Abstract

Structural engineering is a subset of civil engineering, where structural engineers are

trained on how to design the “bones and muscles” that make the actual form and structure of
man-made structures. These include structural steel, reinforced concrete, column line steel,
masonry, piping, interior support, doors, window panes, roofing, walls, and earthquake
response. A quality structural engineer can help determine the proper specifications for a
structure, which will make the structure able to withstand any weather condition.
This paper is about a list of information and issues that causes the structural failure of
buildings. Structural failure begins to occur when the materials is stressed to its upper
strength limit causing to rupture or extreme deformations. The ultimate strength of the
material or the system is the limit of the load bearing capacity. In reaching this limit, the
construction materials could already been damaged, and their load carrying capacity is
suddenly decreased permanently. If the system is properly designed, o local collapsed should
normally not be a cause of instant or gradual failure of the complete building. The ultimate
failure strength of the construction elements should be carefully considered in the design of
structures to prevent failures.
Introductions
“A specification is basically a document that describes the scope of work, the type of
materials to be used, the quality of workmanship and the methodology of installation in a
specific contract. This is to be used and read in conjunction with contract construction
drawings. The specification is a living document to be used by the project team during the
construction phase; its value does not terminate at the design phase,” defines Eng. Gibson N.
Wanjau, Director & Principal Engineer at EL ARCA Engineering.
To the best of his knowledge, Eng. Wanjau further points out the proper specifications for a
structure should;
1. Clearly define the materials and manufacturers’ items to be used on site.
2. Back up the cost of the project, not only the materials and products but also the
performance and workmanship of the contractor.
3. Identify installation, testing and handover requirements.
4. Be clear, and rich in information to provide answer to the many construction
questions on site, saving the project team, contractor and client time and money.
5. Assist in minimizing project risk and providing support should there be any legal
disagreements.
6. Reference the quality and standards which should be applied on a construction
project.
7. Structural engineer also ensures that all the necessary tests are passed before any
construction project is put into use.
Buildings are designed to support certain loads without deforming excessively. The loads are
the weights of people and objects, the weight of rain and snow and the pressure of wind
(called live loads) and the dead load of the building itself. With buildings of a few floors,
strength generally accompanies sufficient rigidity, and the design is mainly that of a roof that
will keep the weather out while spanning large open spaces. With tall buildings of many
floors, the roof is a minor matter, and the support of the weight of the building itself is the
main consideration. Like long bridges, tall buildings are subject to catastrophic collapse. The
causes of building collapse can be classified under general headings to facilitate analysis.
These are bad design, faulty construction, foundation failure, extraordinary load, unexpected
failure mode and a combination of causes.
Bad design does not mean only errors of computation, but a failure to take into account the
loads the structure will be called upon to carry, erroneous theories, reliance on inaccurate
data, ignorance of the effects of repeated or impulsive stresses, and improper choice of
materials or misunderstanding of their properties. The engineer is responsible for all these
failures.
Faulty construction has been the most important cause of structural failure. The engineer is
also at fault here, if the inspection has been lax. This includes the use of salty sand to make
concrete, the substitution of inferior steel for that specified, bad riveting or even improper
tightening torque of nuts, excessive use of drift pin to make holes line up, bad welds, and
other practices well known to the construction worker.
Even an excellently designed and constructed structure will not stand a bad foundation.
Although the structure will be able to carry its load, the Earth beneath it not be able to
withstand it. The displacements due to bad foundations may alter the stress distribution
significantly. Extraordinary loads are often natural, such as repeated heavy snowfalls, or the
shaking of an earthquake, or the winds of a hurricane. A building is intended to stand for
some years should be able to meet these challenges. A flimsy flexible structure may avoid
destruction in an earthquake, while a solid masonry building would be destroyed.
Earthquakes may cause foundation problems when moist filled land liquefies.
Unexpected failure modes are the most complex of the reasons for the collapse, and we have
recently had good example. Any new type of structure is subject to unexpected failure until
its properties are well understood. Suspension bridges seemed the answer to bringing large
gaps. Everything was supported by a strong cable in tension, a reliable and understood
member. However, sad experience showed that the bridge deck was capable of galloping and
twisting without restraint from the supporting cables. Ellet’s bridge at Wheeling collapsed in
the 1840’s, and the Tacoma Narrow bridge in the 1940’s, from this cause.
The conservative, strong statically determine trusses were designed with pin-connected eye
bars to be as strong and safe as possible. The sad experience brought the realization of stress
concentration at the holes pierced in the eye bars. From earliest times, it has been recognized
that tension members have no surprises. They fail by pulling apart when the tension in them
