1

The numerous extracts reprinted from The Death of Yugoslavia by Laura Silber and Allan
Little, published by BBC Worldwide Limited / Penguin, are Copyright (c) Laura Silber and
Allan Little 1996.Permission is gratefully acknowledged.

Permission is acknowledged from W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., to quote several passages
from Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, copyright 1998 by
Chuck Sudetic.

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2
 Balkan Battlegrounds:
A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995

Volume II

Central Intelligence Agency,

Office of Russian and European Analysis,

Washington, DC 20505

October 2003

3
 Preface to Volume II
Balkan Battlegrounds provides a military history of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1995. It was produced by two military analysts in the Central
Intelligence Agency who tracked military developments in the region throughout this period
and then applied their experience to producing an unclassified treatise for general use.
**********************************
The study is organized in two volumes to make it useful to both the non-specialist
general reader and to professional soldiers, scholars, and military historians. Volume I,
published separately in 2002 with an accompanying case of maps, is a chronological
narrative covering the genesis of Yugoslavia’s breakup in 1990 through the end of the
Bosnian war in October 1995. It is divided into sections that introduce the conflict and its
opening round, the Ten-Day War in Slovenia; the 1991 war in Croatia; each year of the
Bosnian war from 1992 through 1994; the development of the Croatian Army and the
progress of the Croatian-Serb conflict; and a more detailed 1995 section that covers actions
in both Croatia and Bosnia.
This volume, Volume II, completes the publication of Balkan Battlegrounds.
Designed to provide specialists with more comprehensive accounts of individual battles and
campaigns and to address in depth such topics as the organization of the Bosnian Serb Army
and the status of the UN Protection Force, it consists of a series of annexes covering the
1991 war in Croatia and the 1992-1994 periods of the Bosnian war. Because the events of
1995 were covered in their entirety in Volume I, Volume II has no annexes for 1995.
Both volumes provide detailed order of battle tables, and the chronology,
illustrations, and maps accompanying Volume 1 are designed for use with both volumes.
Volume II also includes a series of addendums that correct or update some portions of
Volume I using information that became available after Volume I was published, including
the prosecutors pre-trial brief for Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic at the UN’s
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. Regrettably, because of the press of
official business the authors have been unable to incorporate additional information
released during the UN trials or available from other sources since 2002.
We gratefully acknowledge our debt to BBC Worldwide Limited / Penguin, and to
authors Laura Silber and Allan Little for allowing us to quote liberally from their book,
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, which helped provide much of the political context for our
military analysis. For Volume II, we acknowledge permission from W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc., to quote several passages from Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in
Bosnia, copyright 1998 by Chuck Sudetic.
The conclusions, judgments, and opinions we have expressed in this book are solely
and entirely those of the authors and are not to be represented as emanating from the
Central Intelligence Agency or the United States Government.
The Authors
McLean, Virginia, July 2003

4
 Balkan Battlegrounds:
A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict,
1990-1995
Volume II

Contents
Preface to Volume II................................................................................................................................ 4
Section I Addendums to Volume I ........................................................................................................ 10
Addendum 1 Sections II through VI, Volume I .................................................................................. 11
Addendum 2 Section VII, Volume I ................................................................................................... 18
Addendum 3 Chapters 77, 88, and 89 of Volume I, Additions and Corrections from Knin je pao u
Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) by Major General Milisav Sekulic ........................................... 22
Section II Croatia 1991 .......................................................................................................................... 36
Annex 1 The Organization and Arming of the Croatian Serbs 1988-1991 ........................................ 37
Chart 1 Organization of Krajina Secretariat for Internal Affairs, January 1991 – December 1991
...................................................................................................................................................... 44
Chart 2 Croatian Serb Territorial Defence Forces, November 1991 ............................................. 45
Annex 2 The Organizing of the Croatian Government Forces, May 1990 – April 1991 .................... 48
Chart 1 Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs County Police Administrations and Training Centers
...................................................................................................................................................... 54
Chart 2 Special Police Units Directly Subordinate to Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs HQ
December 1990 – May 1991 ......................................................................................................... 55
Chart 3 Croatian Reserve Police Units May 1991 (Assessed) ....................................................... 56
Figure 1 Text of “The Oldest Order Preserved” – Podsused Volunteer Company........................ 57
Annex 3 Croatia Creates An Army – The National Guard Corps, May – September 1991 ............... 59
Chart 1 Croatian National Guard Corps Units and Date of Formation, May – August 1991 ........ 63
Chart 2 Croatian Ministers of Defence – August 1990 – December 1991 .................................... 65
Annex 4 The Arming of the Croatian Government Forces, May 1990 – August 1991...................... 66
Annex 5 Kadijevic Indecisive – The JNA Fails to Halt Secession ........................................................ 68
Appendix 1 JNA Intelligence on Croatian Military Planning ......................................................... 87
Appendix 2 Federal Secretariat of National Defence Report to the Federal Presidency on Import
of Arms and the Formation of Illegal Paramilitary Units .............................................................. 89
Appendix 3 Federal Presidency Order on Surrendering Weapons ............................................... 93
Chart 1 Organization and Select Commanders, FederalSecretariat for National Defence and
Yugoslav People’s Army, 1990-1991 ............................................................................................. 95

5
Annex 6 Scene-Setters for War: Pakrac, Plitvice Lakes, and Borovo Selo ........................................ 97
Annex 7 Croatian Ultimatum to the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia .......................................... 102
Annex 8 Fighting Escalates, June – September 1991 ...................................................................... 104
Annex 9 Military Geography and Weather in Croatia..................................................................... 121
Annex 10 The Battles of the Barracks – Croatian Offensive Operations September – October 1991
.................................................................................................................................................. 128
Appendix 1 Koprivnica Municipality Crisis Staff Order to Prepare for Blockade of the JNA ...... 138
Appendix 2 Estimates of Blockaded Troops and CapturedEquipment ....................................... 139
Annex 11 The Croatian Army Rises: September – December 1991................................................ 141
Chart 1 Order of Battle, Croatian Army, October 1991 – January 1992 ..................................... 148
Annex 12 National Command Authority in Yugoslavia ................................................................... 157
Chart 1 Military Hierarchy in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ................................ 160
Chart 2 Organization of the General Staff, Yugoslav People’s Army .......................................... 161
Annex 13 JNA Campaign Plans and Organization, July – September 1991..................................... 162
Appendix 1 Organization and Equipment of the JNA Ground Forces (Kopnena Vojska JNA – KoV
JNA) ............................................................................................................................................. 171
Chart 1 Skeleton Order of Battle of JNA Forces Earmarked for Strategic Offensive, July 1991 . 178
Chart 2 Order of Battle, JNA Forces in Croatia and Mobilized Formations in Bosnia and Serbia,
July – August 1991 ..................................................................................................................... 179
Chart 3 Order of Battle, JNA Forces in Croatia and Mobilized Formations in Bosnia and Serbia,
Late September to 1 January 1992 ............................................................................................. 188
Chart 4 Order of Battle, Air and Air Defence Force of the JNA, Combat Operations in Croatia,
September to 1 January 1992 ..................................................................................................... 207
Chart 5 JNA Military Schools and Training Centres in Croatia, 1991 .......................................... 211
Annex 14 Mobilization and the Failure of the Strategic Offensive ................................................. 212
Appendix 1 JNA Mobilization Statistics ....................................................................................... 216
Annex 15 Mobilization and the JNA-Serbian Political-Military Conflict.......................................... 218
Annex 16 ”What is the Goal?” – JNA vs. JNA – The Army Debates Its Role and Future ................. 221
Appendix 1 Views of Colonel Vuk Obradovic, Chef de Cabinet to Federal Secretary for National
Defence Army General Veljko Kadijevic, 18 September 1991 .................................................... 224
Annex 17 Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Operations – The Road to Vukovar ........................................ 226
Appendix 1 The Serbian Volunteer Guard – Arkan’s Tigers ........................................................ 261
Annex 18 Western Slavonia Operations – Croatia Strikes Back...................................................... 263
Annex 19 Banija-Kordun-Lika Operations – Consolidating Greater Serbia ..................................... 273
Annex 20 Zadar – Northern Dalmatia Operations .......................................................................... 279

6
 Annex 21 Dubrovnik – Southern Dalmatia Operations................................................................... 282
Section III Bosnia 1992 ........................................................................................................................ 288
Annex 22 Organization of Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav People’s Army Forces, April 1992 ............. 289
Chart 1 Yugoslav People’s Army Order of Battle, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 10 April
1992 ............................................................................................................................................ 295
Chart 2 Organization and Manpower Estimates, Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence .................. 303
Chart 3 Organization and Manpower Estimates, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serb Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.......................................................................................................... 307
Annex 23 Yugoslav People’s Army Objectives, Strategy, and Operations ...................................... 309
Annex 24 Mladic’s Own – The Bosnian Serb Army ......................................................................... 318
Appendix 1 Organization of the Supreme Command ..................................................................... 341
Chart 1 Skeleton Order of Battle, Bosnian Serb Army, June 1992-October 1995 ...................... 342
Annex 25 Croatian Political Objectives and Military Strategy in Bosnia, 1991-1992 ..................... 356
Annex 26 North-eastern Bosnia, April 1992: The Axe Falls ............................................................ 361
Annex 27 Ethnic Cleansing as a Military Operation: Prijedor-Sanski Most-Kljuc, May – July 1992 368
Annex 28 The Battle for the Corridor: Operations in the Posavina, March 1992 to January 1993 377
Appendix 1 Terrain of the Posavina, Maglaj-Tesanj, and Ozren Regions ....................................... 400
Annex 29 Operation “Vrbas 92”: The VRS Assault on Jajce, July – November 1992 ...................... 402
Annex 30 Battles on the Drina, Round One – April to December 1992.......................................... 409
Annex 31 Sarajevo 1992 – The Siege Begins ................................................................................... 422
Annex 32 The Battles for Herzegovina and the Relief of Dubrovnik, 1992 .................................... 433
Appendix 1 Excerpts from Speech by Federal Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic on the Prevlaka
Negotiations, 16 October 1992 ................................................................................................... 454
Annex 33 The Role of the Bosnian Serb Air and Air Defence Force in 1992 ................................... 456
Annex 34 The Charge of the Light Blue Brigade: UNPROFOR First Deploys in Bosnia, Fall – Winter
1992 .......................................................................................................................................... 458
Section IV Bosnia 1993 ........................................................................................................................ 462
Annex 35 Widening the Corridor: Brcko Operations, January – July 1993 ..................................... 463
Annex 36 Battles on the Drina, Round Two: December 1992 – August 1993 ................................ 469
Annex 37 UN Peacekeeping Operations in 1993: By Sea, Air, and Land........................................ 490
Annex 38 Sarajevo 1993: The Siege Continues ............................................................................... 496
Annex 39 “The Man Who Would Be King”, Fikret Abdic and the Autonomous Province of Western
Bosnia in 1993........................................................................................................................... 502
Annex 40 The “Ahmici Massacre” of 16 April 1993: A Military Analysis ........................................ 506

7
 Annex 41 The Croat-Held Vitez Enclave: Vitez, Busovaca, and Novi Travnik, June-December 1993
.................................................................................................................................................. 511
Annex 42 The Kiseljak Enclave in 1993: The Battles for Kiseljak, Kresevo, and Fojnica ................. 515
Chart 1 Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Order of Battle, Kiseljak Enclave, 1993 ...................... 518
Annex 43 The Bosnian Army Capture of Bugojno, July 1993 .......................................................... 519
Annex 44 Northern Herzegovina: Konjic, Jablanica, and Vrdi in 1993............................................ 521
Annex 45 The Vares Enclave and the Stupni Do Massacre: October-November 1993 .................. 526
Section V Bosnia 1994 ......................................................................................................................... 533
Annex 46 On the Ropes: An Analysis of VRS Resiliency, 1994 ....................................................... 534
Annex 47 My Enemy, My Ally: The End of the Croat-Muslim War and the Washington Agreement,
January-March 1994 ................................................................................................................. 537
Annex 48 Sarajevo, 1994: The Guns Are Silenced, But the Siege Continues .................................. 542
Annex 49 Operation “Zvezda 94”: The VRS Assault on Gorazde, April 1994 .................................. 546
Annex 50 “Just Out of Reach”: Donji Vakuf, 1994 .......................................................................... 553
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle, Donji Vakuf Area, 1994 .................................... 558
Chart 2 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle, Donji Vakuf Area, 1994 .............................. 559
Annex 51 A Contest of Wills: The Struggle for Mt. Majevica and the Stolice Transmitter, 1994 ... 560
Annex 52 Kladanj, 1994 .................................................................................................................. 563
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle Kladanj Area, 1994............................................ 566
Chart 2 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle Kladanj Area, 1994 ....................................... 567
Annex 53 Tesanj and Teslic, 1994 ................................................................................................... 568
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle, Tesanj-Teslic Area, 1994 .................................. 572
Chart 2 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle, Tesanj-Teslic Area, 1994 ............................. 573
Annex 54 The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren Mountains, June – July 1994 ............................................. 574
Annex 55 Back and Forth on Mt. Vlasic, 1994 ................................................................................ 581
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle Mt. Vlasic Offensives, 1994 .............................. 584
Chart 2 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle Mt. Vlasic Offensives, 1994 .......................... 585
Annex 56 The Battles for Herzegovina, 1994.................................................................................. 586
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle, Konjic Area, 1994............................................. 590
Chart 2 Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Order of Battle, Konjic Area, 1994 ............................. 591
Chart 3 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle Konjic Area, 1994 ........................................ 592
Annex 57 “Twin Peaks”: The Battles for Mts. Bjelasnica and Treskavica, 1994 ............................. 593
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order Of Battle, Mt. Bjelasnica Offensives, October 1994 ........ 598
Chart 2 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order Of Battle, Mt. Bjelasnica Battles, October 1994 ......... 599

8
 Chart 3 Bosnian Army Order Of Battle, Mt. Treskavica Offensives, November 1994 ................ 600
Chart 4 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order Of Battle, Mt. Treskavica Battles, November 1994 .... 601
Annex 58 “With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?” The HVO-Bosnian Army Capture of
Kupres, November 1994 ........................................................................................................... 602
Chart 1 Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle Kupres, October – November 1994 ................. 606
Chart 2 Croatian Defence Council / Croatian Army (HVO/HV) Order of Battle, Kupres, 1994 ... 607
Chart 3 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle, Kupres, 1994 ............................................... 608
Annex 59 The Demise of Abdic’s Empire, January – August, 1994 ................................................. 609
Chart 1 Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia People’s Defence (“Narodna Odbrana”),
Order of Battle, 1994 .................................................................................................................. 615
Chart 2 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), Order of Battle, Bihac, 1994 ...................... 616
Annex 60 Operation “Breza 94”: The Bosnian and Krajina Serb Armies Attack Bihac, September
1994 .......................................................................................................................................... 618
Annex 61 Punch and Counter-Punch: Bihac Operations, October – December 1994 .................... 624
Annex 62 Operation “Zima 94”: Croatia Enters the Bosnian War Again, November – December
1994 .......................................................................................................................................... 645
Annex 63 UNPROFOR in 1994: Towards Escalation or Evacuation? ............................................... 654
Section VI Bosnia and Croatia 1995 .................................................................................................... 666
Annex 64 UNPROFOR in 1995: From Vacillation to Retaliation to Peace Implementation ............ 667
Chart 1 NATO Rapid Reaction Force ........................................................................................... 677

9
 Section I
Addendums to Volume I

10
 Addendum 1
Sections II through VI, Volume I
Chapter 11:
The JNA, Serbia, and the Croatian War,
Fall – Winter 1991
Comments on Yugoslav and Serbian War Aims and JNA War Planning

In Volume I on page 145-146 and in footnotes 211 and 213, the authors note that
JNA war aims and Serbian war aims appeared to diverge and that the JNA was under
extreme pressure from the Serbian leadership to scale back its war aims and corresponding
strategic objectives. The authors also note that by fall 1991 the JNA was vacillating between
accepting Serbian war aims and continuing to pursue its own more expansive objectives that
called for the military defeat of Croatia in order to preserve some form of a confederal
Yugoslavia. In a recent book by Milisav Sekulic, who served as an officer in the JNA, the
Yugoslav Army (VJ), and the Krajina Serb Army (SVK), the differences between the aims and
objectives pursued by the two sides are laid out more clearly. Sekulic states,
... October [1991] was also characterized by the onset of a direct confrontation
between the proponents of two different plans for resolving the Yugoslav crisis. The
“Serbian plan”, advocated by Borisav Jovic and Slobodan Milosevic, provided for
engagement of the military (JNA) in order to preserve a future Yugoslavia without
Croatia and Slovenia, but including Krajina. This plan also clearly addressed the issue of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. If Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to leave Yugoslavia, then the part
of the republic with a majority Serb population would remain in the future Yugoslavia.
The second plan was supported by the military top brass, led by Gen. Veljko Kadijevic. It
presupposed a continuation of the fight for integral SFRY, whereby those republics that
wanted to leave would be allowed to do so through negotiations, by peaceful means.
Implementing this plan meant carrying out general mobilization in the country, but
what was anticipated was mobilization only in Serbia, Montenegro, and the territories
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with a majority Serb population. The military
leadership anticipated launching a war against Croatian territory with a mobilized JNA,
the aim being to defeat Croatia and in that way to force the leadership of that republic
to leave Yugoslavia “by peaceful means”.1
This is a much clearer statement of the JNA’s war aims and strategic objectives, and
clarifies that – at least by September 1991 – the JNA probably did not have as its war aim
the preservation of the SFRY with Croatia in it. However, the aims and objectives themselves

1
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju niko nije branio a vrhovna komanda je izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and
the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 203. Some of Sekulic's comments in
this book need to be treated with caution because he believes – in good Balkan conspiracy fashion – that
Kadijevic was intentionally trying to sabotage the performance of the JNA.

11
suggest that the JNA was still as confused as the authors initially assessed in Volume I. If you
expect Croatia to leave the SFRY anyway, why mount a massive strategic offensive to keep it
in, only to then allow it to negotiate its way out? The “Serbian plan” as Sekulic calls it was
much simpler and more straightforward.

Comments on Mobilization and the Political Military Conflict, September – December

1991

Page 148 – In Volume I the authors also judge that, as of 9 October, Kadijevic had
acceded formally to the Serbian war aims but continued to call for general mobilization and
an offensive to keep Croatia in a confederal Yugoslavia. We have found a 22 October
statement by Kadijevic that makes it even clearer that he had still not truly acceded to the
Milosevic-Jovic objectives and was still putting forward the JNA’s quite different aims:
In the assessment of the Supreme Command Staff, the time has come when it is
necessary to take appropriate political and military measures in a clear, decisive, and
coordinated fashion. For that reason I propose:
First, that the orientation of all those who favor preserving the Yugoslav state be
clearly defined and realized through practical measures as soon as possible by the
nations that desire that and their legitimate representatives. In parallel, that the JNA
be transformed into an Armed Forces of Yugoslavia that will survive.
Second, that the mobilization of military conscripts and units be carried out
immediately in the part of the country that is willing to remain in Yugoslavia, in
accordance with the operational needs of the JNA. That must be done in a clearly
legitimate way, bearing in mind the de facto state of the legal order in the country. By
carrying out mobilization in the necessary scope and applying political, legal, and other
measures dictated by the situation, we would avoid a situation in which unacceptable
solutions are imposed on the nations that want to continue living in Yugoslavia – by
domestic or foreign force – during the negotiations that are under way or on the
battlefield if the negotiations yield no results.
Third, the Armed Forces of the SFRY will rigorously carry out the complete
decision by the SFRY Presidency adopted in The Hague on 18 October 1991. If the
Croatian side continues to evade the obligations taken on under The Hague agreement,
then resolute action will be taken with all available means, not stopping until the lifting
of the blockades of all JNA barracks and installations has been ensured, together with
the effective protection of the Serb nation in Croatia until a final political solution to the
Yugoslav crisis is found.2

2
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju niko nije branio a vrhovna komanda je izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and
the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 197-198.

12
 Chapter 21:
Bosnian Serb War Aims and Military Strategy, 1992
Pages 210-211 – This chapter’s discussion of the Bosnian Serb war aims is drawn
primarily from an interview with Radovan Karadzic in 1995. Recently, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has listed the Bosnian Serb war aims in its
pre-trial brief for the Milosevic prosecution, drawing on the minutes of the apparently
closed session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 12 May 1992. All six of the aims that
Karadzic discussed in 1995 are included in this list, although what he later described as to
“separate the Bosnian Serbs from Bosnia” is more explicitly stated in 1992 as the
”separation of the Serbian people from the other two national communities”.3 During this
assembly session, General Mladic – who had already been appointed to command the
nascent VRS – discussed this war aim in these terms:
People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in one’s pocket that can be
shifted from here and there. It is something easily said but difficult to achieve ... we
cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that the
Serbs would fall through and the rest leave ... I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr.
Karadzic would explain this to the world. People, that would be genocide.4
The ICTY notes that: “Mladic indicates that he knew that the action that was about
to be undertaken would need to be kept secret and presented in an acceptable manner”.
... let us not only put our minds into what we are doing, but let us also think
thoroughly about it, and let us be cautious about when to keep mum. No. The thing
that we are doing needs to be guarded as our deepest secret. And what our
representatives appearing in the media, at political talks and negotiations, are going to
say, and they do need to present our goals in a way that will sound appealing to the
ears of those we want to win over to our side, without being detrimental to the Serbian
people.5
As the ICTY ads, Mladic states that
... it is a common enemy, regardless of whether it is the Muslim hordes or
Croatian hordes. It is our common enemy. What is important now is either to throw
both of them out by employing political and other moves, or to organize ourselves and
throw out one by force of arms, and we will be able to deal somehow with the other...6
The ICTY ends this section with the observation.
By the summer of 1992, it was clear that the objectives of creating a Serb state
and separating the communities in BiH were a driving factor behind the actions of the
VRS. These objectives were emphasized in reports and instructions from the VRS Main

3
Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, cited in
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution's
Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), pp. 113-114.
4
Ibid., pp. 113-114.
5
Ibid., p. 114.
6
Ibid., p. 114.

13
 Staff, were highlighted in combat reports and instructions of the Corps, mentioned in
meetings and briefings, and disseminated to soldiers at the lowest level.7
These statements and documents constitute the most explicit evidence of the
orchestration at the highest levels in the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership of the
mass removal and killing of the Bosnian Muslim and Croat population in the Bosnian Serb
Republic.

7
Various VRS documents cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v.
Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution's Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), p. 114. The ICTY
cites VRS Main Staff Operational Directive Number 4, 19 November 1992, which states,
... in relation to forcible population transfers, the Drina Corps was tasked thus: ... From its present
positions, its main forces shall persistently defend Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while
the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible
losses on him and force him to leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas together with the Muslim
population.
The ICTY also notes a 1st Krajina Corps Daily Combat Report from 7 August 1992, which states, regarding
Croat and Muslim refugees, “The attempt to expel them to Central Bosnia failed because of transportation
difficulties and their resistance to leaving their places of residence.”

14
 Chapters 51 and 55:
Bosnian Serb War Aims and Military Strategy in 1994
and Operation “Drina 93”
Pages 322-323, 335-336 – The ICTY’s Milosevic pre trial brief also sheds more light
on Bosnian Serb war aims and strategy in late 1993 and early 1994 by citing documents
related to the VRS strategic offensive plan, “Drina 93”. The descriptions of these documents
broadly confirm the discussion of “Drina 93” in Volume I. The ICTY states,
In November 1993 the Bosnian Serb leadership disseminated Operational
Directive Number 6 in response to ongoing political negotiations and the military
situation within BiH. This detailed the tasks of the VRS, which included operations
aimed at achieving the six strategic goals. In December 1993, an addition to
Operational Directive 6 was issued to expand the objectives outlined in the original
Directive.
From these two directives the VRS Main Staff produced its own detailed directive
for combat operations under the codename “Drina”. Much of the language and tasking
contained within these three documents are similar.
The Drina plan comprised two separate phases. The first phase, which was to be
completed by spring 1994, was a series of VRS-wide combat operations aimed at
defending RS territory, improving the tactical and operational position of the army,
shortening the frontline, and freeing VRS forces for engagement within the RS. The
second phase was a detailed contingency plan involving VRS, VJ, and SVK forces in the
event of Croatian aggression against the RSK or foreign aggression, including NATO air
strikes, “against Serbian states”. The Drina plan as a whole included significant
reference to – and coordinated action with – both the SVK and the VJ ... References
were also made to the general objective of establishing conditions for a single Serb
state.
The first phase of the Drina plan primarily concerned combat operations through
the various Corps of the VRS which were to be implemented through the early months
of 1994. Although the instructions for this phase predominantly involved VRS units, it is
clear that, in certain areas, close co-operation and support was expected from the VJ...
... The overall objective of the second phase anticipated co-ordinated VRS and VJ
action in order to “... crush and destroy Muslim OS [Armed Forces] in the enclaves, in
Sarajevo, and on the Kalesija-Tuzla-Lukavac axis, and then continue operations and
advance as soon as possible to the Neretva valley on the Mostar-Metkovic-Neum line,
and the coast on the Neum-Zaton and Cavtat-Prevlaka stretches”.8

8
VRS Main Staff document for DRINA operation, Extract from the Directive for use of the Republika Srpska
Army; Karadzic, Directive for Further Operations, Operational Number 6; Radovan Karadzic, Addition to
Directive Number 6, all cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v.
Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution's Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), pp. 120-122. The
ICTY also includes additional details in this section describing the VJ's close coordination and support to the
VRS.

15
 The phrasing of parts of the ICTY text might seem to imply that the second phase of
the Drina plan was conditional upon a Croatian or foreign attack against either the RSK or
the RS. However, absent access to the VRS planning documents in their entirety, it seems
likely that the ICTY meant that the large-scale involvement of VJ combat forces was
conditional, but that the VRS fully intended to mount offensive operations against Tuzla, the
eastern enclaves, parts of Sarajevo, and in the Neretva valley.9
Based on the VRS Main Staff directive’s mention of the Kalesija-Tuzla-Lukavac axis
as the location of the VRS main effort during the second phase, the Olovo operations
discussed in Volume I probably were the main effort during phase one, designed to cut off
Tuzla from the Sarajevo and Zenica regions so that in phase two the main effort would be
able to overrun the Tuzla area itself. The failure of the various operations from phase one,
discussed on pages 228 and 229 of Volume I, apparently led to the cancellation of the phase
two operation against Tuzla.

9
The ICTY notes that the 1st Krajina Corps fleshed out the Main Staff directive for its own sub-operations
within the plan “adding specific tactical objectives and timelines for 1KK [1st Krajina Corps] units in both
phases” [emphasis added]. General Momir Talic, Commander VRS 1KK, Drina-R document, 21 January
1994, cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Briefl (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), p. 122.

16
 Chapter 51:
The Bosnian Serb Army in 1994 – VRS Military Organization and Defensive
Doctrine
Page 322 – The discussion of VRS military organization and defensive doctrine may
leave one with the mistaken impression that all VRS intervention or counterattack units
were held as corps-level reserve brigades or battalions. In fact, each sector-holding brigade
also had its own elite intervention units – formed from the youngest and most experienced
personnel – to carry out local counterattacks. Generally, infantry battalions within a brigade
would have an intervention platoon (or some other unit with an elite-type designator such
as “reconnaissance-sabotage”) used for counterattacks. Directly subordinate to the brigade
would be a reconnaissance-sabotage company, a military police platoon or company, and
sometimes a designated intervention company also used to counterattack. Some brigades
even appear to have had a brigade-level assault or intervention detachment or battalion
available for such missions. Of course, the VRS also could group these brigade assets into
composite units to augment its picked mobile brigades and battalions at the corps level for
major counter-offensive or offensive operations.10

10
See Annex 24: Mladic's Own – The Bosnian Serb Army, for additional details on VRS offensive doctrine.

17
 Addendum 2
Section VII, Volume I
Chapters 75 and 88:
Abdic – Krajina Serb Operations in Bihac, January – July 1995
Pages 294, 363 and footnote 1252 – The ICTY’s Milosevic pre-trial brief also
provided information that suggests that Operational Group “Pauk” was organized into three
tactical groups, at least two of them commanded by Serbian officers. A July 1995 Krajina
Serb Army video shows Radojica (Raja) Bozovic – “Kobac”, a senior Serbian State Security
(RDB) officer and the joint commander of OG Pauk, and Mihajlo Ulemek – “Legija”, from
Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG), as commanders of Tactical Groups 2 and 3
respectively.11 Tactical Group 1 likely was commanded by an SVK officer. Each tactical group
probably was formed around one of the three Abdic People’s Defence brigades, augmented
with various small SVK or VJ, Serbian RDB, or SDG units. The main SVK forces supporting OG
Pauk appear to have remained in Tactical Groups 8 and 9.

11
SVK Parade Video, 28 June 1995, cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution's Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), pp.
119-120. The ICTY claims that the tactical groups led by Bozovic and Legija were from the VRS, but these
two officers’central involvement with OG Pauk at the time and their presence at a parade for the SVK –
which was also at the heart of OG Pauk – strongly indicates that the TGs were from OG Pauk, not the VRS.

18
 Chapter 80:
The Sarajevo Breakout Attempt, June 1995
VRS Order of Battle

Pages 468 and 473 – The VRS probably had at least another 500 Bosnian Serb MUP
special police available for intervention missions during this operation. These comprised the
1st (Sarajevo) Detachment, the 2nd (Sekovici / Zvornik) Detachment, 6th (Banja Luka)
Detachment, and 9th (Foca) Detachments of the RS MUP Special Police Brigade. It is unclear
where the 1st Detachment was deployed, but the 2nd and 9th Detachments operated in the
Treskavica-Trnovo sector. The 6th Detachment may have been deployed with the 3rd
Sarajevo and 1st Ilijas Infantry Brigades northwest of Sarajevo.12

12
See Maja Bjelajac: I Do Not Give in to Pressure, Banja Luka Reporter, 11 July 2001, pp. 15-17, an interview
with 6th Detachment commander Dragan Lukac; SRNA 3 June 1995. The RS MUP Special Police Brigade was
organized into nine battalion-size detachments with a total of 2.000 troops. The brigade was organized as
follows:
1st (Sarajevo) Detachment
2nd (Sekovic / Zvornik) Detachment
3rd (Trebinje) Detachment
4th (Bijeljina) Detachment
5th (Doboj) Detachment
6th (Banja Luka) Detachment
7th (Prijedor) Detachment
8th Detachment
9th (Foca) Detachment
See also Darko Grabovac: Serbs of a Special Breed, Banja Luka Glas Srpski, 21-22 October 1995, pp. 2-3,
interview with Goran Saric, Commander of the RS MUP Special Police Brigade.

19
 Chapters 91 and 92:
ARBiH Offensive Operations, September – October 1995
The two reported atrocities described below, combined with the ICTY indictments
of senior ARBiH commanders for battlefield atrocities committed against Bosnian Croats in
central Bosnia during the 1993 war, suggest that the killing of military prisoners probably
was not uncommon among some ARBiH units – especially those that included radical foreign
Muslim volunteers. However, the authors have yet to uncover any ARBiH ethnic cleansing
operations that were organized or carried out with the political forethought and systematic
execution of those undertaken by the Bosnian Serbs and, to a lesser degree, the Bosnian
Croats.

ARBiH 505th Mountain Brigade Atrocities, September 1995

Pages 591-593 – A recently surfaced videotape shows members of the ARBiH 505th
Mountain Brigade – one of the best units in the ARBiH 5th Corps – abusing a VRS straggler
during September 1995 as the 505th Brigade advanced north in Operation “Sana 95”. The
VRS prisoner was eventually executed by a foreign Muslim volunteer and beheaded. The
attitude displayed by the ARBiH soldiers toward the prisoner, as detailed in the transcript,
suggests that this probably was not the first time that a Serb prisoner had been killed by
these troops.13

ARBiH El Mujahid Detachment Atrocities after 35th Division Attack, 21 July 1995

Page 599 – During the successful ARBiH 35th Division attack against Podsiljelovo,
spearheaded by the foreign Muslim volunteer El Mujahid Detachment, a number of
prisoners were taken from the VRS 1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade. Several of these
prisoners who survived claim that many of the VRS prisoners were beheaded by the foreign
Muslim soldiers in the El Mujahid Detachment.14

13
Accusing Tape, Sarajevo Dani, 17 October 2001, p. 19, which includes the entire tape transcript. The
atrocity occurred somewhere near Jesenice and Lusci Palanka.
14
Belgrade Tanjug, 26 September 2001, citing statements given to the Bosnian Serb newspaper, Glas Srpski.
The surviving prisoners were eventually turned over to ARBiH 3rd Corps military police, who apparently
expressed amazement that any of them had survived their captivity with the El Mujahid Detachment. The
former VRS prisoners reportedly later provided statements to the ICTY.

20
 Chapter 91:
The 5th Corps Drive to the Sana, 13-18 September, 1995
Correction, page 594 – The VRS “Prijedor” Operational Group 10 title shown is
somewhat confusing. It should read “Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja’s reactivated ‘Prijedor
Operational Group 10 of the 1stKrajina Corps’”.

21
 Addendum 3
Chapters 77, 88, and 89 of Volume I,
Additions and Corrections from
Knin je pao u Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade)
by Major General Milisav Sekulic

Overview
Major General Milisav Sekulic’s book, Knin je pao u Beogradu (Knin Fell in
Belgrade), became available in 2001; the authors were able to digest and incorporate into
Volume I only a few elements of information derived from the Sekulic book. This addendum
seeks to compare Sekulic’s study more closely with Chapters 77, 88, and 89 of Volume I for
the purpose of correcting errors, providing some additional information on key incidents,
and amplifying analytic points made in our treatment of the fall of the Republic of Serb
Krajina.
Sekulic was the Chief of Operations and Training for the Main Staff (Glavni Stab) of
the Krajina Serb Army (SVK). In his memoir he is highly critical of the SVK leadership. His
main thesis, however, appears to be that the Belgrade government – focusing on Serbian
President Milosevic and the Yugoslav Army General Staff – mismanaged the defence of the
Krajina, either intentionally or through incompetence, thus allowing the Croatians to
overrun the Krajina. In preparing his study, Sekulic obviously had almost complete access to
the remaining archives of the SVK, including after-action reports provided by SVK
commanding officers upon their arrival in Belgrade at the VJ’s 40th Personnel Centre.15
Especially critical is his review of the SVK in the run-up to and during the Croatian Army’s
Operations Bljesak and Oluja, covered in chapter 13, “The Aggression of the Croatian Army
in Western Slavonia” and chapter 18, “The Last Battles of the Krajina Serb Army”. His
chapter 13 analyzes the reasons for the defeat of the SVK 18th West Slavonian Corps in
Bljesak. Chapter 18 is even more comprehensive, walking through the fate and performance
of each SVK corps command and combat brigade during Oluja, starting with the 7th North
Dalmatian Corps in UN Sector South and moving to the north, ending with the SVK Air and
Air Defence Force. It includes summaries of the after-action reports by the SVK commanders
and Sekulic’s comments on them.

Bljesak – Summary Comments

Sekulic harshly criticizes the leadership displayed by the SVK during the May 1995
Western Slavonia operations, but his analysis does not negate the basic fact that the 18th

15
The 40th Personnel Centre or 40th Cadre Centre was the official VJ unit to which ex-JNA and VJ officers on
loan to the SVK were assigned, and it controlled the administrative and pay records for these personnel.
The VJ 30th Personnel Centre performed the same function for the VRS.

22
Corps had insufficient forces to defend the RSK territory in Western Slavonia even if it had
been better organized and led. Although it probably could have delayed the HV advance for
a longer period of time, the 18th Corps still would have been defeated. Sekulic appears to
acknowledge this, albeit grudgingly.

Page-Specific Comments and Corrections for Chapter 77

SVK 18th Corps Order of Battle, page 437 and footnote 1276 – Sekulic states that
the 18th Corps had 4.000 troops available, which is consistent with the 4.000 to 5.000 SVK
and MUP personnel estimated in Volume I. These 4.000 troops included only 38 professional
officers and 22 professional NCOs.16
In addition to the three brigades and two detachments mentioned, the 18th Corps
included a battalion-size tactical group, Tactical Group-1, an independent intervention
battalion, a reconnaissance-sabotage detachment, and an independent military police
company. (The unidentified Slatina detachment mentioned in footnote 1276 is the 63rd
Detachment).17
Lieutenant Colonel Borivoje Pavlovic, a former VRS battalion commander, headed
TG- 1, which was an odd unit comprised of 500 personnel, 374 of whom were from
Republika Srpska; 75 percent of them were Croats and Muslims. Sekulic has nothing but
contempt for the tactical group and its commander, which he charges was essentially a
criminal enterprise run by VRS deserters, engaging in smuggling and other black market
activities. General Celeketic, the SVK Main Staff commander, had formed the tactical group
when he was commander of the 18th Corps, and it had reported only to him. After his
promotion out of the corps his former command was able to exercise only the most tenuous
control over TG-1. The tactical group’s nominal mission was to defend the far left flank of
the 18th Corps on the Sava River at Jasenovac.
Operation Narrative, pages 437-441 and footnote 1278 – Sekulic’s information
tracks closely with the situation as described in Volume I, which drew primarily on HV
sources. On the Novska axis, the initial HV advance successfully hit the boundary between
the 98th Light Infantry Brigade and Tactical Group-1, cutting off a battalion from the 98th
Brigade.18 The 98th Brigade was pushed out of its defensive zone by 12:00 on 1 May. TG-1
apparently collapsed precipitately at Jasenovac with most of its personnel fleeing to

16
Major General Milisav Sekulic: Knin je pao u Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2001,
p. 101.
17
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 103-106.
18
Sekulic op. cit., p. 105.

23
Bosnia.19 Sekulic also notes the 54th Light Infantry Brigade’s initially strong resistance
around Okucani, as described in Volume I.20 Sekulic states:
The enemy thrust into the area of Bijela Stena [Stijena], cutting off the zone of
the 51st Brigade [near Pakrac].21 Defence could not be stabilized through the
deployment of the remnants of a company of military police. The logical consequences
ensued. The loss and abandonment of defensive positions by the 98th and 51st
Brigades [Sekulic probably meant the 54th, vice 51st Brigade] resulted in large columns
of refugees moving toward Bosanska Gradiska ... In the morning hours of 1 May, the
Tactical Group defending Jasenovac stopped putting up any resistance. They were to
retreat south of the River Sava without a fight.
Not knowing how matters had developed or the conduct of their “neighbours”,
51st Brigade, 59th and 63rd Detachments, and one battalion each from the 98th and
54th Brigades would continue to mount a defence. The same applied to the
intervention battalion, even though it had been abandoned by its commander. All of
these forces were to be left without any links with the corps command, while the
battalions were cut off from their brigade commands. Right up until 3 May these units
were expecting help to come from the corps command and would offer resistance to
the Croatian Army forces carrying out the blockade... 22
This account of the forces around Pakrac suggests that the bulk of the SVK troops
held out a little longer after the 51st Brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harambasic,
surrendered on 2 May, and differs slightly with the account in our Volume I. Sekulic claims
Harambasic was tricked into surrendering.23
Analysis of the Operation, page 441 and footnote 1284 – Sekulic’s analysis of the
SVK’s failure to defend Western Slavonia corresponds closely with the views of the RSK
investigative commission discussed in Endnote 1284. He condemns both the 18th Corps
commander, Colonel Lazo Babic, and SVK Main Staff commander General Milan Celeketic.
He portrays Babic as unfit to command, failing to grasp the appropriate war plans for the
18th Corps, rejecting any advice from staff officers – he sacked the most capable officer on
the corps staff – and ignoring the problems in the corps. Sekulic describes him as “an
overbearing and swaggering piece of acting, and an amateur one at that”. At the start of the
attack, Babic moved the corps command post from Okucani to Stara Gradiska, abandoning a
well-equipped command post for one that lacked any communication links to the corps
subordinates, severely limiting the 18th Corps command’s ability to influence the battle. The
corps was poorly trained and its units had only a slight understanding of their defensive

19
Sekulic alleges that TG-1 fabricated its war diary in order to cover up its failure to mobilize and its flight
from battle. He is more than a little upset that such a disgrace of a unit was defending Jasenovac, site of a
World War II concentration camp responsible for the deaths of many Serbs. “And for the absurdity and
humiliation to be all the greater, most of the unit was made up of Muslims and Croats.” Sekulic op. cit., pp.
106-107.
20
Sekulic op. cit., p. 106.
21
The Croatian units probably were MUP Special Police and the HV 81st Guards Battalion.
22
Sekulic op. cit., p. 106.
23
Sekulic op. cit., p. 106.

24
responsibilities. The 18th Corps’ reports that its mobilization was satisfactory were false.
Babic had earlier ignored repeated reports from the SVK Security Directorate that the corps
was in poor shape internally.24
Sekulic indicates that the SVK Main Staff was unable to even try to alleviate the
problems within the 18th Corps because General Celeketic, the Commander of the Main
Staff, refused to allow the rest of the Main Staff access to the corps and made all of the
decisions regarding it himself. Prior to Bljesak, the Main Staff did not question this because,
as a former commander of the 18th Corps, Celeketic was presumed to have an excellent
grasp of the situation in Western Slavonia. Celeketic also ignored the Security Directorate
reports that came to his attention – reports which the rest of the Main Staff did not have
access to.25
Sekulic – noting the fundamental problem that the 18th Corps was not actually a
corps and had insufficient manpower to defend the territory allotted to it – also criticizes
the SVK’s lack of any contingency plans to deploy forces from any of its other five corps to
Western Slavonia. He also criticizes the failure to execute “pre-arranged” plans for a
combined attack by the SVK 11th East Slavonia-Baranja Corps and the VRS East Bosnian
Corps. Sekulic claims that VRS Main Staff Commander General Mladic had expressed his
readiness to carry out this operation, but Sekulic suggests that Belgrade vetoed the plan.26
Finally, Sekulic assesses that the intermingling of the local population with the 18th
Corps troops led to mass desertions of SVK soldiers when the HV attack began and the
troops became more concerned with protecting their families than defending their
positions.27
Reference to the SVK “General Staff”, page 441 and footnote 1284 – Any
references in this chapter or elsewhere in Volume I to the SVK “General Staff” instead of the
SVK “Main Staff” are incorrect. The SVK technically had a Main Staff (Glavni Stab), just like
the VRS, not a General Staff (Generalnstab). It had both a Commander of the Main Staff and
a Chief of the Main Staff, instead of only a Chief of the General Staff as was the case in the
Yugoslav Army (VJ).

Oluja – Summary Comments

After reviewing Sekulic’s study, the authors would not change any of their major
conclusions in “Evaluation of Oluja”, pp. 577-579, Chapter 89, Section VII of Volume I.
However, his information amplifies some of these conclusions:
• As emphasized in Volume I, the lack of Main Staff, corps, and brigade-level
reserves was the single biggest reason for the SVK defeat. The after-action
reports from the various SVK formations engaged make this readily apparent.

24
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 102-105, 108-109.
25
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 102-103. 112-113, 116-117.
26
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 115-116, 118-119.
27
Sekulic op. cit., p. 111.

25
 • The new Corps of Special Units (KSJ) – formed to function as the SVK mobile
reserve – fought quite poorly. This probably is a reflection on its personnel
composition, which included a large number of draft dodgers who were rounded
up in Serbia and sent back to the Krajina. In addition, Sekulic judges that the
corps command ineptly handled its role during the HV offensive. (See additional
details below.)
• Although not directly discussed, the war weariness of the entire RSK comes
through in the reports presented by Sekulic.
• Orders to evacuate the civilian population from threatened areas – whether
directed from good or ill intent – had an absolutely disastrous effect on the
morale and motivation of SVK soldiers, who almost immediately started to drift
away from their units to look after their families. A review of brigade casualties
reported by Sekulic suggests that SVK losses were light.
• The typical “domino effect” that can strike an army when a situation starts to
come unglued played out in the SVK. Brigade commanders typically blamed
adjacent brigades for withdrawing and undermining their own positions so that
they too had to withdraw.28 HV breakthroughs in key sectors caused the entire
front to unravel.
• All of this was greatly exacerbated by the near-disintegration of the SVK
command and control network, and – according to Sekulic – poor performance
by senior commanders in coordinating the various corps.
Sekulic’s sweeping criticisms include charges that a number of brigades failed to
hold their positions as long as they could have and should have – including brigades that,
relative to the rest of the SVK, fought well. Sekulic clearly judges that, overall, the SVK
should have been able to resist the HV for much longer than it did. He seems to ignore a
number of factors in making his judgments: that the HV and ARBiH forces engaged in Oluja
outnumbered the SVK at least three to one – 105.000 troops to about 35.000 – and
probably had an even greater advantage in critical sectors; that the HV was a much different
army than that which faced the JNA in 1991; and that a number of the corps commands
were facing totally untenable circumstances at the operational level when they were
ordered to withdraw, even if the tactical position of some their brigades was not
unfavourable.

Page-Specific Comments and Corrections for Chapter 88

Comments on General Mrksic, pages 550 and 551 and footnotes 1727 and 1728 –
Sekulic describes Mrksic’s attitude after his arrival:
His bearing was aloof and superior. He was always surrounded by a personal
entourage of special forces. He also demonstrated “his” work methodology. He placed

28
For an excellent analysis of this phenomenon, see Martin Middlebrook: The Kaiser’s Battle 21 March 1918:
The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, London Penguin Press, 1983.

26
 the corps commanders under his jurisdiction and spent more time with them than with
the people in the Main Staff. He also demonstrated exemplary flexibility, demanding
only what could be carried out. He also had “his own” people, which he trusted without
reserve...
Mrksic seemed like an officer who was quick to perceive problems. He made
precise assessments in connection with the capabilities of his officers and associates.
He never reacted impetuously ... He seemed confident and unwavering. He did not care
about publicity, but it was plain to see that he knew how to maintain the image of
commander and general from the glorious (!) battles in Vukovar. He went personally to
any place where he thought there could be refusal to obey his commands and always
managed to set things straight. He always insisted on the importance of training
soldiers and troops. He did not hold staff meetings very often...
... The progress that had been achieved under Mrksic’s command in a little more
than a month ... was more than had been done during all the previous years.29
Composition of the Corps of Special Units, Page 550 and endnote 1732 (page 551)
– Sekulic does not indicate that the KSJ included a special operations brigade, but only
identifies a small battalion-size reconnaissance-sabotage detachment and a military police
battalion. It is likely that the SVK originally intended to form the 71st Special Operations
Brigade, but that it lacked sufficient trained manpower or possibly the headquarters staff to
do so. Normally, these two detachments / battalions would have been combined under such
a brigade. In addition, unlike our terminology in Volume I, Sekulic refers to the armoured
brigade and Guards brigade in the corps only as the “Armoured Brigade” and “Guards
Brigade” not “2nd Armoured” or “2nd Guards Brigade”.30
15th Light Infantry Brigade, footnote 1737 – The 15th Light Infantry Brigade was a
new formation raised in the 15th Lika Corps only after General Mrksic’s arrival. It was
formed from draft evaders returned from Serbia.31

Page-Specific Comments and Corrections for Chapter 8932

Disposition of the Corps of Special Units, page 563 – Sekulic provides the
deployment plan for the KSJ, indicating that the corps HQ, the 2nd Armoured Brigade, and

29
Sekulic: Knin je pao u Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as excerpted in Politika, Online Edition, URL:
www.politika.co.y/feljton, accessed 18 July 2001. The rest of the Sekulic citations are drawn from the
actual book, unless otherwise stated.
30
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 223-224.
31
Sekulic: Knin je pao u Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as excerpted in Politika, Online Edition, URL:
www.politika.co.y/feljton, accessed 18 July 2001.
32
Instead of being organized chronologically as the narrative on Oluja is in Volume I, these comments are
organized by theme in order to deal with the key events and issues raised by Sekulic, most of which
transcend an individual day's worth of combat. Any details in these comments and corrections that differ
from those in Volume I supersede the earlier text, even if not specifically stated.

27
the MP battalion were in the Slunj area, while the 2nd Guards Brigade and the recon-
sabotage detachment were in the Knin area.33
Comments on New SVK Corps Commanders, pages 562 and 565 and footnotes
1760 and 1770 – Sekulic disparages the commander of the 7th North Dalmatian Corps,
Major General Slobodan Kovacevic, and overall is less than impressed with the new
commanders of the 39th Banija Corps and the Corps of Special Units. When General Mrksic
was dispatched from Belgrade to take over as Commander of the SVK Main Staff, he was
accompanied by Major General Slobodan Kovacevic, the then Chief of Armour-Mechanized
Units on the VJ General Staff, and Major General Slobodan Tarbuk. Kovacevic took over the
7th North Dalmatian Corps and Tarbuk took command of the 39th Banija Corps. Sekulic
notes that the new commanders had little time to comprehend the operational-tactical
situation in their respective areas of responsibility and, in particular, criticizes Kovacevic as
“a weak and poor commander”. Sekulic charges that the 7th Corps headquarters basically
ceased to function during Oluja, and that Kovacevic further undermined the corps’ ability to
operate by placing the corps chief of staff – who Sekulic respects – in command of a task-
organized battle group instead of keeping him back to run the corps headquarters.34
SVK Defensive Operations Along the Northern and North-eastern Approaches to
Knin, pages 566-569 – A more detailed reading of Sekulic’s text than was available as
Volume I was being finished indicates that the SVK had one tactical group – TG-3 – plus the
2nd Guards Brigade available to defend against HV attacks from the Bosansko Grahovo-
Dinara Mountains area toward Knin. The disposition of Tactical Group-3 – which probably
numbered 1.000 to 1.250 troops – appears to have consisted of the following:35
• A “reinforced” battalion from the 15th Lika Corps’ 103rd Light Infantry Brigade –
some 240 troops – was positioned southwest of Drvar, facing south, along the
route from Strmica to Licka Kaldrma.36 This element appears to have been
designated Battle Group-1.
• A battle group drawn from various 7th Corps brigades – apparently primarily
from the 3rd and 92nd Brigades – covering the Derala-Strmica-Knin route. This
element probably was designated Battle Group-2.
• A battle group formed from elements of two unidentified 7th Corps brigades,
7th Corps headquarters, and an RSK MUP police battalion. This element was
designated Battle Group-3.37
• The KSJ 2nd Guards Brigade and the KSJ Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment
were deployed to the Dinara Mountains north of Knin at the end of July
following the suspension of Operation “Mac 95” against Bihac in order to help

33
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 223-227.
34
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 188-189, 234.
35
Tactical Group-3 was commanded by Colonel Rajko Grbic, the 7th Corps Chief of Artillery.
36
This battalion from the 103rd Brigade comprised the 1st Battalion (-), augmented with the brigade recon
platoon, an MP platoon, a tank platoon, a 122 mm howitzer platoon, an M-77 multiple rocket launchers,
and a "police" – probably a MUP – platoon.
37
Battle Group-3 was the unit commanded by the 7th Corps chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Radic.

28
 stem the HV/HVO Operation “Ljeto 95”. However, the KSJ forces apparently
were withdrawn from Dinara back into the Knin area prior to the start of Oluja
on 4 August.
The brunt of the HV attack – 4th and 7th Guards Brigades – fell on Battle Groups-2
and 3 with 4th Guards apparently hitting BG-2 and 7th Guards assaulting BG-3. BG-1 was not
attacked. BG-2 appears to have finally disintegrated by 21:00 on 4 August, despite the best
efforts of the TG-3 commander to encourage his troops to hold the pass at Strmica. BG-3,
however, was able to stabilize its defences on the TG-3 right flank, using elements of the
2nd Guards Brigade and a tank company dispatched by General Kovacevic. Eventually,
however, BG-3 was forced to withdraw because of the HV gains against BG-2. It is
remarkable that BG-2, which probably numbered no more than 500 troops, was able to hold
out as long as it did against an entire HV Guards brigade, plus elements of another.38 A
bigger question was why the KSJ troops from the SVK 2nd Guards Brigade were not thrown
in to block the HV 4th Guards Brigade. Apparently, prior to the start of Oluja, the morale of
the brigade – which included large numbers of former draft evaders – had collapsed, and it
was unfit for combat.39
Correction: on page 569, “Vijuga Battle Group” should be replaced with “Tactical
Group-3”.
The Performance of the 7th Corps and Its Decision to Withdraw, pages 569-570
and footnote 1790 – Sekulic lambastes the performance of every brigade in the 7th Corps
except that of the 92nd Motorized Brigade and indicates that for the most part 1st Vrlika
Light, 2nd Kistanje Infantry, 3rd Benkovac Infantry, and 75th Drnis Motorized Brigades
collapsed or retreated when barely pushed by the HV.40 He also criticizes the brigade

38
Colonel Grbic apparently reported that SVK troops in BG-2 “will fully abandon the defence”, with an
infantry company and a mortar battery from the 92nd Motorized Brigade the first to abandon their
positions.
39
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 189-190, 192, 210-211, 223-224. Sekulic states:
Before the beginning of Operation Storm, the Guard Brigade abandoned its combat mission on
Dinara. It wilfully abandoned Dinara and gathered at the barracks in Knin. That is where it was when
Operation Storm began. Over the course of 4 August, the brigade was ordered to intervene with part
of its forces in the zone of the 9th Brigade (15th Corps) in the Velebit hinterland [presumably the
critical Mali Alan pass area]. That order was not carried out. Practically speaking the brigade did not
participate in any of the fighting during Operation Storm ... If the brigades of the Serbian Army of the
Krajina (Srpska Vojska Krajine) were to be ranked according to what they did during the August
aggression against the RSK, the Guard Brigade would be assigned the most shameful role. Besides its
cowardice, it would rank highest among all the units of the Serbian Army of the Krajina in terms of
the lack of discipline and refusal to carry out orders...
Sekulic op. cit., pp 223-224.
40
Sekulic seems to be exaggerating somewhat, based on a review of the information he provides, except in
the case of the 1st Vrlika Light Infantry Brigade, which does appear to have almost completely collapsed,
almost without an HV attack. Sekulic claims that it took the HV – probably the 126th Home Defence
Regiment – 24 hours to realize that the 1st Vrlika Brigade had abandoned its position. Sekulic also states
that the commander of the 75th Motorized Brigade apparently disregarded a direct order from Mrksic late
on 4 August to move a battalion to defend Knin. Sekulic op. cit., pp. 192-194.
Sekulic praises the 92nd Motorized Brigade – the former JNA 180th Motorized Brigade – indicating that it
had routinely defeated the Croatians since 1991, and stating that it “would have fought the battle that was
most critical to the RSK with honour and dignity, and with a willingness to lay down its life”. He reports that

29
commanders for doing so little to coordinate their actions with each other. However, a close
reading of Sekulic’s information does suggest that the SVK Main Staff and 7th Corps
command appear to have feared being cut off by the HV drives toward Gracac and Knin and
therefore ordered the withdrawal of 7th Corps late on 4 August, confirming the judgment
on pages 569-570 in Volume I.41
Comments of the SVK 18th Brigade Commander, page 568 – The 18th Infantry
Brigade was the formation that checked the HV 9th Guards Brigade in front of the Ljubovo
position near Gospic on 4 August. The brigade appears to have been well organized and
highly motivated, and Sekulic holds it up as a model. Based on the brigade commander’s
after-action report, Sekulic states,
... around 85 percent of the brigade’s fighters had experience in fighting the
[Croatians] and that they exhibited no fear concerning the outcome of the fighting,
which was based not only on their experience, but also on the well-prepared defence
and the engineer organization of the positions and the region. The 18th Brigade had
significant successes in battles with Croat units ... defence of the zone ... [was] carried
out systematically and in detail. Observation posts were set up for all company
commanders and battalion commanders, as well as four advance command posts for
the brigade command. Wire communications were reinforced with another 50
kilometers of cable. Command operations were organized for multiple scenarios. A
brigade reserve was formed and prepared for use in multiple scenarios. The brigade’s
reserve had one tank company, one infantry company (85 fighters) ... one motorized
company (56 fighters), two armoured personnel carriers (M-60), and a Bofors mounted
on a motor vehicle with a 12.7 mm antiaircraft machine gun. Besides these forces, the
reserves allayed fears of an enemy attempt to wedge in at the junction of the 3rd and
2nd Battalions ... and at the juncture of the 2nd and 1st Battalions ... Besides all this,
the brigade was stocked with enough food and ammunition to fight in an encircled
position for as long as 10 days without replenishment (there were six functional small

the brigade had lost 420 killed and 1.500 wounded in action since the start of the conflict. Sekulic op. cit.,
p. 201.
41
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 187-202.
General Kovacevic told Lieutenant Colonel Radic, the 7th Corps chief of staff, sometime early on 5 August
that,
... the decision had been made “to evacuate the people to the Srb region, and then most likely to
[Bosanski] Petrovac ... then the military will be pulled out” ... “If we do not do that immediately, we
will be in an encirclement on the other side of Velebit and we will be destroyed, both us and the
people. We must save lives...”
Sekulic op. cit., p. 190.
In addition, Major General Dusan Loncar, Chief of the Main Staff, told the 15th Corps staff during a meeting
with them late on the evening of 4 August that the RSK Supreme Defence Council had ordered the SVK
Main Staff to move to Srb and that the Dalmatian population was to be evacuated because of the HV
penetration to the outskirts of Knin. Loncar was particularly concerned that the 9th Motorized Brigade
from the 15th Corps focus on defending Gracac to allow the evacuation of the Dalmatian population and
was next going to Gracac with Colonel Milan Suput, the RSK Minister of Defence, to help oversee the
defence. Loncar also ordered that the 15th Corps pull out its forces in a timely manner to avoid
encirclement. Sekulic op. cit., p. 206.

30
 storehouses in the zone). All of this heightened the fighters’ sense of self-reliance and
their confidence in the command structure.42
The 18th Brigade lost nine killed in action, 42 wounded, three captured, and one
deserter during Oluja.43
The SVK Defence of Petrinja, pages 566, 567, 572, and 573 – The highly detailed
after-action report by Colonel Milorad Jankovic, the commander of the 31st Infantry
Brigade, focuses on the 31st Brigade’s left flank as the main HV effort – correctly, since this
was the sector where all but one battalion of the HV 2nd Guards Brigade was committed.
After an initial HV penetration early on 4 August, the 31st Brigade commander inserted part
of his reserve – one tank and one infantry platoon, a recon-sabotage unit, and an MP
platoon – to block the HV advance. During continuous fighting in the morning on this flank,
the 4th Battalion / 31st Brigade collapsed when its commander was killed; however, the
commitment of an additional infantry company and efforts by SVK officers to impose order
restored the brigade defensive position. At 09:25 on 4 August, a renewed HV 2nd Guards
Brigade effort was repulsed and the tank platoon leading it wiped out. The brigade then
managed to hold its own the rest of the day despite several near-panics in some of its sub-
units – which were encouraged to hold their positions by threats from the brigade
commander and brigade intervention units to shoot anyone who retreated.44
The HV attack on 5 August continued to wear down the 31st Brigade, despite some
reinforcements from the 39th Corps who promptly abandoned their positions.45 The 31st
Brigade was so low on troop reserves that a communications platoon was committed to
battle. Finally, at 18:00 on 5 August, Colonel Jankovic requested permission to withdraw
from Petrinja under overwhelming HV pressure. The town fell to the HV the next day. The
31st Brigade lost 13 killed in action, 45 wounded, and six missing on 4 and 5 August.46
Timing of 5th Corps Attack Against 39th Corps, page 573 and footnote 1801 – The
after-action report of the 39th Banija Corps agrees with the ARBiH 5th Corps statement that
its 505th and 511th Brigades attacked toward Zirovac into the 39th Corps zone only on 5
August, despite the claim in the after-action report from the SVK 33rd Dvor Infantry Brigade
that it was attacked simultaneously with the start of the HV offensive on 4 August.47
Comments from the SVK 26th Brigade Commander, pages 567, 567, 574 and 575 –
The 26th Infantry Brigade on the right flank of the 39th Corps performed well, except along
the Una River, where its after-action report confirms its inability to halt the attack of the
reinforced HV 125th Home Defence Regiment, despite the commitment of the 26th Brigade
reserves. In his after-action report, the brigade commander lays out critical problems that

42
Sekulic op. cit., p. 207.
43
Sekulic op. cit., p. 209.
44
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 234-235.
45
Sekulic op. cit., p. 233. The 39th Corps chief of staff states that the entire corps reserve comprised three
infantry companies, not including the 33rd Infantry Brigade facing the ARBiH 5th Corps.
46
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 234-235.
47
Sekulic op. cit., p. 236.

31
his unit faced during Oluja – most of which were problems universal to the brigades of the
SVK:
• The 64-kilometer width of the brigade sector – a massive sector in hilly terrain
for a unit that probably had no more than 1.500 men;
• The limited depths of the brigade’s defences;
• Abandonment of their positions by too many soldiers;
• An HV penetration in a key sector;
• The breakdown in communications;
• Inadequate numbers of trained officer and NCO cadres.48
The Encirclement of the 21st Kordun Corps, pages 567 to 577 and associated
endnotes – Sekulic regards the encirclement and capture of the 21st Corps as one of the
great disasters suffered by the SVK during Oluja and blames a series of events for this
debacle:
• The penetration of the HV 1st Guards Brigade along a vulnerable brigade
boundary between the 50th and 70th Infantry Brigades in the 15th Lika Corps,
combined with the ARBiH 5th Corps attack in the same area;
• Poor performance by the Corps of Special Units in stemming HV and ARBiH
penetrations, both in the 15th Lika and 39th Banija Corps areas;
• Poor command decisions by Operational Group “Kordun”;
• The respectable performance of the 21st Corps itself in generally repelling most
HV Karlovac Corps District attacks, which left it holding its positions as the rest of
the SVK collapsed around it.49
The 70th Plaski Infantry Brigade was positioned forward in a salient around the
town of Plaski on the right flank of the 15th Lika Corps, adjacent to the 21st Corps and the
KSJ, which was centred around Slunj. The brigade was essentially separate from the bulk of
the 15th Corps further south. The left flank battalion (3rd) from the 70th Brigade faced the
entire reinforced HV 1st Guards Brigade – a daunting task for any single brigade in the SVK,
let alone an individual battalion. Nonetheless, the battalion performed credibly against the
1st Guards in its assault from the direction of Otocac, holding it up until early on 5 August,
despite receiving no response to requests for reinforcements from the KSJ.50 (This corrects
our inaccurate judgment in Volume I that the 1st Guards had run into “stiff opposition” from
the KSJ near Licka Jasenica; it was actually the 70th Brigade.) The 50th Infantry Brigade to
the south was unable to protect its right flank adjacent to the 70th Brigade to help block the

48
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 236-238.
49
See Sekulic’s detailed description of the performance of the three brigades in the corps, as well as for a
blow-by-blow account of Bulat’s surrender of the 21st Corps.
50
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 209-210, 211-214. The 70th Brigade had been augmented with a weak battle group
from the KSJ prior to the HV attack. The battle group appears to have been comprised of a composite
company with an infantry platoon, a tank platoon, and a mechanized platoon – 52 “fighters”, two tanks,
two APCs, and a Praga self-propelled air defence vehicle with 2/30 mm cannon. For the movements of the
HV 1st Guards Brigade, see Volume I, footnote 1796.

32
1st Guards, and it was brushed aside.51 As a result, the 70th Brigade commander, apparently
fearing that his forces would be cut off in the salient around Plaski when the HV turned
north, ordered a withdrawal to Slunj early on 5 August. With the attack of the ARBiH 502nd
Mountain Brigade on 5 August, its rapid defeat of the weak SVK 15th Light Brigade and 37th
Independent Infantry Battalion, and the link-up with the 1st Guards, the 21st Corps was now
cut off to the south.52
In addition to the failure of the KSJ to intervene in the 70th Brigade sector, the
corps also even more disastrously failed to follow two separate orders from both General
Mrksic and General Novakovic, commander of the Kordun Operational Group controlling all
SVK operations in the north. Late on 4 August, Mrksic had directed that the KSJ redeploy the
2nd Armoured Brigade to the Glina area by early on 5 August in order to bolster the 39th
Corps defence at that critical road junction. Late on 5 August, with the 39th Corps defence
of Petrinja faltering, Novakovic issued a similar instruction. Both orders apparently were
ignored. In the latter case the KSJ headquarters, including Major General Milorad Stupar,
and the armoured brigade arrived at the town of Topusko on 6 August, but decided on their
own authority that the situation had deteriorated too quickly for them to have any effect at
Glina, so Stupar and the brigade abandoned their mission and drove on to Dvor, on the RS
border.53 Even if this armoured brigade was at less than full strength, its failure to engage at
Glina was a critical failure in the SVK defensive operations and led directly to the capture of
the 21st Corps. A counterattack by these SVK armoured units against the HV 2nd Guards
Brigade, already tired from its tough fight with the 31st Brigade at Petrinja, would have
further delayed the advance of the HV Zagreb Corps District here and probably helped hold
Banija and Kordun for a few more days. Eventually the combined HV/ARBiH drive from the
Slunj area would have forced the SVK to withdraw, but probably not in as disastrous a
fashion as occurred.
The employment of SVK forces in the Banija and Kordun was further confused by
command and control problems among the Kordun Operational Group (more or less the
Operational Group “Pauk” HQ dual-hatted), the KSJ, and the 21st Corps. The OG Kordun /
OG Pauk headquarters – headed by Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Novakovic and chief of
staff Colonel Cedo Bulat – appears to have been taxed beyond the ability of their
headquarters to cope with the evolving situation in essentially four different corps – 21st,
39th, KSJ, and Abdic’s National Defence. The OG headquarters probably had inadequate
communications equipment to start with and when combined with the communications
breakdowns suffered during Oluja, likely had limited information on which to act. Further,
Sekulic charges that Novakovic’s HQ did a poor job of coordinating the actions of these four

51
Based on the 15th Corps after-action report, Sekulic notes that the weakest cooperation in the corps was
between the 50th and 70th Brigades. According to the 50th Brigade commander’s after-action report, the
50th Brigade held a 67-kilometer front with 1.200 troops.
52
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 206-207, 224-225. The commander of the 18th Infantry Brigade in the 15th Corps notes
that the 15th Light Brigade was “completely routed” in the area around Zeljava, Licko Petrovo Selo, and
Vaganac. The KSJ commitment of a few military police units to this area failed to halt the 502nd Brigade.
53
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 222-227.

33
commands in adapting to the evolving situation. Novakovic’s relief of Colonel Veljko
Bosanac, the commander of 21st Corps, and his replacement by Bulat further disrupted
Novakovic’s ability to direct operations. (This corrects an erroneous judgment in footnote
1816 of Volume I that Bosanac might have been killed in action. 54) Not only did Novakovic
lose his chief of staff at a critical moment, but he introduced a new one – albeit a former
commander of the 21st Corps – into a difficult command situation at the same time. In
addition, the existence of the KSJ HQ only further diluted and interfered with Novakovic’s
orders, despite his subordination of the KSJ component units to the 21st Corps.55
Defeat of Abdic’s Forces, page 576 – in contrast to the account available at the
time of writing Volume I, which suggests that the 5th Corps overran Abdic’s forces and
captured Velika Kladusa on 7 August, Sekulic indicates that Abdic’s troops began defecting
on 5 August. This started with the 2nd Brigade, and was followed by the other two brigades,
plus other ancillary units. This information is apparently drawn from the 21st Kordun Corps
after-action report. It is unclear, however, whether all of these units defected on 5 August,
or if – as seems more likely – the defections occurred over 5 and 6 August, allowing 5th
Corps to march into Velika Kladusa on 7 August after overcoming whatever resistance
remained. The Serbian RDB special operations unit, Bosnian Serb MUP Special Police, and
other Serbian / FRY units that had been reinforcing Abdic, successfully evacuated – “wilfully
abandoned” in Sekulic’s words – Velika Kladusa before the 5th Corps arrived.56
Defence of the Escape Route to Dvor, page 576 and footnote 1818 – The route
south to the border town of Dvor on the Una River and the “border” between the RSK and
the RS was the primary evacuation route for SVK forces in Kordun and Banija, as well as the
fleeing Serb population. The primary threats to this route were the attack by ARBiH 5th
Corps forces from the 505th and 511th Brigades toward the Glina-Dvor road through
Zirovac, and the HV 125th Home Defence Regiment assault from the direction of Dubica via
Kostajnica. Sekulic confirms that the 33rd Dvor Infantry Brigade was able to hold against the
5th Corps attack until 7 August, when the brigade’s morale collapsed as word of Petrinja and
Kostajnica’s fall spread among 33rd personnel. This allowed 5th Corps troops to reach
Zirovac and cut the 21st Corps’ escape route. Meanwhile, after the 33rd Brigade troops
retreated across the Una River into the RS, HV troops occupied Dvor. However, Volume I
incorrectly assumes that the battle ended here. In fact, sandwiched between the ARBiH
troops at Zirovac and the HV 125th Regiment at Dvor were the SVK 13th Slunj Infantry
Brigade, which had managed to avoid the fate of the rest of the 21st Corps, and the KSJ’s
2nd Armoured Brigade – plus large numbers of SVK stragglers. Early on 8 August, the two
brigades, under KSJ commander General Stupar’s direction and assisted by the VRS 1st
Novigrad Infantry Brigade in Bosanski Novi (Novi Grad), assaulted Dvor and recaptured it,
allowing the refugees travelling with them to escape across the Una to Bosanski Novi.

54
Bosanac had a reputation as a strong-willed commander and apparently he and Novakovic had a
disagreement over something, according to Sekulic, which led to Bosanac’s relief. Sekulic op. cit., p. 216.
55
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 221-223.
56
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 215-216.

34
Attacks on 9 August by the 13th Brigade, supported by the armour, against the ARBiH forces
to the north allowed additional refugees to escape before the SVK forces finally withdrew
across the Una for good.57
Additional Comments on the Performance of the Corps of Special Units, page 578
and 579 – In the authors’ “Evaluation of Oluja” the poor performance of the KSJ, which was
to have acted as the Main Staff mobile reserve, was discussed.58 At the time, the authors did
not realize exactly how little the corps contributed to the SVK defence – playing no role at all
in delaying the HV 1st Guards Brigade, as was thought at the time, and which was discussed
earlier in describing the fate of the 21st Corps. Major General Milorad Stupar – much
maligned by General Sekulic – in his after-action report laid out a number of problems the
KSJ had to deal with. These included:
• Exhaustion of the personnel from the 2nd Guards and 2nd Armoured Brigades
because they had been engaged in combat operations since 19 July – the start of
Operation “Mac 95” against Bihac;
• Poor morale of the KSJ soldiers, most of whom were draft evaders from the RSK
forcibly detained in Federal Yugoslavia and shipped back to the RSK;
• Lack of communications equipment, which inhibited command and control;
• Poor engineer preparations of defensive positions.59
Sekulic himself states that:
The plan to replenish the Special Unit Corps with younger personnel was not a
complete success. The use of personnel forcibly mobilized in the FRY to replace deserted
military conscripts from Croatia and the RSK was a fundamental weakness that could
be overcome only over an extended period of time. The combat capabilities of the
Special Unit Corps were significantly limited by the inability to keep the officer cadre up
to strength. The first problem was the numerical shortfall of personnel and the second
was the inadequate quality and the small size of the officer cadre.60
It was on the weak reed of the KSJ that Mrksic and the SVK Main Staff had counted
as their primary device for halting HV breakthrough operations; it utterly failed.

57
Sekulic op. cit., pp. 218-219, 226-227, 236.
58
Sekulic states that:
... the Special Unit Corps was intended to represent the creation of an operational-tactical
component that could move very quickly throughout the entire western part of the RSK. Its existence
solved the problem of reserves for the Main Staff of the Serbian Army of the Krajina, since it could
intervene in crisis areas of the theatre of operations. The organization-formational structure of the
company-battery and battalion-artillery battalion (divizion) components made it possible to split off
parts of the Special Unit Corps and send them on missions with a greater level of autonomy. Thus, in
specific regions individual components of the Special Unit Corps became part of other corps, where
they remained until specific missions had been completed.
Sekulic op. cit., p. 223.
59
Sekulic op. cit., p. 227.
60
Sekulic op. cit., p. 223.

35
 Section II
Croatia 1991

36
 Annex 1
The Organization and Arming of the Croatian Serbs
1988-1991
As Serbian President Milosevic continued to consolidate and expand his power in
Serbia during the late 1980s, he also began to develop a base of support in the Serb
communities in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia regions of Croatia. One track of this covert
operation provided assistance in organizing a Serb political party and a separate Serb
political identity, making possible the formation and declaration of the Serb autonomous
regions in Croatia during 1990 and 1991. Probably even more covert was the simultaneous
program to organize, train and arm Serb personnel of the Croatian Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Croatian Serb civilians at least as early as 1990. The size and scope of the effort,
and conclusive evidence of the involvement of Milosevic’s most senior advisers in
orchestrating the operation, make it inconceivable that Milosevic himself did not order this
action. To bypass Federal institutions, he used his own Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), in
particular the Serbian State Security Service (SDB) of the MUP. As Radmilo Bogdanovic, the
Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs in 1990-1991, stated in 1995:
Thus we had ties with Martic, who was first commander of the police and then
Minister of Internal Affairs. We extended help to enable them to ... begin from nothing.
It was the same way when people from the present day Serbian Republic, the then
Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned to us. ... We did our utmost to carry out, follow up, and
ensure security for (the help) they sought and for that which Serbia and the Serbian
people offered. There, that is what the Service did.61
This subversive program – in contrast to that of the Croatians – appears to have
gone undetected, or at least ignored, by JNA counterintelligence.62 The SDB plan to create a
viable Serb autonomous organization within Croatia appears to have had three interlocking

61
The Logistics of Service for the People’s Will, Belgrade Duga, 7-20 Jan 95, p. 21. Radmilo Bogdanovic quoted
in Paul Williams and Norman Cigar: A Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, London
Alliance to Defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996, p. 35.
62
The JNA monitored the Croatian Serbs and their efforts to arm themselves, but there are no indications
that the JNA fully realized the extent of the Serbian Government’s involvement during 1990 and most of
1991. See Annex 5: Kadijevic Indecisive – The JNA Fails to Stop Secession in which the JNA reports its
knowledge to the Federal Presidency of “illegal” weapon acquisitions and the formation of “illegal” military
forces, including those of the Croatian Serbs. Likewise, except for a few instances where local commanders
went beyond their authority to pass out arms, there are no indications that the JNA began arming the
Croatian Serbs until full-scale war broke out between the JNA and Croatia in September 1991. On 13 July
1990, during a meeting between General Veljko Kadijevic and Serbian Federal presidency member Borisav
Jovic, Jovic stated:
The Serbs in Croatia have begun to organize into partisan detachments. For now, that knowledge
is based on statements by individuals. The Serbs in Serb opstinas have asked that TO weapons be
turned over to them. I tell Veljko that that should have been done, but he does not agree (emphasis
added),
suggesting that the JNA was not arming the Croatian Serbs during 1990. Jovic goes on to state that:
They will get them on their own. And I believe that they already have some.
Jovic may not have been fully cognizant of Milosevic’s covert arming operation. Jovic entry for 13 July 1990.

37
objectives: developing a reliable leader or leaders, organizing elite and reliable Croatian
Serb combat units, and arming additional police reserves and local Territorial Defence (TO)
and village guard units.

Key SDB and MUP Personalities and Roles63

The SDB/MUP program to arm the Croatian Serbs centred on four key people:
• Mihalj Kertes and Radmilo Bogdanovic, the two most senior Serbian officials
directly involved in arming the Croatian Serbs, probably exercised political control over the
operation. Once they had received their orders from Milosevic, they probably proceeded
without much further reference or reporting to him. Kertes, one of Milosevic’s most loyal
subordinates, was a member of the Serbian Presidency from the late 1980s until early
1992.64 Bogdanovic served as Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs from May 1988 to May
1991, when he was relieved as a consequence of the brutality with which his police
suppressed demonstrations in Belgrade.65 Despite his formal removal, he continued to
exercise considerable influence over the ministry.
• Jovica Stanisic – later one of Milosevic’s closest advisers – served as deputy chief
of the SDB until 1991, when he was appointed its chief.66
• Franko “Frenki” Simatovic, as one of Stanisic’s deputies, was the primary SDB
liaison officer to the Croatian Serbs and exercised direct control over the SDB’s
hand-picked agents there.

63
The SDB, the State Security Service (Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti), was re-designated RDB, Department for
State Security (Resor Drzavne Bezbednosti), in 1991. Marko Lopusina: Stanisic More Dangerous Than
Milosevic, Belgrade Intervju, 9 May 1997, pp. 60-61.
64
Kertes followed his service on the presidency as chief of the Federal State Security Service in the Federal
Internal Affairs Ministry for part of 1992, and later became head of Serbian Customs in August 1994 when
Milosevic imposed sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs. This position is politically sensitive because of the
substantial revenue generated for the government through customs duties.
65
Belgrade Tanjug, 26 May 1988.
66
A Serbian magazine stated in 1997 that Jovica Stanisic was scheduled in 1989 to eventually take over the
SDB, to which he was appointed chief in 1991. The article claims that Stanisic was close to Milorad Vucelic –
a Milosevic adviser – and Mihalj Kertes. Kertes was the best friend of Jovica’s brother. The article goes on
to say:
During the reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia in 1991, Jovica Stanisic
renamed the Secret Service, changing what used to be called the State Security Service (SDB) to the
State Security Department (RDB). He hoped by this means to get rid of the connotations of the term
“SDB”, which had functioned exclusively as a political police force, and he tried to make the RDB a
reputable service for fighting terrorists and armed Serbian enemies. At the beginning of the 1990s,
the Yugoslav and the Serbian press connected Stanisic to the arrival of Captain Dragan in Serbia and
Krajina from Australia ... to the activation of Simo Dubajic (a volunteer / paramilitary commander) ...
and even Zeljko Raznatovic – Arkan ... Stanisic used to go to the Knin Krajina personally, with his
driver and a bodyguard. Some inspectors say, jokingly, that he went there to visit his in-laws and a
weekend house he has there.
Marko Lopusina: Stanisic More Dangerous Than Milosevic, Belgrade Intervju, 9 May 1997, pp. 60-61.

38
 Creating a Leader: Milan Martic
Milan Martic, a mid-level police inspector in 1990 in the Knin police station,
appears to have been the man the SDB chose to act as the military figurehead for the
Croatian Serb revolt against Zagreb and as the counterpart to Milan Babic, the political
figurehead of the revolt. Martic rose from obscurity in the summer and fall of 1990 during
the first Serb uprisings against Zagreb’s rule to become chief of the separatist Krajina
Secretariat for Internal Affairs by January 1991. There is little chance someone with Martic’s
rank and experience could have achieved so much so quickly unless he was coached and
supported by the SDB.
Milosevic’s SDB liaison officers used Martic to subvert Croatian control of the Knin
police and then create a Krajina Secretariat of Internal Affairs embracing the Serbian
Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina), formed in December 1990. Martic was to use
his units and local SDB-armed village guard forces to consolidate military control over those
ethnic Serb areas that were to be incorporated into the SAO Krajina. His first public act was
to send a letter directly to the Federal Internal Affairs Ministry – bypassing his superiors in
the Croatian MUP – notifying it that he and his personnel would refuse to wear new
Croatian MUP uniforms and insignia.67 When the Croatian Internal Affairs Minister and his
deputies came to Knin on 5 July to discuss the letter, it became clear to them that they had
lost control of the Knin police to Martic and Serb nationalists.68
Martic took complete command in mid-August during the so-called “Log
Revolution”, which started the de facto Serb secession from Croatia. Clearly he and others
had been working for some time to organize the Serb members of the police into units that
he could command and activate at a moment’s notice. His role was formally recognized on 4
January 1991 when the executive council of the recently declared Serbian Autonomous
Region of Krajina formed the Krajina Secretariat for Internal Affairs with Martic at its head.
The Serbian SDB worked with Martic in the Krajina well before the uprising there in
August 1990. Franko Simatovic – “Frenki” – served as Stanisic’s man on the ground in Knin
throughout the 1990-1991 time frame and appears to have exercised direct command over
Martic. Simatovic took part in organizing the uprising in Knin under the nom de guerre
“Dragan Simendic”, possibly under cover as a journalist for the Socialist daily Politika.69
Simatovic may in fact have bypassed Martic at times and directly commanded the Krajina
police force or at least key elements of it, and he directly controlled “Captain Dragan”, the
commander of Martic’s “Kninja” Special Police unit.

67
Silber and Little, p. 98.
68
Belgrade Tanjug, 6 July 1990; See Silber and Little, pp. 98-100, for a description of the meeting.
69
Zorica Vulic: Franko Simatovic, a “Red Beret”, Belgrade Glas Javnosti, 11 Nov 2000, p. 4; Dragoljub Petrovic:
Belgrade's Soft Hand, Belgrade Nasa Borba, 6 June 1995, p. 8. SRS leader Seselj – who had intimate
dealings with the SDB and MUP in 1991 – stated in 1993 that Simatovic was in charge of secret contacts
with Martic. Marko Lopusina: The Serbian Police Are Being Cleaned Up, Belgrade Intervju, 26 November
1993, pp. 64-65.

39
 Formation of Elite Combat Units
The SDB, having prepared Martic to be the Krajina Serb military leader, formed for
him an elite combat unit that was well-trained and reliable, augmented in 1991 by the new
SDB (RDB) Special Operations Unit. At the same time, in Eastern Slavonia, the SDB was
organizing the Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG) under Zeljko Raznjatovic – “Arkan” – although
the SDG did not come into prominence until full-scale war erupted in fall 1991.70 Martic’s
unit, nicknamed the “Kninjas” and commanded by Dragan Vasiljkovic71, more often known
as “Captain Dragan”, was formed as a special police unit, probably in mid-1990. It was first
used openly in the August 1990 uprising as the professional core of Martic’s forces when
they consolidated Krajina Serb control first near Knin before moving into the northern
Krajina’s Banija region during spring and summer 1991. The unit was also heavily involved
after full-scale war broke out in fall 1991, fighting both near Knin and in the Banija region.72
In May 1991, the SDB – now renamed RDB – formed its Special Operations Unit (Jedinica za
Specijalne Operacije) at Golubic in the Krajina under Captain Dragan’s command, but
overseen by Frenki Simatovic. The unit operated jointly with the Kninjas.73 The SDB also

70
For a discussion of the SDG see Annex 17: Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Operations – The Road to Vukovar.
71
Captain Dragan was considered a charismatic commander. Born in Belgrade, he spent much of his life in
Australia, where he may have served in the Australian Army. In addition (or alternatively) he is reported to
have served in the French Foreign Legion. Dragan’s real name is not known for certain, but he has been
identified as Dragan Vasiljkovic and, as recounted below, by other names.
The Belgrade daily Borba today deals with the enigmatic Captain Dragan, commander of Special
Units in the Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) of Krajina in the Republic of Croatia, western
Yugoslavia. He is credited with superior achievements in training and commanding the Krajina units
in their clashes with the Croatian Armed Forces ... The true name of Capt. Dragan was kept secret,
but Borba at last came out with the claim that the man is Zivojin Vasiljkovic, 40, in all likelihood a
Belgrader who as a child left Yugoslavia for Australia with his parents. Leaving in suspense those
curious to know whether he is a Serbian patriot or a mercenary paid by Serbian emigres, the paper
wonders whether “CAP D” is a “veteran legionary, a retired officer of the Australian Military
Academy, a businessman or a Yugoslav People's Army Intelligence Colonel”.
Belgrade Tanjug, 15 August 1991.
Some accounts claim Dragan’s real name is “Daniel Sneden”:
The real name of Captain Dragan, until recently the chief instructor of the special units of the
Army of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, is Daniel Sneden. He was born in Belgrade and is
no kind of criminal, as he has been described in some newspapers, but a top military expert. This was
stated at this afternoon’s news conference for domestic and foreign journalists by Milan Martic,
Internal Affairs Minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina.
Belgrade Radio, 13 August 1991.
72
The “Kninjas” operations during 1990-1991 (before JNA intervention in September 1991) included:
– Operation Golubic kod Knina (Golubic near Knin) – August 1990 – the “Log Revolution”
– Plitvice Lakes – March 1991
– Operation Zaoka (Stinger) – July 1991 – Serb takeover of the town of Glina.
– Operation Dvor na Uni – July 1991 – Serb takeover of the town of Dvor na Uni.
73
Captain Dragan states that the JSO was actually formed from the Kninjas. It is possible that the Kninjas
were split into two units with the JSO absorbing non-Krajina residents from Serbia and probably Bosnia
while the Kninjas retained the Krajina Serbs. V. Cvijic: Minister’s Resignation and Frenki’s Return, Belgrade
Danas, 19 November 2001, p. 5, an interview with Captain Dragan; A Career: Milorad Legija Ulemek – a
Legionnaire-Politician, Belgrade Beta, 21 November 2001, includes portions of an interview with Legija, the
deputy commander of the SDG and late JSO commander; Milan Galovic: “Red Berets” Decline Making
Arrests for Hague Tribunal, Belgrade Politika, 11 November 2001, p. 9.

40
appears to have worked with private Serbian banks and businessmen to finance Dragan (and
probably other SDB activities).74

Formation of Police Reserves and the Territorial Defence

The formation of the “Kninjas” (and Arkan’s SDG) was part of a two-level approach
to arming the Croatian Serbs. The Kninjas – working with the JSO – and the SDG were to
serve as elite mobile units that could be shifted wherever they were needed. The second
part of the SDB plan was to form police reserve units in the Krajina and arm them, along
with the village guards, which were later formed into the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence.75

Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, an official during 1990-1991 in the Serbian Ministry of Defence – which controlled the
Serbian Territorial Defence and was used by the SDB as a source of weapons and other resources – stated
that Captain Dragan had returned to Yugoslavia at the behest of the State Security Service, and that he
worked for both Radmilo Bogdanovic and Jovica Stanisic. She also stated that Captain Dragan’s force was
trained by special police from Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Dobrila Gajic-Glisic: The Serbian Army:
From the Minister of Defence’s Office, Cacak Marica and Tomo Spasojevic, 1992, pp. 101-102, p. 106, cited
in Paul Williams and Norman Cigar: A Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, London
Alliance to Defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996.
Other paramilitary / volunteer commanders – after falling out with Milosevic’s government – have also
affirmed that Bogdanovic and the SDB, through Simatovic, commanded Dragan.
Vojislav Seselj stated in 1993 that Captain Dragan personally served Radmilo Bogdanovic. Miroslav
Mikuljanac and Cvijetin Milivojevic: I Will Travel to the Hague with Milosevic, Belgrade Borba, 13-14
November 1993, pp. 10-11, an interview with Vojislav Seselj.
Dragoslav Bokan, leader of the White Eagles volunteers, in 1991 stated that the:
Red Berets (Captain Dragan’s unit) are Franko Simatovic’s people under the command of Mihalj
Kertes.
Dejan Anastasijevic: Plucking the Feathers of the Eagles, Belgrade Vreme, 22 November 1993, pp. 20-21, an
interview with Dragoslav Bokan, leader of the White Eagles.
In fact, Dragan has publicly admitted on a number of occasions his debt to Bogdanovic and acknowledged
that his success was attributable to Bogdanovic and the police, while also praising Frenki Simatovic’s role in
directing the JSO. The close links between the SDB/MUP, Captain Dragan, and the Serbian Ministry of
Defence during 1990-1991 are also apparent in public statements from Captain Dragan in November 1991
after he returned to Belgrade following a dispute with Babic. Dragan states:
I am active in the training of a special purposes unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) of
Serbia. I will work with units of the Territorial Defence attached to the Ministry of Defence of Serbia
in Bubanj Potok...
Belgrade Tanjug, 7 November 1991; see also Belgrade Tanjug, 13 August 1991. The “special purposes
unit” presumably was the JSO.
74
Dafina Milanovic of Dafiment Bank “reportedly equipped 500 Knin special troops led by Captain Dragan
Vasiljkovic”. Svetlana Vasovic: Perfidious Resourcefulness, Ljubljana Mladina, 17 May 1994. pp. 37-38.
75
The SDB/MUP apparently decided that Belgrade needed to exercise even closer control over the
“Territorial Defence of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem”, probably because of its close
proximity to Serbia. Thus, a Serbian Special Police commander, Radovan Stojicic-Badza, was appointed to
command the TO in this area. Stojicic’s effectiveness and reliability had been proven in 1989 when he
commanded the Special Police in Kosovo during heightened unrest and Serbian suspension of Kosovar
autonomy in 1989. Belgrade Beta, 16 April 1997; Belgrade Radio, 7 December 1991. As noted above, there
are also indications that Stojicic was also involved in the Knin uprising. Stojicic exercised direct control over
Arkan’s SDG in the 1991 eastern Slavonia fighting and coordinated the TO and SDG operations with the
JNA. Stojicic reportedly fought in Bosnia in command of Serbian Special Police. He was then appointed to
head Serbia’s regular police as Assistant Serbian Internal Affairs Minister. Together with Stanisic, he was
one of Milosevic’s closest advisers. After his assassination in 1997, Arkan, Stanisic, and Milosevic attended
his funeral. Belgrade VIP News Service, 14 April 1997.

41
The latter groups would serve as static defence units for the ethnic Serb regions and provide
the bulk of Serb manpower when the fighting escalated during spring and summer of 1991.
The police reserve units were first activated during the August 1990 uprising, but
the arming of Serb villagers probably began some time before that.76 The local village guards
were mobilized as the Territorial Defence under the new SAO Krajina in April 1991 and their
command and control was consolidated by August 1991.77 The same evolution occurred in
the SAO Western Slavonia and SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem TO forces.
The SDB worked closely with the Serbian Ministry of Defence, drawing older weapons from
the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serbia to arm the Krajina and East Slavonia village
guards.78 These weapons included captured German small arms and US-made Thompson
submachine guns supplied to Yugoslav partisans during World War II; some Thompsons may
have dated from the 1950s. The weapons had been transferred to Serbia’s TO stocks in the
1960s from the JNA. The TO also received light antitank weapons, 60 mm and 82 mm
mortars, and probably other infantry support weapons. In some areas the village guards and
TO were able to use weapons captured from Croatian MUP police stations.79 It was probably
not until after full-scale war broke out in September that the Krajina Serb TO began
receiving large-scale assistance directly from the JNA.
TO forces in SAO Krajina were organized generally by municipalities, which had
sufficient people to form a brigade-size force,80 but in the summer of 1991 most SAO Krajina
municipal TO headquarters probably were still struggling to organize as many as 300 or 400
men, about a battalion. By September 1991, however, most of these TO staffs probably had
mobilized brigade-sized units, estimated at about 1.000 to 2.000 troops per municipality. In

76
Belgrade Tanjug, 17 August 1990.
77
“The Executive Council today also endorsed an order by Milan Babic to mobilize the Territorial Defences
and the units of volunteers in the municipalities which decided to join Krajina.” Belgrade Tanjug, 1 April
1991. During a meeting of the Government of the SAO Krajina in August 1991:
... the conclusion was reached to establish a unified system of Krajina’s Territorial Defence as the
armed forces of Krajina and as a part of the unified system of armed forces of the SFRY. The decision
of the Defence Minister to regulate the system of Territorial Defence was adopted; this calls for
subordinating opstina Territorial Defence command centres of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Gracac,
Donji Lapac, and Korenica and the zonal Territorial Defence command centres for Kordun and Banija
to the Krajina Territorial Defence command centre and to regulate Territorial Defence command
centres according to regulations issued by the JNA General Staff.
The Internal Affairs Minister and Defence Minister are commissioned to determine the numerical
structure, equipment, purpose, and structural status of special purpose units. The announcement also
stated that insignia has been adopted for members of Territorial Defence units to be worn on the left
sleeve (The Kosovo shield, crossed swords, the Serbian tricolour, and the name Krajina). Internal
Affairs Minister Milan Martic has been appointed deputy Territorial Defence commander and a
member of the Krajina Territorial Defence command centre responsible for police units.
C. C: Creation of Larger Defence Structures, Belgrade Borba, 21 August 1991, p. 10.
78
Arkan – an SDB operative – was arrested in 1990 for smuggling arms to the Krajina Serbs, but reportedly
was released as a result of pressure from Bogdanovic. Dada Vujasinovic: Secret File on Arkan: Early Jobs,
Paths of Revolution, and Parliamentary Rehabilitation: Pedagogic Poem, Belgrade Duga, 30 January 1993 –
12 February 1993, pp. 16-21. For a detailed discussion of Arkan’s work for the SDB, see Annex 17: Eastern
Slavonia-Baranja Operations – The Road to Vukovar.
79
Ante Barisic: We Do Not Have the Forces For War, Zagreb Danas, 16 July 1991, pp. 18-19.
80
The municipal TO units were re-designated as brigades late in 1991.

42
Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia-Baranja, the TO forces were more closely organized
on the village, and the notional TO “brigade” structures in the outline below may not have
existed. Instead, typical reporting identifies, for example, the “Brsadin TO”, which was a
battalion-sized unit raised from Brsadin and other hamlets nearby. These TO were little
more than bands of armed civilians; few of the men had received any military training
whatever and fewer still had any concept of discipline. JNA professional officers would come
to loathe the often uncontrollable TO forces they encountered during their peacekeeping
duties and in the fall 1991 fighting.

43
 Chart 1
Organization of Krajina Secretariat for Internal Affairs,
January 1991 – December 1991

Krajina Secretariat for Internal Affairs (Headquarters: Knin)

Special Purpose Unit “Kninjas”
Knin Public Security Station
Benkovac Public Security Station
Obrovac Public Security Station
Gracac Public Security Station
Korenica Public Security Station
Vojnic Public Security Station (as of July 1991)
Vrginmost Public Security Station (as of July 1991)
Dvor na Uni Public Security Station
Glina Public Security Station (as of July 1991)
Kostajnica Public Security Station (as of August 1991)
Petrinja Public Security Station (as of September 1991)

44
 Chart 2
Croatian Serb Territorial Defence Forces, November 199181

SAO Krajina Territorial Defence Staff82

1st Zone Staff for Dalmatia
Knin Municipality Staff
Karin Territorial Defence Brigade
Bukovica Territorial Defence Brigade
Benkovac Municipality Staff
Benkovac Territorial Defence Brigade
Obrovac Municipality Staff
Obrovac Territorial Defence Detachment
2nd Zone Staff for Lika83
Korenica Municipality Staff
Korenica Territorial Defence Brigade
Plaski Territorial Defence Detachment
Gracac Municipality Staff
Gracac Territorial Defence Brigade
Donji Lapac Municipality Staff
Donji Lapac Territorial Defence Detachment
1st Sveti Rok Territorial Defence Brigade (Gospic)84
3rd Zone Staff for Kordun and Banija
Kordun Territorial Defence85
Vojnic Municipality Staff
Vojnic Territorial Defence Brigade
Vrginmost Municipality Staff
Vrginmost Territorial Defence Brigade
Glina Municipality Staff
Glina Territorial Defence Brigade
Kostajnica Municipality Staff

81
The order of battle for the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence is drawn from Milisav Sekulic: Knin je pao u
Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2001, pp. 34-35. The authorized manpower for
the SAO Krajina TO Staff was 380 personnel, the regional zone staff HQ was 180 personnel, the municipality
staffs 190 personnel, a TO brigade 1.428 personnel, and a TO detachment 428 personnel. Total authorized
manpower for the SAO Krajina TO in November 1991 was 24.410 personnel.
82
Centralized staff command formed in August 1991 to control the Krajina TO, 6th Lika Division, Kordun TO,
and 7th Banija Division regional headquarters. The Western and Eastern Slavonia TO regional staffs
remained separate and nominally subordinate to the political leadership of the Serbian Autonomous
Regions in both Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia-Baranja-Western Srem. After mid-September, all TO
commands came under the operational control of the JNA.
83
This was the former 6th Lika Shock Division.
84
This brigade had an authorized strength of 2.600 personnel. Milisav Sekulic: Knin je pao u Beogradu (Knin
Fell in Belgrade), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2001, p. 34.
85
This included the former 7th Banija Shock Division.

45
 Kostajnica Territorial Defence Brigade
Dvor na Uni Municipality Staff
Dvor na Uni Territorial Defence Brigade
Petrinja Municipality Staff
Petrinja Territorial Defence Brigade
Sisak Municipality Staff
Sisak Territorial Defence Brigade
Western Slavonia Zone Staff
Pakrac Municipality Staff
Pakrac Territorial Defence Brigade
Okucani Municipality Staff
Okucani Territorial Defence Brigade
Daruvar Municipality Staff
Daruvar Territorial Defence Detachment
Bilogora Territorial Defence Detachment
Jasenovac Municipality Staff
Jasenovac Territorial Defence Brigade
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem Zone Staff
Serbian Volunteer Guard “Tigers” (Battalion)
Tenja Territorial Defence (Brigade)
Tenja Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Tenjski Antunovac Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Petrova Slatina Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Brsadin Territorial Defence86 (Brigade)
Marinci Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Brsadin Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Pacetin Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Ostrovo Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Markusica Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Borovo Selo (Vukovar) Territorial Defence87 (Brigade)
“Stari Jankovci” Territorial Defence (Brigade)88
Nijemci Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Stari Jankovci Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Mirkovci Territorial Defence (Battalion)

86
The “Brsadin TO” referred to here – which later became the 40th Infantry Brigade of the Krajina Serb Army
(SVK) may not have been a brigade-sized headquarters in 1991, but instead a number of independent
battalion-size units from local villages. Thus, this “Brsadin TO” probably actually included the Brsadin village
TO, Pacetin village TO, Ostrovo village TO, and Marinci village TO.
87
The Borovo Selo TO may have been similar to the “Brsadin TO” described above and probably comprised
the Borovo Selo village TO, Bobota village TO, and Trpinja village TO.
88
It is unclear whether a municipal TO formation so designated existed. However, there were a number of TO
formations that were probably battalion-sized, such as the Sotin village TO and the Mirkovci village TO,
from the villages south of Vukovar. These were later grouped into the 45th Infantry Brigade of the SVK.

46
 Baranja Territorial Defence (Division)89
Beli Manistir Territorial Defence (Brigade)
Beli Manistir Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Knezevi Vinogradi Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Bolman Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Knezevo Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Darda Territorial Defence (Brigade)
Darda Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Jagodnjak Territorial Defence (Battalion)
Bilje Territorial Defence (Battalion)

89
Equivalent to a TO division or sub-regional headquarters.

47
 Annex 2
The Organizing of the Croatian Government Forces,
May 1990 – April 1991
The new Croatian Government under President Tudjman inaugurated on 30 May
1990 faced the daunting task of building up a military force without enough weapons to arm
it. Prior to Tudjman’s inauguration, the JNA had confiscated the entire Republic Territorial
Defence (TO) stock of weapons, beginning on 16-17 May (at the same time that it
attempted to seize the weapons of the better-prepared Slovenian TO).90 While they
searched for foreign weapons suppliers willing to provide arms to a non-national
government, the Croatians turned to the only internal institution left with arms in Croatia –
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) – to equip their nascent armed force. The arming of
the MUP led to the creation of the National Guard Corps (ZNG) and eventually the Croatian
Army (HV).

Organizational Overview
The MUP in May 1990 had only a single armed unit – a special operations /
antiterrorist force about the size of a company – and a total of 15.000 rifles (or possibly a
combination of that many rifles and pistols).91 From this unpromising base, the Croatians
embarked on a three-step program to turn the MUP into an army. First, they began
recruiting to enlarge the regular public security police force, both to reduce and dilute the
presence of ethnic Serbs in the force and to expand the Croatian security presence in Serb
areas through the establishment of new police stations. Second, the MUP established
training centres which produced “special units” that became in effect military formations.
Finally, the MUP began to expand its police reserve units at the regional level. Meanwhile,
the Ministry of Defence – with no more units to direct after the loss of the Territorial
Defence – began recruiting company-size volunteer units as well as unarmed volunteer
guards. All of these formations – except the original national antiterrorist unit – were used
to create the National Guard Corps (ZNG) in May and June 1991. As soon as its combat units
had been transferred to the ZNG the MUP started all over again to form additional special
police units to supplement the ZNG.

Organization and Training of the MUP Regular Police

The Public Security Service of the MUP – the regular police – were divided among
county-level “police administrations”, one for each of Croatia’s twenty-one counties
(zupanija). The police administrations’ regular police units were then subdivided into one
public security station per municipality. By January 1991 the regular police had been

90
Belgrade Tanjug, 17 May 1990.
91
Silber and Little, p. 107.

48
enlarged by at least 3.000 personnel to between 15.000 and 20.000. By bringing additional
ethnic Croatians into the regular force, the Croatian Government hoped both to decrease
the number of Serbs in absolute and percentage terms and to move Croatian personnel into
police stations in Serb territory.92 To upgrade its personnel, the MUP established as many as
five training centres, several of which were colocated with special police battalions.93

Organization and Training of the MUP Special Police,

Summer 1990 – Spring 1991
The Croatian Special Police units – organized into battalions or battalion-sized units
– appear to have numbered 3.000 troops by December 1990. The MUP probably began
planning for the new special police force in June or July 1990 and began recruiting in
September or October. The Special Police appear to have included formations directly
subordinate to MUP headquarters and some units directly subordinate to the regional
police administrations. The formation and activities of the Rakitje Special Police Battalion
“Tigers” – one of the units directly subordinate to MUP headquarters and which later served
as the nucleus for the ZNG/HV 1st Guards Brigade – will serve to illustrate how the MUP
went about creating the special police units.
In fall 1990 the Croatian MUP sent several hundred volunteers ostensibly for police
training to the “Simunska” police training centre. About 250 of these volunteers were then
told off into a battalion and sent to a raw new centre in Rakitje, just west of Zagreb, for an
entirely different and secret purpose. With no experience in organizing a military unit, few
facilities for military training, and neither cadre nor non commissioned officers to help
them, their officers started out with the basics, creating a training plan that began and
continued with a strong focus on physical fitness – a virtual necessity since early firearms
training had to be conducted with a minimum of weapons and an absence of firing ranges.
Other basic elements of military organization and practice included morning reveille and
formation for the raising of the Croatian colors and the playing of the national anthem, and
the command staff gradually lengthened training time and the length of the workday to
something like military dimensions. By December of 1990 the battalion had come far
enough to be organized into four companies and designated a special military formation
within the police force, and its staff began to develop contingency planning for the defence
of Zagreb. By January 1991, the unit had drawn in more volunteers, including some from
Bosnia, and numbered more than 300 personnel. To preserve the fiction that these were
policemen and not members of an illegal paramilitary formation, the special police had to
take the same MUP exam required for the regular police. But the battalion was beginning to
drill and train regularly with the weapons the MUP was buying abroad, including Armbrust
antitank rockets. The training facilities, however, remained rudimentary.

92
Belgrade Tanjug, 14 August 1990; See also Silber and Little, p. 146, footnote 4.
93
Belgrade Politika, 21 April 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 14 August 1990.

49
 In January 1991, as the threat of JNA intervention against the Croatian Government
grew, the battalion began providing around-the-clock guard service at key government
buildings. Elements of the battalion also helped escort secret arms shipments coming into
Croatia from abroad. Contingency planners also gave the unit the assignment of defending
the western part of Zagreb against a drive on the city by the JNA armoured brigade
stationed in Jastrebarsko. It saw its first action in February 1991 when – in conjunction with
the Lucko Antiterrorist Unit (Lucko ATJ) – it successfully moved into the town of Pakrac in
western Slavonia to evict armed Serbs who had taken over the local police station. The
Pakrac operation dispelled any illusions the Croatian commanders might have that they
would or could function as policemen, not soldiers. The 200 riot shields the battalion took to
Pakrac proved useless against the automatic weapons wielded by their Serb opponents. The
battalion’s final operation as a police formation in March – the “battle” at Plitvice Lakes –
underlined the combat nature of its future work and foreshadowed its emergence as a fully
military element of the National Guard Corps.94
During the first two weeks in May, the last stage in the transformation of all the
MUP Special Police battalions into military units began. The MUP created its first higher-
level formation, the Special Police Brigade, combining the four Special Police battalions in
the Zagreb area. The new brigade, however, would never see action under this title as two
weeks later it underwent a further transformation into the 1 st Brigade of the National
Guard Corps.95

Organization of the MUP Reserve Police

Little information on the structure of the MUP reserve police has emerged since
1991, although its organization can roughly be discerned from the ZNG successor
formations. It appears that the MUP organized reserve formations for almost every regional
police administration. The MUP probably began organizing the reserve units sometime
during fall of 1990 and, by June 1991, may have had as many as 10.000 personnel organized
into about 16 battalion-sized formations and 10 company-sized units, although a sizable
portion of this total probably lacked weapons. For example, in the Zupanja municipality
(opstina), volunteers for apparent MUP reserve units began to organize in late October
1990.96 MUP reserve personnel probably were recruited primarily from among politically
reliable police reservists, along with men selected from TO lists and from Tudjman’s political
party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). It is unlikely these units saw much, if any,
action before they were incorporated into the ZNG in June 1991, although many did deploy
to wartime locations during the January 1991 confrontation between the JNA and the
Croatian Government.

94
Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16. See also an interview
with Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic, a founding member of the “Tigers” in Boris Komadina: A Tiger Fighting
for Croatia, Hrvatski Obzor, 6 November 1995, pp. 28-29.
95
Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16; The 1st Guards Brigade.
96
Zlatko Djurjevic: On to Freedom with Patriotism and Courage, Hrvatski Vojnik, 16 July 1993, p. 18.

50
 Federal estimates of the size of the Croatian MUP reserve appear to have been
consistently overestimated. The SSUP report noted in the footnotes states that on 31 May
1990 there were 10.589 personnel on the MUP reserve list, while between mid-October
1990 and 10 January 1991 the number of reservists increased to 22.865, and by 21 January
it increased by another 9.327 members for a total estimate of some 45.000 personnel on its
rosters at the end of January. Borisav Jovic in his notes claims that on 25 January 1991,
during the JNA-Croatian confrontation over the Croatian “paramilitary” forces and weapons
shipments, that the Croatians had mobilized 50.000 “reserve” policemen. Although the
SSUP report showing the reserves on 31 May probably is accurate, it almost certainly
includes Serbian reservists whom the Croatians obviously intended either to purge or leave
inactive. In addition, the increases which both the SSUP and Jovic claim are probably
exaggerated. The first chief of the HV Main Staff, General Anton Tus, stated in 1996 that in
late May the Croatians had “only a few thousand” personnel in the MUP in addition to the
ZNG; this number would have included MUP reservists since they had not yet been
transferred to the ZNG. The Croatian MUP reserve units and MoD volunteer troops probably
numbered about 7.000 by December 1990 – January 1991. Some of the discrepancies in
MUP and ZNG personnel estimates probably can be attributed to personnel added to MUP
rosters as individuals but who had not received weapons or been organized into a unit.97 It
seems clear from descriptions of the newly formed ZNG reserve units that they were
expanded from original MUP reserve units to which were added unorganized reservists
drawn from the MUP general reserve roster. The 114th Split Brigade, for example,
reportedly placed most of its armed personnel, comprising the MUP reserve unit, into a
single battalion, implying that the brigade’s other battalions were formed from something
other than a MUP reserve unit.98

Organization of the Ministry of Defence and Volunteer Units,

August 1990 – April 1991
The Croatian Ministry of Defence, having lost the weapons stocks of the Territorial
Defence to the JNA, had little to do with the organization of Croatian military forces until
Colonel-General Martin Spegelj, a retired JNA officer, became Minister of Defence on 24
August 1990. Spegelj appears to have made the acquisition of foreign weapons an

97
This is based on an estimate of about 500 personnel per battalion-sized unit and 150 per independent
company-sized unit. The number of battalions and companies is based on the assessment that each
battalion was, on transfer to the ZNG, activated as a brigade and that each independent company was
activated as an independent battalion. Thus, identifying the number of ZNG formations in June / July 1991
permitted an assessment of police reserve formations.
Information from the SSUP report is drawn from Slobodan Milosevic: The Croatian Army: The Laundering of
Weapons, Nin, 7 June 1991, p. 35. Jovic entry for 25 January 1991. The Special Police had an estimated
force of 3.000, while MUP reservists and volunteer MoD units are estimated at about 7.000 personnel as of
December 1990.
98
Velebit, 21 February 1997, p. 14.

51
immediate top priority, although the MoD does not seem to have begun to create new
military units to replace the TO until late in the year.
Despite the loss of the TO weapons, the MoD retained its pre-confiscation
municipal defence offices – “Secretariats for National Defence” – throughout Croatia. These
had previously been responsible for maintaining the TO weapons depots and the
mobilization rosters necessary to call up recruits and reservists in each area. These offices
provided the MoD with an organizational framework with which to organize men into new
units if weapons could be found for them.99
The MoD first began to organize some company-sized volunteer units in August
1990, in the aftermath of the Serb uprising in Knin. The evolution of a company in Zagreb
probably is a good example of how things proceeded. On 17 August 1990, Zvonimir
Cervenko, the Chief of the Zagreb City Secretariat for National Defence, summoned the
city’s district defence secretariat chiefs to a meeting to discuss the organization of Zagreb’s
defences.100 About 10 days after this meeting, 10 people from the Podsused Secretariat –
one of Zagreb’s districts – met secretly to discuss the organization of a volunteer company.
On 9 September the unit began forming. The people involved recruited only individuals they
knew to be reliable. The unit set up an alert system and established protected hidden
mobilization sites; few written records were kept for security reasons. (See Figure 1 below.)
The company initially consisted of about 60 personnel and coordinated its activities with the
city secretariat and also the MUP’s Rakitje Special Police Battalion. By November 1990, the
company was fully officered, had been issued weapons (though its antitank weapons were
limited to Molotov cocktails and some mines), and its soldiers had begun training on the few
weapons they had. The company made its public debut in January 1991, after the JNA
threatened to disarm the Croatian “paramilitaries”, when it deployed with a Special Police
unit to guard the western approaches to the city, including key bridges and tunnels. The
company did not see combat until after the outbreak of war in fall 1991, when it had
probably been transferred to the ZNG.101
Another example of a locally organized MoD force was in the Virovitica area where
the local municipality (opstina) assembly formed a staff to organize armed detachments
throughout the municipality in coordination with the MoD. The units were organized into
territorial platoons equipped with home-made weapons and some automatic rifles. By
December 1990, Virovitica had about 550 personnel available to guard key facilities. During
the tension with the JNA in January 1991, the volunteer units reportedly surrounded local
JNA garrisons and blocked approaches to the city.102
By March 1991, still plagued by a lack of weapons, the MoD began to organize
unarmed local “National Protection Councils” whose immediate purpose seems to have
been something like a “neighbourhood watch” to guard key facilities.103 General Spegelj
99
Vesna Puljak: Born in the Underground, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 12.
100
Cervenko later became Chief of the Croatian Army General Staff in spring 1995.
101
Vesna Puljak: Born in the Underground, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 12.
102
Zlatko Djurjevic: On to Freedom with Patriotism and Courage, Hrvatski Vojnik, 16 July 1993, p. 18.
103
Gordan Lausic: A Symbol of Croatian Victory – The 125th Brigade, Hrvatski Vojnik, 22 October 1993, p. 12.

52
stated at the time that they had a “Gandhi-like mission” to bring masses of unarmed citizens
into the streets and around bridges and city approaches to deter the JNA from overthrowing
their government.104 Although this seems unrealistic, the organization of manpower – even
without weapons – would allow the ZNG and HV to group these “National Protection” units
into real combat units once weapons became available in fall 1991.

104
Zagreb Danas, 26 March 1991, pp. 11-13.

53
 Chart 1
Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs
County Police Administrations and Training Centers

Zagreb Police Administration

Krapina-Zagorje Police Administration
Sisak Police Administration
Karlovac Police Administration
Varazdin Police Administration
Koprivnica-Krizevci Police Administration
Bjelovar Police Administration
Rijeka Police Administration
Gospic Police Administration
Virovitica Police Administration
Pozega Police Administration
Slavonski Brod Police Administration
Zadar Police Administration
Sibenik Police Administration
Osijek Police Administration
Vukovar Police Administration
Vinkovci Police Administration
Split Police Administration
Pula Police Administration
Dubrovnik Police Administration
Cakovec Police Administration
“Simunska” Education and Training Centre (Zagreb)
“Rakitje” Education and Training Centre / Centre for Training of Special Units,
Rakitje
“Kumrovec” Education and Training Centre
“Pionirski Grad” Education and Training Centre (Zagreb)
“Valbadon” Education and Training Centre / Centre for Police Training (Pula)105

105
“Simunska” may have been able to train up to 2.000 recruits. It appears to have been the basic induction
centre for the Croatian MUP. “Rakitje” reportedly had space to train 350 personnel. “Kumrovec” reportedly
had space to train 600 personnel. “Pionirski Grad” reportedly had space to train 600 personnel. “Valbadon”
reportedly had space to train 750 personnel. Belgrade Politika, 21 April 1991.

54
 Chart 2
Special Police Units
Directly Subordinate to Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs HQ
December 1990 – May 1991

Anti-terrorist Unit Lucko – pre-war formation

Rakitje Battalion “Tigers” – formed July / August 1990106 107
Kumrovec Battalion – formed July / August 1990
Dubrava Battalion – formed by December 1990
Tuskanac Battalion “Cobras” – formed by December 1990

106
The battalions in bold face formed the Special Brigade of the MUP in early May 1991.
107
Each battalion is estimated to have had 250 to 300 personnel.

55
 Chart 3
Croatian Reserve Police Units May 1991
(Assessed)

Zagreb Police Administration

• 4 battalion-size units
• 3 company-sized units
Krapina Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Varazdin Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Bjelovar Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
• 1 company-size unit
Virovitica Police Administration
• 1 company-size unit
Osijek Police Administration
• 2 battalion-size units
Slavonski Brod Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Vinkovci Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Karlovac Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Rijeka Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Zadar Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Sibenik Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Split Police Administration
• 1 battalion-size unit
Cakovec Police Administration
• 1 company-size unit
Sisak Police Administration
• 3 company-size units
Dubrovnik Police Administration
• 1 company-size unit
Pozega Police Administration
• 1 company-size unit

56
 Figure 1
Text of “The Oldest Order Preserved” – Podsused Volunteer
Company108

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ZAGREB-SUSEDGRAD 2 OCTOBER 1990
ORDER

1. THE PODSUSED INDEPENDENT COMPANY

IN THE EVENT OF JNA AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF

CROATIA, THE CITY OF ZAGREB, AND THE CROATIAN
GOVERNMENT AFTER RECEIVING THE ORDER TO BEGIN ARMED
COMBAT, CARRY OUT THIS COMBAT ORDER.

IN THE ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PODSUSED

COMPANY, WITHIN THE BORDERS OF DONJI JAREK
(INCLUSIVE) AND THE JANKOMIR BRIDGE (INCLUSIVE), JNA
FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED

– FROM THE DIRECTION OF JASTREBARSKI

AN ARMORED BATTALION TOWARD THE PODSUSED AND

JANKOMIR BRIDGE

– FROM THE DIRECTION OF BREZICE

AN ARMORED-MECHANIZED BATTALION TOWARD THE BRIDGE

ON THE KREPINI-PODSUSED RIVER

– THE AREA OF JAGODISTE AND GORNJI JAREK, AN AIR ASSAULT.

THE GOAL OF THE ENEMY STRIKE IS TO LIQUIDATE THE LEADERS

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND ESTABLISH SERBIAN
AUTHORITY.

ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS ORDERED ABOVE THE FOLLOWING

HAS BEEN DECIDED:

THE PODSUSED INDEPENDENT COMPANY, REINFORCED BY

RAKITJA SPECIAL POLICE, WILL OCCUPY POSITIONS TO DEFEND
THE FOLLOWING:

1ST PLATOON: ESTABLISH POSITIONS AND PREPARE FOR

DEFENSE IN GORNJI JAREK UP TO THE BOLONJA TUNNEL.

2ND PLATOON: THE PODSUSED BRIDGE ON THE OLD SAMOBOR-

BUKOVINC ROAD

108
Taken from Vesna Puljak: Born in the Underground, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 12.

57
3RD PLATOON: THE JUGORAPID-FACTORY – THE JANKOMIR
BRIDGE

CARRY OUT ALL PREPARATIONS, BUT DO NOT ACT WITHOUT AN

ORDER FROM THE CITY SECRETARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE IN
RAKITIJA. SECRETARY OF THE SUSEDGRAD SNO, Z. PRPIC

58
 Annex 3
Croatia Creates An Army – The National Guard Corps,
May – September 1991
By spring 1991 the Croatian Government was ready to move forward to the next
phase in its development of armed forces, moving ever closer to the overt creation of a
“Croatian Army” through the formation of the National Guard Corps (ZNG). In the earlier
phases of Croatian rearmament the MUP played the key role, but now the Croatian MoD
became the focal point for Croatian military development efforts. The MUP, however, was
still the only Croatian armed force active in the escalating series of military confrontations
with the Croatian Serbs. On 10 April 1991 President Tudjman’s State Supreme Council –
equivalent to the US National Security Council – announced that the MUP “Special Purpose
Force, in order to acquire a more suitable organization and training, were placed under the
Defence Ministry as a special formation, the National Guard Corps”.109 On 18 April, the
Croatian parliament passed into law the bills submitted by Tudjman’s government to
establish the ZNG. The law prescribed that the ZNG would deal with “the defence of the
state borders of Croatia, will defend its territorial integrity, and prevent terrorist operations
in the Republic”.

Formation
President Tudjman himself administered the oath of service to newly transferred
former special police units at the Zagreb soccer stadium on 28 May 1991, formally
establishing the ZNG. At its birth the ZNG consisted of four active-duty brigades drawn from
the Special Police and a special operations battalion formed by a cadre of former French
Foreign Legionnaires serving with the Special Police. The total force numbered probably
about 3.000 to 4.000 troops, as measured by earlier Special Police totals.110 These

109
Belgrade Tanjug, 10 April 1991.
110
Interview with Corps General Anton Tus, first Chief of the Croatian General Staff, Igor Alborghetti: In
Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-17, 59. Tus states
that the ZNG had about 2.000 troops in May upon formation; this total seems low when compared to
earlier numbers of Special Police in the MUP. Not all four brigades were ready for combat, however, upon
the ZNG’s foundation. The 2nd Guards Brigade was formed from the following units in June:
1st Battalion – Cadres from Special Police Training Centres and Rakitje Battalion
2nd Battalion – Special Police / Sisak Police Administration
3rd Battalion – Special Police / Karlovac Police Administration
Vesna Puljak: Thunders’ From Banija, Hrvatski Vojnik, 6 May 1994, pp. 19-20; Vlado Vurusic and Ivo
Pukanic: The Commander of the Fourth Guard Brigade is 25 Years Old, and All the Members of the Lucko
ATJ Are Taller Than 180 Centimeters!, Zagreb Globus, 26 May 1995, pp. 48-49; Neven Miladin: The Strength
of the Black Mambas, Zagreb Velebit, 26 January 1996, pp. 16-17; Neven Miladin: Proven Military Skill,
Zagreb Velebit, 8 March 1996, pp. 14-15.
The 3rd Guards in Osijek appears to have been formed in May / June from the following units:
1st Battalion – Special Police / Osijek Police Administration
2nd Battalion – Special Police / Vinkovci Police Administration
3rd Battalion – Special Police / Slavonski Brod Police Administration

59
formations were to form the backbone of first the ZNG and then the Croatian Army (HV)
throughout the 1991-1995 wars. The brigades were often split up in company-sized and
battalion-sized elements during the first year of their existence to give professional
stiffening and support to local MUP and reserve ZNG units. From June to September 1991,
the ZNG Guards brigades were the only Croatian units fully equipped with small arms,
though they continued to lack heavy weapons. For antitank weapons they had only hand-
held antitank rocket launchers, notably the “Armbrusts” purchased abroad. The Guards
brigades are estimated to have had about 2.000 personnel each, for a total of 8.000, by July
1991.111

Expansion
In early June the Croatian MUP began transferring police reserve units to the ZNG
to provide it with territorially organized reserve brigades and independent battalions.112 The
order to form most of these new units was issued on 28 June and went into effect on 2
July.113 (See Chart 1) Most of these formations, however, were desperately short of small
arms and had virtually no antitank weapons or mortars. A nominal brigade, therefore, was
probably able to field no more than one armed battalion, and the independent battalions
only about a company of men, and many of these would have only hunting rifles and home-
made hand grenades. For example, the 57th Independent Sisak Battalion in June had 60
hunting rifles and 40 automatic rifles, while the 114th Split Brigade had only 620 rifles –
mostly M-48 Yugoslav copies of German WW II bolt action rifles – by the end of July. The

The 4th Guards in Split probably was formed in May from Special Police units in the Dalmatian region.
Former French Foreign Legion soldiers were to play a large role in the formation and history of the Croatian
military during 1991-1995. The first of these arrived in 1990 and began training as part of the MUP’s Lucko
Antiterrorist Unit. On 18 May 1991 the MoD ordered the formation of the Zrinski Battalion with former
Legion personnel led by Ante Roso and his deputy Miljenko Filipovic as the battalion’s command cadre.
According to Filipovic, 27 volunteers drawn from the 300 personnel at the MUP’s Kumrovec training centre
were the unit’s first troops. The Legionnaires’ strict selection procedures required all men to be 25 years or
younger, be psychologically and physically fit, and have no family obligations.
Snjezana Dukic: If We Had Been Only 10 Minutes late ..., Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 May 1994, p. 9, an
interview with Colonel Miljenko Filipovic. See also Marko Barisic: The Colonel or the Corpse, Slobodna
Dalmacija, 24 November 1993, p. 6, which is a profile of General Ante Roso, who became the most senior
ex-Foreign Legionnaire in the HV and HVO. An article by Mate Basic: As An Old Member of the Foreign
Legion, I Do Not Fight For Money, But Because I Am Drawn By the Smell of the Enemy!, Zagreb Globus, 12
August 1994, pp. 49-50; an interview with another ex-Foreign Legionnaire. The Zrinski Battalion was to
become one of the best combat units in the Croatian Army and the lineal progenitor of the 3rd Guards
Parachute Battalion / 1st Croatian Guards Zdrug / 1st Croatian Guards Corps.
111
The 1st Guards had six manoeuvre battalions by September 1991 and probably numbered about 3.000 to
3.500 personnel. Boris Komadina: A Tiger Fighting for Croatia (interview with Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic),
Hrvatski Obzor, 6 November 1995, pp. 28-29.
112
Interview with General Mladen Markac, commander of MUP Special Police, Jasminka Ivancic: Specialists –
Men for Hellish Missions, Zagreb Vjesnik, 20 April 1994, pp. 4-5. An article on the 114th Split Brigade notes
that its first main armed unit were MUP reserve police, which were used to form the 1st Battalion. Zeljko
Stipanovic: The Pride of Croatia’s South, Zagreb Velebit, 21 February 1997, p. 14.
113
Multiple issues of the Croatian military journals Hrvatski Vojnik and Velebit. In addition, the two editions of
the Croatian Army insignia book, Hrvatsko Ratno Znakovlje by Ankica Tudjman, provide additional
information from formation dates stitched on brigade patches.

60
114th reportedly spent most of its first two months searching for weapons and uniforms.114
The organization of some “brigades” at the time also provides some indication of the ZNG’s
ability to equip its personnel. The 112th Zadar Brigade in July was organized into one active-
duty company and four reserve companies, rather than battalions.115 The ZNG reserve units
probably had some 40.000 personnel more or less organized by July 1991, but probably less
than half of these were armed.116 The reserve units would not begin receiving sufficient
weapons and equipment until the latter half of September 1991, after the Croatians began
capturing large numbers of JNA barracks and depots, which contained most of the weapons
for the former Republic TO. Although their lack of experience, weapons, discipline, and
training limited the combat value of the ZNG reserve brigades, they were to provide the
bulk of Croatian manpower when the fighting with Serb forces escalated during July and
August 1991 and in the first days of full-scale war with the JNA in mid- September.

Post-ZNG Organization of New MUP Special Police

The formation of the ZNG left the MUP with a single combat unit, the Lucko ATJ, so
it began recruiting new active-duty Special Police companies for each police administration.
Some of these units were later expanded to battalion size, although many of them included
reservists as well. Like their predecessors, the new Special Police units would receive good
training and equipment and would join with the ZNG Guards Brigades in spearheading
Croatian ground operations throughout the 1991 war.117 The new Special Police probably
numbered 2.000 to 3.000 active duty troops by August 1991, possibly reinforced by another
4.000 to 7.000 reservists.118

Creation of the ZNG Command and National Command and Control

On 3 July 1991, President Tudjman appointed a new Defence Minister, Sime
Djodan, and made former Defence Minister General Spegelj the new commander of the

114
Sinisa Haluzan: Sisak’s Heart on Front Line, Hrvatski Vojnik, 6 May 1994, pp. 22-24; Damir Dukic: The
Scorpions in Defence of Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, pp. 16-18. See also Sinisa Haluzan: The
Croatian Heart of the Fighting Men from Banija, Hrvatski Vojnik, 23 April 1993, p. 18 for a description of
57th Battalion’s lack of weapons and uniforms. The battalion transport was a collection of livestock trucks.
115
Gordan Lausic and Dejan Frigelj: St. Krsevan and 112th Defending Zadar, Hrvatski Vojnik, 18 June 1993, p.
14.
116
This is based on an estimate of 2.000 personnel for each of the 16 identified ZNG reserve brigades and 500
for each of the 13 identified independent battalions. The Croatians almost certainly never put all of these
personnel in the field. There are indications that when units rotated personnel passed the rifles of the
departing troops to the incoming ones because of the weapons shortage.
117
Jasminka Ivancic: Specialists – Men For Hellish Missions, Zagreb Vjesnik, 20 April 1994, pp. 4-5, interview
with General Mladen Markac, commander of MUP Special Police. Photographs of Special Police troops in
late 1991 showed them to be better equipped and far better disciplined than the ZNG/HV reserve units
that fought alongside them. Many Special Police units probably were better trained than even most of the
ZNG Guards. See The Balkans on Fire by Yves Debay and James Hill, pp. 43-47, for a series of photographs
of Special Police in eastern Slavonia.
118
This is based on an estimate of 100 to 150 active-duty Special Police and 200 to 350 reservists for each
police administration.

61
ZNG with former Yugoslav Air Force Colonel Imra Agotic as his chief of staff. Prior to this, the
ZNG field units appear to have reported directly to the Ministry of Defence. Command and
control over both MUP and ZNG forces, however, remained difficult with insufficient
regional and local command structures in place to exercise authority over ill-disciplined
troops – particularly the ZNG reservists – involved in chaotic situations. Coordination at the
local level reportedly was particularly poor, and lack of consultation among many regular
MUP, ZNG and Special Police in Serb-dominated areas made it virtually impossible for the
Croatians to mass their limited forces in sufficient number to take on Croatian Serb forces.
The Croatian Supreme State Council on 17 July ordered the formation of a national-
level Crisis Staff with subordinate regional and municipal crisis staffs to coordinate political,
ZNG and police activities throughout the country.119 The crisis staffs were not true military
command structures, but rather highly politicized bodies often subservient to local HDZ
officials who often had neither the military experience nor the authority to command MUP
and ZNG combat units. Few of them coordinated their activities with the national crisis staff
in Zagreb with any regularity. Despite several changes in leadership, the national staff
proved unable to exert authority over the regional staffs, and labored in vain from June
through August to develop a sound national defence plan.
General Spegelj’s resignation on 3 August further disrupted the Croatian command
system, leaving the relatively junior Colonel Agotic in charge of the ZNG during the crucial
run-up to full-scale war in September.120 Agotic remained the senior Croatian military
commander of ZNG troops in the field until the formation of the Main Staff of the Croatian
Army under former JNA general Anton Tus in late September. Croatian military command
and control at all levels remained generally dismal until Tus took control and transformed
the ZNG into the Croatian Army with a real military command system. Tus’s advent
represented the final stage in Croatia’s development of a true military establishment.121

119
The national Crisis Staff consisted of Prime Minister Josip Manolic, Defense Minister Sime Djodan, National
Guard commander General Martin Spegelj, Internal Affairs Minister Onesin Cvitan, Deputy Internal Affairs
Minister Slavko Degoricija, “Minister for Emigration“ (and Deputy Defense Minister) Gojko Susak, Civil
Defense commander Josip Slunjski, and two presidential advisers. Belgrade Tanjug, 17 July 1991. The
regional staffs usually were headed by the senior political or party officials of the regional counties
(zupanija), and included the regional police administration chiefs, regional civil defense chiefs, regional
Ministry of Defense heads, and appropriate ZNG commanders. Municipal staffs consisted of the
municipality political leadership, probably the police station chief, civil defense and local Ministry of
Defense secretariats, and local ZNG commanders.
120
See Volume I main text for a more detailed discussion of Croatian strategy.
121
See section and Annex 11: The Croatian Army Rises – September to December 1991.

62
 Chart 1
Croatian National Guard Corps Units and Date of Formation,
May – August 1991

Active Brigades and Independent Battalions

Zrinski Battalion – 18 May 1991
1st Guards Brigade122 – 25 May 1991
2nd Guards Brigade – May/June 1991
3rd Guards Brigade – May/June 1991
4th Guards Brigade – 28 May 1991

Reserve Brigades and Independent Battalions123

99th Zagreb-Pescenica Brigade
100th Zagreb Brigade
101st Zagreb-Susegrad Brigade
102nd Novi Zagreb Brigade
103rd Krapina Brigade
104th Varazdin Brigade
105th Bjelovar Brigade
106th Osijek Brigade
107th Valpovo Brigade
108th Slavonski Brod Brigade
109th Vinkovci Brigade
110th Karlovac Brigade
111th Rijeka Brigade
112th Zadar Brigade
113th Sibenik Brigade
114th Split Brigade – 1 June 1991
117th Koprivnica Brigade – late August 1991
118th Gospic Brigade – 26 August 1991
120th Sisak Brigade – 15 August 1991
50th Independent Virovitica Battalion
51st Independent Vrbovec Battalion
52nd Independent Pula Battalion – not formed124
122
The original four active duty ZNG brigades – usually referred to at this time and during 1991-1992 as “A-
brigades” – will be referred to hereafter as “Guards Brigades” even though they did not formally assume
these titles until December 1992. The territorially raised ZNG (later HV) reserve brigades (often referred to
as “R-brigades”) will be designated by their numeric designator and regional title, e.g., 106th Osijek
Brigade.
123
Other than where noted, the Ministry of Defence ordered the formation of all R-brigades and independent
battalions on 28 June 1991. This order took effect on 2 July 1991.
124
The 52nd Independent Pula Battalion was not formed and the unit designator was later allocated to a
ZNG/HV independent battalion in Daruvar (western Slavonia). The HV claims that the ZNG was unable to

63
 53rd Independent Dugo Selo Battalion
54th Independent Cakovec Battalion
55th Independent Bjelovar Battalion
56th Independent Kutina Battalion
57th Independent Sisak Battalion – 15 June 1991
61st Independent Jastrebarsko Battalion
62nd Independent Novska Battalion
63rd Independent Pozega Battalion – 7 June 1991
65th Independent Ivanic-Grad Battalion
Klek Battalion (Ogulin) – 7 July 1991
Metkovic Battalion
Makarska Battalion

form the battalion because of JNA, counterintelligence operations against the ZNG in the Istrian peninsula
and a shortage of weapons. Gordan Lausic: The 119th Brigade – The Pride of Istria, Hrvatski Vojnik, 23 April
1993, p. 15. While this may be true, there are also indications that the mixed ethnic population of Istria was
less than enthusiastic about Croatian secession from Yugoslavia, and JNA counterintelligence almost
certainly tried to exploit this apathy, so recruiting for the ZNG and HV suffered. The HV was unable to
deploy a single combat brigade from the Istrian peninsula in combat prior to January 1992, and even the
Istrian volunteer company of only 45 men it sent to the Dubrovnik front had to be withdrawn after 11 days
of combat. Gordan Lausic: The 119th Brigade – The Pride of Istria, Hrvatski Vojnik,23 April 1993, p. 15;
Gordan Lausic: Croatian Armed Forces, 154th Brigade: Force of Croatian Istria, Hrvatski Vojnik, 7 May 1993.
pp. 28-30.

64
 Chart 2
Croatian Ministers of Defence – August 1990 – December 1991

Colonel General Martin Spegelj, August 1990 – July 1991

Sime Djodan, July – August 1991
Luka Bebic, August – September 1991
Gojko Susak, September 1991 to current

65
 Annex 4
The Arming of the Croatian Government Forces,
May 1990 – August 1991
The JNA’s confiscation of Croatia’s TO weapons stocks in May 1990 forced Zagreb
to look to the worldwide gray arms market for the weapons it needed for its fledgling
forces. How early Croatia began actively pursuing such arms deals is not clear, but the
acquisition process gained momentum after General Spegelj became Minister of Defence in
August 1990. Spegelj claims he traveled to Budapest in October 1990 and contracted with
Hungarian Government officials for the shipment of as many as 30.000 AK-47 rifles, 40 SA-7
hand-held surface to air missiles, 40 launchers for rocket-propelled grenades, and other
equipment for a total of 11 million Deutschmarks.125 Probably no more than 10.000 of the
rifles were actually transported to Croatia.126 The Croatians also bought a number of
Romanian-manufactured AKM rifles, SAR-80 rifles manufactured in Singapore, Ultimax light
machine guns, and “Armbrust” antitank rockets.127 Franjo Greguric, head of the Zagreb-
based “Astra” import-export firm, was probably the government’s primary procurement
official and the conduit to both the MoD and MUP.128 Gojko Susak, the Croatian Minister for

125
Belgrade Tanjug 10 July 1995.
Tanjug drew this information from a July 1995 Zagreb Globus interview with Spegelj. Unfortunately, a copy
of that edition was unavailable for this study.
Spegelj reportedly claims that his arms smuggling had the direct support of the Hungarian Government and
President Jozef Antal. He is reported to have stated that:
I was personally on very good terms with Antal, ... I am convinced he was the one who ordered
that the arms be sold to us at the lowest price, and that all the arms we need be delivered to us.
Spegelj reports that on 5 October 1990 he and the Croatian foreign minister negotiated the purchase of
30.000 AK-47s or AKMs at a price of 280 DM apiece, along with other arms and equipment, in a meeting
held in the foreign ministry with the President of Tehnika, a Hungarian military equipment import-export
firm. The Hungarian offer was a great bargain for the Croatians, who (according to Spegelj) had been
buying AK-47/AKMs at 700 DM a piece. A total of 11 million DM worth of equipment was purchased,
including 40 S-2M and 60 RPGs.
126
The Hungarian Government acknowledged in 1990 that it had shipped 10.000 AK-47 rifles to the Croatians,
but had then stopped further shipments. A Hungarian lawyer filed a claim with the Hungarian privatization
agency in June 1997 on behalf of the Croatian Government to recover money paid for weapons that they
never received. The Croatians want $ 985.000 plus interest from the money they originally transferred to
Technika, which has since been liquidated. Reuters 20 June 1997.
127
The Romanian weapons were first observed during the ZNG formation parade on 28 May 1991.
Photographs of ZNG personnel later in 1991 confirm their possession of weapons from Singapore.
128
Greguric’s involvement in early Croatian arms deals has been widely publicized in the Croatian and
Yugoslav press. Zagreb Danas noted as early as August 1991 that Greguric was involved in deals to import
AK-47s while he was head of “Astra”. Darko Pavicic: Success on the Third Try, Zagreb Danas, 6 August 1991,
pp. 16-17. Globus reported in early 1995 that Greguric arranged the first arms imports into Croatia. Davor
Butkovic: The Last Showdown With the Boys From Hennessy: Will the Croatian Government Go Down With
Them?, Zagreb Globus, 24 March 1995, pp. 8-9. The Belgrade press claimed in February 1991 that Greguric
had tried to acquire 36.000 AK-47s from the Soviet Union, but the deal fell through. To cover up the real
Croatian destination, Greguric reportedly wanted the arms to be exported to South American and African
dealers used by Astra for genuine arms deals with these countries. Greguric almost certainly used similar
methods for shipments that did make it through from other countries. Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 1
February 1991. Serbian President of the Federal Presidency Borisav Jovic noted in January 1991 that:

66
Emigrant Affairs and Deputy Minister of Defence, played a key role in Croatian arms
acquisitions by funneling funds from Croatian expatriates into Zagreb’s coffers.129 Susak
stated in September 1991 that through his efforts the Croatian Government had received in
excess of DM 30 million, which they used to buy about 5.000 small arms.130 By such means
the Croatians apparently managed to import as many as 30.000 small arms by August 1991,
to augment many as the 15.000 or so rifles and other small arms they reportedly had when
Tudjman took power in 1990.
The Federal authorities appear to have overestimated the number of weapons
available to the nascent Croatian armed forces in the same manner they exaggerated the
forces themselves, especially in early 1991. The Federal Secretary of National Defence,
General Veljko Kadijevic, briefed Jovic on 21 January 1991 from what he claimed were notes
from a meeting between Spegelj and other Croatian officials. The Croatians were said to
have reported that they had 60.000 AK-47 rifles and about 7.000 submachine guns. This is at
odds with the fact that the Croatians were able to arm only about 10.000 “military”
personnel – not including regular police – by January 1991, and Croatian military journals
clearly indicate that during the formation of the ZNG reserve units in mid-1991 there was a
desperate shortage of small arms, with many units being armed with hunting weapons and
World War II military rifles. Kadijevic may have accurately reported information on Croatian
weapons he received from JNA counterintelligence, but it is likely that Spegelj and his
associates – suspecting that their meeting place was bugged – were intentionally
exaggerating the weapons available as a deterrent to JNA military action.

... over the last two months, 10 barges ... have arrived transporting arms and ammunition from
military depots in Hungary. This weaponry and ammunition was acquired by way of the “Astra”,
Work Organization for Foreign Trade in Zagreb.
Jovic entry for 9 January 1991. Jovic’s information clearly came from JNA counterintelligence.
129
Globus noted in spring 1996 that:
Gojko Susak is also one of a small number of people who know which and how many weapons
were bought as well as how the money Croatian emigrants have sent to the country during the last
five years has been distributed. Susak was Minister for Emigration until September 1991.
Davor Butkovic: Who Will Replace Gojko Susak, the Croatian Defence Minister?, Zagreb Globus, 19 April
1996, p. 2.
130
Djurdjica Klancir: What I Spent the 30 Million Marks On, Zagreb Globus, 20 September 1991, p. 14,
interview with Minister for Emigres Gojko Susak. Susak did not directly state that they had acquired 5.000
small arms, but that one-tenth of the weapons being used by the “50,000 people fighting on all Croatian
fronts” had been bought with the emigre money.

67
 Annex 5
Kadijevic Indecisive – The JNA Fails to Halt Secession131
As Croatia and Slovenia began to move further away from Federal Yugoslavia and
create independent military forces, the JNA came to the fore as the only Federal institution
capable and seemingly willing to block their secession efforts – with force if necessary. Army
General Veljko Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary for National Defence132 and a true believer in
a Federal Yugoslavia, was the pivotal figure in the non-shooting war the JNA waged with the
Slovenian and especially the Croatian Governments in 1990-1991. Kadijevic, however,
repeatedly lost his nerve during these political-military confrontations and, despite excellent
intelligence on at least the Croatians’ activities and intentions, he failed to exploit
opportunities for the JNA to strike at the republics and disarm them.
Kadijevic and the JNA, in their campaign against both republics (and particularly
Croatia), used as their principal weapon the JNA Security Directorate (Uprava Bezbednosti –
UB), which was popularly known as “KOS” from its Tito-era abbreviation. KOS followed the
organization and arming of the illegal armed forces during the 1990-1991 period.133 The
JNA’s monitoring of nationalist activities in Croatia began during the rise of the Croatian
nationalist political party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) under Franjo Tudjman,
during 1989-1990. KOS not only organized the Federal surveillance campaigns against the
two republics but laid out the planning for JNA strikes against the Croatian Government and
its “paramilitaries”. The JNA’s first move against the republics, and its only decisive one,
came in May 1990, just as the newly elected Slovenian Government took power and before
Tudjman’s inauguration, when it confiscated the weapons of the republican Territorial
Defence. KOS continued to monitor Croatian efforts to create a military force within the
MUP and developed a plan to eliminate this nascent Croatian army, confiscate its weapons,
and if necessary depose both the Slovene and Croatian Governments. KOS was ready to
activate the plan in early December 1990, but Kadijevic and key elements of the Federal
presidency postponed the move at the last minute. A month later Serbian Federal

131
The following account relies heavily on Borisav Jovic’s journal: The Last Days of the SFRY: Daily Notes From
the Period 15 May 1989 to 8 July 1992, as the only primary source detailing the decision making processes
and planning at the highest levels of the Federal Government. Jovic was the only senior political official
whom the military briefed in full on their planning for operations against the separatist Croatian and
Slovenian Governments. Therefore, although many of the sections below may often rely on a single source,
that source is a singularly reliable one.
132
The Federal Secretary for National Defence (Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu – SSNO) was the
highest military body in the country. The JNA General Staff reported directly to the SSNO. The SSNO
reported directly to the Federal Presidency, the national command authority. In time of war, the
Presidency became known as the Supreme Command (Vrhovna Komanda) and the SSNO and the JNA
General Staff became the staff of the Supreme Command. See Annex 12: National Command Authority in
Yugoslavia.
133
The JNA security service’s formal title was “Security Directorate of the Federal Secretariat for National
Defence”. The term “KOS” (kontraobavestajna sluzba – Counterintelligence Service) refers to an early post-
World War II designator for the Security Directorate. In 1990 – 1991, KOS was directly subordinate to the
Federal defence secretary.

68
Presidency member Borisav Jovic joined with Kadijevic in pressing for action, but when the
confrontation came to a head in the Federal presidency, Jovic and the JNA again backed
down. Kadijevic passed up his last chance to move against the Croatians in March 1991
when Jovic resigned as President of the Presidency to give him a free hand.

The KOS and the Rise of Croatian Nationalism

With the creation of the HDZ in early 1989, KOS began to organize itself to monitor
the growth of nationalism in Croatia through the penetration of senior levels of the Croatian
Government and its nationalist political party.134 It mounted at least two separate
operations for this purpose. Colonel Bosko Kelecevic, Chief of Security for the JNA Fifth
Military District covering Slovenia and most of Croatia, set about enlarging the agent
network which the JNA had developed over years of internal security work, reportedly
infiltrating various organizations, trade companies, and newspapers.135 One of his greatest
reported successes was the spreading of KOS personnel throughout Croatia disguised as
news reporters.136
The second and more well-known major collection operation was a special
organization set up under Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Sabolovic of the Security Department of
the JNA’s Fiftth Air and Air Defence Force Corps in Zagreb, apparently code-named “Vihor”
(Whirlwind), but later more generally known as the “Labrador Group”.137 A former case
officer of the Labrador Group, Branko Tarzivuk, stated in 1993 that the group was
established in the spring of 1989, when KOS and the still-subordinate Croatian State Security
Service (SDB) grew concerned about growing Croatian nationalism. The group’s assignment

134
For a description of the creation and growth of the HDZ, see Chapter 6 A Croatian Rifle on a Croatian
Shoulder, Silber and Little, pp. 82-91.
135
Damir Dukic: KOS is Waking Up Sleepy Friends, Slobodna Dalmacija, 10 May 1994, pp. 6-7. Kelecevic
became chief of the Fifth Military District Security in 1987, after working in security in Croatia for twenty
years. Boris Komadina: Marriage of All Serbian Spies in Plitvice, Zagreb Danas, 22 February 1994, pp. 14-15.
136
Kelecevic reportedly had “an excellent feeling for organization and exceptional energy”. Boris Komadina:
Marriage of All Serbian Spies in Plitvice, Zagreb Danas, 22 February 1994, pp. 14-15. Kelecevic apparently
did well enough for him to remain an active duty officer througout the Croatian war, and became the chief
of staff in the JNA 5th Corps in spring 1992. He served throughout the Bosnian war in the 5th Corps’
successor formation, the Bosnian Serb Army’s 1st Krajina Corps. Kelecevic, promoted twice during the war,
continues, as a Lieutenant Colonel General (two stars), to serve as the post-war corps chief of staff.
137
Sabolovic was a senior officer in the Counterintelligence Group (KOG) of the 5th Air and Air Defence Force
Corps. Sabolovic was an ethnic Croat. Dukic: KOS is Waking Up Sleepy Friends, Slobodna Dalmacija, 10 May
1994, pp. 6-7. Damir Dukic: A Muzzle for Labrador, Slobodna Dalmacija, 11 May 1994, p. 6. The group had
two other prominent controlled agents or case officers. Radenko Radojcic, a former official in the Central
Committee of the Croatian League of Communists, appears to have acted as the group’s link to Sabolovic,
together with Slavko Malobabic, who was a former chief of staff to Stojan Stojcevic, head of the Croatian
League of Communists apparently until the beginning of 1990. Radojcic and Malobabic reportedly had the
task of recruiting additional sub-agents into the group. Damir Dukic: A Muzzle for Labrador, Slobodna
Dalmacija, 11 May 1994, p. 6. Radojcic reportedly had full access to the archives of the State Security
Service (SDB) of the Croatian MUP, which probably gave him considerable leverage over many otherwise
unwilling assets. Uros Komlenovic and Filip Svarm: The Secrets of a Zemun Cell, Vreme, 21 December 1992,
p. 17. See also Kresimir Meler: The Truth About the Labrador Group, Delo, 27 September 1993, p. 5, an
interview w ith Branko Tarzivuk.

69
was to prevent the infiltration of nationalists into the Croatian state administration and to
conduct electronic surveillance against key government officials, including senior
Communist party officials, the HDZ, and JNA personnel. By such means Belgrade intended to
keep current on any nationalist plans of the then-communist Croatian Government and on
HDZ and Croatian nationalist penetrations of the JNA.138
Tarzivuk’s claims that the Labrador Group succeeded in organizing a very strong
intelligence network appear to be borne out by later developments.139 When the Croatians
wrapped up part of the group in October 1991, the identities of some key Labrador assets
became public.140 Senior members of the group – apparently acting as controlled agents of
KOS – reportedly included three Croatian security officers, four officials in the former SDB
(the MUP’s renamed Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order), and two
from the technical services of the Croatian parliament. The Croatian police then arrested
another 50 persons, including senior MUP officials, and the deputy district prosecutor for
Zagreb indicated that this intertwined KOS network had also penetrated widely into political
circles. Labrador in particular appears to have been quite successful in penetrating the MUP,
even more extensively than indicated in the Croatian MUP’s investigation of late 1991.141
Sabolovic later reportedly claimed that only a part of the Labrador network was wrapped
up, and that the essential structures remained intact.142

The JNA Confiscates Territorial Defence Weapons

With the JNA’s access to excellent information on the growth of nationalism in
Croatia and the political gains of the HDZ in particular, KOS provided increasingly pessimistic
assessments of the future of a unitary, “communist” Yugoslavia to the JNA high command.
General Kadijevic relayed these assessments to the Federal Presidency, especially the

138
Kresimir Meler: The Truth about the Labrador Group, Delo, 27 September 1993, p.5, an interview with
Branko Tarzivuk. Prior to his work for the KOS as part of Labrador, Tarzivuk worked for the State Security
Service of the Croatian MUP.
For example, while still in the JNA, Croatian Lieutenant Colonel Mile Dedakovic, later Croatian commander
at Vukovar, claimed that in 1991 he passed information on the disposition of the Fifth MD to the ZNG, but
left the JNA after the Labrador Group discovered him. Veceslav Kocijan: Playing Around with Money and
Weapons, Zagreb Danas, 31 December 1991, pp. 20-21, an interview with Mile “Hawk” Dedakovic.
139
Kresimir Meler: The Truth About the Labrador Group, Delo, 27 September 1993, p. 5, an interview with
Branko Tarzivuk.
140
According to one Belgrade newsmagazine, the Croatians’ partial cracking of Labrador in October 1991 came
about when Lieutenant Colonel Sabolovic departed Zagreb in September 1991 and passed his memo book
to his superior, Mirko Martic. On 15 September, however, Croatian troops captured the Air and Air Defence
Force headquarters in Zagreb, seizing computer codes, disks, and Sabolovic’s memo book, which Martic
had failed to destroy. It took the Croatian MUP one month to exploit the captured information and
announce the arrests of part of the Labrador network. Uros Komlenovic and Filip Svarm: The Secrets of a
Zemun Cell, Vreme, 21 December 1992, p. 17.
141
Uros Komlenovic and Filip Svarm: The Secrets of a Zemun Cell, Vreme, 21 December 1992, p. 17. Also see
Kresimir Meler: The Truth About the Labrador Group, Delo, 27 September 1993, p. 5, an interview with
Branko Tarzivuk.
142
Damir Dukic: A Muzzle for Labrador, Slobodna Dalmacija, 11 May 1994, p. 6.

70
Serbian member of the Federal Presidency, Borisav Jovic.143 On 26 April 1990 – in the
aftermath of the Slovenian elections and the first round of the situation in Yugoslavia:
• Anti-Yugoslav, anti-socialist, and nationalistic forces have won in Slovenia and
Croatia.
• There is a danger and an assumption that the same thing could happen in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, partially in Macedonia, and perhaps to some
extent even in Montenegro.
• In Slovenia, they have already begun, and they will certainly do so in Croatia as
well, to consolidate their programs and to take action against socialism,
communism, and Yugoslavia. They are already acting like victors and think that
no one can touch them any more.
Kadijevic indicated that the Slovenes and Croatians would then begin replacing all
of the current officials in federal political institutions with nationalists while undermining
Croatia’s federal institutions and loosening its ties to Belgrade. Kadijevic claimed that
Tudjman had already announced that a separate military – anathema to the JNA – would be
formed. Concluding that the two republics were on the road to secession, he proposed to
Jovic actions the JNA felt were necessary to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
including:144
To force observance of the SFRY Constitution and federal laws throughout the
country, including Slovenia and Croatia, by all means possible, including political ones,
but by force if necessary.
Kadijevic reported that the JNA was already making contingency plans to take over
Croatia and Slovenia if that should become necessary.145
Kadijevic’s assessment was the product of JNA fears that the situation was getting
out of control. The JNA was particularly concerned about Slovene and Croatian campaign
statements about forming their own militaries and supporting laws barring conscripts from
serving outside their own republics. It was in this context that the JNA – apparently in
league with Jovic – began planning to deal with the perceived threats in Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina by confiscating the republican Territorial Defence weapons stocks
throughout Yugoslavia: If not put under better control, the JNA feared, these stocks could
be readily seized by nationalists to form republican armies and challenge the JNA. As Jovic
was scheduled to become President of the collective Federal Presidency on 15 May, it is
clear that he and the JNA planned to wait until the day after Jovic took office to strike.146 On

143
See Jovic entry for 28 September 1989 and Jovic entry for 19 January 1990.
144
Jovic entry for 26 April 1990.
145
Jovic entry for 26 April 1990.
146
Jovic’s notes do not directly mention collusion with the JNA over the confiscation of the TO weapons
between 26 April and 16-17 May, before he assumed the Presidency. However, Kadijevic and Jovic
consulted regularly in private on concerns over the northwestern republics and Kadijevic often briefed Jovic
on things he did not present to any other presidency member. In addition, there is a cryptic note by Jovic
on 3 May 1990 that:
Veljko (Kadijevic) tells me that his conversation with Bogic Bogicevic (Bosnian Federal Presidency
member) was successful. I had no need to talk to Slobodan (Milosevic). All of this is in keeping with

71
15 May, Jovic used his inaugural speech to serve notice that “unconstitutional” acts in
Yugoslavia – clear references to Croatian and Slovenian moves toward unilateral
independence – would not be tolerated. Amplifying his warning, Jovic said:
I believe that the Presidency is duty-hound to react to every political act that upsets
the public, brings about insecurity, and threatens our shared life ... We cannot tolerate crude
attacks on the country’s constitutional institutions, and calls on citizens to behave in an
unconstitutional way, heralding anti-constitutional actions, such as the formation of national
armies...147
On 16 May the Federal Presidency met to discuss the “situation in the country” and
apparently adopted some sort of resolution which Jovic used as legal justification for the
decision to confiscate the TO weapons.148 Only Slovene Presidency member Drnovsek
opposed the measure, according to Jovic.149 The Presidency issued a statement on 16 May:
The SFRY Presidency judges that there is a serious breakdown in the country’s
constitutional order, disregard for existing Federal laws, and other phenomena of social
instability. Because of this, the Presidency considers it essential to take urgent measures to
protect the territorial and political integrity of the country.150
The JNA began confiscating weapons late on 16 May and completed the task on 18
May in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Jovic stated on 17 May:
We take measures to ensure that weapons are taken from civilian Territorial
Defence depots in Slovenia and Croatia and transferred to military depots. We will not

our policy of preserving Yugoslavia, we only have to see what that will look like in practice. Then we
will consult.
Jovic entry for 3 May 1990.
Kadijevic s conversation with Bogicevic almost certainly was related to the Federal Presidency decision
announced on 16 May that provided the pretext to confiscate the TO weapons. Kadijevic probably
presented evidence to Bogicevic about the forming of republican armies in Croatia and Slovenia or other
information that would indicate the weapons were not in safe hands. As further evidence of advance
planning, Jovic’s 15 May inauguration speech was a perfect lead in for the JNA confiscations to begin the
next day.
147
Belgrade Tanjug, 15 May 1990.
148
This council consisted of the Federal Secretary for National Defense, the Federal Secretary for Internal
Affairs, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a chairman, drawn from the Presidency. It dealt with
national security and internal security issues.
149
Jovic’s entry for 16 May 1990 does not explicitly state that confiscation of the TO weapons was on the
agenda. However, it is clear from the context that Jovic intended the resolution that was adopted to be
used to provide him and the JNA justification for their move against the TO forces. Jovic stated on 21 May
that:
(Slovenian President) Kucan and Drnovsek came to discuss the seizure of Slovene TO weapons,
based on the Presidency decision that the weapons be seized from all republic territorial defenses and
placed under JNA control.
Jovic entry for 21 May 1990.
Drnovsek, however, maintained that he was never informed and that there never had been a vote on the
confiscations. See Volume I, Section I on Slovenia: The JNA’s Spring 1990 Efforts to Disable the Slovenian
Territorial Defence.
150
Belgrade Tanjug, 16 May 1990.

