SCHUTZIAN RESEARCH

SCHUTZIAN RESEARCH
It is an annual journal that seeks to continue the tradition of Alfred Schutz.
It seeks contributions that are philosophical, cultural-scientific,
or multidisciplinary in character.

Editor-in-Chief: Michael Barber (St. Louis University)

Associate Editors: Lester Embree (Florida Atlantic University)

Nasu, Hisashi (Waseda University)
George Psathas (Boston University)
Ilja Srubar (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg)

Editorial Board: Gary Backhaus (Loyola College)

Daniel Cefaï (École des Hautes Études en Sciences
Sociales, Paris)
Ion Copoeru (University “Babes-Bolyai” of Cluj )
Jochen Dreher (University of Konstanz)
Thomas Eberle (University of St. Gallen)
Martin Endress (University of Wuppertal)
Hwa Yol Jung (Moravian University)
Suzanne Kassab (German Orient Institute, Beirut)
Fred Kersten (University of Wisconsin at Green Bay)
Hubert Knoblauch (Technical University of Berlin)
Lenore Langsdorf (University of Southern Illinois)
Elisabeth List (University of Graz)
Thomas Luckmann (University of Konstanz)
Joachim Renn (University of Münster)
Yoshikazu Sato (Ritsumeikan University)
Hans-Georg Soeffner (University of Konstanz)
Florence Tocantins (Federal University of the State of Rio
de Janeiro)
Benno Werlen (University of Jena)
Chung Chi Yu (National Sun Yat-Sen University)
Richard Zaner (Vanderbilt University)

Honorary Board Members: Claudia Schutz Gahagan (New York)

Evelyn Schutz Lang (New York)
 SCHUTZIAN RESEARCH

A Yearbook of Lifeworldly Phenomenology

and Qualitative Social Science

Vol. 4 / 2012

¤
Cover: PAUL BALOGH

¤
Zeta Books, Bucharest
www.zetabooks.com

© 2012 Zeta Books for the present edition.

© 2012 The copyrights to the essays in this volume belong to the authors.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronical or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from
the publishers.

ISSN 2067-0621 (paper)

ISSN 2248-1907 (online)
ISBN 978-606-8266-25-1 (paper)
ISBN 978-606-8266-26-8 (ebook)
 CONTENTS

MICHAEL D. BARBER
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

LESTER EMBREE
It’s about Time!
A Sometimes Personal Narrative of Schutz Scholarship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

GEORGE PSATHAS
On Garfinkel and Schutz:
Contacts and Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

ANDREAS GÖTTLICH
Imposed Relevance:
On the Sociological Use of a Phenomenological Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

DANIELA GRISELDA LÓPEZ

The Oblivion of the Life-World:
The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

KEN’ICHI KAWANO
Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

DENISA BUTNARU
Crossing Cultures of Knowledge:
Alfred Schütz’s Heritage and the Contemporary Social Science
of the Individual in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

MICHAEL D. BARBER
The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development . . . . . . 91

HERMÍLIO SANTOS
Action and Relevance:
Making Sense of Subjective Interpretations in Biographical Narratives . . . . . . . 111
LESTER EMBREE
Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

TETSUYA SAKAKIBARA
Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
 Introduction
Michael D. Barber

Many of the papers in this, the fourth volume of Schutzian Research, were
presented at Founding Meeting of The International Alfred Schutz Circle for
Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science held at The New School for Social
Research of New York in May 2012. Lester Embree’s keynote address at the
meeting traces the history of Schutz scholarship, and this volume is the latest
contribution to that history. The papers have been contributed by scholars from
Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. For those
acquainted with Schutz scholarship, one will recognize familiar names, but there
are also several contributors who represent a new generation of Schutz scholar-
ship. The tradition Embree describes, then, appears vital and ongoing. The editor
would like to thank Ms. Minghe Li of the Department of Philosophy at Saint
Louis University for her editorial assistance.
Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 9–22

It’s about Time!

A Sometimes Personal Narrative
of Schutz Scholarship
(Keynote Address at the founding meeting of The Alfred Schutz Circle
for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science, New School, May 2012)

Lester Embree
Florida Atlantic University
[email protected]

Abstract: With some remarks on what I have personally contributed, this essay
sketches the origins of the posthumous effort by which Schutz’s thought, which
could have been forgotten, has become well-known internationally through the
dedicated work in the United States, Germany, and Japan of a modest number of
named students and followers in successive generations as well as his widow Ilse
ans daughter Evelyn. How his thought connects with phenomenology, sociology,
social psychology, and the theory of the cultural sciences is touched on. Besides
references to the two biographies and the annual, Schutzian Research, counts of edi-
tions of translations into a dozen languages and then lists of the Schutz Memorial
Lectures, the archives in Germany, Japan, and the United States, the Werkausgabe,
and the many conferences focused on Schutz are offered. This is to make the case
that the International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive
Social Science is long overdue.

Keywords: phenomenological sociology, Schutz translations, Schutz lectures,

Schutz archives, Schutz Werkausgabe, Schutz conferences

My theme is scholarship on the thought of Alfred Schutz from his death

in 1959 until now, but since a complete narrative could fill a little book, this
is merely a sketch and while there have also been many personal contributions
that a complete narrative should include, I will immodestly emphasize my own,
hoping that they can be understood to represent the personal contributions of
10 Lester Embree

the many others. My contention is that our founding of the International Alfred
Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science at this meet-
ing is long overdue.

Connecting With Schutz’s Thought

I was an undergraduate admitted to a graduate seminar on phenomeno-
logical philosophy with Edward Ballard at Tulane University in Fall 1961,
reading Herbert Spiegelberg’s The Phenomenological Movement (1960), which
is dedicated to Schutz, in relation to that course, and probably first heard his
name then, but I do not recall doing so. What I do recall is reading Aron Gur-
witsch’s “The Common-Sense World as Social Reality—A Discourse on Alfred
Schutz” (Social Research, Spring 1962) during the Summer of 1962 and being
impressed by the study of Schutz’s Collected Papers (1962) during Summer 1963.
So I can now claim half a century of personal involvement with his thought.
Next I sat in on the course on Schutz at the New School team-taught
by Gurwitsch and Thomas Luckmann that Fall and I think it was the next
year that I took the Schutz course by Luckmann at the school before he went
to Frankfurt. I do recall that I wrote a term paper for him analyzing “On
Multiple Realities” and that I sent it to him in Germany, somehow regret-
tably losing my carbon copy (no photocopying in that time), but I proudly
do recall earning an A. I had come to the attention of Gurwitsch by that
time—something one needed to do because there were so many students.
He was impressed that I was translating Ricoeur’s articles on Husserl with
Ballard, and he recommended me to Ilse Schutz to prepare the Index for
Collected Papers III (1966), which I did in Summer 1965. My friendship
with Ilse started then. Th is was my first contribution to “Schutz studies,” as
I think that it is best called. Years later I also made the index for Collected
Papers IV and, of course, now that in volume V.

Scheler in France
Before I continue with what happened in Schutz studies, let me suggest
what did not happen in another case and suggest why. With the Nazi period,
the focus of the phenomenological tradition shifted from Germany to France
and was first led there by Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and
Jean-Paul Sartre. I do not know about de Beauvoir, but the other two were
interested not only in the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Hei-
degger but also in that of Max Scheler. Merleau-Ponty wrote his first publi-
cation on Scheler, Sartre’s posthumous Cahiers pour une morale of 1947-49
(1983) indicates much study of Scheler, and the two men arranged a French
translation of Scheler’s main work, Der Formalismus in Der Ethik (1913/16),
in the new book series that they started. Thus one can easily imagine that
 It’s About Time! 11
right after the war phenomenology was seen in France as represented by Hei-
degger, Husserl, and Scheler. But Scheler seems soon to have been forgotten.
The general historiographical question is why are some figures remembered
and others forgotten? The answer in the case of Scheler in France seems to be
that no other influential figures, Paul Ricoeur for example, were subsequently
interested in him. And thus when Merleau-Ponty wanted a chapter on Scheler
for Les philosophes célèbres (1956), he looked beyond France to Alfred Schutz
in New York to write it.

Schutz Remembered
When Alfred Schutz died in 1959, it was still a time when, as Dorion
Cairns once told me, all the phenomenologists in the USA could sit in his
parlor. No other phenomenologist than Schutz theorized about the social sci-
ences. Schutz’s culminating work, The World as Taken for Granted—as I think
it was to be called—was little more than outlined and his publications were
in what were at best in secondary outlets, e.g., Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research and Social Research. Furthermore, as I will expand on presently,
American philosophers were adverse to the social sciences. Schutz could then
have easily been forgotten in the USA (and was hardly heard of elsewhere) the
way that Scheler was in France. Why was he not?
Before he died, Schutz had arranged for Maurice Natanson to edit Col-
lected Papers I, had outlined his own last book, and had above all left behind
his widow, Ilse, who had been his “scientific secretary” since the 1920s, and
who, if I am not mistaken, arranged for Luckmann to complete what came
to be called Structures of the Life-World (2 vols., English trans. 1973). Maybe
Schutz had also arranged for Arvid Brodersen to edit Collected Papers II (1964),
because a list of contents had been left by Schutz that included the unfor-
tunately omitted essay on T.S. Eliot (now published in CP V), but I do not
know what became of Brodersen. Two other Schutz students, Richard Zaner
and Fred Kersten, began to be involved in much editing and translating, and
Gurwitsch had come to the New School as Schutz’s successor and was in the
background along with Ilse in supporting and guiding the various efforts. Also
helping was the New School colleague Dorion Cairns, whom we now know
had long interacted with Schutz,1 but since these two New School colleagues
lived in the same city and communicated face-to-face or over the telephone,
there is nothing like the documentation that we have with the unfortunately
titled Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gur-
witsch, 1939-1959 (1989). (This title is unfortunate because while Gurwitsch

1
See Lester Embree, “Dorion Cairns and Alfred Schutz on the Egological Reduction,” in
Alfred Schutz and his Intellectual Partners, ed. Hisashi Nasu, Lester Embree, George Psathas,
Ilja Sruber (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2009)
12 Lester Embree

had some desire to return to Europe after the war, Schutz was an emigrant
rather than an exile.)
Finally, phenomenology did develop fairly rapidly in the USA during the
1960s, so there was soon a wide audience for Schutz’s thought, one that especially
included social scientists. The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Phi-
losophy (SPEP) was founded in 1962, the journal Human Studies was founded
by George Psathas in 1978, and The Society for Phenomenology and the Human
Sciences (SPHS) was excluded from SPEP in, I believe, 1979. In short, Schutz
had students, colleagues, and Ilse, while Scheler had nothing like that (although
Scheler’s widow was active in Germany after the war). Thus family, friends, and
students matter for work not to be forgotten. Schutz studies actually got off to a
good start, but sadly too late for Schutz himself to see it. But of course Schutz’s
personality, intellect, and multidisciplinary project are behind it all.

“Phenomenological Sociology”
Before I continue this story, I believe some commentary on the philosophy/
sociology relationship in American phenomenology is also in order. Hisashi Nasu
tells me that the expression “phenomenological sociology” was first used by E.A.
Tiryakian’s “Existential Phenomenology and Sociology” (American Sociological
Review, 1965). It has been widely used since in philosophy as well as social sci-
ence. Had I been asked about that title at that time, I would have been delighted.
Since then, however, I have learned that many phenomenological philosophers
in my country have low opinions of sociology and the social sciences and actu-
ally object contemptuously to various rejected positions and opinions as “soci-
ology,” thus sounding like Logical Positivists, which is somewhat ironical since
Auguste Comte, the father of positivism, also founded sociology in the middle
of the 19th Century.
Coming from the New School and not only anti-naturalistically accepting
from phenomenology the priority of the cultural sciences over the naturalistic
sciences, but also accepting Husserl’s project of a Wissenschaftslehre, it was years
before I recognized this anti-sociological positivistic attitude even within Ameri-
can phenomenological (and now also in so-called “Continental”) philosophy and
I am quite embarrassed by it. It is at the root, I believe, of the original exclusion
of what became the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS)
from the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) in 1979
and SPHS’s its continuing peripheralization in that connection.

Actually Social Psychology

Besides how the label “phenomenological sociology” continues to keep
phenomenological philosophers away from Schutz’s thought, there is an inter-
esting thing about this label in relation to that thought itself. Th is is how
 It’s About Time! 13
what Schutz called “Soziologie” in Austria before the war he found called
“social psychology” when he came to the USA, where “sociology” tended to
be approached via methodological collectivism rather than through the meth-
odological individualism that Schutz accepted from Georg Simmel and Max
Weber. Arguably, “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World”
(1955) is thus sociological in these American terms, but not “The Stranger”
(1944), “The Homecomer” (1944), and “The Well-Informed Citizen.”2 To the
extent, then, that Schutz produced any substantive social-scientific investi-
gations, they are, again in American terms, mostly social psychology rather
than sociology, but it must be granted that not all social scientists today clas-
sify disciplines in exactly these terms, some colleagues currently asserting that
social psychology in psychology is widely different from social psychology in
sociology. My point concerns what Schutz considered his work to be when he
entered the American situation.3
One can also wonder how Schutz’s thought is phenomenological. There
can be no doubt that his main philosophical source was Husserl, but it also
took me awhile to understand how this worked. The key insight is that what
Schutz fundamentally offers is, as does Husserl, a Wissenschaftslehre, a theory
of science or a science theory. In his case it is a science theory focused on the
cultural sciences, the social sciences especially, but also the historical sciences.
Here Schutz relies on Husserl’s constitutive phenomenology of the natural
attitude, also known as phenomenological psychology, to clarify the basic con-
cepts, disciplinary definitions, and distinctive methods of particular cultural
sciences, social psychology first of all, but also economics, history, political
science, and law explicitly and other disciplines, e.g., cultural anthropology,
more or less implicitly.4
What is especially interesting about Schutz’s science theory is that he consid-
ers it something that can be practiced by scientists, such as Max Weber, on their
own particular disciplines as well as by philosophers, such as Schutz, on species
and genera of science. And insofar as social scientists draw inspiration from his
thought in these respects, as many did in opposition starting in the 1960s to the
orthodoxy in American sociology represented by Talcott Parsons, their thought
can be considered phenomenological.

2
Cf. Lester Embree, “Founding Some Practical Disciplines in Schutzian Social Psychol-
ogy,” Bulletin d’analyse phenomenologique, vol. 6 (2010) http://popups.ulg.ac.be/bap.htm.
3
Incidentally, it is clear that for Schutz groups or collectivities are concrete and fundamen-
tal, while individuals are abstractions. Cf. Lester Embree, “Schutz on Groups: The Concrete
Meaning Structure of the Socio-Historical World,” English original (revised) in PhaenEx, vol.
6.1, April/May 2011, pp. 1-11. http://www.phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex/
article/view/3149.
4
No doubt there are many special journal issues on Schutz that I am unaware of, but one
deserves mention not only for its own sake but also for its reference to related bibliography on
his relation to the so-called Austrian economics: The Review of Austrian Economics 14:2/3 (2001).
14 Lester Embree

But there is a wider and deeper impact of Schutz’s thought that is not so
easy for me as a philosopher fully to understand, but some of which I have
come to understand from colleagues in the cultural sciences, including com-
munications, economics, education, nursing, political science, psychology,
and sociology. Th is is that there were movements in such disciplines that
opposed positivism beginning in the 1960s that are now called “qualitative”
or “interpretive” as well as phenomenological and take inspiration, concepts,
distinctions, etc. from Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Merleau-Ponty in
the latter respect, but that Schutz is especially important because he actually
has a great deal to say about the cultural sciences. So there are better stories
to be told by non-philosophers than I can tell about the value of Schutz in
the developments of their disciplines beyond philosophy. I look forward to
reading such accounts.

Schutz in English
Let me now continue my narrative with emphasis on what is in English,
the scientific and philosophic lingua franca of our time. I believe that Luck-
mann arranged or at least helped arrange for the English translation of Schutz’s
Aufbau, i.e. The Phenomenology of the Social World (1967). Then came Helmut
Wagner’s edition of the Life Forms and Meaning Structure (1972), Richard
Grathhoff ’s edition of The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred
Schutz and Talcott Parsons (1978), and Richard Zaner’s edition of Reflections on
the Problem of Relevance (1978). These texts have gone out of print in English,
but the last two are now reprinted in my edition of Collected Papers V (2011)
and the first will be reprinted in Michael Barber’s edition of Collected Papers VI
(forthcoming, with 112 pages of new translation by Fred Kersten). The English
Collected Papers I, II, III, and IV are out of print as well, but Springer tells me
that it will make them available again as ebooks. The Gurwitsch-Schutz cor-
respondence is out of print as well, but many of Schutz’s letters to Gurwitsch
are also reprinted in Collective Papers V. And now the Schutz-Voegelin letters
have been published in English. In sum, practically all of Schutz is now avail-
able in English.

Translations
That Alfred Schutz is a figure of international significance is clear from all the
translations. In my Worldly Phenomenology: The Continuing Influence of Alfred
Schutz on North American Human Science (1988), I was able with information
from Ilse to compose a chart that I can reproduce here.
 It’s About Time! 15
Printings of Schutz’s Books in Various Languages [by 1989]

PSW CPI CPII CPIII RPR SLW TSA LFMS Totals

English 5 7 4 3 2 2 1 1 25
German 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
Italian 1 1 1 1 1 1 5
Japanese 1 1 1 3
Portuguese 1 1
Spanish 1 1 1 1 1 5
Totals 13 11 7 6 4 4 3 2 50

These are the printings as of 23 years ago. Evelyn Schutz Lang has given
me additional information on other translations, which I now summarize with
no doubt some overlaps. The English of PSW was also published in the UK in
1974; the German was published as a Suhrkamp paperback that year as well;
and the Spanish was reprinted in 1993 and 2001. A Finnish translation came
out in 2006 and a French one in 2010. Other translations of the Aufbau are in
various stages of development in Bulgarian, Chinese, and Korean.
With the Collected Papers I, II, and III, things are complicated because some
translations are of selections. I hope it is enough for present purposes to report
that parts or wholes were published in French in 1990, 1994, and 1998; in Ger-
man in 1971 and 1972; in Italian before 1992; in Japanese in 1983, 1985, and
1991; in Spanish in 1974; and translations into Chinese and Swedish are under
development.
Reflections on the Problem of Relevance in English was reprinted in 1970 and
1990; the German translation in 1971; the Italian in 1975; the Japanese in 1996;
and Chinese and Spanish translations possibly to come.
Strukturen der Lebenswelt/Structures of the Life-World was also published in
English in the UK 1974; the German paperback was published by Suhrkamp in
1979 and 1983; and a Ukranian translation is under development.
Life Forms and Meaning Structure was also published in the UK in 1982 and
in German in 1981.
Philosophers in Exile was originally published in German in 1985 and trans-
lated into Japanese in 1996.
Finally, the English translation, A Friendship that lasted a Lifetime: The Cor-
respondence between Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin, appeared in 2011.
In sum, while lots of Schutz was available in English, German, Italian, Japa-
nese, Portuguese, and Spanish by 1989, he has since also been translated into
French and Finnish, and more translations are now under development in Bul-
garian, Chinese, Korean, Swedish, and Ukranian. And let me add that I know
of interest in Schutz in Russia. So the international spread is continuing.
16 Lester Embree

The Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture

This lectureship was first sponsored with contributed funds by the American
Philosophical Association with the following lectures.

– 1968 Maurice Natanson

– 1972 Herbert Spiegelberg “On the Right to Say ‘We’: A Linguistic and
Phenomenological Analysis”
– 1973 J.N. Findlay
– 1975 Maurice Mandelbaum
– 1979 Dagfinn Føllesdal
– 1982 Robert Sokolowski
– 1986 Frederick Olafson
– 1989 David Carr
– 1993 Edward S. Casey “The Ghost of Embodiment: Is the Body a Natural
or a Cultural Entity?”

Then George Psathas had the idea in probably 1993 of a revised Schutz Memo-
rial Lecture, asked me to work with him, and we found sponsorship with the
Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, the Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology, Inc., and the American Philosophy Association.
Recently the attempt to work out a new arrangement with the three sponsors
has failed.
The following are the lectures that were held at the meetings of the Society
for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. The attempt was to alternate phi-
losophers and cultural scientists.

– 1995 “Alfred Schutz: Philosopher and Social Scientist.” Maurice Natan-

son, Yale University
– 1996 “Phenomenological Analysis and its Contemporary Significance.” Ilja
Srubar, University of Erlangen
– 1997 “Making Music Together While We Grow Older: Further Reflections
on Intersubjectivity.” Richard Zaner, Vanderbilt University
– 1998 “Moral Communication in Modern Societies.” Thomas Luckmann,
University of Konstanz
– 1999 “A Stroll with Alfred Schutz.” Fred Kersten, University of Wisconsin
– 2000 “Alfred Schutz’s Influence on American Sociology.” George Psathas,
Boston University
– 2001 “Some Schutzian Theory of History Illustrated from the Women’s
Movement.” Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University
– 2002 “A Moment of Unconditional Validity? Schutz and the Habermas/
Rorty Debate.” Michael Barber, Saint Louis University
– 2003 “This, Yes!” Kurt Wolff, Brandeis University, read by George Psathas
and Gary Backhaus since Wolff had died.
 It’s About Time! 17
– 2004 Ken Lieberman and Larry Wieder substituted for Harold Garfinkle
in reading his “The Lebenswelt Origin of the Sciences.”
– 2005 “Between Conflict and Reconciliation: The Hard Truth,” Rosemary
Rizo-Patron, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
– 2006 “A Continuing Dialogue with Alfred Schutz.” NASU, Hishashi,
Waseda University
– 2007 “A Schutzian Perspective on Legal Interpretation.” Ion Copoeru,
Universitea Babes-Bolyai
– 2008 “Alfred Schutz and the Pedagogy of Suffering.” Mary F. Rogers,
University of West Florida

Fostering Archives
Before I list the volumes of the Alfred Schutz Werkausgabe thus far, let me tell
some additional personal stories. For my edition of the Gurwitsch Festschrift,
Life-World and Consciousness (1972), I wanted to see if there was an ineditum by
his friend Schutz that could be included. I was in New York during the summer
of 1971 writing my dissertation and Ilse, who was on vacation somewhere, had
her maid let me into the apartment and show me the set of shelves in a hallway
off the parlor. It was black, nine feet wide, and almost six feet tall and had five
shelves (I have it in my office today), and full of folders.
So I designated the three stacks of shelves from left to right as “I,” “II,” “III,”
the shelves from the top down as “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,” and “E,” and the folders
as I found them from left to right as “1,” “2,” “3”, etc. (Years later I was amused
to find out that these are sometimes called “the Embree numbers” in the Kon-
stanz Schutz archive!) Then I went through all the folders and scribbled their
titles, descriptions of their contents, and page counts. Later I found out that I
had ignorantly re-invented what archivists call a “finding list.” When I got home
I typed up this list and sent a copy to Ilse and I believe she sent it on to Luck-
mann at Konstanz. Soon Walter Sprondel came and microfilmed all the papers,
and that microfilm has been fundamental for the Schutz archive at Konstanz,
the holographs themselves eventually going to Yale’s Beinecke library. Among
other things, I discovered the collection of letters between Gurwitsch and Schutz
on those shelves.
My second story relates not from America eastwards to Germany but west-
wards to Japan. I have mentioned Worldly Phenomenology (1988). In 1994,
Hisashi took a sabbatical at Boston University with George Psathas, who intro-
duced him to me when I was in town for a conference. I was impressed to learn
that Hisashi was making photocopies of the ca. 500 items of secondary literature
listed in my book. I told him of the ca. 3,000 pages additional to what was on
the microfilm that I had classified and copied in Ilse Schutz’s papers in Summer
1990 and invited him and his family to visit me in Florida. He came and stayed
up several nights reading, smoking, and taking notes.
18 Lester Embree

Since I was then the more impressed, I told him that I had Helmut Wagner’s
copy of the microfilm and suggested he try to establish a Japanese Schutz archive.
I contacted George and he introduced Hisashi to Evelyn in New York and, once
again, the rest is history. A secondary Schutz bibliography is maintained at the
Waseda archive: http://db2.littera.waseda.ac.jp/wever/schutz_e/goLogin.do.
There are 2,071 items listed now. KIMURA, Masato has kindly sent me a
list of the items and I have been able to count them by language (in some cases,
I could relate items in English to the colleague’s home language, e.g., NASU to
Japanese and Luckmann to German): English: 1,260; French: 27; German: 285;
Italian: 15; Japanese: 446; Portuguese: 12; Spanish: 16; and Other: 10. These
numbers will no doubt change as the years go by. And, I might add that cur-
rently Michael Barber is establishing an American Schutz center at Saint Louis
University in St. Louis.

Video
I worked with George Schutz in producing my Schutz video, Alfred Schutz:
Philosopher of Social Science in the 20th Century (1999), available through the
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc.

Helping Barber
This reminds me of a few more things that I take some pride in. Wagner
left a draft of over 2,000 pp. on the life of Schutz from which he extracted his
Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography (1983), but I have always been critical
of this biography for its impersonality—it is like Hamlet without the prince. I
knew that Evelyn had found a trove of family documents in Ilse’s papers, and
I suggested to Michael Barber that he might write a better biography, showed
him Helmut’s 2,000 pages, he was interested, and I introduced him to Evelyn.
Michael’s The Participating Citizen: A Biography of Alfred Schutz (2004) is again
history. Furthermore, it occurred to me several years ago that enough was com-
ing out on Schutz that a specialized publishing outlet ought to be developed,
and I knew of a new publisher that might take it on, proposed to Michael that
he found an annual that I even suggested be called Schutzian Research, and he
has also done that.

Sozialwissenschaft Archiv Konstanz

When Tom Luckmann went to Konstanz, he had two assistants and assigned
one to this archive. Ilja Srubar has told me the following about the archive: “Here
are some facts about the Konstanz archives as far as I can recollect its history.
It was founded in the seventies as a research institution that would collect the
 It’s About Time! 19
literary estates of social scientists who were forced to leave Germany and Aus-
tria after 1933. The Archives should provide research on their scientific impact.
The Schutz Memorial Archives are a part of the materials held in Konstanz. The
official director of the archives was Tom Luckmann, but the archive’s work was
mostly carried out by the archivist on duty, i.e. Walter Sprondel and his suc-
cessors, Ilja Srubar (until 1993), Martin Endress, Knoblauch, Dreher, etc. As
Sprondel brought Schutz’s microfilmed papers to Konstanz, we started to edit the
unpublished manuscripts. Sprondel edited the Schutz-Parsons-correspondence,
Grathoff did it with Schutz-Gurwitsch, I myself edited the Theory of Life-Forms,
etc. Based on the unpublished materials (the Personality Ms) I wrote my Kos-
mion (1988), which served as a theoretical background for the composition of
the ASW. At the same time Tom Luckmann used the Schutzian manuscripts
to write the Structures of Life-World. The holdings of the Schutz archives were
in the nineties enlarged by his library and the materials contained in Wagner’s
literary estate, which was ordered by Embree and I in Florida.”

The Alfred Schutz Werkausgabe

I am also grateful to Ilja for the following account of the Alfred Schütz
Werkausgabe: “When I brought Schutz’s library from New York to Konstanz,
Grathoff and I thought about possibilities of how to use it. Grathoff had the
idea of a new edition of Schutz’s writings based on unpublished manuscripts,
correspondence, and the marginal notes in the books Schutz used. So I worked
out an edition plan for 12 volumes, got permission from Evelyn, and applied for
money from the DFG (German Research Fund). In 1993 we received a grant
for an international team of editors (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) as well as
for a deskman. But in the same year I got the professorship at Erlangen and the
whole project went with me there. The edition was/is directed by three general
editors: Grathoff, Soeffner, and myself and is carried out by a team of single vol-
ume editors. The deskman position was held consecutively by Endress, Renn,
and currently by Sebald. There were nine volumes published until now. The
remaining volumes should appear near the end of 2013.”
The volumes are as follows.

1. Schütz, Alfred (2006), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band I. Sinn und Zeit.
Frühe Wiener Schriften (hg. v. M. Michailow), Konstanz UVK.
2. Schütz, Alfred (2004), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band II. Der sinnhafte
Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie (hg. v. M.
Endreß & J. Renn), Konstanz UVK.
3. Schütz, Alfred (2009), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band III.1. Philosophisch-
phänomenologische Schriften 1. Zur Kritik der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls
(hg. v. G. Sebald, nach Vorarbeiten von Richard Grathoff, Michael Thomas)
Konstanz UVK.
20 Lester Embree

4. Schütz, Alfred (2005), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band III.2. Philosophisch-

phänomenologische Schriften 2. Studien zu Scheler, James und Sartre (hg v. H.
Kellner & J. Renn), Konstanz UVK.
5. Schütz, Alfred (2010), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band IV. Zur Method-
ologie der Sozialwissenschaften (hg. v. T.S. Eberle, J. Dreher, G. Sebald), Kon-
stanz UVK.
6. Schütz, Alfred (2003), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band V.1. Theorie der
Lebenswelt 1. Die pragmatische Schichtung der Lebenswelt (hg. v. M. Endreß &
I. Srubar), Konstanz UVK.
7. Schütz, Alfred (2003), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band V.2. Theorie der
Lebenswelt 2.Die kommunikative Ordnung der Lebenswelt (hg. v. H. Knoblauch,
R. Kurt & H.-G. Soeffner), Konstanz UVK.
8. Schütz, Alfred (2004), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band VI.1. Relevanz
und Handeln 1. Zur Phänomenologie des Alltagswissens (hg. v. E. List ), Kon-
stanz UVK.
9. Schütz, Alfred (2011), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band VI.2. Relevanz und
Handeln 2. Gesellschaftliches Wissen und politisches Handeln (hg. v. A. Göttlich,
G. Sebald & J. Weyand), Konstanz UVK.
10. Schütz, Alfred (2013), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band VII. Schriften zur
Phänomenologie der Musik (hg. v. A. G. Stascheit), Konstanz UVK.
11. Schütz Alfred (2012), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band VIII. Schriften zur
Literatur (hg. v. J. Dreher, M. Barber), Konstanz UVK.
12. Schütz, Alfred (2013), Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe Band IX. Strukturen
der Lebenswelt (hg. v. M. Endreß & I. Srubar), Konstanz UVK.

Conferences
Now let me list professional meetings focused on Schutz that I know of. Prob-
ably there are more than I have heard about thus far. Back in 1974 and I believe
on the recommendation of Ilse I was invited to a conference on Schutz put on in
Gottlieben by the Konstanz archive. I think I then became more than a student for
Luckmann, met Ilja, and had a good time. Recently I circulated a list of the Schutz
conferences I have been to, including several that I organized, and adding two that
Ilja told me about, another one done by nurses in Brazil, and now one in Paris:
1. Alfred Schutz and the Idea of Everydayness in the Social Sciences, Uni-
versität Konstanz, Summer 1974.
2. Phänomenologie und Sozialwissenschaft, Universität Bielefeld, June 1981.
3. Alfred Schutz Memorial Symposium, New School for Social Research,
December 1989.
4. Edmund Husserl und Alfred Schütz in der Krisis der phänomenologischen
Bewegung. Wien, September 1989.
5. Alfred Schutz’s “Sociological Aspects of Literature” (1955), New School
for Social Research, April 1995.
 It’s About Time! 21
6. Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Social Science, Delray Beach, October 1998.
7. Seminario de Alfred Schutz, Escola de Enfermagen de UNIRIO, Rio de
Janeiro (September 1999)
8. Waseda Schutz Centennial conference, March 1999.
9. Konstanz Schutz Centennial conference, May 1999.
10. Preparatory meeting for conference on Alfred Schutz and his Intellectual
Partners at Waseda University, Tokyo, March, 2003.
11. Alfred Schutz and his Intellectual Partners at Waseda University, April 2004.
12.Alfred Schutz und die Hermeneutik, Wien, September 2007.
13. Konstanz Schutz Conference, “Phenomenology, Social Sciences and the
Arts,” May 2009.
14. Alfred Schutz Memorial Conference. Bratislava, November 2009.
15. Alfred Schutz: phénoménologie et pragmatisme, Ecole Normal Super-
ieur, June 2012.

Summary
On the basis of the information given above, which nowise includes all that
has happened, I am convinced that the time has indeed come to found a Schutz
circle that meets regularly and does so in different countries around the world.
This should bring more colleagues into the multidisciplinary community of phi-
losophers and cultural scientists taking inspiration from his thought, the value
of which I do not need to describe for us today.

Substantive Research
Let me close by expressing no more about the past but rather two hopes for
the future of Schutzian research. I do not need to express a hope that it become
more strongly multi- and interdisciplinary, for Schutzian research has always been
thus. But in the first place and on the level of substantive research in interpretive
social psychology, I am always delighted and edified to re-read “The Stranger”
and “The Homecomer” and was encouraged by Berger and Kellner’s “Marriage
and the Construction of Reality” (1964), but I have not come across anything
else like that. I hope that I will. Examples of this sort of substantive research that
Schutz in effect recommended would, I believe, have the most desirable effect
today. Interpretation of Schutz is still needed, but scientific investigations in his
style are more needed and examples can be imitated.

Theory of Science
In the second place, I have mentioned that I believe the core of Schutz’s posi-
tion is a Wissenschaftslehre, a science theory of the cultural and especially the
22 Lester Embree

social sciences. I am completing a manuscript entitled Alfred Schutz’s Theory of

the Cultural Sciences. It covers his theory of the cultural sciences in general and
has chapters devoted to theories of the sciences of cultural anthropology, eco-
nomics, history, law, political science, psychology, and social psychology. There
are more disciplines on which the Schutzian approach can be brought to bear. I
have just had an essay accepted on a Schutzian theory of psychotherapy and have
my eye open for a text on which to base a Schutzian theory of education. So I
hope not only for substantive research by cultural scientists but also for efforts in
Schutzian theory of science done especially by philosophers. Schutzian research
ought not to be scholarship alone on his thought. Continuation beyond his let-
ter but in his spirit is called for.
Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 23–31

On Garfinkel and Schutz:

Contacts and Influence 1

George Psathas
Boston University
[email protected]

Abstract: This paper considers the relation between Harold Garfinkel and Alfred
Schutz. Reference will be made to their correspondence as well as to some of Gar-
finkel’s writing. Garfinkel, who was a graduate student at Harvard at the time,
first met Schutz at the recommendation of Aron Gurwitsch. Their meeting led to
further exchanges including papers that Garfinkel sent to Schutz. When his book,
titled Studies in Ethnomethodology, appeared in 1967 he specifically cited Schutz
as one to whom he was “heavily … indebted” in his work. In later writings he no
longer made such citations and moved away from his earlier position.

Keywords: Schutz, Garfinkel, phenomenology, ethnomethodology.

Harold Garfinkel died in April 2011 at age 93. He had continued to write,
teach, and maintain contact with a large number of persons, both nationally
and internationally, throughout his life. He was a sociologist and was trained
in sociology. He tried to influence the discipline to adopt some of his perspec-
tives and approaches to the study of everyday life. In all the years that he had
pursued this goal, he and his students and others whom he influenced (myself
included) were unsuccessful in being accepted by what we may call mainstream
sociology, i.e. the rest of the discipline. (In fact, one of my former professors from
Yale wrote to me a few years ago and asked, in so many words, “where did I go
wrong? i.e. what was I reading, or who had influenced me at Yale to start me on
this path?) Those whom he had influenced, whether his students or followers,
were usually not hired for full time positions in the field. In 1995 he received

1 Presented at The International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpre-
tive Social Science, The New School for Social Research, New York, 20012
24 George Psathas

the Cooley-Mead Award from the American Sociological Association Section

on Social Psychology. He felt he had been “validated” by the “discipline” when,
in 2002, a Section named “Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis” was
formed. He had published Studies in Ethnomethodology in 1967 and, finally, some
35 years later, he was recognized by the formation of a Section of the ASA. His
influence on the discipline had been enormous in the intervening years and
continuing to this day. For example, he was one of the foremost contributors to
the advancement of qualitative, instead of quantitative methods in sociology.