becomes too high. Of you know the tension, the proportioning a member is easy. A
compression member, a column, is different. If it is short and squat, it bears its load until it
crushes. But if you try to support a load with a 12-foot column that will just support the load
with a 1-foot column, you are in for a surprise. The column bends outward, or buckles and
the load crashes to earth.
Tall buildings have generally been made with a rigid steel skeleton, sheathed in the lightest
materials to keep out the weather. Alternatively, reinforced concrete, where the compression-
resisting and protecting concrete surrounds the tough, tension-resisting steel, integrated into a
single body, has been used. Such structures have never failed (when properly built on good
foundations), and stoutly resist demolition. When the lower supports of a steel skeleton are
destroyed, the weight of the building seems to crush the lower parts and the upper parts
descend slowly into the pile of debris. Monolithic reinforced-concrete buildings are difficult
to demolish in any fashion.
2. Example of collapsed buildings due to structural failures
2.1 Sampoong Department Store, South Korea
The Sampoong Department Store collapse was a structural failure that occurred on
June 29, 1995, in the Seocho-gu district of Seoul, South Korea. The collapse is the largest
peacetime disaster in South Korean history as 502 people died and 937 were injured. It was
the deadliest modern building collapse until the September 11 attacks in New York City, and
the deadliest non-terror-related building collapse until the 2013 Savar building collapse near
Dhaka, Bangladesh [4].
The Sampoong Group began construction of the Sampoong Department Store in 1987
over a tract of land previously used as a landfill. The building’s plans originally called for a
residential apartment of four floors, and the apartments were to be built by Woosung
Construction. Instead, the blueprints were changes to that of a large department store during
the building’s construction by the future chairman of the building, Lee Joon. This involved
cutting away the number of support column to install escalators. When Woosung refused to
carry out the changes, Lee ignored its warnings, fired him, and used his own building
company to complete construction. The building was completed in the late 1989, and the
Sampoong Department Store opened to the public on July 7, 1990. Attracting an estimated
40,0000 people per day during the building’s five years of existence.
The completed building was a flat-slab structure, without crossbeams or a steel
skeleton, which effectively meant that there was no way to transfer the load across the floors.
To maximize the floor space, Lee Joon ordered the columns to be reduced to be 24 inches (61
cm) thick, instead of a minimum of 31 inches (79 cm) in the original blueprint that was
required for the building to stand safely. In addition, each column was 36 feet (11 m) apart to
maximize retail space, a decision that also meant that there was more load on each column
than there would have been if the columns were close together.
A fifth floor was originally planned to house a roller skating rink; it was added later to
comply with zoning regulations that prevented the entire building from being used as a
department store. However, Lee changed the plan for the fifth floor to include eight
restaurants instead. A construction company tasked to complete the extension advised that the
structure would not support another floor but was fired, and another company was hired to
complete the project. The restaurant floor had a heated concrete base referred to as “ondol”,
which has hot water piper going through it; the presence of the 4-foot-thick (1.2 m) “ondol”
greatly increased the weight and thickness of the slab. As a result of the fifth floor’s presence,
the columns held up four times the maximum weight that they were supposed to support.
In addition, the building’s air conditioning unit was also installed on the roof, creating
a 45-tonne load that was four times the design limit. In 1993, the air conditioning units were
dragged across the delicate roof, where the cracking started. The units were moved over the
column 5E, where the most visible cracks in the floor of the fifth level were seen before the
collapse. The cracks in the columns worsened because the columns supporting the fifth floor
were mismatched with the ones supporting the floors below it.
 In April 1995, crack began to appear in the ceiling of the south wing’s fifth floor. The
only response by Lee and his management staff involved moving merchandise and stores
from the top floor to the basements [5].
On the morning of June 29, the number of cracks in the area increased dramatically,
prompting managers to close the top floor and shut the air conditioning off. The store
management failed to shut the building down of issue formal evacuation orders as the number
of customers in the building was unusually high, and it did not want to lose the day’s
revenue. However, the executives themselves left the premises, as a precaution.
Civil engineering experts were invited to inspect the structure, only a cursory check
revealing that the building was at risk of collapse; the National Geographic Channel
documentary programme Seconds From Disaster indicates that the facility’s manager was
examining the slab in one of the restaurants on the fifth floor, only hours before the collapse,
when unknowingly, vibration from air conditioning radiating through the cracks in the
concrete columns, and the floor opened up.
Five hours before the collapse, the first of several loud bangs was heard emanating
from the top floors, as the vibration of the air conditioning caused the cracks in the slabs to
widen further. Amid customer reports of vibration, the air conditioning was turned off, but
the cracks in the floors had already grown to 10 cm wide. Around then, it was realized that
collapse of the building was inevitable, and an emergency board meeting was held. The