72
 permit Territorial Defence weapons to be misused in any conflicts or for forcible
secession.151
The JNA faced no opposition and at a stroke the TO in both republics was disarmed.
Croatian and Bosnian protests proved useless. But Slovenia proved to be a different story.152

JNA Planning for a State of Emergency and the Elimination of the

“Paramilitaries”
In the immediate aftermath of the TO weapons confiscation and the inauguration
of the new Croatian (and Slovenian) Governments, the JNA focused on the political threat
that their independence efforts posed. The army began refining its plans for removing the
Croatian and Slovenian Governments, if necessary. Colonel Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a veteran
KOS officer from SSNO, became the lead officer in KOS, coordinating the security service’s
efforts to follow developments in the separatist republics. Vasiljevic stated in a 1992
interview that the JNA had developed plans in the summer of 1990 to implement a “state of
emergency” and take over the governments in Slovenia and Croatia.153 Kadijevic repeatedly
updated Jovic during the summer of 1990 on JNA planning.154 On 13 July Jovic noted:
Veljko (Kadijevic) informs me that a plan has been definitively formulated for
use of the military in the event that the SFRY Presidency adopts a decision on a state of
emergency. It will be important to adopt decisions in time. The military will propose
such decisions.155
The JNA continued to modify its planning and prepare justification for the Federal
Presidency during August and September. On 4 September Kadijevic told Jovic that they
needed to be ready to use the military in Slovenia as early as September and in Croatia
possibly in October. Kadijevic outlined the JNA’s strategy regarding the two republics which,
rather than launching a preemptive strike, focused on allowing the secessionist leaders to
continue their course toward independence and even developing independent militaries so
that the JNA would have ample justification for moving against them.156

151
Jovic entry for 17 May 1990.
152
It is unclear whether TO stocks in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were also confiscated, although the
Presidency decision called for this.
153
Svetoslav Spasojevic: Whether A Coup d’Etat Was Prepared, Nin, 19 June 1992, pp. 55-58, an interview with
then Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic.
154
Kadijevic and Jovic met on 4 July 1990 to discuss how to ensure that they would have enough votes on the
Federal Presidency to get approval for a state of emergency that would allow the army to act. Kadijevic
claimed that even if the Presidency was unable to get a majority, the JNA would carry out the orders of
only part of the Presidency to implement the state of emergency. Kadijevic’s bold statement would later
echo hollowly when he failed to grasp such a chance in March 1991; Jovic entry for 4 July 1990.
155
Jovic entry for 13 July 1990.
156
Jovic entry for 4 September 1990. Jovic’s note indicates his disapproval of the JNA’s approach when he
states his belief that the separatist republics had already violated the constitution time and time again and
provided more than enough justification for a JNA move. Jovic’s disgust and anger at Kadijevic and the
JNA’s lack of resolve, which he often expressed earlier in his journal, was to become a regular feature of his
notes as Kadijevic failed repeatedly to act or to realize that Yugoslavia as Kadijevic knew it could not be
saved.

73
 According to the bare outline of this planning provided by Vasiljevic in 1992, the
operation would have consisted of two parts. Elite military police antiterrorist units would
have seized senior government officials and probably occupied government offices.157 As
the JNA special operations forces decapitated the government, conventional manoeuvre
units would have occupied border crossings, blocked key border access roads, and occupied
the major airports.158

Operation Shield and the January Crisis

In fall 1990, the JNA appears to have shifted its emphasis from operational plans to
topple the Croatian and Slovenian Governments to a more direct counterintelligence focus
on Croatia’s efforts to develop its own military forces with arms purchased from abroad, a
program energized by the appointment of former JNA General Martin Spegelj to the post of
Croatian Defence Minister. Vasiljevic and KOS had been tracking these activities for some
time, but in October they received the break of a lifetime.159 Spegelj had been recruiting
ethnic Croatian JNA officers to provide inside information on the JNA, procure weapons for
the militarization of the Croatian police, and, in the event the JNA moved against Croatia,
sabotage their JNA units. In early October Spegelj propositioned a man who should have
proved the perfect agent, Colonel Vladimir Jagar, then stationed in Virovitica, Croatia.160
Jagar’s natural father had been a “close, lifelong” friend of Spegelj, and he raised the boy as
part of his own family when Jagar’s mother died. Silber and Little note that “Spegelj loved
and trusted Jagar almost as though he were his own son”. But Jagar, like many of the young
officers who had begun their Army careers as teenagers, regarded himself as a Yugoslav, not
a Croatian. He reported the contact to the KOS. The security service quickly persuaded him
to work as a double agent, directing him to accept Spegelj’s offer and then act as a mole
inside Spegelj’s organization. Jagar was able to provide detailed information on Croatia’s
arms purchasing efforts, Croatian contingency planning for war with the JNA, and Spegelj’s
thoughts on how an armed conflict between the JNA and the Croatian Government might

157
Kadijevic told Jovic on 3 October 1990 that only 100 people must be “gotten rid of” under the JNA’s plan.
Jovic seems to believe that Kadijevic is implying that they would be killed; Jovic entry for 3 October 1990.
Given Kadijevic’s lack of resolve this is unlikely. Vasiljevic stated in 1992 that the state of emergency
planning entailed the arrest of the entire Slovenian and Croatian leadership, but not their “liquidation”.
Instead, they were all to have been “isolated for a certain period ... on the territory of Slovenia and
Croatia”. Svetoslav Spasojevic: Whether A Coup d’Etat Was Prepared, Nin, 19 June 1992, pp. 55-58, an
interview with then Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic.
158
Svetoslav Spasojevic: Whether A Coup d'Etat Was Prepared, Nin, 19 June 1992, pp. 55-58. An interview with
then Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic. The JNA was particularly concerned about Western intervention
in the event of the Croatian and Slovenian Governments being overthrown.
159
For example, KOS assets in Austria reported that a large arms shipment would transit the Hungarian border
into Croatia between 8 and 11 October. Vasiljevic personally led the KOS operation to monitor the cross-
border shipments, which were supervised by senior Croatian officials and guarded by special police and an
estimated 200-300 regular police. Silber and Little p. 110.
160
This account of the KOS-Jagar operation against Spegelj is drawn from Silber and Little pp. 110-117, which
provides the most complete narrative currently available of the events. Virovitica was the home garrison of
the 288th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade / Fifth Military District.

74
pan out. Jagar was “wired” for his meetings with Spegelj, and Vasiljevic ordered Jagar to
encourage Spegelj to talk as much as possible about the smuggling of weapons and to
disclose details of the arms-distribution network. Vasiljevic wanted to know where the
paramilitaries were based, who was in charge, where the weapons were stored. He needed
a detailed breakdown of the operation in order to plan a JNA campaign against it.161
Jagar’s information became the centerpiece of a new Vasiljevic-led plan by which
the KOS proposed to disarm the Croatian paramilitaries, expose Croatia’s “unconstitutional”
arms acquisition efforts, and bring Spegelj and the key Croatian “military” leaders before a
JNA court. The plan was called Operation “Shield”.
Planning for Operation Shield began to jell when Jovic held a series of briefings on
22-23 October for the JNA’s most senior officers and Kadijevic assured them that the
military was developing evidence to try Spegelj and Boljkovac, the Croatian Internal Affairs
Minister.162 But only a week later the JNA asked for a delay in the operation’s
implementation, claiming to Jovic on 2 November that they needed more time to complete
the indictment against Spegelj. Further delays would occur because Jovic was going to be
out of the country from 6 to 15 November on a state visit to the Far East, and the JNA
insisted that he be present to ensure that the Federal Presidency approved their move
against the Croatian paramilitaries. Jovic privately noted his belief that the JNA was stalling
again because of Kadijevic’s indecisiveness, and he wondered why they couldn’t just arrest
the Croatian officials and then finish compiling their evidence.163

161
Silber and Little p. 111. Kadijevic reportedly heard the first tapes in early October, probably as soon as
Vasiljevic had them prepared. Kadijevic then almost certainly shared the information with Jovic. See
Appendix 1 for the entry from Jovic’s journal on 12 October in which he outlines the information provided
by Kadijevic.
162
Kadijevic stated that they needed to be sure that the evidence was solid so that the Croatian officials had
no way out legally. Jovic also inquired about whether the JNA intended to charge Janez Jansa, the Slovenian
Defence Minister, as well. Kadijevic indicated that:
... they are considering, that as well, but it seems to him that Jansa has legitimized his actions,
that they have acted in accordance with a decision by the Slovene Assembly, while Spegelj and
Boljkovac have directly violated Federal laws through their actions; importing arms, recruiting
soldiers, and offices, and working to break up the JNA. Thought is being given to arrest them without
bloodshed, but they are prepared for that as well.
Jovic entries for 22-23 October 1990.
163
Jovic stated on 2 November:
The military has conducted a detailed analysis of all the circumstances in connection with the
violation of military laws in Croatia. Veljko Kadijevic informs me that there are reasons to spend
another few days gathering documentation so that the indictment is unassailable. This involves not
only Spegelj, it involves at least a few other participants in this activity.
The negative side is that on the 8th of this month Croatia will adopt its law on national defence,
which could legalize these activities.
However. Veljko says, it is crucial that I be in the country when the campaign is launched. My trip
... hampers their decision-making ability. The military is afraid that in the event of resistance in
Croatia, the SFRY Presidency in my absence will be unable to agree on military intervention, and that
assumption must be kept in mind. Strange things: They cannot do anything right now because of
themselves, they cannot do anything tomorrow because of me, but all of it is extremely urgent. Veljko
claims that there are no other reasons. Why can’t they arrest them and then “complete” the
indictment? It is obvious that they are hesitating, that they are not resolute.
Jovic entry for 2 November 1990.

75
 According to Colonel Vasiljevic, the JNA finally set 3 December as the date for
Operation Shield’s execution, and spent the rest of November finishing its preparations.164
This included the psychological preparation of the JNA officer corps to undertake an internal
security operation in Croatia, finishing the legal preparations for arresting Spegelj and his
associates, and completing Shield’s operational planning. Kadijevic reported to Jovic on 23
November that preparations for the arrests in Croatia would be completed in the next few
days, but that he needed to know from Jovic whether to first arrest and institute
proceedings against General Spegelj and then seek the Croatian Government’s agreement,
given the immunity issue, or to first seek its agreement:
... we agreed that he should proceed according to the law: first seek the Croatian
Government’s agreement. If that agreement is not granted, then the Croatian authorities
will have shown their true colors. After that, we will probably have to arrest him anyway
under public pressure, once all the facts of the case are disclosed.165
At the end of November, the JNA had completed its secret preparations and was
ready to go. By now the KOS, in conjunction with the JNA Political Administration, had put
months of effort into the plan.
On 2 December the JNA set in motion the last piece of its operational clockwork, a
propaganda ploy designed to justify the impending action. That day it published an official
interview with Kadijevic, prepared days before, that signaled the army’s intentions. Kadijevic
stated:
Yugoslavia is not at the moment threatened by immediate danger from
abroad. However, as early as tomorrow it might no longer be so. Continued
unfavorable trends in internal processes are conducive to the further erosion of
Yugoslavia’s position in the world ... Precisely because of their determination to defend
Yugoslavia, our armed forces have been exposed to unprecedented attacks and
challenges. The main blow has been directed toward breaking up the JNA ... The
greatest danger for the integrity and security of the country is to be found in the
intensive development of purely national armies ... all armed formations established
outside the uniform forces as defined by the SFRY constitution will be disarmed. Those
who constituted them will be accountable before the law.166
The next day, with everything in place, Kadijevic called Colonel Vasiljevic and
ordered him to postpone the operation.
Vasiljevic was nonplused. Later, in 1992, he said:
I will never understand why Kadijevic called me on 3 December 1990 and
delayed the start of the operation. That destroyed months of hard work by the KOS and
enabled the leading people in Croatia to get wind of what was intended for them. ... It

164
R. Pavlovic: Memoirs of the First Man of the Counterintelligence Service, Belgrade Politika, 17 July 1992, p.
7.
165
Jovic entry for 23 November 1990, p. 127-128.
166
Full text of the interview, Belgrade Tanjug, 2 December 1990.

76
 was not a question of betrayal by the Federal Defence Secretary, but his indecisiveness,
which has been at the root of all bad decisions made by the army leadership.167
The record is blank on why Kadijevic called off the operation, but it seems likely
that he had not attempted to get approval from the Federal Presidency or even consulted
Jovic over the final date. Kadijevic could never bring himself to undertake such a radical
move unilaterally, without approval from the Presidency or even a large part of it. There are
no entries about the operation in his journal from 28 November until 10 December, at
which point he states:
Veljko Kadijevic has prepared a report for the Presidency on the creation of a
parallel HDZ army in Croatia and on a draft resolution by the Presidency under which
Croatia would be called upon to voluntarily disarm that army within 10 days.
Otherwise, criminal prosecution and the disarming of these forces will be instituted as
prescribed by law. I will present these proposals at the session on the 12th of this
month.168
At the 12 December meeting, consideration of Kadijevic’s report was put off for
another ten days or more. This time it was Jovic who delayed, because of his “desire to
avoid upsetting the public until the second round of elections in Serbia is completed”. The
elections would not be held until 23 December. Operation Shield was delayed yet again.
The Croatian Government realized that the JNA was planning possible intervention
in December, although how much it knew is unclear. Spegelj, however, did not want to wait
for the JNA. Instead, during a meeting of the Croatian security council in early December –
presumably on 2 or 3 December after Kadijevic’s interview was published – he called for a
pre-emptive war for independence launched with a strategic offensive against JNA barracks
in Croatia. Silber and Little state:
... General Spegelj now unveiled his plan to an incredulous and plainly nervous
meeting of Croatia’s small defence council. Spegelj argued that the JNA was too weak
to launch the war Kadijevic was threatening. The JNA was made up, he said, of
eighteen- or nineteen-year-old conscripts, the majority of whom were non-Serbs, and
who would not he prepared to fight. Spegelj argued that the Croatian police should lay
siege to JNA barracks in Croatia, and cut off food, water, and electricity supplies and
telephone lines. The garrisons, he said, were by JNA convention all physically separated
from the logistics units on which they depended. If the two were separated for long
enough, the garrisons would fall apart by themselves. Their members – the officers and
men – could then be invited to transfer their loyalty, en bloc or individually, to the new
armed forces of the Croatian republic.169
President Tudjman vetoed Spegelj’s proposal. As he explained in a November 1993
interview:

167
R. Pavlovic: Memoirs of the First Man of the Counterintelligence Service, Belgrade Politika, 17 July 1992, p.
7.
168
Jovic entry for 10 December 1990, p. 129.
169
Silber and Little, p. 109.

77
 We were not capable in terms of weapons of winning a victory. In political
terms, even then we would have evoked the anger of the international public, because
we would have been rebels against the constitutional order of a state which was
internationally recognized. We would have experienced total defeat.170
As Silber and Little note, “The political and diplomatic case won over the
military”.171
The confrontation became a showdown the following month when the Presidency
finally met on 9 January to consider Kadijevic’s plan. Kadijevic presented a detailed JNA
assessment, laying out everything the JNA knew about Croatian arms shipments and
contingency planning (as well as Slovene, Croatian Serb, and Kosovar paramilitary
formations). (See Annex 3 for Jovic’s journal entry on Kadijevic’s assessment.) Jovic asked
the Presidency to approve and immediately promulgate an order requiring unauthorized
military forces to disband and surrender all weapons to the JNA, but after a day-long
discussion he had still failed to win over a majority. The Slovene and Croatian Presidency
members, Janez Drnovsek and Stipe Mesic, both voted against the resolution, and the
Bosnian member, Bogic Bogicevic – the deciding vote again – refused to give his assent.
Jovic had to settle for a ten-day grace period for compliance with his order.172 (See Appendix
4 for text of the Presidency order.)
Both the Slovenes and the Croatians publicly announced their refusal to abide by
the order. The Croatian Council for National Defence and Protection, who were the JNA’s
primary target, claimed that Croatia had none of the illegal groups as defined in the
Presidency order; Zagreb considered all of its new forces “legal” and only the Croatian Serb
rebels in the Krajina “illegal”.173 If the JNA tried to intervene and disarm its forces, Croatia
threatened to defend itself by force.174
The Croatians alerted all of their newly formed forces – MUP Special Police units,
reserve MUP units, and MoD volunteers. Within a week of the Presidency order Croatian
Special Police and volunteer units began to move to their wartime deployment locations.175
Contingency plans – probably a variant of the Spegelj plan which Tudjman had vetoed in
December – called for them to deploy around JNA garrisons and open fire if they moved
out.176
As the 19 January deadline grew closer, Jovic met with Kadijevic on 15 January and
began to express his concern over the progression of the crisis. It would be hard for the JNA
to crush an “indoctrinated nation”, he argued, and so “we must attempt to persuade them
(the Croatians) to surrender their weapons voluntarily, even though that is not very likely”.

170
Brigadier Ivan Tolj: There Is No Real Life without Your Own State, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 1-
8, an interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.
171
Silber and Little, p. 109.
172
Jovic entry for 9 January 1991; Silber and Little, p. 112.
173
Belgrade Tanjug, 10 January 1991.
174
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 January 1991.
175
Vesna Puljak: Born in the Underground, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 12.
176
See description of the actions of MoD volunteer units in Virovitica on 21 January 1991 in Zlatko Djurjevic:
On to Freedom With Patriotism and Courage, Hrvatski Vojnik, 16 July 1993, p. 18.

78
Observing that the Croatian nation was resolute, Jovic appears to have questioned whether
the military would be willing to clash with the Croatian people. Kadijevic told Jovic that the
JNA was in favor of eliminating the “HDZ government” not just its paramilitaries. Jovic
perceptively pointed out that the Federal authorities would be unlikely to find a
democratically elected successor government in Croatia that would support a Federal
Yugoslavia. But Kadijevic remained deaf and blind to the idea that the federal, socialist
Yugoslavia which he held dear could no longer exist under the conditions that had emerged
over the previous few years. Jovic noted that:
If they meet resistance, I ask them whether we are in a position after that to get
other democratically elected authorities that will be on our side. Not for socialism, but
rather for Yugoslavia. No response. That is the key to the problem. Croatia‘s aspiration
is to separate from Yugoslavia, under the pretense of struggling against Bolshevism ...
And in the case of the radical variant, we will not be able to find new democratic
authorities, there will be bloodshed, we will have to enforce martial law for at least a
year, we will be isolated from the world, through such action we would disrupt any
effort for a peaceful solution to the political crisis, speed up Slovenia’s secession, and
reinforce the Albanians’ resistance. That is why we must attempt to have the weapons
surrendered voluntarily, to discredit them politically without overthrowing them ... We
will shed blood, if there is no alternative, only for territories in which nations who want
to remain in Yugoslavia live.177
Kadijevic and the Serbian leaders, Milosevic and Jovic, had not always seen eye to
eye on the future of Yugoslavia. From this point forward, their differences would widen.
While Kadijevic clung to his pipe dream of a unified, federal Yugoslav state, Milosevic, Jovic,
and the Serbian political establishment concluded that if the Slovenes and Croatians wanted
out of Yugoslavia, they could go as long as the Serb regions of Croatia remained behind.178
On 18 January Jovic met with Mesic to try to get the Croatians to yield peacefully to
Federal demands. If they did not, he warned, the army would take their weapons by force
and individuals – he meant the top Croatian leaders – would be put on trial. Mesic replied
that if the Federal authorities did that, the Croatians would immediately withdraw from all
Federal institutions, call on all Croats, Slovenes, and Albanians to desert the army, and force
a direct showdown. Somehow, Mesic was led to agree that he would ask Zagreb to

177
Jovic entry for 15 January 1991.
178
The differences became most apparent to Jovic during the climax of the January crisis. Jovic stated on 21
January that:
There is an obvious difference in the positions of the military and of us in Serbia (Slobodan and
me). The military is for crushing the Croatian authorities, whereas we are for protecting the Serb
population in Krajina, but for now I am not emphasizing that point.
Milosevic had told Jovic earlier in the day that:
As soon as they (the Croatians) declare their secession, we should accept that decision, provided
that we hold on to the Krajina opstinas militarily until the people declare by plebiscite where they
want to live. He urges me to convince Veljko to accept that variant.
Jovic entry for 21 January 1991.

79
surrender 20.000 of the weapons.179 After consultations in Zagreb, Mesic told Jovic that the
Croatian Government had grudgingly agreed to collect the weapons and place them under
JNA control. The Croatians, however requested another extension, to 21 January, to which
Jovic and Kadijevic agreed.180
By 21 January, however, the Croatians had still not given up any weapons. They
now demanded that for the weapons to be turned over and their reserve MUP forces to be
demobilized the JNA must observe a series of unacceptable conditions, including:
• The JNA announces that the Presidency order has been fulfilled.
• The JNA withdraws to its barracks.
• The people of Croatia and their leaders are not further troubled.
• The Presidency and the JNA declare that Croatia has the right to impose order in
Knin and other Serb opstinas.
Mesic also informed Jovic that if the Federal Government did not accept the
Croatian demands his government would:
• Declare that the Republic of Croatia has seceded.
• Ask for UN Security Council intervention and the deployment of peacekeeping
troops.
• Withdraw all personnel from Federal institutions.
• Confiscate all Federal property in Croatia.
• Withdraw all personnel from the JNA.
• Threaten anyone who refuses with judicial action.
Jovic’s retort to Mesic was that “they have chosen war...”181
The Croatian military and the JNA began preparing in earnest for war. All Croatian
forces went to their highest alert. The JNA announced on 23 January that unless the “illegal”
formations were disbanded, it would “enhance the combat-readiness of its units to a level
which will guarantee the implementation” of the Presidency order, or, in other words, the
JNA would “disarm” Croatian forces.182 In fulfillment of its proclamation, it began
preparations to redeploy its forces and mobilize additional soldiers.183
Events again came to a head on 25 January, and again the JNA was forced to back
down. Croatian President Tudjman and Mesic had scheduled a meeting with Milosevic and
Jovic in Belgrade to discuss a resolution of the crisis.184 As Silber and Little note: “In Zagreb
tension had reached a fever pitch ... many (Croatian assembly) delegates told him (Tudjman)
he would not make it back alive”.185 At the same time, however, Milosevic had asked Jovic
to convene a Presidency meeting in order to give the JNA the authority to strike. Fatefully,
Kadijevic proposed to Jovic that the “military be ready to take action if necessary, but only

179
Jovic entry for 18 January 1991.
180
Jovic entry for 19 January 1991.
181
Jovic entry for 21 January 1991.
182
Belgrade Tanjug, 23 January 1991, text of Federal Secretariat for National Defence statement.
183
Jovic entry for 23 January 1991.
184
Jovic entry for 25 January 1991.
185
Silber and Little, p. 114.

80
after it is authorized to do so (by the Presidency)”. Jovic was unable to deliver a decisive
vote, even after the JNA showed an amazing film documenting the arms shipments to the
Croatians, including clandestine footage of Spegelj acquired through Jagar. Bosnian
Presidency member Bogic Bogicevic, an ethnic Serb, still held the deciding vote and would
not cast it for military action against the Croatians. Jovic and Kadijevic were forced to accept
from Tudjman’s delegation another compromise whereby the Croatians promised to
demobilize their reserve MUP units in return for the JNA returning to peacetime readiness
levels.186 All the detailed intelligence the JNA had gathered, all of the planning, all of the
propaganda and psychological operations it had put together had gone for naught. As Silber
and Little put it:
Kadijevic’s indecision, his refusal to act without political authority, played into
Milosevic’s hands. Jovic had known of Spegelj’s arms smuggling and distribution
program since mid-October. It had taken nearly four months to reach even this
inconclusive compromise. Throughout this time, the Federal authorities never once
mounted a serious effort to prevent the arming of the Croats.187
Unlike the JNA, Milosevic – the man behind Jovic – had read the handwriting on the
wall and acted on it.
... Milosevic had already decided: if Yugoslavia could not be salvaged and
centralized, then the Croats, like the Slovenes, would be allowed to go. But they would
not be allowed to take with them those parts of their republic that Milosevic’s men
considered Serb territory.188
The JNA – and Kadijevic in particular – still refused to acknowledge the death of
Yugoslavia.189 Only the disasters of war would be able to force them to accept Milosevic’s
view. Before that happened, the irresolute Kadijevic would be given one more chance to
deliver a knockout blow to the secessionist republics.

186
Jovic entry for 25 January 1991; Silber and Little, pp. 114-117.
187
As noted earlier, this was by JNA design in order to allow the Croatians to incriminate themselves and
justify a JNA move against them. Of course, this could only work if the JNA was allowed to undertake the
operation.
188
Silber and Little, p. 117.
189
Interestingly, Kadijevic on 25 January refused a request from Milosevic via Jovic to provide military
protection to the Croatian Serbs in the Knin Krajina. As Jovic states:
Veljko stubbornly refuses, saying that there is a danger that the military will come to be seen as
"Serb”, something that he cannot allow.
Jovic entry for 25 January 1991.

81
 Kadijevic and the JNA Falter Again, March 1991190
The JNA wasted no time after its latest political defeat in beginning to plan again,
this time not just for the disarmament of the “paramilitaries” but for a full state of
emergency and the outright removal of the offending governments. In its angry view,
Slovenia and Croatia were intentionally paralyzing Federal institutions in order to create a
fait accompli, as Jovic and the army described it, in order to dismember Yugoslavia without
going through the constitution or holding referendums. On 11 February, Kadijevic broached
to Jovic a new draft statement and proposals on military intervention, although he did not
explicitly mention a state of emergency.191 On 25 February, he returned with the JNA’s
contingency plan to implement a state of emergency. Jovic writes:
The military’s basic idea consists of relying firmly on the forces that are for
Yugoslavia in all parts of the country and through combined political and military
measures overthrowing the government first in Croatia and then in Slovenia.
The plan also included organizing pro-Yugoslav political rallies and demonstrations
in all of the republics to support the military and oppose the secessionists. The chain of
events would include:
• A Federal Presidency decision to authorize the JNA action.
• An ultimatum to the Croatians that they turn over General Spegelj for
indictment, surrender all of the Croatian weapons, and disband the Croatian
MUP reserve police
• In the event of Croatian refusal, JNA actions to take Spegelj and the weapons by
force.
A military government would then be established and new institutions formed from
“uncompromised” citizens. The Federal Presidency would decide the process therafter for
such matters as elections and referendums on secession.192 Jovic, although he generally

190
This account makes limited use of Silber and Little’s dramatic account (Chapter 9: At Least We Know How to
Fight, The Decisive Month, March 1991, pp. 119-133) of the demonstrations in Belgrade and the Presidency
meetings at which the JNA pushed for a state of emergency, and instead relies heavily on Jovic’s account.
Silber and Little appear – from the authors’ standpoint – to have overplayed the interaction between the
demonstrations and Jovic’s call for the Presidency meeting. The drive for the Presidency meeting, although
supported by Jovic, appears to have been pushed by the JNA, not the Jovic / Milosevic combination. In
addition, they also seem to assume Jovic was Milosevic’s puppet, rather than a semi-independent ally.
Silber and Little also appear to overemphasize the views of those opposed to JNA intervention. None of the
sides had a clear idea of what the other actually wanted or believed – Mesic viewed it through the Croatian
prism of a Serbian / JNA communist conspiracy to dominate Yugoslavia, while the JNA believed that
foreign-backed Slovenian and Croatian nationalists were attempting to destroy a socialist Yugoslavia.
Despite the haze, the JNA’s concerns about the demise of Federal Yugoslavia and its bloody consequences
– which the Slovenes and the Croatians appeared to ignore – seem to have been underplayed in the debate
on the breakup of the Federal state. Many in the international community appear to have wanted it both
ways – retention of Yugoslavia, but opposition to the use of force to achieve this. Unfortunately, as in the
American Civil War, saving a Federal Yugoslavia without a resort to force would have been impossible. Of
course, the use of force at this time could have also made the breakup even more inevitable than it already
appeared.
191
Jovic entry for 11 February 1991.
192
Jovic entry for 25 February 1991.

82
supported the military’s plan, doubted there would be sufficient votes in the Presidency for
its approval, and temporized about committing himself to anything. Milosevic, however,
endorsed the plan, except that the Serbian president felt the military should deal with
Croatia only and leave Slovenia alone. Milosevic told Jovic that the JNA should quit worrying
about winning a majority vote in the Presidency and just go ahead on the authority of the
supporters, removing the rest as part of its program.193
Jovic, however, feared that without Presidency agreement the plan would fail or
the military would refuse to act. He observed that the “military is in big trouble because
there is no political ‘backing’ for what it is supposed to do. It is afraid of taking action
without ‘backing’”. Jovic also worried that the multi-ethnic JNA might unravel if its leaders
acted without political cover. His fears led him, on 28 February, to consider an alternative:
He could resign and disable the Presidency in the hope that a Presidential vacuum would
permit the JNA to act on its own authority.194
Then, after Belgrade erupted in anti-Milosevic street demonstrations and violence
on 9 March, Jovic called a Presidency meeting on the 12th to consider the JNA state of
emergency proposal. The meeting stretched into an intense series of meetings over the next
four days and presented the JNA with its last chance to try to save Federal Yugoslavia. To
underscore its view of the emergency facing their government, the JNA insisted that the
Federal leaders meet in the cold and intimidating wartime Supreme Command bunker in a
Belgrade suburb.195 Not even Jovic knew exactly what the JNA was going to propose.
Kadijevic set forth a five-point plan progression that began with the declaration of a state of
emergency throughout the SFRY. The disarming of “illegal” armed forces would follow, then
referendums in secessionist republics in which “nationalities” rather than the republic at
large could vote on secession, and, within six months, the adoption of a new constitution
and the holding of multiparty elections. Led by their Croatian member, Mesic, the
Presidential majority rejected Kadijevic’s proposal and worked to water it down, asking for
modifications, proposing public statements that negotiations be intensified, stipulating
everything should be achieved through political means, and seeking to remove anything
that would allow the army to act. Kadijevic called their statements:
... the road into the abyss ...Declarations of principles that are not
accompanied by adequate concrete measures and do not ensure the realization of
those principles are worthless. I am no longer willing to participate in such a dance.196
Although he would one day be accused of acting as a Serbian nationalist rather
than a Yugoslav patriot, it was the hard-headed General Adzic, chief of the JNA General
Staff, who seemed to state the army’s case most eloquently and damned the indecision of
the Presidency as Yugoslavia crumbled.197

193
Jovic entry for 28 February 1991.
194
Jovic entry for 28 February 1991.
195
Silber and Little, pp. 124-125. The JNA’s attempt to constitute the Presidency as the Supreme Command
was an attempt to give added legitimacy to the hoped for Presidency decision.
196
Jovic entry for 12 March 1991.
197
Interestingly, Adzic stated during his monologue:

83
 Thus far, we (the JNA) have constantly acted exclusively in accordance with
the law ... I think that we are the only remaining element of society that is executing
your decisions ... Please do not misunderstand my criticism, but no one respects and
carries out your decisions and your public announcements anymore. On the contrary,
they have become an object of evasion by people who hold power, by those who are
threatened by them – most of all, by the people in all our regions and republics; they
have become an object of pity because in practical terms no one respects and carried
out those decisions.
The JNA has no purpose without Yugoslavia. Accordingly, no one should think
that we are fighting for the Army – we are fighting for Yugoslavia ... I do not know
whether anyone really thinks that we will preserve the country in this way, the way
things are going, but we think that there must be resolution regarding what will
become of Yugoslavia. ... I personally think that we must be more energetic, that it is
high time, if we really want to save Yugoslavia, that we also adopt concrete measures
that will mean that. We have offered such measures.
Imposing a state of emergency is not to the detriment of democracy. I still
cannot understand what some people mean by democracy. For some people, anything
that destroys Yugoslavia is democratic and anything that preserves it is
antidemocratic.198
Despite the angry pleas of Jovic and the JNA, the Presidency voted down the
proposal.
A furious Kadijevic, accompanied by Adzic, told Jovic and Milosevic the following
day that “We are going to stage a military coup. Regardless of whether or not the proposed
decision is adopted.” Kadijevic said that they would depose the Federal Government and the
Presidency and remove the republican governments if they opposed the coup. The army
would then give all sides a deadline of six months to reach an agreement on the future of
Yugoslavia, holding the line itself against the state’s disintegration until then. Jovic – utterly
frustrated by the outcome of the Presidency meeting the day before – had already decided
to resign and implement his plan to paralyze the Presidency; he promised the generals he
would give them “room to act”.199
The next three days of Presidency meetings resembled the first day, as
compromises over the JNA proposal flew back and forth across the table. The state of
emergency had been dropped, and now the members and the JNA were haggling over even
an increase in the army’s readiness level. The Croatians and the Slovenes remained adamant

On the other hand, do not let it be thought that I have arguments for the north-western parts of
the country only. Support for democracy – or what is being called democracy in the streets of
Belgrade – is being used to seek the disbanding of the JNA and the formation of a Serbian army: in
this regard, they are no different from the others who advocate republican armies and the breakup of
the JNA.
Jovic entry for 12 March 1991.
198
Jovic entry for 12 March 1991.
199
Jovic entry for 13 March 1991.

84
that they would not tolerate any use of the JNA in the Federation’s dealings with them. The
Presidency was stuck between two bad choices. As Macedonian Presidency member Vasil
Tupurkovski perceptively stated:
...we face two risks ... that without these measures civil war will break out, and
second, that after these measures are adopted, civil war will break out.200
At the end of the last meeting on 15 March, Jovic resigned as President of the
Presidency, followed by the Milosevic-controlled members from Vojvodina and
Montenegro. Milosevic also managed to force the Kosovar member to withdraw. The ball
was in the army’s court.201
Despite the heat and daring of their arguments in the Presidency meetings, the JNA
leadership contemplated the civil war that intervention would precipitate, peered into that
abyss, and drew back. On 17 March, the JNA senior leadership told an incredulous Jovic and
Milosevic their conclusion that JNA intervention would be a disaster, both internally and
diplomatically. The JNA presented two options; the first more or less repeated earlier JNA
plans for a state of emergency but now included a detailed analysis of the catastrophic
events which were likely to occur under this scenario. The second option represented a JNA
capitulation which would blandly state that:
... the SFRY Presidency did not adopt the decision proposed by the military
leadership, but that independently of that the military affirms its constitutional
responsibilities to defend the territorial integrity and constitutional order of the
country. The people are declaratively guaranteed peace and security.
Jovic could not believe that the JNA had taken the Serb leadership and the
Presidency through the events of the previous five days only to come up with such a
vacuous statement. As he put it:
... A very strange outcome. If they were bearing in mind all the analyses back
when they told us that they had decided on a military coup, it is unclear how they
decided on this. If they were not keeping all that in mind, then they are frivolous.
When they presented to us the astounding analysis of what military
intervention in Croatia would mean from the viewpoint of resistance in Croatia, what
the reaction would be like in the other republics, Europe, and the world, and what kind
of repercussions that would have on the economy and on the army itself, I was amazed
that they could even conceive of such a plan, if their analysis is accurate. And for the
most part it is realistic.202

200
Quotation from Jovic entry for 15 March 1991.
201
Jovic entries for 13-15 March. Mesic – as Vice President of the Presidency, together with Prime Minister
Ante Markovic’s Federal Executive Council, attempted to keep the Federal Presidency and Government
running during the Serb and JNA boycott, with partial success.
202
Interestingly, Jovic also states – contrary to many later assessments – that:
We did not pressure them to stage a military coup. They hid from us their intention to do so. I, for
example, had no idea that that was the aim of the decisions proposed to the Supreme Command.
Jovic entry for 17 March 1991.

85
 The JNA had squandered its last chance – however slim it was – of saving a federal
Yugoslavia. As Jovic wrote: “All possibility of defending Yugoslavia has been lost”.203

203
Jovic entry for 22 March 1991. On 22 March, Jovic was still livid at the JNA decision, and continued to mull
exactly what the military leadership had been thinking. His assessment below probably was accurate:
I tried long and hard to understand why the military had done such a somersault overnight. It is
possible that they had not adequately analyzed the difference between acting on the basis of a legal
decision by the Presidency and the imposition of a state of emergency and the forcible seizure of the
weapons on the one hand and a military coup on the other hand, which serve the same goal. The first
case would have minimized while the second case would have drastically increased the repercussions
of domestic and foreign resistance, of political and economic isolation, which they probably
considered only after they were confronted with the critical moment.
Jovic entrv for 22 March 1991.

86
 Appendix 1
JNA Intelligence on Croatian Military Planning

Jovic detailed in his journal on 12 October what clearly is intelligence derived from
the KOS-Jagar collection effort against Spegelj; in fact, in some places Jovic appears to be
quoting transcripts of the audiotapes Jagar made of Spegelj. The information appears to
have been included in some kind of broader JNA assessment on the current state of
Croatian armament and separatism. The assessment provides a flavor of what the JNA knew
and/or believed about Croatian intentions at this time, as well as demonstrating biases in its
analysis. The entire journal entry reads:
The Croatian leadership continues to work feverishly on consolidating a
separatist-coalition block with the new authorities in Slovenia and on destroying the
defensive system of the country and the JNA, as the only obstacle to the definitive
breakup of Yugoslavia. Feeling that the time has come for a radical showdown with the
Army, the innermost leadership circle of Manolic (Josip Manolic, Croatian Prime
Minister), Boljkovac (Josip Boljkovac, Croatian Internal Affairs Minister), Spegelj
(General Martin Spegelj, Croatian Defence Minister), and Seks (deputy Croatian
assembly leader), led by F. Tudjman, has drawn up a secret “Croatian Defence Plan”,
with which the most responsible figures in the new Croatian Government are intimately
familiar.
The plan is based on the general mobilization of all Croats inside the country
and abroad, on a platform of extreme anticommunism and Serbophobia. In order to
achieve the fullest possible effect, an agreement has been reached with the Slovene
leadership whereby that republic will first promulgate amendments on suspending
Federal regulations and forming republican armed forces by taking over the staffs and
units of territorial defence, and while that is going on M. Spegelj will complete the
projects that are under way and form Croatian armed forces on the same model. In
connection with this, Spegelj has spoken with J. Jansa on several occasions and
practically guaranteed the drafting of a joint defence plan, in which one of the priority
tasks is to procure arms as soon as possible.
Spegelj’s assessments served as the basis for the drafting of the plan: that the
JNA does not dare intervene right now because such an action against Croatia and
Slovenia would be ponderous, complicated, and expensive; that the Army is incapable
of carrying out a brilliant operation like the military intervention in Poland and Turkey,
“because things have gone too far” and it would be forced to opt for classical military
intervention like Iraq in Kuwait; that the Army, together with Yugoslavia, is dying and
that “its helplessness is greater than its rage and desire”; that the JNA is currently
behaving like a “worn-out nag” and a “mangy horse”.
Because of this, the plan (Jovic apparently is referring to the Croatian Defence
Plan) specifies that the JNA be compromised, humiliated, and degraded by all means,
thus shattering its unity, and because of this all the media will add the prefix “so-

87
 called” to the name of the JNA, while the tone of reporting will be such that it upsets
and “instills fear in the citizens of sovereign, independent Croatia”, in order to provoke
their revolt against the JNA. Related to this is the fact that “a corporal has become
minister of defence” (apparently a reference to Jansa), even though in Slovenia they
could have found some retired general for that post, which is why a reservist major is
also being appointed commander of the TO.
Through all this, Franjo Tudjman has continued to develop his policy of a so-
called “zig-zag line”, the essence of which is continuously accusing Belgrade, the JNA,
and the Serbs of being the “screenwriters” of the breakup of Yugoslavia, in order to
thus put the Army in a position where “it is afraid of us, not we of it”. At the same time,
the constant emphasis on the “danger” from Serbs reflects a desire to instill fear in part
of the Serb populace and create the impression among them that the only way out is
self-organizing, taking up arms, and leaning toward the chetniks, all of which is in turn
used to frighten the Croats into thinking that “the Serbs are going to shoot at them”.
Because of this, the position that has been adopted in this context is that a referendum
on the future structure of Yugoslavia is completely out of the question, that the HDZ
will dictate such conditions, and that its plan for a confederal structure will be posited
in such a way that it will be unacceptable to Serbs from the very outset.
In the event that the Army does move to intervene, the HDZ plans to call on all
soldiers of Croat nationality to refuse to follow orders and to undertake armed
resistance to the military’s actions, whereby the volunteer youth units (Comment: these
proved fruitless and the concept was abandoned) will be especially important since
they will be used to raid command posts and staffs, barracks, weapons depots, and
other military structures. Based on this plan, the armed structures of the Croatian MUP
have been assigned to so-called Croatian armed police formations, which have been
joined by former special units of the Croatian republican SUP (Secretariat for Internal
Affairs), to which have been added another 400 to 600 constables and discharged
police officers from the SAP (Serbian Autonomous Province) Kosovo. Some of these
forces have already been deployed to tighten security at public buildings that are
especially important to the republic, and some at MUP buildings in Zagreb.
All of this indicates the determination of the Croatian leadership to achieve, in
the shortest possible time and no matter what the cost, the plan for creating its own
armed forces and breaking up the JNA, in connection with which numerous concrete
measures and activities have already been undertaken, from acquiring a large quantity
of arms and ammunition to attempts to recruit individual members of the JNA.204
Much of the JNA assessment appears to have been accurate. See section above:
The Organization and Arming of the Croatian Government Forces, as well as the discussion
of Spegelj’s contingency planning to initiate a confrontation with the JNA and coordinate
defences with the Slovene Defence Ministry.

204
Jovic entry for 12 October 1990.

88
 Appendix 2
Federal Secretariat of National Defence Report to the
Federal Presidency on Import of Arms and the Formation
of Illegal Paramilitary Units

Originated 11 December 1990

Presented to Presidency 9 January 1991
The report asserts that in several parts of the SFRY, arms are being imported and
procured illegally and armed structures are being formed in an unauthorized fashion,
beyond the scope of the JNA and territorial defence. It’s obvious that the goal of all such
activities is to create, contrary to the SFRY Constitution and federal laws, paramilitary
organizations that would be under the command of republican institutions or individual
parties and organized groups.
• Intensive work is under way in Croatia to create separate armed forces in order
to violently threaten the constitutionally established order of the SFRY.
• With this goal in mind, the illegal acquisition of large quantities of arms and
ammunition is being organized and implemented.
Arms and ammunition are being intensively imported into the territory of Croatia
contrary to the law, governing the trade in arms and military equipment and the customs
procedure. For example over the last two months 10 barges of the RO (work organization)
“Casmatrans” have arrived transporting arms and ammunition from military depots in
Hungary. The weaponry and ammunition was acquired by way of the “Astra” Work
Organization for Foreign Trade in Zagreb. Members of the Croatian Government (the
ministers of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs) and their departments have been
directly involved in the illegal acquisition of these arms and ammunition abroad and their
delivery into the country. In this process, special protection and armed escorts have been
provided from the border Crossing to the unloading points (the “St. Nedelja” warehouse
near Samobor, “Mostine” near Split, and others). Arms have been illegally imported in other
ways from other countries as well. This illegal importation into Croatia has provided several
tens of thousands of completely new “Kalashnikov”-type automatic rifles and other
weapons, as well as several million rounds of live ammunition.
• In addition, negotiations are currently under way in Croatia with individual
foreign exporters of arms concerning the acquisition of antitank, anti-aircraft,
and other types of weaponry.
This illegally acquired weaponry and ammunition has been secretly distributed
across the territory of the republic and provided exclusively to persons of Croat nationality
who are confirmed HDZ activists. Agencies of the Ministry of Defence and individual
members of local HDZ committees have been involved in this while security has been
provided by members of special Ministry of Internal Affairs units. In this way alone, tens of
thousands of persons have been armed and provided with up to 150 rounds of live
ammunition each.

89
 Armed, illegal paramilitary organizations have also been created throughout the
entire territory of Croatia through coordinated actions by government institutions and
leading activists of the HDZ, within that political party, which is registered for legal political
activity and is in power. The basic criteria for the selection of the persons filling these
organizations are: national affiliation (Croat); an orientation toward Croatian statehood and
toward denying Yugoslavian confirmation through the execution of right-wing political
missions; and the willingness to follow orders unconditionally. In that regard, oaths are also
administered. Complex plans have been formulated for the use of those armed structures
against JNA units and institutions at garrisons on Croatian territory. The constant monitoring
of units, structures and activities in JNA garrisons has been organized. Addresses are being
gathered and lists of JNA officers are being drawn up, their political orientation is being
appraised, and measures are being formulated to liquidate individual responsible officers in
order to deprive units of their leaders and prevent their use. Plans are being made to
liquidate the officers who are called to units at the first alarm signal, as well as military
couriers and summoners. For the sake of deterrence, various measures are also being
planned involving reprisals against their wives and children, all the way up to liquidation. For
the execution of such missions, terrorist-commando units have already been formed,
including groups for so-called quiet liquidation. The executors, based on compiled “black
lists”, have performed reconnaissance of military personnel housing and know whom they
must liquidate.
Measures have been planned for keeping units from leaving their barracks by
erecting various barricades and obstacles, including machine-gun nests near military
structures. Measures have also been formulated for turning off electric power and water,
cutting phone connections, and taking control of relay nodes, in order to disorganize the
leadership and command system.
• Active work is also being done on breaking up JNA units from within. To this end,
individual officers are also being recruited for cooperation with the HDZ military
structures, and they are being given intelligence and subversion tasks.
• All these activities have been intensively under way for several months now.
Based on the manner of organizing, the planned goals, and the form of activities, it
can be concluded without a doubt that this is a terrorist, party-based paramilitary
organization whose existence is in conflict not only with the Constitution and laws of the
SFRY, but also with the international conventions and acts recognized by the SFRY.
Despite the fact that these HDZ measures and activities are being pursued secretly,
because of their grand scale they have not gone unnoticed, especially in ethnically mixed
areas. The Serb population is reacting to this strongly, and part of it is arming itself illegally,
compiling lists of active and armed members of the illegal HDZ groups, and undertaking
other countermeasures, all of which increases the possibility of direct interethnic armed
conflict.
The SSNO report then stresses that during discussion of the events in Knin Krajina
at the session of 2 October 1990, the SFRY Presidency, among other things, asked for a

90
detailed analysis of the causes that led to interethnic armed conflict and set out the
obligations of all competent institutions in finding peaceful ways to resolve the conflict
situation, as well as demanding that the institutions of the Republic of Croatia examine and
eliminate the causes that are instilling fear, resistance, and even mass civil disobedience,
including the withdrawal of special-purpose police units, the release of those who have
been wrongly detained, the legal return of illegally confiscated weapons, the dismantling of
barricades and sentries, the opening up of communications and the restoration of public law
and order, and the provision of guarantees of the freedom and safety of all citizens. It is
noted that these demands by the SFRY Presidency have essentially not yet been complied
with.
In the territory of Knin Krajina, armed groups have been formed for which weapons
are being acquired in various illegal ways. In that region, there are several thousand rifles
and pistols of various types and even some handheld rocket launchers, while significant
quantities of explosives have been taken from work organizations and are being used to
build improvised explosive devices.
The armed people of Serb nationality have been organized into armed structures
and staffs for use on specific communication routes. These structures are engaged in
obstructing communications, monitoring movement and continuous observation and
reporting, which all comes together at a corresponding centre in Knin. Lately, terrorist-
commando operations have been carried out, the perpetrators of which have not been
identified. Only those who have stolen JNA weapons have been identified. The competent
institutions of justice have launched an investigation against 16 persons on the charge of
seizing weapons from a military transport at the Knin train station. Although all of those
weapons were returned, the investigation is under way and its aim is to identify who
organized that act.
Viewed on the whole, the situation in Knin Krajina is such that all authority is being
exercised by local institutions, independently of the republican institutions in Croatia, which
makes it possible for the new paramilitary organization to act freely. At the same time that
this paramilitary organization was being created, the HDZ was illegally arming and
organizing the Croat population in surrounding areas, which creates the conditions for
armed conflict in this area.
... the unauthorized importation of arms is also taking place in the SR of Slovenia.
Certain quantities of antitank and automatic weapons have been ordered, and possibilities
for the importation of anti-aircraft missiles have also been examined. They are openly
threatening to use these formations against JNA units. As far as is known, however, no
secret party-based armed terrorist formations have been created.
According to the SSNO report, a large quantity of infantry and other weaponry is
also being imported into Kosovo by various illegal means. The money for this is being
obtained in part by various criminal activities (burglaries, thefts, drug trafficking, etc.).
Although reliable data on the number of weapons and people involved in secret military
organizing in Kosovo are not available, the estimated number is so great that it constitutes a

91
real threat to peace in that part of the country. The conclusion to the SSNO report states
that the provided information indicates that paramilitary formations have been created or
are in the process of being created in several parts of the country, beyond the scope of the
legitimate and unified armed forces of the SFRY and under the command of institutions and
individuals beyond the scope of the armed forces leadership and command system
established by the SFRY Constitution and federal regulations. The aim of the activities and
measures that their leaders are undertaking is to violently disrupt the constitutional order of
the SFRY, or rather large-scale armed rebellions. Thus, they are committing serious criminal
acts that are punishable under the SFRY Criminal Code (Articles 114 and 124 of the SFRY
Criminal Code). Such acts are punishable even if they are limited to preparatory work. The
existence of armed structures constitutes a constant danger to the constitutional order of
the SFRY. Bearing in mind that these armed structures are being created within the
framework of mutually antagonistic national political parties and their leadership, they
constitute a serious and immediate danger of the outbreak of armed interethnic conflict and
civil war on the soil of Yugoslavia.
• That is why this situation must be resolved immediately and unconditionally in a
constitutional and legal manner.
Even though the JNA’s criminal prosecutors, which are tracking the cited activities
are obligated to institute criminal proceedings in keeping with their official duties (Article
236 of the SFR Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on Military Prosecution), considering all
the consequences that could be catastrophic for the fate of the country, they have notified
the federal secretary for national defence of all this.
All the analyses and assessments indicate that criminal proceedings and the
obligatory public trial would uncover facts that are so shocking that they would provoke
reactions in other parts of the country that would be impossible to control.
That is why the SSNO believes that it would be better in terms of the overall
political situation in the country for the SFRY Presidency, availing itself of its constitutional
authorities, including the right to drop charges, to resolve the situation by adopting an order
on the disbanding of all armed structures and on disarming them with corresponding JNA
authorization.
Finally, it is warned that if this approach is not adopted, the JNA criminal
prosecutors will be forced to institute and pursue criminal proceedings in keeping with their
official duties, with all the ensuing consequences.205

205
JNA assessment drawn from Jovic entry for 9 January 1991. The authors have edited some of it by
removing what appeared to be Jovic, vice SSNO comments. The JNA assessment is also available in a special
edition of the JNA magazine, Narodna Armija, from late January 1991.

92
 Appendix 3
Federal Presidency Order on Surrendering Weapons

(TEXT) Belgrade, 9 Jan (TANJUG) – The SFRY Presidency, it has been reported, at its
session today presided over by President Dr. Borisav Jovic, came to the following conclusion:
The SFRY Presidency, in accordance with its constitutional obligations and
competence from article 313 of the SFRY constitution, during examination of the situation in
the sphere of protection of the SFRY constitutional order and developments directly
threatening the order, came to the conclusion that in certain parts of the country weapons
from some neighboring and other countries are being secretly imported and distributed to
citizens according to their national and political affiliations, which represents a flagrant
violation of SFRY laws and which is aided by some organizations in foreign countries, with
full cognizance of their government bodies. This means that within certain political parties
illegal paramilitary armed groups are being formed which, by their existence and planned
terrorist activities, constitute a direct threat of armed rebellion and large-scale intranational
conflicts with far-reaching consequences for the security of our citizens, sovereignty, and
the integrity of the country.
In order to thwart such activities and make possible peaceful democratic processes
within the SFRY and implementation of the initiated reform, the SFRY Presidency, at its
session on 9 January 1991, issued the following order:
1. Under the order, all armed groups on the territory of the SFRY which are not
included within the SFRY armed forces or within internal affairs bodies and whose
organization is not based on Federal regulations, are to be disbanded.
2. The weapons and equipment referred to in point 1 of this order are to be handed
over immediately to the nearest units or institutions of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)
regardless of whether they belong to individual organs in the republics or are in the
possession of various groups or individuals.
3. Individuals who possess military weapons, ammunition, and other combat
equipment are obliged to hand them over to the nearest JNA unit or institution upon which
they will be issued with a receipt.
4. The obligations from points 1-3 of this order must be carried out within 10 days
of the order’s effect date.
Individuals who fully comply with the order within the set deadline will not be
called to account. Measures envisaged by law will be taken against individuals who fail to
fufill their obligations from the order.
5. Under a special order from the SFRY Presidency and in connection with the
above order, the JNA will take measures to protect all citizens on the entire SFRY territory if
other competent organs are not in the position to do the same.
6. In line with its powers from the Law on National Defence (The SFRY Official
Gazette, No. 21/82) The Federal Secretariat for National Defence will oversee the
implementation of the order.

93
 7. The JNA units and institutions to be appointed by the Federal Secretariat for
National Defence will have the task of ensuring that the order is carried out.
8. The text of the order is to be published in all public information media.
9. The order comes into effect on the day of its adoption.
((SIGNED)) The Presidency of the SFRY
President Dr. Borisav Jovic
BELGRADE. 9 JANUARY 1991

94
 Chart 1
Organization and Select Commanders,
FederalSecretariat for National Defence and Yugoslav People’s Army,
1990-1991

Federal Secretariat for National Defence

(Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu – SSNO)
Secretary
Army General Veljko Kadijevic, May 1988 to January 1992
(Mixed Croat-Serb)

Deputy Secretary
Admiral Stane Brovet, 1988 to 1992
(Slovene)

Assistant Federal Secretary for Security

Lieutenant Colonel General Marko Negovanovic, 1989 to April or May 1991
(Serbian)
Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, April or May 1991 to 1992
(Serbian)

Assistant Federal Secretary for Morale and Legal Affairs

Colonel-General Simeon Buncic, 1988 to April or May 1991
(Serbian)
Lieutenant Colonel General Marko Negovanovic, April or May 1991 to December 1991
(Serbian)

General Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Generalstab Jugoslovenske narodne armije)
Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, 1989 to January 1992
(Bosnian Serb)
Colonel General Zivota Panic, September 1991 to 1992
(Serbian)

First Military District – Belgrade (I. Vojna oblast)

Commander
Colonel General Aleksandar Spirokovski, 1989 to September 1991
(Macedonian)
Colonel General Zivota Avramovic, July 1991 toJanuary 1992
(Serbian)

Third Military District – Skopje (III. Vojna oblast)

Commander
Colonel General Zivota Avramovic, 1986 to July 1991

95
(Serbian)
Lieutenant Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, July 1991 to January 1992
(Promoted to Colonel General January 1992)
(Serbian)

Fifth Military District – Zagreb (V. Vojna oblast)

Commander
Colonel General Konrad Kolsek, 1989 to July 1991
(Slovene)

Military Maritime District – Split (Vojno pomorska oblast – VPO)

Commander
Vice Admiral Mile Kandic, 1990 to 1992
(Promoted Admiral-three stars, December 1991)
(Bosnian Serb)

Air and Air Defence Force (Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdusna Odbrana – RV i PVO)
Commander
Colonel General Anton Tus, 1985 to June 1991
(Croatian)
Lieutenant Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevic, June 1991 to 1992
(Bosnian Croat)

96
 Annex 6
Scene-Setters for War:
Pakrac, Plitvice Lakes, and Borovo Selo
The “battles” at Plitvice Lakes and Borovo Selo in March and May 1991 heard the
opening shots and saw the first casualties in the Serb-Croatian war that plagued Croatia in
fits and starts throughout the summer of 1991 and heralded full-scale war between Croatia
and the JNA in September. The actions eclipsed the first confrontation between Croatian
Government and Serb forces in the western Slavonian town of Pakrac in early March 1991,
the clash that brought the JNA into action for the first time as a peacekeeping force “to
prevent the escalation of intranational confrontations”.206 Perhaps because no one was hurt
in that incident, it failed to excite Croatia’s Serbs and Croatians the way the later battles
would. After Plitvice and especially Borovo Selo both sides would begin to absorb the fact
that war was an actual likelihood, and make appropriate preparations to meet it.

Pakrac207
In February, as the SAO Krajina moved to extend its control to other Serb regions,
Serb spokesmen in Western Slavonia declared their allegiance to the SAO Krajina. Putting
their words into action, a group of armed Serbs seized the police station and municipal
building in the town of Pakrac – the largest town in Western Slavonia – and, declaring
themselves Krajina police, locked up everyone who declined to submit to the SAO Krajina’s
authority, including some ethnic Serbs.208
In the light of the debacle at Knin the previous August, the blatant Serb action left
President Tudjman no choice but to react forcefully. Croatian Deputy Internal Affairs
Minister Perica Juric organized a Special Police force of about 200 troops and directed them
to approach the town in several small columns to surprise the Serbs before they realized the
MUP was even moving against them.209 On 2 March, in a well-executed operation (in
contrast to the later Plitvice attack), the MUP Special Police retook the town, capturing most
of the Serb “police” and arresting 180 Serbs. No one was hit in the fusillade that
accompanied the operation.
The uproar that followed featured absurd Serb claims of Croatian atrocities and
fictional refugee accounts. The Federal Presidency ordered both sides to pull their armed
partisans back and sent JNA units into the town to keep the peace. The situation calmed

206
Belgrade Tanjug, 2 March 1991.
207
Much of this account is drawn from the detailed description of the incident found in Silber and Little pp.
134-136.
208
Silber and Little point out that Pakrac and Western Slavonia had inherited from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire a multi-ethnic mix of more than 20 nationalities, including Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians (Ukrainians),
Italians, Slovaks, and Hungarians.
209
The Croatian MUP troops were drawn from the Antiterrorist Unit Lucko and the Rakitje Special Police
Battalion. Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16.

97
over the next several days, although the challenge to Zagreb’s right to control its own
territory remained unresolved.210 In addition, although the immediate danger of war had
passed, the propaganda and war hysteria that spread throughout the region heated the
atmosphere for future clashes.

Plitvice Lakes
The Plitvice Lakes area, in the Lika region of Croatia,211 was not just a Yugoslav
National Park but a national treasure of sylvan beauty laced with a series of stunning
waterfalls. As Silber and Little note, at this time the Croatian Government was attempting to
extend purely Croatian authority into Serb-dominated areas like Plitvice by planting MUP
police stations there.212 On 15 February, 70 Croatian police took over one of the hotels at
Plitvice in preparation for establishing a police station in the park.213 Although the police
eventually departed, the SAO Krajina authorities felt obliged to react to this or any other
Croatian move into Serb-declared territory. On 25 March, a large group of Serb nationalist
civilians staged a clearly orchestrated march to protest Croatian control of the park. Three
days later a mixed Serb force of special police and civilians, variously estimated at 50 to 100
armed men,214 occupied Plitvice and expelled the Croatian park managers.215
The Croatian MUP appears to have begun planning for a military response to the
possibility of armed Serb action to claim the park that pre-dated the actual incident.216 The
Croatian Government on 30 March demanded that the Serbs return the park to its former
managers or face police action.217 At 05:00 the next day the MUP moved into Plitvice with
an estimated 300 Special Police drawn from several units.218 Inexperienced at armed tactical
operations, the Special Police units proceeded to drive into the midst of the Serb defences
in a column of buses and other soft-skinned vehicles. Bunching up in the pre-dawn darkness

210
Silber and Little, p. 135.
211
The closest “major” town is Korenica, northeast of Gospic.
212
Silber and Little, pp. 136-137, 146n.
213
Belgrade Tanjug, 16 February 1991.
214
The Serb force involved elements of Captain Dragan’s “Kninja” Special Police units from the Krajina
Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) in Knin (the police force of the Krajina Autonomous Region) and armed
civilians from the Korenica area.
215
Belgrade Domestic Service, 25 March 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 29 March 1991.
216
See Slobodan Kljakic: Carefully Performed Police Terror!, Politika, 6 May 1991, pp. 7-8, for purported entries
from a Croatian security service officer’s notebook detailing Croatian planning in March and April for
intelligence and police actions against Croatian Serb separatists in the SAO Krajina – especially the Plitvice
Lakes – and intelligence and disinformation operations against the JNA.
217
Silber and Little p. 36.
218
The units involved included the Rakitje Special Police Battalion (later forming the core of the National
Guard Corps and Croatian Army’s 1st Guards Brigade) with an estimated 100 troops, the Lucko Antiterrorist
Unit (the Croatian national antiterrorist force) with 100 personnel, and probably county-level Special Police
units from the Gospic and Karlovac County Police Administrations with an estimated 50 personnel each.
The Croatians could have deployed as many as 800 to 1.000 Special Police if all the personnel from these
units had been used (the Rakitje Battalion – 300, Lucko unit – 100-150, and county units, 200 to 300 each).
Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16; Belgrade Tanjug, 31
March 1991.

98
and heavy fog, the column hit a Serb ambush about four kilometers inside the park. The
Serbs opened fire from behind barricades with a rain of bullets and rifle grenades that
paralyzed the column for about 15 minutes. The disaster might have been worse: a rocket
grenade hit a bus full of Special Police but failed to detonate.219 After a bit the Special Police
recovered from the shock, and their superior numbers gradually overwhelmed the Serb
force holed up in a hotel and the post office. By 08:00, the Croatian troops had overcome
Serb resistance and began mopping up. One Croatian special policeman and one armed local
Serb died in the operation, and six on each side were wounded.220 The Croatians arrested 29
Serbs – eight special police and 21 armed civilians.221 The rest of the Serb gunmen
apparently withdrew from their positions and escaped.222
The startling breach of the Federal peace brought swift action from the Presidency,
meeting in emergency session under Serbian member Borisav Jovic. They quickly agreed on
a series of measures to defuse the situation:
• A full and unconditional cease-fire to be observed by all parties.
• The JNA to deploy units to ensure respect for the cease-fire.
• All police and militia forces from outside Plitvice to be withdrawn.
• Combat readiness among additional JNA units to be raised.223
The JNA sped armour-mechanized units to the region to execute the presidency
decision and cordoned off the area with armed posts on all the roads and bridges into the
park.224 The Croatians objected to the JNA deployment and at first refused to yield.225 They
grudgingly began redeploying their Special Police units early on 2 April, replacing them with
90 regular police from nearby Gospic.226 By these actions the JNA’s involvement in
peacekeeping in Croatia had broadened and deepened.227

219
Hrvatski Vojnik, 21 May 1993, p. 13; Belgrade Tanjug, 31 March 1991.
220
The special policeman was Josip Jovic of the Rakitje Special Police Battalion. Vlado Vurusic and Ivo Pukanic:
The Commander of the Fourth Guard Brigade is 25 Years Old, and All the Members of the Lucko ATJ Are
Taller Than 180 Centimeters!, Zagreb Globus, 26 May 1995, pp. 48-49. The Serb armed civilian was Rajko
Vukadinovic, a former butcher from Korenica. Silber and Little, p. 136.
221
Slavko Degoricija, deputy Croatian Minister of Internal Affairs, announced the prisoner totals. Belgrade
Tanjug, 31 March 1991.
222
Chief of the Krajina SUP Milan Martic claimed that the milicija (police) had withdrawn. Belgrade Tanjug
Domestic Service, 31 March 1991.
223
Belgrade Tanjug, 31 March 1991.
224
Belgrade Tanjug, 31 March 1991 and 1 April 1991. The JNA deployed one battalion-sized battle group of the
329th Armored Brigade / 5th (Banja Luka) Corps from Banja Luka, although the units appear to have staged
out of the JNA’s huge Bihac Air Base; The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski
Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29.
225
Silber and Little, p. 138.
226
Belgrade Tanjug, 2 April 1991.
227
An article in a Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) military journal on the JNA 329th Armored Brigade (which later
became a VRS unit) makes it clear that the JNA troops were to prevent either the Croatian MUP or the
Krajina Serb Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) police units from attempting to enter territory controlled
by the other side:
The checkpoint on the crossroads in the village of Prijeboj was put in place and organized with the
mission to prevent the movement of all SUP vehicles toward (Croat-held) Plitvice and MUP vehicles
toward (Serb-held) Korenica or Licko Petrovo Selo ... After regrouping the brigade’s units with the aim
of preventing the “march of peace” from taking place, new problems arose.

99
 Borovo Selo228
Borovo Selo was a Serb-populated town near Vukovar in eastern Slavonia. Inflamed
by accounts of the Plitvice Lakes battle, tempers flared between Croatians and Serbs in
eastern Slavonia-Baranja as local Serb and Croatian village guards began to set up barricades
around their respective villages. When four Croatian policemen from Osijek happened to
learn that barricades on one of the roads into Borovo Selo had been left unguarded over the
May 1st workers’ holiday, they mischievously decided to sneak into the town in the middle
of the night and replace the Yugoslav flag hanging there with the Croatian flag.
The Serbs, however, ambushed the four as they clambered through the barricades.
Two of the pranksters were wounded and captured as their companions escaped. Silber and
Little note:
Discipline had broken down in Tudjman’s police force. The influx of so many
young Croats, promoted to positions of authority which their age and experience did
not warrant, had weakened chains of command and accountability. In Osijek ... (the
police chief) had lost control in both the police and the civil administration. Precisely
who gave the fateful order for what came next, on the morning of May 2, has never
been properly established.229
The morning after the two surviving policemen returned to Osijek, a busload of
Croatian Special Police from Vinkovci set out to rescue the two wounded men held by the
Serbs at Borovo Selo. The Special Police were enveloped by another ambush of Serb village
guards and volunteers from Serbia mounted atop buildings covering the main roads and
intersections; 12 Croatian police died and 21 were wounded before they could withdraw.230

(The “march of peace” was a march led by Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj and
Milan Martic to protest the capture of Plitvice by the Croatians. That the JNA was trying to block it –
see below – underscores the army’s efforts to stay between the two sides.) Nevertheless, the “march
of peace” was organized and it took place in the village of Jezerce. Milan Martic and Vojislav Seselj
spoke before approximately 2-3.000 people and urged them to expel the “MUPovce” from Plitvice.
Some people set off to do so. However, the members of the brigade managed to stop them.
Otherwise it all could have ended with unforeseeable consequences.
The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29. This VRS
article is clearly based on the brigade war diary.
228
This account is drawn from Silber and Little, pp. 140-144, which is the most detailed account available of
the incident.
229
Silber and Little, p. 141.
230
Belgrade Tanjug, 3 May 1991; Vojislav Seselj, Leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), stated on 8 May
that its military wing, the Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP), had 14 personnel from Serbia at Borovo Selo
and the Mirko Jovic-led Serbian National Renewal (SNO) had two. Belgrade Tanjug, 8 May 1991. The
Serbian SDB and MUP provided all of the weapons used by the Serbs. Seselj noted in 1993 that the SCP
cooperation with the MUP began just before Borovo Selo. Miroslav Mikuljanac and Cvijetin Milivojevic: I
Will Travel to the Hague With Milosevic, Belgrade Borba, 13-14 November 1993, pp. 10-11, an interview
with Vojislav Seselj. Silber and Little quote then Serbian Internal Affairs Minister Bogdanovic as saying “If
we had not equipped our Serbs, who knows how they would have fared in the attack by the Croatian
National Guard on Borovo Selo?” See previous section on The Organization and Arming of the Krajina Serbs
for a more detailed discussion of the long-term Serbian plan to arm the Croatian Serb police and Territorial
Defence.

100
Again the JNA quickly moved in troops to impose peace and interpose a buffer between the
Serbs and Croatians.231
Silber and Little judge that the “battle” at Borovo Selo on 1-2 May “arguably, more
than any other (event), set Croatia irrevocably on the path to open war ... Borovo Selo
caused a sea-change in Croatian public opinion”.232
The Croatian Government was stunned.
None (of Tudjman’s ministers) had been prepared for loss of life on such a scale.
Their mood reflected public opinions. Many began to push Tudjman for an immediate
declaration of sovereignty by the Croatian parliament. Tudjman resisted. But the idea to
which Tudjman had clung for months, of reconstituting Yugoslavia as a confederation of
states, had lost the confidence of his ministers, who now believed that Serbia – and not just
the Serbs in Croatia – was determined to block, by bloodshed if necessary, Croatia’s
progress to full sovereignty.233
The Serbs and Croatians were facing up to war. The JNA stood in between.

231
Belgrade Tanjug, 3 May 1991.
232
Silber and Little p. 141.
233
Silber and Little p. 142.

101
 Annex 7
Croatian Ultimatum to the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia
TO THE PRESIDENCY OF YUGOSLAVIA.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF

CROATIA OF 3 AUGUST, AND THE STANDS ADOPTED AT THE 23D SESSION OF THE SUPREME
STATE COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OF 22 AUGUST, THAT IS TODAY, I SUBMIT TO
THE SFRY PRESIDENCY THE FOLLOWING DEMANDS:
1. THAT THE YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY CALLS ON ALL THOSE WHO HAVE TAKEN UP
ARMS IN REBELLION AGAINST THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,
ARMED BY THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AND THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, TO OBSERVE THE DECISION
ON A CEASE-FIRE, AND TO HAND OVER THEIR ARMS TO THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OR THE YUGOSLAV ARMY.
2. THAT THE YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY SHOULD CALL ON THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
TO IMMEDIATELY HALT THE ORGANIZATION AND ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED REBELLION
AND AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AIMED AT THE VIOLENT
APPROPRIATION OF ITS TERRITORY.
3. THAT IN ITS CAPACITY AS SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE
YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY SHOULD ORDER THE YUGOSLAV ARMY, (A) TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE
PROVOCATIVE MOVEMENTS AND RECONAISSANCE AND MILITARY ACTION ON THE
TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND WITHDRAW TO BARRACKS; (B) TO RELEASE
SOLDIERS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MILITARY SERVICE AND RESERVISTS, AND TO
REDUCE THE SIZE OF UNITS TO THEIR REGULAR PEACETIME STATE; (C) TO COORDINATE
THEIR ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA WITH ITS LEGAL
GOVERNMENT.
4. THAT THE YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY SHOULD BEGIN THE PROCESS OF
ESTABLISHING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ALL THOSE OFFICERS OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, FOR THE ARMING OF THE OUTLAW TERRORIST GROUPINGS FROM
YUGOSLAV ARMY SOURCES, FOR PARTICIPATION IN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF MATERIAL AND CULTURAL WEALTH, FOR THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS OF THE YUGOSLAV
ARMY AGAINST THE FORCES OF ORDER IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND AGAINST THE
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA.
IN THIS CONNECTION WE ARE SEEKING A RESPONSE TO OUR DEMAND TO THE
YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY OF 10 JULY WITH REGARD TO COLONEL-GENERAL BLAGOJE ADZIC
AND COLONEL-GENERAL ZIVOTA AVRAMOVIC.
5. THAT EC OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE DEMANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BRIONI DECLARATION
OF 7 JULY.

102
 IF THE YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY AND YUGOSLAV ARMY DO NOT SATISFY THESE
DEMANDS BY 31 AUGUST, AND IF THE ARMED OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ORDER OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE OCCUPATION
OF ITS TERRITORIES CONTINUE, ACCORDING TO THE PLANS TO INCLUDE THEM IN A
GREATER SERBIA OR REMAINDER OF YUGOSLAVIA, THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA WILL
CONSIDER THAT THE YUGOSLAV PRESIDENCY IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE YUGOSLAV ARMY AS AN ARMY
OF OCCUPATION, AND WE WILL ACCORDINGLY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION OF
25 JULY.

ZAGREB, 22 AUGUST 1991.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA.234

234
Interview with President Tudjman. Zagreb Radio, 22 August 1991.

103
 Annex 8
Fighting Escalates, June – September 1991
Serb Operations in Banija and Lika
Serb Planning

In June and July the self-declared government of the SAO Krajina set out
deliberately to gain military control over the Banija region. The coordinated military
campaign was conducted jointly by Captain Dragan’s “Kninja” Special Police unit and the
newly activated Banija Territorial Defence – designated the “7th Banija Shock Division”235 –
and its purpose was to eliminate the Croatian MUP police stations, which still provided a
measure of Croatian Government control in the region.
The Croatian MUP maintained four municipal police stations in the Serb-claimed
areas of Banija – Glina, (Hrvatska) Kostajnica, Topusko, and Petrinja – and had established
substations 10 to 15 kilometers south of Petrinja at Kraljevcani and Dragotinci and between
Croatian-controlled Kostajnica and Serb-controlled Dvor na Uni at the villages of Kozibrod
and Struga. The Serbs apparently planned to eliminate these in a three-stage campaign.
During the first phase, the Serbs would eliminate the station at Glina and pick off the
substations supported by, but distant from, Petrinja and Kostajnica. The second phase
would be an attack on Kostajnica itself, and the last against the stronger forces in and
around Petrinja, along with the station at Topusko. As events proceeded, however, before
the unilateral Serb operations against Petrinja and Topusko could begin, the JNA would be
fully involved in the war, facilitating the capture of both towns by the Serbs.

Glina

On 26 June troops from the Serbs’ Glina TO attacked the police station in battalion
strength, overrunning the facility.236 The Croatians, who estimated their opponents at about
400, counterattacked with the Sisak Special Police and two or three battalions of active-duty
ZNG forces from Zagreb, totaling probably 600-700 troops. This was enough to push the
Serbs out of the station and regain control of most of the town.237 The JNA then moved in to

235
The “7th Banija Shock Division” was the World War II designator of a famous Partisan formation raised in
the region. Prior to the 1991 war, nearly all JNA and Territorial Defence formations throughout Yugoslavia
carried a unit honorific or designator that could be traced to a wartime Partisan unit, and it is likely that
this had been the regional TO’s official unit designator. The 7th Division was later redesignated as the 39th
(Banija) Corps of the SVK.
236
Belgrade Tanjug, 26 June 1991; Zagreb Radio, 26 and 27 June 1991. The Serb troops reportedly employed
both mortars and light antitank weapons. The Glina TO later become the 24th Infantry Brigade of the 39th
Corps.
237
The units involved included the 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade and as much as a
battalion of the 1st Guards Brigade. Vlado Vurusic and Ivo Pukanic: The Commander of the Fourth Guard
Brigade is 25 Years Old, and All the Members of the Lucko ATJ Are Taller Than 180 Centimeters!, Zagreb

104
separate the combatants, employing armoured units – initially about a battalion – from the
10th (Zagreb) Corps garrison in Petrinja.238
The Serbs tried again in Glina with at least one more strong attack in early July, and
then on 26 July the 7th Banija Division staged a full-scale assault – dubbed Operation
“Stinger” (Zaoka) – against the Croatian units deployed in and around the station. Captain
Dragan’s Special Police battalion, brought in from Knin, spearheaded the attack. Serb forces
overran the station and pushed the Croatian troops completely out of the town, clear into
the hills northwest of Glina and northeast up the Glina River valley.239 JNA forces were then
able to restore a buffer zone.
The Croatians had been the first to complain about the JNA in Glina, but now the
Serbs called the JNA commander “a traitor to the Serbian people”, apparently because they
believed he had refused to shoot back when the Croatians had fired on the JNA
peacekeepers.240 Internal Affairs Minister Martic had already criticized the JNA for guarding
the Croatian MUP police stations in Plitvice and Glina. The JNA backed up its commander,
asserting that he had acted properly and had returned fire when fired upon; all concerned
were reminded that the JNA’s mission was to “prevent intranational clashes”.241

Elimination of the MUP Substations

On 13-14 July TO troops from the 7th Banija Division moved against the MUP
substations at the villages of Kraljevcani and Dragotinci, some 10 to 15 kilometers south of
Petrinja. Again, the Serbs were initially successful, overrunning the two substations and
several Croatian-held villages in the area before ZNG and MUP Special Police reinforcements
– probably 300 to 400 troops – arrived to push the Serbs out of the villages.242 The next day,
however, the Croatians complained that JNA armoured units sent to separate the forces had
systematically driven their troops back out of the villages. It was not clear whether the JNA
action was unprovoked, as the Croatians charged, or whether the army troops were reacting
to real or perceived Croatian fire. The apparent upshot, however, was that the Serbian TO
forces then occupied the contested villages.

Globus, 26 May 1995, pp. 48-49; Vesna Puljak: “Thunders’ From Banija”, Hrvatski Vojnik, 6 May 1994. pp.
19-21.
238
The 622nd Motorized Brigade was garrisoned in Petrinja and equipped with 21 T-55 tanks and 10 M-60
armored personnel carriers.
239
Belgrade Radio, 26 July 1991.
240
Belgrade Radio, 26 July 1991. The JNA commander in Glina was Colonel Grujica “Grujo” Boric, a 10th Corps
staff officer. By spring 1992 Boric was the corps assistant commander for rear services. Boric took
command of the corps in spring 1992, leading it – as the 2nd Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS)
– until late 1994. Boric then assumed command of the VRS training center at Banja Luka, where he
remained until 1997.
241
Belgrade Tanjug, 26 July 1991.
242
The troops included the MUP’s Lucko Antiterrorist Unit and the ZNG 2nd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade.
Vesna Puljak: “Thunders’ From Banija”, Hrvatski Vojnik, 6 May 1994, pp. 19-21.

105
 In coordination with the Serbs’ successful attack on Glina on 26 July an estimated
two battalions of the Dvor and Kostajnica TO joined elements of the 7th Banija Division243
and Captain Dragan’s battalion – 600 to 800 men in all – in assaults on the substations
between Kostajnica and Dvor in Operation “Dvor na Uni”. Although reinforced earlier with a
ZNG company, the Croatian forces were routed in heavy fighting and pushed some 15
kilometers from the edge of Dvor almost to the outskirts of Kostajnica, which they
temporarily abandoned on 31 July.244 JNA forces from Petrinja began moving into the area
on 27 July to act as a buffer yet again, also escorting 300 terrified Croatian refugees out of
the battle area on 30 July. The refugees claimed to Western reporters that Serb soldiers had
rousted them from their villages and had even used some of their neighbors as human
shields during the Serb advance.245 Although this specific incident remains uncorroborated,
it was not the last time that Serb troops would be accused of committing war crimes in the
course of their military operations.

Battle of Kostajnica – August / September 1991

The Croatian withdrawal from Kostajnica was brief. Croatian MUP and ZNG troops
re-entered the town on 2 August and, in an apparent meeting engagement, pushed the
advancing Serb forces out.246 The Serbs, who had won a string of relatively easy victories,
were now in for a long, 45-day siege against dug-in Croatian forces, probably numbering
from 500 to 750 ZNG and MUP Special Police.247 The Serb 7th Banija Division committed the
Dvor and Kostajnica TO – probably four battalions numbering 1.000 to 2.000 troops – to the
task of ejecting the outnumbered Croatians, who were surrounded on three sides with only
a tenuous supply route east to Hrvatska Dubica. Kostajnica TO forces cut this route on 4
August, but the Croatians apparently were able to reopen it. During the rest of August, the

243
The Dvor TO later become the 33rd Infantry Brigade of the 39th Corps. The Kostajnica TO later become the
26th Infantry Brigade of the 39th Corps.
244
Belgrade Tanjug, 26-31 July 1991; Zagreb Radio, 26-27 July 1991. The number of ZNG and MUP personnel
in the area is unclear, but probably initially numbered no more than 200 to 300, including the ZNG 2nd
Company / 2nd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade and a volunteer company from the ZNG 57th Sisak
Independent Battalion. Vesna Puljak: “Thunders’ From Banija”, Hrvatski Vojnik, 6 May 1994, pp. 19-21;
Vlado Vurusic and Ivo Pukanic: The Commander of the Fourth Guard Brigade is 25 Years Old, and All the
Members of the Lucko ATJ Are Taller Than 180 Centimeters!, Zagreb Globus, 26 May 1995, pp. 48-49. Sinisa
Haluzan: The Croatian Heart of the Fighting Men from Banija, Hrvatski Vojnik, 23 April 1993, p. 18.
245
Paris AFP, 30 July 1991.
246
Belgrade Tanjug, 1-2 August 1991.
247
ZNG forces were concentrated around most of the 5th ( Varazdin) Battalion / 1st Guards Brigade, plus
elements of the Zrinski Special Battalion, probably a company of 2nd Guards Brigade, and a volunteer
company from the 57th Sisak Independent Battalion. This force alone could have numbered 400 to 500
troops. The MUP probably committed a small battalion of Special Police drawn from Sisak and Kutina
numbering some 200 to 250 personnel. Relief efforts from Hrvatska Dubica appear to have been mounted
by ZNG troops consisting of two companies / 120th Sisak Brigade, elements of the 55th Light Air Defence
Artillery Battalion, the “Wolves” Combat Group, which probably was a platoon / company size “special
operations” unit, and probably some MUP Special Police. Vesna Puljak: The Varazdin Pumas, Hrvatski
Vojnik, 21 May 1993, p. 13; Nikolina Sutalo: Always Ready for the Homeland, Zagreb Velebit, 6 September
1996, p. 12.

106
fighting centred on unsuccessful Croatian efforts to oust Serb troops from key hills ringing
the town to the north and northwest while the Serbs prepared for a final push against the
town.
The Serb assault began on 30 August, cutting the route to Hrvatska Dubica the next
248
day. Croatian efforts to break out failed, and on 8 September TO troops – now stiffened
by major elements of Captain Dragan’s Special Police – penetrated the town’s outer
defences and forced the Croatians into a small defensive ring in the very centre of town
near the bridge to Bosanska Kostajnica.249 The Croatians’ defences began to break up over
the next several days as they were pressed back against the Una River.250 On 13 September
the defence collapsed, and almost 300 ZNG and MUP soldiers crossed the river into
Bosanska Kostajnica, where they were interned by border guards of the Bosnia-Herzegovinia
TO.251

Evaluation of the Banija Campaign

The 7th Banija Division’s campaign from June through mid-September appears to
have been a well-thought-out and generally well-executed operation tailored to the
“national” military strategy of the Croatian Serbs. The operations concentrated initially on
the focal point for Croatian control in Banija, the key road junction at Glina, which gave
access deeper into the area and to the outpost at Topusko. When Glina was taken, along
with the police substations, the 7th Division was able to establish a more territorially secure
base of operations for attacks on Kostajnica, a Croatian toehold blatantly deep in Banija. By
seizing and holding that town, the 7th Division, even without the help of subsequent
intervention by the JNA, placed itself where it could easily have taken Topusko and probably
Petrinja by concentrating its forces on either objective.
The 7th Division’s successful use of elite, mobile shock troops – Captain Dragan’s
“Kninja” Special Police Battalion – to spearhead operations conducted by less capable,
territorially-raised infantry units foreshadowed the spread of this doctrinal concept to all of
the armies that were to take part in the Yugoslav wars. In Kostajnica especially, it is doubtful
that the 7th Division’s poorly trained and undisciplined TO troops – mere collections of
armed civilians – could have taken on and defeated the highly motivated ZNG defenders
without the extra boost in combat power and stiffening that the elite Special Police units
provided at critical moments.

248
Belgrade Radio, 30-31 August 1991.
249
Belgrade Radio, 8 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 8 September 1991.
250
Belgrade Radio, 9 September 1991.
251
Belgrade Radio, 13 September 1991; Zagreb Radio, 12 September 1991. It is unclear how many Croatian
troops escaped from Kostajnica before it fell. The Serbs claimed that 292 MUP and ZNG personnel were
interned in Bosnia on 13 September, although most of these probably were eventually released and
returned to Croatia. Another 70 troops reportedly surrendered to the 7th Banija Division. It is unlikely that
the Croatians suffered 300+ casualties, so a large portion of the force probably was able to slip out of the
pocket before it fell. The 5th Battalion / 1st Guards Brigade, for example, went on to fight soon afterward
in western Slavonia for the rest of the war. Vesna Puljak: The Varazdin Pumas, Hrvatski Vojnik, 21 May
1993, p. 13.

107
 Croatian ZNG regular units and MUP Special Police fought well throughout the
campaign. That they were unable to halt the Serb offensives was not due to any lack of
tactical skill but rather to their inability to concentrate sufficient troops at key points. Their
shortage of armed troops was compounded by poor operational-level coordination by the
regional crisis staff, which resulted in less than optimum use of the units that were
available. When the Croatians were able to concentrate their thinly spread forces, as they
did during the first attack at Glina, they generally succeeded in halting or reversing a Serb
advance.

Lika: Plitvice Lakes, Round 2

On 29 August “Kninja” Special Police and Korenica TO troops surrounded the

Croatian MUP station at Plitvice and took it over after a three-day siege better characterized
as a mob action than a military operation. The 76 MUP personnel surrendered only after the
JNA agreed to transport them safely to Croatian-held territory.252 At the start of the attack
the JNA had been critical of the Serbs, charging that the Krajina forces “are constantly
making threats and provoking ... Croatian policemen in Plitvice”.253 Articles in a Bosnian Serb
Army journal chronicling former JNA units make it clear that the JNA armoured battalion
forming the buffer force blamed the clash on the deployment of Krajina troops into the
area.254 Considering how long it took the Serbs to seize the station from an outnumbered
and isolated force, they probably were content to besiege the station, keep it under fire,
and harass the MUP into giving it up rather than trying to storm it.

Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Baranja Campaign

Although details are lacking, circumstantial evidence makes it clear that the Baranja
TO planned and undertook an operation in late August 1991 to wrest complete control of
Baranja and its major towns from Croatian forces. On 22-24 August between 1.000 and
2.000 Baranja TO troops seized the area around the Baranja municipal seat of Beli Manistir,
the town of Darda, and the town of Knezevi Vinogradi, giving them control of most of the

252
Belgrade Radio, 31 August 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 31 August 1991; Zagreb Radio, 31 August 1991; The
Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29. This VRS article is
clearly based on the brigade war diary.
253
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 August 1991. Major General Milan Aksentijevi, the Fifth Military District Assistant
Commander for Morale, Education, and Legal Affairs, on 31 August commented on the JNA’s transport of
the Croatian policemen out of the danger zone:
This and many other examples show the Yugoslav Army to be also a Croatian army. We have been
and we still are an army of all our peoples and nationalities and do not separate ourselves from the
people. Belgrade Tanjug, 31 August 1991.
254
The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29. This VRS
article is clearly based on the brigade war diary.

108
region.255 Serb forces had earlier in the month taken control of Beli Manistir itself. The
Croatian ZNG defenders probably numbered no more than 750, perhaps as few as 500.256
The Baranja TO operation appears to have been coordinated to hit Croatian defences across
the region simultaneously and prevent the few ZNG/MUP reserves from concentrating. It is
not known if the Eastern Slavonia-Baranja TO’s mobile reserve – Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer
Guard – was used to spearhead the campaign as Captain Dragan’s Special Police had in
Banija. The JNA does not appear to have made any major effort to halt Croatian-Serb
fighting in the region.

Osijek

In and around the major regional city of Osijek, Serb and Croat forces also fought
regularly after the Serbs began to toss random mortar shells into the city. Meanwhile, ZNG
and MUP personnel frequently clashed with elements of the JNA 12th Mechanized Brigade
garrisoned in Osijek. The Croatians claimed the JNA started these engagements, and the JNA
blamed the Croatians.

Borovo Selo – Borovo Naselje – Vukovar

The area around Vukovar and its two major suburbs, Serb-held Borovo Selo and
Croatian-held Borovo Naselje, suffered almost daily, heavy engagements from June through
August, even before all-out fighting for the Vukovar area erupted in September. JNA forces
tried to establish a buffer zone between the two suburbs beginning in May, after the
“battle” at Borovo Selo, and continued their peacekeeping operations without success until
September. Neither the Serbs nor the Croatians seem to have tried very hard to actually
seize the opposing suburb. JNA troops in the Vukovar barracks and on peacekeeping duty in
the area often claimed that Croatian troops fired on them, while the Croatians usually
claimed that the JNA was providing weapons and armoured support to the local Croatian
Serb TO.257

Tenja

The dual villages of Nova (Croatian) and Stara (Serb) Tenja formed a frequent hot
spot during the escalating clashes in July and August. The heaviest fighting occurred on 7-9
July when ZNG and MUP Special Police troops supported by mortar and recoilless rifle fire

255
Belgrade Radio, 22-24 August 1991. The last Croatian-held village in Baranja, Bilje, just northeast of Osijek,
fell to Baranja TO forces on 4 September. Belgrade Radio, 4 September 1991.
256
Almost certainly drawn from the 107th Valpovo Brigade. This estimate is based on a presumption that the
brigade had weapons for 30 to 40 percent of an estimated 2.000-man force. Although the 107th had four
battalions at this time, these were raised from several different towns and probably were dispersed to
support operations in many areas of Eastern and Western Slavonia because of the Croatians’ shortage of
troops.
257
This narrative/assessment is drawn primarily from Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio, and Zagreb Radio
reporting from throughout June-August 1991.

109
attempted to seize the town from Serb TO forces.258 When the attack failed to achieve its
objective, JNA troops interposed themselves to establish a buffer zone. The Croatians
claimed that the JNA unit had sided with the Croatian Serbs and had caused a large number
of the Croatian casualties.259 The JNA almost certainly did fire on the Croatians after an
unidentified sniper – which the JNA claimed was Croatian – killed a JNA sergeant in his
tank.260 Croatian Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Degoricija claimed that Croatian forces
would have defeated the Serb forces had not JNA troops intervened. The Osijek Mayor
stated that 4 ZNG soldiers were killed in action and 27 MUP and ZNG wounded.

Dalj – Sarvas – Bijelo Brdo

The area around these three villages saw frequent fighting during the summer, the
most prominent of which began on 1 August in Dalj after Croatian Serb TO troops attacked a
Croatian MUP police substation in the village. What followed next is still not entirely clear,
and is typical of the confusion that often reigned when three different and mutually
distrustful military organizations operated in close proximity during a shooting war. After
the Serb attack the Croatian MUP either asked the JNA to intervene between the two sides
or the JNA took it on its own to do so. But the Croatians claim that the JNA then sided with
the Serbs and demanded the surrender of the police station. When the MUP defenders
refused, the JNA opened fire and continued to attack until it had captured the entire village
from the MUP261. The JNA claimed that shots fired at its soldiers by the MUP touched off the
pitched fighting, in which the Croatians lost heavily. At least 20 MUP soldiers were killed in
action the first day and more died in heavy fighting over the next day.262 Regardless of who
fired first, the Dalj incident was one of many that summer that convinced the Croatians that
the JNA was on the side of the rebellious Serbs. After the capture of Dalj, fighters of the
Croatian Serb TO and Croatian Government forces faced off for the rest of August and into
September in a regular series of exchanges between the nearby villages of Bijelo Brdo (Serb)
and Sarvas (Croat).

258
The ZNG troops were probably drawn from elements of 3rd Guards Brigade, while the Special Police were
likely from Osijek. The Croatian force probably numbered no more than about 500 troops, or a battalion.
259
The 12th Mechanized Brigade / 17th (Tuzla) Corps, garrisoned in Osijek and commanded by Colonel Boro
Ivanovic, was the JNA formation involved. The 12th participated directly in almost every JNA deployment in
Eastern Slavonia during this period. In addition to its field deployments, the brigade had elements
scattered across several installations including its main Osijek barracks, sub-unit barracks in Nasice and
Vukovar, a large training area near Osijek, an airfield near Osijek, and at the 12th Mixed Artillery
Regiment’s barracks in Vinkovci.
260
Belgrade Tanjug, 7 July 1991.
261
The 51st Mechanized Brigade / 24th (Kragjujevac) Corps (attached to 12th (Novi Sad) Corps), normally
garrisoned in Pancevo, was the JNA unit involved in the action.
262
Belgrade Tanjug, 1 August 1991; Zagreb Radio, 5 August 1991; Zagreb HTV, 4 August 1991.

110
 Vinkovci – Mirkovci

The Serb-held village of Mirkovci, less than five kilometers southeast of Vinkovci,
was a thorn in the Croatian side throughout this period. TO troops regularly fired mortar
rounds into the Vinkovci area and launched sporadic, small-scale ground attacks that
underscored the Croatians’ lack of control in the region.263 The heaviest fighting occurred on
22 July when Croatian ZNG and MUP troops attempted to capture the village.264 After
penetrating the Serb TO defences, they were pushed back out, losing at least 14 ZNG troops
and 1 MUP soldier killed in action and at least another 14 ZNG and three MUP personnel
wounded, with as many as 12 ZNG soldiers missing.265 Croatian forces in Eastern Slavonia
paid a heavy price for their efforts to resist the Serbs, and they complained bitterly that the
JNA had used artillery and aircraft fire against them – a charge the JNA again denied.266

Laslovo – Palaca

Laslovo (Croatian) and Palaca (Serb) were yet another pair of Serb and Croatian
villages, some 15 kilometers south of Osijek, from which the two sides regularly exchanged
fire with small arms, mortar, and rocket grenades. ZNG and MUP fighters apparently
attempted to take Palaca on 23 July; when they failed, JNA troops interposed themselves
between the two villages.267

JNA Operations and the August Barracks Blockade

Between 22 and 28 August, Croatian forces in Eastern Slavonia moved openly

against the JNA with full-scale blockades of its garrisons in Osijek, Vinkovci, and Vukovar.
They not only cut off water, electricity, and food supplies but mined the access roads to the
barracks.268 Clashes between JNA forces and ZNG/MUP troops in and around the three
towns erupted more and more frequently as JNA commanders demanded that the
blockades be lifted, while the Croatians made JNA armoured patrols their primary targets.
As fighting escalated during August, JNA commanders continued to bluster but did little to
relieve either Osijek or Vinkovci.

263
Analysis of Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio, and Zagreb Radio reporting, June-August 1991.
264
Croatian forces were probably elements of the 2nd Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade, elements of the 109th
Vinkovci Brigade, and Vinkovci Special Police for a battalion strength of 500 to 600 troops. The Mirkovci TO
probably numbered 300 to 400 personnel.
265
Belgrade Tanjug, 22-23 July 1991; Zagreb Radio, 22-23 July 1991.
266
The JNA garrison commander in Vinkovci – the commander of the 12th Mixed Artillery Regiment / 17th
(Tuzla) Corps – claimed instead that MUP personnel surrounded the barracks and fired on him. He said he
then fired five tank or mortar rounds into an empty field as a warning to cease and desist. Belgrade Tanjug,
23 July 1991.
267
Belgrade Tanjug, 23 July 1991.
268
The order to initiate the blockades almost certainly came from Vladimir Seks, a HDZ hard-liner and Chief of
the Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Crisis Staff.

111
 On 28 August, however, the JNA 1st Guards Mechanized Division269 mounted a
substantial operation to relieve the Vukovar barracks, which was on the south side of the
town.270 Elements of two mechanized brigades, and possibly some Croatian Serb TO
fighters, formed a force of some 1.500 to 2.000 troops, 60-70 tanks and 60-70 infantry
fighting vehicles. With some support from the air and fire support from the Drava river fleet,
they began a slow push directly from Negoslavci on the south and Sotin on the southeast.
They met moderate resistance271 as ZNG/MUP forces, probably numbering 600 to 800
loosely organized infantry, readied their defences at the edge of town.272 On 4-5 September
JNA forces ran into stiffer resistance and then ground to a halt against Croatian troops on
the south side of town, assisted by pressure on the flanks and base of the Negoslavci axis
from the ZNG.273 The Vukovar barracks remained blockaded and the JNA’s struggle for
Vukovar had begun.

Evaluation of Eastern Slavonia Operations274

Serb TO performance in Eastern Slavonia-Baranja was uneven. The late August

campaign to seize Baranja appears to have been well-planned and executed. Serb
operations elsewhere in the region, however, appear to have been disjointed, with no
apparent overall coordination. Attacks to take Borovo Naselje repeatedly failed against a
spirited Croatian defence. Generally, Serb forces appeared content merely to harass
Croatian villages and towns with random automatic weapons and mortar fire. As in Banija,
most of the local Serbs were mere armed civilians with little or no training, tenuously
commanded by the regional TO staff.
Croatian command and control in Eastern Slavonia also appeared disjointed; there
was no visible attempt to coordinate operations between different areas. Overall, Croatian
troops fought hard, both in defence of Croatian villages and towns – such as Vukovar-
Borovo Naselje – as well as in their limited offensive operations against Serb-held areas. And

269
The 1st Guards was part of the large JNA force mobilized in early and mid-July and deployed to the border
with Croatia. See the section: JNA Campaign Plans and Organization, July-September 1991 for a detailed
description of these movements.
270
Belgrade Radio, 28 & 30 August 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 28 August 1991.
271
JNA units consisted of at least two battalions / 453rd Mechanized Brigade on the Sotin axis and probably at
least two battalions / 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade on the Negoslavci axis. It is also possible that instead
of 1st Guards it was the 453rd that controlled both axes with 1st Guards in reserve. In addition, possibly a
company of 12th Mechanized Brigade may have supported the advance further to the northwest on the
Bogdanovci-Luzac road. The 1.500 to 2.000 personnel estimate is based on the manning of four armor-
mechanized battalions at about 350 to 400 troops per battalion. All of the mechanized brigades were
actually at their fully mobilized strength of about 3.500 troops each, but the JNA deployed nowhere near
that many troops in the actual fighting, so an estimate of 7.000 would have grossly exaggerated JNA
strength in this operation.
272
The Vukovar ZNG forces had been designated the 204th Vukovar Brigade by early September. See
discussion of September Vukovar operations for a full picture of the ZNG order of battle.
273
Belgrade Radio, 4-5 September 1991; Zagreb Radio, 5 September 1991.
274
This section will not evaluate JNA combat performance, but the following sections evaluate actions in
which JNA forces were more heavily engaged.

112
they appear to have demonstrated professional tactical skill in defence of key positions –
such as the initial defence of Vukovar against the JNA in late August-early September.

Western Slavonia
Okucani and the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway

Heavy fighting erupted in and around Okucani on 16 August following a re-

declaration of Western Slavonia’s autonomy, although who started the action is not clear. It
seems, however, that the Croatians moved first in anticipation of a Serb attempt to
consolidate the new SAO Western Slavonia and cut the vital Belgrade-Zagreb Highway at
Okucani.275 The Serbs – probably numbering some 600 to 800 troops in about two battalions
around Okucani – either struck at the same time or quickly recovered, pushing east and
west along the highway, as well as toward Stara Gradiska – near which the TO probably had
another 300 to 400 troops – to secure the main bridge into Bosnia. Troops of the Croatian
MUP and local ZNG troops – probably numbering some 300 Special Police, 300-450 ZNG,
plus probably 100-200 regular MUP police – resisted fiercely, however, pushing the Serbs
back in several places.276 A JNA mechanized battalion from the 32nd (Varazdin) Corps / Fifth
Military District moved into Okucani on 17 August but failed to halt the fighting.277 278The
same day, Croatian MUP personnel destroyed the bridge at Stara Gradiska to prevent JNA
5th (Banja Luka) Corps / First Military District forces – who they believed would aid the
Serbs – from crossing the river. The 5th Corps troops responded by crossing the Sava River
on pontoon bridges the following day.279
By 27 August, TO forces had slowly gained ground from the Croatian troops, but
they claimed even greater success – the capture of 27 of 32 villages in the Okucani
municipality.280 Croatian forces, however, still hung on to key positions north of Stara
Gradiska. The JNA was gradually being drawn more deeply into the fighting around Stara
Gradiska, claiming that Croatian forces were continually firing on 5th Corps positions
northwest of Stara Gradiska along the Strug Canal.281 On 4-5 September direct fighting
erupted between JNA and Croatian forces when, in a “final response to Croat provocations”,

275
The Belgrade-Zagreb highway was the key link between Eastern Slavonia and the rest of Croatia.
276
Reports of fighting drawn from Zagreb Radio, 14 & 16-17 August 1991; Belgrade Radio, 14 & 16-17 August
1991. MUP Special Police organization is difficult to identify, but probably consisted of company-size units
of about 100 men each from the Pozega and Slovonski Brod Police Administrations near Nova and Stara
Gradiska. and the Sisak Police Administration near Novska. ZNG units included the 63rd Slavonska Pozega
Independent Battalion and the 4th Battalion / 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade near Nova Gradiska and the
56th Kutina and 62nd Novska Independent Battalions near Novska. These battalions probably were limited
to 100 to 150 armed personnel at this point because of weapons shortages.
277
Belgrade Tanjug, 17 August 1991.
278
See Annex 10: JNA Peacekeeping - A Case Study in Western Slavonia, August-September 1991.
279
See Annex 10: JNA Peacekeeping - A Case Study in Western Slavonia, August-September 1991.
280
Zagreb Radio, 17-19 August 1991; Belgrade Radio, 17 August & 23 August 1991.
The JNA 5th Corps unit involved was an armored or mechanized battalion / 329th Armored Brigade
garrisoned in Banja Luka.
281
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 August 1991.

113
5th Corps units appear to have pushed Croatian forces away from the canal and back along
the road from Okucani to Stara Gradiska.282 This failed to please the Serb TO commander,
who complained on 7 September that JNA forces had voluntarily pulled back to the canal
from the areas they had captured and allowed ZNG/ MUP forces to reoccupy their previous
positions.283 The Croatians in fact were now in a position to cut off the TO troops, who held
a precarious pocket around Okucani some five kilometers to the west and three kilometers
to the east on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. They had only tenuous links through
uncontested hills to Serb forces to the north at Pakrac, although the semi-friendly JNA held
a patch of territory to the southwest of Okucani that could give the Serbs links into Bosnia.
The battlefield situation was to remain tense but static until the JNA intervened directly and
massively more than a week later.284

Pakrac

Serb TO troops – probably two battalions numbering 600 to 800 men – moved to
seize the town of Pakrac for good on 19 August.285 But Croat forces – a collection of Special
Police and ZNG totaling no more than 300 men – stubbornly held on to several key villages
adjacent to Pakrac.286 These positions blocked the Serbs from expanding their hold on the
surrounding area throughout August and into mid-September.287

Daruvar – Bilogora

Serb TO forces – probably numbering no more than a battalion-size force of 300 to

400 men around Daruvar itself – apparently tried and failed to take the town on 19-20
August.288 No such attempts seem to have been made against Croatian MUP outposts in the
numerous Serb villages northeast of Pakrac and south of Virovitica in the Bilogora region,
but the villagers’ hostility to the MUP ran high.

Evaluation of Western Slavonia Operations

The piecemeal operations of the Serb TO groups in Western Slavonia were not
impressive either in execution or results. An important factor may have been the way much

282
Belgrade Radio, 23 August 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 27 August 1991.
283
Belgrade Radio, 4-5 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 4 September 1991; Zagreb Radio, 4 September
1991.
284
Belgrade Tanjug, 7 September 1991.
285
Analysis of Belgrade Radio and Tanjug, 7-12 September 1991 and Zagreb Radio, 7-8 September 1991.
286
Belgrade Radio, 19 & 23 August 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 20 August 1991.
287
The Croatian force appears to have included Special Police from the Bjelovar Police Administration and
unidentified ZNG troops, possibly from the 56th Kutina Independent Battalion. Belgrade Radio, 19 & 23
August 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 10-11 September 1991; Zagreb Radio, 8 September 1991. Fighting raged in
particular over the village of Kusonje, northeast of Pakrac.
288
This is based on Sinisa Haluzan: Daruvar Cranes, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 16, describing actions
by ZNG units from Daruvar. Zagreb Radio reporting from 1991 claimed Serb forces attempted to seize the
town on 1 September. Both sources say Croat troops retained control of Daruvar.

114
of the Serbian population was squeezed between two Croatian-held towns – Novska and
Nova Gradiska – which put limits on the width of any Serb territorial base. Serb villages and
hamlets were spread out over a considerable area in a narrow corridor running from north
to south, and most of them were concentrated in vulnerable areas around Daruvar instead
of near Okucani. Serb command and control appears to have been generally poor: most TO
forces fought more or less individual battles, although the larger moves launched in mid-
August appear to have been better coordinated. Like most Croatian Serb TO elsewhere, the
SAO Western Slavonia forces were poorly organized, badly disciplined, and hardly trained at
all – bands of local civilians handed guns and sent into the field.
The better organized Croatian forces demonstrated considerable skill, blunting the
first Serb attacks while holding key positions along the Okucani-Stara Gradiska road and
between Novska-Okucani and Nova Gradiska-Okucani to limit the Serbs’ field of operations.
Croatian troops also showed more individual discipline and spirit, tenaciously defending
important villages even under strong Serb pressure. The brief Croatian skirmish with JNA 5th
Corps units in early September, however, made it clear that Croatian forces facing JNA
concentrations of armour and artillery in relatively open terrain would need to be well dug
in with some antitank support to hold their ground.

Knin – Northern Dalmatia – Local JNA Commanders Act

9th (Knin) Corps

The 9th (Knin) Corps was an unusual JNA formation: it was a ground forces corps
subordinated to the Maritime Military District in Split, which commanded the Yugoslav Navy
(Jugoslovenska Ratna Mornarica – JRM). The corps was small, with only two motorized
brigades – one at cadre strength – instead of the three or four manoeuvre brigades common
to most corps. The 9th Corps had the usual corps components of an artillery regiment, an
antitank regiment, a light air defence regiment, and an engineer regiment. Prior to
mobilization, the corps had only 2.300 troops assigned to it. As of June 1991, the corps
commander was Major General Spiro Nikovic.289

Mobilization and Colonel Ratko Mladic

The JNA activated the 9th Corps during the country-wide mobilization that followed
the end of the Ten-Day War in Slovenia (see section below, JNA War Planning and
Mobilization, July – September 1991, for a detailed discussion of JNA mobilizations and
deployment). At full mobilization, the corps would have numbered about 18.000 troops.
Significant to its present mission was the fact that most of its reservists reported
from the ethnic Serb areas around Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, and other SAO Krajina areas of
Dalmatia, giving the corps personnel a decidedly pro-Serb bent.

289
For a full order of battle see Annex 14: JNA Campaign Plans and Organization, July – September 1991.

115
 At about the same time, on 29 June, the 9th Corps received a new officer, Colonel
Ratko Mladic. Mladic was to play the key role in the corps’ performance, pushing the corps
staff to be more pro-active in combating what he viewed as Croatian aggression against the
Serb population. As such, he was a foreunner of the Serbianized officer that was later to
become the JNA norm. General Nikovic had apparently selected Mladic from a list of four
candidates to fill the key Chief of Operational and Training Affairs slot at the corps
headquarters. His choice was a deliberate one, for the two men had earlier served in the
Third Military District staff in Skopje, Macedonia, where Mladic was Nikovic’s assistant in
the War Plans Department. Prior to his arrival in Knin, Mladic had been the Deputy
Commander for Rear Services in the important Kosovo-based 52nd (Pristina) Corps, so his
assignment was technically a demotion.290
General Nikovic himself would make public statements in August supporting the
right of other republics to secede, implying that he supported the Milosevic / Jovic view that
the Serbs should let the other nationalities go their way, except for the Serb areas in
Croatia.291 Mladic, coming to Knin with a similar Serbo-centric attitude and an even stronger
personality than Nikovic’s, rapidly became the driving force in the corps headquarters,292

290
Mladic was born on 12 March 1943, near the town of Kalinovik, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His father was killed
in a clash with Croatian fascist troops when Mladic was only two years old. At the age of 15 he went to the
Military Industrial High School in Zemun, Serbia, and then attended the JNA Military Academy, finishing
first in his class. After graduation in 1965, Mladic served in Macedonia – Skopje, Kumanovo, Ohrid, and Stip
– in many posts from platoon commander to motorized brigade commander. From 1976 to 1978 he
attended the JNA Command-Staff Academy, again finishing first in his class, and then served in a number of
staff positions. In January 1991 he became Deputy Commander for Rear Services, 52nd (Pristina) Corps,
where he served until he accepted the post of Chief of Operational and Training Affairs on 26 June 1991 in
the 9th (Knin) Corps. Biographical data drawn from Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad
Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter 2.
As indicated, movement from a corps rear services chief to corps chief of operations was technically a
demotion. On JNA staffs, the hierarchy consisted of the following: Commander, (Deputy Commander –
military districts only), Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff, Assistant Commander for Morale.
Education, and Legal Affairs (political officer), and Assistant Commander for Rear Services. Mladic’s slot,
along with other staff positions, came under the chief of staff, making it a more junior position than rear
services chief.
291
For a full order of battle see Annex 14: JNA Campaign Plans and Organization, July-September 1991.
292
Mladic made the following pro-Serb statements on 6 August 1991:
There will be no peace in the Skradin area, northeastern Dalmatia in Croatia, until Croatian armed
forces cease breaking into villages populated by Serbs ... the people in the Serbian villages in such
situations are forced to defend themselves, and that it is then helped by the military formations of
the so-called Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina ... over the past month ... SAO Krajina formations
never made incursions on a single Croatian village. In order to prevent the conflict and turn the
illusory truce to peace ... both sides must refrain from opening fire and keep at a given distance from
members of the (9th) corps ... from now on the corps forces will respond with all its might and
combat force to any fired bullet, no matter who fires it.
Belgrade Tanjug, 6 August 1991.
Mladic’s seemingly contradictory statements about the JNA acting as a buffer force between the two sides
along with his pro-Serb statements probably reveal how Mladic actually viewed himself and the JNA at the
time – defenders of Serbs from what he regarded as the actions of Croatian fascism, yet committed to
following orders to maintain the buffer zone. Mladic also was later implicated in the failed internal JNA
coup against General Kadijevic in September 1991. The officers involved believed that Kadijevic had not

116
especially after he was appointed corps chief of staff in early August, replacing a Slovene
officer.293 But Mladic’s Serbian nationalist credentials still bore the gloss of their Yugoslav
national overlay – as was the case with many pro-Serb JNA officers. He later said:
At the time, to be honest, even I did not yet realize that further co-existence was
impossible ... We were all still infatuated with that co-existence. But a man matures
with the events that are imposed on him.294
Mladic’s attendance at JNA planning meetings in Belgrade – apparently in late July
– seems to have changed his mind to a degree.295 Representing the 9th Corps in these
sessions, he stoutly defended the Federation’s integrity and urged direct, strong action
against the secessionist Croatians to preserve it. When his strategy was rejected, he appears
to have lost respect for his superiors of the JNA high command, and henceforth he would
liberally interpret their directives to the corps, looking for opportunities to strike at the
Croatians rather than trying to maintain a meaningless neutrality in defence of an undesired
peace.296 Even Mladic, however, appears to have dutifully obeyed when given direct orders
to halt an operation, nor did he try to mount a full-scale corps-wide campaign against the
Croatians until the JNA General Staff itself launched its strategic offensive in mid-September
1991.
The erstwhile peacekeeper soon was establishing close contacts with the people
and leaders of the SAO Krajina. Mladic later stated:
There was a very high level of understanding and good cooperation between the
civilian and the military bodies, especially with Minister of Internal Affairs Milan
Martic.297
Martic has confirmed this:
When Colonel Mladic came to Knin, we saw that we could trust the Army. From
then on we suggested that people should volunteer in the army and not the police. That
arrangement persisted through the whole war.298
This was Martic’s response to Mladic’s energetic efforts to recruit local volunteers
to fill key specialties in the corps units that mobilization had failed to provide.

been decisive enough against the Croatians and had not sufficiently purged the army of non-Serb /
Montenegrin officers. See section below: Internal JNA Coup Fails to Remove Kadijevic.
293
Major General Janez Ribo previously served as the 9th Corps chief of staff. Janjic, op cit, Chapter 2.
294
Janjic, Chapter 3.
295
Janjic states that the meeting was at the end of June, but given that Mladic only reported to the corps on
29 June, it seems unlikely that he would have been called on to represent the corps at high-level war
planning sessions until he had spent some time in the corps headquarters. Janjic, Chapter 3.
296
According to Janjic, Chapter 3, Mladic returned to Knin from Belgrade convinced that he could not rely fully
on the higher command structure, but that he would instead have to turn primarily to the members of his
units and the local population. That is why he initiated even closer cooperation with the Krajina political
structures.
297
Janjic, Chapter 3.
298
Silber and Little, p. 172.

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 “Border” Fighting, July – August

During July and early August, clashes between Serb and Croatian forces occurred
principally in two areas: near Obrovac and the Maslenica Bridge area, and in and around the
intermixed Serb and Croatian villages some 15 kilometers north of Sibenik. Neither side
gained any significant territory, and JNA 9th Corps troops in the area generally succeeded in
maintaining their even-handed buffer role, though not without occasional skirmishes with
Croatian forces.299

Kijevo

The situation was quite different in Kijevo. The Croatian MUP had established a
police substation in the Croatian-populated town, some 15 kilometers southeast of Knin,
back in March, and had been sending a stream of MUP/ZNG reinforcements to the area that
continued into August. The police station and its supporting troops posed a major
impediment and a constant annoyance to both the JNA and the SAO Krajina. Control of the
village and the town of Vrlika south of it blocked JNA access to its garrisons in Sinj and
separated the SAO Krajina from Serb villages south of Vrlika. Hostility between JNA and
Croatian forces hardened, with JNA commanders charging that the Croatians were
continually firing on and harassing their troops, while the Croatians claimed (in this case,
correctly) that the JNA was supporting the Serbs.
On 18 August, SAO Krajina Internal Affairs Minister Martic issued an ultimatum to
the Croatians to withdraw their forces.300 When, on 25-26 August, SAO Krajina troops
backed the ultimatum with an attack on Kijevo, the JNA cast off its peacekeeping gloves and
joined them. Within 24 hours the JNA-Krajina forces had overrun Kijevo, pushed Croatian
troops out of the whole Kijevo-Vrlika area, and linked up with the Serb villages south of
Vrlika.301 On orders from his superiors, however, General Nikovic then ordered the JNA
troops to halt their participation in the operation.302 The sequence of events over 24-27
August is not entirely clear.303 It looks as if the 9th Corps staff, in reaction to real or

299
Mladic acknowledged to his biographer that the JNA’s “strategy” at this time was to act as a buffer force.
Janjic, Chapter 2. Mladic also acknowledged that during the corps’ peacekeeping operations in early August
they had a number of minor skirmishes with the Croatians. Janjic, Chapter 4.
300
Croatian troops in the area consisted of regular MUP police – probably numbering 50 to 100 in the area –
probably a platoon to company of Special Police with another 50 to 100 personnel, at least a battalion of
the ZNG 114th Split Brigade, with perhaps 300 to 400 troops, and probably a company of the 4th Guards
Brigade, estimated at 100 to 150 troops. Total force: 500 to 750 personnel.
301
The JNA force included major elements of the 221st Motorized Brigade – probably a motorized battalion
plus a company of tanks and supported by a battery of artillery. The force may have numbered some 750
to 1.000 JNA personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Slavko Lisica commanded the brigade: he was to figure
prominently in 9th Corps operations during the rest of the year, as well as in Bosnia during 1992. Lisica was
promoted to full colonel on 7 October as a reward for his successful operations. SAO Krajina forces
probably included mostly TO troops, probably spearheaded by some of Martic / Captain Dragan’s Special
Police, for a probable total of some 500 troops.
302
Janjic, Chapter 4.
303
The Silber and Little account appears to be a bit too simplistic in assuming that the JNA / Serb attack was
completely unprovoked. See Silber and Little, pp. 171-172.

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perceived Croatian harassment, chose to attack Kijevo to regain free access to its barracks in
Sinj and incidentally open a route to the Serb villages south of Kijevo and Vrlika.304 The
significance of the JNA’s involvement in this relatively unprovoked action is as Mladic stated:
That [Kijevo] was when it was decided that we would offer armed resistance.
That was the first time since the forces had been separated [a reference to the JNA’s
peacekeeping mission] that an open showdown was launched.305
Now, at least in Northern Dalmatia, JNA forces had openly sided with the Croatian
Serbs, and in a “Federal” operation that was not a direct response to a breach of the peace.
This brought JNA peacekeeping operations in the area more or less to an end, although even
the 9th Corps would not completely repudiate its buffer mission until the JNA as a whole
went on the attack in mid-September.

Maslenica Bridge306

The next “Federal” action by a combined JNA/Serb force was against Croatian ZNG
units deployed on the north side of the strategic Maslenica Bridge. This bridge was vital to
the Croatian Government because it was the only remaining direct land link between
northern Croatia and the Dalmatian coast.307 ZNG forces – probably numbering at least 500
troops – had held positions facing Serb forces at the approaches to the bridge in the villages
of Krusevo, southwest of Serb-held Obrovac, and Jasenice, northwest of Obrovac, since the
304
On 24 August the 9th Corps publicly claimed that the Serb village of Otisic was surrounded by Croatian
MUP and ZNG troops, although this was never confirmed. Belgrade Tanjug, 27 August 1991.
On 25 August, Croatian forces cut off electricity, water, and telephone service to JNA barracks in Sibenik
and Sinj, blocking their approaches and possibly firing on them. That ZNG troops took part in the barracks
blockade on 25 August is alluded to in Adjelka Mustapic: Cetina Fighters – Giants “Under the Stars”,
Hrvatski Vojnik, 18 June 1993, p. 17. This action appear to have occurred almost simultaneously with
Croatian actions against JNA barracks in Eastern Slavonia.
Mladic later claimed that Croatian forces also made a concerted attack on Serb TO and JNA positions south
of Knin, near Drnis, and from Sinj; he said he observed the Croatian attack from his helicopter. At about the
same time a JNA unit on peacekeeping duty appears to have been cut off from JNA troops to the north
during this fighting. Mladic provided enough detail to make such an attack sound plausible, although his
version remains unconfirmed. Janjic, Chapter 4. There are a few bits of information that seem to indicate
the Croatians were engaged in some kind of operation, although it probably was not on the scale Mladic
claimed. A Croatian military journal article on the 114th Split Brigade stated that brigade elements were to
deploy to Vrlika and Kijevo on 20 August “to remove the blockade at Kijevo”. Damir Dukic: The Scorpions in
Defence of Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, pp. 16-18. A Croatian newspaper article on the 114th
Brigade claimed that the brigade’s first combat mission was in the Svilaja Mountains area on 19 August.
Zoran Vukman: Victorious Trail On All Battlefields, Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 June 1996, p. 8. The Svilaja
Mountains are near the Serb villages south of Vrlika – such as Otisic – which SAO Krajina leaders viewed
with some concern, and which the Serbs claimed were being surrounded by Croatian troops on 24 August.
Bizarrely, Mladic also claimed that the confrontation over Kijevo was partly the result of the Croatian
refusal to allow the burial procession of a Serb – who Mladic claimed had been killed under Croatian MUP
interrogation – to proceed to the Serb’s home village. Janjic, Chapter 4.
305
Janjic, Chapter 4.
306
From this point forward, the narrative will refer to joint JNA and Serb TO and/or Serb volunteer units as
“Federal” forces for convenience, since the combined Serb forces were at least nominally fighting for a
Federal Yugoslavia.
307
Luka Bebic, the then Croatian Defence Minister, stated on 11 September 1991 that loss of the Maslenica
Bridge would “definitely divide Croatia into two parts”. Belgrade Tanjug, 11 September 1991.

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beginning of August.308 On 9 September, JNA units and Serb TO and Special Police forces –
probably totaling 1.250 to 2.000 troops and backed by JNA tanks and artillery – attacked the
Croatian defences in the villages.309 Jasenice and Krusevo fell to Federal forces on 11
September.310 Colonel Mladic then ordered JNA troops to pull back from their forward
positions as Martic’s Special Police came forward to hold them. Lieutenant Colonel Lisica,
the JNA commander for the operation, claims that the order to pull back came clear from
JNA General Staff chief Adzic, implying that the corps staff had been overruled after again
exceeding its authority.311

Evaluation of the Dalmatian Operations

Although both “Federal” attacks were relatively straightforward affairs, the JNA
gave a good account of itself. Well led by highly motivated commanders, the JNA forces
used their advantages in armour and artillery to overwhelm the often outnumbered
Croatian MUP and ZNG defenders. Mladic and Lisica also briefly showed their preference
and talent for driving quickly through and past enemy defences: this would be the
distinguishing feature of 9th Corps operations in 1991 and of both officers’ operations in
Bosnia. Employing armour and artillery in ways that compensated for their lack of infantry
would become a trademark of the JNA in the Croatian war – and of the Bosnian Serb Army
(VRS) in the Bosnian war – although in later battles such tactics often were unsuccessful. In
these small operations, however, Croatian forces had neither the defences nor the numbers
needed to defeat boldly handled armour backed by strong mortar and artillery fire.

308
The ZNG forces included the 1st (Active) Company / 112th Zadar Brigade and as much as a battalion of 4th
Guards Brigade. Gordan Lausic and Dejan Frigelj: St. Krsevan and 112th Defending Zadar, Hrvatski Vojnik,
18 June 1993, p. 14; Zeljko Stipanovic: Proven Countless Times, Zagreb Velebit, 19 January 1996, pp. 14-15.
309
Zagreb Radio, 9 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 12 September 1991; Janjic, Chapter 5.
Lieutenant Colonel Lisica and his 221st Motorized Brigade – probably one motorized battalion, an armored
company, and an artillery battery – again formed the JNA part of the joint JNA / Serb force. See an
interview with Lisica, by Ljubomir Grubic: Pulling Down the Pants, Nin, 23 July 1993, p. 12-14.
310
Zagreb Radio, 11-12 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 12 September 1991; Janjic, Chapter 5; Grubic, pp.
12-14.
311
Grubic, pp. 14-15.

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 Annex 9
Military Geography and Weather in Croatia312
As terrain does in all wars, the military geography of Croatia had important effects
on the nature of the fighting and capabilities of the armies during the 1991 war. Overall,
about 80 percent of the former Yugoslavia consists of highlands and mountains with steep-
sided valleys and a few level basins. These areas can be divided into two different types of
terrain, the inland mountain highlands, and the limestone karst hills that mark the length of
the Adriatic coast and its hinterlands. The remaining 20 percent of the country runs from
flat to gently rolling lowlands. Croatia has all three types of terrain within its boundaries.
The northern plains in former Yugoslavia extend from northern Serbia and
Vojvodina into northwest Croatia and northeastern Slovenia; two of the sectors that saw
major combat during the war. Eastern Slavonia-Baranja and Western Slavonia, lay entirely in
this region, as did some of the Banija-Kordun operations. The plains region, especially in the
Slavonia region of Croatia, is bounded by several large rivers, notably the Danube, the
Drava, and the Sava. West of the Serbian-Croatian border, the plains become gently rolling.
interspersed with only occasional groups of hills and mountains over 1.000 meters. Small,
closely spaced agricultural villages and market towns characterize the plains region, with
most of the larger towns lying near the rivers. The region generally has a continental climate
with cold winters and warm summers. The winters in particular can bring chilly winds
sweeping across the plains. Average daily temperature during January is in the mid-30s F,
while July is in the low to mid-80s F.
Overall, the Croatian plains are fairly well suited to large military operations. The
terrain allows troops and vehicles to move cross-country except during the rainy and snowy
winter season, which lasts roughly from late November until mid-April. Then, alternating
freezing and thawing create soft, muddy ground conditions that make cross-country
movement marginal for most of the winter, impeding tracked vehicles and infantry and
keeping most wheeled vehicles road-bound. The region boasted the best road network in
former Yugoslavia, including the four-lane Belgrade-Zagreb highway.
A small but important portion of the combat area in Croatia, in the Banija and
Kordun regions, is part of Yugoslavia’s interior highlands, steep, hilly mountains mostly
covered with shrubland and forests. In the highlands, mountains crest at over 1.500 meters
above sea level, while hills generally rise about 400 meters to about 600 meters over
neighboring valleys. Numerous streams lace the terrain. Villages and towns are more widely
spaced than in the more populous plains region. Most roads follow the main valleys. Overall,
steep slopes and limited road nets do not favor large-scale motorized and mechanized

312
This analysis is based primarily on three sources: Miroslav Krleza Lexicographical Institute: A Concise Atlas
of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Zagreb Graficki Zavod Hrvatske,
1993; Section 24: Topography: National Intelligence Survey 21: Yugoslavia, Washington DC Central
Intelligence Agency, 1962 (declassified 1980); and analysis of DMA M709 series 1:50.000 scale maps of
Croatia.

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combat or permit much cross-country movement. Winter weather, with deep snow, hinders
all movement and damages roads.
The fighting in the rest of Croatia – the Lika region, Knin-Zadar-Northem Dalmatia,
and Dubrovnik – occurred in the karst region, which stretches along the Adriatic coast and
into its hinterlands. Karst consists of dissected, rocky surfaces, almost exclusively limestone,
covered with only sparse vegetation. The limestone has been eroded, producing fissures,
sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns. Scattered throughout the rocky terrain are
“polje-s” which are large, open valley plains. The region’s dispersed mountain ranges have
many peaks over 1.500 meters, while the hills crest primarily between 200 to almost 550
meters. The rivers are few and small, less than 60 meters wide at high water, and very
shallow at low water. The rocky, steep terrain and the lack of roads make large-scale
combat operations a daunting prospect, especially those dependent on mechanized or
motorized transport. In winter deep snow makes many roads impassable while movement
across the flat poljes is inhibited by floods and mud. The population lives primarily in the
“polje-s” and on the coast, with smaller villages scattered across the higher ground.

Eastern Slavonia – Baranja

In the military sector described as the Eastern Slavonia-Baranja sector, lying in the
northern plains, fighting was generally bounded on the north by the town of Donji Miholjac,
then along the Hungarian border to the Danube River, which forms the Serbian-Croatian
border, down to the Croatian border village of Ilok, and then southwest to the Serbian
border town of Sid. On the west, combat occurred within an imaginary line running from
Vinkovci to Osijek, then along the Drava River to Donji Miholjac. The sector really comprises
two separate areas, Baranja and Eastern Slavonia, divided by the Drava River and its marshy
banks, which segregate almost all combat activity into one or the other sub-region. The
principal towns in the region include Osijek – the largest city with about 105.000 people –
Vinkovci and Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia, and Beli Manistir and Darda in Baranja.313
Overall, although generally conforming to the northern plains topography, the
region is less favourable to combat operations than it might appear. Many features combine
to deter rapid movement by large armour-mechanized forces: the marshes along the major
rivers; smaller rivers, streams, and canals; and large concentrations of villages and towns
interspersed with small forests surrounded during the growing season by cornfields. These
same features, however, offered Croatian light infantry good cover and concealment against
the more powerful JNA armour and artillery. A particularly formidable combat environment
presented itself in the built-up area of the Vukovar-Borovo Naselje-Borovo Selo triangle in
Eastern Slavonia, with its industrial areas and large apartment blocks, along with the
concentration of villages between Vinkovci and Vukovar. Throughout the region, from late
October muddy conditions brought by wintry weather would make cross-country operations

313
The larger villages include Dalj, Tovarnik, Nijemci, Stari and Novi Jankovci, Borovo Naselje and Borovo Selo,
Nova and Stara Tenja in Eastern Slavonia, and Valpovo, Bilje, and Knezovi Vinogradi in Baranja.

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even more difficult. The Drava River north/northwest of Osijek provided a natural border for
the Serbs and a natural defensive line for Croatian troops, while the Bosut River gave
Croatian defenders south of Vinkovci another good defensive position.
Good lines of communication to the battle zones were available for both the
Federal forces and the Croatians. The JNA was able to rely on road and rail networks to the
border towns and cities of Sid, Srpski Miletic, Apatin, and Sombor, which also assured
control over the Danube bridges and logistics and reinforcements for its forces. The Croatian
road and rail links to Osijek and Vinkovci were also adequate, although hampered by Federal
control of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway at Okucani in Western Slavonia. Generally good
roads were also available between towns and villages within the combat zone.

Western Slavonia
The Western Slavonia combat zone also lay in the northern plains, but a sizeable
mountain-hill chain interrupted passage over the plains in the central-northern part of the
zone. The primary focus of combat within the zone was a triangle bounded by the towns of
Jasenovac, Novska, Pakrac, and Nova Gradiska, with Okucani in the middle. A secondary
fighting sector was bounded by the towns Daruvar, Grubisno Polje, Virovitica, Podravska
Slatina, and Vocin.
The primary combat zone also included the river plain along the Sava River
between Novska and Nova Gradiska, running north-south up to the edge of the Psunj
Mountains, just north of Okucani. The strategic Belgrade-Zagreb highway traverses this
area. The plain is a typically flat major river plain which also includes the Strug canal, some
marshy sections near the Sava, and a number of forested areas. Villages along and astride
the Okucani-Nova Gradiska-Novska road provided both sides with ready-made strongpoints.
North of Okucani and the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway, the rest of the primary sector
is dominated by the forested Psunj mountain range, with features rising to almost 1.000
meters but more like 200 to 400 meters in height as it thins out near Pakrac, the principal
town. Pakrac lies in a valley just to the northwest of the mountains, and is connected to
Okucani by a road running through a narrow valley in the Psunj. A number of villages
surrounding Pakrac provide defensive depth to anyone holding the town, as well as key
chokepoints on the roads leading into it.
The secondary sector to the north/northeast of Pakrac lies in the Ravna Gora,
Papuk, and Bilogora Mountains. The Ravna Gora, between Pakrac and Vocin, consists of hills
and mountains ranging from 500 to almost 1.000 meters, while the western Papuk
Mountains near Daruvar crest at 500 to over 900 meters, tapering to 100 to 200 meters
near Podravska Slatina. Most of the Bilogora Mountains, running southeast to northwest
between Grubisno Polje and Virovitica, rise 200 to 300 meters in height. Villages are
scattered throughout these hilly areas, while the larger towns, such as Grubisno Polje, lie in
the valleys. The north-south line of mountains stops abruptly along the southeast-northwest
line roughly between Podravska Slatina and Virovitica and the plains start again. The lines of

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communication throughout the region appear adequate, with decent roads connecting all of
the major towns, but the mountains and hilly terrain are a visible hindrance to cross country
movement by tracked and wheeled vehicles.

Banija – Karlovac – Kordun

The Banija and Karlovac/Kordun regions, while linked, formed separate military
sectors during the fighting. The Banija area runs roughly from the town of Glina north to the
Kupa River, over to the confluence with the Sava River, down to the Una River, south to
Dvor na Uni, and back to Glina. The Kordun runs west of Glina, north to the Kupa, west to
Karlovac, and southwest to a line running roughly between Ogulin and Slunj. Both Banija
and Kordun are bounded on the south by the Bosnian border.
Banija is a region of plains and highlands bounded by the rivers. The major towns
are Sisak, Petrinja, Sunja, Hrvatska Dubica, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Dvor na Uni, and Glina, with
the linked towns of Petrinja and Sisak – Sisak has some 45.000 people – representing the
centre of the region. Banija can be roughly divided into the Zrinska Gora mountains, starting
roughly 20 kilometers south of Petrinja, the low hills north of the Zrinska Gora, and the Sava
River plain. The Zrinska Gora rise from 200 meters to over 500 meters in height, generally
forested and sparsely dotted with villages. The mountains taper toward the Kupa and Glina
Rivers, near Petrinja and Glina, with hills running 100 meters to 200 meters in height. The
Sava River plain, near the town of Sunja, is flat, with typical features of a major river plain,
such as oxbow lakes, marshes, and canals. Both the Sava and Kupa Rivers provide natural
defensive lines or boundaries. Roads in the region are generally adequate but few in
number, centering on the hubs of Glina, Petrinja, and Sisak, as well as the Una River valley
linking Dvor, Kostajnica, and Hrvatska Dubica. The primary routes run Petrinja-Kostajnica,
Glina-Petrinja-Dvor, and Sisak-Sunja-Dubica. Glina is the key road centre, connecting both
Kordun and Banija, with all main east-west roads running through the town. Glina also is
easily approached from the northeast and the Kupa River along the flat plain of the Glina
River valley.
In Kordun, the terrain primarily is hilly, with the beginnings of the karst zone. The
major population centres include the city of Karlovac – numbering some 60.000 people –
and the towns of Vrginmost, Topusko, Vojnic, Slunj, and Ogulin. The crescent-shaped
Kordun region can be considered as two areas, divided along the line Karlovac-Vojnic. The
northeastern half comprises the forested Petrova Gora mountains at heights of 400 to 500
meters, tapering down to hills about 200 to 300 meters tall toward the Kupa River. The area
is dotted with streams. The Kupa River, as in Banija, provides a natural boundary and
defensive line. South of the Vojnic-Karlovac area, the hills run about 300 to 500 meters in
height from the Korana River to the Bosnian border. The area between the Mreznica and
Korana Rivers flattens in a few wider valleys surrounded by hills rising to 300 to 500 meters,
with at least one over 800 meters. From this area, toward the town of Ogulin and southwest
toward the small town of Plaski in Lika, the terrain begins to rise at 400 to 500 meters, then

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600 to over 1.000 meters, as the karst begins. The local road network has four primary
routes, Karlovac-Vojnic- Velika Kladusa (Bosnia), Vojnic-Vrginmost-Glina, Karlovac-Slunj, and
Ogulin-Slunj.

Gospic – Lika
The Lika area, which lies in the karst region, is far more rugged than the previously
described areas, covered with mountains that are interspersed with poljes where the major
towns are located. The combat sector in 1991 was bounded by the town of Gracac in the
south, east to the Bosnian border, up the border to a point west of the Bosnian town Cazin,
west to the small town of Plaski, then south to Otocac and on to the sea at the Velebit
Channel. The major towns include Gospic – the largest in the region with 30.000 people in
the municipality – Gracac, Korenica, Otocac, and Plaski. Although the entire region is quite
hilly and mountainous, three ranges stand out: the Velebit, Mala/Velika Kapela, and
Pljesevica, all of which have peaks ranging over 1.500 meters in height and are generally
forested. The remainder of the area has hills up to 1.000 meters surrounded by poljes. All of
the major towns lie in the variously sized poljes, of which at least seven are major ones, the
biggest being Licko Polje, including the town of Gospic, and Krbavsko Polje, which includes
Udbina Air Base. In addition, the major Yugoslav air base near the Bosnian town of Bihac
straddles the Bosnian-Croatian border in Bihacko Polje. The Yugoslav national park at
Plitvice, north of the town of Korenica, also lies within the Lika area. The road network
connects Gospic, Korenica, Gracac, and Otocac, while the links to Kordun run through
Korenica-Slunj, and to North Dalmatia from Gracac-Knin, and Gracac-Obrovac.

Knin – Zadar – Northern Dalmatia

South of Lika, the Knin-Zadar-Northern Dalmatian area consists of a coastal zone –
Ravni Kotari – and the more mountainous and hilly area around Knin, culminating in the
Dinara Mountains on the Croatian-Bosnian border. This combat sector in 1991 ran from
Zadar northeast toward Obrovac, east to the Bosnian border, southeast along the Bosnian
border, cutting southwest at Sinj, and on to the coast at Sibenik. The area has two sizeable
cities, Zadar with over 75.000 people, and Sibenik with over 40.000 people. Other towns
include Knin with about 12.000 people, Sinj, Drnis, Biograd na Moru, Benkovac, and
Obrovac. The Ravni Kotari, running from northwest of Zadar down to Sibenik, consists of a
narrow strip of relatively flat terrain interspersed with hills up to 200 meters in height. It
also contains a sort of inland sea, four lakes and the mouth of the Krka River flowing into
Sibenik Channel. Roughly north of an imaginary line between Benkovac and Sibenik, the
karst starts to rise and angle to the northeast, where southeast of Knin the Kozjak and
Svilaja Mountains reach heights of 1.200 to 1.500 meters, culminating in the Dinara
Mountains, which rise to almost 2.000 meters just inside the Bosnian border. In this area,
the Krka River flows down from Knin, through Drnis, to Sibenik, while the Peruca Lake and
Dam runs north of Sinj. A relatively extensive road network links the cities and towns.

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Strategically, the Maslenica Bridge, which crosses the channel between the small inland sea,
Novigradsko More and the Velebit Channel, was to become a vital link between Lika and
Ravni Kotari, with Knin and its surroundings controlled by the SAO Krajina; without it, ferries
to Pag Island, north of Zadar, and direct to Zadar and Sibenik, would be the area’s only link
with northern Croatia.

Dubrovnik – Southern Dalmatia

The Dubrovnik sector can be divided into three zones, the Konavli region, the
immediate environs of Dubrovnik city, and the coastal sector running from Zaton to Ston
and Neum. The Konavli area is the southernmost section of Croatia, culminating in the
Prevlaka peninsula overlooking the entrance to Montenegro’s Kotor Bay. The region is some
35 kilometers long from Cavtat to the tip of Prevlaka and about 13 kilometers wide at its
broadest point from the coast to the Bosnian border. Konavli has two terrain areas, a flat
plateau beginning about five kilometers from the Montenegrin border, which is bounded by
the other section comprising karstic highlands rising abruptly from the north edge of the
plateau to almost 1.200 meters along the Bosnian border. There is generally limited road
access from Bosnia and Montenegro, including what were to be the JNA’s major staging
areas around Kotor Bay and the Herzegovinian town of Trebinje. From Montenegro and
Bosnia, there are two main roads, both running northwest along the plateau, the
southernmost being the main Adriatic Highway; both lead to the resort town of Cavtat.
The approaches to Dubrovnik city from Cavtat are dominated by the Zupa Bay and
the coastal resort villages around its edge. The Adriatic Highway runs along a narrow ledge
between steep cliffs – which rise quickly from about 100 meters to 600 meters – and the
bay. On the north side of the bay is another triangle of resort villages centred on Sebreno
and Kupari. Dubrovnik itself – with almost 50.000 people – consists of newer areas
surrounding the old town, all of which are dominated by militarily strategic hills, such as
Zarkovica, Bosanka, and Srdj, ranging from 300 to 400 meters in height; the Bosnian border
lies only five kilometers from the centre of town. Other key areas include the Gruz harbor
area on the north, which is adjacent to the Rijeka Dubrovacka channel. The channel cuts
into the coast for some five kilometers, almost turning Dubrovnik into a peninsula. There is
an extensive road network around the city, although access in and out of Dubrovnik is
limited to one major route toward Trebinje, plus the Adriatic Highway.
The coastal region northwest of Dubrovnik is dominated by the same karstic
highlands that run along the entire Dalmatian coast. The region is no more than seven
kilometers wide between the coast and the Bosnian border. It has only scattered villages
amidst the mountains and hills, with three small ports being the key population centres:
Zaton, lying five kilometers northwest of Dubrovnik, Slano some 20 kilometers northwest of
the city, and Neum, Bosnia’s only access to the sea, sitting almost 50 kilometers to the
northwest. Roughly 10 to 15 kilometers west of Slano begins the large Peljesac peninsula
which juts awkwardly into the Adriatic. A number of small islands lie close by off the coast.

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The hills and mountains run from 300 meters to 900 meters in height, with the terrain
growing in stature as one moves closer to the Bosnian border. Limited road access is a
hindrance to mobility; the primary route is the Adriatic Highway running right up to the
coast below the rising mountains. There are only a few secondary roads: the two key ones
are the road that runs to Slano from Bosnia, and another route running
northwest/southeast parallel to the Adriatic Highway from Slano toward Neum.

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 Annex 10
The Battles of the Barracks – Croatian Offensive Operations
September – October 1991314
Planning and Executing the Barracks Offensive
The Croatian offensive against the JNA was a simple yet effective plan of laying
siege to all JNA facilities throughout Croatian-held territory, and, if possible, capturing them
or forcing their surrender. The strategic objectives of the offensive included:
– Providing Zagreb leverage against Belgrade by making hostages of the barracks.
– Removing a large measure of the JNA’s combat power in Croatia from the
playing field and dislocating JNA plans.
– Acquiring enough weapons from the barracks and depots to develop combat
forces capable of defending Croatia on the battlefield.315
The plan clearly was based on that which General Spegelj had been advocating
since late 1990. As noted earlier, Spegelj believed – and was proven correct in Slovenia –
that many JNA conscripts in their multi ethnic units would not want to fight. Isolated from
support and in untenable tactical positions, the JNA formations would begin to
disintegrate.316
The Croatians’ lack of a true general staff or regional military headquarters was the
primary cause of their command and control difficulties during the summer combat
operations. Happily, these deficiencies had little bearing on the barracks offensive, whose
effective execution was facilitated by the static nature of the barracks siege and the
devolution of command authority down to the level of local commanders. The Ministry of
Defence issued the order to the regional crisis staffs, which simply transmitted the order on
to the municipal crisis staffs. It was up to these municipal crisis staffs to block the entrances
to the JNA facilities, switch off their utilities, and stop all food shipments, using formations
of the local reserve ZNG (soon to be Croatian Army – HV), the National Protection units, and
regular MUP police, sometimes reinforced by professional ZNG and Special Police provided
by higher commands.317 Some of the Croatian forces appear to have been under orders for

314
This section discusses the outcome of Croatian blockades and siege operations against JNA garrisons in
Croatia. Ground combat operations in and around the barracks, including JNA relief operations for the
barracks, will be discussed in the sections and annexes discussing the fall combat operations.
315
Igor Alborghetti: In Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-
17, 59. Interview with Corps General Anton Tus, first chief of the Croatian Main Staff.
316
Silber and Little, p. 109.
317
Based on an analysis of Zagreb Radio reporting from September through December 1991, as well as a
variety of articles from the Croatian military journal Hrvatski Vojnik in which unit histories describe their
involvement in the barracks offensive. Thus, for example, a history of the 3rd (Krizevci) Battalion / 117th
(Koprivnica) Brigade, describes events on 16 September, at Krizevci, in which local ZNG troops – soon to be
formed into the 3rd Battalion – together with National Protection detachments and Special Police
surrounded the the Krizevci barracks, housing a JNA antitank regiment, and the depot. The depot
surrendered on 16 September, and the barracks gave up the next day. Mate Babic: The Pride of the 3rd
Krizevci Battalion, Hrvatski Vojnik, 30 July 1993, p. 18.

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immediate assaults to seize barracks or depots outright; the “appropriate actions”
authorized to Croatian field commanders in the government’s 13 September order probably
is a cryptic reference to this.318 The Croatians were in fact able to seize many JNA facilities
on the spot, especially small, isolated depots and border watchtowers, most of them held by
fewer than 50 soldiers. The Croatians had had plenty of time since 1990 to identify every
JNA barracks and depot and support facility and assess the strength of their defences, and
they probably had rehearsed their actions several times. The crisis staff commanders
successfully planned and coordinated the actions of the various action elements, armed and
unarmed, as well as the civil utilities and commercial firms on which the JNA barracks
depended for services and supplies.319 (Appendix 1 is a sample Municipal Crisis Staff order
regarding the offensive.)
The Croatian seizure of the JNA’s Samobor barracks, housing elements of a
communications regiment and a store of confiscated TO weaponry, provides a model of a
Croatian attack on a JNA barracks. Details of the action and the units employed were
provided by people on the scene shortly afterward, and by Croatian military journals. The
attack was launched in conjunction with one against the JNA Velika Buna barracks on 6
October, and the barracks fell the next day. The main objective of both attacks was to seize
the TO weapons, which would be used to arm several newly mobilizing ZNG brigades; the
communications regiment’s technical equipment would be a bonus. The original blockading
force appears to have been composed of regular MUP personnel and probably some
volunteers; for the assault the Croatians brought in ZNG reinforcements, redeploying
elements of one reserve brigade and mobilizing parts of new reserve brigade.320 The ZNG
attack plan appears to have been fairly simple, even crude, judging from the damage
observed: Croatian troops pummeled the barracks with mortar fire while others opened up
on all the buildings with automatic weapons, both small and large caliber. The heavy volume
of fire probably was intended to shock the JNA into surrendering; snipers appear to have
been positioned in nearby buildings overlooking the barracks to heighten the intimidating
effects. The JNA unit, numbering only about 150 officers and men, put up minimal
resistance before surrendering. Although the tactics were effective in forcing the JNA
surrender, the indiscriminate fire appears to have been counterproductive: a Croatian
military journal reported that the Croatians managed to salvage only 10.000 rifles out of the
16.000 stored at the facility.321 The 6.000 lost weapons would have armed at least two full
infantry brigades.

318
Darko Pavicic: Why I Resigned, Zagreb Danas, 8 October 1991, pp. 14-15. An interview with former Croatian
Defence Minister Luka Bebic. Bebic’s description of the mobilization order appears in full in Volume I.
319
Mate Babic: The Pride of the 3rd Krizevci Battalion, Hrvatski Vojnik, 30 July 1993, p. 18.
320
The 8th ZNG Brigade – later redesignated the 151st Samobor Brigade – had already taken part in several
barracks operations, as well as combat operations in Banija, from where it was redeployed to Sambor for
the attack. Nevin Miladin: They Responded To Every Assignment, Velebit, 19 January 1996, p. 12. The 150th
Zagreb-Crnomerec Brigade headquarters and 1st Battalion were also mobilized in early October and moved
to Sambor for the operation. Vesna Puljak: Crnomerec is Defending Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 22 October
1993, p. 15.
321
Nevin Miladin: They Responded To Every Assignment, Velebit, 19 January 1996, p. 12.

129
 Once the Croatians captured a JNA facility, they lost no time in distributing
captured weapons to ZNG formations. They desperately needed to put soldiers and
especially heavy weapons in the field against the JNA, to the extent that heavy weapons,
including artillery and tanks, were sent piecemeal from the captured garrisons as soon as
they were repaired and serviced. It was also deemed essential to empty the captured
barracks and depots of their equipment, including such non-lethal items as sleeping bags,
before the JNA could retaliate with air strikes or artillery barrages to render the facility
useless and deny its contents to the Croatian rearmament program.

The JNA Reaction

JNA tactics in response to being blockaded and threatened with capture took
several forms. When the Croatians launched a ground attack against a barracks the troops in
the facility defended themselves with their individual direct fire weapons against their
attackers. In most of the larger barracks, JNA units had constructed a variety of revetments
for armoured vehicles, as well as bunkers and trenches around the barracks perimeter. In
addition, it was standard JNA practice to sow the perimeters of barracks and depot depots
with a thick screen of land mines. In some cases, key facilities lacking their own armour
received a platoon or company from an armour or mechanized unit garrisoning a larger
establishment to beef up their firepower and, hopefully, scare off an attack.
More controversially, the JNA could and sometimes did retaliate with indirect fire
from artillery and mortars and with air strikes, usually against Croatian government and
military targets. JNA commanders were moreover given to issuing blustering threats of
death and destruction to the civilian surroundings if the Croatians fired on their
installations. General Momcilo Perisic recalled in 1993 that he told the local Croatian
officials that “we would be forced to destroy Zadar in self-defence” if they shot at the troops
of his artillery training centre. Later, when he was conducting negotiations for the
withdrawal from the barracks, Perisic’s men were under orders to ensure that “all of Zadar
would be blown up” if he and the commander of an adjacent training centre disappeared.322
How much indiscriminate JNA return or retaliatory fire actually occurred is difficult to
determine, as are accusations that the JNA often intentionally targeted non-military or non-
official facilities. Certainly indiscriminate fire occurred, and Croatian propaganda and
psychological warfare efforts always played up this angle for foreign and domestic
consumers. It does appear to have been JNA policy to respond with overwhelming force to
any instance of Croatian fire, although this does not appear to have been uniformly
practiced. Perisic certainly advocated it, claiming to have told Croatian officials that “If they
threatened us with any caliber, we would respond with the biggest”. When the Croatians
cut Perisic’s telephone communications, he claims that his troops shot the dish antenna off
322
Dada Vujasinovic: The Last Victory on the Neretva, Belgrade Duga, 31 July – 13 August 1993, pp. 19-23.
Perisic goes on to state that his men fired on the Zadar muncipal president’s house (the president was head
of the local crisis staff), and commercial factories, which he claims were being used to produce weapons;
Perisic proudly stated his troops hit all of these targets accurately.

130
the local telephone exchange roof, and the Croatians immediately restored his telephone
service. The Croatians firmly believe that Perisic’s actions constituted war crimes, and they
charged and convicted him and a number of his officers, in absentia, for his actions in
1991.323
If a JNA commander believed that the odds were good that he would be overrun or
forced to surrender or compelled to withdraw, he could undertake to disable most of his
equipment, destroy ammunition and weapons stockpiles, and sabotage the facility. This
happened frequently, even in the ill-starred 32nd (Varazdin) Corps. When Croatian troops
captured more than 50 tanks and 20 infantry fighting vehicles in the 32nd Corps’s Koprivnica
barracks, they found that the JNA had done a thorough job of incapacitating them for
immediate use. Finally, after a barracks or depot had fallen, the JNA routinely called in air
strikes to deny its use to the Croatians.

Eastern Slavonia324
As discussed in Volume I, the Croatians initiated blockades against JNA garrisons in
three towns in Eastern Slavonia in late August, following up against garrisons in at least
three other towns on 13/14 September. More than half the garrisons eventually
surrendered, some in as few as two days, while the JNA relieved Vukovar Barracks on 14
September. The Croatians tried especially hard to capture two major barracks in Osijek and
Vinkovci, which supported most of the JNA 12th Mechanized Brigade and the 12th Mixed
Artillery Regiment respectively. Heavy fighting ensued. The 12th Mechanized Brigade broke
out of its barracks on 17 September and fought its way out to Federal-held territory
southeast of Osijek. The artillery regiment held out against strong Croatian attacks until JNA
forces relieved the barracks on 26 September.325 (See discussion of JNA offensive operations
to relieve the barracks in the following annexes). When the fighting subsided, the Croatians
had been able to capture from the JNA an entire antitank brigade, part of the artillery
regiment, elements of a mechanized battalion, a pontoon engineer battalion, and a large
quantity of Croatian Territorial Defence weapons that the JNA had confiscated in May 1990,
as well as other stockpiled JNA supplies.

Death of the Varazdin Corps

The loss of the 32nd (Varazdin) Corps was to prove one of the JNA’s most
humiliating defeats of the Croatian war. For the Croatians it was a signal victory, giving them
almost overnight substantial amounts of armour and artillery, as well as small arms, for their

323
D. B.: A Happy Father’s Grenades, Hrvatski Obzor, 26 April 1997, p. 6.
324
Analysis of Eastern Slavonia barracks siege based on August – September Zagreb Radio, Belgrade Tanjug,
and Belgrade Radio reporting.
325
Zagreb Radio on 18 September described the fighting at “Djuro Salaj” Barracks in Vinkovci, claiming that
half of the barracks were in flames, that fire had spread to the ammunition dump, and that JNA forces were
running short of ammunition. Despite this, the JNA held out for over another week.

131
nascent army. On paper, the corps was a powerful force, including two mechanized
brigades, a motorized brigade, an artillery regiment, an antitank regiment, and supporting
forces that included the JNA’s border guards on the Hungarian-SFRY frontier. Another army-
level antitank regiment was garrisoned nearby. But the crisis gripping the Federal Republic
had already taken a heavy toll of the corps’ cohesion, morale, and the willingness of its
conscripts, in particular, to fight. The Croatian siege compounded these problems and
forced the corps’ eventual dissolution and surrender; by 30 September, all of its units had
surrendered or been captured. The 32nd Mechanized Brigade in Varazdin, where the
Croatians forced a well-equipped mechanized brigade to surrender because its soldiers had
melted away, provides a good example of the corps’ problems. Barely 600 of the brigade’s
peacetime complement of about 1.300 troops remained to surrender.326 The only barracks
the Croatians had to carry by a full-scale assault was that housing the 265th Mechanized
Brigade in Bjelovar. The garrison was already understrength at the time of the blockade,
with at least two of its armoured or mechanized battalions deployed elsewhere. On 29
September, MUP Special Police stormed the barracks and seized it in heavy fighting. The JNA
brigade commander was killed in action: the 400 men remaining surrendered.327
The JNA later court-martialed the Varazdin corps commander, Major General Vlado
Trifunovic, along with four of his officers, for failing to preserve the corps.328 During the
trials, the pathetic personnel state in the 32nd Corps became apparent. General Trifunovic
again emphasized that it was the continual loss of men through desertions, and the lack of
motivation and determination of many who remained, that had caused the corps’
disintegration. The 32nd’s problems began in the aftermath of the Slovenian Ten Day War,
when casualties, captures, and mass desertions had already substantially reduced it, and
these losses had not been replaced when the Croatian siege began. Trifunovic criticized the
JNA General Staff’s orders to hold every facility, no matter how untenable its situation,
which had kept him from concentrating his forces at a few defensible facilities before the
Croatians imposed their blockade.329 The judge in the case noted pointedly that desertions
eventually left the corps with only a third of its men. In the 32nd Mechanized Brigade, more
than 100 officers deserted – over two-thirds of its complement.330 And he would conclude

326
Zagreb Vjesnik, 27 September 1991, p. 5.
327
Zagreb Radio, 29-30 September 1991. Another JNA officer, Major Milan Tepic, posthumously received one
of the JNA’s highest awards, the National Hero Order, for setting off explosive charges that destroyed one
of the Bjelovar underground ammunition depots in order to deny it to the Croatians. Belgrade Tanjug, 25
November 1991.
328
One of the officers, Colonel Berislav Popov, commander of the 32nd Mechanized Brigade, had the
misfortune to be charged with war crimes by both the Slovenes and the Croatians, while also being charged
by the JNA with failure to sufficiently defend his unit.
329
Lj. Stefanovic: Traitor or Corpse, Belgrade Vreme, 13 April 1992, pp. 25-27. The Fifth Military District
commander, General Avramovic, ordered Trifunovic to hold all of the barracks and depots in order to
house reinforcements of the 31st (Maribor) Corps withdrawing from Slovenia. These reinforcements never
arrived. Even if most of the 31st Corps had arrived, it probably would have been more of a burden than
help because of the desertions it had suffered. Both corps had far too much equipment for their few
personnel to use or successfully defend.
330
R. Pavlovic: General Trifunovic Acquitted, Belgrade Politika, 18 June 1992, p. 10.

132
that “The Varazdin Corps had been put in a hopeless situation”. Three of the officers,
including Trifunovic, were eventually acquitted.331

Zagreb – Banija
The Croatian ZNG and MUP blockade of JNA garrisons in Zagreb and the
surrounding area effectively destroyed the JNA 10th (Zagreb) Corps as a combat force,
immobilizing its two strongest formations, the 4th Armoured Brigade in Jastrebarsko and
140th Mechanized Brigade in Zagreb, as well as a large number of JNA support formations
and depots. Although these two formations refused to surrender and eventually were
allowed to withdraw in November and December, the Croatians were able to take from
them large numbers of small arms, including confiscated Croatian TO stocks, as many as 60
stored tanks, a 203 mm (8 inch) howitzer battalion, and part of an army-level
communications regiment’s equipment. They even extracted from the JNA, as part of the
agreement covering the withdrawal of JNA forces at Zagreb, the confiscated Croatian TO
weapons remaining at the uncaptured barracks.

Karlovac – Kordun332
The JNA had at least ten separate barracks, depots, and other facilities in and
around Karlovac, including the garrison for an army-level artillery brigade, a light air defence
regiment, T-34 tank storage, and engineer training facilities. Three smaller barracks appear
to have fallen in mid-September; the remainder, however, held out until at least November,
when the JNA evacuated all but two, which were on the Karlovac frontline but in Serb-held
territory. The Croatians appear to have been able to capture some JNA stocks, including
some T-34s, but many of the heavy weapons were either pulled out earlier or destroyed in
the fighting. Most of the artillery brigade appears to have been redeployed prior to the
siege, while at least part of the air defence regimen’s equipment was caught in a warehouse
and burned.333 The JNA, however, probably had stored a large amount of heavy weapons in
Karlovac that the Croatians were able to capture. Croatian troops also were able to seize
four large depots/barracks in the Ogulin area, southwest of Karlovac, during September,
although a JNA air strike destroyed one of the ammunition depots in October.334

331
R. Pavlovic: General Trifunovic Acquitted, Belgrade Politika, 18 June 1992, p. 10.
332
The description of the status of the Karlovac Garrison is based primarily on Zagreb Radio, 18 September
1991, and November – December Zagreb Radio, Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug reporting.
333
A photograph of at least a battery of destroyed M-53/59 “Praga” self-propelled air defence guns in
Karlovac appears in Eric Michelletti and Yves Debay: War in the Balkans: 600 Days of Conflict in War Torn
Yugoslavia, Paris Histoire & Collections, 1993, p. 46. The warehouse the Pragas were stored in caught fire,
and the vehicles were destroyed in the conflagration. The storage area appears large enough to hold at
least an entire battalion of vehicles (18 Pragas), although only one area was shown.
334
Sarajevo Radio, 19 September 1991; Zagreb Radio, 13 October 1991; Srdjan Spanovic: How to Stop the
Lawlessness, Zagreb Danas, 22 October 1991, pp. 24-25. Vesna Puljak: 143rd Ogulin, Hrvatski Vojnik, 6 May
1994, pp. 25-27.

