Kurniawan, Kevin Nobel. 2018. Education As The Institutional Means
Kurniawan, Kevin Nobel. 2018. Education As The Institutional Means
Abstract: This article describes education as the institutional means which directs the society towards
Postmaterialism. Various studies on multiculturalism have agreed that democratic value is insufficient without
welfare policies, the rise of religious intolerance is related with the widening of social gap in Indonesia.
Secondary data on national statistics, surveys, and literature reviews are utilizedto describe the accessibility and
quality of education as related to Postmaterialism. Between the year 2005 and 2015, the author found in general
the state has provided a wider access of education, but there is still a consistent low continuation rate because of
poverty which impedes students to achieve higher education. On the other hand, the quality of education has
encountered ideological tensions between intercultural values and Islamisation which happen to exist parallelly
in the Reformation period; hence the potential for social disharmony and nationalism are still open to debate.
The author suggests that the state should provide sustainable access towards higher education, both on
secondary and tertiary level, and to provide monitoring and evaluative process on the pedagogical approach
within public schools.
Keywords: Postmaterialism, Education, School Enrolment Rate, Islamisation
Introduction
Postmaterialism emphasises non-material goods such as the freedom of speech and tolerance in the
society. Inglehart argues that if an individual has benefited sufficient amount of material currencies, such as
economic security, he or she would be capable to exercisea higher plane of social necessity, namely religious
tolerance, political tolerance, and the freedom of speech and opinion (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Davis, 2000). It
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is often argued that Postmaterialists are more supportive for liberal rights and equal chance of competition for
any individual as compared to materialists. Simply, one who does have stable economic life is ableto embrace
social and political tolerance. Education is one of the many means whose role is to convey cultural and non-
material values. In this paper, I would like to examine the institution of education as the means to achieve
Postmaterialism and social transformation.
Indonesia is currently experiencing arise of religious intolerance, and ironically, this happens after
democratization (Menchik, 2016). While we assume that democracy should have had produced liberal and
harmonious social integration, it might not always be the case in the non-Western hemisphere, particularly in
developing states. Menchik have coined the term, “Godly Nationalism” as the unique Indonesian ideology to
achieve national integration, also known as political imagined community (Menchik, 2014). And yet, the same
cornerstone which had established the state, hasinversely affirmed the institutionalization of social intolerance.
Religious nationalism has also fueled religious intolerance.
After the Reformation, various radical groups haven taken the democratic opportunity to express the
resistance towards the state’s tolerant ideology - Pancasila (Shihab, 2017). Along the decades after the
reformation, Indonesia is currently facing recurring waves of religious radicalism and violation of human rights;
having 158 cases of religious rights violation, majority of these violations are in West Java (Komnas HAM,
2015; Wahid Institute, 2014; Pew Research Centre, 2016). The rise of intolerant groups addressing the literal
interpretation of religiosity has caused social tension. Recently, various social movements have rose to resist the
democratic state. These movements are not only joined by radical groups, butit is indirectly reinforced by para-
state institutions (Bowen, 2010).
Despite fully aware of the ideological existence of Pancasila, various conservative groups have arrived
to deconstruct the national ideology, and construct an alternative ideology according to their respective interests.
These social movements participate in the social-political arena, some enrolled themselves as militia-type
groups in the social domain, while others are enrolled in the political sphere, competing influence along with the
moderate Islamic organisations, the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Abdhurakhman, 2013; Hadiz,
2010). Generally, the objective is to build an Islamic state; if not, a semi-Islamic state. Without fully recognizing
Indonesia’s cultural diversity; these movements somehow neglect the fundamental definition of intercultural
citizenship (Leeuwen, 2010). Now, it is inevitable to question Indonesia’s modern Islam, which unknowingly
has revealedthe latent potential for social disharmony. The transition towards liberal democracy still raises the
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issue of social distrust and worrying inconsistency with citizenship autonomy, or rather, freedom of minority
groups (Almagor, 2000; Ciftci, 2010).
The rise of such conservative groups is not without a cause. One major factor which impedes
Indonesia’s stagnant democratization is social exclusion. Daniel Byman has warned that financial crisis, poverty,
and economic inequality are capable to make many people believe that the governmental system is bound for
changes (Graff, 2010). Indonesia’s widening social gap between economic classes has been vulnerable towards
religious ideological attacks (Putra, 2013: 70). Indeed, since the year 2000, economic growth has taken a greater
leap, but the benefit has not been distributed equally. According to some researches, Indonesia was ranked sixth
worst inequality of wealth - marking a Gini ratio of 0.394 by September 2016; the richest one percent of the
total population owned 49% of the state’s total wealth (OECD, 2015; Oxfam, 2017; The Asia Foundation, 2016).
