeeping that are necessary, useful, or indicative of
safe management of operating vessels and tanks.

These records, in addition to the construction and maintenance logs, usually are kept by the
plant engineer, maintenance supervisor, or facility manager, and will be indicative of the
surveillance activities around safe operation of pressure vessels.

9. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Chuse, R. 1984. Pressure Vessels: The ASME Code Simplified. 6th ed. McGraw-Hill: New York.

Forman, B. Fred. 1981. Local Stresses in Pressure Vessels. Pressure Vessel Handbook Publishing, Inc.: Tulsa.

Hammer, W. 1981. Pressure Hazards in Occupational Safety Management and Engineering. 2nd ed.
Prentice-Hall: New York.

McMaster, R.C. and McIntire, P. (eds.) 1982-1987. Nondestructive Testing Handbook. 2nd ed., Vols. 1-3.
American Society for Metals/American Society of Nondestructive Testing: Columbus.

Megyesy, E.F. 1986. Pressure Vessel Handbook. 7th ed. Pressure Vessel Handbook Publishing Inc.: Tulsa.

OSHA Instruction Pub 8-1.5. 1989. Guidelines for Pressure Vessel Safety Assessment. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration: Washington, D.C.

Thielsch, H. 1975. Defects and Failures in Pressure Vessels and Piping. 2nd ed., Chaps. 16 and 17. Reinhold:
New York.

Yokell, S. 1986. Understanding the Pressure Vessel Code. Chemical Engineering 93(9):75-85.

APPENDIX IV:3-1. RECORDKEEPING DATA FOR STEEL VESSELS AND LOW PRESSURE STORAGE
TANKS

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE. This outline summarizes information and data that will be helpful in
assessing the safety of steel pressure vessels and low pressure storage tanks that operate at temperatures
between -75° and 315 ° C (-100° and 600° F).

VESSEL IDENTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION. Information that identifies the specific vessel being
assessed and provides general information about it include the following items:

● Current owner of the vessel

● Vessel location
- Original location and current location if it has been moved
● Vessel identification
- Manufacturer's serial number
- National Board number if registered with NB
● Manufacturer identification
- Name and address of manufacturer
- Authorization or identification number of the manufacturer
● Date of manufacture of the vessel
● Data report for the vessel

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 OSHA TECHNICAL MANUAL - SECTION IV: CHAPTER 3

- ASME U-1 or U-2, API 620 form or other applicable report

● Date vessel was placed in service
● Interruption dates if not in continuous service.

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION.

Information that will identify the code or standard used for the design and construction of the vessel or tank
and the specific design values, materials, fabrication methods, and inspection methods used include the
following items:

● Design code
- ASME Code Section and Division, API Standard or other design code used
● Type of construction
- Shop or field fabricated or other fabrication method
● VIII, division 1 or 2 vessels
- Maximum allowable pressure and temperature
- Minimum design temperature
● API 620 vessels
- Design pressure at top and maximum fill
● Additional requirements included, such as
- Appendix Q (Low-Pressure Storage Tanks For Liquified Hydrocarbon Gases) and
- Appendix R (Low-Pressure Storage Tanks for Refrigerated Products)
● Other design code vessels
- Maximum design and allowable pressures
- Maximum and minimum operating temperatures
● Vessel materials
- ASME, ASTM, or other specification names and numbers for the major parts
● Design corrosion allowance
● Thermal stress relief (PWHT, postweld heat treatment)
- Design code requirements
- Type, extent, and conditions of PWHT performed
● Nondestructive examination (NDE) of welds
- Type and extent of examination performed
- Time when NDE was performed (before or after PWHT or hydrotest)

SERVICE HISTORY.

Information on the conditions of operating history of the vessel or tank that will be helpful in safety
assessment include the following items:

● Fluids handled
- Type and composition, temperature and pressures
● Type of service
- Continuous, intermittent or irregular
● Significant changes in service conditions
- Changes in pressures, temperatures, and fluid compositions and the dates of the changes
● Vessel history
- Alterations, reratings, and repairs performed
- Date(s) of changes or repairs

IN-SERVICE INSPECTION.

Information about inspections performed on the vessel or tank and the results obtained that will assist in the
safety assessment include the following items:

● Inspection(s) performed
- Type, extent, and dates
● Examination methods
- Preparation of surfaces and welds
- Techniques used (visual, magnetic particle, penetrant test, radiography, ultrasonic)
● Qualifications of personnel

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- ASNT (American Society for Nondestructive Testing) levels or equivalent of examining

and supervisory personnel
● Inspection results and report
- Report form used (NBIC NB-7, API 510 or other)
- Summary of type and extent of damage or cracking
- Disposition (no action, delayed action or repaired)

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS.

Survey results indicate that a relatively high proportion of vessels in operations in several specific
applications have experienced in service-related damage and cracking. Information on the following items
can assist in assessing the safety of vessels in these applications:

● Service application
- Deaerator, amine, wet hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, or pulp digesting
● Industry bulletins and guidelines for this application
- Owner/operator awareness of information
● Type, extent, and results of examinations
- Procedures, guidelines and recommendations used
- Amount of damage and cracking
- Next examination schedule
● Participation in industry survey for this application
● Problem mitigation
- Written plans and actions

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION.

The information acquired for the above items is not adaptable to any kind of numerical ranking for
quantitative safety assessment purposes. However, the information can reveal the owner or user's apparent
attention to good practice, careful operation, regular maintenance, and adherence to the recommendations
and guidelines developed for susceptible applications. If the assessment indicated cracking and other serious
damage problems, it is important that the inspector obtain qualified technical advice and opinion.

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