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 Gospic – Lika
Croatian forces were able to blockade JNA units from the 13th (Rijeka) Corps at
four concentrations of barracks/depots in the Gospic-Lika region: the largest group around
Gospic city, the town of Otocac, and the villages of Perusic and Sveti Rok, some 12
kilometers north and 30 kilometers southeast of Gospic respectively. Croatian forces seized
all of the seven-odd facilities in the Gospic area, including the main barracks, which housed
the 236th Motorized Brigade.335 The JNA had withdrawn most of the brigade from the town
prior to the siege,336 but the Croatians captured six or seven tanks, possibly two mortar
batteries, and other equipment, and probably some confiscated Croatian TO stocks. JNA
forces also surrendered the barracks and depots in Otocac and Perusic. JNA and Serb TO
forces appear to have broken the blockade of the Sveti Rok depot in late September.337

Zadar – Dalmatia
Croatian ZNG and MUP forces laid siege to JNA facilities in and around Zadar city
(including Zemunik Air Base), as well as in the towns of Sinj and Drnis. Although no major
ground combat formations were garrisoned in the area, Zadar was the site of the JNA’s
artillery training centre (commanded by Colonel Momcilo Perisic, the future chief of the
Yugoslav Army General Staff, quoted earlier), and its air defence training centre, which
included an SA-6 regiment. Croatian troops were unable to capture either of these facilities,
although they did seize at least two other barracks containing large numbers of infantry
weapons, probably confiscated Croatian TO stocks.338 Both commanders of the training
centres appear to have been excellent leaders who inspired their men and organized their
defences well, and they were able to negotiate the peaceful withdrawal of all remaining JNA
barracks and depots in Zadar, including both centres and their equipment, beginning on 11
October, after JNA 9th Corps forces had almost completely broken through Croatian
defences around Zadar.339 The 9th Corps had already lifted the siege of Zemunik Air Base
and the Drnis depot in mid-September, while JNA forces in Sinj barracks – which included an
engineer regiment – were withdrawn in late September.

335
Belgrade Tanjug claimed on 20 September the brigade commander sided with the Croatians and the senior
Serb officer was killed in action during the fighting at the barracks. Jovic notes on 20 September Serb claims
that the Croatians may have killed a large number of Serb soldiers and their families in the barracks after its
capture. Jovic entry for 20 September 1991. The Federal Defence Ministry, however, on 22 September
denied rumors that all officers and their families had been killed in the barracks, stating that three officers
were killed in action and all the families had been previously evacuated from Gospic. Belgrade Tanjug, 22
September 1991.
336
The 236th was prominent in the fighting around Gospic throughout September and October.
337
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 September 1991.
338
Gordan Lausic and Dejan Frigelj: St. Krsevan and 112th Defending Zadar, Hrvatski Vojnik, 18 June 1993, p.
14. The Croatians also claim that the entire Technical-Maintenance Battalion of the 405th Rear Base –
which probably supported the 9th Corps – defected to their side on 20 September. Zagreb Radio, 20
September 1991.
339
Belgrade Radio, 7 October 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 11-12 October 1991.

134
 The Dalmatian Ports: Split, Sibenik, Ploce340
Croatian MUP and ZNG soldiers blockaded the numerous facilities of the
JNA/Yugoslav Navy’s Military-Maritime District in Split and Sibenik, although only a few fell
to their forces.341 The Navy (JRM) lost four of at least 14 installations in the Split area during
September and destroyed another to keep it from falling into Croatian hands. The most
significant loss was an ammunition depot holding all of the JRM’s brand-new Swedish-made
RBS-15 antiship missiles. The JRM hospital staff defected en masse to the Croatians, while
Croatian troops also took possession of an air defence unit and a fuel depot. JNA/JRM forces
clashed regularly with ZNG/MUP personnel around the remaining barracks from September
into December.342 The JRM was able to reinforce at least some of its facilities – primarily the
Divulje Heliport – with JNA ground troops, probably comprising at least an infantry
battalion, transported by sea from Montenegro; the others were probably defended by
elements of the Military-Maritime District’s 86th Protection Regiment.343 JRM warships,
based at Vis Island, regularly patrolled the Split harbor areas during the blockade, firing on
Croatian positions – and according to Croatian accounts, civilian targets – and supporting
the besieged garrisons.344 The vessels also maintained the Split sector of the JNA’s Croatian
coastal blockade. To counter these movements, Croatian Naval forces (HRM) mined some
areas in the approaches to Split and severely damaged the frigate “Split” in November.345
JNA/JRM and Croatian authorities agreed to a Federal withdrawal on 22 November, allowing
a month for Federal forces to pull out their forces and equipment in exchange for the lifting
of the naval blockade along the coast except around Dubrovnik. The agreement delivered to
the Croatians confiscated Territorial Defence weapons stocks and apparently allowed them

340
The description of the activities against JNA facilities in and around the Dalmatian ports is based primarily
on Zagreb Radio and Belgrade Tanjug reporting from September through December 1991.
341
As in Eastern Slavonia, Croatian troops initiated some blockades on 25 August, shutting off power and
water and disconnecting phone lines. This blockade had only been partially lifted by mid-September, when
the Croatian nationwide offensive against the barracks went into effect. Belgrade Tanjug, 27 August 1991.
342
Tanjug claimed in late September that the independent Belgrade daily Borba had reported that the
Croatians were conducting an intimidation campaign against Yugoslav military officers in Dalmatia. The
paper reportedly claimed that the names of officers, their addresses, the names of their wives, and their
vacation home addresses were being read over Croatian television, implying that Croatians should threaten
or harass the men. Belgrade Tanjug, 24 September 1991. There has been no independent confirmation of
this report, although Federal officials implied that similar things occurred in Sibenik. See below.
343
Tanjug reporting from 1 November discusses Montenegrin complaints about the extent to which
Montenegrin JNA personnel had been deployed in Croatia, including at the Divulje Heliport. The troops
apparently were from Niksic – possibly the 179th Mountain Brigade or the Niksic TO Partisan Brigade.
Belgrade Tanjug, 1 November 1991. The troops arrived on 20 September. Zagreb Radio, 20 September
1991. The 86th Protection Motorized Regiment was the Military-Maritime Distric’s guard force. Each
military district had such a regiment, which comprised motorized infantry and elite military police, and was
designed to serve as the district headquarters’ bodyguard in the field to protect it against enemy sabotage
and commando raids.
344
Zagreb Radio reports from 24 and 30 September 1991 discuss the disposition of JRM warships at Vis Island
harbor.
345
Zagreb Radio, 18 November 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 19 November 1991. JNA/JRM forces had already
voluntarily withdrawn from facilities on Korcula Island further south in late September. Belgrade Tanjug, 29
September 1991.

135
to keep intact the JRM’s Naval Academy facilities and infrastructure. The JNA/JRM
evacuation from Split began on 25 November and was completed by late December.346
Croatian forces in Sibenik blockaded JNA/JRM forces belonging to the Military-
Maritime District’s 8th (Sibenik) Military-Maritime Sector at the start of the nationwide
barracks offensive in September. JNA 9th Corps forces immediately launched a relief
operation toward Sibenik, which ZNG/MUP forces were able to halt in heavy fighting on 20
September. (See section Combat Operations, September – December 1991 for more
details.)347 In addition, Croatian forces were able to take possession of at least two of the
8th Sector’s roughly 10 facilities at about the same time. The remaining barracks and depots
– defended by the understrength 11th Naval Landing Infantry Brigade – held out until the 22
November agreement that allowed the JNA/JRM to pull its forces out of both Split and
Sibenik.348 The withdrawal began on 26 November and was completed in late December.349
Croatian ZNG troops also captured two depots near Ploce on 15 September. JNA RV
i PVO fighter- bombers, however, immediately struck the depots, and crews claimed to have
destroyed much of the facilities, including trucks brought in to carry away captured
weaponry.350 JRM warships assisted the Air Force in its retaliatory strikes.351 Croatian
sources, however, claim the ZNG salvaged a large number of weapons from the depots
despite the JNA attacks.352 No other JNA barracks appear to have remained in the Ploce area
after the operation.

Istria and Gorski Kotar: Rijeka, Pula, and Delnice

Compared to other regions, the Croatian blockade of JNA garrisons in the Istrian
and Gorski Kotar regions was very peaceful – except for one disputed encounter at Delnice.
The JNA 5th Military-Maritime Sector in Pula and the 13th (Rijeka) Corps (commanded by
General Marijan Cad, a Slovene) reached a modus vivendi with the local crisis staff
headquarters and Croatian MUP and ZNG commanders whereby JNA and Croatian forces
agreed to refrain from any military action.353 The truce survived two firing incidents in late
September against JNA garrisons in Pula – which the Croatians blamed on combatants not
under their control.354 JNA/JRM personnel in Pula were observed coming and going freely to
the 5th Sector headquarters. At several nearby barracks, JNA-Croatian relations reportedly
were also cordial. JNA/JRM forces began pulling out from the Pula area in late October,
completing the withdrawal from Pula and the nearby island of Mali Losinj on 16
346
Belgrade Tanjug, 25 November and 18 December 1991; Zagreb Radio, 15 December 1991.
347
Zagreb Radio, 20 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 20 September 1991.
348
Belgrade Tanjug, 22 November 1991.
349
Belgrade Tanjug, 26 November 1991; Zagreb Radio, 26 January 1992.
350
Probably 97th Air Brigade / 1st Corps aircraft from Mostar.
351
Belgrade Tanjug, 15 September 1991.
352
Vesna Puljak: Units of the Croatian Army: The Neretva Is Still Flowing, Hrvatski Vojnik, 29 July 1994, p. 26;
Lidija Duvnjak: Second Anniversary of the 53rd Marine Battalion, Hrvatski Vojnik, 22 October 1993, p. 84.
353
The Rijeka garrison included the headquarters, 13th Corps, and the 13th Mixed Artillery Regiment. 13th
Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, and the corps light air defence regiment, plus other support troops.
354
Belgrade Tanjug, 26-27 September 1991.

136
December.355 General Cad worked out an agreement with Croatian authorities on the 13th
Corps withdrawal, which he signed with Croatian Minister for Navigation Davorin Rudolf on
9 November.356 The 13th Corps completed its pullout on 9 December.357
The surrender of the JNA garrison in Delnice – 6th Mountain Brigade/ 13th Corps –
was the only exception to the otherwise peaceful devolution in the region. On 5 November
ZNG troops threatened the garrison, which consisted of a barracks and three depots, and
demanded that it surrender, which it did. The normally placid General Cad reacted with a
stern ultimatum demanding that the garrison be freed immediately or he would order air
strikes against Delnice – a threat which the RV i PVO duly carried out on 7 November.358
However, this was the only JNA response, and the seizure did not affect the 13th Corps
withdrawal agreement signed only two days later.

Easing of the Siege

In late September, the Croatian Army and the MUP eased their blockades of the
barracks in non-combat zones and some of the apprehensions of dire crisis began to fade.
Overall, though, the situation remained tense; the Croatians had lightened the restrictions
imposed on the JNA, but the blockaded troops recognized that they were still prisoners in
their own barracks.

355
Zagreb Radio, 27 October 1991; Sarajevo Radio, 16 December 1991. EC Monitoring Mission personnel
assisted with the negotiations for both the Pula and Rijeka withdrawals.
356
Belgrade Tanjug, 9 November 1991. General Cad in a farewall note to Rijeka and the Gorski Kotar region
indicated that he intended to retire and live in Rijeka after the corps was evacuated. Belgrade Tanjug, 1
December 1991.
357
Belgrade Tanjug, 9 December 1991.
358
Zagreb Radio, 5 and 7 November 1991.

137
 Appendix 1
Koprivnica Municipality Crisis Staff Order to Prepare for Blockade of
the JNA359

Republika Hrvatska (Republic of Croatia)

Opcina Koprivnica (Municipality of Koprivnica)
Narodna Obrana
Krizni Stab opcine Koprivnica (Crisis Staff)
Drzavna Tajna (State Secret)

Klasa: D. T. 801-03/91-01/1
Urbroj: 2137-01-91-6
Koprivnica 13.09.1991

DP “Izvor” Koprivnica n/r Rukovodioca obrambenih priprema

This is the resolution of the Koprivnica Crisis Staff in accordance with the order of
the Croatian Ministry of Defence and the President of the Republic of Croatia to do the
following:
1. Immediately carry out all the necessary preparations to completely stop
supplying the Koprivnica barracks, the House of the JNA, and JNA facilities in Crna Gora with
food and all other products.
2. Inform the Municipal Crisis Staff at telephone No. 822-038 or at Koprivnica
Municipal Centre at No. 985 about the readiness for carrying out measures cited above, and
give the number to which the signal will be sent for carrying out the measures cited above.
3. Maintain a state of constant readiness for carrying out the above-mentioned
measures, which should be implemented upon the reception of the signal by the Crisis Staff
of the Koprivnica municipality. The signal will be sent by telephone by the Intelligence
Centre and the signal will be “TYPHOON 91”. Upon receipt of the signal all the operations
cited above should be carried out in their entirety.

PRESIDENT OF THE CRISIS STAFF:

Nikola Gregur (signed)

359
Document in Mladen Pavkovic: Dok Je Srca Bit Ce I Croatie: lz Povijesti Domovinskog Rata (While There is a
Heart, There Will Be a Croatia: From the History of the Homeland War), Koprivnica Club of the 117th
Brigade, Koprivnica, 1995, p. 92.

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 Appendix 2
Estimates of Blockaded Troops and CapturedEquipment

It is difficult to determine how much equipment Croatian forces were able to seize
from JNA garrisons because the Federal army maintained such an immense amount of
weaponry in storage. When a JNA formation surrendered, Croatian troops got not only that
unit’s equipment but stocks of excess weaponry held in long-term contingency storage and
not assigned to any particular unit.360 Confiscated TO heavy weapons recaptured by the
Croatians are also difficult to enumerate, although these consisted primarily of mortars. The
following list, based on the assigned equipment of surrendered/captured JNA units and
estimates of stored weapons, is a “best estimate” of the total numbers of tanks and
APC/IFVs, and of field artillery, antitank guns, mortars 100 mm and above, plus 76 mm
artillery and antitank guns that Croatian forces captured during the barracks offensive. By
comparison, General Tus stated in 1996 that the Croatians had been able to seize nearly 200
tanks, 150 APC/IFVs, and about 400 artillery pieces, caliber and type unspecified.361 The
blockaded troop numbers are drawn from Milisav Sekulic’s study, Jugoslaviju Niko Nije
Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme
Command Betrayed It).

Blockaded Troops362
6,150 personnel from Fifth Military District
5.500 personnel from Military-Maritime District
2.100 personnel from the Air and Air Defence Force
Total: 13.750 personnel

Main Battle Tanks

200 T-55 tanks
10 to 20 M-84 tanks363

360
Thus, for example, Croatian ZNG troops seized a JNA barracks in Sisak during September. Although no
artillery unit was assigned to the barracks, the JNA apparently had stored artillery there, which was used to
help form the 1st Mixed Artillery Battalion (later redesignated the 6th). Djuro Gajdek: Cannons On Watch
Over Sisak, Hrvatski Vojnik, 8 October 1993.
361
Igor Alborghetti: In Peactime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-
17, 59. Interview with Corps General Anton Tus, first Chief of the Croatian Main Staff.
362
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 222. The blockaded troop
numbers appear to be from early September 1991.
363
The Croatians may have captured more M-84s, possibly 40 to 50; there are indications that the 32nd
Mechanized Brigade in Varazdin may have received a new battalion of M-84s, which it had not even had
time to integrate into the brigade. A Croatian newspaper at the time of the 32nd’s surrender reported that
the brigade surrendered 70 tanks, plus “new equipment for an entire armored battalion”. Thus, up to 31
new M-84s, combined with ones and twos captured throughout Croatia, could have equaled some 40 to 50
tanks. Zagreb Vjesnik, 27 September 1991, p. 5. However, numbers in Sekulic’s study do not include any M-
84s, indicating that at Varazdin 74 T-55s, 71 APCs (or IFVs), 10 mortars, 18 howitzers, four M-63 MRIs, and
five M-77 MRLs were captured. Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala

139
 30 to 40 T-34 tanks
Total: 240 to 260 tanks

Armoured Personnel Carriers / Infantry Fighting Vehicles

20 to 30 M-60 armoured personnel carriers
100 M-80 infantry fighting vehicles
Total: 120 to 130 APC/IFVs

Field Artillery, Multiple Rocket Launchers and Antitank Guns 100 mm and Above
18 M-2 (M- 115) 203 mm howitzers
18M-1 (M-65/M-114) 155 mm howitzers
18 M-84 152 mm gun-howitzers
18 D-20 152 mm howitzers
20 to 30 M-46 130 mm field guns
24 2S1 122 mm self-propelled howitzers
20 to 30 D-30 122 mm howitzers
40 to 50 M-38 122 mm howitzers
80 to 100 M-2A1 (M-101) 105 mm howitzers
40 to 50 M-56 105 mm howitzers
80 T- 12 100 mm antitank guns
18 M-63 128 mm multiple rocket launchers
Total: 395 to 455 field artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and antitank guns 100
mm and above

76 mm Field Artillery and Antitank Guns

60 to 70 M-48B1 76 mm mountain guns
100 ZIS-3 76 mm antitank guns
Total: 160 to 170 76 mm field artillery pieces and anti tank guns

Heavy Mortars
600 to 650 120 mm heavy mortars
400 former TO mortars
200 to 250 JNA mortars

Total: 1200 to 1300 mortars.

(Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp.
156-157.

140
 Annex 11
The Croatian Army Rises: September – December 1991
Formation of a General Staff and the Croatian Army
The chaotic command and control of Croatian forces that characterized the
summer 1991 fighting continued to plague ZNG and MUP forces during the early stages of
the war with the JNA in September 1991. As a result of this ongoing debacle, the State
Supreme Council decided on 22 September to create a general staff – the Main Staff (Glavni
Stozer) of the Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska – HV)364 – with Colonel General Anton Tus as
Chief of the Main Staff.365 In addition, Major General Petar Stipetic and Colonel Ante Roso
were appointed as Tus’s deputies; at least 14 other former JNA generals or colonels were
appointed to serve on the staff. The new Main Staff absorbed the ZNG Command, which
was still headed by its chief of staff, Colonel Imra Agotic, after General Spegelj’s resignation
in August. In conjunction with the formation of the Main Staff, on 27 September a new
Croatian defence law came into effect, laying down the structure of the Croatian armed
forces and the terms of military service for Croatian citizens.366
Tus had previously served as the commander of the Yugoslav Air and Air Defence
Force until May 1991. He told an interviewer in 1996 that a month before leaving his post
he had publicly condemned JNA war preparations and declared that the air force would not
fight against a fellow nationality. Tus also stated that despite his air force background, his
JNA training at the command and staff school and the JNA war college had prepared him for
all types of operations, including ground warfare. Tus claimed that in the JNA, regardless of
the service, the schooling was the same at the operational and strategic levels.367 Tus’s
primary deputy was Major General Petar Stipetic, who had served as Chief of Operations in
the JNA Fifth Military District. Tus stated in 1996 that Stipetic was considered “the best
operations man in the entire JNA”, and he was to play a major role in planning the new
army’s operations during 1991, as well as in later years.368 Colonel Ante Roso had previously
served in the French Foreign Legion and had earlier helped organize and train MUP Special
364
Notwithstanding the formal establishment of the Croatian Army, the Croatians themselves continued to
refer to their combat units as “ZNG” formations. The practice will be continued here up to the end of the
fighting early in January 1992. The army will be referred to as the HV starting with operations in 1992.
365
Belgrade Tanjug, 22 September 1991. The exact status of the National Guard Corps upon formation of the
HV is unclear. It does not appear to have ceased to exist, but remained within the HV. Despite the new title
of “Croatian Army”, the HV Main Staff itself continued to refer to its maneuver brigades as ZNG units.
366
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 September 1991.
367
Igor Alborghetti: In Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-
17, 59. Interview with Corps General Anton Tus, first Chief of the Croatian Main Staff. Born in 1934, Tus
served as a fighter pilot for many years. During his JNA RV i PVO service, he was stationed at Zagreb-Pleso
Air Base, Batajnica Air Base, and the training center in Rajlovac. He became successively a squadron
commander, a brigade or regiment commander, an air corps commander, and assistant chief of staff of the
RV i PVO until he was appointed commander. A Chief of the Croatian General Staff is Being Sought, Zagreb
Globus, 13 September 1991, p. 7.
368
Igor Alborghetti: In Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-
17, 59.

141
Police units and the ZNG’s special forces. General Spegelj, ignoring his earlier resignation,
served as an unofficial advisor to the new Main Staff.
Tus’s objective was to centralize and streamline the Croatian command and control
system. His first mission was to gain control over the disparate and feuding Croatian armed
forces. By late September all forces, including ZNG MUP Special Police, and MUP reserve
units, were at least nominally under his operational control. This step forward would not
prevent command and control problems from plaguing the Main Staff throughout the 1991
fighting. Asked in mid-October if he had complete command and control of the Croatian
forces, Tus replied: “In principle, yes; legally, yes; in practice, not totally”.
Prior to the formation of the Main Staff, the Ministry of Defence had played the
primary role in supplying and also commanding the ZNG despite the creation in July of the
ZNG Command. As the Main Staff took shape, however, the MoD began to focus more on its
support and administrative role, especially the acquisition of weapons from abroad and
increased production of indigenous weapons, ammunition, and equipment.369 Its primary
mission, however, was the management of the mobilization process through its local
National Defence Secretariats. The secretariats were responsible for creating and
maintaining the mobilization records of military-age males in their area of responsibility.370
Despite shifts in the MoD’s bureaucratic focus, Defence Minister Susak remained one of
President Tudjman’s key advisors and a principal decisionmaker on the use of the military,
regardless of the Main Staff’s control of day-to-day operations.

Activation of Corps and Operational Group Headquarters

A crucial aspect in Tus’s move to organize and manage the Croatian military was his
establishment of competent regional military commands to replace the ineffective crisis

369
The Ministry of Defence organized an office for “special purpose production” – as the Yugoslavs called
defence industries – in September 1991. The production priorities focused on relatively simple items that
could be immediately used on the battlefield, such as mortars, mortar shells, and rifle and hand greandes.
In December 1991, the Croatians were able to begin producing explosives, as well as artillery shells and
multiple rocket launcher rounds. Tihomir Bajtek: Development of Croatian Military Industry: Your Partner in
Defence, Hrvatski Vojnik, March 1997, pp. 10-13.
370
For example, on 10 November, Susak issued a statement indicating that on the basis of President
Tudjman’s decision ordering general mobilization in the Dubrovnik Municipality:
All citizens of the Dubrovnik Municipality who have not been mobilized into the Croatian Army,
the Civil Protection (civil defence), or who are not under compulsory work orders are charged to
report to the Secretariat for National Defence of Dubrovnik Municipality or to the bodies and legal
entities to which they are assigned in line w ith their wartime posts of duty.
In addition to this, all the men who are listed on the military register of the Dubrovnik
Municipality Secretariat for Defence, but who are staying in other municipalities are charged to
report to the defence administration of the municipality where they are staying at this time, so that
they can be registered and incorporated into the defence system of the Republic of Croatia.
The defence administration authorities in charge of those who have been called up will receive
compulsory instructions regarding this announcement from the Ministry for Defence. Those who have
been called up and do not act in accordance with the announcement will face measures envisaged by
the provisions of the law on defence and the criminal penal code ...
Zagreb Radio 10 November 1991.

142
staffs. To this end he divided Croatian territory into six corps-level “operational zones” that
would form the command framework for the Main Staffs conduct of combat operations.371
When the operational zones had been established, division-level task force headquarters –
operational groups – were set up to cover sub-regions within the operational zones. Thus,
for example, the 2nd (Bjelovar) Operational Zone, under the command of Brigadier Miroslav
Jerzecic, by late October was overseeing the Posavina and Pakrac Operational Groups.

Formation of New Brigades372

The other key component of Tus’s new Croatian Army, made possible after the
recapture of the former Croatian TO weapons and the seizure of JNA stocks, was to form
and arm new combat brigades and insure that existing brigades were fully equipped. In
September 1991, just prior to the outbreak of full-scale war, the National Guard Corps
consisted of four professional Guards brigades, at least 20 reserve infantry brigades, and at
least 14 independent infantry battalions. Analysis of Croatian military journal articles
indicates that by the end of October another 25 reserve infantry brigades appear to have
been formed (some through the expansion of independent battalions into brigades),
followed by about another 10 brigades in November, and apparently another five to seven
brigades in December.373 Two armoured battalions were formed in October and
incorporated into 1st and 2nd Guards Brigade; a mechanized brigade was also formed to act
as an administrative headquarters for much of the captured armour which was dispersed in
platoon and company-sized packets across Croatia. A final armoured battalion was formed
in late November.374 The ZNG also began organizing such supporting formations as antitank,
artillery, air defence, and engineer battalions during September and October, moving on to
the formation of military police and corps logistics units in November. The addition of
artillery units and the incorporation of captured JNA armour, however, still left the ZNG an
infantry-rich, firepower-poor force in comparison to the JNA, which fielded upwards of
1.000 tanks compared to the 250 or so available to the ZNG in the 1991 fighting.
By the beginning of 1992, according to General Tus, the ZNG consisted of some
200.000 ZNG troops and another 40.000 MUP personnel (probably including regular police)
under arms. Expanding the army to these levels and filling out the reserve brigades had
been the product of thoughtful planning, careful implementation, and not a little political
courage. Croatian hardliners had been demanding that President Tudjman order general
371
Igor Alborghetti: In Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-
17, 59.
372
This section is based primarily on articles in the Croatian military journals Hrvatski Vojnik and Velebit
covering the period 1993 through 1997, which provide invaluable details of ZNG/HV unit histories,
including most brigades’ formation dates. In addition, the previously cited interview with General Tus
provided an overview of the ZNG’s expansion efforts.
373
Tus said in his 1996 interview that by the time of the 2 January 1992 cease-fire he had 65 brigades in the
field. Igor Alborghetti: In Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb Globus, 31 May 1996,
pp. 15-17, 59. The ZNG was also able to mobilize another one or two brigades in early 1992.
374
Vesna Puljak: Thunderbolts in Armor, Hrvatski Vojnik, 20 May 1994, pp. 13-15; Sinisa Haluzan: Croatian
Knights in Armor, Hrvatski Vojnik, February 1995, p. 23.

143
mobilization but, with Tudjman’s stout backing. Tus instead directed a selective mobilization
of thousands of reservists that began in October with brigade activations and continued as
other units were organized through December. With its many constraints and deficiencies in
organization, logistics and weapons availability, the Croatian Army almost certainly could
not have absorbed the conscription of all available manpower. Rather, the Main Staff tried
to match manpower to equipment, seeking, for instance, to identify personnel who had
previously served in the JNA as tank crewmen, to take over newly captured JNA weapons
and equipment. This was complicated, however, by the ad hoc calls for volunteers that had
been used to fill out early units. Thus, after the JNA was forced to turn over the equipment
of a reinforced armour battalion from its 73rd Motorized Brigade in Koprivnica, the ZNG was
unable to mobilize the Croatian reservists who had been associated with the armoured
battalion under the JNA because most had already volunteered for service in MUP and ZNG
infantry units.375

Training
One of the key shortcomings of most ZNG reserve brigades, particularly those
newly raised was that there was not enough time to give them individual and unit training
before they were committed to combat. Most of the new reserve brigades spent no more
than two weeks in existence before their deployment to the battlefield.376 Some of the
brigades were fortunate in being built around the nucleus of an already existing
independent infantry battalion, most of which had already seen combat. Even in these
veteran infantry battalions, however, many of the reservists had little or no formal training.
The situation in specialized units was even worse, given the limited degree of technical
expertise available on how to operate more complex weapons systems and armoured
vehicles, not to mention orchestrating their use in a unit or with other types of units. This
greatly hindered the Croatians’ ability to exploit many of the weapons seized from the JNA,
and they were forced to more or less create new arms and services (armour, artillery, etc.)
as they went along, identifying personnel within the army or among the newly mobilized
who had some knowledge of these systems, and then using these key men as the nucleus of
new specialized units.

Logistics
The ZNG’s budding logistics system was ill-prepared for such a large expansion of
the army, and proved inadequate even to distribute the captured JNA weapons and

375
Mladen Pavkovic: Dok Je Srca Bit Ce I Croatie: Iz Povijesti Domovinskog Rata (While There is a Heart, There
Will Be a Croatia: From the History of the Homeland War), Koprivnica Club of the 117th Brigade, Koprivnica,
1995, p. 34.
376
The ZNG was fortunate that most JNA brigades and TO units were mobilized rapidly as well and thus had
received only minimal refresher training; the result was that the majority of the rank and file on both sides
were untrained reservists. The JNA and its TO, however, were far better armed, which gave the JNA an
edge, even though its reservists’ lack of training limited the JNA’s ability to exploit this advantage.

144
equipment adequately. Distribution of weapons following the seizure of the JNA barracks
and depots was utterly chaotic, but it improved considerably in October and November as
the ZNG began to establish logistics commands for each operational zone. Even so, at the
end of the Croatian war the ZNG was still unable to fix many of its basic distribution
problems.

Relations with the MUP

Despite the creation of the Main Staff and its assumption of nominal operational
control overall Croatian armed forces, the lack of coordination between MUP and ZNG
formations continued into the fall. Tus acknowledged in October 1991 that he was still
having command problems with the police; insisting that “The police cannot have its own
army” he announced that the MUP paramilitary forces – the Special Police – would be
transferred to the army. Many ZNG commanders reported serious problems with the MUP.
In Vukovar, for instance, ZNG chief of staff Branko Borkovic and Ivica Arbanas, one of his
battalion commanders, complained that the MUP commander there barely cooperated with
their forces, hoarding scarce antitank rockets and refusing to let them allocate the rockets
to critical sectors. They claimed they had to forcibly transfer MUP reserve personnel into the
ZNG in order to unify command and control during the defence of the town.377 The MUP’s
independent attitude stemmed partly from the view that its troops were much better than
the ZNG’s reserve troops, which it regarded as undisciplined and untrained.
The conflict between the MUP and the ZNG represented more of an interservice
rivalry than an indication that either side was lacking in zeal to fight the Federal forces. The
causes and consequences were easy to discern, and both had some basis for their
complaints. The MUP’s concerns about the ZNG troops’ lack of training and discipline were
valid, but such conditions were only to be expected in military formations that consisted of
recent civilians thrown into the heat of combat. The MUP Special Police units were often
superior to the ZNG battalions they served with, but they had the advantage of being much
smaller and more easily trained and controlled, and their regional police administrations
had been functioning long enough to have established an effective chain of command. With
the expansion of the ZNG into a formal army, however, the MUP – which had borne much of
the burden of the earlier fighting – was being eclipsed in the public eye as the defender of
Croatia, adding to its professional jealousy. These feelings of professional superiority and
jealousy often were manifested in foot-dragging when MUP units were required to operate
under ZNG orders and cooperate in the defence of a given area. And so, like any interservice
rivalry, the MUP-ZNG dispute on occasion hindered military operations and hampered the
defence of Croatia.

377
Dr. Juraj Njavro: Glava Dolje, Ruke na Leda (Head Down, Hands Behind), Zagreb Quo Vadis, 1995, pp. 85-99.
Dr. Njavro served in the Vukovar hospital during the 1991 battle. His book includes narratives by both
Arbanas and Borkovic. Njavro, in fact, does not identify Arbanas by name, but only his nom de guerre,
“Crni” (Black), who he states was the commander in the Sajmiste suburb of Vukovar. Arbanas was in fact
the first commander of the 1st Battalion / 204th Vukovar Brigade, defending Sajmiste.

145
 Case Study: Formation of a Reserve Brigade
The formation of the 145th Zagreb-Dubrava Brigade was a fairly typical example of
the process by which one of the new ZNG reserve brigades was created. The Ministry of
Defence called up reservists from the Zagreb suburb of Dubrava beginning on 6 October
1991. The reservists, mostly married men in their 30s, gathered at two nearby elementary
schools. Dressed in a variety of civilian clothes, they formed up with a motley collection of
hunting rifles, older military weapons, and little ammunition. On 13 October, an eclectic
column of Zagreb city buses, commercial trucks, vans, and personal vehicles transported
800 of them to the village of Vukovina, some 20 kilometers south of Zagreb, for a week of
training and outfitting. The brigade probably received its real weapons during this week,
probably drawn from the former Croatian TO stocks recovered at the nearby JNA Velika
Gorica barracks and earmarked for the 145th Brigade’s TO predecessor in Dubrava. On 22
October, newly equipped and a bare two weeks from their civilian homes, the brigade
arrived in the combat zone along the Kupa River in Banija, just west of the town of Sisak.
The 145th was to serve the rest of the 1991 war in this sector, conducting both offensive
and defensive operations against JNA and Serb TO formations.378

Case Study: Creation of the Armour-Mechanized Battalion / 117th

(Koprivnica) Brigade379
The formation of the Armour-Mechanized Battalion of the 117th (Koprivnica)
Brigade provides a good case study in how the Croatians incorporated captured JNA heavy
weapons into their force structure, and how they deployed them to the battlefield. It also
illustrates in particular the difficulties of building and equipping a complex technical unit like
an armoured battalion, including the repair of a large number of damaged armoured
vehicles without a functioning logistics and maintenance system.
The JNA barracks at Koprivnica, housing the 73rd Motorized Brigade and a
detached armour-mechanized battalion of the 265th Mechanized Brigade normally
stationed at Bjelovar, surrendered on 30 September. Its table of equipment included 2 BTR-
50 command APCs, 3 PT-76 light reconnaissance tanks, 38 T-55 main battle tanks, 20 M-80
IFVs, 2 armoured recovery vehicles, and 3 armoured bridge-launching vehicles.380 The JNA
units, however, had disabled all of the equipment before they surrendered. The 117th
Koprivnica Brigade, the local ZNG unit, wanting to get the equipment back in working order
and out to the field as soon as possible, managed to find some mechanically inclined men
willing to attempt the necessary repairs, but none of them had any experience with tanks.
378
Information drawn from Gojko Drljaca: From Dubrava to Dubrovnik, Hrvatski Vojnik, 18 June 1993, p. 12.
379
This account is drawn from Mladen Pavkovic: Dok Je Srca Bit Ce I Croatie: Iz Povijesti Domovinskog Rata
(While There is a Heart, There Will Be a Croatia: From the History of the Homeland War), Koprivnica Club of
the 117th Brigade, Koprivnica, 1995, pp. 33-47.
380
Mladen Pavkovic: Dok Je Srca Bit Ce I Croatie: Iz Povijesti Domovinskog Rata (While There is a Heart, There
Will Be a Croatia: From the History of the Homeland War), Koprivnica Club of the 117th Brigade, Koprivnica,
1995,p. 95.

146
Nevertheless, by 9 October three tanks were up and running and were immediately sent to
the Karlovac Operational Zone halfway across the country, to be followed the next day by
three more. Four more went to the 117th’s immediate command, the Bjelovar Operational
Zone on 11 October for service in Western Slavonia.
The repair crews, however, had run out of parts to fix the remaining vehicles. The
Main Staff in Zagreb put out a call to all of the captured depots for the needed parts and
sent three trained mechanics to Koprivnica to assist in the repairs. Meanwhile, local firms
and the work crews managed to fabricate some parts for the tanks and IFVs, which allowed
six more tanks to deploy south to Novska on 13 October, where they were immediately
engaged in support of an attack. After the battle, the tanks were sent back to Koprivnica for
incorporation in a new armour-mechanized battalion which the Main Staff was attempting
to form.
Then, another problem surfaced: the lack of trained crewmen for the new
battalion. Most of the Croatian reservists assigned previously to the JNA 73rd Motorized had
already volunteered in MUP and ZNG infantry formations and were now unavailable for the
new unit. The battalion finally acquired sufficient personnel in early November, when the
call-up was broadened to other towns around Koprivnica. Despite the battalion’s lack of
readiness, another tank platoon was temporarily deployed south to support more ZNG
offensive operations in Western Slavonia on 12 November.
Meanwhile, the ZNG fully outfitted the battalion with personal equipment,
weapons, and ammunition.
Thirteen M-80 IFVs were repaired and put through firing drills. Finally, on 7
December, the battalion was ready to deploy. Of the vehicles originally captured, the
battalion now fielded 1 BTR-50, 12 T-55s, 13 M-80s, and 1 armoured recovery vehicle, plus a
number of support vehicles with a total strength of 15 officers, six NCOs, and 216 soldiers.
The battalion was railed first to a village near Nasice before deploying under its own power
to the frontline south of Osijek, where it arrived in mid-December. But the men of the
battalion seem to have stayed only about 10 days in the field before being sent back to
Koprivnica on “vacation”, leaving their equipment near the frontline. During the December
“vacation” yet another platoon was detached to support a Croatian offensive in Western
Slavonia. The battalion returned to its original sector near Osijek on 29 December and
stayed there until the end of July 1992, when the equipment was turned over to the 132nd
Nasice Brigade and its men placed on reserve status.

147
 Chart 1
Order of Battle, Croatian Army, October 1991 – January 1992

Main Staff of the Croatian Army (Glavni Stozer Hrvatske Vojske)

Colonel General Anton Tus, Chief of the Main Staff
Major General Petar Stipetic, Assistant Chief of the Main Staff
Colonel Ante Roso, Assistant Chief of the Main Staff
Headquarters: Zagreb

Protection Battalion of the Main Staff

(66th Military Police Battalion from mid-November)
Headquarters: Zagreb

Zrinski Special Purpose Battalion

Headquarters: Zagreb (deployed in elements throughout the country)

Eastern Slavonia-Baranja

1st Osijek Operational Zone

Headquarters: Osijek
Brigadier Karl Gorinsek, Commander
Ivica Vrkic, Deputy Commander

68th Military Police Battalion (formed late November)

Headquarters: Osijek

Detachment / River Fleet

Forward Headquarters: Osijek

Operational Group “Osijek”

Colonel Branimir Glavas, Commander

1st (Osijek) Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade

Headquarters: Osijek (Reserve)

101st Zagreb-Susegrad Brigade (from late November)

Colonel Jozo Petrasevic, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Beketinci

106th Osijek Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Osijek

107th Valpovo Brigade

Slavko Baric, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Valpovo

130th Osijek Brigade (formed October)

Forward Headquarters: vic Cepin

132nd Nasice Brigade (-) (from mid-December)

Forward headquarters: vic Cepin

148
 135th Baranja Brigade (formed October)
Forward Headquarters: NW Osijek

160th Osijek Brigade (formed November?)

Forward Headquarters: S Osijek

Armour-Mechanized Battalion /117th Koprivnica Brigade

Marijan Pavlic, Commander (from mid-December)
Forward Headquarters: Beketinci

Operational Group “Vinkovci-Vukovar-Zupanja”

Lieutenant Colonel Mile Dedakovic-Jastreb, Commander (to 20 November)
Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Vrbanec, Commander (from 20 November)
Headquarters: Vinkovci

2nd (Vinkovci) Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Vinkovci

3rd (Slavonski Brod) Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Nustar

105th Bjelovar Brigade (from October)

Forward Headquarters: vic Privlaka

109th Vinkovci Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Nustar

122nd Djakovo Brigade (formed October)

Foward Headquarters: NE of Djakovo

124th Vukovar Brigade (formed December)

Major Ivica Arbanas, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Vinkovci

131st Zupanja Brigade (formed October)

Forward Headquarters: vic Komletinci

204th Vukovar Brigade (surrendered 18 November 1991)

Lieutenant Colonel Mile Dedakovic-Jastreb, Commander (to mid October)
Branko Borkovic, Commander (from mid-October)
Foward Headquarters: Vukovar

Western Slavonia

2nd Bjelovar Operational Zone (formed 1 October)

Brigadier Miroslav Jerzecic, Commander
Brigadier Ivan Plasaj, Deputy Commander

1st Mechanized Brigade

Headquarters: Varazdin (Deployed in platoons and companies in support of
field units)

149
 69th Military Police Battalion (formed late November)
Headquarters: Bjelovar

Operational Group “Posavina”

Brigadier Rudi Stipcic, Commander

1st Guards Brigade

Josip Lucic, Commander (to late December)
Marijan Marekovic, Commander (from late December)
Forward Headquarters: NE of Novska (Probable attack/counterattack reserve)

8th (later 151st) Samobor Brigade (from early October)

Forward Headquarters: NE of Novska

1st Battalion / 101 st Zagreb-Susegrad Brigade (from 28 September to

mid/late October)
Zeljko Cipris, Commander
Forward Headquarters: SW of Novska

117th Koprivnica Brigade (-)

Colonel Dragutin Kralj, Commander
Forward Headquarters: NW of Lipik (to December);
W/SW of Lipik (from December)

3rd (Krizevci) Battalion / 117th Koprivnica Brigade

(8 November – 29 November)

2nd Battalion / 153rd Velika Gorica Brigade

(probably attached from early December)

125th Novska Brigade (formed late October)

Rozario Rozga, Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic Novska / E of Novska

51 st Independent Vrbovec Battalion

Foward Headquarters: probably SW of Novska

53rd Independent Dugo Selo Battalion (from October)

Forward Headquarters: probably SW of Novska

56th Independent Kutina Battalion

Forward Headquarters: NE of Novska

62nd Independent Novska Battalion

(merged into 125th Brigade in late October)
Forward Headquarters: E/SE of Novska

64th Independent Battalion

(formed early October; merged into 125th Brigade late October)
Forward Headquarters: E/SE of Novska

65th Independent Ivanic Grad Battalion (from October)

150
 Foward Headquarters: NE of Novska

19th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion (from late September to mid October)
Major Miodrag Hokman, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Novska

Operational Group “Pakrac”

104th Varazdin Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic NW of Lipik-Pakrac

123rd Slavonska Pozega Brigade (formed October)

Miljenko Crnjac, Commander
Foward Headquarters: vic N of Slavonska Pozega (October-November)
vic Psunj Mountains (December)

127th Virovitica Brigade (formed October)

Djuro Decak. Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic NE of Daruvar (October)
vic E of Pakrac (December)

132nd Nasice Brigade (formed October) (to mid-December)

Forward Headquarters: vic W of Nasice (October-November)
vic E of Pakrac (early/mid-December)

136th Podravska Slatina Brigade (formed October)

Forward Headquarters: SW of Podravska Slatina (to December)
NE of Pakrac (from December)

4th Battalion / 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade

(merged into 123rd Brigade in October)
Forward Headquarters: vic N of Slavonska Pozega

2nd (Orahovica) Battalion/ 132nd Nasice Brigade (from mid-December)

Forward Headquarters: E of Pakrac

50th Independent Virovitica Battalion (merged into 127th Brigade in October)

Djuro Decak, Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic NE of Daruvar

52nd Independent Daruvar Battalion

Major Milan Filipovic, Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic Daruvar/North of Pakrac

63rd Independent Slavonska Pozega Battalion

(merged into 123rd Brigade in October)
Forward Headquarters: N of Slavonska Pozega

77th Independent Bilogora Battalion

Forward Headquarters: probably NW of Daruvar

15th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion

151
 19th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion (from mid-October)
Major Miodrag Hokman, Commander
Forward Headquarters: NE of Pakrac

Operational Group “Gradiska” / 1st Osijek Operational Zone

3rd (Slavonski Brod) Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade (to November)

Forward Headquarters: vic Nova Gradiska

99th Zagreb-Pescenice Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic NE of Stara Gradiska

108th Slavonski Brod Brigade

Vinko Stefanek, Commander

Forward Headquarters: vic SW of Nova Gradiska

121st Nova Gradiska Brigade (formed October)
Forward Headquarters: vic Nova Gradiska

139th Slavonski Brod Brigade (formed November)

Forward Headquarters: vic SW of Nova Gradiska

Banija-Karlovac / Kordun-Lika Operations

3rd Zagreb Operational Zone

Brigadier Stjepan Matesa, Commander

Armour-Mechanized Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade

(deployed in platoons and companies in support of field units)

11th Mixed Howitzer Artillery Battalion

(deployed in batteries in support of field units)

23rd Self-Propelled Antitank Artillery Battalion

(deployed in batteries in support of field units)

67th Military Police Battalion (formed late November)

Operational Group “Sisak-Banija-Posavina”

1st Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic Sisak
(probably in reserve for attack/counterattack)

Mixed Artillery Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade

100th Zagreb Brigade

Forward Headquarters: SE of Sisak

120th Sisak Brigade

Vlado Hodalj, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Sisak

152
 1st Sesvete (later 144th Zagreb-Sesvete) Brigade

145th Zagreb-Dubrava Brigade

Forward Headquarters: West of Sisak

165th Sunja Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Sunja

57th Independent Sisak Battalion

Forward Headquarters: Sisak

1st Mixed Artillery Battalion

Forward Headquarters: Sisak

Command of the Defence of City of Zagreb

Functioned as an operational group headquarters for several brigades W. of Sisak

2nd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: ?
(probably in reserve for attacks/counterattacks)

8th Samobor (late 151st Samobor) Brigade

(from late September to early October)
Forward Headquarters: ?

10th Velika Gorica (later 153rd Velika Gorica) Brigade

(formed early October)
Forward Headquarters: vic Pisarovina

101st Zagreb-Susegrad Brigade

(from late October to late November)
Colonel Jozo Petrasevic. Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic Pokupsko

Elements, 99th Zagreb-Pescenice Brigade (attached)

102nd Novi Zagreb Brigade

Forward Headquarters: E of Pokupsko

148th Zagreb-Trnje Brigade (formed early October)

Forward Headquarters: vic Pisarovina

149th Zagreb-Tresnjevka Brigade (formed early October)

Forward Headquarters: vic Pisarovina

4th Karlovac Operational Zone

Brigadier Izidor Cesnjaj, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Karlovac

3rd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Duga Resa
(probably in reserve for attack/counterattack)

153
 103rd Krapina-Zagora Brigade (from October)
Forward Headquarters: vic Duga Resa

110th Karlovac Brigade

Forward Headquarters: S/SE of Karlovac

111th Rijeka Brigade (to November)

Forward Headquarters: vic Gospic

118th Gospic Brigade (to November)

Forward Headquarters: Ribnik

129th Karlovac Brigade

Forward Headquarters: E of Karlovac

133rd Otocac Brigade (to November)

Forward Headquarters: vic Otocac

137th Duga Resa Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic Duga Resa

140th Jastrebarsko Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic East of Karlovac

143rd Ogulin Brigade (formed mid-November)

Forward Headquarters: vic Ogulin

150th Zagreb-Crnomerec Brigade (from late October / early November)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ogulin

4th Battalion / 110th Karlovac Brigade

(merged mid-November to form 143rd Brigade)
Forward Headquarters: vic Ogulin

70th Military Police Battalion (formed November)

Headquarters: Karlovac

Lika Operational Group (formed November)

(from Headquarters, 5th Rijeka Operational Zone)
Forward Headquarters: Krasno

111 th Rijeka Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic Gospic

118th Gospic Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Ribnik

3rd Battalion / 128th Rijeka Brigade (attached)

128th Rijeka Brigade (-) (from early December)

Forward Headquarters: vic Klanac

133rd Otocac Brigade (to November)

154
 Forward Headquarters: vic Otocac

5th Rijeka Operational Zone (formed 30 September 1991)

Brigadier Anton Racki, Commander
Headquarters: Rijeka

119th Pula Brigade (formed December)381 Headquarters: Pula

128th Rijeka Brigade

(1 battalion formed October; remainder formed November)
(to early December)
Forward Headquarters ( 1st Bn): vic between Rijeka and Delnice

138th Delnice Brigade (formed early November)

Headquarters: Delnice

154th Pazin Brigade (formed November)382

Headquarters: Pazin

155th Rijeka Brigade (formed November)

Headquarters: Rijeka

71st Military Police Battalion (formed November)

Zadar-Northern Dalmatia Operations

6th Split Operational Zone

Brigadier Mate Viduka, Commander

2 battalions / 4th Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: ?
(Probably in reserve for attack/counterattack)

113th Sibenik Brigade

Forward Headquarters: NW of Sibenik

114th Split Brigade (to late October; from early December)

Forward Headquarters: SE of Drnis

126th Sinj Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic Sinj

141st Split-Kastela Brigade (formed mid-November)

Forward Headquarters: S of Drnis

142nd Drnis Brigade (formed early December)

Forward Headquarters: vic SW of Drnis

158th Split Brigade (formed mid/late December)

Forward Headquarters:
381
Not combat ready until January 1992.
382
Not combat ready until January 1992.

155
 Sector “Zadar”
Colonel Josip Tulicic, Commander

2 battalions / 4th Guards Brigade

Forward Headquarters: Zadar
(probably in reserve for attack/counterattack)

112th Zadar Brigade

Colonel Ante Culina, Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic NE of Zadar

134th Biograd Brigade (formed October)

Forward Headquarters: vic Biograd

159th Zadar Brigade (formed December)

Forward Headquarters: Galovac (SE of Zadar)

Dubrovnik-Southern Dalmatia Operations

Southern Sector / 6th Split Operational Zone

Colonel Dzanko, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Metkovic

114th Split Brigade (from late October to early December)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ston/NW of Slano

115th Imotski Brigade (formed early October)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ston/NW of Slano

116th Metkovic Brigade (formed early October)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ston/NW of Slano

156th Makarska Brigade (formed November)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ston/NW of Slano

163rd Dubrovnik Brigade (formed November or December)

Forward Headquarters: Dubrovnik

Metkovic Battalion (merged October into 116th Brigade)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ston/NW of Slano

Makarska Battalion (merged November into 156th Brigade)

Forward Headquarters: N of Ston/NW of Slano

Dubrovnik Battalion (merged November or December into 163rd Brigade)

Forward Headquarters: Dubrovnik

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 Annex 12
National Command Authority in Yugoslavia
The highest political body in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the
Federal Presidency, which consisted of eight members, one for each of the six republics,
plus one each for the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Rising to power
through the 1980s, Serbian President Milosevic came to control four votes on the
Presidency during 1991, the Serbian member, Borisav Jovic, the Montenegrin member.
Branko Kostic, plus those of Vojvodina and Kosovo.
The Federal Secretariat for National Defence (Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu
odbranu-SSNO) and the JNA General Staff were the highest military bodies in Yugoslavia,
and acted in peacetime in an advisory role to the Presidency. In time of war, the Federal
Presidency was designated the Supreme Command (Vrhovna Komanda) and acted as the
national command authority. The SSNO and the General Staff became the Staff of the
Supreme Command (Stab Vrhovne Komande – SVK).

“Group of Six” – The De Facto Federal-Serbian Supreme Command

During the Croatian War in 1991, the Federal Presidency more or less ceased to
function in its pre-war incarnation. Instead, a de facto combined Federal / Serbian Supreme
Command emerged, what Borisav Jovic called the “group of six”. The six prime movers were
Serbian Federal Presidency member Borisav Jovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic,
Montenegrin Federal Presidency member Branko Kostic, Montenegrin President Momir
Bulatovic, Federal Defence Secretary General Veljko Kadijevic, and Chief of the General Staff
General Blagoje Adzic. Nominally, the Federal Presidency continued to act as the national
command authority, under Vice President of the Presidency Branko Kostic. This stemmed
from a decision made on 3 October, with only Milosevic’s supporters present, that a 1
October Presidency declaration of “immediate war danger” allowed the Presidency to rule
by less than a majority of its eight members and with decrees that had the force of law.383

383
Belgrade Tanjug, 3 and 4 October 1991. A 3 October Tanjug statement claimed that:
The manner of work of the Yugoslav Presidency in conditions of an immediate danger of war is
regulated by a decision adopted by the collective head of state in November 1984 and which is a
State Secret.
The Yugoslav Presidency informed the public today that it was now operating in conditions of an
immediate danger of war.
The Presidency at its session on 1 October concluded that an “immediate danger of war” existed
in the country. Six out of the body’s eight members were present at the session, sufficient for a
quorum.
Today’s Presidency meeting was attended by four of its members and the leadership of the armed
forces.
General Secretary of the Yugoslav Presidency told Tanjug this evening that the “1984 decision
empowers the President of the Presidency, or the Vice-President in the President’s absence, to take
on his own certain actions which are in the competence of the Presidency”.

157
Thus, Milosevic’s four members could meet and outvote the remaining Macedonian and
Bosnian members. Croatian member Stipe Mesic,384 who was supposed to be the President
of the Presidency, along with Slovenian member Janez Drnovsek, refused to attend the
meetings for obvious reasons.

Federal Secretariat for National Defence and General Staff Organization

The Federal Secretariat for National Defence was the highest defence policy body in
the nation. It was headed by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, Army General
Veljko Kadijevic. Kadijevic’s deputy was Admiral Stane Brovet. In addition to its policy role,
the SSNO handled support functions for the army and supervised defence production. The
SSNO was made up of a number of departments, the two most powerful of which were the
Department for Morale and Political Affairs and the Security Directorate. Other key
departments included the Department for Military Economy and Production, the
Department for Scientific Research, the Department for Rear Services, and the Department
for Territorial Defence.
The General Staff, headed by Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, controlled the day-to-
day activities of all Yugoslav military forces, and represented more of a joint staff than a
traditional general staff. Adzic had a deputy chief of staff for ground forces, air force/air

If during the implementation of the actions listed in the 1984 decision, the President or Vice-
President is “unable to establish contact with all the members of the Presidency, he will consult with
those he has succeeded in contacting”.
Stari said.
384
Former JNA officer and later Krajina Serb Army Major General Milisav Sekulic blames Mesic for the
breakdown of the Presidency, stating in his book on the 1991 break-up that:
On 1 October, the SFRY Presidency faced stonewalling by its chairman, Stjepan Mesic, who had
not convened a single session of the Presidency from 6 September to 1 October. Nevertheless, the
collective chief of state did meet on 1 October, and the meeting was held without Mesic. It was
presided over by Vice Chairman Branko Kostic. The meeting was attended by Gen. Veljko Kadijevic,
Gen. Blagoje Adzic, and Adm. Stane Brovet, the three key functions in the Armed Forces; the Federal
Secretary for National Defnse, and Chief of the Supreme Command Staff, the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Deputy Federal Secretary for National Defence. The political and
security situation in the country was considered at the session. The unanimous assessment was that
the country faced the danger of all-out war and that it was in a state of the immediate danger of
war. Thus, the conditions were in place for the SFRY Presidency to function and act in the way
provided for in the SFRY Constitution under conditions of an immediate danger of war in accordance
with the SFRY Presidency’s Decision 36 of 21 November 1984. It was declared that by crossing over to
the conditions for functioning during an immediate danger of war, the SFRY Presidency was
eliminating the possibility of its work being stonewalled and assuming certain authorities of the SFRY
Assembly, which was unable to convene.
At that session the SFRY Presidency adopted a decision on how it was to function under the
conditions of an immediate danger of war, thereby ensuring the continuity of the SFRY Presidency’s
work. Under this decision, the member of the SFRY Presidency from the Republic of Slovenia was
stripped of his right to command the SFRY Armed Forces ...
Through this session, the SFRY Presidency “gained the upper hand” over its chairman, Stjepan
Mesic, and lifted the blockade on its work, an immediate danger of war was declared even though
war had been going on for months.
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and
the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 178-179.

158
defence, and the navy. In addition, the separate commander of the Air Force and Air
Defence (RV i PVO), the commander of the Military-Maritime District, which controlled the
Yugoslav Navy, and the commanders of the regular military districts all reported to Adzic.
The charts below depict the hierarchy of the Yugoslav military and the General Staffs
organization.

159
 Chart 1
Military Hierarchy in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Federal Secretariat for National Defence

Inspector General
General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operational-Staff Affairs
Assistant Chief of Staff for Ground Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff for Air and Air Defence Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff for Rear Services
Assistant Chief of Staff for Territorial and Civil Defence
Commander, First Military District
Commander, Third Military District
Commander. Fifth Military District
Commander, Military-Maritime District
Commander, Air and Air Defence Force

160
 Chart 2
Organization of the General Staff, Yugoslav People’s Army

Chief of the General Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operational-Staff Affairs
Operations Directorate
Military Intelligence Directorate
Mobilization Directorate
Training Directorate
Finance Directorate
Assistant Chief of Staff for Ground Forces
Infantry Directorate
Armour Section Directorate
Artillery Section Directorate
Electronics and Communications Directorate
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Directorate
Engineer Directorate
Assistant Chief of Staff for Air and Air Defence Force
Air Force Directorate
Air Defence Artillery Directorate
Air Technical Directorate
Assistant Chief of Staff for the Navy
Naval Forces and Coastal Defence Section
Naval Technical Section
Assistant Chief of Staff for Territorial and Civil Defence
Territorial Defence Section
Civil Defence Section

161
 Annex 13
JNA Campaign Plans and Organization, July – September 1991
This annex outlines the five campaigns into which the JNA’s strategic offensive plan
against Croatia was divided. The plan’s main operation was to be launched out of Eastern
Slavonia, from which JNA armoured-mechanized forces would drive west to link up with the
second operation in Western Slavonia, and then continue on toward north-western Croatia.
Another campaign was to have been undertaken to sever the Zagreb region from Lika and
southern Croatia by an attack near Karlovac. The operation near Zadar would cut
communications along the Dalmatian coast, while the larger operation – split into two sub-
campaigns – would attack from Mostar toward Split and from Herzegovina toward
Dubrovnik. Through these five campaigns the JNA would then have militarily dissected the
Croatian state, leaving the Zagreb government prostrate before Belgrade’s armed authority.
The JNA General Staff mobilized some of the forces for this offensive in early July. Additional
forces were mobilized in mid-September, after the Croatians began their offensive on the
JNA barracks.

Eastern Slavonia – Baranja Operation

The First Military District was assigned command of this campaign, utilizing the 1st
Guards Mechanized Division, 12th (Novi Sad) Corps, and 17th (Tuzla) Corps, reinforced with
major elements of the 24th (Kragujevac) Corps, the corps-level Belgrade City Defence
Headquarters, and other units from the First and Third Military Districts. The First Military
District headquarters was used to form the headquarters of Operational Group 3, which
exercised overall command in eastern Slavonia-Baranja and reported directly to the JNA
General Staff. JNA forces in this campaign were to break through the Vinkovci-Osijek line
and link up with JNA forces in western Slavonia near Daruvar.385 Kadijevic described this
force as the “main manoeuvring force of the Supreme Command in penetrating toward
Zagreb and Varazdin”.386
Implicit in Kadijevic’s statement was the fact that the First Military District
components would compose the JNA’s strongest array of armoured-mechanized forces.
During the first mobilization in late June-early July, the JNA mobilized and deployed five
mechanized brigades to the border area with Eastern Slavonia. Another mechanized brigade
and an armoured brigade were mobilized and ready to deploy on order, while one
mechanized brigade absorbed its mobilized reserves but continued its peacekeeping role in
Eastern Slavonia. Three motorized brigades stationed in Bosnia experienced call-up
problems but managed to achieve partial mobilization. One artillery regiment was mobilized

385
Jovic entry for 20 September 1991.
386
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993, p. 137. For discussion of
mobilization, see Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody
Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 177-231.

162
and deployed, while another was mobilized along with an army-level artillery brigade and
made ready to deploy on order. Support troops needed to sustain the deployment were
also called up.
In the second phase mobilization from 10 to 20 September, the JNA deployed the
formations mobilized in the first phase and mobilized and deployed major elements of the
24th (Kragujevac) Corps and Belgrade City Defence Headquarters (Odbrana Grada Beograd
– OGB) – six additional motorized brigades, a partisan (light infantry) division headquarters,
and at least two partisan brigades – plus one armoured brigade from the Third Military
District. The support troops for the 1st Guards Mechanized Division and the 12th (Novi Sad)
Corps, as well as some 24th Corps support units, were also mobilized. According to
Kadijevic, several more infantry formations were to have been mobilized at this time –
probably up to four partisan (light infantry) brigades from the Vojvodina TO – but these
troops either failed to report or their orders were cancelled because of political concerns
and popular opposition to the call-ups. Many of the 24th Corps’ motorized and partisan
brigades also disintegrated when many of their troops failed to report for mobilization, and
they were simply dropped from the order of battle for the Vukovar operation.
The absence of these infantry units was to have a devastating effect during the
attack on Vukovar, and the general shortage of regular infantry would force the JNA to call
for the organization of volunteer units. It was these volunteer formations, which attracted
Serb extremists, riffraff, and other undesirable elements, that would be responsible for
many of the atrocities committed in Eastern Slavonia. The JNA’s mobilization problems and
its concerns about the reliability of its Bosnian Muslim and Croat soldiers also restricted the
planned use of the 17th Corps. As its difficulties in achieving its objectives mounted, the JNA
had to order a third mobilization in October during which three additional Serbian
motorized brigades were deployed. (The mobilization issue is discussed in detail below.)
The forces assessed as having been earmarked for this campaign as of July 1991
consisted of the following:387
– 1st Guards Mechanized Division – about 32.000 troops, about 380 tanks, 320
IFV/APCs, 220 field artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 75 heavy
mortars.
– 12th (Novi Sad) Corps– about 32.000 troops, about 240 tanks, 190 IFV/APCs, 150
field artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and 95 heavy mortars.
– 17th (Tuzla) Corps – more than 27.000 troops, about 85 tanks, 80 APCs, 135 field
artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 85 heavy mortars.
– 24th (Kragujevac) Corps – more than 14.500 troops, 36 field artillery tubes, and
some 48 heavy mortars.388

387
Note that many of the troops included here would have been assigned to combat support and combat
service support formations, in contrast to the Croatian National Guard Corps / Croatian Army and MUP
forces, which maintained a much higher tooth-to-tail ratio.
388
It is unclear if the corps artillery brigade was also to be called up. If so, this would add another 2.000 troops
with 48 artillery tubes and MRLs. These numbers also assume that the 80th and 130th Motorized Brigades
were not planning to deploy with their T-34 tank battalions. Each battalion had 31 tanks.

163
 – Belgrade City Defence – more than 9.000 troops, 36 field artillery tubes, and
some 36 heavy mortars.
– Vojvodina TO forces (attached to 12th Corps) – at least 8.000 troops and 24
heavy mortars.
Total Forces: at least 122.000 troops, 700 tanks, 590 IFV/APCs, 575 field artillery
tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and 365 heavy mortars.

Western Slavonia Operation

The 5th (Banja Luka) Corps, assigned to the First Military District – Operational
Group 3 headquarters – was to be the main force for this operation. The 32nd (Varazdin)
Corps presumably was to make some attempt to link up with the 5th Corps during its drive
along the Okucani-Pakrac- Daruvar line to split Slavonia from the rest of Croatia.
The 5th Corps mobilized in late June/early July. It comprised one armoured brigade,
two motorized brigades, an artillery regiment, and support troops. Only minor elements of
the corps deployed at this point, detailed to peacekeeping operations and duels with the
Croatians in Western Slavonia in mid- August. The rest of the corps appears to have
remained in Bosnia for refresher unit training during July and early August.389
With the JNA’s general mobilization in September, the entire 5th Corps deployed to
Western Slavonia and began offensive operations. Four partisan brigades were mobilized
and deployed – including three Bosnia-Herzegovina TO partisan brigades – to join the 5th,
followed by two more in November-December,390 and later a partisan brigade from Serbia.
Kadijevic's statements that the 5th Corps received only one and a half of the its designated
five brigades suggest that these formations were seriously under-strength and/or that they
were not the formations originally intended for this sector.391 The 5th Corps would be
further hampered by Croatian operations that disrupted all 32nd Corps attempts to link up
with 5th Corps, which decreased the JNA's combat power in this sector even more.
As deduced from the announced deployments, the forces earmarked for the
campaign as of July 1991 consisted of the following:392
– 5th (Banja Luka) Corps – about 23.500 troops, some 80 tanks, 55 IFV/APCs, over
100 field artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 60 heavy mortars.
– Another five unidentified brigades, estimated at some 10.000 to 23.000 troops,
depending on whether the five were all partisan brigades, all motorized brigades
or some mix. The five brigades’ heavy weapons could have included anywhere
from 30 heavy mortars (five partisan brigades) to 150 tanks, 90 field artillery
tubes over 100 mm, and some 90 heavy mortars (five motorized brigades).
Total Forces: about 33.500 to 46.500 troops, some 80 to 230 tanks, 100 to 190 field
artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 120 to 150 heavy mortars.
389
Belgrade Tanjug ,7 August 1991.
390
These brigades also appear to have mobilized initially in July and then stood down.
391
Kadijevic, p. 138.
392
See note 387.

164
 Karlovac Operation
The JNA plan called for four manoeuvre brigades to operate along the axis from
Vojnic through Karlovac to the Slovene border, which would have split northern and
southern Croatia at a narrow point near Karlovac, probably under the command of the
“Banija and Kordun” Operational Group 1 headquarters (drawn from the Fifth Military
District HQ). The JNA plan did not call for any of the four brigades to mobilize and deploy to
the region during the first phase; rather they appear to have been regarded as supplemental
to the troops normally garrisoned in the Banija, Kordun, and Lika regions, and which were
mobilized in the first phase. These consisted of two motorized brigades, an artillery
regiment, an army-level artillery brigade and other support units. Only one or two brigades
of the four required, however, were in under the second phase.393 Compounding these
shortages, Croatian operations against 10th (Zagreb) Corps’ barracks paralyzed two-thirds of
the corps’ manoeuvre brigades, including an armoured brigade and a mechanized brigade,
leaving the corps all but incapable of supporting the Karlovac campaign. This shortage of
forces was to drastically curtail this portion of the JNA offensive plan, and force OG 1 to take
a primarily defensive stance.394
The assessed total forces earmarked for the campaign as of July 1991 consisted of
the following:395
– Operational Group 1 – some 20.000 to 25.000 troops, 30 to 90 tanks, 130 to 170
field artillery tubes or MRLs over 100 mm, and some 35 to 60 heavy mortars.396
As many as 9.000 additional troops, with some 60 tanks, some 35 field artillery
tubes over 100 mm, and 35 heavy mortars would have been involved in local
operations in Lika and Banija.

Zadar – Northern Dalmatia Operation

The 9th (Knin) Corps / Military-Maritime District was to undertake this operation.
The corps eventually operated directly under the control of the Supreme Command Staff

393
Kadijevic claims that only one of four brigades arrived. Kadijevic, p. 138. However, at least another
motorized brigade, a composite motorized brigade, and one Montenegrin partisan brigade were
dispatched to Banija. Belgrade Tanjug, 21 September 1991. The formations, however, may not have been
earmarked for the actual Karlovac attack.
394
JNA forces normally garrisoned in the Banija, Kordun, and Lika regions – plus the reinforcements noted in
note 392 – were to become involved in a large number of subsidiary operations, primarily in conjunction
with SAO Krajina TO formations. These operations were separate and distinct from the JNA Karlovac
operation, although they provided added pressure on thinly stretched Croatian troops. After October,
these subsidiary operations became the JNA’s primary focus as the army shifted strategic direction to
assume a more defensive posture protecting the SAO Krajina.
395
See note 387.
396
This force mix is based on a range of one motorized and three partisan brigades or three motorized
brigades and one partisan brigade, plus the 10th Corps’ support troops, including an artillery regiment, and
the Fifth Military District artillery brigade. Two of the corps’ own maneuver brigades were almost certainly
not earmarked because of their position deep in Croatian territory or were already involved in local
operations in Banija.

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because the barracks blockade prevented the Military-Maritime District from exercising
command.397 It mobilized the forces prepared for phase one in early July, consisting of two
motorized brigades, an artillery regiment, and support troops. The corps had received an
additional armoured battalion in early 1991 at the height of the tensions over Krajina and
acquired some minor reinforcements during phase two.
The assessed total forces earmarked for this campaign as of July 1991 consisted of
the following:398
– 9th (Knin) Corps – about 18.000 troops, at least 50 tanks, 50 IFV/APCs, 85 field
artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 35 heavy mortars.

Mostar – Split – Dubrovnik Operations

JNA operations in southern Dalmatia were divided into two sub-operations, one
grouping slated to drive from the Neretva valley up the coast toward Split and another
grouping earmarked to push on the Trebinje-Dubrovnik axis and “impose a land blockade”
on the Dubrovnik area.399 The general purpose of this part of the offensive was to cut off
southern Dalmatia and Dubrovnik along the Mostar-Ploce line.400 The operations were to
come under the command of the “Herzegovina” Operational Group 2, formed from the
Montenegrin TO headquarters.
The 4th (Sarajevo) and 37th (Uzice) Corps were to have undertaken the Mostar-
Split sub-operation. The 4th (Sarajevo) Corps’ three motorized brigades, one mountain
brigade, and an artillery regiment were partially mobilized in July 1991. But the large
number of Croat and Muslim reservists assigned to the corps posed political problems, and
many of these men failed to report for duty. The breakdown in mobilization appears to have
left the 4th Corps too weak for its assignment, and for the most part it was confined to
protecting JNA facilities in the Mostar area. The 37th (Uzice) Corps, comprising two
motorized brigades, one mountain brigade, at least one Serbian Territorial Defence partisan
brigade, and possibly an artillery regiment, also came up short during the second phase
mobilization in September, and it was assigned two partisan brigades assembled in a third
mobilization. As a result, according to General Kadijevic, the Mostar grouping managed to
assemble and move only one-third of the forces provided for in the plan of operations.
Because of that, even its initial mission had to be altered and limited to securing the Mostar
airport and, by relying on eastern Herzegovina, creating operational bases for potential
activities toward Split in cooperation with the forces of the Knin grouping and the navy. The

397
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 231. The text indicates that the
“Air Defence” [Protivvazdusna odbrana – PVO] was unable to command the 9th Corps and was therefore
directly controlled by the Staff of the Supreme Command. This is almost certainly a typographical error in
which “VPO” – the Maritime Military District, under whose command the 9th Corps was – was
misabbreviated “PVO” and then incorrectly spelled out as “Air Defence”.
398
See note 387.
399
Kadijevic, p. 138.
400
Jovic entry for 20 September 1991, p. 220.

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Mostar grouping executed the limited mission, although it created many problems in the
field.401
The southern Dalmatian campaign had thus been deprived of a key element in its
execution.
The total forces earmarked for the sub-campaign as of July 1991 are assessed as
the following:402
– 4th (Sarajevo) Corps – about 26.000 troops, up to 80 tanks, 20 IFV/APCs, some
100 field artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 85 heavy mortars.
– 37th (Uzice) Corps – about 23.000 troops, possibly 60 tanks, up to 85 field
artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 85 heavy mortars.
Total Forces: about 49.000 troops, about 140 tanks, 20 IFV/APCs, some 185 field
artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 170 heavy mortars.
The 2nd (Titograd) Corps and the 9th (Boka Kotorska) Military-Maritime Sector,
augmented by the Montenegrin TO, were to undertake the Dubrovnik sub-operation. The
2nd Corps initially appears to have included two mountain brigades, a partisan brigade, and
an artillery regiment. The 9th Sector initially included a motorized brigade, another
motorized brigade attached from the 2nd Corps, and other supporting units. The
Montenegrin TO contingent comprised four partisan brigades, one of which appears to have
been assigned to the 2nd Corps and three to the 9th Military-Maritime Sector.
The assessed total forces assigned to the sub-campaign as of July 1991 consisted of
the following:403
– 2nd (Titograd) Corps – about 20.500 troops, some 50 field artillery tubes and
MRLs over 100 mm, and about 75 heavy mortars.
– 9th (Boka Kotorska) Military-Maritime Sector – about 18.000 troops, some 30
tanks, about 30 field artillery tubes over 100 mm, and some 55 heavy mortars.
Total forces: about 38.500 troops, some 80 field artillery tubes and MRLs over 100
mm, and about 130 heavy mortars.

Air Support
The Ground Forces of the JNA (Kopnena Vojska JNA – KoV JNA) clearly had primacy
in such a large-scale ground offensive, but the Yugoslav Air and Air Defence Force (Ratno
vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdusna odbrana – RV i PVO) was to play an important supporting
role. The RV i PVO would provide close air support, interdiction and reconnaissance missions
while guarding Yugoslav air space against any outside intervention. Its helicopter units
provided direct support to ground units, transporting troops and supplies, evacuating
wounded, and providing fire support with missile-equipped Gazelles.

401
Kadijevic, pp. 139-140.
402
See note 387.
403
See note 387.

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 The RV i PVO’s 1st Corps was to provide support to First Military District operations
in Eastern Slavonia. On average, for combat operations the corps had under command the
equivalent of two fighter-bomber regiments or brigades with some five to six squadrons of
combat aircraft – some 80 to 90 fighter-bombers / reconnaissance aircraft or light strike
planes. In addition, the corps had a helicopter / transport brigade with about 15 transport
helicopters, 15 light attack helicopters, and a half dozen An-26 transport aircraft. The 5th
Corps and the Academy and Training Command supported the Fifth Military District using
four fighter-bomber regiments or brigades with 11 combat aircraft squadrons – some 100
fighter-bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, or light strike planes, plus a helicopter / transport
brigade with about 15 transport helicopters, 15 light attack helicopters, and six An-26
transports. Units from the 1st Corps and the Academy and Training Command supported
the Military Maritime District using two fighter-bomber regiments or brigades with about
four to six combat aircraft squadrons – some 55 to 75 fighter-bombers, reconnaissance
aircraft, and light strike planes. In addition, one transport helicopter squadron, a naval /
antisubmarine helicopter squadron, and a Gazelle helicopter training regiment were
available for support.

Naval Support
The Yugoslav Navy (JRM) played a less active role in the JNA’s strategic planning.
The JRM’s primary mission was to maintain the blockade of the Croatian coastline, but
around Dubrovnik it also provided fire support to ground operations along the coast and
helped supply these operations using landing craft. The Danube River Fleet also provided
fire support to First Military District operations in Eastern Slavonia.
The JRM’s main combat forces in 1991 consisted of four frigates, five diesel
submarines, 16 missile boats, 14 torpedo boats, and 10 large patrol boats. In addition, the
JRM maintained a large fleet of minesweepers, landing craft, and light riverine craft.

Evaluation of the Plan

On paper the JNA General Staff’s strategic offensive was an excellent study in
theoretical staff planning. It correlated the several levels of warfare and integrated the
campaign objectives necessary to fulfil the JNA’s strategic objective – the subjugation and
territorial dissection of Croatia and, as a corollary, the military defeat of its armed forces. If
successfully implemented, the plan would have achieved that objective. Unfortunately, the
JNA was in no condition neither to execute such a complex and involved attack nor – having
been oriented for decades as a strategic defence force – was it even organized or trained to
undertake this kind of offensive. The new plan threw all previous contingency planning out
the window. The JNA 37th (Uzice) Corps, for example, had never planned for offensive
operations on the Dalmatian coast; its wartime contingency plan called for the defence of

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central Serbia.404 All of the commands involved were forced almost overnight to
comprehend and orchestrate operations on a scale and in a manner never previously
contemplated. The result was often chaos.
Ironically, the same civil war conditions that impelled the General Staff to plan such
a large and intricate offensive put its objectives out of reach, for the army, like the nation,
was wracked by ethnic and political strains that degraded its internal cohesion. The General
Staff, however, was too isolated from the military forces it would require for the offensive
and it had not fully comprehended the stresses that were playing upon them. The planning
and organizational difficulties afflicting the command levels were compounded by the
defection of many key JNA officers to the opposing side, and by the unanticipated
reluctance of conscripts and reservists – including many Serbians – to fight. It was a tribute
to the JNA’s essential professionalism, despite the ideological and careerist tendencies of
many officers, that it could even undertake multi-front offensive operations under such
chaotic conditions and achieve some measure of success.

Evaluation of the Proposed Serbian Strategic Plan

As discussed earlier, the top leaders in Serbia – Serbian President Milosevic and
Serbian Federal Presidency member Borisav Jovic – wanted the JNA to adopt quite a
different strategy that would serve Serbian rather than strictly Federal war aims. They
considered the army leaders’ objective of defeating the Croatians unnecessary and
unfeasible, and for much of 1991 they urged the JNA to withdraw from most of Croatia to
the “borders” of Serb-populated areas in Croatia and defend them.405 The Milosevic / Jovic
concept for JNA strategy, although certainly not a detailed plan, rested on a far more
realistic appraisal of the JNA’s capabilities and envisioned far more attainable war aims. The
essentially defensive strategic posture they wanted the JNA to adopt would have been
much easier to implement and support logistically than the difficult offensive the army
actually undertook. A defensive, reactive strategy would have cast the JNA in a much more
favourable light in the propaganda / morale war, mollifying both the Croatians and the
international community and giving its conscripts and reservists a better cause to fight for. It
404
The 37th Corps prepared a study on its actions during the 1991 war. The study indicated that:
... because no unit was used according to the use (contingency) plan, and this made it exceedingly
difficult to carry out the tasks of rear support. The geo-topographic characteristics of the zone where
units of the corps were involved were specific and essentially unknown to command personnel. Units
were forced to go into combat in a short time on the basis of orders from the highest level of
direction and command, which manifested a discrepancy between theory and practice applied out of
necessity, which had very adverse consequences for the effectiveness of direction and command.
Colonel Dusan Loncar: A Time of Bad Decisions, Belgrade Vojska, 9 September 1993, pp. 14-15.
405
For example, on 20 June 1991, during a meeting between Jovic and Kadijevic/Adzic, Jovic asked the
generals:
...to give us a precise answer on whether they will conduct a redeployment of the military along
the new (Serbian) borders of Yugoslavia, in order to prevent major losses by the Serb nation and to
defend its territory. ... We will resist any policy of forcibly keeping the Croats and Slovenes in
Yugoslavia, as well as of forcibly removing Serbs from it.
Jovic entry for 20 June 1991.

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would also have conceded the end of the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia that the JNA was sworn to
defend, which is why the Yugoslav patriots of the JNA opposed it. But in the summer of 1991
most people in Yugoslavia already viewed the JNA as a Serbianized institution, even if its
leaders and many of its officers felt otherwise.

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 Appendix 1
Organization and Equipment of the JNA Ground Forces
(Kopnena Vojska JNA – KoV JNA)

Organization of JNA Command Staffs

The command staffs of the JNA higher level commands and lower formations had a
near identical organization at all command levels, with perhaps some slight variation at the
military district level. JNA command staffs included a commander, the staff, and three
supporting organs or bodies. The staff, headed by the chief of staff who was also the
command’s deputy commander, consisted of officers responsible for operations,
intelligence, personnel, and each of the operations branches – armour, infantry, artillery, air
defence, engineers, NBC defence, electronic intelligence, and communications. There was
also an assistant commander for moral, education and legal affairs, an assistant commander
for rear services, and a chief of security who was equivalent to an assistant commander. The
military district level appeared to differ from this in having a deputy commander position
separate from the chief of staff, making him a second assistant commander.

Strategic and Operational Command Level

The highest level of field command in the JNA was the military district (Vojna oblast
– VO / Vojnopomorska oblast – VPO), equivalent to a western field army headquarters. In
contrast to traditional western field armies, however, the military district was a static area
command charged with the defence of a given region. For example, the First Military
District, headquartered in Belgrade, was responsible for northern Serbia, eastern Croatia,
and virtually all of Bosnia. As such, it had six corps under its command. These corps (korpus)
– the primary operational-level command in the JNA – were likewise normally static area
commands rather than mobile field units. The Navy-led Military-Maritime District, in
addition to one ground forces corps, commanded three military-maritime sectors
(vojnopomorski sektor – VPS), which acted essentially as corps-level commands covering the
long Yugoslav coastline with both naval units and coastal defence ground forces.
As noted earlier, the JNA had converted from a Soviet-style army-division-regiment
organization to the military district-corps-brigade structure during the late 1980s. Each of
the new corps typically had three or four manoeuvre brigades which were primarily
motorized formations, although many corps often had a mix of a mechanized brigade or
armoured brigade and two or three motorized brigades.406 Each corps maintained at cadre
strength one or two partisan division headquarters, each usually responsible for two
partisan brigades that would conduct guerrilla operations in wartime. The corps also had a

406
The only remaining non-partisan division in the army was the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanized Division,
headquartered in Belgrade. Despite its title, the division was organized along the lines of a mechanized
corps, with mechanized brigades rather than regiments.

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variety of support formations, including an artillery regiment, an antitank regiment, and a
light air defence regiment.
During combat operations in Croatia, the JNA formed a number of ad hoc
“operational group” headquarters. The exact subordination of some of the operational
groups remains unclear, although OG 1, 2, and 3 reported directly to the JNA General
Staff.407 Even if the OGs were subordinate to the military districts, the districts appear to
have become more responsible for administrative matters while the operational group
headquarters directed the actual military operations in each sector. Corps headquarters
reported to the OG commands and were the highest tactical-level formation. The OGs were
formed on the basis of existing headquarters. The following operational groups were
formed in 1991:
Operational Group 1, formed from elements of the Fifth Military District. It
controlled the Banija, Kordun, and Lika regions.
Operational Group 2, formed from the Headquarters, Montenegrin TO, and
responsible for the Mostar-Split / Dubrovnik campaign.
Operational Group 3, formed from elements of First Military District headquarters
and responsible for the Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia campaigns.
OG 1 and OG 3 appear to have formed subordinate operational groups to improve
the control and organization of its sub-operations. OG 1 appears to have formed three
operational groups for Banija, Kordun, and Lika. OG 3 formed:
Operational Group “North” based on the 12th (Novi Sad) Corps headquarters and
responsible for the northern half of the Vukovar sector.
Operational Group “South”, from the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade headquarters,
responsible for the southern half of the Vukovar sector.
OG 2 also may have formed two subordinate operational groups to control each of
its sub-operations.
Operational Group “West”, possibly formed from the 37th (Uzice) Corps
headquarters and responsible for the Mostar-Split sub-operation.
Operational Group “Dubrovnik”, possibly formed from the 2nd (Titograd) Corps
headquarters and responsible for the Dubrovnik sub-operation.
Other JNA sub-operations may also have been run by their own operational groups.
The OGs notwithstanding, command and control between various command levels
was often a problem for the JNA during the war, according to Major General Bozidar Djokic
– a Yugoslav Army (VJ) corps commander who in 1991 had been chief of staff of the 2nd
(Titograd) Corps on the Dubrovnik front. In 1993 he noted that the Supreme Command
frequently encountered problems in controlling distant frontline units, even though the
whole purpose of the OG concept was to increase the understanding and linkages between
the General Staff / Supreme Command and field units. The problem, he said, was that the
officers of the ad hoc OG commands did not know each other well enough, not having

407
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 231.

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trained and exercised together like the brigade-level commands. Their command and
control performance suffered accordingly.408

JNA Tactical Organization

The JNA and Territorial Defence in 1991 employed five types of manoeuvre
brigades and two types of artillery formations in Croatia, as well as brigade-level task forces
called “tactical groups”. It also made extensive combat use of the military police units,
whose pre-war anti-terrorist training made them the best infantry units in the JNA. The
varying force mixture fielded by the JNA in each campaign plan was to have an important
impact on some key sectors – especially Eastern Slavonia.
Armoured Brigade (oklopna brigada – okbr). The JNA deployed three armoured
brigades during combat operations in Croatia, and a fourth remained under blockade for
most of the fighting. A JNA armoured brigade consisted of three armoured battalions (27 or
31 tanks, 10 IFVs), and a mechanized battalion (27 or 30 IFVs, six 120 mm mortars), an
artillery battalion (usually twelve 122 mm self-propelled howitzers and four 128 mm
multiple rocket launchers), an air defence battalion, and supporting units. Two of the
brigades were equipped with the Yugoslavs’ best tank, the M-84. An armoured brigade’s
wartime strength totaled about 3.000 personnel, of which some 400 were infantry.
Mechanized Brigade (mehanizovana brigada – mbr). The JNA deployed seven
mechanized brigades – all in Eastern Slavonia – while an additional three mechanized
brigades were under blockade for most of the Croatian war. A JNA mechanized brigade
consisted of two armoured battalions (one with 30 tanks and another with 39 tanks) and
two mechanized battalions (39 APCs or IFVs and six 120 mm mortars each), an artillery
battalion (usually twelve 122 mm self-propelled howitzers and four 128 mm multiple rocket
launchers), an antitank battalion, an air defence battalion, and supporting units.
Mechanized brigades had a total wartime strength of 3.500, of which only 475 to 680 were
infantry, depending on whether the brigade had APCs or IFVs. The relatively small number
of infantry men – especially in proportion to the overall size of the brigade – became a
critical weakness when JNA operations in Eastern Slavonia degenerated into urban and
village warfare in and around Vukovar.
Motorized Brigade (motorizovana brigada – mtbr). Motorized brigades made up
the bulk of the JNA’s wartime force structure. Most motorized brigades were organized into
three motorized (truck borne) infantry battalions (approximately 700 personnel, six 82 mm
mortars, six 120 mm mortars each), an armoured battalion (39 tanks, 31 tanks, or 21 tanks
and 10 APCs), an artillery battalion (18 105 mm or 122 mm howitzers), an antitank battalion
(some brigades, six ATGM vehicles and twelve 90 mm self-propelled tank destroyers or eight
76 mm antitank guns), an air defence battalion, and supporting units. Motorized brigades

408
R. Popovic: The Mistakes Must Not Be Repeated, Belgrade Vojska, 16 December 1993, pp. 8-9. An interview
with Major General Bozidar Djokic.

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had a total wartime strength of 4.600 personnel, of which some 2.100 were infantrymen,
three to four times as a many as in a mechanized brigade.
Mountain Brigade (brdska brigada – bbr).409 The JNA deployed a small number of
mountain brigades – no more than four – during its combat operations, all on the Mostar-
Split / Dubrovnik front, and one mountain brigade was under blockade. Some Montenegrin
TO brigades may also have been designated mountain brigades. A mountain brigade
comprised five mountain battalions (700-800 personnel, six 82 mm mortars, six 120 mm
mortars each), a light artillery battery (six M-48 76 mm mountain guns), and supporting
units. Mountain brigades were typified by the pack animals they used to move heavy
equipment and other burdens through the rugged Balkan terrain. Mountain brigades had a
total wartime strength of 5.000 personnel, of which some 3.500 to 4.000 were infantrymen.
Partisan Brigade (partizanska brigada – partbr). Partisan brigades – which were all-
reservist formations – made up a large percentage of the JNA’s peacetime force structure
and the bulk of the republican Territorial Defence forces. Essentially light infantry brigades,
partisan brigades were organized to conduct World War II-style partisan / guerrilla actions
against an invader. It was as conventional light infantry that JNA and TO partisan brigades
acted in the Croatian war, holding less active sectors and supporting offensive operations by
more powerful JNA formations. A typical partisan brigade consisted of three partisan
infantry battalions (about 500 men and six 82 mm mortars each), a heavy mortar battery
(six 120 mm mortars), and a few supporting units. Most wartime partisan brigades had a
strength of about 2.000, although some brigades were larger.
Protection Motorized Regiment (zastitni motorizovani puk – zmtp). Protection
motorized regiments were elite formations whose mission was to guard the General Staff
and military district headquarters and associated command posts in wartime. These
regiments were comprised of one military police battalion (bataljon Vojne Policije – bVP),
one to two motorized battalions, an air defence battalion, an engineer battalion, and a rear
services battalion. At least two and probably three protection regiments were involved in
the Croatian war.
Tactical Group (takticka grupa – TG) In addition to the standard combat brigades,
the JNA formed a number of tactical group headquarters. A tactical group was essentially a
brigade-level task force headquarters consisting of a semi-permanent or temporary
collection of battalions and brigade elements designed to carry out a specific mission or
control a specific sector.
Battle Group (borbena grupa – BG) A battle group was a battalion / company-level
task force consisting of a semi-permanent collection of companies / platoons designated to
carry out a specific mission or control a specific sector.
Military Police (Vojna policija – VP). The primary JNA military police unit was the
battalion, numbering about 500 troops. Each military district’s protection regiment had a
military police battalion, as did the elite 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, which had two, and

409
Not to be confused with the JNA’s single alpine brigade (planinska brigada), the 345th, which was
previously garrisoned in Slovenia.

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each JNA corps was assigned one. They carried mostly small arms, and each battalion
included a platoon or company of M-86 BOV-VP military police APCs. Military police roles
included assault infantry, rear-area security, counter-sabotage and “antiterrorist” activities,
maintenance of civil order in occupied areas, and dealing with internal army crime and
discipline problems. Each manoeuvre brigade had a military police company.
Reconnaissance-Sabotage (izvidacko-diverzantska). All primary JNA formations had
their own reconnaissance-sabotage elements. Each corps had a company or a “detachment”
that ranged between a company and a battalion in size, while most regular JNA brigades had
companies. Partisan brigades appear to have had platoons. Together with military police
units, these units were the elite elements of the army, used not only in their intended
reconnaissance and sabotage roles, but also as shock troops to spearhead offensive
operations or as “intervention” units to drive back enemy attacks. In addition to the corps
and brigade reconnaissance troops, the JNA General Staff’s 63rd Airborne Brigade – actually
a battalion-sized unit – consisted primarily of reconnaissance and sabotage companies.
Mixed Artillery Brigade / Regiment (mesovita artiljerijska brigada / mesoviti
artiljerijski puk – mabr/map). The JNA employed two artillery formations in Croatia – one of
its two army-level artillery brigades and a corps-level artillery regiment. The two army-level
brigades were formed of three artillery battalions (18 130 mm field guns each) and one
multiple rocket launcher battalion (12 self-propelled 128 mm MRLs). These brigades had
about 3.000 personnel. The corps-level regiments each had two artillery battalions (each
battalion had 18 122 mm or 152 mm or 155 mm howitzers, or in some cases 130 mm or 155
mm field guns), and a multiple rocket launcher battalion (12 128 mm MRLs). The regiments
had about 2.000 personnel.
The JNA also maintained a single FROG-7 (R-65 LUNA-M) rocket artillery brigade
headquartered in Banja Luka and normally assigned to the First Military District. It appears
to have been attached to Fifth Military District or responded directly to the General Staff
during the 1991 war. The brigade consisted of three rocket battalions, each with four
launchers, plus supporting units.
Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigades and Regiments. At the military district-level the
JNA operated mixed antitank artillery brigades and corps-level mixed antitank artillery
regiments. The army-level brigades were organized into three antitank artillery battalions
(12 T-12s each) and one self-propelled antitank rocket battalion (18 ATGM vehicles), one
howitzer battalion (18 122 mm), and a motorized (infantry) battalion. The corps-level
regiments had two antitank artillery battalions and a self-propelled antitank rocket
battalion.

Composition of Unit Personnel

The JNA traditionally filled its active duty units with conscripts drawn from all over
Yugoslavia to make sure that no single formation drew more than a set percentage of its
personnel from the republic in which it was stationed so that conscript formations would be

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multi-ethnic. Upon mobilization, however, brigades drew upon the local and regional
populations to bring their complement up to wartime strength. Because a conscript
formation was never manned at greater than 50 percent strength in peacetime,
mobilization rapidly transformed it into one dominated by the local ethnic group. Reserve
formations, which were territorially raised, already consisted exclusively of one ethnic
group, although many Bosnian formations were a mixture of the groups living in the same
region.

Traditions – Honorific’s
The JNA was proud both of its World War II Partisan heritage and its Communist
ideology; it actively promoted unit traditions from the Partisan war against the Germans
while seeking to indoctrinate its personnel ideologically. Most JNA formations and units
bore an alternate unit designator or honorific corresponding to a World War II partisan
formation, celebrating their “unit day” and honouring the unit’s heroes of World War II. The
1st Guards Motorized Brigade, which made the final push into Vukovar, was the exemplar of
JNA unit traditions.410 It celebrated its formation day as 4 November 1942, when the
Partisan high command had organized a protective Escort Battalion. In October 1944 the
battalion was expanded and re-designated the Guards Brigade. The brigade earned a
number of battle honours for its actions, the most famous of which was the German
attempt to capture Marshal Tito at Drvar in 1944. After the war the brigade became the
“Tito Guard”, in which all nationalities and ethnic groups were represented, and provided
honour guard units for Tito and for key government buildings and national events in
Belgrade. After Tito’s death the brigade provided the honour guard for his mausoleum.

Equipment
JNA armoured equipment was a mixture of Soviet, US, and indigenously produced
tanks, armoured vehicles, and guns.
Of the three major types of tanks employed in the 1991 fighting the most prevalent
was the Soviet designed T-54/55, followed by the M-84 – the Yugoslav variant of the Soviet
T-72 – and the World War II design Soviet T-34. The JNA’s two types of APC/IFVs were
indigenously produced, the M-60, which was a standard APC similar to the US M-113

410
Other examples of JNA unit honorifics drawn from World War II Partisan formations included:
1st Proletarian Guards Mechanized Division
1st Proletarian Guards Mechanized Brigade “1st Proletarian Brigade”
2nd Proletarian Guards Mechanized Brigade “3rd Sandzak Proletarian Brigade”
3rd Proletarian Guards Mechanized Brigade “3rd Krajina Proletarian Brigade”
5th Proletarian Motorized Brigade
9th Motorized Brigade “9th Serbian Brigade”
36th Mechanized Brigade “8th Vojvodina Brigade”
57th Mountain Brigade “5th Sandzak Brigade”
179th Mountain Brigade “6th Montenegrin Brigade”

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mounting a 12,7 mm machine gun (some variants also mounted a pair of 82 mm recoilless
rifles), and the M-80, which was an IFV similar to the Soviet BMP-2, mounting a 20 mm
cannon and a twin AT-3 antitank missile launcher. The JNA also used several variants of the
indigenously produced BOV APC, including the M-86 BOV-VP military police APC, the M-83
BOV-1 ATGM vehicle, and the BOV-3 air defence vehicle.
The JNA artillery consisted of an even greater variety of weapon types than the
armoured units’ tanks and AFVs. Brigade artillery units fielded primarily 105 mm and 122
mm systems. The 105 mm artillery included Yugoslav produced M-56 105 mm (derived from
German World War II M-18 105 mm) and US World War II era M-2A1/M-101 105 mm
howitzers. The 122 mm artillery included modern 2S1 122 mm self-propelled howitzers and
D-30 122 mm towed artillery, plus World War II-era M-30/M-38 122 mm howitzers. Army
and corps level artillery comprised 130 mm field guns and 152 mm and 155 mm howitzers.
These weapons included the Soviet M-46 130 mm field gun, the Soviet D-20 152 mm
howitzer, the Yugoslav M-84 152 mm gun-howitzer, the Yugoslav M-46/84 155 mm gun-
howitzer, and the US-designed World War II-era M-1/M-65/M-114 155 mm howitzer and M-
2/M-59 155 mm field gun. The JNA used three types of multiple rocket launchers, all
Yugoslav-designed: the towed M-63 128 mm “Plamen”, the self-propelled M-77 128 mm
“Oganj”, and a handful of M-87 262 mm “Orkan”.

177
 Chart 1
Skeleton Order of Battle of JNA Forces Earmarked for Strategic
Offensive, July 1991

JNA General Staff

Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of General Staff

First Military District (Operational Group 3) – Eastern and Western Slavonia Campaigns
Colonel General Aleksandar Spirokovski, Commander
1st Guards Mechanized Division (+)
12th (Novi Sad) Corps
17th (Tuzla) Corps
Major Elements, 24th (Kragujevac) Corps
Major Elements, Belgrade City Defence
Major Elements, Vojvodina Territorial Defence

5th (Banja Luka) Corps – Western Slavonia Campaign

Fifth Military District (Operational Group 1) – Karlovac Campaign

Colonel General Zivota Avramovic, Commander

Military-Maritime District
Vice-Admiral Mile Kandic, Commander
2nd (Titograd) Corps (attached) – Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik Campaign
4th (Sarajevo) Corps (attached) – Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik Campaign
9th (Knin) Corps – Knin-Zadar Campaign

9th (Boka Kotorska) Military-Maritime Sector – Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik Campaign

37th (Uzice) Corps (attached) – Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik Campaign

178
 Chart 2
Order of Battle, JNA Forces in Croatia and Mobilized Formations in
Bosnia and Serbia, July – August 1991411 412

First Military District (1. Vojna oblast – 1.VO)

Colonel-General Aleksandar Spirokovski, Commander413
Lieutenant Colonel General Mladenko Maksimovic, Deputy Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Andrija Silic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica

95th Protection Motorized Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica (probably)

317th Communications Regiment (Mobilized?)

Peacetime Headquarters: Bijeljina
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica

411
Please note that the following order of battle generally does not show all military district and corps support
troops. Each military district’s army troops consisted of:
– protection motorized regiment (headquarters security)
– artillery brigade
– antitank artillery brigade
– one to two medium self-propelled air defence rocket regiments (SA-6)
– reconnaissance company or detachment
– military police battalion
– engineer brigade or regiment
– communications regiment
– transport battalion
– NBC defence regiment or battalion
– reserve or “supplementary” regiment (probably replacement / draft holding formation)
– medical battalion
– rear base (logistics/rear services) (one per corps)
For each JNA corps these usually consisted of the following units:
– artillery regiment
– antitank artillery regiment (usually were not mobilized and deployed)
– light air defence artillery regiment
– reconnaissance company or detachment
– military police battalion
– engineer regiment
– pontoon battalion
– NBC defence battalion
– communications battalion
– transport battalion
– medical battalion
In addition, the order of battle does not show the large number of JNA training centers and other depots
that were scattered through out Croatia.
412
This order of battle does not include all JNA cadre-strength partisan division headquarters or brigades.
413
Commanders and chiefs of staff will be included where known down to brigade level.

179
1st Guards Mechanized Division
Major General Mico Delic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica

1st Guards Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized/Deployed)

Colonel Milorad Vucic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Sremski Karlovci/Sid

2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized/Deployed)

Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Stisovic, Commander (to mid-August 1991)
Colonel Dusan Loncar, Commander (from mid-August 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Valjevo
Forward Headquarters: Sabac

3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Antonic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Pozarevac

252nd Armoured Brigade (Mobilized) (attached from 37th Corps)

Colonel Jovan Vuckovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Kraljevo

453rd Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized/Deployed) (attached from 12th Corps)

Peacetime Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica
Forward Headquarters: Sid

1st Guards Mixed Artillery Regiment (Mobilized/Deployed)

Lieutenant Colonel Andjelko Djokic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Kragujevac
Forward Headquarters: Valjevo

1st Guards Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Cvetkovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade

1st Guards Military Police Battalion

Major Jovan Susic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade

152nd Mixed Artillery Brigade (Mobilized) (attached from First Military District)
Peacetime Headquarters: Cuprija

4th (Sarajevo) Corps

180
Major General Vojislav Djurdjevac, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

6th Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Doboj

10th Motorized Brigade (-) (Mobilized)

Colonel Milojko Pantelic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Mostar

49th Motorized Brigade (Mobilized)

Colonel Enver Hadzhihasanovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

216th Mountain Brigade (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Dragomir Milosevic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Han Pijesak

4th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Kiseljak

4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Visoko

346th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

288th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

5th (Banja Luka) Corps

Lieutenant Colonel General Nikola Uzelac, Commander
Colonel Momir Talic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: Bosanska Gradiska

16th Motorized Brigade (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Simo Marjanovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka

329th Armoured Brigade (Mobilized/Elements Deployed)

Lieutenant Colonel Ratomir Simic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: Stara Gradiska

343rd Motorized Brigade (Mobilized)

181
 Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Arsic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Prijedor

5th Mixed Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Desimir Garovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka

454th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Derventa

5th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka

12th (Novi Sad) Corps

Major General Mladen Bratic, Commander
Major General Andrija Biorcevic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

36th Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized/Deployed)

Colonel Drago Romic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Subotica
Forward Headquarters: Batina/Sombor area

51st Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized/Deployed) (attached from 24th Corps)

Colonel Enes Taso, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Pancevo
Forward Headquarters: Bogojevo

16th Mixed Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Vaskovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Ruma

12th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment (Mobilized/Deployed)

Lieutenant Colonel Petar Grahovac, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Novi Sad
Forward Headquarters: Sid area

12th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Novi Sad

17th (Tuzla) Corps (elements probably deployed along Sava River)

Major General Savo Jankovic, Commander

12th Mechanized Brigade (Mobilized/Deployed)

Colonel Boro Ivanovic, Commander Peacetime
Headquarters: Osijek
Peacekeeping duty – Eastern Slavonia
182
 92nd Motorized Brigade (Partially Mobilized/Elements Deployed)
Peacetime Headquarters: Tuzla
Forward Headquarters: ?

327th Motorized Brigade (Partially Mobilized/Elements Deployed)

Peacetime Headquarters: Derventa

395th Motorized Brigade (Partially Mobilized)

Peacetime Headquarters: Brcko

12th Mixed Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Peacetime Headquarters: Vinkovci

158th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade (Mobilized?)

Peacetime Headquarters: Djakovo

17th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Tuzla

Fifth Military District (V. Vojna oblast – V. VO)

Colonel General Zivota Avramovic, Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Andrija Raseta, Deputy Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Dobrasin Prascevic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb
Forward Headquarters: Slunj

65th Protection Motorized Regiment (Mobilized?)

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb?
Forward Headquarters: Slunj?

389th Rocket Artillery Brigade (attached from 1 Military District)

Colonel Tomislav Obradov, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka

580th Mixed Artillery Brigade (Mobilized)

Colonel Svetozar Marjanovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Karlovac

288th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Virovitica

149th Medium Self-Propelled Air Defence Rocket Regiment (SA-6/KUB-M)

Colonel Milan Torbica, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb-Pleso

367th Communications Regiment

183
Peacetime Headquarters: Samobor

10th (Zagreb) Corps

Lieutenant Colonel General Dusan Uzelac, Commander
Major General Ivan Stimac, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb

4th Armoured Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Jastrebarsko
Elements on Peacekeeping Duty: Kordun/Banija

140th Mechanized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb

622nd Motorized Brigade (Mobilized/Elements Deployed)

Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Petrinja
Elements on Peacekeeping Duty: Banija

6th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Garrison: Petrinja

6th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Garrison: Petrinja

608th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb

10th? Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb

13th (Rijeka) Corps

Lieutenant Colonel General Marjan Cad, Commander
Major General Trajce Krstovski, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Rijeka
Forward Heaquarters: Plitvice

6th Mountain Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Anton Racki, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Delnice

13th Motorized Brigade (withdrawing)

Peacetime Headquarters: Ilirska Bistrica, Slovenia

236th Motorized Brigade (Mobilized?)

Peacetime Headquarters: Gospic

184
 13th Mixed Artillery Regiment
Peacetime Headquarters: Rijeka

13th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Rijeka

306th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Karlovac

32nd (Varazdin) Corps

Major General Vlado Trifunovic, Commander
Colonel Sreten Raduski, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

32nd Mechanized Brigade

Colonel Berislav Popov, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

73rd Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Koprivnica

265th Mechanized Brigade (Elements deployed)

Colonel Rajko Kovacevic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Bjelovar
Elements on Peacekeeping Duty: Okucani/Western Slavonia

32nd Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

417th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Krizevci

32nd Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

42nd Border Guard Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Koprivnica

43rd Border Guard Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Virovitica

Military-Maritime District (Vojnopomorska oblast – VPO)

Vice Admiral Mile Kandic, Commander
Major General Nikola Mladenic, Deputy Commander
Vice Admiral Fredrih Moreti, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Split

185
86th Protection Motorized Regiment
Peacetime Headquarters: Split

183rd Communications Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Sinj

9th (Knin) Corps

Major General Spiro Nikovic, Commander
Major General Janez Ribo, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff (to August)
Colonel Ratko Mladic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff (from August)

180th Motorized Brigade (Mobilized/Elements Deployed)

Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Zivanovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Benkovac

221st Motorized Brigade (+) (Mobilized/Deployed)

Armoured Battalion / 10th Motorized Brigade (attached)
Lieutenant Colonel Slavko Lisica, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Knin

9th Mixed Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Peacetime Headquarters: Knin

557th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Milica Potpara, Commander
Peacetime Heaquarters: Benkovac

9th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Knin

5th (Pula) Military-Maritime Sector

Rear Admiral Marijan Pogacnik, Commander (to 3 August)
Rear Admiral Vladimir Barovic, Commander (from 3 August)
Warship Captain Marko Kimer, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff (to 3 August)
Warship Captain Dusan Rakic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff (from 3 August)
Peacetime Headquarters: Pula

139th Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Pula

8th (Sibenik) Military-Maritime Sector

Vice Admiral Djuro Pojer, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Sibenik

11th Naval Landing Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Sibenik
186
Fleet Command
Rear-Admiral Nikola Ercegovic, Commander
Frigates: two Split class, two Kotor class
Patrol Submarines: two Sava class, three Heroj class
Corvettes: two Mornar class
Missile Fast Attack Craft: six Koncar class, ten Osa I class
Torpedo Fast Attack Craft: fourteen Shershen class
Patrol Fast Attack Craft: ten Mirna class
+ other light forces and landing craft

187
 Chart 3
Order of Battle, JNA Forces in Croatia and Mobilized Formations in
Bosnia and Serbia, Late September to 1 January 1992414

Operational Group 3 (Headquarters, First Military District – I. Vojna oblast – I. VO)415

Colonel-General Aleksandar Spirokovski, Commander416 (to late September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel General Zivota Panic, Commander (from late September 1991)
(Colonel General from 29 November 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel General Mladenko Maksimovic, Deputy Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Andrija Silic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
(to late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica

95th Protection Motorized Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica (probably)
(Elements possibly attached to Operational Groups “North” and/or “South” for
Vukovar operation)

317th Communications Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Bijeljina
Forward Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica

389th Rocket Artillery Brigade

(attached from First Military District)
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: ?

Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Operations

Operational Group “North”

(Headquarters, 12th (Novi Sad) Corps)417

414
See note 410. In addition, the order of battle does not show the large number of JNA training centers and
other depots that were scattered throughout Croatia.
415
A JNA document included in Milisav Sekulic’s account of the 1991 war states:
The Supreme Command Staff, through the Operations Centre, has a direct link to the Banja Luka
and Knin Corps and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Operational Groups. At this time the Air Defence Command
[typographical error, should be VPO, Military Maritime District] is not able to command the Knin
Corps. The situation with the Banja Luka Corps and the commands of the three operational groups (at
Banija, Kordun, and Lika) is similar. The command of the Fifth Military District has not been able to
exercise command successfully.
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 231. The OG-1, 2, and 3 referred
to are different than the operational groups in Banija, Kordun, and Lika.
416
Commanders will be included where known down to brigade level.

188
 (activated 30 September; deactivated post- Vukovar when reverted to 12th Corps
designator)
Major General Mladen Bratic, Commander (to 4 November 1991 – Killed in Action)
Major General Andrija Biorcevic. Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
(Commander from 4 November 1991)
Forward Headquarters: Borovo Naselje

18th Motorized Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Novi Sad
Forward Headquarters: vic. Borovo Naselje; after 18 November to vic. Sarvas

51st Mechanized Brigade

Colonel Enes Taso, Commander
(attached from 24th Corps)
Peacetime Headquarters: Pancevo
Forward Headquarters: vic. Borovo Naselje; after 18 November to vic. Tenjski
Antunovac

211th Armoured Brigade

(attached from 21st Corps)
(Mobilized and Deployed mid/late September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Stisovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Nis
Forward Headquarters: vic. Tordinci

12th (Novi Sad) Corps418

Major General Andrija Biorcevic, Commander
Forward Headquarters: Dalj

12th Mechanized Brigade (-)

(reassigned from 17th Corps)
Colonel Boro Ivanovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Osijek
Forward Headquarters: vic. Tenja/Bobota

Elements, 36th Mechanized Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic. Sodolovac/Ernestinovo
151st Motorized Brigade

417
Does not include blockaded formations; only those corps and OG involved in ongoing combat operations.
418
OG “North” appears to have been responsible only for operations on the north side of Vukovar. The 12th
Corps forces not engaged in the Vukovar fighting, primarily south/southeast of Osijek, may have reported
to the corps chief of staff while the corps commander dealt directly with Vukovar as commander, OG
“North”.

189
 (Mobilized and Deployed September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: vic. Ernestinovo

169th Motorized Brigade (-)

(Mobilized and Deployed mid/late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Loznica
Forward Headquarters: vic. Palaca

505th Motorized Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: vic. Tordinci

544th Motorized Brigade (-)419

(Mobilized and Deployed mid/late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Sabac
Forward Headquarters: vic. Bijelo Brdo

16th Mixed Artillery Regiment

(Deployed mid/late September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Vaskovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Ruma
Forward Headquarters: vic. Vera

12th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

Lieutenant Colonel Petar Grahovac, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Novi Sad
Forward Headquarters: vic. Erdut
Defence of Danube bridges

Operational Group “South”

(Headquarters, 1st Guards Motorized Brigade)420
(activated 30 September; deactivated late November and all units reverted to 1st
Guards Mechanized Division)
Colonel Mile Mrksic, Commander
(Major General from 29 November 1991)
Forward Headquarters: vic. Negoslavci

419
Reservist mobilization difficulties delayed brigade deployment.
420
The operational group also included “several territorial and volunteer detachments, and several
independent units at the battalion / artillery battalion level”. Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A
Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad
Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 200.

190
 1st Guards Motorized Brigade
(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991; redeployed to home garrison
December 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: vic. Negoslavci

1st Guards Mechanized Brigade

(from 30 September to 7 October 1991)
Colonel Milorad Vucic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: vic. Negoslavci

252nd Armoured Brigade

(Deployed late September 1991)
(from 30 September 1991)
(attached from 37th Corps)
Colonel Jovan Vuckovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Kraljevo
Forward Headquarters: vic. Petrovci-Marinci

453rd Mechanized Brigade

(from 30 September 1991)
(attached from 12th Corps)
Peacetime Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica
Forward Headquarters: vic. Petrovci-Bogdanovci

20th Partisan Division (-)421

(from late September 1991)
(attached from 24th Corps)
Peacetime Headquarters: probably Kragujevac
Forward Headquarters: probably vic. Petrovci-Bogdanovci

152nd Mixed Artillery Brigade

(Deployed mid/late September 1991)
(attached from I Military District)
Peacetime Headquarters: Cuprija
Forward Headquarters: Negoslavci

1st Guards Military Police Battalion

(from 30 September) Major Jovan Susic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade

421
Normally comprised of two partisan brigades. Reservist mobilization difficulties delayed deployment and
compromised the division’s employment.

191
 Forward Headquarters: Negoslavci?

24th Military Police Battalion

(attached from 24th Corps)
(Probably mobilized/deployed September-October 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Vojnovic, Commander

1st Guards Mechanized Division

Major General Mico Delic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: vic. Negoslavci

1st Guards Mechanized Brigade

(to 30 September; from 7 October 1991)
Colonel Milorad Vucic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: vic. Negoslavci/southern Vukovar
(to 7 October 1991);
probably vic. Nijemci (from 7 October 1991)

2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade

Colonel Dusan Loncar, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Valjevo
Forward Headquarters: vic. Mirkovci

3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade

(Deployed mid/late September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Slobdan Antonic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Pozarevac
Forward Headquarters: vic. Stari Jankovci

80th Motorized Brigade

(attached from 24th (Kragujevac) Corps)422
(Mobilized mid-September; deployed by mid-October 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Kragujevac
Forward Headquarters:

130th Motorized Brigade

(attached from 24th (Kragujevac) Corps)423
(Mobilized mid-September; deployed by mid-October 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Papic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Smederovo / Smederevska Palanka
422
Reservist mobilization difficulties delayed brigade deployment.
423
Reservist mobilization difficulties delayed brigade deployment.

192
 Forward Headquarters: vic. Mirkovci

252nd Armoured Brigade

(Deployed late September 1991)
(from late November 1991)
(attached from 37th Corps)
Colonel Jovan Vuckovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Kraljevo
Forward Headquarters: vic. Petrovci-Marinci

453rd Mechanized Brigade

(to 30 September; from late November 1991)
(attached from 12th Corps)
Peacetime Headquarters: Sremska Mitrovica
Forward Headquarters: southeast of Vukovar

1st Guards Mixed Artillery Regiment

Lieutenant Colonel Andjelko Djokic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Kragujevac
Forward Headquarters: vic. Sid

1st Guards Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

(Deployed mid/late September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Cvetkovic, Commander
Forward Headquarters: vic. Petrovci-Marinci

1st Guards Military Police Battalion

(from late November) Major Jovan Susic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Belgrade
Forward Headquarters: Negoslavci?

12th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Lieutenant Colonel Dragisa Masal, Commander
(Colonel from 4 October 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Vinkovci
Under blockade 25 August to 26 September, when elements captured while
remainder withdrawn; probably attached to 1st Guards Mechanized Division
upon withdrawal)

Operational Group “Baranja”424

Forward Headquarters: vic. Beli Manastir

424
The subordinate formations of OG “Baranja” are unclear. The 36th Mechanized Brigade appears to have
been the only major JNA formation with elements deployed east/northeast of Osijek. The OG may have
been formed to act as a command and control authority over the Baranja Territorial Defence.

193
 36th Mechanized Brigade (-)
Colonel Drago Romic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Subotica
Forward Headquarters: vic. Beli Manastir

17th (Tuzla) Corps425

Major General Savo Jankovic, Commander

Mechanized Battalion / 12th Mechanized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Nasice
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 21 September, when surrendered)

17th Partisan Brigade (Mobilized?)

Peacetime Headquarters: Bijeljina

92nd Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Tuzla
Forward Headquarters: Bosanski Samac / Orasje?
(elements probably deployed along Sava River)

327th Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Derventa
(elements probably deployed along Sava River)
Forward Headquarters: Bosanski Brod

395th Motorized Brigade (Mobilized)

Peacetime / Forward Headquarters: Brcko
(elements probably deployed along Sava River)

158th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Djakovo
(Under blockade to 20 September, when surrendered)

Western Slavonia Operation

5th (Banja Luka) Corps426

Lieutenant Colonel General Nikola Uzelac, Commander
(Colonel General from 29 November 1991)
Colonel Momir Talic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka

425
Involved in defensive role along Sava River; did not engage in major combat operations. 17th Corps
deployed in September/October to Sava River/Croatian border to support Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Operations, but did not cross into Croatia.
426
Under command OG-3, although the Supreme Command Staff (SSNO / JNA General Staff) also had direct
links to the corps and may have exercised direct control.

194
Forward Headquarters: Bosanska Gradiska

2nd Partisan Brigade

(Mobilized September 1991; deployed October 1991? – Bosnia-Herzegovina
TO)
Major Milorad Savic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: multiple locations; southeast of Lipik

5th Partisan Brigade

(Mobilized July / September 1991; deployed October 1991? – Bosnia-
Herzegovina TO)
Major Pero Colic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Prijedor-Omarska
Forward Headquarters: multiple locations

6th Partisan Brigade

(Mobilized September 1991; deployed October 1991?
– Bosnia-Herzegovina TO)
Lieutenant Colonel Branko Basara, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Sanski Most
Forward Headquarters: vic. Jasenovac

11th Partisan Brigade

(Mobilized September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Ratomir Marinkovic. Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Bosanska Dubica
Forward Headquarters: Jasenovac

16th Motorized Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Simo Marjanovic, Commander
(to 13 October 1991, when killed in action)
Lieutenant Colonel Milan Celeketic, Commander (from late October 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Novska

122nd Partisan Brigade

(Mobilized November 1991; deployed December 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Skender Vakuf
Forward Headquarters: Southwest of Lipik

Battle Group / 265th Mechanized Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Milan Celeketic (to late October 1991)
Forward Headquarters: Okucani

195
 329th Armoured Brigade (-)
Lieutenant Colonel Ratomir Simic, Commander
(Colonel from 4 October 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: Stara Gradiska

343rd Motorized Brigade

Colonel Vladimir Arsic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Prijedor
Forward Headquarters: vic. Pakrac

5th Mixed Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Desimir Garovic, Commander
(Colonel from 4 October 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Stara Gradiska

5th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment (Mobilized)

Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Okucani

5th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Stara Gradiska

32nd (Varazdin) Corps

(Under blockade to 19 September, when surrendered)427
Major General Vlado Trifunovic, Commander
Colonel Sreten Raduski, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

32nd Mechanized Brigade (22 September)

Colonel Berislav Popov, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

73rd Motorized Brigade (+) (30 September)

Peacetime Headquarters: Koprivnica

265th Mechanized Brigade (-) (29 September)

Colonel Rajko Kovacevic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Bjelovar

28th Partisan Division (17 September)

427
All major corps formations forced to surrender: date next to unit designator indicates date of capitulation.
The corps was assigned to Fifth Military District, but is shown here with other commands associated with
the Western Slavonia campaign.

196
 Peacetime Headquarters: Daruvar

2nd Partisan Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Daruvar

21st Partisan Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Pakrac

32nd Mixed Artillery Regiment (19 September)

Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

417th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment (17 September)

Peacetime Headquarters: Krizevci

32nd Military Police Battalion (19 September)

Peacetime Headquarters: Varazdin

42nd Border Guard Battalion

(Border Watch Towers – 16 September; remainder 22 September)
Peacetime Headquarters: Virovitica

43rd Border Guard Battalion

(Border Watch Towers – 16 September; remainder probably 30 September)
Peacetime Headquarters: Koprivnica

288th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade

(Fifth Military District Troops)
(Under blockade until about 22 September, when surrendered)
Peacetime Headquarters: Virovitica

Fifth Military District (V. Vojna oblast – V. VO)428

Colonel General Zivota Avramovic, Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Andrija Raseta, Deputy Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Dobrasin Prascevic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb
Forward Headquarters: Slunj

65th Protection Motorized Regiment (Mobilized?)

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb?

428
The exact role of the Fifth Military District and Military-Maritime District Headquarters during these
combat operations remains unclear. Operational Groups 1, 2, and 3 appear to have reported directly to the
JNA General Staff, rather than the military districts, probably leaving the military districts in a logistical
support role. The Fifth Military District and Military-Maritime District Headquarters were unable to exercise
effective command over their forces during the 1991 combat operations. As a result, Operational Groups 1,
2, and 3 and the 9th Corps appears to have reported directly to the Supreme Command Staff (SSNO/JNA
General Staff.)

197
 Forward Headquarters: Slunj?

149th Medium Self-Propelled Air Defence Rocket Regiment (SA-6/KUB-M)

Colonel Milan Torbica, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb-Pleso
(Under blockade to 24 November, when redeployed to Banja Luka)

367th Communications Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Samobor
Forward Headquarters: Slunj (Major Elements)
(Minor Elements under blockade to 6 October, when surrendered)

Banija-Karlovac / Kordun-Lika Operations

“Banija and Kordun” Operational Group l429

Major General Spiro Nikovic, Commander
(Lieutenant Colonel General from 29 November 1991)
Forward Headquarters: Dvor

Banija Operational Group

Forward Headquarters: probably vic. Petrinja

Armoured Battalion / 4th Armoured Brigade

Forward Headquarters: vic. Petrinja

592nd Motorized Brigade

(mobilized September 1991)
(attached from 42nd Corps)
Peacetime Headquarters: Kumanovo
Forward Headquarters: vic. Glina

622nd Motorized Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk,
Commander Peacetime / Forward Headquarters: Petrinja

Composite Brigade (or tactical group)

(deployed late September to Banija)
Elements, 169th Motorized Brigade
Elements, 544th Motorized Brigade

Unidentified Montenegrin Brigade430

429
OG-1 appears to have been formed from the Fifth Military District headquarters. Nikovic served as the 9th
Corps commander until mid-September when he appears to have become Chief of Operations and Training
on the Fifth Military District staff, at which point he also became commander of the task-organized OG-1.
He later took over the 10th Corps in January 1992.
430
Defence Assessed as possibly the Ivangrad (Berane) Partisan Brigade / Montenegrin Territorial.

198
 (Arrived Banija 23 October)

6th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Garrison: Petrinja

6th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Garrison: Petrinja

Operational Group “Kordun”

Forward Headquarters: probably Vojnic

9th Motorized Brigade

(attached from 21st (Nis) Corps)
(Mobilized and Deployed mid/late September; arrived vic. Karlovac
October 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Momcilo Momcilovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Zajecar
Forward Headquarters: vic. Karlovac

580th Mixed Artillery Brigade (Deployed)

(attached from Fifth Military District)
Colonel Svetozar Marjanovic, Commander
Peacetime / Forward Headquarters: vic. Karlovac

Operational Group “Lika”431

Forward Headquarters: Plitvice

5th Partisan Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Zrenjanin
Forward Headquarters: vic. Licki Osik

236th Motorized Brigade (Deployed)

Peacetime Headquarters: Gospic
Forward Headquarters: vic. Licki Osik

1st Armoured Battalion / 329th Armoured Brigade

Major Branko Suzic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Plitvice Lakes

10th (Zagreb) Corps (-)432

Lieutenant Colonel General Dusan Uzelac, Commander

431
Unclear when this OG was formed: possibly combined with OG “Kordun”.
432
Corps does not appear to have exercised any tactical control over deployed JNA and TO forces in Banija and
Kordun, but only over blockaded 10th Corps forces.

199
Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 12 October, when redeployed to Banja Luka, Bosnia-
Herzegovina)

4th Armoured Brigade (-)

Lieutenant Colonel Radovan Tacic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Jastrebarsko
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 13 November, when redeployed to vic. Tuzla,
Bosnia-Herzegovina)

140th Mechanized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 30 November/11 December, when redeployed
to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina)

608th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Zagreb

13th (Rijeka) Corps (-)

Lieutenant Colonel General Marjan Cad, Commander
Major General Trajce Krstovski, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Rijeka
(Rijeka Garrison under blockade 14/15 September to 18/21 November-10 December, when
withdrawn to Bileca, Bosnia-Herzegovina)

6th Mountain Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Anton Racki, Commander (to 9 September)433
Lieutenant Colonel Ljubomir Buljin, Commander (from 9 September)
Peacetime Headquarters: Delnice
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 5 November, when surrendered)

13th Motorized Brigade (withdrawing)

Peacetime Headquarters: Ilirska Bistrica, Slovenia

13th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Rijeka
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 18/21 November-10 December)

13th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Rijeka
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 18/21 November-10 December)

433
Racki defected to the Croatians on 9 September. Zagreb Radio, 22 September 1991. He was assigned to
command the Croatian Army’s corps-level Rijeka Operational Zone upon its formation on 22 September.

200
 306th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment
Peacetime Headquarters: Karlovac
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 8 November; destroyed in barracks)

13th Military Police Battalion

(Under blockade 14/15 September to 18/21 November-10 December)

Military-Maritime District (Vojno Pomorska Oblast – VPO)

Vice Admiral Mile Kandic, Commander
(Admiral from 22 December 1991)
Vice Admiral Fredrih Moreti, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff/VPO, Commander (to
late September)
Major General Nikola Mladenic, Deputy Commander/VPO, Commander (from late
September)
Peacetime Headquarters: Split (Under blockade 14/15 September to 25 November)
Forward Headquarters: Vis Island

86th Protection Motorized Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Split
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 25 November, when evacuation begun)

183rd Communications Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Sinj
(Under blockade in Sinj 14/15 September to 3 October, when withdrawn)
Forward Headquarters: Split and Vis Island?

5th (Pula) Military-Maritime Sector

Rear Admiral Vladimir Barovic, Commander (to 28 September)
Warship Captain Dusan Rakic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff (to 28
September); Commander (from 28 September)
Peacetime Headquarters: Pula
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 18/21 November-10 December, when
withdrawn)

139th Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Pula
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 18/21 November-10 December, when
withdrawn)

8th (Sibenik) Military-Maritime Sector

Vice Admiral Djuro Pojer, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Sibenik
(Under blockade 14/15 September to 26 November, when evacuation begun)

201
 11th Naval Landing Brigade
Peacetime Headquarters: Sibenik

Fleet Command
Rear-Admiral Nikola Ercegovic, Commander
Frigates: Two Split class, two Kotor class
Patrol Submarines: Two Sava class, three Heroj class
Corvettes: Two Mornar class
Missile Fast Attack Craft: Six Koncar class, 10 Osa I class
Torpedo Fast Attack Craft: 14 Shershen class
Patrol Fast Attack Craft: 10 Mirna class
+ other light forces and landing craft

Zadar-Sibenik Operation

9th (Knin) Corps434

Major General Spiro Nikovic, Commander (to mid-September 1991)
Major General Vladimir Vukovic, Commander (from mid-September 1991)
(Lieutenant Colonel General from 29 November 1991)
Colonel Ratko Mladic. Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
(Major General from 4 October 1991)

180th Motorized Brigade (+)

Armoured Battalion / 10th Motorized Brigade (attached)
Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Zivanovic, Commander
(Colonel from 4 October 1991 )
Peacetime Headquarters: Benkovac

221st Motorized Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Slavko Lisica, Commander
(Colonel from 4 October 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Knin

9th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Knin

557th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Lieutenant Colonel Milica Potpara, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Benkovac

9th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Knin

434
Reported directly to the Supreme Command Staff (SSNO/JNA General Staff) because VPO unable to
exercise effective command due to barracks blockade.

202
Mostar-Split / Dubrovnik Operations
“Herzegovina” Operational Group 2
(Headquarters, Montenegro Territorial Defence)
Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar, Commander
(Colonel General from 29 November 1991)
Colonel Radomir Damjanovic, Deputy Commander
Forward Headquarters: Trebinje

4th (Sarajevo) Corps435

(attached from I Military District)
Major General Vojislav Djurdjevac, Commander
Major General Ante Karanusic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

6th Motorized Brigade

Peacetime Headquarters: Doboj

49th Motorized Brigade (Mobilized)

Colonel Enver Hadzhihasanovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

216th Mountain Brigade (Mobilized)

Lieutenant Colonel Dragomir Milosevic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Han Pijesak

4th Mixed Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Kiseljak

4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

Peacetime Headquarters: Visoko

288th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Sarajevo

37th (Uzice) Corps

Major General Milan Torbica, Commander
Colonel Dragoljub Ojdanic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Forward Headquarters: Nevesinje (Corps elements deployed vic. Neum-NW
of Slano; which of the corps’ peacetime subordinates deployed remains
unclear)
Peacetime Headquarters: Uzice

435
Both the 4th and 37th Corps were originally earmarked for an operation in the direction of Split which JNA
was unable to carry out. As a result they were not involved in major combat operations, but served in a
supporting role w ithin OG 2.

203
 10th Motorized Brigade (-) (Mobilized)
(attached from 4th Corps)
Colonel Milojko Pantelic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Mostar

19th Mountain Brigade

(mobilized September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Pozega

37th Motorized Brigade

(probably mobilized September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Raska

57th Mountain Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
(attached from 2nd Corps)
Peacetime Headquarters: Pljevlja
Forward Headquarters: Mostar Airfield
(Brigade appears to have been used solely in internal security around
Mostar)

134th Partisan Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed November 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Uzice

Valjevo Partisan Brigade

(Serbian Territorial Defence)
(Mobilized and Deployed September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Milisav Marinkovic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Valjevo
Forward Headquarters: Nevesinje

208th Mixed Artillery Regiment

(Probably did not mobilize)
Peacetime Headquarters: Valjevo

37th Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Uzice

2nd (Titograd) Corps

Major General Radomir Eremija, Commander
(Lieutenant Colonel General from 22 December 1991)
Colonel Bozidar Djokic, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

7th Partisan Brigade

204
 (Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Lieutenant Colonel Momcilo Radevic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Kolasin
Forward Headquarters: ?

179th Mountain Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Niksic
Forward Headquarters: Possibly north of Slano

1st (Niksic) Partisan Brigade

(Montenegro TO)
(from mid/late Oct)
(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Colonel Milan Milicic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Niksic
Forward Headquarters: Velicani / Ravno

Bijelo Polje Partisan Brigade

(Montenegro TO)
(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Bijelo Polje
Forward Headquarters: NE of Dubrovnik

326th Mixed Artillery Regiment

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Danilovgrad
Forward Headquarters: Provided artillery support to both 2nd Corps
and 9th VPS

2nd Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Titograd

9th (Boka Kotorska) Military-Maritime Sector

Warship Captain Krsto Djurovic, Commander
(to 5 October when died of wounds)436
(Posthumously promoted to Rear Admiral 5 October 1991)
Vice Admiral Miodrag Djokic, Commander (from 5 October)
Peacetime Headquarters: Boka Kotorska

5th Motorized Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)

436
Died of wounds suffered when Croatian forces shot down his Gazelle helicopter.

205
(attached from 2nd Corps)
Colonel Simo Kricak, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Titograd (Podgorica)
Forward Headquarters: vic. Debeli Brijeg

472nd Motorized Brigade

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Trebinje
Forward Headquarters: South of Trebinje

1st (Niksic) Partisan Brigade

(Montenegro TO) (to mid/late Oct)
(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Colonel Milan Milicic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Niksic
Forward Headquarters: Konavli (via Dubravka/Dobrusa)

Cetinje Partisan Brigade (TO)

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Cetinje
Forward Headquarters: vic. Debeli Brijeg

5th (Titograd) Partisan Brigade (TO)

(Mobilized and Deployed late September 1991)
Peacetime Headquarters: Titograd (Podgorica)
Forward Headquarters: vic. Debeli Brijeg

Unidentified Military Police Battalion

Peacetime Headquarters: Kumbor
Forward Headquarters: vic. Debeli Brijeg

206
 Chart 4
Order of Battle, Air and Air Defence Force of the JNA,
Combat Operations in Croatia, September to 1 January 1992

Headquarters, Air and Air Defence Force437

(Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdusna odbrana – RV i PVO)
Lieutenant Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevic, Commander
(Colonel General from 29 November 1991)
Headquarters: Belgrade-Zemun

1st Air and Air Defence Force Corps

(Supporting Eastern Slavonia and Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik)
Major General Bozidar Stevanovic, Commander
Headquarters: Belgrade-Batajnica Air Base

Eastern Slavonia Campaign

138th Transport Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 177th Air Base438 at Belgrade-Batajnica
1 GAMA attack helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 Mi-8 transport helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 An-26 transport squadron (6 aircraft)

204th Fighter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 177th Air Base at Belgrade-Batajnica
1 MiG-29 fighter squadron (12 aircraft)
2 MiG-21 fighter squadrons (25 aircraft)

252nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron

(G-4 – 15 aircraft)
Headquarters: 177th Air Base at Belgrade-Batajnica

Forward HQ / 185th Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: Tuzla-Dubrave Air Base
Two to three squadrons of J-22 Orao, MiG-21’s, and G-4 Super Galeb’s, some 30 to
40 aircraft, usually forward deployed at this base. Aircraft drawn from 172nd Fighter-
Bomber Aviation Regiment and 185th Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment (probably
attached to 1st Corps for combat operations).
437
Please note that the air order of battle, especially aircraft disposition, is arbitrarily presented to give the
reader a general idea of the number of aircraft available in a given sector. Aircraft were moved fre quently
between bases, and totals at a given location would vary accordingly.
438
In addition to any subordinate flying units, an air base also had under command an airfield air defence
battalion or regiment (equipped with antiaircraft artillery, generally a combination of 40mm Bofors and
20mm M-55s, plus SA-7 equipped teams), a combat battalion to act as airfield ground defence troops, and
a variety of technical and rear services units.

207
Mostar-Split/Dubrovnik Campaign

107th Helicopter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 171st Air Base at Mostar
(attached from RV i PVO Training Command)
2 GAMA / Gazelle attack / observation helicopter training squadrons (26 aircraft)

172nd Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 423rd Air Base at Titograd-Golubovci
(probably attached to 1st Corps for combat operations)
1 J-22 Orao squadron (12 aircraft)
2 G-1 Galeb squadrons (30 aircraft)
1 G-4 Super Galeb squadron (12 aircraft)
(1 to 2 squadrons usually on rotation to Tuzla)

97th Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 500th Air Base at Split-Divulje
(Under blockade 14-15 September to 26 November-10 December)
1 Galeb-Jastreb squadron (12 aircraft)
1 Orao reconnaissance squadron (12 aircraft)
1 Mi-8 transport helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 ASW helicopter squadron (9 aircraft)

5th Air and Air Defence Force Corps

(Supporting Banija-Kordun-Lika, Western Slavonia, and Knin-Zadar)
Colonel Ljubomir Bajic, Commander (Major General from 8 October 1991)
Forward Headquarters: Bihac Air Base (Relocated from Zagreb)

350th Air Monitoring, Information, and Navigation Regiment

(Under blockade from 14/15 September to 30 November 1991)
Headquarters: Zagreb-Pleso Air Base

155th Air Defence Rocket Regiment (SA-2)

Colonel Slavko Biga, Commander
(Under blockade from 14/15 September to 30 November 1991)
Headquarters: Zagreb-Kerestinec Rocket Base

350th Air Defence Rocket Regiment (SA-3)

Colonel Bozo Novak, Commander
Headquarters: Vrhnika, Slovenia
(Relocating to Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina)

105th Flight Training Regiment

208
Headquarters: 84th Air Base at Zadar-Zemunik (to Oct 91) and at Udbina (from Oct
91) (probably attached from RV i PVO Training Command to 5th Corps for combat
operations)
1 G-4 Super Galeb squadron (15 aircraft)
1 G-1 Galeb squadron (15 aircraft)
1 UTVA-75 squadron (20 aircraft)

111th Transport Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 151st Air Base at Zagreb-Lucko
(Aircraft relocated to Bihac and Banja Luka - Zaluzani and Mahovljani Air Bases –
September 1991)
1 GAMA attack helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 Mi-8 transport helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 An-26 transport squadron (6 aircraft)

151st Air Base at Zagreb-Pleso and Zagreb-Lucko

(under blockade from 14/15 September to 24 November 1991, when relocated to
Banja Luka-Zaluzani Air Base)

117th Fighter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 200th Air Base at Bihac
2 MiG-21 fighter squadrons (24 aircraft)
1 MiG-21 reconnaissance squadron (6 aircraft)

185th Fighter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 258th Air Base at Pula
(aircraft to 200th Air Base at Bihac – September 1991)
(probably attached from RV i PVO Training Command to 5th Corps for combat
operations)
1 MiG-21 fighter squadron (15 aircraft) (to Bihac Air Base – September 1991)
1 G-4 fighter-bomber squadron (12 aircraft) (to Tuzla Air Base – September 1991)
1 G-1 Galeb fighter-bomber squadron (12 aircraft) (to Bihac Air Base – October 1991)

258th Air Base at Pula

(under blockade from September to December 1991, when relocated to Banja Luka-
Zaluzani)

474th Air Base

Headquarters: Banja Luka

82nd Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 474th Air Base at Banja Luka- Mahovljani
(relocated from Cerklje, Slovenia July 1991)
1 J-21 Jastreb squadron (12 aircraft) (at Udbina Air Base)

209
(possibly attached to 105th Flight Training Regiment)
1 G-1 Galeb squadron (12 aircraft)
1 J-22 Orao reconnaissance squadron (12 aircraft)

210
 Chart 5
JNA Military Schools and Training Centres in Croatia, 1991

Naval High Military School Centre “Marshal Tito”

Vice Admiral Dragoljub Bocinov, Commander
Headquarters: Split
Command and Staff School for Tactics and Operations
Military Academy

Military Academy of the Air and Air Defence Force

Headquarters: Zemunik Air Base

Artillery School Centre

Colonel Momcilo Perisic, Commander Headquarters: Zadar

Air Defence School Centre

Colonel Trpko Zarakovski, Commander
Headquarters: Zadar

Engineer School Centre “Bogdan Orescanin”

Headquarters: Karlovac

Ground Forces Military-Technical School Centre “Army General Ivan Gosnjak”

Headquarters: Zagreb Military-Technical Academy

Driver Training School Centre

Headquarters: Slavonska Pozega

211
 Annex 14
Mobilization and the Failure of the Strategic Offensive
The JNA ordered its second phase mobilization on 16 September 1991, in response
to the start of the Croatian offensive against the JNA’s facilities throughout Croatia that
began on 14-15 September.439 To the consternation of the General Staff, the mobilization
order was greeted almost immediately by the refusal of many reservists to join their units,
and this phenomenon was followed by the desertion of entire units from the front. The
General Staff capped this disaster by instituting an unofficial policy of limiting reservists’
tours to 45 days, a decision that played havoc with the entire reserve system.

Support for War Low, Mobilization Response Poor440

The JNA call-up of formations in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia was a mixed
success that included some stunning failures. The general unpopularity of the war against
Croatia led many reservists to ignore their call-up orders or to desert after joining, and in
some cases entire units refused their deployment orders. The opposition of Bosnian
Muslims and Croats to mobilization and involvement in the war meant that the JNA was
unable to rely on the considerable forces available in Bosnia to fight the Croatians. The
Bosnians were not alone in their opposition; all over Yugoslavia many Serb reservists
complained that they were willing to defend Serbia but saw no point in attacking Croatia.
The mobilization of several Territorial Defence brigades from multi-ethnic Vojvodina
earmarked for Eastern Slavonia collapsed by 20 September.441 On 19 September most of
a 24th (Kragujevac) Corps motorized brigade from Smederevska Palanka in central Serbia
refused their orders to deploy to Eastern Slavonia.442 A senior officer of the 24th Corps
later stated that more than 6.000 of the corps’ reservists had failed to respond to call-
ups.443 In addition, thousands of men deserted. Over 1.000 troops from the elite 2nd
Guards Mechanized Brigade deserted from the Eastern Slavonia front in late
September.444 A former JNA officer recently said he knew of three motorized brigades

439
Analysis of Belgrade Tanjug and Belgrade Radio reporting 14-16 September 1991.
440
See Appendix: JNA Mobilization Statistics.
441
Jovic entry for 20 September 1991. The Vojvodina populace was a tense, multi-ethnic mixture of
Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, and a few much smaller groups, such as Slovaks. Most of the population clearly
lacked enthusiasm about fighting in what they viewed as a Serbian war.
442
A soldier in the 130th Motorized Brigade from Smederevska Palanka said panic and confusion broke out in
the unit after the soldiers were informed they would be deploying to Eastern Slavonia. The soldier
complained that the unit had received poor ammunition and many of the men were given weapons they
had never fired before. He claimed that over 50 percent of the soldiers were not trained or ready to go to
war. Belgrade Studio B TV, 19 September 1991. The brigade eventually deployed to the front.
443
Belgrade Radio, 16 December 1991.
444
Jovic entry for 28 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 29 September 1991. The 2nd Guards Mechanized
Brigade personnel had come under “friendly fire” during operations, which apparently was the spark that
touched off the desertions, although previous problems contributed.

212
 that deserted en masse after mobilization.445 Some 600 reservists from Valjevo –
probably Territorial Defence personnel – deserted from their forward-deployed position
at Nevesinje, Bosnia on 28 September; their brigade was assigned to support the Mostar-
Split / Dubrovnik campaign.446 Many of the defaulting reservists and their parents staged
public protests and deluged authorities with letters justifying their actions. Some 150
reservists who deserted from Eastern Slavonia after 45 days at the front protested at the
JNA club in Kragujevac in December.447 Some 200 reservists from central Serbia went to
Belgrade on 4 December 1991 after two months at the Knin-Zadar front, complaining
about Krajina Serb atrocities and demanding to be demobilized.

Mobilization Failures and their Impact

The failure of the JNA and the respective republic governments – Serbia,
Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina – to mobilize the units the JNA required for its plan
was to prove the offensive’s death knell. General Kadijevic states in his memoirs that:
The one, exclusive reason for modifying the initial plan was the semi-successful
mobilization of and the organized desertions from the JNA reserve structures. Not only
was the response poor; even the weakened units were not allowed to set out for their
deployment positions, or those who did set out left the front as soon as they arrived
there. All the problems of a strategic and operational nature during the execution of
the operation, especially the problems associated with the time of arrival of necessary
or fresh forces at specific locations, were caused exclusively by the failure of
mobilization and by desertions, especially in certain parts of the country ... the failure
to get the forces that were counted on ... (meant) that the operation was executed with
curtailed demands and with incomparably greater problems and losses than there
would have been otherwise.448
The JNA’s inability to commit sufficient combat formations on critical axes of the
offensive ensured that key aspects of the plan went unfulfilled. For example, call-up
problems and the questionable reliability of the Bosnian Muslim and Croat reservists in the
4th (Sarajevo) and 17th (Tuzla) Corps limited the JNA’s ability to use these corps in their
intended roles. The loss of the 4th Corps practically halved the JNA forces available for the
Mostar-Split sub-operation on the Mostar-Split / Dubrovnik front. The JNA decided to use
the 17th Corps for the static defence of the Bosnian-Croatian border along the Sava River
rather than commit it in what might have been decisive move against the right flank of

445
These included the 80th Motorized Brigade from the 24th Corps, the 544th Motorized Brigade from the
12th Corps, and the 19th Motorized Brigade from the 37th Corps. Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije
Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed
It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 207. Most of these brigades eventually deployed in strength to the
front.
446
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 September 1991. The Valjevo TO reservists also reportedly claimed that they had
received insufficient training and inadequate weapons, which the JNA denied.
447
Belgrade Radio, 16 December 1991.
448
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993. p. 136-137.

213
Croatian forces in Eastern Slavonia. In Eastern Slavonia, the disappointing mobilization from
the 24th Corps and the subsequent lack of adequate infantry formations for Eastern
Slavonia was to cripple JNA offensive operations in that vital sector – the JNA’s main effort.
The refusal of so many reservists to respond to call-ups and the desertions of both
conscripts and reservists not only diminished the forces available but vitiated the JNA’s
cohesion and will to fight.449 As Yugoslav Army General Staff chief General Perisic stated in
1993:
The break-up of Yugoslavia also shattered the most important factor, what we
call the human factor, because division of the state into diverse ethnic groups also
divided the army into those ethnic groups. The capability of the human factor we had
up to that point was thereby diminished from the numerical standpoint. Second,
mobilization was destroyed, and third, replenishment with recruits was destroyed, and
this undoubtedly diminished the combat capability of the former army.450
In many ways this collapse in morale and motivation among the JNA’s rank and file
appears to have been even more damaging than the shortage of combat formations. Higher
motivation among the units the JNA did manage to mobilize probably could have
compensated in most cases for the brigades missing from the pre-war staff plan. Low troop
morale and motivation often nullified the JNA’s massive armour and artillery advantages
over the spirited Croatians.
The mobilization failures affected morale even among the JNA’s most senior
leadership, who appear to have lost confidence in the army’s ability to succeed in its plans.
General Kadijevic himself seemed almost paralyzed by the events of September. Jovic
described Kadijevic during a meeting of the de facto Supreme Command on 24 September:
Veljko seems very confused, almost lost. He talks about defeat of the military,
about desertion, about the lack of motivation, about the danger of treason by the still-
large number of Croats in the military, about the Serbs’ major mistrust even of loyal
non-Serb officers, about the drama of people and families. He says that right now 2.000
officers should be replaced in order to avoid the worst, which is very difficult. ... The
military will lose the war against Croatia unless motivation and the success of
mobilization are ensured.451
The desperate tone of Kadijevic and Adzic, reflected in Jovic’s notes over the period
20 September into mid-October, as units disintegrated, operations failed, and barracks fell,
is bleak testimony to their concern about the effect of the mobilization chaos on the army.
The unpopularity of the war led to an unofficial Federal decision to limit reservist
tours to 45 days. This well-meant decision caused a complete breakdown in the JNA reserve
system and profoundly affected overall army morale, readiness, and cohesion.
Narodna Armija, the official JNA mouthpiece, stated in December 1991 that:
449
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993. p. 136-137.
450
Miladin Petrovic and Radovan Popovic: A Successful Officer is a Natural and Legitimate Leader, Vojska, 24
September 1992, pp. 3-5. In 1991, Perisic was a colonel commanding the JNA Artillery Training Centre in
Zadar, Croatia.
451
Jovic entry for 24 September 1991.

214
 ... hundreds of reservists immediately “seized upon” that statement (the Federal
decision) ... No sooner have the personnel of a war unit been welded into a firmer
military collective – after overcoming the change in the way of life and being placed in
the combat situation when there is a danger of losing one’s life ... a certain combat
experience, self-confidence, and confidence in the weapons are gained ... and the
commanding officer must release them to go home and again receive on the battlefield
inexperienced people who will have to experience all the specific features of war from
the beginning.
The reservists, aware that this (the frequent replacement of personnel) was to their
advantage, took up this proposal, which was not officially adopted anywhere, as though it
were a legal decision and as an “acquired” right. They used it as the basis for presenting
demands to unit commanders, in some places engaging in blackmail and abandoning
positions in groups.452
The 45-day tour policy had a particularly detrimental effect on technical and
specialized units, like armour and artillery, which required extensive training on their
equipment; much of their reservists’ 45 days of service was eaten up by refresher training,
leaving only a few weeks for actual combat service.453 The Federal Presidency finally
revoked the 45-day reserve limit on 10 December, extending it to six months. But the
damage had already been done.
Mobilization problems also reduced the overall effectiveness of the offensive plan
by disrupting the timetable for the individual campaigns. Although several started at roughly
the same time in mid-September, at least two of the campaigns – Karlovac and Dubrovnik –
did not get under way until October. Even when the campaigns set off on time their internal
operations were disrupted by the absence of essential combat formations. Instead of a
swiftly moving, multi-front blitzkrieg, the offensive degenerated into a ponderous,
disjointed affair. As Kadijevic notes:
Because the planned forces were not present, it was not possible to execute the
operation in one fell swoop and thus quickly defeat the main body of Croatian forces ...
instead it had to be executed gradually and over a longer period of time.454

452
Ivan Matovic: Solidarity in Sharing the Burden of War, Narodna Armija, 14 December 1991, p. 5.
453
Ivan Matovic: Solidarity in Sharing the Burden of War, Narodna Armija, 14 December 1991, p. 5; See also
Milisav Sekulic, op. cit., p. 205, for additional discussion of the 45-day (Sekulic says it was 40 days) limit on
service. Sekulic also charges that JNA commanders employed the mobilized formations poorly, allowing
brigades to be mobilized and then sit idle and unused for long periods so that discipline declined, when the
time could have been used for training and explaining the purpose of the mobilization.
454
Kadijevic, p. 137.

215
 Appendix 1
JNA Mobilization Statistics

Milisav Sekulic, a former JNA, Yugoslav Army (VJ), and Krajina Serb Army officer,
provides several sets of 1991 JNA mobilization statistics in Chapters 12 and 13 of his book
Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and
the Supreme Command Betrayed It). While the data are not broken down through each
individual corps, brigade, and independent battalion, they do provide a good feel for the
general decline in reservist response rates during the year.
Sekulic divides the mobilization data into three time periods: up to 31 May 1991,
late June through early July 1991, and 10 to 20 September 1991. Although the number of
reservists called up and units mobilized during the first period are not stated, Sekulic says
that 96,5 percent of those mobilized reported for duty.
During the second period in June and July, Sekulic lists the following numbers of
“war units” called up – a reference to mobilization to wartime manpower levels, probably
comprising all brigades and independent battalions.
• 40 war units from First Military District
• 23 war units from the Third Military District
• three war units from the Military-Maritime District
• 16 war units from the Air and Air Defence Force.455

Of these, 38 were Category A units consisted primarily of active duty officers and
conscripts, topped off with reservists, 13 Category B units comprised mostly of reservists
but with some measure of active duty officers and conscripts, and 31 Category R units
comprised almost exclusively of reservists. Sekulic indicates that the response rate for units
“within the specified time” (the response times required of different units varied) was as
follows:
• 4 hours – 46 percent
• 12 hours – 65 percent
• 18 hours – 53.6 percent
• 24 hours – 50 percent
• 36 hours – 46.9 percent
Total – 55.7 percent456
To improve the overall manning level of these units, personnel were transferred
among them and some battalions were eliminated within brigades.
As a result, the JNA had mobilized by 9 September the following forces:
1st Guards Mechanized Division

455
Milisav Sekulic, pp. 206-207. The authors are not able to correlate all of these units to those identified in
the order of battle; the order of battle probably is missing a number of JNA units that were in fact
mobilized and deployed.
456
Milisav Sekulic, pp. 206-207.

216
 4 partisan divisions
22 Ground Forces brigades
3 partisan brigades457
2 artillery brigades
5 support regiments
20 independent battalions (including artillery)
2 companies
15 bases (probably rear bases, the JNA term for corps-level logistics units)
3 Territorial Defence brigades (partisan brigade equivalents)458
19 Territorial Defence detachments (battalion-size units)459
These units were at 73 percent of their authorized wartime strength with a total
manpower of 112.443 troops, divided into 96.625 JNA personnel and 15.518 TO personnel,
out of some 142.058 called up.460 Sekulic claims that of these troops, 26.000 were actually
engaged in combat operations at the time – probably early September.461
During the third period of mobilization in September, 91 war units were called up,
with the following response rates:
• First Military District – 64 percent
• Third Military District – 70 percent
• Military-Maritime District – 58 percent
• Air and Air Defence Force – 6 percent462
Overall – 62 percent463
The response rate “within the specified time” was only 27 percent, but eventually
reached 69 percent. But, as noted, a number of units that did mobilize suffered from mass
desertions after or just prior to deployment.464 Although they were subsequently
remobilized and deployed, the damage to the JNA's strategic offensive had already been
done.

457
These brigades are apparently in addition to those from the partisan divisions.
458
These are not to be confused with the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence, but are official Serbian, Bosnian or
Montenegrin Republic TO units.
459
Milisav Sekulic, p. 222. The authors have been unable to correlate all of these unit totals with the order of
battle that has been compiled; some Ground Forces brigades, the partisan divisions and brigades, and the
TO brigades probably are not shown in the JNA order of battle charts in Annex 13.
460
The troop number 112.443 is actually 79 percent of 142.058; the source of the discrepancy is unclear.
461
Milisav Sekulic, pp. 206-207, 222. Sekulic does not specify the date for these manpower numbers, but
states that they are from the “second half of 1991”.Given the large-scale mobilization in September, the
context of his discussion, and its juxtaposition with the 9 September count of mobilized units, it is likely
that these manpower numbers only cover the June / July mobilization. In addition, his emphasis that only
26.000 of these troops were engaged in combat operations is not entirely relevant since the JNA had not
yet launched its strategic offensive.
462
This number seems absurdly low. It is unclear whether there was a typographical error or if the number
does not reflect response rate but the number of additional units called up.
463
Milisav Sekulic, pp. 206-207.
464
Milisav Sekulic. pp. 206-207.

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 Annex 15
Mobilization and the JNA-Serbian Political-Military Conflict
Through September and October 1991 acrimonious debate raged between JNA
military leaders and the Serbian political leaders over what their political objectives or war
aims should be and the best strategy to achieve them. The failure of the mobilization order
and the JNA’s demand for general mobilization to compensate for it became the symbolic
issue within which the parties’ differing views were debated. Jovic and Milosevic stubbornly
refused Kadijevic’s repeated pleas for general mobilization, leading to furious debates in the
Federal / Serbian de facto Supreme Command. Thus, on 24 September, after Kadijevic’s
desperate statement that the army would lose without (general) mobilization, Jovic noted:
“We discussed things and argued for a long time”.465 On 28 September, Kadijevic stated that
“If mobilization had succeeded, not one garrison would have fallen”, to which Jovic silently
observed: “He does not explain why he did not withdraw them to the new borders when we
told him to, and when that was still possible”.
The debate erupted in full force again in early October, after the chief of the JNA’s
Political Administration, Lieutenant Colonel General Marko Negovanovic, had claimed on 2
October to a retired general that Milosevic and the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) were
responsible for the mobilization failures. General Negovanovic charged that “The basic
culprit is the Serbian state and the SPS because they are not combating the enemies of the
JNA and the desertion from its ranks”.466 The row exploded at a meeting on 5 October, at
which Jovic and Milosevic again denied Kadijevic and Adzic general mobilization. In his diary,
Jovic proposes instead a political solution, since in his and Milosevic’s view the liberation of
all Serb territories – their war aim – had been achieved.
Adzic and Veljko are desperate; they accuse us of leaving the Serb nation in the
lurch. [Montenegrin Federal Presidency member] Branko Kostic takes their side, overall,
without taking into account the actual situation in Europe and Serbia.
How can they think that we are leaving the Serb nation in the lurch if all Serb
territories have been liberated? Surely we must move to a political solution
eventually?467
On 6 October, Jovic and Milosevic decided on their own to accept European
Community demands for a cease-fire in order to lift the siege of the barracks and force the
military to defend only “liberated” territory. Milosevic and Jovic were not about to let the
JNA dictate to them what their war aims should be, nor were they willing to allow the JNA to
continue executing a strategy that they viewed as harmful and counterproductive to
achieving their objectives. As Jovic put it: “We are not a supermarket for satisfying the
generals’ needs. Policy must proceed from us, not from them”.468

465
Jovic entry for 24 September 1991.
466
Jovic entry for 2 October 1991.
467
Jovic entry for 5 October 1991.
468
Jovic entry for 6 October 1991.

