The Demographic

Transition: An Overview of
America’s Aging Population
and Immigration’s
Mediating Role

By Justis Antonioli & Jack Malde

September 2023
 Introduction

The United States faces long-term economic challenges due to an unfolding

demographic crisis. Families are not having enough children to ensure robust
population growth, and improved health care and living standards are leading
to longer lifespans. The result is an aging U.S. population, with the average age
rising each year.

The graying of America means that the portion of people who are of prime
working age is getting smaller, with fewer workers available to fill open
positions, ultimately reducing productivity, straining the federal budget, and
slowing economic growth.

Today, the United States faces an already tight labor market, as demographers
expect birth rates to continue to decline, life expectancy to reach new highs,
and population growth to slow even further. In this environment, policymakers
may turn to immigration policy to mitigate the adverse effects of faltering
population growth, while strengthening the workforce and enabling economic
growth.

This report reviews the research on the implications of the demographic

transition toward an older population, the resulting economic challenges, and
the mediating role that immigration can play.

Evidence of an Aging
Population

The United States’ population is aging, marked by a rising national median age
and a significant portion of individuals no longer of prime working age. A great
deal of research has documented this demographic transition, outlining its key
drivers and forecasting the trend to continue.

Statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau show that between 2000 and 2021, the
national median age in the United States increased by 3.4 years from 35.4 years
to 38.8 years.1 Moreover, statistics from the Census Bureau’s 2021 American
Community Survey found that 55.3% of the population (183.1 million people)
was 35 years or older in 2021, up from 52.8% (163.3 million) in 2010. 2

2
Figure 1: US Population Distribution by Age, 2021 3

65+
13.1% 16.9%

55-64
11.9% 12.9%
35-54

27.8% 25.5%
Age Group

20-34

20.2% 20.0%
10-19

13.8% 13.2%

13.1% 11.6%
0-9

50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Percent of Population

2010 2021
Source: American Community Survey

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the older share of the
population will continue to grow. The ratio of the population ages 65 or older
to the prime working age population (ages 25-54) is increasing from 34 to
46 people ages 65 and older per 100 prime-age people in the next 20 years,
according to CBO’s 2023 Demographic Outlook report. 4

Studies cite two causes of an aging population: improved life expectancy and
decreased fertility rates.

1. Improved Life Expectancy

Due to various health and technological developments, people are living

longer. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, average
life expectancy in the United States was 68.2 years in 1950, 73.7 years in 1980,
and 78.8 years in 2019. 5 The Census Bureau projects that life expectancy will
continue to increase, approaching 85 years in 2050. 6

Improved life expectancy has a clear impact on demographics: Between 1944

and 2013, the percentage of American citizens 65 years and older doubled
from 7% to 14%.7 Recent research by the Kaiser Family Foundation shows
the percentage of citizens 65 years and older increased to 16.9% in 2021, and
demographers expect this rise to continue, reaching 22% in 2050. 8,9

3
 Figure 2: Percentage of U.S. Population 65 Years and Older, 2008-2021 10,11

17.0

Percentage of Population over 65 Years

16.5

16.0

15.5

15.0

14.5

14.0

13.5

13.0

12.5
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2021
Year
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation

2. Decreased Fertility Rates

A growing body of research documents that declining fertility rates have

driven the aging of the U.S. population, a phenomenon that has affected other
countries as well. The global fertility rate reached a modern-day peak of 5.32
births per woman in 1963.12 In the United States, the modern-day fertility
rate peaked in 1957 at 3.61, at the height of the post-World War II baby boom.
According to the most recent data, the global fertility rate is 2.32, while the U.S.
fertility rate is 1.66.13

Figure 3: U.S. Fertility Rates 14

4.0

3.5
Fertility Rate

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5
1957

1971
1973
1975

1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969

1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989

Year
Source: Our World in Data

4
 Studies on fertility rates attribute part of the decline to young adults delaying
starting families while pursuing career opportunities.15 The Census Bureau
reported that the median age for women having children in the United States
has increased from 27 in 1990 to 30 in 2019.16 Women also had fewer children
during this period.17

The driving force behind the fertility rate decline is the significant decrease
in births among women under 30, dropping from 90 births per 1,000 women
in 1990 to 48 births in 2019.18 Although births among women in their 30s and
beyond have risen, the increase has not offset the overall decline in the number
of children being born to younger women.