Garfinkel’s Relation to Schutz

His relation to Schutz was a long and varied one. I will try to delineate some
aspects of this lengthy relationship. Garfinkel said that he had early on read
Schutz’s paper “On Multiple Realities” and that he took it with him when he was
in the army in WWII (in which he served from 1942—1946). While a graduate
student at North Carolina, he had been exposed to Husserl’s Ideas and Farber’s
The Foundation of Phenomenology. His dissertation at Harvard, the Ph.D. was
awarded in 1952, is one in which he attempted in various ways to explore some
of Schutz’s ideas about “reality” (and meaning). In the dissertation, (about 600
pages long) which he sent to Schutz, he presented (most likely in Chapter 5,
titled “A Comparison of the Decisions of Parsons and Schutz,”) his comparison
in order to see how their “different decisions affect(ed) different conceptions of
social order” (Psathas, 2009). His efforts to do laboratory stimulations of interac-
tion; to create meaningless situations; to use recording equipment; to use lengthy
interviews with his “subjects;” all represented novel ideas and approaches which
led him more and more in an empirical direction.
His dissertation was not one in social theory—despite the fact that he had
studied with Talcott Parsons, one of the leading sociological theorists of the day
and that he had read widely in phenomenology. He met from 1946 until 1951
with Aron Gurwitsch (who was at Brandeis) and discussed “subjects in phenom-
enology and sociology” (Garfinkel, 2002: 84) and it was at Gurwitsch’s urging
that he wrote to Schutz in 1949. He met with Schutz in New York “several times”
(personal interview 7/7/01) to “spend tutorial evenings (with Schutz).” At this
time he was enrolled in the graduate program at Harvard.
Garfinkel was also influenced in his thinking (in the 1940s) by various (other)
papers by Schutz including (in addition to “On Multiple Realities”), “Common-
Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” and “The Problem of
Rationality in the Social World,” all of which have now been republished in
Collected Papers I-III. The last paper mentioned also includes some of Schutz’s
criticisms of Parsons on “rationality” which are picked up by Garfinkel. (Schutz
1964 II)
Garfinkel started from a Schutzian and phenomenologically influenced per-
spective (also influenced by Gurwitsch) while at the same time attempting to
 On Garfinkel and Schutz: Contacts and Influence 25
master Parsons’ thought particularly with regard to the question of the sources
of social order. He eventually became critical though he maintained an apprecia-
tion for what Parsons had attempted. Cf. his writings on Parsons, collected in the
Parsons Primer (1960), a treatise of considerable length though never published,
developed his appreciation and critique extensively.
Significantly, in his last letter to Schutz in August, 1958, he said he wanted to
bring news to Schutz of the reception of Schutz’s work in such places as UCLA,
Berkeley, Chicago and Northwestern where Garfinkel said he had “visited, gained
adherents, or sent students.” He eventually turned away from both, Parsons and
Schutz. Away from Parsons in large part because of what Garfinkel called his
“normative” theorizing, his lack of interest in empirically grounded theorizing,
and his acceptance of notions of internalization and motivated compliance to
norms as critical sources of social order.
In Schutz he found a basis for developing a phenomenologically grounded
critique of Parsons and support for a turn toward empirical studies and a con-
ceptual framework which focused on the significance of common sense knowl-
edge and the world of everyday life. Later, he moved away from Schutz because
he became dissatisfied with Schutz’s methodology, derived from Weber, of ideal
type analysis. (Another of his differences with Schutz was that he did not think
Schutz empirical enough.) He preferred to do empirical studies, either interviews
or observations, or demonstration experiments, which enabled what he called
“literal description” and which eventually led him to uncover the ways in which
common sense knowledge was constituted, utilized, modified and actively orga-
nized in the course of persons’ everyday affairs. He preferred to study, what he
called “ordinary” actors (lay members) in everyday situations of choice and action,
as they used various interpretive procedures, made sense, achieved understand-
ings on-goingly, despite ambiguities, uncertainties and unmet expectations. He
claimed to have found that members were actively able to find ways to achieve
order and sense in ordinary affairs of everyday life. He rejected theories of social-
ization which emphasized internalization and scientific rationalities which math-
ematized or quantified observations of human actions. He did not like abstract
theorizing (whereas Parsons did). He rejected all social science programs which
did not give serious and detailed attention to the practical reasoning and practical
actions actually engaged in by persons in the world of everyday life. He preferred
to focus on the actual constitutive practices by which common sense knowledge
achieves its taken-for-grantedness while subject to question. He believed that
he moved beyond Schutz. He thought that the Schutzian perspective was not
adequate enough for the study of social processes, that it ignored the practical
embedded-in-life circumstances, that it lacked the character of reflexivity and
indexicality, and that it favored a social science which would construct overly
rationalized models utilizing ideal types.
In Garfinkel’s view, Schutz’s lack of attention to the actual empirical details
of everyday life occluded his vision. Schutz’s conceptualization of “scientific
26 George Psathas

rationality” and the “attitude of scientific contemplation” somehow did not enable
him to see how even scientists lived and worked in the world of everyday life
and engaged in the same methods of practical reasoning as ordinary members.
In his later studies he specifically engaged in and also argued for empirical
studies of scientist’s work. Cf. his paper on the discovery of the pulsar with Lynch
and Livingston (1981) and also Livingston’s (1986) description and analysis of
the work of mathematicians. In 2011 a book was published titled Ethnomethodol-
ogy At Work, edited by British sociologists Rouncifield and Tolmie. The study of
“work” has become one of the central foci of many ethnomethodological studies.

Garfinkel’s Focus on the Everyday

Accepting Schutz’s analysis of the natural attitude and the significance of
common sense knowledge in the world of everyday life, he worked to develop
an approach which would focus exclusively and seriously on that world, brack-
eting presuppositions provided by theories from any of the social sciences (what
he called “ethnomethodological indifference”). For Garfinkel this meant:
1. taking seriously the actor’s point of view in accepting that how members
carried on their everyday activities when subject to close examination could
uncover their methods of practical reasoning,
2. resisting formulations which might abstract and re-conceptualize into
“scientific frameworks” what was describable, visible and observable, and what
members themselves could make accountable in their actual practices.

Having found in Schutz a new opening to the study of everyday social order
it was not clear what program would result. Schutz’s model had been that of
the rational scientist constructing ideal type models into which all the relevant
contents of consciousness, belief, and values would be assigned to the analyst’s
homunculus or puppet (model).
Garfinkel’s program emerged over a number of years and continued to
develop in his later years. His studies he believed to be different from com-
monsense knowledge. He focused, he said on the hidden “how” (what he also
called the “missing what”)—and, if we can briefly characterize it—it refers to
the methodical practices, the methods actually used by members to produce and
sustain the social reality of everyday life.

Meaning of Ethnomethodology and Breaching

This is what his term “ethnomethodology” had meant—i.e. the methods
of members, or members’ methods, for accomplishing whatever it was they
were doing. In his efforts to study this domain Garfinkel had to become imagi-
native since no methods available at that time provided access. In the begin-
ning he turned the method of “free imaginative variation” into a method of
 On Garfinkel and Schutz: Contacts and Influence 27
disruption—or “breaching experiments”—which would reveal that which was
ordinarily taken for granted.
He started with games such as tic tac toe, which could be disrupted easily,
and also created elaborate deception experiments or “nasty surprises” though he
eventually abandoned these methods to utilize in-depth interviews (the case of
Agnes, 1960) and direct observations or recordings of interaction of members
in everyday situations.
He abandoned the phenomenological reduction and the search for essential
features of phenomena (though he wrote a paper in which he focused on the
essential features of the psychiatric interview Garfinkel (1961)) He adopted meth-
odologies which would enable a closer and more direct examination of everyday
activities. Unfortunately, his early disruption or “breaching experiments” led to
the misinterpretation that these were the research methods of ethnomethodol-
ogy and opened him to criticisms of callousness and cruelty in the search for
findings. But the “breaching experiments’ were designed to provide access to the
taken-for-granted because, as he argued,
[by multiplying] the senseless features of perceived environments; to produce
bewilderment, consternation and confusion (and): to produce the socially struc-
tured affects of anxiety, shame, guilt, and indignation […] should tell us some-
thing about how the structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and routinely
produced and maintained. (1967: 37-8)

He specifically says that these are “designed in Herbert Spiegelberg’s phrase, as

‘aids to a sluggish imagination’ […] (and) produce reflections through which the
strangeness of an obstinately familiar world can be detected.” (1967: 38) This
seems to be a clear reference to the difficulty or impossibility of imagining what
would happen and to the phenomenological methodological preference for trying
to “see things as if seeing them for the first time.” Making the familiar strange,
or disrupting everyday expectancies, was not the aim of such studies but rather
a means for achieving insight into and an understanding of the ordinary, routine
grounds for producing and sustaining everyday scenes.
In the process, Garfinkel (1967: 41) made discoveries which he said had not
been noticed by Schutz, for example, he mentioned:
[…] the occasionality of expressions, the specific vagueness of references, the
retrospective-prospective sense of present occurrences, waiting for something
later in order to see what was meant before, (that these) are sanctioned proper-
ties of common discourse […] they furnish a background of seen but unnoticed
features of common discourse whereby actual utterances are recognized as events
of common, reasonable, understandable, plain talk.

And, we should also add, he was able to show how members sanctioned these
properties in reacting to their disruption or absence i.e. that there was a moral
order as well (members reacted in terms of what was right and wrong.)
28 George Psathas

Where Schutz delineated the features of the natural attitude and the ways
in which persons take for granted the features of a world of everyday life as they
operate within the natural attitude, Garfinkel asked what would happen if the
operative assumptions of the natural attitude could not be met in everyday situ-
ations? What would be revealed not only about their reactions but about the
ways in which the natural attitude itself was sustained and how common sense
was organized?
In exploring persons’ reactions to such breaches of ordinary expectancies, to
difficulties in sustaining aspects of the natural attitude, he was able to uncover
what he referred to as “the actual methods” which members use to “make the
social structures of everyday activities” achieve their observable organization,
sense, and accountability. This he termed “the ‘rediscovery’ of common sense”
for sociology, i.e. making common sense a programmatic topic of study. And, of
course, his argument was that this should be sociology’s “only and exclusively […]
programmatic topic […] that social situations are “self-organizing with respect to
the intelligible character of (their) own appearances” (Garfinkel, 1967: 33) and that
“normative conventions are primarily to be understood as resources for establish-
ing and maintaining the intelligibility of a field of action.” (Heritage, 1987: 245)
They are part of the cognitive resources which may be used to make actions
and settings understandable and morally accountable. They (operate at both
the level of presupposition and, in their use in making actions accountable) are
both cognitive and moral in nature, i.e. they have a doubly constitutive force as
presuppositional and constitutive in the production and recognition of action
(Heritage, 1987: 247). Common understandings are shown to be achieved in
the course of interaction rather than operative at the level of presupposition.
In these studies Garfinkel expanded and also transformed Schutz’s project. He
started with it as a base and then began to explore the foundations. If Schutz was
engaged in a constitutive phenomenology of the social world as persons operate
within the natural attitude, Garfinkel was engaged in a constitutive sociology
of the natural attitude’s relevance, use, and functioning, as well as the uncover-
ing of the social and interactional resources used by members for its production
and sustenance.
The natural attitude of relevance for sociology includes the social sources
of its production and sustenance, that is, studies of the actual methods used by
members in mundane occasions for its production and sustenance. In this sense,
the taken for granted becomes the topic of study rather than only a resource for
understanding everyday life.
It has emerged most clearly in the program of studies of work which Garfin-
kel and others have contributed to, beginning (in published form) in 1981, an
edited collection (1986), and their presentation in Garfinkel’s publication Eth-
nomethodology’s Program (2002) (his ideas here were first developed from 1967-
2002). The most recent studies by British sociologists have been published in a
book titled Ethnomethodology At Work edited by Mark Rouncefield and Peter
 On Garfinkel and Schutz: Contacts and Influence 29
Tolmie (2011). These studies have more recently broadened to include many spe-
cific work sites. They focus on “specific competencies” which comprise ordinary
work activities, the “specific, discoverable, material practices which make up these
activities which requires detailed descriptions of naturally-organized social prac-
tices which […] can be reproduced, checked, and evaluated […]” (Rouncefield
and Tolmie 2011). The focus is on knowledge-in-use as it is on-goingly produced
and organized in the course of accomplishing particular kinds of social actions,
namely those characterizing the work, occupation, or organization.

Conclusion
The phenomenological and Schutzian influences on Garfinkel may appear to
have faded as he relentlessly pursued a program of ethnomethodological studies
and made revisions in some of its aspects. But I think it can fairly be said that
without phenomenology (via Husserl, Gurwitsch, Schutz, and Merleau-Ponty),
ethnomethodology would not have developed.
Garfinkel brought Schutz out of the philosopher’s study, (away from the phe-
nomenologist’s search for essences), away from ideal type analyses, and into the
mundane world of action and discourse, where members continually produced
and re-produced an achieved social order in and through their practices. The
methodical character of their doings became his set of topics and the search for
the sources of social order his on-going quest.
The “treasures” which Schutz had mentioned in his correspondence were
pursued in ways which Schutz would probably never have imagined (or probably
approved) and as “free imaginative variation” became the “breaching experi-
ment”, phenomenological sensibilities and approaches were converted to bold
and brash exercises and studies which disturbed not only those who were being
studied but the social science community as well. His was a distinctively 1960s
California-American style which replaced the Viennese waltz.
It is amazing to me how little acknowledgment is given to the influences of
phenomenology and Alfred Schutz on the development of the approach to the
study of common sense knowledge as a practical accomplishment developed by
ethnomethodological studies.
Perhaps Garfinkel’s brashness, outrageous neologisms, and in-your-face criti-
cal undermining of established “truths”, “methods”, and “theories” in sociology
was what accounted for much of the reaction. But, we would also have to ask,
what accounts for the continued marginalizing of ethnomethodology which
nevertheless lives and grows as evidenced by numerous studies?

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——. (2002). Ethnomethodology’s Program: Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism, Edited
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——. (2006). Seeing Sociologically: The Routine Grounds of Social Action, Edited and
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(orig. written 1948).
—Heritage, J. (1984). Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology, Oxford: Polity Press.
——. (1987). Ethnomethodology. In: A. Giddens, J.H. Turner, (Eds.) Social Theory
Today. Cambridge: Polity Press: 224-72.
Livingston, Eric (1986). The ethnomethodological foundations of mathematics. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Lynch, M. (1993). Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Studies
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Human Studies, 27, 1-35.
——. (2009). “The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Harold Garfinkel: What was
the “terra incognita” and the “treasure island?” in H. NASU, L. Embree, G. Psathas
 On Garfinkel and Schutz: Contacts and Influence 31
and I. Srubar (Eds.) Alfred Schutz and His Intellectual Partners, Konstanz: UVK
Verlagsgesselschaft mbH, 401-434.
——. (2010a). “Alfred Schutz’s Influence on American sociology during his lifetime.”
In Cherry Schreker (Ed.), Transatlantic Voyages and Sociology: The Migration and
Development of Ideas, Ashgate Publishers, 225-238.
——. (2010b). “Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis at Boston University:
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U.K. and Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 2011.
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——. (1964). “The problem of rationality in the social world.” in Collected Papers Vol.
II, (3rd edition) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 64-90 (orig. 1943).
——. (1945). “On multiple realities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4, June,
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——. (1962b). “Concept and theory formation in the social sciences,” Collected Papers
Vol. I, (3rd edition) The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 48-66 (orig. 1954).
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——. (1974) Language and social reality: the case of telling the convict code. The Hague:
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Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 33–44

Imposed Relevance:
On the Sociological Use
of a Phenomenological Concept
Andreas Göttlich
Universität Konstanz
[email protected]

Abstract: The present paper discusses the concept of imposed relevance as devel-
oped by Alfred Schutz. The discussion acts on the assumption that within his writ-
ings there are two different usages of the concept: a phenomenological one and a
sociological one. The argument states that both usages may not be confused—a
failure which might be induced by the fact that Schutz himself never dwelled on
their correlation. This being said, this paper presents some basic considerations
which try to utilize phenomenological reflections for sociological analyses, keep-
ing in mind that the difference between them may not be blurred.

Keywords: Relevance, Power, Social Imposition, Phenomenology vs. Sociology

One of the most frequent accusations directed at phenomenologically orien-

tated sociology in the tradition of Alfred Schutz, is its assumed lack of consid-
erations of power relations. The life-world is supposed to be a “harmless place”
(cf. Srubar 2007) where individuals intersubjectively construe shared systems of
relevance on a level playing field. Although at least some of the writings within
the Schutzian paradigm encourage this (mis-)interpretation, one must insist that
the pertinent critique falls short of Schutz’s principal approach. His concept of
imposed relevance, as introduced in his Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,
and later used in various applied studies, provides a useful tool for analyzing
power relations from a subjective point of view. Therefore the deficiency in ques-
tion is not so much a fundamental problem, but rather a problem of missing
elaboration in Schutz’s work. The deficit is explained by the contingent fact that
Reflections remained a fragment, which in particular lacks a profound analysis
34 Andreas Göttlich

of the social imposition of relevance, which can be regarded as the core phe-
nomenon of power relations. Having said this, the present paper focuses on the
concept of imposed relevance and its possible impact on sociological research. It
presents some basic thoughts which might prove helpful for further developing
a phenomenologically informed sociology of power.
In order to facilitate understanding, the following argumentation is sub-
divided into several theses. The first of these simply states that the concept of
imposed relevance—the way it was introduced by Schutz in his Reflections—is
a phenomenological, not a sociological term. This thesis may appear trivial, as
Schutz himself was quite clear on this point. Yet, it becomes significant in con-
nection with the second thesis, which states that in the scientific literature relat-
ing to Schutz, and even in his own so-called “applied studies,” the concept is
frequently used for sociological description without having previously clarified
one important question: is it possible to simply add sociological reflections on
imposed relevance to the phenomenological considerations presented in Reflec-
tions, or does the perspective have to be changed in order to enable an enhance-
ment of this kind? If one ignores this question, one runs the risk of confusing
constitutional (philosophical) and constructional (empirical) analysis. There-
fore, the third thesis observes the necessity to further elaborate the connec-
tion between the phenomenological and the sociological use of the concept of
imposed relevance. Calling into question one of the criteria that Schutz uses for
distinguishing between free and imposed relevance, an alternative theoretical
proposal is made, which tries to utilize philosophical reflection for empirical
research. Accordingly, the fourth and last thesis states the need for a sociologi-
cal adaptation of the phenomenological concept.

Thesis 1: The concept of imposed relevance—the way it was introduced by Schutz

in his “Reflections on the Problem of Relevance”—is a phenomenological, not a
sociological concept.

This first statement is, I assume, the least controversial of my four theses,
so I will dwell only shortly on it. At the very end of his book The Phenomenol-
ogy of the Social World, Schutz hints at the problem of relevance as a topic for
further investigation. He states that “the definitive clarification of this problem
will be possible only through an over-all phenomenological analysis” (Schutz
1997: 249). This is exactly what he tried to accomplish with his Reflections 15
years later. In fact, in this text Schutz only seldom uses the terms “sociological”
or “phenomenological,” yet the principal framework of his enterprise makes it
clear that he is “not primarily orientated towards concrete issues of sociologi-
cal analysis, but rather towards the clarification of basic theoretical questions.”1

1
Transl. by the author; the German original reads: „nicht primär an konkreten Themen
soziologischer Analyse, sondern an der Klärung grundlagentheoretischer Fragen orientiert.“
 Imposed Relevance 35
This estimation by Elisabeth List (2004: 10), who edited Schutz’s manuscript on
relevance in the Alfred Schütz Werkausgabe, is supported by the fact that in his
manuscript he deliberately makes no statements about the social world. Because
of methodological considerations, he begins by reflecting on the situation of the
solitary individual in its “natural” surrounding, and delays the contemplation
of social relationships to the later parts of his treatise. In an interim summary,
Schutz himself critically remarks “the omission made thus far […] that we have
handled our problem […] as if there were no social world at all, as if an isolated
individual experienced the world of nature disconnected from his fellowmen”
(Schutz 2011: 135). This is the same procedure he previously used in The Phenom-
enology of the Social World, yet in contradistinction to this book, his unfinished
Reflections on the Problem of Relevance ends before it broaches the issue of the
social world. As a consequence, in this manuscript the topic of socially imposed
relevance remains uncovered.

Thesis 2: In empirical analyses relating to Schutz and also in his own so-called
“applied studies,” the concept of socially imposed relevance is frequently used without
elaborating on the difference between constitutional (phenomenological) and con-
structional (sociological) analysis.

According to my first thesis, the concept of socially imposed relevance lacks

phenomenological clarification in the work of Schutz. This circumstance has not
prevented him and others from using this term within the context of sociologi-
cal analysis, somehow contradicting his own claim of providing a philosophical
foundation of the social sciences. Due to the size of this paper, I will concentrate
on Schutz’s own writings and mention only two examples. In his paper “Equality
and the Meaning Structure of the Social World,” he uses the concept of socially
imposed relevance in order to define the phenomenon of social discrimination:
“discrimination,” says Schutz, “presupposes both imposition of a typification
from the objective point of view and an appropriate evaluation of this impo-
sition from the subjective viewpoint of the afflicted individual” (1964a: 261).
And in his essay “The Well-informed Citizen,” he makes the case that due to
increasing social anonymity, the zone of socially imposed relevances will grow
in modern times (cf. 1964b: 129). Both theses are highly significant for empiri-
cal sociological analysis, and Schutz himself points out that within this context
the concepts of imposed and intrinsic relevances are “merely constructive types”
(1964b: 126). This remark certainly raises the question of a phenomenological
analysis of the constitution of socially imposed relevance within the consciousness
of the individual, in contradistinction to its social construction (cf. Luckmann
2007): is there something like an eidos that we can call “social imposition” and
that we can describe by means of phenomenology (i.e., as a universal structure
of the life-world)—or is “social imposition” merely a social construction, to be
analyzed by means of empirical re-construction?
36 Andreas Göttlich

The fact that there is a link missing between the constructional and the
constitutional usage of the concept is aptly illustrated by The Structures of the
Life-World. In this work, Thomas Luckmann obviously intends to mend what
Schutz’s manuscript lacks, and so he introduces the concept of socially imposed
relevance. Yet his according reflections are rather scarce and they only refer to
one of the three types of relevance differentiated by Schutz, namely to that of
thematic relevance. Although we learn that forced attention “in daily life … is
of the greatest importance” (Schutz/Luckmann 1973: 190), Luckmann gives no
phenomenological description of the way in which this forced attention is con-
stituted in the consciousness of the afflicted individual. Thus, The Structures of
the Life-World provides only little insight exceeding Reflections.

Thesis 3: The connection between the phenomenological and the sociological use
of the concept of imposed relevance needs to be reflected upon more deeply by elabo-
rating the friction between both usages.

At this point, it is necessary to go into greater detail regarding the con-

tent of Schutz’s theory of relevance. As already mentioned, Schutz distinguishes
between three types of relevance—thematic, interpretational, and motivational
relevance—and divides all of them into free or intrinsic relevances on the one
hand, and imposed or bound relevances on the other. This can be summarized
in the following cross-tabulation:

free (intrinsic) imposed (bound)

thematic relevance voluntary advertence forced attentiveness
interpretational relevance explication of a problem routine coincidence
motivational relevance in-order-to motive because-of motive

Table 1: Types of free/imposed relevance

If one looks for the criteria which Schutz uses to draw the line of demarcation
between free and imposed relevance, one finds the opposition between familiarity
and unfamiliarity in the case of thematic relevance, the opposition between actu-
ality and latency in the case of interpretational relevance, and the aspect of time
in the case of motivational relevance. According to the first criterion, a thematic
relevance is perceived as free when we are familiar with it, whereas unfamiliarity
interrupts the idealizations of “and so on” and “again and again,” which is why
the according topic is perceived as imposed. According to the second criterion,
interpretational relevances which lie within the grasp of our consciousness are
regarded as free, whereas relevances that lie beyond this grasp are regarded as
imposed. Finally, the third criterion of time is aptly illustrated by the distinc-
tion between because-of-motives and in-order-to-motives: because-of-motives
 Imposed Relevance 37
are defined as imposed relevances, as their constitution reaches back in time
and their ongoing existence determines our current action. In contradistinction,
in-order-to-motives are defined as free relevances, as they are projected into the
future which principally can be changed.
In the following I will concentrate on the type of motivational relevance and
therewith on the criterion of time, which in my opinion a) needs further inves-
tigation and b) has the potential to lead over to sociological considerations. This
can be illustrated by using an example from the world of literature. In an epi-
sode in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (Dostoyevsky 2010), the eldest
of the brothers, Dmitri Karamazov, acquires a notable amount of money. For a
specific reason, he is determined not to spend the money for a certain span of
time. As Dmitri knows his own unsteady character, he is aware of the fact that
he cannot simply rely on the fortitude of his own resolution, which although
made in earnest at that moment in time, may well be superimposed by concur-
ring motivations later in time. To solve the problem of not being able to trust
himself, he sews the money into the lining of his cloak in order to prevent him-
self from accessing it in the future. In other words, the present Dmitri confines
the freedom of action for the future Dmitri.
At first glance, the example provides an accurate illustration of Schutz’s state-
ment that motives of action which have been constituted in the past (i.e. because-
of-motives) are experienced by the present ego as imposed, whereas they are
regarded as free in the very moment of their constitution: Dmitri 1, who sews
the money into the lining of his cloak, freely disposes of the money, whereas
Dmitri 2, who carries the money along with him, is constrained by the previous
act of Dmitri 1. Drawing from Schutz’s manuscript, Das Problem der Personal-
ität in der Sozialwelt (2003) where he distinguishes between three temporalities
of the ego, we can say that the present ego imposes relevances upon the future
ego, and respectively that the present ego is subject to relevances imposed upon
itself by the former ego.
If one looks closer, however, the example proves to be more complex. Why is
the present ego confined by the motivations of the former ego at all? Can deci-
sions not be principally revised? Certainly decisions, respectively the resulting
actions, may influence facts in a way that hinders subsequent action in the future,
and we may even deliberately choose our actions in a way to make certain future
acts impossible. However, to erect actual barriers for future action is a rather
complex task which we can perform only seldom. More often we can simply
construct minor obstacles that are mere reminders that we once set certain rel-
evances. This is exactly the case with Dmitri Karamazov, who could simply tear
the money out of the lining of his cloak and thus revise his previous decision.
So we need an explanation for Schutz’s assumption that motivations which
were constituted in the past are experienced as imposed ones. The general con-
sideration that man is a creature of habit, and that therefore relevances are prin-
cipally characterized by continuance does not suffice, as it does not explain why
38 Andreas Göttlich

we revise some decisions more easily than others. The thesis I would like to
submit, is that an explanation must be sought with regard to the relation of the
different temporalities of the ego. Schutz himself hints at the possibility that a
former ego can fade away in the course of time, so that the present ego no longer
identifies with it. Thus one may argue that in such cases the present ego experi-
ences the relevances set by this former ego as imposed ones—they are perceived
in almost the same way as if they had been determined by a different person. On
the other hand, if the former ego is accepted by the present ego as a constitutive
part of its biographical identity, then the latter will not perceive the decisions of
the former as impositions.
Referring exactly to this relation between different temporalities of the ego,
the German philosopher Theodor Litt (1926) introduced the concept of the
reciprocity of perspectives, which Schutz later used in order to explain the pos-
sibility of an intersubjectively shared world with common meaning (cf. Schutz
1962a: 11ff., 1962b: 315f.). Before considering the social world, however, Litt
refers to cases where the present ego regards the point of view of the former ego
as a distinct perspective—illustrated by the fictitious statement “this once was
me”2 (Litt 1926: 84). The term reciprocity is meant to underline the discrete-
ness of the perspective of the former ego, opposing an understanding which
reduces the past to a mere derivative of the present. Thus, starting from Schutz’s
distinction between the temporalities of the ego, and in addition relating to
Litt’s considerations, we can state that the stronger the reciprocity of perspec-
tives between former and present ego turns out to be, the weaker the tendency
to perceive motivations determined in the past as imposed will be—after all, it
was the ego itself that constructed them. Vice versa, the weaker the reciprocity
of perspectives between former and present ego is, the stronger the tendency to
perceive motivations determined in the past as imposed will be. This latter case
is illustrated by Dmitri Karamazov, who knows in advance that his future ego
will some day abolish his decision to save the money and therefore sews it into
the lining of his cloak in order to impede the anticipated change of opinion (or
more precisely: its implementation). The money sewn into the lining is not only
a mark, which is meant to overcome the transcendence of time, but also a sign,
which is meant to overcome the intrasubjective transcendence between two per-
sons: the current and the future ego.
From my point of view, Litt’s concept provides a theoretical figure which is
able to give at least a formal explanation as to why motives which were set in the
past are sometimes experienced as imposed and sometimes not: the clue seems to
be reciprocity which here can be defined according to the degree of overlapping
between the interpretational relevances of the present and the former ego, as it
is those relevances from which ego’s motivations spring. This approach has the
considerable advantage that it can be expanded to the social sphere (as, by the

2
Transl. by the author; the German original reads: “das war ich einmal.”
 Imposed Relevance 39
way, Litt did himself).3 So far, I have only talked about the solitary individual
and in this context I have modified the example of Dmitri Karamazov. In fact,
Dmitri obtains the money in question from another person, a woman whom
he very much adores. Dmitri promises her to keep the money for a while and
to return it thereafter. In this version, the case becomes more complex, yet the
additional social dimension can be described by pursuing the insights gained
when reflecting on the solitary Dmitri.
In the same way as it appears to be misleading to principally define because-
of-motives as bound relevances, it would be wrong to generally classify all moti-
vations of the ego that are somehow evoked by the action of others as socially
imposed relevances.4 The sole fact that relevances that originate in the past influ-
ence our current behavior does not necessarily mean that we experience them
as bound. In the same way, the sole fact that relevances which are set by others
influence our own behavior does not necessarily mean that we experience them
as imposed. In both cases the answer to the question whether a relevance is per-
ceived as intrinsic or bound, depends on the relation between two persons: the
intrasubjective relation between current and former ego in the one case, and
the intersubjective relation between ego and alter in the other. The concept of
reciprocity provides the clue with regard to the aspect of time as well as to the
aspect of sociality. If the ego assumes a strong reciprocity of schemes of apper-
ception, appresentation, and interpretation, then it is inclined to regard motiva-
tions constituted by the former or by the alter ego as intrinsic. On the contrary,
if it assumes only a weak reciprocity, then it tends to perceive such motivations
as imposed ones.
It is important to point out that in social reality both dimensions frequently
correlate: a motive determining the actual behavior of ego has often been con-
stituted by alter and adopted by a former ego—as it is the case with Dmitri
Karamazov. This correlation between time and sociality is characteristic for
contracts which, in the juridical sense, define a considerable amount of our
social relations, and even more so in the metaphorical sense provided by Thomas
Hobbes. The commitments which one enters into when signing a contract will
be perceived as imposed, the more one assumes a weak reciprocity with regard
to the partner, and the more the former ego which signed the contract fades
away over the course of time. On the contrary, if one assumes a strong reciproc-
ity with regard to the partner, and if the former ego, which signed the contract,
is still seen as a part of the biographical identity, then one is more inclined to

3
A similar connection between time and sociality becomes apparent in the following
remark by Husserl (1999: 115): “Somewhat as my memorial past, as a modification of my liv-
ing present, ‘transcends’ my present, the appresented other being ‘transcends’ my own being.”
See also Schutz’s term “autobiographical sociality” (1996a: 196), introduced in his paper “On
the Concept of Horizon.”
4
One may detect a certain tendency to this direction in Schutz’s reflections on the moti-
vational context of social interaction (1997: 159ff.).
40 Andreas Göttlich

regard said commitments as intrinsic. The fact that the observance of contracts
is usually supervised by state authorities, using the threat of juridical sanctions,
reacts to the case of weak reciprocity, where the moment of inner conviction is
outweighed by the moment of external force. What Emile Durkheim (1998)
described as “non-contractual elements of contracts,” on the other hand, refers
to the case of strong reciprocity, without which contractualism could not pos-
sibly work as a general means of social integration.

Thesis 4: In order to use the concept of imposed relevance for the description of
social relations one has to adapt its original phenomenological elaboration.

The considerations so far have led to the result that the talk of socially
imposed relevance must take into consideration the element of reciprocity. The
latter has indeed been described by Schutz as a formal element of the general
structures of the life-world, that is, as a general thesis performed in the natu-
ral attitude of everyday life. However, in its phenomenological form, which
explains the basic assumption of a world of common meaning, this concept
does not suffice with regard to the problem at hand. In order to discern between
imposed and free motives of action in a way that is able to reflect the actual
perception of living individuals, we must differentiate between suppositions
of reciprocity that have stood the test of time so far, and suppositions of reci-
procity that have failed—a failure which does not affect the general thesis. In
other words, we have to take into consideration the concrete social situation
with its particular unique history, rather than making statements on the gen-
eral structure of the life-world.
To sum up, a mundane phenomenology can only consolidate the empirical
reconstruction of acts of social imposition of relevance, but cannot replace it.
It is also worth adding that a transcendental phenomenological approach like-
wise offers no solution. Following a transcendental approach, the differentiation
would have to be sought within the primordial sphere of the ego which is won
by the epoché of the psychic events pertaining to the alter ego (fremdpsychische
Vorgänge), as performed in Husserl’s 5th Cartesian Meditation (cf. Husserl 1999:
89ff.). Husserl resists the allegation that the transcendental ego uncovered by this
performance would be bound to solipsism by insisting that “the psychic life of
my Ego […], including my whole world-experiencing life and therefore includ-
ing my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by
screening off what is other” (ibid.: 98; original emphasis). It would be an “illu-
sion,” Husserl argues, “that everything I, qua transcendental ego, know as existing
in consequence of myself, and explicate as constituted in myself, must belong to me
as part of my own essence” (ibid.: 149; original emphasis).
For the problem at hand this would mean that within the primordial sphere
a differentiation between proper (intrinsic) and alien relevances (and as a sub-
category of them: imposed ones) is principally possible, as the transcendental
 Imposed Relevance 41
ego has, at least potentially, consciousness of other egos. And yet, by screening
off their psychic events, the latter are reduced to mere bodies5 —bodies which
must be filled with inner life again by acts of appresentation. “For reasons of
method,” Husserl writes, “the actuality for me of what is other … shall … remain
excluded from the theme” (ibid.: 94), according to the fundamental “proposi-
tion that everything existing for me must derive its existential sense exclusively
from me myself, from my sphere of consciousness” (ibid.: 150). Now, whatever
philosophical benefit the contemplation of such existential sense might bring, it
seems obvious that this sense must necessarily differ from the meaning which
derives from social interaction with real contemporaries of flesh and blood, and
so a transcendental approach cannot help in empirically reconstructing acts of
social imposition of relevance.
If the above argumentation is correct, then phenomenology—transcendental
as well as mundane—would be overcharged with providing a universal criterion
which marks the turnover where alien relevances become proper ones. There-
fore, it cannot replace the empirical reconstruction of first-order-constructions
of socially imposed relevance. However, it teaches the importance of the sub-
jective point of view, as the concept of imposed relevance cannot be thought
without reference to antagonism on the part of those subject to power.6 To take
into consideration their point of view may not suffice, as Max Weber has shown
when he defined power independently from the existence of a reluctant will.7
Nevertheless, phenomenological reflection reminds us not to ignore the subjec-
tive point of view in its significance for analyzing power relations. Take, as an
example, social typification which—regardless of the intentions of the typi-
fier—may impose relevances on the afflicted individual or group or it may not.
In order to decide on what the case is, one has to consider the subjective point
of view of the typified individuals and their systems of relevance. In “Equality
and the Meaning Structure of the Social World,” Schutz states that “the Ameri-
can way of life is not disturbed by the fact that foreigners identify it with the
pattern presented by Hollywood films” (1964a: 255). On the other hand, in the
same essay he touches on the “Separate Car Act,” which was enacted in Loui-
siana in 1890 and forbid African-Americans to travel in the same rail cars as

5
“Among the bodies belonging to this ‘Nature’ and included in my peculiar ownness, I
then find my animate organism as uniquely singled out—namely as the only one of them that
is not just a body” (Husserl 1999: 97).
6
The examples Schutz uses in his applied studies are in fact exclusively concerned with
a victim’s perspective, which may have autobiographical (and in this context: ethical) reasons
(cf. Barber 2004).
7
An argument aiming in the same direction can be found in Structures of the Life-World,
where Thomas Luckmann refers to what one could call a systematic self-deception of the
individual: within the natural attitude the conscious intentionality centres on the free in-
order-to-motives more often and less so on the bound because-of-motives. From this one may
argue that in everyday life the individual chronically overestimates its own freedom of will
respectively of action.
42 Andreas Göttlich

white people. Referring to this juridical example, Schutz remarks: “the imposed
system of relevances has indeed repercussions upon the system of relevances of
those it is inflicted upon […]. [B]eing treated as a type induces self-typification
with an inverted sign” (ibid.: 261).
Consequently, Schutz defines discrimination by referring to the objective
point of view as well as to the subjective one, and in this way I believe that social
phenomena of power must be regarded from both sides. The concept of socially
imposed relevance provides a very helpful tool for the study of the subjective
perspective, but we must consider that this specific type of relevance cannot
be developed by simply adding the social world to the “natural” world, the lat-
ter being the subject matter of Schutz’s philosophical Reflections on the Problem
of Relevance. We must not forget about the difference between phenomeno-
logical and sociological statements. Because they refer to social constructions,
sociological statements are subject to the postulate of adequacy (Schutz 1996b:
22) which has no influence on the philosophical theorems of phenomenology.
Consequently, if one applies phenomenological reflections exactly as they are to
social constructions, one runs the risk of violating said postulate, for example
by defining a priori criteria for distinguishing between imposed and free rele-
vances—a distinction which is actually a matter of social construction. There-
fore, I believe that considering Schutz’s phenomenological distinction between
free and imposed relevance as an effort to solve Immanuel Kant’s antinomy of
freedom (cf. Kant 1996: 473ff.) would be ill-advised, as the following remark by
Thomas Luckmann clearly shows:

“In short, plans are imbedded in plan hierarchies, which finally refer to the limits
of the human situation in the life-world. This means that either immediately, or
at least mediately, all conduct can be ordered in contexts of ‘free’ motivational
relevance. Vice versa, however, in principle every act and all conduct have a
‘history.’ A ‘first’ project is—as long as we are satisfied with the description of the
life-world—unimaginable. Fundamentally, all conduct and every act can be
understood in contexts of ‘bound’ motivational relevance” (Schutz/Luckmann
1973: 222f.; emphasis by the author).

In my opinion, Schutz’s considerations should be read as basic reflections

which provide useful instruments for empirical research. Thus, let me reformu-
late my statement from the beginning more precisely: the concept of imposed
relevance, originally developed by Schutz by means of phenomenological descrip-
tion, allows the empirical examination of power relations, yet it has to be adapted
for sociological intentions by making it compatible with the first-order-constructs
of common sense. In a way, this is what the postulate of subjective interpreta-
tion calls for, that is, to refer “all kinds of human action or their result to the
subjective meaning such action or result of an action had for the actor” (Schutz
1962a: 43). Instead of an a priori demarcation between free and imposed rel-
evances by means of philosophical reflection, the sociologist has to reconstruct
 Imposed Relevance 43
everyday processes of interpretation which may well be at odds with the philo-
sophical point of view. Here, this conclusion results from reflections on the type
of motivational relevance, yet it applies to the types of thematic and interpreta-
tional relevance as well, which I have omitted in the preceding and which have
to be analyzed separately. I hope that some of the considerations presented in
this paper might prove helpful in pursuing this task.