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 The debate over war aims was partially settled on 9 October when Kadijevic
defined the JNA’s goals as “protection of the threatened Serb nation in Croatia and
withdrawal of the military from besieged barracks”, which Jovic silently interpreted thus:
“The overthrow of the Croatian leadership, which he has long demanded, has now been
replaced by withdrawal of the military”.469 Despite the proclaimed change in objectives, the
JNA still seemed unsure of its aims. At the same meeting in which he outlined the JNA’s new
objectives, Kadijevic stated that: ”the JNA does not have enough strength to completely
defeat the Croatian forces; although they might fall in 10 days if it were not for the problem
of the besieged garrisons”, prompting Jovic to ask him ”... why they did not do that before
the garrisons came under siege and why he is still thinking about the complete defeat of the
Croatian forces, if he has accepted the new goals”. Kadijevic unconvincingly replied that the
JNA needed more troops to threaten the Croatians with enough force to persuade them to
accept a peace agreement.470 Even so, the meeting marked a partial shift in Kadijevic’s
thinking, though it was battlefield realities that drove the change far more than Jovic or
Milosevic’s persuasive arguments.
The continuation of the mobilization debate even after this meeting showed how
hard it was for Kadijevic to abandon his strategic offensive and wholeheartedly adopt the
strategic defensive. On 22 October, Kadijevic stated at a Presidency meeting:
For the last time I propose that the SFRY Presidency, as well as the corresponding
legitimate bodies of the nations who have opted to continue living together in a new
Yugoslavia, immediately assume the function of the institutions of the Yugoslav state
and declare a state of war and general mobilization.471
Jovic meanwhile noted on 25 October that:
... Kadijevic right now is very unhappy about how Serbia is not providing enough
reservists for the war and how Slobodan (Milosevic) and I are not doing more
(politically) to combat desertion. At every meeting, he tries to emphasize that we could
easily win the war if we (I and Slobodan) only wanted to!
Ten days ago, he asked for 30.000 reservists in order to end the war in 15 days ...
He has already received half of that... Now he wants 250.000! How can that be, when
nothing essential has changed on the battlefield?472
The Serbian civilian leaders not only viewed mobilization as unnecessary but, given
the war’s unpopularity, feared that general mobilization would cause ”massive protests and
469
Jovic entry for 9 October 1991.
470
Jovic entry for 9 October 1991.
471
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993, p. 133.
472
Jovic entry for 25 October 1991.
Not surprisingly, the debate had alienated the JNA from the Serbian leadership. Jovic noted that Milosevic
had come to dislike Kadijevic, complaining that he meddled in political affairs while not taking care of the
military issues. Kadijevic appears to have become equally displeased with the political leadership, only half-
jokingly claiming that he would join the Serbs from Western Slavonia who had threatened to “settle
scores” with the leaders in Belgrade, who they regarded as having abandoned them. Jovic noted that at
one meeting with Milosevic:
Veljko was so agitated that he said, if you are not going to accept what I propose, then I am going
to disband the military!!

219
political defeat” for Milosevic’s government.473 The last clash in the unresolved debate over
war aims and mobilization appears to have come when the JNA prepared to resume its
offensive march westward after capturing Vukovar. Milosevic put an end to the debate and
the JNA’s war plan with an order, ratified through a Federal Presidency decision, halting the
operation. Belgrade did not need Croatia defeated, only Serb territory defended.474 475

473
Jovic entry for 30 October 1991.
474
Silber and Little, pp. 186-187.
475
See Vukovar Aftermath – The JNA Continues the Offensive in Annex 18: Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Operations – The Road to Vukovar.

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 Annex 16
”What is the Goal?” – JNA vs. JNA – The Army Debates Its Role
and Future
As Kadijevic argued war aims and strategy with Jovic and Milosevic, JNA officers
were debating the same issues among themselves, and arguing as well about the ethnic
composition of the JNA and their perception that under Kadijevic and Adzic the army was
becoming rudderless. No fewer than three coup-like attempts against Kadijevic and other
senior officers grew out of the intense debates among mid-level officers that September.
One of those near the centre of the debate was Kadijevic’s chef de cabinet, Colonel
Vuk Obradovic. Obradovic says there were two camps in the JNA: These consisted of:
Individuals ... for the proclamation of a general mobilization and the initiation of
an army offensive which would break the resistance of the Croatian regime on the
entire territory of Croatia.
This camp almost certainly consisted of Kadijevic, Admiral Brovet, and other
diehard Yugoslav loyalists. Obradovic, however, observed that:
Most of the generals were against this: they more or less openly supported the
withdrawal of the JNA to the ethnic borders of the Serbian people. It was believed that
this could be the north western border of some new Yugoslavia.
Drawing on the arguments of the second side in the heated debate, Colonel
Obradovic took the initiative on 17 and 18 September to present to General Kadijevic and
the Staff of the Supreme Command proposals that would revise the foundations from which
the JNA derived its composition, its ideological orientation, and its very existence. The
proposals appear to reflect the views of those JNA officers whom Obradovic had referred to
as the majority.476 The main points consisted of the following paraphrased concepts:
• It must be recognized that the SFRY no longer exists, rendering the JNA an army
without a state.
• Since a new state has not yet been created, the JNA should rely on those people
who accept the army as their own – Serbians and Montenegrins, and to a lesser
extent Muslims and Macedonians. The ethnic boundaries of these people are
the borders the army must defend.
• Since “An Ustasha and Fascist regime is in power in Croatia” and is waging a
“brutal” war against the JNA, the army should use all its resources to oppose the
Croatians and attack their vital installations.
• The “transformation of the JNA into an army of the people who accept it as their
own must be urgently carried out” by purging it of all ethnic groups who do not
support the JNA.

476
For the full text of Obradovic’s proposal, see Appendix 1.

221
 • The “de-ideologization of the JNA” should be effected immediately and
symbolized by removing pictures and busts of Marshal Tito from all JNA facilities
to military museums.477
Obradovic’s proposals – which tracked closely with those of the Serbian political
leadership – were debated at a meeting of the “Staff of the Supreme Command” (i.e., the
JNA General Staff, including General Adzic, plus key SSNO officers) on 19 September.
Obradovic perceptively pointed out, in agreement with one of the more junior generals,
that:
... the war aims for which we will all fight together must be clearly defined. It is
also my belief that the aims for which we are fighting at this time is not clear to a
great, great part of the army cadre and, from this, huge consequences are resulting. I
think, personally, that these aims must move within the boundaries of the protection of
ethnic borders of the people to whom we belong and, second, the rescue of our
comrades outside these ethnic borders through a combination of political,
international, military, and all other activities... If our aims are at variance with the
readiness of the Serbian people to fight for certain things, we will experience both a
political and military debacle.
Although General Adzic appears to have accepted Obradovic’s basic viewpoint,
General Vasiljevic, Chief of the Security Administration, and many others rejected the
proposals, particularly the de-ideologization of the JNA.478 Despite his apparent
philosophical agreement with his officers, Adzic would continue to follow Kadijevic’s lead in
discussions with the de facto “supreme command”.
Kadijevic himself seems to have come around to agreeing with some of Obradovic’s
proposals but, with characteristic indecisiveness, appears not to have followed through with
them. During a 28 September meeting of the de facto “supreme command”, he aired some
of the ideas in the course of a briefing on the state of the army. Jovic recorded that “Veljko
has now come to the conclusion that if the previous commitment of the JNA is narrowed to
the Yugoslav regions, its combat commitment will be reduced in practice to protecting the
Serb nation and those who wish to remain with it in the same state”. Kadijevic concluded
that “a formula should be found for turning the JNA over to those nations that want to
remain in Yugoslavia”. Jovic took this to mean that Kadijevic was proposing to re-designate
the JNA a Serbian Army, which was the last thing the Serbian Government wanted at this
point. What Kadijevic seemed to be proposing would rip the Federal mantle from the
Serbian Government, undercutting the claim by Belgrade and the Croatian Serbs that it was
they who wanted to stand by Federal Yugoslavia and the Croatians who were seceding from
an internationally recognized state.479

477
Major General Vuk Obradovic: General Vuk Obradovic on the Elimination of the “Tito Hat” and Five-Point
Star in the JNA – The Tangled Web Has Begun to Unravel, Belgrade Danas, 14-15 June 1997, p. 8.
478
Major General Vuk Obradovic: General Vuk Obradovic on the Elimination of the “Tito Hat” and Five-Point
Star in the JNA – The Tangled Web Has Begun to Unravel, Belgrade Danas, 14-15 June 1997, p. 8.
479
Jovic entry for 28 September 1991.

222
 Before the meeting there had been several moves by mid-ranking JNA officers –
apparently at Milosevic’s instigation – to put an end to Kadijevic’s vacillation. The most
serious of these occurred on 28 September 1991 when the commander and security officer
of the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, Colonel Mile Mrksic and Major Veselin Sljivancanin,
entered the SSNO / General Staff building in Belgrade and demanded that Kadijevic be
replaced, apparently by Adzic, so that a clear and decisive policy could be laid down through
the acceptance of Obradovic’s proposals or similar concepts. The conspirators were headed
off, however, by General Vasiljevic, who – perhaps alerted by Obradovic’s roundtable
discussion – had discovered that a group of lower ranking colonels and generals had begun
planning a coup against the SSNO and the General Staff. Vasiljevic infiltrated one of his
officers into the circle of conspirators and so received warning of the impending coup in
time to rush to Belgrade and persuade Mrksic and Sljivancanin to give up the putsch.480
Vasiljevic’s pre-emptive success ended any further efforts to remove Kadijevic and spun out
his half-hearted, simultaneous commitment to both Yugoslavia and Serbia. The debate over
the future of the JNA was left to be played out on the battlefield and in the arguments
between Kadijevic and Adzic on one side and Milosevic and Jovic on the other.

480
Vasiljevic, in a report on the coup to the Federal Presidency and the JNA, later claimed that a 28 September
meeting finalized the decision to move against Kadijevic. The conspirator group reportedly included retired
Air Force security officer Major General Nedjelko Boskovic, who was the immediate orchestrator of the
effort, Colonel Mrksic, Major Sljivancanin, Lieutenant Colonel General Bozidar Stevanovic, Commander of
the 1st Air and Air Defence Force Corps, Major General Ljubomir Bajic, Commander of the 5th Air and Air
Defence Force Corps, and apparently Colonel Vuk Obradovic. The conspirators appear to have acted at the
behest of Milosevic and the leadership of the Serbian Government. It is unclear whether Jovic was involved
or not. Kresimir Meier: How to Get Rid of an Unwanted Witness, Ljubljana Delo, 24 April 1993, p. 7. Most of
the material from the Delo article appears to have been drawn from Vasiljevic’s memoirs, which were
published and excerpted in the Belgrade magazine Nin during summer 1992. It has not been possible to
acquire a copy of that part of the Nin excerpt or of Vasiljevic’s memoirs.
In addition to the move against Kadijevic, there appears to have been an effort by General Stevanovic to
remove Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevic – a Bosnian Croat – from his position as commander of the Air
Force. Uros Komlenovic: Ferment in the Army: The Fog Riders, Vreme, 29 March 1993, pp. 31-32.
Stevanovic later denied he was trying to remove Jurjevic, saying that Jurjevic had misinterpreted criticism
by the 1st Corps of Air Force policies and unit deployments. Slavoljub Kacarevic: I Am Not A Putschist,
Intervju, 3 April 1992, pp. 4-7. An interview with General Stevanovic after he had assumed command of the
Air Force in early 1992.
Kadijevic reported at the 28 September “supreme command” meeting that:
Over the last three days, three putsches have been attempted: in the air force, the VMA (Military
Medical Academy), and the Guard Brigade. ... The same slogans and the same demands everywhere.
They want the SFRY Presidency, the Supreme Command, and the military to be purged of traitors and
that only Serbs and Montenegrins be left. There is no faith in Kadijevic and Brovet. They want people
who will “purge, overthrow, kill ...”.
Jovic entry for 28 September 1991.

223
 Appendix 1
Views of Colonel Vuk Obradovic,
Chef de Cabinet to Federal Secretary for National Defence
Army General Veljko Kadijevic, 18 September 1991

“PROPOSAL OF SOME VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS”

1. THE SFRY NO LONGER EXISTS. ALL FEDERAL ORGANS HAVE BEEN BLOCKED AND
EFFECTIVELY BROKEN UP. ALL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS AND
THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN STOPPED. FURIOUS WAR BETWEEN THE CROATIAN AND SERBIAN
PEOPLE IN CROATIA, SLOVENIA AND CROATIA BELONG TO YUGOSLAVIA ONLY IN THE
INTERNATIONALLY LEGAL SENSE. THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY HAS, THUS, REMAINED
WITH ITS OWN STATE AND HAS FOUND ITSELF IN A VACUUM.

2. SINCE NEW STATE CREATIONS HAVE STILL NOT BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE
RUINS OF THE CURRENT YUGOSLAVIA, THE JNA CLEARLY AND FIRMLY MUST RELY ON A
NATION THAT ACCEPTS IT AS THEIR OWN. THAT NATION IS THE SERBIAN AND
MONTENEGRIN PEOPLE, AND TO SOME EXTENT THE MUSLIM AND MACEDONIAN PEOPLE
AS WELL. THEREFORE, THE ETHNIC BOUNDARIES YUGOSLAV CRISIS, ARE ALSO BECOMING
BORDERS THAT THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY CAN AND MUST DEFEND. ONLY A
YUGOSLAVIA IN THESE FRAMEWORKS IS THE REAL HOMELAND FOR MEMBERS OF THE JNA.
WE CANNOT AND DARE NOT REMAIN WITHOUT A FATHERLAND.

3. AN USTASHA AND FASCIST REGIME IS IN POWER IN CROATIA. THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA HAS INITIATED AND IS LEADING AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING AND
MOST BRUTAL WAR AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL ARMY. THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THIS WAR ARE ALREADY MUCH GREATER THAN THE ONE IN SLOVENIA, BECAUSE OF ALL
THAT, CONTACT SHOULD BE ENDED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT
PROCLAIMS THE ARMY AN OCCUPYING ARMY, PLACES IT BEYOND THE LAW, AND ATTACKS
WITH ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES. AND ATTACKS SHOULD BE INFLICTED ON IT USING ALL
AVAILABLE RESOURCES. THEY ARE NOT SPARING US. WE SHOULD NOT SPARE THEM EITHER.
ATTACK VITAL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTALLATIONS (THE SUPREME COMMAND, TV, ETC.).

4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JNA INTO AN ARMY OF THE PEOPLE WHO

ACCEPT IT AS THEIR OWN MUST BE URGENTLY CARRIED OUT, WITHOUT WAITING FOR A
DEFINITIVE SOLUTION ON THE FUTURE MAKEUP OF THE COUNTRY. PROCEED WITH
OFFICERS / NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS WHO DO NOT ACCEPT SUCH A
CONCEPT. AS WITH THE SLOVENES, AND WITHOUT A DECISION BY THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
SFRY ABOUT THIS, ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN INTERNAL CLASHES AND A DRASTIC FALL IN THE
REPUTATION OF THE JNA BE AVOIDED.

224
 5. THE SO-CALLED DE-IDEOLOGIZATION OF THE JNA IS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE
AT THIS TIME. IT MUST BE ALL-ENCOMPASSING. AT LEAST TWO DECISIONS MUST BE MADE
QUICKLY: (1) A DECISION WHEREBY ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE ARMY ARE PROHIBITED FROM JOINING ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR WORKING IN IT, AND
(2) A DECISION ON THE REMOVAL BY COMMISSION OF PICTURES AND BUSTS OF J. B. TITO
FROM ALL OFFICIAL PREMISES OF THE JNA, EXCEPT FOR MUSEUM ESTABLISHMENTS
(MUSEUMS, MONUMENTS).

6. THE STATUS IN THE SLAVONIAN (VUKOVAR) GROUPING IS ALARMING. THE

COMMAND IS FRAGMENTED AND EXTREMELY INEFFECTIVE, AND THE GROUPING AND USE
OF UNITS ARE ERRONEOUS. I PROPOSE THAT A TEMPORARY COMMAND BE IMMEDIATELY
FORMULATED WHICH WOULD UNITE AVAILABLE FORCES AND THUS PREVENT A MILITARY
AND POLITICAL DEBACLE. THE TASK IS TO CHECK THE GUARDS DIVISION.

COLONEL DR. VUK OBRADOVIC

225
 Annex 17
Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Operations – The Road to Vukovar
The Battle of Vukovar so consumed the First Military District that it would be too
late for it to perform its assigned role as the main component in the JNA’s strategic
offensive. Thanks to the First Military District’s operational and tactical failures, it took three
separate tries to take the town, running roughly from 14 to 25 September, 30 September to
27 October, and 29 October to 20 November. The Croatians’ excellent defence network in
Vukovar kept the JNA at bay until mid-November. Not until the JNA had evaluated the
lessons from its failed attempts was it able to overwhelm the town. Adding to the
command’s disgrace, the volunteer and TO units the JNA threw into the battle, and some of
the JNA’s own people, committed a number of atrocities during the fighting.

Organization of Vukovar Defences

Like the Croatian forces everywhere, those in Vukovar were split between ZNG and
MUP commands. In mid-August the ZNG formalized its presence by infiltrating into the town
about 50 to 100 men of the 1st Guards Brigade under Ivica Arbanas to stiffen and reorganize
the ZNG forces.481 At that time the ZNG probably consisted of an under-armed reserve
battalion of 200 to 300 personnel. The MUP, which up to this point had been the primary
defence force, probably comprised 400 to 500 active and reserve regular and Special Police
personnel. Coordination between Arbanas and the MUP commander, Stipe Pole, however,
was poor, and no one was in charge of the hundreds of local volunteers defending their own
homes.482
Then, on 30 August, the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Mile Dedakovic-Jastreb,
known as “Hawk”, and his chief of staff, Branko Borkovic – both ex-JNA officers – provided
the catalyst to establishing the city’s defences. Together they set about unifying the town’s
defensive command and reorganizing its armed units.483 Borkovic later stated:

481
Jasna Babic and Eduard Popovic: Not A Single Fighter From Vukovar Among the Some 30 Croatian Generals,
Zagreb Globus, 3 June 199, pp. 2-4.
482
Dr. Juraj Njavro: Glava Dolje, Ruke Na Ledja (Head Down, Hands Behind), Zagreb Quo Vadis, 1995, pp. 85-
99. Interviews with Arbanas and Borkovic; Jasna Babic and Eduard Popovic: Not A Single Fighter From
Vukovar Among the Some 30 Croatian Generals, Zagreb Globus, 3 June 1994, pp. 2-4.
483
Borkovic later detailed Dedakovic and his efforts to reorganize ZNG forces in the town:
We arrived on 30 August and were immediately taken to the MUP to see Pole. After the talk, we
convened all the commanders of all the posts, however many there were in the city and the nearby
villages ... I received reports from the commanders on the numbers, weapons, and positions. After
that, we moved to the National Defence Secretariat, where we found a big table full of bottles and a
stretcher on which people slept below another table. I had it cleared away immediately. I took the
maps, arranged them according to what I had written down regarding the positions and
commanders, and drew a war map. We moved all the equipment from the upper rooms into the
basement. On the same day, I toured all the positions in Mitnica. On the second day, I was in
Sajmiste, and after that I visited Luzac and Borovo. I relayed all my observations to Dedakovic. We
jointly issued [cover names] to all commanders.

226
 When we arrived in Vukovar, the defences were quite fragmented. Basically each
local community had its ZNG or MUP forces and organized its headquarters, which
were under nobody’s control. Everyone really did what he thought and wanted. A
number of free riflemen and small groups were falling apart in some local communities.
Coordination among them and a headquarters to which they were responsible and
from which they received orders were for the most part missing. All that had to be
united, organized in a military manner, and placed under one command.484

Borkovic goes on to describe what sectors each of the local commanders were designated to cover, and
their efforts to ensure that commander in local villages and Vukovar districts would respond to their
orders:
There were some problems with the local communities, because I demanded just one commander
from each local community. The most problems were with the King Tomislav local community,
because several commanders reported. Their potential was only 100-150 people, and they were
divided into two or three groups of different factions. We insisted that one commander report from
each local community. We conducted the defence through direct communication with the local
communities ...
Borkovic also described his efforts to reestablish a working National Defence Secretariat to catalogue
available manpower in Vukovar and increase the number of active duty ZNG personnel in Vukovar:
... a National Defence Secretariat turned out to be necessary. We could not count on the existing
one, because there was not a single Croat there who would know what to do. That is why I took over
the Secretariat, and then we gathered a group of people whom I taught to work. First of all, I
recorded the status and the people, issued cards to volunteers, and recorded all those who wanted to
join the Active Guard. [Note: the ZNG differentiated between professional or “Active” ZNG and
Reserve ZNG personnel; even in ZNG reserve brigades, there often was an Active component, often a
company or battalion], because there was an order to make the Active Guard a battalion instead of a
company. During that period, we accepted 40 people. On the other hand, there were not enough
weapons or uniforms.
Borkovic also had to reorganize the Civil Defence structures:
There were problems in Civil Defence (civilna zastita – CZ), because there were no trained people,
and so we created the kind of organization in which the military commanders of the local
communities were also simultaneously the commanders of the civilian structures ... Along with HPT
(Croatian Post and Telecommunications) we also kept the electrical industry, but when the electrical
system and the long-distance power line were destroyed, it was all reduced to maintaining the
electrical generator. We more or less managed to keep the water pipeline open and we brought
water from ‘Commerce’ [Note: apparently a building in Vukovar] in tank trucks, and by patching up
water pipeline installations relatively well, and, until just before the very end, one could say
satisfactorily in view of what the conditions were like. Mitnica, Borovo [Naselje], and Trpinja Road
had some wells. Things were critical inside Vukovar itself, because there were abandoned wells that
were not prepared, and no one took them into account. Things were most difficult in Vukovar Novi,
and it was the center of the city.
Borkovic noted that he and Dedakovic disagreed in early September over exactly how to organize the town
headquarters:
I felt that all the essential commanders should be directly involved in the work of the
headquarters, that constant duty should be organized at the headquarters. [Note: Borkovic appears
to be referring to establishing a duty / watch officer system to man the headquarters] and that it
should not be reduced to him and me. We would thus gain freedom of movement, and from each of
the stronger local communities ... one person would sit in headquarters, receive reports, and react
immediately to every attack, and we [i.e., he and Dedakovic] could work in the field. There were
disagreements because Dedakovic did not agree with that, but I managed to insist on my own view
and that was the case from 14 September on.
Dr. Juraj Njavro. pp. 85-99. Interview with Borkovic.
484
Branko Borkovic: Rusitelj Ustavnog Poretka (Destroyer of the Constitutional Order), Zagreb, 1995, p. 10.

227
 Dedakovic and Borkovic created a city defence command from the local ad hoc ZNG
elements and subordinated the local communities to it. By 4 October, under the authority of
the Osijek Operational Zone, they had created a single brigade from the assorted defenders,
designated 204th Vukovar Brigade.485
Borkovic, who took command in Vukovar when Dedakovic was shifted to Vinkovci
in mid-October, later described the brigade’s formation:
The 204th Brigade arose because we received an order from Osijek to form a
brigade. Then I divided the existing forces into units, with each local community being
one company. Depending upon certain ties and the situation in the field, I designated
which companies would join which battalion. There were thus four battalions in the
Vukovar area ... The First Battalion was the Active Guard and [units from] the southern
part of Vukovar, that is, Sajmiste, 1 May, and Vukovar Stari. The Second Battalion was
Mitnica. The Third Battalion was Borovo ... Vukovar Novi and Bogdanovci joined the
Fourth Battalion.486 I also planned the development of an independent anti-armour
company that would be armed with Maljutkas [AT-3 ATGMs], which we managed to
obtain at 10 posts. We obtained a lot of captured Maljutkas, as well as artillery, one
division [“division” = “divizion”, a JNA term used to denote an artillery battalion]. Just
then we obtained howitzers, and so I concentrated the howitzers, mortars, and B-1 and
ZIS cannons.487 Some of the artillery was brought in from Djakovo immediately before
the fall of Mitnica. [Note: the Mitnica district was the last Vukovar sector to surrender

485
Borkovic included a copy of the order assigning the battalion commanders of the new brigade in his
account. Branko Borkovic, p. 38.
486
The brigade apparently was supposed to have six battalions; this, however, apparently did not come to
pass, despite a later statement by Dedakovic that the 204th had six battalions. The brigade formation order
shows five battalion commanders, with a sixth to be named later. Borkovic, however, clearly indicates that
only four were ever active. Any formed elements of the other two probably were dispersed among the
rest. See Dedakovic’s comments in Veceslav Kocijan: Playing Around With Money and Weapons, Zagreb
Danas, 31 December 1991, pp. 20-21. See the brigade formation order in Branko Borkovic: Rusitelj
Ustavnog Poretka (Destroyer of the Constitutional Order), Zagreb, 1995, p. 38.
487
As of 24 September, the then Defence Headquarters. Vukovar District, had the following heavy weapons:
60 mm mortars, 3 pcs
82 mm mortars, 15 pcs
120 mm mortars, 9 pcs
M-48 B1, 76mm mountain guns, 5 pcs
ZIS-3, 76 mm field / antitank guns, 3 pcs
M-71, 128 mm single barrel rocket launchers, 2 pcs
M-55, triple barrel 20 mm antiaircraft guns, 2 pcs
M-75, single barrel 20 mm antiaircraft gun, 1 pc
Bofors 40 mm antiaircraft gun, 1 pc
SA-7b (S-2M) hand-held surface to air missile launchers, 6 pcs
M-57 RPG, 7 pcs
other RPG, 4 pcs
unidentified “Wasp”antitank rocket launchers, 20 pcs
M-79 “Osa” antitank rocket launchers, 7 pcs
AT-3 launchers, 14 pcs
From a copy of a report from the Vukovar District Defence Headquarters to ZNG Headquarters in Zagreb
and Osijek included in Branko Borkovic: Rusitelj Ustavnog Poretka (Destroyer of the Constitutional Order),
Zagreb, 1995, p. 48.

228
 on 18 November.] We did not manage to finish forming that part. Part of Gotalo’s anti-
armour group was also there, but because of Gotalo’s death, I did not manage to
complete that anti-armour group, since there was no one who would know how to lead
it, especially for working with the Maljutkas. It all therefore remained at the company
level, i.e. wherever someone knew how to use an Osa or Zolja. [Note: “Osa” is the M-79
90 mm antitank rocket launcher and the “Zolja” is the disposable M-80 64 mm antitank
rocket launcher copied from the US M-72 LAW]. We managed to prepare the artillery,
and it was later concentrated, but we chose our targets carefully, because we had little
ammunition. Kreso Brnas from the Land Registry calculated on the map the coordinates
of the targets that I assigned.488
The troops defending Vukovar included a high percentage of non-Vukovar natives.
Borkovic estimated in 1995 that only 60 percent of his forces were from Vukovar
Municipality.489 The remainder consisted of volunteers and bits of units infiltrated into the
town.
Borkovic estimates that at the end of September he had fewer than 1.500 soldiers
in the town, while Mile Dedakovic indicates that the 204th Brigade had 1.800 personnel on
1 October.490 This does not include MUP special police troops, of which Dedakovic indicates
there were 1.100 in the entire Vukovar-Vinkovci region. About 500-550 of these may have
been in Vukovar itself with probably 200 local personnel who began the siege, reinforced by
possibly 300 to 350 troops from the Varazdin and Slavonski Brod Special Police units. Thus,
the maximum number of Croatian forces defending the town probably was some 2.000 to
2.300 personnel.491 Of his troops, Borkovic states that he believes there were about “400-
500 real fighters”, probably referring only to the ZNG.492 This likely includes only those who
functioned as mobile attack / counterattack troops, compared to the remainder who served
primarily in a static defence role. In addition to the 2.000 to 2.300 Vukovar personnel, the
Croatians in September-October probably had another 1.000 or so troops in the 2nd
Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade, one to two battalions of the 109th Vinkovci Brigade, and
other smaller units deployed around the village of Nustar, east of Vinkovci and to the east.
These forces took part in the battles along the Croatian supply route to Vukovar. The rest of
the 109th Brigade, plus the remainder of the MUP forces, guarded the line from halfway
between Osijek and Vinkovci to south of Vinkovci during September. In total, on 1 October
the forces around Vinkovci-Nustar numbered some 3.300, based on analysis of Dedakovic’s
numbers.493 Deployed around Vinkovci, the ZNG had some 29 field artillery pieces over 100
mm, plus six 76 mm ZIS-3, five T-12 100 mm antitank guns, and seven M-36 90 mm tank

488
Dr. Juraj Njavro, 1995, pp. 85-99. Interview with Borkovic.
489
Branko Borkovic, p. 14.
490
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic: Bitka za Vukovar (The Battle for Vukovar),
Vinkovci Vinkovacke jeseni/FWT, 1997, map between pp. 100-101. Dedakovic’s account became available
just as this study was being completed, so this resource has not been fully exploited.
491
Dr. Juraj Njavro, pp. 85-99. Interview with Borkovic; Branko Borkovic: Rusitelj Ustavnog Poretka (Destroyer
of the Constitutional Order), Zagreb, 1995, p. 14.
492
Dr. Juraj Njavro, pp. 85-99. Interview with Borkovic.
493
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mikrovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic: Bitka za Vukovar, map between pp. 100-101.

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destroyers – all with limited ammunition.494 By mid-October, the formation of new brigades
gave the new “Vinkovci-Vukovar-Zupanja” Operational Group a total of five-six brigades
defending the same line. Few of these units, however, were deployed to fight in the Nustar /
Vukovar supply corridor area. In addition, some reinforcements were deployed to the sector
for the two failed Vukovar relief operations described below.
The tactics adopted by the ZNG and to some degree the MUP, to combat the JNA
were highly effective in stopping an armour-heavy, infantry-poor force in an urban
environment. The central aspects of Croatian defensive operations consisted of large-scale
mining, roving antitank teams, snipers, and the organization of a heavily fortified defensive
stronghold system.495 The stronghold or fortified zone system appears to have served as the
backbone to the Croatian defensive network, based on US military analysis of JNA writings
and analysis of the battle.496 The fortified zones consisted of a single neighbourhood or
community cluster of buildings and streets supplemented with observation and sniper posts
in high-rise apartments or other tall buildings.497 The JNA later noted that the Croatian

494
Dedakovic provides information from 8 November as to the artillery and mortar holdings assigned to
Operational Group “Vinkovci” and apparently deployed around Vinkovci town, together with the available
ammunition totals:
M-84 152 mm gun-howitzers, 5 pcs with 64 round
D-20 152 mm howitzers, 9 pcs with no ammunition
105 mm howitzers, 4 pcs with 200 rounds
D-30 and M-30/M-38 122 mm howitzers, 4 pcs with no ammunition
M-46 130 mm field guns, 2 pcs with 105 rounds
2S 1 122 mm self-propelled howitzers, 5 pcs with 180 rounds
120 mm mortars, 7 pcs with 400 rounds
82 mm mortars, 5 pcs with 250 rounds
M-36 90 mm tank destroyers, 7 pcs with 280 rounds
T-12 100 mm antitank guns, 5 pcs with 150 rounds
82 mm recoilless rifles, 6 pcs with 15 rounds
ZIS-3 76 mm antitank / field guns 6 pcs with 120 rounds
The mortar totals seem low and may not include all mortars assigned to the infantry formations.
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mikrovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic, p. 135.
495
For an overview of the Croatian defenses as viewed by the JNA, see Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic:
Combat Actions for Centers of Population: East Slavonian Battlefield 1991/92, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, May-
August 1996, pp. 105-111. Novi Glasnik is the postwar Yugoslav Army’s professional journal.
496
The JNA journals from which the US analysis was done only note the Croatian defenses described as being
in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, and do not specifically describe them as being in Vukovar.
However, Vukovar clearly is the town in question. Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick: Croatian and
Serbian Tactics in 1991 Fighting in Former Yugoslavia, How They Fight: Armies of the World, Charlottesville,
VA, US Army National Ground Intelligence Centre, 1997, pp 19-22. Winkler and Patrick refer to these
strongholds as “strongpoints”, although this term would appear to give too narrow a picture of the
defensive network they describe. Therefore, this analysis uses the terms “strongholds”, “fortified area”, or
“fortified zone” interchangeably to describe the fortified neighborhoods or communities which were the
foundation of the Croatian defence.
497
LTC Postic notes that in the Croatian defences:
The fire plan is the main strength of the defence of the enemy armed forces in defending centers
of population. It is organized at entrances, throughout the entire depth and beyond the center of
population ... The fire plan was organized as a system of antitank and antipersonnel fire, the
framework being infantry arms fire ... In battles in centers of population and near them, enemy
armed forces made massive use of sniper fire in the fire plan to destroy major isolated, open ... and

230
strongholds were arrayed such that overlapping fires covered each primary axis. The town’s
sewer system provided a secure route between the town’s fortified zones. The approaches
to the strongholds were also liberally covered with mines. The mines “severely channelled”
JNA/TO movement. “... fortifications, such as ditches, forms of cover, wire obstacles,
bunkers, and barricades” augmented the mines.498 The US military analysis noted that
Croatian forces used mines, on a “massive” scale, to buy time and inflict losses on Serbian
forces:
... Mining occurred on a massive scale along roads, approaches to populated
areas, and at almost all objectives within the populated areas themselves.499
The Croatians appropriately positioned covering fire for these obstacles, making
their removal far more difficult.500 The US military analysis notes:
The system of fires consisted essentially of a series of smaller systems of fire sacks
formed by carefully situated weapons ... at the exit from the strongpoint, was a system
of fire sacks based on antitank systems.501
The fortified zones also served as rallying points for Croatian counterattacks against
JNA penetrations and as bases of operations for mobile antitank teams.
The Croatian counterattacks usually attempted to cut off the JNA spearheads –
often using the antitank teams as described below – and Croatian troops then cleared out
Federal positions along the attack axes. But shortage of troops apparently often forced the
ZNG to withdraw from recaptured positions to their main defensive line. Branko Borkovic
later stated:
Because of the Chetniks’ activity in the city, we had to undertake clean-up
operations, from house to house. First we would throw grenades, and when they
jumped out of the house or an entire street, we gathered up the weapons and returned,

camouflaged live targets ... attention was given to using sniper teams on many targets in a multi-
tiered fire plan.
Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic: Combat Actions for Centers of Population: East Slavonian Battlefield
1991/92, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, May-August 1996, pp. 105-111.
498
Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick: Croatian and Serbian Tactics in 1991 Fighting in Former
Yugoslavia, How They Fight: Armies of the World, Charlottesville, VA, US Army National Ground Intelligence
Centre, 1997, pp 19-22. Postic observes that:
Antitank obstacles ... were very well organized ... Anti tank obstacles were also made from
materials that release large amounts of smoke when ignited, filling streets and divisions of the center
of population with smoke. These obstacles were ignited as soon as our tanks and armored vehicles
appeared, so that the crews, because of the smoke, would lose orientation and be forced ... to turn
off the road ... onto the grass and dirt section of the street and hit anti tank mines that had been
buried ... or upon emerging from the smoke screen would be in the sights of antitank weapons. An
attempt was made to fully block all approaches to the settlement, crossroads in it, all entrances to
gardens, orchards, yards, and buildings, entrances ... everything was mined that an attacker might
approach and move. All obstacles were monitored and protected by all kinds of firepower, especially
by ambush from the side.
Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic: Combat Actions for Centers of Population: East Slavonian Battlefield
1991/92, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, May-August 1996, pp. 105-111.
499
Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick, pp 19-22.
500
Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic, pp. 105-111.
501
Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick. See also Postic quote above.

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 because we did not have the personnel to stay in the street. We often had to clean out
the same houses three times.502
Based on this and analysis of subsequent Croatian defensive operations, Dedakovic,
Borkovic, and their commanders appear to have conducted a modified defence in depth,
utilizing the debris-strewn and mine-laden no-man’s-land between Federal and Croatian
forces as a “battle zone” to wear down a JNA drive. If Croatian defenders could not stop the
JNA in this forward area, they could hope that by the time they reached the main strong-
points the attackers would be too weak to penetrate the main line of defence, or that a
flanking counterattacks that would push them back out of the “battle zone”.
The antitank teams, equipped with hand-held antitank rockets – especially the M-
79 90 mm “Osa” – exploited the cumulative effects of the mines and the confined urban
environment, which slowed JNA movements in the town, and the JNA armour’s lack of
infantry support.503 The teams in at least one sector, Borovo Naselje, each consisted of 10 to
15 personnel, mostly young men 18 to 25 years old. Each group carried automatic rifles,
pistols, at least one sniper rifle, and two antitank rocket launchers, probably “Osas”.504 It
would appear that most of the group’s soldiers concentrated on providing protection to the
rocket launcher personnel and separating the JNA infantrymen from the armour. Ivica
Arbanas describes below how the Croatians usually achieved such separation:
In the beginning, the infantry did not go in front of the tanks. It went behind
them. You let a tank come in, you throw a grenade behind it, they scatter, and they do
not even have any place to run to in those small and narrow streets.505
The tanks and APC/IFVs, their vulnerable flank and rear armour exposed by the
flight of the foot soldiers, were now open to attack from Croatian antitank gunners
concealed in houses and buildings lining the streets.506 Another tactic was to allow armour
to move into a Croatian kill-zone or fire-sack and then systematically eliminate the vehicles.
Arbanas describes how the Croatians dealt with an abortive JNA armour attack during the
late August clashes:
We agreed to let two or three [tanks] pass, and then when they were deep inside
our ranks, we would take them one by one.507
The lack of effective infantry to counter these antitank units was to cost the JNA
508
dearly.

502
Dr. Juraj Njavro, pp. 85-99. Interview with Borkovic.
503
Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic, pp. 105-111.
504
Dr. Juraj Njavro, pp. 85-99. Interview with Arbanas.
505
Dr. Juraj Njavro, 1995, pp. 85-99. Interview with Arbanas.
506
Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic, pp. 105-111.
507
Dr. Juraj Njavro, pp. 85-99. Interview with Arbanas.
508
In addition, the ZNG mounted some of its fire support assets, such as mortars, and other heavy weapons on
trailers, trucks, and other vehicles to act as ad hoc self-propelled artillery that could move around quickly in
the town to threatened areas, and also avoid enemy shelling. Branko Borkovic. p. 14; Tammy Arbuckle:
Yugoslavia: Strategy and Tactics of Ethnic Warfare, International Defence Review January 1992, p. 19-22.

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 Vukovar – Round One, September 1991
The first major JNA attack to test these defences, after the opening skirmished in
August, came in mid-September. On 14 September, just as the full-scale Croatian barracks
blockade began, the First Military District announced that it had begun a small operation to
relieve the Vukovar barracks, which had been blockaded earlier on 25 August.509 The JNA
probably expected to overawe the Croatians with their armour and quickly occupy the town.
The 14 September attack was much better prepared and organized than the JNA’s
28 August effort. The attack plan called for the 453rd Mechanized Brigade from the 12th
(Novi Sad) Corps to push toward the Vukovar suburbs of Bogdanovci and Dukinci and the
town’s south-western sector. Elements of the 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade (apparently
attached to the 453rd), with infantry support from elements of the Brsadin and Negoslavci
TO units, made the main thrust from Negoslavci into the Sajmiste district, where the
barracks was located.510 The 51st Mechanized Brigade from 12th Corps appears to have
made a supporting attack, aided by elements of the Bobota and Trpinja TO units, into
Borovo Naselje. JNA artillery and RV i PVO fighter-bombers were to provide fire support.
Overall, the attack probably involved some 2.000 JNA troops – including up to 350 infantry.
As many as 1.600 TO infantry may have been involved, although the number probably was
considerably less.511
Artillery preparation and air strikes began about mid-day on 14 September,
followed by the ground advance.512 The 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade broke through
Croatian defences and quickly reached the barracks. Branko Borkovic, the ZNG chief of staff
in the town, indicates that the JNA was not even slowed down by the antitank minefields –
and, he claims, only 20 soldiers – he had been counting on to stop the attack. He recalled:
On 14 September, when the “Chetniks” reached the barracks without any
problems, I was at Sajmiste and experienced it directly ... The tanks were simply passing
over the mines, and did not even go around the mines, as if they knew they would not
explode ... They did not even stop ... and just passed over the metal mines ... They broke
through us along both the Negoslavci and Petrovac road ... There were a total of about
20 Guard members there ... We got out by crawling for two hours through the
sunflowers ... [Borkovic blamed treachery by the soldier who was to have laid the
mines].513

509
Belgrade Tanjug, 14 September 1991.
510
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 221 indicates that battalions
from the 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade were attached to the 453rd.
511
Estimated at two armor-mechanized battalions each for 1st Guards Mechanized and 453rd Mechanized
Brigades and one armor-mechanized battalion for 51st Mechanized Brigade. The TO battalions are
estimated at 300 to 400 personnel each. Although all four identified TO battalions were involved in the
attack, it is possible that only elements, possibly one to two companies, were committed from each, which
would decrease the size of the TO commitment to possibly only 600 to 800 men.
512
Zagreb Radio, 14 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug and Belgrade Radio, 14-17 September 1991.
513
Dr. Juraj Njavro, pp. 85-99. Interview with Borkovic.

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 This success was not enough to carry the JNA farther into the town, and the JNA/TO
secondary attack on Borovo Naselje failed to dent the Croatian defences there.
The 14 September attack marked the beginning of a two-week JNA/TO effort to
consolidate Federal positions around the Vukovar barracks and cut the Croatian forces’
primary link to Croatian-held Vinkovci, which ran through the village of Bogdanovci to just
southwest of Borovo Naselje. These operations appear to have been designed to seize
jumping-off positions and ensure that the defenders were completely cut off when the
arrival of JNA reinforcements would permit new and bigger effort to seize the town in its
entirety. On 18 September one to two battalions from 453rd Mechanized and 1st Guards
Mechanized Brigade and as many TO light infantry “battalions” were sent toward the Luzac
bridge across the Vuka River – the eastern terminus of the Croatian supply route. JNA and
TO troops attacked together on the north side of the Vuka. A battalion from 51st
Mechanized Brigade drove down the Trpinja-Borovo Naselje road while Arkan’s Serbian
Volunteer Guard and the Brsadin TO battalion attacked just north of the Vuka to seize a key
observation point in a grain silo and a Croat-held forest that led to the north side of the
Luzac bridge. By 21 September the JNA claimed its armour had broken through to the south
side of the bridge, but it appears that ZNG/MUP troops pushed Federal forces back and
reopened the link. The SDG and Brsadin TO troops appear to have seized their important silo
objective on 25 September, but were unable to clear the forest. By 22 September, as the
operation ended, JNA armour and TO infantry had partially cleared several streets around
the Vukovar barracks.514 The next phase in the struggle for Vukovar was about to begin, but
not until the JNA’s reinforcements could arrive.

Vinkovci Interlude: A Barracks Relieved, Late September 1991

On 20 September, while JNA troops at Vukovar were battling for a toehold in the
town, the remainder of 1st Guards Mechanized Division, reinforced with elements of the
24th (Kragujevac) Corps, arrived at the town of Sid, the JNA’s main staging area in the south-
western Vojvodina province of Serbia.515 But before it could reinforce the units engaged
around Vukovar, it had first to relieve the JNA barracks at Vinkovci and seize the cluster of
villages and roads to the southeast. This would give the JNA more security to expand its
staging areas south of Vukovar for operations to reduce the town. The JNA would then use
the same base to prepare to break out from the Vinkovci area and drive west according to
its original campaign plan.
The 1st Guards Division attacked toward Vinkovci immediately upon its arrival on
20 September. From right to left, the division appears to have arrayed the attached 252nd
Armoured Brigade north of Sid; the 2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade northwest of Sid; and
the 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade, possibly supported by elements of the 130th
Motorized Brigade, west of Sid. An army-level artillery brigade, and possibly the divisional

514
Zagreb Radio, 18 September 1991; Belgrade Tanjug and Radio, 18-26 September 1991.
515
Zagreb Radio, 20 September 1991; Belgrade Radio, 20 September 1991.

234
artillery regiment, supported these units. The division’s initial objective was the Croat-held
border town of Tovarnik, which stood directly on the main road to Vinkovci. The 2nd Guards
pushed into Tovarnik while the 252nd Armoured bypassed opposition to the south and
moved towards the villages or Orolik and Stari/Novi Jankovci on 20-24 September.516
Meanwhile, the 3rd Guards moved along the left of the 252nd, drove for Vinkovci, brushing
aside weak Croat resistance, and arrived at the Serb TO-held village of Mirkovci on 21
September.517 Over the next three days 3rd Guards edged in toward Vinkovci, forcing the
Croatians into an agreement to lift their blockade of the Vinkovci barracks on 25
September.518 The remnant of the JNA artillery regiment garrisoned there pulled out on 27
September.519
Back in the small town of Tovarnik, 2nd Guards was having a more difficult time
against at most a battalion of ZNG and MUP troops. Although much of the town apparently
fell on 21 September after fairly heavy fighting, it took the brigade another three days to
mop up Croat pockets of resistance in Tovarnik and the nearby village of Ilaca.520 On 21
September, Croatian forces actually cut off one armour-mechanized battalion after allowing
it to pass toward the village, and then hit and pinned down the rest of the brigade as it
moved into the town; the battalion remained isolated for three days.521 The 2nd Guards also
had to suffer the morale-bruising experience of friendly fire when RV i PVO fighter-bombers
accidentally bombed brigade elements near Tovarnik on 21 September, inflicting numerous
casualties.522

516
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic. pp. 95-113.
517
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 September 1991.
518
Zagreb Radio 25 September 1991.
519
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 September 1991.
520
Belgrade Radio 21-22, 24 September 1991.
521
R. Kostov and P. Boskovic: All the Spices of the Valjevo “Porridge”, Narodna Armija, 2 November 1991, p.
11.
522
The JNA admitted 84 wounded personnel to the hospital in Sremska Mitrovica from three days of fighting,
many of which included the friendly fire casualties. Belgrade Tanjug, 22 September 1991. During a briefing
on 28 September to the Federal / Serbian Supreme Command, General Adzic reportedly stated that:
The entire 2nd Mechanized Brigade (Valjevans) has fled ... All of the equipment of the 2nd
Mechanized Brigade is now in Sid, without any forces to man it.
Jovic entry for 28 September 1991.
Adzic’s statement, or Jovic’s interpretation of it, probably exaggerated the status of 2nd Guards, but it
would appear that at least some major elements of the brigade broke after their experiences in Tovarnik
and in particular the friendly fire incident.
The JNA’s official journal, Narodna Armija, claimed in November that 2.000 reservists – which may be
exaggerated – deserted the brigade for Valjevo (it would appear temporarily), after the fiasco in Tovarnik.
One reserve captain attempted to justify the reservists’ desertion, claiming the JNA mishandled the
advance on Tovarnik, using inappropriate tactics and failing to provide sufficient intelligence. He stated:
As far as morale is concerned, we left Valjevo completely prepared. However, without any
previous preparations, including psychological, from the march we headed for Tovarnik. We weren’t
told what the strength of the enemy was or what equipment he had. We went in a column; this was
also a mistake. The Ustashi allowed part of the column to pass, while 18 of our tanks and seven troop
carriers were cut-off without food and water for three days. In addition to all this ... our artillery fired
on our positions, because of a lack of coordination, fortunately without tragedy ... I claim that there
weren’t any advance guards, and that it was also an error for them to order us to pass quickly
through Tovarnik instead of firing from a distance with our tank guns. We lacked data on where the

235
 Vukovar – The Second Phase, Late September – October 1991
The JNA began preparations for a new advance against Vukovar with the arrival of
reinforcements around 26 September for both the 12th Corps and 1st Guards Division, sent
by the 24th Corps, Belgrade City Defence, and Third Military District. The First Military
District also received a new commander, Lieutenant Colonel-General Zivota Panic, who
previously had served as Deputy Chief of the JNA General Staff for Ground Forces. Panic had
earlier been the First Military District’s chief of staff under the now former commander,
Colonel General Spirkovski, who was fired for his lack of success at Vukovar – and probably
because of concerns about his Macedonian ethnicity as well. Panic and Adzic visited the
Vukovar sector to find out why the JNA offensive had stalled. Silber and Little write:
There were appalled by what they found there. There was no clear chain-of-
command, and no demarcation of tasks between the various units deployed. There
was, by Panic’s own account, “chaos”. Many soldiers appeared not to know who their
commanding officer was. There was desertion from the ranks, particularly among
reservists who had been mobilized and sent to the front with no clear idea of why they
were there and no notion of what they were trying to achieve.523
Panic was determined to regain control of the chaotic and unruly conglomeration
of JNA, TO, and newly arriving volunteer units and coordinate them for a more effective
attack on Vukovar. He had revamped the command structure by about 30 September,
creating two new operational group (OG) staffs, “North” and “South” from elements of the
12th Corps headquarters, under the command of Major General Mladen Bratic (the 12th
Corps commander), and the newly arrived 1st Guards Motorized Brigade headquarters
under the command of Colonel Mile Mrksic. He gave each of them clearly defined sectors
and responsibilities.524 The brigades that had been conducting the attack on Vukovar were
reassigned to the new operational groups, and the newly responsible headquarters tried
again to bring the local TO and volunteer units firmly under JNA control, with mixed results.
The remaining forces, under the rest of 12th Corps headquarters and the 1st Guards

mines were and whether and where there were bunkers. We did not even know when one operation
was completed and when the next began. All this contributed to an appearance of mistrust and
doubt.
R. Rostov and P. Boskovic, p. 11. The brigade eventually cleared and secured the collection of villages
southeast of Vukovar, including Sarengard and Ilok, and then moved to positions southeast of Vinkovci.
523
Silber and Little, p. 177.
524
Major Veselin Sljivancanin. Chief of Security for the new OG “South“ (Headquarters, 1st Guards Motorized
Brigade), stated in 1996 that:
We took over command on approximately 30 September ... We tried to put everything under one
command, regardless of the price. This was verv difficult.
Momcilo Petrovic: Sljivancanin: Who I Am, What I Am, and What I Did in the War, Belgrade Intervju, 29
March 1996, pp. 16-25.
Former JNA, Yugoslav Army (VJ), and Krajina Serb Army (SVK) officer states:
The Operational Group “South” was to be involved in the fighting for Vukovar. Besides the Guard
Brigade, that operational group included units of the 20th Partisan Division, several territorial and
volunteer detachments, and several formations on the battalion level.
Milisav Sekulic, p. 200.

236
Mechanized Division, were to act primarily as sector formations providing support to the
Vukovar attack and maintaining pressure on the Croatian supply corridor to Vukovar
through Bogdanovci and on Croatian Osijek Operational Zone units at Vinkovci and Osijek.
Panic’s new command arrangements, however, would not prevent another JNA debacle.
The JNA reinforcements, called up in the second phase of mobilization from 10 to
20 September, began to arrive around 26 September. In the north, the 12th Corps received
an additional armoured brigade, the 211th, and five motorized brigades, the 18th, 169th,
544th, 151st, and 505th. The 18th Motorized Brigade and possibly elements of the
armoured brigade were committed to the fighting around Vukovar and the Vinkovci-
Vukovar supply corridor, although elements of the other brigades may have also bolstered
these forces. The other four brigades were deployed to hold the frontline between Osijek
and Vinkovci, supporting the 12th Mechanized Brigade, which had escaped from its barracks
in Osijek, while the bulk of the armoured brigade was positioned on the frontline north /
northwest of Nustar. The 252nd Armoured arrived in the area after its movement through
Vinkovci described above. The JNA also brought an army-level artillery brigade for additional
fire support, and the divisional artillery regiment would operate from positions in Serbia.
The elite 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, which included an entire battalion of crack military
police antiterrorist troops, also began arriving on 30 September, just in time for the new
attack.525 The 1st Guards Motorized Brigade was augmented with elements from the 20th
Partisan Division / 24th Corps. The 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade, together with the
shaken 2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade and probably elements of the 80th and 130th

525
The 1st Guards Motorized Brigade was to play a key role in the capture of Vukovar. The brigade was a
unique formation in the JNA. In September 1991, the formation was organized into the following sub-units:
1 armor-mechanized battalion (360 men, 21 M-84 main battle tanks, and 10M-80 IFVS)
1 military police antiterrorist battalion (500 men)
1 military police battalion (500 men, 18 M-86 BOV-VP APCs)
1 honour guard battalion (500 men)
1 “artillery“ battalion (200 men, 12 M-75 120mm mortars)
1 antitank rocket battalion (200 men, 8 M-83 BOV-1 anti tank missile vehicles)
1 light self-propelled air defence artillery-rocket battalion (200 men, 18 BOV-3, 6 SA-9)
1 reconnaissance company (100 men)
1 engineer battalion (385 men)
1 communications company (100 men)
1 rear services battalion (375 men)
The brigade had total estimated wartime strength of 3.500 troops. Colonel Mile Mrksic was the brigade
commander with Colonel Miodrag Panic as chief of staff. Major Veselin Sljivancanin was the brigade chief
of security. Lieutenant Colonel Dobrivoje Tesic appears to have commanded one military police battalion,
probably the antiterrorist battalion, while Lieutenant Colonel Branislav Lukic commanded the other. Milisav
Sekulic states:
The beginning of the battle for Vukovar was marked by the arrival of the Motorized Guard
Brigade at the theatre of operations on 30 September 1991. This brigade was brought in and
deployed in the period from midnight on 30 September to 05:00 on 2 October. That action took 53
hours ... The activities to prepare the Guard Brigade for deployment at the theatre of operations
lasted 14 days (from 16 to 29 September) and comprised additional mobilization, training, and
organizational preparations. All of that was done in the region of a peacetime location.
Milisav Sekulic, p. 200.

237
Motorized Brigades / 24th Corps, remained in their newly acquired positions near Vinkovci
to guard against ZNG troops massed in that town.
The JNA had now amassed a considerable force around Vukovar and its supply
route from Vinkovci. Those units comprised up to 25 armour-mechanized battalions, four
motorized infantry battalions, four military police or antiterrorist battalions (used as elite
infantry), one infantry battalion, three to six partisan infantry battalions, up to 13 field
artillery battalions, and 3 MRL battalions.526 In addition, the JNA probably fielded three or
four volunteer infantry battalions or “detachments” (soon to be joined by several more
volunteer units) plus Arkan’s elite Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG) “Tigers”, and as many as
seven low-quality battalion-sized TO units. Elements of the JNA’s elite 63rd Airborne Brigade
– a special operations formation – may also have been sent to the theatre to provide shock
troops.527 In total, the JNA and TO deployed in the Vukovar sector an estimated 37.000 to
44.000 troops assigned to combat units – not including assorted support formations – of
which at only 13.000-16.000 were infantry. Most of these were poorly trained and badly
motivated, and many of the TO personnel were not fit for anything more than guarding their
villages.528 Overall, the First Military District’s force around Vukovar was ill suited for the
operation it was entrusted with. Its massed armour was any impressive array that was
almost useless against Vukovar; since only four or five armour-mechanized battalions, each
on single axes, could be sent against the town at one time. In the confined streets they
would be unable to mass to achieve much shock effect, and their infantry escorts would
either be TO volunteers apt to disperse at the first sign of stiff resistance or conscripts and
reservists too frightened to dismount from their misnamed infantry fighting vehicles.
The JNA plan for the 30 September attack called for the new Operational Group
“South” to use elements of three brigades, 1st Guards Mechanized and 453rd Mechanized,
and the newly arriving 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, to expand the JNA/TO foothold
around the Vukovar barracks and push directly toward the centre of town. This force
probably comprised two armour-mechanized battalions and two TO battalions, and
probably some elite military police antiterrorist or Guards Divisional reconnaissance “special
units”. Meanwhile, 1st Guards Mechanized Division, using additional elements of the 453rd
Mechanized Brigade plus the 252nd Armoured and 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigades, would
attempt to cut the Vukovar-Vinkovci supply corridor. The 12th Corps and TO elements
would conduct some supporting attacks from Brsadin toward Borovo Naselje.
Three days of heavy fighting brought the JNA/TO forces close to Vukovar centre as
JNA and TO units pushed street by street. The thick carpet of mines along all the attack

526
These numbers include all of the units under Operational Groups “North” and “South” shown in Chart 3 of
Annex 13, plus 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade and 1st Guards Mixed Artillery Regiment from 1st Guards
Mechanized Division and 16th Mixed Artillery Regiment from the 12th Corps. These numbers do not
include the rest of the 1 st Guards Division or the rest of the 12th Corps.
527
Of the seven identified TO units, some may have been company rather than battalion-size, further
decreasing the available infantry.
528
Note that this manpower estimate does not include all JNA/TO personnel in Eastern Slavonia-Baranja, but
only those assessed to have taken part in the siege of Vukovar or operations against it.

238
routes, however, slowed the advance. On 3 October the Croatians launched a devastating
counterattack that forced Federal troops to relinquish many of their gains and apparently
left some of them isolated at the tip of the advance.529 A renewed push on 10 October
gained little ground.
The attack against the supply corridor fared somewhat better as JNA troops seized
the villages of Marinci and Ceric, severing the supply route, on 1-3 October.530 However,
ZNG/MUP forces managed to hold onto Bogdanovci, which would remain a thorn in the
JNA’s side. JNA troops then attempted to seize Nustar, northeast of Vinkovci, on 4/5
October, but failed.531 Despite this shortfall, the JNA move had severely restricted Croatian
access to Vukovar, all but blocking the Croat supply line.532 Borkovic has claimed that
Croatian forces in Vukovar received no ammunition resupply after 1 October.533 The 12th
Corps/TO supporting attacks against Borovo Naselje made little headway.
The JNA tried again to bite into the Croatian defences on 16 October. The main
effort this time was in the north against the ZNG’s 3rd Battalion / 204th Brigade,
commanded by Blago Zadro, in the major Croatian stronghold of Borovo Naselje. Zadro had
commanded the Croatian defence in the Vukovar suburb since the start of the fighting; he
and his forces had been a major frustration to the local Serbs and the JNA for some time.
Arbanas described Zadro as: “... an essential name in the defence of Vukovar”. He said in
1995 that Zadro:
... was born 50 years ago in Herzegovina, came to Borovo Naselje as a child,
graduated from secondary school, and was hired by the Borovo combine. He was one
of the HDZ organizers for the Vukovar municipality, and an organizer of the defence
from the first days. He participated in all of the battles in Borovo Naselje until his
death. His sons also distinguished themselves in the battles.534
The JNA/TO Operational Group “North” push against Zadro’s men consisted of
three prongs. Two of the thrusts came from the northwest near the Trpinja-Borovo Naselje
road, and from Borovo Selo in the northeast along the Danube, probably involving the 18th
Motorized Brigade, supported by armour-mechanized units from the 51st Mechanized
Brigade and a TO battalion.
A third prong hit the 4th Battalion / 204th Brigade, defending the key village of
Luzac, between Vukovar town and Borovo Naselje. This attack involved a move probably by
453rd Mechanized Brigade from the south, while Arkan’s SDG, plus one to two TO

529
Unless otherwise noted, the narrative is derived from Zagreb Radio, Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug
reports covering the period of the engagement.
530
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic, map between pp. 36-37, plus captured JNA
252nd Armored Brigade operations order pp. 95-99.
531
Postic describes a JNA attack on Nustar, probably this one, in which an armored-mechanized battle group
entering Nustar, likely from 252nd Armored Brigade, was ambushed as it exited the village, suffering heavy
casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic: Combat Actions for Centers of Population: East Slavonian
Battlefield 1991/92, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, May-August 1996, pp. 105-111.
532
Branko Borkovic, p. 19.
533
Branko Borkovic, p. 21.
534
Dr. Juraj Njavro. Interview with Arbanas.

239
battalions, and probably with armour support from 51st Mechanized Brigade elements,
attacked from the west. The assault from Borovo Selo went well, seizing an abandoned
sport airfield and some adjacent buildings at the northeast corner of the village on 16
October. JNA and TO troops battled to the Borovo Naselje railroad station on 17 October,
penetrating about one and a half kilometers to create a narrow and precarious salient
adjacent to the Danube, which they appear to have been able to hold. JNA claims on 16
October, that the attack was “the beginning of the final operation” for the capture of
Borovo Naselje, were premature. Croatian defences stiffened, and the drive stalled; the
attack from the northwest also appears to have made little progress. At Luzac, meanwhile,
JNA armoured units had laid a pontoon bridge over the Vuka River and entered the town on
17 October, with support from JNA/TO troops in the nearby Djergaj Forest to the west. The
Croats’ 4th Battalion, however, launched a spirited counterattack the next day, pushing the
JNA out, destroying the pontoon bridge, and eliminating the TO positions in the forest.
Croatian defences had held yet again. The battle, however, had cost Blago Zadro his life. He
was killed in action on 16 October.535
The JNA’s final operation in October came against the Vukovar district of Mitnica, in
the far southeast corner of the town, where the JNA had been generally content to harass
Croatian forces with shellfire but no major ground attacks. On 26 October, however, the JNA
troops hit the district along with one or two battalions of volunteers and TO troops. As in
most JNA advances, Federal forces made initial progress, claiming to have seized the town
water tower some two kilometers from their start line, as well as a key hill. Croatian troops,
however, as usual, appear to have pushed the JNA/TO units from most of the district by the
end of 27 October.

Serbian Warriors and Undisciplined Rabble – The Volunteer Units

The second phase of the battle saw the introduction of a new factor into the
intense street fighting: Serbian volunteer units, often referred to as paramilitaries. The
mobilization failures that had plagued the JNA throughout Croatia, combined with the lack
of infantry in the armour-heavy force besieging Vukovar, impelled the JNA to call for
volunteers willing to serve the Serbian cause with arms. General Adzic, briefing the Federal-
Serbian Supreme Command on 28 September, stated:
Many forces were needed for Slavonia; they have no infantry. He asks where the
Slavonian Serbs are; do they really think that other people are going to defend their
land?
Adzic drew several conclusions from the situation, including:
– Units must be supplemented by volunteers;
– Slavonia must have infantry to exercise control over the liberated territory.
535
Jasna Babic and Eduard Popovic: Not a Single Fighter From Vukovar Among the Some 30 Croatian Generals,
Zagreb Globus, 3 June 1994, pp. 2-4. Zadro was promoted posthumously to general officer rank, and the
Croatian Army Command and General Staff School at the HV Military University “Petar Zrinski” was named
after him.

240
 The volunteers would be that infantry.
The JNA attempted to regulate its volunteer recruitment with official instructions
issued on 13 September 1991 on the acceptance of volunteers.536 A follow-on order in
December 1991 attempted to bring recalcitrant volunteer units into line:
Volunteer formations currently engaged outside the Armed Forces for the
carrying out of certain military assignments ... must bring their position in the Armed
Forces of the SFRY into accord with the regulation in this order within 10 days. Within
the same period, all individuals and volunteer formations not included in the Ground
Forces of the SFRY ... shall be removed from the territory under the responsibility of the
commands, units, and institutions of the SFRY.537
An example of the Federal authorities’ volunteer recruitment is the public
statement issued by the Novi Sad Military District of the Serbian Ministry of Defence on 1
October:
The command of the Novi Sad Military Sector (or District) has issued a call to all
citizens living or staying in the territory of Vojvodina to report voluntarily to municipal
Secretariats for National Defence.
The call applies to all persons between 20 and 50 years of age who have not been
registered with municipal Secretariats for National Defence and want to take part in
war activities as volunteers.
Municipal Secretariats for National Defence will register all volunteers and will
send them right away to the Slobodan Bajic-Paja Barracks in Novi Sad. The volunteers
will be sent to battle zones in accordance with needs of war units of the armed
forces...538
The JNA was to get its wish for more infantrymen, but many JNA officers did not
like what they received.
Serbia had a long history of raising small, irregular military bands for its defence,
designated komitas or chetniks, and they figured heavily in Serbia’s wars of the late 19th
and early 20th Centuries, fighting independently as guerrillas or serving as auxiliaries to the
regular Serbian Army. These units were infamous for the extensive atrocities and looting
they committed during these wars. A Serbian Army officer stated during the 1912-1913
Balkan Wars that:
Responsibility for atrocities lies, however, only to a minor extent with the regular
forces ... The komitas were worse than you can possibly imagine. Among them there
were intellectuals, men of ideas, nationalist zealots, but these were isolated individuals.
The rest were just thugs, robbers who had joined the army for the sake of loot. They

536
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002.
<www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm> accessed June 2002, p. 91.
537
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002.
<www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm> accessed June 2002, p. 91-92
538
Belgrade Tanjug, 1 October 1991.

241
 sometimes came in handy, because they held life cheap – not only the enemy’s but
their own as well. At the village of Nagorican, near Kumanovo [in Macedonia], no fewer
than two hundred of them fell, fighting bravely. But in the intervals between battles
they were just out-and-out brigands ... There were partisan units of twenty, fifty, and
even one hundred men, each under the leadership of its vojvoda (commander). When
war came, they were attached to particular army units for outpost duty and scouting,
and some regular officers were appointed to command them. As long as the partisans
were with the army, things went well enough: but when an operation was completed
and the army moved forward, leaving the partisans behind to disarm the population,
without anybody to keep an eye on them, that was when the horrors began.539
The JNA’s experiences with Serbian volunteer units in 1991 would be a resounding
echo of those of the old Serbian Army.
The JNA and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) often used Serbian
nationalist political parties, particularly Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS), to help
find and organize willing personnel for the new units, while the JNA provided officers to
command the “detachments” – a company or a battalion-sized unit.540 Many of party
recruits were men who only a few years before would have been arrested by the Federal
Government, and the JNA in particular, as nationalist agitators. Most of the volunteer units
took on a distinctly Serbian royalist cast that was anathema to the communist JNA, whose
direct ancestor, the World War II communist National Liberation Army, had fought bitterly
with the royalist chetnik guerrillas. Both the SRS and another nationalist party, the Serbian
National Renewal Party (SNO), had helped to recruit men for the defence of Eastern
Slavonia in early 1991, such as at Borovo Selo, with the help of the MUP. Typical of how a
volunteer unit was formed is the case of an SRS company-size element organized in
November 1991. Ljubisa Petkovic, head of the SRS Crisis Headquarters, and responsible for
organizing the party’s volunteers, announced on 13 November that 100 volunteers were
preparing to go to Croatia. He said the unit would first be equipped in the JNA’s “4 July”
Barracks in Belgrade, and then “at the request of the Territorial Defence of Slavonia,
Baranja, and Western Srem” go into battle.541 Petkovic later boasted that two SRS
“battalions” and one SNO “battalion” took part in the capture of Vukovar. Many volunteer
units had begun reporting to JNA commands in September, followed by even more in
October, probably in response to the JNA’s repeated call for troops. By the time of the
cease-fire in January 1992, each JNA manoeuvre brigade in Eastern Slavonia probably had a
detachment of volunteer infantry assigned to augment its regular component – estimated at
3.000 to 4.500 personnel.
Many volunteer units technically formed part of the Eastern Slavonia-Baranja
Territorial Defence and nominally came under command of the JNA with the rest of the TO.
539
Leon Trotsky: From the History of a Brigade, The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky: The Balkan Wars,
1912-1913, pp. 117-131.
540
The volunteer units are usually referred to as “detachments“ (odredi), a units usually between a company
and battalion in size. Most of the detachments probably numbered some 200 to 300 personnel.
541
Belgrade Radio, 13 November 1991.

242
Others were directly formed as JNA volunteer units. As Adzic had planned, the JNA used
these zealously nationalist fighters to help spearhead JNA attacks against Vukovar: but the
JNA appears to have used them more especially to mop up areas seized by elite JNA
antiterrorist / MP units. The volunteers generally proved far more willing to close with the
determined Croatian defenders than many of the JNA’s conscripts and reservists, or, in most
cases, the local TO units. Off the battlefield, however, the JNA had to pay a price for the
volunteers’ combat effectiveness. Like the units associated with the old Serbian Army, the
new volunteer units’ discipline was miserable, and the JNA’s control over them was often
tenuous. Typical was the experience of Major Veselin Sljivancanin, Chief of Security for
Operational Group “South” (Headquarters, 1st Guards Motorized Brigade) who encountered
serious difficulties when he tried to extend a unified chain of command over the various
volunteer units when the Guards took over the southern Vukovar sector. It was bad enough
that the volunteers disparaged the Federal soldiers as “Communists”, a pejorative in their
nationalistic lexicon. Sljivancanin observed that many of volunteer bands didn’t get along
even with each other, so that, for example, SRS units could not be put with Vuk Draskovic’s
somewhat more moderate Serbian Renewal Movement (SNP) personnel.542 Finally, the
volunteers exceeded most JNA soldiers in their drinking habits, both on and off duty, which
made them even less subject to discipline.
The many professional JNA officers who were appalled by these troops’ refusal to
follow orders were even more troubled by their criminal behaviour against civilians, as
illustrated below. The JNA officers had good reason to complain about the volunteers’
nationalist disdain, their disorderly and un-soldierly behaviour, their reluctant and
incomplete subordination to the JNA, and especially their atrocities. Still, granted the ample
evidence for the volunteers’ many shortcomings, it was also true that many of them fought
hard and valiantly against the grim defenders of Vukovar, and they helped substantially to
overcome the JNA’s shortage of infantry.
The volunteers had a major part in the many atrocities committed during the
operations in Eastern Slavonia, and especially after the fall of Vukovar. The Belgrade
newspaper Vreme commented on a First Military District official’s report in October that
confirms the atrocities many volunteer units committed, the distaste felt by some JNA
officers for the volunteers, and how little the JNA could or would do about their war crimes.
Vreme states:
How far things have gone is best evidenced by a dispatch sent on 23 October
1991 from the Slavonian battlefield by the First Military District command

542
The lack of discipline forced the Federal Presidency to issue a statement in late November that:
The SFRY Presidency paid tribute to all volunteer units and individuals who, together with the JNA,
made a large contribution to the struggle against Nazi-Fascism and its pogrom policy against the
Serbian population in Croatia. At the same time, the SFRY Presidency points out that all units and
volunteer detachments must strictly observe orders from relevant JNA commands ... the SFRY
Presidency has ... authorized the JNA to take all necessary measures against those units, armed
detachments, and individuals who fail to obey orders from their relevant commands.
Belgrade Tanjug, 25 November 1991.

243
 headquarters. In it, the responsible officer reports on the seven-day state of morale in
the division and accompanying units.
After first emphasizing what was being done most of all with the army (“The
development of a proper attitude toward the population, especially that of Croat
nationality and their property”, among other things), the colonel refers to “activities
and phenomena that are having a positive influence on morale” – including “proper
treatment of prisoners”. Finally, however, the colonel also mentions the following in the
context of “activities and phenomena that are having a negative influence on morale”:
Vreme includes a direct quote from the report:
In the 1st Proletarian Guards Mechanized Division’s combat zone there are
several groups of various paramilitary formations from Serbia – from Chetniks to
“Dusan the Powerful” [SNO] detachments and various self-styled volunteers whose
basic motivation is not to fight the enemy, but rather to plunder property and give vent
to their base instincts against the innocent population of Croat nationality.
During the capture of 80 residents of Croat nationality in the town of Lovas by the
Lovas TO and “Dusan the Powerful” detachments, they were physically abused, after
which four residents were killed.543
After the arrival of the “Valjevo” detachment in Lovas, the captured residents
were used to clear minefields, during which 17 residents were killed.
Wounded residents were denied medical assistance by the medical staff of the Sid
Health Centre.
The officer proposed that:
The disarming of the paramilitary formations be undertaken in an organized
fashion, especially of the “Dusan the Powerful”, “Chetnik”, and “Arkan’s Soldiers”
detachments, and that the institutions of government and of the Republic of Serbia be
involved in that action.544
Although the JNA and the Federal-Serbian leadership recognized the problem, they
did little to ensure that the volunteers were reined in.

543
Lovas fell on 27 September during JNA mopping-up operations around Tovarnik. Belgrade Tanjug, 27
September 1991. The JNA had earlier bypassed the Croat-held villages northeast of Tovarnik and near the
village of Ilok when moving into the Vukovar area.
544
Milos Vasic: War Crimes: Time of Shame, Belgrade Vreme, 24 February 1992, pp. 12-14. Another JNA officer
described a similar experience. Colonel Milorad Vucic, commander of the 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade,
which was one of the most heavily engaged JNA formations during the battle, stated in December 1991
that:
Negative occurrences happened, particularly in relation to the treatment of the population, the
treatment of their property and their personal security. Personnel from some of [our] brigade’s sub-
units protested to me with vehemence when they witnessed first-hand the criminal behavior by some
individuals from various [paramilitary] groups, and sought earnestly that a stop be put to that. They
simply do not want to die for such things.
From an interview with Colonel Vucic in the 25 December edition of the JNA journal, Narodna Armija; quoted
in Norman Cigar: The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions, Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 297-338.

244
 The JNA and Urban Warfare Operations and Tactics – Shortcomings and
Lessons Learned
A campaign to seize a defended town or city usually can be described as a three
phase operation.545 546 The first phase involves the isolation of the town or city to prevent
the enemy from reinforcing the defenders, and to achieve dominating positions from which
to attack the area. The second phase consists of the assault or break-in to gain a foothold in
the town or city. The third phase comprises the usually slow and systematic clearance of the
enemy forces from the town.547 First Military District (Operational Group 3) did a poor job of
working through most of these phases at the operational level, which probably contributed
to General Spirokovski’s removal from its command. Even after General Panic’s arrival the
District did a poor job of orchestrating the attacks of its tactical commands, which resulted
in disjointed and uncoordinated assaults that allowed the Croatians to focus their limited
resources on stopping one attack at a time. The JNA failed to isolate Vukovar completely
until two weeks after the start of the campaign, so the Croatians were able to infiltrate men
and equipment almost up to the end of the operation. Nor did the JNA focus from the
beginning on severing the corridor between Vinkovci and Vukovar, satisfying itself with the
relief of its barracks. Even after the main supply corridor was crushed, Croatian forces could
threaten the blockade from their hold on the village of Bogdanovci; the JNA’s many
subsequent attacks to seize the village did not succeed until the final week of the operation.
The JNA was able to break in to Croatian defences as early as mid-September, but failures at
the operational and tactical level resulted in a prolonged and costly clearance phase. It was
not until November that First Military District finally put together an excellent operation
plan that, combined with tactical improvements described below, produced an all-out
attack that finally overwhelmed the Croatian defences.
During the first period of the campaign, in September, the three principal JNA
combat arms – armour, infantry and artillery – were poorly coordinated. The JNA’s lack of
motivated and well trained infantrymen to operate with the tanks in systematically clearing
the town in classic urban warfare forced the JNA to use armour and artillery to bludgeon the

545
The discussion of phases in urban combat at the operational level is derived from Colonel Michael Dewar’s
study: War in the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Khajji, UK David & Charles, 1992, pp. 9-
10. Dewar’s book helped the authors acquire a more thorough understanding of urban warfare. The
Russian Army’s experience in Grozny during 1994-1995 has also been examined.
546
Not to be confused with the three phases described in the Vukovar campaign. The theoretical three phases
of an urban operation describe the missions being accomplished, while the three phases of the Vukovar
campaign describe a series of actual combats over distinct time periods.
547
The JNA divides urban combat into more or less the same three phases that Dewar does, although the first
phase under JNA doctrine appears to include more preliminary actions than just isolation of the town. The
JNA preliminaries include reconnaissance of enemy dispositions and reconnaissance in force to seize
prisoners for intelligence, identification of the best attack axes, coordination of all arms, and the
containment of the populated area to be attacked. Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick: Croatian and
Serbian Tactics in 1991 Fighting in Former Yugoslavia, How They Fight: Armies of the World, Charlottesville,
VA US Army National Ground Intelligence Centre, 1997, pp 19-22.

245
Croatians into submission.548 Croatian troops, however, were too well prepared and
motivated for these crude tactics to work. When the JNA forces advanced, their conscript
and reserve infantrymen were reluctant to emerge from the deceptive protection of their
infantry fighting vehicles to engage the fearsome Croatian fighters and protect their tanks.
JNA tank-infantry operations were conducted exactly opposite to what is normally required
in an urban environment: with the infantry trailing behind and vulnerable in their thin-
skinned IFVs or APCs, both tanks and soldiers were exposed to the fire of the Croatians’
mobile anti-tank teams. While the infantry clung to their own vehicles, the tanks would
often be cut off and forced to fight their way out of Croatian fire pockets.
In addition to poor tank-infantry cooperation, artillery support appears to have
consisted of imprecise and uncoordinated battering of Croatian positions, while JNA armour
and infantry did a poor job of exploiting artillery support.549 The conduct of mortar fire was
probably even worse, controlled at a lower level or by the TO and therefore probably more
susceptible to indiscriminate firing.550 On the other hand, the mortar crews were also likely
to be responsive to calls from infantry or armour commanders engaged in heavy fighting.
But JNA armour and infantry units were generally ineffective in their use of the artillery
support. Finally, the JNA’s reliance on heavy weapons fire, although often necessary to
support a given attack, created tons of debris that impeded movement in narrow urban
streets and provided rubble and cover for the Croatians’ defences.551
During the second period, from the end of September throughout October as new
levies of volunteer and JNA infantry were arriving, the JNA began to shift away from its
armour-heavy tactics. Armour-infantry coordination, however, was still poor, and the army
was still relying too much on firepower alone. The JNA’s October attacks generally started
well, penetrating some depth into Croatian defences. But the infantry, whether JNA, TO, or
volunteer, seemed unable to hold their captured ground. Because they neglected to clear
and occupy nearby buildings, Croatian infantry and antitank teams were able to infiltrate

548
Postic states that:
Because of the shortage of infantry personnel ... it was not possible to act in accordance with the
principles of assaulting a center of population: by assault detachments, teams, and sapper groups.
Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic: Combat Actions for Centers of Population: East Slavonian Battlefield
1991/92, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, May-August 1996, pp. 105-111.
549
A postwar Yugoslav Army analysis of JNA artillery operations during the 1991 war noted that:
It was found that artillery preparations for attack on centers of population were more effective
when they were of shorter duration ... fire was most effective when shooting at open targets in
salvos, and the poorest results were achieved by systematic firing, because the enemy retreated to
shelter immediately after the first few shells, and firing was wasted, especially when not observed.
Artillery teams were often given the mission of destroying an isolated target, which was impossible
because of consumption of ammunition and resistance of the target ... the efficiency of artillery fire
was inadequately used by infantry units.
Colonel Milan Miletic: Artillery in Military Operations of 1991, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, 6 November 1996, pp.
97-103.
550
Miletic also was highly critical of JNA target acquisition methods or lack thereof during fighting throughout
Croatia, noting that organic artillery observation units were under-utilized, and basic techniques remained
unpracticed. Colonel Milan Miletic, pp. 97-103.
551
A similar situation had developed during the 1943 Battle of Monte Cassino in Italy.

246
behind the advance units’ flanks and make counterattacks that drove the JNA forces back
and often cut off their forward units.552
For its third campaign against Vukovar the JNA at last put all the pieces together
tactically, making detailed preparations for the attack and fully integrating the various arms.
The JNA first clearly identified tactical objectives to be achieved during each part of the
attack, specifically selecting key terrain features, buildings and other commanding
positions.553 More thorough intelligence and reconnaissance preparations gave attacking
units better information on enemy dispositions and fortifications.554 Finally appreciating
that special training in urban warfare was a prerequisite for success against Vukovar, the
JNA brought in more elite infantry formations – primarily 1st Guards Motorized Brigade – to
spearhead the attack. The JNA now had enough infantry to tailor its assault units with an
appropriate mixture of forces, completely integrating all arms.555 Rather than sending out
armour to spearhead the attack, infantry and engineer units led the way, with armour in
support and used as mobile artillery.556 Mortar units provided direct support, while field
artillery was able to provide far more accurate fire because the JNA had seized key
observation points.557 With its new and better trained combined arms formations the JNA

552
Postic indicated that Federal forces insufficiently consolidated the positions which they had seized,
allowing hidden enemy troops to continue engaging JNA/TO troops, as well as permitting Croatian
personnel to re-infiltrate the position. Lieutenant Colonel Milos Postic, pp. 105-111.
553
Based on analysis of objectives reported captured during initial attacks of the final phase. Belgrade Radio
and Tanjug reporting for November 1991.
554
Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick, pp 19-22.
555
A sample assault force from a JNA attack on one of the Croatian fortified zones comprised a combined
arms battalion consisting of the following elements:
two tank companies
one mechanized company
one military police company (-)
one reconnaissance company
one 120mm mortar battery
The battalion was then further task-organized into four assault groups, each with:
five tanks
three to four APC/IFVs
one to two infantry platoons
half a squad of combat engineers
The battalion attacked down three axes, with one assault group per axis, while the fourth remained in
reserve.
Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick, pp 19-22.
556
It appears that the elite Military Police / Antiterrorist units, when used as infantry, were split up into
companies and acted as the main assault infantry element, while volunteer and TO infantry provided the
second echelon, mopping up a captured sector and consolidating its defence. The elite shock troops were
then pulled out to prepare for the next move. Borkovic’s comments on JNA tactics in November support
this judgment:
At that time a group of their specialists [special operations troops] were in action at Sajmiste for
two hours daily. They took one house at a time, and at each one they left chetniks [i.e. volunteers] to
guard the positions.
Branko Borkovic, p. 23.
557
Ivica Arbanas notes that the JNA’s capture of the Brasadin grain silos gave the JNA artillery a big advantage:
From the silo, they could see clear as day where we were walking, what we were doing, where
trucks were coming to us, and where the cars were. They simply knew our routes and paths. Then our

247
revamped its tactics. To ward off the devilishly effective Croatian counterattacks, it
systematically and thoroughly cleared each objective, trying to ensure that units advanced
evenly along the front, and restraining units from making unsupported deep
penetrations.558 Captured areas were thoroughly mopped up so that advancing units would
not be attacked from behind.559
The Air Force and Air Defence (RV i PVO), which made regular, daily strikes on
Vukovar, did not shine owing to the organization’s inherent limitations, the nature of the
urban combat, and problems with air-ground cooperation. In the absence of an official tally
of RV i PVO sorties, one semi-reliable source claims that about 80 percent of the 1st RV i
PVO Corps’s 2.000 flights were against Vukovar. For a three-month campaign, that works
out to roughly 18 a day.560 This does not seem to be a very high number in relation to the
intense combat in and around the town, particularly since some of the flights would have
been reconnaissance missions, and possibly included helicopter sorties and casualty
evacuation flights. Some JNA personnel and Serbian journalists, in fact, complained about
the general absence of the RV i PVO’s. During the second combat period, even Belgrade
Radio was moved to observe: “The cooperation between all branches of the army is
assessed very highly, except for the air force, whose support, in the view of many
participants, has been unjustifiably lacking”.561 A JNA officer, Captain Darko Savic, wrote in a
JNA military journal article on urban warfare tactics in Vukovar that:
A particular problem in the coordination of forces participating in the attack
involved cooperation with aviation. Although aviation is coordinated at a higher level,
as a rule, the actual executors of the attack were acquainted with the details. Each
deviation resulted in very undesirable consequences.562
Flying close air support missions in such close, confined combat was almost
impossible because of limitations in target acquisition and the accuracy of the RV i PVO’s
older fighter-bombers, which were mostly equipped with unguided rockets, iron bombs,
cluster bombs, and cannons. The likelihood of friendly fire incidents – Captain Savic’s “very
undesirable consequences” – was high, as the 2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade, which was
not even conducting urban operations, found out at Tovarnik. Most air strikes probably hit
supply routes, suspected command posts, and heavy weapons positions further into the

people began to suffer: one lost an arm, one died, and five or six were wounded precisely for that
reason. But while the silo was ours, the shells fell in the gardens.
Dr. Juraj Njavro. pp. 85-99. Interview with Arbanas.
558
Charles M. Winkler and Charles R. Patrick, pp 19-22.
559
A Belgrade reporter observed volunteer troops during mopping up operations after Vukovar’s fall as they
cleared underground passageways beneath the Vukovar museum. Unattributed, interview with Major
Veselin Sljivancanin, Belgrade Nin, 29 November 1991, pp. 18-19.
560
Vladimir Jovanovic: Taking Ambushes, Podgorica Monitor ,22 October 1993, p. 12.
561
Belgrade Radio, 3 October 1991. Silber and Little cite a 5 November 1991 Belgrade Tanjug report that
claims the air force flew 65 sorties that day against Vukovar and elsewhere. Silber and Little, p. 178. At the
time, there were seven combat sectors in Croatia. If Vukovar received 18 sorties that would have left about
seven for the rest of Eastern Slavonia and the other six areas, which seems reasonable in terms of priority.
562 Captain Darko Savic: Use of Armored-Mechanized Units in a Populated Place, Vojni Glasnik, January-
February 1992, pp. 25-28.

248
town and away from the contact line. Finally, with so much artillery in and around Vukovar,
even with its initial observation difficulties, it was much easier and probably more efficient
for the JNA to rely on its big guns for fire support than on the RV i PVO.

Last Stand at Vukovar – November 1991

The plan by General Panic and the First Military District for what was to be the last
attack on Vukovar differed significantly from previous efforts in that it provided for
simultaneous coordinated attacks from all quadrants in order to stretch Croatian troop
reserves to the breaking point. The operation called for Colonel Mrksic’s OG “South” to
make one push straight into central Vukovar from its lodgement north of the Vukovar
barracks. Meanwhile, OG “South” would make an assault river crossing from Serbia across
the Danube into the Vukovar port area, between Vukovar town and Borovo Naselje. Here it
would link up with General Bratic’s OG “North” troops, whose objective was the village of
Luzac. Together these two thrusts would cut Croatian defences in half, isolating Borovo
Naselje and Vukovar town from each other. OG “North” would then systematically reduce
Borovo Naselje, and OG “South” would do the same with Vukovar town.563 OG “South”,
supported by 1st Guards Mechanized Division, would make supporting attacks against the
Croatians’ salient around Bogdanovci to ward off any Croatian attempts to relieve or
reinforce their positions.
Mrksic’s first attack, launched from the south around the barracks into the centre
of town, was carried out by elements of his own 1st Guards Motorized Brigade and probably
elements of the 453rd Mechanized Brigade, 63rd Airborne Brigade, 1st Guards Military
Police Battalion, one to two TO battalions, and likely one or two volunteer detachments.564
Elements of the 453rd Mechanized Brigade probably attacked in support from the west /
southwest corner of the town. OG “South” assault river crossing appears to have been made
by elements of the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade also. They were to link up with General
Bratic’s forces spearheading the advance into Luzac – Arkan’s “Tigers”, a TO battalion, and
elements of 51st Mechanized Brigade, possibly supported by 453rd Mechanized Brigade /
OG “South” from across the Vuka. Meanwhile, OG “North”, using elements of the 51st
563
Note that this analysis of the JNA plan is based on how the battle played out, and not any specific
elucidation of the operation from JNA commanders or planners. However, it is clear from a detailed
reading of the battle that this was more or less the plan.
564
Lieutenant Colonel Tesic, in command of one military police battalion, led the attack on the left. One of his
companies appears to have been commanded by Captain Miroslav Radic. Lieutenant Colonel Branislav
Lukic, in command of the other military police battalion, led the attack in the center.
Radic’s company appears to have been augmented with additional volunteer troops, bringing the force
under his command from company to battalion strength of 500 men.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecutions Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002.
<www.un.org/icty/Iatst/ index.htm> accessed June 2002, p. 94.
The long-suffering 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade, under Colonel Vucic, which had borne the brunt of
operations in this sector since August, had been pulled out of the line after the failed early October attack
and returned to the control of 1st Guards Mechanized Division. It was apparently redeployed to the
Nijemci sector, some 25 kilometers southeast of Vinkovci.

249
Mechanized Brigade, probably the 18th Motorized Brigade, and possibly other JNA brigades,
supported by volunteers and TO troops, would attack down the Trpinja Road and from
Borovo Selo into Borovo Naselje.
The supporting attack against Bogdanovci kicked off on 29 October as JNA armour
units, probably elements of the 252nd Armoured Brigade, the Sumadija Volunteer
Detachment, and other volunteer and TO units, attempted to seize the village; elements of
the 211th Armoured Brigade / OG ”North” probably pushed south from the Tordinci /
Ostrovo area in support. Heavy fighting ensued; one Sumadija volunteer told a Serbian
reporter that his unit had suffered 49 killed and 78 wounded in action during the fighting.565
By 3 November both sides claimed to hold the village; the Croatians, however, held out until
10 November.566
The main assault against Vukovar-Borovo Naselje commenced on 30/31 October,
with OG “South” beginning its drive toward central Vukovar, street by street. By 1
November OG “South”, supported by RV i PVO fighter-bombers hitting MUP and ZNG
headquarters, claimed to have cut one of the 204th Brigade’s main lateral supply routes
between the town’s defensive sectors. On 3 November, the battle for the “Bosko Buha”
community, which sat on a key height overlooking central Vukovar, began, and raged for six
days against a furious Croatian defence until JNA, TO, and volunteer troops took it on 9
November.
As the fight for “Bosko Buha” started, the JNA executed the key manoeuvre in the
final phase at Vukovar as OG “North” and OG “South” forces converged between Borovo
Naselje and Vukovar town. OG “South’s” surprise river crossing, supported by the JNA’s
Danube River Flotilla, appears to have easily seized the Vukovar port facilities on 3
November. Simultaneously, OG “North”, led by Arkan’s SDG and JNA armour, battled its way
into the Luzac area, moving to surround the village rather than trying to storm it with a
frontal assault.567 They then linked up with OG “South” and captured a former animal feed
factory near the port, which Croatian troops had turned into a sniper and machine gun nest.
A supporting attack by elements of two TO battalions gained a foothold in the south-
western corner of Borovo Naselje. Over the next two days JNA forces widened the corridor
between Luzac and the Vukovar port, making it impossible for a Croatian counterattack to
reopen the critical link between Borovo Naselje and Vukovar town. OG “North” also
attacked Borovo Naselje from the direction of Borovo Selo and Trpinja on 4 November,
meeting strong resistance from Zadro’s former 3rd Battalion / 204th Brigade. Elements of
three volunteer detachments “penetrated deep into Borovo Naselje and held their positions

565
Mirko Bekic: Soldier’s Incidental Story: Don’t Pick Up Anything, Brother, Belgrade Borba, 4 November 1991,
p. 9.
566
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic, map between pp. 36-37, and chapter on
Bogdanovci, pp. 161-175.
567
Momcilo Djorgovic: It Seems We Will Have To Go To Zagreb, Belgrade Borba, 1-2 January 1992, p. 12. An
interview with Arkan, Branko Borkovic, p. 23.

250
for seven days ...”568 Major General Mladen Bratic, commander of OG “North” and 12th
(Novi Sad) Corps, was killed by an antitank missile on 4 November during the fierce fighting
around Borovo Naselje. His chief of staff, Major General Andrija Biorcevic, took command.
Despite these successes, the JNA/TO/volunteer forces still had to clear and occupy
Vukovar and Borovo Naselje against desperate Croatian troops. As OG “South” prepared to
clear Vukovar town, Biorcevic – directing the battle from the commanding heights of the
Brsadin grain elevator – ordered OG “North” to launch concentric attacks from north, south,
and west against Borovo Naselje, starting on 8/9 November after the arrival of elite JNA
infantry – probably additional MP /antiterrorist troops or possibly 63rd Airborne Brigade.
JNA, TO, and volunteer troops, including the “Tigers”, slugged their way into the industrial
suburb over the next week, with the main effort coming from the south / southwest. On 10
November, the key height of Milovo Brdo, near the Vuka River, was captured. Heavy fighting
also occurred in the town’s worker district, and industrial areas along the Danube; the
heavily fortified Borovo Naselje grain silo fell on 13 November.569 The remnants of the 3rd
Battalion / 204th Brigade began to disintegrate; the same day, a group of ZNG commanders
from the suburb made their way out to the Vinkovci area, followed by some of their men. By
15 November, the remaining defenders held only a part of the main road through town and
the rubber / shoe factory, where most of the civilians were hidden.570 The last Croatian
resistance appears to have collapsed on 16 November as the converging drives took their
toll on the exhausted Croatian troops. Federal forces proceeded to mop up Borovo Naselje
over the next three days, capturing a number of ZNG troops as they attempted to break out
and exfiltrate back to Vinkovci.
Meanwhile, in the newly formed corridor to the Danube, Mrksic’s OG “South”
troops moved toward Vukovar town from the north, in support of the drive from the
barracks area. Although victory was in sight, they still faced the daunting task of clearing the
remaining defenders street by street from the centre of town. After the fall of Bosko Buha,
Federal troops slowly cleared each surviving area. By 15 November, JNA forces,
spearheaded by 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, more or less controlled central Vukovar,
having seized the bridges over the Vuka River and the areas around the town’s main
Orthodox and Catholic churches. Croatian troops continued to fight, although now in
disjointed bands, as Borkovic almost certainly had little or no way to control the isolated
fragments of his command. On 18 November, the ZNG and MUP forces holding out in
central Vukovar, along with those in the isolated Mitnica district, agreed to surrender.

The Death of Vukovar

The Battle of Vukovar destroyed the 204th Vukovar Brigade as a fighting force. The
brigade, led first by Mile Dedakovic, and then by Branko Borkovic, suffered at least 60
568
Quote From the War Diary of the Novi Sad Corps, which apparently was published in part in the Serbian
press. Branko Borkovic included a copy of several excerpts in his book. Branko Borkovic, p. 50.
569
Quote From the War Diary of the Novi Sad Corps, Branko Borkovic, p. 50.
570
Branko Borkovic, pp. 24-25.

251
percent casualties, together with MUP Special Police forces. Croatian Government medical
authorities estimate that the combined ZNG / MUP forces suffered 450 killed in action, and,
up to 6 November, 748 ZNG troops and 161 MUP were wounded.571 Given a rough average
of 250 a month, the ZNG and MUP probably suffered at least 125 and 25 wounded
respectively in the last two weeks of fighting. Thus, of the estimated 2.000 to 2.300
defenders of Vukovar, some 1.500 became casualties. (More than 300 of the wounded
personnel captured at Vukovar hospital were brutally executed by some of Mrksic’s men,
local TO personnel, and volunteer troops on 20 November near the village of Ovcara, south
of Vukovar.)572 The 204th Brigade’s senior officers also suffered heavily; the 1st Battalion

571
Branko Borkovic, p. 100.
572
Jasna Babic and Eduard Popovic, pp. 2-4. The UN war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia in The Hague
later indicted Colonel (now Lieutenant Colonel General) Mile Mrksic, commander Operational Group
“South” and 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, Major (now Colonel) Veselin Sljivancanin, Chief of Security
Operational Group “South” and 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, and Captain Miroslav Radic, probably a
company commander in one of the MP battalions / 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Dobrovoje Tesic, for the war crimes committed at Ovcara.
Two JNA personnel, one officer, possibly in a transport unit, and the other an enlisted Military Police
reservist, later described the atmosphere in Vukovar after the town’s fall and at Ovcara just prior to the
massacre. The officer states:
I was a member of the unit in charge of the evacuation of the civilian population from Vukovar.
We came to Vukovar on 18 November 1991. In Eastern Slavonia, that day is celebrated as the day of
the liberation of Vukovar. We parked several coaches on the street above the hospital. I had enough
time, so I decided to see what the town looked like. I went down to the hospital. In front of the
hospital someone put the arm of a young man into a black garbage bag. The arm was leaning
against the wall, the bag was rolled down. I saw a reporter with a camera who photo graphed the
scene from various perspectives. On the other side there was a huge pile of bandages full of blood.
The picture was horrible. In front of the entrance several Yugoslav People’s Army ambulances were
parked. The wounded were being evacuated.
People were being taken out, youngsters between 18 and 25 years. I remember that they were all
shaven and that they were wearing clean light-blue pajamas with vertical stripes. Military Police
were standing in front of the hospital. Under a tree in a corner I saw Captain Radic. I knew him; I
knew most of the Yugoslav People’s Army officers from the Topcider Barracks. He had worked there
before the war. I also knew the officers from the “4 July” Barracks in Vozdovac, Belgrade, since I
visited various barracks as part of my duties.
I went to him and greeted him. He murmured something. He had an icy look directed at the
stretchers and the wounded that were being brought out. I asked him: “How many patients are
there?” He did not answer my question. I said: “The more there are, the better to exchange them for
our prisoners”. He replied: “These are dead people”. I asked him: “How can you say that they are
dead. You can see that they are alive, well shaven”. I was a little bit naive. I felt that no conversation
could be made. I felt ill at ease. He did not reply to anything, and I went away without a word.
There is a wall to the left of the hospital. An International Red Cross official was standing there. I
recognized him since I had seen him once on television. It was the man with whom Major Sljivancanin
had an unpleasant television duel several months earlier.
I met two nurses who had just come out of the hospital. One of them was crying. They were both
young and beautiful. I heard one of them saying to the other crying: “How can they say that we are
all Ustashas?”
The dusk was falling, and I noticed a group of civilians across the road. It was a group of 100 to
150 people. Across the street, at the entrance to a park, there was a fuel stock room. The room was
full of coal and wood. A big porch was in front of it. This is where the people were standing, and I
approached a woman in the group. I asked her what they were waiting for, since night was falling.
She told me: “We are Croats. What will happen with us, mister?” “You will be evacuated, there are
problems at the moment”, I replied. She grasped my hand and said: “I am scared”. I told her not to

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 worry, that I was told that the Croats would be evacuated to Croatia and the Serbs to Yugoslavia. A
truck came at that moment and soldiers threw out bags with food, normally used by the Yugoslav
People’s Army. Cans, packages for army units. The people still clung together. Only a few of them
made a step forward and took the packages. The group consisted of women, old people, and
children. There were no young people among them. The people were over 60, mostly women,
approximately 150 of them. The space was huge, and they were standing there in groups.
I stayed there for 15 minutes. I did not see the Military Policeman who came to me. It was dusk.
He took me by the hand and brought me out of the group. He said: “There is no need for you to stay
here. When trucks come, they will be taken away”. He was polite, but he practically dragged me out.
The night fell in the meantime. The convoy started moving. Vukovar bade farewell to us with
buildings that were still burning.
As the officer moved into the town he found:
I met soldiers in various uniforms in the town. Some of them were wearing black fur hats and
cockades (Distinguishing features of Serbian nationalist “chetnik” units]. Most of them had yellow
boots hanging down from their shoulders that were stolen from the “Borovo” factory and shop [a
manufacturer of rubber goods and shoes]. Some of them drove bicycles, motorbikes, or cars pierced
with holes and without windows. I stopped in front of the adult education center. Flames were
swallowing the building. The town was still burning, and it was very stuffy. There was a bank across
the road where a stack of savings books lay on the street. Glass was falling out of the window frames.
Approximately 80 bodies were lined up across the street. In rows. A section of the park was covered
with bodies. They were covered with plastic sheets. There I came across some reporters and news
photographers. There were no traces of violence on the bodies. The reporters told me that they died
during the three-month clashes. Many of the bodies were naked. They were a horrible sight,
especially the women. I could bear the men somehow, but I felt sick and ashamed when I saw young,
and especially old naked, dead women. It was relatively warm, and they had begun to discolor and
develop an offensive smell. There were no children among them.
The Testimony of a Yugoslav People’s Army Officer Who Was in Vukovar During the Last Days of the Drama:
I asked Radic How Many Prisoners There Were in the Hospital, and He Told Me: “These Are Dead People”,
Belgrade Dnevni Telegraf, 12 October 1996, p. 3.
After the officer’s story was published, the MP reservist came forward anonymously to describe the fate of
the prisoners being carried from the hospital. The reservist almost certainly was a member of the 24th
Military Police Battalion, attached to Operational Group “South” from the 24th Kragujevac Corps. The 24th
MP Battalion took over responsibility for Vukovar after its capture. Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Vojnovic
mentioned below, the battalion commander, was appointed town commandant.
Belgrade Radio 18 December 1991; Belgrade Radio 16 December 1991.
My detachment was located on the exit from Negoslavci toward Vukovar, on the junction with the
road that leads to Sotin, where Ovcara was located. About 15 to 20 of us had been ordered to guard
the prisoners of war at Ovcara. There, we encountered members of the “Petrova Gora” Movement [a
volunteer unit], Territorial Defence units from Vukovar, and a Chetnik unit whose military affiliation I
did not know. Altogether there were about 40 of them, either drunk or completely insane.
In front of the hangar with the prisoners, there was an enormous pile of clothes and shoes,
through which the Chetniks were rummaging and dividing up the money they found. The people
inside the hangar were turned with their faces toward the wall and with their hands against the wall.
A group of Chetniks was taking off their necklaces, rings, watches ... Those people were virtually
naked and bare-foot, standing on the concrete, in the cold. There were many more of them standing
there, more than double, in comparison with the 200 bodies that were dug up at Ovcara. Perhaps
there were 500 people. They were of all ages, from 17 to 80, mostly men, a few older women, and
only one young woman.
Our detachment, then headed by Lieutenant Colonel Vojnovic, was supposed to identify them. The
identification was interrupted by a group of Territorial Defence soldiers who broke into the hangar,
singled out more than 30 men and women, loaded them on a truck, and took them to Sotin. I can
never forget a prisoner who complained to me that he was “not guilty of anything, that he was a
driver in the Vukovar hospital and had no connection with the Croatian National Guardists”. I found
out from some other people that he was married to a Serb woman and had three children. My first
reaction was to get him out of that group and get him over to the side that was supposed to be
released. Then one of my commanding officers came up and slapped me saying: “Do you want these

253
alone lost one battalion commander wounded (Arbanas), and two killed in action, while the
last commander was captured attempting to break out of the pocket as the town
surrendered. Two other battalion commanders, including Blago Zadro, were killed or

drunken fools to kill us all?” The same group that released some people interrogated others in ways
that you could only see in the movies. Prisoners suspected of having taken part in the fighting were
rounded up in the middle of the hangar, while the others were ordered to sit on the floor, in a circle,
with their backs to the wall. Each one of us guarded about 10 to 15 people. I was guarding a corner
area where that young woman was. Then a Chetnik walked up to me and said: “You guard this one
for me. Tonight she will belong only to me and God”. When I replied that I was guarding all of them
equally, he told me not to be a smart-aleck. The woman’s name was Vesna. She was probably in her
fifth or sixth month of pregnancy, and I found out that, as it was rumored then, she was the wife of
one of the most notorious Ustashas, a man called Markubasic. They told stories about how he made
chains out of childrens’ fingers.
Our commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vojnovic, was arguing with some “non-formation”
troops, trying to draw them away from the prisoners, but the slaughter had already begun. It was
then that 1 saw, for the first time in my life, a man breaking another man’s head to bits with his rifle
butt. The Chetnik called Cetinje was the most “active” in that group. He found a Sqiptar (ethnic
Albanian) among the prisoners. Kemo was his name, and beat him to death, forcing him to learn to
sing “O Vojvodo Sindjelicu” (Serb nationalist song). Not a single bone in his body, including his little
finger, remained intact. One of the Territorial soldiers was kicking Vesna in the stomach, cursing her
Ustasha mother. They jumped on the wounds of many of the people. I can say with certainty that
they were drunk and crazy enough to open fire on us and kill us all had we attempted to save the
prisoners. We could do nothing. There were many more of them too.
We arrived at Ovcara around 16:00 or 17:00, and, at around 21:00, two military transport
vehicles arrived at the hangar, plus a truck and a dredge. They filled the truck with prisoners and
drove away toward a small forest area, a few hundred meters away from Ovcara. Then Lieutenant
Colonel Vojnovic ordered our unit to retreat and thus avoided our involvement in the liquidation. We
left when they drove the first group away.
I know that those were the prisoners that were dragged out of the basements and cellars of the
Vukovar hospital. There were also many wounded men, but I am quite certain that there were more
than 200 people. After we left, we heard shots being fired until about an hour after midnight. Those
people were killed only because they were Croats, and I would not be surprised that, among them, in
that chaos and madness, there might also have been Serbs. I cannot recall the exact date when this
happened, but I am certain that it was between 18 and 20 November 1991. Two days before the
events in Ovcara, we were guarding prisoners from Mitnica, with commander Zdenko Karaula. There
were 172 of them, and they were captured by the [Military] Police Guard commander, Karanfil.
(Note: the officer’s unit is not given; he may have been part of the military police from 1st Guards
Motorized Brigade or possibly 1st Guards Military Police Battalion). My platoon was guarding the
hangar with the prisoners. We stretched a rope in the middle of the hangar and told them that if
anyone touched it, they would all be dead. There were only 15 of us guarding all of them, but no one
tried anything. The following morning, a man came from the Red Cross in Zurich (whom Major
Sljivancanin had insulted on television) and thanked us for having observed the convention on
prisoners of war. We gave the prisoners fruit juice and toast, and later they were transferred to the
prison in Sremska Mitrovica. I mention this in order to show the difference between us, the mobilized
reservists, and those who took part in the war and killed all those people at Ovcara. The purges
continued in Vukovar as well, but there were no more mass killings. The purges were mainly
conducted by teams from Borovo Selo. Those people were real animals, they went Croat-hunting at
night, and they would kill if any one even pointed a finger at someone else for having cooperated
with the Croats. The Chetniks were motivated by money, while these other soldiers did it out of
revenge. While the liberation of Vukovar was under way, we worked together with all of them, and
later they caused us a lot of problems. The Chetniks behaved like professional plunderers, they knew
what to look for in the houses they looted ...
Crazed and Drunken Chetniks Broke People’s Heads With Their Rifle Butts, Stomped on People’s Wounds,
and Threw Dead Bodies Into a Well, Belgrade Dnevni Telegraf, 14 October 1996, p. 3.

254
missing in action. Borkovic and Arbanas, however, managed to escape to Vinkovci as
Vukovar fell.
The civilian cost in Vukovar was also immense. Subtracting military deaths, some
1.131 civilians are confirmed dead, while another 2.600 were reported missing. The official
Croatian record keeper for the Vukovar Municipality (which comprised the entire area
around the town, including small towns and villages such as Tovarnik, Bogdanovci, etc.)
estimated in 1993 that the total number of dead – including military deaths – in Vukovar
was between 4.500 and 5.000.573
The JNA and TO lost heavily as well. One former JNA officer states that the Federal
forces suffered some 1.180 officers and men killed in Vukovar alone – apparently not
including the rest of the Eastern Slavonia-Baranja operations.574

Croatian Relief Operations, Recriminations, Responsibilities, and Implications

The Croatians made only two serious attempts to relieve Vukovar during the 86-day
siege, one in mid-October and one in November. Neither amounted to much, and the loss of
the town after Zagreb’s failure to make any major effort to relieve it would lead to a welter
of recriminations, infighting, political fallings out among the Croatian political leadership,
the ZNG Command and Croatian Main Staff, including Dedakovic – who had been shifted to
Vinkovci as the regional commander in mid-October – and Borkovic.
The first attempt, ordered by General Tus, the Main Staff chief, was planned for 13
October. The Main Staff reinforced the units around Vinkovci with the 83rd Independent
Zagreb Volunteer Battalion, plus a battalion from the 122nd Djakovo Brigade, a ZNG special
operations unit (possibly the Zrinski Battalion), and the Lucko Antiterrorist Unit. They also
brought in company-size special police units from Varazdin, Osijek, Vinkovci, and Slavonski
Brod Special Police for a total of about 1.000 additional troops. Dedakovic was to command
the attack, while Osijek Operational Zone commander Karl Gorinsek was in overall control.
The attack’s objective was to push JNA forces away from the Vinkovci-Vukovar road and
reopen a link to the town, apparently through a drive from south of Vinkovci, near the
village of Marinci. The operation jumped off at 05:30 on 13 October, spearheaded by the
elite MUP units. The attack failed almost immediately at the cost of 10 MUP troops killed
and 25 wounded.575 The JNA forces then arrayed south and east of Vinkovci – an armoured
brigade, two mechanized brigades, and a motorized brigade – were just too strong.

573
The Vukovar Municipality records listed 1.851 names as killed in Vukovar as of March 1993; the 450
MUP/ZNG deaths must be subtracted from this total, based on information in Borkovic’s account. The
records also show another 2.600 missing, including 300 from the Vukovar hospital (these 300 probably are
the wounded ZNG troops mentioned earlier). Zeljko Luborovic: Count the Dead and the Name of the Living,
Zagreb Danas, 5 March 1993, pp. 19-21.
574
Milisav Sekulic, p. 220.
575
Borkovic includes a copy of Tus’s operation order, as well as a description of the attack. Branko Borkovic,
1995, pp. 45, 105. See also Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic, pp. 176-182 for
more tactical details, including the map between pp. 180- 181.

255
 The last operation began early in November with most of the same units from the
October operation, with the addition of 800 more troops from the 3rd Guards Brigade. On 2
November ZNG and MUP special operations units set out on a drive to create a corridor
through the villages of Ceric and Marinci toward Bogdanovci and on to Vukovar. Other units
would try to harass JNA forces on the flanks and keep their reserves pinned down. The units
making the main attack toward Ceric sought to infiltrate the JNA lines but quickly bogged
down in the extensive minefields the JNA had laid along the approach routes. Supported by
armour and artillery fire concentrated on the approaches, the JNA halted the drive only a
short distance beyond the Croatians’ jumping-off point.576
Dedakovic tried again to get a relief column through on 13 November. The plan this
time called for bypassing Ceric and cutting off the JNA 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigade in
the village, then moving from Nustar through Marinci to Bogdanovci. Once the first troops
had punched through, MUP and ZNG special operations units would strike out to widen the
corridor’s base.577 But this operation also failed. Dedakovic tells the story:
Mercep [a notoriously independent MUP commander] came at a time when the
breakthrough was being planned, on the 12th and 13th. He interrupted in his particular
style and said: “Tomorrow, I will be in Vukovar with my men.”
When he told me that, it was clear to me that nothing would come of the
breakthrough. I showed him where the artillery guns were, where the tanks were,
where everything was, and I proposed to him that he and his people move from the left
flank along the Vuka and strike from the flank at Marinci. While another group would
strike from the other flank via Djeletovci, and a third head on, and all of this supported
by artillery ... he said that was out of the question. When I saw that he was going to be
arrogant, I told him straight out: “Mr. Mercep, I am the commander here, and what I
say goes.” However, Mercep said that he would do as he pleased, and he went off to
Osijek. In any case, I wrote to the Surpeme Command that the breakthrough we were
working on at their command was political rather than military. They sent me one
brigade, 800 of whose men arrived, while 400 fled.578
The ZNG and MUP forces – although they included many of the best Croatian units
– lacked the manpower and the firepower needed to overcome the JNA defences. The
Croatian artillery around Vinkovci was woefully short of ammunition to support the drive,
and there were not enough engineers to deal with the extensive minefields that slowed any
force making the attempt.
The loss of Vukovar, and the perception among many of the Vukovar commanders
that Zagreb had failed to provide adequately for its defence or relief drew complaints from
Dedakovic and others even before the town fell. The Croatian Government and President
Tudjman had heaped praise on Dedakovic’s leadership in the defence of Vukovar, but as
conditions in the town worsened and no help came, Dedakovic and the political chief in

576
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic, pp. 182-188.
577
Mile Dedakovic with Alenka Mirkovic-Nadj and Davor Runtic, see map between pp. 192-193.
578
Veceslav Kocijan: Playing Around With Money and Weapons, Zagreb Danas, 31 December 1991, pp. 20-21.

256
Vukovar, Marin Vidic-“Bili”, spoke out publicly and privately to criticize the government’s
lack of support. On 23 September, Dedakovic sent a report to ZNG headquarters in Zagreb,
which included the statement that:
We are still not getting the requested aid in manpower and infantry arms and we
do not know how long it is thought to leave us without a reply and in uncertainty ... if
you are not in a position to meet [our requests], you are at least in a position to answer
them, paper being cheap.579
Dedakovic had earlier gone to Zagreb via Vinkovci on 11 October to plead with the
government to provide more assistance to help defend and relieve Vukovar, and to organize
a relief operation for the town himself.580 He met with both President Tudjman and Defence
Minister Susak. Dedakovic states that:
In order to defend Vukovar, we needed long-range artillery from Vinkovci. I told
the President that we did not have any shells, and at that point Minister Susak pulled
out a fax and said: “Here, Mr. President, 2.000 rounds are arriving at 13:00 hours.”
However, they did not arrive. When I called him and told him that, he said that there
were problems with transport ... When I offered to facilitate the transport, he said that
he would work it out and that they would arrive during the day. But they did not
arrive...581
On another occasion, Dedakovic charged that Susak had sent eight truckloads of
supplies meant for Vinkovci-Vukovar to Herzegovina. In October, Dedakovic held a
telephone press conference to demand more support. At the same time, Vidic sent an
appeal that was read aloud at the Croatian Assembly, criticizing the government and the
Assembly for not doing enough to help the town.582
Two days after the failure of the last relief operation on 13 November, Dedakovic
sent one of his final reports as the operational group commander in Vinkovci to Tudjman,
the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, General Tus, the Minister of Internal Affairs,
and the President of the Croatian Assembly. In it he reported the failure of the attack and
described the deteriorating situation in Vukovar, and made a plea to save those left in the
town. He ended with a demand that:
This time I request that you finally deign to reply to me, in writing, that you will
take action in the context of saving lives, and do so URGENTLY, and what you expect of
me, and in this context give me specific orders, forces, and material.583

579
Quoted from Dedakovic’s report, identified as “Regular Daily Report”, dated 23 September 1991, from the
Headquarters for the Defence of the District of Vukovar to Headquarters of the Croatian National Guard of
the Republic of Croatia – Zagreb. A copy is included in Borkovic’s book. Branko Borkovic, p. 35.
580
Dedakovic told Borkovic: “Branko you stay here. We will soon come back. We will organize a breakthrough
to Vukovar from Vinkovci.” Branko Borkovic, p. 16.
581
581 Veceslav Kocijan, pp. 20-21.
582
Veceslav Kocijan: When the Hawk Was Away on Business, Zagreb Danas, 26 November 1991, pp. 14-15.
Borkovic and Vidic also were highly critical of the Vinkovci political / crisis staff leadership, prior to
Dedakovic’s arrival to take command. See Branko Borkovic, pp. 15-16, 104.
583
Borkovic included a copy of the report in his book. Branko Borkovic, p. 52.

257
 The plea did not fall on deaf ears. But the government responded, not by providing
reinforcements, but by arresting Dedakovic, his chief of staff Nikola Toth (a former Vukovar
battalion commander), and Borkovic immediately after the fall of the town.
Tudjman and the Croatian Government feared the political blowback of
Dedakovic’s charges – most of which appear to have been accurate. Zagreb’s propaganda
machine, which had built Vukovar up as the new Stalingrad, now launched a smear
campaign against Dedakovic and the others. It claimed that Dedakovic was working for JNA
KOS, was conspiring to overthrow the government in collaboration with the neo-fascist
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) leader Dobroslav Paraga, and had stolen funds meant for the
defence of Vukovar. Dedakovic underwent interrogations by the military police in which he
apparently was beaten and then charged in court with conspiracy against the government.
Although he was finally found innocent in April 1994,584 neither he nor any of the others
arrested by the government ever received an official apology. Of the Vukovar commanders
who had commanded its long and valiant defence, only one was ever promoted to general
officer rank – Blago Zadro, who received his promotion posthumously.
Post mortem analyses question whether a much stronger Croatian effort in the
Vinkovci sector would have enabled the Croatians to hold Vukovar, and whether the forces
for such an effort were available. If Zagreb had provided the considerable numbers of
troops, equipment, and supplies that Dedakovic and Borkovic demanded, they could
certainly have caused the JNA even more problems, but it seems unlikely that they could
have permanently relieved the Vukovar garrison. Arguably, a larger body of ZNG / MUP
troops trying to break through to Vukovar might have forced the JNA to scale back its
offensive operations against the town. But while the JNA made a poor showing on the
offensive for reasons already stated, it excelled on the defence and might well have held off
a strong relieving force without compromising its eventually successful assault. As to
whether Zagreb had the troops and resources available to meet Dedakovic’s requirements,
it will be seen in the sections that follow that there were few quiet sectors in Croatia during
fall 1991, and with all available troops more or less committed, a stronger effort in Eastern
Slavonia would have stripped forces from other sectors.
Strategically, Vukovar fulfilled its role without reinforcements. Cold-hearted as they
may have seemed, General Tus and the Croatian Main Staff did not need to relieve Vukovar,
and the forces there were best expended in diverting and delaying the substantial JNA
forces required to overcome them. By the time Vukovar fell in mid-November, the timetable
for the JNA’s strategic offensive had been utterly dislocated, through the complete
disruption of what General Kadijevic called his “main manoeuvring force”. The staunch
Croatian defence of Vukovar ensured that the JNA’s intricately contrived strategic offensive
plan was dead in the water the moment JNA tanks set off to relieve their Vukovar barracks

584
Jasna Babic and Eduard Popovic, pp. 2-4. Borkovic was held for three weeks before being released. He was
hounded the rest of his career and resigned from the Croatian Army in early 1993. Branko Borkovic, p. 26.

258
on 14 September. Thanks to this diversion, the Croatian Main Staff could afford to use its
assets elsewhere to achieve more useful objectives than Vukovar’s relief.585

Vukovar Aftermath: The JNA Continues the Offensive?

After the fall of Vukovar, the JNA moved immediately to reposition forces to
resume its belated strategic offensive by threatening the Croatian defences between Osijek
and Vinkovci.586 The operation’s objective would have been to cut off the two towns and
follow on with a drive toward Western Slavonia and then Zagreb, as called for in the original
plan. General Panic, First Military District commander, later stated:
We had orders to take Osijek and Zupanja the moment Vukovar fell, and to
march towards Zagreb with two columns, along the Drava and Sava Rivers. And we
could have accomplished that in two days.587
To this end, beginning about 20 November, the JNA 12th Corps attacked from
southeast of Osijek to seize key villages on the south-western approaches to Osijek,
launching secondary attacks from directly east on the main Osijek-Dalj road. Two villages,
Ernestinovo and Laslovo, appear to have been taken or cut off on 21 November, and
another, Tenjski Antunovac, fell on 24 November. A 12th Corps communiqué said the
capture of the villages “significantly worsens the operational and tactical positions of the
Ustasha formations to the southwest of Osijek”.588 JNA forces were now only 10 kilometers
from the main north-south road from Osijek to Djakovo, which appears to have been the
ZNG’s main lateral supply link between Vinkovci and Osijek. Reacting to the advance, ZNG
forces from the Osijek Operational Zone, supported by a newly arrived brigade from Zagreb,
counterattacked, and fighting raged along the new line into December.589 The last JNA push
appears to have come on 11 December, when its troops drove another two kilometers

585
As will be seen, the effort in Western Slavonia to keep open the lines of communication from the Zagreb
region to the rest of Eastern Slavonia around the Osijek and Vinkovci areas was to become a key focus,
drawing in many of the available troops and supplies.
586
The fighting around Osijek during the Battle of Vukovar typically consisted of regular, fairly intense local
clashes and JNA/TO shelling of the city. There were no major battles, judging by analysis of Zagreb Radio,
Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug reporting for this time period. Around Vinkovci – separately from the
battles along the Croatians’ Vinkovci-Vukovar supply corridor – the JNA did mount two attacks, both in
mid-November, prior to Vukovar’s fall. The first appears to have come on 10 November, when the 12th
Corps, probably spearheaded by the 211th Armored Brigade, tried and failed to penetrate along the
Jarmina-Ivankovo line and cut off Vinkovci. The second occurred on 14-16 November when elements of 1st
Guards Mechanized Division, probably 1st and 2nd Guards Mechanized Brigades, attacked near Nijemci,
some 25 kilometers southeast of Vinkovci, striking toward Lipovac on the Belgrade-Zagreb highway,
probably to clear a larger buffer zone along the Serbian border and putting yet another crimp in the
highway.
587
Panic was quoted in Silber and Little, p. 186.
588
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 November 1991. Troops from Arkan’s SDG “Tigers”and armored units from the JNA
12th Mechanized Brigade spearheaded the attacks. Momcilo Djorgovic: It Seems We Will Have To Go To
Zagreb, Belgrade Borba, 1-2 January 1992.
589
The 101st Zagreb-Susegrad Brigade arrived in the threatened sector almost simultaneously with the
beginning of the JNA advance.

259
toward the road, but the ZNG again drove them back. Heavy, profitless fighting along this
line continued until the January 1992 cease-fire.
It was not the ZNG however, that halted the JNA’s strategic offensive. In the last
battle between the army and the Serbian leadership over war aims and strategy, Milosevic
and Jovic finally prevailed over the JNA and put an end to its determined campaign to defeat
Croatia and return it to the Federation. As General Panic again relates:
... I was ordered to go back. I talked to Jovic and [President of the Federal
Presidency Branko] Kostic. And I also talked to President Milosevic. It was his decision,
Milosevic’s decision, and it was approved by the rump presidency. He simply said: “We
have no job there in Croat populated areas. We have to protect the Serb areas”, and
that was the line. And I said if the task was to protect Yugoslavia we should go further
... But President Milosevic said, among other things, that we must stop. And that was
the order from the defence minister [Kadijevic] and I just obeyed.590

The JNA had finally given up on Yugoslavia.

Could the JNA have successfully prosecuted its offensive war plan? With the forces
made available to First Military District by Vukovar’s fall – the entire 1st Guards Mechanized
Division and 12th (Novi Sad) Corps – it is likely that the JNA could have broken the Croatian
Osijek-Vinkovci defence line, although it would have taken longer than the two days Panic
predicted. The terrain involved was far more open and armour-friendly than the congested
urban environment of Vukovar. Croatian antitank defences and field fortifications were
weak, and without the cover of the city cellars they had used as bunkers in Vukovar, it is
unlikely that the ZNG reservists could have withstood armoured drives or concentrated
artillery fire in the open fields between Osijek and Vinkovci. And First Military District, rather
than becoming bogged down in more street fighting, probably would have bypassed both
cities. Nonetheless, the battle would have been costly and it remains questionable how
deep into Croatia the JNA’s logistics system could have sustained such a large force. The
more mountainous terrain that looms out of the Slavonian plains as one nears the
battlefields of Western Slavonia also would have given the Croatians better defensive
positions against the armour on which the JNA relied. Even without advancing all the way to
Varazdin and Zagreb, however, a JNA breakout from Eastern Slavonia would have placed
immense pressure on the Croatian Government and probably would have forced it to accept
less favourable peace terms than it won from the final “Vance Plan”. The mere existence of
the threat to Osijek, demonstrated by the tentative advances the JNA made in November,
appears to have influenced Zagreb’s willingness to agree to the terms Vance negotiated in
December.591

590
Panic was quoted in Silber and Little, pp. 186-187.
591
General Kadijevic also claims that this was the case, stating:
The JNA grouping in eastern Slavonia won that battle [Vukovar], defeated the main body of the
Croatian forces, and after the liberation of Vukovar was ready to continue on westward. Although
relative to the initial plan of operation it was too late for the second mission, for the reasons that I

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 Appendix 1
The Serbian Volunteer Guard – Arkan’s Tigers

One of the most famous (or infamous) volunteer units fielded in the former
Yugoslavia was the Serbian Volunteer Guard (Srpska Dobrovoljacka Garda – SDG), more
popularly known as “Arkan’s Tigers” from the nom de guerre of its leader, Zeljko
Raznjatovic. The SDG however, was unlike any of the other volunteer units in that it was the
covert creature of the Serbian Department for State Security (RDB). Arkan’s charisma and
his reliable service to the Yugoslav State Security Service during the 1980s made him a
natural choice to command such a unit.

Origins
The SDG or “Tigers” appear to have been organized in October 1990 by the
Department for State Security of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) as part of the
RDB’s plan to covertly arm the Croatian Serbs. Key actors in the unit’s formation included
then Minister of Internal Affairs Radmilo Bogdanovic, then RDB deputy chief Jovica Stanisic,
as well as senior RDB officer Franko Simatovic – “Frenki”.

Military Training and Capability

Under the tutelage of the very professional Serbian Special Police, the SDG quickly
became a well-trained and well-equipped light infantry shock formation, which Arkan
described in September 1991 as an “assault” unit of about 600 men.592 Already a notably
effective fighting force in the operations in eastern Slavonia of 1991, the SDG stood out
from the poorly run, ill-disciplined, irregularly formed paramilitary / volunteer units. Arkan
often insisted that alcohol was banned in his unit, which was almost certainly true, and he
also asserted that “discipline in the Serbian Volunteer Guard was such that orders were
carried without ever being questioned. Beatings were one of the methods. This might
appear very unrefined and harsh, but I have to tell you that discipline brings order to a
Serb”.593 Photo and film footage of the unit from 1991 to 1995 testify to the unit’s superior
bearing and discipline.

Combat Operations
Arkan was not only the SDG field commander directing combat operations in
eastern Slavonia in 1991, but he also ran the “Centre for Training Volunteers” in Erdut. His

have indicated, its success and the threat of it penetrating to Zagreb were significant factors in
Croatia’s acceptance of the Vance Plan.
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993, p. 137.
592
Dusan Masic: They Will Never Capture Me Again, Belgrade Nin, 13 September 1991, p. 26. Interview with
Arkan.
593
BK Television interview with Arkan, 4 June 1997.

261
headquarters in Erdut was in the same facility as the headquarters of the East Slavonia,
Baranja, and Western Srem Territorial Defence (TO) under the command of Serbian Special
Police officer Radovan Stojicic.594 Stojicic appears to have been in overall command of the
SDG, although it came under the operational control of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA)
during combat operations. Throughout the campaign it functioned as assault infantry,
primarily in support of the JNA 12th (Novi Sad) Corps. The SDG played a particularly
important role in the 1991 Vukovar operation, helping capture the key Croatian strongholds
of Luzac and Borovo Naselje.
Despite its creation and reputation as an elite combat unit, the SDG played the
leading role in a number of war crimes and atrocities in Croatia and Bosnia and was involved
in a number of others. Given the level of SDG discipline, it seems clear that most of the SDG
atrocities were committed as an express act of policy or methodical cruelty as distinguished
from the barbarity and drunken excesses of lesser paramilitary formations. Arkan himself let
it be known in September 1991 that the SDG would no longer accept the surrender of any
Croatian troops dressed in the black uniforms of the Ustasha.595

594
Dada Vujasinovic: Secret File On Arkan: Early Jobs, Paths of Revolution, and Parliamentary Rehabilitation:
Pedagogic Poem, Belgrade Duga, 30 January-12 February 1993, pp. 16-21; BK TV Interview with Arkan, 4
June 1997.
595
Dusan Masic, p. 26. Interview with Arkan.

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 Annex 18
Western Slavonia Operations – Croatia Strikes Back596
The 5th (Banja Luka) Corps, under Lieutenant Colonel General Nikola Uzelac, on 21
September began assembling its main force, comprising one armoured brigade, two
motorized brigades, and four, later six, partisan brigades, plus an artillery regiment and
other support units. The JNA force would eventually total about 20.000 troops with 90
tanks, 75 IFV/APCs, more than 100 field artillery tubes and MRLs over 100 mm, and some 70
heavy mortars.597 The West Slavonian TO provided an additional 7.000 personnel in seven
local detachments. Some 5.000 volunteers probably joined the JNA and TO ranks some time
later.598
The 5th Corps’ campaign plan called for it to drive north from the Bosanska / Stara
Gradiska area along the Pakrac-Daruvar-Virovitica axis with the object of severing Slavonia
from the Zagreb region. A bridgehead across the Sava consolidated by flank guards would be
widened along east and west axes toward Novska and Nova Gradiska. The 5th Corps would
then link up with the main JNA operational grouping – the 1st Guards Mechanized Division

596
The details of the fighting in Western Slavonia are drawn from Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio, and Zagreb
Radio reporting from mid-September through 1 January 1992, as well as a multitude of articles in the
Croatian military journals Hrvatski Vojnik and Zagreb Velebit discussing the activities of the various
brigades. The list of journal articles includes: Sinisa Haluzan: Daruvar Cranes, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August
1993, p. 16, The 52nd Independent Daruvar Battalion; Vesna Puljak: Eyes Fixed on the Sky, Hrvatski Vojnik,
23 April 1993, p.79, Air Defence units of 1st Guards Brigade; Zlatko Djurjevic: On to Freedom With
Patriotism and Courage, Hrvatski Vojnik, 16 July 1993, p. 18, The 127th Virovitica Brigade; Vesna Puljak:
Always Advancing – Without Retreating, Hrvatski Vojnik, 7 May 1993, pp. 14-15, The 153rd Velika Gorica
Brigade; Ozren Veselic: They Have Something to Teach, Hrvatski Vojnik, 30 July 1993, p. 17, The 104th
Varazdin Brigade; Mate Babic: The Pride of the 3rd Krizevci Battalion, Hrvatski Vojnik, 30 July 1993, p. 18,
The 3rd (Krizevci) Battalion / 117th Koprivnica Brigade; Mladen Pavkovic: Brave Warriors from the Drava
Valley, Hrvatski Vojnik, 2 July 1993, pp. 22-24, The 117th Koprivnica Brigade; Vesna Puljak: Three Years of
Tigers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16, The 1st Guards Brigade; Sinisa Haluzan: Tear of
Slavonia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 17-19, The 132nd Nasice Brigade; Gordan Lausic: A Symbol
of Croatian Victory – The 125th Brigade, Hrvatski Vojnik, 22 October 1993, p. 12; Vesna Puljak: Born in the
Underground, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 12, An Independent Company of the 101st Zagreb-
Susegrad Brigade; Goran Bijuk: The Lionhearted Mikesi, Hrvatski Vojnik, 24 September 1993, p. 14, The
19th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion; Neven Miladin: Victories In War and Peace, Zagreb Velebit, 29
March 1996, p. 15, The 123rd Slavonska Pozega Brigade; Neven Miladin: They Responded to Every
Assignment, Zagreb Velebit, 19 January 1996, p. 12, The 151st (8th) Samobor Brigade; Formations of the
Croatian Army, Hrvatski Vojnik, 16 July 1993, pp. 14-15, The 56th Independent Kutina Battalion; Gordan
Radosevic: The 99th – From Slavonia’s Plain to the Kapela Heights, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 January 1995, pp. 23-
25.
597
The initial drive was made with the bulk of the 329th Armored Brigade and the Okucani TO; the 2nd Krajina
Partisan Brigade later reinforced them. The 5th Kozara Partisan Brigade also operated in this sector during
late November.
598
The TO and volunteer personnel eventually came officially under JNA control, although even prior to the 31
October 5th Corps order to this effect, the JNA as a practical matter probably directed combat operations
by accompanying TO forces. The 5th Corps order, dated 31 October 1991, states “all TO units and HQs
located in the AORs of JNA Brigades are subordinated to those commands”. The order adds that the JNA
Brigades are to consider the attached units of the TO and other formations of reinforcement (sic) as
elements of their own combat disposition and are to look after those formations. International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). <www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm> accessed June 2002, p. 92.

263
and the 12th (Novi Sad) Corps – coming from the direction of Osijek-Vinkovci. Together
these forces would then push toward Varazdin and Zagreb.
The opposing ZNG/MUP forces of the Bilogora-Podravina Crisis Staff (2nd Bjelovar
Operational Zone from 1 October) more or less matched the JNA/TO in manpower along all
three axes but were much less well armed.599 In the Nova Gradiska sector (under 1st Osijek
Operational Zone), the ZNG and MUP had arrayed by late September a force of as many as
5.500 to 6.000 troops, which grew to 10.000 by mid-October. These were organized in one
Guards battalion, four reserve infantry brigades, and three Special Police battalions.600 In
the north, near the town of Virovitica and the Bilogora Mountains, the ZNG/ MUP initially
had some 3.000 troops, expanded to 9.000 by mid-October and organized in four reserve
infantry brigades and two independent battalions. In and around Pakrac town, the ZNG’s
original 1.500 grew to some 3.500 troops organized in one reserve infantry brigade and two
independent battalions.601 Between Pakrac and Novska, the ZNG/ MUP had assembled an
estimated 3.000 to 4.000 men, increasing to 7.000 troops in early October, organized in one
to two battalions of a Guards brigade, two reserve infantry brigades, and two independent
battalions, plus elements of four Special Police battalions.602 Between Okucani-Novska and
the Sava River, the ZNG initially deployed an estimated 5.000 troops in late September,
growing to some 6.000 by mid-October.603 These included most of a Guards brigade, one
reserve infantry brigade, and four independent battalions. In total, the ZNG/MUP eventually
deployed about 35.000 troops in the Nova Gradiska-Virovitica-Pakrac-Novska area.604

599
The manpower estimates below are based on an average Croatian brigade having some 2.000 personnel
and an independent battalion some 500, unless other information is available. Many brigades, however,
probably had more than 2.000 troops and so the estimates likely are on the low side. It is also difficult to
track the rate at which armed Croatian manpower grew: the numbers may overstate Croatian personnel
totals at the beginning while understating them in the later phases.
600
The formations included a battalion of the 1st Guards Brigade, the 3rd (Slavonski Brod) Battalion / 3rd
Guards Brigade, the 99th Zagreb-Pescenice Brigade, the 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade, the 63rd
Independent Slavonska Pozega Battalion, and three Special Police “battalions”. By the end of October, the
63rd Slavonska Pozega Battalion and the 4th Battalion / 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade had formed the
123rd Slavonska Pozega Brigade and another battalion of the 108th Brigade had been used as the nucleus
of the new 121st Nova Gradiska Brigade. In addition, the 139th Slavonski Brod Brigade was formed, adding
at least another 4.500 troops to the Nova Gradiska sector.
601
These troops were from the 104th Varazdin Brigade, the 1st Battalion / 105th Bjelovar Brigade, the 55th
Independent Bjelovar Battalion, and the 76th Independent Pakrac-Lipik Battalion.
602
The forces in this sector were from the 8th Samobor Brigade, the 117th Koprivnica Brigade, 56th
Independent Kutina Battalion, the 65th Independent Ivanic Grad Battalion, and elements from four Special
Police “battalions”; these units were also reinforced by one to two battalions of the 1st Guards Brigade
when necessary.
603
These forces comprised the bulk of the 1st Guards Brigade – which also included the first ZNG tank
company from the captured Varazdin barracks – the 101st Zagreb-Susegrad Brigade (which arrived at the
end of September), the 51st Independent Vrbovec Battalion, the 53rd Independent Dugo Selo Battalion,
the 62nd Independent Novska Battalion, and the 64th Independent Novska Battalion By the end of
October, the battalion of the 101st Brigade was withdrawn, but the 62nd and 64th Novska Battalions had
been expanded to a full brigade – the 125th Novska. Thus, the manpower total in the sector probably
remained about the same.
604
The force expansion noted above increased the total estimated forces in the triangle to at least 27.000
troops.

264
 While most of the 5th (Banja Luka) Corps began mobilizing on 15 September, its
forward deployed “peacekeeping” units from the 329th Armoured Brigade, augmented by a
battle group from the 16th Motorized Brigade, attacked ZNG/MUP elements near the town
of Stara Gradiska and nearby Okucani. It was apparently the 329th’s mission to create a
bridgehead to which the rest of the corps would deploy, a mission it completed in good
order.605 A week later the under-strength 343rd Motorized Brigade, with an attached
battalion from 5th Partisan Brigade, joined the 5th Corps forces across the Sava. With these
forces the 5th Corps now began a two-pronged advance from its bridgehead. The 329th –
supported by a battle group from the 265th Mechanized Brigade (the former peacekeeping
unit) – moved against ZNG/MUP forces deployed southeast of Okucani and west of Nova
Gradiska. At the same time the 343rd advanced through Okucani, moving on the 5th Corps’
main axis (see below). In hard fighting the 329th Armoured Brigade advanced some six
kilometers toward Nova Gradiska over a two-week period, putting it within five kilometers
of the town by 7 October.606 At this point the drive either stalled or the JNA halted.
Inconclusive fighting continued in the area through the end of the month.
Following on the consolidation of the 5th Corps bridgehead and the advance of the
329th and 343rd Brigades, the JNA attacked on the left flank in early October. Over 5-9
October, the 16th Motorized Brigade, with a battalion of the 5th Partisan, drove the 1st
Guards Brigade and the 62nd Novska Battalion back along the Okucani-Novska road until
the JNA drew within one kilometre of Novska.607 Simultaneously, the 6th and 11th Partisan
Brigades pushed along the bank of the Sava River, capturing Jasenovac on 7 October. Sharp
fire-fights continued until the end of October – one of which killed the 16th Brigade’s
commander on 13 October – but neither side appears to have mounted any major
actions.608
Meanwhile, the Pakrac sector – which TO and ZNG MUP troops had fought hard for
back in August – heated up in September and would become one of the most fought-over
areas in the Croatian war. With the advance of the 343rd Motorized Brigade through
Okucani on 23/24 September, the JNA began its move toward Pakrac, which 5th Corps
probably hoped to clear quickly so that it could push on toward its true objective, Virovitica.
Rather than directly attack the town, the JNA’s 343rd Motorized Brigade instead attempted

605
The 5th Corps’ 329th Armored Brigade had deployed elements on “peacekeeping” duty near Stara Gradiska
in Western Slavonia since mid-August. Belgrade Radio 16-18 September 1991. General Uzelac was born in
Benkovac, Croatia and moved to Slavonia with his family. In 1941 he fled with his family to central Serbia.
Uzelac probably was about 55 years old at the time of the interview. He was promoted to Colonel General
on 29 November 1991. M. Petrovic and R. Popovic: The War is Dirty and Has Been Imposed, But the Ustashi
Do Not Want Peace, Narodna Armija, 11 December 1991, pp. 6-7. An interview with Colonel General Nikola
Uzelac; Belgrade Radio 29 November 1991.
606
The commander of 329th Armored Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Ratomir Simic, was promoted to full
Colonel on 7 October, probably in recognition of his leadership in this sector.
607
Vesna Puljak: The Varazdin Pumas, Hrvatski Vojnik, 21 May 1993, p. 13; Gordan Lausic: A Symbol of
Croatian Victory – The 125th Brigade, Hrvatski Vojnik, 22 October 1993, p. 12.
608
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 October 1991.

265
to outflank Croatian defences and cut Pakrac off.609 Heavy fighting ensued in the villages of
Kusonje, Bair, and Bujavica. A 27 September ZNG and MUP counterattack reversed the
initial JNA successes around the key road junctions of Lipik and Dobrovac, some three to five
kilometers southwest of Pakrac; at the same time the ZNG 76th Pakrac Battalion, elements
of the 104th Varazdin Brigade, and Special Police troops succeeded in holding off repeated
TO efforts to seize the town itself.610 The JNA renewed its advance in early October, this
time seizing the important crossroads at Gornji Caglic on 3 October, then pushing on against
Lipik and Dobrovac, which fell on 11 October. This reduced Croatian access into Pakrac to a
single tenuously-held road link.611 But the intensity of the Croatian defence and the need for
continued mopping-up operations had sapped the JNA’s strength, and its attack ran out of
steam. The 5th Corps was no longer in a position to reach Virovitica, although its gains,
combined with the large TO-held areas north of Pakrac, substantially reduced the road
connections between Eastern Slavonia and the rest of Croatia. Before long the Croatian
forces would steal the initiative from the JNA and begin to redraw the map.

The Second Phase – The Croatians Go On the Attack

At the end of October, the 2nd Bjelovar Operational Zone, under the command of
Brigadier Mirislav Jezercic, launched an offensive – Operation “Bilogora”. The new operation
was aimed at TO positions in the Bilogora Mountains near Virovitica and southwest of the
town of Podravska Slatina at the northern tip of the large Serb/Federal-held salient in
Western Slavonia.612 This offensive was the first major ZNG/MUP offensive operation and
marked a shifting of the initiative to Zagreb’s forces. The Bilogora-Podravska Slatina area
made a perfect target for the Croatians’ offensive debut, as only weak TO forces defended
the sector; the JNA’s 5th Corps’ units were all tied up further south, limiting JNA help to air
support. The pocket of Serb villages southwest of Virovitica in the Bilogora Mountains had
blocked the main road between Virovitica and Daruvar since early 1991, and the elimination
of the TO-held area north of Pakrac would also generally facilitate greater communications
with Eastern Slavonia.
The Croatian advance was to move on several axes. In the Bilogora area, the
ZNG/MUP were to mount converging attacks from Grubisno Polje and Virovitica along the

609
The commander of the 343rd, Colonel Vladimir Arsic, went on to command the brigade during the earlier
phases of the Bosnian war. In late 1993 he assumed command of the Bosnian Serb Army “Doboj”
Operational Group 9 and was promoted to Major General. His chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Radmilo
Zeljaja, also served in Bosnia, in early 1992 serving in temporary command over all forces in the Prijedor
region that were conducting military operations and ethnic cleansing in the area. He later assumed
command of the 343rd, by now redesignated 43rd and dual-hatted as Tactical Group 4 near Gradacac.
Zeljaja later went on to command “Prijedor” Operational Group 10 during the last campaigns of the war in
western Bosnia.
610
Zagreb Radio, 27 September 1991.
611
Belgrade Radio, 12-14 October 1991.
612
Jezercic was a former JNA officer. He later served at the Croatian Army’s military academy and as the
Croatian defence attache in Budapest, Hungary.

266
main road between the two with over 2.000 troops.613 Meanwhile, further east, elements of
three brigades, possibly some 1.000 to 2.000 personnel, attacked south toward the centre
of Serb-held territory near Podravska Slatina around the village of Miokovicevo.614 Elements
of another battalion attacked toward the same village from northeast of Daruvar.615 Serb
forces in the Bilogora area probably numbered only 300 to 400 disorganized TO personnel,
probably deployed more to guard their own villages than along any specific frontline. TO
forces around Miokovicevo likely comprised almost 1.000 troops, possibly reinforced with
up to 600 Serbian or Bosnian Serb volunteer personnel.
The Croatian attack jumped off around Podravska Slatina on 26 October against a
stiff TO defence aided by repeated RV i PVO air strikes. The drive against the villages in the
Bilogora Mountains southwest of Virovitica began on 1 November and rapidly defeated TO
troops in this area, sending the remaining Serb forces and thousands of Serb refugees
streaming south. Following this success, the ZNG/MUP forces increased their pressure on TO
positions between Daruvar and Podravska Slatina. Croatian attacks over the next two
weeks, however, failed to make any significant gains.
At the same time as Operation “Bilogora”, ZNG troops launched an attack northeast
of Novska, probably timed to divert JNA attention from the larger operation. The 28/29
October attack, involving elements of three brigades and two independent battalions led by
the 1st Guards and Special Police – some 5.000 troops – probably hit elements of the thinly
spread 16th Motorized, 2nd Partisan, and 343rd Motorized Brigades.616 The JNA lost several
key villages, and the ZNG moved into a position to threaten the main Federal road link
between Okucani and Pakrac.

The Third Phase – The TO Collapses and the Croatians Advance

Croatian offensive operations shifted into high gear late in November and
December, as Operation “Bilogora” routed TO forces north of Pakrac and ZNG troops
between Novska and Pakrac pressed JNA troops hard. This time, Croatian forces hit the JNA
first about 23 November, renewing operations between Novska and Pakrac. The 2nd
Bjelovar Operational Zone’s Operational Group “Posavina”, led again by 1st Guards Brigade,

613
Croatian forces on the Grubisno Polje axis probably consisted of the 77th Independent Bilogora Battalion
and the Bjelovar Special Police while the Virovitica axis comprised most of the 127th Virovitica Brigade and
the Virovitica Special Police.
614
Troops were from the still forming 136th Podravska Slatina Brigade, probably reinforced by up to a
battalion of the 127th Virovitica and a battalion of the 132nd Nasice Brigades.
615
The 52nd Independent Daruvar Battalion.
616
The Croatian units included the 1st Guards Brigade, the 8th Samobor Brigade, the 117th Koprivnica
Brigades, and the 56th and 65th Independent Battalions. In addition, Tomislav Mercep’s notorious Special
Police reserve unit, apparently nicknamed “Autumn Rains”, helped spearhead the attack. See the interview
with former unit member Miro Bajramovic in Miro Bajramovic: How We Killed in Pakracka Poljana, Feral
Tribune, 1 September 1997, pp. 15-19, as well as the interview with Mercep in Igor Zovko: I Had Bajramovic
Arrested Because He Stole VCRs, Zagreb Vjesnik, 12 September 1997, p. 7.

267
took a key hill area some 10 kilometers northeast of Novska on 29 November.617 By 7
December, hard-fought battles enabled ZNG forces to recapture Lipik and push to within a
kilometre of the main road from Okucani to Pakrac near the key village of Donji Caglic. A
JNA counterattack around Lipik on 30 November briefly blunted the Croatian drive. Then on
10 December ZNG forces spearheaded by 117th Koprivnica Brigade troops launched a major
drive to cut the road. They ran into elements of the 122nd Partisan and 343rd Motorized
Brigades, backed by a wall of JNA armour and artillery.618 One Croatian account, from the
117th Brigade, states:
In the early morning hours of 10 December 1991, a coordinated assault began.
This action will long remain etched in the memories of all those who participated in it.
This was the attempt to occupy Caglic Donji. The action did not succeed because all
indications are that the [JNA] were stronger. The [JNA] deployed their forces along the
entire line. They had extremely strong artillery forces, as well as armoured-mechanized
units. They pounded us the entire time as our defenders were withdrawing.619
Fierce fighting continued near the road until the January cease-fire, but neither side
was able to take any new ground.
The largest Croatian advance, however, came north east and east of Pakrac as
Operational Group “Pakrac” forces – over 6.000 troops from the 127th, 132nd, and 136th
Brigades, plus Special Police – finally smashed through TO defences between Daruvar and
Podravska Slatina on 7-10 December. Broken TO units poured south from the Miokovicevo
and Vocin areas toward the road junction of Kamensko, some 25 kilometers east of Pakrac.
The retreating TO troops found no respite as the ZNG 123rd Slavonska Pozega Brigade and
elements of the 132nd and 136th Brigades launched a new attack on 17 December from the
direction of Slavonska Pozega toward Kamensko while additional ZNG troops attacked from
south of Daruvar in order to link up west of Kamensko. However, TO defences northeast of
Pakrac – reinforced by the JNA’s 5th Kozara Partisan Brigade which had been rushed to the

617
In addition to the Croatian advances, the JNA mounted a small-scale attack northeast of Stara Gradiska in
late November involving about two battalions from the 5th Partisan Brigade – about 600 troops – and the
3rd Armored Battalion / 329th Armored Brigade. The objective appears to have been to expand the
bridgehead, securing 5th Corps crossing points, but it does not appear to have accomplished much. The
Brigade of a Long and Honorable Warpath, Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, which has a history of the 5th
Kozara, the later designator of the 5th Partisan. The brigade commander, Major Pero Colic, was to lead the
5th Kozara throughout both the Croatian and Bosnian wars. He was later plucked from retirement
obscurity, promoted to Major General, and made Chief of the Bosnian Serb General Staff when the Serbian
Democratic Party engineered the relief of General Mladic in November 1996.
618
Mico Glamocanin: Without a Battle Lost, Kozarski Vjesnik, 26 August 1994, which recounts the history of
the 2nd Battalion / 343rd Motorized Brigade; also To the Pride and Honor of the Fatherland, Kozarski
Vjesnik, 20 May 1994, which discusses the history of the brigade as a whole.
619
Mladen Pavkovic: Dok Je Srca Bit Ce I Croatie: Iz Porvijesti Domovinskog Rata (While There is a Heart, There
Will Be a Croatia: From the History of the Homeland War), Koprivnica Club of the 117th Brigade, Koprivnica,
1995, p. 50. Despite the success of the defence on 10 December, the 343rd Motorized Brigade appears to
have suffered heavily in its struggle to halt the initial ZNG attack, and probably lost most of its frontline
infantry. One detailed VRS military journal article on the 343rd – apparently based on the brigade war diary
– claimed it had only 76 men on the frontline on 7 December, drawn from an assortment of units, including
the brigade headquarters. First Baptism by Fire, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 33-34.

268
area – had stiffened somewhat, and managed to block the juncture of the two columns for a
week. Then the ZNG/MUP’s superior numbers overwhelmed the JNA and TO, forcing their
remnants to retreat to positions around Pakrac and Okucani by 27 December.620

Evaluation of Forces, Operations, and Tactics

The key to the development of the operations in Western Slavonia for both the
JNA/TO and the ZNG/ MUP was the JNA’s inability to rapidly break out of its bridgehead on
the Sava and drive quickly toward Virovitica. The weaknesses of the JNA, combined with the
ZNG/MUP’s staunch defence of key strongholds, gave the Croatians time to mobilize and
arm additional forces. As a result, by mid-October the JNA had no chance of defeating
Croatian troops in the region and had insufficient units with which to defend the sprawling
TO holdings in the north. Croatian forces, better organized and armed than the weak TO,
were able to choose when and where to attack Serb forces, while tying down the stronger
JNA in the south. Without the presence of JNA combat units, the TO was doomed to defeat.
Despite their growing strength, however, the Croatians remained unable to achieve
anything other than local victories over the better equipped and more professional JNA.
The JNA 5th Corps’ difficulties in late September and early October stemmed
initially from JNA campaign plan. These problems were to magnify the effects of the JNA’s
dependence on firepower alone, and the limited training of 5th Corps’ reservists.
Consequently, things began to unravel immediately for 5th Corps when it was forced to
undertake its operation without the full complement of forces earmarked for it in the JNA
General Staff’s plan. General Kadijevic has stated that the 5th Corps was supposed to have
received five combat brigades over and above its own forces (it is unclear if he includes the
mobilized Bosnian TO brigades among 5th Corps’ own units). Kadijevic concludes that the
5th Corps:
... executed only part of its mission. The most important reason was that because
of the unsuccessful mobilization that group [5th Corps] did not get the planned five
brigades, only the equivalent of one and a half brigades ... If the envisaged brigades
had arrived, even late, the majority of the problems that emerged later would not have
even arisen. Nowhere did the failure of mobilization that I have noted have such a
negative effect as on the situation in Western Slavonia.621
The result was that the JNA did not have the planned combination of overwhelming
heavy weapons and superior numbers that would have allowed it to push quickly through
Croatian defences. With more infantry to exploit the JNA’s firepower advantages the 5th
Corps could have compensated for the training deficiencies of its reservists by sheer weight

620
For an account of the 5th Partisan Brigade’s activities during this fighting see The Brigade of a Long and
Honorable Warpath, Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994. After heavy fighting near the village of Dereza, some
seven kilometers northeast of Pakrac, the brigade’s 2nd Battalion experienced major desertions because of
low morale. It was reinforced by additional Bosnian troops, as well as a JNA unit from the 52nd (Pristina)
Corps in Kosovo.
621
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993, p. 138.

269
of numbers; without it, the heavy guns could create only tactical gains based on brute
force.622 The 5th Corps’ crucial problem was that the reserve replacements that filled out its
ranks had received little or no tactical training, while few of its reserve combat formations
had conducted the kind of field training and exercises needed to create cohesive, well-
trained units. The bald fact was that most JNA personnel – other than the command staffs –
had hardly more training than most of the ZNG troops.623 By the time the JNA had taken
steps to correct these deficiencies, the Croatians had become far better organized, acquired
a number of heavy weapons, and moved enough troops to the sector to ensure that the JNA
would be unable to repeat its initial successes. The Croatians might not be able to rout the
5th Corps, but they could stop it and hold it fast.624
The mobilization failure placed General Uzelac and the 5th Corps staff in a
predicament over how to array the brigades available to them. If they had chosen to mass
their formations on the Virovitica axis – the corps’ main direction – that would have left the
corps’ flanks vulnerable to converging attacks from Novska and Nova Gradiska, potentially
allowing the Croatians to cut off the bulk of 5th Corps. The other option, the one Uzelac
settled on, was to mass most of his forces on the flank axes to create an adequate base of
operations in the Novska-Okucani-Nova Gradiska triangle, while making a smaller effort
toward Pakrac. Uzelac probably hoped that he would eventually receive enough
reinforcements to continue the drive to Virovitica, and that even the initiation of the attack
would tie down Croatian forces and threaten their lines of communication to Eastern
Slavonia. This appears to have been the best Uzelac could have done in the circumstances,
although the advance on Virovitica would be further hamstrung by the defection of Bosnian
Croat and Muslim reservists from the brigade mobilized for this axis.
The Western Slavonia TO often proved to be more of a burden than an asset to the
625
JNA. Despite the tutelage and example of the JNA, TO soldiers continued to display the
same shortcomings that hindered them during the summer fighting, and they remained

622
For the JNA to be successful, it either needed a small, well-trained and well-equipped force or a large,
comparatively untrained but well-equipped force. A smaller, ill-trained, but well-equipped force could
make some gains, but not achieve a decisive victory.
623
The corps and brigade staffs were professionals, and the 5th Corps had conducted staff exercises and some
field training exercises in early August in preparation for its role in the strategic offensive. Belgrade Tanjug,
7 August 1991. M. Petrovic and R. Popovic: The War is Dirty and Has Been Imposed, But the Ustashi Do Not
Want Peace, Narodna Armija, 11 December 1991, pp. 6-7. An interview with Colonel General Nikola Uzelac.
624
General Uzelac says the troops learned quickly in the field. Units ran training programs for new personnel
and the corps distributed “lessons learned” to its units. M. Petrovic and R. Popovic: The War is Dirty and
Has Been Imposed, But the Ustashi Do Not Want Peace, Narodna Armija, 11 December 1991, pp. 6-7. An
interview with Colonel General Nikola Uzelac.
625
The volunteer units played no major role in Western Slavonia beyond augmenting JNA/TO manpower. Each
JNA brigade or TO “brigade” equivalent likely had one to two detachments of 200 to 300 personnel. The
volunteer troops generally had the same royalist, irresponsible, and cut-throat attitudes as their
counterparts in Eastern Slavonia (some units served in both sectors, having transferred to Western Slavonia
after the fall of Vukovar). A reporter visiting a “Chetnik” volunteer unit in the Papuk Mountains, southwest
of Podravska Slatina, in early December described its personnel as “social misfits”. They carried a black flag
with skull and crossbones and chanted Chetnik slogans, such as “I’ll gouge out their eyes and cut off their
ears”, or “surround them, take them alive, and massacre them”.

270
undisciplined and unreliable throughout the campaign. The TO leadership failed to create
cohesive combat units from the village guards who made up the force, unlike their ZNG
counterparts, and few TO units were able to defend any position without the presence of
JNA combat units.626 Charged with defending more territory than its manpower could cover,
the TO would find that its glaring military deficiencies meant that the revamped ZNG and
MUP could drive Serb forces from most of Western Slavonia.627
The Croatians’ successful defence of Western Slavonia and their occupation of large
areas hinged on the way they capitalized on the elements of superior morale, rapid
organization and deployment of manpower, captured heavy weapons, and operational-level
planning. At the outset of the JNA campaign it was the high morale of local reserve units and
the stiffening of professional Guards and Special Police troops that allowed them to contain
the JNA advance. ZNG/MUP personnel were able to use the villages that dotted the JNA’s
advance route as strongholds to slow them down. This bought time for the ZNG to mobilize
and arm more troops with newly captured small arms and integrate the heavy weapons
seized from JNA barracks, and these new formations were readily controlled by the new
Croatian corps and division-level command structures. The creation of effective command
staffs was especially important for the Croatians’ offensive operations. The staffs of the 2nd
Bjelovar Operational Zone and its operational groups devised effective and workable
campaign and tactical-level attack plans.628 These improvements allowed the combined
ZNG/MUP forces to crush the weak TO units wherever they were encountered. They
remained insufficient, however, to achieve any more than local victories against the
firepower and professionalism of the JNA.629
Throughout Croatia, both the Croatians and the JNA used special shock units –
Guards, military police, Special Police, reconnaissance-sabotage, or “intervention” elements
– to spearhead attacks by larger, regular formations. These methods were clearly apparent
in ZNG/MUP operations in Western Slavonia. Most ZNG formations were reserve units
whose ranks were filled with older, less able men. The ZNG therefore larded its reserve

626
The TO’s (temporarily) successful defence of its positions near Podravska Slatina is the only exception to
this.
627
The SAO Western Slavonia Government (and others) claim that the JNA betrayed the TO is absurd.
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 December 1991. The JNA barely had enough forces to hold the Novska-Pakrac-Nova
Gradiska triangle, let alone the immense mountain areas north of Pakrac.
628
The 2nd Bjelovar OZ campaign plan, by directing their main effort against those areas defended only by the
TO while making holding attacks against the JNA, allowed the Croatians to focus their strengths on the
weakest links in the Federal force. At the tactical level, most of the Croatians’ multi-brigade operations
used concentric or converging attacks along key roads, usually cutting off an isolated salient or forcing the
Serb TO to stretch its already limited reserves more thinly.
629
General Tus, Chief of the Croatian Main Staff, claimed in a 1996 interview that the cease-fire that ended
the war prevented the ZNG from retaking all of Western Slavonia; he said: “ZNG/MUP troops could have
reached the Sava River in another five to seven days”. Considering the ZNG’s performance against JNA
troops between Pakrac and Novska, it seems highly unlikely that they could have succeeded in driving the
5th Corps back into Bosnia. Croatian troops scored some moderate successes against the JNA, but Croatian
troops in 1991 did not have the ability to overcome the JNA’s firepower, as demonstrated during the attack
on the Pakrac-Okucani road. Igor Alborghetti: In Peactime Croatia Will Have Only 50.000 Soldiers, Zagreb
Globus, 31 May 1996, pp. 15-17, 59. An interview with General Anton Tus.