The effect of economic inequality has produced social uncertainty, particularly towards conservative groups
(Arifianto, 2016).
Since there is a wild current of economic fluctuation, we arrive at the question on how is the state is
coping with such changes? The notion of democracy promises equal chance for every citizen to benefit freedom
from the state. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for the state to convey the message of multicultural harmony if the
social situation betrays the ideological basis for equal social-economic freedom (Kymlicka, 2012). The
accumulation of social resentments towards the anomic and incomplete state of democratisation would result in
a greater number of social conflicts and potential disintegration.
There are already several comments which touched the ideological thread on religion and economic
inequality1,but I consider the theoretical gap between economic inequality and intoleranceis still a bit too far.
Economic inequality may produce social resentments, but the failure of materiality alone cannot provide
adequate explanationfor Postmaterial incapability. Education is the prior point of the society’s take off towards
Postmateriality – the “meeting point” between the material (economy) and non-material pole (culture). I do find
it quite convincing that the Postmaterial analysis on education can help us trace the institutional connection
between democracy, social inclusion, and social transformation. Thus, there are two major questions which the
author attempts to answer on the issue of Postmaterialism: 1. How do we perceive education as a material value?
2. How do we perceive education as a Postmaterial value?
Methodology
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The analysis on this paper will rely on two types of secondary data, quantitative and qualitative. The
quantitative data analysis will take an examination on the Indonesian educational access based on the National
Statistic Centre (Badan Pusat Statistik). Quantitative data would allow the author to see how far the material has
been achieved by the state, providing economic security and infrastructural access towards education. On the
other hand, to examine Postmaterial values such as social tolerance, the communication of civic values within
the educational institution will be mostly made up of qualitative data collected from various literature reviews
andthe author’s previous research.
1
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2011/04/110426_surveiradikalisme.shtml. Accessed on 20
July 2017, 3:36 pm.
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individual’s Postmaterialistic preference have a direct impact towards democratic values. Although his writing
may show the trend of Postmaterialistic atmosphere in the Western society, the shift towards modern democracy
and social inclusion still requires a dose of sociological explanation.
The correlation between Postmaterialism and social inclusion lies in the premise that every individual
should have the equal chance to benefit both material and non-material goods (Morselli & Passini, 2012).
Material goods may include basic economic needs such as nutrition, minimum wage/income, etc, this is to say
that an individual should live above the poverty line, living above the “safety net” of the society. On the other
hand, Marshall’s thesis on citizenship rights (Civil, Social, Political rights), for an example, fall closer into the
category of non-material goods (Marshall, 1950). This is to say that the Maslow’s psychological approach
towards the pyramid of needs, from material to non-material goods, is not limited to the individual but it may be
relevant to be projected into the collective group. To make the statement more sociologically sound, I would
argue that the society follows the Parson’s thought on social structure, AGIL (Adaptation, Goal Orientation,
Integration, Latency).The society operates like the individual, its mechanics requires “concrete” economic
satisfaction (material), correlating with the “abstract” cultural latency (post-material).
Previous studies have proven that countries which experienced economic inequality are incapable to
grasp democratic culture (Brym, 2016; Inglehart, 2008). These studies shared a common theme that if the West
is modern and non-West is less modern, then Postmaterialism would appearin the West because the society is
living on a better social-economic condition. In other words, the West’s “already rich” material atmosphere has
become the basis for latent social transformation, giving birth towards a denser democratic culture where the
individual is given more liberal space to express their own autonomy. But, we must also be aware that the West
have not reached this state without a long period of socio-historical progress. As compared to the West, Third
World Countries such as Indonesia, I assume, is currently developing towards Postmaterialism along the
modernization railroad.
Sources: BPS. (2017). Persentase Penduduk Usia 7-24 Tahun Menurut Jenis Kelamin Kelompok Umur Sekolah,
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dan Partisipasi Sekolah 1, 2002-2015. Badan Pusat Statistik; BPS. (2017). Indikator Pendidikan, 1994-2016.
Badan Pusat Statistik.