Figure 4: Births per 1,000 Women, 1990 and 201919

120

110

100

90

80
Births Per 1,000 Women

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1990 2019
Age Group

15-19 20-29 30-39 40-44 Total

Source: United States Census Bureau

5
 A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Aging populations and their consequences can be observed worldwide.

Research on the global population shows that in 2019, nearly 703
million people were over the age of 65. More-recent research put this
number at 761 million in 2021—a jump of 58 million in two years—and
this population is projected to more than double, reaching 1.6 billion in
2050. The Population Reference Bureau in 2010 predicted that the rapid
increase in older adults would result in four persons of working age for
every person over the age of 65 in 2050, down from nine in 2010.

Although this demographic transition is occurring globally, different

countries are experiencing different paces of aging. The United States
is not aging as fast as some other countries, but its trajectory can be
presaged from the experiences of several Asian and European countries,
such as Japan, China, and Germany, which have seen decades-long runs
of declining fertility and longer life expectancy.

In 2020, 1 in 3 people in Japan were over the age of 65, and

demographers predict that the Japanese workforce will decrease by
11.5% from 69 million to 61 million as soon as 2030. In China, the result of
a decades-long decline in fertility rates can be observed: For the first
time in more than 60 years, the population has decreased, with India
overtaking China as the most populous country in 2023.

In Germany, policymakers are exploring policy tools aimed at enhancing

the workforce participation of older citizens. This effort comes as
the share of the German population ages 65 and older is expected
to rise from 22% to nearly 33% by 2050. Moreover, research in 2015
indicated that the share of the overall European population over age 65
is predicted to be 27% in 2050, while the share of the North American
population 65+ is predicted to be 22% in 2050.

Evidence of Slowing
Population Growth

There is considerable evidence that U.S. population growth is slowing, with

decreasing fertility rates being a key driver of this phenomenon. Over time,
less children being born slows population growth or precipitates population
declines, even without the effects of aging.

6
 From July 2017 to July 2018, the U.S. population grew an estimated 0.62%,
the lowest pace of annual growth since 1937. 20 Since then, annual population
growth has dropped further to 0.40% from July 2021 to July 2022. 21 Moreover,
the 2020 decennial census revealed that the U.S. population growth of the past
decade was the lowest in the country’s history: Population growth from 2010-
2020 was 7.4%, nearly 2.5 percentage points less than population growth from
2000-2010 and less than half of the growth rate from 1990-2000. 22

Figure 5: Decennial Population Growth Rate 23

Percentage of Growth from Previous Decade

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

6
1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020
Year
Source: United States Census Bureau

CBO forecasts that annual U.S. deaths will exceed births by 2042, meaning that
any population growth after that turning point will be driven entirely by
immigration. Considering expected immigration rates (estimated by CBO to be
about the same as the years before COVID-19), CBO’s forecast shows population
growth of only 0.3% per year, on average, over the next 30 years—roughly one-
third of the annual growth rate that we have seen over the past 40 years (0.8%). 24

Effects on the Workforce and

Economy

Economic models showcase the effects of demographic trends on economic

growth and are corroborated by empirical studies. As such, declining
population growth rates and an aging population have negative implications for
the U.S. economy.