References
Barber, Michael (2004). The Participating Citizen. A Biography of Alfred Schutz. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor (2010). The Brothers Karamazov. Ed. by S. McReynolds. Transl.
by C. Garnett. 2nd ed. New York/London: Norton.
Durkheim, Emile (1998). The Division of Labor in Society. Transl. by W. D. Halls. Bas-
ingstoke: Macmillan.
Husserl, Edmund (1999). Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Ed.
by D. Cairns. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer.
Kant, Immanuel (1996). Critique of Pure Reason. Indianapolis et al.: Hackett Publ.
List, Elisabeth (2004). “Einleitung der Herausgeberin.” In: Alfred Schutz, Relevanz und
Handeln 1: Zur Phänomenologie des Alltagswissens (ASW Vol. VI.1). Ed. by E. List.
Konstanz: UVK, pp. 7–40.
Litt, Theodor (1926). Individuum und Gemeinschaft. Grundlegung der Kulturphilosophie.
3rd ed. Leipzig: Teubner.
Luckmann, Thomas (2007). „Wirklichkeiten: individuelle Konstitution, gesellschaftliche
Konstruktion.“ In: Lebenswelt, Identität und Gesellschaft. Schriften zur Wissens- und
Protosoziologie. Ed. by J. Dreher. Konstanz: UVK, pp. 127–137.
Schutz, A. (1962a). “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action.”
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Nijhoff, pp. 3–47.
——. (1962b). “Symbol, Reality and Society.” In: Collected Papers I: The Problem of
Social Reality. Ed. by M. Natanson. The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. 287–356.
——. (1964a). “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World.” In: Col-
lected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. Ed. by A. Brodersen. The Hague: Nijhoff,
pp. 226–273.
——. (1964b). “The Well-informed Citizen. An Essay on the Social Distribution of
Knowledge.” In: Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. Ed. by A. Brodersen.
The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. 120–134.
——. (1996a). “On the Concept of Horizon.” In: Collected Papers IV. Ed. by H. Wagner
and G. Psathas in collab. with F. Kersten. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer, pp. 196–200.
——. (1996b). “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World.” In: Collected Papers
IV. Ed. by H. Wagner and G. Psathas in collab. with F. Kersten. Dordrecht et al.:
Kluwer, pp. 6–24.
——. (1997). The Phenomenology of the Social World. Transl. by G. Walsh and F. Leh-
nert, with an introd. by G. Walsh. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
44 Andreas Göttlich

——. (2003). „Das Problem der Personalität in der Sozialwelt.“ In: Theorie der Lebens-
welt 1: Die pragmatische Schichtung der Lebenswelt (ASW Vol. V.1). Konstanz: UVK,
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——. (2011). “Reflections on the Problem of Relevance.” In: Collected Papers V: Phe-
nomenology and the Social Sciences. Ed. by L. Embree. Dordrecht et al.: Springer,
pp. 93–199.
Schutz, Alfred and Thomas Luckmann (1973). The Structures of the Life-World. Vol. I.
Transl. by R. M. Zaner and H. T. Engelhardt. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press.
——. (1989). The Structures of the Life-World. Vol. II. Transl. by R. M. Zaner and
D. J. Parent. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Srubar, Ilja (2007). „Ist die Lebenswelt ein harmloser Ort? Zur Genese und Bedeutung
des Lebensweltbegriffs.“ In: Phänomenologie und soziologische Theorie. Wiesbaden:
VS Verlag, pp. 13–33.
Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 45–64

The Oblivion of the Life-World

The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz
and Talcott Parsons1
Daniela Griselda López
University of Buenos Aires/CONICET
[email protected]

Abstract: At the beginning of the 1940s in the United States, an exchange of cor-
respondence took place between two of the great thinkers in Sociology, Alfred
Schutz and Talcott Parsons. This correspondence dealt with matters which many
deemed to be “the greatest central problems in the social sciences.” The reading of
these letters leads one to assume that the focus of both authors was on answering
how sociology could be appropriately based on the revision of Max Weber’s classi-
cal contribution. However, this interpretation has served as the basis to affirm that
Schutz and Parsons revisited Weber’s project from opposing sides by detaching the
elements from its main corpus. This leads to not only opposite but antithetical points
of view. From this perspective, Schutz is labeled as a subjectivist whereas Parsons
is labeled as an objectivist. Strikingly, even Schutz himself dismisses the idea of
presenting both authors as antagonists. What’s more, he underlines his purpose as
that of complementarity. Here arises an obvious question. If Schutz from the very
beginning underlined the idea of complementarity, why then does contemporary
sociological theory present Schutz and Parsons’ contributions as antithetical? Taking
this question as the starting point, our enquiry allows us to expose the existence of
an interpretive scheme in Sociological Theory that introduces the dualistic dilemma
in the analysis of Schutz and Parsons’ epistolary exchange. We will analyze this
interpretive scheme’s main features by using the hermeneutical analysis. Then, in
order to critically revisit the debate, our research unveils the prejudices involved
in this interpretive tradition, highlighting the misunderstandings regarding the

1
A version of this paper was presented at the Founding Meeting of The International
Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science held at The New School
for Social Research of New York in May 2012.
46 Daniela Griselda López

dualistic interpretation of Schutz’s work and his links with Parsons. By doing this it
makes clear the way in which these interpretations have veiled the original sense of
Schutz’s epistolary exchange with Parsons. Thus our paper, being directly opposed
to the dominant reading, aims to propose that the debate shouldn’t be seen as a
confrontation between subjectivism and objectivism, but as part of Schutz’s project
to go beyond the dualism, starting with a phenomenological approach that recovers
the life-world as the forgotten foundation of the social sciences.

Keywords: Alfred Schutz, Talcott Parsons, Phenomenology, Life-World.

Introduction
In this paper we aim to interpret the correspondence between Alfred Schutz
and Talcott Parsons from a different standpoint, recovering the dualistic dilemma
from the perspective of conceptual history (Begriff sgeschichte) as proposed by
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics.2
The program of conceptual or philosophical history argues that the history
of a concept follows a movement that always goes beyond ordinary linguistic use
and separates the semantic direction of the words from its original field of use,
extending and specifying, comparing and distinguishing. From this perspective,
“there is an extremely changing relationship between coining of concepts and
linguistic use.”3 Thus, it is not only aims at illustrating some concepts historically
but also aims to link the concepts with the humus of language in act and use.
The history of a concept would be the history of the impurities that this concept
has been collecting throughout its use in the process of coming into contact with
“the mud of daily life.”4 Amid a sea of words, the concepts are like “chameleons,
which are colored by their ecological environment.” For the linguistic orienta-
tion in the world, the words and their meanings are relevant, thus, only when
they appear “melted in the movement of their mutual understanding.” Thus,
Gadamer links this view of conceptual history with his hermeneutical thesis.
The concepts of philosophy cannot survive without the protection of a tradition
that, as a set of discursive practices, fertilize and protect them.
Following this perspective, in the first part of this paper, we present the
correspondence carried out between the authors in the forties with reference to
the critical study written by Schutz about the first book of Parsons, The Struc-
ture of Social Action5 (hereinafter SSA), as well as the interpretations triggered

2
Hans-Georg Gadamer, “La historia del concepto como fi losofía,” in Verdad y Método
II (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 1998), pp. 81-93. (Truth and Method II); Hans-Georg
Gadamer & Reinhart Koselleck, Historia y Hermenéutica (Barcelona: Paidós, 1997). (History
and Hermeneutics).
3
Hans-Georg Gadamer, “La historia del concepto como filosofía,” p. 92.
4
Hans-Georg Gadamer & Reinhart Koselleck, Historia y Hermenéutica, p. 5.
5
Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action. A Study in Social Th eory with Special
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 47
by that correspondence, emphasizing the dualistic dilemma. We will show the
existence of an interpretive tradition in sociological thought which introduces
the dualistic dilemma and the conceptual distinction of subjectivism-objec-
tivism in the analysis of Schutz’s work and in the interpretation of its links
with the work of Parsons.
The second part reconstructs a genealogy of the dualistic dilemma in the
early work of Schutz. It will be demonstrated that the discussion around dual-
ism is of major concern at the beginning of his reflections and that it is from
this place that Schutz approaches the correspondence. This is in clear contrast
to the dominant interpretive tradition, which has veiled that original meaning.

1. The Correspondence and its Interpretations

1.1. The Schutz-Parsons Correspondence
and Schutzian Intention of Complementarity
Our reading of the critical study of SSA illuminates a distinctive point of
analysis: the excessive emphasis placed by Parsons on the study of the field of
theory and the “evolution” of theoretical systems. Parsons’ interest is focused on
the analysis of scientific theory and its evolution towards a normative orienta-
tion. Schutzian criticism stresses two central elements. Firstly, he emphasizes the
danger involved in replacing social reality with the abstractions created by sci-
ence and, secondly, he emphasizes the need to understand that reality as a result
of human activity. It is in connection with these aspects that Schutz articulates
his critical study, highlighting in particular the need to study in depth the sub-
jective point of view:

“Professor Parsons has the right insight that a theory of action would be mean-
ingless without the application of the subjective point of view. But he does not
follow this principle to its roots. He replaces subjective events in the mind of
the actor by a scheme of interpretation for such events, accessible only to the
observer, thus confusing objective schemes for interpreting subjective phenom-
ena with these subjective phenomena themselves.”6

The relationship between common sense and scientific knowledge and the con-
cept of normative values alongside the concept of “unit act” (with all its out-
standing features) present the difficulty of replacing the subjective point of view.

Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1937, First Edition. Alfred Schütz Handbuch Bibliothek, Sozialwissenschaftliches
Archiv Konstanz. Alfred Schütz Gedächtnisarchiv).
6
Alfred Schutz & Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence
of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons. Edited by Richard Grathoff (Bloomington/London:
Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 36.
48 Daniela Griselda López

According to Schutz, Parsons formulates this question: “What does this social
world mean for me, the observer?”7 This formulation “intentionally eliminates
the actor in the social world, with all his [or her] subjective points of view.”8 This
type of social science does not deal directly and immediately with the world of
everyday life, but with “skillfully and expediently chosen idealizations and for-
malizations of the social world.” However, that question should be replaced with
another: “What does this social world mean for the observed actor within this
world, and what did he [or she] mean by his [or her] acting within it?”9 Schutz
stresses the necessity to “go back to that ‘forgotten man’ of the social sciences,
to the actor in the social world whose doing and feeling lies at the bottom of
the whole system”:

“Why always address ourselves to this mysterious and not too interesting tyrant
of the social sciences called the subjectivity of the actor? Why not honestly
describe in honestly objective terms what really happens, and that means speak-
ing our own language, the language of qualified and scientifically trained observ-
ers of the social world? […] scientific propositions do not refer to my private world
but to the one and unitary life-world common to us all.”10

Schutz’s comments focus on the importance of clarifying the subjective mean-

ing, so as to avoid the “oblivion” and the substitution of the social life-world.
That reflection, according to Schutz, can only be carried out taking philosophi-
cal understanding as the starting point. In this context (and against Parsons’
interpretation which considers the Schutzian perspective as antagonist) the let-
ters show Schutz’s interest to base philosophically, to “expand”, “deepen”11 and
“complement” in his own words Parsons’ frame of reference in order to regain
that “forgotten” basis of meaning12. That intention is evident in some excerpts
from the correspondence:

“You impute to me throughout, therefore, an antagonistic attitude toward your

position, which I have not had at all. To be sure, there are criticisms of some

7
Ibid., p. 48.
8
Ibid., p. 47.
9
Ibid., p. 48.
10
Ibid., p. 44. Emphasis added.
11
“I would like to suggest that only a theory of motives can deepen the analysis of social
action, provided that the subjective point of view is maintained in its strictest and unmodified
sense” in Alfred Schutz & Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, p. 32.
12
In a text from 1940 (the same year in which Schutz’s critical study is written) Schutz
states that according to Husserl “the basis of meaning (Sinnfundament) in every science is the
pre-scientific life-world (Lebenswelt) which is the one and unitary life-world of myself, of you,
and of us all” in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 120.
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 49
of your theories in this paper, and I have never hesitated to make clear where I
have to disagree with you. But it seems to me that the bulk of my paper shows
where and in how far our theories coalesce.”13

And also in the following quotation: “[Regarding SSA] I realized immediately

the importance and the value of your system and also the fact that it starts exactly
where my own book ends.”14

1.2. The Interpretation of their Correspondence

In spite of this intention of complementarity, interpreters and commenta-
tors have understood the critical study and the correspondence in a different
way. Fundamentally, interpreters introduce the dualistic dilemma, firstly, in the
analysis of Schutz’s work and, secondly, in the interpretation of his exchanges
with Parsons. From this hermeneutical framework, both contributions are seen
as antithetical and contrasting projects. The “alleged antithesis” is based on an
analysis of Weber’s work and on the possibility of splitting his theoretical perspec-
tive.15 Interpreters provide a dualistic reading of the work of Schutz, by assum-
ing that he splits the subjective and the objective meaning both at the level of
the description of the features of the life-world, –the antithesis is interpreted in
terms of subjective action vs. social order–, and at the level of the social science
reflection, –the contrast is made between subjectivist vs. objectivist perspective.
It is also assumed that Schutz “gives special advantages to the subjective part

13
Alfred Schutz & Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, p. 95. Emphasis in original.
14
Ibid., p. 97. Emphasis added. In a text from 1944, “Some Leading Concepts of Phenom-
enology”, we found a similar expression: “Phenomenology, searching for a real beginning of all
philosophical thinking, hopes when fully developed to end where all the traditional philosophies
start. Its place is beyond—or better, before—all distinctions between realism and idealism”
in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality, p. 101. Emphasis added.
15
Richard Grathoff, “Introduction,” in The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence
of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons (Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1978a),
pp. xvii-xxvi; Richard Grathoff, “How long a Schutz-Parsons Divide?” in The Theory of
Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons (Bloomington/London:
Indiana University Press, 1978b), pp. 125-130; Helmut R. Wagner, “Review: Theory of
Action and Sociology of the Life-World,” Contemporary Sociology, 8:5 (1979), pp. 685-
687; David Zaret, “From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern
Social Theory,” Th e American Journal of Sociology, 5 (1980), pp. 1180-1201; Roy Fitzhenry,
“Parsons, Schutz and the problem of Verstehen,” in Talcott Parsons on Economy and Society.
Edited by Robert Holton & Bryan Turner (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1986), pp. 145-178; Th omas Schwinn, Jenseits von Subjektivismus und Objektivis-
mus: Max Weber, Alfred Schütz und Talcott Parsons (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993);
Martin Endress. “Two Directions of Continuing the Weberian Proyect: Alfred Schutz and
Talcott Parsons,” in Alfred Schutz and his Intellectual Partners. Edited by NASU Hisashi;
Lester Embree; Psathas George; Ilja Srubar (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH,
2009), pp. 377-400.
50 Daniela Griselda López

of the type.”16 From this point of view, Schutz is described as a subjectivist and
Parsons as an objectivist.
Although references about this area abound, here we will mention only a
few of them. In Beyond Subjectivism and Objectivism17 by Thomas Schwinn, the
aforementioned analysis becomes clearly visible. Here, the author argues that
what in Weber is integrally linked i.e. subjective action and social order, then
appears split in the works of Schutz and Parsons. While Schutz radicalizes the
subjective perspective, Parsons mainly highlights the objective perspective. Con-
sequently, “the difficulties of these theories are complementary: Schutz fails to
master the problem of social order, whereas Parsons lacks an adequate and rich
concept of subjective action.”18 In this context, the author attributes to Parsons
and Schutz the “fatherhood” of the micro-macro division that, from his point
of view, is present today in the current theoretical discussion.
Referring to the “Weberian Suggestion,”19 Richard Grathoff states that “Par-
sons and Schutz pursued this suggestion in different directions.”20 The same
idea is developed in a text by Helmut Wagner: “Schutz had started from Weber
and found that the latter’s idea of subjective approach had to be radicalized with
the help of phenomenology. Parsons had bypassed the crucial part of Weber’s
definition of subjective meaning as the ‘meaning meant by the actor’, explain-
ing that subjective phenomena have meaning only as described and analyzed by
the observer […]. Both, then, moved from Weber in quite opposite directions.”21
Similarly, interpreters22 consider that a dualism between the life-world and
science is present in the Schutzian perspective. An example of this is the recent
interpretation of HO Wing-Chung:

16
Alfred Schutz & Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, p. 118.
17
Jenseits von Subjektivismus und Objektivismus –originally written in German– is one of the
few systematic works that have been written about the correspondence between the authors. The
other important work belongs to Elizabeth Kassab, The Theory of Social Action in Schutz-Parsons
Debate. Social action, social personality and social reality in the early works of Schutz and Parsons:
a critical study of Schutz-Parsons correspondence (Friburg Suisse: Éditions Universitaires, 1991).
18
Thomas Schwinn, Jenseits von Subjektivismus und Objektivismus: Max Weber, Alfred
Schütz und Talcott Parsons, p. 12.
19
“A study of social action […] has to relate that subjective meaning to the various his-
torical objectivations in a social situation, say to a science or some tradition […]. This is the
problem: would it not be possible, Weber suggests, to give sociology a solid foundation start-
ing from some methodology that could grasp this texture of social action?” in Richard Gra-
thoff, “Introduction,” p. xx.
20
Richard Grathoff, “How long a Schutz-Parsons Divide?” p. 128.
21
Helmut R. Wagner, “Review: Theory of Action and Sociology of the Life-World,”
p. 686. Emphasis in original.
22
James J. Valone, “Parsons’ Contributions to Sociological Theory: Reflections on the
Schutz-Parsons Correspondence,” Human Studies, 3: 4 (1980), pp. 375-386; HO, Wing-Chung,
“Understanding the Subjective Point of View: Methodological Implications of the Schutz-
Parsons Debate,” Human Studies, 31 (2008), pp. 383-397.
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 51
“The bone of contention that divides Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons in their
debate is that Schutz acknowledges an ontological break between the com-
monsense and scientific worlds whereas Parsons only considers it ‘a matter of
refinement.’”23

“Apparently, Schutz suggests a fundamental rupture between two worlds: the

experiential and the scientific.”24

From these and other interpretations an obvious question arises. Why does con-
temporary sociological theory present the contributions of Schutz and Parsons
as antithetical considering that from the beginning, Schutz intended to give his
work and its connection to Parsons’ a sense of complementarity?

1.3. Parsons and the Dualistic Interpretive Tradition

In order to answer this question, we show the existence of an interpre-
tive scheme in sociological thought which introduces the dualistic dilemma
in the analysis of Schutz’s work and in the interpretation of its links with
the work of Parsons. Making use of the hermeneutical analysis, we recover
a historical-conceptual genealogy of the dualistic analysis and of the con-
ceptual distinction of subjectivism-objectivism; and we trace its antecedent
in Parsons’ retrospective interpretation of the correspondence. Th is is an
interpretation that has managed to impose itself as the dominant reading.
With this we attempt to show that Parsons’ retrospective analysis of his let-
ters with Schutz has managed to impose itself as the dominant interpretive
framework for the correspondence.
Parsons focuses on “Descartes’ famous dichotomy of knowing subject
and object known” and its generalization “the actor-situation or actor-object
distinction”25 and says:
“The phenomenological point of view, particularly in the version represented by
Schutz, seems to me a relatively modest attempt to give special advantages to
the subjective part of the type or if one will one horn of the Cartesian dilemma.
In doing so, however, it seems to me to have leaned too far in the direction of
attributing a quasimetaphysical status to immediate knowledge of the subjec-
tive and a corresponding derogation of the importance and certain special roles
of objectification.”26

Moreover, he states that: “It seems to me that Dr. Schutz poses an altogether
unrealistically sharp contrast between the point of view of the actor and the

23
Ibid., p. 383.
24
Ibid., p. 387.
25
Talcott Parsons, “A 1974 Retrospective Perspective”, in The Theory of Social Action: The
Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons (Bloomington/London: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1978), pp. 117.
26
Ibid., p. 118.
52 Daniela Griselda López

point of view of the scientific observer and analyst, virtually dissociating them
from each other.”27
According to Parsons, this point of view is part of a puzzling contention
of the phenomenological school which is prominent in Schutz’s work and has
been carried on by followers of his such as Harold Garfinkel. This is the special
emphasis on phenomenological access to what is called “everyday life” and the
insistence that everyday life in this sense is radically distinct from any perspec-
tive of the scientific observer.” From Parsons’ point of view, “It seems to me to
be an unreal dichotomy. There is not a radical break between everyday life and
the behavior of scientifically trained people, but science constitutes an accen-
tuation and special clarification of certain components which are present in all
human action.”28
The characterization of phenomenology as “subjectivist” is also present in
the works of Pierre Bourdieu29 and Jürgen Habermas.30 Bourdieu holds that
social science oscillates between objectivism and subjectivism, two apparently
incompatible points of view or perspectives. On the one hand the Durkheimian
maxim appears stating: “treat social phenomena as things.” On the other hand,
Bourdieu presents the Schutzian perspective, which in his opinion reduces the
objective world to the representations that agents make of it. In the same mode,
Habermas classifies Schutzian phenomenology as subjectivist. According to him,
Schutz and Luckmann (following the model of a generative subjectivity) consti-
tute the life-world as the transcendental frame of possible everyday experience.
However, they do not understand the structures of the life-world by grasping
the structures of intersubjectivity, but rather “in the mirror of the isolated actor’s
subjective experience.” That is the reason why, according to Habermas, the “expe-
riencing subject” remains the court of last appeal for analysis.31
This classification, as well as the previous, has a dualistic ground. Habermas
defines subjectivism as a theoretical program which conceives society as a net-
work structured in terms of meaning, a network of symbolic structures constantly
being generated according to underlying abstract laws. This theory formulates the
task of reconstruction of the generative process from which social reality emerged
as structured in terms of meaning. On the other hand, he refers to objectivism as
a theoretical program which conceives society not from the inside, as a process

27
Ibid., p. 123.
28
Ibid., p. 124.
29
Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” in In Other Words. Essay Towards
a Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 123-139.
30
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action; Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A
Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987 [1981]); Jürgen Habermas, Teoría
de la acción comunicativa: complementos y estudios previos (Madrid: Cátedra, 1989). (The theory
of Communicative Action: complements and previous studies).
31
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action; Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A
Critique of Functionalist Reason, p. 130.
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 53
of construction, that is to say, a process of generation of meaning structures,
but from the outside as a natural process, which can be observed in its empiri-
cal regularities and can be explained with the help of nomological hypothesis.32
Based on the analysis of this dualistic interpretive tradition and encouraged by
the “mission” assigned by Gadamer to conceptual reflection of both questioning
the obviousness of our concepts (which may lead to error) and also promoting
“a critical consciousness of the historical tradition,” we face the task of exposing
the “prejudices that guide the dominant interpretation.” We carry out this task
through those interpreters who have pointed out the ambiguities in the dualis-
tic reading of Schutz’s work. Thus, we begin the process of making visible these
dualistic prejudices in order to make a critical analysis of that interpretive tradi-
tion and to expose the mistakes that have veiled the original meaning attributed
by Schutz to the correspondence.
From this point of view, we recover the views of authors like Wagner33 and
Srubar34 who have pointed out the ambiguities in the Parsonian dualistic read-
ing of Schutz’s work. According to Wagner,

“in view of Schutz’s extensive methodological writings, the reproach that he

gave ‘special advantages to the subjective part’ does not concur with his actual
position. For him, the matter was that of the relationship between the origi-
nary substratum of human experiences and the attempts to come to terms with
it cognitively and theoretically. He paid equal attention to both sides of these
concerns.”35

This makes clear that “Parsons retrospectively polarized the issue clearly, but
failed to do justice to its complexity.”36 As Srubar states, “the differences between
both approaches cannot be understood in the light of the contrast between sub-
jective and objective points of view.”37
Another commentator who has pointed out the misinterpretation of Schutz’s
phenomenological thought is Martin Endress.38 He is one of the authors who

32
Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Teoría de la acción comunicativa: complementos y estudios previos.
33
Helmut R. Wagner, “Reflections on Parsons’ ‘1974 Retrospective Perspective’on Alfred
Schutz,” Human Studies, 3: 4 (1980), pp. 387-402.
34
Ilja Srubar, Kosmion: Die Genese der pragmatischen Lebenswelttheorie von Alfred Schütz
und ihr anthropologischer Hintergrund (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988).
35
Helmut R. Wagner, “Reflections on Parsons’ ‘1974 Retrospective Perspective’on Alfred
Schutz,” p. 391.
36
Ibid., p. 388.
37
Ilja Srubar, Kosmion: Die Genese der pragmatischen Lebenswelttheorie von Alfred Schütz
und ihr anthropologischer Hintergrund, p. 201.
38
Martin Endress, “Reflexivity, Reality, and Relationality. The Inadequacy of Bourdieu’s
Critique of the Phenomenological Tradition in Sociology,” in Explorations of the Life-World:
Continuing Dialogues with Alfred Schutz. Edited by Martin Endress; George Psathas; NASU
Hisashi (Netherlands: Springer, 2005), pp. 51-74.
54 Daniela Griselda López

have defended phenomenology against the accusation (especially by Bourdieu)

of subjectivism.39 He points out that Bourdieu’s writing is concerned with the
overall subjectivism-objectivism dichotomy with extensive misunderstandings of
those theoretical traditions most important to his own “theory of theories.”

1.4. The Schutz-Garfinkel Correspondence

Similarly, Garfinkel’s doctoral thesis,40 as well as the unpublished exchanges
between Schutz and Garfinkel regarding the Schutz-Parsons correspondence41,
makes evident those misunderstandings contained within the dualistic interpre-
tation of Schutz’s work and its links with Parsons’.
With regard to the first element of analysis (the presentation of Schutz’s work
as dualist), we can see that while the dualistic interpretations maintain that Schutz
does not analyze the problem of social order, according to Garfinkel, it is possible
to reconstruct this problem in the context of Schutzian work. Fundamentally,
when speaking of social order in Schutz, Garfinkel refers to the notion of “orders
of reality” or “finite provinces of meaning.” In this context, when considering a
particular order of reality, for instance, the world of dreams or the world of sci-
entific contemplation or that of the everyday life-world, the question that Schutz
poses, according to Garfinkel, refers to the basic traits or conditions, which remain
and maintain that particular order, and which constitute its “specific cognitive
style.”42 As stated by George Psathas,43 “Garfinkel’s analysis has led him to for-
mulate the relationship between six characteristics (as defined by Schutz) as form-
ing the ‘systemic character of cognitive style’ […] The social order which he was
involved in studying therefore was equivalent to a finite province of meaning.”44

39
Christian Greiffenhagen & Wes Sharrock, “Where do the limits of experience lie?
Abandoning the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity,” History of the Human Sciences, 21:
3 (2008), p. 71.
40
Harold Garfinkel, The Perception of the Other: A Study in Social Order (Ph.D. unpub-
lished Thesis, Harvard University, June 1952).
41
Harold Garfinkel, “Letter to Alfred Schutz on October 8, 1953” (Schütz´s Papers, Alfred
Schütz Gedächtnis Archiv, Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, Universität Konstanz, Germany, 1953a);
Harold Garfinkel, “Notes on the Sociological Attitude. Unpublished, 1-19” (Schütz´s Papers, Alfred
Schütz Gedächtnis Archiv, Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, Universität Konstanz, Germany, 1953b);
Harold Garfinkel, “A Comparison of Decisions made of four ‘Pre-Theoretical’ problems by Talc-
ott Parsons and Alfred Schutz. Unpublished, 1-29” (Schütz´s Papers, Alfred Schütz Gedächtnis
Archiv, Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, Universität Konstanz, Germany, 1953c); Alfred Schutz,
“Letter to Harold Garfinkel on January 19, 1954” (Schütz´s Papers, Alfred Schütz Gedächtnis
Archiv, Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, Universität Konstanz, Germany, 1954).
42
Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality, p. 230.
43
George Psathas, “The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Harold Garfinkel: What
was the ‘Terra Incognita’ and the ‘Treasure Island’,” in Alfred Schutz and his Intellectual Part-
ners. Edited by NASU Hisashi; Lester Embree; Psathas George; Ilja Srubar (Konstanz:
UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2009), pp. 401-433.
44
Ibid., p. 414.
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 55
Indeed, Garfinkel’s thesis itself is oriented towards transforming Schutz’s analy-
sis of multiple realities into a possible program for empirical research. Garfinkel
takes Schutzian formulations as his starting point, according to Psathas, “even to
the point of wanting to attempt an operationalizing of the six features of a finite
province of meaning and held that their empirical manifestations could be stud-
ied experimentally.”45 He decides to use “an experimental format to test certain
hypotheses, loosely formulated, with regard to the consequences of the removal or
inoperability of any of the six characteristics of the finite province of meaning.”46
With respect to the second element, that of the Schutz-Parsons antagonism,
the unpublished correspondence held between Schutz and Garfinkel regard-
ing the Schutz-Parsons’ exchange, sheds light on the prejudice contained in the
interpretation of the work of both authors as antithetical. The Schutz-Garfinkel
correspondence allows us to recover Schutz’s own interpretation on its links
with Parsons and his intention of complementarity with the work of the latter:

“Reading your interpretation of Parsons’ and my theory, I am not so sure

whether there are really such fundamental differences between our ‘decisions’
as you assume to prevail […] Could the difference between Parsons and me
rather be interpreted as a difference on the level of research? Parsons thinks
that empirical investigations, if carried on far enough and grouped in accor-
dance with a conceptual scheme, will lead by necessity into the insight into
problems which could only be handled on a purely theoretical level […] I, in
turn, try to start with an application of Husserl’s analysis of the structure of
conscious life to the problem of the social world which is to me basically the
world of intersubjectivity as experienced in the natural attitude. From here
I try to explain and elucidate the concrete phenomena of the social world,
defining the subject matter of the social sciences as the endeavor to explain
the phenomena of the social world in terms of the experiences which people
living their daily life within the social world have in their natural attitude and
in terms of the meaning these experiences have for them. In one word, my
ideal would be to end where Parsons starts.”47

At this point Schutz directs the reader to the analysis of his first work The Phe-
nomenology of the Social World48 (hereinafter PSW). The project contained in
that book would reveal the Schutzian intention of complementarity with Par-
sons’ work. Thus, we emphasize the importance of rebuilding the project and
the questions which that text answers, for it is that text which operates as the
background of the critical study of Schutz to SSA.

45
Ibid., p. 417.
46
Ibid., p. 413.
47
Alfred Schutz, “Letter to Harold Garfinkel on January 19, 1954,” pp. 1-2. Emphasis
added.
48
Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanson: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1967 [1932]).
56 Daniela Griselda López

Following Greiffenhagen & Sharrock’s interpretation,49 we sustain that the

characterization of phenomenology as ‘subjectivist’ presupposes an underlying
subjective–objective dualism, which phenomenology explicitly aims to overcome.
In the following we emphasize this argument by tracing a genealogy of the dual-
istic issue in the early work of Schutz in order to show that the overcoming of
dualism was a project in which Schutz was already immersed in his early work.

2. A Genealogy of the Dualistic Dilemma in the Early Work of Schutz

As a second stage of our work, we radicalize the evident misunderstandings
and prejudices of the interpretive framework pointed out by the authors and we
seek our own systematic response to the dominant interpretation. In order to do this,
we trace a genealogy of the dualistic dilemma in the early work of Schutz. Tak-
ing this genealogy as a starting point, we show that the overcoming of dualism
was a project in which Schutz was already immersed in his early years in the
context of the reflections of the Austrian School of Economics.

2.1. Schutzian Project and the Dualistic Dilemma

In order to recover the original meaning of the Schutzian critical study, we
move back to the historical conceptual genealogy and recover the questions
and discussions which appeared as the background of his first book, PSW. The
context of that work is that of the discussion held within the Austrian School
of Economics.
Schutz’s membership of the Austrian School of Economics is a relatively
unexplored context of the author’s work. However, it is essential to discuss his
first period. Fundamentally, we want to review the epistemological problems of
the Austrian School regarding concept formation in the social sciences.50
The epistemological crisis goes back to the beginning of the school. Accord-
ing to Wilson, this has its origins in the works of Carl Menger.51 Menger begins
what is called the “subjectivist revolution” in economics. The subjective revolu-
tion replaces the classical theory of value of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and
Karl Marx with a theory of value understood “in a subjective sense.” According
to the Austrian School, the value of goods and services cannot be defined by an

49
Christian Greiffenhagen & Wes Sharrock, “Where do the limits of experience lie?
Abandoning the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity,” p. 72.
50
Christopher Prendergast, “Alfred Schutz and the Austrian School of Economics,” The
American Journal of Sociology, 92: 1(1986), pp. 1-26; Thomas Wilson, “The Problem of Subjec-
tivity in Schutz and Parsons,” in Explorations of the Life-World: Continuing Dialogues with Alfred
Schutz. Edited by Martin Endress; George Psathas; NASU Hisashi (Netherlands: Springer,
2005), pp. 19-50.
51
Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute,
2007 [1871]), Carl Menger, Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with special ref-
erence to Economics (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009 [1882]).
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 57
objective standard such as the quantity of labor embodied in the product but
subjectively by the utility that consumers assign to them.52
The consequence of this “subjectivist revolution” in value theory shakes the
foundations of epistemological and methodological reflection.53 The problems of
foundation regarding scientific concepts become apparent in the discussions held
with the German Historical School, particularly with its representative Gustav
Schmoller, who holds up the rigours of historical research, and sees economy
as a history of economic facts. According to Menger, it is necessary to guard
against the representatives of the Historical School as they deny the regularity
of economic phenomena and place the free will of individuals at the center. In
contrast, the political economy theory proposed by Menger was independent
of the practical activity of economic agents. With this assertion it is possible to
emphasize the separation that, according to Menger, exists between economic theory
and social life as a whole. That problem was repeatedly pointed out by Schmoller:
“Menger – says Schmoller – ‘abstracts’ or ‘isolates’ the economic aspect of social
life, working on the assumption that he had defined the simple elements of this
economic aspect.”54
The Austrian School holds a distinctive conception of theory, not as a body of
ideas that can in principle be corroborated empirically, but rather as an a priori
scheme for the elaboration of concepts in which terms the empirical material
can be interpreted.55 What is of interest to theoretical economists are the types
(or typical forms) of economic phenomena. The study of types and typical relation-
ships, according to Menger, is essential. Research should construct unfalsifiable
typical-ideal models of the behavior of economic facts. Such principles should
be generated by direct intuition and not by observation. Moreover, these prin-
ciples are conceived as logically necessary and unalterable, prior to all experience.
Those types and typical relationships are held a priori and are disconnected from
the concrete practice of economic agents. These comments make clear the sharp
dualism between economic theory and social life held by the representatives of
the Austrian School.
The third generation of the Austrian School centered on Ludwig von Mises,
Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Machlup, and Friedrich von Hayek,
will inherit these problems56. The first task proposed within Mises’ seminar

52
Cf. Christopher Prendergast, “Alfred Schutz and the Austrian School of Economics.”
53
Cf. Michael Barber, The Participating Citizen. A Biography of Alfred Schutz (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2004).
54
Darío Antiseri, “Estudio Introductorio,” in El Método de las Ciencias Sociales. Edited
by Darío Antiseri; Juan Marcos De La Fuente (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 2006), p. 47. (The
Method of the Social Sciences).
55
Cf. Thomas Wilson, “The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons.”, p. 22.
56
Schutz studied at the University of Vienna; Hans Kelsen was his law tutor and Lud-
wig von Mises taught him economics. He met the latter in 1920. That same year, he joined a
private seminar given by von Mises.
58 Daniela Griselda López

(Miseskreis) is to investigate and discuss the methodology of Max Weber. The

reflection on Weber’s texts is not capricious, given that his interpretive sociology
takes as its starting point the subjective meaning and the notion of the ideal type
as a methodological tool. These issues have been developed by Menger but, as
shown, are facing a crisis – that is, the a priori character of the categories provided
by economic theory has been criticized. In this way, Weber’s work emerges as a
pathway to solving these problems.
Whilst the continuity of Mises’ thinking with Menger’s apriorism is clear, by
the late 20s, these notions were being challenged by logical empiricism. Critics
pointed to the same foundation of the objective categories. On the one hand, logical
empiricism held that the conceptual foundation based on intellectual intuition was
unreliable; on the other hand, the possibility of reasoning through historical trends
or cases had been denied by Menger in his discussion with historical economists.
The root of the problems of foundation resided in the dualistic view of reality
held by the Austrian School. This School founded the objective a priori knowledge
by introspection, which means leaving aside the subjective activities of specific
actors. While the object of inquiry was subjective actions, the methodology of
the formation of objective categories, according to that object, consisted in an
intellectual intuition which involved “oblivion” or a disconnection of the act-
ing subject, i.e. the subject being understood as a real person. Thus, the concrete
subject was replaced (and with that, the life-world, which is a subjective forma-
tion resulting from the activities of the subjective pre-scientific experience) with
a priori idealities created by science.
The need to radicalize the reflection on the subjective point of view and thus
to radicalize the “subjectivist revolution” was pointed out by Schutz in the discus-
sions within Mises’ seminar. In a manuscript from 193657, Schutz pointed out
that although the “Copernican turn” of the theory of marginal utility results in a
more radical comprehension of economic life; economists consider that subjects
of economic life are not humans in the fullness of their existence: “Here a fictive
world comes into existence alongside the actual world.”58 These reflections show
the danger involved in taking the idealities of science for reality itself, leaving
aside the life-world. This results in the inability to account for subjective experi-
ence, which is replaced by the scientific idealities and abstractions. In this context,
Schutz directed his major work PSW, based on Weber’s interpretive sociology, to
solve these problems59. In this work, Schutz took the works of Henri Bergson and
Edmund Husserl to rethink Weber’s concept of action and subjective meaning.