271
brigades and independent battalions with “elite” sub-units of reconnaissance, sabotage, and
intervention companies or platoons composed of younger men and volunteers. These
soldiers were not elite in the sense that professional armies use the term; most probably
had no more training than their comrades and differed from them only in their motivation
and youth. By concentrating these qualities, however, the ZNG/MUP were able to maximize
the effect of their manpower advantages. A typical order of battle for a Croatian attack
might consist of two or three reserve brigades, plus some independent infantry battalions,
which would provide the bulk of the manpower. One or two Guards battalions and/or
Special Police units interspersed along the line would attempt to seize the main objective,
while the reserve formations, led by their “elite” sub-units, would advance alongside.

272
 Annex 19
Banija-Kordun-Lika Operations – Consolidating Greater
Serbia
The fighting in Banija, Kordun, and Lika consisted primarily of local operations by
which SAO Krajina TO and JNA units from Operational Group-1 were able to consolidate the
Krajina’s control between Petrinja and Knin. The largest attack was the JNA’s operation to
capture the large Croatian-held pocket around Slunj, south of Karlovac, during October-
November. The JNA’s originally planned Karlovac campaign to drive toward the Slovenian
border near the city failed to materialize because of mobilization problems.

Banija
The fighting in Banija from September through December evolved into two phases.
The first period consisted of the initial JNA/TO effort to evict Croatian pockets south of the
Kupa River and secure the river as a defensive line. This phase was followed by a period of
more or less static trench warfare marked by regular exchanges of artillery and small arms
fire against defensive positions, towns, and villages, punctuated by occasional small probes
by both sides aimed at improving their positions along the main Kupa River line.
The first move of the Banija TO (7th Banija Division) was to follow up its 13
September victory in Kostajnica, which had ended the its summer campaign, and seize the
key town of Petrinja.630 The opening of the Croatian offensive against the JNA barracks on
14 September provided convenient timing for the TO’s move and gave them decisive JNA
support. On 16 September an estimated 1.200 troops from the Petrinja TO attacked
Croatian positions in and around the town, supported by elements of the JNA 622nd
Motorized Brigade. By 22 September, Federal forces had pushed Croatian units – estimated
at 650 to 750 personnel from 2nd Guards Brigade and the Sisak Special Police – out of the
town to positions some one to three kilometers north along the Kupa River or east toward
the key industrial town of Sisak.631 In addition, TO troops southwest of Petrinja pushed to
within five kilometers of Sisak. Meanwhile, the arrival of a JNA composite brigade from
Serbia on 21 September allowed the TO to launch an attack northwest of Glina, pushing
Croatian forces away from the town and securing the Kupa River line and the Glina River
valley some 10 kilometers north of Glina. The combined JNA/TO force accomplished this by
5 October.
October marked the beginning of a second, more static phase of the hostilities. As
noted, this period was characterized by persistent low-level clashes under a steady barrage
of Federal harassment shelling of Croatian towns, villages, and defensive positions. Both
sides also conducted a number of minor attacks, nearly all centred on the loop of the Kupa

630
Petrinja had a pre-war population of some 18.000, split almost evenly between Croatians and Serbs.
631
Croatian forces had already withdrawn from two salients deep in Serb-held territory, near Topusko and
Hrvatska Dubica, beginning on 16 September.

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River, northwest of Petrinja. In the first attack, on 18 October, a JNA armour battalion and a
TO infantry battalion – and possibly elements of the JNA 592nd Motorized Brigade arriving
from Macedonia – tried to clear a tenacious Croatian bridgehead in the river loop.632 The
attack failed. About 10 days later, elements of the 2nd Guards Brigade, forming the point of
as many as 5.500 troops from three or four brigades, attacked in the same area and pushed
JNA/TO forces back about two or three kilometers. Fighting carried over into November,
with the Croatian forces, still led by the 1st Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade, penetrating
another two to three kilometers against TO troops and probably the 592nd Motorized
Brigade, reaching the village of Glinska Poljana by 14 November.633
The last major battle in Banija worth noting was the ZNG’s Operation “Vihor”
(Whirlwind). The bold but ill-fated operation began about 8 December and had died by the
15th. The 102nd Novi Zagreb Brigade, probably with elements of the 2nd Guards Brigade
and Special Police units, began the attack from a point along the Kupa River near Pokupsko.
The objective was to cross the Kupa and break out of the bridgehead toward Glina and the
Glina-Petrinja road, and perhaps even cut off JNA/TO forces in the Kupa River loop
northwest of Petrinja.634 The operation proved as disastrous as it had been ambitious. JNA
and TO forces, probably including elements of the JNA’s 592nd Motorized Brigade, appear
to have ambushed the force shortly after it crossed the Kupa, and the ZNG units
disintegrated. At least 17 soldiers from the 102nd Brigade drowned in the hasty retreat
across the river.635 With the operation’s failure, the frontline in Banija remained deadlocked
for the rest of the war.

Karlovac – Kordun
As part of its nationwide strategic offensive the JNA had originally planned a major
thrust to the Slovenian border in the Karlovac area to cut Zagreb off from southern Croatia,
but the failures of the reserve call-up left the army with far too few men to deploy for the
operation, and it was scratched.636 The JNA in the Karlovac-Kordun area, operating with or
in support of the Serb TO, had to be satisfied with lesser operations against Slunj (see
below), attacks to relieve JNA barracks in and around Karlovac, and actions to consolidate
Serb-held territory to the south and southwest. The fighting in this part of Croatia was

632
The 592nd Motorized Brigade was garrisoned in Kumanovo, Macedonia as part of the 42nd (Kumanovo)
Corps. The brigade or elements of the brigade probably began to arrive in mid-October.
633
Neven Miladin: The Strength of the Black Mambas, Zagreb Velebit, 26 January 1996, pp. 16-17.
634
Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita Naklada, 1996, p. 193
635
General Bobetko, then an adviser to the Croatian Ministry of Defence, and a General Budimir, then a
colonel, continue to exchange public recriminations over the operation. Bobetko blamed Budimir in his
memoirs for the disaster, accusing him of poor planning, while Budimir has defended himself in the press.
See Zeljko Grgurinovic: Action Stopped on Demand of the Americans? Why Croatian Army Action “Una”
Failed, in September 1995, About Which Generals Bobetko and Cervenko Still Polemicize, Zagreb Obzor, 13
September 1997, pp. 32-33.
636
General Kadijevic notes that missions for the Karlovac grouping “had to be curtailed” because only one of
the four brigades earmarked for the operation, in addition to the locally available forces, arrived. Army
General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993, p. 139.

274
characterized by constant low-level clashes – especially around the barracks – that included
sniping, harassing fire, feints and counter-feints, JNA/TO shelling of the city that continued
throughout the war, and occasional focused attacks. The first of the small-scale attacks
began about 5 October, probably upon the arrival of the JNA 9th Motorized Brigade from
Serbia.637 Over three days, JNA and Vojnic TO troops pushed through Karlovac’s southern
suburbs and relieved two besieged barracks.638 JNA and TO forces were now some three to
five kilometers from the centre of town, although the Korana River blocked them from
seizing it quickly. Meanwhile, some 25 kilometers east of Karlovac, JNA and TO forces took
Lasinja, the last Croatian-held town south of the Kupa between Karlovac and Petrinja, on 8
October.639 On 4 or 5 November the JNA launched another operation, on a 10-kilometer
front, toward the suburb of Duga Resa. This probably was designed to encircle Karlovac on
three sides, and possibly achieve the original JNA goal of cutting northern Croatia off from
the south. Over the course of three days JNA troops slogged forward to make some
incremental gains.640 On 8 November, however, a Croatian counterattack led by elements of
the 2nd Guards Brigade appears to have put a halt to the advance.641

Capture of Slunj
The Croatian-held pocket around the town of Slunj, on the boundary of the Lika and
Kordun areas, blocked the Croatian Serbs from linking up the regions they held to the north
and the south. It was a key objective for their forces, which were now openly joined by the
JNA.642 Early in October JNA/TO forces began nibbling at the enclave, seizing some outlying
villages about 25 kilometers southeast of Slunj near the Bosnian border. A concerted effort
to take the town began in early November. Pushing primarily from the Plitvice Lakes area to

637
The 9th Motorized Brigade from Zajecar. Although the JNA maintained a large number of barracks and
other storage facilities in Karlovac, few of them housed combat units. Any large-scale combat operations
would require the JNA to bring in units from outside the region.
638
The Federal forces involved probably numbered 1.000 to 2.000 troops from the 9th Motorized Brigade, and
up to 1.200 TO troops, supported by elements of the 580th Mixed Artillery Brigade. They faced the 3rd
Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade, major elements of the 110th Karlovac Brigade, and Karlovac Special Police,
probably some 2.000 to 3.000 troops (forces available for front-line duty may have been diminished by the
necessity to monitor hold-out JNA barracks).
639
Lieutenant Colonel Mile Novakovic, with a small armored-mechanized force – probably at most a battalion
with some local TO troops – captured the areas north of the town of Vrginmost, almost certainly including
Lasinja. Novakovic went on to become the SVK General Staff chief in 1993 after serving as a tactical group
commander in Bosnia during 1992. Jovanka Simic: Intrigues Because of Politics, Belgrade Vecernje Novosti,
15 October 1993, p. 2. An interview with Major General Mile Novakovic.
640
The operation probably involved one to two JNA battalions from the 9th Motorized Brigade, two TO
battalions, and a JNA armored battalion, possibly some 2.000 to 3.000 troops.
641
Simultaneously, the besieged JNA garrison at the nearby Logoriste barracks, including a number of T-34
tanks, attempted to break out. Some elements reached JNA/TO lines, but most of the tanks were knocked
out, after which the Croatians seized the barracks. ZNG forces were drawn from the 3rd Battalion / 2nd
Guards Brigade, elements of the 103rd Zagora Brigade, most of the 137th Duga Resa Brigade, and the 2nd
Battalion / 150th Zagreb-Crnomerec Brigade, probably at least 3.000 troops.
642
Croatian forces in Slunj appear to have been cut off in late August or early September. It is unclear whether
the Croatians were able to infiltrate men and supplies into the enclave after the main road between Slunj
and the Croatian-held town of Ogulin had been severed.

275
the south, JNA and TO troops gradually worked their way in toward Slunj, which fell on 16-
18 November. The surviving Croatian defenders fell back toward the Bosnian border, near
the small town of Cetingrad, about seven kilometers southwest of the town of Velika
Kladusa, where Federal forces overran them on 27 November. But many of the Croatian
ZNG and MUP fighters chose internment in Bosnia over surrender to the JNA or the local
Serbs.
The JNA/TO operation to take Slunj typified the nature and scope of the vicious,
small-scale actions that characterized the war in the Banija-Kordun-Lika regions. By late
October the JNA had begun preparations for a major assault to close the pocket.643 To
control the operation the JNA appears to have formed two tactical group headquarters and
began to move reinforcements into the area. Colonel Cedomir Bulat was to command
Tactical Group-2 along the primary attack axis.644 The reinforcements included most of an
armoured battalion from the 329th Armoured Brigade, elements of a newly arrived partisan
brigade, and a D-30 howitzer battalion.645 Meanwhile, the 236th Motorized Brigade, the
bulk of which was deployed near Gospic, moved elements – probably a reinforced
motorized battalion – into position. These forces, together with about a battalion of TO
troops from Korenica and one from Plaski, probably were formed into two to four
reinforced battalion battle groups and were to attack the pocket from positions about 20
kilometers directly south of Slunj, near the Plitvice lakes.646 Exempted from the assault were
the JNA forces at the Slunj training area 10 to 15 kilometers west / southwest of town,
which appear to have been assigned the defensive role of containing the ZNG/MUP forces

643
JNA/TO troops from the Korenica area began encroaching on parts of the pocket near the Bosnian border
in early October, after Croatian forces mortared the JNA RV i PVO Bihac Air Base. JNA armored units from
the 329th Armored Brigade and TO troops attacked and ruthlessly destroyed the village of Vaganac on 9
October; they were supported by RV i PVO air strikes from Bihac. Dreznik Grad and two or three more
villages suffered similar fates on 10-12 October. A JNA NCO at the air base told a Belgrade magazine that
“Vaganac is wiped out, and little is left of Dreznik ...”. Uros Komlenovic: General Ljubomir Bajic: A Flying
Prince Marko, Belgrade Nin, 18 October 1991, pp. 30-31.
644
The 45-year-old Bulat was born in Karlovac and had served at nearly all levels of command in the JNA, from
platoon leader to brigade commander. He graduated from the JNA Military Academy in 1967, from the JNA
command-staff school in 1978, and the JNA’s war college equivalent in 1987. He also taught at the military
training center in Sarajevo and at the Centre of Military Colleges in Belgrade in the operations department.
Bulat was serving on the Fifth Military District staff when war broke out but eventually took command of
the 21 st Kordun Corps of the Krajina Serb Army (SVK). He was forced to surrender much of the corps to the
Croatian Army in 1995 after his forces had been cut off near Karlovac. But they had fought well compared
to other parts of the SVK. M. P.: We Do Not Want Karlovac – For the Time Being, Belgrade Intervju, 3
September 1993, pp. 20-22. An interview with Colonel Cedomir Bulat. See also International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial
Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002.
<www.un.org/icty/latst/ index. htm> accessed June 2002. pp. 92-93, which draws on a 1 November 1991
order issued by Bulat as commander of TG-2 for the operation against Saborsko. Bulat’s new tactical group
appears to have reported to either Operational Group “Lika” or Operational Group “Kordun“, which in turn
were under the command of OG-1.
645
The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29.
646
The Lika TO was known as the ”6th Lika Division”, a historic World War II Partisan unit from the area. The
TO had adopted the 6th Lika title for the same reasons that the Banija TO had taken on the 7th Banija
Division moniker.

276
there.647 The tactical group probably numbered 3.000 to 3.500 troops in total, with about 20
tanks, 10 APCs, and 18 artillery pieces. Little is known about the structure and number of
Croatian forces in the pocket, but probably they numbered no more than 1.000 ill-equipped
local or volunteer ZNG troops and special or regular police, with perhaps a sprinkling of
village guards carrying their hunting rifles.
The JNA’s slow drive toward Slunj began in early November, as Bulat’s tactical
group converged on the town, systematically destroying Croatian villages in its path. The
JNA/TO advance appears to have featured successive drives by the reinforced battle groups,
each moving along a main road and probably led by a company of armour and/or self-
propelled air defence vehicles; flanking infantry probably were detailed to clear the areas
alongside the road. On approaching a Croatian village, tank and artillery fire would suppress
any defenders and scare away the residents; the JNA and TO then burned the village. RV i
PVO fighter-bombers supplemented these attacks.
The JNA’s road-bound methods and limited infantry, however, made Bulat’s force
vulnerable to Croatian hit-and-run attacks from the region’s heavily forested hills and
mountains, and attacks like these appear to have slowed the advance. The main push, from
the Plitvice Lakes area toward Slunj, had barely reached the outskirts of Rakovica by 12
November – an advance of only two or three kilometers. The secondary attack toward
Saborsko also moved slowly. Over the next week, however, the advance gained momentum
and finally rolled over Slunj and its surrounding villages between 16 and 18 November.648
Over the next ten days JNA and TO troops slowly pursued Croatian forces retreating toward
the last Croatian stronghold at Cetingrad, on the Bosnian border. It fell on 27 November.

Gospic – Lika
Most of the fighting near the town of Gospic and throughout the Lika region
consisted of minor contests for control of villages and key local terrain. There were no
battles even on the scale of Slunj, and the lines established during the late summer fighting
essentially marked the frontline throughout the fall and winter of 1991. The biggest event
was the Croatian forces’ expulsion of JNA, TO, and volunteer forces from Gospic. Croatian
and Serb TO forces had been fighting in and around the eastern and south-eastern parts of
the town since August. With the shift in Croatian strategy to attack JNA barracks, the ZNG
118th Gospic Brigade and Gospic Special Police went over to the offensive, taking the main
barracks on 20 September and clearing Gospic by 22 September. The fighting in Lika,
although at times intense, now shifted into a series of local actions by both sides to improve

647
The 65th Protection Motorized Regiment was the bodyguard force for the Fifth Military District
headquarters and presumably had troops available at the Slunj training area for the operation.
648
A reporter from the independent Belgrade newspaper Borba on the scene observed the destruction on 16
November; Zagreb Radio also identified several of the villages and claimed that the JNA had almost
completely destroyed them. Zagreb Radio, 22 November 1991. Observations of the Slunj area in 1995, after
Croatian forces had recaptured the town, bore out the damages the Croatians claimed Federal forces had
inflicted on the area in 1991. “House after house in Slunj was leveled to the extent that little more than
rubble remained“, while Slunj’s old town had been almost completely destroyed.

277
their tactical positions in and around the key Croatian-held towns of Gospic and Otocac: the
Croatians in particular hoped to shove Serb troops further out of range. Battles of this
nature were to last until the January 1992 ceasefire.

278
 Annex 20
Zadar – Northern Dalmatia Operations649
The primary mission of JNA forces in Northern Dalmatia in the strategic offensive
was to sever the land connections between the Dalmatian coast and northern Croatia.
Accomplishing that mission with relative ease by early September, the JNA 9th Corps turned
its attention to relieving the besieged barracks in Zadar. The opposing Croatian forces were
no match for the corps’ firepower and aggressive battlefield leadership.

The 9th Corps Attacks – September to October

Now under the command of Major General Vladimir Vukovic, the 9th Corps in its
offensive operations displayed the same drive and initiative it had shown in its earlier
attacks in support of the local Serbs.650 On 16 September, the corps, supported by local TO
troops, mounted three attacks, a brigade-sized drive toward Zadar city and two smaller
pushes toward Sibenik and Drnis. The 180th Motorized Brigade’s attack on Zadar, launched
from near Benkovac, rapidly moved to within about seven kilometers of the city, relieving
the besieged Zemunik Air Base the same day.651 There elements of the ZNG 4th Guards and
112th Zadar Brigades managed to hold up the JNA for a time.652 When the 180th, possibly
reinforced by elements of the 221st Motorized Brigade, renewed the attack on 2 October it
again broke through the Croatian defences and pushed to the edge of town, virtually cutting
it off by 7 October.653 The success of the JNA assault persuaded Croatian political and
military authorities in Zadar to allow the remaining JNA garrisons to withdraw with their
equipment. This was completed on 21 October.654
Some 45 kilometers to the southeast, Lieutenant Colonel Lisica and elements of his
221st Motorized Brigade and Captain Dragan’s Special Police made the corps’ second-most
important attack – a drive toward Sibenik and the blockaded JNA/JRM facilities there.655 A
successful assault here would also sever the important Adriatic Highway. The Croatian 113th
Sibenik Brigade and Sibenik Special Police, however, managed to halt Lisica’s troops near

649
As in earlier sections, accounts of daily events are drawn heavily from contemporary press reporting –
Zagreb Radio, Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug.
650
Vukovic replaced Major General Spiro Nikovic on 16 September, the same day the corps offensive began.
651
Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Zivanovic commanded the 180th Motorized Brigade. Zivanovic was promoted
to full colonel on 7 October 1991 in recognition of his leadership during these operations. Zivanovic later
served as the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army’s Drina Corps for much of the Bosnian war, retiring just
before the capture of Srebrenica in 1995.
652
Gordan Lausic and Dejan Frigelj: St. Krsevan and 112th Defending Zadar, Hrvatski Vojnik, 18 June 1993, p.
14.
653
Simultaneously with the new attack at Zadar, the 9th Corps seized a chunk of the Miljevac Plateau,
probably as a diversionary move. The plateau, some 10 kilometers west of Drnis and 15 to 20 kilometers
northeast of Sibenik, was important to consolidating JNA positions around Drnis, as well as providing the
JNA a potential jump-off point toward Sibenik.
654
Zagreb Radio, 21 October 1991.
655
The 221st probably employed a reinforced motorized battalion with roughly a company of armor.

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the town of Vodice and a key bridge on the Adriatic Highway leading into Sibenik.656 Heavy
fighting continued in the area until 22 September, when the JNA appears to have called off
its attack.
The 9th Corps, augmenting its forces with some troops from the 221st, made
another drive some 20 kilometers south of Knin and 25 kilometers northeast of Sibenik to
take the key road junctions near Drnis and rescue the JNA depot near the town. JNA forces
quickly seized the approaches to Drnis on 16 September, relieving the depot and seizing the
road junction around the village of Oklaj on 18 September. The ZNG 114th Split Brigade
could do little to counter the JNA’s armour and artillery. After Drnis itself fell on 21
September, JNA troops from the 221st hit Croatian forces around Sinj, opening the way for
the corps’s engineer regiment to withdraw from its barracks.657 The Croatians permitted the
pullout on 27 September.658

Local Operations – October to January

After the completion of their main operations, Vukovic and Mladic launched a
series of small-scale operations during November, December, and early January that the
Croatian troops were unable to counter. The first and largest of these occurred between
Zadar and Benkovac, near the villages of Skabrnje and Nadin. The JNA, probably supported
by local TO forces, kicked off the attack on 18 November, seizing over 100 square kilometers
of ground by 22 November. The territory expanded and helped secure the JNA’s previously
narrow salient toward Zadar as well as the Serb-held town of Benkovac. On 20 November,
JNA or TO troops made a small attack 20 kilometers north of Sibenik to straighten the line in
that area as well. The 9th Corps ended the year with a push to expand its salient near Zadar,
this time to the north, capturing possibly 75 square kilometers of ground around the small,
inland Novigrad Sea. The corps made one last attack after the final cease-fire was to have
gone into effect, on 3 January, when JNA troops attempted to grab the town of Unesic,
about 15 kilometers south of Drnis, and the key hills near the town. The last-minute
operation was probably designed to broaden the defence of the approaches to Drnis and
the main route toward Knin, but the ZNG 114th Split Brigade threw it back.659
656
V.P.: They Resisted Heroically, Zagreb Velebit, 20 September 1996, p. 11. Lieutenant Colonel Lisica, who
commanded the attack, later stated:
Mladic said: ”go to the bridge”. At the beginning, no one realized that this was a real war in which
lives would be lost. In order to get [my troops] moving, I secretly arranged with our artillery officer to
shell our own positions and headquarters. He was astonished: how can I shell our own people? I gave
the order, but if any one was killed, bravo. When headquarters was finished off, I told the fighters,
you see what they are doing to us. That is how I motivated them, and in two hours we covered 20
kilometers and reached the Sibenik bridge.
Ljubomir Grubic: Pulling Down the Pants, Nin, 23 July 1993, pp. 12-14. An interview with Major General
Slavko Lisica.
657
The commander of the engineer regiment, Colonel Mico Vlaisavljevic, later served as chief of staff of the
VRS 2nd Krajina Corps in western Bosnia during most of the Bosnian war.
658
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 September 1991.
659
Oddly, there is no mention of this attack in any of the contemporary press accounts. It figures prominently,
however, in Hrvatski Vojnik and Slobodna Dalmacija articles on the 114th Brigade. See Damir Dukic: The

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 Evaluation of JNA Operations and the Croatian Response
Overall, the JNA dominated this sector throughout the fall phase of the conflict, just
as it had during the summer. Vukovic and Mladic together handled the 9th Corps boldly.
Mladic in particular demonstrated the inspired leadership that was to later earn him the
adulation of the entire Bosnian Serb Army. He was ever present in the frontlines, visiting
units, moving to and from across the battlefield. The corps’ “always attacking” attitude
perfectly matched Mladic’s temperament. Given the corps’ extensive frontage, spanning
roughly 180 kilometers, and its limited striking power, the JNA’s continual attacks kept the
Croatians off balance and prevented them from taking the initiative to exploit Federal
weaknesses.660 At the tactical level, the 9th Corps methods were those employed elsewhere
by the infantry-poor JNA, bludgeoning the enemy out of position with massed firepower to
minimize the need for infantry assaults. Much of the fighting involved the JNA’s efforts to
capture key villages along major lines of communication; the JNA push toward Zadar, for
example, required the seizure of a number of villages along the main roads into town.
Standard JNA practice upon approaching a village was to order a preparatory bombardment
with artillery and/or multiple rocket launchers, possibly augmented by air strikes. The
infantry would then move into the village supported by tanks firing their main guns to clear
the advance. If an attack was held up, JNA artillery would re-prep the target, relying on
massed fire to overcome the enemy and spare the infantry.
ZNG and MUP forces were unable to match the firepower and operational skill of
the 9th Corps. The ZNG forces first mustered between Zadar and Sinj included only three
reserve brigades, plus the 4th Guards Brigade, whose battalions had been dispersed in
support of the reserve brigades. Working with the more experienced MUP, these troops
were sufficient to contain the local TO forces, but when the JNA’s mobile forces showed up
with their armour and artillery ZNG/MUP units could not stand up to the firepower or repel
the JNA’s well-led, spirited attacks.

Scorpions in Defence of Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, pp. 16-18 and Zoran Vukman: Victorious Trail
On All Battlefields, Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 June 1996, p. 8.
660
The JNA could also call on the local TO. TO forces appear to have figured less prominently in 9th Corps
operations than elsewhere, but overall the local “brigades” were used to help defend what the two
motorized brigades and Captain Dragan’s Special Police battalion, 9th Corps’s mobile forces, had captured.

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 Annex 21
Dubrovnik – Southern Dalmatia Operations661
As discussed earlier, the JNA General Staff had originally planned for two sub-
operations in southern Dalmatia, one toward Split and one toward Dubrovnik. Troop
deficiencies caused by mobilization problems and subsequent political difficulties in Bosnia,
however, were such that only the Dubrovnik campaign would go forward.662 General
Kadijevic has described the mission of the JNA around Dubrovnik:
Under the modified plan of operation, the mission of the Trebinje-Herzegovina
grouping was to liberate Prevlaka, to impose a land blockade on the broader Dubrovnik
area, and to be ready for actions in the direction of the mouth of the Neretva. Thanks
to successful mobilizations in eastern Herzegovina and Montenegro, the grouping got
the forces envisaged for this mission.663
These forces comprised two motorized brigades, one mountain brigade, some five
partisan brigades, and a corps-level artillery regiment, probably about 28.000 personnel
organized in combat formations supplemented with some 2.000 unruly volunteer troops.664
They operated under the command of the 2nd (Titograd) Corps and the 9th (Boka Kotorska)
Military-Maritime Sector (9th VPS).665 These two corps-size elements were under the overall
control of Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar’s “Herzegovina” Operational Group 2,
which had been formed from the Headquarters, Montenegrin Territorial Defence. The
campaign plan called for the JNA to advance in two main columns. The first, controlled by
the 9th VPS, was to push directly up the coast to clear the Konavli area, seize Dubrovnik
airport, and then lay siege to the city. Other forces would make supporting attacks from
Bosnia directly north of Dubrovnik. The second advance, to be led by the 2nd Corps, would
strike toward the coastal towns of Ston and Slano to sever the Adriatic Highway to
Dubrovnik, some 25 to 30 kilometers northwest of Dubrovnik, and cut off the city from
reinforcements and the rest of Croatia. The Yugoslav Navy (JRM) was to provide fire support
and other assistance along the coast, while blockading Dubrovnik’s port.
The JNA completely outmanned and outgunned the forces the Croatians could field
near Dubrovnik-Konavli. And because the JNA had only a few facilities in the Dubrovnik area

661
As in earlier sections, contemporary press sources – Zagreb Radio, Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug
provide the bulk of day-to-day information on combat operations.
662
For a discussion of the problems afflicting the Mostar-Split sub-operation, see the Mostar-Split / Dubrovnik
section in Annex 13 JNA Campaign Plans and Organization, July – September 1991.
663
Army General Veljko Kadijevic: Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Belgrade, 1993, p. 140.
664
On 2 October, Belgrade Tanjug reported that Niksic had raised 1.000 volunteers, while Belgrade Radio
reported on 5 October that Kotor had raised 250 volunteers and Cetinje 320 volunteers.
665
The 2nd Corps and 9th Sector may have been grouped together as Operational Group “Dubrovnik”, which
also appears to have been in charge of the overall operation as the Operational Group formed from the
2nd Corps headquarters.

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before the war, the Croatians’ barracks blockades would have yielded fewer weapons.666
Originally, the Croatians probably had no more than 1.000 armed personnel for the defence
of the Dubrovnik-Konavli area, mostly MUP regular police and a number of volunteers,
including some hastily armed merchant sailors.667 By November, perhaps 1.000 more
volunteers had infiltrated into the city to assist in its defence.668 Overall, the Croatian
defence effort, led by the Ministry of Defence’s local secretariat and the MUP Dubrovnik
Police Administration, was poorly organized and haphazardly controlled, providing no
centralized communications to direct the inadequate defence forces.
In the Slano-Ston area, Croatian forces were able to deploy more troops, organized
into actual ZNG combat units. Initially, the ZNG had about one brigade-equivalent, drawn
from battalion-and company-sized units in Ploce-Metkovic and Makarska and reinforced by
the 115th Imotski Brigade soon after the fighting started – probably about 4.000 troops. This
force grew to as many as 8.000 men during November, under the command of the ZNG
Southern Sector, with the arrival of the 114th Split Brigade and the activation of full
brigades from both Metkovic and Makarska. But, as always, they were outgunned by the
JNA.

The Occupation of Konavli and Cavtat, 1 to 22 October

The JNA did not actually launch its operation until 1 October, taking two weeks to
mobilize and deploy the Montenegrin JNA and TO reservists called for in the army’s
campaign plan and augmenting them with volunteer units.669 Montenegrin and
Herzegovinian troops from the 9th VPS – primarily the 5th and 472nd Motorized Brigades,
plus the 1st Niksic Partisan TO Brigade – quickly pushed up the narrow neck of Konavli
supported by naval gunfire and brushed aside weak Croatian resistance.670 By 5 October the

666
Vice Admiral Miodrag Jokic has said that the JNA had pulled a combat brigade out of Dubrovnik in the
1960s and moved it to Trebinje. Todorovic: The Navy on the High Seas, Belgrade Borba, 17 March 1992, p.
9. An interview with Vice Admiral Miodrag Jokic, commander 9th VPS.
667
For example, one group of 12 merchant seamen were dispatched on foot to the Konavli area from
Dubrovnik armed with only four rifles among them.
668
The 114th Split Brigade infiltrated about 100 personnel into the city during late October. Damir Dukic: The
Scorpions in Defence of Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, pp. 16-18.
669
During late September, prior to the attack, Croatian and JNA forces had regularly skirmished near the JNA
facilities on the Prevlaka peninsula overlooking Kotor Bay.
670
The advance came from two directions. The 5th Motorized Brigade from Titograd (Podgorica), spearheaded
by an armored battalion, pushed from the Herceg Novi area in Montenegro along the main Adriatic
highway through Vitaljina, while troops from the Trebinje-based 472nd Motorized Brigade and 1st Niksic
Partisan TO Brigade attacked out of Herzegovina in the tri-border area along a more northerly, secondary
route. The attackers appear to have bypassed several potential pockets of resistance in Vitaljina and the
coastal town of Molunat, which JNA troops, probably MP units, mopped up on 4/5 October. The 1st Niksic
Brigade provides an example of the level of casualties suffered by the JNA during these opening moves,
losing 4 wounded on 1 October. S. Vulesevic: Time of Decisive Battles, Srpska Vojska, 26 August 1995, p. 36,
an article on the Bosnian Serb Army 1st Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, previously the JNA 472nd
Motorized Brigade; M. Vukosavljevic: An Unbridgeable Rampart Against the Enemy, Belgrade Vojska, 28
January 1998, pp. 8-9; War Bulletin, Belgrade Vojska, 28 January 1998, p. 9, articles on the 1st Niksic
Partisan TO Brigade.

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JNA had seized the Cilipi area, including Dubrovnik airport, having advanced some 15 to 20
kilometers up the coast. The overrunning of the airport and its duty free shops was the
occasion for what one JNA reservist called “the party of a lifetime”.671 The JNA appears to
have paused for the next week for reasons that are still unclear, while the festival of looting
continued. When the JNA made its next advance, on 15 October, against the resort town of
Cavtat some three kilometers from the airport, it took pains to avoid another spree of
systematic plunder, using special operations troops and Military Police rather than the
reserve units responsible for the previous excesses.672 It also spared the town the usual
artillery preparation. Nevertheless, shops were still stripped, JNA troops abused and
arrested many local people, and there were many discreet thefts of money and valuables.673
Over the next week JNA troops slowly moved up the coast from Cavtat, taking additional
resort villages, such as Plat, and getting ready to lay siege to Dubrovnik itself.

Slano – Ston Operations, 1 October – 1 January 1992

While the 9th VPS was moving directly on Dubrovnik, the 2nd (Titograd) Corps,
supported by nearby elements of the 37th Corps and the JRM, moved to cut off the city and
its environs from the rest of Croatia. The Montenegrin corps struck first toward the town of
Slano on the Adriatic highway, battling Croatian troops from Metkovic and Makarska near
the village of Cepikuce.674 Although Slano itself appears to have held out until 7 October, the
highway was cut sooner, possibly as early as 2 October. After this victory, the 2nd Corps was
supposed to make a push to the northwest.
Typical of the attackers’ overall performance in October, when the JNA either did
not attack vigorously or slowed against stiff Croatian defences, the 2nd Corps managed only
to consolidate its positions along a line running from Cepikuce through the village of Lisac to
the Adriatic during the month. It also discovered that the ZNG had moved forces into
Herzegovina, between the villages of Hutovo and Ravno, threatening the right flank of the
JNA 2nd Corps. To meet this threat OG 2 apparently shifted the 1st Niksic Partisan TO
Brigade from the Konavli area under the 9th VPS to the 2nd Corps area. During the period
16-20 October, the brigade succeeded in clearing the Ravno area and stabilized a line in
Herzegovina, south of Hutovo Lake, roughly along the Trebisnjica River.675
In November the force of 7.000 to 10.000 JNA mountain and partisan troops
appears to have pushed north only slowly against the estimated 6.000 to 8.000 men of the

671
Misha Glenny: The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, London Penguin Books, 1992, p. 133.
672
Belgrade Radio, Belgrade Tanjug, 15 October 1991; Dragan Todorovic: Miodrag Jokic, Retired Vice Admiral,
On Charges That He Was A War Profiteer and Poor Commander: I Prevented Looting On the Battlefield,
Belgrade Borba, 2 June 1993, p. 14. An interview with Vice Admiral Modrag Jokic, commander, 9th VPS.
673
Silber and Little, p. 182; Glenny, p. 133-134.
674
The attack appears to have been led by the Niksic-based 179th Mountain Brigade, supported by one or two
Montenegrin TO partisan brigades, and elements of the 326th Mixed Artillery Regiment.
675
M. Vukosavljevic: An Unbridgeable Rampart Against the Enemy, Belgrade Vojska, 28 January 1998, pp. 8-9,
War Bulletin, Belgrade Vojska, 28 January 1998, p. 9, articles on the 1st Niksic Partisan TO Brigade. The 2nd
Corps commander claimed that Ravno had been “completely destroyed”. Belgrade RTV, 16 October 1991.

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ZNG.676 This drive included a thrust into Herzegovina toward Hutovo.677 By mid-December,
the 2nd Corps, with air and naval support, had driven some 10 kilometers further to the
northwest, and by the time of the January 1992 ceasefire had established the front line five
or ten kilometers from the town of Ston and the Bosnian port of Neum.678

Dubrovnik Under Siege, 22 October – 1 January 1992

Back near Dubrovnik, the JNA began its move to besiege the port city on 22
October with an amphibious assault by the 9th VPS on the town of Kupari, some 10
kilometers southeast of Dubrovnik’s old town.679 Over the next week JNA troops rolled over
the outlying suburbs and key hills to the southeast, while a supporting attack by 2nd Corps
finally broke through near the village of Osojnik, seven kilometers north of the city. As the
JNA approached, the city suffered increasing bouts of shelling, including some firing into the
old town. By 26 October, Zarkovica hill, looking directly over the city from the southeast,
had fallen to JNA assaults. The same day the JNA’s “Herzegovina” Operational Group 2
issued an ultimatum for the demilitarization of the city. In exchange the JNA offered an 11-
point proposal including promises that it would not enter the old town and would restore
water, electricity, and phone service.680 The Croatians rejected the ultimatum, the JNA
withdrew its proposal on 1 November, and the siege resumed, including more shelling of
various parts of the city.681 In an assault on 8-10 November JNA troops seized another key

676
The Croatian forces comprised the 114th Split Brigade, which was deployed to the area at the end of
October, the 115th Imotski Brigade, the 116th Metkovic Brigade (formed in November from independent
battalions), and the 156th Makarska Brigade (formed in November from independent battalions and
companies), plus probably at least one Special Police “battalion”. The 114th Split Brigade was redeployed
to positions near Drnis in December.
677
The 1st Niksic Partisan TO Brigade undertook this part of the operation, beginning on 21 November. The
attack – led by one tank platoon – went forward through the village of Zelinkovac, along the south side of
Hutovo Lake and had neared the outskirts of Hutovo when the brigade was informed that the JNA had
signed a cease-fire with the Croat-controlled Neum Municipality, inside Herzegovina. M. Vukosavljevic: An
Unbridgeable Rampart Against the Enemy, Belgrade Vojska, 28 January 1998, pp. 8-9; War Bulletin,
Belgrade Vojska, 28 January 1998, p. 9, articles on the 1st Niksic Partisan TO Brigade.
678
The brigade which appears to have served as the spearhead for this part of the operation, apparently the
1st Niksic Partisan TO Brigade (but possibly the 179th Mountain Brigade), came in for special praise in 1992
from then future Yugoslav Army General Staff chief Perisic. Perisic claimed that the brigade lost only 12
men killed in two months of combat operations, of which only half died in the front line. He claimed that
the brigade had very able commanders and was intelligently committed and used in combat. Miladin
Petrovic and Radovan Popovic: A Successful Officer is a Natural and Legitimate Leader, Belgrade Vojska, 24
September 1992, pp. 3-5. An interview with then Major General Momcilo Perisic.
679
The amphibious assault avoided a difficult advance overland around Zupa Bay between Cavtat and Kupari.
The road running through the resort villages of Plat, Mlini, and Sebreno went directly under cliffs rising
almost immediately to 400 to 600 meters in height, while dropping quickly off to the bay on the other side
of the road.
680
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 October 1991.
681
Belgrade Tanjug, 1 November 1991.
Vice Admiral Miodrag Jokic, in command of 9th VPS, stated in early 1992:
Back on 25 October, we arrived just outside Dubrovnik, and it was clear to us at that time, taking
for granted that we would not enter the city, that it would be a delicate matter to remain at the
approaches to the city, on sensitive overlooking positions ... and that this could be a possible source

285
hill overlooking Dubrovnik from the southeast. One of the most violent bombardments
came on 6 December, apparently during confused fighting on and around key positions on
Mount Srdj, in which an ancient fortress was destroyed and shells rained into the city.682
Admiral Jokic, commanding 9th VPS, later claimed that a local commander ordered the
shelling after one of his men was killed by Croatian troops on Srdj. He ruefully
acknowledged that the commander should have limited his actions to neutralizing the firing
positions responsible rather than destroying the old fortress and shelling the city.683 In any
case, both sides agreed to a ceasefire the next day, 7 December, and the JNA also agreed to
lift the naval blockade of the city.684 The ceasefire appears to have generally held until it
merged with the countrywide ceasefire in January 1992.

Evaluation of Combat Performance

Neither side’s combat performance from October through December 1991 can be
described as better than mediocre. The operations appear to have moved with sludge-like
slowness at times, partly because of the difficult terrain, but also probably because the JNA
lacked current experience in commanding, controlling, and moving large combat forces,
while the Croatian forces had no regular army to manoeuvre.
Overall, while the JNA was able to achieve the campaign’s military objectives, these
victories came at a political / public relations price that, combined with the international
opprobrium earned at Vukovar, did serious damage to the Federal cause as a whole (see
discussion of JNA excesses and their effect below). At the purely military level, the JNA’s
two-pronged campaign plan appears to have been well conceived, although a stronger
attack from Herzegovina directly toward Dubrovnik city might have effected a more rapid
opening and closing of the siege. The whole operation, in fact, appears to have been
conducted sluggishly; whether this was intentional and derived from political considerations
or was the undesired result of operational and tactical difficulties is unclear. At the tactical
level, JNA combat techniques centred, as elsewhere in Croatia, on artillery and mortar fire
power, which the JNA appears to have used prodigiously to make up for the deficient

of conflict. I insisted that the other side agree to demilitarization. When were just about to conduct
the negotiations, which we did not want to publicize, an order came down from Zagreb that there
was no question of this, that Dubrovnik was a part of sovereign Croatia, that the defence would be
strengthened ... A new team was sent for negotiations headed by Davorin Rudolf, the Minister [for
Navigation]. I asked him the reasons for this sudden change ... He answered me: We cannot have two
major defeats in so short a time, Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Had we agreed, in the manner envisaged,
everything would have been different.
Todorovic: The Navy on the High Seas, Belgrade Borba, 17 March 1992, p. 9. An interview with Vice Admiral
Miodrag Jokic.
682
Zagreb Radio, 6 December 1991; Belgrade Tanjug, 8 December 1991; Glenny, p. 135.
683
Todorovic: The Navy on the High Seas, Belgrade Borba, 17 March 1992, p. 9. An interview with Vice Admiral
Miodrag Jokic.
684
The JNA also agreed to pull its troops back from Mount Srdj and restore water and electricity. Zagreb
Radio, 7 December 1991. Belgrade Tanjug, 8 December 1991.

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training among line units dominated by hastily recalled reservists.685 The JNA used its single
available armour battalion effectively on the open Konavli plateau, but elsewhere the
mountainous terrain made the use of tanks almost impossible. The JNA also made effective
use of its naval dominance to block any substantial resupply of Dubrovnik proper and to
limit enemy movements along the coast, while using the JRM’s amphibious capability and
naval gunfire to facilitate ground operations.
Skimpy reporting and record-keeping on ZNG/MUP units and operations during this
period make it more difficult to gauge their performance around Dubrovnik. The scratch
forces defending the approaches to Dubrovnik city and Konavli appear to have done their
best to delay and harass the JNA’s advance, but the few ad hoc ZNG and MUP units available
were no match for the JNA formations arrayed against them. In the fighting around Slano-
Ston, the Croatians fielded much larger and better organized forces, and they exploited the
extremely difficult topography to put up fairly stiff resistance to the JNA. Despite this, the
JNA appears to have been able to drive the Croatians from their defensive positions when
and where it wanted. The Croatians’ lack of heavy weapons to counter JNA movements, and
its shortage of professional officers, meant that in a head-to head-fight the JNA would
eventually prevail.

685
One apparent exception to this was the cited JNA seizure – against almost no resistance – of Cavtat, and
several other villages northwest of Dubrovnik, using reconnaissance and Military Police units without any
artillery preparation.

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 Section III
Bosnia 1992

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 Annex 22
Organization of Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav People’s Army
Forces, April 1992
The Yugoslav People’s Army686
The chaos of the Slovenian and Croatian wars had caused considerable upheaval
within the JNA. Many of its units were in disarray after being forced to withdraw
precipitately from their barracks in Slovenia and Croatia, and the JNA was in the midst of
implementing the Vance Plan, which called for its complete withdrawal from Croatia. The
JNA’s strategic-level command structure reflected a geographical entity that no longer
existed, and so at the beginning of 1992 it undertook a major reorganization that began
with several major personnel shifts.687 The most prominent of these was the retirement of
the ailing General Veljko Kadijevic, who had served as Federal Defence Secretary throughout
the Yugoslav crisis, and his replacement as acting secretary by Colonel General Blagoje
Adzic, the Chief of the JNA General Staff. General Panic, the commander of the First Military
District in northern Serbia and eastern Croatia, became acting chief of the General Staff.688
Next came some complicated shuffling of military districts and corps areas. Prior to
the Croatian war, elements of three different military districts nominally commanded the
JNA formations garrisoned in or deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now the JNA moved
to consolidate command and control in the republic by reassigning responsibilities to a
revamped system of military districts. The former Fifth Military District headquarters in
Zagreb, Croatia, was re-designated the Second Military District (II VO) and relocated to
Sarajevo, from which it assumed command over all JNA forces in Bosnia proper (excluding
Herzegovina) and Croatia (excluding Eastern Slavonia and Dubrovnik). Colonel General
Milutin Kukanjac, previously commanding the Third Military District in Skopje, Macedonia,

686
For a detailed JNA order of battle as of 10 April 1992, see Chart 1
687
The JNA made the announcement regarding the reorganization on 3 January, based on a 30 December
Federal Presidency decision. The JNA reorganized into four military districts, plus the Navy and Air Force
and Air Defence:
First Military District, HQ Belgrade, under Colonel General Zivota Panic
Second Military District, HQ Sarajevo, under Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac
Third Military District, HQ Skopje, under Colonel General Nikola Uzelac
Fourth Military District, HQ Podogorica (Titograd), under Colonel General Pavle Strugar
Navy, HQ Kumbor, under Admiral Mile Kandic
AF and AD, HQ Belgrade, under Lieutenant Colonel General Bozidar Stevanovic
In addition, the former commander of Fifth Military District (now Second), Colonel General Zivota
Avramovic, became Deputy Federal Defence Secretary, replacing Admiral Stane Brovet, while Avramovic’s
former deputy, Colonel General Andrija Raseta, became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Belgrade Tanjug,
3 January 1992.
688
See Jovic entry for 31 December 1991, which notes Kadijevic’s resignation. Jovic indicates that he did not
entirely believe that health concerns were the only reason for his resignation; he implies that the impact of
the Yugoslav crisis had drained Kadijevic mentally. But Kadijevic also suffered from genuinely serious
medical problems.

289
was appointed commander of the Second.689 The JNA General Staff also formed a new
Fourth Military District (IV VO) from the headquarters of the Montenegrin Territorial
Defence, under Colonel General Pavle Strugar, who had led the operations around
Dubrovnik during the Croatian war.690 From its headquarters in Podgorica the Fourth District
controlled the JNA forces in Herzegovina as well as Montenegro (except for the coastal
areas under Navy command), and around Dubrovnik.
The JNA’s operational-level headquarters remained the corps, of which there were
now five with headquarters and major deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina – four under
the Second District and one under the Fourth. Most of the elements of two of these corps
were still deployed in Croatia during early 1992 – the 5th (Banja Luka) Corps and the 10th
(Bihac) Corps, headquartered in Bosnia. Finally, the Second Military District’s 9th (Knin)
Corps, whose headquarters and major units remained in Croatia, had one brigade stationed
in Bosnia. Elements of all these corps, including the entire 9th (Knin) Corps, would be
available when the JNA ordered mobilization for Bosnia and commenced operations in early
April.691
By early April, after the JNA had ordered mobilization, JNA ground and air combat
formations in Bosnia comprised the following major units (including those deployed to
Croatia, but garrisoned pre-war in Bosnia)692:
at least three partisan division headquarters
one armoured brigade
one armour-mechanized unit training centre
one mechanized brigade
fourteen motorized brigades
one protection motorized regiment
two mountain brigades
at least fourteen partisan brigades693
one FROG-7 rocket artillery brigade
five mixed artillery regiments
one mixed antitank artillery brigade

689
Prior to becoming commander of the Third Military District, Kukanjac had served in several command and
staff positions in the JNA, including the JNA Chief Inspector-General. He had attended and graduated from
all the major JNA ground forces and national defence schools. He was born in Serbia and was 56 years old
in 1992.
690
The Montenegrin TO headquarters, under Strugar, had used the designator “Herzegovina” Operational
Group 2 during the Dubrovnik operations.
691
All of the JNA forces stationed in Croatia were scheduled to be withdrawn to Bosnia under the Vance Plan.
The transformation of the Second VO (plus one corps of the Fourth VO) into the Bosnian Serb Army at the
end of May, however, would effectively nullify this provision of the plan.
692
For a discussion of the factors that drove JNA strategy and mobilization, see the next annex.
693
Several of these brigades had originally been Republican TO brigades from Western Bosnia, which the JNA
had “illegally” mobilized for service during the Croation war. After their mobilization, they served as JNA
rather than TO brigades, and are so accounted for here. In addition, as part of the JNA mobilization in early
April, several new partisan brigades were mobilized, incorporating local TO and volunteer personnel in an
attempt to provide better organization and control over these ill-disciplined elements.

290
 four mixed antitank artillery regiments
one SA-2 surface to air missile regiment
one SA-3 surface to air missile regiment
one SA-6 surface to air missile regiment
seven light air defence artillery regiments
two fighter-bomber brigades
two fighter-interceptor regiments
one helicopter / transport brigade
one helicopter training regiment
Together with personnel in the JNA’s many Bosnia-based schools, the Second and
Fourth Military Districts, plus the Fifth Air Force and Air Defence Corps, the JNA had a about
100.000 to 110.000 personnel stationed in the republic in April 1992. The ground units were
equipped with a total of about 500 tanks, 500 to 600 field artillery pieces 100 mm and
above, 48 multiple rocket launchers, and 350 120 mm mortars. The air units had some 120
fighters or fighter-bombers, some 40 light attack helicopters, and 30 transport
helicopters.694

Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence and Volunteer Units695

Although most the Serb troops in Bosnia served in the ranks of the JNA, Bosnian
Serb Territorial Defence and volunteer units formed an important segment – and, at the
start, a more heavily engaged one – of the Serb forces. Drawn from the towns and villages
now contested between Serb and Muslim-Croat armed forces, the TO and volunteer units
formed the Serbs’ first line of defence (or offense). Although volunteer units were nominally
formed separately from the TO, in practice most volunteer troops, as counted by the JNA,
appear to have been incorporated by design into the TO when fighting erupted. The JNA had
continued the practice begun during the Croatian war of forming separate volunteer units,
but in Bosnia its purpose was to legitimize the arming of local Bosnian Serbs.696 When the
budding Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBH) activated its municipal, brigade-
level Territorial Defence staffs – which the Serbs had appropriated from the Bosnian
Republic TO – most of the volunteer units recruited by the JNA were folded into the local TO
formation and ceased to exist as separate entities.697 In addition to slipping these volunteers
into the TO, the JNA also supplied some weapons directly to TO headquarters and units.698

694
The formation types described are identical to those noted in Annex 14.
695
For a listing of Bosnian Serb TO formations by municipality, see Chart 2.
696
The volunteer concept dates to the Croatian war when the JNA’s difficulties in mobilizing reservists forced
the army to call on volunteers (mostly Serbs), who were generally formed into their own units and
attached to JNA combat brigades. Many such units were formed in Bosnia and fought in the Croatian war,
particularly in Western Slavonia.
697
The SDS took over the municipal TO structures during the fall of 1991 in those areas where Serbs made up
a majority, plurality, or, in some cases, a sizeable minority. Generally, it appears that the republican TO
staff continued to function in a nominal way while the Serbs set up parallel structures mirroring the official
staffs. In some cases, however, new staffs were activated as late as the end of April. The first TO formations

291
 By mid-April, SRBH TO and volunteer forces estimated at 60.000 personnel had
been organized into some 44 municipal TO units designated as “brigades” or “battalions“;
these ranged in size from the 300 men mustered in B. Krupa to the 4.200 troops jointly
contributed by the Sokolac and Olovo municipalities. Each unit came under the command of
the municipal crisis staff headed by the local SDS president.699 The organization of the

appear to have been mobilized in late February near Bosanski Brod, with general mobilization ordered on
15 April. Paris AFP, 29 February 1992; Belgrade Tanjug, 15 April 1992. With respect to the absorption of the
volunteers by the TO, there is evidence that the JNA had intended to exercise command and control over
them separately, but apparently had insufficient time to act on its plans.
On 25 March, General Adzic ordered the Second VO to:
As soon as possible, begin establishing headquarters and brigades of volunteer units or reduced
scope, provide them with JNA officer cadre, and supply them with weapons and equipment. All
volunteer formations should be organized in a military manner and connected with the JNA
headquarters in their respective zones of responsibility.
Adzic gave General Kukanjac’s command until 15 April to achieve this. Cekic, pp. 186-187, drawn from
SSNO: General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, Administration, Top Secret, No. 585-2, 3 April 1992 to
Second Military District. By 20 March, General Kukanjac informed the JNA General Staff that Second
Military District had already armed over 69.000 volunteers. Cekic, Supplement XII, pp. 304-321. Two other
documents state that General Adzic directed on 25 March and 3 April that:
... the formation, equipping. and signing of JNA officers to volunteer units, the military
organisation of volunteer units and co-ordinating them with JNA Commands, the reinforcement,
evacuation, or destruction of strategic stockpiles and the mobilisation in the areas where the Serbs
make [a] majority; and for the formation of brigade and detachment-size volunteer units with JNA
officers as commanding staff and armed with JNA weapons; the acceleration of the retrieval of
modern military equipment; the removal of JNA units and property from Zenica, Capljina, and
Travnik; and the planned and secure mobilization on the territories where the Serbs are in the
majority.
JNA SSNO: Minutes of meetings, 25 March 1992 and SSNO Order, 3 April 1992, cited in International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second
Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002) <www.un.org/icrv/latst/inilex.htm> accessed
June 2002, p. 106. Given that full-scale fighting broke out in early April, however, it seems apparent that
the JNA lacked the time and the means to organize the volunteers into units salted with JNA cadre. Instead,
the SDS-dominated TO staffs did the organizing and appointed the officers. In only a few instances were
volunteers incorporated into nearby JNA formations along with men mobilized from the TO. Not until the
Bosnian Serb Army was consolidated in the summer and fall of 1992 was the JNA – by then the VJ – able to
take full control of these troops.
698
See Cekic, pp. 52-53 for a description of the supply of JNA weapons to the Bosnian Serb TO and local
Sarajevo Serbs in March and April. See Cekic, p. 97, for the Bosnian Serb Bihac TO’s request for JNA
weapons in February, and pp. 104-105 for the Bosnian Serb Bosanska Krupa TO’s request (and JNA
approval) in the second half of April. The 10th Corps reported to the Second Military District on 6 April that
“TO and police units were being formed in the area of responsibility according to plan”. 2nd MD Combat
and Operations Report for 6 April 1992 cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia
Indictments), 3I May 2002) <www.un.org/icry/latst/index.htm> accessed June 2002, p. 106.
699
A good example of SDS-controlled TO units comes from an article on the 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade,
the successor to the Bosanska Krupa Serb TO unit. According to Captain 1st Class Miroslav Vjestica:
Back before the war, in accordance with instructions from the SDS, we formed the brigade. The
official name was the Serbian Territorial Defence; we called it Grmec Brigade. It was under the
command of the Crisis Staff and the SDS President. Many of their soldiers obtained their wartime
experience on the Croatian battlefield.
We were creating the brigade in the war ... on the move. Until 15 May, the military commander
was Mile Strbac-Bijeli, and then came Colonel Vukasin Danicic (by decision of the Main Staff of the
Army of Republika Srpska).

292
volunteers and TO in an area near Visoko provides a good example of the TO/volunteer
structure. The SDS municipal board for Visoko tasked a local SDS chief in one village with
recruiting volunteers for the JNA (which presumably issued the volunteers weapons). These
personnel were then formed into a 470-man TO unit, complete with an organized command
staff and three TO infantry companies, one from each of three villages.700 On paper, this is
the way most TO formations were organized. But the units themselves generally lacked
training and discipline, mere collections of civilians bearing small arms and provided with a
few mortars and light antitank weapons. Few could boast any officers with JNA experience,
but were led by SDS politicians chosen for their political reliability rather than any battlefield
skills.701 To overcome these deficiencies, JNA commanders would call up the personnel of
some TO and volunteer units and incorporate them into JNA reserve partisan brigades,
where they were somewhat better organized and led, though still deficient as soldiers.

Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs702

The final component in the triumvirate of Serb security forces was the newly
created Ministry of Internal Affairs of the SRBiH (MUP). The SRBiH MUP came into existence
on 1 April when Bosnian Republic Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic announced that the
Bosnian Serb Assembly had passed laws creating the ministry, and that the organs of the
Bosnian Republican MUP would cease to function in the SRBH as of that date.703 Mico
Stanisic, a senior policeman in Sarajevo and relative of Serbian State Security chief Jovica
Stanisic, became the new SRBiH Minister of Internal Affairs. In some ways the
announcement merely formalized what had been going on for months in the Serb
autonomous regions, where the local police had already fallen under the control of regional
Serb police commanders.
SRBiH MUP forces, estimated at about 16.000 active and reserve personnel, were
organized into four parts. The first, State Security, would direct civilian intelligence and
counterintelligence through a system of regional centres. The second, Public Security,
represented the active duty uniformed patrolmen and traffic police and plainclothes
criminal investigators. The existing Police Reserve appears to have been expanded and
enhanced so that its members could take on a combat role in addition to their original
function of backing up the active duty Public Security personnel. Finally, the Serb element of
the pre-war Republican antiterrorist unit MUP was expanded by the SRBiH into a much

Danicic’s appointment on 15 May clearly marked the beginning of the brigade’s conversion from an SDS-
controlled TO formation into a regular VRS brigade. Nikola Zoric: 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade: Order
on Krajina Chests, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, pp. 8-9.
700
Cekic, p. 187-188.
701
This problem was to plague the lower command levels of the Bosnian Serb Army throughout the war.
702
For a more detailed look at the SRBH MUP structure and esti mated regional manpower in April, see Chart
3.
703
Belgrade Tanjug, 31 March 1992.

293
larger force.704 These regional units – at least one per regional headquarters – were
nominally intended to perform antiterrorist and counter-sabotage roles, but now they
would often be given important assault missions in combat operations. The State Security
and Public Security sections were staffed for the most part by Serb personnel who had
served in the Republican MUP; in many cases a Republican MUP command and its
predominantly Serb membership was simply re-designated into the SRBiH structure. The
Reserve and Special Police, though they preserved a leavening of pre-war Republican
personnel, now received an influx of politically reliable but untrained SDS police recruits.
The police in particular, along with the rest of the SRBiH MUP, got a great deal of assistance
from the Serbian MUP in forming and organizing.705

704
The Bosnian Serb Special Police Brigade formally dates its formation to 4 April 1992, when Serb elements of
the Republican antiterrorist unit seized the Republican police academy in Sarajevo, although the unit
probably was clandestinely formed earlier. Pale Srpska TV, 4 April 1996. A Special Police detachment was
also established in Trebinje on 1 April. Belgrade Tanjug, 1 April 1992. The Bosnian Serb Government
formally authorized the establishment of Special Police (or Special Militia) detachments for each public
security service center on 27 April. Belgrade Tanjug, 27 April 1992. A newly formed battalion or
detachment paraded in Banja Luka on 12 May. Belgrade Tanjug, 12 May 1992. The SRBH MUP had
requested and was promised JNA assistance in the formation of the unit on 23 April, providing a laundry list
of equipment needed. The list included, among others things, six helicopters, seven armored vehicles, 10
trucks, 157 pistols, 157 Heckler & Koch sub-machine guns. Although the JNA appears to have provided
much of the equipment asked for, it almost certainly did not give the Special Police the helicopters. See
entire list of requested items in Cekic: Supplement XV, pp. 324-328.
705
Photographs in Cekic (see pp. 376-377, 380-381, 391) show a number of SRBH MUP personnel wearing US-
pattern BDUs and web gear. Since it is highly unlikely that the JNA provided such equipment, these items
were probably surplus goods bought on the open market by the Serbian MUP. Weapons and boots appear
to have been provided from internal Yugoslav / Serbian stocks.

294
 Chart 1
Yugoslav People’s Army Order of Battle,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 10 April 1992706

Second Military District707

Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, Commander
Lieutenant Colonel General Branko Stankovic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
Major General Muharem Fetahagic, Assistant Commander for Morale, Education, and Legal
Affairs

65th Protection Motorized Regiment

HQ: Han Pijesak

389th Rocket Artillery Brigade

HQ: Banja Luka

454th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade

HQ: Derventa

580th Mixed Artillery Brigade

HQ: Vojnic, RSK (Croatia)

240th Medium Self-Propelled Air Defence Rocket Regiment

HQ: Sarajevo- Lukavica (moved to Sokolac in spring 1992)

367th Communications Regiment

HQ: Han Pijesak?

405th Rear Base

HQ: Knin, RSK (Croatia)

530th Rear Base

HQ: Bosanski Petrovac

744th Rear Base

HQ: Sokolac

993rd Rear Base

HQ: Banja Luka

706
Note that this is the static skeleton order of battle and does not show the specific task-organized, sector
orders of battle for the main combat areas. See specific orders of battle for those areas. Although this
order of battle includes much of Croatia, it excludes JNA forces in Eastern Slavonia.
707
Note that this order of battle does not show the many operational group headquarters that were active
during the Croatian war and remained in existence until the conversion of the Second Military District into
the Bosnian Serb Army.

295
4th (Sarajevo) Corps
Major General Vojislav Djurdjevac, Commander

6th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Doboj

14th Motorized Brigade

Colonel Tomislav Sipcic, Commander
HQ: Zenica

49th Mechanized Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Enver Hadzhihasanovic, Commander
HQ: Sarajevo-Lukavica

216th Mountain Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Dragomir Milosevic, Commander
HQ: Han Pijesak

4th Mixed Artillery Regiment

HQ: Kiseljak (moved to Pale-Koran area in spring 1992)

4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

HQ: Visoko (moved to Mokro in spring 1992)

346th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

HQ: Sarajevo-Lukavica

288th Military Police Battalion

HQ: Sarajevo-Lukavica

5th (Banja Luka) Corps

Major General Momir Talic, Commander
Colonel Bosko Kelecevic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vicinity of Stara Gradiska, RSK (Croatia)

2nd Partisan Brigade

HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Okucani, RSK (Croatia)

5th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Prijedor-Omarska
Forward Headquarters: vic. Pakrac, Croatia

11th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Bosanska Dubica

296
Forward Headquarters: vic. Jasenovac, RSK (Croatia)

16th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: East of Novska, Croatia

329th Armoured Brigade

HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: East of Okucani, RSK (Croatia)

343rd Motorized Brigade

HQ: Prijedor
Forward Headquarters: vic. Lipik, Croatia

10th Partisan Division

6th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Sanski Most

13th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Bosanski Petrovac

3rd Partisan Detachment

HQ: Bosanska Dubica

30th Partisan Division

Colonel Stanislav Galic, Commander

1st Partisan Brigade

HQ: Kotor Varos

17th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Kljuc

19th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Donji Vakuf

122nd Partisan Brigade

HQ: Skender Vakuf

5th Mixed Artillery Regiment

HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Stara Gradiska, RSK (Croatia)

5th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Okucani, RSK (Croatia)

297
 5th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment
HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: vic. Okucani, RSK (Croatia)

5th Military Police Battalion

HQ: Banja Luka
Forward Headquarters: Stara Gradiska, RSK (Croatia)

9th (Knin) Corps

Major General Ratko Mladic, Commander
Colonel Savo Kovacevic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff
HQ: Knin, RSK (Croatia)

9th Armoured Brigade (former 221st Motorized Brigade)

HQ: Knin, RSK (Croatia)

11th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Bosansko Grahovo

180th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Benkovac, RSK (Croatia)

9th Mixed Artillery Regiment

HQ: Knin, RSK (Croatia)

557th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

HQ: Benkovac, RSK (Croatia)

Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

HQ: Knin, RSK (Croatia)

9th Military Police Battalion

HQ: Knin, RSK (Croatia)

10th (Bihac) Corps

Lieutenant Colonel General Spiro Nikovic, Commander

15th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Bihac

236th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Gracac, RSK (Croatia)

622nd Motorized Brigade

HQ: Petrinja, RSK (Croatia)

6th Mixed Artillery Regiment

298
 HQ: Petrinja, RSK (Croatia)

6th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

HQ: Petrinja, RSK (Croatia)

17th (Tuzla) Corps

Major General Savo Jankovic, Commander
Colonel Milan Stublincevic, Chief of Staff

92nd Motorized Brigade

HQ: Tuzla

327th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Derventa

336th Motorized Brigade (former 4th Armoured Brigade)

HQ: Bijeljina

395th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Brcko

2nd Armoured Battalion / 453rd Mechanized Brigade (attached)

Forward Headquarters: vic. Janja

38th Partisan Division

HQ: Bijeljina

17th Partisan Brigade

HQ: Bijeljina

22nd Partisan Brigade

HQ: Ugljevik

17th Mixed Artillery Regiment

HQ: Brcko

17th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

HQ: Bijeljina?

17th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

HQ: Tuzla

497th Engineer Regiment

HQ: Bijeljina

Fourth Military District

Colonel-General Pavle Strugar, Commander

299
HQ: Titograd (Podgorica)
Forward HQ: Trebinje (“Herzegovina” Operational Group 2)

2nd (Podgorica) Corps

Major General Radomir Damjanovic, Commander
HQ: Podgorica (Titograd)
Forward Headquarters: vic. Trebinje

1st Niksic Partisan Brigade

HQ: Niksic
Forward Headquarters: south of Ljubinje

5th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Podgorica (Titograd)
Forward Headquarters: vic. Dubrovnik, Croatia

472nd Motorized Brigade

HQ: Trebinje
Forward Headquarters: North of Dubrovnik, Croatia

Elements, 326th Mixed Artillery Regiment

HQ: Danilovgrad
Forward Headquarters: vic. Slano / Dubrovnik

2nd Military Police Battalion

HQ: Titograd
Forward Headquarters: vic. Trebinje?

13th (Bileca) Corps

Colonel Momcilo Perisic, Commander
HQ: Bileca

10th Motorized Brigade

Colonel Milojko Pantelic, Commander
HQ: Mostar

13th Motorized Brigade

HQ: Bileca

13th Mixed Artillery Regiment

HQ: Bileca

13th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment

HQ: Bileca

13th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment

300
 HQ: Bileca

Elements, 37th (Uzice) Corps708

Colonel Dragoljub Ojdanic, Commander
Peacetime Headquarters: Uzice
Forward Headquarters: Visegrad

5th Air Force and Air Defence Corps

Major General Ljubomir Bajic, Commander
Headquarters: Bihac Air Base

350th Air Monitoring, Information, and Navigation Regiment

Headquarters: 200th Air Base at Bihac-Zeljava

155th Air Defence Rocket Regiment (SA-2)

Colonel Slavko Biga, Commander
Headquarters: Banja Luka

350th Air Defence Rocket Regiment (SA-3)

Colonel Bozo Novak, Commander
Headquarters: Mostar

97th Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 171st Air Base at Mostar
(Relocated from 500th Air Base at Split-Divulje to Mostar)
1 Galeb-Jastreb squadron (12 aircraft)
1 Orao reconnaissance squadron (12 aircraft)
1 Mi-8 transport helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 ASW helicopter squadron (9 aircraft)

107th Helicopter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 171st Air Base at Mostar
2 GAMA/Gazelle attack / observation helicopter training squadrons (26
aircraft)

117th Fighter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 200th Air Base at Bihac-Zeljava
2 MiG-21 fighter squadrons (24 aircraft)
1 MiG-21 reconnaissance squadron (6 aircraft)

185th Fighter Aviation Regiment

Headquarters: 200th Air Base at Bihac-Zeljava
(Relocated to Bihac from Pula September 1991)

708
Which formations of the 37th Corps deployed to the Visegrad area remains unclear.
301
 1 MiG-21 fighter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 G-1 Galeb fighter-bomber squadron (12 aircraft)

82nd Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 474th Air Base at Banja Luka-Mahovljani
1 J-21 Jastreb squadron (12 aircraft) (at Udbina Air Base)
1 G-1 Galeb squadron (12 aircraft)
1 J-22 Orao reconnaissance squadron (12 aircraft)

111th Transport Aviation Brigade

Headquarters: 474th Air Base at Banja Luka-Mahovljani
1 GAMA attack helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 Mi-8 transport helicopter squadron (15 aircraft)
1 An-26 transport squadron (6 aircraft)

Tuzla-Dubrave Air Base

Headquarters: Tuzla-Dubrave Air Base
Two to three squadrons of J-22 Orao, MiG-21s, and G-4 Super Galebs,
some 30 to 40 aircraft, were usually forward-deployed at this base.
Aircraft drawn from 172nd Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment and
185th Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment (1 G-4 squadron).

302
 Chart 2
Organization and Manpower Estimates,
Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence709

Banja Luka / Bosanska Krajina Area710

Banja Luka TO
2.000 personnel

Sipovo / Mrkonjic Grad TO

1.200 personnel

Prnjavor TO
1.000 personnel

Grahovo TO
800 personnel

Drvar TO
600 personnel

Glamoc TO
800 personnel

Bosanski Petrovac TO
700 personnel

Kupres TO
1.000 personnel

Srbac TO

709
The manpower estimates probably include every Serb registered with a municipal TO or issued a weapon,
and probably represent an overcount of personnel actually available to serve in the field, since many over-
age men likely were included in the initial count. To ascertain the regional TO structure, a search has been
made of Belgrade Radio, Belgrade Tanjug, and Pale SRNA traffic during the first six months of 1992 for
references to Serb territorial units and their home municipalities. The list of municipal TO units is based on
this search as well as a list of JNA-recruited volunteers, organized by municipality, provided by General
Kukanjac in a 20 March assessment. On the assumption that the volunteer units provided the bulk of the
TO’s personnel, the estimates for the TO strengths are based primarily on this listing but modified to take
account of specific conditions in a given municipality in April. For example, the volunteer numbers for the
municipalities of Donji Vakuf, Jajce, and Bugojno have not been included in the TO estimates because it is
believed that these personnel were incorporated into the JNA 19th Partisan Brigade when it mobilized in
early April. The same is true for the Sanski Most municipality, where it is assessed that these personnel
were incorporated into the 6th Partisan Brigade. In addition, some municipalities did not have any
volunteers listed, yet clearly had a TO force, such as Zvornik, and thus an entry for Zvornik was added.
710
The pre-war republican TO was divided into regional districts that controlled a set number of
municipalities, and it is believed that the Bosnian Serbs maintained a similar hierarchy prior to the TO’s
incorporation into the Bosnian Serb Army, but few details are available. Instead, a general regional
grouping is included for clarity’s sake.

303
 1.800 personnel

Celinac TO
600 personnel

Laktasi TO
750 personnel

Bosanska Krupa TO
300 personnel

Bosanski Novi TO
1.000 personnel

Posavina / Northern Bosnia Area

Brcko TO
400 personnel

Bosanski Brod TO
1.000 personnel

Modrica TO
850 personnel

Doboj TO
1.800 personnel

Ozren TO
2.000 personnel

Teslic TO
1.000 personnel

Samac TO
1.000 personnel

North-eastern Bosnia / Northern Drina Valley Area

Bijeljina TO
1.000 personnel

Zvornik TO
1.000 personnel

Sekovici (Birac) TO
1.000 personnel

304
 Srebrenica / Bratunac TO
500 personnel

Sarajevo Area

Novi Grad TO / Trnovo TO

2.400 personnel

Centar (Kosevo) TO
700 personnel

Stari Grad TO
600 personnel

Novo Sarajevo TO
2.800 personnel

Vogosca TO
1.500 personnel

Hadzici TO
1.500 personnel

Pale TO
2.000 personnel

Ilidza TO
2.800 personnel

Ilijas TO (including Visoko, Breza, and Vares Municipalities)

5.200 personnel

Sokolac TO (including Olovo Municipality)

4.400 personnel

Southern Drina Valley Area

Rogatica TO
800 personnel

Gorazde TO
2.000 personnel

Cajnice TO
500 personnel

Visegrad TO
1.000 personnel

305
 Rudo TO
500 personnel

Foca TO
1.000 personnel

Kalinovik TO
900 personnel

Herzegovina Area

Konjic TO
600 personnel

Mostar TO
500 personnel

Trebinje TO
1.000 personnel

Total Manpower Estimate

About 60.000 personnel

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 Chart 3
Organization and Manpower Estimates, Ministry of Internal Affairs of
the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Headquarters, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Pale

Mico Stanisic, Minister of Internal Affairs

Public Security Services Centre of Bosanska Krajina Autonomous Region

HQ Banja Luka
– Controlled police secretariats / stations in 22 municipalities
– One special police detachment formed on 12 May
– Estimated total personnel:
1.350 active duty public security personnel
5.400 reserve police
200 to 250 special police
6.950 to 7.000 total personnel

Public Security Services Centre of Northern Bosnia

HQ Doboj
– Controlled police secretariats / stations in four to five municipalities
– Probably created a special police detachment in May
– Estimated total personnel:
200 to 250 active public security personnel
800 to 1.000 reserve police
40 to 50 special police
1.000 to 1.300 total personnel

Public Security Services Centre of Semberija

HQ Ugljevik
– Controlled police secretariats / stations in three or four municipalities
– Probably created a special police detachment in May
– Estimated total personnel:
150 to 200 active public security personnel
600 to 800 reserve police
30 to 40 special police
800 to 1.050 total personnel

Public Security Services Centre of Romanija and Birac

HQ Pale
– Controlled police secretariats / stations in about 16 municipalities
– Special police detachment formed 1-4 April
– Estimated total personnel:
800 active public security personnel

307
 3.200 reserve police
150 to 200 special police
4.150 to 4.200 total personnel

Public Security Services Centre of Herzegovina

HQ Trebinje
– Controlled police secretariats / stations in about seven municipalities
– Formed special police detachment 1 April
– Estimated total personnel:
350 active public security personnel
1.400 reserve police personnel
70 to 100 special police personnel
1.820 to 1.850 total personnel

Total SRBH MUP Personnel Estimates711

500 active and reserve state security personnel
2.800 to 3.000 active public security personnel
11.000 to 12.000 reserve police
500 to 650 special police
15.000 to 16.000 total estimated personnel

711
Note that the total estimates have been rounded and that the regional estimates added together may not
exactly equal the totals. The methodology used in constructing the regional estimates is based on a
building block approach, using the municipal police secretariats as the individual block, plus one special
police unit per regional center based on a size of about three or four percent of the estimate for the
combined public security and reserve police. Each municipality is estimated to have had 50 active duty
personnel and 200 reserve personnel.

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 Annex 23
Yugoslav People’s Army Objectives, Strategy, and Operations
JNA Missions, April 1992:
Defend the Serbs, Talk to the Muslims, Fight the Croats
The JNA’s pre-April policy of supporting a peaceful solution to Bosnia’s complex
political issues continued to guide its actions as war broke out.712 However, five events
catalyzed and moulded the JNA’s involvement during this period and eventually steered it
toward backing the Bosnian Serbs:
• the Croat-Serb fighting and so-called “massacre” of Serbs near Bosanski Brod in late
March,
• the Serb takeover of Bijeljina on 31 March – 4 April,
• the Croat seizure of Kupres on 4-5 April,
• Croatian Army intervention in south-eastern Herzegovina,
• the mobilization of Bosnia’s TO and reserve MUP forces on 4 April.
It was the republic’s TO mobilization that appears to have spurred a Bosnian Serb
counter-mobilization of its TO and the outbreak of widespread fighting in Sarajevo and
other parts of the republic.713 In response to these events General Kukanjac ordered the
mobilization of the Second Military District’s 40.000-odd reservists (of whom 22.000
responded), and designated four combat areas: Kupres, Bosanski Brod, Bijeljina, and
Sarajevo.714 General Strugar, the commander of the Fourth Military District in Herzegovina,

712
Interestingly, Karadzic complained during a 1997 interview that the Bosnian Serbs did not trust the JNA at
the time, claiming that it “very rarely helped us”. The JNA, he said, regarded the Bosnian Serbs as “...
nationalists and anti-communists. As far as they were concerned, there was no difference between
Izetbegovic, Tudjman, or Karadzic”. Dejan Lukic: Mobilization Was the Direct Cause of the War, Belgrade
Vecernje Novosti, 2 June 1997, p. 11. An interview with Radovan Karadzic. Given the long-standing tensions
that existed between the Bosnian Serb Army’s ex-JNA officers and Karadzic’s SDS throughout the war,
Karadzic’s statement probably has some basis in fact. Former JNA operations officer and Krajina Serb Army
(SVK) General Milisav Sekulic states in his book on the JNA in 1991-1992 that the JNA was too even-handed
during early 1992 and should have forcefully attacked those who were illegally continuing the dissolution
of Yugoslavia in Bosnia. See Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je lzdala
(Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Villbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp.
285-314.
713
Karadzic claims that the Presidency decision on mobilization sparked the war, as reported in Silber and
Little, p. 229 and in the Vecernje Novosti interview discussed earlier. See also Dejan Lukic: Mobilization Was
the Direct Cause of the War, Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 2 June 1997, p. 11. An interview with Radovan
Karadzic.
714
Cekic, pp. 132-141, provides a detailed description of the JNA mobilization orders and preparations, based
on captured JNA documents:
In early April 1992, the headquarters and units of Second Military District were “due to the
complex political / security situation in the area of responsibility” at the “highest level of combat
readiness”. By order of the commander of Second Military District, on 6 April 1992 (sic – actually 5
April) at 21:00, the mobilization was initiated at 21 wartime units of this command. The function of
the Reserve Command Post of Second Military District was established and it started its operation,
while the mobilization process was followed in the course of the day...

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Highlighting the strong ties to the Bosnian Serbs, the JNA set up the Reserve Command Post in Pale where
“contact was established with the Crisis Committee of the SDS for the Municipality of Pale”. This
headquarters, located at the “Turist“ Hotel, consisted of:
– 20 officers from the HQ, Second Military District, headed by the chief of staff, Second Military District
– 6 officers, 20 soldiers, and 8 communications vehicles of 367th Communications Regiment
– 1 squad of Military Police of the 65th Protection Motorized Regiment (1 officer, 9 soldiers)
– 1 officer and 5 soldiers of the service personnel
– 1 van, 3 all-terrain vehicles, and 1 passenger car
– Total: 28 officers, 34 soldiers, and 13 vehicles
On 6 April 1992, by 18:00 the response of the reservists ordered to report to the units of the Second
Military District was as follows:
Summoned Reported
2.161 officers 506 or 23 %
1.996 NCO 491 or 25 %
35.264 reservists 13.084 or 37 %
38.786 total 14.039 or 36,2 %
Of the total number of 39.463 reservists called up, on 7 April 1992 by 18:00 the total response was 17.082
or 43% plus 24 vehicles
2.253 officers 683 or 30 %
2.112 NCO 777 or 37 %
35.098 reservists 15.622 or 44 %
On 8 April 1992 by 18:00 the response of the reservists ordered to report to the units was:
2.152 officers 795 or 37 %
1.840 NCOs 1.004 or 54 %
36.436 reservists 20.676 or 57 %
40.428 total 22.474 or 55 %
Of the rear-echelon reservists, 5.112 were ordered to report. As of 9 April 1992 at 06:00 790 or 15,4 % had
reported (259 officers, 543 NCOs, and 4.310 soldiers were summoned and 17 officers, or 6.5%; 56 NCOs or
10,3% and 717 soldiers or 16,6%).
“In the course of mobilization, until 11 April, the units and institutions of the Second Military District
received 22.474 reservists, of which the majority in the units of 17 and 5 Corps”. Three of the Second
Military District’s five corps had primary responsibility for the situation in four designated combat areas:
– “Kupres Area of Combat Activities” – 5th (Banja Luka) Corps, supported by the 9th (Knin) Corps
– “Bosanski Brod Area of Combat Activities” – 17th (Tuzla) Corps
– “Bijeljina Area of Combat Activities” – 17th (Tuzla) Corps
– “Sarajevo Area of Combat Activities” – 4th (Sarajevo) Corps
The detailed disposition of JNA combat formations in these areas, as gleaned by Cekic from JNA
documents, is provided below.
Deployment of JNA forces on 7 April 1992
1. Kupres Area of Combat Activities
(Cekic, p. 135 – On 8 April, vic Kupres, 9th Corps undertook the “actions of cleansing the city, assisting
the population and preparation for continuation of planning for further activities in the area of
Kupreska vrata feature and the village of Malovan”)
Axis: Doline (Hill 1152) – Strazbenica Village – route of attack of 3rd Battalion / 11th Partisan Brigade
Axis: Zlosela village – Hill 1120 – Kupresko Polje – attack of tank company with the Volunteer Brigade
from Sipovo and Zloselo
Axis: Zlosela village – Hill 1156 – Olovo village – attack route of 2nd Battalion / 13th Partisan Brigade
Mortar Company deployed area of Suhovo village
105mm howitzer battery in the area of Blagaj village
2nd Battalion / 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment deployed in the area of Mrdnjevci village, Hill 1154, the
church at elevation 1130 in Novo Selo
Area of Koprivnica – Carev Mlin – 1st Battalion / 19th Partisan Brigade / 30th Partisan Division
Area of Donje and Gornje Vukovske — Vukovske TO Brigade.
major part of Kupres town under control Kupres TO Company
2. Bosanski Brod Area of Combat Operations
Bosanski Brod TO Brigade – eastern part of Bosanski Brod – area of Greda feature

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probably did the same for his area, which he presumably divided into three combat areas:
Drina Valley, Capljina-Mostar-Konjic, and southern Herzegovina-Dalmatia-Dubrovnik.715

Lijesce Brigade in the area of Lijesce

1st Battalion / 327th Motorized Brigade with 1 TO Brigade vic Kobile Gornje village and movement of
the column on the communication with Paraslica village
Tank Company / 327th Motorized Brigade in the area of Nareci village
2nd Armored Battalion / 336th Motorized Brigade in area of Unka village
3rd Battalion / 327th Motorized Brigade in area of Zboriste village, Bosanski Luzani village, with
movement of the column toward the Ukrina River
Prnjavor TO Battalion and Trstenica TO Company in the area of Kalacka Village, Pavlovo brdo, with the
movement of the column along the road
Antitank element of 1st Battery / 1st Battalion / 17th Mixed AT Artillery Regiment in area of Bjelas
village
MRL battery / 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment deployed vic Polje village (elevation 199)
Battery of Howitzer Artillery Battalion / 336th Motorized Brigade area of Sekici village
4th Battalion / 327th Motorized Brigade in area of Glovoca village
HQ, 327th Motorized Brigade in Derventa
2nd Battalion / 497th Engineer Regiment in area of Betnja Mala and Polje villages
Command Post of 1 st Operational Group / 17th Corps in area of Podnovlje village (Hill 179)
3. Bijeljina Area of Combat Operations
HQ, 38th Partisan Division deployed in Bijeljina
17th Mixed Artillery Regiment, Bijeljina
MRL Batery / 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment
Howitzer Artillery Batery / 17th Mixed Artillery Regiment
2nd Armored Battalion / 453rd Mechanized Brigade in area of Janja village
1st Battalion / 17th Partisan Brigade in area of Bosanska Raca, Galistok, Brodare villages
2nd Battalion / 17th Partisan Brigade in area of Gornji Sepak village (Zvornik municipality)
3rd Battalion / 17th Partisan Brigade in the area of Trpovacka greda feature, Lukavac River, Donje
Crnevljevo village
Command Post in area of Mala Obarska village
Mortar Battery of 38 (sic – prob 17) Partisan Brigade in area of Ljesnica village
22nd Partisan Brigade deployed:
1st Battalion – Celopek
2nd Battalion – Bogatovo Selo
3rd Battalion – Donja Trnova
CP – Ugljevik
4. Sarajevo Area of Combat Operations
49th Motorized Brigade deployed at the following points:
– tank platoon at Vratnik
– reinforced tank platoon at Butmir Airport
– reinforced tank platoon at Mojmilo Hill
4th Mixed Artillery Regiment vic Koran
4th Mixed AT Artillery Regiment vic Mokro
346th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment vic Trebevic
216th Mountine Brigade in Han Pijesak area
FCP 4th Corps at Zlatiste
Non-attached II VO units
240th Self Propelled Medium Air Defence Rocket Regiment
65th Protection Motorized Regiment
715
Although no documentary evidence regarding this division is available, given that three JNA corps had
headquarters deployed in the Fourth Military District areas of Bosnia, this seems likely. Units from the 37th
(Uzice) Corps deployed to the Visegrad / Drina Valley area beginning on 13-14 April, after threats to blow
up one of the Drina River dams had been received and fighting had broken out in Visegrad. Colonel
Dragoljub Ojdanic, commander of the corps, claimed that the president of the municipality, a Muslim, had
requested the JNA deployment. Belgrade Radio, 14 April 1992; Sarajevo Radio, 16 April 1992. The 13th

311
 At the start, JNA forces appear to have assumed two primary missions in these
seven combat zones: defending Bosnian Serb territory against Croat “aggression” and
making at least token efforts to keep the peace between Muslim and Serb TO forces.716 The
manner in which it pursued these missions varied among the zones because of the JNA’s
attitudes toward the Muslims and the Croatians. There was no tolerance whatsoever for any
Bosnian Croat – or especially Croatian Army – forces, which were viewed as an immediate
threat to the JNA itself and to the Bosnian Serbs. Senior JNA officers were insistently vocal
during April that the presence of Croatian Army forces in Bosnia posed the primary threat to
the republic.717 This being the case, they wasted no time in joining with Bosnian Serb TO

(Bileca) Corps had taken over from the 37th Corps near Mostar-Capljina in early March. Belgrade Tanjug, 6
March 1992. The 2nd (Podgorica) Corps was in command in the area south of Capljina, including the
Dalmatian coast and Dubrovnik. Belgrade Tanjug, 26 April 1992.
716
This judgment is based primarily on JNA statements and actions in the respective zones, rather than on
hard documentary evidence. Cekic states that:
After the mobilization was ordered, the units of the Second Military District, being in full combat
readiness because of “further complications of political / security situation in the area of
responsibility”, apart from controlling and securing of “vital installations and barracks, and
undertaking of combat security measures within the frontal area, supplying of units with food, fuel,
and explosive ordnance, establishing of the units of the “Territorial Defence” and the “Ministry of the
Interior” of the so-called Serb Republic of Krajina, also undertook preparations for attack
operations. (Emphasis added) Cekic, pp. 134-135.
Cekic indicates that a Top Secret General Staff directive to the HQ, Second Military District does exist,
having observed it referenced in Second Military District documents. The order, Top Secret No. 172, which
is described as an “execution plan”, reportedly was submitted on 6 April, as Second Military District was
mobilizing. It is likely that Second Military District’s exact mission instructions are outlined here.
Unfortunately. Cekic (and presumably the Bosnian Government) were unable to obtain a copy of this order.
Cekic, p. 129. FN 33.
Although Cekic provides outstanding source material, he assumes or assesses complete JNA involvement in
all phases of the Bosnian Serb military operations at this time. We do not believe this to have been the
case: rather, as indicated earlier, we believe the JNA was still of two minds, although it was committed to
providing all the help necessary to the Bosnian Serbs if it believed they were threatened. This appears to be
based on JNA documents, and likely represents a formalized statement of the two missions, with the
phrase “controlling and security of vital installations and barracks“ possibly providing the cover for
peacekeeping while the “preparations for attack operations” likely refers to Kupres and possibly Bosanski
Brod. Cekic also cites a JNA Second Military District HQ document from 16 April in which it is stated that
JNA units have “secured” key lines of communications and “objects” throughout Bosnia. Cekic also claims
that this included blockading Sarajevo, but it is unclear whether this is directly stated in the cited document
or not. See Cekic, p. 144, FN 66 references VP 5027 [VP 5027 was the field post number for Second Military
District Headquarters] Internal Use, No. 25/142-760, Sarajevo 16 April 1992, Attention Commander.
717
In a statement three days earlier General Kukanjac said that, after the Bosnian Presidency had ordered the
mobilization of the republican TO, deployment of Croatian troops to Bosnia was the “main problem” in
Bosnia. Belgrade Tanjug, 4 April 1992. Later in the month, Kukanjac further emphasized his distress over
the HV’s presence in Bosnia, stating that:
... some parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina have for months been occupied by the Croatian Army; this
has been one of the biggest problems on the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina ... The departure of the
Croatian Army and other paramilitary forces from these areas and the disarmament of domestic
republican paramilitary forces constitutes the key to resolving the situation in Bosnia. Belgrade
Tanjug, 29 April 1992.

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units to attack Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces in Kupres, near Bosanski Brod and
Bosanski Samac, and between Stolac and the Bosnian-Croatian border near Dubrovnik.718 719
In contrast to its military engagements with the Croats, in those areas where
fighting erupted between Serb and predominantly Muslim Republican TO forces – Bijeljina,
Sarajevo, and the Drina Valley – the JNA saw its role during April as primarily one of keeping
the peace.720 General Kukanjac, although mistrustful of the Muslim-led republican
government, still appears to have believed that the army could work with it.721 On 3 April,
asserting that Izetbegovic had asked him to deploy JNA forces to Bijeljina, he promised to
“protect every people and everyone who is in danger”.722 The JNA took similar action in
Sarajevo, attempting to interpose itself between Serb and republican forces in several key
suburbs.723 The JNA also moved units from Serbia into Visegrad and Foca in an attempt to
calm the situation.724
Although the JNA’s peacekeeping intentions in these areas may have been good,
they had little or no impact on the actual fighting because JNA commanders were entirely
unwilling to fire on the Serb TO and police forces who were initiating most of the clashes.725

718
The JNA counterstrike at Kupres began on 6 April. The operations around Bosanski Brod were primarily
defensive, and began in earnest in late March. Operations against HV and Bosnian Croat forces started
around Stolac on 10-11 April.
719
The fighting in these areas will be discussed in detail in the sections describing combat operations.
720
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 285-314.
721
Sekulic strongly criticizes Kukanjac for putting any faith in the Bosnian Republic government and
Izetbegovic in particular. Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody
Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 285-314.
722
Belgrade RTV, 3 April 1992. The JNA ordered additional units from the Serbian-based First Military District
to deploy to the Bijeljina / northeastern Bosnia region after the Serbs captured Bijeljina. On 8 April,
“according to the plan” two motorized battalions and one armored battalion from First Military District
arrived in Biljeljina, according to JNA documents. This may or may not include the armored battalion from
453rd Mechanized Brigade that was deployed to the nearby town of Janja on 5 April. See Cekic, pp. 255-
256 for references to a series of JNA documents referencing JNA moves in early – mid April.
723
See the tense Sarajevo Radio interview with Kukanjac in which he pleads for people to stop firing on the
army and claims that the JNA was asked to interpose itself between Republican and Serb forces at Vraca
Hill in Sarajevo. Sarajevo Radio, 7 April 1992.
724
Belgrade Radio stated on 14 April:
The Uzice Corps units arrived today from the direction of Uzice and immediately will assume
control of the town. On their way to Visegrad the army forces did not meet any resistance. Large
quantities of explosives, medical equipment, and food supplies have been found ... The Serbian village
of Bosanska Jagodina was released from a blockade after weathering a siege and several days of
provocations by Muslim paramilitary formations. ... [the] President of the Visegrad Municipality, who
asked this morning that units come as soon as possible to protect vital facilities and bring peace and
security to the people. The announcement by the Uzice Corps command and the proclamation to
Visegrad citizens say that these people are asked to cooperate with a view to preventing the
extremists from running wild, assuring that weapons are returned to the militia (police) station, and
having everyone participate in restoring peace. It has been stated that the Uzice Corps will disarm the
paramilitary units.
Belgrade Radio, 14 April 1992.
A Second Military District spokesman told Sarajevo Radio on 13 April that JNA forces in Visegrad were
sheltering 700 people of all nationalities in their barracks. Sarajevo Radio, 13 April 1992.
725
Sekulic does claim that:

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JNA troops stationed in Bijeljina did nothing to stop the Serb’s armed seizure of the town,
although they did shelter civilians fleeing the fighting. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs’
combat operations to blockade Sarajevo and seize key districts within it continued
unabated.726 JNA troops also stood by and watched while local Serb TO and police seized
Visegrad and Foca. Even if they had been able to separate the forces and halt the fighting,
the likely result would have been to consolidate the Serbs’ territorial gains and confirm the
expulsion of the legitimate municipal authorities, just as they did in Croatia during the
summer of 1991.
In other places the JNA’s claims to be keeping the peace proved even more hollow,
because in several instances it appears that JNA forces directly supported a Serb attack on a

... the command of the Second Army [Second Military District], in a bid to show its impartiality,
occasionally opened fire against Serb positions. Sekulic harshly criticizes this JNA policy of blaming all
sides, claiming that only the Serbs supported the policy that the JNA and the Federal Presidency were
pushing. Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody
Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp.
288-289.
726
A Bosnian Muslim journalist, Sejo Omeragic, who accompanied Bosnian Presidency members Fikret Abdic
and Biljana Plavsic on their inspection of Bijeljina in the aftermath of the Serb capture of the town wrote an
article for the newspaper Slobodna Bosna describing the situation in the town. He made the following
observations of the JNA forces in the town:
At the barracks, Fikret Abdic spoke with General Jankovic [17th Corps commander] and his
officers. The first impression of these officers is that they are forlorn people who do not know what
more they can say, and to whom. Some try, almost in whispered tones, but they generally stop in
mid-sentence. The pained atmosphere is occasionally broken by Mr. Abdic’s questions. All in vain. The
officers act like helpless souls, crowded into their barracks in the face of the evil that is taking place in
the ghostlike city.
”We have done as much as we can. We have taken these people in and fed them”, says General
Savo Jankovic about the refugees in his camp. “There are around 300 people staying here, but there
are many more in Patkovaca, somewhere around 1.500. There are both Serbs and Muslims here,
while all the people in Patkovaca are Muslims.”
“I want to see all of them”, says Abdic. Immediately thereafter, one senses a palpable fear among
the officers. One of them, a colonel, goes out every hour and reports that an attack on the barracks is
possible. Incompetent and inexperienced, they are not even able to agree on what should be done.
(The question arises: what are they trying to hide?) ... Finally, after he goes out for the third time, the
colonel calls General Jankovic, who returns with awkward apprehension and addresses Abdic: “You
must go to the opstina [municipal] building because Ms. Biljana Plavsic is there. There you will have
some sort of talk with Arkan...”
“We must speak with the refugees, our visit has been pointless if we do not speak with them”,
says Abdic. On the way out we met with the refugees. A circle of armed men tightens around us.
People are weeping and sighing. Completely forlorn people who praise the army for receiving and
taking care of them.
Later, Plavsic, General Prascevic (Second Military District chief of staff), and General Jankovic spoke with
Arkan.
Here in the park, with a security detachment, Biljana Plavsic, General Prascevic, and General
Jankovic are speaking with Arkan. Biljana Plavsic asks Arkan to let the army take over the city now.
“Out of the question.“ ... “First I must clean up this area, and then we will go to Bosanski Brod.”
I listened to an army in which a corporal had more authority than these two broken men with the
rank of General.
Sejo Omeragic: Tracking Down Crime: The Bloody Bijeljina Bayram, Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna, 5 April 1996,
pp. 12-15. Reprinted from 4 April 1992 edition.
Omeragic’s observations seem to clearly demonstrate the army’s indecisiveness and its refusal or inability
to act, rather than indicating any involvement in the Bosnian Serb operation.

314
Bosnian town. Eyewitnesses to the attack by combined Bosnian Serb TO fighters, Serbian
volunteers, and Serbian Special Police on the Bosnian border town of Zvornik on 8-9 April
claim that it was supported by JNA artillery firing from inside Serbia.727 JNA troops clearly
took an active part in operations to confiscate “illegal” arms from the local population under
the guise of “peacekeeping”, with “illegal” being defined as those belonging to Muslims,
notably during the Bosnian Serb takeover of Vlasenica on 21 April.728 JNA troops operating
in Visegrad and Foca probably undertook similar missions to disarm the Muslims and there
is some evidence that they may have directly participated in some of the Serb attacks.729
JNA units were also involved in the 23 April capture of Bosanska Krupa and the 24 April
seizure of key installations in Sanski Most town in western Bosnia.730 Such actions reinforced
the growing belief among Muslims – already nearly universal among Croats – that the JNA

727
See Silber and Little, pp. 222-224. The UN High Commission for Refugees representative to former
Yugoslavia, Jose Mendiluce, passed through Zvornik the day it was attacked. He reported seeing artillery
firing from inside Serbia into the Zvornik area. Serbian Radical Party leader, Vojislav Seselj, said of the
operation:
The Bosnian Serb forces took part in it. But the special units and the best combat units came from
this side [Serbia]. These were police units – the so-called Red Berets – special units of the Serbian
Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The army engaged itself to a small degree – it gave artillery support
where it was needed. (Emphasis added)
This would seem to indicate that the JNA played only a supporting role, not a direct one, in the capture of
Zvornik, although there are other indications that troops from the Bosnia-based 336th Motorized Brigade
helped secure the town. The “Red Berets” were the most elite special operations unit in the Serbian MUP,
under the command or authority of “Frenki” Simatovic and Serbian State Security (RDB). The “Red Berets”
were directly associated with Captain Dragan’s Special Police unit from Knin, which operated with such
effectiveness during the Croatian War.
728
See Belgrade Tanjug, 21 April 1992. It is worth quoting because it probably reflects the JNA’s role in many
of the nominal peacekeeping operations during the second half of April. Some in the JNA may actually have
believed they were helping to keep the peace by confiscating Muslim weapons. Of course, this merely
served to strengthen and consolidate Bosnian Serb control over those regions where this occurred.
A possible interethnic conflict was prevented in Vlasenica today by a successful intervention of the
units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) Tuzla Corps. After a state of emergency was proclaimed in
the town this morning, unknown people started skirmishes.
After that, the Vlasenica Muncipal Crisis Headquarters – which consists of members of the Serbian
nation – gave an ultimatum to all citizens who illegally possess arms to hand them over to the Public
Security Station or a JNA unit before 10:00. A large number of citizens handed over their weapons, a
Tanjug reporter was told in the Crisis Headquarters.
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 April 1992. See also Cekic, pp. 139-140. JNA forces probably included elements of the
336th Motorized Brigade. Since the JNA and the Bosnian Serb authorities had “legally”, by their definition,
distributed weapons to the Serb population, the only “illegal” weapons were those of the Muslims and
Croats.
729
Although Sarajevo Radio reported on 14 and 16 April that Visegrad was relatively peaceful and seemed to
imply that the JNA deployments had helped out in the situation, on 18 April the SDA claimed via Sarajevo
Radio that the JNA was helping the SDS hunt down the most important Muslim officials and dignitaries in
the town. Sarajevo Radio, 14, 16, 18 April.
730
Report: Serbian police and volunteers take Sanski Most and oust extreme members of SDA who fled to
Croatia, 24 April 1992 and militarv report regarding military activities, staffing and organization of the 6th
Sanska Brigade between 10 August 1991 and 28 August 1992, 28 August 1992, cited in International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second
Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002.
<www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm> accessed June 2002, p. 241.

315
had become an army wholly dedicated to the Serbs. Claims that it was keeping the peace
and would protect all nations increasingly fell on deaf ears.

Defend the Barracks, Fight the Muslims – May 1992

The JNA’s knee-jerk reaction to any threat to its facilities – a response strongly
conditioned by the loss of its barracks in Croatia – finally brought the JNA into open
hostilities with the Muslim-led republican forces. Already in early April the JNA had
retaliated against the Bosnian Croats for attacks on its barracks and air base near Mostar
with air strikes and artillery fire.731 These clashes, however, derived from existing hostilities
between Croats and JNA-backed Serbs. It was not until the republican TO blockaded the
JNA’s barracks in Sarajevo on 1-2 May that JNA and Bosnian TO confrontations degenerated
into all-out war. Tensions had already been growing between the two as a result of the
increasingly overt support that the JNA’s nominal peacekeepers were giving the Bosnian
Serbs. The Federal Presidency’s announcement on 27 April that it would be withdrawing the
Serbian elements of the JNA from Bosnia appears to have led to the TO decision on 29 April
(despite public denials) to blockade JNA facilities. The TO feared that the withdrawal would
deny it the opportunity to take back its confiscated weapons stocks and appropriate the
JNA’s heavy weapons.732 On 1-2 May, the TO blockaded the barracks and on the following
night attacked the Second Military District Headquarters. General Kukanjac threatened to
retaliate against the city if the attack did not stop and apparently followed through by
shelling TO and MUP headquarters. After the JNA’s arrest of President Izetbegovic led to UN
mediation, its headquarters personnel were to be allowed to leave. But when the TO
ambushed the UN-escorted withdrawal column, the JNA’s outrage knew no bounds and
took it into a completely overt alliance with the Serbs.733 The very next day the official
Yugoslav press agency announced that JNA tanks and Serb TO troops had captured the
north Bosnian town of Doboj from Muslim and Croat forces.734

731
Tensions between the Croats and Muslims on one side and the JNA had been on the rise in southeastern
Herzegovina since the deployment of JNA Montenegrin reserve formations to the area during the 1991
Croatian war. The blockade of the JNA’s barracks in Capljina, which began on 4 March, together with the
deployment of HV forces into the area in late March, brought the situation to the boiling point. The clashes
around JNA facilities in April were merely the culmination in a long chain of events.
732
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 April 1992; for a photograph of the supposed TO order, see Professor Dr. Kosta
Cavoski: The Hague Against Justice Revisited: The Case of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Serbian Sarajevo (sic);
1997, p. 88.
733
See Silber and Little, Chapter 17, for a more detailed discussion of the situation regarding the blockade of
the JNA barracks, Izetbegovic’s arrest, and the assault on the JNA convoy as well as Milisav Sekulic:
Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia and the Supreme
Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 299-302 for a JNA account. As with Cekic, Silber
and Little ascribe more coherence and strategic forethought to JNA policy in support of the Serbs than we
believe existed. Without minimizing the critical role the JNA played in arming the Bosnian Serbs earlier in
the year, our analysis is intended to produce a more complex understanding of how the army viewed its
mission. The JNA did not have a strategic plan to dismember Bosnia; Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs,
however, did. We believe this shade of difference is important in terms of drawing lines of responsibility for
the war.
734
Belgrade Tanjug, 4 May 1992.

316
 The analysis that the TO’s decision to blockade the barracks brought the JNA into
open war with the Muslim-dominated TO is not meant to imply that war with the JNA and
its successor, the Bosnian Serb Army, could have been avoided. On the contrary, the JNA
had already given itself over mentally to the Serbs, along with the weapons it had provided
them, whatever hopes some officers, such as Kukanjac, might retain that a peaceful
settlement could be reached. Nothing Sarajevo could have done or not done would have
changed this fact. Though JNA engagements with the republican TO had been sporadic and
piecemeal before the blockade, it was only a matter of time before JNA combat units
became involved on the side of the Serb TO en masse. Belgrade had decided well
beforehand that the JNA formations in Bosnia would become the Bosnian Serb Army, and
the announcement of the “withdrawal” that provoked the blockade virtually signalled that
intention.

317
 Annex 24
Mladic’s Own – The Bosnian Serb Army
Formation of the VRS735
The Bosnian Serb Army was formed officially on 20 May 1992, although the genesis
of its formation dates to 27-30 April, following Bosnia’s declaration of independence, when
the Federal Presidency announced a new republic comprised of only Serbia and
Montenegro. On 30 April, Serbian President Milosevic, Federal Presidency member Borisav
Jovic, and other key Serbian and Federal officials met with Bosnian Serb President Karadzic
and Assembly speaker Krajisnik to agree on the transfer of the JNA forces in Bosnia to the
new Bosnian Serb republic. As Borisav Jovic has stated:
Karadzic agrees. Krajisnik raises a series of questions: How will that military be
financed, who will pay its wages, who will provide its pensions, etc., all of which are
indeed problems, but are not critical to our discussion ...
For us this action was very significant, but for the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I
believe, it was even more significant. They got their own military.736
On 12 May, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the formation of the Bosnian
Serb armed forces, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel General Ratko Mladic.737 By
19 May, the last of the Serb soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro had withdrawn from the
JNA units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the VRS came into existence the following day.738
Despite the official conversion of the JNA in Bosnia into the VRS, the chaos resulting
from the 3 May ambush in Sarajevo, the JNA personnel withdrawals, and the ongoing
fighting threatened to disrupt Mladic’s efforts to form a single, unified VRS from the start.
General Gvero later stated:
The first ones to come were Ratko Mladic, the late [VRS logistics chief, General
Djordje] Djukic, and I, then several other officers and [future Main Staff chief] Manojlo
Milovanovic, and on 9 May 1992, they found general disarray here in Crna Rijeka [the JNA
command centre near Han Pijesak]. General Kukanjac was here with several hundred
officers, and their sole concern was to go back to Serbia.739

735
See Chapter 16 in Volume I and Annex 22 for discussions of efforts to prepare JNA forces in Bosnia for
transfer to the Bosnian Serbs, if necessary.
736
Jovic, entry for 30 April 1992.
737
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 May 1992. General Adzic appointed Mladic commander and chief of staff of the JNA
Second Military District on 8 May, after General Kukanjac and General Stankovic were relieved in the wake
of the disastrous ambush of the District’s headquarters convoy on 3 May. Headquarters, Second Military
District was to become the Main Staff of the VRS. For Mladic’s description of the circumstances
surrounding his appointment, see Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska
Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter 7. Adzic almost certainly told Mladic at the same time that he would
become the commander of the VRS upon its formation.
738
Belgrade Radio, 18 May 1992.
739
Milja Vujisic: The Truth About the General’s Dismissal, Belgrade Intervju (Internet Version), 13 December
1996. An interview with Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero. Mladic observed that:

318
 Mladic states that:
I immediately set out to gather people and form a command headquarters and
Main Staff (of the future Serb forces), partly from the remnants of the Second Military
District, partly from people who came with me from Knin and other regions, but who
had been born in Bosnia-Herzegovina.740
Gvero indicates:
... In that general muddle and uproar, nothing serious could be done until the 12
of us were left and until we established a network to control those units which
remained in the field; we worked speedily to establish control over them, to form new
units, and to link them into the single entity of a front with a unified command system.
At that time, there were units of the JNA in the field which had not been
withdrawn, there were numerous village or municipal units, various volunteer units and
armed groups, or paramilitary organizations, with all kinds of different insignia and
various advisers ... One of my conditions for coming here was that we do away with all
insignia, including the red star and cockade [a royalist symbol] and various other recent
insignias. I called for the VRS to be one army with one symbol and one insignia, under
one command.741
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic formalized the Main Staff’s efforts to eliminate
“rogue” elements with the proclamation of a decree on 13 June 1992 prohibiting:
... the formation and operation of armed groups and individuals ... not under the
unified command of the armed forces or the police force.742

I encountered a very complex situation; with a large number of traumatized people ... Many of
them knew nothing about the people closest to them. There were several dozen officers working at
those headquarters, some of whom had spent their entire career working in Sarajevo. Many of them
had left family and property behind in that city ... Unfortunately; many of them never saw their
families again.
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter 7.
740
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter 7.
741
Milja Vujisic: The Truth About the General’s Dismissal, Belgrade Intervju (Internet Version), 13 December
1996. An interview with Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero. Mladic, Gvero, and many other ex-JNA
officers had an abhorrence for a disunited command, as Gvero implies, and constantly enforced the VRS
prerogatives as the sole RS armed force, assuming operational control over all MUP units in combat. They
heartily despised the volunteers and “paramilitaries”, and particularly deplored their penchant for looting
rather than fighting. In a 1993 interview then Major General Slavko Lisica described his dislike for
volunteers, stating:
These were not fighters, but rather adventurers and the usual dregs that every war brings to the
surface ... they are disorganized, irresponsible, and have never fit in with my concept of combat. You
have guys who will kill a 90-year old man just for a lamb... They ask me to send them out for so-called
“cleansing”. Ok, I say, there are some minefields that you can clear out to your heart’s content ...
volunteers have been a burden in my zone of responsibility, so that on one occasion I even sent in
tanks to disarm them.
Ljubomir Grubic: Pulling Down the Pants, Belgrade Nin, 23 July 1993, pp. 12-14 – an interview with Slavko
Lisica.
742
A copy of the order can be found in Professor Dr. Kosta Cavoski: The Hague Against Justice Revisited: The
Case of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Serbian Sarajevo (sic), 1997, p. 55. An order from Karadzic on 6 August
indicates that this order had been more or less carried out, except for some groups near Kljuc and in the
Drina River valley; see Cavoski, p. 71.

319
 Political-Military Squabbles: Chetniks versus Partisans
The new army was a mixture of two visions, that of its ex-JNA, ex-Communist senior
officers and the Serbian nationalism of the SDS.743 The senior JNA officers, like Mladic and
General Milan Gvero, the army’s senior political officer, viewed the army’s mission as
defending threatened Serbdom against renewed fascist aggression. They appear to have
truly believed that they were in many ways carrying on the JNA’s partisan traditions of
World War II, viewed through a Serbian prism. Karadzic and the SDS, however, were Serbian
nationalists who believed in the revival of greater Serb “royalist” sentiment, renewing the
traditions of the Kingdom of Serbia. The SDS praised the World War II exploits of the royalist
Chetniks, archenemies of the Partisans. Although both visions were clearly pro-Serb and led
to essentially the same objective, from the very beginning their different bases generated
ideological and emotional conflicts over war aims, military strategy, political control over
the military, and the role of the SDS in the army. By the end of the war, these conflicts had
deteriorated into open and vitriolic hatred between the VRS Main Staff and the SDS.
The fundamental clash between the VRS Main Staff and the SDS came over the
desire of the SDS to control the internal composition of the army and the appointment and
promotion of its officers to ensure political reliability. The “royalist” SDS did not trust the ex-
Communist JNA officers. General Gvero has stated that:
At the root of it all ... is the fact that the political and state leaders of the RS the
whole time wanted the SDS, not the state, to exercise command over the army. That is,
for the army to be party-controlled ... That concept was very essential to them...
That negative attitude toward the army was personally known to me at once;
from the beginning, since May 1992, it was obvious in the first top-level meetings, in
the very top leadership of the RS ... From the first moment they behaved toward us as
though the officers of this army could only serve them with their professional
knowledge, but without respect for them as people, because it was clear to them that
we would not fit into their schemes of their party politics. For them, no one who had
been an officer of the JNA could be a Serbian officer.744
Karadzic’s statement that in 1992 the “JNA could not be trusted ... The JNA
regarded us as nationalists and anti-communists” seem to bear out Gvero’s statements.745
The VRS would complain throughout the war of the SDS’s interference in the internal
workings of the army and accuse the party leaders of refusing to provide the army with the

743
This section will refer to the SDS rather than the Bosnian Serb Government as such, because the
government was essentially the formal face of the SDS. The SDS was for all intents and purposes the only
Bosnian Serb political party during the war; it was the government. There was little political control or
influence exerted on the army (outside of the Yugoslav Federal Republic) other than by the SDS.
744
Milja Vujisic: The Truth About the General’s Dismissal, Belgrade Intervju (Internet Version), 13 December
1996. An interview with Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero. See also Lieutenant Colonel Milovan
Milutinovic: Wisdom and Caution, Srpska Vojska, 22 March 1996, pp. 10-14. An interview with Lieutenant
Colonel General Milan Gvero.
745
Dejan Lukic: Mobilization Was the Direct Cause of War, Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 2 June 1997, p. 11.

320
resources needed to prosecute the war.746 Karadzic, Krajisnik, and the SDS compounded this
perception with their involvement in widespread smuggling, war profiteering, and
corruption, which the army charged siphoned supplies from its soldiers.747 The army was
further hampered by “poor selection of command personnel” when its needs for junior and
mid-level officers were filled by the appointment of SDS supporters instead of recruitment
based on professional qualifications.748
These ongoing disputes and ideological wars exacerbated a disagreement between
the SDS and the military over the proper use and limits of force juxtaposed against the
politicians’ concerns for such factors as international opinion. Throughout the war, Karadzic
and the SDS leadership were far more concerned than Mladic and the VRS Main Staff about
the impact Bosnian Serb military actions might have on Republika Srpska’s international
political standing. SDS leaders had no compunction about ordering the VRS to stand down
from an incipient military operation if they thought its results might compromise their
attempts to legitimize the RS internationally or score political points. The VRS Main Staff did
not object per se to overall political control of the military – as Red Army-model JNA officers
they were ingrained with this principle.749 Rather, they were outraged by the direct
interference of Karadzic and the SDS leadership in the conduct of military operations, not in
order to achieve a vital war aim, but rather to go along with what they viewed as political
stunts, such as the regulation of heavy weapons deployments by international monitors.750

746
Many, including probably the SDS, would argue that they were asking for nothing more than the same level
of control that the Yugoslav League of Communists had exercised over the JNA (including these same VRS
officers) during its reign over the SFRY. While the two examples are superficially similar, the underlying
facts are far different. Certainly, in the JNA, officers needed a politically correct pedigree to advance.
However, the JNA system also placed a premium on professional competency. An officer had to have
punched the proper professional tickets, such as attendance at the army’s professional military academies,
performance at staff schools, and success at various levels of command, before he could rise in the ranks.
An officer, particularly at the more sensitive, higher levels of command and staff, had to be both politically
reliable and professionally capable. This was the general rule, although there were certainly many
exceptions. The SDS on the other hand, was not advocating a sophisticated, systemic solution to political
reliability and competency, but instead was prepared to randomly grant someone an officer slot based on
his importance to the SDS in a local municipality or on the amount of money provided to the party till (or its
leaders). The SDS required little or no professional credentials from a prospective officer.
747
The most detailed accounts of the VRS Main Staff’s charges against the SDS can be found in Lieutenant
Colonel Milovan Milutinovic’s November 1996 letter to Nin and General Gvero’s December 1996 interview.
Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Milutinovic: Loss of Supreme Command, Belgrade Nin, 1 November 1996, pp.
19-22 (A letter to the editor from Lieutenant Colonel Milutinovic); Milja Vujisic: The Truth About the
General’s Dismissal, Belgrade Intervju (Internet Version), 13 December 1996. An interview with Lieutenant
Colonel General Milan Gvero. Milutinovic was the Chief of the VRS Information Service and, together with
Gvero, served as the official VRS mouthpiece during the war. He and Gvero were both at the top of the SDS
hit list, and Karadzic tried to relieve them in fall 1995. Milutinovic’s letter inspired Karadzic and the SDS to
make their final and successful effort to fire Mladic in November 1996.
748
Milutin Kozarica: Discipline – The Foundation On Which An Army Is Built, Srpska Vojska, 28 December 1995.
pp. 17-19.
749
The JNA believed in the strict adherence of the army to political control of the military through the League
of Yugoslav Communists and the Federal Presidency. See Kadijevic Fails to Stop Secession, in the section on
the Croatian war for an example of JNA servility to political authority.
750
Karadzic’s many attempts to placate world opinion with what the VRS regarded as militarily unsound
political “stunts” included his move in 1992 to allow the UN to monitor VRS heavy weapons around key

321
Such interjections imposed what Mladic had called during the Croatian war “start-stop”
operations, in which an ongoing, successful attack was halted for transient political ends.
The generals complained that the SDS did not seem to realize that warfare cannot be turned
on and off like a water faucet, and, as time went on, the VRS Main Staff became increasingly
selective over which SDS directives it would follow. Karadzic and the SDS were hostilely
resentful of what they viewed as their legitimate efforts to exercise political control over the
military, and their anger would culminate in Karadzic’s failed attempt to fire Mladic in late
1995.751
Karadzic’s efforts to dominate the VRS were intertwined with and complicated by
the strong allegiance Mladic and the VRS owed to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and
the Yugoslav Army (VJ). Many have claimed that Milosevic and the VJ directly planned and
controlled VRS military operations. We do not believe this to have been the case. Instead,
the relationship was a far more complex interweaving of influence, logistics (including such
things as officer salaries), and personal ties. Mladic and his top officers certainly had far
more respect for and loyalty to Milosevic than they ever did for Karadzic, and they clearly
viewed him as the top Serb. This never meant, however, that Milosevic and his two General
Staff chiefs, General Zivota Panic and General Momcilo Perisic, were in the habit of issuing
daily orders to Mladic to attack this or stop shelling that. The VRS planned and ran their own
war, with some political guidance from Belgrade, and with generous amounts of logistics
and other support from the VJ.
Karadzic and the SDS naturally resented Milosevic’s influence over the VRS and,
after the August 1994 falling-out between Milosevic and Karadzic, fought hard to remove
that influence. They tried to win senior VRS officers over to the SDS’s side in the dispute
with offers of bribes and perquisites, and they did whatever they could to pump up the
image and authority of the forces of the SDS-controlled Ministry of Internal Affairs at the
expense of the VRS. When the VRS officers resisted, the party powers appear to have
resorted even to withholding supplies to the army in an effort to bend the VRS to its will.
The party machinery mounted a public relations campaign alleging Belgrade’s “unnatural
control” over the VRS that focused on the former JNA officers’ communist indoctrination,
labelling them “red generals”, “red scum”, and other pejoratives. When they were actually
conducting the war, Mladic and the Main Staff were able to resist or ignore the SDS
campaign to bring them under Karadzic’s thumb, but these political-military conflicts
became an infection that vitiated the Republika Srpska’s ability to deal with its enemies
throughout the Bosnian conflict.

towns, the effort to turn over the VRS Air Force and Air Defence aircraft to the FRY, the cession of the
Sarajevo airport to the UN, the agreement to “demilitarize” Srebrenica in April 1993 when the VRS was on
the verge of victory, the September 1993 withdrawal from Mount Igman, and the halting of the VRS
offensive against Bihac in late 1994 in favor of a cease-fire negotiated by former US President Jimmy
Carter.
751
The Bosnian Serb national command authority was vested in the “Supreme Command” (Vrhovna Komanda)
or VK. For a descrip tion of the VK, see Appendix I.

322
 VRS Organization, 1992
The first order of business facing Mladic and the Main Staff was to re-establish and
extend the chain of command among the former JNA corps headquarters while converting
the SDS-raised TO “units” into full-fledged VRS brigades.752 These brigades were to provide
the bulk of the VRS manpower throughout the war, especially the manning of most of the
static trench defences, while the VRS relied on the veteran formations inherited from the
JNA as its mobile reserve. By the end of 1992 the Main Staff had provided the VRS’s six
corps (five original ex-JNA corps, plus a new one activated in November), together with
Main Staff subordinate units, with the following major combat formations:753
– two armoured brigades
– one mechanized brigade
– ten motorized brigades
– one protection motorized regiment
– at least sixty three infantry or light infantry brigades754
– one FROG-7 rocket artillery brigade
– six mixed artillery regiments
– one mixed antitank artillery brigade
– two mixed antitank artillery regiments
– five light air defence artillery regiments
At the time of its formation in 1992, the VRS numbered over 250.000 troops (when
fully mobilized), but by 1994-1995, the VRS would deploy only about 155.000 troops, even
at full mobilization.755 It originally fielded some 500 to 550 tanks, about 250 armoured
personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, 500 to 600 field artillery pieces over 100 mm,
and some 400 to 500 120 mm mortars.
The Air Force and Air Defence (V i PVO) included the following units:
– one mixed aviation (fighter-bomber and helicopter) brigade
– one SA-2 brigade
– one SA-6 regiment
– one light air defence artillery regiment
– one early warning radar battalion

752
See Nikola Zoric: 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade: Order on Krajina Chests, Srpska Vojska, 5 July 1993, pp.
8-9, for description of a light infantry brigade’s antecedents as an SDS controlled TO unit.
753
Most VRS brigades underwent several reorganizations during the war, usually cutting back the number of
subordinate battalions. Some new brigades were formed after 1992 but at the same time older ones were
consolidated into other formations.
754
Infantry and light infantry brigades in the VRS were, in fact, different in composition. An infantry brigade
generally was larger, sometimes twice as large, as a light infantry brigade, and was usually better equipped,
having a field artillery battalion instead of only mortars and mountain guns, and often a company of T-34
tanks. In 1992, however, many future infantry brigades were still designated as “partisan” (the original JNA
term) or, using the new VRS term, “light infantry”.
755
VRS General Savo Sokanovic provided the 250.000 troops figure during a news conference in May 2000.
During the war, then Colonel Sokanovic headed the VRS Information Service under General Gvero. Banja
Luka RTRS Radio, 10 May 2000.

323
 The V i PVO numbered about 2.000 personnel and fielded some 20 Galeb-Jastreb
and Orao fighter-bombers, about 15 Gazelle light attack / observation helicopters, and
about 15 Mi-8 Hip transport helicopters.
The JNA order of battle inherited by the VRS was less impressive than it looked,
since most of the combat formations listed above lacked practical experience; they had not
been mobilized for the Croatian crisis and had remained in Bosnia throughout the war. Only
one corps command (1st Krajina – ex-5th Banja Luka), one armoured brigade, three
motorized brigades, and five infantry / light infantry brigades had mobilized and deployed
into the field during 1991.756 The majority of the VRS units and their officers had never been
required to mobilize and integrate reservists into a peacetime cadre structure, weld newly-
uniformed civilians into a functioning combat team while deploying to the battlefield, and
logistically support troops during the chaos of combat. To compensate for these
shortcomings, the JNA transferred to the VRS a host of veteran combat officers to fill key
command and staff slots.

Evolution of the VRS, 1992-1995

Each of the VRS’s major commands evolved during the war to fill a specific role, in
the process developing its own character based on unit esprit, regional affiliations and
shared experiences. The following sketches give a feel for the mission and persona each of
these commands took on.757

The Main Staff – The Brain

The Main Staff was the brain of the VRS, formulating Bosnian Serb military strategy
and dealing with the Bosnian Serb civilian leaders to match this strategy to the leadership’s
war aims. The Main Staff worked out operational-level planning with corps commands,
developed doctrine, managed personnel, and supervised army-wide logistics. While Mladic
was officially “Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS” (Komandant Glavnog Staba VRS) he
relied on Major General (later Lieutenant Colonel General) Manojlo Milovanovic, the Chief
of the Main Staff (Nacelnik Glavnog Staba), to ensure that things ran smoothly. During many
major operations Mladic, and in some cases Milovanovic, would directly supervise the
battles. In Operation Lukavac 93 – the Trnovo-Mount Igman operation in August-September
1993 – Mladic supervised the Herzegovina and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps attacks both on the
756
The brigades in question were the 1st (ex-329th) Armored, 43rd (ex-343rd) Prijedor Motorized, 16th
Krajina Motorized, 1st Herzegovina (ex-472nd) Motorized, 2nd Krajina Infantry, 5th Kozara Light Infantry,
6th Sanska Infantry, 11th Dubica Infantry, and 22nd (ex-122nd) Infantry Brigades. The 8th Herzegovina (ex-
13th) and 27th (ex-327th) Derventa Motorized Brigades also took part in combat operations during April
1992 in Bosnia as JNA formations, just prior to the formation of the VRS. In addition, the JNA 13th (VRS 8th
Herzegovina) Motorized Brigade and the 4th Armored Brigade (redesignated as the JNA 336th Motorized
Brigade and became the VRS 1st Zvornik Infanty Brigade) had been blockaded in their barracks in Croatia
for the duration of the war, while the 14th (VRS 2nd Romanija) Motorized Brigade had taken part in the
Slovene Ten Day War.
757
For a skeleton order of battle for the VRS from 1992-1995, see Appendix 2.

324
ground and from his personal Gazelle helicopter. In 1992, however, Mladic and Milovanovic
appear to have done less of this than they did later in the war, possibly because of the
demands of establishing the Main Staff and dealing with Karadzic and the SDS.
Mladic had seven deputies, who headed the Main Staff’s seven primary bodies:
– Major General Manojlo Milovanovic, Deputy Commander and Chief of the Main
Staff.758 Milovanovic supervised Operations and Training Section, and the branch
(armour, artillery, etc.) sections.
– Colonel Mico Grubor, Assistant Commander for Organizational-Mobilization and
Personnel Affairs, dealing with administrative and personnel issues.759
– Major General Milan Gvero, Assistant Commander for Morale, Religious, and
Legal Affairs, who served as the army’s senior political and information
officer.760
– Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security.761
– Colonel Jovo Maric, Assistant Commander for Air and Air Defence Force
Affairs.762
– Colonel Stevan Tomic, Assistant Commander for Development and Finance.763
– Major General Djordje Djukic, Assistant Commander for Rear Services. Djukic
and his staff were responsible for VRS logistics and maintenance issues.764

758
Note that Milovanovic was not just a deputy, but was considered the deputy to Mladic, with the authority
to issue orders to the other sections in Mladic’s absence. Milovanovic was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel
General on 24 June 1994. Milovanovic appears to have had one or two deputies during the war. Colonel
Radivoje Miletic served as the deputy during 1994-1995. Their formal title was Deputy Chief of Staff and
Chief of Operations and Training. Miletic was promoted to Major General on 23 June 1995.
759
Grubor was promoted to Major General on 24 June 1994. Colonel Petar Skrbic replaced Grubor by early
1995, and was promoted to Major General on 23 June 1995.
760
Gvero had served throughout the Croatian war as the JNA’s leading public spokesman, and was best known
for the tours of Vukovar he gave to foreign journalists. His official position was Chief of the Section for
Information and Propaganda in the Department for Morale and Political Affairs of the Federal Secretariat
for National Defence. Gvero was promoted to Major General (one star) on 22 December 1991, and
Lieutenant Colonel General on 24 June 1994. Gvero also supervised the VRS Information Service, headed by
Colonel Savo Sokanovic and Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Milutinovic. Sokanovic was also Gvero’s deputy
and chief of the Section for Morale and Education.
761
Tolimir had previously served as Chief of Security / 9th (Knin) Corps, working directly for Mladic. He was
one of Mladic’s closest advisers. Tolimir was promoted to Major General on 24 June 1994. His two deputies
were Colonel Petar Salapura, Chief of Military Intelligence, and Colonel Ljubisa Beara, Chief of Counter-
Intelligence. Salapura appears to have been Chief of Military Intelligence in the Second Military District
(and possibly its predecessor the Fifth Military District). Beara was actually a naval security officer and had
served as Chief of Security / Military-Maritime District during the Croatian war.
762
Maric and his staff dealt with organizational and doctrinal issues, but did not command the Air and Air
Defence Force, which was separate. Maric was promoted to Major General on 24 June 1994.
763
Tomic was promoted to Major General on 24 June 1994.
764
Djukic had previously served on the JNA General Staff, heading the Technical Services Section in the office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Rear Services. Djukic was promoted to Major General on 23 December
1991, and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General on 24 June 1994. The office of the Assistant
Commander for Rear Services consisted of Technical Service, Quartermaster Service, Procurement and
Trade, Medical Service, Traffic Service, and Construction Service Sections.

325
 Of these, the big four were Milovanovic, Gvero, Tolimir, and Djukic. They served
not only in their respective staff positions but also as Mladic’s confidants and closest
advisers.
The Main Staff, although thrown together from a variety of different officers in
different commands, developed during the war into the most professional staff and
planning body of all the many combatants in the Bosnian conflict.765 Time and again the VRS
Main Staff demonstrated its ability to plan and execute difficult operations, even in the
midst of shortages of reserves, materiel, and logistics, and, in 1995, NATO air strikes and
Croatian Army intervention. When, at the end, the VRS found itself losing the war, it was
through no fault of the Main Staff or of strategic and operational errors.

1st Krajina Corps (1. Krajiski Korpus) – Backbone of the VRS

The 1st Krajina Corps was the largest, most experienced, and most capable corps in
the army from start to finish. In 1992, only the 1st Krajina Corps headquarters had any
experience in conducting corps-level combat operations, having directed JNA operations in
Western Slavonia during 1991. The corps was able to maintain full continuity in its
experienced staff with the assumption of command in March 1992 of Major General Momir
Talic, who had been chief of staff during the 1991 operations. Talic’s chief of staff, Major
General Bosko Kelecevic, took over this position simultaneously with Talic’s assumption of
command and served with him for the duration of the Bosnian war.766 By virtue its previous
combat experience and size, the 1st Krajina Corps became the VRS strategic reserve.767 The

765
The 1995 Croatian Main Staff in Zagreb probably came a close second. The 1995 version of the HV certainly
was the most formidable army that fought in Bosnia. HV forces, however, were free to use such
overwhelming force that it is difficult to judge the relative importance of staff work (beyond the obvious
need for it to be conducted competently) to the victory, in comparison to its high value for the resource-
constrained VRS.
766
Kelecevic previously served as Chief of Security for the Fifth Military District throughout the Croatian war,
and during the pre-war crises.
767
The size of the corps area forced the VRS to establish two (later three) semi-permanent commands to
control key sectors: “Doboj” Operational Group 9 and 30th Infantry Division. OG-9 appears to have been
formed originally from an operational group derived from elements of the JNA 17th Tuzla Corps and former
TO forces brought together in late May 1992 to control the forces deployed around Bosanski Brod and
Doboj. Under the VRS, Colonel Milvoje Simic initially commanded the OG; Colonel Slavko Lisica replaced
him at the end of 1992. In mid-1993, Lisica was removed, promoted, and given command of the VRS Centre
of Military Schools. Colonel Vladimir Arsic replaced him, leading the OG until the end of the war. Arsic was
promoted to Major General on 23 June 1995. OG-9 was initially responsible for areas around Doboj, Teslic,
and Ozren, but later appears to have assumed command over all 1st Krajina Corps forces stretching from
Teslic to Orasje – the bulk of the Posavina Corridor. The 30th Infantry Division (originally 30th Partisan
Division) (19th Brigade, 1st Sipovo, and 11th Mrkonjic Brigade) was responsible for the sector running from
Donji Vakuf (Srbobran) to the boundary with OG-9 near Teslic from 1994-1995. Previously, the sector had
been split into the 30th Division sector, covering the Donji Vakuf-Kupres area and the “Vlasic” Operational
Group (1st Kotor Varos and 22nd Brigades), under Lieutenant Colonel Janko Trivic, covering the Mount
Vlasic-Travnik area, up to the OG-9 boundary. The “Vlasic” OG was merged with the 30th Division in 1994.
Colonel Stanislav Galic commanded the division during much of 1992, until Colonel Jovo Blazanovic
replaced him. The division’s last commander was Colonel Momir Zec, who led it from late 1994 to the end
of the war. Zec was promoted to Major General on 23 June 1995. The 1st Krajina Corps formed a third
major subordinate command, “Prijedor” Operational Group 10, in August 1995, to deal with the Bosnian

326
corps had more hitting power, concentrated in two armoured brigades and four motorized
brigades, than all others, in addition to its roughly 30 infantry/light infantry brigades. Those
brigades in particular, such as the 16th Krajina and 43rd Motorized, which had fought in
Western Slavonia, became fire brigades that would be transferred repeatedly, often in dribs
and drabs, throughout the RS to hold or seize key sectors. Most of its brigades were raised
in Bosanska Krajina, where the VRS had only minimal frontline sectors to deal with until
1995, so that these units could be sent outside of their home areas. It was not until late
1995 that the HV’s irruption into the heart of the Bosnian Serbs’ strategic rear area, the
Bosanska Krajina, spelled the end of the VRS’s powers of resistance, as the army was forced
to redeploy nearly all of 1st Krajina Corps’ unit – plus many from other corps – to defend the
area, stripping the army of its few remaining troop reserves.

2nd Krajina Corps (2. Krajiski Korpus) – Vulnerable Backdoor

The 2nd Krajina Corps, under the leadership of Major General Grujo Boric, and later
Major General Radivoje Tomanic, was the weak sister of the five corps.768 The corps was
made responsible for secondary sectors until late 1994, stretched thin throughout its area of
responsibility. Although the corps staff was formed from the headquarters of the battle-
tested 10th Corps, it had none of that pre-war corps’ striking power.769 Instead, it mustered
eight relatively weak brigades, none of which had Croatian war experience. The number of
brigades available was comparable to the other corps, but, given the vast frontages the 2nd
Krajina was forced to hold, its lack of operational reserves to plug enemy penetrations left it
completely inadequate to face a major threat. Its task was made more difficult by the
awkward separation of its brigades between the Kupres-Bosansko Grahovo and the Bihac
sectors. When Bosnian Army 5th Corps forces, and later HV/HVO forces, began major
operations against the corps in late 1994, the Main Staff had to send substantial
reinforcements to the region in a vain attempt to stem the tide. The 2nd Krajina Corps’

Army and HV/HVO offensives threatening Western Bosnia. Colonel Radmilo was its commander. This OG
appears to have existed earlier, during 1993, when it acted as a holding formation for elements in the
Prijedor-Sanski Most area, while covering the Una and Sava River boundaries with Croatia. Colonel Branko
Basara appears to have been in command at that time. The OG probably was inactivated in 1994.
768
Boric originally took command of the corps as a colonel and was promoted to Major General in late 1992.
Boric had served as Assistant Commander for Rear Services in the corps during the Croatian war. Upon his
relief, he took command of the VRS training center, the Centre of Military Schools, located in Banja Luka,
which he headed until 1997. Major General Radivoje Tomanic replaced him in November 1994, after the
Bosnian Army breakthrough at Bihac. Tomanic served on the VRS Main Staff prior to his appointment.
Boric’s chief of staff was Colonel Mico Vlaisavljevic. Vlaisavljevic was promoted to Major General on 24
June 1994. Vlaisavljevic previously commanded the engineer regiment of the 9th (Knin) Corps under
Mladic. Colonel Dusan Kukobat replaced Vlaisavljevic at the same time Tomanic replaced Boric.
769
The old 10th (Zagreb) Corps, from which the 10th (Bihac) Corps was formed, had an armored brigade, a
mechanized brigade, and a motorized brigade, plus an artillery regiment and an antitank regiment. None of
these units remained with the corps when it became the 2nd Krajina. The armored brigade had been sent
in late 1991 to the Tuzla area, while the mechanized brigade had gone to the Sarajevo area. The motorized
brigade and the artillery units remained in the Krajina.

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sector became the backdoor through which both the Krajina Serb and Bosnian Serb Armies
were defeated.

East Bosnian Corps (Istocno-Bosanski Korpus) – Guardian of the Corridor

The primary mission of the East Bosnian Corps (originally the JNA 17th Tuzla Corps)
for the duration of the conflict was the maintenance and widening of the Posavina Corridor
at its narrowest point in Brcko. The corridor was the single most strategic sector in
Republika Srpska, the loss of which would have split the RS in two; at Brcko the corridor was
only five kilometers wide. In addition, the corps was tasked with defending the frontline
along the Majevica Mountains and the protruding “Sapna” salient, east of Tuzla city. Colonel
(later Major General) Novica Simic led the corps for most of the war, taking over from
Colonel Dragutin Ilic in late 1992 after successfully leading a tactical group under 1st Krajina
Corps during the operation to create the western portion of the corridor in the summer of
1992.770 Simic’s troops were raised from three regions: Posavina (along the Sava River),
Semberija (around Bijeljina), and Majevica (the mountain area northeast of Tuzla). Each of
these regions eventually raised three infantry / light infantry brigades, in addition to an elite
light infantry / light motorized brigade, which was used as an assault unit or to reinforce
threatened sectors.771 Because of the importance of Brcko, the corps was regularly
reinforced by 1st Krajina Corps formations.

Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (Sarajevsko-Romanjski Korpus) – Besieging Sarajevo

The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (originally the JNA 4th Sarajevo Corps) was best
known for its maintenance of the siege of Sarajevo, and remained the focus of world
attention, gaining an evil reputation from its repeated shelling and sniper attacks on civilians
in the city. Its repeated shelling of market places, which killed scores of people in 1994 and
1995, provoked international pressure that forced the corps to remove most of its heavy
weapons from around Sarajevo. The corps was also the most politicized of the VRS corps
commands because of its proximity to the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale and, perhaps in
consequence, was run by more commanders than any other corps in the war: Major General
Tomislav Sipcic, Major General Stanislav Galic, and Major General Dragomir Milosevic, who
served during 1992, 1993-mid-1994, and mid-1994 through 1995 respectively.772 But the
corps retained its military professionalism in spite of political influences, fighting

770
Simic commanded Tactical Group 1 of the 1st Krajina Corps during Operation “Corridor 92”. He had served
as chief of staff in the JNA 329th (VRS 1st) Armored Brigade during the 1991 Croatian war. He was
promoted in July 1993 to Major General after the successful action by 1st Krajina / East Bosnian Corps
Operation “Sadejstvo-93” to widen the Posavina corridor near Brcko. Colonel Dragutin Ilic was Simic’s
predecessor as commander of the East Bosnian Corps upon its absorption by the VRS. Simic’s chief of staff
throughout the war was Colonel Budimir Gavric. Gavric was promoted to Major General on 24 June 1994.
771
Of these nine brigades, all but one were formed by the end of 1992. The 3rd Posavina Infantry Brigade was
formed on 28 September 1994, from four battalions of the 2nd Posavina Infantry Brigade.
772
Galic was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General upon his retirement. The chiefs of staff for these corps
commanders was as follows: Colonel Dragan Marcetic, 1992, Colonel Cedo Sladoje, 1993-1995.

328
successfully in a number of small-scale VRS offensive operations in 1992-1993 and in larger
defensive actions during 1994-1995. The corps consisted of a mechanized brigade and eight
infantry / light infantry brigades in 1992-1993, and one mechanized brigade and seven
infantry / light infantry brigades in 1995.773 All were raised from Sarajevo city, its suburbs,
and parts of the Romanija region. These troops held both an inner siege ring around the city
proper and an outer ring facing away from Sarajevo toward central Bosnia and Mount Igman
/ Herzegovina. In between the rings lay a number of Serb-populated suburbs, such as Ilijas
and Hadzici.774 Prior to the formation of the Drina Corps in November 1992, the corps was
also involved in VRS operations around Gorazde and Zepa in the Drina River valley,
commanding an additional motorized brigade and elements of one of the Sarajevo brigades.

Drina Corps (Drinski Korpus) – The Dirty War in the Enclaves

The Drina Corps was formed on 1 November 1992 from forces of the East Bosnian,
Sarajevo-Romanija, and Herzegovina Corps, to provide a unified command covering the
entire Drina valley. Major General Milenko Zivanovic led the corps until late July 1995, when
Major General Radislav Krstic replaced him.775 The corps had responsibility for three of the
most internationally visible sectors in Bosnia, after Sarajevo: the Muslim-held enclaves of
Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. The fighting in the Drina valley around these enclaves was
particularly nasty, with the Bosnian Serbs charging Bosnian Army units from Srebrenica and
Zepa with atrocities against Serb civilians during 1992 and 1993, to which the VRS
responded more than in kind, including the now infamous slaughter of Muslim males
escaping from fallen Srebrenica in July 1995. Vicious fighting also took place in the southern
half of the corps sector at Gorazde, particularly during the April 1994 VRS offensive, in which
the army burned captured Muslim villages. Due to reorganizations and shifting boundaries,
the corps varied in size from one motorized brigade and eight infantry / light infantry
brigades in 1992 to a motorized brigade and seven infantry / light infantry brigades in
1995.776 These forces held multiple, awkward fronts, forced to guard both the enclaves and
the frontline with the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps south east of Tuzla. The corps area of
responsibility was essentially split into a northern and a southern zone, running along an

773
The VRS merged three light infantry brigades in late 1993, creating the 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade from
the Vogosca, Rajlovac, and Kosevo Light Brigades.
774
The Serbs expelled most of the Muslims who had lived in these suburbs before the war.
775
Zivanovic was a close colleagues of Mladic, and had previously commanded the JNA 180th Motorized
Brigade / 9th (Knin) Corps under Mladic during the Croatian war, earning a promotion. Zivanovic was a
colonel when he took command of the new corps, and was promoted to Major General during 1993. He
was rewarded with promotion to Lieutenant Colonel General at his retirement in July 1995. Prior to
assuming command of the corps in July 1995, Krstic had served as corps chief of staff since early 1995. He
previously commanded the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade (ex-JNA 14th Motorized), leading it under
both the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Drina Corps during fighting around Gorazde, Zepa, and Olovo
during 1992-1994. Krstic lost part of his leg in combat. Krstic’s predecessor as corps chief of staff was
Colonel Milutin Skocajic. Skocajic was promoted to Major General on 24 June 1994.
776
In late 1994, four of the five brigades of Tactical Group Visegrad, which comprised the 1st through 5th
Podrinje Brigades, were merged into three brigades. One of the new brigades was transferred to the
Herzegovina Corps along with its area of responsibility on the southern side of Gorazde.

329
east-west line at Zepa, although this natural division was not formalized in the command
structure. The northern sector consisted of the “Sapna” salient-Kladanj-Srebrenica triangle,
while the southern comprised Gorazde. Zepa faced both. The presence of the Main Staff
headquarters at the Han Pijesak / Mount Zep complex, in the middle of the corps area, also
complicated command, as Mladic and Milovanovic were often tempted to interfere in local
events.

Herzegovina Corps (Hercegovacki Korpus)

The Herzegovina Corps was formed from the JNA 13th Bileca Corps, and given
command over all VRS forces in the Serb-controlled section of the old Ottoman “vilayet” of
Herzegovina. Major General Radovan Grubac commanded the corps from the beginning of
the war until he was ousted with General Mladic in November 1996.777 Despite its large
frontage, the corps started with only three motorized brigades (one of which was converted
into an infantry brigade) and three – later four – light infantry brigades to defend its
territory.778 The corps initially controlled most of the front around Gorazde as well,
commanding another five light infantry brigades before giving this up to the Drina Corps in
the latter half of 1992.779 Despite its manpower shortages the corps was generally successful
in most of its battles. During 1992, the corps stayed primarily on the defensive, attempting
to hold off HV/HVO operations in the long sector between Mostar and Trebinje-Dubrovnik.
During 1993-1995, after most fighting with the Croats had ended, the corps was able to shift
its focus north, leading VRS offensives, including Operation Lukavac 93 at Mount Igman and
the campaign against Gorazde during April 1994. A composite Herzegovina Brigade –
essentially a tactical group – was used during 1994-1995 to defend key positions along the
Treskavica Mountains near Trnovo-Kalinovik and to fill gaps in other corps as well.

Limited Manpower – VRS Strategic Reality

The strategic reality faced by the Main Staff and its corps from the beginning to the
end of the war was that the VRS did not have enough troops to hold the long frontlines that
stretched from Bihac to Trebinje. While this was of less consequence in 1992, when only the
Croatian Army was capable of conducting any large-scale offensive operations against the
VRS, it was to become an increasingly difficult and eventually insoluble problem as the war
dragged on. Even in 1992, however, the VRS was forced to draw single battalions from many
brigades and shift them from front to front to reinforce local units. As the lengthening war
brought increasing losses and higher rates of desertion and draft dodging, the VRS had to

777
Grubac’s chief of staff was initially Colonel, later Major General, Vlado Spremo. Colonel Miladin Prstojevic
replaced Spremo during mid to late 1994.
778
The Main Staff’s 1st Guards Motorized Brigade moved almost per manently to Kalinovik in September 1993
upon the conclusion of Operation “Lukavac 93”, and was attached to the Herzegovina Corps command for
the rest of the war.
779
The corps again assumed control over part of the Gorazde front during mid to late 1994, reabsorbing two
light infantry brigades that were then merged into a single formation.

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plumb every available source to fill the ranks. As early as 1993 it began forming reserve
battalions in many brigades comprised of males over 50 years old and even women to
operate rear area facilities and defend secondary areas.780 By the end of the war, the VRS
was desperately plugging gaps in the line with composite brigades of platoons and
companies drawn from several different formations, shifting them from one end of Bosnia
to the other, or using a variety of rear services units to hold frontline sectors.

VRS Operational and Tactical Methods, 1992-1993781

Campaigning

At the operational or campaign level, the VRS appears to have followed JNA
doctrine for mountain warfare, which called for slow, methodical advances to avoid threats
from enemy units concealed in the dense forests and difficult mountain terrain. An advance
usually proceeded along several axes converging on the objective, often a town, which the
VRS would first try to cut off and isolate into an enclave or salient. The army would then
systematically reduce the area, methodically moving from one enemy defensive line to
another in a series of set-piece attacks with some tactical exploitation following a
breakthrough. One to two brigades or tactical groups would be assigned to each axis.

Tactical Doctrine

Endemic shortages of troops led the Main Staff to rely heavily (as had the JNA) on
the use of firepower-based tactics, which made up for deficiencies in rifle fire and limited
the necessity for infantry units to close with the enemy. During 1992 in particular, the VRS
often succeeded in using the shock effect of armour and artillery to rout poorly organized,
ill-trained, and under-equipped Muslim and Bosnian Croat infantry units, allowing the VRS
infantry to pretty much walk into the objective. As resistance coalesced, however, the VRS
developed a more sophisticated tactical offensive doctrine. This doctrine relied on detailed
pre-attack planning, reconnaissance, and intelligence to identify enemy tactical weaknesses,
the integration of all available fire support, and the use of specially selected small infantry
units to spearhead an advance by larger regular infantry units supported by small armoured
columns.

780
See Drago Vrucinic: Capable of More and Better Things, Ratni Bilten Seste Sanske Pjesadijske Brigade (War
Bulletin of the Sixth Sanska Infantry Brigade), 15 November 1994, p. 4:
By order of the Prijedor Operational Group and the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade, of March 1993,
four “B” Battalions were formed in the territory of Sanski Most municipality. The members of these
battalions are able-bodied men age 50 and above and women between the age of 18 and 40, except
those who have children younger than seven years old.
781
The VRS spent most of 1992-1993 on the offensive, so this section will deal with how the VRS adapted its
offensive operational-tactical doctrine to its shortage of soldiers. The development of VRS defensive
doctrine, particularly in light of the even more pressing manpower problems encountered in the second
half of the war, will be discussed at the beginning of the 1994 section, when the VRS assumed (for the most
part) the strategic defensive.

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 Structure of a VRS Attack

A typical VRS attack consisted of three phases: Attack Preparation, Execution, and
Pursuit.
First Phase (Attack Preparation)

– (D minus n) The VRS begins operational planning and intelligence preparation of the
objective to determine the enemy’s weakest positions several days or weeks before an
attack. The corps or an operational group commander and brigade / tactical group
commanders coordinate planning for the attack with major input from military
intelligence.
– (D minus 3+) The Serbs establish artillery observation and reconnaissance posts in key
vantage points overlooking enemy positions and begin emplacing artillery and mortars.
These posts allow units down to battalion to identify key enemy weak points, call for and
adjust artillery or mortar fire, and pass important intelligence back through the chain of
command.
– (D minus 2 or 3+) The preliminary artillery bombardment begins with mortars
concentrating on frontline positions and the field artillery striking deeper.

Second Phase (Execution)

– (D minus 1) VRS makes early morning probing attacks to identify weak points in front line
and perhaps deceive the enemy as to the timing of the main attack. Reconnaissance-
sabotage units rove behind enemy lines to get more intelligence and attack rear area
targets.
– (D Day) Intense pre-dawn artillery and mortar fire is concentrated on enemy positions
with support from direct-fire weapons and tanks on key strong-points. At the end of the
preparation, probably from 04:00 to 06:00, regular infantry, spearheaded by elite assault
infantry units and supported by armour, attack in two or more of the weakest enemy
sectors, supported by direct-fire artillery and other weapons. The infantry advances along
hills and ridges, while armour, from positions on nearby roads or tracks, provides fire
support against enemy bunkers, machine gun positions, and concealed forest defences.
Close coordination between the two is vital to success. Direct fire and mortar barrages
are concentrated on eliminating enemy anti-tank weapons while artillery and MRL fire
focus on routes into the attacked area to cut off the sector from reinforcement. Armour-
mechanized units conduct tactical exploitation to further unravel enemy defences if the
initial infantry push is successful.782

782
A recent Yugoslav Army (VJ) professional journal article describing VJ doctrine for the use of an armored
battalion in mountain terrain provides an excellent overview of many of the same principles incorporated
into the VRS tactical doctrine. Given the JNA ancestry of both, this is not surprising. The following passage
describes the conduct of an attack, and, although focused on armor, usefully includes how all arms, not just
armor, take part in it:

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 Third Phase (Tactical / Operational Pursuit)

– (D plus ?) VRS continues tactical exploitation to next enemy defensive line and prepares
for another set piece battle or, if resistance is weak, expands tactical exploitation into
operational exploitation.

Role of Combat Arms and Units in the Attack

Each command or arm played a specific role within the attack.

Command Units

Corps / operational group and brigade command staffs jointly planned the
operation. Military intelligence units, especially signals intelligence, helped drive the
planning. Artillery observation and reconnaissance groups supplemented the intelligence

Within the scope of the overall mission of the battalion, companies are given many consecutive
missions that mainly coincide with tactical-topographic objects in the depth of the enemy defence so
that by their gradual conquest the enemy will be broken into many smaller parts for easier
encirclement and destruction ...
In an attack in moutainous terrain, the battalion will most frequently use encirclement and bypass
and, less often – only when compelled to do so – a frontal form of attack. An attack on the leading
edge of the enemy requires starting with deployed mechanized and attached motorized [infantry]
companies, and tank companies act as when they are in direct support of infantry. Because of the
increased danger of action by enemy short-range antitank combat weapons, tanks must move
directly in the combat disposition of the infantry or behind it, attacking in columns, most often
platoon columns. During an attack, there has to be uninterrupted communication between
mechanized (motorized-infantry) components and tanks, and the tanks at any moment must be
secured by the infantry. Between the tanks and the infantry there must be clearly coordinated fire,
and targets must be indicated. Tank fire is used primarily for destruction of bunkers, nests of
automatic weapons, and clearing forests, steep slopes, and other sheltered objects by machine gun
and cannon fire. In the attack objects are occupied one after the other by a combination of frontal
attack of the infantry and envelopment-bypass of tank platoons and companies. Military-territorial
units [light infantry] may be used for these missions...
... Rapid penetration deep into enemy defence requires the use of advantages offered by the
terrain for sneaking smaller units of temporary composition through gaps, taking envelopment and
bypass on the flanks and wings, and rapidly breaking through to the rear lines. When there is no
possibility of envelopment and bypass, it is necessary by a combination of actions in valleys and along
ridges, with strong fire support by artillery units and tank fire, to neutralize enemy fire points and
with infantry support to take certain objects and then continue energetic penetration by tanks.
... Upon taking some objects and attaining certain lines ... it is required to set up combat
disposition, re-establish disrupted cooperation, reconnoiter the further direction of the attack as far
as possible, and only then continue penetration. [Comment: note emphasis on phased, methodical
attack]
Colonel Hajrudin Redzovic: Armored Battalion in Mountainous Areas, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, September-
October 1996, pp. 47-52.
Other examples also illustrate key aspects of JNA mountain tactical doctrine, especially the focus on a
methodical, step by step advance, regrouping after an advance to the next defence line, while emphasizing
flank security in the difficult terrain. A Bosnian Army (and former JNA) officer stated after a successful VRS
attack near Travnik in November 1992 that:
The Chetniks broke our defence lines step by step, using strong forces, securing their flanks and
regrouping stronger forces ... It was a text book operation.
Andrej Gustincic: Bosnian Frontline Collapses, Serbs Closer to Travnik, Reuters, 17 November 1992.

333
collection effort. Their observation posts, dispersed at battalion level, were the main eyes
and ears during an attack, feeding information to the battalion commander and adjusting
artillery / mortar fire in support of the attack. When deployed in advance of an attack or
behind enemy lines, reconnaissance-sabotage units supplemented intelligence collection.

Infantry Units

VRS infantry units were of four types: regular, assault / intervention,

reconnaissance-sabotage, and antiterrorist (military police and MUP special police). During
an attack, however, there were essentially only three roles:
Reconnaissance-Sabotage Role
Elite reconnaissance-sabotage units, either corps or brigade-level troops, were deployed
before an attack to conduct reconnaissance behind enemy lines and. during an attack, to
raid and disrupt enemy positions.
Assault Role
Expanding on methods introduced by the JNA during the Croatian war, the VRS used small,
elite assault infantry units to spearhead an attack and seize key objectives so that regular
infantry could more easily penetrate into the enemy defensive zone.783 About a platoon of
assault troops accompanied each attacking regular infantry battalion. Each VRS brigade had
at least one reconnaissance-sabotage platoon or company, together with a collection of
assault or intervention platoons in its line battalions. Some brigades had a full assault
battalion. Probably few of these brigade-level formations had received the specialized
training that characterizes genuinely elite units: generally they were collections of younger
men, usually battle-experienced, who had been stripped from regular line units to form the
shock troops. The corps could reinforce these organic units with truly elite corps-level
formations, such as military police, assault battalions, reconnaissance-sabotage units, or
MUP special police. Many of these corps-level units had received additional training in
advanced infantry tactics.
Regular Infantry
In the attack, the role of regular infantry units was to follow up the assault infantry. They
supported the assault infantry with suppressive fire during their initial attack and then
783
The use of small, picked infantry detachments to spearhead attacks by larger bodies of normal infantry
troops is reminiscent of the German development of “stormtroop” (sturmtruppen) units in the First World
War during 1915-1917 to lead attacks by regular infantry. The following excerpt is from a British
intelligence assessment written in 1918:
A noteworthy feature of infantry organization has been the introduction of “Assault
Detachments” (Sturmtrupps). These units consist of picked men whose initiative and skill in attack are
developed by special training ...
During the later part of 1916, an assault company (Sturmkompagnie) was formed in a number of
divisions. An assault company usually consists of 1 officer and 120 men: the company is organized in
3 platoons, one of which is often attached to each regiment of the division. These units are mainly
employed in patrolling, and in carrying out trench raids and offensive operations.
Imperial General Staff, Handbook of the German Army in War, April 1918, Nashville Imperial War Museum
/ Battery Press, reprinted 1996, p. 47. See also Martin Samuels: Command or Control? Command, Training,
and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918, London Frank Cass, 1995, Chapters 3 and 8.

334
moved forward to widen the break in enemy lines, mop up remaining enemy troops, and
then consolidate or exploit the gains made.