7
 1. Impact of slowing population growth

Theoretically, population growth means more labor that can produce goods and
services, more consumers to drive demand, and more innovators to generate
important ideas. Research suggests that slowing population growth is a threat to
sustainable economic growth, with one recent theoretical study even arguing that
living standards might stagnate entirely in the absence of population growth. 25

In addition to theoretical evidence, researchers have long studied the empirical

relationship between population growth and GDP, finding that while many
other factors play a role in a nation’s economic growth, there is a positive
correlation between population growth and GDP. 26 A meta-analysis of 29
prominent economic growth studies found that in high-income countries,
declining population growth rates slow economic growth. 27

2. Impact of an aging population

An aging population not only contributes to declining population growth, it

also increases the dependency ratio—the ratio between children and retirees
(the groups who typically do not work) and the working-age population. The
prime working-age population (typically defined as ages 25-54) generally pays
taxes and provides the majority of the revenue that funds federal and state
programs used by the dependent share of the population.

Theoretical research demonstrates the importance of the dependency ratio by

viewing the relationship between demographics and the economy through
the lens of the average human life cycle. In both the early and elderly years
of an individual’s life, that individual is a consumer, but their productivity
is not sufficient to support their consumption. That responsibility, therefore,
falls on the working-age population in the middle years of their lives, when
labor productivity is the highest. 28 As a result, the lower the dependency ratio
(i.e., fewer dependent individuals relative to prime working-age adults), the
greater the productive capacity of an economy. 29 Empirical research documents
the negative impact an increasing dependency ratio can have, with one 2016
working paper demonstrating that each 10% increase in the fraction of the
population ages 60 or older is associated with a 5.5% decrease in GDP per
capita. 30

The evidence for an increasing dependency ratio in the United States is clear.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines
the old-age dependency ratio as the number of individuals ages 65 and over
per 100 people of working age (20-64). 31 The OECD reported that in 2023, the
U.S. old-age dependency ratio was 31.3%, compared with 20.9% in 2000. 32
OECD predicts this ratio will increase to 40.4% in 2050. 33 Census Bureau data
corroborates the increase in the old-age dependency ratio, showing a 34%
increase in the 65+ population, or a growth of 13.8 million since 2010, with this
growth expected to continue over the next decade. 34

8
 The reality of increasing dependency ratios is manifested in declining labor
force participation rates. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the
civilian labor force participation rate as the percentage of the population that
is either working or actively looking for work. 35 BLS data demonstrates that the
civilian labor force participation rate has declined steadily from 66.5% in June
2003 to 62.6% in June 2023. 36

Figure 6: Labor Force Participation Rate June 2003–June 202337

66.5

66.0

65.5

65.0
Participation Rate

64.5

64.0

63.5

63.0

62.5

62.0

61.5
June-04

June-05
June-03

June-08
June-06

June-09
June-07

June-20

June-23
June-22
June-10

June-14

June-18
June-15

June-16
June-13

June-19
June-12

June-21
June-17
June-11

Year
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Research also projects slowing growth rates in the size of the civilian labor
force. Earlier this year, CBO forecasted that the civilian noninstitutionalized
population—people ages 16 or older who are not in the care of an institution—
will grow from 266 million people in 2023 to 301 million people in 2053,
expanding by 0.4% per year, on average. 38 The subgroup of people ages 25-54
(adults in their prime working years) will grow at an average annual rate of 0.2%
over that period. These growth rates are significantly lower than they have been
over the past 40 years, when the civilian noninstitutionalized population grew
at a rate of 1.1% per year on average, and the prime working-age population grew
at a rate of 0.9% per year on average.