directors suggested to Lee that all customers should be evacuated, but Lee angrily refused to
do so for fear of revenue losses. However, Lee himself left the building safely before the
collapse occurred. Lee did not even inform his own daughter-in-law, who was one of the
employees in the building, of the imminent danger. She became trapped in the rubble and was
rescued only days later.
At about 5:00p.m., Korean Standard Time, the fifth-floor ceiling began to sink, and
store workers blocked customer access to the fifth floor. According to Seconds From
Disaster, the store was packed with hundreds of shoppers 57 minutes before the collapse, but
Lee did not close the store or carry out repairs during that time. When the building started to
produce cracking sounds at about 5:52p.m., workers began to sound alarms and evacuate the
building, but it was too late.
Around 5:52p.m., the roof gave away, and the air conditioning units crashed through
into the already-overloaded fifth floor. The main columns weakened to allow the insertion of
escalators, collapsed in turn, and the building’s south wing pancaked into the basement.
Within 20 seconds of the disaster, all of the building’s columns in the south wing gave way,
killing 502 people and trapping more than 1,500 inside.
2.2 Hotel New World, Singapore
The Hotel New World, previously known as the New Serangoon Hotel until 1984,
was the main tenant occupying the top three floors, and a branch of the Industrial and
Commercial Bank took up the ground level. A nightclub, Universal Neptune Nite-Club, and
Restaurant, was also situated on the second level of the building at the time of the collapse.
The building had previously experienced a poisonous gas leak (caused by carbon monoxide)
in some of the hotel rooms, first hitting the headlines on 30 August 1975, the day after the
poisonous gas leak was reported.
Many potential causes of the accident were investigated. Surviving sections of
concrete were tested to ensure they were to proper constructions standards, and it was found
that they were. Even the construction work of the underground railway tunnels who had
assisted in the rescue was investigated, even though the excavations were more than 100
yards from the collapsed building. It was found that they had no effect on the building’s
stability. Also investigated were the various additions made to the building after its initial
construction. Air conditioning system had been constructed of the roof of the building, the
bank had added a large safe, and ceramic tiles had been fixed to the building’s exterior, all
adding considerably to the building’s weight. It was found that the weight of these additions
was inconsequential.
However, this line of investigation into weight led to the discovery that the original
structural engineer had made a serious error in calculating the building’s structural load. The
structural engineer had calculated the building’s live load (the weight of the building’s
potential inhabitants, furniture, fixtures and fittings) but the building’s dead load (the weight
of the building itself) was completely omitted from the calculation. This meant that the
building as constructed could not support its own weight. Collapsing was only a matter of
time. After three different supporting columns failed in the days before the disaster, the other
columns which took on the added weight no longer supported by the failed columns—could
not support the building.
According to Channel News Asia, Lian Yak Building was designed by unqualified
draftsman instead of a professional structural engineer. An investigator found out that he had
under-estimated the dead weight which the columns and walls could support. The
investigator also found that Ng requested to use inferior materials to build Lian Yak Building
in order to reduce the cost.
2.3 World Trade Centre, USA
The Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre collapsed on September 11, 2001, as a
result of being struck by two jet airlines hijacked by 10 terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda,
during the September 11 attacks. Two of the four hijacked airliners crashed into the Twin
Towers, one into the North Tower (World Trade Centre 1) and the other one into the South
Tower (World Trade Centre 2). The collapse of the Twin Towers destroyed the rest of the
complex, and debris from the collapsing towers severely damaged or destroyed more than a
dozen other adjacent and nearby structures.
The cause of the tower to collapse is that the high temperatures in the fires weakened
the steel beams and columns, causing them to become “soft and mushy”, and eventually were
unable to support the structure above. The fireproofing became dislodged during the initial
aircraft impacts. The initial structural failure occurred; the progressive collapse of the entire
structure was inevitable. The heat from the fires was a key factor, causing steel columns in
both the core and the perimeter to weaken and experience deformation before losing their
carrying capacity and buckling. Once more than half of column on a particular floor buckled,
the overhead structure could no longer be supported and complete collapse of the structures
occurred.
In both towers, the section of the building that had been damaged by the airplanes
failed. Aside from the structural damage, the impacts had removed fireproofing from a large
part of the impact zone allowing the structural steel to heat rapidly. As a result, the core
columns were weakened and began to shorten due to creep. The hat truss resisted this by
shifting loads to the perimeter columns. Meanwhile, web diagonals of the 60 foot trusses
supporting the long-span tenant floor area began to buckle, causing the floors to sag by more
than 2 feet. This pulled in the perimeter walls, which buckled. The floors above the impact
zone now fell freely onto the undamaged structure below.
The North Tower lasted around 46 minutes longer than its twin, having been struck 17
minutes before the South Tower was attacked and standing another half-hour after the South