57
“Political Economy: Human Conduct in Social Life” in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers
IV (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). The essay was occasioned by Fried-
rich von Hayek’s visit to Vienna in 1936, where he gave a lecture to the Viennese Gesellschaft
fur Wirtswissenschaft. The topic was “Wissen und Wirtschaft” (Knowledge and Economics).
58
Ibid., p. 99.
59
Cf. Christopher Prendergast, “Alfred Schutz and the Austrian School of Economics”
and Thomas Wilson, “The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons.”
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 59
2.2. The Philosophical Foundation of Weber’s Interpretive Sociology and the
Overcoming of Dualism
In order to explain the problem of subjective meaning (the basis for solving
the problem related to concept formation in the social sciences) Schutz takes as
a starting point the clarification of Weber’s distinction between subjective and
objective meaning.
However, Schutz finds in Weber’s work a similar dualism to the one found
in the Austrian School framework. As regards this dualism, Schutz’s critique
of Weberian concepts of motivational and observational understanding is well
known: “Indeed, Weber’s distinction between observational and motivational
understanding is arbitrary and without any logical basis in his theory. Both types
of understanding start out from an objective meaning-context. The understand-
ing of subjective meaning has no place in either.”60
Weber could not give an adequate account of the subjective context of mean-
ing, posing a dilemma between the description of the subjectivity from the actor’s
standpoint and the observation from the sociologist’s standpoint. This shows a
dualism in the Weberian scheme amongst the world of scientific reflection, the
objective context of meaning, on the one hand; and the subjective context of
meaning which cannot be accounted for, on the other:

“My analysis shows that the Weberian conceptual pairs a) actual and motiva-
tional understanding, and b) subjective and objective meaning can be transposed
into each other. A sufficiently precise investigation will demonstrate that these
pairs under no circumstances yield sufficiently sharp and useful distinctions. The
reason for this confusion of concepts chiefly is a disregard for the set of problems
pertaining to intersubjectivity and time.”61

In order to overcome the Weberian dualism, Schutz takes as his starting point
Bergson’s distinction between inner experience (durée) and empirical space and
time. Schutz makes the transition from subjective to objective meaning by trac-
ing the path from the inner experience of pure duration to the concept of space62
and proposes an analysis of the structure of the life forms.
The overall purpose of the structure of life forms is to provide a bridge
between the “inner” levels of the I, determined by the duration, and the “outer”,
spatiotemporally-determined levels which are Weber’s starting point. However,
Schutz found a limitation and a dualism in Bergson’s scheme. Both levels are
intrinsically divided. As a consequence and as stated by Lenore Langsdorf, he

60
Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 29.
61
Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers IV, p. 84.
62
In his Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (1889), Bergson proceeded from
space-time conceptions to inner duration. Schutz reversed the procedure and began with pure
duration, see Helmut R. Wagner, “The Bergsonian Period of Alfred Schutz,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 39: 2 (1977), pp. 187-199.
60 Daniela Griselda López

maintained a strict dichotomy between experience (duration; flux; continuum)

and language (conception; discrete units; spatiotemporal entities), “Seen from a
philosophy of science context, that dichotomy is the subject-object division – a
useful theoretical position, perhaps, but one with dubious philosophical justifi-
cation and problematic empirical validation.”63 However, the limitations of the
Bergsonian analysis did not affect the theoretical development of Schutz, “Not
abandoning but restricting Bergson, he decided, with the help of Felix Kaufmann,
to penetrate deeply into Husserl’s phenomenology.”64
Taking as a starting point Bergson’s distinction between stream of duration
(durée) and empirical space and time, Schutz redefines both poles via Husserl’s
reflections on the double intentionality of the stream of consciousness and the
Husserlian distinction between “static analysis” and “genetic intentional analy-
sis” – among others.
Schutz proposes at that level an articulation between subjectivism and
objectivism. The analysis of the structure of the life-world as a structure of
meaning, (which is gradually arranged from the lower layers of meaning,
closer to the durée, to the higher contexts of meaning no longer penetrated by
rays of attention), allows Schutz to account for the transition from the sub-
jective to the objective65. This articulation is the key to overcoming Weber’s
and Bergson’s dualism between subjective and objective meaning. This is the
dualism that constitutes the starting point of the Schutzian analysis. Thus, one
can begin to expose the prejudice of the dominant sociological interpretation
regarding Schutz’s reformulation of Weberian interpretive sociology. There-
fore it is possible to argue that Schutz is not a dualist who splits the element
of the Weberian corpus but, on the contrary, he takes Weber’s dualism as his
starting point in order to overcome it. This argument also wrecks the alleged
Schutzian radicalization of the subjective pole.

2.3. Life-World and Science. The Epistemic Claim

Schutz in his first book similarly demonstrates the necessary articulation
between the social life-world and scientific reflection, taking the notion of ideal
type as a starting point. The fact that the world of contemporaries and of pre-
decessors can only be grasped in an ideal typical way, anticipates the ideal types
of social scientists. Also, the fact that subjective meaning contexts can be com-
prehended in objectivating and anonymizing constructions with the help of the
personal ideal types in the naive natural point of view of everyday life, antici-
pates scientific social types. Since every social science starts out by taking for

63
Lenore Langsdorf, “Schutz’s bergsonian analysis of the structure of consciousness,”
Human Studies, 8 (1985), p. 321.
64
Cf. Helmut R. Wagner, Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1983).
65
Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 74ff.
 The Oblivion of the Life-World 61
granted a social world which it sees as either a world of mere contemporaries or
a world of predecessors, it can comprehend this world only by the method of
ideal types, whether course-of-action types or personal types. Now, since it is
typifying experience, social science is an objective meaning-context the object of
which, however, is subjective meaning-contexts (to be precise, the typical subjec-
tive processes of personal ideal types).
Thus the social world is only pregiven to each social science in an indirect
way and never with the immediacy of living intentionality:

“Since what is thematically pregiven to sociology and every other social science
is the social reality which is indirectly experienced (never immediate social real-
ity) – a social reality which can only be comprehended in the They-relationship
and therefore typically – it follows that even when social science is dealing with
the action of a single individual, it must do so in terms of types.”66

Furthermore, given the danger of confusing the ideal types of specific actors with
the ideal types of social scientists, Schutz argues that social observation should be
developed as an ideal-typical construction of second order. Comprehensive soci-
ology must build personal ideal types for social actors that are compatible with
those built by the latter. This should be its basic premise. The same is significant
from the point of view of any empirical social science that includes the indirect
observation. His ideal types must not only be compatible with the established
conclusions of all sciences, but also must explain in terms of motivations the very
subjective experiences which they cover: “Each term used in a scientific system
referring to human action must be so constructed that a human act performed
within the life-world by an individual actor (in the way indicated by the typical
construction) would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself as
well as for his fellow-man.”67
This argument regarding any scientific thought that can be called an “epis-
temic claim”68 (of the life-world in general and of everyday life in particular) is
latently present in the early work of Schutz and is structured in a more consis-
tent manner in the correspondence held with Parsons. As stated by the editor of
the correspondence, Richard Grathoff: “The major issues of the Schutz/Parsons
debate illuminate this epistemic claim of sociology to the world of everyday life.
Schutz had this claim in mind when he insisted that Parsons needed only ‘to go
a few steps further in radicalizing’ his theory.”69

66
Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 227. Emphasis in original.
67
Alfred Schutz & Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, p. 60. Emphasis added.
68
See as well, Richard Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology (New York: Pegasus Books,
1970) and Aron Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the Theory of Science (Evanston: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1974).
69
Richard Grathoff, “How long a Schutz-Parsons Divide?” p. 127.
62 Daniela Griselda López

This claim is also important for our argumentation because it exposes the
unfounded rupture of the life-world and science which has been attributed to
Schutz by the dominant interpretation.

3. Concluding Considerations
With these reflections we aim to illuminate the background of Schutzian
thought along with the original sense and his initial intention as he begins his
correspondence with Parsons. The historical-conceptual genealogy regarding
the dualistic dilemma in the early work of Schutz, allows us to recover the
questions and the problems that the author had in mind when writing the criti-
cal study on SSA. The discussion around the dualisms is the main concern at
the beginning of his reflection and it is from this place that Schutz faces the
correspondence. This is in clear contrast to the dominant interpretive tradi-
tion initiated by Parsons, which has veiled that original meaning. The open-
ing of this new hermeneutic horizon to understanding the correspondence,
which unveils the Schutzian original intention of overcoming dualisms, allows
us to sustain our own interpretation of the letter exchanges. Opposed to the
dominant reading and far from being interpreted as a confrontation between
subjectivism and objectivism, the correspondence must be understood in the
context of the Schutzian project of overcoming all dualisms, starting from a
phenomenological foundation that recovers the life-world as the forgotten basis
of meaning of the social sciences.

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Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 65–77

Reformulation
of “How Is Society Possible?”
Ken’ichi Kawano
Waseda University
[email protected]

Abstract: “How is society possible?” posed by Georg Simmel has been one of the
fundamental problems in sociology. Although various attempts have been made
to solve it, I conceive that “society” in the problem remains to be articulated. Sim-
mel provides us with two concepts of society—“society as interaction” and “soci-
ety as unity”—to be distinguished. Some research traditions in sociology have
been concerned with the former, others have dealt with the latter. On the other
hand, Simmel maintains continuity between them. In this sense, his concept of
“society” has “ambiguous” characteristics. It seems to me that in the ambiguous
style Simmel had intended to reveal the secret of “society,” but in the end could
not have got to it. In my opinion, in order to unveil the secret, it is required that,
drawing on Schutzian phenomenologically oriented sociology, sociologists or social
scientists make a differentiation between the society which is realized or brought
about by partners with no need of an observer, “the social,” and the society which
an observer recognizes by use of the concept. In this article, from a Schutzian
point of view, I wish to articulate “society” and to indicate four phases of “soci-
ety.” These investigations lead to a reformulation of the problem of “how is society
possible?” and sociology (or the social sciences) which makes possible the deeper
understanding of society.

Keywords: Schutz, Simmel, the interactional, the unified, the social.

Introduction
“How is society possible?” It has been one of the fundamental problems in
sociology (or for the social sciences). On the other hand, Talcott Parsons formu-
lated another problem of “how is social order possible?” as “Hobbesian problem
66 Ken’ichi Kawano

of order.” These two problems have often been regarded as similar or the same
one by sociologists or social scientists. However, I think there are crucial differ-
ences between them. Whereas Parsonian “social order” presupposes the concept
of normative or factual order and can be recognized only by scientific observer
who knows the concept (and criteria) of “social order,” Simmel, investigating
“society,” focuses on “society” realized by partners who are involved with it “with
no need of an observer” (Simmel, 1908 [1910]: 22 [373]).
Alfred Schutz refers to Albion W. Small’s English translation of “Note on the
Problem: How is Society Possible” (“Exkurs über das Problem: Wie ist Gesell-
schaft möglich?”) in Simmel’s Soziologie in the footnotes of his paper1 (Schutz,
[1953] 1962: 18n, 41n). But Schutz does not take up or deal explicitly with the
problem of “how is society possible” in his writings. Nevertheless, I think it is
possible that Schutz’s phenomenologically oriented sociology will be (or “was,”
implicitly) able to make a major contribution to inquiry of the fundamental
problem of sociology—“how is society possible.” For, I think that in some crucial
respects Schutz shares with Simmel the view of social reality for sociology or the
social sciences. And Schutz, drawing on phenomenological tradition, explores the
everyday life-world and social reality within which “society” emerges. Schutz’s
works and Schutzian phenomenologically oriented sociology shed light on “soci-
ety” realized by those who are living in daily life, although Schutz himself often
refers to the term “social reality” rather than “society” as the key terms of the
social sciences.2
In the first section of my paper, I point out the view of society or social real-
ity which Schutz shares with Simmel in brief. In the second, characteristics of
Simmel’s concept of society are illustrated. In the third section, introducing the
term “the interactional” and “the unified” to considerations of “society,” I articu-
late four phases of “society” from the Schutzian point of view, and in the last I
attempt to reformulate the problem of “how is society possible?”

1. The Decisive Diff erence: Between the Social Sciences and the Natural
Sciences
Schutz points out that there is “an essential difference in the structure of the
thought objects or mental constructs formed by the social sciences and those
formed by the natural sciences” (Schutz, [1954] 1962: 58). For Schutz, “[t]he
primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social
reality” (Schutz, [1954] 1962: 53). By the term “social reality” he refers to “the
sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experi-
enced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their

1
Schutz states that Simmel “overcome the dilemma between individual and collective
consciousness, so clearly seen by Durkheim” (Schutz, [1953] 1962: 18).
2
Simmel (1858-1918) himself never knew works of Schutz (1899-1959) in his lifetime.
 Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?” 67
fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction” (Schutz,
[1954] 1962: 53). It is well known that, drawing on the constitutive phenomenol-
ogy of the natural attitude and theory of multiple realities, he explores “social
reality” experienced by those who are living in daily life and sheds light on the
everyday life-world.
Simmel also states that “there is a decisive difference between the unity of a
society and the unity of nature”3 (Simmel, 1908 [1959]: 22 [338]). Whereas—in
the Kantian view—“the unity of nature emerges in the observing subject exclu-
sively,” the unity of a society is realized “with no need of an observer” (Simmel,
1908 [1959]: 22 [338]; 1908 [1910]: 22 [373]). In this citation, it is noteworthy
that he has an insight into “society” realized (or brought about) “with no need
of an observer.” I think Schutz shares with Simmel not only the view of “the
decisive difference” between the social sciences and the natural sciences, but also
the view of society realized in everyday life-world “with no need of an observer.”
Schutz characterizes the social scientific constructs, as follows:

“The thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded
upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man
living his everyday life among his fellow-men. Thus, the constructs used by
the social scientist are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely
constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene…” (Schutz,
[1953] 1962: 6)

The social scientific constructs are “founded upon” the constructs made by
those who are living in daily life. To put it in another way, whereas “the world
of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not ‘mean’ anything to mol-
ecules, atoms, and electrons…the observational field of the social scientist—social
reality—has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings
living, acting, and thinking within it” (Schutz, [1954] 1962: 59). Thus, he states
that the social scientist have “to interpret in terms of their subjective meaning
structure lest he abandon any hope of grasping “social reality” ” (Schutz, [1953]
1962: 40). Schutz sheds light on the everyday life-world and describes “social
reality” constituted by those who are living in daily life in terms of their subjec-
tive (or ‘inherent’) point of view4.
Simmel conceives of “society” as realized or brought about “with no need
of an observer.” Introducing Schutzian terms to it, in everyday life-world those
who are living in daily life realize or bring about “society” “with no need of an
observer.” Schutz shares with Simmel the view of society which is brought about
by those who are living in daily life.

3
This citation is from the version of Kurt H. Wolff ’s English translation (Wolff, 1959).
4
With regard to the experience of ‘social reality,’ we can make a distinction between two
points of view from which social reality is experienced; that is, the viewpoint of those who are
living in daily life and that of social scientists.
68 Ken’ichi Kawano

2. Society as Interaction and as Unity5

Simmel’s writings have often been characterized as “ambiguous.” It seems to
me that this “ambiguity” applies to his concept of society, and makes it difficult
for sociologists to get to the point of the problem—How is society possible? In
Simmel’s works, we can find two concepts of society to be distinguished: society
as “interaction” and society as “unity.” With regard to society as interaction, Sim-
mel states that society “exists where individuals enter into interactions” (Simmel,
1908: 4 [314]) and that “that which constitutes society in every current sense of
the term is identical with the kinds of interaction,” and “[a] collection of human
beings does not become society” (Simmel, 1908: 5 [315]). About society as unity,
he points out that “[o]n the whole, sociology has confined itself to those social
phenomena in which interactional forces already present themselves in isolation
from their individual bearers, or, at least, in the form of conceptual unities” (Sim-
mel, 1908: 14 [326]). These unities of the supra-individual entity include states,
labor unions, priesthoods, family forms, economic systems, military organiza-
tions, guilds, communities, and so on (Simmel, 1890; 1908: 14).
Simmel usually makes a clear distinction between “interaction” and “unity”
and sheds light on the significance of the former—society as interaction (or socia-
tion [Vergesellschaftung])—for sociology. However, he also expresses “unity” as
nothing other than interactions6 and maintains continuity between “interaction”
and “unity.” “Immeasurably small steps constitute the structure ([Zusammenhang])
of historical unity; equally unpretentious interactions between persons constitute
the structure ([Zusammenhang]) of societal unity”7 (Simmel, 1908: 16 [328]).
That is, on the one hand, he makes a differentiation between society as “interac-
tion” and society as “unity”; and on the other hand, he also maintains continuity
between them. In this sense, Simmel’s concept of society becomes ambiguous.
On the basis of the above arguments, from the logical point of view there
are three possibilities of interpretation of Simmel’s concept of society. That is,
(1) society as “unity,” (2) society as “interaction,” (3) society which includes both
(society as) “unity” and “interaction.” As for (1) society as “unity,” it is problem-
atic because society as “interaction” is excluded. We cannot disregard Simmel’s

5
Simmel sheds light not only on interaction or sociation [Vergesellschaftung], but also
on “the forms” of interaction (or sociation), and had developed “formal sociology.” Actually,
focusing on “finite provinces of meaning” and “forms,” I argued before affinity between the
Schutzian perspective and Simmel’s one (Kawano, 2003). Hisashi Nasu argues and makes clear
the affinities of phenomenological perspective and Simmel’s one (Nasu, 2001).
6
Simmel states in the original texts that “Diese Wechselwirkungen bedeuten, daß aus
den individuellen Trägern jener veranlassenden Triebe und Zwecke eine Einheit, eben eine
“Gesellschaft” wird. Denn Einheit im empirischen Sinn ist nichts anderes als Wechselwirkung
von Elementen.” (Simmel, 1908: 4)
7
Simmel states in Soziologie as follows. “Die unermeßlich kleinen Scritte stellen den
Zusammenhang der geschichtlichen Einheit her, die ebenso unscheinbaren Wechselwirkungen
von Person zu Person den Zusammenhang der gesellschaftlichen Einheit.” (Simmel, 1908: 16)
 Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?” 69
emphasis on the significance of “interaction” for sociology. It is reasonable to
say that we can adopt either (2) or (3). About (2) society as “interaction,” it is in
conformity with Simmel’s original insight into interaction. However, in the case
that (2) excludes unity of super-individual entity, sociology does not deal with
such social entities as states, economic systems, communities, and so on. On the
contrary, if we adopt (3) society which includes both “unity” and “interaction,”
we need to explain the ambiguous relationship between interaction and unity.8
Which is a better option for sociology?
Some sociologists refer to the ambiguity of Simmel’s works as “very sugges-
tive” or “full of insight,” and others criticize it and negatively call his writings
“too oblique,” “intellectually playful,” and “lacking system.” As we have shown,
this characteristic of ambiguity applies to his concept of society. And it seems
to me that in an ambiguous style he intended to approach the secret of society;
but in the end could not have got to it. In my opinion, in order to unveil the
secret, it is required that, drawing on Schutzian phenomenologically oriented
sociology, sociologists or social scientists shed light on the pre-predicative expe-
rience of “partners” themselves who are involved with something which, from
the viewpoint of an “observer” can be called society.

3. The Interactional and the Unified

(1) “Partners” and “Observer”
It is one of the kernels of Simmel’s sociology that society is brought about (or
realized) “with no need of an observer” (Simmel, 1908 [1910]: 14 [373]). To put it
in another way from the Schutzian point of view, “in everyday life-world” society
is realized with no need of an observer. On the basis of this view, I would like to
ask whether in everyday life-world society as “interaction” and society as “unity”
of the supra-individual entity is realized with no need of an observer or not.
In everyday life-world an interaction is realized or brought about by persons.
We can call persons who bring about or realize an interaction “partners” who
are involved with it. If we take the view of society as interaction, in everyday
life-world interaction is realized by “partners” “with no need of an observer.” In
this line of thought, the word “observer” has its particular meaning. Making
use of the concept or the label (e.g., society, interaction, or unity), the “observer”
recognizes something realized by “partners.” Whereas “partners” realize or bring
about something (societal unity), the “observer” recognizes it by pasting a con-
cept or label on it.9 To be sure, there is a case that, after realizing a societal unity,

8
If the relationship between “interaction” and “unity” is made clear, the concept of soci-
ety which includes both “unity” and “interaction” would be adopted.
9
If an observer takes the world of scientific contemplation as “paramount reality” or
“home base” in the sense of Schutz’s theory of multiple realities and relevance, we can regard
him/her as a “scientific observer.”
70 Ken’ichi Kawano

partners themselves recognize it. In this case, the same person is both a “partner”
involved with a societal unity and an “observer” recognizing it. Next, I would
like to articulate two phases of interaction, paying attention to the difference
between “partners” and “observer.”

(2) Interaction and the Interactional

According to Simmel, society is realized or brought about by “partners” with
no need of an observer. It is reasonable to say that this view applies to “interac-
tion.” However, I wonder if it is possible within Simmel’s logic that “interaction”
is brought about by partners without observer. For, he does not make a distinc-
tion between “interaction” brought about or realized by partners in everyday
life-world and “interaction” recognized by an observer. While Simmel seems
to be aware of the difference between the viewpoint of “partners” and that of
an “observer,” he does not articulate two phases of “interaction” in his inquiry
into “interaction as society.” That is, Simmel’s term “interaction” includes two
phases of “interaction” to be differentiated from the Schutzian point of view10.
In order to articulate these two phases of “interaction,” we need to take into
account the difference between the viewpoint of an observer and that of “part-
ners” who are involved with it, and to “bracket” the concept of interaction. It
is possible to make clear the phase of interaction brought about or realized by
partners in everyday life-world, only when we examine it without pasting the
label of “interaction” on it.
“An observer” recognizes interaction on the premise of the concept of “inter-
action.” However, even if “partners” did not know the concept of “interaction,”
an interaction is brought about by partners involved with it in everyday life-
world. Strictly speaking, in the latter case, an interaction realized by “partners”
cannot be regarded as “interaction” from their point of view, because they do
not know the concept of “interaction.” They realize “something” which can be
called interaction from the viewpoint of those who know the concept of “inter-
action.” Here, I will call this something—which is brought about or realized by
“partners” in everyday life-world with no need of an observer’s recognition—
“the interactional.” After an observer recognizes “the interactional” as “interac-
tion,” “the interactional” can be called “interaction.” However, before someone
recognizes “the interactional” as “interaction” from the viewpoint of observer,
“the interactional” which is taking place in everyday life-world cannot be called
“interaction” yet. By the use of the term “the interactional,” we can distinguish

10
“Society as interaction” can be analyzed by social scientists, but it is always constituted
or realized by “partners” involved with it in everyday life-world. In order to articulate the
latter phase (of society as interaction), phenomenological analysis or fi ndings of “lifeworld
(Husserl)” and “everyday life-world” (Schutz) are required. On the basis of the findings of it
in phenomenology, Schutzian constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, theory of
multiple realities, and methodology of the social sciences which we cannot find in Simmelian
sociology or neo-Kantianism have been developed.
 Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?” 71
and refer to the phenomena which “partners” are experiencing and lies beneath
interaction in everyday life-world before (or without) observer’s reflective recog-
nition of “interaction” on the predicative level.
To give an example, I remember playing in the park when l was a preschool
child with my friends who were about same years old as me. We used to play
tag, hide-and-seek, and baseball. I’m sure that I did not know the concept of
“interaction” at that time and never regard playing in the park with my friends as
“(society as) interaction.” However, kinds of exchange had been brought about or
realized by us as “partners” playing in the park and we had been good friends. In
these illustrations there was no observer who recognized “interaction.” With no
need of an observer, preschool children as “partners” realized or brought about
“kinds of exchange in playing in the park,” that is to say, “the interactional.”
And from my point of view today, each of “the interactional” (which constitutes
“playing in the park”) can be called “interaction.”
In my idea, “the interactional” has another characteristic and it indicates sug-
gestive perspective for sociology. In addition to the fact that “the interactional”
is realized by “partners” with no need of an observer, there is no one other than
“partners” themselves who take notice of “the interactional” in the strict sense.
It is “partners” themselves who can take notice of “the interactional” which is
realizing and realized.
For example, I would like to imagine the case that person A and person B
are friends, and one day they happen to meet on the street and exchange greet-
ings. In the case, “the interactional” is brought about by A and B as “partners”
involved with it (the interactional). And if there is no one on the street other
than A and B, in principle they themselves are only able to take notice of “the
interactional” realized. To be sure, in particular situations, I think that “the
interactional” can be seen also from the viewpoint of an observer who is not
involved with it. For example, in the above case, if person C happens to look at
their exchanging greetings in a face-to-face situation, C would take notice of “the
interactional” realized there, although C is not involved with it as a partner. But
in the other situations, it is only “partners” themselves who take a position to
know whether “the interactional” is realized or not. Even if “partners” involved
with “the interactional” are not reflective in the natural attitude and do not
regard “the interactional” as “interaction,” their “stock of knowledge at hand”
as a stock of previous experiences would be more or less modified by their pre-
predicative experience of “the interactional” (their exchanging greetings). This
means that “partners” who are involved with “the interactional” themselves can
notice in pre-predicative level that “the interactional” is realized. In this sense,
“the interactional” is realized by “partners” and it occurs in inherent conscious-
ness for “partners” themselves.11

11
In order to explicate fully “the interactional” and “interaction,” we need to take into
account such Schutzian concepts as “act,” “action,” “working (Wirken),” “the world of working,”
72 Ken’ichi Kawano

We must make a clear distinction between “interaction” and “the interac-

tional” for the deeper understanding of “society as interaction.” Whereas the
former (“interaction”) emerges through “observer’s recognition” on the premise
of the concept of interaction, the latter (“the interactional”) is brought about by
partners” in the natural attitude of daily life with no need of an observer. Tak-
ing into account “the interactional” in everyday life-world, we can understand
that the articulation of “society as interaction” is required. From the Schutzian
point of view, we can point out that the Simmelian concept of “society as inter-
action” includes not only “interaction” but also “the interactional.” It is society
as “the interactional” that “partners” really realize or bring about with no need
of an observer.

(3) The unity and “the unified”

On the analogy of the distinction between “interaction” and “the interac-
tional,” “society as unity” is to be articulated. The unity of the supra-individual
entity is recognized by the “observer” on the premise of the concept of unity (of
the supra-individual entity).12 It is supposed that in everyday life-world “some-
thing,” which is brought about by partners involved with it and can be called
“unity” from the viewpoint of the observer, takes place. In the same way as “the
interactional,” I would like to call this something “the unified.”

Something realized by partners

The interactional The unified
in everyday life-world
The observer’s recognition Interaction Unity

Figure 1.

In Figure 1, both “the interactional” and “the unified” are supposed to be

realized or brought about by partners involved with it in everyday life-world.
Just as something including ‘the interactional’ is regarded as “interaction” when
it is recognized by an “observer,” we can assume that something including “the
unified” can be called “unity” from the viewpoint of the “observer.” However,
there is a significant difference between “the interactional” and “the unified,”
as well as similarities between them. For the deeper understanding of society
we need to make it clear.
In the second section, I refer to the “ambiguity” of Simmel’s concept of soci-
ety. He, on the one hand, makes a differentiation between society as “interaction”

“Fremdwirken,” “fremdbewirktes Handeln,” and so on. But it is beyond this paper to discuss
it fully. Within this paper, I confi ne myself to shed light on the four phases of society and
reformulate “how is society possible.”
12
As I refer to in the second section, these unities include states, labor unions, priesthoods,
family forms, economic systems, military organizations, guilds, communities, and so on.
 Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?” 73
and society as “unity”; and on the other hand, he also maintains continuity
between them. In considering the relationship between “the interactional” and
“the unified,” possibly we take as clues Simmel’s view of the relationship between
interaction and unity. He states that “interactions between persons constitute the
structure ([Zusammenhang]) of societal unity” (Simmel, 1908: 16 [328]). Based
on the continuity between interaction and unity, I think that there is continuity
between “the interactional” and “the unified.” That is, certain kinds or amounts
of “the interactional” constitute “the unified.”
“The interactional” and “the unified” are supposed to be realized or brought
about by “partners” in the everyday life-world with no need of an observer. With
regard to “the interactional,” it is “partners” (involved with it) themselves who
take a position to know whether “the interactional” is realized or not13. It occurs
in inherent consciousness for partners themselves. And in principle, every part-
ner who is involved with the interactional can take notice of “the interactional”
on the pre-predicative level. As for “the unified,” can “partners” involved with it
take notice of it on the pre-predicative level?
I would like to take as an instance “playing in the park” when I was a pre-
school child, again. At that time I did not know either the concept of “interaction”
or “unity.” In the park, we, preschool children, had realized various exchanges.
In our arguments, the exchange realized by us before (or without) reflective rec-
ognition can be called “the interactional.” And, even if preschool children had
not been reflective, on the pre-predicative level we (preschool children) had taken
notice that “the interactional” is realized. For, if preschool children had not taken
notice of “the interactional” at all, nothing would have taken place between
preschool children in the park. “The interactional” had been taken notice of by
preschool children on the pre-predicative level. From the viewpoint of observer,
we can predicate that each participant in “the interactional” constitutes “play-
ing in the park,” and we regard the “playing in the park” of preschool children
as a “(society as) unity.” In this sense, “the unified” is supposed to be realized
or brought about by preschool children in the park. However, contrary to “the
interactional,” it is difficult for preschool children to take notice of “the unified”
on the pre-predicative level, because it requires making a conceptual distinction
between “the interactional” and “the unified.”14
On the basis of the continuity between interaction and unity, we suppose
that certain kinds or amounts of “the interactional” constitute “the unified.” In
this sense, I think that “the unified” is realized or brought about by “partners”
involved with it, because each of “the interactional” is realized by them. How-
ever, although “partners” themselves notice on the pre-predicative level that “the
interactional” is realized, they cannot notice on the pre-predicative level that “the

13
In the section 3 (2) (“Interaction” and “the Interactional”), I offer an explanation of it.
14
It is not “the unified” but “the interactional” that even in pre-predicative level more or
less modifies our “stock of knowledge at hand” as a stock of previous experiences.
74 Ken’ichi Kawano

unified” is realized. It is possible for them to take notice of “the unified” on the
presupposition that they can make a conceptual distinction between “the inter-
actional” and “the unified” and predicate what kind or amounts of “the interac-
tional” constitute “the unified.” It is required for them to predicate what kind or
amounts of “the interactional” constitute “the unified,” on the premise of such
concepts of unity as states, labor unions, priesthoods, family forms, economic
systems, and so on. Each concept of unity determines, by definition, what is to
be included in it. Because without a predicative judgment (on the premise of the
concept of unity) “partners” cannot judge whether each of “the interactional”
constitutes “the unified” or not, they cannot notice on the pre-predicative level
that “the unified” itself is realized. “The unified” is supposed to be realized by
“partners” involved with it in everyday life-world, but it can be found from the
viewpoint of an “observer” only after the recognition of unity.15

We have examined four phases of society (the interactional, the unified, inter-
action, and unity). It is from the viewpoint of an “observer” that “interaction”
and “unity” of the supra-individual entity can be recognized. And “interactions”
constitute “unity.” In contrast to them, “the interactional” is realized or brought
about in everyday life-world by “partners” who are involved with it, with no need
of an observer, and “partners” themselves can notice on the pre-predicative level
that “the interactional” is realized. If they know the concept of interaction and
turn to it after it has been realized, they are sure to regard “the interactional” as
interaction on the predicative level.
Among the four phases of society, it is a more complex task to explicate “the
unified” than the others. “The unified” is supposed to be realized by “partners”
involved with it in a similar way as “the interactional” in everyday life-world, for
there is continuity between “the interactional” and “the unified.” But it cannot
be noticed by them on the pre-predicative level, in contrary to “the interactional.”
That is, “the unified” which is supposed to be realized by “partners” without the
observer’s recognition can be found from the viewpoint of the “observer” after
the (observer’s) recognition of unity on the predicative level. This is the reason
why it is a perplex task to get at “the unified.”
On the one hand, both “the interactional” and “the unified” are realized in
everyday life-world by “partners” with no need of an observer, but there is a dif-
ference between them, on the other. Whereas “the interactional” can be noticed
by “partners” involved with it on the pre-predicative level, “the unified” can-
not be. We can suppose that not only “the interactional” but also “the unified”
is realized by “partners” involved with it in everyday life-world, because “the
unified” is constituted by each of “the interactional.” But on the pre-predica-
tive level “partners” involved cannot notice “the unified”—but can notice “the

15
Schutz was aware that it is one of the most important but perplexing task of sociology to
analyze “the subjective meaning of a social collectivity” (Schutz, 1932 [1967], 226-8 [198-200]).
 Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?” 75
interactional”—in our daily life, because it is possible for them to take notice of
“the unified,” after they predicate what kind or amounts of “the interactional”
constitute “the unified.”
When we refer to “the unified,” we must pay attention to the fact that “the
unified” is “the mixture” of the interactional and the unified, in the strict sense.
“The mixture” (“the unified”) is supposed to be realized by “partners” involved
with it in everyday life-world with no need of an observer, because it is constituted
by each of “the interactional.” And “the mixture” cannot be noticed by “partners”
on the pre-predicative level, because it is to be regarded as “something” beyond
each of “the interactional.”
In my opinion, by introducing the concept of “the interactional” and “the
unified” to the inquiry into “society,” we can get at “the something” which is
realized or brought about in everyday life-world by “partners” involved with it,
with no need of an observer. I would like to call it “the social.” “The social” lies
beneath “society” in everyday life-world and includes “the interactional” and “the
unified.” By “the social,” something social (“the interactional” and “the unified”)
which is realized by partners with no need of an observer in everyday life-world
is to be designated.16

4. Reformulation of “How is Society Possible?”

“How is society possible?” has been one of the fundamental problems in
sociology. But, the “ambiguity” of Simmel’s concept of society makes it dif-
ficult for sociologists to get to the point of the problem. In our discussion, we
have articulated Simmel’s concept of society from the Schutzian point of view.
In an “ambiguous” style of descriptions of society, Simmel tried to approach the
enigma of society. However, in my idea, in order to unveil the secret of society, it
is required to make a differentiation between the society which is brought about
or realized by partners with no need of an observer, the social, and the society
which an observer recognizes by use of the concept. On the basis of this dif-
ferentiation, we can deal both with society (or social reality) realized in every-
day life-world and with society recognized from the viewpoint of the (scientific)
observer in the world of science.
So far, inquiring into the fundamental problem in sociology—how is society
possible?—most sociologists have regarded “interaction” or “unity of the supra-
individual entity” as society. However, we should have made a distinction not only
between society as interaction and as unity, but also between the society which is

16
To put it in another way, by use of the concept of “the interactional” and “the uni-
fied” we can redefine “the social” in sociology. I believe that such new concepts as “the inter-
actional” and “the unified” which I construct will have been useful for social scientists or
sociologists to approach “the subjective meaning (in the Schutzian term)” of actors who are
involved with society.
76 Ken’ichi Kawano

realized by partners with no need of an observer and the society which observer
recognizes by use of the concept. In my opinion, “society” in the problem—how
is society possible—includes four phases of society: “the interactional,” “the uni-
fied,” “interaction,” and “unity (of the supra-individual entity).”
In order to resolve the problem—how is society possible—on the one hand,
we need to inquire into how each phase of society is possible and, on the other
hand, to develop the methodology of the social sciences which can deal with soci-
ety of the related four phases at the same time. For the former inquiry, Schutzian
constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, theory of multiple realities,
theory of relevance, and theory of social action provide us with insightful clues.
And for the latter, findings of Schutz’s methodological works are to be applied
to it. The Schutzian inquiry of “society” will make the deeper understanding of
society possible, and will have had an impact on sociology.