Declining labor force participation and slowing civilian labor force growth
rates have already had clear consequences for the economy in the form of a
tight labor market—one in which insufficient workers are available to fill
vacant positions. In President Biden’s economic report this year, the White
House touched on the issue of aging, arguing that one of the driving forces of
the current tight labor market is the fact that baby boomers are leaving the
workforce and not enough younger workers are replacing them. “Unless efforts
are undertaken to mitigate the impact of demographic change—by drawing

9
 more adults into the labor market and/or increasing immigration flows—the
labor supply is likely to be constrained for the foreseeable future,” the report
concluded. 39

Ultimately, a persistently tight labor market is one in which businesses are

unable to hire all of the workers they need, which restricts economic output
and innovation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce in July 2023 highlighted
the latest employment data: The United States has 9.8 million job openings
but only 5.9 million unemployed workers.40 This means that even if every
unemployed person in the country found a job, the economy would still have
3.9 million open jobs. The chamber previously reported that more than 90% of
state and local chambers of commerce were concerned that worker shortages
were holding back their economies.41 A tight labor market can also contribute
to inflation if businesses are forced to offer higher wages to lure workers from
other jobs or back into the workforce and pass these costs on to consumers
in the form of higher prices. Such actions, in turn, can also constrict real
economic growth.42

The Importance of
Immigration

While an aging population and slowing population growth threaten U.S.

economic growth, research has shown that immigration has mitigated the
negative economic consequences of this demographic transition. Further
research has demonstrated that as the U.S. population continues to age,
immigration will only grow in importance.

1. Population Growth

An abundance of evidence reveals that immigration is a significant

determinant of U.S. population growth, particularly in the face of an aging
population. Increases in the number of foreign-born Americans and their
descendants, according to Pew Research statistics, have been the main driver of
U.S. population growth since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965, accounting for 55% of the population increase from 1965-2015.43
In 2022, foreign-born workers’ share of the U.S. labor force rose to 18.1%, the
highest level in 27 years of record-keeping.44

Census data from July 2020 to July 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic
revealed the consequences for U.S. population growth when the nation is
experiencing a high number of deaths, a low number of births, and lower
immigration than the prior year. The combination resulted in a population

10
 increase of only 0.01%—the slowest growth rate on record for the United
States.45 Census researchers noted that the pandemic was an underlying factor
in this period of near-stagnant population growth. However, demographers are
also aware that as the U.S. population continues to age, and if birth rates and
immigration levels remain low, the staggeringly low growth rates experienced
in 2020-2021 might occur again. In particular, CBO has forecast that, by
2042, deaths will exceed births due to population aging. After that point,
immigration will entirely drive any population growth.46

Figure 7: Population Growth and Its Underlying Factors47

1.0
Projected
0.9
By 2042, with the aging of the population, deaths
0.8 exceed births in CBO’s projections. As a result,
population growth after that point is driven
0.7 entirely by immigration.

0.6

0.5
Percent

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

-0.1

-0.2
2009

2043

2045

2049
2007

2023

2025

2033

2035

2039

2053
2029

2047
2027

2037

2041
2013

2015

2019

2021

2031

2051
2017
2011

Year

Population Growth Births Minus Deaths Net Immigration

Source: Congressional Budget Office

CBO expects net immigration to initially rise as the effects of the pandemic
wane and economic conditions improve, and then to stabilize at historic rates.
Overall, it projects annual net immigration to the United States to average 1.1
million people per year from 2023-2053, roughly in line with the pre-pandemic
period between 2010 and 2019 (an average of 1.0 million people per year).
Notably, however, the forecasted level of immigration is insufficient to prevent
a slowing of the population growth rate, as the greater number of deaths than
births during this time will reduce the population growth rate from 0.3% to
0.2% year over year by 2051.48

Other research corroborates CBO’s forecast that the population will be highly
dependent on immigration. The Census Bureau has projected that, under a
zero-immigration scenario, the U.S. population will only increase until 2035,
after which it will decline through 2060.49 The other scenarios analyzed, each
of which contains some degree of immigration, all show the U.S. population
rising through 2060.