The graphic 1 above depicts the overall School Enrolment Rate (SER) in Indonesia between the year
2005 and year 2015. If we would observe the line (SER All Ages), Indonesia has experienced a rise in School
Enrolment Rate, beginning with only 62.12% on the year 2005 and have reached 70.91% by the year 2015.
Along the decade, it does appear that School Enrolment Rate has ascend consistently, there is a total
rise of 8.79% throughout the period. On one hand, I would argue that the accessibility for education has
increased formidably as the trend above has suggested, but there are further notes which must be elaborated.
I have also differentiated School Enrolment Rates into different age groups. School Enrolment Rate for
Ages 7-12 (Primary/Elementary Education) has not experience very tremendous changes since practically
almost every Indonesian citizen are able to enjoy basic educational threshold. Primary education has changed
from 97.14% – 98.59%, an increase of 1.45%. On the other hand, the School Enrolment Rate for Ages 13-15
(Lower Secondary Education) has increased from 84.02% – 94.59%, an increase of 10.57%. In addition, the
School Enrolment Rate for Ages 16-18 (Senior Secondary Education) have encountered the greatest
improvement from 53.86-70.32%, an increase of 16.46%.
On the positive aspect, these statistical data tell that there is different scale, or gradation, of
improvements within each respective level of education. The School Enrolment Rate does not only state how
many students are attending schools, but these rates also explain the accessibility – the amount of educational
infrastructure made available for students to participate. There might be not much improvement in the
elementary threshold since it is already high at the beginning, but there are higher levels of improvement in the
lower and higher secondary education; elementary education having the lowest improvement, followed by the
lower secondary threshold, and higher secondary threshold experiencing tremendous rise of student participation.
There are several factors which have led to the increase of School Enrolment Rate, one of which is
Compulsory Study Policy. This policy varies from different period of governance. Since the year 1994, it has
been declared that Compulsory Study should be made up to Nine-Year (Up to lower secondary education)
(Firman & Tola, 2008). And by the year of 2011, reports have shown that a huge sum of financial resources
have been prepared to tackle the problem of access. The central government have issues the 12 Years Policy
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through the ministry of education and culture to strengthen scholarship distributions (Lestari et al, 2015).
Although the initial expectation of such policies is to produce a 97 percent Crude Participation Rate for
secondary education by the year 2020, it has already made one when regular citizens are able to enjoy better
access on primary and secondary education as shown above.
The goal of this program is to develop education in Indonesia, to improve equity and access. Based on
the findings above, I do find convincing that the state had shown its performance to achieve the first objective.
But, the accessibility of education may not be stable throughout different levels of education. The government
have provided infrastructural and scholarship support for education, and yet, there is a consistent trend
throughout the decade that School Enrolment Rates decline whenever students attempt to reach a higher level of
education. There is a gap between the 12 Year Compulsory Study Policy and the increasing dropout rate
throughout the increasing age groups. Primary school students are unable to continue studying for lower
secondary education, and so on. The overall access of education has improved, but the access and continuation
for higher education is stillquite stagnant.
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Source: The World Bank. (2012). Indonesia: Preparing Indonesian Youth for Transition – Issues and Policy
Agenda for Senior Secondary Education.
In the previous section, I have stated that the government has provided policies which promote the
accessibility of education. It is quite questionable how students experience low continuation rate even ifthe state
has already reserved 20% of the national budget for educational purposes. It seems odd in the first place when
the supply side has provided enough funds for scholarship to cover up tuition fees. Nevertheless, it does appear
that there are more factors which result in greater cost outside the expected equation; the subsidyprovided by the
government may not always cover other form of household expenses related to educational access in a public,
state-controlled, senior secondary education. The supply and demand side seem to not meet very properly.
As it is shown in graphic 2, the demand side of higher secondary education reflects the necessary
expense outside the government’s subsidy. The poorest quintile having the minimum household expense of Rp.
2,500,000 while the richest quintile would have a higher expense of Rp. 3,500,000. The weight of expense in
such secondary education is still quite burdensome for Indonesian citizens who are already at an initial
economic disadvantage (The World Bank, 2000). The problem of materiality, economic security, are still
obstacles for individuals to achieve higher levels of education.