References
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University of New York Press.
Iyasu, T., Soeda, Y., and Iwasaki, N. (eds.) Georg Simmel and Sociology (in Japanese:
“Georg Simmel to Shakaigaku”), Tokyo: Sekai-Shisousha.
Kawano, K. (2003) “The Turn to New ‘Formal’ Sociology”, (in Japanese: “Aratanaru
‘Keishiki’ Shakaigaku heno Tenkai”), Studies on the History of Sociology 25, 91-111.
Nasu, H. (1997) The Way to Phenomenological Sociology, (in Japanese: “Genshogaku-teki
Shakaigaku heno Michi”), Tokyo: Koseisha-Koseikaku.
——. (2003) “Some Aspects of Simmel’s Formal Sociology,” (in Japanese: “Keishiki
Shakaigaku no Shoisou”), in: Iyasu, T., Soeda, Y., and Iwasaki, N. (eds.), Georg Sim-
mel and Sociology, Tokyo: Sekai-Shisousha.
——. (2004) “Between the Everyday Life-World and the World of Social Scientific
Theory—Towards an ‘Adequate’ Social Theory”, in: Endress, M., Psathas, G., Nasu,
H. (eds.), Explorations of the Life-World: Continuing Dialogues with Alfred Schutz,
Dordrecht: Springer, 123-141.
Schutz, A. (1932) Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verste-
hende Soziologie, Wien: Springer.
——. ([1945] 1962) “On Multiple Realities”, in: Natanson, M. (ed.), Collected Papers
I: The Problem of Social Reality, The Hague: Nijhoff, 207-259.
——. ([1951] 1962) “Choosing among Projects of Action”, in: Natanson, M. (ed.), Col-
lected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, The Hague: Nijhoff, 67-96.
——. ([1953] 1962) “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action”,
in: Natanson, M. (ed.), Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, The Hague:
Nijhoff, 3-47.
——. ([1954] 1962) “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences”, in: Natan-
son, M. (ed.), Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, The Hague: Nijhoff,
48-66.
——. ([1959] 1966) “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy”, in: Schutz, I. (ed.),
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Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, The Hague: Nijhoff,
92-115.
——. (1970) Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, Zaner, R. (ed.), New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Simmel, G. (1890) Über sociale Differenzierung: sociologische und psychologische Unter-
suchungen, Schmoller, G. (ed.), Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt.
——. (1908) Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, Leip-
zig: Duncker & Humbolt.
——. ([1917] 1920) Grundfragen der Soziologie, Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Company.
Wolff, K. H. (ed.) (1950) The Sociology of Georg Simmel, Illinois: The Free Press.
——. (ed.) (1959) Essays on Sociology, Philosophy & Aesthetics, New York: Harper & Row.
Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 79–90

Crossing Cultures of Knowledge:

Alfred Schütz’s Heritage
and the Contemporary Social Science
of the Individual in France
Denisa Butnaru
University of Augsburg / CNRS-Université de Strasbourg
[email protected]

Abstract: The aim of the present article is to draw attention on a historical

development in the French sociological tradition. Being a heritage of the Ger-
man intellectual context, the tradition of the comprehensive sociology was not
among the main trends in France. Furthermore, the phenomenological orienta-
tion in social theory mostly associated with the work of Alfred Schütz was also
a side interest until the 1980s. From this decade on, a new paradigm becomes
gradually institutionalized, a paradigm which gathers different intellectual and
theoretical positions and which partly rehabilitates the comprehensive and the
phenomenological heritage. My intention is to analyze how this new orientation
in the French social science used the comprehensive legacy in order to propose
a new culture of knowledge.

Keywords: culture of knowledge, comprehensive sociology, typification, sub-

jectivation, sociology of individual.

Regardless of its specificity, the development of French sociology benefited

from a number of influences among which the most prominent are those com-
ing from the German and American contexts. In the present essay my aim is to
address the question of how the comprehensive sociological turn in the orienta-
tion developed by Schütz, led to the formation of a new culture of knowledge.
I will further pursue how this theoretical tradition contributed to a new socio-
logical orientation in France, an orientation which has been recently known as
the “sociologies of the individual” (Martuccelli & de Singly, 2009).
80 Denisa Butnaru

My interrogation of this concept is developed in the framework of a larger

comparative project1 that aims to analyze the French and German sociological
epistemic traditions, with a specific focus on the sociological qualitative meth-
odology. The main line of research in this project targets precisely the notion of
“cultures of knowledge” (Wissenskulturen) within a limited period, namely from
the 1960s up to the present. According to Reiner Keller and Angelika Poferl (DFG
KE 1608/2-1, 2010: 2), the concept “cultures of knowledge” has been already dis-
cussed in social epistemology by authors such as Wolf Lepenies or Karin Knorr-
Cetina. While Lepenies tends to understand a culture of knowledge in terms of
a general orientation that concerns whole national traditions of human sciences
(Lepenies, 1989), Knorr-Cetina’s more applied description legitimates the use of
this notion “culture of knowledge” in the context of science. The fields that the
latter chose in order to build her epistemological insights are high energy physics
(HEP) and molecular biology (MB). Using these examples she elaborated the con-
cept of epistemic culture (1991; 1999), a concept which doubtlessly proves itself an
essential tool in the debate concerning the constitution of “cultures of knowledge”.
My present approach does not rely on either of these two orientations. I intend
to consider the influence of the Schützian social science and its formation of a
culture of knowledge in the French academic context, by focusing rather on
Thomas Kuhn’s understanding of paradigm and paradigmatic change, however
not in terms of incommensurable paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). What I mean in this
context, by culture of knowledge, is the establishment of a new epistemological
paradigm within the sociological field.
I shall therefore adress about how the Schützian heritage contributed to the
formation of a new culture of knowledge in the French sociological landscape.
Having been often associated with four major paradigms—the genetic struc-
turalism of Pierre Bourdieu, the sociology of the actor of Alain Touraine, the
methodological individualism of Raymond Boudon, and the sociology of orga-
nizations, developed by Michel Crozier—the French sociology seems quite fore-
seeable not only in its methodology but also in its theoretical claims. However,
the so called “pragmatic turn” that started in the 1980s, the ultra-saturation of
the debates between the partisans of the holistic orientations and those of the
rational choice theory and the emergence of new inquiries related to the trans-
formation of society encouraged the researchers to find new ways to consider
the social reality.
One of the influences that marked considerably the beginning of this new
era of inquiry in France is represented by Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology

1
The project in the frame of which I develop my present essay is named Soziologische Wis-
senskulturen. Die Entwicklung qualitativer Sozialforschung in der deutschen und französischen
Soziologie seit den 1960er Jahren” (KE 1608/2-1, 2010). It is supervised by Prof. Dr. Reiner
Keller, Universität Augsburg, Germany and Prof. Dr. Angelika Poferl, Hochschule Fulda,
Germany and supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for a period of two
years (January 2012-December 2013).
 Crossing Cultures of Knowledge 81
and the social phenomenology developed by Alfred Schütz. Both orientations are
constantly connected in the French sociological context, the Schützian heritage
having had a strong influence, mainly as far as its pragmatic side is concerned.
Researchers such as Louis Quéré and Patrick Pharo, acknowledge clearly the
influence of such a conceptual background on their work (Dosse, 1995: 88-94).
However, before the phenomenology of the life-world developed itself into
a phenomenology of action, and gradually into an epistemological orientation
that stresses the role of the individual, the Schützian social science, which rep-
resents the conducting line of my analysis, was present in France, in the form of
an interrogation on the comprehensive method. This aspect has been stressed
by sociologists such as Michel Maffesoli (1979; 1985), Thierry Blin (1995; 1997;
1999), Daniel Cefai (1998), Patrick Watier (2002) and some decades ago already,
by Robert Williame (1973). Certainly, the comprehensive tradition was primar-
ily imposed in France by Raymond Aron, already in the beginning of the 20th
century (Aron, 1936; Aron, 1938a; Aron, 1938b). Yet, a proper development of
this tradition which includes the Schützian background has become more evi-
dent during the past thirty years.
There are sociologists, as it is the case of Jean-Michel Berthelot, who speaks
of a “retour du sujet” (Berthelot, 2000: 35). By the use of this concept he reminds
us not only of a phenomenological jargon, which is dangerous for a sociological
approach in the French context, but also of a deeper fear that French sociologists
held; this refers to the fact that such a concept draws explicitly on a philosophi-
cal allegiance. To evoke the concept of subject or subjectivity in a sociological
context is rather risky because it may hint at some transcendental reminiscence,
to which fieldwork researchers are clearly reluctant. In French social sciences, the
focus remains constantly on applied knowledge, and on the effective relations
that individuals develop. Given this background, I intend to highlight how the
sociology of the individual can be justified in the French speaking context in
relation to some Schützian principles and I will purposely avoid the use of the
term “sociology of the subject/ of subjectivity.”
I will first delineate the point up to which the Schützian methodology con-
tributed to the development and to the reinforcement of the comprehensive tra-
dition; second, I will stress the importance of Schütz’s theory of action and its
connection to the pragmatic conception of the individual and show how this
orientation leads contemporary French sociologists to construct new debates on
the status of individuality.

1. Some influences of the Schützian comprehensive tradition in the French

sociological context
As Daniel Cefai argues in a remarkable study on Alfred Schutz’s work (Cefai,
1998), Schütz has been read by many French researchers as a sociologist of the
everyday life. Michel Maffesoli in particular is one of the social scientists who
82 Denisa Butnaru

contributed to the institutionalization of such a view (Maffesoli, 1979; 1985).

Some others identified Schütz as “an artisan of the notion of Lebenswelt, opposed
to that of system, one of the moments of foundation initiated by Jürgen Haber-
mas in his ‘pragmatics of communicative action’” (Cefai, 1998: 8, my transl.).
Cefai underlines the complexity of an enterprise that would aim at clarifying
the Schützian thought and he emphasizes that Schütz’s main interest was that
of legitimating the constitution of social relations in as far as they are meaning-
conditioned before his elaboration of a phenomenology of action developed into
a main core of his inquiry.
This acknowledgement involves two distinct levels of meaning constitution:
first, the temporality of the acts of consciousness, which recalls clearly the Hus-
serlian phenomenology of inner time consciousness; second, the constitution of
typifications, a process which is partly associated with the genetic phenomenol-
ogy and partly with a more general epistemological issue, that further reopens
the inquiry on the very status of the comprehensive methodology as a corpus
per se in the sociological field. Both levels highlight the subjective implications
of our experiences.
Nevertheless, the second level, which is that of typifications, has a deeper
importance precisely because it is a crossroad given its character as a method-
ological conceptual tool. What does this involve? First, it allows a discussion of
the subjective level invested in the meaning processes; and second, it is the very
concept which explains our comprehensive relatedness to one another. Not to
mention, that it is also the concept that is at stake in the discussion of the sepa-
ration between the common-sense knowledge and the elaborated knowledge of
the social scientist. But to come back to the temporal aspect, which has a dou-
ble implication in the Schützian work—that is, it recalls both the significative
potentiality of the ego and the social temporality, the latter being exemplified
by Schütz with a stratification of the social world in predecessors, contempo-
raries, and successors (Schütz [1932]/ 2004)—one of the French contemporary
sociologists who paid a special attention to these details for the constitution of
social relations is Thierry Blin.
Following the Schützian prospect, Blin stresses the idea that “the separa-
tion alter/ ego is temporally grounded in that the inner time consciousness is
given in its continuity […] in contrast to the foreign inner time consciousness,
which presents (s’offre) itself only partially, and in this sense it is only present in
a discontinuous form” (1997: 253, my transl.). He says further that “the lived
temporality involves and generates the separation of the subjects and the private
constitution of their identity” (ibid., p. 258, my transl.).
Temporality involves at another level besides the emphasis on meaning con-
stitution and on the privacy of this meaning constitution, a biographical articu-
lation, an aspect which is significant for Schütz and which has been recovered
from the Schützian theoretical background by Daniel Cefai. Biography actually
is the element which allows joining temporality to the experience of typifying
 Crossing Cultures of Knowledge 83
and therefore to the reflexive process upon which typifications are realized. And
more essential than temporality, is the typification that represents for some soci-
ologists in France a very prolific argument in favour of the comprehensive turn.
Typification is an epistemological provocation because it generates a double
form of inquiry concerning the methodological comprehensive approach, as I
shall explain in the following. The first level where typifications are active and
where they require a particular attention for the constitution of the forms of
knowledge, is of course the level of everyday life, the life-world. At this stage,
they represent the conditions of possibility for comprehension. And such a status
requires further a specific inquiry. Moreover, typifications are founding elements
for effective intersubjective comprehension and for interpretation, processes that
cannot be separated from our actions and interactions. As Patrick Watier argues,
“comprehension, the fact that people in their current life understand the activi-
ties of other individuals, is an ontological condition of the social existence and
at the same time the appropriate method of the human sciences” (Watier, 2002:
26, my transl.). This idea combines the above mentioned aspects that typification
has. However, the Schützian approach, contrary to what is perceived in some
French sociological circles, in particular, those of Bourdieusian inspiration, does
not stress only the role of the subjectivity or of the subject in its realization. This
is actually what the so-called “new sociologies” question. Schütz says clearly that:

“Verstehen is […] the particular experiential form in which common-sense think-

ing takes cognizance of the social cultural world. […] it is a result of processes
of learning or acculturation in the same way as the common-sense experience of
the so-called cultural world. Verstehen is, moreover, by no means a private affair
of the observer which cannot be controlled by the experiences of other observers.
It is controllable at least to the extent to which the private sensory perceptions
of an individual under certain conditions (Schutz, 1962: 56).”

Another aspect, which shows the importance of typifications for a method-

ological discussion in social sciences, concerns the differentiation that the social
scientist imposes in her approach to knowledge. This idea has been stressed by
some French scholars, as it is the case for instance of Philippe Corcuff (1991;
2001), Laurent Thévenot (1994) (in a more indirect manner, since he relies in his
theses not that much on Schütz, but rather on Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul
Sartre), Danny Trom (2001) and once more, Daniel Cefai (2001). The socio-
logical knowledge is, as Corcuff recalls, “a construction of constructions” (2001:
108). Corcuff also highlights an important element that the Schützian social sci-
ence taught to the French classical methodological approach. In France, social
methodology was basically focused on the “epistemological break” between the
field of research and the position of the sociologist as such. This refers to the fact
that despite the acknowledgement of a differentiation in the registers of knowl-
edge, registers that involve different elaborations of typifications, Schütz consid-
ers the belonging of the researcher to the life-world as being essential. While in
84 Denisa Butnaru

the French tradition, the postulate of objectification of research data is primor-

dial, the Schützian social science, by its defence of the comprehensive stance as
a method of social sciences, stresses the importance of the scientist’s sharing a
common background of knowledge, that of common-sense. As Schütz argues,
“the exploration of the general principles according to which man in daily life
organizes his experiences, and especially those of the social world, is the first
task of methodology of the social sciences” (Schutz, 1962: 59). It is because, in
particular in the qualitative research, the researcher is not only an observer, but
also an actor.
Cefai for instance, taking on Schütz’s differentiation of registers of knowl-
edge, affirms that

“the researcher finds herself at the crossroad of three types of relevance frames;
that is she is at the same time an ordinary person, a social actor and a scientist.
As an ordinary person, she constitutes herself in the unfolding of her biographic
trajectory, which is sedimented in stocks of knowledge and which embodies itself
in the genesis of her habitus. […] As a social actor, the researcher is caught in
networks of interactions; she takes part in collectivities, organizations and insti-
tutions, to the existence of which she/he contributes. […] As a scientist, she/he
pursues the goal of “knowing for the sake of knowing”, from contribution to
the production of a corpus of objective and impartial knowledge” (Cefai, 2001:
60, my transl.).

It is important to note that Cefai’s ternary classification introduces an important

aspect, which shall gradually separate the Schützian social science from phenom-
enology and bind it to pragmatism. This aspect is the position of the “social actor,”
which very often, in the case of participant observation becomes effective. The
researcher has a repertoire of skills that allows her to engage in different types of
interactions in the fieldwork. And this is a situation in which the three elements
that Cefai evokes become simultaneously activated; further, it is also the fieldwork
that allows the overlapping between a phenomenological methodological stance
and a pragmatic engagement of the scientist. It is the moment when Verstehen syn-
thesizes multiple levels and skills, and when it surpasses its most known definition
in terms of a realm of possibilities, becoming thus a concrete manifestation. “To
understand (comprendre)”, to recall once more Cefai’s position, "[…] is to learn
a grammar of situations and interactions, taking into account simultaneously a
semantics of conceptual networks and narrative forms and a praxeology of practi-
cal rules and conventional usages” (Cefai, 2001: 61, my transl.).
This orientation might seem somehow contradictory to the Schützian pos-
tulate, according to whom “the theoretical scientist […] is not involved in the
observed situation, which is to him not of practical but merely of cognitive
interest” (Schutz, 1962: 63). In the fieldwork, as a social scientist, you are often
engaged in the practicality of the situation, and it is precisely this competence
that aliments the cognitive interest with more details. Despite the “objective
 Crossing Cultures of Knowledge 85
stance” that has to guide the research, the scientist remains a living biogra-
phy that experiences multiple levels of knowledge and practices—an idea that
was stressed by Philippe Corcuff, who developed an ordinary epistemology
of syndicalism 2 and who used partly the Schützian discussion to build his
methodological inquiry.

2. Sociology of Individual: The Actor and the Context

I will pursue now the interest of some French sociologists in Schütz’s theory
of action and show how that led to the development of a new disciplinary cul-
ture of knowledge. The appeal to the notion of “individual” is more tempting in
a sociological analysis than that of “subject”—at least in the French sociologi-
cal context, because, as formerly mentioned, the latter recalls quite explicitly a
philosophical tradition. Or, since sociology in France was founded as a strong
reaction against philosophers, a position which is openly assumed by Emile
Durkheim in the beginning of the 20th century, to speak of “subjectivation” or
of subjectivity cannot be done without taking some conceptual risks. There are
some sociologists who use the term “subjectification” also in relation to indi-
viduation, as it is the case, for instance, of Danillo Martucelli (2005), but this
is connected to a historical approach in which what he names “subjectification”
is related to a collective action.
The hypothesis I advance in this context is that what has been acknowl-
edged under the label “sociologies of the individual” (Martucelli & de Singly,
2009), which have emerged starting from the 1980s in France—I explicitly
refer to such authors as Francois Dubet, Danillo Martucelli, Francois de Singly,
Jean-Luc Kaufmann, and especially Philippe Corcuff (to name only the most
prominent), found their reason of being on the one hand in a redundancy of the
conflict between the Bourdieu and Boudon schools of thought and on the other
in the interest that the constructivist theoretical debates associated partly with
the Schützian heritage raised. To argue for the social as forming individuals or
for the individual as forming the social led the sociological debates to political
implications and symbolic camps that oppose one another in a fruitless debate
rather than contribute to any scientific dialogue. Under such circumstances,
alternative ways of considering the challenging problems of new social dynam-
ics were needed. The sociology or the sociologies of the individual, in which the
Schutzian tradition partly plays an important role, emerged within such a context.
Doubtlessly the sociological tradition that inquires on the status of the indi-
vidual can be found, as Martucelli and de Singly (2009) argue, in many con-
texts, and it includes processes and mentalities that evolved in peculiar societies
(U.S.A., UK, Germany, and the ethnographic tradition in France). Further, this

2
Philippe Corcuff included in his object both the elaborated sociologies of the syndi-
calism and the ordinary sociologies which were produced by the syndical actors themselves.
86 Denisa Butnaru

development has to be inextricably connected to new configurations through

which the social world redefined itself. Yet, my interest in the present text is to
focus only on the Schützian theoretical heritage and therefore on a historical
dimension of inquiry rather than on an argumentative aspect.
One of the most detailed studies on the crossing of influences in social sci-
ences and on the development of this new paradigm which is the sociology of
the individual is Francois Dosse’ L’empire du sens (1995). Dosse explains clearly
that the strongest point that was imported from the Schützian work was rather
the pragmatic side and the action theory. As I previously stated, there are also
authors who were interested in Schütz’s prolongation of the comprehensive meth-
odology already initiated by Max Weber, but their relevance is not that strong
on the stage of the current French sociological discipline.
The action theory evolved gradually towards an approach that, following the
social conditions of possibility for the realization of such actions, did not focus
anymore on the mechanisms of consciousness and the capacity of individuals to
operate between imaginary stages of action. It addresses the question of action
and of “the horizon of practical significations that the actor projects by the root-
ing of the actor herself in the world” in terms of a “sensible and public dimension,
without fixing it as an ‘objective stance’ that is opposed to a ‘subjective stance’
of action” (Cefai, 1993: 183, my transl.).
It is in this context that a transfer of interest is performed from the position
of the actor as such to the context of action, and therefore what the Schützian
phenomenology of action interrogated, falls under a new register of knowledge
constitution and knowledge organization, which is that of the external condi-
tions of acting. In these contexts, as Cefai says

“the actor is both acted and acting (actant) […] The identity/ ipseity of the actor
is therefore not fixed in advance, once for all, ready-made as some positive data:
the identity does not cease to construct itself within the in-between of the mean-
ing positionings (Sinnsetzungen) and of meaning interpretations (Sinndeutungen),
through which networks of interactions and interlocutions are created” (ibid.,
p. 185, my transl.).

The focus in this case is on a double instance that the actor has in the action
as such and in its realization, the actor becoming somehow subsumed into the
process she creates and being simultaneously the generator of it. Such a per-
spective where the emphasis is transferred from the individual’s inner meaning
processes to the context and to the interrogation on the context as a condition
of possibility for action and acting, led the French sociological inquiry to a new
field, which is that of the pragmatic sociology. This field started to develop in par-
ticular from 1980s onwards. The initiators of this orientation are Luc Boltanski
and Laurent Thévenont. Their main line of reasoning converges partly with the
Schützian project, in which the purpose of their sociological program is “to fol-
low the cut (découpage) operated by the actors in the situation; that is a cut of the
 Crossing Cultures of Knowledge 87
cut (un découpage du découpage)” (Corcuff, 2011: 101, my transl.) which targets
the ordinary meaning that the individuals mobilize in their actions (for instance,
the meaning of justice or love). The emphasis is on “general logics which are
active in the situation” (ibid., p. 102, my transl.), an idea that recalls once more
the question of typifying processes, which are at the same time general and situ-
ated. This postulate reestablishes also a certain balance between the instances
that constitute the context of action, and that are constituted in turn by action.
But let me turn to the category of the individual, for which I make up my
plea. The subjectivity and subjectivation have a certain weight and as categories
they are particularly fruitful for the construction of a sociology of experience [as
Francois Dubet does for instance, (Dubet: 1994)]; a sociology of the individual
recalls in a more direct manner the social implications and the contextuality
of one’s actions. Further, and this is also even though in some indirect manner
a Schützian element, “if the individual becomes a major theme of reflection,
this happens because the social changes are better visible when considering the
individual biographies” (Martuccelli, 2005, my transl.) and I would add, when
considering the way individuals argue for their “actant” position at a pragmatic
level. Subjectivity and subjectivation processes represent a prolific field for the
research of comprehensive mechanisms, actions, and of the logics through which
these actions are supported. Yet the concrete consequences of actions upon indi-
viduals’ lives invite a new sociological definition.
What does this category of individual bring in addition to that of actor?
Why should a sociologist give it more particular attention? According to Danillo
Martucelli, who is one of the main defenders in France of a sociology of the
individual (he speaks actually of a sociology of individuation), the aim of this
sociological sub-field “affirms itself as an attempt to write and analyse […] the
production of individuals” (Martucelli, 2005). The production of individuals
and of their individuation goes from a sociological stance hand in hand with
processes of institutionalization and legitimation. It is needless to say that a
fundamental argument in defence of this idea comes from the constructionist
orientation, which benefited also extensively from the Schützian social science.
It is also more than evident that individuation is connected with socialization
and thus involves multiple levels and stages in the definition of what an indi-
vidual effectively means.
What this new sociological inquiry targets is not the action and the way the
action is both subjectively and contextually created. It aims “to give account
simultaneously of the standardized system of challenges (épreuves) proper to
a certain society and of the manners through which these challenges diffract
themselves on the individuals, individuals whose experiences organize and
express these challenges” (Martucelli, 2009: 79, my transl.). This recalls indi-
rectly Schutz’s theory of choice and our response to problematic situations that
is connected to the system of relevances. Challenges cannot be separated from
individuals’ reactions, values construction, and knowledge sedimentation. They
88 Denisa Butnaru

are context-bound and implicitly action-bound. Therefore they point to decisions-

taking mechanisms and concrete coping with the situation.
A sociology of the individual that takes “challenge” as a focal point for the
definition of the individual, is for sure not enough grounded if it does not con-
sider the responses the individuals develop precisely to these challenges and how
these responses configure further their stock of knowledge. It is a project the
development of which benefits clearly from the Schützian conceptual acquisi-
tion, a contribution which is clearly at the basis of a new culture of knowledge
in the French contemporary sociology.

Conclusion
As I have suggested, the Schützian social science had not a direct impact
on the sociologies of the individual; it influenced them rather indirectly via the
constructivist approach and it appears with more preeminence in the work of
a few sociologists interested partly in the revivification of the comprehensive
sociology (Michel Maffesoli, Thierry Blin, Patrick Watier, and Daniel Cefai).
An inquiry on the contribution of the Schützian social science needs a more
extensive elaboration. My main interest in the present essay was to stress that
Schütz’s theoretical heritage is obvious in the case of the new sociological ori-
entations developed in France during the 1980s and the 1990s, both in as far
as the methodological research principles are concerned and as an epistemo-
logical inquiry.
The presence of ethnomethodology in France (Louis Quéré, being its most
prominent figure) benefited from the Schützian heritage, especially in its inquiry
on situated action, context, and the logic that is behind it. And yet, this is only
one current that integrated the Schützian background, many others, which con-
front themselves in the debate on the status of individuality, being related to his
theories. These currents may be as different as a Bourdieusian derived approach,
such as the one defended by Bernard Lahire, up to theories on a forged through
experience self, as it is the case of Francois Dubet’s or Danillo Martucelli’s.
These interrogations emerged also because the new social configurations in the
transformation of society required new manners of questioning the sociological
object. However, their development cannot be analysed without mentioning
the social phenomenological background and the debates that such a concep-
tual frame generated.

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Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 91–110

The Cartesian Residue

in Intersubjectivity
and Child Development
Michael D. Barber
St. Louis University
barbermd@slu. edu

Abstract: This paper argues that Husserl’s account of adult recognition of another
allows for immediate, noninferential, analogical access to the other, though one
does not experience the other’s experience as s/he does. The passive-associative
processes at work in adult recognition of another make possible infant syncretic
sociability and play a role in constituting the infant’s self prior to reflection. The
reflective perspective of the psychologist and philosopher discovers that such infant
experiences, though at first seeming indistinguishable from their parents’ experi-
ence, belong to their own stream of consciousness and constitute a non-eliminable
Cartesian residue and an inescapable solitude of identity. Finally new research in
joint attention reveals that the infant self is constituted not only by passive experi-
ence but also by active movements evident in the infant’s attempt to shape the direc-
tion of adults in joint attention, however this may fall short of high-level reflection.

Keywords: passive synthesis, empathy, stream of consciousness, joint atten-

tion, reflection

1. Introduction
In a recent conference, in which I developed Edmund Husserl’s theory of
Einfühlung that argues for an analogical sense-transfer of the meaning “animate
organism” to similar others on the basis of a analogizing, but not inferential,
“assimilative apperception,” I was criticized for presupposing the view that we
are first and foremost isolated monads who somehow must reach out to others
to whose experience we lack direct access.
92 Michael D. Barber

It was argued that I neglected the evidence of contemporary developmen-

tal psychology in which the experience of mother and child is so fused as to be
indistinguishable, in which one lives in one’s mother’s experience before even
having a self, which, when one finally constitutes it as separate, bears all the
marks of already having undergone that immersion in the experience of a mother
or father. Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his famous essay “The Child’s Relations
with Others” incorporates developmental psychology within his own thought
by drawing on, in part, Henri Wallon’s view of “syncretic sociability,”1 defined as
the “indistinction” between me and the other. Merleau-Ponty argues that prior
to three years of age, the “child’s own personality is the personality of the other
and this indistinction of the two personalities makes transitivism possible,”2 that
is, attributing to others what belongs to oneself. Merleau-Ponty gives evidence of
transitivism, by pointing to a case when one misbehaving child struck another
little girl sitting beside her and when she was asked why, in complete sincerity
she answered that her companion was naughty and she had hit her, as if her
“naughtiness” were the other’s. In another case, the child made no distinction
between her hand, her father’s hand, and a photograph of a hand. Another child,
who had a glass in her hand, set it down, and then five minutes later heard the
sound of breaking glass and became agitated as if she still had the glass in her
hand—the child confused herself with her situation. One child, when trying to
use a subject with a predicate describing her action (e.g., writing), used another
person’s name in the subject position, e.g., stating “Papa write” instead of “I
write.” Only at age three does the child stop lending his body and thoughts to
others and “he understands that whatever the diversity of situations and roles,
he is someone above and beyond these different situations and roles.”3
Consequently, far from it being the case that one is an individual need-
ing to break out of atomism in order to reach others, one is genetically quite
social before arriving at one’s individuality. In some sense, the phenomenological
account of how we know another might be taken to reflect a mistaken starting
point because it begins in the phenomenological reduction that isolates one’s
consciousness from the world and others. This starting point, it might be said,
results in a pseudo-problem, namely of how I reach another’s experience, since,
if contemporary developmental psychology is correct, there is no problem of
reaching another’s experience since I am immersed in another’s experience long
before I gradually individuate myself.
In this paper, I will consider first of all Husserl’s account of the adult recogni-
tion of the other, and I will argue that it does not involve isolated monads who
are incapable of “reaching another’s experience,” but rather relies on associative,

1
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others,” The Primacy of Perception,
And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, ed.
James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 120.
2
Ibid., 148-149, the italics are mine.
3
Ibid., 152, see also 146, 148, 149, 151.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 93
automatic, noninferential processes by which we recognize the other with a kind
of immediacy similar to that described by Max Scheler’s perceptual theory of the
other. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which one does not have “direct access”
to the other’s experience in the sense that one does not experience the other’s
experience as the other experiences it, and this lack of direct access constitutes
an unavoidable monadic isolation of one subject from another that resembles the
isolation of the Cartesian ego. At this point, I will turn to consider the intersub-
jective and subjective dimensions of infant experience. Here, I will argue first of
all that the kinds of associative processes involved in recognizing another, accord-
ing to Husserl, make possible the incorporation of other’s experience within
one’s own in infant syncretic sociability and contribute to the constitution of an
infant’s self prior to reflective self-awareness. Secondly, the reflective perspective
of the psychologist or person recovering his or her past reveals a temporal stream
of consciousness that is one’s own (even as it is socially formed), that explains
in part the lack of direct access to adults’ experience, that extends backward
toward infancy, that constitutes infant individuation (though infants do not rec-
ognize it), that can never be completely shared, that constitutes a solitude that
can never be overcome, and that represents a non-eliminable Cartesian residue
that neither philosophy nor psychology ought to overlook. Thirdly, I will show
how new research in joint attention demonstrates that it is not only a stream of
passive associations that constitute infant and, subsequently, adult identity, but
that there are important activities that, undertaken within an intersubjective
setting, contribute to the individuation of the child’s stream of consciousness
(and that anticipate later individuating processes that Schutz discovers in rela-
tion to the social forces that impinge on one’s identity) and that are to be found
at an earlier age than Merleau-Ponty, drawing on the development psychology
of his day, recognized.

2. Husserl: The Limits of Reaching Another’s Experience

In considering Husserl’s account of experiencing an adult in the Cartesian
Meditations and in the published three volumes of manuscripts on intersubjec-
tivity, it is important to see that there is direct experience of another in the sense
that Husserl’s intentional account of knowledge differs from the representa-
tional (in an “idealist” sense) variants. Vasudevi Reddy, for instance, criticizes the
internalization and individualization of experience that seems typical of recent
Western psychology and that renders it Cartesian in an idealist sense. In this
tradition, representations are taken as the route to experiencing others, but, since
such representations are inside individuals, the individual knower constructs the
other who is ultimately experienced as a part of oneself. 4 Of course, Husserl is

4
Vasudevi Reddy, “Experiencing Others: A Second-Person Approach to Other-Aware-
ness,” in Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development, eds. Ulrich
94 Michael D. Barber

no idealist, and the intentional acts directed toward another do not fall short of
the other and are not confined to ideas within oneself.
But how is the other directly reached? In perceiving anything, one intention-
ally reaches the thing directly, but one also brings to bear one’s past experience
and transfers past associations and expectations on to what one is now directly
perceiving. This bringing to bear on perception is referred to as “apperception”
by Husserl who defines it as follows:

“Apperception is no conclusion, no kind of thinking. In a certain way every

apperception of something new is an analogizing transference on the basis of
an earlier, instituting apperception. With the first originary instituting grasp
of the goal-directed meaning of a scissors, the child “sees” forthwith scissors,
without first thinking back on the first scissors and concluding the analogizing
goal-definition.”5

It is important to see that such passive, assimilative syntheses occur constantly

in human experience, beneath the level of ratiocinative comparing because, as
famed Husserl-commentator Dorion Cairns observes, “the fundamental ten-
dencies of mental life are tendencies to identify and to assimilate”6 and there
is “a fundamental tendency to believe in a likeness of everything to everything
else.”7 Husserl’s use of the term “sees” above suggests that although new mean-
ings are transferred, this transference takes place with such immediacy and
automaticity that one directly sees the object as a scissors, as opposed to seeing
some unidentified thing and then foraging around for a concept (e.g., “scissors”)
to apply to what is seen.
There is a similar analogizing apprehension of the other’s body as an “ani-
mate organism,” a transference of the sense “animate organism,” when one
sees hands groping or grabbing, feet walking, eyes responding as if they were
seeing—all seeming to proceed from something governing in its parts. Of
course, the originary experience of an “animate organism” is of one’s own
body in which one governs parts that function like those functioning in the
other “animate organism.” The transference of the sense “animate organism”
is experienced as a “pairing,” a kind of passive synthesis, which happens with-
out the active participation of the ego, an assimilation of one similar thing

Muller, Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, Nancy Budwig, and Bryan Sokol (New York: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 2008), 123-125.
5
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte ausdem Nachlass, Drit-
terTeil: 1929-1935, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana, vol. 15 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 14.
6
Dorion Cairns, “Some Applications of Husserl’s Theory of Sense-Transfer,” ed. Lester
Embree, Fred Kersten, and Richard M. Zaner, The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phe-
nomenological Philosophy 7 (2007): 315. Also printed as Dorion Cairns, “Applications of the
Theory of Sense-Transfer,” in Animism, Adumbration, Willing, and Wisdom: Studies in the Phe-
nomenology of Dorion Cairns, ed. Lester Embree (Bucharest: Zetabooks, 2012), 57.
7
Ibid.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 95
with another, an “assimilative synthesis.” Though the similarity of the other’s
animate body to my own evokes the transference of the sense “animate organ-
ism,” the similar body of the other evokes this transferencewith such rapid-
ity that it isn’t even given first as a mere inanimate “physical thing” (Körper),
rather the presenting body and animate organism are given as a “functional
community.”8 Since Husserl claims that the child “sees” scissors, one could
extend such perceptual language to Husserl’s account of recognizing the other
and claim that one “sees” another animate organism. At this point, one could
envision a possible convergence between Husserl’s account of the recognition
of the other and Max Scheler’s perceptual theory of the other. Scheler, however,
goes beyond “seeing” the other’s animateness in the other’s governed move-
ments to seeing more specific and perhaps more culturally relative features in
the other, such as seeing the other’s sorrow in her tears, the other’s anger in
her clenched fist, or the other’s praying in her folded hands.9
Before Husserl discusses the apperceptual transference of the sense “ani-
mate organism” that the other’s similarity to me evokes, he, admitting that the
other is intuitively given “in person,” also observes that neither the other ego,
nor his or her experiences, nothing of what belongs to his own essence comes
to originary givenness for me. Were the other directly given, he (or she) would
be a mere moment of my own unique essence, and he (or she) and I would be
one. I can never be “there,” Husserl suggests, but nevertheless there is a kind of
making present together, a “kind of ‘appresentation’”10 of the other presented
in my originary experience as an animate organism (which appresents) and the
other’s experience as originarily given (which is only appresented). No sooner
does Husserl mention “appresentation” than he begins to show how this kind
of appresentation is like and unlike the usual appresentation we are most famil-
iar with, the one we experience in dealing with physical things. To be sure, the
front of a physical object appresents its rear and prescribes a more or less deter-
minate content for it in the way that the other’s being there in person makes
him or her co-present (mitgegenwärtig).11 However, the fundamental difference
is that in the case of a physical object, one can verify the existence of the back-
side of the cube by a fulfilling presentation (I can go around and see the back
side), but one can never verify the other’s original sphere by somehow or other
“going around and seeing it.”12 Though Eugen Fink thought that the use of the

8
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion
Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), Ibid., 122, see also 111-112, 119-120,
9
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1954), 260.
10
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans.
Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 109.
11
Ibid., 109.
12
Ibid.
96 Michael D. Barber

concept of appresentation was metaphoric—“and unsuccessful at that,”13 it is

clear that Husserl himself recognized the metaphoric nature of appresentation
(a kind of appresentation) and its limits, that is, without the expectation that
the metaphor of appresentation, drawn from our experience of physical things,
captures without residue how we experience the other, though Fink seems to
expect that it ought to and hence is unsuccessful.
One can inquire further how it is that the other’s experience is not originarily
given. One aspect of this non-givenness has to do with the relationship between
my own bodily perspective and every “outer” thing. Although it is always pos-
sible for me to move toward things that are near or far away, my own living body
is unique in that wherever I go, it is always there accompanying me, and I am
always “in” it or with its presence. As Husserl puts it, “I, the transcendental ego,
with my transcendental kinaesthetic-appearance governing activity live here alone
in an immediate activity while I am among things.”14 Similarly, even in dealing
with another person whom I immediately apperceive as an animate organism
governing in its body, it never ceases to be the case that this other, like physical
things, is always given with reference to my bodily perspective, to the 0-point
of my orientation (Nullpunkt der Orientierung). 15 This 0-point of orientation
to which everything presents itself is something from which I cannot escape or
distance myself and to which everything that presents itself to me must present
itself (even other persons), and were I to be given access to the viewpoint from
which the other experiences the world, were I to inhabit his or her Nullpunkt, I
would be that other, as Husserl suggests. Consequently it is impossible for the
other’s experience to be given to me as it is to her.
Also, when it comes to the question of the inaccessibility of the other’s
experiences, there are also a series of what Alfred Schutz calls “essentially
actual experiences” that are attached to the innermost core of the Ego, what
Scheler called the “absolute personal privacy” of a person.16 Schutz argues that
such experiences are so intimately given (e.g. an experience of deep grief) that
our memory can recall only that we experienced them, but there is a dimin-
ished capacity for reproducing the how of such experiences. Schutz goes on to
describe such experiences:

13
Eugen Fink, “Comments by Eugen Fink on Alfred Schutz’s Essay, ‘The Problem of
Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl’ (Royaumont, April 28, 1957),” in Alfred Schutz,
Collected Papers 3: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. I. Schutz (The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1966), 85.
14
Husserl, Husserliana 15: 286.
15
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte ausdem Nachlass,
ErsterTeil: 1905-1920, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana, vol. 13 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973),
257-260, 275, 329; Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Texte ausdem
Nachlass, Zweiter Teil: 1920-1928, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana, vol. 14 (The Hague: Martinus-
Nijhoff, 1973) 455; Husserliana, vol. 15: 264, 274-275.
16
Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 66
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 97
“The recollection of an experience of the external world is relatively clear;
an external course of events, a movement perhaps, can be recollected in free
reproduction, that is, at arbitrary points of the duration. Incomparably more
difficult is the reproduction of experience of internal perception; those inter-
nal perceptions that lie close to the absolute private core of the person are
irrecoverable as far as their How is concerned, and their That can be laid hold
of only in a simple act of apprehension. Here belong, first of all, not only all
experiences of the corporeality of the Ego, in other words, of the Vital Ego
(muscular tensings and relaxing as correlates of the movements of the body,
‘physical’ pain, sexual sensation, and so on), but also those psychic phenom-
ena classified together under the vague heading of ‘moods,’ as well as ‘feelings’
and ‘affects’ (joy, sorrow, disgust, etc.).”17

If I have such trouble recovering in memory what my own experience of deep grief
consisted of, for instance, it would seem that I would definitely lack originary
experience of what the other is experiencing at the innermost core of her person
when she is experiencing grief. I can know that other persons are feeling sorrow
or great joy or experiencing weariness or tension, perhaps because it is “written
on their faces” and/or because they inform us that this is what they are feeling,
but because I lack any originary experience of how the other is experiencing such
somatic feelings or moods, they seem all the more elusive. The other’s essentially
actual experiences constitute a domain of experience that is originarily given to
the other but not to me, even as my essentially actual experiences are originarily
given to me and not to the other.
Finally, there is the issue of temporality and the fact that I have no originary
experience of the other’s temporality. In the stream of consciousness, each expe-
rience plays a role, even if only an infinitesimal one, in affecting, constituting,
and inflecting emotionally all the other experiences, including that experiential
moment in which one from a particular here and now attempts to explicate the
train of her own experience. As a result, Schutz argues:

“The postulate, therefore, that I can observe the subjective experience of another
person precisely as he does is absurd. For it presupposes that I myself have lived
through all the conscious states and intentional Acts wherein this experience has
been constituted. But this could only happen within my own experience and in
my own Acts of attention to my experience. And this experience of mine would
then have to duplicate his experience down to the smallest details, including
impressions, their surrounding areas of protention and retention, reflective Acts,
phantasies, etc. But there is more to come: I should have to be able to remember
all his experiences and therefore should have had to live through these experi-
ences in the same order that he did; and finally I should have had to give them

17
Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Fred-
erick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 53
98 Michael D. Barber

exactly the same degree of attention that he did. In short, my stream of con-
sciousness would have to coincide with the other person’s, which is the same as
saying that I should have to be the other person.”18

The other’s intended meaning, constituted within the unique stream of each
individual consciousness, is “essentially inaccessible to every other individual.”19
In Schutz’s view, that does not rule out understanding another person suffi-
ciently for pragmatic purposes, it only means that “the meaning that I give
to your experiences cannot be precisely the same as the meaning you give to
them when you proceed to interpret them.”20 In summary, the facts that all
my experiences must be given to my Nullpunkt of orientation and that I can
never inhabit your Nullpunkt, that there are certain essentially actual experi-
ences intimate to the core of my person that only I can directly experience,
and that all my experiences belong to an interconnected stream that is given
to me but never directly to anyone one else constitute reasons for Husserl’s
claim that I never experience the other’s experiences originarily and explains
why he contends that if the other’s experiences were originarily given to me,
he (or she) would have to be a moment of my own unique essence. He (or she)
and I would be one.
Even though we do not have access to the other’s originary experience, it
should still be kept in mind that the other is before us “in person” and that the
apperceptual transfer of the sense “animate organism” to the other takes place
through passive synthesis beneath the control of the conscious “I” with such
ease and automaticity that one “sees” the other as an animate organism without
any sense-content intermediary between the I and the other. In addition, even
though one cannot verify that the other is an animate organism through access
to the other’s originary experience, one resorts to another, unique “style”21 of
verification, namely “verifiable syntheses of harmonious further experience”22
in a continual process of fulfillment. The other animate organism continually
proves itself as an animate organism when, for instance, the organism turns its
head toward a loud noise sounding behind it, engages my eyes when I am look-
ing at it, extends its arms toward food that appeals to it, or ducks or shields its
face when an object is hurtling toward it. In fact, when one considers the inter-
actions with animate organisms that behave so constantly and predictably as
animate organisms, one becomes aware of a rather massive amount of confirm-
ing evidence, despite a lack of access to the other’s originary experience, which
can, then, only seem like a trivial deficit. The transfer of the sense “animate
organism” to another, effected by passive synthesis almost without thought, is

18
Ibid., 99.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 113.
22
Ibid., 114.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 99
so continually verified that no doubt at all arises as to whether the other is an
animate organism.23 Even with the limits of experiencing another, our experi-
ence is not that of an isolated atom reaching out to another.