Tower collapsed. This was because Flight 11 struck more or less in the center, causing more
symmetrical impact damage to the North Tower's core and leaving more of its structural
support intact. The fires also took more than an hour to spread to the south side of the
building, where there was fireproofing damage. Travelling at 440 miles per hour, Flight 11
crashed through Floors 93 and 99, leaving only 10 floors' worth of structural weight pressing
down on the damaged, burning section of the North Tower.
Flight 175's much higher impact speed inflicted structural damage even more
catastrophic than Flight 11's, which was compounded by the plane slicing through the
southeastern corner rather than the center, unbalancing the South Tower on one side. The
uneven weight distribution was significantly aggravated by Flight 175 crashing much lower
down, between Floors 77 and 85, resulting in double the pressure on both the perimeter wall
columns and core columns than in the North Tower and causing them to snap more quickly.
The difference in the impacts was such that a senior FDNY chief reportedly expressed strong
disbelief that the North Tower would collapse even after witnessing the collapse of the South
Tower, because the North had not been struck at a corner.
 When the columns failed, the entire building above fell onto the first intact floor
beneath impact. The vertical capacity of the connections supporting an intact floor below the
level of collapse was adequate to carry the load of 11 additional floors if the load was applied
gradually and 6 additional floors if the load was applied suddenly (as was the case). Since the
number of floors above the approximate floor of collapse initiation exceeded six in each
WTC tower (12 floors in WTC 1 and 29 floors in WTC 2), the floors below the level of
collapse initiation were unable to resist the suddenly applied gravitational load from the
upper floors of the buildings.
From there collapse proceeded through two phases. During the crush-down phase, the
upper block destroyed the structure below in a progressive series of floor failures roughly one
story at a time. Each failure began with the impact of the upper block on the floor plate of the
lower section, mediated by a growing layer of rubble consisting mainly of concrete from the
floor slabs. The energy from each impact was "reintroduced into the structure in [the]
subsequent impact, ... concentrate[d] in the load-bearing elements directly affected by the
impact." This overloaded the floor connections of the story immediately beneath the
advancing destruction, causing them to detach from the perimeter and core columns. The
perimeter columns peeled away and the cores were left without lateral support.
This continued until the upper block reached the ground and the crush-up phase
began. Here, it was the columns that buckled one story at a time, now starting from the
bottom. As each story failed, the remaining block fell through the height of the story, onto the
next one, which it also crushed, until the roof finally hit the ground. The process accelerated
throughout, and by the end each story was being crushed in less than a tenth of a second.
Methodology
Many of the examples of engineering failure cited above could have been avoided. It
would appear that time and cost constraints, in many instances, led to omission errors. An
absence of design checks and reviews juxtaposed with cost cutting procedures, such as in the
case of New World Hotel original structure plan. With this in mind, error reduction and
prevention should be reviewed as a continuous process, rather than a project system. In doing
so, this process enables the mapping of dependencies and interfaces that influence the error
prevention process. Furthermore, viewing error prevention as a continuous process implies
that learning from errors is a collective capacity that can produce the knowledge needed for
individual, organizational and project-related error prevention practices. Given the
complexity of the project environment within which designers work, the production of a
collective capacity would involve the learning processes of not only design organizations but
the entire project team.
Structures should be able to resist extreme weather including high winds and surface
water or run-off. They should be capable of withstanding dynamic forces and have solid
foundations. If unstable or likely to become unstable, a suitable large exclusion zone should
be established around the structure until rectification works are completed. Temporary
bracing should be considered if the structure is incomplete or works may affect stability
where lateral support from piers, cross-walls, floors, and roof framework is missing or being
altered, temporary bracing should also be used. Temporary bracing or other stability controls
should be designed by a competent person who is experienced in such works. To ensure work
will not compromise stability, a competent person should be consulted before adding or
making changes to or undertaking any structural work on the structure, or before excavating
near the structure.
An established engineer should inspect the temporary bracing arrangements and
verify in writing the stability of the structure when the bracing is first installed. Inspections
should be done regular intervals, based on risk assessment that takes into account the
structure’s condition, environmental factors and length of time the bracing has been in place.
In addition, an inspection should take place as soon as possible after an extreme weather
event or another incident that could affect stability.
Results and Discussions
1. Use of Substandard Materials and Lack of Quality control
This happens when the contractor or builder decides to use inferior materials to put up
the structure. For example, use of the wrong mix ratio of concrete (of lower class than
specified). Failure may also occur due to contractor and Engineer’s inadequate
supervision and control of operations and material quality.