And when students have achieved “employable age” to work, individuals tend to lose interest for
higher education, and later participate in the informal labors to attain immediate income (Moeliodihardjo, 2014;
Weston, 2008). The attrition during the transition of various educational levels depend heavily on the initial
household welfare and employment opportunities. This eventually results in the higher probability for students
to give up schooling and move towards economic labor (Suryadarma, et al, 2006). Theentrance into informal
jobs may provide economic income, but it is not at all promising to exercise upward social mobility
(Pattinasarany, 2012).
From these datas, I would like to argue that education as a material value – as an infrastructural access
has experienced a general trend of improvement. But, the transition towards higher education (lower, senior
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secondary education and college/university threshold) has not been satisfactory. On the supply side, the state has
not calculated the household expenses outside the budget which has burdened individuals originating from
disadvantaged groups. These expenses cannot be fully covered by the state, and thus rendering students and
parents from fully participating in school.
On the demand side, the reality of material value is still superior. Individuals felt the urgency to secure
economic income as a greater priority than to continue education. Students, having reached the employable age
of 15, would leave schools and obtain a job, even an informal one. Teachers in public general secondary school
also had to sacrifice more time on second jobs (2.7 hours per week) after their period of teaching in the
classrooms (17 hours per week) (The World Bank, 2012). This explains that not only students have to work to
earn extra wages, but teachers too experience economic insecurity which result in a lower focus for educative
purposes. The welfare of both students and teachers have yet to reach a material line of satisfaction.
This remarks that students who study in class appear to orient themselves towards material values more
than Postmaterial. Education is still a means for economic end, thus explaining the continual decline in the
secondary education when both teachers and students are more prone to search for secondary occupations to
earn a living. On the other part, the state has focused improvement in distributing educational access as a
material equity, as it was represented by the statistics;the quantitative data alone could only show the dispense
of school infrastructure. The next section would examine how Postmaterialism is being discussed and conveyed
within the school’s public sphere.
values as well but it is referred as a negative counterpart towards the liberal Postmaterial side. To trace how
civic values are threatened inside the educational institution, it would be necessary to bring up the topics on the
Multiculturalization and Islamisation of the state’s ideology. These two words represents the current social
situtation in Indonesia, but it might as well become the discourse which have been first reproduced within the
educational ground/arena. This section on the Postmaterial analysis will first begin with the multiculturalization
phenomenon, followed by Islamization after the Post-Authoritarian period.
I would like to use the term “intercultural” to describe the process of social inclusion, Islamization is
related with religious conservatism. It is quite interesting to first note how these two words are the ideal type of
the Indonesian intercultural society. Menchik (2016) stated that religious nationalism mixes both religion and
secular nationalism into one singular political imagined community in Indonesia. Therefore, it is not uncommon
for us to observe that Indonesian nationalism sometimes is identified by certain groups as intercultural, and by
some others, Islamic Orthodoxy. By assuming the Postmaterial argument, it is more likely to categories social
tolerance into the intercultural inclusion.
Previous studies have discussed that the escalating violence in the society has already began after the
Reformation, the increasing density of Islamization in the governmental institution rose as a counter-reaction
towards the repressive anti-Islamic Authoritarian period. Islamization entered the state’s institution, and thus
through its apparatus, this religious trend had influenced the institution of education. In return, the effect of
religious conservatism has also reduced the educational capacity to convey intercultural values, namely social
and religious tolerance (Raihani 2011). In other words, the tension between intercultural citizenship and
Islamization do not only reflect the resistance against democracy on the ideological ground, it is also practiced
within the educational institution itself.
The second cause of such trend is not always caused by the state, but by each school units. Recently in
the Reformation period, the School-Based Management (SBM) program have provided more freedom and
autonomy for each school to determine their own affairs. The decentralization of education institution, although
isa more democratic scheme, it is more prone to be infiltratedby religious conservatism. Islamization has gained
the momentum to project an Islamic expression within the Indonesian public schools. The effect of
democratization may not always lead towards Postmaterialism where students are engaged in social tolerance
and intercultural citizenship, but into other forms of non-materiality.
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Graphic 3. Multilevel Analysis on Government’s Policy and School’s Vision & Mission
Government Policy: “To produce intellectual and
competitive individuals; To socialise spiritual
(religiosity), social-emotional (tolerance), intellectual
and kinesthetic intelligence”.