3. Passive Synthesis and Syncretic Sociability

Having explained how the adult other is grasped, immediately, via apper-
ceptual analogizing without inference and yet not given originarily, we are in a
position to understand better how passive synthesis, so basic to intersubjective
recognition, is centrally important for the formation of infant intersubjective
relationships and infant subjective identity. First of all, something like the passive
syntheses and associations involved in transferring the sense “animate organism”
to another would also be crucial for the syncretic sociability that Merleau-Ponty
describes, as well as for the kind of joint attention processes that we will discuss
in the final section of this paper. Although analogical transferences of sense on
the basis of perceived likenesses or the kinds of syntheses occurring when one is
affected by a perceptual object held in synthesis with its horizon constitute “pri-
mary passive syntheses,” a different kind of passive synthesis, a “secondary passive
synthesis,” occurs through cultural assimilation, also passively formed, often on
the basis of imitative repetition of the behavior of others in one’s culture (e.g.
learned behaviors or language acquisition). As an instance of a kind of second-
ary passive synthesis involved in syncretic sociability, Merleau-Ponty describes
how a little girl can overcome jealousy toward her new brother by identifying
with her mother or by identifying with a mother dog that she has just seen nurs-
ing its pups, but such “identification with” is a matter of assimilating passively,
internalizing, without reflection, one’s own actions, speech tones, and words
with those of the human or animal mother. Upon seeing the new brother, the
girl allows the little boy to evoke bodily and verbal responses in herself that are
synthesized with, that is, made in resemblance to, the bodily and verbal behav-
iors she has witnessed in her mother and the mother dog. Any imitation that
is not deliberately mapped out beforehand, for that matter, would make use of
passive synthesis insofar as one brings into synthesis one’s own actions with those
observed in another in such a way that the former mimic the latter. All transi-
tivism, in which, for instance, I take my hand for another’s involves a synthesis
between my hand and the other’s. Further, such phenomena as the contagion of
cries in a nursery, which Merleau-Ponty mentions, rely upon one infant passively
synthesizing his voice expression with what he hears next to him. In fact, insofar
as psychologists have been able to observe different attitudes (e.g. beginning to
cry) within the first 16 days of a child’s life depending on whether it was being
held by the mother, nursemaid, or father, mechanisms of passive synthesis must
have been at play, since the child at a minimum has to have some experience of

23
Ibid., 117-120.
100 Michael D. Barber

being held by her mother which she then holds to a degree present in mind at
the moment when being held by her father, and the contrast, which presupposes
holding two different experiences together in consciousness, that is, synthesiz-
ing them, is registered in the infant’s change of attitude. Passive syntheses are
pervasively at play in an infant’s life, though the infant need not at all be reflec-
tively aware or conscious that he or she is engaging in a process of synthesizing
one experience with another. 24
In addition, the literature on joint attention, which we will discuss in our
final section, is replete with examples of children passively synthesizing their
behaviors with others’ (as we have already seen them doing and as they might
do, for instance, when they assume a role, such as washing dishes in a play house
like their mother). The very process of pointing with one’s index finger to an
object in order to direct an adult’s attention at it—crucial for joint attention and
distinctive of human children—also depends on passive synthesis. When the
child points once and observes an adult directing her attention in the direction
of the pointing and when in future situations the child would like to direct that
adult’s attention, that past conjunction of events, the pointing and the adult’s
change of attention, will be brought into synthesis (passively) with the present
moment and one will point again, synthesizing one’s present gestures with the
early one that was used successfully to direct an adult’s attention. Children will
repeatedly point even in experiments in which the involved adults do not pay
attention to them and follow their pointing, so strong is the assimilation of the
present situation to past situations in which pointing (perhaps repeatedly) suc-
cessfully directed adult attention. 25
One current in the literature of joint attention, one that is represented by
Maximilian B. Bibok, Jeremy I.M. Carpendale, and Charles Lewis, argues for
an action-based approach to the mind of children, insisting that children acquire
skills that enable them to have knowledge of their environment in terms of
potential outcomes they can achieve by making use of such skills. Pointing,
one can imagine, is such a behavioral scheme that children acquire via passive
synthesis insofar as by repeated experience they “know” by habit that they can
successfully direct adult attention by pointing with their index finger. Such
actions are not driven by representations, so consequently one does not have
to attribute to children a theory of mind to explain their action. In addition,
according to Bibok, Carpendale, and Lewis, the Cartesian gap between mental
representations and the world, between subjective and objective, is bridged by
the formation of embodied skills that issue in environmental outcomes (e.g.,
pointing effects a change in adult attention). “From an action-based approach,
knowledge is the unmediated, embodied ability to interact directly in and with

24
Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others,” 109-111, 117, 123-125, 135, 148.
25
Muller, et al., Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Develop-
ment, 59, 67-68, 71, 80-84, 106.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 101
our environment.“26 In fact, Husserl’s notion of passive synthesis need not be
limited to mental representations only, but rather it can include embodied skills
insofar as the first successful deployment of an embodied skill constitutes an
abiding possession that can be reactivated when a similar situation evokes that
skill’s application, that is, when the evocative situations and corresponding skills
are held in a synthetic relationship with each other, albeit passively, without the
child having to deliberate or theorize about what skill is required by a certain
situation.27 Paradoxically, Husserl, whose Cartesianism appears in his recogniz-
ing our lack of access to each other’s originary experience and our unshareable
stream of consciousness, cannot be characterized as a Cartesian mentalist inso-
far as his views on passive synthesis permit the assimilation of one’s behaviors,
movements, and actions to others’ beneath the level of the reflective ego.
Husserl is clear that activity presupposes passivity, that active judgment
depends upon passively constituted things, and that we apprehend objects in
passive synthesis without the participation of the active ego. There is a sub-per-
sonal psychic dimension at play beneath the level of the ego, and this dimension
involves series of passive syntheses in which one builds up a set of habitual behav-
iors before the ego reflects upon itself. Moreover, there is a law of transcendental
generation in accord with which, every act emanating from me, every decision,
every experience, constitutes “a new abiding property.”28 Even should I reverse
a decision, I will be forever that person who at one time made that decision and
then reversed it. Whatever experiences I may have—decisions,perceptions, actions
witnessed—they become part of my stream of consciousness, and afford pos-
sibilities for future passive syntheses, that is, whenever future conditions similar
to the conditions of the past summon me to bring my past experience to bear
on those future conditions, that is, to bring into synthesis past experiences with
future ones. Of course, all these experiences of the stream of consciousness,
including those taking place beneath the level of the controlling ego, which occur
in a unique order and with unique degrees of intensity from person to person,
as Schutz observed, serve to individuate the person whose stream is flowing on.
The interesting thing is that we are formed and shaped by the experiences we
have, we are individuated, long before we are able to reflect on those experiences.
Reflection discovers an ego that has already been shaped by the experiences it
has been having in their unique order and intensity and by the distinctive syn-
theses by which one’s past has been brought into relations with whatever one
experiences in the present. Reflection discovers a unique stream of consciousness
already formed before reflection ever appears on the scene.29

26
Maximilian B. Bibok, Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, and Charlie Lewis, “Social Knowl-
edge as Social Skill: An Action Based View of Social Understanding,” in Social Life and Social
Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development, 150.
27
Ibid., 150-154, 166.
28
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 66.
29
Ibid., 66-67,80.
102 Michael D. Barber

4. The Stream Reflected On

In addition, reflection also discovers the uniqueness of the stream of con-
sciousness insofar as one comes to recognize, contrary to Merleau-Ponty and
Scheler, that although one shares experiences with another, at no point are the
other’s experiences and one’s own fused in a single stream. When Scheler dis-
cusses the supposed fusion of my experience with another’s, he is setting out to
undermine the underlying presuppositions of the analogy and empathy argu-
ments for other minds, namely that our own self is given to us primarily and
that what is primarily given of others is the appearance of their body, with the
result that we must undertake the impossible task of inferring deductively the
existence of others.30 To oppose such an inferential grasp of other minds, Scheler
turns to the experience of animals, very young children and primitives (sic), who
recognize the existence of fellow beings even though they may not be capable
of inference. But he also attacks the underlying presuppositions of these argu-
ments by appealing to developments in child psychology and the experience of
children and primitives, who are often unable to distinguish whether a thought
belongs to themselves or others and who often partake in a common stream
of experience in which no mark indicates to whose stream of consciousness a
thought belongs. Such an intermingling of experiences, undifferentiated as to
whether they belong to one’s self or another’s, should be impossible if what is
given to us primarily is our own self and what is given primarily of the other is
their body and if inference is required to reach another’s experience.31 Scheler
emphasizes that the discovery of the child’s individuality is late, and the entire
trajectory of his thought converges with Merleau-Ponty’s idea of “indistinction”
mentioned above.32
However, Schutz resists Scheler’s argument, though he begins by agreeing
with him that the We is prior to the I in the sense that the natural attitude, in
which the existence of Others is unquestionable, precedes any theoretical posi-
tion that might end up at solipsistic conclusions. In addition, Schutz concurs
with Scheler on the priority of the We since in thinking and acting in everyday
life, in living among objects and others, I am directed toward objects rather
than my acts and thoughts, and consequently I am not aware of myself; my
stream of thought is an “anonymous flux.”33 However, once I stop and think,
even abiding within the natural attitude, all acts, thoughts, and feelings appear
as originating in my previous acting, thinking, and feeling. It is important to
distinguish, as Scheler does not, between the naïve attitude of living in my acts

30
Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 244.
31
Alfred Schutz, “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the
Alter Ego,” in Collected Papers1: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. M. Natanson (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 161.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 169.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 103
and thought and the attitude of reflecting upon them. In reflection, the stream
of consciousness “is through and through the stream of my experiences.”34 If
some of my experiences refer to others’ thoughts, nevertheless they are “others’
thoughts thought by me.”35 Furthermore, that children and primitive people only
slowly come to recognize their individuality does not prove that their streams
of consciousness are at one point indistinguishably fused, but rather only that
they acquire the technique of reflection later, which then reveals to them that
their thoughts and actions are their own and were their own all along even if
not yet recognized as such.
Let us consider an example. I have a friend who informed me that he often
recollects the way his mother responded so strongly to children who evoked
her love for them, for instance, walking a great distance in great heat to greet
her grandchildren when she was ill or even awakening from a coma to blow a
kiss to her grandchildren. He found in himself similar feelings of affection and
care emerging when faced with little children, and such feelings seem to him to
resemble her feeling. He could imagine that at one point he was actually living
in the love for children that she had, perhaps for him as her child. It would have
been as if her experience of loving children had actually become his experience,
as if he had internalized her feelings with all their vital tones and somatic reper-
cussions in himself. But however similar my friend’s feelings toward children
may have been to those of his mother, as he reflected back from the perspective
of an adult, can we be sure that his experience was the same as hers? Because her
experience of love for children was so profound, flowed from the intimate sphere
of her personality, and hence constituted an “essentially actual experience,” as
his experience did, one can wonder whether what she experienced is what he
experienced, in the same way that I can wonder whether another’s sorrow or joy
is equivalent to my own. In addition, since he was a male who had never given
birth to a child in contrast to her who had undergone pregnancy and borne three
children, one could wonder whether his experience of caring for children shared
all the somatic overtones characterizing her care. In addition, the temporal his-
tories modifying and inflecting their experience differed profoundly, not only
in that he had never been pregnant or given birth to a child, but also in that he
did not learn to care for small children from her parents or from growing up in
a lower-class Irish household, as she did. At best my friend could settle on simi-
larities leading him to hypothesize that his and his mother’s experiences might
at one point have been the same.
Furthermore, at no point, as I canvas my memory do I ever come across a
thought or act of another pertaining to the other’s stream of experience. If I
come across a memory of my friend’s memory of her deceased father that was
disclosed in a conversation, the memory of that memory is in my stream not

34
Ibid., 170.
35
Ibid., 171.
104 Michael D. Barber

hers. One way of illustrating this is to notice how this memory can provoke
passive associations usually on the basis of similarity with other segments of my
stream. For instance, memory of my friend’s memory of her father can call to
my mind a time (still in my stream) when this same friend was speaking of her
deceased mother or it can stir up memories of my deceased father, which my
friend has no access to but which clearly belong to my stream. However, at no
point could my memory of my friend’s memory of her father suddenly evoke
via passive synthesis a memory of a friend of my friend’s father if I have had no
previous knowledge at all, no previous experience at all, of that friend of my
friend’s father. My friend, who might have known well the friend of her father,
could be induced via passive associations to recollect that friend. Consequently,
it can be shown to whose stream an experience belongs by the other experiences
that that single experience can be associated with; there are some experiences
within one stream of experience with which a single experience can be associ-
ated that are not accessible to someone with another stream and that are impos-
sible of being evoked by passive association by that single experience. When I
remember, then, my friend’s memory of her deceased father, that encompassing
memory is my own, or as Schutz puts it, “In thinking the thoughts of another,
I think them as ‘others’ thought thought by me.’”36
Another point of interest in Schutz’s argument against Scheler’s view that I
live in other’s experience before my own is that the anonymous flux of experi-
ence that reflection eventually discloses as being my own, according to Schutz,
consists in “acts and thoughts” directed toward objects.37 Schutz does not seem
aware that in addition to these acts which effect active syntheses under the
control of the ego (e.g., producing a judgment about an object) there is also a
vast domain of passive syntheses in which, beneath the control of the ego, for
instance, an object is distinguished from a background that is held in simulta-
neity (in synthesis) with the appearance of the object, or a new object similar to
an object experienced in the past evokes a sense-transfer. Indeed, discussions of
passive syntheses within the Husserlian corpus depend upon the discovery of
Husserl’s manuscripts unavailable to Schutz in his day. This vast domain of pas-
sive syntheses makes all the richer the constitution of the individuated stream
of consciousness that Schutz already recognized as constituted as constituted
by its unique history of active syntheses in the unique and unrepeatable order
and intensity in which they were experienced. The point, of course, is that long
before one appropriates reflectively one’s unique identity, one’s flux of experi-
ence has already been individuated by a host of experiences, some of which have
involved one’s agency and many others of which have taken place without the
participation of one’s ego. We are profoundly individuated, more than Schutz
might have imagined, long before we reflect on our identity.

36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 168-169.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 105
5. Joint Attention and the Active Formation of Identity
I have argued that Husserl does not succumb to a Cartesian isolation of atom-
ized persons and that the analogizing apperceptual sense transfer of animate
organism involving passive synthesis makes possible access to the other’s experi-
ence, though not with the access that the other has to his or her own experience.
Passive synthesis explains, too, the kind of syncretic sociability that Merleau-
Ponty finds basic to infant experiences. Despite a developmental psychological
tendency to assimilate the child’s identity with its parents’ identity, I have argued
that reflection discloses a stream of consciousness in which the experiences of
my history belong to my stream and no one else’s. That stream, constitutive of
my unique identity and anonymous prior to reflection, includes a sea of passive
syntheses, of which Schutz was not particularly aware, and the kinds of active
synthesis, acts, and thoughts, which Schutz mentions. Although infants are
not reflective about their experience, it would be a mistake to think, though,
that they are therefore simply passive recipients of behavior or feeling patterns
that they find instantiated in their parents and that they, via passive syntheses,
simply internalize in imitation of their parents. Contemporary studies of joint
attention, particularly the phenomena of pointing, show, on the contrary, that
infants, however unreflective they may be, are actively involved in shaping their
own stream of consciousness and even their relationships with adults before they
become reflective and reflectively fashion their own identity.
The psychological evidence indicates infants begin by experiencing as early as
two months the attention of others directed at them and then (at 10-12 months
100% of the time) are able to follow another’s attention to other things in the
world. 38 This later development, in which infants adjust their gaze contingent on
a change in the adult’s focus of action, represents the most basic type of shared
attention, of “looking where someone else is looking,”39 and suggests that the
view that infants are totally egocentric and incapable of taking another’s point
into account is far from true.40

38
George Butterworth, “Origins of Mind in Perception and Action,” in Joint Attention:
Its Origins and Role in Development, ed. Chris Moore, Philip J. Dunham, Dalhousie University
(Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1995), 30; Valerie Corkum,
Chris Moore, “Development of Joint Visual Attention in Infants,” Joint Attention, 62, 64; Dale
A. Baldwin, “Understanding the Link Between Joint Attention and Language,” Joint Atten-
tion, 133, 135, 140; Tanya Behne, Malinda Carpenter, Maria Gräfenhain, Kristin Liebal, Ulf
Liszkowski, Henrike Moll, Hannes Rakoczy, Michael Tomasello, Felix Warneken, and Emily
Wyman, “Cultural Learning and Cultural Creation,” in Social Life and Social Knowledge, 71.
The timing of when infants are capable of joint attention varies from study to study, see Ibid., 78.
39
Corkum and Moore, “Development of Joint Visual Attention in Infants,” 62; George
Butterworth, “The Ontogeny and Phylogeny of Joint Visual Attention,” in A. Whiten (ed.),
Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development, and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 223.
40
Butterworth, “Origins of Mind in Perception and Action,” Joint Attention, 30.
106 Michael D. Barber

A new set of behaviors emerges, though, when infants at 9-12 months of

age establish a referential triangle among themselves, an adult, and some object
toward which child and adult share attention, particularly through the infant’s
deployment of pointing gestures. 41Several authors have discovered that pointing
infants are not simply interested in drawing attention to themselves since they
repeated pointing gestures when an adult in an experiment focused on them but
not on the object they pointed to. In addition, when the adult in the experiment
failed to look back at the pointing infant but looked only at the object, infants
repeated pointing and focused their attention on the adult—as if the infant
desired an actual triangulation, namely, that their pointing would direct the
adult to turn to the object but also in a context in which the adult would share
attention on that object with the infant.42 Often, the child is not interested in
obtaining the object, often looking at the adult’s face rather than the hand or
a body part that might deliver the object to the child and seemingly being sat-
isfied if the adult merely turns her attention to the object indicated. The child
seems motivated by a “purely social motive of sharing attention to something”43
and seeks, then, “to change the adult’s intentions so that they become aligned
with its own.”44 One researcher concludes that “human infants find the emo-
tional outcome produced by this joint interaction enjoyable45 and “intrinsically
rewarding.”46 Pointing, then, is pre-linguistic, fully communicative act.”47
The research also suggests that nonhuman apes do not produce declarative
gestures of this kind, that is, gestures that are not aimed at retrieving an object
for themselves.48 Neither autistic children nor chimpanzees spontaneously pro-
duce these pre-linguistic “protodeclaratives” that normal infants do in point-
ing.49 In fact, manual pointing, that is, the use of the outstretched arm and
extended index finger, is unique to humans, and it is thought to be connected
with language use, as if pointing preceded the verbal expression “look,” which
children will use later to direct attention to objects.50 As one author has put it,
chimpanzees “showed no interest in cooperating in social games […] which had

41
Behne, et al, “Cultural Learning and Cultural Creation,” Social Life and Social Knowl-
edge, 76.
42
Ibid.; Stephán Desrochers, Paul Morrissette, and Marcelle Ricard, “Two Perspectives
on Pointing in Infancy,” in Joint Attention, 94-96.
43
Michael Tomasello, “Joint Attention as Social Cognition,” Joint Attention, 111.
44
Ibid.
45
Bibok, et al, “Social Knowledge as Social Skill,” Social Life and Social Knowledge, 163.
46
Ibid.
47
Behne, et al, Cultural Learning and Cultural Creation,” Social Life and Social Knowl-
edge, 83.
48
Ibid.
49
Michael Tomasello, “Joint Attention as Social Cognition,” Joint Attention, 111.
50
George Butterworth, “Origins of Mind in Perception and Action,” Joint Attention, 34;
Bibok, et al, “Social Knowledge as Social Skill,” Social Life and Social Knowledge, 160.
 The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development 107
no other goal beyond doing something together.”51 Young chimpanzees display
no interest in sharing with others the object of their attention.52
What becomes evident is that in an intersubjective relationship of joint atten-
tion, the child, though not reflective, is not merely passively absorbing the influ-
ences in its environment, but on the contrary, actively taking initiatives to direct
adult attention in directions to which adults are not directed and thus to guide
a “conversation” of interchanged looks about an object. Of course, the child
“works with” a network of passively absorbed patterns of intersubjective behav-
iors and social expectations, for example, expecting that looks will be returned,
that adults will follow pointing gestures, and that many of the “rules” often
governing a child-adult relationship (e.g., that loud screaming is not appropri-
ate) maintain. But in pointing, the child takes charge of these socially learned
behavioral patterns and effects something novel, directing adults in directions
that they may not have expected.
This taking charge of this network of socially learned behavioral patterns
within a joint attention framework in order to do something creative with
them, something not predictable, actually anticipates the way in which reflec-
tive adults are able to innovate in coming to terms with the social expectations
constraining their behavior. Schutz finds the language we constantly use to
be constituted by objective meanings, that is, meanings which do not depend
on the particular situations in which word-users find themselves and which
would have the meanings they do regardless of who uses them. But once some-
one uses objective words, she also infuses them with subjective meaning and
connotations particular to herself. Hence, what Goethe meant by “demonic”
can only be understood by familiarity with all his works, or the word “civili-
zation” in the mouth of a French person has a meaning it would not have in
persons from other cultures.53 Furthermore, since an individual inhabits vari-
ous social roles, as a father, a church member, a citizen, and a professional, he
will define a situation in the light of how he weights those roles, hence he may
function as a citizen or a professional in a way that no one else will since oth-
ers may not have these many roles intersecting in themselves or weigh such
roles in the same way.54 In this Schutzian tradition, Maurice Natanson has
described well how reflective adults infuse the social typifications surrounding
them with a creative significance flowing from the unrepeatable uniqueness of
their stream of consciousness.

51
Behne, et al, Cultural Learning and Cultural Creation,” Social Life and Social Knowl-
edge, 83.
52
Bibok, et. Al, “Social Knowledge as Social Skill,” Social Life and Social Knowledge, 163.
53
Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, 124-125.
54
Alfred Schutz, “The Well-Informed Citizen: As Essay on the Social Distribution of
Knowledge,” Collected Papers 2: Studies in Social Theory, ed. ArvidBrodersen (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 125.
108 Michael D. Barber

“Within the current of concrete existence, the person has a margin of decision
about the way in which he will present himself: to repeat the same routine in
the same way, to play the same role in the same way, to promise the same style
of action, or—and this is the moment of freedom—to transcend the boundar-
ies of the typical, to lash into a role with originality, to announce through fresh
action that the ‘I’ is still not captive or tame.”55

Although infants do not have the ability to decide reflectively how they will pres-
ent themselves, nevertheless, this higher level of freedom and self-determination
can be traced back to earlier anticipations whenever an infant, not content with
the focus of an adult, seeks to direct joint attention to unexpected objects. Free-
dom doesn’t spring suddenly from an infancy in which children’s personalities
are merely passive receptacles, internalizing the behavior patterns of adults from
whose personality their own is not even distinguished.
A dialectic between intersubjectivity and the transcendental stream of con-
sciousness has pervaded this paper. I have denied that an analogical appercep-
tual transfer of the sense “animate organism” to another need imply a Cartesian
isolation of one subject from another and that passive syntheses make possible
something like Scheler’s perceptual theory of the alter ego, but I have defended
the view that there is a Cartesian residue in the fact that my stream of originary
experience never coincides with another’s. Though passive syntheses are continu-
ally at play in syncretic sociability, I have opposed the position that my identity,
even as an infant, is identical with that of others, such as my parents. The lack of
reflection on my acts and thoughts does not show that my identity is submerged
in another’s; on the contrary, later reflection on my acts and thoughts reveals
that they belong to my own stream of consciousness. Even beneath the control
of the I or beneath my reflection, the identity of my stream of consciousness
is being constituted via passive syntheses, active syntheses, and the initiatives
highlighted by joint attention, in which even an unreflective infant asserts itself
within the social settings into which it is born. In the midst of social relation-
ships, the transcendental stream of consciousness continually emerges, not pro-
hibiting intersubjective relationships but limiting our knowledge of the other and
resisting any absorption of my identity into another’s and the other’s into mine.

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Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 111–124

Action and Relevance:

Making Sense of Subjective Interpretations
in Biographical Narratives 1

Hermílio Santos
Department of Social Sciences, PUCRS-Brazil
[email protected]

Abstract: This paper analyses biographical narratives as a possibility of getting

access on how individuals interpret their life-world, that is, the subjective interpreta-
tion in biographies of actors on their social context. Here biography is understood
as the description made by the individual himself. It is of processes and experiences
that extended through the course of life, that is, written or oral presentation of
the history of life. In this sense, biographies and biographical trajectories are not
purely individual phenomena, but social ones. The biographical narrative offers
important elements for the analysis not only on the narrator´s life, but especially on
the connections between the individual and his group or community, considering
however that any narrative is an interpretation based on a specific biographical situ-
ation. In this sense, the access to the experiences accumulated and consolidated in
their biographies permits the analysis of the subjective interpretation of the actors.

Keywords: Action, relevance, subjectivity, biographical narratives, Alfred

Schutz

The Brazilian sociological literature has so far dedicated relatively little atten-
tion to analytical perspectives that propose to explore the subjective interpreta-
tions of social actors. This type of analysis conceives individuals as actors that

1
A previous version of this paper was presented at the Founding Meeting of the Alfred
Schutz Circle, in May 2012 in New York. This paper is based on an empirical research on expe-
riences of delinquency of female adolescents in Brazil, with the financial support of CAPES,
CNPq and FAPERGS. I would like to thank the reviewers of this paper, that alerted me for
some mistakes and helped to improve it.
112 Hermílio Santos

interpret things they are faced (people, ideas, etc.) in order to locate themselves
in the world and, by doing that, to establish their guide of action. This presup-
position is shared by many schools of the comprehensive sociology (or interpre-
tive sociology), including symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology besides
the sociology influenced by phenomenology. Common to all these approaches
is the idea that the social actor not only internalizes norms and meanings; on
the opposite, this actor is also, according to Arthur S. Parsons, a conscious agent
and responsible for the active adoption of normative codes in the interpretation
of social reality (Parsons 1978: 111). It is precisely the subjective interpretation of
reality or social context that provides the main object of analysis for my paper,
which has on the sociology of Alfred Schutz an important theoretical support
– especially his analysis of the system of relevance – above all because it enables
the discussion of the subjective interpretation of the actor for the comprehension
of their action and their world. Furthermore, it can inform methods that aim
precisely to “capture” the subjective interpretation of actors.
Among the most important and fertile authors in the sociology of the 20th
century, Alfred Schutz may be the less known in Brazil, even though his name
is included in the basic bibliography of some social science courses in Brazil-
ian universities and has been quoted by important authors (for instance, Velho
1999). However, it is possible to identify, in the last years, an increasing interest in
approaches that potentially could offer new knowledge on Brazilian social reality.
In this sense, the sociology of Alfred Schutz represents an important reference
not only for strictly theoretical discussions, but also as an epistemological foun-
dation for empirical research that has the subjective interpretation as the main
focus. Before exploring biographical narratives as a possibility of getting access
to the subjective interpretation of the life-world, I will present the importance of
the concept of relevance for the comprehension of the subjective interpretation.

1. Action and Relevance

Although he has never conducted empirical research2 (Eberle 2010: 129),
Schutz suggests that sociologists who want to offer a comprehension of everyday
life should focus on the life-world, putting questions as what the social world
means for the actor, and what he would like to say through his/her action inside
it (Schutz 1979: 265). The presupposition here is that every individual constructs
his/her own world through the elements offered by others with whom they main-
tain any kind of relation. The starting point of the sociological investigation
proposed by Schutz is the interpretation of the subjective meaning attributed to
phenomena by actors, since the subjective point of view is the only and sufficient

2
Some years before he died, Schutz had a very close contact with studies on juvenile
delinquency in New York, carried on by the Columbia University sociologist R.M. MacIver
(Barber 2004: 201).
 Action and Relevance 113
guarantee that the world of social reality will not be replaced by a fictional world
that does not exist, constructed by the observer (Schutz 1979: 266).
The investigation proposed by Schutz should not be misinterpreted as a pro-
cedure that merely “gives voice” to the object under investigation, but, follow-
ing the comprehensive sociology tradition (verstehende Soziologie), proposes to
explore the common sense knowledge. This necessarily implies interpreting the
individual´s interpretation of everyday life, since it somehow affects the indi-
vidual’s capacity to attribute meaning (Staudigl 2007: 235). At the same time,
to put the subjective meaning at the frontline of analysis is not the same as
studying the psychological processes of the agent, since what is intended to be
understood is not the agent’s psyque, but the meaning of his or her action (Cohn
2002: 28). The investigative undertaking implies assuming what Schutz calls the
“first-order-constructs”, that means, those involved in the experience of com-
mon sense in everyday life as the object of the sociological analysis, that is, of
the “second-order-constructs”, those that are built according to the rules of all
empirical sciences (Schutz 1979: 271).
What for Durkheim (1962) represents for the individual a constraint to his/
her action – the role played by collective representations –, for Schutz is a refer-
ence that individuals can dispose and follow an object of interpretation, since
the individual is properly provided with the cognitive capacity required for that,
developed since childhood (Schutz 2003: 339; see also Cicourel 2007: 175). Here,
the individual follows a “natural attitude” in relation to the world; he/she believes
in things of the everyday life. However, in phenomenological terms, “believe in”
implies,in doing of the everyday situations, an object of inspection and investiga-
tion (Natanson 1998: 7) – everything that is taken for granted in the life-world--
is surrounded by uncertainty (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 9). Thus, the every-day
interpretation conducted by individuals occurs within the natural attitude, based
mostly on the stock of knowledge available to them, on their previous experi-
ences and on others with whom they are in contact of, directly or indirectly (for
instance, parents, teachers, teachers of teachers, etc.), that means, based on the
knowledge at hand (“vorhandenes Wissen”), which serves as a “reference code”
(Schutz 1979: 72) for the individual. In this sense, this knowledge system – as
the result of sedimentation of subjective experiences (biography) in the life-world
(Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 123) – assumes for those individuals who recognize
themselves as internal members of a group, community or movement an aspect
of coherence, clarity and consistency (Schutz 1979: 81).
The problem of individuals’ interpretive attributes in everyday life is the most
important aspect of Schutz’ sociology in terms of the attempt to combine3 the

3
This “fusion” should not be understood as an attempt of juxtaposing interpretations. On
the opposite side, it deals with a fusion that Schutz carried out through a critical combination
of Weber and Husserl, which was criticized among others by Giddens (1978: 24-34), Gorman
(1979), and Campbell (1996:33); the latter exclusively regarding Weber.
114 Hermílio Santos

most significant foundations on which his theoretical framework is established:

Husserl’s phenomenology and Weber’s4 sociology of action. Weber points out
that individuals, in action, ascribe subjective meaning, considering the present,
past, and most probable future behavior of those with whom they interact, at
the same time that others are ascribing meaning to them (Weber 2004: 13-16)
– it becomes clear that individuals, for Weber, are interpreters par excellence.5
Keneth R. Muse asserts that some authors (for instance, George Psathas and
Helmut R. Wagner) identify in Weber’ methodological formulations some “phe-
nomenological” aspects (for instance, in the doctrine of Verstehen), although,
according to Muse, Weber himself did not recognise such elements as being
“phenomenological”. Still, the argument of Muse is that it is possible to identify
strong evidences of the impact of Husserl on Weber among other influences.
This influence, according to him, can be found where it would be less expected:
in the doctrine of ideal type (see Muse 1991).
The establishment of a common life with others necessarily presupposes
sharing meanings that sustain social relationships (Schutz 1979: 80; see also
Schutz 1972: 202) expressed through common values that are reaffirmed in the
communicative environment and in interactive relations (Schutz 1979: 160).
It means that people from a specific community or group possess something
socially significant in common, which separates them from others. The meaning
that a group presents to its members consists in their knowledge of a common
situation, thus, a common system of typification and relevance (Schutz 1979:
82). In this sense, recognizing similarities also involves establishing differences
(Jenkins 2002: 80) and this is what makes possible the in-group (Schutz 1979:
80).6 Saying that, it implies that the members of an internal group do not have
“knowledge about”, but “knowledge of” a social context, which individuals are
sufficiently familiar with (Nasu 2006: 391). However, this familiarity is not given
since ever, transmitted by parents and teachers, for instance, but is confirmed in
each situation (Nasu 2006: 394).
The habitus concept, as employed by Bourdieu (1980, 2000 and 2005) – a
system of socially constituted dispositions that generate and unify the whole of
practices and ideologies of an agent group (Bourdieu 2005: 191) – stays some-
how close to the identified characteristics of members of an “internal group”,
as on the formulation of Schutz. The habitus of an agent is anchored on its past

4
The sociology of Schutz has a third important support, the theory of value formulated
by Ludwig von Mises, one of the most important representatives of the so-called Viennese
School of Economics. Important here for Schutz is his theory of value, which accentuates the
subjective perspective in the process of giving value to specific goods (see Endreß and Renn
2004:18-20 and 25-36).
5
For a brief and important comparison of the phenomenological approaches of life-world
in Weber and Schutz, see John R. Hall (1991).
6
In Schutz’s analysis of the “stranger”, the role played by the alterity in the individual
action can be clearly observed. (see, for instance, Schutz 2004a: 219; 2004b: 116; 1979: 85).
 Action and Relevance 115
experiences and, besides composing their thoughts and perceptions of pres-
ent reality, defines agent’s practice in a regular and constant manner (Crossley
2001: 83). This is expressed through symbolic marks of distinction through the
knowledge acquired, translated in lifestyles, as well as on political, moral and
esthetic judgments (Bourdieu 1980: 92; 2000: 61). In this sense, we could state
that members of a specific internal group are connected to each other by a spe-
cific habitus. However, Bourdieu (2000: 92) asserts that habitus makes possible
the production of all thoughts, of all perceptions and also of all actions, what
seems to restrict significantly the possibility of individual interpretation of their
own habitus. On the one side, it seems to be possible to identify some proximity
between the concept of habitus and of the relevance system of an internal group;
but on the other side, it is clear that the role of interpreter played by individuals
or agents is not emphasized with the same intensity in both approaches.7 Cross-
ley (2001: 85), for instance, points out precisely this distinction between these
approaches, affirming that phenomenology – as well as those schools called by
him “social phenomenology” (ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism)
– excessively stresses the agents interpretive horizon. It could also be said as an
objection to the phenomenological approach that it does not consider the con-
straints played by the “social structure” on the definition of individual action.
It must be remembered, however, that the main concern here is to point out
just the possibility open to individuals to interpret their reality, also including
an interpretation of the structural constraints over their actions. This is still an
exciting dispute and not yet surpassed, even though some important sociologists
believe it was by Giddens and his structuration theory (Giddens 2003). In any
way, it seems that this debate could be around the concept of relevance, consid-
ering its implications for the empirical research (Schutz 2004b) and its capacity
to overcome some limitations of the theories just mentioned.
Relevance is the most important problem for the phenomenological inves-
tigation of life-world (Nasu 2008: 92), since it concerns the ways individuals
make sense of objects and events around them. That means how they perceive,
recognize, interpret, know and act in everyday life through the selection of
elements within the totality involved in each situation. The experience itself
occurs as a process of choice, not a fatality or a passive reception of informa-
tion, regarding the fact that individuals can choose which elements of meaning
should receive their attention, that is, which elements within those involved in
a situation are considered relevant. On the one hand, we could say that indi-
viduals do not always choose the objective situations of life they have to face; on
the other hand, individuals can make choices concerning the attention given to
problems. Those choices are informed by the stock of knowledge accumulated
through previous experiences, their own experience and also experience from

7
For other theoretical dialogues between the Schutzian and Bourdieusian perspectives,
see Endress, 2005 and Dreher, 2011.
116 Hermílio Santos

others with whom they maintain any kind of tie, even if those other individu-
als are not their contemporaries. In this sense, current and future choices are,
in some way, influenced by choices taken in the past, but not in a deterministic
way, since the actors constantly submit even the past experiences to interpreta-
tion and reinterpretation. Although anchored on the stock of knowledge, indi-
vidual’s course of action remains open, even if constraint by phenomena over
which he/she does not have any control.
Common sense knowledge is based on the sedimentation of experiences.
Experiences are not restricted to practical events in which individuals are directly
engaged, but also those events in which their contemporaries or even their prede-
cessors took part and are somehow connected to their everyday life. Experiences
must be understood as phenomena to which individuals assign meanings. How-
ever, not all experience can be considered meaningful, since this characterization
is restricted to experiences that are regarded retrospectively (Schutz 1979: 63).
To say that an experience is meaningful implies affirming that it is possible for
the individual to distinguish it and accentuate it, which means, to confront it
with other experiences, that is, to confront what is not possible with the ongo-
ing events. It is only possible if the experience can be delineated through what
Schutz calls “an attention act.” Thus, to ascribe meaning to an experience is to
interpret it ex post, by recovering it through memory, even if the event had just
occurred. Although Schutz did not delineate a method based on his sociology
(Hitzler; Eberle 2000: 117), this can be undertaken through analysis of bio-
graphical and everyday life narratives, because their use allows recovering the
most important and meaningful elements for subjective interpretation, i.e. the
system of relevance and typification.