Armour-Mechanized and Self-Propelled AD Artillery Units

The VRS used armour-mechanized and self-propelled AD artillery units in three

roles during an infantry attack: mobile fire support, tactical exploitation, and mobile reserve.
Tanks and self-propelled air defence artillery vehicles most often performed the first role,
providing direct fire from positions overlooking the battlefield along a key road or from
over-watch positions on key terrain. During tactical exploitation, mixed armour-mechanized
elements pushed quickly behind local remaining defensive positions. From its normal
second-echelon positions the armour also formed a mobile reserve to block enemy
counterattacks.784 Armour-mechanized units were usually organized in companies with
mixed tank, mechanized infantry, and attached SPAA, usually with seven tanks and three
APCs or three tanks and seven APCs, and possibly one to three SPAA attached. The VRS’s
limited number of tanks, persistent fuel shortages, and the operating difficulties of
mountainous terrain made it cautious about employing its armour.

Artillery and Heavy Weapons Units

The fire support for a VRS attack came from both indirect and direct artillery fire,
mortars, antitank guns, and recoilless rifles.
Indirect
VRS field artillery over 100 mm, multiple rocket launchers, and 82 mm / 120 mm mortars
were the primary indirect fire support systems. During preparatory bombardments mortars
targeted enemy frontline positions. The artillery was tasked during the preparation phase to
focus on deeper interdiction and suppression of key strong-points, roads, and troop
concentration areas, as well as harassing fire on towns. These bombardments continued for
several days – probably at least three – prior to an attack. During the attack mortars and
artillery concentrated on hitting and suppressing specific enemy defensive positions on each
attack axis, while laying stationary barrages on key withdrawal and reinforcement routes to
isolate the attack sector.
Direct

784
Again, although geared toward the VJ, Colonel Redzovic’s article provides the best detail on how former
JNA armies used armor in mountain warfare, emphasizing that infantry, not armor, was to lead in the
attack:
Combat action requires preparation and organization so that the armored battalion will not be
the carrier of an attack on mountainous terrain, but will act as direct support to motorized (infantry)
units. At the same time, when being the carrier of the attack is unavoidable, it must be reinforced by
a greater number of motorized (infantry) units, engineering, artillery, air defence units, and military-
territorial [comment: light infantry] to the extent possible, and made independent in the logistic
sense.
Colonel Hajrudin Redzovic: Armored Battalion in Mountainous Areas, Belgrade Novi Glasnik, September-
October 1996, pp. 47-52.

335
The VRS used its light artillery, anti tank weapons, and anti-aircraft guns in direct fire roles
during an attack to suppress enemy defences and engage key strong-points. This use of
direct fire gave the infantry commander closer control than was possible with field artillery
and heavy mortars. The VRS used the following weapons most often in this direct role:
– M-48 76 mm mountain guns and ZIS-3 76 mm field guns
– T-12 100 mm AT guns
– BOV-1 and BRDM ATGM vehicles, AT-3 ATGM
– Recoilless rifles
– Air defence artillery

VRS Structural Strengths and Weaknesses

A number of critical organizational strengths and weaknesses profoundly

influenced the VRS way of war. The new army’s most fortunate asset was its wholesale
incorporation of a functioning military organizational hierarchy from the JNA. Building such
a structure from scratch would have been difficult and daunting, as the Bosnian Army was to
find. Even with the skeleton of such an organization in place, developing smoothly
functioning and natural relations between command levels and among officers takes
considerable time and effort. This structure, with former JNA professional officers filling the
army’s most important slots, particularly in staff and technical positions, would make the
VRS a tough, resilient, and efficient force at the strategic and operational levels.
At the tactical level, however, despite the infusion of a sophisticated doctrine, most
regular infantry units were poorly trained, particularly in 1992, and suffered from a lack of
trained and competent junior officers and NCOs. Most units were not mobilized until war
was upon the country, so that reservists rarely received even the most basic refresher
training.785 The inevitable result was heavy casualties among the infantry during 1992, and
the VRS had to rely even more heavily on selected elite units to achieve its battle
successes.786 A lack of trained officers and NCOs below the brigade headquarters level

785
As the war went on, the VRS did institute some basic training for new conscripts, but it does not appear
that this provided the recruits with anything more than basic military skills, although some specialty and
technical personnel probably received additional training. In mid-1993 the VRS established an army-level
military training center, the Centre of Military Schools, which included an officer school, an NCO school,
and combat development and training sections. Nevertheless, the output of new officers and NCOs almost
certainly was never able to fill the gaps in the VRS junior leadership ranks caused by the original
deficiencies and the subsequent casualties. Most VRS training was given within the operational unit. For
example, within a single corps, the corps-level artillery regiment would run a series of courses for all the
artillerymen in the corps’s formations, or the corps-level military police battalion would conduct counter-
sabotage courses for all brigade-level MPs.
786
As an example, in what would appear to have been no more than a week’s worth of combat (but might
have been a month), the 6th Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade suffered 35 men killed in action and 130
wounded during heavy fighting near Gradacac, roughly 25 to 30 percent of its strength; this level of
casualties does not appear to have been an isolated case. This battalion did not serve in the Croatian War,
and was raised in early April 1992, apparently from local TO personnel in the town of Ljubija near Prijedor.
Its only previous action prior to its committment at Gradacac had been ethnic cleansing operations near
Prijedor during May-September. Zivko Ecim: The Year of Successful Actions, Kozarski Vjesnik, 25 June 1993.

336
exacerbated the tactical difficulties; General Mladic has noted that most of these personnel
were inadequately trained.787 Most JNA units would have planned to rely on JNA reserve
officers and NCOs to fill junior command positions. But even the reservists’ training and
leadership skills were far better than the SDS appointees on whom the VRS was forced to
rely for most of the junior slots.788 Many of these officers were appointed because of their
political connections or financial contributions to the SDS. Infantry training and junior
leadership were to show only minimal improvements as the war progressed.789
Poor junior leadership led directly to problems with discipline and morale in many
units, which were compounded as the conflict dragged on into an extended war of attrition,
when unmotivated conscripts and reservists began to desert or flee the draft.790 Endemic
corruption, particularly among SDS officers, and blatant war profiteering, corruption, and
draft avoidance among privileged civilians had disheartening and demoralizing effects on
many enlisted personnel. Desertions left the VRS even more dependent on its elite units and
massed firepower, but these became less and less effective as the Bosnian Army improved
and its defences strengthened.
The outdated linkage of the territorially-raised brigades to their home
municipalities for logistics support handicapped many manoeuvre brigades. Under the pre-
war Yugoslav concept of General People’s Defence, TO brigades depended on their home
municipalities for logistics support and manpower.791 Because most of the VRS formations
were former TO units, the army carried this concept over into the Bosnian war.
Unfortunately, the system had been designed for fighting a decentralized guerrilla war,
allowing units and their municipal political leadership to fight semi-autonomously even
behind enemy lines. It was inappropriate for a centrally directed conventional war,
particularly the World War I style of the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia. Since municipalities
varied in the resources available to them, brigades received different levels of support
determined not on the military needs of the VRS and the mission assigned to a particular
brigade, but rather by the amount of material and food a municipality could spare. The
corruption of SDS officials at the municipal level compounded this structural flaw and made
it impossible for the Main Staff to persuade the SDS leadership to enact a proper central
budget for the army. Too many SDS officials were making too much money to interrupt the

787
See Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter
7.
788
The VRS was forced to rely even more on SDS appointees in those ex-JNA units raised in heavily mixed
ethnic regions, since many reserve officer and NCO positions were scheduled to have been filled in the old
army by Muslim and Croat reserve cadres.
789
For a particularly informative discussion of key shortcomings in the VRS, including officer selection and
training, see Milutin Kozarica: Discipline – The Foundation On Which An Army Is Built, Srpska Vojska, 28
December 1995, pp. 17-19.
790
Milutin Kozarica: Discipline – The Foundation On Which An Army Is Built, Srpska Vojska, 28 December 1995,
pp. 17-19.
791
See Colonel Lazar Durovski: “The Commune and National Defence”, The Yugoslav Concept of General
People’s Defence, Belgrade Medunarodna Politika, 1970, pp. 301-305, for a description of the role of the
municipality (also called communes) in the pre-war Yugoslav defence doctrine.

337
system. The same municipal leaders were also responsible for nominating many of the
incompetent junior officers in the VRS manoeuvre brigades.792

Help from Big Brother – VJ Support

The support received from the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Internal Affairs
Ministry was critical to the VRS’s ability to sustain itself organizationally and logistically.
Among the many misconceptions about the VJ-VRS relationship, the most striking is that
large numbers of Yugoslav Army ground troops fought in Bosnia during the conflict and that
the VRS was under the command of the VJ General Staff. There is no evidence to support
this notion, despite frequent assertions by ill-informed journalists. The VJ and the Serbian
MUP routinely deployed packets of special operations troops to support VRS operations.793
These forces usually numbered a few hundred, and probably did not total more than 2.000
men at any given time. There is just one occasion when the VJ is known to have sent
anything other than special operations personnel into Bosnia, and that was during the
winter-spring 1993 VRS counteroffensive at Srebrenica, when roughly a battalion of VJ
armour was deployed into the area and VJ artillery provided fire support from positions
inside Serbia.
More important to the VRS war effort were the individual VJ officers and NCOs who
served in VRS units. These personnel provided badly needed cadres for many poorly led
units. The VJ also continued to pay the salaries of ex-JNA VRS officers and NCOs.794

792
For several critiques by VRS professional officers of different aspects of this structural flaw, see Lieutenant
Colonel Milovan Milutinovic: Loss of Supreme Command, Belgrade Nin, 1 November 1996, pp. 19-22; Milja
Vujisic: The Truth About the General’s Dismissal, Belgrade Intervju (Internet Version), 13 December 1996 –
An interview with Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero; Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Milutinovic:
Wisdom and Caution, Srpska Vojska, 22 March 1996, pp. 10-14. An interview with Lieutenant Colonel
General Milan Gvero. One of the clearest statements about the municipality problem came from Major
General Momir Zec, commander of the 30th Infantry Division, in August 1995. He stated:
... I do not expect them [the state] to buy us airplanes and atom bombs. But what there is must be
equally distributed: there must be one joint treasury. Supplying individual units today depends upon
how rich a municipality is, and the formational structure of individual brigades depends upon this. For
this reason, we now have municipal armies, and even armies of local communities...
... At the beginning of 1992, we had very good military results ... If we had had more order and
discipline, if we had not had local-municipal armies, we could have ended the war back in 1993.
M. Solaja and R. Vujetovic: The Army is to Order, Not Convince, Krajiski Vojnik, August 1995, pp. 23-25 — an
interview with Major General Momir Zec.
793
VJ troops were drawn primarily from the 63rd Airborne and 72nd Special Operations Brigades. MUP
personnel came from Frenki Simatovic’s elite “Red Beret” special operations unit, as well as regional active
duty and reserve Special Police units. For example, in December 1993, as part of Operation “Pancir”, some
120 VJ troops – probably from either the 63rd or 72nd Brigades – were deployed under command of the
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, while during June 1995 defensive operations around Trnovo three Serbian MUP
special units took part. SRK Command, No 20/15-1409, 15 December 1993 and RS MUP Combat Reports,
30 June and 1 July 1995 cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor
v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002,
www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 119.
794
The ICTY pre-trial brief on Milosevic for Bosnia and Croatia outlines the VJ/VRS personnel connection,
stating:

338
Logistically, the Federal Republic and the VJ supplied the VRS with fuel, ammunition, and
maintenance support to ensure that the Federal equipment left behind could move and
fight.795 Fuel in particular was vital to keeping the VRS’s large fleet of trucks, buses, and

... Despite a mobilisation process throughout 1992, not every Bosnian Serb returned to serve in
the VRS and there were shortages in certain military specialisations and command ranks. The VJ
assisted the VRS in this area by maintaining a significant role in the training of VRS military
personnel, and through incentives offered to FRY military officers who volunteered to serve in the
VRS...
On 6 Aug 1994, the VJ Main Staff [sic] decided to provide officers serving in the RS double credit
(for pension purposes, etc.) for duty performed in BiH after 20 May 1992 ... The personnel matters of
VRS officers as well as contract workers and other personnel were administered from the 30th
Personnel Centre of the General Staff of the VJ in Belgrade, an administrative unit specifically
established for this purpose. This arrangement was developed after a number of meetings between
the VRS and the VJ and, with more than 26.000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the
VRS in July 1992, provided the VRS with the ability to continue operations despite its monetary and
personnel shortfalls.
GS VRS document, “Analysis of the Combat Readiness of the Army of the Republika Srpska in 1992”, April
1993, Report on the Army of Srpska Republika, General Mladic, 01 Sept 1992, cited in International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second
Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed
June 2002, pp. 128-129.
795
The ICTY pre-trial brief also detailed some of the VJ’s logistical support plan for the VRS stating:
... in the late summer of 1992 the VRS Main Staff and the General Staff (GS) of the RY agreed
upon a plan of supply, code-named “Izvor” (Source). This plan was aimed at facilitating the delivery of
large quantities of ammunition and fuel from the FRY to the VRS ... On 12 September the VRS Main
Staff wrote to the 1 KK [1st Krajina Corps] noting the agreement between the GS FRY and the VRS and
that the 14th Logistics Base (which supported the 1 KK and the 2 KK [2nd Krajina Corps]) had already
taken over 225 tonnes of ammunition with a further 220 tonnes to follow. The letter also noted that
the logistics base and the Corps were also allowed to procure ammunition and fuel in the FRY.
Documents also indicate that VRS OG Doboj received large quantities of material from Serbia and
Montenegro between 5 August – 14 September 1992, including small arms, artillery, tank and rocket
ammunition. There were probably at least three deliveries of ammunition to the 1 KK through the
Izvor plan as documentation in early 1993 notes the delivery of supplies in accordance with “Izvor-3”.
On 1 January 1993, a 1 KK logistics report noted that 29 trailer trucks had been dispatched for the
transport of material from the FRY as per the Izvor-3 plan and later documents indicate that this
material was received by the technical services of the corps. In April 1993, in an analysis of the
combat readiness of the VRS, the Main Staff noted that units of the army had been supplied with
technical equipment from the FRY reserves and that 7.451 tonnes of ammunition had been received
via the Izvor plan.
Other evidence indicates additional FRY technical and material support to the VRS. Almost
immediately upon the reopening of the Posavina corridor in the summer, material transfers between
Belgrade and Banja Luka began once again. On 5 August, the 1 KK noted that sources of ammunition
and fuel were limited but supplies were located in the FRY. Later in 1992, there is evidence that
individuals from the 1 KK were travelling to the FRY in order to secure material and technical
resources, including fuel, mines and explosives for their individual units. Other references note that
repairs of military equipment were being carried out in the FRY and transported back to the 1 KK. In
December 1992, a daily combat report noted that three thousand 82mm mortars shells had come
back from repairs in the FRY. References to the establishment of a commission for obtaining
ammunition in the FRY, certificates authorising the collection of fuel from the FRY bearing the 1 KK
commanders signature block and issued by the corps, and a request for ammunition sent to the
Republic of Serbia Secretariat of the Interior (SUP) also illustrate the extent of FRY and VJ support for
the VRS ...
... At the 50th Session of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska in April 1995, General Mladic
provided a consumption review of weapons and other equipment used by the VRS form the start of

339
armour in operation. Mobility was key to the army’s ability to shift its limited mobile
reserves from sector to sector throughout the country in time to sharpen an attack or stiffen
a defence.

the war until 31 December 1994. After initially obtaining roughly 40% of the infantry, artillery, and
anti-aircraft ammunition it was to use from former JNA stocks, the VRS received at least another 34%
of the total amount of each of these items it consumed before 31 December 1994 from the VJ.
Various 1st Krajina Corps and VRS Main Staff documents and Audio Recording, General Mladic, 50th
Session of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Sanski Most, 15-16 April 1995, cited International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second
Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed
June 2002, pp. 126-128.

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 Appendix 1
Organization of the Supreme Command
The Supreme Command (Vrhovna Komanda – VK) was the national command
authority for Republika Srpska, somewhat similar to the US National Security Council.796
Formed on 6 December 1992, it consisted of the following positions and individuals:
President of the RS, Radovan Karadzic
Vice President of the RS, Nikola Koljevic
Prime Minister of the RS (various)
President of the RS Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik
Minister of Internal Affairs (various)
Minister of Defence (various)
The Commander of the Main Staff VRS, Lieutenant Colonel General Ratko Mladic
and the Chief of the Main Staff, Major General Manojlo Milovanovic, were not members of
the VK, but attended its meetings in an advisory capacity. Only civilian members were
allowed to vote on decisions of the VK. Karadzic and the SDA hoped to use the VK to
strengthen their control over the VRS and the prosecution of the war. They established it
after the army had opposed several of Karadzic’s political-military gestures to curry Western
favor in 1992, such as his move to hand back the VRS combat aircraft to the Yugoslav
Federal Republic. In this they were only partially successful.

796
Belgrade Tanjug, 6 December 1992.

341
 Chart 1
Skeleton Order of Battle, Bosnian Serb Army,
June 1992-October 1995797

Main Staff of the VRS, HQ Han Pijesak-Mount Zep

(Glavni Stab Vojske Republike Srpske – GS VRS)

1st Guards Motorized Brigade HQ Kalinovik798

(1. gardijska motorizovana brigada – 1. gmtbr)

65th Protection Motorized Regiment, HQ Han Pijesak-Mount Zep799

(65. zastitni motorizovani puk – 65. zmtp)

10th Sabotage Detachment, HQ Bijeljina-Vlasenica800

(10. diverzantski odred – 10. do)

89th Rocket Artillery Brigade, HQ Banja Luka801

(89. raketno-artiljerijska brigada – 89. rabr)

Centre for Military Schools “Rajko Balac”, HQ Banja Luka802

(Centar vojnih skola Vojske Republike Srpske “Rajko Balac” – CVS VRS “Rajko Balac”)

67th Communications Regiment, HQ Han Pijesak803

(67. puk veze – 67. pv)

63rd Autotransport Battalion, HQ Zvornik

797
This order of battle is designed to show the number and types of permanent formations available to the
VRS, as well as the three semi-permanent division-level headquarters in 1st Krajina Corps. It also shows
home garrisons of each formation and the final unit designator in 1995; many former light infantry brigades
became regular infantry brigades during the course of the war. It does not show the almost innumerable
tactical group or provisional brigade structures put together throughout the war or their deployed field
locations. These will be dealt with in each campaign section as part of the order of battle analysis for each
operation.
798
The brigade was created as an elite formation in December 1992 from personnel drawn from throughout
the Republika Srpska. It was modeled on the JNA/VJ 1st Guards Motorized Brigade. It was attached to the
Herzegovina Corps and more or less permanently deployed at Kalinovik after Operation Lukavac 93 around
Mount Igman-Bjelasnica.
799
The regiment served as the bodyguard force for the Main Staff, as well as serving as an elite intervention /
asssault infantry formation throughout the RS. As a JNA formation it had served as the bodyguard
formation for the Second / Fifth Military District.
800
The detachment was formed in early 1994 with the primary mission of conducting the most important
sabotage operations behind enemy lines for the Main Staff.
801
The pre-war 389th Rocket Artillery Brigade in the JNA; it was the only FROG-7 surface-to-surface missile
unit in the army.
802
This training center was established in mid-1993 from the former JNA “Petar Drapsin” Centre for Training
Armor-Mechanized Units. It consisted of an officers school, an NCO school, and various training
departments. It was named for its second commander, Major General Rajko Balac, after he was killed
leading cadets from the school in combat at Bihac in November 1994.
803
The pre-war JNA 367th Communications Regiment which supported the Second / Fifth Military District.

342
 (63. autotransportni bataljon – 63. atb)

14th Rear Base, HQ Banja Luka804

(14. pozadinska baza – 14. PoB)

27th Rear Base, HQ Sokolac805

(27. pozadinska baza – 27. PoB)

30th Rear Base, HQ Bileca806

(30. pozadinska baza – 30. PoB)

35th Rear Base, HQ Bijeljina807

(35. pozadinska baza – 35. PoB)

410th Intelligence Centre, HQ Banja Luka

(410. obavestajni centar – 410. ObC)

Technical Repair Institute “Hadzici”, HQ Hadzici808

(Tehnicki remontni zavod “Hadzici” – TRZ “Hadzici”)

Military Hospital, HQ Sokolac

(Vojna Bolnica – VB)

1st Krajina Corps, HQ Banja Luka809

(1. krajiski korpus – 1. kk)

Operational Group 9 “Doboj”, HQ Doboj

(9. operativna grupa “Doboj” – 9. OG “Doboj”)

9th Reconnaissance Company, HQ Doboj

(9. izvidacka ceta – 9. ic)

9th Military Police Battalion, HQ Doboj

(9. bataljon vojne policije – 9. bVP)

9th Mixed Engineer Battalion, HQ Doboj

(9. mesoviti inzinjerijski bataljon – 9. minzb)

Operational Group 10 “Prijedor”, HQ Prijedor-Omarska810

(10. operativna grupa “Prijedor” – 10. OG “Prijedor”)

804
This logistics unit supported the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps. It was the pre-war 993rd Rear Base.
805
This logistics unit supported the Sarajevo-Romanija and Drina Corps. It was the pre-war 744th Rear Base.
806
This logistics unit supported the Herzegovina Corps.
807
This logistics unit supported the East Bosnian Corps.
808
This facility was a pre-war JNA medium-level repair facility for armored vehicles and other equipment.
809
Formed from the pre-war 5th (Banja Luka) Corps.
810
This OG was formed in 1992-1993 to control rear echelon and border security units in western Bosnia. It
was reactivated in late August-September 1995.

343
 30th Infantry Division, HQ Sipovo811
(30. pesadijska divizija – 30. pd)

30th Communications Battalion, HQ Sipovo

(30. bataljon veze – 30. bv)

36th Independent Armoured Battalion, HQ Sipovo

(36. samostalni oklopni bataljon – 36. sokb)

1st Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment, HQ Banja Luka812

(1. izvidacko-diverzantski odred – 1. ido)

Assault Detachment “Wolves of Vucijak”, HQ Prnjavor813

(Udarni ili Jurisni odred “Vukovi sa Vucjaka”)

1st Military Police Battalion, HQ Banja Luka814

(1. bataljon vojne policije – 1. bVP)

1st Communications Battalion, HQ Banja Luka815

(1. bataljon veze – 1. bv)

1st Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade, HQ Banja Luka816

(1. mesovita protivoklopna artiljerijska brigada – 1. mpoabr)

1st Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka817

(1. mesoviti artiljerijski puk – 1. map)

1st Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka818

(1. laki artiljerijski puk PVO – 1. lap PVO)

1st Engineer Regiment, HQ Banja Luka819

(1. inzinjerijski puk – 1. inzp)

1st Pontoon Engineer Battalion, HQ Banja Luka820

(1. pontonirski bataljon – 1. pontb)

811
The division originally was designated “partisan”. After the JNA-style “partisan” was dropped, the division
designator alternated between 30th Light Infantry and 30th Infantry Division, finally ending with “infantry”
in 1995. The division was also often called 30th Krajina Division.
812
The detachment (a cross between a company and battalion) was originally a company.
813
This unit was originally a volunteer unit formed in 1991 for service in Western Slavonia.
814
Formed from the pre-war military police battalion of the JNA 5th Corps.
815
Formed from the pre-war communications battalion of the JNA 5th Corps.
816
Formed from the pre-war 5th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment. It also may have incorporated elements of
the pre-war 454th Mixed Anti tank Artillery Brigade.
817
Formed from the pre-war 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment.
818
Formed from the pre-war 5th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment.
819
Formed from the engineer regiment of the pre-war JNA 5th Corps.
820
Formed from the pontoon battalion of the pre-war JNA 5th Corps.

344
 1st Autotransport Battalion, HQ Banja Luka
(1. autotransportni bataljon – 1. atb)

1st Medical Battalion, HQ Banja Luka

(1. sanitetski bataljon – 1. snb)

1st Armoured Brigade, HQ Banja Luka821

(1. oklopna brigada – 1. okbr)

2nd Armoured Brigade, HQ Doboj822

(2. oklopna brigada – 2. okbr)

2nd Krajina Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka823

(2. krajiska pesadijska brigada – 2. kpbr)

5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Prijedor-Omarska824

(5. kozarska laka pesadijska brigada – 5. klpbr)

6th Sanska Infantry Brigade, HQ Sanski Most825

(6. sanska pesadijska brigada – 6. spbr)

11th Dubica Infantry Brigade, HQ Kozarska Dubica826

(11. dubicka pesadijska brigada – 11. dpbr)

12th Kotorsko Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kotorsko

(12. kotorska laka pesadijska brigada – 12. klpbr)

16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, HQ Banja Luka827

(16. krajiska motorizovana brigada – 16. kmtbr)

11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Mrkonjic Grad

(11. mrkonjicka laka pesadijska brigada – 11. mlpbr)

19th Krajina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbobran (Donji Vakuf)828

(19. srbobranska laka pesadijska brigada – 19. slpbr)

22nd Krajina Infantry Brigade, HQ Knezevo (Skender Vakuf)829

821
Formed from the pre-war 329th Armored Brigade.
822
Formed from assets of the JNA’s “Petar Drapsin” Centre for Training Armored-Mechanized Units and one
M-84 armored battalion of the 336th (ex-4th Armored) Motorized Brigade.
823
Formed from the pre-war 2nd Partisan Brigade. Also called at times 2nd “Banja Luka” Light Infantry
Brigade.
824
Formed from the pre-war 5th Partisan Brigade.
825
Formed from the pre-war 6th Partisan Brigade. It also used the designator 6th Krajina Light Infantry
Brigade.
826
Formed from the pre-war 11th Partisan Brigade. Also seen designated 11th Kozara Infantry Brigade.
827
Formed from the pre-war 16th Motorized Brigade. Nicknamed the “Garava (Black) Brigade”.
828
Formed from the 19th Partisan Brigade.

345
 (22. krajiska pesadijska brigada – 22. kpbr)

27th Derventa Motorized Brigade, HQ Derventa830

(27. derventska motorizovana brigada – 27. dmtbr)

31st Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbobran (Donji Vakuf)

(31. laka pesadijska brigada – 31. lpbr)

43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade, HQ Prijedor831

(43. prijedorska motorizovana brigada – 43. pmtbr)

1st Doboj Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Doboj

(1. dobojska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. dlpbr)

1st Celinac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Celinac

(1. celinacka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. slpbr)

1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbac

(1. srbacka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. slpbr)

1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Gradiska

(1. gradiska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. glpbr)

1st Novigrad Infantry Brigade, HQ Novigrad (Bosanski Novi)832

(1. novigradska pesadijska brigada – 1. ngpbr)

1st Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

(1. banjalucka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. bllpbr)

2nd Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

(2. banjalucka laka pesadijska brigada – 2. bllpbr)

3rd Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

(3. banjalucka laka pesadijska brigada – 3. bllpbr)

4th Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

(4. banjalucka laka pesadijska brigada – 4. bllpbr)

1st Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kotor Varos833

(1. kotorvaroska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. kvlpbr)

1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Prnjavor

829
Formed from the pre-war 122nd Partisan Brigade.
830
Formed from the pre-war 327th Motorized Brigade. It was previously assigned to the 17th (Tuzla) Corps.
831
Formed from the pre-war 343rd Motorized Brigade. Also seen designated 43rd Kozara Motorized Brigade.
832
Transferred to 2nd Krajina Corps, November 1994.
833
Also seen as 1st Krajina Light Infantry Brigade.

346
 (1. prnjavorska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. plpbr)

1st Sipovo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Sipovo

(1. sipovska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. slpbr)

1st Teslic Infantry Brigade, HQ Teslic

(1. teslicka pesadijska brigada – 1. tpbr)

2nd Teslic Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Teslic (formed 1993)

(2. teslicka laka pesadijska brigada – 2. tlpbr)

1st Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bosansko Petrovo Selo

(1. ozrenska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. olpbr)

2nd Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Tumare

(2. ozrenska laka pesadijska brigada – 2. olpbr)

3rd Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Gornja Paklenica (formed 1993)

(3. ozrenska laka pesadijska brigada – 3. olpbr)

4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Vozuca (formed 1993)

(4. ozrenska laka pesadijska brigada – 4. olpbr)

1st Trebava Infantry Brigade, HQ Modrica

(1. trebavska pesadijska brigada – 1. tpbr)

1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Krnjin

(1. krnjinska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. klpbr)

1st Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Modrica

(1. vucjacka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. vlpbr)

1st Osinja Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Osinja (to 1994)834

(1. osinjska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. olpbr)

1st Laktasi Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Laktasi (to 1995)835

(1. laktaska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. llpbr)

1st Knezevo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Knezevo (Skender Vakuf) (to 1995)836
(1. knezevska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. klpbr)

2nd Krajina Corps, HQ Drvar837

834
This brigade was formed in 1992 and appears to have merged with another brigade – possibly the 27th
Motorized Brigade – in 1994.
835
This brigade was formed in 1992 and by 1995 appears to have merged with another formation, possibly
one of the four Banja Luka light infantry brigades.
836
A second-line formation which appears to have merged with another formation, probably the 22nd
Infantry Brigade, during 1995.

347
 (2. krajiski korpus – 2. kk)

2nd Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment, HQ Drvar838

(2. izvidacko-diverzantski odred – 2. ido)

2nd Military Police Battalion, HQ Drvar

(2. bataljon vojne policije – 2. bVP)

2nd Communications Battalion, HQ Drvar

(2. bataljon veze – 2. bv)

2nd Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Bosansko Grahovo

(2. mesoviti artiljerijski puk – 2. map)

2nd Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment, HQ Drvar

(2. laki artiljerijski puk PVO – 2. lap PVO)

2nd Engineer Regiment, HQ Kljuc-Laniste

(2. inzinjerijski puk – 2. inzp)

2nd Autotransport Battalion, HQ Drvar

(2. autotransportni bataljon – 2. atb)

2nd Medical Battalion, HQ Drvar

(2. sanitetski bataljon – 2. snb)

1st Drvar Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Drvar

(1. drvarska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. dlpbr)

3rd Petrovac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Petrovac

(3. petrovacka laka pesadijska brigada – 3. plpbr)

5th Glamoc Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Glamoc

(5. glamocka laka pesadijska brigada – 5. glpbr)

7th Kupres-Sipovo Motorized Brigade, HQ Kupres839

(7. kupresko-sipovska motorizovana brigada – 7. ksmtbr)

9th Grahovo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bosansko Grahovo840

(9. grahovska laka pesadijska brigada – 9. glpbr)

837
Formed from the pre-war 10th (Bihac) Corps.
838
This detachment was originally a company.
839
Formed from 9th (Knin) Corps assets and manpower from the Kupres and Sipovo areas. The brigade was
also known as the 7th Kupres-Sipovo Motorized Brigade.
840
840This brigade was formed from a combination of the Serb Bosansko Grahovo TO and the ex-JNA 11th
Motorized Brigade. The 11th was originally the 11th Naval Landing Infantry Brigade, stationed before the
Croatian war in the port city of Sibenik.

348
 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Krupa
(11. krupska laka pesadijska brigada – 11. klpbr)

15th Bihac Infantry Brigade, HQ Ripac

(15. bihacka pesadijska brigada – 15. bpbr)

17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kljuc

17. kljucka laka pesadijska brigada – 17. klpbr)

21st Independent Armoured Battalion, HQ Petrovac

(21. samostalni oklopni bataljon – 21. sokb)

East Bosnian Corps, HQ Bijeljina841

(Istocno-Bosanski Korpus – IBK)

3rd Military Police Battalion, HQ Bijeljina

(3. bataljon vojne policije – 3. bVP)

3rd Communications Battalion, HQ Bijeljina

(3. bataljon veze – 3. bv)

3rd Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Donje Polje

(3. mesoviti protivoklopni artiljerijski puk – 3. mpoap)

3rd Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Bijeljina

(3. mesoviti artiljerijski puk – 3. map)

3rd Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment, HQ Vukosavci

(3. laki artiljerijski puk PVO – 3. lap PVO)

3rd Engineer Regiment, HQ Dvorovi

(3. inzinjerijski puk – 3. inzp)

3rd Pontoon Engineer Company, HQ Bijeljina842

(3. pontonirska ceta – 3. pontc)

3rd Autotransport Company, HQ Bijeljina

(3. autotransportna ceta – 3. atc)

3rd Medical Battalion, HQ Bijeljina

(3. sanitetski bataljon – 3. snb)

1st Posavina Infantry Brigade, HQ Brcko843

(1. posavska pesadjska brigada – 1. ppbr)

841
Formed from the pre-war 17th (Tuzla) Corps.
842
Formed from the pontoon battalion of the pre-war JNA 17th Corps.
843
Formed from the pre-war 395th Motorized Brigade.

349
 2nd Posavina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Samac
(2. posavska laka pesadijska brigada – 2. plpbr)

3rd Posavina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Pelagicevo844

(3. posavska laka pesadijska brigada – 3. plpbr)

1st Semberija Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bijeljina845

(1. semberijska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. slpbr)

2nd Semberija Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bijeljina

(2. semberijska laka pesadijska brigada – 2. slpbr)

3rd Semberija Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bijeljina846

(3. semberijska laka pesadijska brigada – 3. slpbr)

1st Majevica Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Ugljevik847

(1. majevicka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. mlpbr)

2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Ugljevik

(2. majevicka laka pesadijska brigada – 2. mlpbr)

3rd Majevica Infantry Brigade, HQ Lopare848

(3. majevicka pesadijska brigada – 3. mpbr)

Special Brigade / 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers”, HQ Bijeljina849

(Specijalna brigada / 1. bijeljinska laka pesadijska brigada “panteri” – 1. blpbr
“panteri”)

Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, HQ Sarajevo-Lukavica850

(Sarajevsko-Romanjski Korpus – SRK)

4th Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment “White Wolves”, HQ Pale

(4. izvidacko-diverzantski odred “Beli vukovi” – 4. ido “Beli vukovi”)

4th Military Police Battalion, HQ Lukavica851

844
Formed in September 1994 from four battalions of the 2nd Posavina Brigade.
845
Formed from the 17th Partisan Brigade.
846
Formed in November 1992, possibly with a large percentage of Muslim personnel.
847
Formed from the 22nd Partisan Brigade.
848
Elements of the pre-war JNA 92nd Motorized Brigade, headquartered in Tuzla, may have gone into the
formation of this brigade.
849
This brigade, one of the more colorful and effective VRS mobile units, had two official designators. It was
initially designated “Special Brigade”, and nicknamed the “Panthers” or “Serbian Guard-Panthers”. It was
later retitled “1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade”, although few seem to have referred to it by this name.
Despite the “light infantry” designator, it was in effect a light motorized brigade, organized into an armored
battalion plus an unknown number of light infantry / light motorized infantry battalions. It was also
equipped with a variety of home-made light armored cars and other mobile weapons.
850
Formed from the pre-war 4th (Sarajevo) Corps.

350
 (4. bataljon vojne policije – 4. bVP)

4th Communications Battalion, HQ Lukavica

(4. bataljon veze – 4. bv)

4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Lukavica

(4. mesoviti protivoklopni artiljerijski puk – 4. mpoap)

4th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Lukavica

(4. mesoviti artiljerijski puk – 4. map)

4th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment, HQ Lukavica852

(4. laki artiljerijski puk PVO – 4. lap PVO)

4th Engineer Battalion, HQ Pale

(4. inzinjerijski bataljon – 4. inzb)

4th Autotransport Battalion, HQ Lukavica

(4. autotransportni bataljon – 4. atb)

4th Medical Battalion, HQ Pale

(4. sanitetski bataljon – 4. snb)

1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, HQ Lukavica853

(1. sarajevska mehanizovana brigada – 1. smbr)

2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Vojkovici

(2. sarajevska laka pesadijska brigada – 2. slpbr)

3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade, HQ Vogosca854

(3. sarajevska pesadijska brigada – 3. spbr)

4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Pale855

(4. sarajevska laka pesadijska brigada – 4. slpbr)

1st Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Rajlovac (to late 1993)

(1. rajlovacka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. rlpbr)

851
Formed from the pre-war 288th Military Police Battalion.
852
Formed from the pre-war 346th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment.
853
This brigade was formed from the pre-war 49th Motorized Brigade, headquartered in Sarajevo, and the
pre-war 140th Mechanized Brigade, which was relocated from Zagreb to Sarajevo at the end of the
Croatian war.
854
Originally the Vogosca Light Infantry Brigade, the brigade subsumed the Rajlovac and Kosevo Brigades,
which became battalions, during 1993.
855
This brigade was formed in early 1995 from three light infantry battalions – Pale, Praca, and Jahorina – that
appear to have been previously assigned to the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade or possibly the 2nd
Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade.

351
 1st Kosevo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kosevo (to late 1993)
(1. kosevska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. klpbr)

1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, HQ Han Pijesak856

(1. romanijska pesadijska brigada – 1. rpbr)

1st Ilijas Infantry Brigade, HQ Ilijas

(1. ilijaska pesadijska brigada – 1. il.pbr)

1st Ilidza Infantry Brigade, HQ Ilidza

(1. ilidzanska pesadijska brigada – 1. idz.pbr)

1st Igman Infantry Brigade, HQ Hadzici

(1. igmanska pesadijska brigada – 1. ig.pbr)

Drina Corps, HQ Vlasenica

(Drinski Korpus – DK)

5th Military Police Battalion, HQ Vlasenica

(5. bataljon vojna policija – 5. bVP)

5th Communications Battalion, HQ Vlasenica

(5. bataljon veze – 5. bv)

5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Vlasenica

(5. mesoviti artiljerijski puk – 5. map)

5th Engineer Battalion, HQ Vlasenica

(5. inzinjerijski bataljon – 5. inzb)

5th Medical Battalion, HQ Vlasenica

(5. sanitetski bataljon – 5. snb)

1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Rogatica857

(1. podrinjska laka pesadijska brigada – 1. plpbr)

2nd Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Visegrad (to mid-late 1994)858

(2. podrinjska laka pesadijska brigada – 2. plpbr)

3rd Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Cajnice (to mid-late 1994)859

856
Formed from the pre-war 216th Mountain Brigade.
857
Originally 1st Rogatica Light Infantry Brigade. Prior to the formation of the Drina Corps, it was assigned to
Tactical Group “Visegrad” of the Herzegovina Corps.
858
Originally 1st Visegrad Light Infantry Brigade; merged with 5th Podrinje mid-late 1994. Prior to the
formation of the Drina Corps, it was assigned to Tactical Group “Visegrad” of the Herzegovina Corps.
859
Originally 1st Cajnice Light Infantry Brigade; merged with 4th Podrinje and became 14th Herzegovina Light
Infantry Brigade, transferred to Herzegovina Corps, mid-late 1994. Prior to the formation of the Drina
Corps, it was assigned to Tactical Group “Visegrad” of the Herzegovina Corps.

352
 (3. podrinjska laka pesadijska brigada – 3. plpbr)

4th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Rudo (to mid-late 1994)860

(4. podrinjska laka pesadijska brigada – 4. plpbr)

5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Visegrad861

(5. podrinjska laka pesadijska brigada – 5. plpbr)

1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, HQ Zvornik-Karakaj862

(1. zvornicka pesadijska brigada – 1. zvpbr)

1st Birac Infantry Brigade, HQ Sekovici

(1. bircanska pesadijska brigada – 1. bpbr)

1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bratunac863

(1. bratunacka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. blpbr)

1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Vlasenica (from late 1993)

(1. vlasenicka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. vlpbr)

1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Milici (from late 1993)

(1. milicka laka pesadijska brigada – 1. mlpbr)

2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, HQ Sokolac864

(2. romanijska motorizovana brigada – 2. rmtbr)

Independent Infantry Battalion “Skelani”, HQ Skelani865

(samostalni pesadijski bataljon “Skelani” – spb “Skelani”)

Herzegovina Corps, HQ Trebinje/Bileca

(Hercegovacki Korpus – HK)

7th Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment, HQ Bileca866

(7. izvidacko-diverzantski odred – 7. ido)

860
Originally 1st Rudo Light Infantry Brigade; merged with 3rd Podrinje and became 14th Herzegovina Light
Infantry Brigade, transferred to Herzegovina Corps, mid-late 1994. Prior to the formation of the Drina
Corps, it was assigned to Tactical Group “Visegrad” of the Herzegovina Corps.
861
Originally 1st Gorazde Light Infantry Brigade; merged with 2nd Podrinje mid-late 1994, but retained 5th
designator. Prior to the formation of the Drina Corps, it was assigned to Tactical Group “Visegrad” of the
Herzegovina Corps.
862
Apparently formed from major elements of the pre-war 336th (ex-4th Armored) Motorized Brigade. Prior
to the formation of the Drina Corps, it was assigned to the East Bosnian Corps. The Podrinje Special Forces
Detachment, “Drina Wolves” were part of the brigade.
863
Formed in November 1992 from one battalion of the 1st Birac Brigade and the Bratunac TO.
864
Formed from the pre-war 14th Motorized Brigade. Prior to the formation of the Drina Corps, it was
assigned to Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
865
Despite some reporting that this unit was a brigade, it appears to have been only a battalion throughout its
history.
866
This detachment was originally a company.

353
 7th Military Police Battalion, HQ Bileca
(7. bataljon vojne policije – 7. bVP)

7th Communications Battalion, HQ Bileca

(7. bataljon veze – 7. bv)

7th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion, HQ Bileca

(7. mesoviti protivoklopni artiljerijski divizion – 7. mpoad)

7th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Bileca867

(7. mesoviti artiljerijski puk – 7. map)

7th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment, HQ Bileca

(7. laki artiljerijski puk PVO – 7. lap PVO)

7th Engineer Battalion, HQ Bileca

(7. inzinjerijski bataljon – 7. inzb)

7th Autotransport Battalion, HQ Bileca

(7. autotransportni bataljon – 7. atb)

7th Medical Battalion, HQ Bileca

(7. sanitetski bataljon – 7. snb)

1st Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, HQ Trebinje868

(1. herzegovacka motorizovana brigada – 1. hmtbr)

2nd Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Borci

(2. herzegovacka laka pesadijska brigada – 2. hlpbr)

8th Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, HQ Nevesinje869

(8. herzegovacka motorizovana brigada – 8. hmtbr)

11th Herzegovina Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbinje (Foca)870

(11. herzegovacka pesadijska brigada – 11. hpbr)

14th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Cajnice (from mid-late 1994)

(14. herzegovacka laka pesadijska brigada – 14. hlpbr)

15th Herzegovina Infantry Brigade, HQ Bileca871

867
Formed from the pre-war 13th Mixed Artillery Regiment.
868
Formed from the pre-war 472nd Motorized Brigade. Also known as the Trebinje Brigade.
869
Formed from the pre-war 10th Motorized Brigade, a designator the 8th, probably used for much of 1992. It
was also known as the Nevesinje Brigade.
870
Originally designated the 1st Foca Light Infantry Brigade.
871
Formed from the pre-war 13th Motorized Brigade, a designator the 15th, probably used for much of 1992,
and possibly later.

354
 (15. herzegovacka pesadijska brigada – 15. hpbr)

18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Gacko

(18. herzegovacka laka pesadijska brigada – 18. hlpbr)

Air and Air Defence Force, HQ Banja Luka

(Vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdusna odbrana – V i PVO)

92nd Mixed Aviation Brigade, HQ Banja Luka-Zaluzani872

(92 mesovita avio brigada – 92 mabr)

474th Air Base, HQ Banja Luka-Mahovljani

(474 vazduhoplovna baza – 474 vb)

474th Light Air Defence Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka-Zaluzani

(474. laki artiljerijski puk PVO – 474. lap PVO)

155th Air Defence Rocket Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

(155. raketna brigada PVO – 155. rbr PVO)

172nd Medium Self-Propelled Air Defence Rocket Regiment, HQ Sokolac

(172. srednji samohodni raketni puk PVO – 172. ssrp PVO)

Air Observation Battalion, HQ Banja Luka873

(bataljon vazduhoplovnog osmatranja, javljanja, i navodjenja – bVOJIN)

872
The 82nd Fighter-Bomber Aviation Brigade and the 111th Helicopter Transport Brigade merged sometime
in 1992 to form the 92nd. It had four squadrons – one Galeb-Jastreb fighter-bomber squadron, one Orao
fighter-bomber / recon squadron, one Gazelle squadron, and one Hip squadron.
873
This unit was the VRS early warning radar battalion.

355
 Annex 25
Croatian Political Objectives and Military Strategy in Bosnia,
1991-1992
Political Goals
Croatian policy toward Bosnia in 1992 would be driven by President Tudjman’s
personal views and philosophy, bolstered by the strongly held parallel views of Croatian
Defence Minister Gojko Susak and the powerful “Herzegovina lobby”. Tudjman’s vision of a
united Croatian people rested on the conviction that he was the man of destiny who would
achieve this goal. He had long ago dismissed the possibility of maintaining a unitary multi-
ethnic Bosnian state, and he considered the Muslims in Bosnia, like those in Serbia (in the
Sandzak and Kosovo), to be an eventual threat to Croatians and Croatia. For their part,
Susak and other ethnic Herzegovinians in the Croatian Government nursed a similar vision
of attaching to Croatia the Bosnian Croat regions, especially Croat-dominated Western
Herzegovina. In this they were backed by the powerful Croatian émigré community, many of
whom were from Herzegovina.874 This alignment with the Herzegovinians enabled Tudjman
and Susak to deflect and ignore the strong opposition to Bosnian partition in the Croatian
Foreign Ministry, the Croatian Assembly, and other parts of the government and public.875
Zagreb’s first priority was to increase the political awareness and organization of
the Bosnian Croats, moving toward the autonomy of Croats in Bosnia as an interim step on
the road to their separation and integration into Croatia proper. In August 1990 Tudjman’s
political party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), formed a wing in Bosnia876 which,
guided from Zagreb, advocated a “sovereign, independent, and confederal” (emphasis
added) Bosnia.877 A year later, during the Croatian war, the Bosnian Croats declared the
formation of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, covering 30 Bosnian municipalities,
with Bosnian HDZ vice-president Mate Boban as the com munity’s president.878 By January

874
Tudjman most clearly outlined his beliefs on Bosnia to US Ambassador Warren Zimmermann in January
1992. Zimmermann provides a detailed description of this conversation in his memoirs of the breakup of
Yugoslavia. During the discussion, Tudjman claimed that the Muslims wanted to create an “Islamic,
fundamentalist state in Bosnia”, and that they planned to “flood the region with 500.000 Turks” while
rewarding Bosnian Muslim families for having large families. Islamic influence would spread from Bosnia
through Sandzak, Kosovo, and Turkey to Libya. Izetbegovic was a “fundamentalist front-man” for Turkey,
striving to create a greater Bosnia. Tudjman went on to discuss how the Croatians and Bosnian Croats
needed to conclude a deal with Milosevic and the Serbs over partitioning Bosnia, ignoring the fact that
Tudjman had just fought a war with the Serbs in which he demanded the West recognize the inviolability of
Croatian borders. Tudjman claimed that this was the only way to stop a war in Bosnia and halt the Muslims.
See Warren Zimmermann: Origins of a Catastrophe, New York Random House, 1996, pp. 181-184.
875
Zimmermann noted that Tudjman’s key aides were flabbergasted by his diatribe. Other senior HDZ officials
publicly stated their strong opposition to the division of Bosnia. However, working with Susak, Tudjman
bypassed all of those opposed to a Croatian policy of carving up Bosnia rather than supporting its unity.
876
Belgrade Tanjug, 18 August 1990; Silber and Little, p. 209.
877
Belgrade Tanjug, 18 August 1990.
878
Zagreb Radio, 18 November 1991.

356
1992, a Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina had also been established.879 Local
Bosnian Croat officials in predominantly Croat municipalities would now respond more to
the national HDZ leadership – and Zagreb – than to the nominal central Bosnian
Government in Sarajevo.
Zagreb and the Bosnian Croats saw these nascent Croat mini-states as parallels to
that of the Bosnian Serbs. While moving on this track, Zagreb was also negotiating with
Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs to partition Bosnia or create a nominal confederation with
virtual independence for the three ethnic entities.880 Tudjman and senior Croatian and
Bosnian Croat leaders held a series of meetings to discuss partition with Serbian and
Bosnian Serb leaders in 1991 and early 1992, starting with Milosevic in spring 1991,
followed by Nikola Koljevic, a Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency in December 1991,
and Karadzic in February 1992. Semi-secret talks continued as late as May, when Bosnian
Croat leader Mate Boban reached a tentative agreement on “borders“ and a cease-fire with
Karadzic. International reaction to what was regarded as Croatian perfidy forced Tudjman to
back off and change tacks. Within two weeks he had manoeuvred to promote an agreement
on confederation initialled by the Croatians, the Bosnian Croats, and a high-ranking Bosnian
Muslim official, which at least temporarily deflected the spotlight from the Boban-Karadzic
talks.881 Zagreb also played up its diplomatic recognition of the Bosnian government and
crowed about its role in the republic’s creation. Quietly, however, Tudjman and Susak
continued to support and encourage Bosnian Croat efforts to strengthen and extend their
autonomy, moving from Western Herzegovina into the more ethnically diverse Central
Bosnia and Posavina. These actions would result in armed fighting during fall 1992 between
nominally allied Muslim and Croat forces.

Military Strategy
Croatian military strategy during 1991 and 1992 in pursuit of these political
objectives escalated from the provision of weapons and Croatian Army “volunteers” to train
and organize a Bosnian Croat military in late 1991 to the full-blown deployment of Croatian
Army combat formations in April 1992. Zagreb appears to have sent weapons as early as
October or November 1991.882 An ethnic Herzegovinian commanding Croatian Army special

879
The same day that the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was formed, a Regional Committee of the
Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina was also created. By January 1992 the Croatian press was
referring to the Posavina community. Belgrade Tanjug, 19 November 1991; Zagreb HTV, 19 January 1992;
Sarajevo Radio, 25 March 1992.
880
In an interview with the political weekly Herceg-Bosna on 27 March Tudjman declared that the Bosnian
Croats could not accept any “unitarianistic” solution from Sarajevo, i.e., they would not accept a Muslim-
dominated central government controlling ethnic Croat areas. Cantonization was the minimum acceptable
solution.
881
See O. Ramljak: Better Now Than Never, Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 May 1992, p. 6, and Zivko Gruden:
Bombshell from Split, Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 20 May 1992, p. 2.
882
Colonel Mile Dedakovic-“Hawk”, the Croatian commander in Vinkovci-Vukovar during the Croatian War,
stated at the end of December 1991 that Defence Minister Susak had told him that weapons originally
intended for Vukovar had been diverted to Herzegovina. Dedakovic states:

357
operations forces has admitted to having first gone to Western Herzegovina in December
1991 – as a “volunteer” – to train and organize Bosnian Croat soldiers.883 In early 1992
Zagreb stepped up its shipments of weapons and equipment and continued the organization
of what would become the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) – the Bosnian Croat army.884
With its own war at least temporarily at an end, Zagreb also allowed Bosnian Croat enlisted
men serving in the HV to demobilize and return to Bosnia with their personal weapons,
where they helped form the nucleus of the growing Bosnian Croat forces.
The JNA’s defeat of HV/HVO forces in the Battle of Kupres in early April and the
advent of war throughout Bosnia brought more increases in Zagreb’s support to the Bosnian
Croats. Corps General Janko Bobetko, a senior officer on the Croatian Main Staff, received
approval from Croatian President Tudjman on 10 April to establish a command post at the
Croatian port of Ploce from which to reorganize HV forces in southern Dalmatia.885 Tudjman
authorized the move apparently because of Bobetko’s erroneous assessment that the JNA

Susak told me personally in front of some other people that Herzegovina must also have help. I
said that I had nothing against that, but I asked him who needed help more now, Herzegovina or
Vukovar?
On one occasion, I sent eight drivers I trusted to the Supreme Command for supplies, but when
they got there, they were told they were not needed, and that they themselves would find drivers.
Those eight tractor-trailer rigs never reached either Vinkovci or Vukovar. And then Susak told me that
those trucks had gone to Herzegovina ... There are documents.
Veceslav Kocijan: Playing Around With Money and Weapons, Zagreb Danas, 31 December 1991, pp. 20-21.
An interview with Mile Dedakovic.
883
In May 1994, then Colonel Miljenko Filipovic, commander of the elite Zrinski Battalion, the HV’s premier
special operations unit, discussed his actions in late 1991 and spring 1992 in Western Herzegovina:
... toward the end of 1991 we were training soldiers in Tomislavgrad. We took part in the battles
on Kupres, which I commanded personally. The battalion liberated three-fourths of Kupres, but in the
end it fell nevertheless, through no fault of ours.
... After it fell, we remained for a time in Herzegovina, helping to build the Croatian Defence
Council (HVO). You see, I was born in Tomislavgrad, and I was fighting in Herceg-Bosna as a
volunteer. I cannot leave the graves of my ancestors to anyone. Absolutely not! Incidentally, when
war broke out in Croatia, most of the volunteers came from Herzegovina, and they only went back to
defend their own.
Snjezana Dukic: If we had been only 10 minutes late..., Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 May 1994, p. 9. An
interview with Colonel Miljenko Filipovic.
Although Filipovic almost certainly did volunteer to go back, he also almost certainly was directly
authorized and/or asked to by Defence Minister Susak. It is noteworthy that Filipovic refers to his
“battalion” fighting in Kupres in April 1992. This would indicate that a large portion of his unit – which
included a high proportion of Croats who had previously served in the French Foreign Legion – had also
“volunteered” for Bosnia duty, as had Colonel, later General, Ante Roso, another Herzegovina native,
member of the HV Main Staff, and founder of the Zrinski Battalion. Roso, Filipovic, and their men almost
certainly organized and trained the local HVO brigade in Tomislavgrad, which was commanded for most of
the war by Zeljko Glasnovic, another ex-Foreign Legion Croat, who almost certainly had served in 1991 in
the Zrinski Battalion. For the reference to Roso’s presence at the disastrous Battle of Kupres, see Marko
Barisic: The Colonel or the Corpse, Split Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 24 November 1993, p. 6.
884
See Volume I, Chapter 18, The Bosnian Croat Militias, for a detailed discussion of the formation and
organization of the HVO.
885
This section is based on the detailed information, including copies of key documents, found in General
Bobetko’s memoirs, Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita Naklada, 1996. The most important
section covering the HV’s actions in Herzegovina is The Preparation and Organization of the Defence of the
General Herzegovina Region and Preparations for Operation Jackal, pp. 200-274.

358
victory at Kupres was the first step in a major JNA offensive to seize Herzegovina and the
Croatian port of Ploce and sever southern Dalmatia.886 Upon assuming control over HV
southern Dalmatian forces, Bobetko began organizing HVO headquarters (usually with HV
officers) and units under his command.887 This included the establishment of a forward
command post for Bobetko on 16 April in Grude, some 35 kilometers west of Mostar. This
command post was dual-hatted as the new Main Staff of the HVO, under a former JNA
colonel in the HV, Milivoj Petkovic.888 Zagreb’s theatre objective in Herzegovina was to
defend and hold the Croat territory of Herceg-Bosna and assist in the relief of Dubrovnik; to
that end, Bobetko was preparing a counteroffensive to free the Mostar-Neretva valley in
preparation for and in support of HV operations to break the Serb / JNA blockade of
Dubrovnik. He had already ordered the first full HV combat unit – a battalion of the 4th
Guards Brigade – into Herzegovina on 12 April.889 Additional brigades followed soon after,
both to defend Herzegovina and take part in simultaneous HV operations to reach HV
troops besieged in Dubrovnik. By early July, HV/HVO forces were ready to undertake
Operation “Jackal” to seize the Mostar-Neretva valley.
After the successful completion of this operation and the final actions around
Dubrovnik in September and October, the HV probably decreased its ground troop presence
in Herzegovina. HV combat units, however, remained in defensive positions north of
Dubrovnik inside Herzegovina until the implementation of the Dayton agreement in early
1996.890 More importantly, from a Bosnian political-military standpoint, Zagreb retained
direct command over the HVO for the duration of the conflict. This was aptly demonstrated

886
See Bobetko, p. 202 for a photographed copy of Tudjman’s order authorizing Bobetko to assume command
of all Croatian forces from Split to Dubrovnik.
887
See particularly Bobetko pp. 212-216, 220-221, 224, 229 for photographs of his orders to HV officers
organizing HVO defenses in key areas of Herzegovina.
888
See Bobetko pp. 206-208 for photographs of the orders establishing this forward command post with
Petkovic as its chief when Bobetko was not present. It is interesting to note that when Bobetko was
present at this command post he issued his orders on stationery with the header:
Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna
Croatian Defence Council
Southern Front Command Headquarters
Forward Command Post Grude
In accordance with JNA practice followed by the HV and other former Yugoslav armies, Bobetko then
sealed his signature with a stamp that reads “Main Staff Herceg Bosna” (Glavni Stozer Herceg Bosne). See
pp. 214-215 for good examples of this.
During an interview with Petkovic – who is originally from Split, Croatia, not Bosnia – in late 1994, after he
had been tranferred back to the HV, the interviewer writes:
He remained [in the HV] until April 1992 in what then was the Split Operational Zone. He informed
General Bobetko at the time that he wanted to join the Croatian Defence Council as a volunteer.
Petkovic himself states:
The reason was simple. The Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina needed help. The Croatian
Defence Council was neither organized nor structured. They lacked officers at the command level ...
Fast action was needed ... I was Chief of the General Staff of the HVO, and I stayed all of 28 months
instead of the two or three that were planned.
Ana Diklic: The Guard Brigades are the Cutting Edge of the Croatian Army, Osijek Glas Slavonije, 31
December 1994, p. 36. An interview with Milvoj Petkovic.
889
For a photograph of this order, see Bobetko, p. 203.
890
For a detailed account of the Herzegovina fighting, see Annex 32 The Battles for Herzegovina 1992.

359
by the passage of senior HV and HVO General Staff officers, such as Generals Petkovic,
Praljak, Roso, and Budimir, through the revolving door between the two armies from 1993
to 1995, assuming command first in one force and then the other.
In addition to its efforts in Herzegovina, the HV also assumed command over the
nascent HVO forces in the Posavina and began deploying regular HV combat units to the
region in April.891 The HV 1st Osijek Operational Zone, through its Posavina Operational
Group, controlled the initially successful HV/HVO operations, which had as their objective
the capture and retention of “Croat” territory, while maintaining pressure on the Bosnian
Serbs’ most strategic supply route to western Bosnia. Following setbacks at the hands of the
Bosnian Serb Army, the HV dispatched deputy Main Staff chief General Petar Stipetic to
assume command in mid-July. Even so, Croat troops were unable to halt the VRS, and the
key town of Bosanski Brod fell in October. Following this defeat the HV scaled back its
presence in the Posavina as well, although it retained some troops in the remaining Orasje
pocket.892 The HV also continued to exercise overall command of the HVO Posavina
Operational Zone (later the Orasje Corps District) throughout the war.

891
The JNA claimed that two battalions of the HV’s 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade had crossed the Sava River
into Bosnia at Bosanski Brod on 18 April and engaged in combat with JNA and Bosnian Serb Territorial
Defence troops. Belgrade Tanjug, 18 April 1992. Despite the Serbian sourcing, this date is consistent with
HV actions elsewhere and probably is true.
892
The fighting in the Posavina, including HV involvement, is discussed in more detail in Annex 28 The Battle
for the Corridor: Operations in the Posavina, March 1992 – January 1993.

360
 Annex 26
North-eastern Bosnia, April 1992: The Axe Falls
Zvornik
At the beginning of April 1992, Zvornik was a relatively large town of approximately
15.000 residents (sixty percent of them Muslim) nestled on the west bank of the Drina
river.893 A two-lane bridge connected it with the smaller town of Mali Zvornik, on the
opposite bank of the river in Serbia. In late January 1992, the “Serbian Autonomous Region
of Semberija and Majevica” had included Zvornik among its constituent municipalities,
although Serbs were only a minority of Zvornik’s total population.894 Interethnic violence
first erupted during the republic-wide tensions following the announcement of the
independence referendum results on 2 March. Two weeks later, Zvornik’s Serbs proclaimed
their own, independent “Serbian Municipality of Zvornik”.895 At the end of March, the
personnel of Zvornik’s police station split into two rival forces.896 By the beginning of April, a
near-war psychosis had settled over the town. Many Serbs anticipated violence and sought
safety across the river in Serbia, while Zvornik’s Muslims lived in constant fear as the Serb
population mobilized, organized, and armed itself around them. By the time of the
republic’s declaration of independence on 6 April, tensions had reached a fever pitch.
The Serb forces rallying in the Zvornik area were a hodgepodge of professional
troops, local Serb TO and volunteer forces, and Serbian ultranationalist volunteer units.
Units included the local Zvornik TO, probably local MUP police forces, Arkan’s Serbian
Volunteer Guard, Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj’s men, and “Frenki“ Simatovic’s
crack Serbian RDB/MUP “Red Beret” special operations troops.897 Elements of the JNA 336th
Motorized Brigade, which could call on artillery units in Serbia, backed up these forces. All
told, the Serbs may have mustered 1.000 to 2.000 men. Arkan and Simatovic’s units made
up only a small portion of the attack force, totalling no more than 200 – but they probably
played the most important role considering their professional ism and experience (see Seselj
quote below.) The rest, except for the JNA elements, were little more than a rabble.
Muslim forces appear to have been organized by the “Patriotic League” prior to the
outbreak of the war, and were apparently led by an individual named “Captain Almir”,898
whose real name was Samir Nistovic.899 Almost nothing is known about the size or

893
According to the 1991 census data, the entire Zvornik municipality, including suburbs, numbered 81.295
residents. Of these, 59 % were Muslim, 38 % were Serb, and fewer than 1 % were Croat.
894
Sarajevo Radio, 29 January 1992, FBIS Vienna AU3001101092, 301010Z Januar 1992.
895
Belgrade Tanjug, 15 March 1992, FBIS London LD1503154992, 151549Z March 1992.
896
Belgrade Radio, 28 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2803162092, 281620Z March 1992.
897
It is unclear whether Simatovic himself was present, or if, as seems likely, Captain Dragan (of Croatian war
fame) led the “Red Berets” in the fighting.
898
Sarajevo Radio, 10 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1004180392, 101803Z April 1992.
899
Travnik Bosnjak, Interview With Senahid Hadzic, Commander of the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade. Crucial,
21 November 1995, FBIS Reston VA, 96BA0040A.

361
composition of Zvornik’s defence, but the debacle that ensued suggests that the Muslim
defenders were few in number or poorly organized – and quite probably both.
Fighting between Serbs and Muslims broke out in and around Zvornik on 8 April,
with the JNA, too, openly shelling Zvornik from inside Serbia on the far side of the river.900
Late on that day Arkan arrived in the area and delivered an ultimatum: the Muslims of the
Zvornik commune must hand over their arms by 8 a.m. the following day or “experience the
fate of Bijeljina”.901 Serb forces surrounded the town, while the Muslims manned hastily
thrown-together barricades on its outskirts and waited anxiously through the night.902
Minutes after the ultimatum expired the next morning, the Serb forces – including Arkan’s
men, SDS-armed “volunteers”, and Simatovic’s “Red Berets”, supported by more JNA
artillery fire – began their attack and within hours had occupied the town. Muslim resistance
within the town effectively ended by nightfall, although mopping-up operations and
sporadic fighting continued in the immediate area for the next few days.
By pure coincidence, Jose Mendiluce, the senior representative of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the former Yugoslavia, happened to be in Zvornik as
the Serb forces were taking it over. Acting on his own, Mendiluce helped to evacuate
hundreds of Zvornik’s Muslims by declaring them to be under UNHCR protection and then
arranging their transport to Muslim-held Tuzla. This inspired and courageous act
undoubtedly saved many lives, but it became the first instance in which UN authorities
actively, if unwittingly, facilitated Serb ethnic cleansing. By evacuating Zvornik’s entire
Muslim population, the UNHCR had helped the Serbs achieve the ultimate political-military
objective of their assault.903
In contrast to Bijeljina, the JNA actively supported the Serb paramilitaries assaulting
904
Zvornik. Indeed, the Yugoslav Army made no effort to conceal its involvement at Zvornik,
and a JNA official statement from 10 April announced that following Croat-Muslim
“provocations” in the area:
JNA and Territorial Defence units ... entered Zvornik, pushed the paramilitary
formations out of town, established order, and restored communications.905
But it was the Serbian RDB/MUP’s “Red Beret” special operations unit that was the
most decisive force. As the Serb extremist Vojislav Seselj was later to state openly:

900
Sarajevo Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804181592, 081815Z April 1992.
901
Sarajevo Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804224092, 082240Z April 1992.
902
Gjelten,Tom: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 89-
91.
903
Reiff, David: Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West, New York Simon & Schuster (Touchstone
Books), 1995, pp. 200-202.
904
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 2 March 1992, FBIS London LD0203222792, refers to members of a JNA
mechanized-armored unit from Jastrebarsko deploying to the Zvornik area in late February – early March.
This was the former 4th Armored Brigade, formerly headquartered at Jastrebarsko and redesignated the
336th Motorized.
905
Belgrade Tanjug, 10 April 1992, FBIS London LD1004224892, 102248Z April 1992.

362
 The Bosnian Serb forces took part in it. But the special units and the best combat
units came from this side [Serbia]. These were police units – the so-called Red Berets –
special units of the Serbian Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The army engaged itself to a
small degree – it gave artillery support where it was needed. The operation had been
prepared for a long time. It wasn’t carried out in any kind of nervous fashion.
Everything was well organized and implemented.906
In sum, the capture of Zvornik illustrates how the well-organized Serb paramilitary
groups (organized, supplied, and backed by the Serbian Internal Affairs Ministry), the
Serbian MUP’s own forces, and the JNA could collaborate to demolish in short order a
stunned, ill-equipped, and disorganized Muslim resistance.

Visegrad
The town of Visegrad had been a Turkish stronghold in Bosnia where in 1571 the
Ottoman Vizier of Bosnia907 commissioned the empire’s greatest architect, Sinan, to design
and build a 180-yard long, eleven-arched bridge over the Drina. This jewel of Turkish
architecture was to provide the inspiration for the acclaimed book “Bridge over the River
Drina” by Yugoslavia’s only Nobel-prizewinning author, Ivo Andric.908 But Andric’s binding
imagery of the bridge notwithstanding, the Visegrad municipality had been fracturing since
January 1992 when the Serb-majority districts on the left bank of the Drina voted to join the
Serb Autonomous Region of Romanija while those on the right bank voted to join the SAO of
Herzegovina.909 Visegrad’s Muslims, of course, did not want to be in either of the
Autonomous Regions; Serb and Muslim goals were clearly mutually exclusive. Tensions
spiked again in the first days of March, when the referendum results were announced,
although they did not lead to actual violence.910 In Visegrad, as in a number of other
municipalities, the ethnic composition of the police force was a source of open dispute in
the run-up to the war.911 Then on 23 March barricades went up on the road to Gorazde912

906
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, p. 224.
907
The Ottoman vizier who commissioned the bridge was Mehmet Pasha Sokolovic, who had been born a
member of a prominent Orthodox family from near Visegrad. He was taken as a youth by the Ottomans as
part of the “blood tax” of Christian children, and subsequently rose by skill and luck to become the most
powerful advisor to Sultan Suleyman the Magnificant. Despite this, Mehmet Pasha never entirely separated
from his Orthodox background, allowing the Serbian Orthodox Church greater freedom within the Ottoman
empire and arranging for his own brother to be appointed Patriarch of the newly-restored Serbian
Orthodox Church. See Sudetic, Chuck: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New
York W. W. Norton and Co., 1998, pp. 12-13.
908
Andric won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961. His book details the life of the town – and of the
Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish communities which comprised it – through four centuries after the
bridge’s construction. Andric (a Croat who wrote in the Serb dialect) also refers directly to the interethnic
tensions in then-Yugoslavia and the potential for violence beneath the community’s surface.
909
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 13 January 1992, FBIS London LD 1301140392, 131403Z January 1992.
910
Belgrade Tanjug, 4 March 1992, FBIS London LD0403233392, 042333Z March 1992.
911
Interview with Momcilo Mandic, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina: They Want
the Personnel Officer to Be Replaced!, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 6 March 1992, p. 2.
912
Belgrade Tanjug, 23 March 92, FBIS London LD2303114292, 231142Z March 1992.

363
and shooting was heard throughout the town after Muslims attacked four Serbs on 24
March.913 914
Open violence erupted on 7 April, when Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence forces
moved to seize control of the town. The local TO probably numbered some 1.000 Bosnian
Serb troops, backed up by roughly 100-200 municipal police from the area. These were
probably assisted by small numbers of JNA 37th (Uzice) Corps troops.
The Bosnian Muslim forces were clearly overmatched in terms of numbers,
organization, and weapons. Belgrade media claimed at the time that there was a battalion
of 450 armed Muslims in the town, but this is almost certainly a vast exaggeration.915 In
reality, the Muslims probably could count only a fraction of the local police and reserve
police forces – perhaps 100 or so individuals – and maybe several dozen armed Patriotic
League members. It would have been surprising to find more than 250 armed Muslims in
the Visegrad area, not all of whom might answer to any single authority.
Details of the fighting in Visegrad are very hazy: the heaviest fighting appears to
have taken place on 8 April, probably centred on a contest for the police station, and Serb
forces made an organized effort to clear “paramilitaries” from the left bank of the Drina
during the day.916 Panic spread as rumours circulated of Arkan’s imminent approach, and
the entire Muslim population had fled Visegrad and its environs by the morning of 9 April.917
Sporadic Muslim resistance appears to have continued in isolated areas for a few
days after the fall of Visegrad itself. While Visegrad was being overrun, Bosnian Serb forces
appear to have wiped out a detachment of “Green Berets” manning a roadblock near the
town of Rudo on the Bosnian-Serbian border.918 Serb forces also overwhelmed local Muslim
resistance in the nearby villages of Dobrun919 and Bosanska Jagodina over the next few days,
although Dobrun appears to have been surrounded for four days before surrendering.920
Even though minor skirmishes may have continued for as much as a week after the 7 April
attack, the Bosnian Serbs had established effective control over the area within 48 hours.
In a bizarre episode as the fighting around Visegrad drew to a close, a Bosnian
Muslim, Murat Sabanovic, seized control of the hydroelectric dam above the city and
threatened to blow it up with explosives, which would have flooded Visegrad and much of
the surrounding area. After negotiations by radio failed, the JNA stormed the position and
discovered that Sabanovic had no explosives. Before his capture he managed to release a
small amount of water that did little damage.921

913
Belgrade RTV, 24 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2403194292, 241942Z March 1992.
914
Belgrade Tanjug, 24 March 1992. FBIS London LD2403234392, 242343Z March 1992.
915
Belgrade Tanjug, 7 April 1992, FBIS London LD0704150692, 071506Z April 1992.
916
Sarajevo Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU804151492, 081514Z August 1992.
917
Zagreb Radio, 9 April 1992, FBIS London LD0904120792, 091207Z April 1992.
918
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 9 April 1992, FBIS London LD0904215792, 092157Z April 1992.
919
Sarajevo Radio, 10 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU 1004203092, 102030Z April 1992.
920
Belgrade RTB Television Network, 9 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0904191892, 091918Z April 1992.
921
Glenny, Misha: The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin, 1992, pp. 165-166.

364
 Foca
Foca, ethnically split at 52 percent Muslim, 45 percent Serb, straddled a north-
south road running alongside the Drina river about 20 km southwest of Gorazde. As
elsewhere in the Drina valley, there had been trouble in Foca for weeks before April 1992.
On 1 March, during the referendum on Bosnian independence, shooting broke out at a
polling station near Foca922 and barricades went up on the Foca-Sarajevo road when the
referendum results were announced the next day.923 When word of a series of interethnic
confrontations in and around Gorazde reached Foca on 23 March, the local SDS Crisis Centre
declared a “state of readiness” because of the “threatened security of the minority Serb
population in Gorazde” and stated that if peace were not restored that same day, the party
would call on the Serb population of Foca to arm itself.924
The Foca SDA appears to have been exceptionally well organized, and the several
hundred defenders in the area were probably the best armed and best organized Muslims in
eastern Bosnia. (Foca appears to have been the one area where the Muslim paramilitaries
managed to acquire mortars and other heavy weapons before the outbreak of the war.)
Their comparatively high level of organization and armament gave the Foca Muslims
something of a fighting chance. Whereas Muslim forces in Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Visegrad
were essentially wiped out within a day or two, those in and around Foca were able to
continue resistance for almost three weeks.
Serb forces in the Foca area consisted primarily of the Foca Territorial Defence,
numbering probably about 1.000 troops. Elements of Territorial Defence units from nearby
towns (at the very least, the Cajnice TO) probably assisted,925 and up to 200 local MUP
forces were probably also involved. At least in the later stages of the operation, the Bosnian
Serbs were also reinforced by volunteers from Seselj’s Serbian Chetnik Movement.926
Finally, the JNA’s 37th (Uzice) Corps may have provided some support. There were
persistent though never-substantiated claims that Uzice Corps troops participated in the
battle, and men from units such as the 37th MP battalion may also have assisted the
Bosnian Serbs.
When Bosnia formally declared its independence on 6 April, the Foca Serbs took
control of the municipal authorities – including the police – and declared themselves loyal to
the SRBH and independent of the Sarajevo government.927 Fighting became general by the
evening of 8 April, and eight were killed and six wounded in the contest for control of the

922
Belgrade Radio, 1 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0103210892, 012108Z March 1992.
923
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 2 March 1992, FBIS London LD0203I60I92, 021601Z March 1992 (U).
924
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 23 March 1992, FBIS London LD2303I32592, 231325Z March 1992.
925
Miro Stanic, Commander of the Foca War Headquarters, left on 30 April 1992 to meet in Cajnice with the“
Army Minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina” in order to coordinate further
operations in the area. (Belgrade Radio, 30 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU3004161292, 301612Z April 1992)
Cajnice was also the closest sizeable town with its own TO headquarters.
926
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 15 May 1992, FBIS London LD1505135392, 151353Z May 1992.
927
Belgrade Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804114792, 081147Z April 1992.

365
Jajce 2 hydroelectric plant near the town.928 A tense calm descended and continued through
most of the day on 9 April, as the Serbs again issued an ultimatum that the local Muslims
could either surrender their arms or face retribution. When the deadline passed at 6 p.m.
Serb forces opened intense fire and mortar shelling on the Muslim-majority neighbourhoods
of Donje Polje and Sukovac.929
The next few days witnessed the most intense Muslim resistance in the Drina valley
of April 1992, notably at the police station, one of the first contested locations. But by 11
April the Serbs had swept the Muslim defenders from the police station and most of the
town, and had raised a Serb flag atop Foca’s mosque.930 International negotiator Jose
Cutileiro arranged a cease-fire to take effect at midnight on 12 April, but it broke down
within a day.931 Most of the town was a no-man’s land by day and a looter’s paradise by
night. Even Serb radio broadcasts admitted that the town was deserted until dusk, after
which looters would take anything they could carry from the abandoned shops.932
By 14 April the Serbs were growing frustrated with their inability to dislodge the
stubborn Muslim defenders from the Donje Polje district. A fierce street battle began that
morning as Serb forces battered the neighbourhood with artillery fire and eventually pried
the Muslim defenders out of a conspicuous skyscraper that had given Muslim snipers a
dominating position overlooking the town.933 With its loss the Muslim defences became
untenable and most Muslims had fled the Foca area by 17 April.934
A particularly bad example of “ethnic cleansing” followed the Serb capture of Foca.
Muslim-owned houses were looted or torched, mosques were burned down, and the
remnants of the Muslim population were terrorized. A Reuters correspondent managed to
get into Foca shortly after the town was captured by Serb forces, and described the scene
he saw. The report is indicative of both the destruction and the chaos of the very first days
of the Bosnian war, before the various sides had regularized their forces and imposed
greater discipline on the troops:
Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foca, turning the once quiet Bosnian town into a
nightmare landscape of shattered streets and burning houses. The motley assortment
of fierce-looking bearded men carry Kalashnikovs and bandoliers or have handguns
tucked into their belts. Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia; others
are wild-eyed local men, hostile toward strangers and happy to have driven out their
Moslem neighbours. No one seems to be in command and ill-disciplined and bad-
tempered gunmen stop and detain people at will.
The Moslems, who made up half the town’s population of 10.000 people, have
fled or are in jail. Many of their houses have been destroyed or are in flames. Entire

928
Zagreb Radio, 9 April 1992,FBIS London LD0904101192, 091011Z April 1992.
929
Sarajevo Radio, 9 April 19992, FBIS Vienna AU0904190792, 091907Z April 1992.
930
Sarajevo Radio, 11 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1104213792, 112137Z April 1992.
931
Zagreb Radio, 13 April 1992, FBIS London LD1304080792, 130807Z Apri1992.
932
Belgrade Radio, 13 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1304173292, 131732Z April 1992.
933
Belgrade Radio, 14 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1404161692, 141616Z April 1992.
934
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 17 April 1992, FBIS London LD1704152792, 171527Z April 1992.

366
 streets have been destroyed, restaurants reduced to cinders and twisted metal,
apartment blocks charred, the hospital hit by mortar fire. The Serbs say that despite the
damage, only seven or eight of their own men and about twenty Moslems were killed in
the fighting.935
The fall of Foca did not end the Muslim resistance in the general area, which
continued almost until the end of April. Muslim forces appear to have rallied in the
Ustikolina area (site of a JNA arms warehouse) between Foca and Gorazde where they
attempted to block further Serb advances, while pockets of defenders held out in a few
other areas. The Serb forces moved to mop up captured areas and demand the surrender of
Muslim forces in the remaining villages.936 On 30 April the leader of the Foca area’s Bosnian
Serb war headquarters claimed his forces had occupied about 85 percent of the Foca
opstina, and added that “We certainly will not stop at these borders because the parts
where the Muslims are in the majority are still a threat”.937 When Serb forces finally crushed
all Muslim resistance in and around Foca, the Muslims shifted their actions to the defensive
ring around Gorazde.

935
Glenny, Misha: The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin, 1992, p. 166.
936
Sarajevo Radio, 28 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2804192492, 281924Z April 1992.
937
Belgrade Radio, 30 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU3004161292, 301612Z April 1992.

367
 Annex 27
Ethnic Cleansing as a Military Operation:
Prijedor-Sanski Most-Kljuc, May – July 1992938
The Bosnian Serb Takeover, April 1992
As the war widened in April, the Bosnian Serb leadership in the Bosanska Krajina
Autonomous Region moved to consolidate its control over key municipalities that retained
Muslim and/or Croat-controlled governments and police units. The Prijedor, Sanski Most,
and Kljuc municipalities bordering the Sana River valley were of particular concern because
of the high concentrations of Muslims in all three – the Muslims had a plurality in Prijedor
and Sanski Most, while the Serbs had a plurality in Kljuc.939 In mid-April, the Serbs,
coordinated by the SDS, acted. In Sanski Most, between 15 and 20 April, units from the JNA
6th Partisan Brigade, recently returned from Western Slavonia, occupied key administrative
buildings and infrastructure, including the police headquarters, radio station, and power
station.940 SDS officials took charge of the municipal government, the Sanski Most municipal
police secretariat was absorbed into the new Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs941,
and all the Croat and Muslim police were expelled from the force.942 A little more than a
fortnight later the SDS took full power in Prijedor, with JNA troops – units of the 343rd
Motorized Brigade – again providing backup in case there were problems.943 As in Sanski
938
This section will look almost exclusively at the ethnic cleansing in Western Bosnia through the actions of
the Bosnian Serb Army. It will not examine the detention camp system, and is not intended to cover war
crimes issues. Nor will it focus on the often exaggerated actions of so-called “paramilitary” units (more
accurately designated volunteers, these cutthroats served as auxiliaries to VRS regular formations).
Reporting not otherwise cited in these notes is drawn from a series of refugee accounts, and has been
judged to be highly accurate in most cases. Crosschecks between these accounts and Serb journals that
corroborate these accounts have allowed us to develop a detailed picture of the VRS operations.
939
In Prijedor Municipality, the population of 112.470 was about 44 percent Muslim, 43 percent Serb, almost
six percent Croat, and eight percent “Yugoslav” and others. In Sanski Most Municipality, the population of
60.119 was about 47 percent Muslim, 42 percent Serb, some seven percent Croat, and about four percent
“Yugoslav” and others. In Kljuc Municipality, the population of 37.233 was about 48 percent Muslim,
precisely 49.5 percent Serb, about one percent Croat, and about three percent “Yugoslav” and others.
(Numbers have been rounded). Miroslav Krleza Lexicographical Institute: A Concise Atlas of the Republic of
Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Zagreb, Graficki Zavod Hrvatske, 1993, p. 125.
940
The 6th Partisan Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Branko Basara, had fought during the Croatian war
around Jasenovac in Western Slavonia as part of the 5th (Banja Luka) Corps. The brigade had originally
been a Bosnian republic TO formation that the JNA had “illegally” mobilized in the fall of 1991, along with
several other TO brigades in Bosanska Krajina. By spring 1992 it was in effect a JNA brigade. Major
elements of the brigade redeployed to Sanski Most from Western Slavonia on 3 April.
941
The Bosnian Serbs also moved to take power in the adjacent Bosanska Krupa Municipality on about 20
April, when local Bosnian Serb TO troops, supported by at least a battalion of the JNA 6th Partisan Brigade,
attacked Bosanska Krupa town and surrounded the town of Arapusa. The section of Bosanska Krupa town
on the south side of the Una River fell to TO and JNA troops on 23 April, followed soon after by Arapusa.
Belgrade Tanjug, 21-22 April 1992; Belgrade Radio, 23 April 1992; Zagreb HTV, 21 April 1992.
942
Some press reports claim that the Muslim and Croat police barricaded themselves in the local municipal
assembly building on 19 April before being ejected the following day. Belgrade Tanjug, 20 April 1992.
943
The 343rd Motorized Brigade, under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsic, had fought in Western
Slavonia as part of the 5th (Banja Luka) Corps in and around Pakrac-Lipik. Although Arsic was the brigade

368
Most, key buildings and facilities were taken over, including the municipal government
headquarters, radio station, and police station, and all Croat and Muslim police were sent
home.944 In Kljuc, Serbs probably took over the government during April or possibly early
May; no detailed reporting is available.945 JNA troops from the 6th Partisan Brigade almost
certainly backed this move as well. The stage was set for the “cleansing of the terrain” to
begin.

The Forces: April – May 1992

During late 1991 and early 1992, as the Serbs continued their march toward
autonomy and independence, Croats and Muslims of the Sana valley – as elsewhere in
Bosnia – set about organizing local self-defence groups or village guard forces against the
possibility of attack by Serbs and their JNA backers.946 These “units”, often organized by
former JNA reserve or TO officers or members of the Patriotic League, were little more than
untrained bands of civilians armed with hunting weapons or the odd military rifle, often
World War II era bolt-action M-48s. They could muster only a few antitank or other heavy
weapons, and some they did have were defective pieces bought from Serb black marketers.
Most of the men came from the villages near Prijedor city proper. It is unlikely that any
more than 500 of them were armed, though a larger number of males probably were
registered as part of the force. Since they were scattered throughout the villages, their
nominal commanders had little or no ability to concentrate forces against Serb or JNA
troops. They clearly would be no match for regular units of the JNA or its successor, the
Bosnian Serb Army.
As the Vance-Owen plan went into effect in Croatia, the JNA’s 5th (Banja Luka)
Corps began withdrawing combat brigades from the frontline in Western Slavonia. During
April, elements of three brigades, the 5th and 6th Partisan Brigades and the 343rd
Motorized Brigade, began returning to their home garrisons in Prijedor and Sanski Most in
Bosnia.947 The three brigades would be met by new reservists mobilized by the Second

commander, his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja, may have supervised the JNA actions at
this time. See “The Forces” section.
944
Some reporting suggests that the takeover in Prijedor happened concurrently with that in Sanski Most
945
Sarajevo Radio indicated that the Serbs had taken control of Kljuc by at least 9 May. The Serbs reportedly
guaranteed all residents “personal security”. Sarajevo Radio, 9 May 1992.
946
See Volume I, Chapter 17: The Patriotic League: Bosnia's Muslims Begin to Organize, for detailed discussion
of Muslim efforts to organize defense forces
947
VRS unit information drew heavily on the following articles in the newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik:
To the Pride and Honor of the Fatherland, Kozarski Vjesnik, 20 May 1994.
Zivko Ecim: Serb Seal for All Times, Kozarski Vjesnik,13 May 1994.
Zivko Ecim: We Know Our Goal, Kozarski Vjesnik, 20 May 1994. An interview with Radmilo Zeljaja.
Mico Glamocanin: Without a Battle Lost, Kozarski Vjesnik, 26 August 1994.
Mile Mutic: The Brigade of a Long and Honorable Warpath: The Warpath of the 5th Kozara Brigade,
Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984.
Zivko Ecim: A Bomb in the Heart, A Sight in the Eye, Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984. An
interview with Pero Colic.
Zivko Ecim: The Formation of the Ljubija Battalion, Kozarski Vjesnik, June / July 1994? Issue 980.

369
Military District on 5 April and by members of the Bosnian Serb TO folded into their ranks.
The commander of the 5th Corps, Major General Momir Talic, also established a regional
command under Lieutenant Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja, the chief of staff of the 343rd, to
oversee the regional TO headquarters and the security of the Sana River valley. Zeljaja in
turn coordinated all his actions with local SDS leaders.948 By the time the JNA units in Bosnia
became the Bosnian Serb Army on 20 May, the forces under Zeljaja’s command may have
numbered as many as 8.000 troops, probably including former TO units (in the process of
converting to regular JNA/VRS units) and “volunteer” personnel. These forces were backed
by small amounts of armour and field artillery.

The “Cleansing” Begins, May 1992

The Bosnian Serbs’ next step was to order all Muslims and Croats to turn in their
weapons to the VRS and police. The Serbs, and the VRS in particular, claimed that this was
necessary to eliminate the “threat” from the virtually non-existent Muslim “forces” in the
area.949 The VRS was particularly concerned about the possibility that the town of Kozarac
and the surrounding Muslim villages might be used to block the main road between Prijedor
and Banja Luka.950 Newly commissioned in the VRS, Lieutenant Colonel Zeljaja ordered the
predominantly Muslim villagers within about a 10-kilometer radius of Prijedor city to turn in
all weapons or face the consequences. A day or so later, on 22 May, a VRS patrol clashed
with a village guard unit near the village of Hambarine.951 It was the only pretext the VRS
would need. Zeljaja later stated:
Hours of talks with the representatives of the SDA and HDZ did not yield any
results. On May 22, in the field below Hambarine, they were shooting at our soldiers ...
and shot two of them dead ... Within 40 minutes time we found out who had been
shooting. We invited the gentle men from the SDA and HDZ to deliver the culprits to us

948
Kozarski Vjesnik article. The role of Colonel Arsic upon the 343rd’s complete redeployment to Prijedor, and
where he fit in the chain of command, is unclear.
949
For one of the most explicit statements of Serb views on the Muslim threat, see Battle for Prijedor, Krajiski
Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 34-35. Krajiski Vojnik is the military journal of the 1st Krajina Corps. The article opens
with the statement:
A special chapter in the biography of this heroic brigade (43rd Motorized] is certainly the events
of April 1992, when Prijedor became the media center of the entire world. It did not suit the world’s
powerful leaders that the Serbs of this region would not consent to suffer the fate of their forefathers
half a century ago – and that is what was intended for them. The fanatical Muslim extremists were
“hurrying” their Serbian neighbors to move out of their homes, or else – you know what. A knife, just
like 50 years ago. And it was all prepared, the knives were sharpened, the scenario was composed,
and the executors were already known.
950
The Krajiski Vojnik article claims that:
... without a clear situation in the Krajina and on the slopes of Kozara, there would have been
many more problems in liberating the corridor and all of Posavina, and later the Drina basin and
Romanija.
Battle for Prijedor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 34-35.
951
The VRS and the Muslim defenders of Hambarine present differing stories of the clash. The VRS claimed
that the patrol was ambushed, while the Muslims claimed that the Serbs fired first, and that the Muslims
were only returning fire.

370
 by 12:00 the next day. They were also told (and I think that my statement was made
public through our news media) that this command would not allow Prijedor to become
another Tuzla [where JNA troops withdrawing from the city had been fired on] ... After
that the events developed the way they wanted them to: they blocked the road in
Kozarac, and they were again offered everything, but they would not listen ... The
attack was launched two hours after the given ultimatum expired.952
Zeljaja and the VRS, however, had been preparing to move against the villages well
before the incident at Hambarine. Then Major Pero Colic (a post-war Chief of the VRS
General Staff) later stated that two battalions of his 5th Partisan Brigade and one battalion
of the 43rd (former 343rd) Motorized Brigade had moved into staging areas near the
Muslim stronghold of Kozarac two days before the fortuitous clash at Hambarine.953
On 23 May VRS troops encircled Kozarac and the neighbouring villages, shelling
them in preparation for an infantry attack. Kozarac itself, however, held out for four days,
inflicting several casualties on the Serb attackers, before succumbing to the VRS’s superior
numbers and armour. After the town’s seizure, VRS troops apparently killed a large number
of people, including women and children.954 The remainder were herded into camps, where
men 18 to 60 years old were segregated from the women, children, and elderly. Hambarine
received the same treatment as Kozarac, although it fell more quickly.955
In response, Patriotic League commander Slavko Ecimovic, a Croat, regrouped the
remnants of the Muslim-Croat local defence units just south of Prijedor and planned a near-
suicidal attack on key Serb installations in Prijedor town itself. What Ecimovic hoped to

952
Zivko Ecim: We Know Our Goal, Kozarski Vjesnik, 20 May 1994. Interview with Colonel Zeljaja.
953
Mile Mutic: The Brigade of a Long and Honorable Warpath: The Warpath of the 5th Kozara Brigade,
Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984. The order of battle for the operation to secure Kozarac and the
villages surrounding it comprised:
1st Battalion / 5th Partisan Brigade
2nd Battalion / 5th Partisan Brigade
1st Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade
Reconnaissance Company “Zoran Karlica” / 43rd Motorized Brigade
“Cigo” Reconnaissance-Sabotage Platoon / 5th Partisan Brigade
“Zoran Miscevic” Reconnaissance Sabotage Platoon / 5th Parti san Brigade
Military Police Platoon / 6th Partisan Brigade
The action appears to have been under the command of Zeljaja and Major Zoran Karlica, who led the 343rd
/ 43rd’s recon company during the fighting in Croatia. It is unclear whether Major Colic was in command of
his battalions during the attack.
954
The 1st Krajina Corps reported to the VRS Main Staff that 80 to 100 Muslim men were killed and 1.500
captured. The VRS lost four killed and 15 wounded. A series of 1st Krajina Corps reports to the VRS Main
Staff from 24 and 26 May 1992 cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY):
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31
May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, pp. 237-238. At least one refugee
claimed that VRS troops had not committed any atrocities in their area, although this was not apparently
true in Kozarac town itself.
955
The attack on Hambarine probably involved troops from the 5th Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade, as
Zeljaja had identified that unit as having lost the soldiers killed in the initial clash at Hambarine. Elements of
the brigade reconnaissance company “Zoran Karlica” also may have been involved. At least one refugee
claims that the atrocities that later took place in the village were definitely not perpetrated by the troops
who first seized Hambarine.

371
achieve through the attack remains unclear. One possibility is that he hoped that if he could
take and hold his objectives even temporarily, a mass uprising among Prijedor Municipality’s
still numerous Muslim population might ensue. Another possibility is that he hoped the
attack would divert the Serbs from encircling the Muslim villages long enough for the
villagers to escape into the forests and hills and make their way to Bosnian Government-
held territory.
In any event, in the early hours of 30 May, about 200 Patriotic League fighters
(possibly more) attacked a hotel used by the Serbs as a barracks, the police station, the VRS
garrison, and the municipal government headquarters. They apparently overran the hotel,
killing a number of Serb soldiers, and the police station, where they seized a large number
of small arms. Ecimovic was killed during the attack. Eventually, having received little or no
support from SDA supporters in the town and with VRS reinforcements arriving, the
surviving Muslim and Croat forces pulled out. They had held key sections of Prijedor for
most of a day, embarrassing the VRS and MUP, which lost 14 soldiers killed in action and 26
wounded. The consequence of their brief success, however, was almost certainly to confirm
and inflame Serb fears of a Muslim military threat to SDS/VRS control over the region.956

956
Oddly, Krajiski Vojnik has one of the most detailed accounts of the attack on Prijedor. It has been cross-
checked with other information, and found to be generally accurate, although Serb estimates for Muslim
manpower seem high. The following is the Krajiski Vojnik account:
At dawn on 30 May, the Muslims and Croats attacked Prijedor, but the creators of the attack
were then president of the Prijedor SDA, Mirza Mujadzic, and hardened HDZ member Slavko
Hecimovic. They were joined by Second Lieutenant Asim Muhic, Kemal Alagic, and Hadji Izet Mesic.
The attack was prepared for almost a month, with intensive drilling in the forests of Kurevo and
Panjik.
The attackers reached the Sana by forest paths and rural roads, and crossed the river near the old
tannery. They gathered in the Old City, at Dedo Crnalic’s restaurant, and split there into five groups.
The attack was well-planned and coordinated from the city itself, where about 500 armed Muslims
were already concealed. The attack began at early dawn, at preciselv 04:00 hours, on 30 May 1992.
Along with the above mentioned groups, others were led by Slavko Ecimovic, Asim Muhic, Kemo
Alagic, and Hadji Izet Mesic, and which had the assignment of occupying the new hotel, the municipal
building, the Public Security Station [police], and Radio Prijedor. A fifth group, headed by Edin Cajic
(Little Edo), had the assignment of cutting off, near the underpass, the road by which the city would
receive help from the barracks, and at the same time “encouraging” Puharska [a predominantly
Muslim suburb] to go on the offensive, since at that time there were more than 5.000 Muslims in it.
The battle was fought until 8, and then members of the 43rd Motorized Brigade, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja came to the city’s aid, and in just two hours completely destroyed
the attackers and drove them into flight with great losses. Fleeing headlong along the same route
across the Sana River ... they gathered again in the forests of Panjik and Kurevo.
Battle for Prijedor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996. pp. 34-35.

372
 Sanski Most-Kljuc, May – June 1992957
Meanwhile, further south, the VRS had also acted quickly to eliminate the
supposed threat from the Muslims and Croats at Sanski Most town and in the villages
surrounding Kljuc. On 25 May, VRS 6th Partisan Brigade units began mortaring the
predominantly Muslim Sanski Most suburb of Mahala. The next day VRS troops began
rounding up the entire population, again separating the “military age” males from the rest
and interning them in camps, while shipping most of the women and children to the
Muslim-controlled Bihac enclave. In Kljuc Municipality two battalions of the 6th Partisan
Brigade and a VRS engineer battalion, possibly supported by a battalion from the 13th
Partisan Brigade, began a series of brutal actions to clear villages north and northwest of
Kljuc town on about 25 May.958 These operations continued into early June, and succeeded
in driving out or killing a large proportion of the rural Muslim population. The VRS 6th
Partisan Brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Branko Basara, himself admitted that units
under his command “had been committing ‘genocide’ against Muslim non-combatants”.959

Ethnic Cleansing: A Portrait

A typical action against a village appears to have followed a standard pattern. The
VRS unit engaged in a sweep operation would first surround the village, then pound it with
mortar or direct fire to terrorize the population into submission and dishearten any
defenders.960 Many villagers, particularly the women and children, would scatter into
nearby forests during the shelling. In most cases, troops then moved into the village itself on
957
This section is based primarily on refugee accounts. In addition, issues of the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade’s
(the later designator for 6th Partisan Brigade) wartime newspaper, Ratni Bilten (War Bulletin) have clearly
stated the 6th’s involvement in the “liberation” of Sanski Most and Kljuc. In addition, the ICTY’s Milosevic
pre-trial brief on Bosnia and Croatia includes a section on Sanski Most drawn heavily from VRS 1st Krajina
Corps documents, including war diaries and reports from the 6th Sanska Brigade. See International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial
Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June
2002, pp. 240-245.
958
The operations in the Kljuc area involved the 1st and 2nd Battalions / 6th Partisan Brigade, plus an engineer
[pioneer] battalion of what later became the 2nd Engineer Regiment / 2nd Krajina Corps. An article from
the engineers’ unit journal states:
We all remember the day some soldiers were killed while passing through Banja Luka at Pudin
Han, but few know that part of the Pioneer Battalion was already stationed in Kopjenica in the
afternoon hours, that it began infantry actions toward Velagici, and that the first mortar shells,
recoilless gun shells, and M-84 machine gun bullets came from the barrels of the Pioneer Battalion ...
Many townspeople of Kljuc will remember the entry of the Stojadin [a car] into Kljuc with the
commander and seven heroes on it after the cleansing of Velagici and Pudin Han.
Predrag Malic: Pioneer Battalion of Laniste – Future Overflow Chamber of the Klenovac-Laniste Pipeline,
Mladi Inzinjerac, February 1993, p. 4.
959
Command of the 6th Partisan Brigade Order establishing discipline in the units of the brigade during
combat operations, 3 June 1992, cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY):
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31
May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 243.
960
Many of the initial attacks were preceded by a demand that the village surrender any weapons it had. This
did not preclude the VRS from shelling the village anyway.

373
the following day. In some instances, this entry was only a precautionary move to check for
weapons and harass the population, after which the VRS withdrew and passed on; the VRS
commander might order Muslims to demonstrate their submission by hanging white sheets
out of their windows. Usually, however, VRS units directly entered the village and began a
house-to-house clearance of the population, randomly killing some, burning homes, and
looting valuables. The “military age” males – 18 to 60 years old – were separated from the
women, children, and elderly men. Often these prisoners were killed, but in most cases they
appear to have been shipped off to camps, primarily Omarska, Keraterm, and Manjaca. The
women and children were sent separately to the camp at Trnopolje or bused to the
frontlines near Bosnian Government-controlled territory in the Bihac enclave or Travnik.
Finally, the homes still standing were burned, bulldozed, or dynamited.
These terse descriptions and the earlier accounts of “actions” and “operations” give
little indication of the brutality and horror that usually accompanied a VRS descent on a
Muslim or Croat village. The following description, based on the account of a 62-year old
Muslim survivor, provides a more vivid description of these “actions”:
At about 15:00 hours on 30 May 1992, a large force of ethnic Serb ... soldiers
entered the village of Prhovo, located about 7 kilometers northeast of the district
centre of Kljuc. The village contained 45 houses grouped along a main road and several
small streets, and had more than 150 inhabitants.
The soldiers, who wore stocking masks over their faces, went from house to
house searching for weapons. After finding some weapons, the soldiers proceeded to
ransack the homes, break windows and doors, and pull the residents out into the
streets. These men, women, and children were ordered to fold their hands behind their
heads and were herded through the village to a point on the road where they were
stopped and lined up.
Meanwhile, the soldiers attempted to coax back into the village those residents
who had run into the woods when the soldiers arrived. The soldiers announced through
megaphones that the residents would not be harmed if they returned.
The assembled villagers were then told they were free and that they need not
worry anymore, and they were ordered to place white flags on their homes to indicate
the village had surrendered. That night and the next, some people fled to the woods,
and others slept in their cellars.
At about 18:00 hours on 1 June, the soldiers returned and again used
megaphones to call people in from the forest. They also went from house to house and
pulled people into the streets. The male residents were beaten severely. At about 19:00
hours, the soldiers began murdering the residents with automatic weapons. The
residents were heard pleading for their lives and then the first shots were heard in
various spots around the village. After a time the single shots were replaced by long
bursts of automatic gun fire. The soldiers were heard cursing and taunting their victims
as they killed them.

374
 After the shooting stopped and the soldiers had departed, one Muslim man who
had fled to the woods when the shooting started returned to the village. The murdered
men, women, and children lay in the streets. Houses were burning and their roofs were
collapsing down into them. Some women and children who had hidden in basements
began to come out into the street crying and looking for their loved ones.
At least 53 people were dead.

Last Acts, July 1992

A few of the people who survived such attacks and escaped into the sprawling
forests and mountains of the Majdanska Planina mountain and forest area between Prijedor
and Sanski Most would band together in groups for survival. A number of these bands were
armed, and some remnants of the self-defence groups, including the survivors of the attack
on Prijedor, began operating as guerrillas. They attacked a number of VRS patrols in the area
and did what they could to help the surviving Muslim population.
The VRS appears to have viewed incidents like these as the last major threat to its
control over the area and mounted a major operation around 20 July to eliminate these
survivors and clear villages and towns that were as yet “un-cleansed”.961 The plan called for
most of the 5th Partisan Brigade, under Major Pero Colic, reinforced by at least one
battalion of the 43rd Motorized Brigade, to sweep south from Prijedor toward Stara Rijeka.
Near there, Colic’s troops would link up with units of the 6th Partisan Brigade moving north
from Sanski Most through Stari Majdan. The operation appears to have gone more or less as
planned. The VRS units destroyed a number of villages, expelling the population or killing
them, while dispersing most of the wandering guerrillas and survivors. It was the last major
ethnic cleansing operation by the VRS in the region, after which the 1st Krajina Corps began
transferring the remaining combat formations to key battlefronts further east, indicating
that the VRS believed that the “threat” had been virtually eliminated and that the few
remaining armed Muslims could be contained by the police.962

Final Analysis
The Bosnian Serb Army undertook these ethnic cleansing operations because it
believed the Muslim population posed an armed threat or could act as a “Fifth Column”

961
It is unclear who was in overall command of the operation. Lieutenant Colonel Zeljaja moved to the
Posavina corridor on 26 June, taking command of the newly formed Tactical Group 4, which comprised the
headquarters and major combat elements of the 43rd Motorized Brigade. Zeljaja served as commander of
Tactical Group and 43rd Motorized Brigade for much of the war. He later took command of the “Prijedor”
Operational Group 10, formed in late summer 1995 to control 1st Krajina Corps troops defending Western
Bosnia against the joint Croat-Muslim offensive that ended the war.
962
Krajiski Vojnik claimed that the Serbs did not completely eliminate the threat until November 1993. This
almost certainly is a reference to the capture by MUP Special Police troops of a small group of Muslim men
who were hiding in the forests near Sanski Most. See AP Photos by Radivoje Pavicic from 11 November
1993, which depict a series of males clothed in civilian dress surrounded by Special Police.

375
during the war with the Bosnian Government. The VRS focus on seizing weapons from the
population and on detaining military-age males supports this analysis. That the Bosnian
Serbs’ paranoia greatly exaggerated this supposed threat does not mean that the VRS did
not believe it. The few armed Muslim groups that managed to form and survive the Serb
assaults and make sporadic guerrilla attacks on VRS and MUP forces in the region inflamed
this paranoia still further.963
In addition to their nominal military objectives, the Serbs’ removal of the Muslims
and Croats from the area solidified their political control over the region and moved the
Serb Republic that much closer to its war aim of an ethnically pure state. The SDA’s control
over the Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc municipalities prior to the war had greatly worried
the SDS leadership.
Together with photographs of the MUP and VRS camps to which many of the
civilians were sent, reporting of the VRS military actions in the region during the spring and
summer of 1992 have become some of the most lasting images of the war in Bosnia.
To many, reports of soldiers singling out one ethnic group for death, torture, and
expulsion, combined with startling photographs of living skeletons at Omarska, resurrected
memories of the Nazi Holocaust. While it may have served the Bosnian Serbs’ immediate
political and military objectives, the campaign blackened the pages of Serbian history. Taken
together with similar operations conducted in the Drina valley, it served to destroy any
sympathy the Bosnian Serbs might have hoped to gain from the international community,
while creating a thirst for revenge among the Muslim people. The Serbs may have sown the
seeds for the next war at Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc.

963
Many Western journalists have viewed the VRS soldiers and Serbian volunteer troops involved in the
massacres and cleansing operations as cowards who were willing to kill innocent men, women, and
children, but were unwilling to stand up and fight armed soldiers in battle. The battle records of the three
brigades most heavily involved in the ethnic cleansing operations – the 5th Partisan (later 5th Kozara Light),
6th Partisan (later 6th Sanska Infantry), and 43rd Motorized – do not bear out the latter charge. The VRS
used all three, although primarily the 43rd and 6th, as fire brigades throughout the war, shifting them from
sector to sector. In addition, all three appear to have performed adequately during the Croatian War. If the
soldiers in these units had a reputation for ineffectiveness in battle, it is unlikely that the 1st Krajina Corps
would have relied so heavily on them throughout the conflict.

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 Annex 28
The Battle for the Corridor: Operations in the Posavina,
March 1992 to January 1993
Opening Clashes, 24 February to 1 April 1992964 965
The clashes in the Bosanski Brod area were the spark for the fighting that would
consume Posavina during 1992.966 The chain of events began on 24 February, when the local
SDS in Bosanski Brod declared the formation of a Serb municipality supplanting the old one.
Five days later the Serbs put up barricades in the town,967 and on 3 March the Serb TO
engaged local Croat and Muslim police and armed civilian opponents of the new order. The
Croats and Muslims quickly banded together and formed a joint headquarters. One of the
key Muslim organizers was a journalist named Armin Pohara. He later stated that:
The first day of the attack on Brod, about 200 shells fell on the city. The Croats
already had a crisis command centre in the HDZ, and the Muslims formed their own
within the Muslim group. I led the Muslims and the Croats were headed by Iran Brizic ...
We established a joint crisis command centre in which they elected him chairman and
me deputy.968
Pohara told Silber and Little that he went to Bosanski Brod’s twin city, Slavonski
Brod, in Croatia, to ask for more weapons from the HV.969 Neither side was able to take over
the city, and the fighting died down for a while before breaking out more fiercely about ten
days later. The JNA deployed most of the 327th Motorized Brigade from nearby Derventa to
the area, nominally to help keep the peace; as the fighting spread, however, the JNA began
focusing on the Croat-led forces. By late March it was dealing with armed clashes in
Derventa itself. Then, toward the beginning of April, the apparent deployment of regular

964
For a description of the military geography of the Posavina, see Appendix 1.
965
The following narrative and analysis has a Serbo-centric focus because of the strategic importance of the
Posavina Corridor to the creation and survival of Republika Srpska. The Bosnian Serb Army has published a
substantial amount of information on its operations in the corridor, making it far easier to tell the Serb side
of the military story than that of the Croatians, who, for obvious reasons (they lost), have provided far less
public information on their version of events. The Bosnian Serb military journals Krajiski Vojnik and Srpska
Vojska contain many detailed articles on the corridor that describe unit dispositions, the battles, and
commanders. The comparable Croatian military publications, Hrvatski Vojnik and Velebit usually mention in
passing that a unit fought in the “Sava Basin” in 1992, or, more rarely, will admit to having been in
“Bosanska Posavina”; beyond general locational statements, however, no narrative detail is provided on
combat operations. The last HV commander in Posavina, General Stipetic, is still an active duty officer and
has not published his memoirs, unlike the Croatian Army commander in Herzegovina and the Dalmatian
coast, General Bobetko.
966
Most of this section, as with much of the combat narrative in this study, is drawn from contemporary
Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio, Zagreb Radio, and Sarajevo Radio reporting.
967
Paris AFP 29 February 1992; Sanja Modric: The Good and Bad of the Land of Mystery, Split Slobodna
Dalmacija, 27 July 1992, pp. 8-9; an interview with Armin Pohara.
968
Sanja Modric: The Good and Bad of the Land of Mystery, Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 July 1992, pp. 8-9; an
interview with Armin Pohara. Both Muslims and Croats joined the newly forming HVO brigade, in contrast
to many other areas of Bosnia in which Muslims joined the TO and Croats the HVO.
969
Silber and Little, pp. 220-221.

377
Croatian Army troops into the Bosanski Brod area signalled a change that was to shift the
balance to the Croats and the Muslims.

Croats Advance in the Centre, Serbs Hold the Flanks, 1 April to 1 June 1992
In early April Zagreb moved its forces in to consolidate the Croat hold over Bosanski
Brod town and expand their control to the rest of the municipality, as well as Derventa.
Reinforcing the two newly organized HVO brigades with at least one HV brigade, the
Croatians mounted a total force numbering some 4.000 to 5.000 troops.970 They faced JNA
and Serb TO units, comprising 3.000 personnel in the under-strength JNA 327th Motorized
Brigade, an armoured battalion, and two to three battalion-sized TO brigades. On 4-5 April,
HV/HVO forces broke out of their bridgehead, apparently finding a weak point in the
JNA/TO line southwest of Brod, and pushing about 10 kilometers toward Derventa.971 Heavy
fighting continued over the next two weeks as Croat forces continued to edge closer to
Derventa, while HVO units around the town itself fought the Serbs for control. By 22 April,
HV/HVO forces occupied most of Derventa, while JNA and Serb forces hung on at the
outskirts of town to the southwest.
By the beginning of May, the HV appeared ready to inject additional troops into the
battle to expand Croat territorial holdings and sever the east-west road at the town of
Modrica.972 Although they had lost Derventa, JNA and Serb TO units still held positions some

970
The two HVO brigades, 101st Bosanski Brod and 103rd Derventa, appear to have been organized in mid-
March. The HV brigade was the 108th Slavonski Brod from across the river, probably with a battalion of the
3rd Guards Brigade attached.
971
The disposition of JNA and Serb TO forces around Bosanski Brod as of 7 April is given below, based on JNA
Second Military District documents in Cekic, pp. 135-136.
Bosanski Brod TO Brigade – eastern part of Bosanski Brod – area of Greda feature
Lijesce Brigade in the area of Lijesce
1st Battalion / 327th Motorised Brigade with 1st TO Brigade vic Kobile Gornje village and movement of
the column on the communication with Paraslica village
Tank Company / 327th Motorised Brigade in the area of Nareci village
2nd Armored Battalion / 336th Motorised Brigade in area of Unka village
3rd Battalion / 327th Motorised Brigade in area of Zboriste village, Bosanski Luzani village, with
movement of the column toward the Ukrina River
Prnjavor TO Battalion and Trstenica TO Company in the area of Kalacka Village, Pavlovo brdo, with the
movement of the column along the road
Antitank element of 1st Battery / 1st Battalion/ 17th Mixed AT Artillery Regiment in area of Bjelas
village
MRL battery / 17th Mixed AT Artillery Regiment deployed vic Polje village (elevation 199)
Battery of Howitzer Artillery Battalion / 336th Motorised Brigade area of Sekici village
4th Battalion / 327th Motorised Brigade in area of Glovoca village
HO, 327th Motorised Brigade in Derventa
2nd Battalion / 497th Engineer Regiment in area of Betnja Mala and Polje villages
Command Post of 1st Operational Group / 17th Corps in area of Podnovlje village (Hill 179)
972
It is unclear who the operational-level HV commander was at this time, although it possibly was the 1st
Osijek Operational Zone commander, Major General Josip Lucic, and his successor (from 20 June), Brigadier
Vinko Vrbanac, or more likely the commander of the Posavina Operational Group, Brigadier Vinko Stefanek,
headquartered in Slavonski Brod. General Petar Stipetic, then deputy chief of the HV Main Staff, does not
appear to have taken command of what was to be called the “Slavonian Battlefield” until probably mid-

378
five kilometers southeast of Brod itself, while controlling the key town of Modrica and
positions near Odzak. To carry out the attack, the HV sent most of the elite 3rd Guards
Brigade to Bosanski Brod, while a composite tactical group, including a battalion from 2nd
Guards Brigade, was sent to positions near Odzak – a total of about 2.000 to 3.000
additional troops. Two HVO brigades – possibly another 3.000 to 4.000 troops – were also
organized near the town of Odzak.973 By 13 May the joint HV/HVO force had defeated JNA
and TO forces near Bosanski Brod, rolling some units back 10 to 15 kilometers into a pocket
near the village of Podnovlje on the Bosna River, while others fell back to positions just
south of Derventa. HVO and TO troops then seized the key town of Kotorsko/Johovac on the
main Doboj-Derventa road, completely cutting off the pocket at Podnovlje and severing the
corridor. Croat troops also captured Modrica, cutting the corridor again at a major road
junction and linking up with the 107th HVO Brigade at Gradacac.
Despite these HV/HVO (and TO) gains, JNA and Serb forces had not been routed
and were able to consolidate the gains they had made at key road junctions – Brcko,
Bosanski Samac-Pelagicevo, and Doboj. A force combining Arkan’s SDG “Tigers”, Serb TO,
volunteer, and MUP troops – apparently with little or no JNA assistance – had captured the
important Sava river port of Brcko during early May. Poor organization and a lack of
discipline, however, allowed the troops to break ranks and plunder the town, and the Serbs
were unable to push beyond the Brcko suburbs, leaving the corridor only about three
kilometers wide.974 Earlier, on 17 April, the JNA Tactical Group-17 and TO units had seized
the town of Bosanski Samac on the Sava River and the key roads between Modrica,
Pelagicevo, and Brcko.975 (The JNA and TO had also occupied Modrica on 11 April, but as
discussed above, Croat forces retook the town on 13 May.) A little later, on 3 May, they took
control of the important road and rail junction of Doboj, although TO and HVO troops
remained only two kilometers to the south and west of town. The hold on Doboj, along with
the positions the JNA had maintained just outside Derventa, were to become vital to the

July. An early 1996 Zagreb Globus article implies that Stipetic was the HV commander in Posavina at least
as early as mid-June. Davor Butkovic: President Tudjman Begins Major Purge of Top Officers In Croatian
Armed Forces: Generals Antun Tus, Franjo Feldi, Petar Stipetic, Vinko Vrbanec, and Many Others Are
Leaving!, Zagreb Globus, 19 January 1996, pp. 5-6. However, Stipetic was still fulfilling his Main Staff duties
as late as 25 June when he met in Karlovac with UNPROFOR deputy commander General Morillon. It seems
likely that Stipetic was appointed after the loss of Modrica and Odzak in late June and mid-July.
973
The 102nd Odzak and 105th Modrica Brigades.
974
During a 1995 interview, then Major General Momir Zec, who in 1992 was a JNA lieutenant colonel in the
Tuzla area, stated that:
Greediness hindered us ... Even now I claim that if we had not plundered Brcko, we would have
had a wider ‘corridor’, because the Muslims would have been driven past Majevica.
M. Solaja and R. Vujetovic: The Army Is To Order, Not Convince, Krajiski Vojnik, August 1995, pp. 23-25; an
interview with Major General Momir Zec.
975
The exact composition of TG-17 is unknown. It obviously was formed from 17th Corps units, the best
candidates being elements of the 17th Partisan Brigade and the 395th Motorized Brigade.
17th Corps Daily Operational Report, 18 April 1992, cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia
Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 109.

379
VRS’s ability to move reinforcements into striking position for a major counteroffensive to
reopen the corridor.

VRS Preliminary Offensive Operations at Doboj- Derventa,

1 June to 24 June 1992976

976
In addition to contemporary press reporting, the narrative in this and the following sections on VRS 1st
Krajina Corps preliminary operations, Operation “Corridor 92” itself, and the follow-on operations in
November and December draws primarily on the following articles from Bosnian Serb military journals and
civilian periodicals:
• Who’s Who in Krajina, Belgrade Vreme, 25 October 1993; describes career of Major General Mile
Novakovic, commander (as a colonel) of VRS Tactical Group 2 during Operation “Corridor 92”.
• Jovanka Simic: Intrigues Because of Politics, Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 15 October 1993, p. 2; an
interview with Mile Novakovic.
• Anniversary of the Capture of Brod, Televizija Banja Luka, 7 October 1997; includes statements by
Major General Slavko Lisica on the capture of Brod.
• Ljubomir Grubic: Pulling Down the Pants, Belgrade Nin, 23 July 1993, pp. 12-14; an interview with
Slavko Lisica.
• Radmila Zigic: The 1st Armored Brigade of the 1st Krajina Corps: Without A Battle Lost, Srpska Vojska,
15 July 1993, p. 11.
• M. Tosic, and R. Vujatovic: When Father and Electricity Come, Krajiski Vojnik, December 1995, pp. 7-
10; an interview with VRS soldier Mico Milovanovic, a member of the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade.
• Dusan Vrzina: The Best Unit of the 1st Krajina Corps: 1000 War Days of the 16th, Krajiski Vojnik, June
1994, pp. 15-16; a history of the VRS 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade.
• Milan Celeketic: Defence of Krajina, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 25; more on 16th Krajina Motorized
Brigade by its former commander.
• Radmila Zigic: 16th Krajina Brigade: Heroes of Flat Posavina, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, pp. 7-8.
• Statements by Major General Momir Talic, Commander of the 1st Krajina Corps: There Will
Nevertheless Not Be War, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 7-10.
• Operation Corridor: Road Paved with Lives, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 11-14; includes list of all VRS
brigades involved in the operation.
• Chronology of Events – Daily War Diary, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 16-17; war diary of 1st Krajina
Corps headquarters from 24 to 28 June 1992.
• Nenad Cvjetkovic: Anniversary of Liberation of Serbian Posavina marked on Trebava: More Than
Victory, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 26; article on 1st Krajina Corps tactical groups in Posavina.
• Posavina Front: Zek’s Unfinished Story, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 36; interview with Colonel
Radmilo Zeljaja, commander of Tactical Group 4 and 43rd Motorized Brigade.
• Dusan Vrzina: The Weapons Awoke: Sketch for a Monograph: The Brcko Battlefield, Krajiski Vojnik,
June 1996, p. 20; narrative of successful 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade attack west of Brcko in
December 1992.
• The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29; article
on history of VRS 1st Armored Brigade, includes war diary excerpts.
• Colonel Miko Skoric: From Victory to Victory, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 38-39; biographic
information on Colonel (then Major) Miko Skoric, who commanded a battalion in the 2nd Armored
Brigade and the 1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade during the corridor battles.
• Commander Trivo, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 40-41; article describing Colonel Trivun Vujic,
commander of 27th Derventa Motorized Brigade, who was killed in action near Derventa on 30 June
1992.
• Slavisa Sabljic: Lest We Forget – The Government’s Battle Steel Against Steel, Srpska Vojska, June
1996, p. 24; interviews with soldiers in the VRS 1st Armored Brigade.
• M. Tosic: The Majority of the Glorious Ones – Tank Units, Krajiski Vojnik, August 1995, p. 34; article
describing history of VRS 2nd Armored Brigade.

380
• Two Years Since Completion of ‘Operation Corridor’: The Krajinas Have Breathed Deeply of Freedom,
Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, pp. 30-37.
• Zivko Ecim: A Bomb in the Heart, A Sight in the Eye, Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984; an
interview with then Colonel Pero Colic, commander of the 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade.
• Zivko Ecim: We Know Our Goal, Kozarski Vjesnik, 20 May 1994; interview with Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja.
• Mico Glamocanin: Without a Battle Lost, Kozarski Vjesnik, 26 August 1994; history of 2nd Motorized
and 4th Motorized Battalions / 43rd Motorized Brigade.
• Mile Mutic: The Brigade of a Long and Honorable Warpath: The Warpath of the 5th Kozara’s Brigade,
Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984; history of the 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade, it appears to
be based on the brigade war diary or include excerpts from it.
• Zivko Ecim: The Year of Successful Actions, Kozarski Vjesnik, 25 June 1993; a history of the 6th (Ljubija)
Battalion / 43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade.
• M. Jovicevic: Rescuing Industrial Installations, Belgrade Vojska, 24 December 1992, p. 22; an article on
a special unit formed within the 27th Derventa Motorized Brigade to secure key infrastructure in
Derventa during its recapture.
• Mark Rucnov: Among Fighters From Majevica: Panthers, Belgrade Vojska, 4 April 1993, pp. 6-7; an
article on the VRS Special Brigade “Panthers” / East Bosnian Corps [later the 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry
Brigade].
• Multiple issues of the newsletter for the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade (AKA 6th Krajina Light Infantry
Brigade or 6th Partisan Brigade), Ratni Bilten (War Bulletin), describing actions of brigade sub-units in
1992.
In addition, the following articles from Croatian military journals and Croatian and Bosnian Muslim
periodicals provide some detail on the 1992 operations:
• A. Prlenda: A Small But Modern Army, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 4 October 1996, p. 4; HVO chief of staff
Major General Zivko Budimir, who commanded an HV tactical group in Posavina in 1992, notes the
difficult fighting in Derventa and Brod.
• Edhem Ekmescic: We Have to Have A Strong Army Because It Is the Guarantee Of Our Return Home!,
Travnik Bosnjak, 2 January 1996, pp. 12-13; an interview with Major Ibrahim Salihovic, commander of
the Bosnian Army 211th Liberation Brigade in 1995; he fought in 1992 in the 21st Srebrenik Brigade
near Brcko and in the corridor, including attacks that successfully severed the Serb supply route.
• Mirudin Aldobasic: The Doboj ‘Golden Lily’, Doboj Bosanski Reporter, January 1996, p. 3; article on
Bosnian Muslim soldiers from Doboj.
• Muhamed Cabric: Reviewing the Forces of Decisiveness, Doboj Bosanski Reporter, January 1996, pp. 4-
5.
• Is A Battle for the Corridor Imminent, Zagreb Vjesnik, 10 May 1994, p. 7; includes HVO casualty
statistics for Posavina.
• Interview with General Anton Tus, Chief of the HV Main Staff, Zagreb HTV, 21 August 1992; Tus admits
HV forces are in Bosnia, claiming the HV is needed there to protect the Croatian border.
• Marko Barisic: Wartime Strategy: Doboj Has Still Not Fallen, Zagreb Danas, 2 June 1992, p. 27; details
the military situation around Doboj as of late May 1992.
• Sanja Modric: The Good and Bad of the Land of Mystery, Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 July 1992, pp. 8-
9; an interview with Armin Pohara.
• Gordan Radosevic: Slavonia, Who Did Not Love You..., Zagreb Velebit, 9 May 1997, pp. 16-17; article
on the 3rd Guards Brigade.
• Gordan Lausic: With Vukovar In Their Hearts, Hrvatski Vojnik, 8 October 1993, pp. 28-29; article on
124th Vukovar Brigade elements deployed along the Sava.
• Gordan Radosevic: Bite of the Cobras, Hrvatski Vojnik, 17 June 1994, pp. 17-19; article on the 3rd
(Slavonski Brod) Battalion / 3rd Guards Brigade.
• Gordan Radosevic and Zeljko Stipanovic: Wolves from the Drava, Zagreb Velebit, 31 January 1997, pp.
18-19; article on 107th Valpovo Brigade and a tactical group formed in 1992 under Major Zivko
Budimir.
• Anto Pranjkic: Wolves from the Drava, Zagreb Velebit, March 1996, p. 15; as above.
• Vesna Puljak: Up To Their Task, Zagreb Velebit, 10 January 1997, pp. 12-13; article on 70th MP
Battalion.

381
 The only VRS force that could potentially reopen the corridor was the 1st Krajina
Corps – the former JNA 5th (Banja Luka) Corps – but most of its best units were still tied
down in Western Slavonia or reorganizing after withdrawing from the region. In order to
better understand the situation and prepare plans for a counter-strike, Major General
Momir Talic, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, sent a planning group, headed by his chief
of staff, Colonel Bosko Kelecevic, to the Derventa-Doboj area at the beginning of June.
Kelecevic’s mission was to coordinate with VRS commanders on the ground, determine
where the critical sectors were, and prepare for the redeployment of 1st Krajina Corps units
from Western Slavonia and Banja Luka.
Meanwhile, VRS commanders in Doboj organized the remnants of JNA 17th (Tuzla)
Corps units in the Doboj-Derventa area into a new operational group, “Operational Group

• Neven Miladin: Security Through Experience and Training, Zagreb Velebit, 3 January 1997, pp. 14-15;
article on the 5th Rijeka Operational Zone, the current Fifth (Pazin) Corps District, which mentions
that the 111th Rijeka Brigade was ordered to “Bosanska Posavina” in early 1992.
• Gordan Radosevic: Thundering Slavonian Artillerymen, Zagreb Velebit, 27 December 1996, p. 13;
article on the 2nd Mixed Artillery Battalion.
• Vesna Puljak: They Passed the Test in Sunja, Zagreb Velebit, 22 March 1996, p. 15; article on the 103rd
Zagora Brigade.
• Neven Miladin: Proven Military Skill, Zagreb Velebit, 8 March 1996, pp. 14-15; article on the 3rd
Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade.
• Neven Miladin: The Strength of the Black Mambas, Zagreb Velebit, 26 January 1996, pp. 16-17; article
on the 1st Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade, which had elements assigned to “Bosanska Posavina” in
1992.
• Neven Miladin: Proven Throughout All of Croatia, Zagreb Velebit, 26 January 1996, p. 14; article on the
145th Zagreb-Dubrava Brigade.
• Neven Miladin: Where It Was Needed Most, Zagreb Velebit, 8 December 1995, p. 15; article on the
137th Duga Resa Brigade.
• Gordan Radosevic and Anto Pranjkic: The Pride of Slavonski Brod, Zagreb Velebit, 7 July 1995, p. 11;
article on the 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade.
• Vesna Puljak: Always Advancing – Without Retreating, Hrvatski Vojnik, 7 May 1993, pp. 14-15; article
on the 153rd Velika Gorica Brigade.
• Vesna Puljak: Crnomerec is Defending Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 22 October 1993, p. 15; article on the
150th Zagreb-Crnomerec Brigade.
• Branko Bolfek: Everything Passes, But Not the Mountaineers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 13 August 1993, p. 19;
article on the 103rd Zagora Brigade.
• Dubravko Grakalic: Dismissal of General of the Corps Zvonimir Cervenko is Preparation for Departure
of Minister of Defense Gojko Susak in 1997!, Zagreb Globus, 15 November 1996, p. 11; article
discusses current HV Main Staff chief, General Pavao Miljevac, and his command of the 137th Duga
Resa Brigade in Bosnia in 1992. Also notes that Stipetic was the overall commander.
• Tudjman Carries Out Reshuffle of Military Echelons, Zagreb Radio, 5 December 1992; this includes the
relief of Major General Petar Stipetic as commander of the “Slavonian Battlefield” (Slavonsko Bojiste),
and his appointment as commander of the Zagreb Corps District. The HV often used the term
“Battlefield” to denote a senior command, which was essentially the equivalent of a separate, ad hoc
corps headquarters reporting directly to the Main Staff. General Bobetko’s Southern Battlefield or
Southern Front (Juzno Bojiste) was the equivalent headquarters in southern Dalmatia and
Herzegovina.
• Mladen Pavkovic: Zemlja Rata Zlata: Fotografije, Zagreb Meditor, 1995; a book of photographs,
almost exclusively of HV troops in Bosnian Posavina during 1992; focus on 117th Koprivnica Brigade
soldiers around Bosanski Brod.
President Franjo Tudjman, News Conference, Zagreb Radio, 1 December 1995; Tudjman states that HV
troops were sent to defend Bosnian Posavina in 1992 (although he claims they did not arrive until the fall).

382
Doboj”, under the command of Colonel Radivoje Simic. In addition to holding its current
positions near Derventa and Doboj, Simic’s forces hoped to break through to the VRS-held
pocket clustered around the village of Podnovlje and the Trebava region, some 10 to 20
kilometers northeast of Doboj. As a result, on 8-9 June, OG “Doboj” units, led by the 1st
Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade, attacked north from the Doboj area toward the key Croat-held
road junction of Kotorsko-Johovac, through which passed the main road to Derventa and
Podnovlje. Over three to four days of heavy fighting VRS troops managed to push into the
villages, but were unable to take full control of them.
By 14 June, the 1st Krajina Corps had taken over command of the operation, and
had began moving elements of several brigades – reinforced by a brigade of Krajina Serb
Special Police units – into the area, forming two tactical groups to continue the attack.977
The corps, however, switched the main effort to the left. Tactical Group 1, under
Colonel Novica Simic, with 3.000 to 4.000 troops in the main attack sector, was to push
along the main road toward Derventa, recovering this key artery.978 The advance, if
successful, would also place VRS troops in better jumping-off positions for an attempt to
recapture Derventa, while flanking the defences at Kotorsko. Covering TG-1’s right flank
977
These so-called Special Police almost certainly were elements of the new “Special Police” brigades that the
JNA had helped organize in the RSK as it withdrew in early 1992. These units were different from the
traditional MUP “Special Police”, which were primarily elite special operations units. The brigades were
organized along the lines of a JNA motorized brigade; the “police” appellation was simply a cover for a
military force in being when the Krajina Serb TO and remaining ex- JNA units were demobilized and their
equipment stored. One of these brigades appears to have been formed for each UN Protected Area, except
possibly Sector West. The key role (he later served as commander of the Special Units of the RSK MUP) that
ex-JNA Colonel Mile Novakovic played in these units further emphasized this fact. Cekic outlines the basic
structure of one of these brigades, based on a 25 April JNA document outlining a request from the Krajina
Serb TO Kordun Operational Zone complete the organization of its Special Police Brigade. This request
included the following equipment:
426 pcs of 7.62mm pistols
3900 pcs of automatic rifles
116 pcs of M-57 rocket propelled grenade launchers
93 pcs of M-84 7.62mm general purpose machine guns
7 pcs of recoilless rifles
32 pcs of 9K11 (AT-3) antitank missile launchers
10 pcs of 120 mm mortars
12 pcs of M-42 ZIS-3 76 mm antitank guns
18 pcs of M-2 or M-56 105 mm howitzers
24 pcs of M-75 20mm air defense artillery pieces
10 pcs of M-55 20mm air defense artillery pieces
13 pcs of S-2M (SA-7) man-portable surface-to-air missiles
Cekic, p. 112.
978
The headquarters of 1st Armored Brigade formed the command of Tactical Group 1, under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Novica Simic, the brigade chief of staff. The main units in the tactical group were the
reinforced 3rd Battalion / 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, a battle group (battalion task force) from 1st
Armored Brigade, one to two battalions from the newly formed 2nd Armored Brigade, the 1st Battalion /
6th Sanska Infantry Brigade, the 1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade, the “Wolves of Vucijak” assault
detachment (a former JNA volunteer unit), the 1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade, and the crack 1st Military
Police Battalion. These forces probably were equipped with about 60 tanks and at least 18 field artillery
pieces over 100mm. In addition, another 1.000 troops from the 1st Osinja Light Infantry Brigade held a
more static sector on TG-1’s far left flank over to positions 10 kilometers south of Derventa, where it linked
up with the 27th Motorized Brigade.

383
along the left bank of the Bosna River, RSK Special Police (and ex-JNA) Colonel Mile
Novakovic’s Tactical Group 2, with some 3.000 to 4.000 troops, was to make a direct assault
on the Croat line at Kotorsko in order to link up with the forces cut off in Podnovlje.979
Fighter-bombers and light attack helicopters from the 92nd Mixed Aviation Brigade were to
provide air support. HV/HVO forces in the main sectors probably numbered 2.500 to 3.500
troops from the HV 3rd Guards Brigade, and the HVO 101st Bosanski Brod Brigade, and
roughly a battalion of Muslim TO troops.980
TG-1 forces, led by elements of 1st Armoured and 16th Krajina Motorized Brigades,
were able to break Croat lines west of Kotorsko-Johovac. On 18 June elements of TG-1’s 2nd
Armoured Brigade took the key hill of Cer, some five kilometers to the northwest, while
16th Motorized units advanced parallel to the 2nd Armoured on the important Highway 17
to Derventa. By 20 June, however, the advancing TG-1 had stalled along the Plehan-
Tomasevo Brdo line, some seven kilometers southeast of Derventa, after having pushed
forward another two kilometers. Meanwhile, elements of TG-1 and TG-2 advanced through
Kotorsko, linking up with Podnovlje and eliminating the remaining Croat-Muslim forces on
both sides of the Bosna River.

Operation “Corridor 92”, 24 June to 6 October 1992

Forming the Corridor, 24 to 28 June 1992.

At this interlude, General Talic decided to launch the 1st Krajina Corps’s main effort
– Operation “Corridor 92” – to reopen the supply route to the rest of the RS and the FRY.
(Civilian and military supply shortages in the western RS and the RSK. particularly medical
supplies, apparently had become critical.) The preliminary operations had provided the
corps with a sufficiently large base of operations to ensure that its spearheads would not be
cut off. On 21 June the corps began redeploying TG-1 and TG-2 into their attack sectors
while shifting the corps forward command post to Duga Njiva hill in Trebava. TG-1 turned
over its positions southeast of Derventa to the newly formed Tactical Group 3, moving south
through Kotorsko and then east through the previously cut-off Trebava area to positions
near the village of Donji Skugric, some seven kilometers southeast of Modrica. It still
numbered about 4.000 to 5.000 troops, although with a slightly different composition.981 It

979
979 The headquarters of the RSK Special Police formed the command of Tactical Group 2. Its main units
comprised an RSK Special Police Brigade, the 1st Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Trebava Light
Infantry Brigade, with some armor support from a company or two of 1st Armored Brigade. TG-2 probably
was equipped with 10 to 20 tanks and at least 18 field artillery pieces over 100mm.
980
Another 1.500 to 2.000 troops from the HVO 103rd Derventa Brigade covered the Croat’ right hand sector
opposite the 1st Osinja and elements of the 27th Derventa. The HV 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade probably
provided additional support in this sector. One to two battalions of HV artillery and multiple rocket
launchers – some 18 to 36 guns and 8 to 12 MRLs were in support.
981
TG-1 still included the 3rd Battalion / 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, a battle group from the the 2nd
Armored Battalion / 1st Armored Brigade, the 1st Battalion / 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade, the 1st Prnjavor
Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Laktasi Light Infantry Brigade, the “Wolves of Vucijak” assault detachment,
and the 1st Military Police Battalion. It picked up a battalion or two from the 1st Trebava Light Infantry

384
was assigned the primary mission of opening the corridor and seizing Modrica: General Talic
gave Colonel Simic four days to achieve the objective. TG-2, after absorbing the forces that
had been cut off in Podnovlje, shifted its assault units along the left (or northern) bank of
the Bosna River to positions some 12 kilometers southwest of Odzak. It now had some 5.000
troops, although at least 1.000 of these were tied down guarding its flanks and would not
attack.982 Its mission was to attack toward Odzak, along TG-1’s left flank, and attempt to
seize the town. Elements of the VRS 2nd Posavina Light Infantry Brigade / East Bosnian
Corps were deployed on the opposite side of the corridor, ready to link up with TG-1.
Topping off the preparations, while redeploying its combat forces the 1st Krajina Corps
implemented a deception plan employing civilian radio transmissions and intentionally
unencrypted communications traffic to convince the Croats that the VRS intended to make
its main advance toward Tuzla.983
HV/HVO forces at Odzak-Modrica-Gradacac numbered about 7.000 to 8.000 troops,
although some of these forces also faced VRS East Bosnian Corps troops to the east, In the
main sector, south of Modrica, the HVO 105th Modrica Brigade and elements of the HVO
107th Gradacac Brigade faced Tactical Group 1 and the 2nd Posavina Brigade troops. They
held the five-kilometre-wide gap between the VRS 1st Krajina and East Bosnian Corps that
divided the RS. The gap marked a distinct change in the terrain, which shift abruptly from
the Trebava hills and mountains to open plains. On the left or northern bank of the Bosna,
west of Odzak, an HV tactical group, including the elite 3rd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade,
held strong defensive positions in more difficult terrain, including the key Debar Kula
narrows which guarded the main road into Odzak. The HVO 102nd Odzak Brigade may have
reinforced these HV troops, but most of the brigade probably held the front northeast of
Odzak, facing VRS 2nd Posavina Brigade forces.
The VRS artillery preparation, utilizing field artillery, mortars, and direct fire from
tank and antitank guns, began at 06:30 on 24 June, targeting enemy forward defensive

Brigade, which had been holding the sectors opposite Modrica and Gradacac. It now probably had about 30
tanks and at least 18 field artillery pieces over 100 mm.
982
TG-2 now included the RSK Special Police brigade, one to two companies of the 1st Armored Brigade, a
battalion of the 27th Motorized Brigade (which earlier had been cut-off in Podnovlje), the newly arrived
2nd Krajina Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade. The assault units comprised the RSK
Special Police, the armor, and probably the 2nd Krajina, and the battalion from the 27th Motorized. The 1st
Vucijak was tied down guarding the left flank, northwest of Podnovlje. The TG still probably had 10 to 20
tanks and 12 to 18 field artillery pieces over 100 mm.
983
The 1st Krajina Corps journal states:
Confusion was also being created in the enemy ranks by disinformation that a special team of
Serbian officers were releasing, according to plan, over the local radio stations, the press and
unprotected telegrams between our units. The enemy bit the hook and obtained the impression and
reached the firm conclusion that the main direction of the attack would be Doboj-Gracanica-
Smoluca-Tuzla.
Operation Corridor: Road Paved With Lives, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 11-14. Despite the Serb claim
that the Croats were deceived, there is no evidence either way that the HV/HVO believed the VRS attack
would be toward the south.

385
positions.984 A half hour later, the TG-1 and 2 launched their attack. The 1st Krajina Corps
war diary claims that the first day of the offensive was “characterized by a very low attack
tempo by all units due to poor knowledge of the terrain and the positions of enemy
forces”.985 The rapid redeployment of the tactical groups had forced the VRS units to
advance without having properly reconnoitred enemy defences or examined the ground
over which they were to attack. Nevertheless, TG-1, led by the 3rd Battalion / 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigade (supported by a tank company from 1st Armoured Brigade), was able to
break into HVO defences between Gradacac and Modrica, advancing about two to three
kilometers to seize the village of Gornji Kladari and approach Zivkovo Polje. The HVO 107th
Brigade, however, had set up a fire pocket at Zivkovo Polje and allowed the 3rd Battalion to
drive right into it, and then hit the unit from three sides. VRS artillery was able to lay down
covering fire and smoke that permitted the battalion to pull back to its start line after two
hours of fighting. TG- 1’s planners, probably in their haste to prepare the attack, had failed
to provide adequate protection on the right flank, giving the HVO the opportunity to set up
the ambush. Meanwhile, on the left flank along the Bosna River, more TG-1 units were able
to penetrate a kilometre toward Modrica, reaching the village of Kuznjaca, where a
minefield halted the attack. Units of the 2nd Posavina Brigade remained about two and a
half kilometers from TG-1’s forces.
To the north, the second prong of the offensive, Tactical Group 2 quickly ran into
stiff resistance. VRS units here faced troops from the HV 2nd Guards Brigade, who had
prepared excellent defensive positions backed by strong artillery fire. TG-2 was unable to
gain any ground, but reinforced its forward line.
During the night of 24-25 June the HVO attempted a counterattack against TG-1,
while shelling VRS supply roads. The counterattack withered under superior VRS firepower,
while Colonel Simic used the time to pull out the ambushed 3rd Battalion / 16th Motorized
and move it to cover the right flank. He replaced it as TG-1’s spearhead with the elite 1st
Military Police Battalion and the 1st Battalion / 1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade. When
the attack was renewed at daylight they retook Gornji Kladari, which the 16th had taken and
lost the previous day, while the units on the left flank pushed another kilometre toward
Modrica to reach the new HVO defence line at Tarevci and Donji Rijecani.
Across the Bosna, Colonel Novakovic’s Tactical Group 2 was able to punch through
the initial HV defence line, advancing up to two kilometers. The HV, however, was able re-
establish their defences and halt the VRS attack with strong artillery fire. As night fell, TG-2
consolidated its gains and reinforced its assault units. Meanwhile, southeast of Derventa,

984
The VRS 89th Rocket Artillery Brigade also fired two LUNA-M (FROG-7) surface-to-surface missiles at the
Croatian city of Slavonski Brod about two hours after the main attack started. The attack might have been
designed to divert HV attention from the ground offensive or to hit supply concentrations in the city.
985
Chronology of Events – Daily War Diary, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 16-17; war diary of 1st Krajina Corps
headquarters from 24 to 28 June 1992.

386
Colonel Slavko Lisica’s new Tactical Group 3 probed HV/HVO defences in preparation for a
renewed attack against the Plehan-Tomasevo Brdo line.986
On 26 June, Tactical Group 1 finally broke through the remaining HVO units,
penetrating six kilometers into their defences and linking up with the 2nd Posavina Brigade
troops in the village of Kornice. Units were also able to expand the breach on the flanks,
pushing to within two kilometers of Modrica from the south and moving toward Gradacac.
The “Little Corridor” (Mali Koridor) was now as wide as four kilometers, although it
narrowed to two kilometers near Modrica.
Tactical Group 1’s victory was not matched by Tactical Group 2, whose attack
stalled against strong HV resistance, particularly from intense artillery fire. The corps war
diary states that:
The defence had the advantage because of the height of its positions, the
narrows at Dobor Kula around which it was not possible to pass, and very well fortified
defence sectors, with a mass blockade by a minefield. By using the visibility of the
terrain skilfully, the enemy prevented our forces from breaking into an assault position
and from moving tanks closer for direct fire.987
Tactical Group 3 further to the west experienced similar difficulties, making little
gain around Plehan in the face of strong artillery and multiple rocket launcher fire.
The next day, Colonel Simic shifted his main force, together with 2nd Posavina
Brigade, toward the north against Modrica, still seeking to widen the corridor. VRS forces
were able to seize a chunk of the remaining HVO bridgehead south of the Bosna, leaving the
Croats stuck in a vulnerable 3km by 3km salient centred on Modrica, with their backs to the
Bosna. To the north, TG-2 was again unable to find a weakness in the Croat defences and
did not advance.
Modrica finally fell on 28 June – St. Vitus Day – when troops from Tactical Group 1,
led by the 2nd Armoured Battalion / 1st Armoured Brigade, occupied the town against little
resistance.988 The HVO 105th Modrica Brigade apparently withdrew following the VRS attack
the previous day, which had left it in an untenable position. The VRS had achieved its
primary objective according to schedule, and convoys to the western RS and the RSK could
now pass through the captured area. But their passage was limited to the hours of darkness
because HV/HVO defences on the north side of the Bosna were able to interdict the road
with artillery fire. The elimination of these forces was 1st Krajina Corps’s next objective.

986
Tactical Group-3 was formed from the headquarters of Colonel Lisica’s 2nd Armored Brigade. In addition to
that brigade, it consisted of the 1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Osinja Light Infantry Brigade, all
but one battalion of the 27th Derventa Motorized Brigade, and the 1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigade.
987
Chronology of Events – Daily War Diary, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 16-17; war diary of 1st Krajina Corps
headquarters from 24 to 28 June 1992.
988
Radmila Zigic: The 1st Armored Brigade of the 1st Krajina Corps: Without a Battle Lost, Srpska Vojska, 15
July 1993, p. 11.

387
 On to the Sava: The Capture of Odzak, Derventa, and the Drive to Brod, July 1992.

General Talic and his staff began preparing for the next advance as Modrica fell,
while the tactical groups began incorporating new units recently withdrawn from Western
Slavonia.989 The main effort would come in Tactical Group 2’s sector as it tried again to seize
the strong HV defensive positions west of Odzak and allow VRS forces to advance on the
Sava at Novi Grad. Tactical Group 1 was to assist in the attack on TG-2’s right flank.990 To the
west, Tactical Group 3 and the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade were to make a two-pronged
advance toward Bosanski Brod, with TG-3 directed to seize Derventa in a preliminary
operation. The 16th Motorized was also to cover TG-2’s left flank toward the Sava.
HV/HVO forces in both sectors appear to have consisted of more or less the same
formations that had faced the late June attacks. Against TG-1 and 2 the Croats fielded at
least one HV tactical group, possibly reinforced with an additional battalion or two, plus
most of two HVO brigades, the 102nd Odzak and the remnants of the 105th Modrica –
possibly totalling 5.000 to 6.000 troops. Opposite TG-3 and 16th Motorized Brigade, the
HV/HVO deployed the 3rd Guards Brigade, the 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade, probably an
additional HV tactical group (in the sector southeast of Bosanski Brod), and two HVO
brigades, the 101st Bosanski Brod and 103rd Derventa, probably with 9.000 to 10.000 men.
Although limited information on Croat planning is available, it was almost certainly focused
on staying on the defensive, holding key terrain on the approaches to the main towns and
the Sava River, and counterattacking when possible to restore lost positions.
Tactical Group 2 launched its attack on 5 July, making slow progress against HV
forces along the Jakes-Dobor Kula line. The VRS-RSK troops finally stormed the defences on
7 July. TG-1, which had been providing enfilading fire support to TG-2, quickly shifted an
armoured battalion from 1st Armoured Brigade the next day across the Bosna River and
through the Dobor Kula pass to locations south of Odzak. With a bridgehead directly south
of Odzak now secure, TG-1 moved more units across the river, placing its forces in position
to roll up the HV flank while TG-2 continued its frontal assault. But the HV/HVO forces
doggedly continued to defend their positions and the Serb troops had to edge their way
forward, slowly gaining control of the key heights in TG-2’s sector and the approaches to
Odzak in TG-1’s area. On 12-13 July TG-1 forces broke into Odzak and thrust through the
HV/HVO forces, while to the northwest troops from TG-2 seized the last HV/HVO line. With
the Croat defences broken, both tactical groups were now able to push rapidly toward the
Sava, overcoming broken remnants of withdrawing HV/HVO units to reach the river on 15
July.991

989
The last VRS (ex-JNA) unit withdrew from Western Slavonia on 6 July 1992.
990
TG-1 now comprised nearly the entire 1st Armored Brigade, up to three battalions from the 6th Sanska
Infantry Brigade, the 1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Laktasi Light Infantry Brigade, and the 1st
MP Battalion.
991
The 2nd Armored Battalion / 1 st Armored Brigade again led the TG- 1 advance. Radmila Zigic: The 1st
Armored Brigade of the 1st Krajina Corps: Without A Battle Lost, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 11

388
 On the Derventa-Bosanski Brod front, while preparations for the new attack were
underway, Tactical Group 3 had continued its struggles to seize the vital Plehan-Tomosevo
Brdo line so that it could get its forces in position to strike at Derventa.992 By 1 July, after
heavy fighting lasting several days, shock troops drawn from several formations were finally
able to seize the Plehan position, advancing over five kilometers to positions some three
kilometers south of town.993 Two days later, VRS troops advanced into Derventa.
With Tactical Group 3 now in position, the main advance toward Bosanski Brod
could begin. Colonel Milan Celeketic’s veteran 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, the bulk of
which had recently arrived from Western Slavonia, was to make the primary effort.994 The
brigade was to attack from the Podnovlje area, on TG-3’s right flank and drive in the
Croatian left flank directly toward Bosanski Brod and the Sava River. TG-3 would launch
supporting attacks in the same direction. The drive began on 5 July against stiff resistance
from HV troops. After more than a week of fighting, attackers from the 16th finally broke
the Croat defences and drove toward the Sava River and Brod, carrying along TG-3 forces as
the Croat line crumbled. By 15 July elements of the 16th had reached the Sava, and by 17
July they had reached the village of Vinska on the Obodni Canal, some 10 kilometers
southeast of Bosanski Brod.
As a result of this attack VRS forces had smashed the HV/HVO’s central position in
the Posavina. The 1st Krajina Corps had gained control of about 30 kilometers of the
winding right bank of the Sava from Vinska to Bosanski Samac. Croat forces were now
isolated in two widely separated bridgeheads around Bosanski Brod and Orasje and posed
only a minimal threat to the strategic corridor anywhere west of the Brcko-Orasje line.

The Battle for Bosanski Brod, July to October 1992.

Around Bosanski Brod itself Croat forces still held strong defences, however, and
they would get stronger. To bolster the enclave in the aftermath of the recent defeat,
Zagreb began pumping more troops into the Bosanski Brod area, possibly up to five tactical
groups by early September, although some of units identified probably alternated with each
other. Over all, the HV/HVO force probably numbered up to 15.000 troops by the beginning
of September.995 They also received a new commander, General Petar Stipetic, the deputy
chief of the HV Main Staff and a veteran JNA staff officer.996

992
Colonel Lisica’s Tactical Group-3 now commanded the following brigades or elements drawn from these
brigades, including up to one battalion / 1st Armored Brigade, the 2nd Armored Brigade, the 27th
Motorized Brigade, the 1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Osinja Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st Krnjin
Light Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade.
993
Elements from the 1st and 2nd Armored, 27th Motorized, 1st Krnjin Light Infantry, and 1st Vucjak Light
Brigades were involved in the battle. The commander of the 27th Motorized Brigade, Colonel Trivun Vujic,
was killed in action during the attack.
994
During May, after withdrawal from Western Slavonia, the 16th had absorbed 1.500 new recruits and
conducted refresher training at the JNA training area in Manjaca, south of Banja Luka.
995
This assessment is based on a careful reading of Hrvatski Vojnik and Velebit reporting (see above source
references) which often cryptically refer to HV deployments to the Bosnian Posavina in 1992 as the “Sava

389
 The VRS forces trying to take the town had to contend not only with these Croat
strengths but also with their own weaknesses. Most of the units in Tactical Group 3 had
been engaged in ongoing combat operations for over a month and a half, and, with few VRS
reserves available, they were likely to continue to remain in the line. TG-3 was further
handicapped by the fact that most of its units were newly raised light infantry brigades with
few experienced junior officers and NCOs, which made them susceptible to bouts of
indiscipline and prone to tactical deficiencies in battle. All told, as of early September they
numbered at least 12.000 and as many as 15.000 troops, drawn from as many as 11
different brigades.997

Basin” or simply Posavina, although in some cases articles will explicitly state the unit went to Bosnian
Posavina.
The tactical groups discussed were usually formed from a single brigade headquarters, one of its own
battalions, and up to two battalions from other brigades, plus support troops – estimated at up to 2.000
men total. Some tactical groups may have been smaller with about 1.000 troops. Thus, for example.
Tactical Group 145 was formed from the headquarters of the 145th Zagreb-Dubrava Brigade, one of its
battalions, plus units from the 101st Zagreb-Susedgrad, 148th Zagreb-Trnje, 151st Samobor, and 153rd
Velika Gorica Brigades. Neven Miladin: Proven Throughout All Croatia, Zagreb Velebit, 26 January 1996, p.
14.
Unfortunately, Croatian sources provide little detail on HV Posavina operations, and, because of the tactical
group structure predominantly used by the HV, identification of a “brigade” as having fought in the area
provides only minimal help, since it was usually only one element of that brigade. These sources usually
provide little locational information other than in the “Posavina” or “Sava Basin”; since HV troops were
deployed in three discrete sectors – Bosanski Brod, Modrica-Odzak (to mid-July), and Orasje, it is difficult to
get a fix on how many troops were in fact stationed where and against which VRS units. The following HV
brigades sent elements to the Posavina as part of a tactical group or were fully deployed to the Posavina
during 1992. The list may include some units that did not enter Bosnia but were deployed to defend the
Sava River line from inside Croatia.
3rd Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade (+)
3rd Guards Brigade
101st Zagreb-Susedgrad Brigade
103rd Zagora Brigade
104th Varazdin Brigade
107th Valpovo Brigade
108th Slavonski Brod Brigade
111th Rijeka Brigade
117th Koprivnica Brigade
124th Vukovar Brigade
131st Zupanja Brigade
137th Duga Resa Brigade
139th Slavonski Brod Brigade
145th Zagreb-Dubrava Brigade
148th Zagreb-Trnje Brigade
150th Zagreb-Crnomerec Brigade
151st Samobor Brigade
153rd Velika Gorica Brigade
157th Slavonski Brod Brigade
996
Stipetic was widely regarded as the best operational planner in the HV. He served on the HV Main Staff
during the 1991 war. Stipetic later played key roles during Operations “Flash” (Bljesak) and “Storm“ (Oluja).
He became Chief of the HV Main Staff in early 2000.
997
Tactical Group 3 had now expanded to roughly a division-sized force. It included the following units, based
on the sectors which they held around the enclave, beginning on the VRS right flank:
1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade

390
 The Croat bridgehead at Bosanski Brod was oddly shaped. HV/HVO forces on the
right flank had greater depth to their positions, holding a strong bastion around Bijelo Brdo-
Kostres-Zboriste, over 15 to 20 kilometers from Bosanski Brod and only three kilometers
north of Serb-held Derventa. On the left flank, due to the VRS advance in mid-July, the Croat
perimeter in some places sat only 10 kilometers from the town itself.
Despite the VRS advantage on its right flank (the HV left), most of its summer
campaigning consisted of a series of relatively fruitless attacks on the VRS left around Bijelo
Brdo, which the HV/HVO had held since April. On 27-28 August VRS troops from the 11th
Dubica Infantry and 27th Derventa Motorized Brigade finally were able to storm this
position, but the Croat defenders were able to pull back in good order to secondary
defensive positions some four kilometers north at Korace. VRS attacks continuing into mid-
September gained little ground.
By the end of September, Colonel Lisica appears to have wearied of the piecemeal
attacks that had gained so little and was ready to launch a major offensive against the
enclave. On 27 September the VRS sent four air strikes against Croat positions around
Korace and Bosanski Brod and kicked off the ground attack, pushing toward Korace and
Kostres. The advance, led by troops from the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade and the 16th
Krajina Motorized Brigade, was unsuccessful, running into a new HV brigade that General
Stipetic had moved to this sector for a planned attack toward Derventa.998 Frustrated by the
unexpected rebuff in the Korace sector, Lisica unexpectedly shifted the focus of his attack to
the northeast, near Kolibe, where on 4-5 October Major Miko Skoric’s 1st Krnjin Light
Infantry Brigade, together with major elements of the 2nd Armoured and 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigades, broke through Croat lines and pushed quickly toward Brod. VRS troops
occupied the town on 6 October and HV engineers blew the bridge over the Sava between
Slavonski and Bosanski Brod. The battle for Bosanski Brod was over.
Questions about Bosanski Brod’s rapid fall after such a prolonged defence have
been fought over in the press since Lisica’s men marched into the town, and its capture has

one to two battalions / 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade (from September)

1st Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade
1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade
1st Osinja Light Infantry Brigade
11th Dubica Infantry Brigade
27th Derventa Motorized Brigade
2nd, 3rd, and 6th Battalions / 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade
3rd Battalion / 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade (also served on right flank)
In addition, most of the 2nd Armored Brigade, plus one to two battalions of the 1 st Armored Brigade – up
to 75 tanks, plus 20 to 30 APCs/IFVs – were parceled out to the infantry brigades to provide direct support.
TG-3 probably had at least three artillery battalions mounting 36 to 54 field artillery pieces over 100mm in
direct and general support roles. In addition, the V i PVO’s 92nd Mixed Aviation Brigade provided air
support.
998
A VRS tank crewman said that the four tanks from the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade that took part in the
attack on Kostres suffered 50 percent casualties among their crewmen. Radmila Zigic: 16th Krajina Brigade:
Heroes of Flat Posavina, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, pp. 7-8. See Dragan Djuric: New Commander of the
Croatian Army, Zagreb Nacional, 15 March 2000, pp. 21-23, an interview with General Petar Stipetic, for
the deployment of the HV brigade.