11
 2. Labor Supply

Consistent with research that immigration plays a significant role in U.S.

population growth, evidence shows that immigration also effectively bolsters
the labor force. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that because
international migrants tend to be of working age, they increase the size of the
labor force in the receiving country, reducing the dependency ratio and slow
population aging. 50 BLS data shows that foreign-born workers, particularly men,
participate in the workforce at a considerably higher rate than their native-born
counterparts. In June 2023, the total labor force participation rates for foreign
and native workers were 67.0% and 62.1%, respectively; for men only, these
numbers were 77.9% and 66.7%, respectively. 51

Research has also shown that immigrant labor creates more employment
opportunities for natives. This counters the “lump of labor fallacy,” or the
false idea that economies can produce only a fixed number of jobs and that
increased immigration must always come at a cost to domestic employment. 52
Instead, research found that immigrants often take lower-skilled positions not
commonly held by native-born workers, and native-born workers as a result
enter occupations that often require proficient language and communication
abilities. Immigration thus allows native-born workers to pursue more-
specialized jobs and to advance in their careers. 53 Similarly, high skilled
immigrants can expose natives to new forms of knowledge—efficient processes
and cutting-edge research, for example. This increases natives’ human capital
and makes them more productive. 54

Immigration also provides vital financial support for an aging population.

The graying of America necessitates significant spending on Social Security,
Medicare, and other federal programs, while leaving the nation with a smaller
share of workers to pay taxes to support these programs, weakening the
programs’ financial sustainability. As discussed earlier, the dependency ratio
grew from 20.9% in 2000 to 31.3% in 2023 and is forecasted to keep growing as
the population ages. 55 A recent white paper found that over the next 30 years,
immigrants will generally pay more in taxes than they will consume in public
benefits, particularly for those immigrants with greater education levels. 56
The study also found that not only is the fiscal impact of immigrants positive,
but it is also greater than that of native-born Americans. The three primary
reasons are that immigrants are more likely to be of working age than native-
born residents, the education levels of recent arrivals to the United States have
been increasing, and immigrants are less likely to be eligible for government
benefits. 57 In addition, evidence suggests that immigrants are less likely to
claim benefits even if they are eligible. Immigration, as a result, can be a useful
tool to maintain or extend the sustainability of important federal programs.

12
Conclusion

The aging of the U.S. population and declining population growth will continue
for the foreseeable future, with major consequences for the U.S. workforce,
the federal budget, and economic growth. In the face of this demographic
transition, immigration will be a vital tool to maintain population growth and
drive the U.S. economy.

13
Endnotes

1 Jewel Jordan, “Nation Continues to Age as It Becomes 10 Kaiser Family Foundation, “Population Distribution
More Diverse,” U.S. Census Bureau, June 30, 2022. by Age,” 2021. Available at: https://www.kff.org/other/
Available at: https://www.census.gov/newsroom/ state-indicator/distribution-by-age/?currentTimefram
press-releases/2022/population-estimates- e=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%
characteristics.html. 22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.

2 U.S. Census Bureau, “Table DP05: ACS Demographic 11 2020 data was not released due to disruptions to data
and Housing Estimates,” 2010 – 2021 American collection caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
Community Survey, 2021. Available at: https://data.
census.gov/table?q=DP05. 12 Max Roser, Fertility Rate, Our World in
Data, December 2, 2017. Available at:
3 Ibid. https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate.