2. Experience and Biographical Narrative

A relevant problem here, from the point of view of sociological investigation,
is how to obtain access to the subjective interpretation. In this sense we are deal-
ing here with the problem of adequacy in sociological investigation, already dis-
cussed by Eberle (2010). The biographical narrative approach developed by the
German sociologist Fritz Schütze (1984) and incremented by Gabriele Rosen-
thal (2004 and 2008) is already well established and permits the construction
of typologies of life-world interpretation, considering in this process how indi-
viduals “manipulate” their stock of knowledge and, above all, how they deal
with the system of relevance and typification, key-elements in the interpretive
process of everyday life.
Even though well established, the biographical research in sociology is not
accepted without important critical appraisals. One of the most influential
authors that expressed his critics to the incorporation of biography as a source
for the sociological analysis was Pierre Bourdieu. In his short essay “L’illusion
biographique” (The biographical illusion), Bourdieu argues that the incorporation
 Action and Relevance 117
of life stories in sociological research is not more than a concession of sociology
to the common sense (Bourdieu 1986: 69). It is, indeed, a problematic article
in many aspects. First of all, the author tries to identify assumptions of the bio-
graphical research in sociology that are not found in sociological literature but
in metaphors of literature, when referring to authors like Maupassant and Jules
Romains. Bourdieu explicitly states that, among other things, dealing with bio-
graphical material would mean to admit that life is a history, understood as a
succession of historical events. As these assumptions are not available this way
in the sociological literature on biographic research, or at least the author does
not present the references where we could find such presuppositions, Bourdieu
seems to have no other alternative but to refer to authors that have nothing to
do with what he wants to refute. However, this is just one of the problems one
may find in his text, and probably the less important one. Another aspect may
receive more attention, and it concerns what is intended when sociologists under-
take biographical research. According to some authors influenced by Bourdieu,
having biography as a material of sociological analysis would mean to search
“an harmonic causality of individual life histories”, that could be explained “by
the necessity, from the part of individuals as by the social science, to ascribe a
coherent meaning to human actions” (Montagner 2007: 252).
Bourdieu’s illusion was to believe to be possible to refute a sociological
approach without refuting simultaneously its epistemological and methodolog-
ical foundations. In this sense, to become a successful and consistent task, the
refutation of the biographical research in sociology would mean to refute not
only its methodological assumptions, but above all its epistemological founda-
tion, what, definitely, Bourdieu was not able to present in his paper. The alter-
native presented by Bourdieu was, without rejecting completely the material of
life histories, to leave aside the focus on biography and to emphasize the “trajec-
tories”, understood as the “objectification of relations between agents and the
exchanges presented in the field” (Montagner 2007: 254).
The main problem here is not whether life history is harmonious or not, but the
possibility of the existence of something as “biography”, that means, the interpreta-
tion of the actor on his or her own life. In fact, to admit the existence of biography
would imply attributing to the actor a status of interpreter, which Bourdieu and
his followers are hardly disposed to do, since it would require, among other things,
a deep modification, for instance, of the interpretation on the relation between
subject and habitus, as mentioned earlier in this paper. In fact, the comprehension
of the relation between habitus and individual in the way as assumed by Bour-
dieu is coherent with the position defended by the French sociologist that see the
biographical approach as an illusion. The sociological investigation focusing on
the biographical narrative is, in fact, a contradiction, if such approach would be
anchored in the theory of habitus from Bourdieu, since he presupposes the irrel-
evance of the interpretation by the actor (Truc 2011: 162), which is at least as an
indispensable resource for the comprehension of social phenomena.
118 Hermílio Santos

In the Brazilian sociological research, narratives or biographical narratives

still remains marginal, despite the fact that its use is becoming widespread (see,
for instance, Stoll 2004; Weller 2005a and 2005b; Feltran 2008). However, bio-
graphical data are in many cases faced as a way to get objective information on
the conditions of life, complementing other types of data collection. It is worth
mentioning that the recent Brazilian sociological research, when using narratives,
does not distinguish between arguments, description and narrative itself. This
distinction, which came from socio-linguistic research and was incorporated to
sociological research by Fritz Schütze (see, for instance, Schütze 1983), is essential
for the sociological approach based on the experience of actors having as starting
point their own narrative, since it is the discursive resource more strictly con-
nected to the chain of actions (Rosenthal 2004: 53; Labov and Waletzky 1973).
In a more precise way, it is the kind of discourse most connected to the way the
narrator presents his/her interpretation of the development of facts (Küsters
2009: 25).
Biographical and everyday life narratives are able to offer a very important
access to the narrator’s interpretation, but also to the connections between indi-
viduals and their groups, communities and movements (Carvalho 2003: 293).
The main theoretical source for the elaboration of the biographical narrative
approach is, among others, the sociology of Alfred Schutz, especially his theory
of relevance (see for instance, Rosenthal 1995). This approach has as a starting
point that any narrative is an interpretation viewed from a specific biographical
situation (Schutz 1979: 73), since a biography is a description of processes and
lived experiences by the individual herself.
According to Rosenthal, the comprehension of individual action requires
investigating the actor’s subjective perspective as well as the course of his/her
action. That means to investigate experiences considering the meaning that indi-
viduals give to their action by the time it occurred and the biographical context
in which the narrators place their experiences (Rosenthal 2004: 49). In this sense,
the resource of biographical narrative can be assumed as a possibility of com-
bining a diachronic (the biography) with a synchronic approach (the interpreted
biography from a biographically specific moment: the present).
With the biographical narrative approach, especially with the formulation
and analysis proposed by Gabriele Rosenthal (1995; 2008), it is possible to obtain
the needed data for the analysis of the relevance system shared among groups
of people that present similar experiences (for example, engagement in specific
social movements, unemployment, perpetration of offences and violence, etc.).
Through narratives of biographical experiences it is possible to get access to
data that permits the interpretation of the narrator’s relevance system, which
is essential, according to the sociology of Schutz, for the comprehension of the
action of the agent as well as the meaning shared among those directly or indi-
rectly engaged in a similar type of phenomenon, in delinquency or violence, for
instance. For that reason, researchers should proceed in a way different from the
 Action and Relevance 119
well-known semi-structured interview, with the purpose of not to give directions
or to “colonize” the interviewee with pre-established questions, since such pro-
ceeding could lead to the contamination of the interviewee by the researcher´s
relevance system.
In the approach proposed by Schütze it is recommended that the first ques-
tion put to the interviewee should be as open as possible, in a way that the
interviewee presents his/her all life in a detailed and extended form. This way,
the interviewee would be able to select from his/her own relevance system the
most convenient moment to start the biographical narrative, the phases in his/
her life that would deserve more attention, the episodes that will be more accen-
tuated and those that will be narrated in detail, or, on the opposite, episodes
which the interviewee will prefer to describe. Here the author of the narration
is making choices that are in some way connected to the action and to the nar-
rated sequences. These choices are based on the relevance system, which allows
the individual to select from the events available; so far they are relevant to the
agent’s action (Nasu 2008: 91). If the researcher put to the interviewee questions
explicitly related to the research problem it would be lending to the biographer
the researcher’ relevance system, which would obviously interfere with obtain-
ing the subjective interpretation of the actor.
This problem that we could call “colonization” of the interviewees’ relevance
system by the relevance system of the social scientist can be observed, for instance,
in the research proposal of social trajectories of the French sociologist Bernard
Lahire. By establishing in advance which issues the interviewees should talk
about, and in which sequence they should be introduced, Lahire (2004) gives up
on the possibility of obtaining elements for the analysis of the subjective interpre-
tation on the interviewees’ course of life, either because he thinks it is not pos-
sible to get it or because he believes it would not be relevant for the sociological
research. Proceeding this way, Lahire’s proposal leaves the interviewee even more
hostage of the researcher and, even worse, it leaves without consideration the
chosen thematic and the discursive forms of the interviewee as key-elements for
the comprehension of the positions taken along his/her biography or in specific
episodes. This problem can be partly minimized if the social scientist gives the
biographers the possibility of choosing the thematic, and also if the sociologist
is aware of the textual types during the interviewees’ narrative.
It is recurrent during the interview the occurrence of passages not only with
narratives, but also with description and arguments (Schütze 1984: 91). Nar-
ratives – in opposition to description and arguments – refer to the sequence of
past events, which presents a temporally sequence relation or a causal connec-
tion among them (Rosenthal 2008: 139). This way, the narrative passages of the
interview should receive priority exactly because they permit the provision of
adequate analytical elements for the investigation of the subjective interpretation,
since the narrative closely refers to the guide of action taken by the interpreter
(Küsters 2009: 25).
120 Hermílio Santos

Each interview is transcribed and submitted to the reconstructive and sequential

analysis. The reconstructive analysis means that the interview is neither analyzed
with pre-defined categories nor submitted to the test of hypotheses formulated
a priori. The objective of the reconstruction is to decode the past meaning of the
lived experience as well as the presented meaning in the present. In the sequen-
tial analysis, the transcribed text is interpreted in small units according to its
sequential form, which means that the sequence is how the text is created dur-
ing the interview. According to the objective hermeneutic approach of Ulrich
Oevermann (see Wernet 2009) and adopted by Rosenthal, each data of the bio-
graphical sequence is initially interpreted without the consideration of the total-
ity presented in the interview. However, its meaning for the researcher becomes
consistent while the analysis goes ahead when each narrated event is interpreted
in the context of the whole interview. The maintenance of the sequence of issues
introduced by the interviewee during the analysis process is important, since it
presents in some way the access to the choices made by the biographer.
It is worth mentioning that the effort here, as a sociological activity, is directed
to the reconstruction of the latent structures of meaning of biographical or epi-
sodical events, since these are not available to the interviewee (Rosenthal 2004:
55). This analytical procedure is implied in dividing the text generated by the
interview in small analytical units. These units are divided according to the con-
cept of “thematic fields” as formulated by Aron Gurwitsch (see Rosenthal 1995).
According to Gurwitsch (2009: 220), the thematic fields work as the environ-
ment in which the reality of experiences are located and perceived, since noth-
ing is experienced in its emptiness. The thematic fields are introduced by the
interviewee him/herself, and the researcher formulates hypothesis out of these
fields that should be tested. That means hypotheses are generated based on the
narrated facts as well as on the omitted ones, since the analysis should consider
the narration obtained in the interview, as well as additional information on the
informant (for instance, official documents of prisoners, patients, employment
agencies, or, when it is not the case, information obtained with friends or rela-
tives). In this sense, the events experienced by the interviewee but not mentioned
during the interview are also relevant. The interview is then analyzed in its total-
ity; its sequence and discursive forms are identified as well as the thematic fields.
The resource of biographical narratives offers an important access to what
Schutz calls “because motives” for an action. In opposition to the “in order
to motives”, which refer to the future expectations of the agent, the “because
motives” are connected to the past experiences (Schutz 1962: 22), that means, to
the stock of knowledge, even if such motivations are not necessarily explicit in
the course of action. On the one side, a great part of the sociological investigation
is concerned with the consideration of the “in order to motives”, for instance,
the conclusion that the engagement in guns traffic are mostly connected to the
intention to assure a leading position in the drug traffic. On the other side, this
focus does not give a comprehensive understanding of the problem, since it gives
 Action and Relevance 121
no attention to the subjective interpretation of reality of those engaged in drug
traffic, for instance. In this sense, even if many or most of those that are engaged
in drug dealing maintain some kind of relation to the guns traffic, it says very
little about the possible interpretation about their “because motives”, which would
be of great interest, since the result of such investigations could potentially offer
other kind of strategies to minimize a problem that affects especially youngsters
in the periphery of metropolitan areas in Brazil and many other societies with
similar socioeconomic situations.
This complex proceeding of data collection and data analysis permits to ana-
lyze the problem of the subjective interpretation in everyday life in an adequate
way. It permits to make explicit the relevance and typification systems, and also
allows access to the stock of knowledge, which provides important subsidies for
the comprehension of the interviewees’ experiences. Proceeding this way, it is
possible to obtain new elements to understand the social reality, as well as the
actor’s action.

Concluding Remarks
The Brazilian social science literature has been so far modestly receptive to
analysis that tries to understand social phenomena having as a starting point
the perspective of individual action, that is, through the sociological analysis
of subjectivity. In this paper, I tried to explore the thematic through the theo-
retical approach proposed by Alfred Schutz and through the methodological
proceeding of the biographical narrative, since it permits the emergence of the
relevance system of the actors, a key-element in the Schutzian sociology for the
comprehension of action and social reality. The analysis of biographical narra-
tives is promising for the Schutzian research, since it enables the exploration of
the foundation of the agent’s action. As stated by Schutz, these foundations are
connected to the way experiences are accumulated in their respective biographies
and expressed through their system of relevance, conceived as the orientation
for the individual action. Proceeding the way as briefly indicated here would be
possible to get a better understanding of the individuals’ interpretation of action
in similar communities or of those who share similar experiences.

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Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 125–131

Two Concepts of Type

in the Work of Alfred Schutz
Lester Embree
Florida Atlantic University
[email protected]

Abstract: Schutz not only adapted Max Weber’s “ideal types” but also Edmund
Husserl’s prepredicative “types,” which must have been “empirical types,” in his
work. With care, these terms can be kept distinct. The former term refers to con-
cepts used in common-sense thinking as well as cultural science, while the latter
refers to vague material universals or eidē. This essay studies how “type” is used
in these two different ways by Schutz after he had read Husserl’s Erfahrung und
Urteil by 1940.

Keywords: Schutz, Weber, Husserl, ideal types, empirical types.

The social world has particular dimensions of proximity and distance in space
and time and of intimacy and anonymity. Each of these dimensions has its spe-
cific horizontal structure, and to each of them belongs a specific experiential style.
These experiences are prepredicative, and their style is that of typologies formed
differently for experiences relating to contemporaries, predecessors, and succes-
sors. Husserl’s analyses of the prepredicative experience and of the nature of types
(although not applied by him to the social world) are of particular importance
here. (I 148, citing Erfahrung und Urteil, §§8, 22, 24, 25, 26, 80, and 83 [a])

On November 9, 1940, Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) wrote to his friend Aron

Gurwitsch, “But you must read Erfahrung und Urteil as soon as possible; you
need it more than you think.”1 Probably Schutz had himself recently read the
book. A number of references to this work of 1938 by Husserl edited by Ludwig

1
Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, Philosophers in Exile, ed. Richard Grathoff and trans.
J. Claude Evans (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 26.
126 Lester Embree

Landgrebe occur significantly thereafter in Schutz’s oeuvre and do so most inter-

estingly with respect to what Husserl called “empirical types.”2 Then again, how-
ever, from his literary beginnings in the 1920s and especially in his masterpiece,
Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt of 1932, Schutz had referred to “ideal
types,” a term he had from Max Weber, or used the later-introduced the syn-
onyms “homunculi,” “puppets,” and especially “constructs” for it, so that there
are two concepts of type expressed in Schutz’s oeuvre.
While Schutz himself did not confuse the two concepts, the student of his
work might not regularly and distinctly recognize empirical types because the
pertinent adjective “empirical” is only used twice by Schutz, who instead usually
depends on context and writes merely of “types.” Simply put, the difference is
that while ideal types are concepts formed and used in everyday common-sense
thinking as well as in cultural-scientific and philosophical research, empirical
types are vague or unclarified universal essences or eidē and, while the former
can refer to the latter, the latter are not conceptual and hence do not refer,
although they can be exemplified by fictive and serious individuals and can be
clarified through free-phantasy variation. The key passage for “empirical types”
reads, “We have seen how empirical types are, according to Husserl, preconsti-
tuted in passivity, which he considers as the lowest form of the constitution of
universals” (III 99).
Schutz also uses the two expressions “typification” and “typicality” in broad
significations that include both concepts of type, but with the former tending
both as a noun and with reference to interpretation to express the narrower sig-
nification of “ideal type”3 and the latter tending to express the narrower signi-
fication of Husserl’s “empirical type.”4

2
References to Schutz will occur textually by means of the volume and page numbers
in Collected Papers, vol. I, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962); vol.
II, ed. Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); vol. III, ed. Ilse Schutz (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred
Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996); and vol. V, ed. Lester Embree (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2011).
3
E.g., “In the sociological perspective the state can be considered an abbreviated designa-
tion of a highly complex system of interdependent personal ideal types. In the ordinary use of
terms such as ‘the state,’ however, one naively takes this complex structure of typifications for
granted” (II 52) and “We have, however, to keep in mind that the common-sense constructs
used for the typification of the Other and of myself are to a considerable extent socially derived
and socially approved” (I 19).
4
E.g., “My Irish setter Fido has the typical traits of all dogs and the particular traits of
the species Irish setter. In addition, Fido has certain characteristics of his appearance and
behavior which are exclusively his own and which permit me to recognize him as ‘my Fido’
over against all other Irish setters, dogs, mammals, animals, objects in general—the typicality
of all of which can be found in Fido, too, of course. But precisely inasmuch as he is a typical
Irish setter, Fido shows traits which are atypical for all other dogs which are not Irish setters.
The set of unique personal traits—his ‘typical’ way of greeting me, for instance—are atypical
for all the Irish setters which are not Fido” (V 216).
 Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz 127
In the present study passages with occurrences of the word “type” from major
essays after Schutz certainly knew Erfahrung und Urteil will be quoted and dis-
cussed in order to more clearly distinguish the two concepts of type.
On April 13th, 1940 and thus over six months before recommending Erfah-
rung und Urteil to Gurwitsch, Schutz spoke at the Faculty Club of Harvard Uni-
versity on “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World” and included some
of the theory of ideal types that he had developed from Max Weber:
“To become a social scientist, everyone must make up his mind and replace
himself as the center of this world by another animate being: the observer. […]
— This shift in the point of view has a first, fundamental consequence: the sci-
entist replaces the human actors he observes on the social stage with puppets
he creates and manipulates himself. What I call “puppets” corresponds to the
technical term, “ideal types,” which Weber introduced into the social sciences
[…] — My analysis of the daily social world has shown the origin of typification.
In daily life we typify human activities that interest us as appropriate means for
producing intended effects but not as expressions of the personality of our fellow
man. The procedure of the scientific observer is the same. He observes certain
events caused by human activities and begins to establish types of such proceed-
ings. Later he co-ordinates typical actors with the typical acts they execute. In
this way he constructs personal ideal types which he imaginatively endows with
consciousness” (IV 19-20, cf. II 17-18).

Erfahrung und Urteil is first referred to in 1941 (III 9), but not concerning empiri-
cal types. Ideal types are again described the next year (II 71, 81, & 86) and
also in 1944 (II 103), with empirical types finally described for the first time in
“Teiresias or Our Knowledge of Future Events” (1944), albeit without the adjec-
tive or an explicit reference to the book:
“As Husserl has shown, all forms of recognition and identification of objects,
even of objects of the outer world, are based on a generalized knowledge of the
type of these objects or of the typical way in which they manifest themselves. I
recognize this particular cherry tree in my garden as being the same tree I saw
yesterday, although in another light and shade of color. This is only possible
because I know the typical way in which this object, “this particular cherry tree,”
refers to the preexperienced types of “cherry trees in general,” “trees,” “plants,”
“extended objects,” and so on. Each of these types has its typical style of being
experienced; the knowledge of this typical style itself is an element of our stock
of knowledge at hand” (IV 54).

In 1945, it is stated that the social scientific model of the world is populated by
what must be ideal types (I 255) and in 1946 Schutz writes, “let us construct
three ideal types which shall be called the expert, the man on the street, and the
well-informed citizen” (II 122). Then in Reflections on the Problem of Relevance
of 1947/51, he identifies his source while repeating his point about what it can
be said that he should have, but did not, explicitly specify as empirical types:
128 Lester Embree

“Husserl has already shown, in an important section of his Erfahrung und Urteil
that the world is from the outset known in the prepredicative experience of man
in the natural attitude as a world in terms of types. In the natural attitude, for
instance, I do not experience percepts of outer objects of this or that configura-
tion, Gestalt, extension, color, etc., but from the outset mountains, trees, animals,
birds, dogs, fellowmen, and so on. He has clearly shown, although in not so many
words, that even in the prepredicative sphere it makes a difference whether I rec-
ognize this concrete object as an animal, a mammal, a dog, an Irish setter, or “my
dog Fido.” In ascertaining the animal as an Irish setter, I am already interested
in all the properties typical for the species in question, properties which are not
typical for other dogs, such as greyhounds or poodles” (V 129).5

Still, however, it is not yet made explicit that the types in question here are dif-
ferent from ideal types, although he has begun to use the expression “typicality”
and soon also focuses on concepts.
In “Language, Language Disturbances, and the Texture of Consciousness”
(1950), Schutz follows Erfahrung und Urteil in going beyond the prepredicative
experience of types:

“This is very roughly the function of interest for the constitution of typical objects
and typical relations in the prepredicative sphere. The categorial knowledge,
the act of predicative judging belongs to a higher level, that of the spontaneous
activity of the Ego” (I 279).

At this point he might have distinguished the two concepts of types such that
ideal types belong to the predicative level, but instead pursues three levels of
generalizing universalization, which is about eidē:

“To be sure, in a certain sense generalization starts even at the first level, that
of receptivity, since every object of such receptivity is from the outset an object
of a somehow foreknown type. And there is also on the second level a general
form contained in any form of predicative judgment. […] Conceptual think-
ing proper—the third level—is distinguished from the second by the thema-
tization of the relationship to the general: this is one red object (among many
other red objects, one of the possible actualizations of Redness as such, of the
eidos ‘red’)” (I 280).

5
“Typifying consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable.
In so far as Rover is just a dog, he is deemed to be equal to all other dogs: a doglike behavior
is expected of him, a particular way of eating, of running, etc. But even looking at Rover as
an individual in his uniqueness, I may find that today he behaves in an extraordinary way. It
is typical for him to greet me when I return home. Today he is rather lethargic and I fear he
may be ill. Even my notion of the individual and unique Rover already involves a typifica-
tion of what I believe to be his habitual behavior. And even the ill Rover has his typical way
of being ill” (II 234).
 Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz 129
The relation of concepts to universal essences or eidē is now clear in this passage:

“[E]idetic intuition. Taking an empirical fact as our point of departure, we

transpose the factual experiences to the realm of ‘irrealities,’ of the ‘as if,’ which
confronts us with the pure possibilities, purified, that is, of everything bound
to the particular fact and any fact at all. Thus we obtain the eidos as the intu-
ited or intuitable pure universal which, not conditioned by any fact, precedes all
conceptualizations in the sense of ‘meanings of words’; on the contrary, all pure
concepts have to be formed as adjusted to the eidos” (III 110).

And here again Schutz might have also already written, “We have seen how
empirical types are, according to Husserl, preconstituted in passivity, which he
considers as the lowest form of the constitution of universals” (III 99).
Schutz then offers a contrast with reference to the ideal types referred to
between the concepts of everyday thinking and the ideal types of the empiri-
cal sciences:

“The latter are distinguished from the former by the fact that they use types
of those determined by a limited number of well-defined characteristics. […]
Types of this kind are called by Husserl ‘essential types’ (wesentliche Typen).
Nonscientific empirical concepts as used in daily life are, however, not limited
as to the number of their characteristics. Their formation is frequently guided
by a typification which separates and distinguishes objects in accordance with
characteristics which these objects have only seemingly in common with other
objects—for example, conceiving of the whale as a fish because of his bodily
shape and the fact that he lives in water. Types of this kind are called by Hus-
serl nonessential types (ausserwesentliche Typen)” (I 282).

Something can be added at this point about the role of language (and this time
a qualifying adjective can be included with a gloss):

“We may interpret the prescientific human language as a treasure house of pre-
constituted <ideal> types and characteristics, each of them carrying along an
open horizon of unexplored typical contents. By naming an experienced object,
we are relating it by its typicality to the preexperienced things of similar typical
structure, and we accept its open horizon referring to future experiences of the
same type, which are capable of being given the same name” (I 285, gloss added).

Where thinking or interpreting in terms of ideal types now and thus not the
experiencing of empirical types is further concerned, there is a difference between
and relation of common sense and social science, but it first needs to be rec-
ognized again that Schutz uses the synonyms “thought objects” and especially
“constructs,” explaining to Gurwitsch at one point that, “in the social sciences
there is the increasing tendency to replace the concepts of type and ideal type
by the concept of ‘construct’” (V 251).
130 Lester Embree

Then in “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences” (1952) he

writes,

“But the observational field of the social scientist—social reality—has a specific

meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and think-
ing within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have preselected and
preinterpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives.
It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behavior by motivating
it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this
social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the
common-sense thinking of men living their daily life within their social world.
Thus the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second
degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by actors on the social scene,
whose behavior the social scientist has to observe and to explain in accordance
with the procedural rules of his science” (I 59, cf. IV 143 f.).

Furthermore concerning common-sense typification, there is this passage from

“Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World” (1955), where the
role of language is again clear:

“But it will be useful to remember that what the sociologist calls ‘system,’ ‘role,’
‘status,’ ‘role expectation,’ ‘situation,’ and ‘institutionalization’ is experienced
by the individual actor on the social scene in entirely different terms. To him
all the factors denoted by these concepts are elements of a network of typifica-
tions—typifications of human individuals, of their course-of-action patterns,
of their motives and goals, or of the sociocultural products which originated
in their actions. These types were formed in the main by others, his predeces-
sors or contemporaries, as appropriate tools for coming to terms with things
and men, accepted as such by the group into which he was born. But there are
also self-typifications: man typifies to a certain extent his own situation within
the social world and the various relations he has to his fellow-men and cultural
objects” (II 232-33).

Schutz then returns again to how the world is “from the outset experienced in
the prescientific thinking of everyday life in the mode of typicality,” Rover the
Irish setter being used again “either as this unique individual, my irreplaceable
friend and comrade, or just as a typical example of ‘Irish setter,’ ‘dog,’ ‘mammal,’
‘animal,’ ‘organism,’ or ‘object of the outer world’” (II 233).

“Thus, typifictions on the common-sense level—in contradistinction to typifi-

cations made by the scientist, and especially the social scientist—emerge in the
everyday experience of the world as taken for granted without any formulation
of judgments or of neat propositions with logical subjects and predicates. They
belong, to use a phenomenological term, to prepredicative thinking” (idem).
 Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz 131
Schutz also follows Husserl in describing the origin of predicative thinking, but
this is beyond the scope of the present study, which is merely concerned to dis-
tinguish the important concepts of empirical and ideal types.

References
Husserl, Edmund (1939). Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der
Logik. Redigiert und heruasgegeben von Ludwig Landgrebe. Prag: Academia / Ver-
lagsbuchhandlung.
(1973). Experience and Judgement, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, London: Rout-
ledge.
Schutz, Alfred (1962). Collected Papers, vol. I, ed. Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff.
——. (1964a). vol. II, ed. Arvid Brodersen, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
——. (1964b). vol. III, ed. Ilse Schutz, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
——. (1996). vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
——. (2011). vol. V, ed. Lester Embree, Dordrecht: Springer.
Schutz, Alfred and Aron Gurwitsch (1989). Philosophers in Exile, ed. Richard Grathoff
and trans. J. Claude Evans, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Schutzian Research 4 (2012) 133–150

Phenomenological Research
of Nursing and Its Method 1

Tetsuya Sakakibara
The University of Tokyo
[email protected]

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to clarify what “phenomenological” means in

the phenomenological researches of nursing and what “method” is or should be
adopted in phenomenological researches of nursing. The essay first defines a tradi-
tional classification of the phenomenological researches of nursing by Cohen and
Omery, and then gives a new attempt to classify the phenomenological approaches
in the theories of nursing. On this basis, the essay reviews some representative
“phenomenological” researches of nursing today and addresses critical comments
to them. Finally, the essay will make clear what “phenomenological” should mean
in the phenomenological research of nursing and what kind of “method” should
be adopted in those researches.

Keywords: phenomenology, method, nursing, epistemological–ontological,

the matter itself.

§ 1. Introduction
As one of the qualitative research methods of nursing care, a so-called “phe-
nomenological approach” has attracted attention from researchers and nurses.
In American and European countries, philosophical interpretation and ground-
ing of nursing care by using phenomenology has been implemented since the
1980’s. In Japan, too, “phenomenological approaches” to nursing research and

1
This paper was presented at the international conference “Phenomenology as a Bridge
between Asia and the West” on May 23-25, 2011 at Saint Louis University. I thank both
organizers of the conference, Professor Dr. Michael Barber and Professor Dr. Nam-In Lee,
for their kind invitation.
134 Tetsuya Sakakibara

practice began in the 1990’s. Statistics support the fact that the number of nursing
researches using a phenomenological approach in Japan has increased since 1990.2
However, when we ask again what the “phenomenological approach” is in the
theories of nursing, we will find that there are different approaches called “phe-
nomenological,” which are not uniform at all. In my opinion, one of the reasons
for this situation lies in the history of “phenomenological movement” itself, in
which the phenomenology founded by Husserl was developed and employed by
him and was also critically inherited and developed further in various directions
by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists.3 As a result, it could
be said that each phenomenologist, even in each stage of his thought, has his
own method and content of “phenomenology.” Therefore, “phenomenological
approaches” in the research of nursing are also diverse because of the diversity
of phenomenology which they are based on. It is not easy to determine their
phenomenological methods.
The aim of this paper is to clarify what “phenomenological” means in the
phenomenological researches of nursing and what “method” is or should be
adopted in phenomenological researches of nursing. In the following, I will first
define a traditional classification of the phenomenological researches of nursing
by Cohen and Omery and then give my own attempt to classify the phenom-
enological approaches in the theories of nursing (Chapter 2). On this basis, I will
review some representative “phenomenological” researches of nursing today and
address critical comments to them (Chapter 3-6). Finally, I will make clear what
“phenomenological” should mean in the phenomenological research of nursing
and what kind of “method” should be adopted in those researches (Chapter 7).

§ 2. The Classification by Cohen and Omery and a Criticism of it

As one of the traditional classifications of the phenomenological research of
nursing, an attempt made by Cohen and Omery4 is well-known. It is also cited
as a “useful” survey of the development of phenomenological philosophy by
Holloway and Wheeler in their Qualitative Research for Nurses.5

2
Michiyo Watanabe, Tomoko Watanabe, and Teruko Takahashi, “Kango niokeru Gen-
shogakuteki-Houhou no Katsuyou to sono Doukou [Phenomenological Movement in Japa-
nese Nursing],” in: Kango Kenkyu [The Japanese Journal of Nursing Research], Vol. 37, No. 5,
2004, pp. 59-69.
3
Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction,
Th ird revised and enlarged edition, with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann, Martinus
Nijhoff, Hague / Boston / London, 1982.
4
Marlene Zichi Cohen & Anna Omery, “Schools of phenomenology: implications for
research”, in: J.M. Morse (ed.), Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods, Sage, Thousand
Oaks / London / New Delhi, 1994, pp. 136-156.
5
Immy Holloway & Stephanie Wheeler, Qualitative Research for Nurses, Blackwell,
Oxford, 1996, p. 121.
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 135
Cohen and Omery first describe Husserl’s phenomenology as epistemological
eidetic and Heidegger’s phenomenology as ontological hermeneutic, and then
classify various schools of phenomenology in the United States, especially those
traditions which have been “used extensively in social science research,” into the
following three schools:
1. The “Duquesne school, including Giorgi, Colaizzi, Fischer, and van Kaam,”
which is “guided by Husserl,”
2. The tradition of “Heideggerian Hermeneutics”, for example, “Diekelmann,
Allen, and Tanner”, and
3. The “Dutch school” or the “Utrecht school” as a combination of these two
schools, for example, “van Manen.”6
According to Cohen and Omery, these schools all strive to “obtain funda-
mental knowledge of phenomena.” Yet they are differentiated from one another
when, in order to achieve the goal, they describe the “eidetic structure” of the
phenomena (the Duquesne school), or interpret the phenomena to “bring out
hidden meanings” (Heideggerian hermeneutics), or combine the former two
“features of descriptive and interpretive phenomenology” (the Dutch school).7
It seems, however, that this classification is not sufficient if we consider the
present circumstances of the phenomenological research of nursing. On the one
hand, various researches based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the lived
body are increasing in Japan as well as in the United States8; on the other hand,
exceedingly few approaches using the Dutch phenomenology are now to be seen
at least in Japan. In fact, Holloway and Wheeler also, in the thoroughly revised
second and third editions of their book mentioned above9, delete a figure in
the first edition which showed that the Duquesne school and the Heideggerian
hermeneutics have been unified or integrated into the Dutch school10, so that
the account of the Dutch school has somewhat receded in importance. On the
other hand, Holloway and Wheeler in the second and third editions mention
“research which was based on the ideas of Merleau-Ponty”, as one of the “other
examples of the phenomenological research.”11
Under these circumstances, I will propose a modified classification includ-
ing the researches based on the ideas of Merleau-Ponty, according to which

6
Cohen & Omery (1996), pp. 149f.
7
Cohen & Omery (1996), pp. 149f.
8
For example, Yumi Nishimura, Katarikakeru Shintai—Kango-Kea no Genshogaku [The
Telling Body—Phenomenology of Nursing Care], Yumiru-Shuppan, Tokyo, 2001; Sandra P.
Thomas & Howard R. Pollio, Listening to Patients. A Phenomenological Approach to Nursing
Research and Practice, Springer, New York, 2002.
9
Immy Holloway & Stephanie Wheeler, Qualitative Research in Nursing, Second edition,
Blackwell, Oxford, 2002; Immy Holloway & Stephanie Wheeler, Qualitative Research in Nurs-
ing and Healthcare, Third edition, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex, 2010.
10
Holloway & Wheeler (1996), p. 122.
11
Holloway & Wheeler (2010), pp. 226-227.
136 Tetsuya Sakakibara

phenomenological approaches in the theories of nursing care can be classified

into the following two types:
1) approaches that require the phenomenological reduction or phenomeno-
logical attitude in order to understand and recognize the lived experience of ill-
ness of the patient just as it is, namely without any presupposition or prejudice, and
2) approaches that ask phenomenology for ontological knowledge so to
speak—knowledge about the way of being of persons—in order to understand
and interpret the way of being of the patient and his or her family and also the
way of being of the nurses who take care of them.
The former approaches inherit the spirit of Husserlian epistemological phenom-
enology, and the latter are based on Heidegger’s and/or Merleau-Ponty’s ontologi-
cal phenomenology.12
In the following chapters, chapters 3 to 6, I will review some representative
“phenomenological” researches of nursing today according to this classification,
and address some critical comments to them.