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become yet another Balkan conspiracy legend.999 Many have argued that Croatian President
Tudjman agreed to withdraw HV forces from the enclave in exchange for Belgrade’s
withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the Croatian Prevlaka peninsula, south of Dubrovnik.
General Stipetic recently stated that he still did not know why Bosanski Brod fell, but
maintained that it could not have been because the VRS was stronger.1000 Suspiciously, the
public agreement on Prevlaka came at the end of September, concurrently with the final
VRS attack. Although a number of senior Croatians, notably former Tudjman aide Josip
Manolic, have hinted or claimed this was the case, there is no direct evidence to indicate
this is true.1001 Stipetic also claimed that Bosnian Croat President Mate Boban had struck a
deal with Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, but neither is there any information to confirm
that.
The more likely explanation is simply that the VRS troops, after months of attacking
the Croat positions, finally mastered them and found themselves ready to defeat the Croats
in battle just as Zagreb was deciding on a withdrawal, possibly because of a deal or possibly
because Tudjman and the HV believed the enclave was becoming untenable.1002 Stipetic,
however, claims he never issued an order for the withdrawal of the units near Bosanski Brod
town before they collapsed under the VRS attack. An examination of the final battle
confirms that Croat resistance remained strong, but that the strike in the north-eastern
sector after the repeated VRS attacks in the southwest surprised the HV, rupturing the Croat
front. Regardless of Stipetic’s objection, given the short distance to Bosanski Brod from
there – less than seven kilometers – it is hardly surprising that the town then quickly fell,
irrespective of whether its defenders had been pulled back or pushed back. Although the
HV/HVO seem to have been able to withdraw most of their forces before Serb troops took
the town, a number of Croat units were cut off at Korace and had to escape across the Sava
on rafts and other craft.1003 It seems unlikely that that they would have had to resort to such
means if they were expecting a Serb takeover.
Finally, Bosanski Brod, while important to the Serb consolidation of their control
over the corridor, was less strategically vital to their opponents than many people have
claimed it to be. Croat forces in the pocket, while a potential threat to the main supply route
through Derventa, were not likely to be able to close the 35-kilometer gap between the
Bosanski Brod front and Doboj. The 1st Krajina Corps opened the corridor on 28 June,
before the VRS recaptured Derventa. If the VRS had not captured Brod, it could still have

999
See Silber and Little, p. 256 for the latest statement of such a conspiracy.
1000
Dragan Djuric: New Commander of the Croatian Army, Zagreb Nacional, 15 March 2000, pp. 21-23; an
interview with General Petar Stipetic.
1001
Davor Butkovic: President Tudjman Ordered the Croatian Army to Withdraw From Posavina and to Cede
the Corridor to the Serbs!, Zagreb Globus, 22 April 1994, pp. 7-10; an interview with Jospic Manolic.
1002
Dragan Djuric: New Commander of the Croatian Army, Zagreb Nacional, 15 March 2000, pp. 21-23; an
interview with General Petar Stipetic.
1003
See Dragan Djuric: New Commander of the Croatian Army, Zagreb Nacional, 15 March 2000, pp. 21-23; an
interview with General Petar Stipetic for a definitive statement on the cut-off HV forces and Reuters
reports from 6-7 October 1992 in which both a police spokesman and the HV military police chief in
Slavonski Brod claimed some troops were still holding out at Korace.

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contained the pocket. The biggest threat to Serb control over the corridor came not at
Bosanski Brod, but further east at Brcko-Orasje. In fact, Croat attacks on the corridor, clearly
with HV assistance or involvement, increased after Bosanski Brod’s fall. Bosnian Croat
troops – again apparently with HV support – also were able to repel a VRS offensive against
Orasje in November (see below). If Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs negotiated a deal to
secure the corridor in exchange for Prevlaka, they made a bad bargain, since HV/HVO forces
continued to hold Orasje for the rest of the war.

Battles for Gradacac, July 1992 to January 1993.

While battles continued to the north, VRS Tactical Group 4 and the HVO 107th
Gradacac were fighting their own private war over the key road junction of Gradacac, some
12 kilometers southeast of Modrica. Fighting surged almost continuously for six months
over the same set of villages and roads around the town. At first, during July, Colonel
Radmilo Zeljaja and TG-4 were assigned to guard the rear of the main VRS attack toward the
Sava and Bosanski Brod.1004 But at the same time Zeljaja was supposed to put pressure on
Ivan Mijavac’s mixed Croat-Muslim 107th Brigade – some 2.500 to 3.500 men – holding
Gradacac. Zeljaja had no more than 2.000 men for his mixed missions. They carried off their
primary task with ease but made only minor gains around Gradacac against stiff resistance.
In early August Lieutenant Colonel Pero Colic brought his 5th Kozara Light Infantry
Brigade’s 1.000 troops into Gradacac and assumed command over TG-4.1005 Colic’s troops
almost immediately attacked the HVO-held salient from the northeast, penetrating one or
two kilometers into HVO defences. A seesaw struggle ensued as Croat, Muslim, and Serb
troops battled during the rest of August and September over the villages along these
approaches to the town. The HVO troops staunchly defended their positions, even regaining
some ground taken by the neighbouring VRS 2nd Posavina Brigade in earlier fighting.
Not until late October was the recently arrived 6th Battalion / 43rd Motorized
Brigade able to push the 107th Brigade back several kilometers directly north of town and
penetrate the town’s industrial zone.1006 The battle continued into November and
December, with gains measured in meters.1007 On 7 December HVO troops pushed the 5th
Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade out of two villages to the northwest. (The 43rd’s 4th
Battalion retook the villages in early January.) Later in the month, VRS units struck back

1004
TG-4 appears to have initially consisted of Headquarters, 43rd Motorized Brigade, 2nd and 5th Battalions /
43rd Motorized Brigade, probably 3rd Battalion / 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, a tank company from 1st
Armored Brigade, and an artillery battery from 43rd Motorized Brigade.
1005
TG-4 now consisted of Headquarters, 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade, 1st and 2nd Battalions / 5th Kozara
Light Infantry Brigade, 3rd Battalion / 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, 1st and 4th Battalions / 6th Sanska
Infantry Brigade, 2nd and 5th Battalions / 43rd Motorized Brigade, ”Wolves of Vucijak“ assault
detachment, a tank company from 1st Armored Brigade, and an artillery battalion from 43rd Motorized
Brigade. Equipment totals probably numbered about 10 tanks and 12 pieces of 105 mm howitzers.
1006
During heavy fighting in early October at Gradacac, the commander of the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps, Zeljko
Knez, threatened to release industrial chlorine gas if VRS attacks against Gradacac did not stop. Under
strong international pressure, Knez ordered the chlorine cylinders withdrawn on 25 October.
1007
Colonel Zeljaja and headquarters, 43rd Motorized Brigade resumed command over TG-4 on 4 November.

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again in the industrial zone, inching their way forward. The year ended with both sides
locked in position, but the 107th Brigade still holding Gradacac.

Battling for the Eastern Corridor: Brcko-Orasje, July 1992-January 1993

As the VRS wound down its efforts to seize the western half of the corridor in
October, it shifted its attention to the remaining Croat enclave of Orasje at the eastern end
of Posavina, as well as the narrow gap between HVO-held frontlines southwest of Brcko and
the Sava River. From July through September, the VRS East Bosnian Corps, initially under
Colonel Dragutin Ilic, had made a number of less-than-successful attempts to widen the
corridor at Brcko. On 12-13 September HVO and TO troops actually managed to temporarily
sever the corridor northwest of Brcko on the road to Orasje, and cut it again on 10-12
October. On 20 October, HV/HVO troops captured the village of Vidovice, just southeast of
Orasje, bringing more pressure on the corridor and securing the Orasje enclave.
Goaded by this situation, the VRS began preparing an operation to capture Orasje,
no doubt spurred on when the HVO and Bosnian Army 2nd Corps troops again cut the VRS
supply line on 9 November at Gorice, some seven kilometers northwest of Brcko. Troops
from the 2nd Posavina Brigade managed to reopen the route, but only the elimination of
Orasje would put an end to the troublesome Croat-Muslim actions.
To beef up the planned attack the 1st Krajina Corps moved the entire 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigade, plus an armoured battalion from 1st Armoured Brigade – over 3.000
troops – to positions some 10 kilometers south of Orasje, reinforcing 2nd Posavina and 2nd
Krajina Infantry Brigade units opposite the enclave. The total force likely numbered 6.000 to
7.000 men. The VRS faced two relatively high-strength HVO brigades, the 104th Samac and
106th Orasje, the remnants of the four HVO brigades defeated in the west, plus perhaps
two HV tactical groups, probably about 10.000 total personnel.
The VRS offensive began in mid-November, initially penetrating HV/HVO defences
south of Vidovice and at Covic Polje. Troops from the 2nd Battalion/ 16th Motorized
attempted to flank Vidovice, but bogged down in heavy fighting and terrible weather. One
Bosnian Serb soldier in the 2nd Battalion later recalled:
... we had been constantly followed by bad weather ... In the morning heavy
frosts, rain during the day, the clouds would break up, and again frost. Many of the
soldiers were freezing, they vomited blood, but we didn’t retreat from a single foot until
the command was given to withdraw. I don’t know who gave this command or why; if
there had only been a little better organization and command, Orasje would have been
liberated too.1008

1008
M. Tosic, and R. Vujatovic: When Father and Electricity Come, Krajiski Vojnik, December 1995, pp. 7-10; an
interview VRS soldier Mico Milovanovic, assigned in 1992 to the 2nd Battalion / 16th Krajina Motorized
Brigade.

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 Poor weather, insufficient VRS organization or planning, and a staunch Croat
defence enabled the HV/HVO units to stop the attack cold and push the 16th Motorized
back.1009
Despite these year-end successes, the VRS position in the eastern end of the
corridor remained vulnerable. At Brcko itself, the most important route in the entire
Republika Srpska remained only three kilometers wide. The new positions taken in
December made the supply line only marginally more secure, extending it some five to ten
kilometers further west – the sector where Bosnian Army and HVO units had cut the
corridor during the fall. The route was still vulnerable from both the north and south, since
the VRS had failed to eliminate the Orasje pocket.

Secondary Operations in Northern Bosnia, June to October 1992

Not far from the 1992 Posavina battles, VRS, TO/ARBiH, and HVO forces clashed in
several secondary sectors of northern Bosnia. These battles centred around two adjacent
regions: the periphery of the Maglaj-Tesanj salient, including the towns of Doboj and Teslic,
and on the frontline surrounding the Serb-held Ozren Mountains.
Rather than re-start the failed Orasje attack, the VRS shifted its focus to the threat
from the south side of the corridor. The 16th Motorized was attached to the East Bosnian
Corps, now under Colonel Novica Simic, and turned around to face positions just west of
Brcko.1010 On 14 December, the 16th Motorized launched its two-pronged assault,
supported by troops from the 1st Posavina Infantry Brigade and 3rd Semberija Light Infantry
Brigade from the East Bosnian Corps.1011 On the right, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, led by
recon units and supported by armour, pushed toward the villages of Vuksic and Ulice. On
the left, the 3rd Battalion, led by elite military police troops and backed by an armoured
battalion, headed toward Donji Rakic. The Krajina troops penetrated two kilometers into the
defences held by the Bosnian Army’s 21st Srebrenik Brigade and the HVO’s 108th Brcko
Brigade on a six- kilometre front. Two weeks later, on 27 December, the 16th repeated its
performance, pushing the ARBiH/HVO defenders back another kilometre on the same front.
The line in the Brcko area was to remain stable until mid- 1993.1012

1009
The brigade commander and chief of staff at the time, Colonel Vukadin Makragic and Lieutenant Colonel
Vlado Topic, both indicated in the VRS journal, Srpska Vojska, that the fighting was “most difficult on
Orasje”, in which the battle zone was a “mud-covered, swampy line of demarcation, with trenches full of
water”. Radmila Zigic: 16th Krajina Brigade: Heroes of Flat Posavina, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, pp. 7-8.
1010
Simic took over the East Bosnian Corps on 19 September, after a short stint as commander of the 16th
during August and September.
1011
The 3rd Semberija was formed during November 1992 in the Bijeljina area, and included a large number of
Muslims in its ranks. It was deployed to hold the frontline in roughly the same sector that the 16th
Motorized Brigade’s attack was going to occur.
1012
The dates of 14 and 27 December for these attacks are tentative. They correspond to gains reported on
Belgrade Radio which were then compared to Krajiski Vojnik articles discussing operations of the 16th
Krajina Motorized Brigade. The two, however, do not exactly match up, and the 16th Brigade attack may
have occurred early in January 1993. There is a small chance that the Krajiski Vojnik articles are discussing
part of Operation “Sadejstvo 93” in July 1993, but this seems unlikely.

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 The Serb-held town of Doboj, on the north side of the Muslim-Croat Maglaj-Tesanj
salient, was the most strategically significant position of these secondary sectors. The town
was a key road and rail junction for the VRS 1st Krajina Corps forces fighting to create the
corridor to the north and provided the only gateway to the Ozren Mountains. Following the
JNA/Serb TO capture of the town on 3 May, JNA/TO and later VRS troops from Operational
Group “Doboj” had gradually pushed elements of the HVO 110th Usora and the Doboj TO
further south, and the HVO 109th Doboj to the east, away from the town. By early July,
however, HVO and TO troops still remained within three kilometers of Doboj to the south
and east of the town. On 13 July, in an attempt to disrupt the ongoing VRS drive to the Sava,
the HVO 110th Usora and the Doboj TO mounted a major attack toward Doboj, pushing to
within two kilometers of the town centre before VRS 1st Doboj Light Infantry Brigade troops
were able to halt the attack. On 19 July, reinforced with units from Tactical Group 3, the VRS
threw the HVO and TO forces out of the territory they had gained. A month later, VRS forces
were able to push the HVO/TO defenders back another two kilometers to the south. The
frontline remained static for the rest of the year (and, despite often heavy fighting. for the
rest of the war).
Another hot spot was the area south of the Serb-controlled town of Teslic. In late
July, HVO forces from the 111th Zepce Brigade, together with Tesanj TO troops, were able
to advance about 10 kilometers toward Teslic, reaching positions some five kilometers
southeast of the town. By 8 August, however, VRS 1st Teslic Light Infantry Brigade / OG
“Doboj” counterattacks had stopped the HVO/TO operation, and less than a week later VRS
troops had retaken all of the lost ground. Over the next month the VRS 1st Teslic was able to
gain additional ground, reaching a key line of hills southwest of Tesanj, while claiming to
have “liberated” all of the Teslic Municipality. The line stabilized here with little change
during the rest of 1992, although battles for the key hilltops and the Tesanj-Novi Seher road
continued.
Along the eastern boundary between the Maglaj-Tesanj salient and the Ozren
Mountains, VRS troops from the 1st Ozren Light Infantry Brigade / OG “Doboj” fought a
series of grinding battles with Maglaj TO (ARBiH) – later the 201st Maglaj Brigade forces
during September-November. The TO held a salient about five kilometers deep and five
kilometers wide on the eastern (or right) bank of the Bosna River in the Ozren encompassing
the old town portions of Maglaj. The VRS launched a series of battalion and multi-battalion
attacks beginning in late August in an attempt to eliminate this salient. During three months
of fighting, the 1st Ozren was able to gradually constrict the small TO bridgehead, even
claiming on 20 October to have seized the Maglaj old town, although ARBiH troops appear
to have pushed the Serbs back out. By mid-November, however, the VRS drive appears to
have stalled and the Serbs called off the offensive, leaving the ARBiH with a one-to three-
kilometre-deep position on the east bank.
Another important battle fought on the periphery of the Ozren during late August
was the relief and capture of the surrounded Serb-held town of Smoluca, some six
kilometers north of the government (Muslim)-held city of Lukavac. Bosnian TO troops had

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cut off the Serb-populated pocket around Smoluca at the start of the fighting in April and
May. By mid- August, the VRS was ready to do something about the plight of the
beleaguered Serbs and sent OG “Doboj”, reinforced by the “Panthers” of the East Bosnian
Corps’s light motorized Special Brigade, to try to reach the enclave. In heavy fighting the
“Panthers”, supported by troops from the 1st and 2nd Ozren Brigades, broke through to the
enclave east of the Spreca River by 31 August. Unable to hold the enclave against strong TO
pressure, however, the VRS decided to evacuate the population and withdraw its troops,
leaving the frontline to run along the Spreca.

Evaluation of the 1992 Posavina Operations

Strategically, the VRS operations in the Posavina during 1992 were a major Serb
victory, achieving a key war aim – the creation of a territorially contiguous Serb state. The
separate wings of the Republika Srpska could not have survived politically, economically, or
militarily without the connecting link created by the VRS offensive. Although the corridor
saw no major fighting during 1993-1995 that compared to the operations of 1992, its
importance and vulnerability required the VRS to position a large portion of its strategic
reserves to defend the area. Although the VRS was perennially short of infantry reserves,
these troops were only rarely available for use in battles elsewhere. Only the threat posed
to the western RS in 1995 by the combined forces of the HV/HVO and ARBiH posed forced
the VRS to redeploy many of these units, since the loss of the western part of the republic
would make the corridor irrelevant.
The notable combat effectiveness during the Posavina operations stemmed from
the professionalism of its ex-JNA officer cadre, the JNA military system retained by the VRS,
and the army’s dominant firepower. The operational and higher tactical VRS commands –
1st Krajina Corps headquarters and the tactical group headquarters – consisted entirely of
professional officers from the JNA, all of whom had served in combat during the 1991
Croatian war.1013 The combination of their personal experience and training within the well-
established JNA military system created a whole greater than the sum of its parts. This
smoothly functioning team was able to use its staff skills to plan effective operations and
battles, rapidly shift units from one sector to another, and ensure adequate logistical
support.1014 When these professional advantages were combined with the superior fire
power inherited from the JNA the Serbs were difficult to beat.

1013
All four tactical group commanders had either served as JNA brigade commanders or brigade chiefs of staff
during the 1991 war.
1014
An interesting organizational highlight from the Posavina campaign is the effective use the VRS made of
tactical group headquarters, which the army was to employ extensively throughout the war. Initially, the
groups were formed to control battalion-sized elements withdrawn from several brigades still deployed in
Western Slavonia. As the VRS operation grew in scope, and more complete brigades were formed or
redeployed to the region, the tactical groups – which initially were the size of reinforced brigades – grew to
multi-brigade, division-sized formations. Although the TG headquarters seem to have been able to cope
with controlling up to three or four small brigades at a time, the expansion of TG-3 during the Battle of
Bosanski Brod to command parts or all of 11-plus brigades taxed Colonel Lisica’s headquarters to the limit.

397
 Where the Serb military came up short was in the number of professional officers
and NCOs below the brigade and battalion level, particularly in newly raised light infantry
units, and therefore in the quality of its troops. The soldiers of these units were largely
civilians inducted when the VRS was created; even the units themselves had often not
existed prior to May 1992. The rapid expansion of the Serb military forces in May and June
stretched and thinned the cadre of JNA officers, and many of the newly raised battalions
were lucky if their battalion commander was a JNA reserve officer, let alone a JNA combat
professional. Most units had to be sent into battle with almost no indoctrination or training
under company officers and NCOs almost as green as they were. It was no wonder that
discipline and tactical efficiency in these newly raised units were extremely poor. Indeed, at
the battalion level and below most of the HVO and the better-organized Bosnian TO units
opposing the VRS were as good as the Serbs’ locally raised, non-JNA units; the difference
was that the Serbs were much better armed. It was only the VRS’s superior professionalism
at the corps and brigade levels, and its prodigious use of firepower, that enabled it to
overcome its deficiencies on manpower.
The Croatian Army performed relatively effectively in the Posavina, having made
evolutionary improvements from the late 1991 force in organization, logistics, staff work,
and use of firepower. As in 1991, however, the more professional and better equipped ex-
JNA units of the VRS were usually able to defeat the HV in a given engagement.
Nevertheless, the HV, when dug in and supported by the newer artillery it was receiving,
was difficult to dislodge, as the VRS found at Bosanski Brod and Orasje. And individual HV
units were often better than many of the recently organized VRS light infantry formations.
The HVO, which was organized and controlled by the HV, performed in much the
same way the new Croatian forces had in the early and middle stages of the 1991 war. Most
units were poorly organized and lacked training, but fought hard to defend their homes. The
leavening of Bosnian Croat veterans who had fought in the 1991 HV, together with the HV
provision of brigade level staff officers, played an important role in solidifying these units.
When stiffened with HV troops, HVO forces strongly resisted VRS attacks. The HVO,
however, paid the price of their doughty resistance; the Orasje Corps District – the later
designator for the Posavina Operational Zone of 1992 – listed 3.000 personnel killed in
action and 10.000 wounded during the war.1015 Most of these casualties probably came in
1992.
The Bosnian Territorial Defence – by October it had become the Bosnian Army
(ARBiH) – played a less central role in the Posavina fighting, both in terms of physical
presence as well as combat capability. In contrast to the HVO, which could rely on HV aid in
men and equipment, the TO/ARBiH had no mentor to guide, organize, and arm its forces. As
a result, although most fought as hard as the HVO troops, their units lacked organization,

The staffs of these essentially brigade-level headquarters were simply not trained or equipped to deal with
this many formations at once. The 1st Krajina Corps probably should have formed another TG headquarters
or shifted another TG headquarters to Bosanski Brod to take command over half of the sector in order to
better manage the battle.
1015
Neven Miladin: The Pride and Strength of Croatian Posavina, Velebit, 28 November 1997, pp. 14-15.

398
training, staff work, and weapons. Despite these initial shortcomings, the situation had
improved by the end of 1992, and entering 1993 the ARBiH was moving toward assuming
the primary role in defending the south side of the Posavina corridor, supported by the
veteran HVO brigades.

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 Appendix 1
Terrain of the Posavina, Maglaj-Tesanj, and Ozren Regions
Posavina

The principal combat zone was the Posavina region, which ran along the Sava River
roughly from a western line at Bosanski Brod-Derventa-Doboj over to a Brcko-Orasje axis in
the east. In terms of military geography, this area consists of two differing sectors. The
western sector, up to Odzak-Modrica-Gradacac, is an area of lower hills at 200 to 300
meters in height between Doboj and Derventa, interspersed with streams and a large
number of villages and smaller towns, such as Kotorsko. Near Bosanski Brod, just north of
Derventa, the hills drop off to less than 100 meters approaching the Sava River plain.
Directly on the main approaches from Derventa is a large man-made lake that channels
ground movement to narrow corridors on either side of the lake bounded by the Sava.
Northeast of Doboj, the Trebava region is more mountainous, rising to 400 to 600 meters or
so. The large Bosna River runs between Doboj and Trebava (and into the Sava north of
Odzak). The main road runs north-south from Doboj, through Kotorsko, to Derventa and
Bosanski Brod. The main east-west highway links into this road at Kotorsko, continuing to
western Bosnia from Derventa.
The other sector, beginning at Odzak-Modrica-Gradacac, is far different than most
of Bosnia. Tending east from the western area, the hills abruptly drop off along the line of
these three towns, with level plains dotted with villages and farms stretching east to Brcko
and north to the Sava. There are occasional hills, but these rise to no more than 100 meters
in height. South of a line running roughly from Gradacac to Brcko, the hills and mountains
begin to rise again. In the north, approaching the Sava, much of the ground along the river
becomes marshy, often flooding in winter. Over all, the road network through the region is
good, with fine asphalt roads running east-west from Brcko to Modrica and Gradacac, while
the main north-south route runs from Orasje to near Gradacac on the way to Tuzla city.

Doboj – Maglaj – Tesanj – Teslic

The region comprising the towns of Maglaj-Tesanj-Teslic and other areas southwest
of the Posavina was a secondary combat sector in northern Bosnia during 1992. Other key
towns include Jelah, Zepce, and Zavidovici. The Bosna River bounds the region on the east
and the south; a large mountain range peaking at 1.000 meters forms the western
boundary, along with the town of Teslic. Doboj was on the northern boundary. In the
Muslim-Croat Maglaj-Tesanj enclave, the terrain is lower than the surrounding mountains,
at only 100 to 300 meters near Tesanj and Jelah, along the Usora River valley. South and
southwest of the Muslim-held Maglaj town, a belt of 400 to 600 meter hills curve to the
north, east of Serb-controlled Teslic, and provides a natural boundary between the two
areas. South of these mountains lies the Croat-dominated Zepce-Novi Seher area, with

400
lower hills at 200 to 400 meters. The town of Zavidovici, held by the Muslims, lies on the
Bosna River to the east.

Ozren Mountains

The large Serb-held salient in the Ozren Mountains was also a secondary
battleground in 1992. The area, bounded on the east by the Spreca River, the west by the
Bosna River, and the south by the Krivaja River, consists of rugged mountains rising to about
1.000 meters. It is covered by a number of villages, but with only a few small towns, the
most important being Bosansko Petrovo Selo. A number of Muslim-held towns surrounded
the salient, including the industrial city of Lukavac, as well as Maglaj, Zavidovici, and
Gracanica. The key to the area, however, was Doboj, which was the gateway into the
salient.

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 Annex 29
Operation “Vrbas 92”: The VRS Assault on Jajce,
July – November 1992
The Bosnian Serbs wanted to eliminate the Croat-Muslim salient at Jajce to extend
and consolidate their control of western Bosnia and eliminate the threat to Bosnian Serb
lines of communication posed by the salient. Perhaps more importantly, the Serbs needed
to take over two hydroelectric power plants on the Vrbas River that supplied a considerable
portion of electricity for the region and were vital to the economic well-being of Western
Bosnia.1016

Terrain and Campaign Planning

As with many areas of Bosnia, the terrain around the town of Jajce favours the
defender. Jajce sat in an almost inaccessible position, defended by a series of hills
immediately around the town that were controlled by the HVO and TO. In 1992 the HVO-TO
salient stuck out from the rest of Croat-Muslim central Bosnia like a north-eastward-facing
head in profile, stretching some 25 kilometers from the Serb-held village of Vitovlje at the
chin to the village of Jezero at the crown, and some 20 kilometers wide from the Ugar River
along the nose to the Rijeka River at the nape. Just under the tight collar was the town of
Turbe, northwest of Travnik, from which a narrow neck about seven kilometers wide and 10
kilometers long extended to the broader enclave around Jajce, about where an ear would
be (see Map 13).
Instead of making its main effort against the neck of the salient, the VRS chose to
push directly for the town, probably hoping that this would force the Croat-Muslim
population to flee or possibly because they wanted to avoid taking on the strong HVO and
TO defences near Travnik. In any event, the VRS 30th Infantry Division’s campaign plan
followed standard JNA/VRS operational and tactical doctrine for mountain warfare, using
multiple converging axes to shrink the enclave before making a final assault. The operation
was to be undertaken slowly and methodically, guarding the attacking force’s flanks and
ensuring that all captured ground was cleared as the operation proceeded.
The 30th Division chose three primary attack routes toward Jajce town, running
from the north, the west, and the south/southwest. The first route, running from Banja
Luka, began at the initial frontline about 10 kilometers north of town, dominated by the

1016
Mladic emphasizes the importance of the two plants; the short-lived cease-fire later arranged between the
Croats and Serbs called for the Croats to provide the Serbs with electricity if the Serbs halted their
offensive. Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996,
Chapter 7. The territory itself does not appear to have been particularly important to the Serbs since the
pre-war population of Jajce Municipality was only 19 percent Serb. The Croats and Muslims made up 35
percent and 39 percent of the population respectively. Yugoslavs and others made up the remaining seven
percent. Miroslav Krleza Lexicographical Institute: A Concise Atlas of the Republic of Croatia and the
Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Zagreb Graficki Zavod Hrvatske, 1993, p. 125.

402
Gola Planina feature and the Vrbas River valley, along which one of the major roads to Jajce
runs. (The Ugar River valley to the northeast, which converges with the Vrbas some five
kilometers north of Gola Planina, is almost impassable because of the steep approaches,
and formed a natural frontline that narrowed the possible attack sector.) The Gola Planina
lies west of the river valley and is about six kilometers wide and five kilometers long, rising
to 1.000 meters. It completely dominates the approach route along the Vrbas river road.
The size of the feature makes it difficult to isolate or surround. More hills control the east
side of the valley, dropping from 800 meters to 400-500 meters at the river in less than a
kilometre. The hydro-electric plants so desperately wanted by the Serbs, Jajce I (north) and
Jajce II (south), were both on this route. The approach route to the west, from the direction
of the Pliva Lake (about three kilometers long and a third of a kilometre wide), at the
frontline some eight kilometers west of town, was less treacherous, but also guarded by
mountains and passes. An attacker would have to seize an 865-meter hill, then two more
passes at Donji Mile and Vrbica – the last gate to Jajce – in order to reach the town. In
addition, an attacker would need to protect his left flank by seizing Caning Polje while
attacking along the main road. This secondary route would also allow an approach to the
north side of Jajce at Carevo Polje, coming around the south side of Gola Planina and
bypassing the main defences on the north. The Pliva Lake would guard the right flank of any
attack most of the way to the town.
The third route, from the south/southwest, began at the initial frontline some five
to seven kilometers outside of town. This route actually was split into two parallel routes,
one running along the Selinac River valley and the other along the Vrbas River valley from
the direction of Serb-held Donji Vakuf (Srbobran). They converged at the Elektrobosna
industrial plant (a silicon and chemical complex) and a secondary defensive line between the
villages of Skela and Bage, some two kilometers from town. Both, however, were difficult
approaches. Along the first, a series of 700-800 meter hills looked directly over the road. On
the second, which ran along the main Jajce-Donji Vakuf highway, a tunnel near the initial
frontline and then a 1.000-meter hill on the right flank, looking directly down on the road,
offered good defensive positions. Once past these, the 900-meter Bukovica feature posed a
final obstacle, looking directly down on the Elektrobosna plant.

Forces
The VRS deployed an estimated 7.000 to 8.000 troops for Operation “Vrbas 92”
under the command of Colonel Jovo Blazanovic’s 30th Infantry Division / 1st Krajina Corps.
Blazanovic’s forces were divided into Tactical Groups 1, 2 and 3. Tactical Group 1, consisting
of the 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade plus the Krajina Brigade – 3.000 to 3.500 troops –
was to advance along the southern axis.1017 Tactical Group 2, consisting of the reinforced

1017
The 11th Mrkonjic Brigade was on the tactical group’s right flank and the Krajina Brigade was on the left
flank, adjacent to TG-2. The Krajina Brigade’s origins are obscure: it probably was a composite formation
drawn from several 1st Krajina Corps brigades, particularly from those raised in Banja Luka, probably

403
17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade – some 2.000 to 2.500 troops – was to make the main
advance along the western and northern axes. Tactical Group 3, organized with at least
three battalions from three separate brigades, had some 1.500 troops guarding the
northern/north-eastern front along the Ugar River line. One or two direct support artillery
battalions, a corps artillery battalion, and an armoured battalion – 30 to 50 field artillery
over 100 mm, and 20 to 30 tanks – are assessed to have backed these three tactical groups.
VRS forces could also call on the Serbs’ skimpy airpower in the form of one-plane or two-
plane strikes by Galeb-Jastreb or Orao fighter-bombers attacking with guns, rockets, and
cluster bombs. Two light infantry brigades, the 19th at Donji Vakuf and the 22nd at Mount
Vlasic near Travnik, protected the flanks of the assault forces.1018
The defending HVO Jajce municipal command and Bosnian Government Jajce TO
forces are estimated to have started with some 3.400 armed troops, plus another 1.000
unarmed men. These appear to have been reinforced with another 2.200 armed men in
mid-September. HVO troops, which appear to have played a slightly more active role in the
defence, were organized under the Jajce Municipal Headquarters, and probably consisted of
about two battalions of local troops – about 1.000 men – only two-thirds of whom probably
had weapons. The HVO reinforced these units with dribs and drabs of platoons and

including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigades. Belgrade Radio observed on 1
September that TG- 1 was comprised “mainly of Banja Luka fighters”. It also may have included elements of
the 1st Sipovo Light Infantry Brigade.
1018
VRS Order of Battle – Jajce Campaign, July-November 1992
30th Infantry Division
Colonel Jovo Blazanovic, Commander
Tactical Group 1 (HQ, 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade), deployed southern axis
11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade
Krajina Brigade (-)
1-2 field artillerv batteries (6-12 howitzers)
Total: 3.000 to 3.500 troops
Tactical Group 2 (HQ, 17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade), deployed western / northern axes
17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade (+)
1-2 field artillerv batteries (6-12 howitzers)
Total: 2.000 to 2.500 troops
Tactical Group 3, deployed north / northeastern front-Ugar River line
1st Battalion / 1st Celinac Light Infantry Brigade
1st Battalion / 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade
1st Battalion / 1st Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade
Total: 1.500 troops
19th Light Infantry Brigade
2 battalions facing Bugojno
1 battalion facing Jajce enclave
Total: 1.500 troops
22nd Light Infantry Brigade
2 battalions facing Travnik
1 battalion facing northeast front of Jajce pocket
1 field artillery battalion (12 howitzers)
Total: 2.000 troops
1 corps-level 155 mm artillery battery-battalion from 1st Mixed Artillery Regiment (6-12 howitzers)
1 armor battalion (20 tanks, 10 APC/IFV)
Total VRS troops: 7.000 to 8.000 (Jajce operation); 3.500 (supporting flanks)

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companies drawn from the Central Bosnia Regional headquarters – which had overall
responsibility for Jajce – and the North-western Herzegovina Regional headquarters in
Tomislavgrad. The first of these reinforcements probably comprised about 1.000 troops,
followed by another 1.000 in early September. The Bosnian Government Territorial Defence
in Jajce was a municipal headquarters estimated to command about three battalions of local
citizens, some 1.500 men; about half of them may have had rifles. Two battalions of TO
troops, consisting of about 1.000 personnel from the TO Zenica District headquarters,
supported these local forces and sent another 1.000 men in early September.1019 Command
and control links between the two allied armies appear to have functioned adequately, but
were often strained, especially by the HVO’s order of 10 July disbanding the Bosnian
Government’s competing local government headquarters. The defenders lacked not only
the heavy weapons needed to engage Serb armour and artillery but even, in many cases,
individual weapons. But their morale was stiffened by the knowledge that it was their
homes they were defending against the Serb invaders. And they wielded pickaxes and
shovels valiantly to lace the naturally difficult terrain with strong bunker and trench
defences. The VRS was in for a hard fight.

Operations1020
The VRS appears to have begun preparations for the Jajce campaign during June,
and began tightening the ring around the enclave during July. Tactical Group 3 (TG-3) and
the 22nd Light Infantry Brigade / 30th Division started hitting at the base of the supply neck

1019
HVO and Bosnian TO Order of Battle – Jajce Campaign, July-November 1992
HVO Forces
Jajce Municipal Headquarters (Brigade-equivalent) (+)
– 2 local battalions; 1.000 total personnel, of which 650 armed
– 2 to 3 battalions from Northwestern Herzegovina Regional HQ and Central Bosnia Regional HQ;
1.000 armed troops
Total: 1.650 armed troops (to early September)
Reinforcements (from early September)
– 2 to 3 battalions from Northwestern Herzegovina Regional HQ and Central Bosnia Regional HQ;
1.000 personnel
Total: 2.650 armed troops (from early September)
TO Forces
Jajce Municipal Headquarters
– three local battalions; up to 1.500 personnel, of which 750 armed
– two battalions from Zenica TO District;: 1.000 armed troops
Total: 1.750 armed troops (to early September)
Reinforcements (from early September)
– two battalions from Zenica TO District; 1.000 armed troops
Total: 2.750 armed troops (from early September)
Total Combined Force
– 3.400 armed troops (to early September)
– 5.400 armed troops (from early September)
1020
The narrative of the Jajce operations relies heavily on contemporary local reporting by Belgrade Radio,
Belgrade Tanjug. Zagreb Radio, and Sarajevo Radio, augmented with detailed terrain and map analysis of
these and other reports.

405
into the salient northwest of Turbe from about 3 to 9 July and again from 17 to 22 July. It is
unclear whether the Serbs wanted to sever this route completely or merely threaten it;
most likely they wanted to leave an inviting escape route open to encourage the defenders
and the civilian population to evacuate the enclave. In any event, the attacks gained little
ground.
In early August the VRS was ready for serious action, taking the first step in a
progressive “bite and hold” campaign with an attack directly toward Jajce town. In four
weeks of seesaw fighting along the western axis, troops from Tactical Group 2 (TG-2) were
able to fight through HVO-TO lines near the pass at Donje Mile, while skirting the rear of
Gola Planina on the flank.1021 These forces were able to push almost six kilometers toward
the town before they were stopped at the Vrbica pass, less than two kilometers from
Jajce.1022 The town’s defenders now had their backs to the wall. But on the northern
approaches HVO and TO units were able to stymie TG 2’s attempts to advance on the vital
dams. While the 30th Division was preparing its next move for sometime in mid-September,
the HVO and TO hoped to disrupt its preparations with an attack in central Bosnia against
VRS positions between Donji Vakuf and Mount Vlasic, north of Travnik. Launched about 9
September, it fizzled out on 12 September with little or nothing gained. Nor did it have any
apparent diversionary effect on the VRS’s planned attack, which actually appears to have
kicked off the same day, 9 September, along the south/south-western approach to Jajce
with supporting attacks along the western axis. Tactical Group 1 (TG-1) succeeded in driving
back HVO-TO troops some five kilometers, reaching a line about a kilometre from Jajce town
between the villages of Bage and Skele on the Vrbas River at the Elektrobosna facility by
15/16 September.
It was apparently the expectation that Jajce would be overrun by the next Serb
thrust that motivated Bosnian Croat leaders to strike a deal, sealed on October 9, whereby
they would continue to supply Serb districts with electricity from the two hydroelectric
plants in return for a ceasefire in place by the VRS.1023 It was Croat forces that were
defending the dams, and the Muslims, who were not included in the deal, almost certainly
reacted angrily, their fears revived of a Croat-Serb conspiracy to carve up Bosnia between
them and leave the Muslims with only scraps. Relations between HVO and TO units in
central Bosnia had been strained by the unresolved political disputes over Bosnia’s future,
and the new Serb-Croat deal over Jajce proved too much. On 21 October fighting between

1021
Engineer troops from the engineer battalion (later regiment) of the 2nd Krajina Corps cleared extensive
minefields along the attack route of the 17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade, which made up the bulk of TG-2.
Predrag Malic: Pioneer Battalion of Laniste – Future Overflow Chamber of the Klenovac-Laniste Pipeline,
Mladi Inzinjerac, February 1993, p. 4.
1022
Reuters reporter Kurt Schork talked to a Bosnian soldier in September who stated that the VRS broke
through in mid-August. Kurt Schork: Besieged Bosnian Town Braces for Winter, Serbs, Reuters, 24
September 1992. This statement is consistent with VRS claims in August. Belgrade Radio, 26 August 1992,
Belgrade Radio, 1 September 1992.
1023
RS Defense Minister Colonel Bogdan Subotic announced the agreement. Belgrade Tanjug, 9 October 1992.

406
Croats and Muslims erupted around Travnik, Novi Travnik and Bugojno, almost directly
along the supply route to Jajce.1024
The VRS moved quickly to exploit these differences, with the prospect that the
erstwhile allies would betray one another at Jajce itself. On 25 October the 30th Division,
reinforced with troops from the crack 1st Military Police Battalion and 1st Reconnaissance-
Sabotage Company, launched an all-out attack along all three axes.1025 But Serb hopes that
the Croats and Muslims facing them would fold or fade away were quickly dashed.1026 Along
the western axis, near the key Vrbica pass and Carevo Polje just to the north, strong-points
appear to have exchanged hands several times, testifying to stout resistance. VRS TG-1
troops approaching from the south reached the Pliva River, directly across from the centre
of town, by 27 October, but Croat and Muslim troops still held out at Vrbica and Carevo
Polje. On the same day, along the northern axis, Tactical Group 2 units reached positions
near the Jajce 2 hydroelectric dam, having advanced about five kilometers. Two days later,
the town finally fell, as VRS units reached the old fortress in the centre of Jajce. But the
precious dams, which should have been a more important strategic target than Jajce itself,
were sabotaged by the retreating Croat defenders. The defeated troops and the frightened
civilian residents of the pocket now had to retreat across barely navigable dirt tracks under
Serb fire, as cold, rainy weather set in. Thousands poured into Travnik, causing one of the
biggest single refugee crises of the war.1027
The last act in the campaign came in mid-November. VRS forces had occupied
nearly all of the former enclave, but the stub of the neck that had led into it still stuck out
stubbornly near Turbe. Eliminating this stub would place VRS forces in a position to pressure
not only Turbe but Travnik, if they wanted that option. So, on 12 November, 30th Division
forces began grinding away at the awkward salient at Karaula, and erased it from the map
18 November.1028 Here the VRS halted, apparently content with its gains.

Evaluation of the Campaign

The VRS 30th Infantry Division captured Jajce because it was the more professional
force. It was better organized, better armed, better staffed, and better trained. Where it fell
short was in the weight of numbers, which was not enough to take the objective quickly and

1024
See Volume I, Chapter 31: Dress Rehearsal for War – The 1992 Croat-Muslim Clashes for a detailed
discussion of this fighting and its origins.
1025
Milka Tosic: The Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 52, an article on the 1st Military Police Battalion;
Ljubomir Paljevic: The Eyes and Ears Corps, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 53; an article on the 1st
Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company (later Detachment).
1026
Personnel from the VRS 4th Battalion / 6th Krajina Light Infantry Brigade later claimed in the September
1994 issue of the brigade magazine that Jajce was its “toughest battle”.
1027
For vivid descriptions of the appearance of these forlorn people, their arrival in Travnik, and the
atmosphere in central Bosnia at the time, see Ed Vulliamy: Seasons in Hell, London Simon & Schuster, 1994,
pp. 179-185, and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart: Broken Lives, London Harper Collins, pp. 84-105.
1028
A Muslim former JNA officer in Travnik called this little VRS attack a “text-book operation”, as the VRS
again used JNA tactical doctrine of a slow, methodical advance, guarding its flanks, and consolidating each
gain while integrating all arms in the battle. Reuters, 18 November 1992.

407
seize the vital dams before the Croats could put them out of commission. The valiant Croat
and Muslim defenders of the HVO and TO were able to hold out as long as they did because
they were highly motivated, innovative, and improvised excellent defensive positions in
easily defensible terrain. Claims by defeated soldiers that one side betrayed the other are
probably inevitable, given the inter-ethnic tensions of the time, but there is no solid
evidence that the Croats sold out Jajce to the Serbs.1029 Croat claims and Muslim
counterclaims that refusals to allow supplies and reinforcements through caused the
enclave’s fall have some validity, but both sides are to blame for their fratricidal clashes in
central Bosnia. Even with the additional resources that might have been provided, the
defenders could not have held the enclave indefinitely, and the VRS would eventually have
taken the town. As the Bosnian TO commander in Travnik, Colonel Hasan Ribo, stated, the
HVO did not abandon Jajce; it fell because of “pure Serbian military pressure”.1030

1029
The strongest piece of evidence comes from the chief of staff of the Bosnian Army’s 705th Jajce Mountain
Brigade who stated in 1995 that, while he was serving in the Jajce TO in 1992:
... the city would never have fallen if there had been a little more cooperation and coordination
between the TO and the HVO! When I say this, I am thinking of the fact that the HVO units began to
withdraw from the city 10 days before Jajce finally fell into Chetnik hands.
Dzemal Sefer: We Are Ready Both for War and For Peace, Travnik Bosnjak, 5-12 December 1995, pp. 13-15;
an interview with Senior Captain Miralem Imamovic, chief of staff 705th Glorious Jajce Mountain Brigade.
Contradicting the captain’s claim that HVO troops pulled out early, other contemporary Croat reporting
indicated that HVO units were still fighting in Jajce at its fall. At this point in time, the weight of evidence
suggests that there was no betrayal, although coordination problems clearly existed.
1030
Jajce Refugees under Fire – UNHCR, Reuters, 30 October 1992.

408
 Annex 30
Battles on the Drina, Round One – April to December 1992
Zvornik – Srebrenica1031
After the fall of Zvornik, Serb TO forces expanded their area of control around the
town in an attempt to seize the entire municipality as well as link up with Serb-controlled
municipalities around Sekovici and Vlasenica. Strategically, the capture of this territory
would help connect the north-eastern parts of the Serb republic and Serbia itself with Serb-
controlled territory around Sarajevo. However, it took almost two weeks for the new Serb
offensive to get on track when Zvornik TO and volunteer troops supported by a JNA armour
battalion from the 336th Motorized Brigade finally seized the Muslim-held village of Kula
Grad on 26 April, less than a kilometre southwest of Zvornik itself.1032 Even then, Serb forces
were only able to push the tough Muslim defenders about three kilometers south of Zvornik
into the Donje Snagovo-Kamenica area. To the northwest, Serb troops – presumably still
aided by the JNA 336th Motorized Brigade – had more success. By 9 May, the Serbs had
punched through several Muslim-defended villages, reaching the outskirts of Sapna village,
some 15 kilometers northwest of Zvornik, where Bosnian TO troops were finally able to halt
them.1033 Nevertheless, Serb and JNA troops were able to seize the key town of Kalesija, 20

1031
As with most of the combat narratives, contemporary press reporting is the primary source for the day-to-
day events of 1992. These include Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio, Sarajevo Radio, and Zagreb Radio. In
addition, three Western studies on the Srebrenica area have supplemented these reports:
 Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York Review of Books, 18
December 1997, pp. 65-81; this article includes a review of a book by Chuck Sudetic: Blood and
Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, which features a detailed history of
Srebrenica.
 Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Familyšs Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W.
Norton & Company, 1998. While recounting the experiences of a single family in Bosnia, it
provides a great deal of “ground truth” feeling for the situation in the Drina Valley during 1992-
1993.
 Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books,
1996.
David Rohde: Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massacre since World War II,
New York Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1996. Almost exclusively focused on the fall of Srebrenica in 1995,
this book nevertheless gives useful background information on the situation around the town in 1992.
1032
17th Corps Daily Operational Report, 18 April 1992, cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia
Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 109
1033
Elite Bosnian Patriotic League troops, the “Black Swans”, under the leadership of the unit founder, Mehdin
Hodzic, together with Hase Tiric and Hajrudin Mesic, were able to halt Serb attacks around the villages of
Nezuk and Zaseok, along the road to Sapna. On 10 May, Hodzic, after Tiric and Mesic were wounded,
stopped a Serb/JNA armored attack:
The Chetniks were attacking with about 10 tanks and several APCs. The ring around our fighters,
the wounded, and the civilians was tightening, and the Chetniks were using a megaphone to call
upon our fighters to surrender. Going deeper into the village, however, the Chetniks did not know
that they were actually entering a trap prepared for them by Mehdin Hodzic. Then our Osas [M-79
“Osa” 90 mm anti-tank rockets] were heard and several tanks were already on fire. Then Mehdin
Hodzic ordered a counterattack, and our men destroyed the Chetniks. They also captured their first

409
kilometers west of Zvornik, on 11 May. As a result of these successes, Serb forces were able
to open the vital Zvornik-Sekovici road, which was the only route available to Pale from the
northeast. Although Bosnian TO troops from Kalesija managed to recapture the town on 25-
28 May, the Serbs – now formed into the Bosnian Serb Army – managed to retain control of
the road.
During late May and June, both sides reorganized their forces. With the formation
of the Bosnian Serb Army on 20 May, local Serb TO and volunteer units, plus the JNA 336th
Motorized Brigade, were re-cast into new territorially-raised infantry and light infantry
brigades. In the Zvornik-Sekovici area, at least two brigades (and possibly another two later
on in 1992) were created under the command of the East Bosnian Corps. The 1st Zvornik
Infantry Brigade – with about 3.500 troops – was split in two parts. Half the brigade faced
northwest toward Bosnian TO positions around Sapna-Kalesija, while the other half faced
south/southeast toward Cerska-Kamenica to guard the Zvornik-Sekovici road.1034 The other
brigade, the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade, headquartered in Sekovici – with 3.000 to 4.000
troops – was also forced to fight in two directions with half guarding the frontline around
Kalesija-Kladanj, and the other attempting to defeat the Muslims around Cerska-
Kamenica.1035 A special operations battalion, the “Drina Wolves”, and a MUP special police
detachment, about 500 troops, rounded out the VRS order of battle.1036
The Bosnian TO worked to create a stronger chain of command and better-
organized sub-units for its brigade-equivalent municipal TO headquarters. Battalions,
companies, and platoons were formed, although weapons remained scarce. Despite this
lack of weapons, TO commands proved particularly adept at organizing sabotage units that
were to have amazing success against the VRS. The TO was able to field in the Sapna salient
or “thumb”, southeast of Tuzla and under the command of the Tuzla TO District, the Zivinice
TO (brigade), Kalesija TO (brigade) deployed between Kalesija and Sapna, the Zvornik TO
(brigade) between Sapna and Teocak, and the Teocak TO (brigade) at the tip of the Sapna
salient.1037 Altogether, these units probably numbered about 8.000 to 10.000 men, although
probably at most 50 percent were armed. In the Cerska-Kamenica enclave, the TO organized
an additional two “brigades”, with possibly another 4.000 men combined, although again no
more than 50 percent had weapons, and probably less.

tank and self-propelled artillery piece. ... Unfortunately, the hero Mehdin “Senad” Hodzic also died at
the close of the battle. A Chetnik sniper hit him right in the heart.
S. Hodzic: Black Swan, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 7 March 1996, p. 8.
1034
The 1st Zvornik appears to have been formed from the ex-JNA 336th Motorized Brigade.
1035
The 1st Birac probably initially included battalions raised in Vlasenica and Milici. Units from these two
towns were expanded into brigades in late 1992 or early 1993 and designated 1st Vlasenica and 1st Milici
Light Infantry Brigades.
1036
Banja Luka TV, 7 May 1997: Tactical Antiterrorist Exercise held marking anniversary of “Wolves of the
Drina”, includes short interview with General Milenko Zivanovic.
1037
The Tuzla TO District became the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps later in the year, and the brigade-level TO
municipal headquarters were redesignated as brigades. Thus, the Kalesija TO became the 205th Mountain
Brigade, the Zvornik TO became the 206th Mountain Brigade, the Teocak TO became the 1st Teocak
Mountain Brigade.

410
 Meanwhile, on the battlefield, despite their setbacks in May Bosnian TO forces in
both Kalesija-Sapna and the Cerska-Kamenica enclave refused to give up, and throughout
1992 made several strong efforts to link up while attempting to sever the Serb-controlled
road. On or about 7 June TO troops from Kalesija and Sapna attempted to push through VRS
Zvornik Brigade forces toward the key villages of Memici and Caparde, on the Zvornik-
Sekovici road. Over the next month, fighting seesawed back and forth. Eventually, the VRS
gained the upper hand. On 19 June 1st Birac Brigade troops seized the key height, Mount
Vis, which overlooked Kalesija, the Spreca River valley, and the Tuzla-Dubrave air base. The
fighting petered out after 9 July, when troops from the Zvornik Brigade retook Memici.
Following this battle, Bosnian TO / Army troops drawn primarily from the Cerska-
Kamenica enclave launched a series of strikes to sever the Zvornik-Sekovici-Pale road during
July-September. The first raid against the road came on 29-30 July. While Bosnian Army
forces from Kalesija-Sapna made holding attacks, Muslim sabotage troops hit the corridor at
a key bottleneck, Crni Vrh, some 10 kilometers northeast of Sekovici and four kilometers
west of Muslim held territory in the Cerska-Kamenica area. Fighting back, the Serbs were
able to reopen the route. Late in August Bosnian Army units from Kalesija and Kamenica
struck at the road from two sides in a vain attempt to link up their forces, gaining only a
little ground. Sabotage units hit the route twice in September, but were beaten back. During
October, ARBiH units made a major effort to link the Kalesija and Cerska-Kamenica regions,
while VRS troops from both the Zvornik and Birac Brigades attempted to shrink the Cerska-
Kamenica enclave. Neither side succeeded, although the VRS was able to seize a few key
positions around Kamenica, and during one of the last Muslim pushes, on 30 October, they
lost a veteran ARBiH brigade commander, Hajrudin Mesic from the Teocak Brigade.1038 The
dogged Muslims kept at it, though, severing the route three times in November. The VRS
countered with a Zvornik Brigade attack that captured the Zvornik-Drinjaca-Bratunac road
between the Drina River and the Cerska-Kamenica enclave on 22 December. At the turn of
the new year, however, this slender route would be retaken and held when Naser Oric’s
men attacked out of Srebrenica and firmly tied in the Cerska-Kamenica enclave with
Srebrenica-Zepa.
The Muslim defenders of Srebrenica were to become some of the Serbs’ most
dangerous and deadly foes during the course of the Bosnian war.1039 Serb TO troops and

1038
S. Hodzic: Captain Hajro, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 6 March 1996, p. 6. Ferid Hodzic, the commander in
Cerska-Kamenica states that:
In October, we tried to link up with Teocak. We were hoping to meet Hajro’s men in Nezuk, west
of Zvornik. But we lacked the weapons and the ammunition and we never broke through. Hajro died
on 30 October in a last attempt to make a link.
Quoted in Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books,
1996, p. 79.
1039
This section on Srebrenica is based heavily on Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The
New York Review of Books, 18 December 1997, pp. 65-81 and Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Ven geance: One
Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, which includes a detailed history of Srebrenica. The account in the
article has been cross-checked against official reporting and is consistent with this information. See also Jan
Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books, 1996, pp. 77-
79. For a short pre-war history of the prosperous mining community, see David Rohde: Endgame: The

411
armed volunteers led by the local SDS President, Goran Zekic, took over Srebrenica on 18
April after demanding that Muslims in the town turn over their personal and official
weapons. Most of the Muslims refused and fled to the hills.1040 There, under the leadership
of the charismatic Naser Oric, who had served in the Serbian special police, they planned
their counter attack while harassing the occupying Serbs with attacks throughout the month
of April.1041 On 8-9 May, after a Muslim college student killed Goran Zekic, Oric’s men swept
back to reclaim their city from the suddenly demoralized Serbs. Deprived of their leader,
Serb forces seem to have disintegrated, and withdrew helter-skelter to Bratunac to wreak
revenge on the Muslim minority there, rounding up and slaughtering most of the remaining
males.1042 Meanwhile elite Serbian MUP “Red Beret” special operations troops (possibly led
by Captain Dragan of Croatian War fame) arrived to reinforce Bratunac and its environs.1043

Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II, New York Farrar, Strauss, and
Giroux, 1996, pp. xiii-xiv.
1040
Many reports also claim that troops from Arkan’s elite Serbian Volunteer Guard were involved in the
occupation of Bratunac and Srebrenica. However, no Serb sources have verified this claim, and
“Srebrenica” is not shown in a 1994 SDG-produced list of battle honors. Some of the volunteer elements
may have fought in Vukovar during 1991, and possibly were confused with the SDG.
1041
Danner’s description of Oric gives the flavor of one of the Muslim’s most effective, yet most brutal
commanders:
Short, powerfully built, with closely cropped dark hair and beard, Naser Oric was a twenty-five
year old body builder, former bar bouncer, and member of the Yugoslav special military police [sic];
indeed, Oric’s martial skills were such that, though he was a Bosnian Muslim – his grandfather had
been a member of the hated Ustase – he had been assigned to serve in Kosovo and then appointed a
bodyguard to Milosevic himself. In his plans to defend Srebrenica, Oric proved cunning and ruthless ...
Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York Review of Books, 18 December
1997, pp. 65-81. David Rohde writes that:
According to local stories, the brawny former bodyguard ... drank a mixture of honey and walnuts
– an aphrodisiac – before battle. As Naser passed through villages on his way to the front line,
farmers had jars of the potent concoction ready for him. Naser was loved because he always led his
men into battle. He was always the first out of the trench. His soldiers told their wives they loved
Naser more than them. Soldiers named their sons Naser.
David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II,
New York Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1996, p. 75.
Although most reports claim Oric was in the Serbian special police, he may instead have served in the pre-
war Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs elite Special Police Brigade, which served prominently in Kosovo.
1042
Danner describes the Serb actions:
In Bratunac, a few miles from Srebrenica, soldiers patrolled streets with megaphones, ordering
Muslims from their homes. Thousands were herded into a soccer stadium. Women and children were
loaded aboard buses and trucks and expelled. Seven hundred and fifty men were marched down
Bratunac’s main street and packed into a school gymnasium. Serb soldiers called the hodza or Muslim
holyman, to the front of the gymnasium; there they forced him to shimmy up a climbing rope, poured
beer over his head, and then beat him with clubs and iron bars, demanding he make the sign of the
Orthodox cross. Alter beating him nearly to death, the Serbs stabbed him in the back of the neck and
shot him in the head. Then they began to beat the Muslim men; in three days they killed more than
three hundred and fifty, and dumped the bodies in the Drina.
Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York Review of Books, 18 December
1997, pp. 65-81. See also Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia,
New York W. W. Norton & Company, 1998, pp. 149-155.
1043
The presence of Dragan and the “Red Berets” has been corroborated. See Sarajevo Radio, 7 August 1992.
Dragan left the Krajina in November 1991, after a dispute with RSK President Babic, and was reabsorbed
into the Serbian MUP, when he was quoted as saying. “I am active in the training of a special purposes unit

412
 Oric and the Muslim forces – numbering between 4.000 and 6.000 men in three
“brigades” – of which probably 30 to 50 percent were armed – ignored the Serb build-up
and began their own reign of terror against Serb military and civilian occupants outside the
towns of Bratunac, Skelani, and Milici. The Muslims systematically raided Serb villages,
killing their defenders and making off with their weapons and the villagers’ food. A Muslim
battalion commander later stated:
We were not ready for war. We had to attack to get arms and ammunition. We
attacked south because the Serbs were weak there; they did not think we would dare to
attack towards Serbia. Another important factor was food. We had to obtain food. We
had many refugees from Zvornik, Bratunac, Rogatica, and Han Pijesak ... And anyway,
we simply wanted to liberate as much as possible of the Srebrenica opstina
[municipality].1044
This raiding continued through June, July, and August, as the Muslims looted and
razed Serb villages and expanded their areas of control. Chuck Sudetic observed that Oric’s
combat troops were now being followed by a band of desperate civilians.
Oric could now count on a force that struck the fear of God into the Serb peasants
... a horde of Muslim refugees, men and women, young and old, who were driven by
hunger and, in many cases, a thirst for revenge. Thousands strong, these people would
lurk behind the first wave of attacking soldiers and run amok when the defences
around Serb villages collapsed. Some ... used pistols to do the killing; others used
knives, bats and hatchets. But most ... had nothing but their bare hands and the empty
rucksacks and suitcases they strapped on their backs. They came to be known as
“torbari”, the bag people. And they were beyond Oric’s control.1045
The Serbs were now tasting a particularly nasty version of their own medicine.1046
On 26 September Oric’s men scored one of their biggest victories when they hit the
village of Podravanje and the nearby hamlets, some 15 to 20 kilometers southeast of Milici,
near the Srebrenica bauxite mines. At least 27 VRS soldiers were killed – early Serb reports
claimed as many as 50 had died – and the territory gained allowed the Srebrenica fighters to
link up with Avdo Palic’s brigade in Zepa.1047 The Muslims treated the Serbs – soldiers and
civilians alike – with no quarter. Sudetic writes:

of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) of Serbia...”, Belgrade Tanjug, 7 November 1991. This unit clearly
was the elite “Red Berets” special operations unit of the RDB, under the command of senior RDB officer
“Frenki” Simatovic. Dragan later returned to the Krajina in spring 1993, after the Croatian Army offensive
near Zadar.
1044
Suljo Hasanovic, quoted in Honig and Both, p. 78.
1045
Chuck Sudetic: Bloodand Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W. Norton &
Company, 1998, p. 157. See also the review in Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The
New York Review of Books, 18 December 1997, pp. 65-81.
1046
See also David Rohde: Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World
War II, New York Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1996, pp. 15-16, 215-216 for Serb claims of Muslim atrocities.
1047
See Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books, 1996, p.
79, for the report claiming that Oric linked up with Zepa. The VRS troops probably were from Milici-raised
units of the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade.

413
 The Serb fighters left behind men and women who had been wounded and killed
... Then the torbari rushed in. Muslim men shot the wounded. They fired their guns into
the bodies of the Serb dead, plunged knives into their stomachs and chests. They
smashed their heads with axes and clubs, and they burned the bodies inside buildings.
Oric’s men grabbed half a dozen prisoners; one, a fighter from Serbia who had relatives
in Podravanje, was beaten to death, and the others emerged bruised and battered
when they were exchanged a month later.1048
The Muslim attacks continued into October, as several villages 10 to 15 kilometers
north of Skelani, right on the Drina River border with Serbia, were burned. In mid-
December, more villages, about 10 kilometers southeast of Bratunac, were attacked and
more than 50 Serbs killed. The VRS 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade and the Skelani
Battalion were powerless to stop Oric.
Oric was now ready for his next objective: to link up with the Cerska-Kamenica
enclave to the northwest and overrun the entire Bratunac-Skelani area, pushing right to the
Serbian border. This offensive, which kicked off successfully on 24 December, was to be his
last campaign, however. Instead of final victory it would bring down the wrath of General
Ratko Mladic, the VRS, and the Yugoslav Army.

Battles along the Southern Drina: Rogatica, Gorazde, Foca, and Visegrad1049
After the capture of Foca and Visegrad during April, the Serbs’ next objective was to
take control of the remaining Muslim strongholds centred around Gorazde. At the beginning
of May the Serbs tried to occupy key suburbs of Gorazde town from the direction of Cajnice
and take the Potkozara and Trebresko Brdo passes on the road to Cajnice. This first try failed
despite fighting that stretched into June. On 24 June, the VRS – probably the Cajnice Brigade
– claimed to have taken the southern district of Zupcici, some three kilometers south of the
town centre, but they must have lost it to a government counterattack because on 10 July,
more than two weeks later, the VRS again announced the capture of Zupcici. The Bosnian
Army’s 43rd Drina Shock Brigade appears to have succeeded in pushing VRS troops back
again and by the end of July the frontline in this sector had stabilized 10 kilometers
southeast of town.
The Bosnians’ rapid reorganization of their army and TO combat units contributed
to this victory. By June the government had organized its forces into five brigades (1st
Rogatica, 1st Visegrad, 1st Drina Shock, 31st Drina Shock, 43rd Drina Shock), while creating a
regional headquarters, the East Bosnian Operational Group, under the command of Ferid

1048
Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W. Norton &
Company, 1998, p. 158. See also Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York
Review of Books, 18 December 1997, pp. 65-81.
1049
The narrative in this section is based almost exclusively on a detailed operational-tactical analysis of
contemporary press reporting, supplemented by a few other reports and background gained over five
years on the units deployed in the area.

414
Buljubasic, to control these forces.1050 The operational group probably covered about 8.000
to 10.000 troops, although, as usual, no more than 50 percent of these probably had
modern small arms. In addition, elements of two tactical groups deployed in the Mount
Igman-Trnovo area – possibly some 2.000 to 4.000 personnel – would be involved in
operations to aid the enclave.
The VRS “Podrinje” Operational Group of the Herzegovina Corps, apparently under
the command of Colonel Svetozar Parezanin, plus elements of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,
controlled 10.000 to 11.000 troops covering the Trnovo-Foca-Gorazde-Visegrad region.1051
The “Podrinje” OG commanded at least two (and possibly three) tactical groups in Foca and
Visegrad.1052 TG “Foca” under Colonel Marko Kovac, controlled the Foca Light Infantry
Brigade (2.500 troops) – which was heavily involved in the Trnovo-Gorazde fighting – plus
apparently the Gacko Light Infantry Brigade (1.200 men).1053 On the north side of this
corridor, 1.500 troops organized in four battalions of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (probably
assigned to either the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized and/or 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigades)
and the “White Wolves” Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment supported TG “Foca”.1054 TG
“Visegrad”, led by Major Vinko Pandurevic (and later Colonel Dragisa Masal), was the
primary force containing or attempting to seize Gorazde. The tactical group was organized
into four, later five, light infantry brigades – the Rogatica, Visegrad, Cajnice, Rudo, and
Gorazde Brigades – with about 5.500 troops. Elements of the Sarajevo- Romanija Corps’s
2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade supported the tactical group around Rogatica. Several
hundred Serbian and Montenegrin volunteer “troops” also augmented VRS personnel, but
their presence faded as the fighting dragged on.1055 On 1 November, the newly activated
Drina Corps took charge of most of the Gorazde front, except for TG “Foca”, to provide Serb
forces with a more unified command and control structure.
Although the dogged Bosnian TO/Army troops had a firm grip on Gorazde’s
defence, the enclave would need more supplies to hold out. Opening a supply corridor from
Mount Igman, north of Foca, to the beleaguered enclave would be one of the government’s
most critical tasks during the year. When Serb troops hit and captured Foca and the nearby
town of Ustikolina in April, they had pressed the unprepared Muslim forces back to the
northeast, along the Osancica and Drina Rivers, some 15 to 20 kilometers west of Gorazde

1050
The “shock brigade” designator appears to have stemmed from World War II partisan unit honorifix.
1051
Although this is the total number of VRS troops available, the Serbs consistently failed to fully mobilize
most of their units, which often fought at less than full strength.
1052
The third tactical group, TG “Kalinovik”, may not have been formed until 1993.
1053
By 1993, the Foca Brigade had been redesignated the 11th Herzegovina Light Infantry (later Infantry)
Brigade, while the Gacko Brigade became the 18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade. The Gacko Brigade
probably was shifted to TG “Kalinovik” either later in 1992 or in 1993.
1054
See M. Koruga: War Portrait of the “White Wolves”: In Defense of Freedom, Srpska Vojska, 25 August 1995,
p. 23.
1055
These units drifted in and out of Bosnia at the whim of their “commanders”. Most appear to have been far
more interested in plundering Muslim homes and killing civilians than engaging in combat operations. They
were never more than company-sized, and the VRS’s ability to exert command and control over them often
appears to have been limited during the early phases of the war. By the end of the year most of these units
had disappeared, and the VRS allowed them into Bosnia only if they subordinated themselves to the army.

415
town. Clashes along this line continued throughout May, although little ground changed
hands.
By the beginning of June, however, Muslim forces from Mount Igman began
pressuring VRS troops around the key road junction of Trnovo, which was the gateway to
Gorazde: from there Bosnian forces could use a rough mountain road to transport supplies
across the southern Jahorina Mountains to the enclave. On 1 June, VRS troops and Serb
civilians appear to have withdrawn from the town, but four days later the Serbs returned
and pushed the Muslim forces back out. By late July the Bosnian TO/Army had prepared a
major offensive to seize both Trnovo and the key Rogoj Pass to the south of town and thus
secure a route over the Johorina running through the villages of Grebak and Jabuka. On 23-
25 July Muslim troops captured the Jabuka-Grebak areas, pushing the Serb troops from the
Foca Brigade and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps out of several villages along the corridor,
probably flushing out the local Serb population as well. On 31 July troops from the Bosnian
TO “Igman” Tactical Group stormed Trnovo, then pushed on to capture the Rogoj Pass, 10
kilometers south of the town. For the next three weeks VRS forces held off repeated Muslim
attempts to reach the town of Kalinovik, another 12 kilometers further south. Their success
came too late, for the road to Gorazde – some five to 15 kilometers wide and 30 kilometers
long from Trnovo to the Osanica River – lay open to the supply trucks.
Fire-fights peppered the area of the corridor for months afterward, but it was not
until mid-November that the VRS made a concerted effort to close down the road.1056 This
operation called for attacks by both the Sarajevo-Romanija and Herzegovina Corps at the
route’s narrowest point, possibly under the overall command of Colonel Vlado Spremo,
chief of staff of the Herzegovina Corps. On 11 November two Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
battalions, probably augmented by the “White Wolves”, under a Lieutenant Colonel
Borovina, pushed south from positions near Praca on Jahorina, while troops from the Foca
Brigade under Colonel Kovac drove north. By 13 November the two forces had linked up at
Modro Polje. Muslim troops fought to restore the corridor over the next week with some
success. On 7 December, however, VRS troops ambushed a supply column near Grebak and
closed the road; it would stay closed until early in the next year. The 1992 fighting seemed
to indicate that the VRS had insufficient forces to hold a continuous frontline along the
supply track, but could interdict it with shellfire and the occasional ground forces strike.
During 1993, however, the VRS would move to shut down the corridor for good.
While they battled in the west, Muslim and Serb forces also fought over the
Rogatica-Visegrad-Gorazde triangle along the banks of the Drina. In late May, as the two
sides fought for control of the south bank of the Drina at Gorazde town, clashes erupted

1056
In the interim the VRS Foca and Gacko Brigades apparently carried out a strange operation along the road
connecting Foca and Gacko, as well as the adjacent Zelengora mountains. The focal point was the village of
Tjentiste, some 20 kilometers south of Foca. No previous military activity had been reported in the sector,
and it appears the VRS intended a combination of ethnic cleansing and counter-partisan actions. It lasted
from 26 September to about 5 October. The VRS Herzegovina Corps trumpeted the success as the first time
that troops from southern Herzegovina had linked up with the Drina valley, creating an “uninterrupted”
front from Dubrovnik to Visegrad. Belgrade Tanjug, 26 September 1992

416
around the Mount Trovrh radio tower and Borak hill, some seven kilometers
north/northeast of town. The hills running between the two points dominated the
approaches to the town from both the north and the northeast. By 29 May, Muslim troops
seized control of Borak, although Serb forces retained the Trovrh tower.
Throughout May, June, and July, Serb/VRS forces also moved to take control of the
rural portions of the Rogatica municipality, seizing most of the area between Muslim-held
Rogatica and Zepa. Bosnian TO/Army forces, however, still held Rogatica itself. The VRS
Rogatica Brigade, under Major Rajko Kusic, gradually pushed Muslim soldiers and civilians
out of the area, particularly along the Rogatica-Visegrad road, and by the end of July the VRS
was ready to assault the town itself. Rogatica fell on 2 August after two days of fighting.1057
Muslim forces in the area strongly resisted the attacks, but Kusic’s troops were
subsequently able to secure most of the area surrounding the town. Beginning on 8 August,
the Rogatica Brigade moved to take the remaining Muslim-controlled part of the road,
beginning at the Sjemec depression, some 12 kilometers east of Rogatica. The attack
appears to have been at least partially successful.
Now, it was Ferid Buljubasic’s turn to go on the offensive. Beginning in mid-August
the East Bosnian Operational Group launched a series of attacks to clear the northern (left)
bank of the Drina around Gorazde, and penetrate toward Rogatica and Visegrad. One of the
first objectives was the Trovrh radio tower, which appears to have fallen in late August after
sustained fighting.1058 By 30 August Muslim troops, led by the 1st Rogatica, 1st Drina, and
31st Drina Shock Brigades, had captured much of the northern bank, pushing to within 10 to
15 kilometers of Rogatica from the south.
The next step was to move on Visegrad, including the key hydroelectric dam south
of town, while renewing the drive toward Rogatica. Muslim troops already held a narrow
salient toward Visegrad, culminating in the village of Mededa, 12 kilometers southwest of
town. They also held a strip of land five to seven kilometers wide on the south side of the
Drina at its confluence with the Lim River, directly across from Mededa. The Muslim
offensive kicked off on or about 12 September but made little headway against VRS Tactical
Group “Visegrad”, under Major Vinko Pandurevic. VRS Rogatica and Rudo Brigade troops
counterattacked in late September and early October with some success. By 12 October,
however, Buljubasic’s men appear to have retaken the lost ground (including near Rogatica),
and were able to renew the drive, slowly grinding their way toward Visegrad. By early
November, Muslim 1st Visegrad Brigade units had pushed to within one to two kilometers
of Visegrad town and the dam, and were within five kilometers of Rogatica from the

1057
The Rogatica Brigade lost 12 personnel killed in action while capturing Rogatica. Vuk Kovacevic: They
Protected Serbian Territory, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, pp. 13-14, an article on the 1st Podrinje (Rogatica)
Light Infantry Brigade.
1058
The Rogatica Brigade lost 15 killed and 30 wounded during the fighting around Trovrh and Jabuka pass in
late August. Vuk Kovacevic: They Protected Serbian Territory, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, pp. 13-14; an
article on the 1st Podrinje (Rogatica) Light Infantry Brigade. At some point, the Rogatica Brigade was
reinforced by elements – probably 1-2 companies – of the 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade / 2nd Krajina
Corps. Nikola Zoric: 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade: Order on Krajina Chests, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993,
pp. 8-9.

417
south.1059 VRS counterattacks may have regained some ground in early December, but
Muslim troops appear to have pushed Serb forces back out again.

Zepa and the VRS Main Staff

One of the more intriguing sectors in the Drina valley fighting was the area around
the little village of Zepa, east of Han Pijesak. In and around Zepa, the Muslims had collected
thousands of refugees and local villagers in a mountain fastness that was nearly
impregnable. Operating from this area, Muslim soldiers – from the 6th Zepa Shock Brigade
under the command of Avdo Palic – made themselves hornets around the ears of the VRS,
particularly the nearby VRS Main Staff, the high command of the army. Muslim-controlled
villages were less than five kilometers from the Main Staff command bunker complex at
Mount Zep.
On 4 June, Muslim troops ambushed and annihilated a VRS supply convoy driving to
the important radio relay tower on Zlovrh mountain, only some five kilometers northeast of
Zepa itself.1060 The VRS did not respond to this attack, but after the next incident, on 7
August, when 13 VRS soldiers were captured, the Main Staff decided to eliminate the
hornets’ nest or at least swat back.
Guarding the Main Staff was normally the job of the 65th Protection Motorized
Regiment; much of that elite unit’s troops, however, appear to have been dispatched to the
fighting around Sarajevo. With the rest of troops in the area tied down all over the Drina
valley, the only formation still in the Han Pijesak-Mount Zep area was the 67th
Communications Regiment. To deal with Palic’s hornets the VRS had to redeploy the 4th
Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade all the way from Prijedor in western Bosnia to Han
Pijesak to conduct its planned counterattack.1061 The Main Staff was also able to draw on

1059
Muslim forces may even have established a tenuous link to Zepa, some 20 kilometers to the north,
although it seems unlikely that they actually controlled a strip of territory linking the Gorazde-Zepa area.
1060
For a detailed account of the 4 June ambush, see Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story
of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W. Norton & Company, 1998, pp. 115-117. See also Biljana Djurdjevic:
The Serbs Do Not Attack First, Belgrade Intervju, 11 June 1993, pp. 20-22; interview with Major General
Manojlo Milovanovic, Chief of the VRS Main Staff. Milovanovic claims that at first some Muslims in the area
refused to fight the Serbs, and were killed by other Muslims:
As early as 20 May last year I had talks with Muslims from the wider area of Zepa, more precisely
from the village of Krivaca. The fifteen of them were armed with hunting rifles and were located near
to one of our units. I asked them: What are you people doing here? They said we are protecting you
from the Muslims. What are you? We are Muslims. So which Muslims are you protecting us from?
They said: from Sandzak Muslims. They will force us to fight against you. When this happens we will
run to you. And this is exactly what happened. The Sandzak people entered Zepa and killed the
Muslims who did not want to fight against us.
Although Milovanovic’s claim that these Muslims were from the Sandzak seems absurd, the claim that
Muslims killed other Muslims is not.
1061
See Where It Was Hardest, There Was the 4th Battalion: From Romanija to the Una and Sava, Krajiski
Vojnik, June 1996, p. 37. The 4th Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade was reinforced with one company
each from the 6th and 7th Battalions / 43rd Motorized Brigade, and part of the brigade antitank battalion.
In addition, elements 1 to 2 companies – of the 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade / 2nd Krajina Corps were
deployed to the Han Pijesak area. For more details on this operation, see also Mico Glamocanin: Without a

418
elements of Lieutenant Colonel Radislav Krstic’s 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade.
Combined with elements of the 65th, these units managed to seize and destroy several
Muslim villages, clearing about 60 square kilometers in front of its headquarters.
This still left Muslim forces only five to ten kilometers from Mount Zep, and the
rugged terrain made their main stronghold around Zepa virtually impenetrable.1062 On 11
December a large Muslim sabotage unit struck at the Main Staff area again, but this time
troops from the 65th Protection Regiment and the 2nd Romanija Brigade were able to block
the strike.1063
Attacks like these would continue for another two and a half years while the Zepa
hornets’ nest hung just beyond the grasp of the bedevilled VRS.

Evaluation of the 1992 Drina Valley Operations

The ability of the Bosnian Muslims in the Drina valley to organize military units
under extremely difficult conditions, defend their homes, and then undertake offensive
operations against the Bosnian Serb Army stands as one of greatest military feats of the
Bosnian war. The victories these forces achieved, which deflected the Serbs from one of
their key war aims, came at a terrible price. At the beginning of the conflict the Serbs had
driven thousands of Muslims from their homes and probably killed thousands more. Muslim
military successes could not retrieve those terrible losses, and their forces remained locked
in tenuous and hungry enclaves often crowded with refugees. Where they did succeed in
pushing back the Serbs in 1992, their very successes – together with the many revenge-
driven atrocities committed by Muslim forces, mostly around Srebrenica – would bring on a
VRS strategic offensive in 1993 that was to destroy most of these gains.
Muslim military prowess can be attributed to four factors: organization, motivation,
natural fighting ability, and leadership. The Bosnian TO/Army forces in the Drina valley,
caught unawares when the war started, quickly organized themselves into classic military
formations ranging from platoon to brigade. Although these units had nothing like the
robust command and control network, discipline, or professional leadership common the
former JNA units of the VRS, they were sufficient to provide a coherent framework for the
defence of the remaining Muslim territory. Possibly as a legacy of Yugoslavia’s era of
Communist regimentation, every side in its war of disintegration, including the put-upon
Muslims, set out promptly to organize its manpower, set up a chain of command, and work
actively to professionalize its forces while the fighting raged. It was not a pretty process

Battle Lost, Kozarski Vjesnik, 26 August 1994, an article on the 43rd Motorized Brigade, and Mirjana Micic:
Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, an article on the 65th Protection Motorized
Regiment, and Nikola Zoric: 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade: Order on Krajina Chests, Srpska Vojska, 15
July 1993. pp. 8-9.
1062
1062 Biljana Djurdjevic: The Serbs Do Not Attack First, Belgrade Intervju, 11 June 1993, pp. 20-22; interview
with Major General Manojlo Milovanovic, Chief of the VRS Main Staff.
1063
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 December 1992.

419
from a Western or NATO professional military standpoint, but the Muslim recruits of 1992
had units to report to, and they knew who their commanders were.
Second, the Muslims in the Drina valley were highly motivated instant soldiers. The
men, particularly the refugees, had seen family members and friends brutally killed,
tortured and raped. Many had lost their homes and all of their possessions. Their villages
had been overrun and burned to the ground. Those who had escaped with their families
now had to watch them slowly starve as the roads to central Bosnia and the central
government were cut and pinched off. These experiences inspired the men of the Bosnian
TO/Army forces in the valley with a powerful motivation to kill Serb soldiers and take their
weapons, food, and anything else that would help them survive.
The Bosnian TO/Army made good use of the natural fighting ability that seemed to
characterize the men of the Drina valley. They proved to be adept mountain rangers and
fighters; operating in semi-partisan fashion, in small units, they exploited the familiar
mountainous terrain to infiltrate the porous lines fronting VRS positions and to attack Serb
villages. Their quick and stealthy movements terrorized VRS front line soldiers, as well as the
Serb peasant population, so that a minor Muslim raid might gather steam and roll up new
territory as Serb troops and their families panicked and abandoned their positions and
homes.
Finally, Muslim military leaders were chosen not for their political correctness or
affiliation to a party, only for their ability to fight and inspire. Muslim soldiers grouped
naturally around what were essentially chieftains or warlords rather than professional
soldiers. These commanders were men who had risen naturally and by example to the top
of the “warrior” groups in the early days of the fighting. They had a common thirst for battle
and an appreciation of their situation expressed in the local equivalent of “the best defence
is a good offense”. Far from hunkering down and waiting for the VRS to hit them, these
commanders took advantage of their men’s anger and their natural combat skills to take the
war to the Serbs.
The Serbs gathered under the banner of the VRS failed to defeat Bosnian TO/Army
forces in the Drina valley during 1992 because of shortcomings in organization,
professionalism, and firepower. The VRS suffered from a command and control vacuum in
the valley during most of the year, until the formation of the Drina Corps in November. The
two corps that had been responsible for the region under the JNA, the East Bosnian and
Herzegovina, were focused elsewhere (Posavina and Mostar-Dubrovnik, respectively). The
operational group headquarters these corps formed to organize the men and materiel
allocated to the Drina valley proved unable to unify the Serb effort or bring to bear the
resources needed to combat the Muslims.
The absence of a former JNA corps in the valley also meant that, unlike the
situation in other Serb-dominated areas, there would not be enough professionals with JNA
experience in staff and leadership skills to organize and command newly created units. JNA
professionalism was one of the key assets that had brought the VRS success elsewhere in
1992, and the availability of higher staff skills at the corps level, and often in brigades, had

420
helped make up for the deficiencies in discipline and training at the battalion and company
levels. Of the two former JNA combat brigades deployed in the valley, one was split in three
different directions, and the other had been considerably diluted with TO personnel so that
there was little or no cadre of regular units to compensate for the rawness of the new
brigades.1064 Without this leavening of professional expertise and disciplined stiffening,
most Serb units in the valley faced their Muslim opponents with a surfeit of modern rifles as
their only advantage.
Unfortunately for the Serbs, although they had more weapons than the Muslims
the advantage was not on a scale that allowed the VRS to compensate for its other
shortcomings, as was the case in other theatres. With few regular formations to draw on,
the VRS lacked the numbers of JNA-supplied armour and field artillery it needed to support
its operations in the valley. Most of its new light infantry units had only 60 mm and 82 mm
mortars to provide fire support, plus a few 120 mm pieces.

1064
The ex-JNA 336th Motorized Brigade appears to have become the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade. Organized
into seven battalions, its professional cadre probably was stretched to the limit. The ex-JNA 14th Motorized
Brigade, originally garrisoned in Muslim-held Zenica, was moved to Sokolac when fighting broke out. It
became the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, and was split between the Olovo-Kladanj area, Han Pijesak-
Zepa, and Rogatica-Gorazde.

421
 Annex 31
Sarajevo 1992 – The Siege Begins
From the very outset of the Bosnian war, Sarajevo was the political and emotional
heart of the nation and the primary focus of the world’s attention. Indeed, even before the
war began the 1984 Olympics had made Sarajevo the outside world’s most familiar image of
Yugoslavia. When that image was shattered by artillery fire and replaced with street fighting
in the Olympic village, the Kosevo and Zetra stadiums in ruins, rows of new graves dug
alongside the soccer field, most Western viewers could relate the carnage to something
familiar, and the plight of besieged Sarajevo commanded media attention in a way that the
rest of the country, inaccessible and unfamiliar, could not.
Bosnia’s capital city of some 430.000 citizens (pre war) lay on a more or less east-
west axis along both sides of the tiny Miljacka river. Tall mountain peaks loom up over the
city on all sides, an ideal winter Olympics location but a phenomenally bad defensive one, as
besieging artillery could overlook the city centre and fire accurately and almost at will. The
urban centre of Sarajevo was broadly divided into the Old City (Stari Grad) in the east and
the new city (Novi Grad) to the west, which were themselves comprised of and surrounded
by a multitude of neighbourhoods and suburbs, each with their own names.
Even before the war began, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic had a vision of a
partitioned, Serb-dominated Sarajevo. As Silber and Little narrate it:
Karadzic always made plain his ambition to partition Sarajevo... Without shame,
he would advocate to journalists and diplomats alike the need to build a wall through
the heart of the city... The extreme east of the city, the narrow winding streets of the
Turkish old town, together with the broad boulevards of the neighbouring nineteenth-
century Habsburg quarters, were for the Muslims and Croats. Everything to the west of
Marijin Dvor – including most of the city’s twentieth-century industrial and commercial
infrastructure, and most of its residential capacity – was to be inhabited exclusively by
Serbs. This was decided on the preposterous grounds that the farmland and villages on
which the modern city had been built were originally populated mostly by rural Serb
communities. Karadzic made no apologies for devising a plan which would cram the
vast majority of the city’s people into the smallest, most crowded sector of the town. “It
is the habit of the Muslims to live this way”, his deputy, Biljana Plavsic, once
memorably declared. “They like to live on top of one another. It’s their culture. We
Serbs need space”.1065
Karadzic even went so far as to describe his views on the future of Sarajevo to then-
US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman:

1065
Laura Silber and Alan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 232-233.

422
 The city will be divided into Muslim. Serbian, and Croatian sections, so that no
ethnic groups will have to live or work together... Our vision of Sarajevo is like Berlin
when the Wall was still standing.1066
In Sarajevo as elsewhere in Bosnia, one of the first tangible indications that
widespread communal violence was looming came immediately after the results of the
republic-wide independence referendum were announced on 3 March. Roadblocks,
barricades, and checkpoints sprang up all over Bosnia that day, but the division of Sarajevo
city along ethnic lines was the largest and most pronounced confrontation in the republic.
And with four killed in clashes between roving, rival ethnic gangs it was also the bloodiest.
War did not come to Sarajevo in March 1992, but it came closer than it had at any other
time or place to date.
Despite all the evidence of impending catastrophe, though, most Sarajevo citizens
believed that a negotiated peace could be maintained and war somehow averted. Tens of
thousands would cling to this belief until literally the first shells were falling around them. In
part this was due to the uniquely multiethnic character of the city. Just over one-third (34.1
percent) of all marriages in Sarajevo in 1991 were inter-ethnic, almost double the country-
wide average of 18.6 percent and more than triple the 9.5 percent average for non-urban
areas.1067 Sarajevo’s citizens also tended to be more educated and more politically
moderate than anywhere else in the country, except perhaps for Tuzla in northeast Bosnia.
But although the “silent majority” of Sarajevans simply wanted peace, a significant Serb
minority was girding for war. Although the city census showed a Muslim or “Yugoslav”
majority, almost 120.000 Serbs were concentrated in five municipal districts of Sarajevo’s
city centre, and most of these did not share the Sarajevo government’s perception of a
multiethnic capital.1068
Ironically, although multiethnic, cosmopolitan Sarajevo was the last place to accept
that war could come to Bosnia, it was the first place where organized violence actually
began; the shooting in Sarajevo slightly predated Bosnia’s formal declaration of
independence, which was the trigger for the fighting elsewhere in the country. On 5 April,
well-equipped Serb paramilitaries surrounded and then attacked the Bosnian MUP’s large
police academy complex on the south side of the city. Not only did the Muslim-dominated
academy occupy a commanding position atop Vraca Hill, overlooking the Serb-majority
Grbavica neighbourhood, it was also stockpiled with guns and ammunition. The Bosnian
Serbs, already alienated from the prospective multiethnic government, feared that the
academy would put 800 well-armed government police cadets in their rear, and resolved to
pre-emptively eliminate this threat with mortar, rocket, and rifle fire.1069 1070 1071 1072 The

1066
The New Yorker, The Victor in Bosnia by William Finnegan, October 9, 1995, pp. 5-6.
1067
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 10-
11.
1068
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, p. 10.
1069
The head of the MUP school reportedly stated there were 840 students and teachers in the school
compound at the time. (Most of these were teenagers.) Zagreb Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS London
LD0504160392.

423
building was contested for several hours, and about a dozen of its defenders wounded,
before an EC-brokered cease-fire was agreed to late in the day. Under the terms of the
agreement JNA troops were brought in to serve as buffers, but in fact they appear to have
turned control of the facility over to the Serbs and taken the teenage cadets as hostages.1073
1074 1075 1076

The following day was 6 April; the anniversary of the city’s liberation from the Nazi
occupation in 1945, and any illusion of normalcy in Sarajevo broke down completely.
Bosnian Serb gunmen fired indiscriminately from upper floors of the Holiday Inn (later to
become the well-known home of many Western war correspondents) into the courtyard of
the Bosnian Parliament building across the street, killing several pro-peace demonstrators
and injuring numerous others. Bosnian Government Special Police eventually stormed the
hotel, capturing six Serb snipers. Few Sarajevans had any doubts that Radovan Karadzic had
ordered the shootings – the rooms from which the shots were fired had been rented to the
Serbian Democratic Party, and one of the six arrested Serbs turned out to be a Karadzic
bodyguard – but his role was never actually proven.1077
That afternoon Serb forces began directing mortar rounds and rifle fire into the
Muslim-majority Stari Grad and Bascarsija neighbourhoods on the eastern end of the
city.1078 As it had claimed the previous day at the Vrace barracks, the JNA garrison professed
to be completely impartial, but at least some JNA elements helped and supported the Serb
territorials. JNA 2nd Military District commander Milutin Kukanjac later categorically denied
claims that his tanks had fired in support of Serb paramilitaries at any point during the
fighting,1079 but a variety of other reports all maintained that olive-green tanks – which at

1070
By an unfortunate and ironic coincidence the gun battles around the surrounded police academy were
going on at the exact time as thousands of Sarajevans paraded into the area in a march for peaceful
coexistence among all the factions. Unaware of the assault, the crowd crossed south over the Vrbanja
bridge and marched towards the Serb paramilitaries attacking Vraca hill. One man was injured, and then a
21-year-old medical student, Suada Dilberovic, was shot through the chest. She died within minutes, and
the Sarajevo marchers’ dream of a united Bosnia died with her. She is sometimes counted as the first
casualty of the Bosnian civil war, although that dubious distinction could perhaps better be awarded to the
Muslim victims of Arkan’s occupation of Bijelina four days earlier, on April 1.
1071
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 226-227.
1072
In the end, the several hundred captive police cadets were exchanged for the six Serb gunmen who fired
into the crowd from the Holiday Inn on April 6, 1992. Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper
Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 41-42.
1073
Sarajevo Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0504200892.
1074
Less intense fighting occurred elsewhere in the city on 5 April. Muslim forces took over the Novo Sarajevo
police station (Sarajevo Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0504134292), and shooting and grenade fire
were reported in the Dobrinja and Bascarsija neighborhoods. (Sarajevo Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS Vienna
AU0504224292.)
1075
Zagreb Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS London LD0504230692.
1076
Zagreb Radio, 5 April 1992, FBIS London LD0604000892.
1077
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 2-3,
22-24.
1078
Sarajevo Radio, 6 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0604184292.
1079
As Kukanjac put it:
The Yugoslav People’s Army will not bombard Sarajevo. For sure, never, not tonight, not today,
not tomorrow.

424
that time must have belonged to JNA units – had indeed fired on Muslim-held positions near
Grbavica and at the Vrace police academy.1080
When the fighting had died down and the JNA ended its programmed withdrawal
late in May, the new Bosnian Serb Army absorbed the JNA 4th Corps and all the Serb TO
forces around the city and moulded them into a single force dubbed the Sarajevo-Romanija
Corps. This formation, using the structure of the former 4th Corps, controlled three former
JNA brigades (including enough equipment for five armour-mechanized battalions), six new
light infantry brigades (raised from the TO), a mixed artillery regiment, an antitank regiment,
and an air defence regiment.1081 All told, the force comprised about 15.000 men with up to
80 tanks, about 72 field artillery pieces, and 12 multiple rocket launchers, plus several
hundred 60 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm mortars.
Major General Tomislav Sipcic commanded the new corps, but Colonel (later Major
General) Stanislav Galic would replace him that fall.
Even more than elsewhere, Sarajevo’s non-Serb defenders – initially numbering
perhaps 10.000 armed residents of all types – were a haphazard lot.1082 They included much
of the former Sarajevo Territorial Defence headquarters and units from the Muslim-
majority municipalities, some Muslim JNA deserters from the Marshal Tito and other
barracks in the city, probably several thousand Patriotic League members (at least
organized, if not fully armed), and a few conspicuous bands of common criminals. The last

Sarajevo Radio, 7 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0704201092.

1080
Sarajevo Radio, 7 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0704234292.
1081
The order of battle of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in 1992 was as follows:
Headquarters, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps – Lukavica
1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade* – Grbavica/Stari Grad
2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade* – Dobrinja/Vitkovici
1st Romanija Infantry Brigade* – Hresa
Vogosca Light Infantry Brigade – Vogosca
Kosevo Light Infantry Brigade – Kosevo
Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade – Rajlovac
llidza Light Infantry Brigade – Ilidza/Nedzarici/Airport
Igman Light Infantry Brigade – Hadzici/Kiseljak
Ilijas Light Infantry Brigade – Ilijas/Visoko
“White Wolves” Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment
4th Mixed Artillery Regiment*
4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment*
4th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment*
*Ex-JNA brigade/regiment
Four infantry battalions of the corps – the Trnovo, Pale, Praca, and Jahorina Battalions – appear to have
been assigned to the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry (Trnovo) and 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade (the other
three). These battalions, however, were not stationed around Sarajevo, but deployed 20 to 25 kilometers
southeast of the city as part of VRS operations to contain Bosnian Army forces around Gorazde in the Drina
valley. The 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, although assigned to the corps, was never deployed around
Sarajevo and fought in the Olovo-Kladanj, Rogatica-Gorazde, and Han Pijesak-Zepa areas. These operations
also probably drew off some of the corps’ artillery and armor strength from the siege of the city.
1082
A senior Bosnian Army official told a Reuters correspondent that Sarajevo’s defenders had begun the war
with about 4.000 police weapons and about 3.000 weapons of all other types. (Reuters: Bosnia’s Moslem
Army Predicts Long Conflict, by Gilles Trequesser, 1 December 1992) Other figures based on Patriotic
League membership suggest that the actual number of weapons was probably somewhat higher, though
not much.

425
category, de facto gangster mobs led by flamboyant outlaw chiefs like Juka Prazina, Musan
“Caco” Topalovic, and Ramiz “Celo” Delalic, provided some of the city’s best-armed and
bravest defenders, but they also openly extorted “donations” from the citizens they claimed
to be defending and for a time became a law unto themselves.
The rest of April in Sarajevo was to see a series of contests for control over various
neighbourhoods in which the JNA continued to play an ambiguous role. In these contests of
the first few days, most of the battle lines that would last the remainder of the war were
drawn. On 13 April intense firing racked the Mojmilo district, a hilly area overlooking the
south-western part of the city.1083 Under cover of the fighting the JNA reportedly withdrew
some 12.000 small arms from the Mojmilo Territorial Defence depot and transported them
to Pale.1084 The JNA openly confiscated the contents of the Faletici Territorial Defence depot
in the far northeast part of the city at the same time, leaving the local inhabitants unarmed
and outraged.1085 On 15 April, however, the JNA sent its own armed troops to the Mojmilo-
Dobrinja area to suppress the fighting and serve as peacekeepers. The Bosnian Government
had little choice but to agree to the deployment after the fact.1086
The Vogosca district, north of Sarajevo city on the far side of the mountainous Zuc
ridge was the next to be contested. On 18 April a battle began for control of the Pretis
munitions plant in the area, precipitated, according to Bosnian Government sources, by the
approach of an army convoy whose purpose was to remove weapons and production
machinery from the factory – a credible enough claim given the JNA’s removal of TDF stores
from inside the city five days earlier. Summoned by a broadcast call for defenders, Bosnian
Territorial Defence and Patriotic League forces moved to prevent the confiscation and
occupied the facility themselves.231087 Two days later, however, Serb forces occupied the
local police and assembly buildings and established de facto control over most of
Vogosca.1088 1089
At approximately the same time, Serb forces were taking over most, but not all, the
residential areas adjacent to the Sarajevo airport runway. Street battles began in the Ilidza
district in south-western Sarajevo on 22 April, including a struggle for control of a complex
of hotels.1090 1091 (Many years earlier, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife had stayed
in one of these hotels the night before they were shot; just a few years later, these same
hotels were to become the headquarters of the IFOR multinational peacekeeping mission.)

1083
Zagreb Radio, 13 April 1992, FBIS London LD1304145192.
1084
Zagreb Radio, 13 April 1992, FBIS London LD1304145192.
1085
Sarajevo Radio, 13 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1304190692.
1086
Sarajevo Radio, 15 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1504193092.
1087
Sarajevo Radio, 18 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1804153592.
1088
Sarajevo Radio, 20 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2004152392.
1089
One exception appears to have been the Government-held Svrake district of Vogosca, which was
surrounded by Serb forces but continued to resist and hope for relief into the next month. Sarajevo Radio,
3 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0305205292.
1090
Sarajevo Radio, 22 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2204073492.
1091
Government forces appear to have briefly gained control of the hotel complex in mid-May 1992, but the
Serbs recaptured the area and retained control until the center was handed over to UNPROFOR. Sarajevo
Radio, 14 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1405210092.

426
Over the next few days, Serb forces occupied all of Ilidza (at the north-western end of the
airport runway), most of Nedzarici (along the north side of the western half of the runway),
and part of Dobrinja (along the north side of the eastern half of the runway). But they could
not completely dislodge the Muslims from the remainder of Dobrinja – a compact but
densely populated neighbourhood of mixed ethnicity – or the Butmir neighbourhood
adjacent to the south side of the runway. This tenuous connection – with Muslim-controlled
neighbourhoods touching fractions of the Sarajevo airport runway on opposite sides – was
to be the besieged city’s Government-held lifeline out of the city centre for the next three
years.1092
The second of May, 1992, was to be one of the most crucial days in the three-year
siege of the city. Partly by accident, a series of interrelated events occurred which
irrevocably changed the JNA’s involvement in the siege and dramatically escalated the level
of violence. It all began as President Izetbegovic’s plane returned from three days of
unproductive international negotiations in Lisbon. As the aircraft began its return flight, the
pilot told Izetbegovic that landing clearance had been refused at JNA-controlled Sarajevo
airport due to fighting in the area. Izetbegovic ordered the pilot to land at Zagreb instead.
But then came a reversal which was to have far-reaching consequences: the pilot said
shortly afterward that Sarajevo air traffic control had changed its instructions and that the
President could land at his own risk if he so chose. After a few minutes of reflection,
Izetbegovic ordered the pilot to change course back to Sarajevo.1093
The UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, Canadian Brig. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, had
sent a Swedish armoured personnel carrier to escort Izetbegovic back to the Bosnian
Presidency under UN auspices, but after the flight had been delayed for over an hour and a
half the APC left. Instead of neutral Swedish peace keepers Izetbegovic was met by 30 JNA
soldiers who escorted him to the JNA barracks at Lukavica. JNA Gen. Djurdjevac,
commander of the JNA 4th (Sarajevo) Corps, told Izetbegovic he was being detained “for his
own safety”, but for all practical purposes the Bosnian President was now the JNA’s
prisoner.1094
However, at roughly the same time JNA was taking the Bosnian President hostage,
the Yugoslav army was itself being held captive in most of Bosnia. In Sarajevo itself, the
second of May saw Government police and Muslim volunteer forces begin to surround
several JNA barracks and the JNA officers’ club in Sarajevo – apparently under orders from
someone other than Izetbegovic – with demands for the surrender of the Serb troops inside.
When the JNA troops refused, the Bosnian Government forces began laying siege to the
buildings. The army responded by bombarding Sarajevo’s centre with heavy field artillery

1092
Since the Sarajevo airport itself was controlled at first by the JNA and then by the UN for most of the war,
even this Government-held link was not quite continuous until the construction of the tunnel under the
airport runway.
1093
Laura Silber and Alan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, p. 231.
1094
Laura Silber and Alan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 232, 235.

427
from outside the city, a terrifying escalation from the mortar rounds that had done most of
the shelling to date.1095
In a recent study of the JNA in 1991-1992, former JNA operations officer and
Krajina Serb Army (SVK) general Milisav Sekulic states that:
... there was a hasty decision to arrest Alija Izetbegovic as soon as he landed at
the airport, which was controlled by units of the JNA. The idea was to force him to
order an immediate halt to the mobilization [of the Republic Territorial Defence] and
the combat operations. There was also an assumption that the safe passage of the
Command of the Second Military District out of Sarajevo would be guaranteed. This
decision was approved personally by Gen. Blagoje Adzic, Acting Federal Secretary for
National Defence, with the prior agreement of the Yugoslav President; that agreement
had been given by Dr. [Branko] Kostic [the Montenegrin who was the then President of
the Federal Presidency]. A mark of the amateurish, dilettante nature of the operation is
the fact that the whole muddled enterprise failed to provide a fallback in the event that
Alija Izetbegovic refused to comply with the Army’s requests. Neither had thought been
given to what was to be done if Izetbegovic was cooperative, but his orders were not
accepted by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency or the Army of the Muslim-Croat
coalition.
Sekulic also notes that the JNA had not given thought to the international response
to the arrest of the “legally elected” president of Bosnia.1096
Then the JNA – apparently reacting to the surrounding of its barracks, although the
exact sequence of events that day is unclear – dramatically escalated its offensive against
Government-held Sarajevo. Acting without pretence for the first time, the JNA sent two
armoured columns out from their garrisons in an attempt to relieve the other, blockaded
JNA barracks in the city and either incidentally or deliberately cut the capital’s government
positions in half. One armoured column advanced into the city from the west near the
airport, but was stopped by makeshift Government defences in the far-western
neighbourhood of Stup. Another JNA column advanced north from the Lukavica barracks
south of the city centre, aiming to cross from the Serb-majority Grbavica suburbs on the
south side of the Miljacka river over the narrow Skenderija bridge and into the Government-
held heart of the city. The JNA tanks succeeded in crossing the bridge and made it to within
a hundred meters of the Bosnian Presidency building. Muslim Patriotic League volunteers
and Territorial Defence troops stopped the Serb armoured advance with Molotov cocktails,
rifle grenades, and a homemade artillery piece made out of a drainpipe. Caught at a
disadvantage in the close-in fighting, four Serb tanks were destroyed and the rest gave up

1095
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 98-
99.
1096
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, pp. 301-302.

428
their ground and retreated to the south. Disaster had been narrowly averted, and Sarajevo’s
beleaguered defenders scored a major psychological victory.1097 1098
By the evening of 2 May the President’s capture was not only public knowledge but
had become a real-time media event. Live, three-way negotiations were begun over
Sarajevo Radio as the Bosnian Government, the JNA, and the EC tried to arrange terms for a
ceasefire and the President’s release. At the same time, the various parties were also
contacting the Bosnian Territorial Defence, the Bosnian Serb military forces, and the UN – all
of whom had their own stake in the negotiations. The confused multi-level negotiations
failed to produce any agreement that evening.1099 1100
The following day, 3 May, the drama continued. After hours of negotiations,
agreement was reached that the President would be exchanged for JNA Gen. Kukanjac and
over 200 staff officers and enlisted personnel then surrounded in the 2nd Military District
headquarters in the city. The Bosnian Government guaranteed a safe conduct for the JNA
convoy leaving the barracks, and the evacuation was to be supervised by Gen. Mackenzie’s
UNPROFOR peacekeepers. Things unravelled almost immediately, however, when Muslim
paramilitaries opened fire on the withdrawing JNA vehicles, killing at least six Federal troops
and capturing the rear third of the convoy. Izetbegovic was outraged, both that the
Government’s safe-conduct guarantee had been violated and that his own life had been
placed at risk.1101
After the dramatic events of 2-3 May, the remainder of the month degenerated
into a series of inconclusive battles for control of areas of Sarajevo that were already
becoming familiar names to international journalists and their audiences. On 4 May,
Government forces mounted an assault which temporarily retook Vrace hill,1102 but they
were unable to hold on the area. Dobrinja remained hotly contested, with Serb forces
shelling the Muslim-held apartment complexes while sporadic infantry battles erupted
nearby.1103 Muslim forces counterattacked in Ilidza, briefly gaining control of the hotel
complex there, but were later forced back out.1104
One of the most significant events of this period was not a battle at all. Rather, it
was the “bread line massacre” – the first of Sarajevo’s much-publicized major shelling
incidents. Twenty-two Muslim civilians were killed and 70 wounded when a mortar bomb
exploded in a bread line on Vaska Miskin street on 27 May. The Serbs maintained (as they
would in several later incidents) that they were not responsible and that the Bosnian
Government had fired on its own people. UNPROFOR Gen. Mackenzie (who was in Belgrade
at the time) accepted at face value the Serb claims that the Muslims had detonated a

1097
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, pp. 98-
99.
1098
Laura Silber and Alan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, p. 233.
1099
Sarajevo Radio, 2 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0205191992.
1100
Sarajevo Radio, 2 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0205195592.
1101
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, p. 99.
1102
Sarajevo Radio, 4 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0405173692.
1103
Sarajevo Radio, 12 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1205211392.
1104
Sarajevo Radio, 14 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1405210092.

429
landmine at the site in order to gain international sympathy, and publicly stated that the
bread line massacre had been a Muslim ploy.1105 The statement was allowed to stand with
no UN investigation of the incident; no evidence has been advanced to substantiate the
Bosnian Serb claims.1106
The Bosnian Government attempted its first major counterattack from within the
city on 8 June. Army forces mounted simultaneous offensives in several areas, aiming to
capture four critical hilltop positions overlooking the city centre. Sarajevo’s defenders
apparently surprised the besieging Serbs and took their objectives armed with little more
than determination. However – as was to prove the case in many future offensives – the
lightly armed Bosnian forces found that while they could take positions away from similarly
armed defenders, they could only rarely hold them against massed Serb counterattacks and
artillery fire. More Government forces attacked out of the Dobrinja neighbourhood in the
southwest near the airport, pushing the Serbs back several blocks. They made significant
gains, too, on the south side of the river, but could retain only part of them. Bosnian forces
did manage to capture and hold Mojmilo ridge in the southwest, but only temporarily
gained control of the strategic points atop Vrace hill and Vidikovac in the southeast.1107 1108
Bosnian Territorial Defence and Special Police forces1109 jointly captured Zuc hill, a key
position north of the city, but held the peak for only a while and had to re-take it late that
year.1110 At the end of the impressive operation the Bosnian Government had to settle for
control of only Mojmilo, which at least removed the sniper threat to the southwest part of
the city. The remainder of June saw more fighting but little substantial change.
Already at mid-June the general battle lines had been established within and
around the city. The areas of control closely matched the pre-war ethnic majorities in each
district, and were to change remarkably little over the embattled months and years to
come. Bosnian Government soldiers, mostly Muslims, controlled most of the city centre,
holding an uneven, barbell-shaped defensive perimeter running east-west along the
Miljacka river. The Government-held area was widest in the western part of the city, where
the defence lines included the Dobrinja neighbourhood south near the airport, held the
Rajlovac rail yards as the defence’s western boundary, and thence ran north east to include
the still-contested Zuc hill. The Government’s hold was narrowest near the city centre,
where the Serb-held Grbavica neighbourhood gave the Bosnian Serb forces a toehold along
part of the south bank of the Miljacka river and the Serb siege lines came down from the
north almost to the former Olympic stadium on Kosevo hill. The eastern lobe of the barbell

1105
Tom Gjelten: Sarajevo Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege, New York HarperCollins, 1995, p. 117.
1106
Laura Silber and Alan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, p. 310.
1107
Sarajevo Radio, 8 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0806181392.
1108
Sarajevo Radio, 9 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0906074492.
1109
Bosnian Army commander Rasim Delic listed the units involved in this battle in a commemorative speech.
These were “the Sokolje, Boljakov Potok, and Buca Potok detachments from the Muncipal Staff of the TO
(Territorial Defense) Novi grad, the Pofalici and Velesici detachments from the Muncipal Staff of the TO
Novo Sarajevo, Vogosca detachments, and special units of the MUP (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the
Military Police”. Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 9 June 1996, p. 3. FBIS Reston VA, 969B0057B, 221438Z Oct 96.
1110
Sarajevo Radio, 8 June 1992, FBIS London LD0906015192.

430
was smaller than the western, but included the heart of historic Sarajevo and almost all of
the key government buildings.1111
The Muslims and Croats controlled most of the urban core of Sarajevo, then, but
the Serbs held most of the hills overlooking the city centre and the industrial suburbs such
as Vogosca, Hadzici, Semizovac, and Ilijas. Most of the Serb-held areas immediately
surrounding the city centre were sparsely populated but strategically valuable: the suburban
heights nearest to downtown Sarajevo gave a perfect field of view over what later became
known as “sniper alley”, while the mountains slightly further out provided ideal artillery
positions, allowing the guns to fire accurately into the city while leaving them virtually
immune to counterattack.
The opening of Sarajevo airport under UN control on 29 June provided significant
humanitarian relief to the city’s population but had little effect on the military situation.
Government forces held strips of territory on either side of the airfield, but could not move
troops or supplies across the UN-controlled runway. It was not until a tunnel was dug under
the runway a year later that the Bosnians actually had a physical connection to the outside
world that would allow them to bring troops, food, and – most importantly – ammunition
into the city.
After a lull of several months in offensive operations – meaning that shooting and
shelling continued and neighbourhoods were contested but little change occurred in the
confrontation lines – the next round of serious fighting broke out in December. The Bosnian
Serbs opened a month of heavy fighting with an offensive push directed against the Otes
and Stup suburbs of western Sarajevo, which were jointly held by HVO and Bosnian Army
forces. The Serb offensive began with a day of intense shelling on 1 December, followed by

1111
A more detailed (though still approximate) detailing of the frontline trace is as follows: starting from
Saraevo airport in the southwest, the surrounding Serb forces held parts of the modern built-up
neighborhoods of Dobrinja and Nedzarici adjacent to the airport on its north side. Control then ran
northeastward along the crest of a Mojmilo hill, curving north to touch the south bank of the Miljacka river
in the Hrasno area. The one small chunk of the city center the Serbs held was here in the Grbavica district,
approximately one and a half kilometers running along to the south bank of the river. From south of
Grbavica the Serb lines extended up to Vraca hill – the police academy site contested the day before the
war began – and then ran atop the hill lines extending to the southeast. Serb forces held both of the old
Ottoman forts overlooking Sarajevo from the southeast corner of the city. The siege line ran almost north-
south at the extreme eastern end of the city, curving around to the Sedrenik area in the northeast and then
running northwest above the Kosevo Olympic stadium, to the Velesici and Pofalici neighborhoods south of
Serb-held Vogosca. In the northwest corner of the city, strategic Zuc hill was at this time still being fought
over, with neither side able to hold it unconditionally. Serb control ran around the Muslim-held Rajlovac
railyard area, from which the western boundary of the siege line also ran north-south. The western
boundary was defined by the rail line, with the Serbs holding the western side and the Muslims the
eastern. Both Serb and Muslim forces controlled territory adjacent to Sarajevo airport. Serbs held the llidza
neighborhood at the northwest end of the runway. Muslim forces controlled most of Stup to the east of
llidza, but Serb forces held part of Butmir on the south side of the runwav. (Derived from multiple sources,
including Belgrade Radio, 7 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0705151692).

431
several days of infantry assaults.1112 1113 By 6 December, the hard-pressed defenders had
begun to fall back.1114
Perhaps to help relieve Stup and Otes, the Bosnian Government mounted a second
offensive effort against the Serb-held peaks overlooking the city the following day. Trying to
reach two of their June offensive objectives, the Government forces attacked Zuc hill in the
northwest and the edge of Mt. Trebevic in the southeast for several days after 7 December.
Again their initial rush succeeded, and they captured most of Zuc hill and the key peak of
Vidikovac on Mt. Trebevic.1115 Almost inevitably, Vidikovac was lost to a Serb counterattack,
but by 10 December the Bosnian Government triumphantly claimed firm control of the
summit of Mt. Zuc – a crucial victory that largely secured the northern part of urban
Sarajevo from Serb attacks.1116 At a high price in blood and effort, the Bosnian military had
managed to close out 1992 as a victor of sorts.
Perhaps more than anywhere else in Bosnia, the siege of Sarajevo illustrated the
difference between the Bosnian Government’s numerous, determined, but ill-equipped
infantry forces and a Bosnian Serb military bristling with heavy equipment but a small body
of infantry reserves that had to be carefully husbanded. Sarajevo’s defenders could draw on
a large pool of manpower but lacked weapons and ammunition to equip most of them. But
even the best armed of the defending infantrymen lacked the supporting weapons they
needed to fight their most important adversaries: the Serb artillery pieces that shelled the
city with cruel impunity from miles away. Unable to counter the guns directly, the Bosnian
Army tried to reduce their effectiveness by assaulting the well-defended nearer hills the
Serbs used as firing and spotting locations.
These desperate attacks cost them high casualties for what was usually no more
than a few hundred yards’ advance. Then, heartbreakingly, the exhausted assault troops as
often as not had to give up their gains under the fire of Serb artillery and counterattacking
reserves. The Serbs enjoyed the luxury of several hundred artillery pieces, tanks, and
mortars ringing the city. These could inflict civilian and military casualties, material
destruction, and sometimes telling political pressure on the Bosnian Presidency, but in the
end artillery bombardments proved incapable of forcing the surrender of either the
population or the political leadership.
As 1992 drew to a close, Sarajevo’s citizens could take some measure of hope from
their painful victories and their few permanent gains: halting the JNA armoured advances on
2 May, the capture of Mojmilo ridge in June, and the successful occupation of vital Mt. Zuc
in December. But the defence of Sarajevo had been more a saga of disasters averted than of
gains made. In a military situation where neither side could force a quick conclusion, the
stage was set for a protracted and bloody contest of wills. Such was to prove the case.

1112
Sarajevo Radio, 1 December 1992, FBIS London LD0212000992.
1113
Sarajevo Radio, 2 December 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0212122092.
1114
Sarajevo Radio, 6 December 1992, FBIS London LD0612172092.
1115
Sarajevo Radio, 7 December 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0712161592.
1116
Sarajevo Radio, 10 December 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1012121192.

432
 Annex 32
The Battles for Herzegovina and the Relief of Dubrovnik,
19921117
JNA Offensive Operations: Kupres and Southern Herzegovina, April 1992
The Battle of Kupres1118

Conspiracy theories abound in the Balkans, and in 1992 the belief that one side was
planning to attack the other was virtually an obsession. In the Kupres area during March and
April 1992, the JNA and Bosnian Serbs believed it of the Croats, and the Croats believed it of
the JNA and the Bosnian Serbs. The JNA (or at least elements of the JNA) appear to have
thought – erroneously – that the Croats intended to launch a major offensive from Kupres
to link up with Croat forces in the Posavina or elsewhere.1119 The Croats, for their part,
feared that the JNA – again, improbably – was going to attack and cut off Western
Herzegovina from the Croats in Central Bosnia in an operation called “Trojan Horse”.1120
With such ideas afloat, hostilities were almost inevitable.

1117
The analysis of these operations is based primarily on two sources, the memoirs of the Croatian Army (HV)
regional commander, General Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Buttles) and contemporary press
reporting from Zagreb Radio, Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug. General Bobetko’s account – if
somewhat bombastic and rambling – is indispensable for an understanding of Croatian strategic thinking
and the operational-tactical situation in the Herzegovina-Dubrovnik areas. In addition, Bobetko has
included detailed situation maps and photo graphs of many key documents, including operations orders for
several battles. Nevertheless, Bobetko’s memoirs must be read very carefully and crosschecked with the
daily press coverage of events, supplemented by detailed map analysis of the operations, because the
general has omitted at least two key time periods when HV operations were less than successful.
1118
Kupres town lies on the north side of a somewhat triangular plateau, Kupresko Polje, which was
surrounded by a semi-oval of tall, tree-lined mountains. Starting clockwise around the semi-oval, the town
is dominated to the north by the Demirovac feature at 1.765 meters. The feature is part of a range that
separated Kupres from the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno. Between Bugojno and Kupres, the range is
about 10 kilometers wide with peaks ranging from 1.000 to 1.500 meters in height. A key chokepoint is the
Kupreska Vrata pass / tunnel on the road between Kupres and Donji Vakuf. At the tip of the triangle or oval
lies Vukovsko Polje, which was separated from the rest of Kupresko Polje by an upside-down L-shaped set
of mountains intruding into the plateau from the north. Continuing around the oval, back toward the
northwest, lies another range, the Cincar Mountains, bordering the plateau some 15 kilometers from
Kupres, and intersected by two passes, the most important being Suica pass, on the route from Kupres to
Suica village and Tomislavgrad. The pass is dominated by the 1.806-meter peak of Malovan. Northwest of
Kupres town, on the key road to the town of Sipovo, the plateau narrows, then widens a bit before ending
about 15 kilometers from Kupres as it reaches the Viterog massif. Veliki Viterog, the highest point on the
range, rises to 1.906 meters in height.
1119
See Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter
6, for a convoluted and conspiratorial discussion of Croat intentions. A Belgrade Politika article from 1993
claims that HV forces intended to break through to the Sava River near Banja Luka and cut the Serb-
controlled Bosanska Krajina in two. Dusan Kecman: Kupres is the “Umbilical Cord” of the Balkans, Belgrade
Politika, 25 August 1993, p. 8.
1120
Mentioned in Attila Hoare: The Croatian Project to Partition Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1990-1994, East
European Quarterly, March 1997, pp. 121-138. Hoare cites his source as a 17 April 1992 Zagreb Globus
story. Unfortunately, the original Globus article is unavailable. However, there is no evidence to support
the view that the JNA was planning a major offensive to achieve such an objective. In addition, the JNA

433
 More plausibly, the fighting appears to have resulted from the uncertainties,
anxieties and tensions that all Bosnians felt about the future of the republic, and the trickle-
down effect this had on an ethnically mixed municipality like Kupres.1121 Suspicions between
Croats and Serbs were already smouldering after the 1991 Croatian War, and the early
March referendum and the Serbs’ open planning for secession heightened these levels to a
white-hot pitch. Both sides armed themselves to “defend” their home villages and the town
itself. At the beginning of April, it appears that the Bosnian Croats’ HV commanders decided
to pre-empt the possibility of a Serb attempt to seize the strategically located town, which
they viewed as a potential Serb dagger pointed at the heart of Croat territory. It was this
“defensive” move of 3 April that brought into play the assortment of armed and semi-armed
formations poised to dispute Kupres’s future.
The forces available for the coming fight were a study in contrasts. The Bosnian
Croats’ nascent army – the Croatian Defence Council or HVO – was in Kupres a barely
organized collection of mostly local villagers and townspeople, possibly grouped into three
notional battalions under a loose brigade-level command structure.1122 This was stiffened by
the presence of 100-200 veterans of the Croatian Army’s elite Zrinski Battalion, special
operations fighters who had “volunteered” to serve in Bosnia. Most were probably ethnic
Herzegovinians, who plausibly were returning home; they were led by HV General Ante
Roso and Colonel Miljenko Filipovic, both former French Legionnaires, as were many of their
men. Roso appears to have been in overall command of Croat defences in the Livno-
Tomislavgrad region, while Filipovic acted as the tactical commander.1123 All told, their force
probably numbered no more than 2.000 troops, most of them poorly equipped and trained;
it is unlikely the Croats had more than a dozen 60 mm and/or 82 mm mortars, plus possibly
a few 120 mm mortars and the odd 76 mm mountain gun or ZIS artillery piece.
Although the Croats holding Kupres could deal with local Bosnian Serb TO forces,
they had no hope of winning against the professional, organized, and heavily armed
Yugoslav People’s Army formations when they moved to retake the town. Kupres was
nominally in the area of responsibility of the JNA’s 5th (Banja Luka) Corps. The 9th (Knin)
Corps, however, reinforced the 5th Corps for the JNA’s counter-strike, probably because the

forces involved, while clearly adequate to retake Kupres, would have been inadequate for a larger
operation.
1121
Kupres had a population numbering some 9.600, of which about 51 percent were Serb, almost 40 percent
Croat, eight percent Muslim, and one percent other. Miroslav Krleza Lexicographical Institute: A Concise
Atlas of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Zagreb Graficki Zavod
Hrvatske, 1993, p. 125.
1122
HVO units appear to have included the Kupres Battalion, the 1st Tomislavgrad Battalion, and the XIII HOS
Battalion “Jure Francetic”. (raised in the Tomislavgrad area, but probably comprised of radical Croats from
throughout the area). These battalions later combined as the King Tomislav Brigade, under Zeljko
Glasnovic. In addition, elements of a Bosnian Croat special operations unit from Posusje, which later
became the “Ante Bruno Busic” Regiment, appear to have deployed to Kupres.
1123
See Snjezana Dukic: If we had been only 10 minutes late..., Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 May 1994, p. 9, an
interview with Colonel Miljenko Filipovic. For Roso’s background, see Marko Barisic: The Colonel or the
Corpse, Split Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 24 November 1993, p. 6.

434
bulk of the 5th Corps’ best units remained deployed in Western Slavonia.1124 The JNA forces
collected for the operation comprised two brigade-sized tactical groups, each probably
numbering roughly 2.000 troops. The first, under the command of Colonel Stanislav Galic’s
30th Partisan Division / 5th Corps, consisted of two partisan battalions, a battalion-sized
volunteer “brigade”, a tank company, a heavy mortar battery, and a reinforced corps
artillery battalion.1125 This group appears to have acted primarily as a holding force directly
north of Kupres, on the main road to Sipovo. It was supported on its left flank, near
Kupreska Vrata, by another partisan battalion.1126 The second tactical group was drawn from
Colonel Slavko Lisica’s 9th Armoured Brigade / 9th (Knin) Corps, including one to two
armoured battalions, one to two motorized battalions, probably a TO battalion, and
probably one or two artillery batteries.1127 It was to act as the main strike force, coming
from the west/northwest. In addition, the Serbs’ Kupres TO, probably some 1.000
personnel, apparently remained positioned in the tip of the Kupres triangle at Vukovsko
Polje, where the Croatians’ surprise takeover of the town had cut them off the first week in
April. JNA and Serb forces marshalled for the counterattack outnumbered and outgunned
the defending Croats, with an estimated 5.000 troops, about 30 tanks, and 24 to 36 field
artillery pieces over 100 mm.
The stage for the Croat takeover of the town had probably been set by fighting
between local Serb and Croat forces around 1 April, although there are no reports of clashes
on that date.1128 Whatever the antecedents, the Croat initiative dates to 3 April when
HV/HVO forces deployed in the Suica area had attacked the Serb villages of Donji and Gornji
Malovan, near the Malovan peak, on the road to Kupres. Simultaneously, local HVO troops
in the villages of Zlosela and Rasticevo were engaging JNA and Serb troops some 10
kilometers northwest of Kupres, acting as a covering force (by design or by accident) for the
main thrust up from Suica. By 4 April, Croat troops had secured a lodgement in the town
against Serb TO elements, and Zagreb Radio announced the town’s fall on 5 April. The Serbs,
however, appear to have retained a hold on at least a small section or outlying area of
Kupres, plus a larger pocket centred on Vukovsko Polje. Croat forces were now dangerously

1124
It is unclear which corps exercised overall command of the operation, although it would seem that the 9th
Corps did, given the repeated references to it in contemporary radio and wire service traffic, as well as the
presence of Mladic and Colonel Savo Kovacevic, his chief of staff during the fighting. See Jovan Janjic: Srpski
General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter 6.
1125
The units included the 3rd Battalion / 11th Partisan Brigade (from the Bosanska Dubica area) and 2nd
Battalion / 13th Partisan Brigade (from the Bosanski Petrovac area), each probably with about 500 men, a
voltunteer “brigade”, probably with another 500 to 750 personnel, and the 2nd Battalion / 5th Mixed
Artillery Regiment. See Cekic, pp. 135-136. Colonel Miodrag Sovilj may have been in direct command of the
tactical group. See Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise,
1996, Chapter 6.
1126
1st Battalion / 19th Partisan Brigade.
1127
The 9th Armored Brigade probably was formed at the beginning of 1992 from the Knin-based 221st
Motorized Brigade – previously commanded by Lisica – and an independent armored battalion. The TO
battalion(s) appears to have come from Bosansko Grahovo and/or Bosanski Petrovac. Milenko Sukalo:
Anniversary of Liberation of Kupres Marked: Freedom in Wounds, Vojska, 6 May 1993, p. 27.
1128
Contemporary press and wire service reporting from Belgrade Radio, Belgrade Tanjug, Zagreb Radio, and
Sarajevo Radio provide the bulk of the information on the day-to-day events during the battle.

435
exposed in a salient that appears to have stretched some 15 kilometers long, but were only
about seven kilometers wide.
The JNA was quick to respond to the Croat initiative. The day after the town’s fall
the JNA kicked off its counterattack in a blinding snowstorm. According to Colonel Lisica:
I spent the night of 6-7 April with a company at a command post above Zloselo.
The previous night the 9th Armoured Brigade had advanced from Trbovlije [near Drnis,
Croatia], through Knin, Drvar, Glamoc, and Kupres and arrived above Zloselo. On that
day, at exactly 14:30 hours, I issued an order to my soldiers. The direction of attack was
Zloselo-Osmanlije-Olovo-Kupres. That is how we advanced. The operation lasted two
and a half hours...1129
Supported by 30th Division troops, the 9th Armoured Brigade rapidly advanced
some seven kilometers to the outskirts of Kupres, shattering the Croat positions in their
path.1130 JNA units fought their way into the town on 7 April, linking up with hold-out TO
units. The remaining HV/HVO forces pulled out of town toward Suica, pursued by Lisica’s
armour. By 10 April, JNA and TO units had retaken Gornji and Donji Malovan, reaching the
Suica pass, where they either stopped or were stopped by Croat defenders.1131 As would be
expected with such a rapid victory, the JNA and Serb TO forces suffered relatively light
casualties, losing 31 killed in action up to 16 April.1132 Croat losses appear to have been far
heavier, although no detailed figures are available.1133 Indeed, the combined HV/HVO forces
appear to have suffered a near disaster during the retreat when JNA armour overran some
units on the open plains.1134

Battles of Mostar – Stolac – Neum: March – May.

The JNA’s offensive in the Stolac-Neum area was undoubtedly justified by JNA
beliefs that Croat dominance of the area would threaten the Bosnian Serb population in
eastern Herzegovina. In particular, the continued presence of Croatian Army troops around
Neum, where they had been deployed during the 1991 Croatian War, would have
encouraged the JNA to take a hand, opposed as it was to deployment or actions of any

1129
Milenko Sukalo: Anniversary of Liberation of Kupres Marked: Freedom in Wounds, Vojska, 6 May 1993, p.
27.
1130
The JNA attack plan involved a fairly straightforward two-pronged advance directly on the town via the
two main roads from the north west, more or less shearing off the top of the Croat salient. The JNA was
unable to attack the base of the salient to cut off the entire Croat force because the impassable terrain of
Cincar Mountains abutted the base of the salient. Milenko Sukalo: Anniversary of Liberation of Kupres
Marked: Freedom in Wounds, Vojska, 6 May 1993, p. 27.
1131
In addition to the contemporary reporting, some other sources include Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko
Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Publishing Enterprise, 1996, Chapter 6, and Ljubomir Grubic: Pulling Down
the Pants, Belgrade Nin, 23 July 1993, pp. 12-14; an interview with Slavko Lisica.
1132
Belgrade Radio, 16 April 1992. There is no reason to question these totals.
1133
Colonel Filipovic was also wounded during the fighting.
1134
Both sides claimed that the other committed atrocities against civilians after they had captured the Kupres
area. Both claims are likely true to some degree. The JNA and the Serbs, however, used their more lasting
victory to thoroughly expel all Croats from the region, while any Serbs the Croats may have ejected were
able to return.

436
“Ustasha” forces – as the JNA always referred to the Croats – in Bosnia at this time. The JNA
regarded Croat regulars as an automatic threat to native Serbs, and the clashes that broke
out the first week in April offered the JNA the opportunity to execute existing plans to
secure the Neretva valley from Mostar to Neum, thereby creating a viable “border”
between Croat-controlled western Herzegovina and Serb-controlled eastern
Herzegovina.1135
The Croatians viewed the JNA deployments in south-eastern Herzegovina very
differently, seeing them as poised against Croatia, including Dubrovnik, the port of Ploce,
and all of southern Dalmatia; Zagreb and the HV Main Staff were convinced that the JNA
was planning a strategic offensive to seize control of these areas. They expected additional
drives from the Knin, Livno, and Kupres areas would support the attack. The Croat
assessment was in line with the JNA’s original campaign plans for the region during the 1991
war, a plan the JNA had had to abandon because of mobilization problems. Its 1992
campaign plan was nowhere near that ambitious.
In April, the JNA forces in Herzegovina and north of Dubrovnik on the Dalmatian
coast were under the command of Colonel-General Pavle Strugar’s Fourth Military District,
which was better known as Operational Group 2, its Croatian War designator.1136 Strugar
had deployed two corps from Mostar to the coast, the 13th (Bileca) Corps and the 2nd
(Podgorica) Corps.1137 The 13th Corps, under Major General Momcilo Perisic, controlled the
10th Motorized Brigade stationed around Mostar, the Montenegrin 57th Mountain Brigade
deployed from Mostar Airfield to near Stolac, and the 13th Motorized Brigade located from
near Stolac to north of Neum. The corps was backed by the 13th Mixed Artillery Regiment.
Serb Territorial Defence (TO) detachments from Mostar, Nevesinje, Bileca, and Ljubinje also
supported the JNA. All told, the corps probably had about 10.000 troops, supported by
possibly 1.500 to 2.000 TO personnel. The 2nd Corps area of responsibility ran from south of
Stolac to the Dalmatian coast, straddling the Bosnia-Croatia border. Major General Radomir
Damjanovic’s corps had two motorized brigades in the frontline, the 472nd on the coast,
and apparently the Montenegrin 5th Motorized, located between the 472nd and the village
of Ravno.1138 Montenegrin Territorial Defence units, including the 1st Niksic Partisan TO
1135
See Annex 23: Yugoslav People’s Army Objectives, Strategy, and Operations, April-May 1992.
1136
Operational Group 2 was formed in 1991 from the headquarters of the Montenegrin Territorial Defense
headquarters, headed by General Strugar, to prosecute the JNA campaign along the Mostar / Split-
Dubrovnik axes. In the JNA reorganization at the end of 1991, the operational group became the new
Fourth Military District controlling all JNA forces in eastern Herzegovina, Montenegro – except the coast –
and the Serbian 37th (Uzice) Corps.
1137
The Montenegrin city of Titograd had assumed its pre-Communist name of Podgorica by early 1992, so the
JNA 2nd (Titograd) Corps also took on the new title.
1138
General Bobetko’s memoirs identify the brigade between the 472nd and the 13th Motorized as the “V.
Vlahovic” Motorized Brigade. Veljko Vlahovic was an associate of Tito’s and the brigade’s barracks probably
were named after him. The 5th Motorized Brigade from Podgorica, which was involved throughout the
1991 Dubrovnik campaign and the early 1992 fighting almost certainly is the brigade in question. If this unit
was not the 5th, it may have been the 179th Mountain Brigade from Niksic, which fought in the area during
1991. Belgrade Vojska indicates that the Montenegrin TO’s 1st Niksic Partisan Brigade was remobilized in
January 1992 for service. Bobetko, p. 287, shows the “Sava Kovacevic” Partisan Division on the 5th
Motorized Brigade’s right flank. The 1st Niksic Brigade’s nickname was the “Sava Kovacevic” Brigade, so it

437
Brigade, continued the JNA 2nd Corps line to a position near Gornje Hrasno, south of Stolac.
Elements of the 326th Mixed Artillery Regiment provided fire support. The 2nd Corps
probably had about 8.000 troops deployed between Ston and Stolac.1139
HV and HVO forces were less uniform in organization and deployment.1140 Between
Mostar and Stolac, the HVO was still struggling to mobilize and organize local defence units,
and had few if any coherent forces to oppose the JNA advance to the Neretva. From north
of Neum to the coast, however, Corps General Janko Bobetko’s new Southern Front,
activated on 10 April, had two full brigades, the 4th Guards and the 116th Metkovic
Brigades, a coastal defence infantry detachment, plus elements of the 115th Imotski and
156th Makarska Brigades, a total of 5.000 to 6.000 troops. In addition, the veteran 1st
Guards Brigade was en route with at least another 2.000 troops.
The JNA deployment to Herzegovina in 1991 to prosecute the Croatian war around
Dubrovnik had been met by fear and hostility among area Croats and Muslims against the
JNA and the Serbs. By early 1992 relations between the JNA and the local citizenry were
probably the worst of any place in Bosnia. The JNA’s war in Croatia had led Croatians in
Mostar to regard JNA units as an occupation force and a constant source of provocation.
Even when the JNA tried to be impartial and unobtrusive, it was still universally perceived as
a force friendly to the Serbs and hostile to the Muslims and Croats, and JNA soldiers and
reservists made to feel unwelcome in most of western Herzegovina. On 1 February, a battle
between an army patrol and Croat police reservists left a JNA officer severely wounded.1141
1142
Three days later hundreds of mostly Croat citizens blockaded the roads from Mostar to
Citluk and Siroki Brijeg in protest over the behaviour of JNA reservists in the area. The local
Serbs responded a couple of days later by blockading the Mostar-Sarajevo road.1143
On 4 March, the Croats began a blockade of the JNA’s barracks in Capljina, some 25
kilometers south of Mostar, while Mostar citizens traded gunshots with the garrison of the
JNA’s “Mostarski Bataljon” Barracks on 14 March.1144 Barricades went up once again the
following day as Mostar citizens demanded the withdrawal of JNA reservists from the
city.1145 Blockades partitioned the city into its ethnic neighbourhoods for the next three
days, and inter-ethnic gunfire was exchanged in some outlying neighbourhoods.1146 1147 Even
more serious fighting occurred on 1 April, with skirmishes between JNA soldiers and Croat

was probably this brigade that served between the 5th and 13th Motorized Brigades, together with other
Montenegrin TO units. M. Vukosavljevic: An Unbridgeable Rampart Against the Enemy, Belgrade Vojska, 28
January 1998, pp. 8-9; War Bulletin, Belgrade Vojska, 28 January 1998, p. 9; articles on the 1st Niksic
Partisan TO Brigade.
1139
The maps in Bobetko, pp. 284-287 are a generally accurate portrayal of the JNA force disposition at this
time.
1140
See Bobetko’s force disposition maps, pp. 284-287.
1141
Belgrade Tanjug, 1 February 1992, FBIS London LD0102223992.
1142
Zagreb Radio, 1 February 1992, FBIS London LD0102172192.
1143
Belgrade Tanjug, 6 February 1992, FBIS London LD060294192.
1144
Belgrade Tanjug, 14 March 1992, FBIS London LD1403202192.
1145
Belgrade Tanjug, 15 March 1992, FBIS London LD1503214192.
1146
Belgrade Tanjug, 17 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1703161492.
1147
Belgrade Tanjug, 18 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1803161992.

438
paramilitaries in several villages and mortar fire in the southern suburb of Jasenica.1148
Finally, on 3 April 1992 – several days before the outbreak of countrywide hostilities – a
remote-controlled bomb blew up an oil truck outside the JNA’s “Mostarski bataljon”
barracks, killing one and injuring 40.1149 Mostar was already a virtual war zone even before
war was declared.
When that finally happened on 6 April, fighting between the JNA and primarily
Croat forces in Herzegovina became general. The town of Siroki Brijeg1150 west of Mostar,
was hit by JNA air attacks on 7 and 8 April,1151 1152 while JNA artillery began shelling some
Mostar suburbs and shelled the city periodically thereafter.1153 1154 Croat forces tried and
failed to occupy Mostar’s JNA-held military airfield on 9 April.1155 Serb territorials seized
control of two hydroelectric power stations on the Neretva two days later.1156
In this environment, the Fourth Military District ordered the 2nd and 13th Corps to
attack and take control of all of Herzegovina east of the Neretva.1157 On 10 April the 13th
Motorized Brigade and the 57th Mountain Brigade advanced to the Neretva, surrounded
the town of Stolac, and entered the town the next day. By 13 April the JNA had occupied the
left (eastern) bank of the Neretva from Mostar to just south of Capljina against minimal
Croat opposition. The commander of a JNA armoured unit, apparently in the 13th Motorized
– who later defected to the Bosnian TO – commented on the advance:
After the tank unit under my command pushed through the defence lines, the
reservist units followed. They looted house after house in Bivolje Brdo, Domanovici, and
other villages [between Stolac and Capljina].1158
Further south, the 2nd Corps attacked HV troops from the 4th Guards and 115th
Imotski Brigades deployed northeast of Neum, where JNA and HV forces had clashed
repeatedly but inconclusively during late 1991 and March 1992, helping feed JNA paranoia
about Croat intentions in Bosnia. The 2nd Corps was now able to capture some key hills and
a pass in the HV-held salient, but apparently could not exploit the seizure to push the HV
force back toward Neum town itself. In fact, HV units may have restored the position
through a counterattack.
The 2nd Corps renewed the attack on 23 April, this time from the southeast, and
with a much stronger force. The 5th Motorized and 472nd Motorized Brigades attacked

1148
Belgrade Radio, 1 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0104155992.
1149
Belgrade Tanjug, 3 April 1992, FBIS London LD0304221192.
1150
Also known as Listica.
1151
Belgrade Tanjug, 7 April 1992, FBIS London LD0704184192.
1152
Belgrade Tanjug, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804195992.
1153
Zagreb Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS London LD0804133993.
1154
Sarajevo Radio, 22 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2204201592.
1155
Belgrade Tanjug, 9 April 1992, FBIS London LD0904201192.
1156
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 April 1992, FBIS London LD1104133292.
1157
The JNA Operational Group 2 – the Fourth Military District’s other designator – officially announced it had
defeated Croatian forces in the area. See Belgrade Tanjug, 12 April and 17 April 1992.
1158
M. Sutalo, Belgrade Borba, 17 April 1992, p. 8.

439
along their entire front from north of Ston to the Trebisnjica River.1159 The HV 1st Guards
Brigade bore the brunt of the attack, although some supporting attacks hit the 4th Guards,
115th, and 116th Brigades. JNA troops were able to break into the HV defences at some
points, but failed to break out.1160 The Croatians’ tenacious hold of the key peaks in the
rocky Dalmatian terrain against intense artillery fire was the decisive factor in containing the
attack.1161
A ceasefire was arranged in early May between Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban
and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, meeting in Graz, Austria, in an attempt to work
out a political arrangement for their people in Bosnia. They issued a formal statement on 7
May agreeing to a cease-fire but acknowledging that disagreement on the division of Mostar
and its environs had prevented agreement on a draft “delineation map”. The Bosnian Serbs
maintained that the Neretva River was the dividing line between Serb and Croat claims, and
that the portion of Mostar on the east bank of the river should be Serb. The Bosnian Croats
maintained that all of Mostar and the river banks should belong to the Croats. The Bosnian
Muslims – the largest percentage of Mostar’s population – were not even mentioned.1162
The ceasefire proved short-lived, for the following day JNA 13th Corps troops – the
10th Motorized Brigade and possibly the 57th Mountain Brigade – joined Bosnian Serb TO
forces in mounting a concerted attack against the Croat-held portion of the eastern river
bank.1163 Mostar’s defenders were in serious trouble. The Bosnian Croats hung onto a
narrow band on the eastern bank, and the Bijelo Polje neighbourhood to the northeast. But
JNA and Bosnian Serb forces occupied positions on three sides of the city: the high hills
overlooking the city from the east, Mt. Hum and some of the suburbs to the south, and
some of the high ground to the north. The highway west toward Siroki Brijeg (some 15km
away) was still free, but subject to JNA shelling.1164

1159
Simultaneously, the 63rd Airborne Brigade carried out an air assault at Capljina barracks, assisting the 13th
Corps in rescuing the 170 JNA personnel surrounded there. According to former JNA operations officer
Milisav Sekulic:
After a blockade lasting several days of the barracks at Capl jina, units of the 13th Corps, working
together with forces of the 97th Aviation Brigade, successfully mounted an operation to evacuate
people from the besieged barracks. All people and weapons were withdrawn from the beleaguered
barracks following a helicopter landing operation with proper combat cover. This was an extremely
well conducted and efficient operation undertaken by JNA specials [specijalaca – the abbreviated
term used for JNA special operations troops]...
Milisav Sekulic: Jugoslaviju Niko Nije Branio A Vrhovna Komanda Je Izdala (Nobody Defended Yugoslavia
and the Supreme Command Betrayed It), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2000, p. 297; Belgrade Tanjug, 23 April
1992; L. K.: Osa Has Fallen, Belgrade Nin, 13 August 1998, p. 16, which mentions operations of the 63rd
Airborne Brigade during 1991-1998.
1160
For a discussion of the battle, see Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita Naklada,
1996, pp. 276-279, plus the situation maps on pp. 284-287. Also see Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers,
Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16, an article covering the 1st Guards Brigade.
1161
The 1st Guards in particular had a difficult time adjusting to the terrain in Dalmatia and Herzegovina,
having served throughout the Croatian war in the flatter, more agricultural spaces of Western Slavonia.
1162
Zagreb Radio, 7 May 1992, FBIS London LD0705163192.
1163
Zagreb Radio, 8 May 1992, FBIS London LD0805110692.
1164
Sarajevo Radio, 10 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1005213292.

440
 The HV Organizes the Defence of Herzegovina, April – May 1992
As already noted, the HV Main Staff – and General Bobetko in particular – believed
the JNA was planning a strategic offensive to sever large parts of Dalmatia from the rest of
Croatia while overrunning western Herzegovina.1165 Zagreb felt compelled to intervene to
protect its own territory as well as the Croat population of western Herzegovina, in addition
to achieving its larger political objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.1166 Croatian Army
involvement in Herzegovina was therefore early and extensive (as HV Gen. Janko Bobetko’s
memoirs make clear), and it is essentially impossible to discuss the Bosnian Croat and
Croatian Army forces in Herzegovina at this time as separate and independent entities.1167
The JNA’s advance to the Neretva on 10-13 April brought an immediate response from the
HV, and on 12 April Bobetko ordered the deployment of a battalion from the 4th Guards
Brigade to positions north of Capljina, near Citluk, in order to stiffen the HVO’s defences. HV
officers were already present trying to coordinate and organize Croat defences from Livno
to Mostar, but Bobetko’s arrival brought renewed and more professional impetus to these
efforts.
In fact, the HV-HVO relationship went beyond even the deployment of allied HV
units fighting alongside HVO forces in Bosnia or advisors assisting in their formation. Not
only were HV and HVO forces operating under a joint command, the HVO Main Staff was
itself an HV forward command post, established on 16 April in Grude at Tudjman’s
direction.1168 For all practical purposes, the HVO was at this time a subordinate command
under the HV, directed by Bobetko through former HV officers reassigned to the HVO.1169
Bobetko personally selected the first chief of the HVO Main Staff, Croatian Army Col. Milivoj
Petkovic, and Petkovic’s newly-established HVO headquarters was simultaneously also an
HV command post both officially and in practice.1170 Throughout the war – but especially at
this time – the HVO’s chain of command, both political and military, ultimately ran all the
way back to Tudjman’s desk in Zagreb.
Bobetko and his staff reorganized the entire command of the HVO throughout
Herzegovina, appointing new HV officers, forming new staffs and units, and generally
providing a level of professionalism and expertise previously unavailable. In addition, more

1165
See Bobetko pp. 200-201, and 275-276 for a discussion of his per ception of the JNA threat.
1166
See Annex 25: Croatian Political Objectives and Military Strategy in Bosnia, 1991-1992.
1167
The documents General Bobetko reproduces in his memoirs provide clear evidence that the Croatian Army
formed, organized, and commanded the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) during the spring and summer of
1992. The most important section covering the HV’s actions in Herzegovina is “The Preparation and
Organization of the Defense of the General Herzegovina Region and Preparations for Operation Jackal
Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita Naklada, 1996, pp. 200-270.
1168
A photographic copy of Tudjman’s order authorizing Bobetko to assume command of all Croatian forces
from Split to Dubrovnik is reproduced in Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita
Naklada, 1996, p. 202.
1169
See particularly Bobetko pp. 212-216, 220-221, 224, 229 for photographs of Bobetko’s orders to HV
officers organizing HVO defenses in key areas of Herzegovina.
1170
See Bobetko pp. 206-208 for photographs of the orders establishing this forward command post with
Petkovic as its chief when Bobetko was not present.

441
HV troops were sent to the Livno-Tomislavgrad (Kupres) front and the Neretva valley to
stiffen the inexperienced local HVO forces. By mid-May the combined HV/HVO forces were
more than able to hold western Herzegovina, even though the JNA had no actual intention
of conquering the region.
Bosnian Government forces played the least important role in the Herzegovina
theatre in 1992. The Bosnian Army had its base of control primarily in the northern
Herzegovina area bounded by the cities of Mostar, Konjic, and Jablanica. (Most of these
areas were of mixed Croat-Muslim ethnicity; neither faction really “controlled” this territory
since both the ARBiH and HVO maintained forces in the same cities and towns.) At this time,
Government forces in Herzegovina were mostly focused on organizing and establishing
themselves, and were confined to a largely defensive role most of the time. In addition, the
Bosnian Army forces in Herzegovina – what became the ARBiH 4th Corps late in 1992 – were
the weakest and least well-armed even by the marginal standards of the underequipped
ARBiH. (The entire 4th Corps was to fight the war with no more than half a dozen tanks and
APCs, and roughly a dozen tube artillery pieces.) Ammunition shortages and mismatched
heavy weapons types left the Bosnian Government forces in the area with essentially no
heavy weapons other than mortars.

The HV Relieves Dubrovnik, May 1992

While Bobetko was reorganizing the HVO, he was also building up HV forces in the
Neum-Ston area in preparation for a major attack to clear JNA forces from the Slano area
and the north-western approaches to Dubrovnik.1171 During the period from 28 April to 18
May, the HV Southern Front reorganized and rested its troops while bringing in more
supplies for the offensive. The Southern Front campaign plan called for a two-brigade attack
along a 20-kilometer front from the Adriatic Highway to Hrasno in Bosnia. The 1st Guards
Brigade would make a multi-pronged frontal advance along the highway and along
mountain roads to the north towards Cepikuce, with the two axes converging on Slano.1172
The 4th Guards Brigade would attack on the 1st Guards left flank towards Zavala and Ravno,
taking key mountain features that threatened the flank and rear of the operation.1173 The
brigades’ movements were to be conducted in two phases: the first to a 25-kilometer phase
line stretching from Slano to the north end of Popovo Polje, and the second, after a seven-
kilometre advance, to a natural defence line along a steep ridge northeast of Slano and
thence to Zavala-Ravno.1174

1171
Bobetko, p. 294.
1172
In addition to its own five battalions, one battalion of the 115th Imotski Brigade was attached. Andjeljka
Mustapic: The Knights from Imotski – For Croatia and For God, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, pp. 14-15. The
1st Guards Brigade was commanded by Colonel Marijan Marekovic.
1173
The 4th Guards Brigade at this time was under the command of Colonel Mirko Sundov.
1174
This account is based primarily on Bobetko’s narration, pp. 295-296. Unusually for such an importation
action, Bobetko did not provide an operation order. In addition see Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers,
Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16, an article covering the 1st Guards Brigade.

442
 The HV advance was greatly assisted by the withdrawal of JNA forces and the
conversion of JNA forces in Bosnia into the Bosnian Serb Army.1175 The 27 April Federal
Presidency decision to withdraw the Serbian and Montenegrin elements of the JNA from
Bosnia also probably accepted the need for the JNA to end the siege of Dubrovnik. In any
case, it appears that the JNA had been thinning out its forces on the frontline and pulling
back artillery assets and supplies before the Croatian attack began. The 2nd Corps was also
probably in the process of transferring the Herzegovina-raised 472nd Motorized Brigade
back into Bosnia for assignment to the VRS. As a result, when the attack kicked off on 18
May, HV troops rapidly advanced along all axes, recapturing the main objective of the attack
– Slano – on 24 May.1176 Further north, in Bosnia, the JNA forces were less likely to
withdraw. However, the infiltration of a reconnaissance company from the 4th Guards
Brigade behind a key JNA position at Velja Medja routed the JNA defenders, facilitating the
4th Guards’ successful attack to Ravno.1177 The HV push forced the JNA and the new VRS to
expedite their retreat, and they abandoned the Dubrovnik suburb of Mokosica on 26
May.1178 By the beginning of June Bobetko’s Southern Front had linked up with the HV
163rd Dubrovnik Brigade. The siege of the city was over.1179

Operation “Jackal” and the Liberation of Mostar, June 1992

From the outset, the HV/HVO command began preparations for first the complete
capture of Mostar itself (e.g. occupation of both the west and east banks of the Neretva
river), followed by the capture of Blagaj and Stolac to the southwest. While the relief of
Mostar was itself a critical objective, Bobetko was also focused on the longer-term goal of
relieving Serb pressure on Dubrovnik. Even after HV forces had relieved the siege, VRS
forces retained control over key positions in Bosnia overlooking the city. To these ends, the
combined HV-HVO command devised a plan for a campaign to first retake much of eastern
Herzegovina – thereby guarding the left flank of any renewed HV operations around
Dubrovnik – and then to relieve Mostar from outside the city, rather than breaking out from
within. This plan was codenamed Operation “Jackal” (Cagalj), and was set for early summer
of 1992.1180

1175
This judgment is based on an analysis of public statements from VRS and FRY officials. (See particularly
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 May 1992) plus the ease of the HV’s advance, which Bobetko seems to believe was a
great victory over a strong enemy. It certainly was a success for the HV, but except for certain parts of the
4th Guards Brigade’s sector, the JNA and VRS clearly seemed to be withdrawing. The HV advance would
have hastened the retreat.
1176
Zagreb Radio, 24 May 1992.
1177
Bobetko, p. 296.
1178
Zagreb Radio, 26 May 1992.
1179
There is conflicting evidence in some cases about when and how Bobetko’s troops linked up. For example,
Vesna Puljak’s article on the 1st Guards Brigade claims it did not enter Slano until 27 May or link up with
the 163rd Dubrovnik Brigade until mid-June. However, the contemporary Zagreb Radio reports clearly
indicate that Slano fell on 24 May, that the JNA had pulled out of Mokosica by 26 May, and that the HV was
in control of the key town of Osojnik, above Dubrovnik, on 30 May.
1180
Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita Naklada, 1996, pp. 200-270.

443
 Bobetko’s preparations were extensive. He first shored up weak HVO anti-tank
capabilities by bringing in an HV unit from Sisak. He then worked to establish several
platoon-sized reconnaissance and sabotage units, each intended to locate and attack a
specific objective and disrupt Serb forces at the very outset of the HV/HVO offensive. The
main offensive effort was also to be assisted by Croatian artillery fire, which was intended to
knock out the Serb command post in Aladinovici and to pin Serb forces down while the
Croats executed a flanking manoeuvre through Klepci.1181
At the end of May the Bosnian Croats began a series of preliminary attacks against
the VRS 10th Motorized Brigade aimed at progressively improving their tactical position
around Mostar and relieving Serb pressure on the city. These began with the capture of Mt.
Hum to the south on 23 May.1182 The next Croat advances were on 11 June when HVO
forces pushed significantly further, taking Mt. Orlovac and the towns of Varda, Cule, and
Krusevo to the southwest and Jasenica and Slipcici to the south.1183 1184 By 12 June the
Bosnian Croats had cleared the Serbs from the western bank of the Neretva.1185 As an
admission of defeat, the Serbs destroyed two of Mostar’s other bridges on 13 June leaving
only the largely-undamaged Stari Most connecting the two river banks.1186
At the same time the main event, Operation “Jackal”, was launched from Capljina.
The first important step was the capture of Tasovici, opposite Capljina on the east bank of
the Neretva, on 7 June.1187 Rapid advances north and east followed. The withdrawal of
Montenegrin JNA forces, and the long frontages held by the poorly manned brigades of the
VRS Herzegovina Corps, had left the area vulnerable. On 13 June HVO 1st Herzegovina
Brigade forces from Capljina, in conjunction with HV 156th Makarska Brigade units,
captured the road junction at Recice and the towns of Bivolje Brdo and Lovke, while
elements of the HV/HVO Tactical Group-2, consisting primarily of the 116th Metkovic
Brigade, then made a lightning advance eastward up to the outskirts of Stolac.1188 The
advance north along the east bank of the Neretva made similar progress, advancing from
Bivolje Brdo through Pijesci and Gubavica to reach the Mostar suburb of Buna by 14
June.1189 By 15 June the HV TG-2 was consolidating its hold on Stolac and the 1st
Herzegovina and 156th Makarska Brigades had captured the nearby Serb stronghold of
Hodovo.1190
The final element of the operation was an advance northwest towards Mostar
itself. One of Bobetko’s columns advanced north through Buna and Blagaj, reaching Mostar
airport from the south. At the same time, another column consisting of the HV’s 4th

1181
Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita Naklada, 1996, pp. 200-270.
1182
Sarajevo Radio, 23 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2305213192.
1183
Zagreb Radio, 11 June 1992, FBIS London LD1106113292.
1184
Sarajevo Radio, 11 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1106201092.
1185
Zagreb Radio, 12 June 1992, FBIS London LD 1206 183292.
1186
Zagreb Radio, 13 June 1992, FBIS London LD 1306221192.
1187
Zagreb Radio, 8 June 1992, FBIS London LD0806141692.
1188
Zagreb Radio, 13 June 1992, FBIS London LD1306215492.
1189
Zagreb Radio, 14 June 1992, FBIS London LD1406115392.
1190
Zagreb Radio, 15 June 1992, FBIS London LD1506114892.

444
Battalion / 4th Guards Brigade and the Mostar HVO forces pushed south through Jasenica.
The two Croat columns were able to link up at the Mostar-Soko airfield on 17 June.1191 With
this major objective accomplished, the Bosnian Croats turned their attention to mopping up
the Bijelo Polje neighbourhood in the northeast.
At the same time, on 16 June HVO/ARBiH forces – now attacking from the newly
captured eastern side of Mostar – overran the key VRS command post / communications
facility on Mt. Velez, wiping out the command of the VRS 10th Motorized Brigade, killing its
brigade commander, and taking the hill.1192 The HVO/ARBiH forces then advanced into the
foothills of Mt. Velez to the east,1193 and by 21 June they had made Mostar more or less
secure from Serb ground attack.1194 VRS troops from the stricken 10th Motorized Brigade
managed to retake Velez on 24 June but were unable to advance any farther.1195 Battles
continued on and around Mt. Velez, between Mostar and Serb-held Nevesinje, through the
rest of the summer and again in early November, but neither side was able to make any
significant advances.1196
Operation “Jackal” was a major success for the combined HV and HVO forces.
(Croat-Muslim relations in Mostar were already strained by this time, and the Bosnian Army
was not included in any of the planning for Operation “Jackal”. ARBiH troops appear to have
played at most a secondary role in the attacks eastward out of Mostar itself.) Although the
Serb-held lines still ran dangerously close to Mostar, enough of the eastern bank of the
Neretva (and, most importantly, the high ground directly overlooking the city) had been
cleared of Serb forces. Strategically, the operation had also accomplished Zagreb’s
intermediate objective: establishment of a position from which Croatian forces could mount
another operation to relieve Serb pressure on Dubrovnik.