2. Methodology of Construction
The contractor’s failure to construct in accordance with drawings and specifications
given by the engineer can also be a cause or reason for failure of structures.

3. External/Environmental Conditions
These are often natural, such as unexpected loads, heavy rain, earthquakes and maybe
defective sites, which may have unusual ground conditions.

4. Error in structural design

Error in design doesn’t only mean errors of computation, but also it can be a failure to
account for loads the structure will be expected to carry, reliance on inaccurate data
and improper choice of materials and their properties.

5. The structure usage

Every structure is designed and built to withstand a certain amount load. A residential
house is designed to withhold the weight of the residents living in it. As well as the
furnitures, fixtures and fittings in it.

Structural engineers perform an assortment of tasks within a building, many of these

engineers will be involved in the planning process, which will determine many of the
building’s characteristics. They will be responsible for determining the structural integrity,
load bearing ability, and conditions of the structure, among other things. Structural engineers
can also implement many of the building’s controls, ensuring that they work correctly, and
can monitor the overall effectiveness of the facility.
Civil engineers may also be called upon during a large earthquake or even cracks which are
starting to show up to inspect any damaged areas and ensure that safety regulations have been
followed. Many smaller civil engineering firms specialize in a particular segment of the field.
Some specialize in projects that focus on the residential market, while others focus on
commercial projects such as apartment complexes and office buildings. Structural engineers
may choose to work either on a specialty or multi-specialty basis, depending on the type of
structure they are working on. Whatever the case, it is almost certain that structural
engineering will continue to grow in importance as time goes by.
Conclusion
Structural failures are a symptom of a dysfunctional organizational and managerial
practices that prevail within the construction history. They significantly contribute to cost and
schedule growth, and rework. Furthermore, they jeopardize safety and are major contributors
to accidents that occur during and post construction. Significant failures were drawn upon to
highlight the adverse role that errors and failures can have upon the safety of the workers and
the general public. Many of the failures that have occurred could have been prevented if
design checks and reviews had been undertaken and appropriate managerial and project
management practices had been implemented. Instead cost and time pressures appear to be
prevailing nemeses contributing to errors and failures.
Considering the magnitude of human loss associated with building collapse and other
disaster and the ineffectiveness of the emergency management, there is need for immediate
review of practical policy guidelines by the government that should be carried out to letter to
make safe for living. In view of this, the following recommendations are necessary for
implementation by all stakeholders in disaster management generally and building collapse.
Policy review of the emergency agencies to simplify their hitherto bureaucratic procedures of
operations; adequate funding and monitoring of the activities of all emergency management
agencies. Appointment of qualified and expert building professionals – architects, and
engineers by building clients for design and supervision. Statutory implementation of all
physical development planning regulations, acts, bye-laws and codes in the processing of
building permit, actual construction and post occupancy follow-up.

Acknowledgement
I would like to express my special thanks and deepest appreciation my course mates for their
infinite wisdom, sincere attitude and the corrective feedback they gave me at all stages of this
study. I would like to thank them for guiding me whenever I consulted them. I will always
appreciate their guidance to me for my study. In addition, I would like to thank my lecturer
for the guidance and passion that he has shown to me all through this study.
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