§ 3. Giorgi’s Descriptive Phenomenological Method

From the viewpoint of my classification, the “descriptive phenomenological
method” proposed by Amedeo Giorgi13, for example, can be regarded as one of
those that inherit Husserl’s principles of epistemological phenomenology:
Giorgi, as a representative researcher of the Duquesne school, calls himself
a “phenomenological psychologist” and aims at “understanding the phenom-
enal world of the other” (i.e., of the “participant”) (DP, 107f.) in “a certain level
of invariance” (DP, 131) of psychological “noetic-noematic” structure of the
experience (DP, 102f.). The required “scientific phenomenological psychologi-
cal method” begins by “having the researcher assume the attitude of the phe-
nomenological reduction, with a psychological perspective and with a sensitivity
toward the phenomenon being researched” (DP, 137; cf. also DP, 128). When
the researcher obtains “a description of a phenomenon” “given by ordinary per-
sons within the natural attitude” (DP, 137, 96), the researcher must analyse these
“raw data” “from within the phenomenological reduction” (DP, 96). That is,

“[e]verything in the raw data is taken to be how the objects were experienced by
the describer, and no claim is made that the events described really happened as

12
I think that the distinction between epistemology and ontology can be a useful index
to understand various directions and intentions of phenomenology practiced by Husserl, Hei-
degger, Merleau-Ponty, and so on. But this is not to say that this distinction is absolute, and that
epistemological phenomenology and ontological phenomenology are independent of each other.
In this paper, it will be rather argued in terms of the phenomenological researches of nursing
that epistemological and ontological phenomenology should be complementary and integrated.
13
Cf. Amedeo Giorgi, The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology. A Modified
Husserlian Approach, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2009 (hereafter DP).
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 137
they were described. The past personal experiences of the researcher and all his
or her past knowledge about the phenomenon are also bracketed. This bracket-
ing results in a fresh approach to the raw data” (DP, 99-100).

The researcher “first read[s] […] through” the raw data “entirely to get a sense
of the whole” (DP, 137).

“Afterwards, she breaks the lengthy descriptions into parts that are called mean-
ing units. Finally, each meaning unit, originally expressed in the participant’s
own words, is transformed by the researchers by means of a careful descriptive
process into psychologically pertinent expression” (DP, 137).

This process should be carried out in the “phenomenological procedure of free

imaginative variation” in order to achieve “a certain level of invariance of the
variable meanings” (DP, 131f.). The “transformed meaning units”, then, “form
the basis for the writing of the general structure of the experience” (DP, 137),
but this writing procedure, for its part, requires respecting the “noetic-noematic
correlation” (DP, 102f.), which comes to the fore only within the phenomeno-
logical reduction (cf. DP, 100).14
It is now clear that Giorgi’s “descriptive phenomenological method” inherits
the spirit of Husserlian epistemological phenomenology to understand and recog-
nize the participant’s lived experience without any prejudice and yet on a certain
level of eidetic invariance. Giorgi has many students and followers in the United
States15, and his phenomenological method is also adopted, for instance, in the
nursing theory of Jean Watson.16 Even in Japan, a statistical research reports that
the “most used” research method up to 2004 was Giorgi’s.17 As a pioneering
work of these researches in Japan, Hiroko Hirose’s phenomenological research
on the interview process with a dialysis patient is well-known.18
But one of the problems we have to consider here is the methodological pro-
cedure for recognizing a general structure of the experience. Giorgi breaks the
raw data given within the phenomenological reduction into “meaning units,”

14
Giorgi states: “[…] the refusal to posit the existential claim allows the noetic-noematic
relation to come to the fore so that the substratum of the psychologist’s reality can be focused
upon” (DP, 100).
15
According to Holloway and Wheeler, Giorgi has “many students and followers who
are descriptive phenomenologists” and “stay close to Husserl.” For instance, they name “Les
Todres, Barbro Giorgi, and Karin Dahlberg” (Holloway and Wheeler (2010), p. 228).
16
Jean Watson, Nursing: Human Science and Human Care. A Theory of Nursing, National
League for Nursing, New York, 1988.
17
Watanabe, Watanabe, and Takahashi (2004), p. 65.
18
Hiroko Hirose, “Kango-Mensetsu no Kinou ni kansuru Kenkyu – Touseki-Kanja tono
Mensetsu-Katei no Genshogakuteki-Bunseki [A Study of the Function of Nurse Counseling—
A Phenomenological Analysis of the Counseling Processes with Hemodialysis Patients],” in:
Kango Kenkyu [The Japanese Journal of Nursing Research], Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 367-384 (1992);
Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 541-566 (1992); Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 49-66 (1993).
138 Tetsuya Sakakibara

transforms them to their invariants in the “phenomenological procedure of

free imaginative variation,” and thus describes the essential noetic-noematic
structure of the experience. The question we have to ask now is whether such
a method can grasp the whole context (the “whole meaning”) sufficiently and
also to understand the meaning of the single particular experience. In nursing
practice, it is primarily important to understand the individuality of the patient
in his/her whole context (i.e., the meaning story of his/her illness) and to care
for him/her on the basis of this understanding. That said, even if we find an
essential structure of the experience of the patient, what should be achieved is
not general essence that is common to all the patients, common to all the cases,
or common to all the experiences of such and such illness. Such essence would
be separated from the whole context of the patient concerned. What should
be achieved is rather something like “individual essence”19 that is inherent in
this particular patient, in this particular case, or in this particular experience
of illness in question, and yet that should be grasped in the whole context of
the person concerned.
The second problem we have to point out is that Giorgi’s method has little
interest in the corporeity [Leiblichkeit] of the person. In order to understand the
“phenomenal world of the other”—i.e., the meaningful experience of the world
which is lived by the participant—just as it is, Giorgi carries out the phenom-
enological reduction and the free imaginative variation and clarifies, for instance,
a general structure of the experience of “jealousy” which is lived by the partici-
pant (DP, 139ff.). According to Giorgi, “jealousy is experienced when [a person]
discovers a strong desire in [himself or] herself to be the center of attention of
a significant other, or others.” That is, “jealousy is experienced when [a person]
perceives that another is receiving significant attention that [he or] she wishes
were being directed to [him or] her and the attention the other is receiving is
experienced as a lack in [him or] her” (DP, 167). However, if the matter to be
clarified is not a general structure of such psychic experience, but rather a lived
experience of the world modified through the body in illness, how could Giorgi
approach it with his method? In order to understand and recognize such a bodily
experience of the world as it is, would it not be required to take the way of being
of the body in illness into consideration?
We now find an excellent phenomenological research that inherits the Hus-
serlian spirit of epistemological phenomenology and yet also takes account of
the way of being of the body in order to understand and recognize a lived expe-
rience of illness of the patient: S. Kay Toombs, The Meaning of Illness.20 Let me
examine her studies in the next chapter.

19
Socrates-ness of Socrates would be an example of “individual essence.”
20
S. Kay Toombs, The Meaning of Illness. A Phenomenological Account of the Diff erent Per-
spectives of Physician and Patient, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht / Boston / London,
1992 (hereafter MI).
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 139
§ 4. Toombs’ Phenomenological Research of the Lived Body in Illness
Although Toombs does not belong to the Duquesne school, she also develops
a nursing theory based on Husserlian phenomenology. Just like Giorgi, Toombs
also understands phenomenology on the level of “psychological phenomenology”
(MI, xi) and carries out the “phenomenological reduction” on this level (MI,
121). But then, whereas Giorgi aims to describe a general structure of psychic
experience, Toombs attempts to work out a fundamental distinction between the
“naturalistic attitude” of the physician and the “natural attitude” of the patient
(MI, 13ff.) as well as to clarify a difference between the physician’s way of under-
standing and recognizing the patient’s illness and the patient’s way of understanding
and recognizing his/her illness, i.e., a difference of the “meaning of illness” for
the physician and the patient (MI, 33ff.). Motivated by her “own experience as a
multiple sclerosis patient” (MI, xi), Toombs grasps her lived experience of illness
as it is, which would be lost sight of in the naturalistic attitude of the physician.
By acquiring the distinction between the naturalistic (natural scientific) attitude
and the personalistic (natural) attitude which Husserl worked out through the
phenomenological reduction in Ideas II, she will reveal the difference between the
physician’s and the patient’s way to experience and recognize the illness on the
basis of this difference of the cognitive attitudes of consciousness, and thus go into
the lived experience of illness as the matter itself. It is now clear that Toombs’
interest is also epistemological, and her research can be regarded as one of those
approaches which inherit the spirit of Husserlian epistemological phenomenology.
The important point to note is, however, that Toombs’ research, led by the
matter itself as “illness-as-lived”, goes gradually into the “phenomenological
analysis of the body” (cf. MI, xvf.). Since the “lived experience of illness” as the
matter itself is founded in the “lived body in illness,” which is a particular way
of being as “being-in-the-world,” the research attempting to recognize the lived
experience of illness as it is must go into a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological
ontology of the body. Toombs thus clarifies, for instance, the “pre-reflective level
illness” as a “disruption” of the way of being of the “lived body” (cf. MI, 62-70).
Hence we have to say that Toombs’ research is certainly one of those that are
guided by an epistemological interest and inherit Husserlian spirit of epistemologi-
cal phenomenology but that the task of this research, because of its matter as lived
experience of illness founded in the lived body, can only be accomplished by an
ontological clarification of the way of being of the lived body. To put it in terms of
my own classification mentioned in the second chapter, an approach which inherits
Husserlian epistemological phenomenology is complemented by a Merleau-Pontian
ontological phenomenology of the body just in terms of the matter itself.
So far we have sketched two phenomenological researches of nursing that
inherit the Husserlian spirit of epistemological phenomenology, but we note
also some excellent researches that inherit Heidegger’s and/or Merleau-Ponty’s
ontological phenomenology. In the next two chapters, we would like to view
two of those approaches.
140 Tetsuya Sakakibara

§ 5. Benner and Wrubel’s Phenomenological Research of Caring

Benner and Wrubel’s work The Primacy of Caring 21 is one of the most sophis-
ticated approaches to a phenomenological research on nursing that are found in
the United States. But as opposed to Giorgi and Toombs, obviously the inten-
tion of their work is ontological. Referring to “Heidegger,” they state clearly “the
ontological question takes precedence over the epistemological one”, so “the
question of being is prior to the question of knowing, and the answer to the
question of knowing arises out of the answer to the question of being” (PC,
41). Grounded primarily on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology presented in
Sein und Zeit, especially on its interpretation by H. Dreyfus, and also adopting
Dreyfus’ understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, Ben-
ner and Wrubel first draw a “phenomenological view of the person,” i.e., a view
of “what it is to be a person.” Then they try to clarify “nursing” as a “way of being
in the world” (cf. PC, xi).
The following five points are a summation of their key concepts and under-
standing of the “phenomenological view of the person”:
(1) “[O]ur bodies”, as well as our minds, are “bearer[s] of intelligence” (PC, 42,
294). We are not made up of an intellectual “mind” and a mechanical “body” as
“the Cartesian tradition” portrays us (cf. PC, xii). The person has, or better, is an
“embodied intelligence” (PC, 42f.). In cases when people recognize familiar faces
and objects, or when people maintain their posture or move their bodies without
conscious attention, the “embodied intelligence” functions well (PC, 43). This
intelligence is also contained in “highly complex skills,” for example, those of
the “expert nurse” giving an injection or drawing blood from a patient (PC, 43,
45). When it works well, it is “rapid, nonconscious, and nonreflective” (PC, 43).
(2) The person is brought up in the context of “meanings” and understands
the world in terms of these “background meanings.” According to the Carte-
sian scheme of subject and object, meaning is private and only accessible to the
person in question. On Benner and Wrubel’s view, however, we always live in
the “background meaning” which is “a shared, public understanding of what is,”
“a way of understanding the world.” It is “what a culture gives a person from
birth” and “that which determines what counts as real for that person.” Back-
ground meaning is not fully amenable to “conscious reflection,” but it is “known
in bodily ways that enable people to navigate through life.” (PC, 46f.)
(3) We have the “capacity to care” (PC, 42), so “persons, events, projects, and
things” always “matter to us” (cf. PC, 1, 42). “[B]ecause things (including other
people) matter to us, we become involved in the world” (PC, 47). “[O]ur caring
causes us to be involved in and defined by our concerns” (PC, 42). Benner and
Wrubel term this way of being as “concern” (PC, 47), “caring,” or simply “care”
(PC, 1) following Heidegger’s expositions about “Sorge.” It is a concern or care that

21
Patricia Benner, Judith Wrubel, The Primacy of Caring. Stress and Coping in Health and
Illness, Addison-Wesley, Menlo Park, California, 1989 (hereafter PC).
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 141
causes us to “live in a differentiated world where some things really matter, while
others are less important or not important at all.” The “world” is understood in
the light of “concern,” and the “person” is defined by his/her “concern” (PC, 48).
(4) People are involved in a certain “situation” because of their “concerns.”
Thus, they are not “separate subject[s] who touch the world only indirectly
through representations” as supposed in the Cartesian dualism. Care or concern
causes people to “inhabit their worlds in an involved […] way,” so that they are
rather “constituted by their worlds” (PC, 49). Because “situations” themselves
have the “capacity to engage us and to constitute us” (PC, 42), we do not have
the “radical freedom” to be able to choose all actions all the time. Freedom is
always “situated freedom” (PC, 54).
(5) The foundation of such people is “temporality.” “Temporality means being
anchored in a present made meaningful by past experience and one’s anticipated
future” (PC, 112). The person is the kind of being whose “present moment is con-
nected to all the past moments of [his or her] life, because the present moment
is infused with the personal understanding of past lived experience. And this
meaningful connectedness of past and present enables the emergence of the pos-
sibilities of the future” (PC, 112).22
Among these five points, which are related with one another, caring as “a basic
way of being in the world” (PC, xi) is “a key characteristic of the phenomenologi-
cal view of the person” (PC, 48). Since the “basic way of being” of the person is
caring (PC, xi), we “live in a differentiated world where some things really mat-
ter, while others are less important or not important at all” (PC, 48). A “disease”
diagnosed by the physician is also experienced by the patient as an “illness” that
is “laden with meaning” (cf. PC, xii, 8f.). On this basis of the phenomenological-
ontological view of the person, Benner and Wrubel shed light on “illness as human
experience” and develop their theory of nursing in order to cope with it.
It is now reasonable to suppose that caring as “a basic way of being” of the
person—the way of being in which things, events, and persons “matter to” us,
we become involved in them, and we thus experience them with meaning—is
precisely the matter itself for Benner and Wrubel. They regard nursing as one of the
modes of this caring as the basic way of being in the world. What is decisive in
nursing practice is to understand a lived, meaningful experience of the patient’s
illness, which is founded in the patient’s caring as his/her way of being in the
world. Thus, led precisely by their matter itself, they refer mainly to Heidegger’s
phenomenology of Dasein as being-in-the-world, especially to its interpretation
by Dreyfus, and develop their phenomenological theory of nursing on this basis.
It should be noted, however, that there is still room for question in Benner and
Wrubel’s phenomenological-ontological theory of nursing. The first problem to

22
On these five points cf. also Patricia Benner, “The Tradition and Skill of Interpretive
Phenomenology in Studying Health, Illness, and Caring Practices,” in: Patricia Benner (ed.),
Interpretive Phenomenology. Embodiment, Caring, and Ethics in Health and Illness, Sage, Thou-
sand Oaks / London / New Delhi, 1994, pp. 99-127, esp. p. 104f.
142 Tetsuya Sakakibara

point out is that the above-mentioned five points of the phenomenological view
of the person are not any recognitions that could be epistemologically legitimated
or demonstrated through an objective observation from outside or an immanent
reflection upon the lived experience of consciousness, but they all belong to an
ontological insight, so to speak. I believe that it is generally reasonable to suppose
or presuppose these five points for a phenomenological study of nursing care and
also in everyday nursing practice23, especially in the case of nursing a chronic
patient, for instance, a patient with kidney trouble or a dialysis patient. From
the epistemological point of view, however, there is still room for examination.
Let me take the background meaning as an example. Benner and Wrubel
state, background meaning for an individual is “provided by the culture, subcul-
ture, and family to which [this] person belongs.” But because it is “taken up in
individual ways from the cultural background meaning” (PC, 46), there might
always be differences between individual and cultural background meaning.
Moreover, “[a]s people live out the background meaning over time, it is modi-
fied and takes on new forms,” so that background meaning is “not complete or
finished” (PC, 47). But if this is the case, one might doubt from the epistemologi-
cal point of view that it would be possible to understand a background meaning
of the other, who takes up his/her background meaning in an individual way
from the cultural background meaning, which is also constantly modified. Ben-
ner and Wrubel argue that it can be expected that human beings have “com-
monalities” and “participate in common meanings,” since they—ontologically
seen—“inhabit a common world,” have “common capacities” and “common
cultural backgrounds,” and “are in common situations” (PC, 98; cf. also PC,
88). I have to say that this ontological “premise” is naive from the epistemologi-
cal point of view. Certainly, I also consider that the premise of such ontological
“commonality” is effective for nurses in order to practice everyday nursing care
smoothly. If, however, they encounter a patient or his/her behaviour they can-
not understand at all on the basis of their “common” background meanings, it
should be necessary to examine these ontological commonalities epistemologi-
cally. It seems that it is at least in some cases necessary for nurses, even for the
experienced and experts, to go through a Husserlian epistemological process of
ἐποχή in which they bracket their own background meanings consciously. They
need to try to understand the patient’s situation, concern, and self-interpretation
and to re-evaluate the patient without any prejudice. Benner and Wrubel’s onto-
logical approach needs a complement from the epistemological point of view.
Secondly, I would like to stress that, in general, the phenomenological the-
ory of nursing proposed by Benner and Wrubel supposes or presupposes that
patients are fully capable of verbal communication. In the context of providing

23
In my opinion, however, one more aspect—intentionality—should be added especially
to the element “caring,” in order to grasp an active aspect of nursing care sufficiently. On
this point cf. Tetsuya Sakakibara, “The Intentionality of Caring,” in: Alessandro Salice (ed.),
Intentionality, Philosophia, München (forthcoming).
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 143
care especially for the patients in serious illness, however, it is possible to imagine
cases in which such verbal communication with patients is no longer possible.
For example, there are cases of patients in the so-called vegetative state. In those
cases, it is extremely difficult to understand the patient’s background meaning,
concerns, and situations and to provide care as proposed by Benner and Wru-
bel. The Husserlian ἐποχή seems also to be not so useful, because these cases
lack sufficient epistemological keys for understanding the patient’s background
meaning, concerns, and situations as they are. In this light, another phenome-
nological-ontological approach toward care as proposed by a Japanese researcher
of nursing care, Yumi Nishimura, can be regarded as an attempt to fill in these
gaps. Let me go into her research in the next chapter.

§ 6. Yumi Nishimura’s Phenomenological Research of Nursing Care

for a Vegetative State Patient
Nishimura’s work on The Telling Body24 is an excellent phenomenological
research of nursing care, especially for patients in a “persistent vegetative state,”
which is defined in medical diagnosis as the state in which, although the patients
open their eyes as if they had clear consciousness, their mental activities, such as
the ability to respond to external stimuli or to recognize people or objects, cannot
be confirmed, and they cannot communicate with the external world (cf. KS, 15).
Nishimura takes a keen interest in “a relationship and communication between a
vegetative state patient and a primary nurse which cannot be grasped explicitly” and
yet “exists” (KS, 217f.). In order to elucidate this relationship, she refers to Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological-ontological concept of “intercorporéité.”25 According to
Merleau-Ponty, in the bodily prelinguistic and preconscious stratum where mind
and body are not yet separate (KS, 159, 183, 230), our bodies are communicating
with each other by the “intentionnalité motrice” (KS, 154) functioning in a revers-
ible way (“réversibilité”) (KS, 158). Based on this idea of our bodies’ way of being
proposed by Merleau-Ponty, Nishimura clarifies a primary nurse’s lived experiences
of/with her vegetative state patients, such as “twining of lines of sight” (KS, 150ff.)
or “remaining a feeling of the patient’s hand” (KS, 166ff.) in a compelling way.26

24
Yumi Nishimura, Katarikakeru Shintai—Kango-Kea no Genshogaku [The Telling Body—
A Phenomenology of Nursing Care], Yumiru Shuppan, Tokyo, 2001 (hereafter KS).
25
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes, Gallimard, Paris, 1960, p. 213.
26
I cite Nishimura’s analysis of a nurse’s experience of “twining of lines of sight” from
the revised English version of a part of her book: Phenomenology of the Body and the Experi-
ence of Nurses: Possibilities for Communication through Interaction with Patients in a Persistent
Vegetative State (this paper was presented by Nishimura at the international Merleau-Ponty
conference at Rikkyo University on November 22 and 23, 2008):
“Here, the relationship between nurse A and patient U is described. Nurse A was in the third
year of clinical practice and in charge of patient U. Patient U was a male about 40 years old, and
was reduced to a persistent vegetative state (PVS) due to a traffic accident that had occurred over
144 Tetsuya Sakakibara

The matter itself to investigate for Nishimura is the primary nurse’s lived experi-
ence of a communication with vegetative state patients, which “cannot be grasped
explicitly” and yet undeniably “exists.” This relationship between the patient and
the nurse cannot be observed from the outside by a natural, scientific method

10 years prior to this investigation. The relationship with patient U was described as experiences
of ‘twining of lines of sight’ […]. However, I could not understand the meaning of ‘twining of
lines of sight.’ It was Merleau-Ponty’s description that helped me to establish the viewpoint for
investigating this experience. […] Patient U was considered to be one of the most serious PVS
patients. Not only could he not make eye contact, but it was also uncertain whether he could
see since he suffered from cataracts. Nurse A tried, however, to confirm patient U’s intention
by a slight timing of a blink in response to nurse A’s voice. But her communication with patient
U was suddenly discontinued as he developed cancer of the esophagus, and developed a serious
convulsion while being treated for the cancer. After the convulsion was eased, nurse A looked into
the patient’s eyes as was her usual custom, but now realized that ‘I am not reflected in his eyes.’
In the first interview, held more than one year after patient U’s death, nurse A told me of
the discontinuity of communication and exchange with patient U. Although nurse A repeatedly
mentioned the communication with patient U in the second and fourth interviews, the nurse
was always at a loss for words, saying ‘it is very difficult to express’ in both interviews. In the
seventh interview, while making the excuse that ‘I may have already mentioned,’ nurse A told
of the experience of ‘I have become distant from patient U’ again.
‘Even though I caught his eye, I still tried to make eye contact. When I looked into his
eyes, I felt that nothing was impressively responding to me. It is an abstract expression, but …’
Nurse A was concerned with patient K when the interview was conducted, and patient K
suffered from nystagmus. When I asked nurse A about patient K’s eye movement, nurse A’s
inexplicable experience was finally crystallized.
‘I feel that ‘twining of lines of sight’ may exist at a moment during eye movement. […]
Such a moment of “twining of lines of sight” can be grasped as the moment. This may be why
I am a primary nurse of the patient.’
Nurse A was not in charge of patient K. But when nurse A mentioned patient K’s line of
sight, she unconsciously replaced it with patient U’s line of sight. It is evident, because nurse
A used the word ‘primary.’ In this conversation with nurse A, in which patient K could not be
distinguished from patient U, the very expression ‘twining of lines of sight’ was extracted. […]
What is to be noticed here is that the feeling acquired through patient U’s eyes was expressed in
terms of ‘twining of lines of sight,’ which is not heard in the vernacular, instead of ‘eye contact.’
The expression ‘twining of lines of sight’ was finally extracted through repeated rewordings, with
hesitations, while talking and reviewing previous experiences and experiences with other patients.
I struggled to understand the meaning of this expression, but then Merleau-Ponty’s thought of
requiring ‘to return to that world which precedes knowledge,’ and his subsequent descriptions
suddenly appeared as clues: ‘I say that my eyes see, that my hand touches… but these naïve
expressions do not put into words my true experience’. ‘Seeing sound and hearing colors do exist
as phenomena. […] Nor are these even exceptional phenomena.’ Since we firmly connect sense
receptors with sensations in the level of knowledge, […] I puzzled about the expression ‘twining
of lines of sight.’ But […] nurse A told me the feeling: ‘Possibly, he can understand, he can hear,
and he can see. I am reflected in his eyes …’ Here, recognition, auditory sensation, and visual
sensation were in complete harmony. Nurse A could not separate individual sensations, such as
‘I can hear’ or ‘I can see.’ This is the only way that the nurse could express the feeling. […] Th is
experience can be considered as that of a sensation which has already started to function before
we recognize and reflectively understand the situation. Nurse A told me this experience, using
the expression ‘line of sight’, which was the most symbolic for her.
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 145
of clinical physiology. On the other side, it also cannot be grasped at all by the
so-called “grounded theory approach” (KS, 33-38). This method, as the most
famous (and perhaps most used) qualitative research method, will analyse and
validate a social human relationship by coding and categorizing the data collected
through observations and descriptions and also by constant comparison in this
process.27 But Nishimura points out that the grounded theory can only conceptu-
alize the conscious dimension perceived or realized by observation or description and
cannot reach the persons’ way of being that is not able to be grasped explicitly in
the epistemological sense (KS, 33-41). Nishimura’s matter is precisely a bodily,
preconscious experience lived by the primary nurse, i.e., an experience of which
the nurse cannot be conscious explicitly and which, therefore, lacks a sufficient
epistemological key. Thus, led by her matter itself, Nishimura comes to refer
to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology of the lived body (KS, 41-45).
How is it possible, however, to approach such a bodily, preconscious lived
experience that lacks an epistemological clue? Nishimura aims at a “dialogue” in
the interview (KS, 210f.). The bodily, preconscious lived experience as Nishimu-
ra’s matter belongs to an intercorporeal dimension which is “always generated
dynamically” (KS, 212). Also in a “dialogue,” Nishimura states, an intercorpo-
real lived experience in which “mind and body are not yet separate” is generated
when the interviewer and the interviewee “become so absorbed in the dialogue
that they cannot distinguish between one’s own statement and the other’s any
more” (KS, 215). In a dialogue with the primary nurse, indeed, the interviewer
cannot go back to those intercorporeal lived experiences that the primary nurse
had of/with the vegetative state patient since the intercorporeal dimension is a
ceaseless genesis. But if the interviewer in the dialogue goes into the same depth
of the preconscious intercorporeal dimension where mind and body are not yet
separate, an experience of intercorporeal communication between the primary
nurse and the vegetative state patient “is generated anew” precisely in the dialogue
between the interviewer and the primary nurse (KS, 217). Thus, Nishimura aims
at this function of the dialogue and will interview the primary nurse to approach
her intercorporeal, preconscious experience of/with the vegetative state patient.
According to her, furthermore, the gained description about the intercorporeal,
preconscious lived experience is interpreted and apprehended again in a new sense

The ‘line of sight’ was expressed as a sensation without being limited to physical eye move-
ment—this is also supported by the following fact: Since patient U suffered from cataracts,
nurse A ‘did not know whether he could see’. Nevertheless, nurse A and patient U were in the
state of ‘twining of lines of sight,’ and the nurse felt a kind of approach from the patient. This
experience means that nurse A did not receive the ‘line of sight’ from patient U as mere feel-
ing of being looked at. The ‘eyes’ and the eye movement mentioned above are not ‘a screen on
which the things are projected’ but ‘a certain power to approach things,’ and they have already
begun to function as ‘move intentionality’ as a progress toward reality. Therefore, the ‘twin-
ing’ expressed by nurse A can be understood as a sensuous experience of her body guided by
and responding to the ‘move’ of the patient.”
27
Cf. Holloway & Wheeler (2002).
146 Tetsuya Sakakibara

by the readers and woven into their experiences. This is nothing but a dialogue
with the readers.” In the process of reading and interpreting the description, the
readers are also awaked to a dimension of the intercorporeal preconscious expe-
rience and “live” this experience “as their own” (KS, 220). Thus, intercorporeal
experiences are newly generated further.
It is now clear that Nishimura’s phenomenological research that approaches
the relationship and communication between the primary nurse and the vegeta-
tive state patient, which cannot be grasped explicitly and yet certainly exists, is
through and through supported by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology
of intercorporeity. This is because the matter itself to investigate for Nishimura is
an intercorporeal communication between the primary nurse and the vegetative
state patient. Led by the matter itself, she refers to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy of the lived body. It seems that this is an appropriate approach to the matter.
This is not to say that there is no room for argument in Nishimura’s research.
As stated, she adopts a method of “dialogue” for approaching the preconscious
intercorporeal dimension that lacks a sufficient epistemological key, based on
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of intercorporeity. But how is it possible to
confirm that the interviewer’s (i.e., Nishimura’s) dialogue with the primary
nurse leads to the “same” deep intercorporeal dimension as that of communica-
tion between the primary nurse and the vegetative state patient? Nishimura
joined in advance in the primary nurse’s caring for the vegetative state patient.
But how would the interview have developed if I, for example, who have no
skills and experiences of nursing, had joined in the primary nurse’s caring and
interviewed her? Nishimura herself is also a nurse and has similar bodily expe-
riences and skills to those of the primary nurse. Is it not possible or even neces-
sary to say that Nishimura’s experiences and skills as nurse could make it easier
for her to open the door to the “same” depth of intercorporeal dimension in the
dialogue?28 This is a point that needs an epistemological examination. Like Ben-
ner and Wrubel’s theory, Nishimura’s phenomenological-ontological approach
also needs a complement from the epistemological point of view.

§ 7. What the “phenomenological” means and should mean in the pheno-

menological research of nursing
The previous consideration gives us a survey of some representative “phenom-
enological” researches in nursing today. What is then a common “phenomeno-
logical” element to find out in these phenomenological researches?
The first point is that all of the phenomenological researches in nursing sur-
veyed here clearly intend to keep a distance from the natural scientific or medical

28
If this is the case, it suggests that there is a “matter” which can be seen especially for/
by nurses or persons of nursing experience, and that there can be phenomenological researches
on such matters carried out especially by such people.
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 147
attitude, and instead go back to a direct “lived experience” that would be over-
looked in the former attitude, and to clarify the lived experience laden with
“meaning.” Originally, in Husserl, the starting motive of phenomenology was
also to go back to the matter itself for him, i.e., the intentional lived experience
in which the world appears laden with meaning, and yet would be overlooked
in the natural scientific psychology. Husserl had to suspend the natural scien-
tific attitude that attempts to apprehend the relationship between conscious-
ness and the world objectively from outside as a causal psychophysical relation.
And this procedure of bracketing the natural scientific prejudice was gradually
formulated as the method of “phenomenological ἐποχή or reduction.” Now
we can say that, in the above sketched phenomenological researches of nursing,
a “phenomenological ἐποχή” in the sense of bracketing the natural scientific
prejudice or a “phenomenological reduction” as the procedure of going back to
the lived experience of meaning is also explicitly or implicitly carried out in the
task of keeping a distance from the natural scientific or medical attitude and
going back to a direct “lived experience.” Giorgi and Toombs clearly spoke of
the “psychological phenomenological reduction.” But we can say that, in Benner
and Wrubel and Nishimura as well, a phenomenological ἐποχή or reduction is
implicitly carried out in order to go back to their matters themselves that could
not be grasped in the natural science. Thus, the going back to the lived experience
of meaning by bracketing the natural scientific prejudice turns out to be a first ele-
ment of the “phenomenological” research of nursing.
Secondly, it should be noted that, even if the bracketing the natural scientific
prejudice and going back to the lived experience of meaning is carried out in all
“phenomenological” researches of nursing, a further methodological approach
and the way of clarifying the lived experience is different in each research, accord-
ing to what “matter” is aimed at in the research concerned.
For Giorgi, the aim is to clarify and understand the meaningful experience
of the world that is lived by the other (i.e., the participant), and the matter for
him is a general structure of psychic experience, for example, that of “jealousy.” His
interest is to recognize the psychological structure as it is, and this is an epistemo-
logical interest. Thus, without any specific attention to corporeity, he adopts the
psychological phenomenological reduction as a method for obtaining the raw
data from the lived experience of the other, breaks them into meaning units,
and attempts to identify a general structure of psychic experience through the
free imaginative variation of those meaning units.29
For Toombs, the basis of her research is her own experience of illness, which
she lives as a multiple sclerosis patient. The matter of her interest is a difference

29
It seems to me, however, that “jealousy” is a very bodily psychic experience, if jealousy
has, as Giorgi states, an essential structure that it is “experienced when [a person] discovers a
strong desire in [himself or] herself to be the center of attention of a significant other, or others,”
that is, “when [a person] perceives that another is receiving significant attention that [he or] she
wishes were being directed to [him or] her” (DP, 167).
148 Tetsuya Sakakibara

between the physician’s way of recognizing the patient’s illness and the patient’s
way of recognizing his/her own illness, i.e., a difference of the “meaning of ill-
ness” for the physician and the patient. Her interest is also epistemological. When
she tries to explain and recognize the lived experience of illness that would be
overlooked in the natural scientific or medical attitude, however, she cannot but
refer to a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological ontology of the body, since her
lived experience of illness as matter itself is founded in the way of being of the
lived body in illness. Thus, in Toombs’ research, the epistemological problem
of how the illness is experienced and recognized—led by the matter itself—is
solved through a phenomenological-ontological clarification of the way of being
of the lived body.
Benner and Wrubel try to understand and cope with “illness” as lived experi-
ence of the patient that would be overlooked in the natural scientific and medical
attitude. For them, the matter itself is the way of being-in-the-world of the person
as caring, on the basis of which “disease” is experienced as “illness” laden with
meaning. They have an ontological interest in the way of being-in-the-world of
the person itself. Thus, they refer to Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology of
Dasein in order to clarify this matter itself.
In Nishimura’s case, the matter itself to investigate is the primary nurse’s
experience of communication with the vegetative state patient, which “cannot
be grasped explicitly,” and is yet certainly lived by the primary nurse in the pre-
conscious stratum. Since this experience lacks a sufficient epistemological key, an
epistemological approach to this matter through reflection is impossible. Thus,
led by the matter itself, Nishimura refers to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of
the body, and the method of “dialogue” to understand this matter is also formed
on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of intercorporeity.
The above consideration clearly shows that, although the procedure of brack-
eting the natural scientific prejudice and going back to the lived experience is
carried out in all “phenomenological” researches of nursing, a further “method”
is different in each research, according to what “matter” is aimed at in the
research in question. The “method” becomes formed and fixed precisely in terms of
the “matter itself.”
Since Heidegger’s formulation, the basic spirit of phenomenology is well-
known as “To the matters themselves! [Zu den Sachen selbst!].”30 It should be
noted, however, that the “method” for approaching and clarifying the matters
themselves was developed in terms of the very matters themselves [von den Sachen
selbst her] even in the founder of phenomenology Husserl31 as well as in Hei-

30
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1927, 197915 (hereafter
SZ), pp. 27, 34.
31
Cf. Tetsuya Sakakibara, Husserl Genshogaku no Seisei. Houhou no Seiritsu to Tenkai
[Die Genesis der Phänomenologie Husserls. Eine Untersuchung über die Entstehung und Ent-
wicklung ihrer Methode], University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 2009, pp. 3-4, 108-112, 116-119,
123-138, 445-458.
 Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method 149
degger.32 It is not too much to say that phenomenology is developed in various
ways in the history of philosophy. Moreover, the methods in phenomenology
also exhibit a wide variety precisely because these methods are formed on the
basis of and in terms of the various matters themselves that are seen by bracket-
ing the natural scientific prejudice and going back to the lived experience laden
with meaning.
That being the case, in “phenomenological” researches of nursing, the
“method” can also be different and various according to what “matter” is aimed
at and seen. This paper surveyed some representative phenomenological researches
of nursing which find a clue in Husserl, Heidegger, and/or Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenology. But the “method” will be open and depend on the “matter.” For
example, Levinas can also be referred to in a phenomenological research of nurs-
ing care, for instance, for a terminal patient in a hospice. All researches that go
back to a lived experience, which would be overlooked in the natural scientific
attitude, and clarify the experience in terms of the matter itself, can be called
“phenomenological.”
In conclusion, I should mention that, as argued in this paper, in order for
a “phenomenological” research of nursing to be valid and compelling, episte-
mological and ontological approaches need to complement each other. I have
emphasized the importance of the ontological approach in the “phenomenologi-
cal” researches of nursing. Even so, this does not mean that an examination of
research from the epistemological point of view is dispensable.
A phenomenological research of nursing is not a mere application of phe-
nomenology to the research of nursing, but rather an attempt at revision and
renewal of the traditional phenomenology itself on the basis of and in terms of
the matters themselves in the field of nursing care. I hope that a development of
the phenomenological research of nursing will lead to the further development
of phenomenology itself.

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