Keast (2006) has provided a frame of multilevel analysis on governmental and institutional level of
education vision and policies. This analytical framework allows us to observe the conflict of values – the
ideological tension between intercultural citizenship and Islamization. Based on graphic 3, it is found the state
has formulized four Postmaterial values which become the pillar for cultural latency: spiritual intelligence,
social-emotional intelligence (this includes social tolerance), intellectual intelligence, and kinesthetic
intelligence (putting knowledge into practical situations). Based on these values, I would like to point out that
spiritual intelligence, otherwise known as religiosity, tend to have difficulty to embrace with other forms of
intelligence one of which is the social-emotional intelligence where social tolerance fall into this category.
It is also the same vision, perhaps if interpreted by religious orthodoxy, this particular point on
“religious education”justify and reproduce the Islamization of public schools. Although this value was meant to
imply that religious freedom is a crucial element to construct Indonesia’s democratic anatomy, it may not
always be the case in the Reformation period; Islamization seems to grow as had the historical trend has
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suggested. And eventually, the same repercussive effect was passed down and adopted by each individual
school unit. In one particular school in the Depok region, the school’s vision & mission reflect the state’s
policies, practiced it in an Islamic fashion for religious learning, and also implemented such religious culture in
the school’s public sphere (Kurniawan, 2017).
The increasing density of Islamic culture within the public schools have produced some alarming issues.
It is often found, that in some public schools, the social intolerance has become part of the culture. Intolerance,
may not always lead towards destructive violence nor coercion just as David Little (2001, quoted by Fuad, 2007)
has proposed, but intolerance still consist the act of forbearance and have not yet reach the willingness to accept
other cultural norms (Bretherton, 2004). Ultimately, the cultural dominance of a certain group results in a non-
coercive form of violence, symbolic violence, where non-Muslim students although are free to express their
opinions, their inferior stance are not fully welcomed implicitly into the cultural arena due to the strong current
of Islamisation (Connoly & Healy, 2004; Schubert, 2002)
Based on my interviews, I have found students opinions that symbolic violence, the weakening of
Postmaterialism, is found in school. The school’s bureaucratic system although has openly accepted the
Christian student community (Rokris) on the same equal ground as the Islamic student community (Rohis), the
administrative principle has once produced arbitrary policies which undermine minority student activities such
as the freedom of worship. Second, the informal culture as it has already been regulated and maintained,
discourage non-Muslim students to participate in the student presidency position (Ketua OSIS), let alone to
receive a major election from Muslim students (Kurniawan, 2017).
It is understood that civic education is an important means for students to know democratic values and
to embrace mutual respect as a civic value (Chzhen, 2013; Kirhkham, 2016; Leeman, 2008; Martin, 2013; Tan,
2007) On the contrary, the current situation where civic education is overwritten by overwhelmingly strong
Islamic culture could impede Postmaterial theme in education. The message on harmony, tolerance, and national
solidarity, if not consistent with intercultural practices, would remain anomic and a normative textbook
formality. Pancasila and other forms of Postmaterial values are external ideasfrom the students, and remain as so,
since the cultural factors impede the internalization of such values into the subjects.
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Substantive Islam as a Means for Postmaterialism
Although Islamization has become a momentum in the democratic period, and sometimes raises
worrying circumstances, Hefner (2009), based on his researches, have also argued that the Islamic religion can
become a means to direct the students towards democratization. Opposing Bruce’s argument (Furseth & Repstad,
2006: 99) that Islam and Democracy are two incompatible poles of political culture, Hefner’s research on
Islamic Education and Modern Muslim echoes Menchik’s initial statement on “Godly Nationalism” (Hefner,
2009). Hefner found an impressive result that most Muslim public and educators which he had surveyed, have
shown a general agreement towards democracy.
Table 1. Muslim Attitudes on Democracy and Islam
Support for Democracy
No. Percentage who agreed with the following statements Year Year
20042 20063
1. Democracy, compared to other forms of governance, is the best form of government 71.6% 85.9%
for a country like ours (Indonesia).
2. Democracy is a source of political disorder 7.0% 8.1%
3. Every citizen is equal before the law regardless of his or her political views. 82.8% 94.2%
4. Every citizen should be allowed to join any political organization 79.5% 82.5%
5. Mass media should be protected by law from arbitrary actions of government. 78.6% 92.8%
6. Our economy will be better if the government gives more freedom to each citizen to 76.9% 73.4%
do as he or she wishes.