4 Congressional Budget Office, The Demographic Outlook, 13 Ibid.

January 2023. Available at: https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/58912. 14 Our World in Data, “Fertility rate: Children Per
Woman (1957-2021) Table,” 2023. Available at:
5 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Life https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate.
Expectancy at Birth, age 65, and age 75, by Sex, Race,
and Hispanic Origin: United States, Selected Years 15 Danan Gu, Kirill Andreev, and Matthew E. Dupre,
1900-2019,” August 12, 2022. Available at: https:// “Major Trends in Population Growth Around the
www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus/data-finder.htm?year=2020- World,” China CDC Weekly, 3(28), 2021. Available at:
2021&table=Table%20LExpMort. https://weekly.chinacdc.cn/en/article/doi/10.46234/
ccdcw2021.160.
6 U.S. Census Bureau, Living Longer: Historical and
Projected Life Expectancy in the United States, February 16 Anne Morse, “Stable Fertility Rates 1990-2019 Mask
2020. Available at: https://www.census.gov/content/ Distinct Variations by Age,” U.S. Census Bureau, April
dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25- 6, 2022. Available at: https://www.census.gov/library/
1145.pdf. stories/2022/04/fertility-rates-declined-for-younger-
women-increased-for-older-women.html.
7 U.S. Department of State, Why Population Aging
Matters: A Global Perspective, 2007. Available at: 17 Ibid.
https://www.nia.nih.gov/sites/default/files/2017-06/
18 Ibid.
WPAM.pdf.
19 U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 1: Fertility Rates by Age:
8 Kaiser Family Foundation, “Population Distribution
1990-2019,” April 6, 2022. Available at: https://www.
by Age,” 2021. Available at: https://www.kff.org/other/
census.gov/library/stories/2022/04/fertility-rates-
state-indicator/distribution-by-age/?currentTimefram
declined-for-younger-women-increased-for-older-
e=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%
women.html.
22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
20 William H. Frey, “US population growth hits
9 Jonathan Vespa, Lauren Medina, and David M.
80-year low, capping off a year of demographic
Armstrong, Demographic Turning Points for the United
stagnation,” Brookings Institution, December 21,
States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060, Current
2021. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
Population Reports, February 2020. Available at:
the-avenue/2018/12/21/us-population-growth-hits-
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
80-year-low-capping-off-a-year-of-demographic-
publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf.
stagnation/.

14
21 U.S. Census Bureau, “Growth in U.S. Population 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Shows Early Indication of Recovery Amid Covid-19 Development, “Old-age dependency ratio,” 2023.
Pandemic,” December 22, 2022. Available at: Available at: https://data.oecd.org/pop/old-age-
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press- dependency-ratio.htm.
releases/2022/2022-population-estimates.
html#:~:text=DEC.,components%20of%20change%20 32 Ibid.
released%20today.
33 Ibid.
22 U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Population
34 Luke Rogers and Kristie Wilder, “Shift in Working-Age
Change Data,” April 26, 2021. Available at:
Population Relative to Older and Younger Americans,”
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/dec/
U.S. Census Bureau, June 25, 2020. Available at:
popchange-data-text.html.
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/06/
23 Ibid. working-age-population-not-keeping-pace-with-
growth-in-older-americans.html#:~:text=In%20
24 Congressional Budget Office, The Demographic Outlook, contrast%2C%20a%20higher%20ratio,were%2049%20
January 2023. Available at: https://www.cbo.gov/ dependent%2Dage%20people.
publication/58912.
35 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Force Statistics
25 Charles I. Jones, “The End of Economic Growth? from the Current Population Survey,” 2023. Available
Unintended Consequences of a Declining Population.” at: https://www.bls.gov/cps/definitions.htm.
American Economic Review, 112 (11): 3489-3527,
2022. Available at: https://www.aeaweb.org/ 36 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Civilian labor
articles?id=10.1257/aer.20201605. force participation rate,” 2023. Available at:
https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/
26 E. Wesley F. Peterson, “The Role of Population civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm.
in Economic Growth,” Sage Open, 7(4), 2017.
Available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 37 Ibid.
full/10.1177/2158244017736094.
38 Congressional Budget Office, The Demographic Outlook,
27 Derek D. Heady and Andrew Hodge, “The effect of January 2023. Available at: https://www.cbo.gov/
population growth on economic growth: A meta- publication/58912.
regression analysis of the macroeconomic literature.”
39 The White House, Economic Report of the President,
Population and Development Review, 35: 221-248, 2009.
March 2022. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.
Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ERP-2023.pdf.
abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2009.00274.x.
40 Stephanie Ferguson, “Understanding America’s Labor
28 Andrew Mason and Ronald Lee, “Six Ways Population
Shortage,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, July 12, 2023.
Change Will Affect the Global Economy,” Population
Available at: https://www.uschamber.com/workforce/
and Data Review, 48: 51-73, 2022. Available at:
understanding-americas-labor-shortage.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/
padr.12469. 41 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “The America Works
Report: Quantifying the Nation’s Workforce Crisis,”
29 David E. Bloom, “Population 2020,” International
June 1, 2021. Available at: https://www.uschamber.
Monetary Fund, March 2020. Available at:
com/workforce/education/the-america-works-report-
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/
quantifying-the-nations-workforce-crisis.
issues/2020/03/changing-demographics-and-
economic-growth-bloom. 42 Victoria Guida, “Fed’s Powell Cites Top Barrier
to Taming Inflation – Worker’s Wages,” Politico,
30 Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen, and David Powell,
November 30, 2022. Available at: https://www.politico.
The Effect of Population Aging on Economic Growth,
com/news/2022/11/30/feds-powell-inflation-workers-
the Labor Force and Productivity, National Bureau of
wages-00071403.
Economic Research, July 2016, revised June 2022.
Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/
working_papers/w22452/w22452.pdf.