7. Free and fair contestation between political parties improves the performance of 74.7% 80%
government of this country
Support for Shari’a and Islamism
No. Percentage who agreed with the following statements Year Year
2004 2006
1. Islamic governance, i.e., governance based on the Qur’an and Sunna under the 72.2% 72.2%
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2
2004 percentages are based on a survey of 1000 members of the general Muslim public in eight provinces
across Indonesia.
3
2006 data are based on a survey of 940 Muslim teachers in secondary-level Islamic schools (madrasas and
pesantrens) in eight provinces.
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Source: Hefner, R, W. (2009). Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia. University of
Hawaii Press.
Based on Hefner’s survey on the year 2004 and 2006, we can see that 85.9% of Muslim educators
agree on democracy as the best form of government in Indonesia. At the same time, the similar respondents
have also agreed towards the implementation of Islamic governance by the state, 72.2% of the overall Muslim
educators have agreed on this topic. Furthermore, the Muslim public and Islamic educators, has shown high
agreeableness on the practice of democracy. Higher than 70% from each respective group have shown positive
alignment with democratic values; only 7 - 8.1% responds that democracy is the source of political disorder.
On the contrary, the same survey reflects the potential for Postmaterial disability. The same percentile,
70% of the total respondents, agree that religious authority suits best for national regulation. While the Muslim
public partially agrees towards supporting Islamic values, I sensed that there is a higher tendency for Muslim
educators stressing a stricter practice of conservative religiosity in the public sphere. It is shown in the survey, in
the category “support for Shari’a and Islamism”, that there is a higher percentile in almost of every item where
Muslim educators promote Islamism in political, social, gender, and personal aspects of Indonesian public life.
Thus, with the full awareness that Islamism is inseparable from Indonesian democracy. the questions retain: how
do we reconcile these two differing views? How could democracy and Islam share the same part in the
Postmaterial territory.
On the Western perspective, Islam is incompatible with the Western democracy. However, the
Indonesian ideology (Pancasila) has prepared accomodations for both conflicting values; The indigenization of
Western democracy into the Indonesian social historical context gave birth to its own unique trait, and this
ideology becomes the Postmaterial bay which withhold different and mixing forms of cultural diversities. The
first point of Pancasila (Belief in the One and Only God) encompasses the possibilityfor Godly Nationalism and
religious freedom, and also the implementation of the Islamic belief (Akidah). And on the fourth point
(Democracy Guided by the Unanimity Amongst Representatives),it encourages the collective form of political
decision, similar to the notion of the Western democracy.
The transition towards Postmaterialism can be achieved when intercultural democracy is conveyed in
the field of education. Since Islam, and perhaps other religious groups, have generally agreed to the state’s
ideology, it is therefore a possibility to join religious value in harmony with democratic and civic values. I
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would assume that the survey above suggests that the concrete form of Indonesian governance is best with
democracy, while most Muslim educators would agree that the substantive value of Islam (shari’a) can also
promote the solidarity of the state, affirming its essential point in the Pancasila.
The issue of Postmateriality now comes whether Muslim educators are able to convey similar message
towards the students. Hefner (2009) have argued that Muslim educators should receive higher education in order
to balance these two differing views between democracy and Islam, so thus to synergies them, and be made
understood in the classrooms. Baidhawy (Syamsiyatun & Siregar, 2013) have suggested that social harmony, a
reflection of the ideological solidarity, should be supported by the state through the form of multicultural theory-
based religious education. It is because religious education has often been misused to limit religious freedom.
Religious education, according to him, should be sensitive towards diversities, and should shift from just
religious learning into interreligious dialogue.
The challenge for Indonesia today may not always end on the material issue of education access, but on
the Postmaterial factor of education quality. Not all educators are very concerned on pedagogy, as it has already
been stated above, to meet a day’s earning might still be difficult, let alone to pour higher concentration on civic
and religious education. On the material factor, Indonesian teachers still focus more on technical requirements,
finishing checklists of bureaucratic demands. On the non-material, educators may be ignoring the important
aspect of Pancasila’s intercultural value, or worse, having no careful attention towards the penetration of
alternative ideologies in schools. These radical movements enter through both methods: one from reading
materials which suggest literal interpretation, and second through external actors which recruit students as
adherents into their circles (Rokhmad, 2012). Teacher and school managers are encouraged to be aware, critical,
and evaluative to such growing issues. Should they not be careful, as the survey has proven, some teachers
(64.4%) might also slip into the less democratic category, possibly injuring the transition towards
Postmaterialism.
Discussion
Postmaterialism began with a psychological approach to examine the individual’s shifting orientation
from economic security towards social security. This notion follows the modernization theory which claims that
as the society progresses from developing to developed railway, the sustainable economic atmosphere would
inevitable produce a higher form of social value, namely social tolerance, civility, and democracy. The freedom
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of speech is more appreciated by Postmaterialist, while the freedom of economy is appreciated by materialists.
If we would picture the term “Material” and “Postmaterial”, it appears to follow Marx’s economic determinism
whereby the economic material is the basis to support ideology, education, and other forms of social institutions
in the higher Postmaterial platform. However, as this article has suggested economy alone is insufficient to
boost the developing state into Postmaterial nature; education is an important institution to smoothen the
transition.
There is still one major issue which have not been explored in this paper which requires further
research. The author is unable to explain how middle-class Muslim societies disagree with Postmaterialism.
Agreeing on the concept of Postmaterialism, we should have expected that most middle-class populist would be
more democratic, civil, liberal, etc. However, the current issues in Indonesia today shows that intolerance
persists even after material satisfaction which suggests that other social factors have also come into the “social
equation”4.
Based on that social phenomenon, I would like to suggest that since the concept of Postmaterialism
began in the more homogenous Western society, it may be unsuitable to capture societal change in the cultural
heterogenous society in developing countries. Therefore, if the author is to borrow Parson’s view on the society,
the author would argue that culturally heterogenous society not only requires economic satisfaction (Adaptation),
but also to be supported with cultural modification (Latency). Cultural modification can be located in the
cultural apparatus such as the educational institution. Intercultural education may be required to support the
transition towards Postmaterial atmosphere in Indonesia.
There are several points which I would like to suggest some possible recommendations on the
Indonesian education. First, as I touch the issue of educational accessibility, I would like to recommend that the
accessibility should be distributed horizontally and vertically. Horizontal distribution requires the spread of
educational infrastructure throughout the national region, in both urban and rural areas, to avoid possible social
disparity in geographical terms. Vertical distribution suggests that secondary and tertiary education should be
made more accessible (not just compulsory), by calculating other forms of household expenses which have not
been covered by the state, encouraging both students and parents to participate in school, reducing low
continuation rate and increasing school Enrolment rate. The state should also increase the teachers’ welfare
condition, thus to avoid them having secondary jobs. Likewise, providing higher teacher education and material
access so they would not have to worry on bureaucratic task, but to focus on essential learning processes.
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Second, on the educational quality, I would like to recommend that state should not ignore the
decentralized stance of school management, particularly after the democratization period since it is already
vulnerable towards alternative ideologies. The state should participate in formulizing curriculum which not only
touch the normative aspect of the state’s ideology, but also to engage continuously in formulizing learning
methods and multicultural forums, assisting both teachers and students to discuss, criticize, and internalize
Postmaterial values. Postmaterial values may not be crudely lean towards liberal democracy, nor to just religious
education, but also on intercultural citizenship learning. Postmaterialism is not just transferred through the
infrastructure and availability of textbooks, but the cultural atmosphere within the school. Thus, the state should
balance the centralization of educational institution to monitor and evaluate schools’ learning environments.
Conclusion
Postmaterialism is a perspective to measure the degree of social inclusion in Indonesia. Social inclusion
encompasses both material and non-material satisfaction, covering economic security and citizenship. The
institution of education, based on its accessibility and pedagogical quality, is one means to measure the
transition from material towards Postmaterialism. Based on its material aspect, educational access has become
more distributed although with difficulties to achieve secondary and higher threshold. While on its Postmaterial
aspect, the process of education in class requires the educators’ active role on conveying civic values,
intercultural dialogues, and national solidarity; considering that there are also ideological tensions on both
intercultural and Islamic values in the public schools. Postmaterialismis not only based on economic conditions;
further researches should also consider other social factors such as intercultural education,to strengthen the
transition towards a more democratic culture.
4
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/06/08/11204529/Kelas.Menengah.Konsumtif.dan.Intoleran. Accessed on
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Author Profile
Kevin Nobel Kurniawan is currently serving as an assistant lecturer in the Department of Sociology,
University of Indonesia. He is also working as a research associate in the Labsosio Research Cluster, Education
and Social Transformation.
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