15
43 Pew Research Center, Modern Immigration Wave 53 International Monetary Fund, World Economic
Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Outlook: The Great Lockdown, April 2020. Available
Change Through 2065, September 28, 2015. Available at: at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/28/ Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020#Chapter%204.
chapter-2-immigrations-impact-on-past-and-future-u-
s-population-change/. 54 George J. Borjas, Immigration and Economic Growth,
National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2019.
44 Gabriel T. Rubin and Rosie Ettenheim, “Immigrants’ Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/
Share of the U.S. Labor Force Grows to a New High,” working_papers/w25836/w25836.pdf.
The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2023. Available at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/immigrants-share-of- 55 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
the-u-s-labor-force-grows-to-a-new-high-67805c45?ref Development, “Old-age dependency ratio,” 2023.
link=integratedwebview_share. Available at: https://data.oecd.org/pop/old-age-
dependency-ratio.htm.
45 Luke Rogers, “Covid-19, Declining Birth Rates and
International Migration Resulted in Historically Small 56 Alex Nowrasteh, Sarah Eckhardt, and Michael
Population Gains,” U.S. Census Bureau, December 21, Howard, The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the United
2021. Available at: https://www.census.gov/library/ States, Cato Institute, March 21, 2023. Available at:
stories/2021/12/us-population-grew-in-2021-slowest- https://www.cato.org/white-paper/fiscal-impact-
rate-since-founding-of-the-nation.html. immigration-united-states?s=09.

46 Congressional Budget Office, The Demographic 57 Alex Nowrasteh and Robert Orr, Immigration and
Outlook, January 2023. Available at: the Welfare State: Immigrant and Notice Use Rates and
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58912. Benefit Levels for Means-Tested Welfare and Entitlement
Programs, Cato Institute, May 20, 2018. Available at:
47 Ibid. https://www.cato.org/immigration-research-policy-
brief/immigration-welfare-state-immigrant-native-
48 Ibid. use-rates-benefit.

49 Sandra Jacobs, “A Changing Nation: Population

Projections Under Alternative Immigration
Scenarios,” U.S. Census Bureau, February 2020.
Available at: https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1146.
pdf.

50 Giovanni Peri, “Immigrant Swan Song,” International

Monetary Fund, March 2020. Available at: https://
www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/
can-immigration-solve-the-demographic-dilemma-
peri#author.

51 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economic News

Release,” Available at: https://www.bls.gov/news.
release/empsit.t07.htm.

52 Bipartisan Policy Center, Recent Immigration Has

Been Good for Native-Born Employment, June 18, 2018.
Available at: https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/
recent-immigration-has-been-good-for-native-born-
employment/.

16
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