Operation “Tiger” and Dubrovnik Follow-On Operations,

July – September 1992
After the initial link-up with HV forces in Dubrovnik, the Southern Front quickly
attempted to bounce the VRS 472nd Motorized Brigade from the key mountains and hills it
held inside Bosnia and less than five kilometers from Dubrovnik city. Zagreb wanted to
ensure that the Serbs could not fire directly on Dubrovnik or threaten Croatian control over
it again. VRS shelling of the Dubrovnik area continued unremittingly, which the HV

1191
Zagreb Radio, 17 June 1992, FBIS London LD1706204792.
1192
O. Zerajic: Nevesinje Brigade: On the Ramparts of Serbian Hearths, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 12; an
article on the VRS 8th Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, which used its former JNA designator, 10th
Motorized Brigade, throughout 1992. The dead brigade commander was Colonel Tomo Pusara.
1193
Zagreb Radio, 18 June 1992, FBIS London LD1806200592.
1194
Zagreb Radio, 21 June 1992, FBIS London LD2106163892.
1195
Belgrade Radio, 24 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2406172492; O. Zerajic: Nevesinje Brigade: On the Ramparts
of Serbian Hearths, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 12; an article on the VRS 8th Herzegovina Motorized
Brigade, which was the former JNA 10th Motorized Brigade.
1196
Zagreb Radio, 8 November 1992, FBIS London LD0811145492.

445
countered by firing on Trebinje.1197 On 2 June Southern Front forces from the 1st Guards
and 163rd Dubrovnik Brigades, supported by the Zrinski Special Operations Battalion,
attacked. Their objective was the two-kilometre-wide pass that ran through Zaplanik and
Orah and opened into the flat Popovo Polje region. If HV forces could break into Popovo
Polje they could roll up VRS defences, advance on the Serb-held town of Trebinje, and break
the VRS hold over Dubrovnik.1198
The attack on 2 June took Zaplanik, but the initial penetration was too narrow. The
Zrinski Battalion successfully captured the important Golubov Kamen feature, which
overlooked the main attack axis through the pass. However, the battalion was forced to
withdraw due to poor coordination with the 163rd Dubrovnik Brigade on its right, which
failed to seize the Ivanica area. As a result, the primary attack, apparently by the 1st Guards
Brigade, failed to push through the pass. On 8 June VRS troops counterattacked and pushed
the HV back to its start line.
The importance of the terrain ensured that the HV would try again, this time with
better planning and preparation by the Southern Front for its Operation “Tiger”. After
reorganizing its units and receiving another Guards brigade and a reserve brigade, its forces
would attack on a wider front with detailed plans to seize key features that had held up the
previous attack.1199
The Southern Front order of battle for the new operation consisted of three Guards
brigades, two reserve brigades, an armoured battalion, and a corps artillery battalion.1200 It
would get air support from the Croatian Air Force’s single MiG-21 to strike VRS
communications nodes and key positions.1201 The attack frontage was some 23 kilometers,
divided into three sectors for the Guards assault brigades. The 1st Guards, reinforced with
the Zrinski Special Operations Battalion, would attack on the left flank to capture a series of
mountains and hills on the edge of Popovo Polje and protect the main thrust. This would
come from 4th Guards Brigade attacking in the centre towards Zaplanik and Orah along the
pass into Popovo Polje, while capturing Golubov Kamen and Ivanica. A special operations
unit from the 4th Guards, reinforced with armour, was detailed to outflank these two

1197
It is often difficult to tell which side fired first in these exchanges.
1198
Bobetko conveniently does not discuss this failed attack, although he alludes to it in at least two places, p.
297 and p. 318, noting that HV troops had failed for 20 days to capture the important hill, Golubov Kamen,
in the context of the passage dates before the start of Operation “Tiger” in July. The failed attack is also
mentioned in Snjezana Dukic: If we had been only 10 minutes late..., Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 May
1994, p. 9; an interview with Colonel Miljenko Filipovic, commander of the Zrinski Battalion. A close
analysis of Belgrade Tanjug reporting from 2 through 9 June, amplified by detailed map work, illuminates
the ebb and flow of this battle. In addition, the locations described in these Tanjug reports as having been
captured initially by HV troops and then recaptured by VRS units are later identified as HV objectives for
Operation “Tiger” in July.
1199
The description of Operation “Tiger” is found in Bobetko, pp. 302-313 (which are contained in a
photograph of the operation order) and pp. 316-321, plus the official HV situation map on pp. 314-315.
1200
Note that the HV artillery battalions at this stage often fielded a mixture of several different artillery pieces
and 120 mm mortar tubes, and generally were not comparable in strength to a VRS artillery battalion.
1201
Belgrade Tanjug reported an air strike on the Mount Leotar radio relay tower site on 1 July. Belgrade
Tanjug, 1 July 1992. See part 4 of Bobetko’s operation order, pp. 302-313.

446
features to ensure that the main force could advance.1202 The 2nd Guards Brigade was to
attack on the right flank of the 4th Guards to tie down VRS units and keep them from
reinforcing the sector opposite the 4th. The 1st and 4th Guards would attack on a frontage
of seven kilometers while 2nd Guards attacked on a nine-kilometre front.1203 The operation
was to take place in two phases. In the first, lasting three days, all three brigades would
advance about four kilometers. In the second phase, lasting two days, the 1st Guards would
push on another five kilometers, while the other two advanced only a kilometre or so. Two
reserve brigades, the 145th Zagreb-Dubrava (with a battalion of the 156th) and 163rd
Dubrovnik, were to relieve the Guards after they reached their final objectives.1204
VRS forces consisted of two to three battalions from the 472nd Motorized Brigade /
Herzegovina Corps, probably reinforced with a special police detachment and a company of
tanks.1205 The brigade 105 mm artillery battalion, probably reinforced with one to two
batteries of corps 130 mm and 155 mm artillery, provided fire support. The brigade had very
few reserves to commit against any HV advance because of the long front – 40 kilometers –
it was holding.
The attack jumped off at 05:00 on 4 July and by 9 July had achieved many of its
objectives. The 1st Guards with the attached Zrinski Battalion captured all of the features
assigned to them on the left, successfully protecting the 4th Guards advance.1206 The 4th
Guards pushed through the VRS frontline position, seizing Zaplanik by 6 July. This advance
was facilitated by the infiltration of special units from the 4th Guards, reinforced with tanks,
between Golubov Kamen and Ivanica, surprising the Serb troops and turning the VRS
defences of these positions.1207 Nevertheless, the VRS was able to halt the 4th Guards in
front of the village of Orah and the important 900-meter Vlastica position, blocking an HV

1202
The Independent Novi Zagreb Company “Cobras” was attached to the 4th Guards and also helped lead the
attack. Andjeljka Mustapic: The Zagreb “Cobras” – Poison for the Enemy, Life for the Homeland, Hrvatski
Vojnik, 2 July 1993, pp. 25-26.
1203
The 2nd Guards Brigade was short one reinforced battalion that was deployed in the Posavina.
1204
The 145th Brigade appears to have been using the designator “Tactical Group 5” at this time.
1205
The brigade was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bogdan Kovac. See Radovan Kovacevic: A
Brigade is Defending the Heart of Herzegovina, Belgrade Politika, 5 October 1992, p. 6. By 1993 the 472nd
Motorized Brigade had been redesignated the 1st Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, but was more
commonly referred to as the “Trebinje” Brigade.
1206
Nevertheless, the 1st Guards Brigade continued to experience difficulties fighting in the mountainous,
rocky terrain. Bobetko states:
The 1st Brigade had plenty of problems executing its mission, given the fact that no model could
be applied here: instead, it had to use smaller groups of companies and platoons. Clearly the
battalion was the basic tactical unit. It was necessary to deliberately and systematically capture every
dominant elevation, but in such a way that one elevation that dominated another was always taken,
thus disrupting their entire system of defense. It took several days for people to adjust to the new
tactical approach to warfare and execute their specific mission in this terrain, which was not
characteristic of wars in Slavonia and other places. On the whole it was not exactly easy to achieve
the necessary pace in this sort of operation.
Bobetko’s analysis applies across the board to all units fighting in Dalmatia and Herzegovina. Bobetko, p.
316.
1207
Bobetko, pp. 317-318; Andjeljka Mustapic: The Zagreb “Cobras” – Poison for the Enemy, Life for the
Homeland, Hrvatski Vojnik, 2 July 1993, pp. 25-26.

447
breakout into the plains. The 2nd Guards Brigade appears to have made only minor gains on
the right. VRS counterattacks during 12-14 July failed to restore the lost positions.
Encouraged by this partial success, the Southern Front buckled down to seize its
unattained goals and additional terrain that would facilitate an advance on Trebinje,
slogging ahead during July and on into August and September.1208 This appears to have
resulted in at least four battles, probably not including a number of smaller efforts, plus a
major VRS counterattack. The Southern Front continued to rely on the 1st and 4th Guards
Brigades to provide the main attack forces, relieving them during pauses with more reserve
brigades brought in from elsewhere in Croatia.1209
The first attack in this series of operations came on 16 July, when the HV renewed
its advance towards Orah and the Hum village / mountain area at the mouth of the pass into
Popovo Polje. HV forces near Stolac and west of Ljubinje appear to have made supporting
attacks. HV units, probably led by elements of the 1st and 4th Guards, succeeded in
capturing Orah, but the VRS was able to halt the push toward Hum. No gains appear to have
been made on the flanks.
For the next two attacks, the HV shifted its focus about 10 to 15 kilometers to the
northwest. The VRS 472nd Brigade held a salient jutting into HV lines along the south-
western face of the hills and mountains rising above Popovo Polje. The Southern Front
command may have hoped to eliminate the salient and possibly break into northern Popovo
Polje. The first attack came on 29-30 July – possibly led by 1st Guards – and appears to have
failed with minimal gains. An attack along the earlier axis further south toward Hum also
appears to have failed. The Southern Front renewed the attack on 7 August, this time

1208
Bobetko is virtually silent about this period, although he does make brief references to important Serb-
held hills after “Tiger” which were objectives of that attack. He also discusses an almost successful VRS
counterattack in August. This section therefore relies on a close reading of the daily press traffic and
detailed map plotting of these actions.
1209
These included elements drawn from the 112th Zadar, 113th Sibenik, 114th Split, 115th Imotski, 126th Sinj,
141st Split, 144th Zagreb-Sesvete, 148th Zagreb-Trnje, and 163rd Dubrovnik Brigades. This list is drawn
primarily from Vesna Puljak: Four Years of Operation Tiger, Zagreb Velebit, 12 July 1996, p. 8. See also the
following articles in Hrvatski Vojnik and other periodicals for brief references to service by HV units in
Dubrovnik or the “Southern Battlefield”:
 Neven Valent Hribar: The Petka Coastal Artillery Battery, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, p. 83.
 Damir Dukic: The Scorpions in Defense of Croatia, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993, pp. 16-18; an article on
114th Split Brigade.
 Damir Dukic: Honorable and Ready for the Homeland, Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 10 April 1994, p. 10;
an interview with Major Marko Skejo on the 9th HOS Battalion “Sir Rafael Boban” / 114th Split
Brigade.
 Andjelka Mustapic: The Knights from Imotski – For Croatia and For God, Hrvatski Vojnik, 4 June 1993,
pp. 14-15; an article on 115th Imotski Brigade.
 Vesna Puljak: Units of the Croatian Army: “The Neretva is Still Flowing”, Hrvatski Vojnik, 29 July 1994,
p. 26; an article on the 116th Metkovic Brigade.
 Gojko Drljaca: From Dubrava to Dubrovnik, Hrvatski Vojnik, 18 June 1993, p. 12; an article on the
145th Zagreb-Dubrava Brigade.
 Sinisa Haluzan: Through Thorns to Glory and Victory, Hrvatski Vojnik, 20 May 1994, pp. 19-21; an
article on the 148th Zagreb-Trnje Brigade.
Ante Matic: Even the Last Stone of Croatian Land, Hrvatski Vojnik, 9 April 1993, pp. 14-16; an article on the
156th Makarska Brigade.

448
breaking through the VRS defences and advancing five kilometers to the Bobani feature
before the attack was halted.
Colonel Grubac’s VRS Herzegovina Corps troops attempted to regain the initiative
on 14 August, launching a major counterattack aimed at reversing the gains of Operation
“Tiger” and capturing Bobani.1210 The attack was a stunning success, crumpling elements of
the HV 113th Sibenik Brigade then holding the line, and – according to General Bobetko –
almost breaking through to the village of Osojnik, north of Dubrovnik and just inside the
Croatian border. Bobetko, however, was able to quickly commit the 5th Battalion / 1st
Guards Brigade from reserve to block the VRS assault.1211 The Croatians were then able to
recapture most of their previous holdings.1212
The final attack in this series of minor operations appears to have come on 7
September when the HV renewed its attack in the hills around Bobani. After six days of
fighting, however, the Croatians had little to show for their efforts. The VRS retained its hold
over most of the hill line protecting Popovo Polje.

Zagreb and Belgrade Negotiate the JNA Withdrawal from Prevlaka,

September – October 1992
When the JNA withdrew from Bosnia and its positions north of Dubrovnik in May
1992, it retained control over the Konavli plateau, southeast of Dubrovnik, which included
the resort town of Cavtat and Dubrovnik airport. The object of the JNA’s concern was a
small spit of land at Konavli’s far southern tip – the Prevlaka peninsula. Whoever occupied
Prevlaka could see across Kotor Bay, the new home of the Yugoslav Navy after its ejection
from the Croatian coast. Coastal artillery or missile batteries erected on or near Prevlaka
could wreak havoc on the Federal fleet when it sortied from Kotor. To defend Prevlaka, the
JNA needed to retain its hold over Konavli.
The peninsula was within Croatia’s administrative boundaries, something that had
never mattered to the Federal military in the old Yugoslavia. Now, however, the Vance
Peace Plan that had ended the Croatian war required the JNA to withdraw its forces from
within Croatia. Belgrade, before it would approve the withdrawal, wanted assurances about
Prevlaka. It opened negotiations with the UN over Prevlaka in July and progressed to direct
talks with the Croatians in September. Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance helped mediate the talks
as part of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and the two sides quickly
reached agreement on the demilitarization of Prevlaka and the deployment of a UN

1210
The corps, using troops from the 13th Motorized Brigade, also made a simultaneous attack around Stolac
some 50 kilometers to the north that was partially successful.
1211
The commander of the 5th Battalion was Ivan Korade. The 5th Battalion would later serve as the nucleus
for the 7th Guards Brigade “Pumas” formed in 1993 under Korade’s command. The 7th Guards would gain
fame in 1995 during Operation “Storm” and HV operations in Bosnia.
1212
Based on Bobetko, pp. 318-319 and pp. 335-336, as well as Belgrade press reporting.

449
observer force to monitor the peninsula. The JNA withdrawal was scheduled for completion
on 20 October.1213 1214

The Race for Konavli, October 1992

The withdrawal of the JNA’s Podgorica Corps troops that had been holding Konavli
would have serious military consequences for the JNA’s VRS brothers in the Herzegovina
Corps to the north. In addition to guarding Prevlaka, the JNA positions in Konavli had
protected the VRS flank from an attack directly towards Trebinje. The pullout would add
another 20 kilometers of front to the already overstretched 472nd Motorized Brigade.
General Bobetko and the HV Southern Front command realized that they had to
ensure that the VRS did not attempt to fill in behind the JNA when it pulled out, and they
could well imagine the advantages of occupying Konavli themselves. So when Bobetko
sensed that the VRS was indeed preparing to move units into Konavli as the JNA redeployed
its forces, he began making his own plans to beat the VRS to Konavli when the last JNA
soldier crossed into Montenegro on 20 October.1215
But there was a daunting obstacle to Bobetko’s plans: the JNA had blown Konavli’s
main road from Dubrovnik to Cavtat, around the Zupa Bay. Without the road, the narrow
gap between impassable cliffs and the sea made movement along the coast impossible.
Undismayed, Bobetko organized a Croatian Navy landing craft, some local ferries, and other
assorted vessels into an ad hoc amphibious landing flotilla. The assault force embarked
included the 5th Battalion / 1st Guards Brigade, a tank company, a special company from
the 163rd Dubrovnik Brigade, and a MUP Special Police unit.1216
On the evening of 19-20 October, however, as the JNA was finishing its withdrawal,
a heavy storm whipped up the sea, apparently dooming the landing. Somehow, the vessels
managed to move the ground troops the 20 kilometers from the port of Zaton to Cavtat,
where they disembarked under VRS artillery fire. The 5th Battalion / 1st Guards Brigade
quickly moved north towards the line of hills that ran along the Bosnian border.1217
The VRS Herzegovina Corps had ordered full mobilization on 16 October in an effort
to scrounge every available man to deploy along the rapidly yawning gap that the JNA
withdrawal from Konavli was leaving.1218 On 19-20 October, as the HV troops were
attempting to land at Cavtat, the VRS was moving about a battalion of troops from the

1213
See Cosic’s speech in the appendix, plus David Owen: Balkan Odyssey, New York Harcourt, Brace, &
Jovanovich, 1995, pp. 51-52, and Borisav Jovic: The Last Days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo
slavia: Daily Notes from the Period 15 May 1989 to 8 July 1992, Belgrade Politika, 1995, entry for 7 July
1992, plus Paris AFP 30 September 1992, and Belgrade Tanjug 6 October, 14 October, 20 October, and 21
October 1992.
1214
See Appendix 1 for excerpts from a speech by Federal Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic outlining the stages
in the talks over Prevlaka.
1215
Bobetko, pp. 328-329.
1216
Bobetko pp. 328-329 and Vesna Puljak: Three Years of Tigers, Hrvatski Vojnik, 5 November 1993, pp. 12-16;
an article covering the 1st Guards Brigade.
1217
Bobetko, pp. 328-330.
1218
Belgrade Tanjug, 16 October 1992.

450
472nd Brigade into position along the border. The Serbs were too late. The 5th Battalion /
1st Guards Brigade troops, supported by the tank company, hit the VRS near the village of
Glavska, just across the border, driving them back. The HV advance flanked the line of hills
centred on Vlastica, some 10 kilometers to the northwest, which the VRS had staunchly held
for the past four months. Vlastica fell on 26 October to HV troops from the 4th Guards and
163rd Dubrovnik Brigades advancing from positions near Dubrovnik city. The gate to
Trebinje was now open.1219
President Tudjman, however, ordered the last phase of the operation halted,
according to General Bobetko. Zagreb was under enormous diplomatic pressure from the
international community to call off the attack and halt the fighting, and Tudjman felt obliged
to yield.1220 The daring HV operations around Dubrovnik had relieved the siege, captured
some of the most threatening Serb positions, and reoccupied the Konavli area. The VRS,
however, still held Trebinje, and Serb artillery deployed near the town would depress
Dubrovnik’s tourist industry for years to come.1221

Evaluation of Herzegovina – Dubrovnik Operations

The operations in Herzegovina and along the Dalmatian coast to Dubrovnik were
the most complex offensive campaigns the Croatian Army had fought up to that point.1222
The HV owed its victories to good staff work and organization, an emerging breakthrough in
operational-level doctrine, the use of experienced brigades and elite special units to
spearhead all operations, and surprisingly strong logistics support. The experience the HV
gained in conducting these operations became the springboard for the Croatian Army
improvements that would make it the finest armed force in the Balkans by 1995.
The HV/HVO’s success in organizing and moving forces to defend Herzegovina and
Dalmatia and then running a series of offensive operations in difficult terrain demonstrated
that HV officers had the professional staff skills necessary to conduct actions of impressive
complexity. That they had achieved this with a variety of hastily created headquarters and
commands was also a tribute to their imagination and flexibility. General Bobetko’s
headquarters, the Southern Front, was an ad hoc corps level staff formed only during April
that reported directly to the HV Main Staff – the JNA would have called it an operational
group.1223 While such a staff might prove adequate for a short operation close to its logistics

1219
Bobetko, pp. 328-331.
1220
Bobetko, p. 330-332.
1221
Bobetko claims that the Southern Front developed a plan to capture Trebinje at this time, but that Zagreb
would not approve its implemen tation. Bobetko, p. 331.
1222
The only comparable operations were those in Western Slavonia in 1991.
1223
The Southern Front initially had difficulties coordinating the advance of its formations. Bobetko writes:
We saw situations in the beginning in which forces of the 1st Brigade were attacking while some
parts of the 4th Brigade were observers, even though from their positions they could have offered
effective support and created favorable conditions for the 1st Brigade units in capturing rather
sensitive and difficult positions. Thus, that problem too had to be overcome organizationally and
tactically.
Bobetko, p. 289.

451
source, it would not normally be suitable for conducting sustained operations at the end of
a long supply line, and it had barely sufficed in this case. Bobetko had so few people
assigned to his headquarters that he had to practically merge his staff with that of the 1st
Guards Brigade in order to get things done.1224 With no organic logistics units, Southern
Front was dependent on the Main Staff in far-away Zagreb to collect its supplies and move
them forward. To create the dual-hatted Southern Front forward command post / HVO
Main Staff under Colonel Petkovic, Bobetko had to raid the HV Split Operational Zone and
other units. It was an impressive show of improvisation, but the future Croatian Army could
hardly rely on a jury-rigged command and logistics system for conducting a major offensive,
much less a war.
Already during Western Slavonia operations in 1991 and during parts of the
Herzegovina and Dalmatian campaigns in 1992, the HV had shown promise in developing its
operational-level or campaign doctrine. HV/HVO forces in Operation “Jackal” demonstrated
a willingness to quickly exploit the weaknesses of VRS defences after punching holes in Serb
lines. HV units also quickly exploited the defeat and withdrawal of JNA/VRS forces
northwest of Dubrovnik in May. This emerging doctrine of forcing a breakthrough into the
depths of the enemy’s positions to collapse his entire defensive framework was to become a
hallmark of HV operations in 1995.
HV tactical methods had coalesced even more, particularly the reliance on the
Guards brigades and other special units to spearhead all operations. The HV’s territorially
raised “R” (for reserve) brigades, such as the 163rd Dubrovnik, did not have the experience,
training, or motivation to qualify as shock troops, and General Bobetko had found that
special formations were needed to consistently break through the strong defensive crust of
the VRS.1225 The doctrine he established for the Dubrovnik campaign in July-September 1992
would henceforth be the doctrine for virtually all HV (and later HVO) operations. A typical
HV operation would be organized as follows: One to two Guards brigades, themselves led by
elite reconnaissance-sabotage units, Special Police, or similarly trained units, would conduct
the attack with “R” brigades following in the second echelon. When the operational
objectives had been achieved, the “R” brigades would take over the defence of the frontline
while the assault formations were withdrawn into the reserve, ready to mount
counterattacks or lead a renewed offensive.

1224
See Bobetko, pp. 276. Parts 11 and 12 of the operation order for “Tiger”, p. 313, and p. 336.
1225
Bobetko states that the 163rd:
... had spent a long time, more than two years, defending [Dubrovnik] itself, and it took a certain
amount of time to adapt to movement, to a new command method, which up to then had been
exclusively defensive. It was not capable of broader and deeper envelopments, so that it had to
occupy the territory and positions of the 4th Brigade, parts of the 2nd Brigade, parts of the 1st
Brigade ... it was a reserve structure with nearly 2.500 people. Among them were many brave men,
but nevertheless they lacked experience.
Bobetko also writes about the unreliability of most of the reinforcements the Main Staff sent him, nearly all
of which – except the 2nd Guards Brigade – were reserve formations. He states that:
... the units that arrived were unprepared, untrained, and unreliable for any serious combat
mission.
Bobetko, p. 320. See also Bobetko, p. 335.

452
 Even the logistic support seems not to have been all that bad: General Bobetko
claims that, when he really needed something, he got it, implying that the HV logistics
system had substantially improved since 1991. No doubt the importance of the operation to
the Croatian Government, as well as the fact that Herzegovina-Dalmatia and Posavina were
the only major operations they had to support, made it easier for HV logisticians to support
frontline forces than had been the case in 1991. Nevertheless, the fact that Bobetko had to
worry about supplies and sometimes demand them underlines the hazards and difficulties
of relying on a supply network stretching all the way back to the capital.1226
As for the Bosnian Serb Army, its strengths and weaknesses were readily apparent
during its defensive operations against the HV/HVO from May through October 1992. The
major weakness of the VRS – the primary cause of all its lost battles – was its shortage of
manpower. The Serbs simply did not have enough troops to hold the frontlines their
ambitions forced them to hold. The Herzegovina Corps had few if any operational reserves
and its brigades lacked sufficient tactical reserves. As a result, an HV/HVO breakthrough,
unless quickly contained, could rapidly result in catastrophe. In addition to its traditional
strengths in professional staff skills and firepower, the VRS in Herzegovina helped
compensate for this critical shortcoming through its exploitation of the extremely difficult
but mostly familiar ground. General Bobetko’s operation order for Operation “Tiger” paid
tribute to the defensive skill of the VRS in the rocky Herzegovinian terrain:
... the enemy is applying the tactic of guerrilla warfare, attacking with small
groups (10 to 15 soldiers) and taking advantage of his knowledge of the terrain, while
using villages as bases. He is defending his positions with daring manoeuvres and
offensive actions, thereby utilizing easily moved infantry weaponry (recoilless guns,
Maljutkas [antitank missiles], and 82 and 60 mm mortars).
The line of defence ... is defended by firmly holding positions, adroitly exploiting
the advantage of the terrain, which towers over the terrain occupied by our units and
suitable approaches to those elevations.1227
The fact that a single VRS brigade stretched over 40 kilometers of front held off
repeated HV attacks from July through September – while nearly breaking the HV front
during August – speaks volumes about the tenacity of the Serb defence.

1226
Bobetko, p. 298.
1227
A photograph of this order is reproduced in Janko Bobetko: Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb Vlastita
Naklada, 1996, pp. 302-313.

453
 Appendix 1
Excerpts from Speech by Federal Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic on
the Prevlaka Negotiations, 16 October 19921228

Informal negotiations ... between the representatives of the Republic of

Montenegro and Republic of Croatia concerning Prevlaka were held for the first time at the
end of 1991 and at the beginning of the 1992 in The Hague, at the International Conference
on Yugoslavia, although no progress was made in these negotiations. In the talks of Dr.
Borisav Jovic, Head of the State Committee for Liaison with the UN, with UNPROFOR
Commander General Satish Nambiar, held on 10 July 1992, General Nambiar raised the issue
of the Yugoslav Army’s withdrawal from the Dubrovnik region in accordance with Vance’s
Plan. On that occasion Dr. Borisav Jovic presented the FRY’s position regarding Prevlaka.
This position was coordinated beforehand at the session of the Supreme Defence Council. It
was confirmed that the FRY accepts point 18 of Vance’s Plan and that the realization of the
FRY Army’s withdrawal from that region will be carried out on the basis of a specific
agreement between the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and the UNPROFOR Command.
We concluded that the FRY would demand that it be ensured, in the interest of peace, that
the Croatian forces would not be able to bring heavy arms into the vicinity of the FRY border
and that the FRY will seek the final solution to the Prevlaka issue in political negotiations or
at the International Court of Justice. It was also decided on that occasion that the FRY Army
will completely withdraw from the territory of Croatia on the condition that UN forces are
temporarily deployed in Prevlaka until a political or a court solution is found.
On the basis of the Yugoslav Army’s proposal, and through the cooperation of the
FRY President with the Serbian and Montenegrin Presidents, the FRY Government on 17 July
1992 compiled a memorandum concerning Prevlaka, which was coordinated with the
leadership of the Republic of Montenegro and sent to the UN Security Council. The
memorandum explained in detail the historical and legal reasons, and the geostrategic basis
[for the peninsula] to be a part of the FRY’s territory.
The issue of Prevlaka was also thoroughly discussed in the talks that I held with Mr.
Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia, on 28 September
1992. In the talks that FRY Prime Minister Milan Panic and I held with the Co-Chairmen of
the Conference on Yugoslavia ... we examined the issue of Prevlaka in great detail. On that
occasion we reached an agreement on the conditions under which the FRY Army would
withdraw. In the talks of FRY President and FRY Prime Minister with Vance and Owen, Co-
Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia, held on 28 September 1992, we coordinated the
details and speed of the FRY Army’s withdrawal, which were agreed upon by General Panic
[Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army] and General Morillon [Commander of
1228
Upon the formation of the new Federal Yugoslav Republic in spring 1992, the collective Federal Presidency
was abolished. Instead, there was to be a single Federal President elected by the Federal Assembly. In
addition, a Supreme Defense Council, composed of the Federal President and the Serbian and Montenegrin
Presidents, would make all major decisions regarding national security. Serbian nationalist writer Dobrica
Cosic was elected the first Federal president.

454
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. On that occasion I informed Vance and Owen of the
danger stemming from the Croatian occupation of a part of eastern Herzegovina and
demanded that the Croatian forces withdraw from there ... Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-
Chairmen of the International Conference on Yugoslavia, offered guarantees that they will
strive for Croatia to observe the agreement and refrain from embarking upon any military
actions that would endanger Trebinje, Herceg-Novi, and Boka Kotorska. In the talks I held
with Croatian President Tudjman under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference
on Yugoslavia on 30 September 1992, we agreed on and realized the signing of a joint
declaration. This declaration says: The two presidents agree that the Yugoslav Army will pull
out of Prevlaka by 20 October 1992 in accordance with Vance’s Plan.1229

1229
Belgrade Radio, 16 October 1992.

455
 Annex 33
The Role of the Bosnian Serb Air and Air Defence Force in
1992
The Bosnian Serb Air and Air Defence Force (V i PVO) was a highly visible
component that played a subordinate role during the Bosnian Serb Army’s operations in
1992. This visibility caused the UN Security Council to approve the creation of a “no-fly
zone” over Bosnia in October 1992 that quickly curtailed fixed-wing combat flights, although
helicopter sorties and occasional fighter-bomber attacks were to continue throughout the
conflict.1230 The V i PVO was a small force, and its ability to provide a decisive punch to VRS
ground operations was limited. It had about 20 J-22 “Orao” light strike / reconnaissance
aircraft and J-21 “Galeb-Jastreb” dual-purpose light strike / trainer aircraft, 15 light attack /
observation helicopters, and 15 transport helicopters, as well as a number of air defence
units. It flew both reconnaissance and ground attack missions for the VRS, its combat sorties
focusing primarily on interdiction but including some close air support. During a typical VRS
campaign, such as Operation “Vrbas 92” at Jajce, VRS attack aircraft, operating in two- and
four-plane formations, might carry out one or two air strikes a day against enemy
headquarters, artillery / mortar positions, bridges, and road junctions, and, probably less
frequently, enemy frontline positions. For such missions the VRS could also use Gazelle light
attack helicopters equipped with AT-3 antitank missiles, unguided rockets, and machine
guns to target enemy frontline defences. These helicopters were more vulnerable to enemy
ground fire, however, and the VRS appears to have employed them even more sparingly
than it did its strike planes. In a support role, the VRS Mi-8 and Gazelle observation
helicopter fleet was used to transport wounded quickly to VRS and Yugoslav Army medical
facilities, delivering critical supplies, and moving VIP passengers to the battlefield.
While the VRS certainly was glad to have air support for its ground campaigns, in
some ways the psychological effect of being attacked from the air had a greater impact on
Croat and Muslim troops than the actual physical damage the V i PVO could inflict on these
forces. The V i PVO had too few aircraft to saturate enemy positions with dumb bombs and
unguided rockets, and there were not enough precision guided weapons available to have
any decisive effect. The mountainous, forested terrain and the type of military formations
deployed in Bosnia – primarily light infantry and small armour and artillery units – made
targeting by aircraft difficult. Flying low and slow enough to identify these targets would

1230
UN Council Declares Bosnia A Military No-Fly Zone, Reuters, 9 October 1992. Almost simultaneously,
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic offered to send the V i PVO aircraft to Yugoslavia in a political gesture
designed to score points with the West. This effort came to naught after negotiations between Karadzic
and EU envoy Lord David Owen broke down when the VRS blocked Karadzic’s attempt to give away its
aircraft. Belgrade Tanjug; Belgrade Radio, 13-15 October 1992. The initial “no-fly zone” resolution provided
no enforcement mechanism to ensure that no one flew aircraft over Bosnia. The Security Council approved
the enforcement of the zone in early 1993 after Bosnian Serb An-2 biplanes attacked Bosnian Army
positions around the Srebrenica enclave by rolling bombs out of the planes’ cargo doors.

456
have made V i PVO aircraft more vulnerable to enemy ground fire, so the Serbs flew at
higher altitudes that reduced their effectiveness even more.

457
 Annex 34
The Charge of the Light Blue Brigade:
UNPROFOR First Deploys in Bosnia, Fall – Winter 1992
“The Balkans ... are not worth the bones of a single healthy Pomeranian grenadier.”
Otto Von Bismarck

“There is no reason why men and women from faraway countries should shed their
blood on behalf of communities unwilling to come to terms with each other.”
Indian Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, then departing UNPROFOR commander1231

As early as December 1991, then-Bosnian Republic President Izetbegovic had made

a face-to-face appeal to UN Envoy Cyrus Vance (who was negotiating the cease-fire in
Croatia) for UN troops to monitor his own republic’s borders.1232 But both Vance and the
UN’s lame duck Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, were wholly preoccupied with
the just-beginning peacekeeping operations in Croatia, and undoubtedly felt that a new UN
deployment at the time would distract attention and divert already limited resources away
from the Vance Plan’s implementation. Moreover, the collapse of an UN-brokered cease-fire
in Croatia at the time of the Vance-Izetbegovic meetings left Vance hesitant over even the
Croatian peacekeeping deployment.1233 Perez de Cuellar was similarly reluctant to take on
any additional UN responsibilities in the face of a visibly worsening situation, and he
opposed the deployment of peacekeeping forces in an environment without at least a
workable cease-fire and the outlines of a negotiated agreement. The Secretary General
argued publicly against premature diplomatic recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav
republics, predicting (correctly, as it turned out) that such actions would destabilize what
was left of Yugoslavia and push not-yet-independent Bosnia or Macedonia over the brink
into war.1234
One indication of the UN’s preoccupation with Croatia and its lack of understanding
of the looming Bosnian problem can be seen in the closing days of 1991, as UN leaders
surveyed possibilities for a suitable headquarters location and logistical base for the newly-
created “UNPROFOR” (United Nations Protective Force), which would oversee the peace
settlement in Croatia.1235 1236 The new Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, declined to

1231
The Philadelphia Inquirer, U.N. Stretched to Limit by Crisis upon Crisis by Rick Lyman, 7 March 1993, p. 1.
1232
Reuters, 6 December 1991.
1233
Reuters, Vance Steps Up Diplomatic Activity, Yugoslav Fighting Goes On by Vjekoslav Radovic, 8 December
1991.
1234
Reuters, U.N. Chief Warns Against Recognising Croatia, Slovenia by Evelyn Leopold, 12 December 1991.
1235
On 15 December 1991, the UN Security Council voted to send a small group of 21 observers to reconnoiter
potential locations for the peace keeping forces in Croatia. They arrived in Croatia a few days later.
1236
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protective Force) – the first UN peace keeping operation on the continent of
Europe – was formally created on 21 February 1992, with an initial mandate of 12 months. At the time of
its creation its mandate was to establish and patrol the supposedly demilitarized UNPAs (United Nations
Protected Areas) in Croatia, thereby separating the warring Croatians and Krajina Serbs until a political

458
choose a location within Croatia, since it would necessarily have to be in either a Croat-held
or Serb-held area. The choice would thus appear to favor one side to the detriment of the
other. The UN therefore cast about for a location in adjacent – and seemingly peaceful –
Bosnia. The large city of Banja Luka – close to the UN sectors and the centre of a large
transportation network – would have been ideal, but its large Serb population made it an
insufficiently impartial choice. Instead, the UN selected a city whose multiethnic mix made it
appear (at least from the United Nations headquarters in New York) the most neutral and
logical choice in the former Yugoslavia. On 9 March 1992 – less than 30 days before the
Bosnian civil war was to begin – Indian Lt. General Satish Nambiar, the first UN peace
keeping force commander, landed in the Olympic city of Sarajevo and established his
headquarters a few blocks from where the fighting would break out.1237
By the end of December 1991, as the first handful of the roughly 12.000 UN
peacekeeping troops began arriving in Croatia to separate the warring Croats and rebel
Krajina Serbs, the European Community (led by the Dutch, who then held the EC Presidency)
began to press harder for a UN preventive peacekeeping role in Bosnia.1238 As war
approached, in late March 1992, then-Bosnian Government Presidency member Ejup Ganic
reiterated Izetbegovic’s request for the UN to send in military observers or peacekeepers to
prevent hostilities.1239 But Boutros Boutros-Ghali shared his predecessor’s reluctance to
commit UN peacekeepers without a “clear and viable mandate” and in the absence of a
workable agreement among the warring parties.1240 Boutros-Ghali publicly rejected the idea
of a UN commitment in late April 1992, shortly after fighting had broken out.1241 However,
several of the UN Security Council members – most notably France and Austria – strongly
opposed Boutros-Ghali’s position and tentatively began investigating peacekeeping options
behind the scenes.1242
As their mission was being debated within the Security Council, the UN
peacekeeping headquarters troops attempted to establish themselves on the ground in
Bosnia.1243 Only weeks after their arrival, in mid-May, UNPROFOR’s first high-visibility action

settlement could be reached. The UN would maintain its peacekeeping mission in the UNPAs until August
1995, when the Croatian Army’s “Operation Storm” overran the areas and rendered the mission irrelevant.
1237
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, p. 204.
1238
Reuters, EC Wants U.N. Peacekeepers Sent To Bosnia by Stephen Nisbet, 20 December 1991.
1239
Reuters, Bosnian Asks U.N. to Intervene as Fighting Worsens 27 March 1992.
1240
Reuters, U.N. Chief to Investigate Peace-keepers for Bosnia by Evelyn Leopold, 28 April 1992.
1241
Reuters, U.N. Says it Can’t Send Peace Force to Bosnia by Anthony Goodman, 24 April 1992.
1242
Reuters, France Quietly Lobbies for U.N. Force in Bosnia by Evelyn Leopold, 28 April 1992.
1243
At this time, UN military commanders were frequently critical of the UN headquarters’ lack of organization
and experience, and of the perception that the UN authorities were trying to micromanage events in the
field from a detached headquarters thousands of miles away. This criticism (largely unjustified, in our view)
hit home when Canadian Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie (then UNPROFOR Chief of Staff in the Former
Yugoslavia) delivered the stinging and unusually pointed public statement: “Do not get in trouble as a
commander in the field after 5 PM New York time or Saturday or Sunday. There is no one to answer the
phone. It is a nine-to-five civilian operation”. Jane’s Defense Weekly, 13 March 1993, pp. 23-28. To its
credit, the UN did respond to Mackenzie’s indictment of its organization by establishing a round-the-clock
“situation center” and a small military planning organization of some 100 full-time staffers. The Economist,
United Nations Peace keeping: Trotting to the Rescue, 25 June 1994, pp. 19-22.

459
failed to inspire observers in or out of Bosnia as most of UNPROFOR’s staff in Bosnia
evacuated to Belgrade in the wake of heavy fighting in the Sarajevo suburbs near the
airport. About 100 UN personnel remained behind to show the flag and attempt to carry on
the UN mission until they could be reinforced.1244 After a protracted series of negotiations,
the UN passed UNSC Resolution 758 on 8 June 1992, setting the terms for the reopening of
Sarajevo Airport under UN control.1245 The first 80 peacekeepers arrived ten days later to
inspect the airfield, but battles near the former Olympic village in Dobrinja further delayed
the airport’s opening. First Serbs and then Muslims were accused of breaking the cease-fire,
despite a UN ultimatum directed at both factions.1246 The first humanitarian relief flight
eventually landed on 29 June, one day after French President Mitterrand made an
unscheduled but highly publicized six-hour stop in Sarajevo.
The UN’s unanticipated humanitarian relief mission in Bosnia – exemplified by the
Sarajevo airlift – brought with it a requirement for a greatly expanded peace keeping force
which would come under a UN Sector Sarajevo command directed by UNPROFOR’s Chief of
Staff, Canadian Brig. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie. With the opening of the airlift, the UN first
ordered a full battalion of Canadian peacekeepers to take charge of the airfield and
maintain security. Shortly thereafter, the force was expanded to include a Ukrainian and an
Egyptian battalion, all deployed in the Sarajevo area. This arrangement cosmetically
provided one peace keeping unit representing each of Bosnia’s principal faiths – Catholic,
Orthodox, and Muslim.
The UN’s commitment to Bosnian peacekeeping increased slowly but continuously.
The multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BH Command), a headquarters staff
essentially transferred from NATO, was established in the fall of 1992. Under it the
battalion-sized Canadian, Ukrainian, and Egyptian contingents remained in the Sarajevo area
while additional units contributed by UN member nations were deployed across the
country. The British, supported by Belgian and Dutch logistical elements, were based at
Vitez and took responsibility for central Bosnia. The Spanish contributed a battalion based at
Mostar. The French and Portuguese initially took over the Bihac area. Denmark and Norway
contributed units that began operating from Kiseljak, adjacent to the British sector.
Canadian and Dutch forces were originally intended to operate from Serb-held Banja Luka,
but were refused entry. (The displaced Canadians were first moved to Macedonia and
eventually became the first peacekeeping unit sent to the UN-declared “Safe Area” of
Srebrenica.)1247
By the end of 1992, UNPROFOR had some 7.500 troops in Bosnia and was already
finding itself over taxed. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali abandoned a proposed plan to
seal off Bosnia’s borders to prevent the infiltration of additional men and weapons from
Croatia and Serbia, citing the need for at least 10.000 more troops against the small
1244
Reuters, U.N. Convoy Ready to Leave Sarajevo by Richard Meares, 16 May 1992.
1245
Reuters, Text of Operative Part of Sarajevo Resolution, 8 June 1992.
1246
Reuters, Serbs Comply With Truce But Bosnia Forces Fight – U.N. Chief by Evelyn Leopold, 27 June 1992.
1247
Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York
Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 108-118.

460
likelihood of finding contributors for such a force. Indeed, after an October 30 call for 75
military observers to monitor Bosnia’s airfields for No-Fly Zone violations, the UN had
received only 33 by the end of the year.1248 The UN in Bosnia was finding itself with a vague
but expanding mission largely forced upon it by its principal member nations without the
force contributions necessary to execute the mission. It was to be one of UNPROFOR’s
principal dilemmas for the next three years.
In New York, the UN was expanding a mandate that remained tremblingly vague.
UNSC Resolution 770, passed on 13 August 1992, authorized the peacekeeping forces of
member states in Bosnia to use “all measures necessary” to deliver humanitarian aid,
though stressing that this was not a prescription for the use of force.1249 Interpreting this
caveat, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) adopted by UNPROFOR and transmitted to its
subordinate contingents were extremely restrictive. If attacked, UN peacekeepers were to
return fire with only a single round, and that only after positively ascertaining the source of
the firing. If shooting continued, UN forces were to withdraw without returning fire unless
there was absolutely no other alternative.1250 1251 1252 In practice, these ROE proved
unworkable in an environment like Bosnia, and most national contingents adopted their
own, unwritten Rules of Engagement, which were more or less in accordance with the spirit
of the UN’s peace keeping guidelines.1253 1254 In practical terms, the UN forces in Bosnia had
potentially contradictory missions (which additional firepower or more lenient rules of
engagement would not necessarily have helped) since the peacekeepers were directed
primarily to protect and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, but increasingly were
being called on to respond somehow to any other violations of UN resolutions by the
warring factions. UNPROFOR’s humanitarian missions largely tied the peacekeepers’ hands,
since a certain degree of factional goodwill was essential for the free movement of relief
convoys. An aggressive UN response to any abuses or humiliations from one of the factions
(generally, the Bosnian Serbs) could immediately lead to a complete shutdown of the relief
effort with just a few shots fired in the direction of humanitarian flights or convoys. The UN
in Bosnia was caught wearing one iron fist and one velvet glove – and could not use one
without handicapping the other.
1248
Reuters, U.N. Chief Says Bosnia’s Borders Need 10.000 Troops by Evelyn Leopold, 29 December 1992.
1249
UNSC 770 was amended by UNSC 776, passed on 14 September 1992, authorizing the expansion of
UNPROFOR’s mandate to include protection of humanitarian convoys.
1250
The Times, Serb Warlords and UN Politics Frustrate British Mission, 13 November 1992.
1251
The Christian Science Monitor, For UN Peacekeepers in Croatia. Isolation is Tough Challenge, 14 December
1992.
1252
The Times, British Troops Chafe at No-Fire Rule as Serb Lines Creep Toward Them, 20 December 1992.
1253
Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York
Columbia University Press, 1997. pp. 108-118.
1254
This view has been contradicted by the then-UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo commander in Bosnia, Canadian
Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie. He stated not long afterward that:
It is a common – and incorrect – assumption that UN forces have to tolerate shooting, and are
heavily restricted in their ability to fire back. Under the Rules of Engagement, at least when I was
there, anybody in the UN can fire back at any equipment or formation attacking.
Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie: Military Realities of UN Peacekeeping Operations, RUSI Journal, February 1993,
pp. 21-24.

461
 Section IV
Bosnia 1993

462
 Annex 35
Widening the Corridor:
Brcko Operations, January – July 1993
Cutting the Corridor ... Again; January Battles at Brcko – Orasje
At the end of 1992, VRS Colonel Novica Simic’s East Bosnian Corps, supported by
1st Krajina Corps units, made a successful attack to seize several Muslim-held villages some
10 kilometers west of Brcko town, from which Bosnian Army forces had been cutting and
squeezing the corridor around Markovic Polje, Loncari, and Gorice.1255 The VRS success was
short-lived; on 2 January ARBiH 1st Operational Group / 2nd Corps troops from the 21st
Srebrenik Brigade, the ARBiH 108th Motorized Brigade, and the HVO 108th Brigade,
reinforced by other 2nd Corps units from Tuzla, were able to attack and again sever the
corridor in these areas.1256 The HV/HVO provided artillery support from the Orasje pocket
and Croatia itself.
Elements of the VRS 2nd Posavina Light Infantry, 3rd Semberija Light Infantry, and
16th Krajina Motorized Brigades counterattacked almost immediately and by 5 January
appear to have blocked the ARBiH advance. On 7 January the Muslims renewed their assault
and fighting raged until mid-January when the battle tapered off, leaving the corridor open.
It was the last major Bosnian Army-HVO effort to cut the Serb supply line.

The VRS Attacks ... and Fails, May 1993

After the January fighting, clashes in the Brcko sector settled into a routine of
regular exchanges of mortar and small arms fire even when no major action was underway.

1255
As noted in the 1992 Posavina operations study, the exact time period for this VRS attack remains hazy. It
may in fact have occurred in early January in response to the 2 January ARBiH/HVO attack described in this
section. See the 1992 Posavina operations sector for details.
1256
The 1st Operational Group / 2nd Corps exercised command and control over the sector running from Celic
south of Brcko, through Brcko itself, and over to Gradacac inclusive. It included the following bri gades:
21st Srebrenik Mountain Brigade
107th Gradacac Motorized Brigade
108th Motorized Brigade
208th Celic Mountain Brigade
In addition, the 1st OG coordinated its operations with the 108th HVO Brigade in Brcko. The 1992 108th
HVO Brigade split into two formations either late in 1992 or early 1993, both designated 108th – the ARBiH
108th Motorized Brigade and the 108th HVO Brcko Brigade. The 1st Operational Group was regularly
reinforced by elements of the 5th Operational Group headquartered in Tuzla (covering the Majevica
Mountains), plus elements of the 115th HVO Zrinski Brigade in Tuzla. The 5th OG was organized into three
brigades, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Tuzla Mountain Brigades with 7.000 to 8.000 troops. The 115th Zrinski had an
estimated 2.500 troops.
See Said Huremovic: The Miners Brigade: From a Patriotic League to a Modern Army, Prva Linija, June 1997,
p. 15; an article on the 3rd Tuzla Brigade; and Milenko Horvatic: Enormous Contribution to the Defense,
Zagreb Velebit, 19 July 1996, p. 15; an article on the HVO 115th Zrinski Brigade, for brief references to the
service of these brigades in the Posavina.

463
By now, the two sides faced each other from a maze of trenches and bunkers divided by a
no-man’s land that made the area one of the most dangerous sectors in Bosnia.
The VRS shattered this relative calm in May when the East Bosnian Corps made
another attempt to widen the corridor. Colonel Simic’s attacking force opposite Brcko
comprised the three sector brigades covering the Brcko area – the 2nd Posavina, 3rd
Semberija, and 1st Posavina – reinforced with the corps’ mobile brigade, the 1st Bijeljina
Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers”.1257 The total force probably amounted to some 5.500
troops, although the troops making the actual assault probably numbered only about a third
of the total. Elements of the 1st Krajina and East Bosnian Corps artillery regiments –
probably up to two battalions of 155 mm howitzers – reinforced the brigade-level fire base.
The ARBiH 1st Operational Group / 2nd Corps and the HVO defended the sector
with forces from three local brigades, the 21st Srebrenik, 108th Motorized, and 108th HVO
Brigades. This force comprised about 12.000 troops, about half of them employing only
small arms.1258 Fire support was confined to a few mortars and some direct fire antitank
guns and recoilless rifles.
The VRS attack began on 13 May, led by the “Panthers”, who succeeded in breaking
into the ARBiH 108th Motorized Brigade positions between Dizdarusa and Omerbegovaca at
the south-eastern corner of the front. Elements of the 1st Posavina and 3rd Semberija
attacked further to the north and west around Brod and Ulice-Bukovac. Despite the Serbs’
initial gains, the Muslim defenders managed to hold their second-line positions and
prevented the Serbs from widening their foothold. By 16 May, the 108th Motorized, with
assistance from its sister 108th HVO Brigade, managed to push the “Panthers” back to their
start line. Renewed VRS attacks over the next four days all along the line, particularly on 20
May, failed to dent the joint ARBiH-HVO defence.

The VRS Succeeds – Operation “Sadejstvo (Joint Action) 93”, July 19931259

1257
Elements of the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade may also have been involved in the attack in the sector
west of Brcko, but it appears that the brigade had been withdrawn into reserve in February after the
January battles. See Dusan Vrzina: The Weapons Awoke; Sketch for A Monograph: The Brcko Battlefield,
Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 20.
1258
Elements of the 5th Operational Group / 2nd Corps from Tuzla may also have reinforced the 1st
Operational Group. See earlier footnote for the composition of the 5th OG.
1259
This account of Operation “Sadejstvo 93” is drawn from contemporary press traffic in Belgrade Radio,
Sarajevo Radio, and Belgrade Tanjug, plus the following sources:
 Mico Glamocanin: Without a Battle Lost, Kozarski Vjesnik, 26 August 1994; an article on the 4th
Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade.
 Mile Mutic: The Brigade of the Long and Honorable Warpath: The Warpath of the 5th Kozara Brigade,
Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984.
 Zivko Ecim: The Serbs Dislike the Easy Tasks, Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984; an interview
with Colonel Pero Colic, commander of the 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade.
 Dragan Stegic: The 16th, Directory of Heroes, Srpska Vojska, 25 June 1994, pp. 12-14; an interview
with LTC Vlado Topic, commander of the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade.
 Battle for “Strujni”[electricity] Corridor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 23.

464
 The VRS waited until July to make another attempt at widening the corridor. This
time the VRS had the added objective of securing a route for a 110-kilovolt power line that
would provide electricity for the power-starved Bosanska Krajina region in western
Bosnia.1260 The Serb effort again came under the command of Colonel Novica Simic’s East
Bosnian Corps.1261 Simic had the same formations he used in the May attack, bolstered by
two brigades from 1st Krajina Corps – the 5th Kozara Light Infantry and 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigades – plus an armoured battalion from the 1st Armoured Brigade, the 4th
Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade, and elements of the elite 1st Military Police Battalion.
Elements of the 1st and 3rd Mixed Artillery Regiments – 155 mm howitzers and 128 mm
multiple rocket launchers – were to provide corps-level fire support. All told, the VRS had
assembled over 10.000 troops for the attack (including sector holding units), almost double
the strength of the May assault. The ARBiH and HVO fielded the same brigades that had
defeated the Serbs in the May fighting.
Simic’s attack plan envisaged two main thrusts designed (apparently) to converge
on the large village of Gornja Brka, some 10 kilometers from central Brcko. VRS forces
comprising the first thrust – Tactical Group 1 controlling the “Panthers”, the “Pesa” special
assault detachment from the 1st Posavina Brigade, elements of the 1st MP Battalion, and
the 4th Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade, plus the sector troops from the 1st Posavina
Infantry Brigade – would directly assault the main defence line in front of Brcko from the
east. The second thrust – Tactical Group 2 comprising the 5th Kozara Light and 16th Krajina

 The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, pp. 26-29; an
article on the 1st Armored Brigade.
 Where It Was Hardest, There was the 4th Battalion: From Romanija to the Una and Sava, Krajiski
Vojnik, June 1996, p. 37; an article on the 4th Battalion / 43rd Motorized Brigade.
 Dusan Vrzina: The Best Unit of the 1st Krajina Corps: 1.000 War Days of the 16th, Krajiski Vojnik, June
1994, pp. 15-16; an article on the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade.
 Radmila Zigic: Peso: Jedna Ratna Legenda (Peso: One War Legend), Belgrade Novi Dani, 1995.
 Videotape Garda Panteri, narrated by Major Ljubisa Savic-Mauzer, a videography of the 1st Bijeljina
Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers”, also known as the “Serbian Guard”.
 Sefko Hodzic: The Sava is Far Away, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 14 December 1995, p. 10; an article on the
215th Mountain Brigade, discussing the Brcko front; the 108th Motorized Brigade was redesignated
the 215th in late 1994.
Edhem Ekmescic: We Have to Have a Strong Army Because It Is the Guarantee of Our Return Home!, Travnik
Bosnjak, 2 January 1996, pp. 12-13; an interview with Major Ibrahim Salihovic, a former officer in the 21st
Srebrenik Brigade and later commander of the 211th Liberation Brigade
1260
According to Krajiski Vojnik:
It was necessary to liberate several villages in the vicinity of Brcko so that a 100-kilovolt long-
distance power line could be repaired and put into operation. The line went through the villages of
Brod, Srpska [Donja] Brka, Kolonija, Lipovac, Djukici, and Bajici.
Battle for “Strujni”[electricity] Corridor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 23
1261
One source claims that “Sadejstvo 93” was a joint 1st Krajina / East Bosnian Corps operation with
Lieutenant Colonel General Momir Talic, the commander of 1st Krajina Corps, in overall command with
Simic as his chief of staff. This is highly plausible given the large-scale 1st Krajina Corps involvement. See
Radmila Zigic: Pesa: Jedna Ratna Legenda (Pesa: One War Legend), Belgrade Novi Dani, 1995, p. 56. Zigic
also claims that Simic was promoted to major general (one star) as a result of the VRS victory. This is also
very likely, given that Simic was positively identified as a major general later in 1993.

465
Motorized Brigades, plus sector units from the 2nd Posavina and 3rd Semberija Brigades –
would attack from Ulice, some 10 kilometers west of Brcko, towards the south.
The VRS attack began on 20 July. TG-1 led the way, hitting ARBiH 108th Motorized
Brigade positions near Brod and Suljagica Sokak. Initially, however, TG-1 made little
headway. TG-2 carried out a preliminary attack only, near Bajici, surprising Muslim forces
and gaining 500 meters.1262
On 23 July, TG-2, spearheaded by the 16th Krajina, launched its main assault, while
the 5th Kozara attacked on the right flank of the 16th.1263 The 16th attacked with all three
battalions on line.1264 The 1st and 2nd Battalions, supported by a tank company from 1st
Armoured Brigade, attacked toward Bajici, but quickly bogged down.1265 The 3rd Battalion
assaulted Lucici and achieved more success, seizing the Muslims’ first trench line, but then
was halted at the 108th’s reserve position.1266 TG-1 also attacked, but gained only minimal
ground.
The major break came on 24 July in TG-1’s sector when the “Panthers”, the “Pesa”
unit, and the 1st MP Battalion stormed Muslim defences around Brod.1267 This success
unhinged the ARBiH defences and allowed the 3rd Battalion / 16th Krajina to seize Lucici.
The two forces then converged toward Lipovac, seizing Kolonija and advancing along the
railway line. The ARBiH 108th Motorized was forced to pull back toward Donja Brka, also

1262
Battle for “Strujni”[electricity] Corridor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 23; this article provides a detailed
account of the 16th Krajina’s role in Operation “Sadejstvo 93”.
1263
The 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade relocated from the Gradacac front under Tactical Group 4 to Ulice on
9 July. A tank company from the 1st Armored Brigade and a light air defense battery from the 1st Light Air
Defense Artillery Regiment were attached. Mile Mutic: The Brigade of the Long and Honorable Warpath:
The Warpath of the 5th Kozara Brigade, Kozarski Vjesnik, 29 July 1994, Issue 984.
1264
The 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade was organized into the following sub-units:
Reconnaissance Company
Military Police Company
Communication Company
NBC Defense Platoon
1st, 2nd, 3rd Motorized Battalions
Armored Battalion
Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion
122 mm Howitzer Artillery Battalion
Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion
Engineer Battalion
Rear Battalion
Dragan Stegic: The 16th Directory of Heroes, Srpska Vojska, 25 June 1994, p. 12-14; an interview with
Lieutenant Colonel Vlado Topic, commander of the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade.
1265
The 1st Krajina Corps journal, Krajiski Vojnik, states that:
[the loss of a company commander] ... as well as poor coordination between the 1st and 2nd
Battalions, hindered the performance of the mission so that the attack was broken off.
Battle for “Strujni”[electricity] Corridor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 23; this article provides a detailed
account of the 16th Krajina’s role in Operation “Sadejstvo 93”.
1266
Battle for “Strujni”[electricity] Corridor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 23; this article provides a detailed
account of the 16th Krajina’s role in Operation “Sadejstvo 93”.
1267
See Radmila Zigic: Pesa: Jedna Ratna Legenda (Pesa: One War Legend), Belgrade Novi Dani, 1995, pp. 55-
60.

466
losing Omerbegovaca further south. To the west, however, at Bajici, the 108th was enjoying
greater success, completely halting the 2nd Battalion / 16th Krajina’s attack.
The next day the 108th counterattacked against TG-1, but failed to penetrate the
new Serb line. Meanwhile, TG-2 redoubled its stalled efforts to seize the Bajici-Djukici line.
The 16th Krajina pushed again with all three battalions, including a flank attack from the 3rd
Battalion toward Djukici from its newly captured positions at Lipovac. The 5th Kozara
attacked further west. According to Krajiski Vojnik:
... the enemy defence was very strong, and the terrain unfavourable for us. The
cleared area made the approach of infantry impossible, and at the same time it was cut
through with numerous canals, which made the use of tanks impossible. In the battle,
which lasted the whole day, an advance of about one kilometre was achieved. The high
power transmission line was on our side, but we did not succeed in conquering Djukici
and Bajici.1268
TG-2’s role in the operation was over.
TG-1, however, continued to edge its way forward toward Donja Brka. On 26-27
July, Serb troops captured additional territory, including an agricultural complex. By the end
of 27 July, Donja Brka (which the Serbs renamed Srpska Brka) had fallen. VRS forces dug in
along the final line running from in front of Bajici and Djukici to positions southwest of
Lipovac to Donja Brka and south of Omerbegovaca. At its deepest penetration, the East
Bosnian Corps had advanced five kilometers.

Evaluation of Brcko Operations

The battles around Brcko in 1993 once again demonstrated Serb superiority in
planning, organization, and firepower. In particular, Operation “Sadejstvo 93” showed the
VRS’s ability to professionally plan a substantial operation involving more than 10.000
troops. The VRS was able to shift additional units into the sector and coordinate fire support
between two different corps, while also integrating brigades and other elements from two
separate corps to form the attack force. The combination of professional planning, the
employment of the elite 16th Krajina Brigade, “Panthers”, and 1st MP Battalion, and
substantial firepower allowed the Serbs to overrun some of the strongest Muslim defences
in Bosnia.
The Bosnian Army, helped by its HVO allies, as usual fought hard, but could not
completely stop the Serb juggernaut. But the Serbs’ setback in May and during part of the
July operation demonstrated that well-prepared defensive positions – bunker and trench
systems – could often halt a Serb attack. VRS armour and infantry units were usually
reluctant to close with the Muslim infantry, and relied heavily on artillery plus tank main gun
fire to break ARBiH defences. As Bosnian Army fortifications became more elaborate and
well-constructed, the Serbs found it harder to suppress these defences; the VRS had only a

1268
Battle for “Strujni”[electricity] Corridor, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996, p. 23; this article provides a detailed
account of the 16th Krajina’s role in Operation “Sadejstvo 93”.

467
finite number of artillery tubes spread across the country to defeat increasingly strong
ARBiH fortifications.1269 Thus entrenched, the staunch Muslim infantry grew more and more
capable of holding positions against the better-armed Serb opponent. Serb forces could
break into ARBiH defences but could not shake the Muslims loose to expand or even hold
newly gained ground. This trend was to continue during 1993, and gain momentum in
1994.1270

1269
An analysis of British artillery during the Battle of the Somme in the First World War illustrates the
importance of comparing the number of guns available to the absolute task at hand:
What then of numbers? Did [the British commander] possess so many more guns than at previous
offensives that he might expect sheer weight of fire power to overwhelm the German defence?
Certainly he had guns in unprecedented quantity ... [the British commander] may have been tempted
to conclude that he could destroy any defensive system, no matter how strong.
It is important not to be mesmerized by these ... figures. Rather, it is the number of guns (and
shells) relative to the task in hand that is crucial (emphasis added) ... The vital question ... was
whether [the British commander] possessed sufficient artillery to subdue these particular defenses.
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson: Command on the Western Front, London Blackwell, 1992, pp. 166-168.
The main point of all this is to note that while the VRS may have had more artillery than the Bosnian Army,
that was not what ultimately mattered. The Serb artillery (and armor) was not trying to suppress the
Muslims’ artillery. It was trying to knock out their trenches and bunkers. The stronger these got, the
stronger the Serbs’ artillery needed to be. The Serbs, however, had to stretch their artillery and mortar
assets to cover an immensely long frontline. As a result, the relative number of guns per kilometer of front
to be attacked was always relatively low, and with ARBiH defenses getting stronger, the Serbs’ ability to
take them on got weaker.
1270
This analysis applies primarily to the heart of the territory controlled by the Bosnian Government in
northern and central Bosnia. The eastern enclaves did not enjoy the same advantages as did ARBiH forces
in these areas. In addition, the strength of Bosnian Army fortifications appeared to increase as one moves
from south to north, possibly because of terrain factors.

468
 Annex 36
Battles on the Drina, Round Two:
December 1992 – August 1993
The Srebrenica Campaign, December 1992 – April 19931271
Bosnian Army Offensive Operations, 14 December 1992 – 26 January 1993

Following up its successes in attacking Bosnian Serb Army forces and Serb villages
in the Srebrenica-Bratunac-Skelani area in 1992, the Bosnian Army launched a major assault
on the VRS in late December. This attack was designed to link Srebrenica with the Muslim-
held Cerska-Kamenica pocket, some 15 to 20 kilometers to the northwest, while expanding
Muslim territorial control in the region. To reach Cerska, Naser Oric’s troops needed to
capture the Konjevic Polje-Bratunac road.
Oric’s force still numbered only 4.000 to 6.000 men in three brigades. But even
though the number of armed personnel probably had gradually increased during 1992 as
the Muslims captured more weapons, no more than 3.000 of these soldiers probably were
armed. The VRS Drina Corps under Colonel Milenko Zivanovic had up to 2.000 troops in the
1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade and the Skelani Battalion deployed in the north and
southeast opposite Oric: another 500 to 1.000 troops from the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade
were deployed along the western side of the Srebrenica enclave.1272
Oric launched a preliminary attack east of Bratunac on 14-15 December, hitting
three Serb villages in the Loznicka Rijeka area – Voljavica, Bjelovac, and Sikirica – and cutting
off Bratunac’s water supply. The Serbs claim that a large number of civilians died in the
attack.1273 The main assault began on 24 December against the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road
and the villages alongside it. The initial advance cut the road between the village of Kravica
and Bratunac, although Kravica remained linked to VRS forces at Drinjaca, and from there to
Zvornik.1274 ARBiH troops also captured the important Glogova mountain area (500 to 700
meters in height), some five to ten kilometers northwest of Bratunac. This terrain
dominated the area along the road. Several Serb villages fell as well.
VRS and ARBiH troops fought back and forth along the road and east of Bratunac
throughout December and into January; it looked as if the Muslim offensive had been

1271
As with all the combat operations sections in this volume, the day-to-day narrative is based primarily on
contemporary press reporting from Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio, and Sarajevo Radio, to which
additional information and detailed map analysis has been applied.
1272
The elements from Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Andric’s 1st Birac Brigade may have been absorbed into
the new 1st Vlasenica and 1st Milici Brigades, although their dates of formation have not been found.
1273
The Serbs initially claimed 100 people died in the attack, although three days later they stated 63 were
killed. Belgrade Tanjug, 15 December 1992; Belgrade Radio, 18 December 1992. See also Chuck Sudetic:
Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W. Norton & Company, 1998,
pp. 160-162 for a description of Oric’s attack in the area.
1274
Major Vinko Pandurevic’s Zvornik Brigade had opened a corridor to Drinjaca between the Kamenica pocket
and the Drina River on 22 December. From Drinjaca, the Serbs could reach Kravica.

469
contained. But Oric was not finished yet. The biggest shock to the Serbs came on 7 January –
the Orthodox Christmas – when Oric’s troops overran the village of Kravica. Drawing on
Chuck Sudetic’s account, Mark Danner writes:
Serb women had worked for days preparing suckling pigs, fresh bread, pickled
tomatoes and peppers – an intoxicating feast to the starving torbari of Srebrenica. And
Oric had also been working for days, preparing the attack.1275
Sudetic himself notes:
After dark on Christmas Eve, some three thousand Muslim troops assembled on
the slushy hilltops around Kravica. Behind them lurked a host of torbari who lit
campfires to warm themselves. At dawn they started clattering pots and pans. “Allahu
ekber! God is Great!“ the men shouted. The women shrieked. Shooting began. The Serb
men in Kravica scrambled into their trenches...1276
Danner then states:
The Serbs were vastly outnumbered; the Muslims, many in white uniforms that
blended with the snow, seemed to come from every direction. By mid-afternoon, thirty
Serbs had died and the front line had collapsed. Serbs ran into the town centre,
screaming for everyone to flee.1277
Sudetic’s account describes the plunder:
The first of the torbari to arrive in Kravica found entire Christmas dinners that
had been waiting to be eaten by Serb men who had gone off to fight that morning
thinking they would be back by noon. Three Muslim soldiers barged into one home and
stood there as if paralyzed at the sight of the pastries and the jelly, the bottles of
brandy and the roast pork on the stove. They laughed and shouted and plunged into a
cake. The ashes of burning houses ... fell like snow on the hillside. The pigs ran wild.
Sheep were butchered and roasted on the spot or herded back to Srebrenica with the
cows and oxen. The dead lay unburied, and within days the pigs, dogs, and wild
animals had begun to tear away at the bodies.1278
Meanwhile, even as the looting continued, the Muslim forces quickly moved up the
road, linking up with Ferid Hodzic’s troops in the Cerska-Kamenica enclave. The offensive’s
main objective had been achieved.

1275
Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York Review of Books, 18 December
1997, pp. 65-81. As discussed in the 1992 Drina valley section, the torbari were the desperate Muslim
refugees that followed the advance of Oric’s forces to plunder the Serb villages of food and anything else of
value. Torbari translates as “bag people”. This information is based on the Sudetic study and Danner’s
article. See Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W.
Norton & Company, 1998, pp. 157-158, 161-162.
1276
Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W. Norton &
Company, 1998, p. 162. See also Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York
Review of Books, 18 December 1997, pp. 65-81.
1277
Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York Review of Books, 18 December
1997, pp. 65-81.
1278
Chuck Sudetic: Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia, New York W. W. Norton &
Company, 1998, p. 163-164.

470
 On 16 January, Oric followed up this success with an attack toward the village of
Skelani, on the Serbian border, some 25 kilometers southeast of Srebrenica. The Muslim
forces nearly captured it and the entire sector along the border. It was the Yugoslav Army’s
Operational Group “Drina” – controlling a combination of local VRS troops from the Skelani
Battalion and VJ border guard and territorial defence units from the Uzice Corps, reinforced
with regular VJ troops drawn from the 95th Protection Motorized Regiment, the 2nd
Mechanized Brigade, and probably the VJ Corps of Special Units – that managed to halt the
Muslims within a kilometre of Skelani.1279 The Muslims were so close that one of Oric’s men

1279
Two VJ commands from two separate armies had responsibility for the border east of Srebrenica. The First
Army’s “Drina” Operational Group under Major General Tomislav Sipcic – the former commander of the
VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps – controlled the frontier from north of Bijeljina, to the village of Rogacica,
some 12 kilometers north-east of Skelani. This included the town of Ljubovija, directly east of Bratunac. A
border guard battalion at Loznica manned a series of watchtowers along the river. The Second Army’s
Uzice Corps, under Major General Dragoljub Ojdanic, controlled the border from Rogacica south to the
Montenegrin border. It had one border guard battalion at Bajina Basta and one border guard battalion at
Priboj, southeast of Gorazde, controlling the frontier. In addition, the VJ deployed the following units along
the border:
– territorial defense detachment – now called “military-territorial” – from Bajina Basta.
– an armor-mechanized battalion in Loznica
– a 122mm howitzer battery at Radalj.
– an additional armor-mechanized or motorized infantry company, a 120 mm mortar battery, a 128 mm
M-71 single-barrel rocket launcher battery, a 122 mm howitzer battery, and an M-77 “Oganj” multiple
rocket launcher battery in Ljubovija
– a military police company in Mali Zvornik.
– a reconnaissance company with elements in Mali Zvornik and Ljubovija.
Bratunac Brigade Special Sitrep 2 1942/24 to GS VRS and Command of Drina Corps, 24 January 1993, cited
in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002,
www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002,, p. 116.
The VJ General Staff’s elite Corps of Special Units, headed by Vukovar veteran Major General Mile Mrksic,
also reinforced these local forces. The corps had been formed in 1992, grouping together most of the VJ’s
special operations units. The Corps of Special Units was organized into three brigades:
1st Guards Motorized Brigade, HQ Belgrade
63rd Airborne Brigade, HQ Nis
72nd Special Brigade, HQ Pancevo
The 1st Guards was Mrksic’s old unit which led the JNA attack at Vukovar. It was responsible for both
ceremonial and protection duties in Belgrade. The 63rd, although designated an airborne brigade, was
actually a reconnaissance-sabotage force organized into companies and usually broken up into small teams
rather than employed in a traditional airborne infantry role. The 72nd included a wide variety of elite
military police antiterrorist / countersabotage troops, reconnaissance- sabotage units, and assault infantry
personnel. The 63rd and 72nd probably provided the bulk of the VJ reinforcements from the Corps of
Special Units that were sent to the Skelani-Bajina Basta area. The 95th Protection Motorized Regiment,
which provided elements along the border, served as the bodyguard force for the VJ’s First Army in
Belgrade and included elite military police units. The 2nd Mechanized Brigade, elements of which also
bolstered the border forces, was part of the VJ’s Mechanized Corps – the former 1st Guards Mechanized
Division – and had fought in the 1991 Croatian war in eastern Slavonia. It was garrisoned in Valjevo.
In addition to the artillery units listed above, the VJ dispatched a mixed 130 mm M-46 field gun and M-77
“Oganj” multiple rocket launcher battalion drawn from the First Army’s 152nd Mixed Artillery Brigade in
Cuprija. The battalion deployed into the Uzice Corps sector at the Tara plateau, near the Perucac dam, from
which VJ artillery observers could see most of the area southeast of Srebrenica. See also Belgrade Vojska,
11 February 1993 and 20 May 1993. In Politika, First Army chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel General Nikola
Mandaric stated that:

471
was able to machine-gun women and children fleeing across the bridge to the Serbian town
of Bajina Basta.1280 By 20 January, the VRS and VJ troops had managed to rescue a VRS
company cut off at the key Jezero hill top, some 12 kilometers northwest of Skelani.
Nevertheless, the Muslims were able to consolidate their positions and dominate the village
and the border. The Bosnian Army troops also took time to mortar Serbia near Bajina Basta
and the town of Ljubovija. The VRS lost at least 30 soldiers killed and almost 100 wounded in
the fighting.

VRS Preliminary Counterattacks, 26 January – 10 February 1993

Reacting to these Muslim successes, the VRS and the VJ rushed reinforcements to
the Bratunac-Skelani area to bolster VRS defences and make some preliminary
counterattacks while the VRS Main Staff made preparations for a full counteroffensive to
crush the Srebrenica-Cerska enclave. In late January, Ljubisa Savic-Mauzer’s elite Special
Brigade “Panthers” arrived in Bratunac via Serbia.1281 Two battalions of the 6th Sanska
Infantry Brigade were also on the way.1282 The VJ contributed a military police company
from the 95th Protection Regiment and elements of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade.1283 The

The Yugoslav Army from the right bank of the river – that is, from its own territory – is helping out
the Army of the Serbian Republic in defense of everything Serbian. By the decree of the President of
the republic and the Supreme Defense Council, the Yugoslav Army is deploying a part of its forces on
the right bank of the River Drina to give assistance to the Army of the Serbian Republic in the
protection of the Serbian population from genocide, and is at the same time successfully protecting
the Yugoslav border along the River Drina. For the time being that assistance consists of a certain
support of the Army of the Serbian Republic and of preventing sabotage-terrorist groups from
penetrating into the territory of Serbia and Yugoslavia, which is their intention, as we have learnt
from the experience from Rudo and Visegrad. As for the desires of the Muslim and Ustasha forces to
conquer this region on the left bank of the River Drina and to populate it with Muslims, well, that will
not work, and if we receive the orders we will cross the river to help the Serbian people.
D. Pejak: Yugoslav Army Helping Army of Serbian Republic, Belgrade Politika, 26 January 1993, p. 8.
1280
Mark Danner: Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster, The New York Review of Books, 18 December
1997, pp. 65-81.
1281
Belgrade Radio, 2 February 1993; an interview with Lubisa Savic-Mauzer. See also Marko Rucnov: Among
Fighters from Majevica: “Panthers” in Battle Every Day, Belgrade Vojska, 4 April 1993, pp. 6-7 and
Videotape Garda Panteri, narrated by Major Ljubisa Savic-Mauzer, a videography of the Special Brigade
“Panthers”, also known as the “Serbian Guard”. The brigade appears to later have been later redesignated
1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade. The “Panthers” were originally a small volunteer unit formed from parts
of the Bijeljina TO in 1992 with the assistance of Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer Guard. The unit was later
expanded into a light motorized brigade titled “Special Brigade” and assigned to the East Bosnian Corps to
act as the corps mobile formation, although the Main Staff often used the brigade outside the corps AOR as
well. The unit’s strange mixture of ad hoc armored fighting vehicles cobbled from trucks, steel plate,
antiaircraft guns, helicopter rocket pods and other odds and ends, earned the nickname “Mad Max”
brigade from the authors. Ljubisa Savic-Mauzer, originally the unit’s chief of staff, commanded the brigade
from August 1992 until the end of the war.
1282
From the War Bulletin (Ratni Bilten) of the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade, 15 September 1994, which includes
a short history of each battalion in the brigade. See also 1 KK (1st Krajina Corps) Forward Command Post
Order to 1 KK 6th Light Infantry Brigade, 3 January 1993, cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia
and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 117.
1283
Bratunac Brigade Special Sitrep 2-1942/25 to GS VRS and Command of the Drina Corps, 25 January 1993,
cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:

472
Serbian State Security Department (RDB) appears to have provided a volunteer
reconnaissance-sabotage company from its special operations unit.1284 By 1 February, the
“Panthers”, elements of the 1st Bratunac Brigade, and the VJ units were counterattacking
towards the south and southeast in order to give the VRS elbow room around Bratunac and
capture the village of Voljavica so that the town’s water supply could be restored. VJ
artillery units provided fire support from across the Drina River in Serbia. Despite the
reinforcements, it was hard going, and it was not until 10 February that VRS troops were
able to storm the important Caus Hill, overlooking both Bratunac and the Muslim-held
industrial suburb of Potocari.1285 Voljavica remained untaken.
Serb forces also made counterattacks near Skelani to push the Muslims away from
the Serbian border and create some manoeuvring room. A mixed force of VJ and Serbian
RDB special operations troops and Serbian Chetnik volunteers provided the main striking
power.1286 A mixed artillery battalion of the VJ 152nd Mixed Artillery Brigade backed up the

Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002,
www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 117.
1284
The “Gray Wolves” reconnaissance-sabotage unit appears to have been a Serbian MUP/RDB unit, possibly
a volunteer unit attached to “Frenki” Simatovic’s “Red Beret” unit below. Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel
Milan Urosevic appears to have originally commanded the 1st Bratunac Brigade, with Ognjenovic in place
by February.
1285
The 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic,
spearheaded its counterattacks with the “Gray Wolves”, which apparently was the unit that captured Caus.
V. Kovacevic: Reconnaissance Units from Bratunac: Only a Heart of Steel, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 30.
Ognjenovic was himself replaced by Colonel Cvijetin Vuksic in April-May, moving to an important staff job
in the higher VRS command structure around the enclave.
1286
The units were drawn from Major General Mile Mrksic’s VJ Corps of Special Units (see footnote above),
together with “Frenki” Sima tovic’s Serbian MUP/RDB “Red Beret” special operations troops, and a 300
man volunteer unit led by Branislav Vakic from Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Chetnik Movement. The Serbian
Chetnik Movement was the paramilitary arm of Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS). In a 1994 interview,
Vakic provided extensive details about the support his unit received from the VJ and the MUP throughout
the Srebrenica campaign:
... we were to some extent armed by the Yugoslav Army and then by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MUP) of Serbia. How ever, there were many volunteers. I alone had 300 men on that section
of the battlefield. There were not enough weapons and uniforms for all of us. I sought help from
General Momcilo Perisic, currently chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, who was then the
commander of the 3rd Army in Nis. I went from Skelani to meet him three times. He promised, and
supplied, uniforms for 80 fighters, underwear, some food, and a set of night-vision binoculars that I
needed. I did not receive any weapons from him, but he put me in contact with Major General
Ojdanic, Uzice Army [Corps] commander. General Ojdanic later sent me to General Mile Mrksic who
was stationed in Skelani. At that time, the Yugoslav Army needed us and the cooperation was good.
There was a lot of such cooperation [with the Serbian MUP]. In battles from Skelani to Srebrenica,
we fought alongside the special forces of the MUP, under the command of Obrad Stevanovic, the
third man in the Serbian MUP. I had excellent cooperation with him on the Skelani battlefield. He had
his headquarters in Bajina Basta, and he would issue orders about where one should go. From the
beginning of April until 25 May last year [1993], we fought alongside the special forces of the MUP.
A note of appreciation was sent to the “Old Serbia” Volunteer Unit. We received the note – as it
says on it – from the War Headquarters of the Special Units of the MUP Serbia located in Bajina
Basta. The note bears the date of 25 May 1993. The reason given for presenting it to us is as follows:
“For successes and cooperation during combat operations in the liberation struggle of the Serbian
people in the Serbian Republic” The document is stamped and signed ...
... I also possess an authorization note ... The note bears the following inscription: The Republic of
Serbia, the MUP of Serbia, Special Units. It also bears a clearly written date – 25 May 1993 – and a

473
infantry. By 26 January, the joint VRS and VJ/Serbian force managed to create a five-
kilometre buffer between Skelani and the frontline. By 30 January, Serb forces had retaken
the key Jezero hill. The Serbs then consolidated their positions.

Operation “Cerska 93” – VRS Counter-offensive Begins, 10 February – 16 March 1993

While these counterattacks were opening up space, the VRS Main Staff was shifting
forces into position to begin the step-by-step destruction of the Srebrenica-Cerska enclave.
Adding to the redeployment of the “Panthers”, the Main Staff moved two of its most elite
formations, the 65th Protection Motorized Regiment and the newly formed 1st Guards
Motorized Brigade – some 4.000 troops – to positions near Cerska to reinforce the Drina
Corps.1287 These units joined some 2.500 to 3.000 local Drina Corps troops that were already
surrounding the enclave on three sides.1288 Elements of the Drina Corps’s 5th Mixed Artillery
Regiment provided fire support.

place: Bajina Basta. It is an authorization note allowing the MUP members to take with them from
Skelani “things that have been taken as war booty from territories where war operations were
carried out”. The note I possess lists what they may take from the battlefield: a television set, a water
heater, two typewriters, and a cooker. It also says that the document is issued on the basis of an
order by General Mile Mrksic, commander of TG- 1.
Zorica Mladinovic: General Perisic Gave Us Uniforms, the Army Gave Us Weapons, and Special Troops of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia Trained Us, Belgrade Telegraf, 28 September 1994, pp. 6-7; an
interview with Branislav Vakic.
1287
The 65th Protection Motorized Regiment was the bodyguard force for the Main Staff. It was an ex-JNA
formation, previously assigned to guard the JNA Second Military District Headquarters (the Main Staff’s
predecessor) and, prior to that, the Fifth Military District Headquarters in Croatia. It comprised elite
military police antiterrorist / countersabotage units, which the VRS used as shock troops. See also Mirjana
Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, p. 25; an article on the Protection Regiment.
The 1st Guards Motorized Brigade was a new unit that began forming in December 1992 and became
operational on 19 January, directly subordinate to the Main Staff. It was modeled on the JNA/VJ 1st Guards
Motorized Brigade, and was comprised of young Serb personnel from throughout the Republika Srpska. It
was organized and trained similarly to the 65th as a countersabotage force to protect key personnel and
installations and perform ceremonial duties. Invariably, the Main Staff employed it as an assault formation
instead. See also Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14:
an article on the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade.
1288
These Drina Corps troops came from the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade, the
“Drina Wolves” special operations unit, and a Bosnian Serb MUP special police detachment headquartered
in Sekovici.
Although the brigades involved in the several phases of the Srebrenica campaign have, for the most part,
been identified, the exact command and control arrangements between the VRS Main Staff, the Drina
Corps, and the subordinate tactical formations remains unclear and apparently were confusing at the time
to even the actual VRS commanders. The VRS 1st Bratunac Brigade chief of operations reported in late
January to the Drina Corps and the VRS Main Staff that:
In view of the number of VRS and VSRJ [VJ] units, I suggest you form a Corps IKM [forward
command post] (Main Staff) in Bratunac, which would consolidate the operations in the Drina River
valley (Zvornik. Bratunac, and Skelani), because it is no longer possible to go on this way.
Bratunac Brigade Special Sitrep 2-1942/25 to GS VRS and Command of the Drina Corps, 25 January 1993,
cited in International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002,
www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 117.
The VRS Main Staff appears to have responded to this and did take a direct interest in the actions around
Srebrenica and directly supervised key portions of the operation from its genesis to the final act in April.

474
 On 10 February, Lieutenant Colonel Milomir Savcic’s soldiers from the 65th
Protection Regiment, supported by Zvornik Brigade troops, launched their attack on the
northern half of the Cerska-Kamenica enclave.1289 The VRS, making a three-pronged advance
from the direction of Zvornik, Drinjaca, and Sekovici, fought its way into Kamenica in six
days of fighting. The Muslim forces pulled back into the Cerska area.
Meanwhile, near Bratunac, the “Panthers” and 1st Bratunac Brigade troops
reinvigorated their push to recapture the south-eastern approaches to the town. By 17

This supervision included on-the-ground oversight from both General Mladic and General Milovanovic. In
addition, a series of senior VRS colonels, at least two of whom served on the Main Staff, also appear to
have been involved in controlling the battle. Colonel Miladin Prstojevic, Chief of Operations and Training /
Drina Corps, arrived in Bratunac in early January to coordinate the defense of Bratunac and Skelani and
liase with supporting VJ forces. He was followed by Colonel Svetozar Parezanin. Parezanin previously
commanded or was the chief of staff in the “Podrinje” Operational Group / Herzegovina Corps covering the
southern Drina valley prior to the formation of the Drina Corps. It is unclear whether he was on the Drina
Corps staff or worked for the Main Staff. Colonel Dragutin Ilic, the former commander of the East Bosnia
Corps and described on 8 March as “from the headquarters of the Army of the Serbian Republic”, followed
Parezanin and may have been authorized to exercise command responsibility for the entire operation –
absent Mladic and Milovanovic – given his apparent involvement in the 24 March mortar incident in
Srebrenica. After llic came Colonel Rajko Balac, whose normal position was Chief of Artillery / VRS Main
Staff, who may have had the same responsibilities as Ilic.
In addition to the VRS, the VJ and Serbian MUP each had at least one senior commander on site. Major
General Mile Mrksic – of Vukovar fame – was the commander of the VJ Corps of Special Units and
apparently was present in Skelani to oversee the employment of VJ forces (and possibly more – see below).
“Frenki” Simatovic, the right-hand man of Serbian State Security chief Jovica Stanisic, and Obrad
Stevanovic, Serbian Special Police commander, coordinated the operations of the “Red Beret” troops,
possibly together with Captain Dragan. Simatovic, Stevanovic, and the “Red Berets” also exercised
operational control over Branislav Vakic’s Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers (see Vakic footnote
above.)
With so many high-powered officers floating around, it is difficult to find where the Drina Corps staff under
Colonel Zivanovic fit in. Instead of relying on the Drina Corps, the Main Staff may have set up its own
operational group – possibly under the succession of colonels listed above – with a set of tactical groups
covering the different attack axes. Thus one tactical group would cover Vlasenica-Cerska, another Zvornik-
Kamenica, another Bratunac-Potocari-Srebrenica, and another Skelani-Srebrenica. One note of caution,
however, is Branislav Vakic’s revelation of a document that showed General Mrksic as commander of
“Tactical Group-1” in Skelani. It is unlikely that Mrksic was serving under a VRS colonel if he was leading a
tactical group on the Skelani-Srebrenica axis. Mrksic’s tactical group may instead have included just the VJ
troops on the border, rather than any VRS tactical groups fighting against Srebrenica. See Zorica
Mladinovic: General Perisic Gave Us Uniforms, the Army Gave Us Weapons, and Special Troops of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia Trained Us, Belgrade Telegraf, 28 September 1994, pp. 6-7 for an
interview with Branislav Vakic in which he displays a document affirming Mrksic’s position as commander
of TG-1.
At the end of the operation the Drina Corps formed a new operational or tactical group under the
command of Colonel Vukota Vukovic (with former 1st Bratunac Brigade commander Lieutenant Colonel
Ognjenovic as his deputy) to control the units remaining in position around the enclave. On Position With
Bratunac Troops: No One Can Defeat the People, Vojska, 6 May 1993, pp. 26-27
1289
Mirjana Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, p. 25; an article on the Protection
Regiment. Honig and Both claim that the attack began on 8 February, vice 10 February. Willem Honig and
Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books, 1996, p. 81. The 10 February date
is based on an analysis of the fighting as reported in Sarajevo Radio and Belgrade Tanjug. Sarajevo Radio
provided the most detail on 10 February as to the attack axes of the VRS advance. It is true that on 7
February the same station had claimed that the VRS had attempted a breakthrough at Cerska on 7
February, but no further detail was provided. Given that the fighting focused on Kamenica rather than
Cerska, it has been judged that the main assault came on 10 February.

475
February, VRS troops appear to have retaken the villages of Boljevac, Voljavica, and Sikirica
on the Drina, freeing up the Bratunac water supply. The Muslims, however, were able to
halt the Serbs at the entrance to Gradina and the Sase lead and zinc mines, some seven
kilometers to the northeast of Srebrenica.
About ten days later, the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade and the 1st Birac Brigade
assaulted the Cerska area.1290 The main effort came from the west and south. By 1 March,
Muslim defences had collapsed and VRS troops had entered the cluster of hamlets
collectively known as Cerska. With unfortunate irony for the Muslims, the US chose 1 March
for its first humanitarian air drop of food supplies, with Cerska as the first target. All of the
supplies fell into Serb hands. Over the next two days, Serb forces mopped up the area,
burning Muslim villages as the populace fled to the Konjevic Polje area – a small open plain
along the Milici-Zvornik road – some seven kilometers east of Cerska.
The Serb counteroffensive against Srebrenica had already caused grave concern in
the West even before Cerska’s fall – as evidenced by the US air drops and several failed UN
aid convoys.1291 The loss of the Cerska-Kamenica area finally pushed the UN into acting. On
5 March, General Morillon, the commander of UN Protection Forces in Bosnia, arrived in the
area to survey the situation and negotiate the evacuation of civilians. He also visited
Konjevic Polje itself on 8 March. He then trekked to Srebrenica where he made his famous “I
will never abandon you” statement.1292 Morillon’s expedition and his efforts to evacuate
many of the refugees seem to have nudged the VRS Main Staff into accepting a momentary
pause in Serb operations. This would soon change.
The loss of Cerska made it imperative that the Bosnian Army do something to try to
relieve Srebrenica. On 8 March, Sefer Halilovic, the commander of the Bosnian Army,
publicized his order to the ARBiH 2nd Corps to launch a relief operation. The 2nd Corps,
however, had almost no hope of success. Colonel Andjelko Makar, the corps chief of
operations, later stated:
We were ordered to attack towards Srebrenica. But Serb tanks and artillery had
opened up the corridor and they were now trying to take Gradacac and push us back to
Majevica. All our forces were engaged in defending Gradacac, Brcko, OIovo, and
Tesanj. We were so heavily engaged defensively that whoever ordered us to attack
towards Srebrenica did not understand that we simply could not.1293
Nevertheless, 2nd Corps tried. Troops from the 3rd and 4th Operational Groups
flung themselves against the 1st Birac Brigade between Kladanj and Kalesija, and were
quickly and predictably stopped.

1290
Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article on the
1st Guards Motorized Brigade.
1291
See Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books, 1996, pp.
82-89 for details of the UN efforts.
1292
Again, see Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books,
1996, pp. 82-89, and Silber and Little, pp. 266-268, for details of the UN efforts.
1293
Makar is quoted in Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin
Books, 1996, p. 84.

476
 The ARBiH attack does not appear to have delayed the next VRS move, which
began on 13 March, as soon as the British UN troops had left Konjevic Polje the previous
day. The VRS objective was to overrun Konjevic Polje and reopen the Bratunac-Konjevic
Polje-Zvornik road. Troops from the 65th Protection Regiment and the 1st Guards
Motorized Brigade, with support from the 1st Zvornik Brigade, again led the attack from the
northwest. A Yugoslav Army armoured battalion directly supported the advance.1294
Elements of the 1st Bratunac Brigade, and possibly the “Panthers” and 6th Sanska, attacked
from the southeast. In three days of fighting the VRS/VJ force pushed the Muslim defenders
south of the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. Kravica, Glogova, and most of the villages along
the road were again in Serb hands.

The Final Push: 20 March to 18 April 1993

After their success on the Bratunac road, the VRS Main Staff shifted the main effort
to the south-eastern sector, near Skelani, from which they intended to make the final push
against Srebrenica itself. During an almost week-long pause, VRS shifted both the 65th
Protection and 1st Guards to the Skelani area while regrouping its forces in the Bratunac
area.1295 (Simultaneously, the Serbs were allowing the UN to establish procedures for
helicopter evacuation of wounded from Srebrenica and allowed a UN aid and evacuation
convoy into Srebrenica).1296 The VRS order of battle for the new attack had the 65th
Protection Regiment, supported by VJ paratroopers from the 63rd Airborne Brigade and
possibly the 72nd Special Brigade, making the main effort along the Skelani-Srebrenica
road.1297 The 1st Guards would attack on the right of the 65th. These forces probably
comprised a single tactical group.1298 Near Bratunac, the “Panthers”, probably with help

1294
The battalion’s parent brigade is unclear, but appears to have been either the 252nd Armored Brigade
from Kraljevo, 1st Mechanized Brigade from Belgrade, or 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, also from
Belgrade, in that order of likelihood. Croatian press accounts suggest that a VJ officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Momir Cvijovic, was in charge of the action along the Bratunac road and that he was wounded during the
action. Karlo Jeger: The Army of Yugoslavia Has Crossed the Drina, Attacked Bosnia, and Taken Cerska,
Zagreb Globus, 12 March 1993, pp. 9-10.
1295
Mirjana Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, p. 25; an article on the Protection
Regiment; Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an
article on the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade.
1296
See Willem Honig and Norbert Both: Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, London Penguin Books, 1996. p.
91 and Belgrade Tanjug, 16 March 1993, 22 March 1993, and 24 March 1993.
1297
The VRS Skelani Battalion probably covered the left flank of the shock troops along the Drina River, near
the Perucac dam. See Donald Forbes: Bitter Serbs Seethe Over World’s Concern for Their Foes, Reuters, 8
March 1993, for a portrayal of the views and life of VRS soldiers from the Skelani Battalion. As a VRS
lieutenant told Forbes:
The men here are from the villages and some are quite elderly ... they are not real fighters or
chetniks ...just ordinary citizens.
Such low caliber troops were not trained or equipped to make the main thrust of the counteroffensive,
which required the deployment of the elite 65th and 1st Guards and the VJ/Serbian units. See also L. K.:
Osa Has Fallen, Belgrade Nin, 13 August 1998, p. 16, for a note on the operations of the VJ 63rd Airborne
Brigade at Srebrenica in 1993.
1298
The Main Staff may also have directed the Drina Corps to attach at least some of its brigades’ elite sub-
units to the tactical group southeast of the town. At a minimum, the RDB “Grey Wolves” volunteer unit

477
from Serbian RDB “Red Berets” and the Chetnik volunteers, would attack to the right of the
1st Guards, initially seizing the Sase lead and zinc mine area, then pressing toward key hills
near Zalazje, about two kilometers northeast of Srebrenica. At least two VJ artillery
battalions appear to have supported the attack, one near Ljubovija and another on the Tara
plateau, near the Perucac dam.1299
The attack kicked off on 20 March with VRS/VJ units from Jezero, led personally by
General Mladic, advancing along the road and the hilltops approaching the Muslim
stronghold of Kragivode, some five kilometers from Jezero.1300 By 22 March, Kragivode had

that had been attached to the 1st Bratunac Brigade was part of the force and took part in the march
toward Srebrenica from Skelani, including the fighting at Osmace and Zeleni Jadar. V. Kovacevic:
Reconnaissance Units from Bratunac: Only a Heart of Steel, Srpska Vojska, 15 July 1993, p. 30.
1299
The battalion on the Tara plateau came from the 152nd Mixed Artillery Brigade headquartered in Cuprija.
1300
Mladic later described part of the advance:
... in one patch of forest on that Kragivode (sic), the Muslims had dug a series of battle and
communications trenches. Among other things this protected them from artillery fire. They used a
sort of Vietnam tactic. They went along digging like hamsters. They hid. You could not see them in the
daytime or at night ... I had an observation post in the village of Jezero, where I arrived by helicopter
from an elevation. The observation post was some 600 meters from the front line. In some directions
it was even closer ... From the observation post I saw on that Kragivode elevation one of our tanks
stopped in the middle of the road. I asked why that tank was stopped there. The officers present said
that the Muslims had damaged part of the road, so they were waiting for it to be repaired. It looked
to me like a Muslim trap. Night was already falling. I asked that it be fixed as quickly as possible, but
it was impossible, even though a bulldozer had arrived to repair the road ... Since the situation was
very specific and critical, I asked one of the commanders to remain at the observation post so that I
could go out and take a look.
I set out for the location in a “Puh” [Steyer-Puch military vehicle]. Along the way, I came across
the battalion commander, who was waiting for me ... There was fighting going on in his immediate
vicinity. Bullets were whizzing by. He suggested that I get out of the “Puh” and get into a BOV
(armored combat vehicle) ...
The BOV had already arrived, at his calling. We got in, my escort, a colonel, and I. I did not know
the crew. I quickly issued orders, because I was in a hurry. I was afraid that the Muslims would
capture the tank, because they were known to let us get into a “shooting trap”, and that, regardless
of the casualties, they would attack in order to get their hands on heavy equipment. I did not have
time to communicate with the gunner on the BOV. Thus, I quickly assigned roles. I told the colonel,
who knew the people, that I would not take the radio set from him and that I would command, since I
did not yet know his system of command and his subordinates. I was not familiar with their voices,
and someone else could handle communications for me: “You, colonel, keep your men on the line and
watch to the left and straight ahead”. To the driver I said: “you are responsible only for driving”. To
the assistant driver I assigned a precise area of activity. Behind me, on specially installed mounts, I
placed a rifle, for my escort. Thus, each person had his role regarding who would watch what. I
watched to the right and straight ahead ...
We went ahead. We found the tank, but we wanted to go up to a curve to reconnoitre, and then
extract the tank and go further. At one point, however, I saw a Muslim bunker above some cut. We
had already passed below it. All that was going on in the course of combat. We heard blows against
the BOV. We heard our gunner firing from the BOV. Periodically we too, inside, fired short bursts.
Since the Muslims were showering us with fire, our gunner pulled back a little into the cabin, probably
to protect himself, so that he did not see the bunker. As soon as I saw that bunker, I told the driver:
“Stop!” and I told the escort: “get out, the bunker is up there”. He said to me: “please, you mustn’t
get out! We’ll do it...” I said: “It’s not important who does it, just get out!” The escort, one soldier,
and I got out. That little soldier was very brave and competent. He told me: “Should I throw a
grenade?!” “Do it!”, I said. He threw a grenade at the bunker ... When we entered that bunker, we
wandered into a labyrinth of communication trenches which went out in all directions ...

478
fallen, and the Serb forces were pushing on towards Osmace, a village sitting on a 900-
meter hill overlooking the road.1301 The Serbs, led by the VRS 65th Protection Regiment and
the VJ 63rd Airborne Brigade, finally stormed the village on 24 March, and quickly pushed
seven kilometers up the road towards the Srebrenica industrial zone in the village of Zeleni
Jadar.1302 Zeleni Jadar was the keystone of the remaining defences of the town, and its loss
would put the Serbs within striking distance of Srebrenica itself, five kilometers to the north,
and cut off the town’s water supply.1303 To defend it Oric ordered a last-ditch counterattack
by every available man. The Muslims managed to fling the Serbs back towards Osmace,
where the 65th endured what Srpska Vojska called “a night of terror”.1304 Then the VRS dug
in about two kilometers from Zeleni Jadar. The frontline now ran about five kilometers to
the northeast and seven kilometers to the east and southeast of Srebrenica.
Another pause in the battle now occurred. The UN negotiated a humanitarian
cease-fire between the two sides that went into effect on 28 March so that UNHCR could try
to evacuate many of the thousands of refugees trapped in the town. Bosnian Government

... the Muslims again began to fire from somewhere with an “Osa” or “Zolja” which had come
between us and the tank ... They had a strong sideways position for firing from a dominant elevation
at the “Bajina Basta” [Perucac] dam. From there they pounded us until we neutralized them ... Our
reinforcements arrived, so that we pushed them back and occupied very favorable positions.
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 10.
1301
Mladic also described his frontline frolics around Osmace:
The next day, we had strong skirmishes for the village of Osmace. That was a big Muslim base.
General Milan Gvero and I arrived in that village by helicopter once it had already been taken. Since I
like to visit units everywhere and offer a little encouragement, I often used helicopters in combat. I
had competent pilots, so that in the course of battle, at the most critical moments, I could call on
several units, all the way up to the front ... The next day, I landed again at the same location. The
same day, we set out for the Serb village of Brezani, which the Muslims had burned down. The Serb
village of Turija is also nearby. It is between Osmace and Srebrenica. We wanted to liberate those
Serb villages as well. There we had a [Hill] 945. One commander invited me to come to that hill the
next day ... Then I left for Zvomik. Around that time I also had a helicopter accident – I flew into some
high voltage wires. The next day, I returned to the same place. ... I’m going to [Hill] 945 ... I did a few
landings here. These were the first Serb landings. I gave 30 soldiers a lift to positions near the village
of Brezani. I was sorry that they had to trudge through those holes and was afraid for them to go
through the forest, because they might step on mines. While I was giving them a lift, I said: “You go
from here to Brezani, so we will see who is the first to arrive at [Hill] 945!” ... From the helicopter I
saw the completely burned-down village of Brezani and the routed Muslim groups who were
withdrawing. Our soldiers had not yet entered that village, but we set down in Brezani, again next to
a house. Thus, we had crossed the front, ahead of our units. Indeed, this was not the first time I had
done that ... We arrived at the elevation, and then the other units arrived, and later we set out ...
toward Zeleni Jadar ... This was a magnificent operation. The Muslims offered feverish resistance. Our
soldiers, officers, and MUP members passed the test with the highest grades.
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 10.
1302
The same day. a number of civilians, including children, were killed and wounded by Serb shells at a soccer
field just after UN helicopters had evacuated wounded from the field. Two Canadian UN soldiers in town
from Morillon’s earlier foray were also wounded. See Silber and Little, p. 72.
1303
See also L. K.: Osa Has Fallen, Belgrade Nin, 13 August 1998, p. 16, for a note on the operations of the VJ
63rd Airborne Brigade units at Srebrenica in 1993, including the capture of Zeleni Jadar. The 63rd Airborne
elements were under the command of VJ Major Goran Ostojic, who was later killed in action in Kosovo
during the summer of 1998 while leading 63rd Airborne units during counterinsurgency operations.
1304
Mirjana Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, p. 25; an article on the Protection
Regiment.

479
officials, however, considered that the departure of most of the civilians would hand the
Serbs their goal of ethnically cleansing the area, and blocked the evacuation. The VRS,
meanwhile, was more interested in using the UNHCR to negotiate the surrender of the
town. A representative of the VRS Main Staff, Colonel Dragutin Ilic, told senior UNHCR
official Jose Mendiluce to inform the Muslims that they should surrender or the VRS would
take the town in two days.1305
The VRS renewed the battle promptly on April first with its usual preparatory
1306
shelling. On 3 April, following a diversionary attack on the north-western side of the
enclave, troops from the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade attacked toward the village of
Skenderovici, some seven kilometers due east of Srebrenica.1307 The “Panthers” pressed the
attack toward the Sase area in the northeast, while the 65th Protection and 63rd Airborne
advanced on Zeleni Jadar. The VRS captured the town water supply while Serb forces inched
toward Srebrenica on the other axes. But on 7 April Oric’s elite reconnaissance-sabotage
troops spearheaded a counterattack that retook Zeleni Jadar and the water supply.
Over the next week, Serb and Muslim forces grappled in intense combat while the
VRS pounded away at Bosnian Army defence lines. On 14 April the VRS reported the loss of
43 men killed and 71 wounded in just the past two days of fighting. Their break came the
next day, 15 April, when all three main VRS formations crashed through the weakened
Muslim forces and took the major heights overlooking the town. Major Savic-Mauzer’s
“Panthers” grabbed the village of Zalazje and the 825-meter Zanik hill less than two
kilometers northeast of Srebrenica. On Mauzer’s left, 1st Guards seized the 1.000-meter
Kvarac feature and the 800-meter Pribicevac, both about three kilometers due east of
town.1308 Meanwhile, the 65th Protection broke into Zeleni Jadar again, where heavy
fighting spilled over to 16-17 April.
The day before the VRS breakthrough, 14 April, Oric had decided that he could no
longer hold Srebrenica.1309 He asked the UNHCR official in town, Louis Gentile, to relay the

1305
Silber and Little, p. 268.
1306
There are some indications that the VJ withdrew its infantry units from the operation due to unwanted
international attention by the beginning of April. The Serbian MUP forces and the Serbian Chetnik
Movement volunteer troops, however, remained, and the VJ continued to provide artillery support.
Belgrade also continued to allow the VRS to resupply its forces northwest of Skelani via Serbia, while
probably providing some of the supplies itself.
1307
During the final push against Srebrenica during March and April, VRS forces on the north / northwestern
face of the enclave, probably from the 1st Zvomik, 1st Birac, and 1st Bratunac Brigades, mounted a series
of small-scale, but violent attacks to pin down Bosnian Army troops in the area and keep them from
reinforcing the main sector in the southeast. David Rohde states:
In 1993 – armed with automatic rifles and homemade guns that consisted of iron pipes filled with
nails and gunpowder – the Muslims had fought desperately to hold half of Buljim, a 2.300 foot (about
800 meters] peak that loomed over the northwest corner of the enclave.
David Rohde: Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II,
New York Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1996, p. 8.
1308
Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article on the
1st Guards Motorized Brigade.
1309
The best account of the town’s surrender is in Silber and Little, pp. 270-275.

480
message to UNPROFOR headquarters so that the VRS did not find out and make a final push
against the town. Gentile states that:
The commander told me that they had decided to surrender. He said it was not
simply the shelling in the centre of the town, but that their defensive lines had
collapsed. They looked desperate and finished.1310
The UN began negotiating with the Serbs for a cease fire and – although the UN
refused to call it that – a Muslim “surrender”. On 16 April, Mladic agreed to the deployment
of a Canadian UN infantry company to the town to disarm Oric’s troops. On 17 April the two
sides agreed to a cease-fire that came into force the next day.1311 The UN Security Council’s
declaration on 16 April that Srebrenica was now a UN “Safe Area” had almost no effect on
Oric’s determination to defend his town. The Canadians arrived, and although the Muslims
handed over some weapons, they never fully disarmed. From their UN sanctuary Oric and
his men would continue to harass VRS forces and Serb villagers in the area until July 1995.
Then, the Serbs would brush UNPROFOR aside and Mladic would direct his vengeance-
seeking troops to massacre nearly all of the males, soldiers and civilians alike, they found in
Srebrenica.

Zepa Interlude, May 1993

Following the Serb victory at Srebrenica, the VRS Main Staff shifted its gaze to its
next target: Zepa. The elimination of this enclave would further consolidate Serb control
over the upper Drina valley. It would also secure the Han Pijesak-Mount Zep area against
the guerrilla raids from Zepa that had plagued the Main Staff headquarters during 1992. The
VRS attack against this enclave, however, did not commence until May and was to be a
short-lived affair.
A single Bosnian Army brigade, the 6th Zepa Shock Brigade under the command of
Avdo Palic, defended Zepa. It probably numbered 1.000 to 2.000 personnel, of whom no
more than half may have had weapons. The VRS attack units comprised a relatively small
force of about 2.000 troops organized in three to four battalions – from 1st Guards
Motorized, 2nd Romanija Motorized, and 1st Podrinje (Rogatica) Light Infantry Brigades –
under the command of a tactical group headquarters.1312 Lieutenant Colonel Radislav Krstic
from 2nd Romanija Motorized appears to have commanded the attack, with supervision
from the Main Staff.
The VRS stepped up its shelling of Zepa at the end of April, and attacked on 3-4
May. The Serbs attacked along two axes, against the southwest corner directly toward Zepa
village itself, and against the northwest corner along the few tracks leading into the enclave.

1310
Silber and Little, p. 271.
1311
Silber and Little, pp. 272-273; Paris AFP, 17 April 1993.
1312
Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article on the
1st Guards Motorized Brigade. Note that the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade and the 1st Podrinje Light
Infantry Brigade both normally had elements deployed around Zepa. The tactical group was apparently
designated either Tactical Group “Drina” or Tactical Group “Zepa”.

481
The Muslims staunchly defended the very difficult approaches and held back the VRS for
three days.
On 7 May, the VRS appears to have partially cracked the Muslim defence line, but
was unable to penetrate into the heart of the pocket. Meanwhile, Muslim pleas for
international support had pushed the UN to negotiate with the Serbs for the deployment of
UN peace-keeping troops and observers to the newly declared “Safe Area”. Although the
VRS initially blocked UN attempts to get observers into Zepa, on 8 May Mladic acceded to an
arrangement with General Morillon that allowed the UN into the enclave. Why Mladic and
the Main Staff called off the operation still remains unclear. They may have decided that
Zepa was not worth the effort and the losses that total occupation of the enclave would
require at that point. Or they may have believed the UN would do their work for them,
since, as with Srebrenica, the deal called for the UN to “demilitarize” Zepa by disarming its
defenders. But, as also happened in Srebrenica, demilitarization had to wait until 1995 when
the VRS would “demilitarize” Zepa on its own terms.

Gorazde-Visegrad, January – June 1993

The fighting in the Gorazde-Visegrad area during 1993 began in January when the
Bosnian Army renewed the offensive it had broken off in 1992. On 12 January, a force of
approximately two brigades of ARBiH troops from Ferid Buljubusic’s East Bosnian
Operational Group attacked toward Visegrad and Rudo. In fighting over the next ten days,
Muslim forces edged forward in the direction of Rudo before the VRS 4th Podrinje (Rudo)
Light Infantry Brigade halted the attack near the villages of Strmica and Strgicina. The
Muslims were also able to infiltrate a sabotage team into Serbia, but VJ border guards
intercepted and destroyed the unit on 23 January. VRS counter-attacks in late January
gained minimal ground and the frontline remained roughly where it was before the ARBiH
attack.
Three months later, the VRS Drina Corps shifted over to the attack as part of the
strategic offensive to clear the Drina valley. The first operation came in early April, during
the Srebrenica campaign, when Colonel Dragisa Masal’s Tactical Group “Visegrad” tried to
take the Muslim-held salient southwest of Visegrad.1313 The attack began on about 4 April
along the frontline north of the village of Mededa. Almost three weeks of fighting gained
the Serbs virtually nothing. The VRS renewed the operation on 30 April with an attack on
the important Zaglavak hill, whose capture would have allowed the Serbs to look down on
the Muslim controlled Ustipraca-Mededa-Visegrad road running along the Drina. After three
fruitless days, the Serbs called off the attack.

1313
The 1st Podrinje (Rogatica) Light Infantry, 2nd Podrinje (Visegrad) Light Infantry, and 5th Podrinje
(Gorazde) Light Infantry Brigades made the main effort. Major Rajko Kusic, Lieutenant Colonel Luka
Dragicevic, and Lieutenant Colonel Radomir Furtula respectively commanded the brigades.

482
 Determined to wipe out the Muslim-held salient, the VRS at the end of May
brought in more troops that may have included some VJ elements.1314 The principal
reinforcement was the Main Staff’s 1st Guards Motorized Brigade under Colonel Milenko
Lazic.1315 TG “Visegrad” kicked off the new operation on 26 May. Troops from the 1st, 2nd,
and 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades, probably spearheaded by elements of the 1st
Guards, hammered the ARBiH 1st Rogatica and 1st Visegrad Brigades. Within two days the
Serbs had breached Muslim defences southeast of Rogatica, and by 31 May had seized
Mededa and entered the outskirts of Ustipraca, having advanced more than 15 kilometers
from the old frontline near Visegrad. By 4 June, the VRS had consolidated its gains along a
new frontline that ran along the Praca River from Ustipraca to five kilometers southwest of
Rogatica. With the destruction of the salient, captured Muslim villages were burned to the
ground.
As this phase of its offensive ended, TG “Visegrad” shifted its focus to the Cajnice-
Gorazde axis with the apparent intention of eliminating the Muslim bridgehead on the south
(right) bank of the Drina. Elements of the 1st Guards Motorized and 3rd Podrinje Light
Infantry Brigade attacked the ARBiH 43rd Drina Shock Brigade beginning on about 2
June.1316 In four days of fighting VRS troops appear to have made small gains, but by 8 June
Muslim forces had brought the assault to a halt.

Operation “Lukavac 93” – The Capture of Trnovo and Mount Igman

During June, to the west of Gorazde, VRS Herzegovina Corps units and ARBiH 6th
Corps forces fought a series of small engagements along the Muslim supply corridor to
Gorazde, trying to seize key terrain that would make the route safer. The biggest attack
came on 9 June when 81st Mountain Brigade / “Igman” Operational Group troops –
probably supported by other units – attacked positions of the VRS 18th Herzegovina (Gacko)
Light Infantry Brigade south of Rogoj pass, capturing Dobro Polje. Although VRS
counterattacks appear to have made good the loss, the fighting spread further east to the
centre of the logistics route at Jabuka-Grebak. Although the Serbs do not appear to have
yielded any ground, the attacks kept the VRS off balance.
The VRS Main Staff was able to use these Muslim attacks as a pretext for launching
the final operation of its strategic offensive – Operation “Lukavac 93”. The objectives of
“Lukavac 93” were twofold. The first was to directly link the Herzegovina region with the
rest of Republika Srpska.1317 So far, the Serbs lacked any primary road connecting

1314
Colonel Zivanovic, commander of the Drina Corps, and the civilian chief of Visegrad municipality visited
Uzice on 11 May, possibly in an effort to coordinate the upcoming VRS operation with the VJ and receive VJ
assistance. However, there is no conclusive evidence of VJ involvement in the attack. Belgrade Tanjug, 11
May 1993.
1315
Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article on the
1st Guards Motorized Brigade.
1316
Lieutenant Colonel Rade Danilovic commanded the 3rd Podrinje.
1317
Mladic has stated that:

483
Herzegovina and the Serb-held areas around Sarajevo. Their only territorial link was the
narrow strip running from Foca to Cajnice and then Visegrad.1318 The second objective was
the severing of the Muslim supply route to Gorazde, which would be a natural by-product of
a successful link-up with Serb forces near Sarajevo.
General Mladic and the VRS Main Staff directly supervised the operation,
employing forces from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Herzegovina Corps.1319 In
addition, the Main Staff brought in at least two of its top formations: 65th Protection
Motorized Regiment and 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, probably some 3.000 to 4.000
troops.1320 These units reinforced local VRS forces drawn from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized,
2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry, 1st Ilidza Infantry, 1st Igman Infantry, 11th Herzegovina Light
Infantry, and 18th Herzegovina (Foca) Light Infantry Brigades. All told, the Main Staff
assembled about 10.000 troops.
The reinforcements left the Bosnian Army’s “Igman” Operational Group / 6th Corps
outgunned and outmanned. Elements of the OG’s five brigades – 4th Motorized, 8th
Mountain, 9th Mountain, 81st Mountain, and 82nd Mountain – held positions on the north
side of Mount Igman and in the Trnovo-Gorazde corridor with about 8.000 to 8.500 troops.
Elements of two additional 6th Corps brigades, the 43rd and 49th Mountain, with some
1.000 to 1.500 troops, held the southern end of Bjelasnica, west of Kalinovik.
On 2-3 July, Colonel Ratko Bundalo’s Tactical Group “Kalinovik” / Herzegovina Corps
opened the offensive, striking with 1st Guards Motorized Brigade towards Rogoj pass from
the south.1321 The 18th Herzegovina Brigade covered the Guards’ left flank, and, Colonel
Marko Kovac’s Tactical Group “Foca” / Herzegovina Corps protected the right flank with
elements of the 11th Herzegovina Brigade. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps appears to have
launched a supporting attack from the north. Mladic personally led the operation, marching
alongside the assault forces or overseeing the attack from his Gazelle helicopter.1322 After

[“Lukavac 93”] related to the area between Mounts Jahorina, Igman, Bjelasnica, and Treskavica.
That is the area from Gorazde to Ivan Sedlo. The goal of this operation was to link Herzegovina with
the other territory of the Republika Srpska and to territorially connect the Serb nation ...
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 11.
1318
Herzegovina, however, was not cut off in the same way that Bosanska Krajina and the Republic of Serb
Krajina were in 1992. The region still bordered on Montenegro and necessary supplies and commercial
traffic passed through that republic.
1319
See Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 11.
1320
See Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article
on the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade; Mirjana Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994,
p. 25; an article on the Protection Regiment; and the video, Garda Panteri, narrated by Major Ljubisa Savic-
Mauzer, a videography of the Special Brigade “Panthers”, also known as the “Serbian Guard”.
1321
Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article on the
1st Guards Motorized Brigade.
1322
Mladic took particular glee in taunting the UN later on Mount Bjelasnica with the use of helicopter, in
violation of the “No-Fly Zone”. Mladic told UN observers that:
It’s my right as a commander ... General Mladic cannot walk.
Mladic, in fact, as UN spokesman Commander Barry Frewer stated, “flew away in his helicopter” with UN
personnel standing nearby and watching in disbelief. Reuters, 7 August 1993. Mladic described his
encounter with the UN over the helicopter on Bjelasnica:

484
eight days of fighting the 1st Guards finally broke through the ARBiH 81st Mountain Brigade,
seizing the Rogoj pass and the town of Trnovo. After the breakthrough, VRS troops quickly
converged from north and south and swung toward the west towards Mount Igman and
Mount Bjelasnica.1323 The 1st Igman Brigade / Sarajevo-Romanija Corps made supporting

They found me up top, at the very peak, where the cabins for the cableway turn around. We were
on the roof, and then we climbed down, took chairs, and sat. I watched the progress of the fighting
there across Bjelasnica, our drive to the west, and also looked to the west across Igman. At one point
that [UN observer] Piterson asked me: “Whose army is on Igman?” I said: “Ours”. He said: “That’s not
right. I just came from there, and that is the Muslims’ headquarters”. But before that he had
reproached me for flying by helicopter. I told him: “I flew, what of it? I am General Mladic, the
commander of the Forces of the Republika Srpska, surely you don’t expect me to ride a donkey!?” And
since he had thus provoked me, as if he would give me permission and as if I would ask him how I
could travel, I said this about his claim that there were Muslims on Igman: “Fine. I will go there
now...” I told the pilot: “Get the helicopter ready!” I sat down in the helicopter and went down.
(When they saw where my pilot was taking me, they could not believe their eyes.) I set down below,
gathered my commanders, held a meeting, issued the necessary orders, did my job, and then
returned to Bjelasnica. Then I asked him (Piterson): “Well, whose army is down there?!”
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 11.
1323
As at Srebrenica, Mladic was again up front with his troops. Mladic later described part of the advance
from Trnovo:
Above the village of Sabic, at Precko Polje, on 14 July 1993, we set out to seize the road to Igman.
There are some medieval tombstones there. Precko Polje is a small plateau of several hundred
meters. It looks like some sort of terrace. To the north is Igman, while to the west the Serbs held a
characteristic peak, Proskok. That elevation, between Treskavica and Bjelasnica, is like an ax, with its
cutting edge turned to the sky. The eastern slope is wooded. That is where the Muslims were firmly
entrenched. They bitterly defended the approaches to Proskok and Igman. The Muslims had
completely burned down the villages below Treskavica, such as Serb Ledici, expelling and killing Serbs
along the way. Here were also the Muslim villages of Dejcini [sic – Dejcici], Vojkovici, Sabici ... Part of
the unit was operating out of the village of Ledici, toward Proskok [defended by the ARBiH 82nd
Mountain Brigade]. We knew that they had strong forces up there. We had done a good job
observing and reconnoitering them. But our position down below was unfavorable. We were in a
hole, a ravine, so that they could easily fire on us ... We entered the village of Dejcini (sic) and routed
a smallish unit of theirs there, which was offering the last resistance in the village of Sabici. They fled
Sabici head over heels, whereby some of them were killed, some were wounded, and some were
captured. From there we had to advance further, to Precko Polje. I knew that they had defenses
there, that it would be very “firm”. That is why I ordered the commander of the Ilidza Brigade to
direct his forces from Dejcici toward Proskok, to pass between Proskok and Siljak under Bjelasnica
itself, in the Baba Valley. Since I had no other forces working on securing the road and we were
avoiding the road because they were firing on anything moving on it (by maintaining control of that
road, they also made it impossible for us to use that route to transport equipment), that is why I and
my escort set out in that direction while I sent the others to the left and right of the road, because
they were directing a lot of fire at us. In Dejcici they fired at us with some of their howitzers and
mortars, but fortunately to no avail. Because of their artillery fire, I forced an attack. I placed my
escort and ordered them to maintain a connection with that unit. We left for Precko Polje. The
Muslims attacked there strongly all day long, all the way until evening. At one point, the situation
was very critical. Colleagues who were next to me suggested that I withdraw from there and let them
continue. “No. God forbid!” I said, “I am not retreating!” There were no more than ten of us there,
one girl, several soldiers, and several of us officers. At the point when one of the officers was bringing
me a report on the situation of the neighboring units and asking me to withdraw, to go back, one
soldier from escort, who had just had a bullet pass through his pants below the knee, (leaving no
wound, fortunately), said: “Now you cannot go back there, I have just returned from there. One of
our soldiers died right next to me. A bullet hit a grenade on his belt. He died from the explosion ...”
Since I had the habit of addressing soldiers as “chief”, that is also how they often addressed me. That
soldier stopped and turned to me again: “Chief, you cannot continue with the road operation. The

485
attacks against the Golo Brdo feature on the northwest side of Igman. By 20 July VRS forces
had advanced another 10 kilometers to the west and sat at the south-eastern feet of Igman
and Bjelasnica. But Bosnian Army defences, now apparently under the control of the 1st
Corps, appeared to be firming up and the battle now paused.
To the east, two days after the VRS breakthrough to Trnovo, the Sarajevo-Romanija
Corps, probably led by the 65th Protection Regiment, penetrated ARBiH lines at Jabuka-
Grebak in the centre of the Gorazde supply route.1324 Herzegovina Corps troops from the
11th Herzegovina Brigade linked up with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps units. The VRS then
pushed the remaining Muslim forces east into the Gorazde enclave, and the frontline
coalesced roughly along the Osanica River. The Serbs had finally destroyed the Muslim
supply corridor and achieved all of their objectives.
But Mladic wanted more – to cut off the Muslim supply route into Sarajevo over
Bjelasnica and Igman.1325 On 31 July he launched a surprise attack on the 2.000-meter
summit of Mount Bjelasnica, apparently with a helicopter air assault supported by missile-
firing Gazelle helicopters. Elements from the 65th Protection and the 1st Guards then
stormed the rest of Bjelasnica and Igman over the next four days, driving back the stunned
Muslim defenders, most of them from the 81st and 82nd Mountain Brigades.1326 Troops
from the 1st Igman Brigade attacked from the Hadzici area, hoping to link up. The VRS

Turks have cut the road off...” I was a little angry with him for saying in front of the others that one of
our soldiers had been killed; I was afraid of panic erupting among our men. That is why I angrily
yelled at him: “Who ordered you to come back here?!” He was a little confused: “Well, I came here to
inform you...” I ordered him: “Back to your position!” He returned and the ones next to me now
stepped up their efforts to get me to withdraw from there. I said curtly and angrily: “Stop that! I
never retreat!” After that, no one dared mention retreating to me. That evening, at 20:20, the rest of
our units arrived there...
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 11.
1324
Mirjana Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, p. 25; an article on the Protection
Regiment. See also Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter
11.
1325
Mladic again later stated:
First, we did not go to Igman and Bjelasnica with the aim of taking Sarajevo. Our goal was not all
of Sarajevo; rather, we simply wanted to divide it. Second, we went to Igman and Bjelasnica because
the Muslims, with the help of UNPROFOR, especially General Morillon, had dug a tunnel under the
Sarajevo Airport, from Dobrinja to the Sokolovic colony. They dug it under Serb land, under the
airport, which we had given up for humanitarian purposes. With that tunnel they distributed forces
and resources, alternately sending reinforcements into Sarajevo and pulling them out of Sarajevo.
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 11
1326
Goran Maunaga: Magnificent in Military Order, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, pp. 12-14; an article on the
1st Guards Motorized Brigade; Mirjana Micic: Constantly in Motion, Srpska Vojska, 25 January 1994, p. 25;
an article on the Protection Regiment. See also Mustafa Borovic: Trnovo and Hadzici Are Now Fighting for
Igman, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 13 November 1996, pp. 26-27, for some details of the military situation from the
Bosnian Army side.
Bosnian Army sources told Reuters that:
Most of these units never had combat for 14 months and suddenly they were confronted by tanks
and helicopters ... they just couldn’t take it.
Reuters, 5 August 1993. It also had not helped that, according to Bosnian Army deputy chief of staff Jovan
Divjak, the ARBiH had earlier withdrawn 1.500 to 2.000 troops to fight the Croats. As a result, the thinly
held Muslim defenses quickly cracked under the strain.

486
advanced some 10 kilometers up the mountain from the previous frontline, reaching the
Veliko and Malo Polje area and the site of 1984 Winter Olympics ski jump.
Despite the shock of losing the vital twin peaks, General Delic and the Bosnian
Army General Staff reacted quickly to the VRS attack. The 1st Corps dispatched at least a
brigade of troops drawn from several formations through the airport tunnel, while the 3rd
Corps sent elements of the crack 7th Muslim and 17th Krajina Mountain Brigades.1327 By 5-6
August, the ARBiH had consolidated its defences on the main Igman mass, northeast of
Veliko Polje and to the west, while international pressure forced the Serbs to halt their
drive.
Mladic had struck a sore nerve in the international community. Until the Igman-
Bjelasnica assault, there had been little reaction to the Serb offensive operations in Gorazde
and Trnovo, but anything threatening Sarajevo was a different matter. The Serb siege of
Sarajevo was the focus of most Western diplomatic and media attention. Anytime the
fighting or shelling around the city increased, there was an accompanying rise in the
intensity of Western rhetoric and threats of action. With the VRS now on the verge of
severing the city’s last supply link, Western concern that the city defences would collapse
took centre stage.
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic was attending peace talks at the time in Geneva,
Switzerland, and diplomats there put pressure on him to order Mladic off the mountains. As
threats of NATO air strikes filled the air, Karadzic agreed on 5 August to a VRS withdrawal to
its 30 July positions. Karadzic’s conditions, however, were that UN troops take over the Serb
positions and that Muslim forces be barred from re-entering the zone. Over the next week,
French UN troops began deploying onto Igman and Bjelasnica to supervise the VRS
withdrawal.
The Serbs announced the beginning of their pullout on 6-7 August, but their
withdrawal claims were quickly challenged. On 9 August NATO agreed to a phased air strike
program to protect the UN Safe Areas and force the Serbs off of Igman if they did not
withdraw. When UN spokesmen the next day claimed that VRS troops were not
withdrawing and still occupied Igman, the VRS retorted that it was merely rotating units that
had been in the frontline for some time.1328 Despite the Western threats and Karadzic’s

1327
The 1st Corps formations included elements of at least the 10th and 101st Mountain Brigades. The ARBiH
also deployed a number of small special operations units. See the following articles:
• Edhem Badzak: “Glorious” for the Second Birthday, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 5 April 1996, p. 10; an
article on the Muderis Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company, which later formed the basis of the 4th
Muslim Light Brigade.
• Sefko Hodzic: Unsuccessul Chetnik Setup, Ljubljana Oslobodjenje, 21-28 December 1995, p. 11;
interview with Sead Rekic, commander of 3rd Reconnaissance-Sabotage Battalion. At the time of
“Lukavac 93”, Rekic commanded the “Dido” Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment.
• Fikret Julardzija: There Can Be No Success Without Good Units and Fighting Men, Travnik Bosnjak, 4
July 1995, pp. 28-29; interview with Brigadier Nedzad Ajnadzic, the commander of the 37th Division in
1995, but a commander in 1st Corps during 1993. Ajnadzic described the reinforcement of Igman with
troops from 3rd Corps, including elements of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade.
1328
The unit rotation story at least appears to have been true. The VRS redeployed the Special Brigade
“Panthers” (i.e. 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade) from the Brcko area after the end of Operation

487
prodding, Mladic only slowly withdrew his men from the mountains over the next week,
while they broke and burned anything of value they could not take with them.1329 By 15
August all but 200 of the VRS troops had fallen back to their earlier positions, and by 19
August only small groups of Serbs – probably reconnaissance units – were observed moving
clandestinely among the trees on the mountains.

Evaluation of Drina Valley Operations

The VRS strategic offensive of 1993 decisively achieved most of its goals. For much
of 1992 Bosnian Army forces had been able to hold large sections of the Drina valley,
threatening Serb dominance and frustrating a key Serb war aim. The 1993 offensive
drastically reduced the amount of territory under Muslim control and wiped out or
dispersed most of the Muslim population. It effectively achieved the Serb war aim of
establishing the Serb republic’s eastern border on the Drina and more firmly linked the
Herzegovina region to the rest of Republika Srpska. Finally, the VRS operations almost
eliminated the threat of Muslim attacks on Serb towns and villages, although they would
suffer from sporadic raids until 1995.
The VRS was able to achieve this strategic victory by methods that were in direct
contrast to those used during 1992. The essential element in the Serb success was the Main
Staff, which set goals, allocated resources, and then systematically orchestrated a series of
well-designed operations. Each campaign proceeded logically from the last as the VRS
moved from north to south down the valley. In 1992 there had been little coordination
between the major sectors and the array of Serb forces had lacked the resources which only
the commitment and authority of the Main Staff could produce.
VRS units in 1992 had been untrained, undisciplined, and often tactically inept, and
the higher-level tactical commands did a poor job of directing them. During the 1993
offensive, each operation was well organized and focused and the staff planning measured
up to the high standards inherited from the JNA. The Main Staff also brought in elite units as
well as VJ and Serbian MUP special operations units to spearhead attacks, dramatically
increasing Serb tactical proficiency, while a year of combat experience had also improved
the performance of many local units. The VRS, in some cases with VJ help, also increased the
amount of fire support available to combat units, which had enjoyed only a small relative
weaponry advantage during the 1992 battles.
Most Muslim units – particularly in Srebrenica – fought with the same skill and
tenacity they had exhibited in 1992. The small-unit infantry tactics at which the Muslim
mountain units excelled proved effective in delaying the Serb advance, particularly when
Muslim teams infiltrated the Serb attack columns’ flanks. Even these effective methods

“Sadejstvo 93” on 27-28 July to the Igman area in order to relieve the tired 1st Guards Brigade and 65th
Protection Regiment. See the video Garda Panteri, narrated by Major Ljubisa Savic-Mauzer, Special Brigade
“Panthers”, also known as the “Serbian Guard”.
1329
Mladic strongly opposed withdrawal. Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska
Press, 1996, Chapter 11.

488
were not enough to offset the revamped VRS organization, professionalism, and firepower.
The Muslim enclaves’ limited access to additional troops and supplies from northern and
central Bosnia ensured that the VRS, given ample men and firepower, could systematically
reduce the pockets.

489
 Annex 37
UN Peacekeeping Operations in 1993:
By Sea, Air, and Land
...may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
Authorities of the United Nations Security Council, as specified by Article 42 of the
United Nations Charter

In 1993 the UN’s peacekeeping roles were to expand significantly, both in terms of
the geographic area covered and in terms of the mandates the UN was taking on. These
were the heady days of “the New World Order” and multilateral peacekeeping efforts were
at their zenith. Worldwide, the number of peacekeeping troops deployed under UN auspices
was skyrocketing. Just three years earlier, the UN had deployed only about 11.000
peacekeepers around the world. By July 1993 this number had increased more than
sevenfold, reaching a peak of 78.744 troops from 67 separate nations deployed on
peacekeeping missions around the globe.1330 Costs had, of course, risen to match: in 1990,
the UN spent $400 million on peacekeeping but the tab for operations in 1993 ran over $3
billion.1331 1332 1333
A series of UN Security Council resolutions expanded UNPROFOR’s role, along with
NATO’s, far beyond the original core mission of assisting humanitarian aid deliveries,
including such diverse functions as preventing combatant military air flights and enforcing
UN-imposed economic sanctions at sea. Many of the UN’s new missions did not prove easy
ones, and 1993 was to be a frustrating year for the peacekeepers.

By Air: The “No-Fly Zone”

The first UN air operations in Bosnia had begun on 3 July 1993 with the opening of
the air bridge into Sarajevo.1334 Operations continued until 3 September, when an Italian Air
Force Alenia G-222 transport was hit by a surface-to-air missile and destroyed with the loss
of four crewmembers. The danger was further underscored when Bosnian Croat troops fired
on the four US Marine Corps helicopters conducting search-and-rescue operations in the
crash area. UN air operations were halted for more than a month afterward, resuming on a
semi-routine basis in October.

1330
Jane’s Defence Weekly, United Nations Peackeeping Operations Are Winding Down by Thalif Deen, 25
February 1998, p. 6.
1331
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 March 1993, pp. 23-28.
1332
See also Blue Helmets, Empty Guns by Brian Hall, The New York Times Magazine, 2 January 1994.
1333
The Economist, The United Nations: Heart of Gold, Limbs of Clay, 12 June 1993, pp. 21-24.
1334
The first actual flights in were President Mitterand’s helicopter arrival on 28 June, followed by several
flights over the next few days that brought in an airport guard force of 125 French marines and assorted
equipment for the airport. However, the UNHCR airlift as such did not begin until 3 July.

490
 The Sarajevo air bridge that brought UNHCR humanitarian aid soon adopted the
unofficial name of “Maybe Airlines”, based on the adage that “maybe the plane comes,
maybe not ... maybe it lands, maybe not ... maybe it gets shot at, maybe not”. It was an apt
enough name, given the circumstances the pilots and aircrews had to work under. In
addition to the all-too-obvious threat of hostile ground fire, there were also the very real
dangers of terrible weather and inadequate airport facilities. The Joint Air Operations Cell
(JAOC) at Ancona Air Base in Italy oversaw operations by US, British, French, German, and
Canadian military transports flying primarily from UN-run Camp Pleso airfield at Zagreb in
Croatia.
On 28 February 1993, US Air Force planes from Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany
began airdropping humanitarian aid directly to the encircled Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica,
Zepa, and Gorazde, which could not be reached by UNCHR land convoys. French and
German aircraft joined the effort the following month. Operations were substantially
curtailed as the need fell off in early summer 1993, but occasional airdrop missions were
flown as late as 19 August 1994.
NATO had been providing aerial surveillance of Bosnian airspace since 16 October
1992 following the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 781 declaring a ban on flight
operations by the Bosnian factions. Not surprisingly, the Bosnian factions soon discovered
that a flight ban with no enforcement mechanism was a joke, and hundreds of “No-Fly
Zone” violations were soon recorded. The Bosnian Serb Air Force’s use of a turboprop plane
on tactical bombing missions around Srebrenica in March 1993 was deemed too blatant a
violation to be ignored, and the UN Security Council passed a second resolution authorizing
NATO fighters to enforce the previous No-Fly Zone resolution.
Although the UN humanitarian airlift and AWACS electronic surveillance flights had
been underway for months, the commencement of Operation DENY FLIGHT – the NATO No-
Fly Zone enforcement missions – on 12 April 1993 was unquestionably a major step in a new
direction in air operations. NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) was assigned the
mission of enforcing the No-Fly Zone, and established a Combined Air Operations Centre
(CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy to oversee operations. US, British, French, Dutch, and Turkish Air
Force fighters based either in Italy or on aircraft carriers operating in the Adriatic began
searching for No-Fly Zone violators.1335 1336
Both practical and political difficulties severely hampered the No-Fly Zone
enforcement mission. In practical terms, it was difficult for the NATO fighters to locate,
intercept, and identify low-flying aircraft over Bosnia conducting short missions, sometimes
at tree-top level. (Virtually all of the identified No-Fly Zone violations were by helicopters
rather than fixed-wing aircraft.) Politically, the enforcing fighter pilots were highly
constrained as to what they could do in any case. Although their mandate technically
allowed them to down any offending aircraft of any type, UN and NATO decision-makers
directed that NATO fighters engage only aircraft that could positively be identified in the act

1335
Air Force Magazine, The Fully Deployable Air Campaign by Tony Capaccio, January 1994, pp. 50-54.
1336
Air International, RAF DENY FLIGHT Operations, March 1994, pp. 150-151.

491
of conducting combat operations – bombing or strafing ground targets – to avoid the
possibility of downing a medevac helicopter or civilian aircraft. Not surprisingly, although
the No-Fly Zone was established in October 1992 and enforcement flights began in April
1993, no NATO aircraft would actually engage Bosnian Serb aircraft until early the following
year.1337

By Sea: Operation Sharp Guard

The UN’s effort to create an ever-tightening net of economic sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro began shortly after the start of the war in early 1992 and was to
grow larger and more complex throughout the conflict. Although UN Security Council
Resolution 757 first imposed sanctions in May 1992, no enforcement of any type began until
July 1992, when NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) jointly contributed forces
for a naval enforcement mission in the Adriatic. The NATO warships could challenge vessels
suspected of being sanctions evaders, but they had no authority to do anything about it
until UN Security Council Resolution 787 on 16 November 1992 empowered them with stop-
and-search authority on both the Adriatic and the Danube river.
The NATO/WEU naval enforcement mission underwent several changes of name
during its first year, beginning as “Sharp Vigilance”, then becoming “Maritime Guard”, and
finally “Sharp Guard”. This last re-designation, in June 1993, accompanied an important
improvement in the command structure that brought together the NATO and WEU warships
as a Combined Task Force (CTF) under a single joint commander, which would greatly
enhance the effectiveness of the operation as a whole.1338 Thereafter, Operation Sharp
Guard would, on average, consist of eight ships from NATO’s Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), seven ships from the Standing Naval Force Atlantic
(STANAVFORLANT), and six WEU vessels, as well as several maritime patrol aircraft.1339
On balance, the maritime sanctions enforcement mission was to prove a UN
success. Once the necessary forces and authorizations finally became available in late 1992
– and especially after the command arrangements were streamlined in mid-1993 – the
NATO/WEU task force was largely able to shut down the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s
(FRY) maritime imports of proscribed goods. UN Security Council Resolution 820, passed on
17 April 1993, tightened the sanctions regime even more and effectively declared the FRY’s
territorial waters a commercial shipping exclusion zone. While cigarette boats and other
small craft could still evade the naval blockade, the volume of traffic was sharply curtailed
and the FRY’s ability to bring in certain key goods – most notably, oil and gasoline – was
critically undercut.

1337
Jane’s International Defense Review, Bosnia Mission Stretches Air borne Eyes and Ears by Tim Ripley,
January 1994, pp. 54-56.
1338
Jane’s International Defense Review, Shalikashvili Admits Blockade “Less Than Satisfactory”, November
1993, p. 842.
1339
Jane’s International Defense Review, Isolating Yugoslavia by Tim Ripley, October 1994, pp. 75-79.

492
 On Land: UNPROFOR in 1993
On the ground in Bosnia, UNPROFOR’s peacekeepers soldiered on under difficult
and trying circumstances. By mid-1993 UN headquarters (UN HQ) in Kiseljak had established
itself and its command structure, with just under 10.000 peacekeepers operating almost
exclusively in Muslim and Croat-held Bosnia. UNPROFOR now had seven national
manoeuvre battalions in Bosnia (still less than the twelve in adjacent Croatia). Three of
these were the French, Egyptian, and Ukrainian battalions brought in to provide a
peacekeeping representative for each of the major religions in Sarajevo. There was another
French battalion based at Velika Kladusa in the Bihac Pocket, a British battalion at Vitez, a
Canadian battalion at Kiseljak, and a Spanish battalion at Medjugorje. Support troops made
important contributions and added to the manpower total, but it was the manoeuvre
battalions that served as the backbone of UNPROFOR’s presence in Bosnia throughout the
war.
As in the previous year, these forces did what they could to show the UN flag,
promote local agreements where possible, deliver humanitarian aid, assist refugees and
embattled citizens, and generally mitigate the horrors of war for the Bosnian population.
This basketful of missions proved an immense task, and even in the best of circumstances
UNPROFOR could hardly hope to achieve all of them fully. And Bosnia-Herzegovina was not
the best of circumstances. UNPROFOR remained plagued by ill-defined missions, limited
resources, and adversarial local commanders, and these conditions would daily tax the
patience, abilities, and ingenuity of the UN commanders to their limits.
A single incident on 8 January 1993 – only weeks after UNPROFOR had firmly
established itself in Bosnia-Herzegovina – made chillingly clear how little respect the new
peacekeeping force could expect when push came to shove. On that day, Bosnia’s Deputy
Prime Minister for Economics, Hakija Turajlic, was travelling in a French UNPROFOR
armoured personnel carrier from Sarajevo airport to the city centre after meeting with a
visiting Turkish delegation. Along the way two Bosnian Serb tanks blocked the UN convoy
and stopped it at a checkpoint (known to the UN as “Sierra-4” – Serb checkpoint four)
manned by about 40 Bosnian Serb soldiers. The Serb soldiers insisted on inspecting the
vehicles: the French troops refused: a two-hour standoff ensued while the French waited for
their battalion commander, Col. Patrice Sartre, to arrive, and while he attempted to resolve
the dispute. Inexplicably, and in direct violation of UN rules of engagement, the UN
peacekeepers opened the doors of Turajilic’s vehicle. One Serb drew his pistol, aimed over
Sartre’s shoulder, shot the Muslim cabinet member seven times, and left him dead inside
the French APC. The UNPROFOR peacekeepers were horrified, but took no action against
the Serb gunman. Although the far greater horrors of Srebrenica have since eclipsed it, the
Turajlic assassination marks one of UNPROFOR’s darkest hours.
Throughout the year, the humanitarian aid delivery mission – UNPROFOR’s
fundamental raison d’être – was beset by obstacles, both natural and artificial. Heroic
efforts by British Army Royal Engineers, for instance, had kept the overland link from the

493
ports in Croatia to Mostar and Vitez open, despite icy roads, weak and damaged bridges,
roadblocks, and sniper fire. As if these military handicaps weren’t bad enough, in early July
both the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats began to charge the UN exorbitant road tolls –
hundreds of dollars per vehicle, payable in cash – for transit rights.1340 Conditions worsened
as winter approached and the two factions, both adversaries of the Bosnian Muslims, tried
harder to obstruct UN aid deliveries to besieged Muslim areas such as Maglaj and
Gorazde.1341 In October a Danish truck driver was killed and eight Dutch peacekeepers
wounded when a UN convoy was caught in the cross fire between Muslim attackers and
HVO defenders south of Novi Travnik. This last straw impelled the UN to halt its
humanitarian relief effort entirely1342 1343 until, on 18 November, the leaders of the three
Bosnian factions signed a formal agreement in Geneva guaranteeing safe passage for all UN
convoys.1344 The paper at least allowed the convoys to resume, but the fact remained that
the factions could and would obstruct humanitarian aid deliveries whenever it suited
them.1345
UNPROFOR’s dilemma is perhaps best illustrated by UN Security Council Resolution
836, passed on 4 June 1993, which created the six UN-designated “safe areas” of Sarajevo,
Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa. The import of the resolution was entirely
unclear to the parties on the ground and to the UN peacekeepers assigned to protect the
safe areas. The UN had clearly assumed some sort of responsibility for these six cities and
towns, and the UN’s arm in Bosnia, UNPROFOR, was obviously the body to implement the
resolution. But to the last day of the war, UNPROFOR’s mandate and responsibilities in
regard to the safe areas were never spelled out.
Just as importantly, the passage of UNSCR 836 had given UNPROFOR a new, if
ambiguous, mission but not the new forces needed to carry it out. At the time the
resolution was passed UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported that he would
require an additional 34.000 UN peacekeepers to properly secure the newly designated safe
areas. The Security Council authorized only 7.600 more – and it was up to Boutros-Ghali to
find member nations willing to contribute them. The three principal sponsors of the
resolution – the US, UK, and France – made it clear that they would not provide additional
troops for even this requirement.1346 The UN’s decisions – or lack of decisions – about
missions and forces made in 1992 and 1993 would haunt the international community in
1994 and especially 1995, when the events at Srebrenica were to bring the flaws in the safe
area concept into glaringly sharp relief.
There is no question that UNPROFOR accomplished much good in 1993 – helping to
force, cajole, or negotiate the passage of UN aid convoys, brokering an endless succession of

1340
The Times, Croats and Serbs Order Huge Tolls on UN Convoys, 2 July 1993.
1341
Reuters, UN Says Bosnian Rivals Hampering Convoys by Giles Elgood, 12 October 1994.
1342
Reuters, Dane Dies When UN Trucks Hit in Bonsnia Crossfire by Mark Heinrich, 24 October 1994.
1343
Reuters, UN Blames Bosnian Moslems for Convoy Attack by Philippe Naughton, 27 October 1994.
1344
The Times, Bosnian Factions Offer Convovs Safe Passage, 19 November 1993.
1345
Reuters, Aid to Bosnia Still Delaved Five Davs After Deal by Kurt Schork, 23 November 1993.
1346
The Economist, Rescue the Rescuer, 12 June 1993, pp. 18-19.

494
cease-fires, and probably limiting the worst excesses of the Croat-Muslim war simply by
being there. But UNPROFOR also endured many humiliations and travails, and the UN’s
perceived impotence was to undercut the international community’s credibility at times and
start UNPROFOR down a road that would in many ways discredit the very concept and
tradition of UN peacekeeping operations.

495
 Annex 38
Sarajevo 1993: The Siege Continues
By 1993 the Bosnian Army and the Bosnian Serb Army forces around Sarajevo had
fully settled into the grim routine of trench warfare. Sporadic but daily shelling and small
arms exchanges, punctuated by the occasional battle for a key suburb, terrain feature, or
defensive position, became the norm for the soldiers of both sides.1347 As part of its siege
warfare, the VRS harassed civilian areas of the city with sniper bullets, machinegun fire,
mortar rounds and artillery shells that claimed many civilian lives and kept Sarajevo in the
world headlines day after day.
The biggest military event of the siege during 1993, described in the previous
section, was the VRS capture of Mount Igman in August that cut the city’s last supply line –
other than the UN – and stirred an international response that forced a Serb withdrawal.
Other important clashes included battles at Azici and Stup in February and March, which
were part of an operation the VRS had initiated in December, beginning with the capture of
Otes, to further isolate Sarajevo. Loss of the suburbs, particularly if followed up by the
capture of Dobrinja, would leave Bosnian Army troops even further from the UN-controlled
airport and the ARBiH troops in Hrasnica-Butmir-Mount Igman. It would also have precluded
use of the new tunnel the ARBiH was digging under the airport to Hrasnica. The Bosnian

1347
The three-day battle for Hill 935 (Crkvica) northwest of Hadzici in early January 1993 is a good example of
the World War 1-style trench warfare that typified the fighting over key positions, even when neither side
was undertaking a major operation. On 5 January ARBiH troops – probably from the 302nd Mountain
Brigade – seized the hill top from the VRS 1st Igman Brigade, which reclaimed it two days later. This
account is from the VRS journal Srpska Vojska:
On the day before (Orthodox] Christmas Eve, 5 January, an infantry-artillery attack on Zenik and
Vela began along the lines of defense. The attacks by the enemy forces were directed especially
toward Crkvice, the highest elevation and most important peak along the Vela-Zenik-Tresnjice line.
The attack began at around 20:00 from Vela, moving toward Crkvice, which was attacked at around
22:30 ... After several hours of fierce fighting, platoon leader Brane Draskic and soldiers Nenad
Malinovic and Milomir Boskovic were killed. The other fighters retreated toward Zenik and formed a
reserve line of defense from the southwestern side of Crkvice. On Christmas Eve, 6 January, in the
morning hours, our fighters from the direction of Vela and Zenik formed a semi-arc around Crkvice.
The artillery rained down with unabated intensity until the afternoon, so that it was impossible to
move further. The action was temporarily delayed, for only several hours, until 30 fighters could set
out in the direction of the enemy from Zenik ... In hand to hand combat, the enemy was engaged in
close fighting, and our fighters approached Elevation 935. Several trenches were also recaptured.
Dusk began to fall quickly. In the fierce fighting, platoon leader Mirko Jokanovic was killed. The
deputy commander of the Zenik Company, Trivko Ateljevic, and Branko Kujaca, were wounded.
Among the [enemy] dead were neighbors from Vidovici and Godusa. The action was over by the next
morning.
On Christmas Morning, the fighters of the Rakovica Battalion and the other battalions that were
part of the Igman Brigade, together with the “Lightning” and “Hedgehog” Special Units and Special
Units from the Ilidza Brigade, set out from Vela and Zenik for the final showdown ... A semi-arc was
formed ... The artillery did its work. The infantry advanced step by step. Our fighters liberated one
trench after another. The [enemy] forces retreated, leaving their dead behind ... Elevation 935 was
ours again.
Trisa Kujaca: At the Three-Border Area of Republika Srpska: Battle for Crkvice, Srpska Vojska, 25 January
1994, p. 29.

496
Army victory at Stup, following the loss of Azici, thwarted this plan. Other minor battles
during the year included failed VRS attempts in July and December to recapture the
prominent Zuc Hill, which the Serbs had lost in December 1992. ARBiH units and VRS forces
also regularly clashed in the Grbavica district, the only Serb-held section of central Sarajevo,
particularly around the Vrbanja bridge-Jewish cemetery sectors. The year ended with a
spate of bloody shelling incidents in the city centre that killed a number of civilians.1348

The Campaign for the Western Suburbs and the Outer Siege Ring,
December 1992 – April 19931349
In early December, the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps under Major General Stanislav
Galic organized a two-pronged campaign to further tighten the siege of the city while
consolidating the territorial integrity of the collection of suburbs and districts known as
“Serb Sarajevo”. The first sub-operation in the campaign was designed to seize control over
three key western suburbs of Sarajevo, which would strengthen the tenuous Serb-held link
between Ilidza and Nedjarici while making Muslim access to the UN controlled airport more
difficult and blocking potential relief operations from Bosnian Army-held Butmir-Hrasnica. A
follow-on attack against the Dobrinja district would have then cut the last link to the airport
and eliminated the newly constructed supply tunnel under the airport to Butmir. At the
same time, General Galic’s troops would undertake a second sub-operation to capture key
hills and roads north of the city, near Ilijas, Semizovac, and Vogosca. The seizure of these
positions would eliminate key positions from which Bosnian Army forces could undertake
further operations to attempt the city’s relief, while more closely linking the Ilijas area with
Serb-held territory to the east.
The VRS took the first step in the suburb operation in early December 1992,
blasting their way through the suburb of Otes, some 15 kilometers west of central
Sarajevo.1350 In mid-February, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps launched the second part in the
campaign, attacking Azici. Troops from the 1st Ilidza Infantry Brigade attacked with
supporting tanks and APCs from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade. Several special
assault units spearheaded the attack. The total assault force probably numbered 1.000 to
1.500 troops. Artillery and mortars from units throughout the area backed up the attack
with substantial fire support, including 155 mm howitzer and multiple rocket launcher fire
from the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment. Against the planned assault the 3rd Motorized
Brigade / 1st Corps was defending the Azici-Stup sector with more than 4.000 men, but only
half had small arms. As Serb intentions became clear, the 1st Corps reinforced the brigade
with mobile elements of the other formations manning the city defence lines.

1348
Reuters, 2 January 1994.
1349
The combat narrative for this and the other battles around Sarajevo is based primarily on contemporary
press reporting from Sarajevo Radio, Belgrade Radio, Belgrade Tanjug, and Pale SRNA.
1350
See Annex 31: Sarajevo. 1992: The Siege Begins.

497
 The VRS attacked on 15 February, quickly breaking into ARBiH positions as direct
tank fire and artillery and mortar shells hammered the government defenders. The Serbs
slowly advanced through the town over the next five days, pushing the mixed Muslim-Croat
units back building by building. By 20 February, Serb troops had occupied Azici. The defeat
brought court-martials for four Bosnian Army officers and re-designation for the 3rd
Motorized Brigade.1351
A month later, on 17 March, the VRS moved against Stup, the last suburb outside
the main Sarajevo districts. The Serbs appeared to be on their way to victory over the re-
titled 102nd Motorized Brigade, and when they claimed to have captured Stup on 20 March,
residents fled the town. The ARBiH 1st Corps quickly moved additional reinforcements into
the Stup area, digging in around the Stup highway bridge and the Stupsko Brdo sectors. The
corps also shifted its small tank force – no more than 10 tanks – to the area, and on 22
March fought unusual tank-against-tank engagements with the VRS. UN observers counted
over 2.400 detonations before they almost certainly lost count in the heavy fighting.
Overextended by their desire to make good their claim to Stup, the Serbs exposed
themselves to a counterattack by ARBiH troops that drove them back almost to their start
line. The defeat forced the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to halt its campaign to capture the rest
of the western suburbs.1352
While the battles for the suburbs raged, the 1st Ilijas and 1st Vogosca Brigades
launched an attack in mid-February to capture the Semizovac-Srednje road and plateau. This
time it was the VRS that was able to drive the enemy back, capturing 16 villages and
eliminating a key sally point for attacks toward the city while widening their tenuous link
between Ilijas and Vogosca. In mid-March the 1st Ilijas and 1st Igman Brigades followed up
with an attack southwest of Ilijas, pushing ARBiH forces away from the town. The Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps concluded this series of attacks in April when the 1st Ilijas Brigade seized
the important Ravni Nabozic position overlooking the Semizovac-Srednje road.1353

1351
Reuters carried the Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje’s report of the ARBiH charges against the officers,
which noted that:
Some events that have taken place during combat in Azici undoubtedly show serious weakness
among the officers in charge of detachments, squads, battalions, and brigades ... this weakness is
shown especially when it comes to the preparation of military units for combat.
Reuters, Bosnian Officers Face Charges Over Defeat, 24 Februarv 1993.
1352
A VRS tank commander attached to the 1st Igman Brigade, Radmilo Samardzic, gave a vivid account of the
fierce fighting, reporting that his crew “burned” during the attack on Otes, while at Sokolj – apparently
near Rajlovac – his tank was hit by three M-79 antitank rocket rounds. During another incident at Sokolj, his
tank fell into a trench and was nearly overrun by ARBiH infantry. Samardzic said he was ready to take his
own life rather than surrender, but he and his gunner were able to drive the infantry off with grenades.
Aleksandar Petranovic: Note From the Hadzici Battlefield: Under the Cannon’s Barrels, Srpska Vojska, 15
July 1993, p. 29.
1353
See Aleksandar Petranovic: 1st Ilijas Light Infantry Brigade: Shield for Central Bosnia, Srpska Vojska, 15 July
1993, p. 10. See also Belgrade Tanjug, 21 and 22 January 1993, and 20 February 1993; Belgrade Radio, 8
January 1993; Sarajevo Radio, 22 January 1993, 3 February 1993, 8 March 1993, 27 April 1993; Zagreb
Radio, 25 January 1993.

498
 The Battles for Zuc Hill, July and December 1993
The VRS made a significant effort in late July 1993 to recapture the important Zuc
Hill area, actually a series of hills, the most important of which are Point 850, Orlic, and Golo
Brdo, that looks down over central Sarajevo. Bosnian Army troops had seized the foremost
hills in December 1992, right after the fall of Otes. Its recapture by the VRS would further
tighten the siege around Sarajevo, while the timing of the attack would divert ARBiH
attention from the imminent continuation of Operation “Lukavac 93” and the capture of
Mounts Igman and Bjelasnica.1354
The VRS “Vogosca” Operational Group of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps commanded
the Vogosca, Rajlovac, and Kosevo Infantry Brigades which normally controlled the sector
around Zuc. For the attack, the VRS Main Staff apparently reinforced the OG with two
infantry battalions from the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade / 1st Krajina Corps, armour support
from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, and probably small VRS or special police assault
units to bolster organic brigade-level special units. The total number of combat troops
probably was about 2.500 to 3.000 men.
The ARBiH 1st Corps also had three brigades, the 2nd, 1st, and 9th Motorized
Brigades, in the Zuc sector, deployed respectively opposite Rajlovac and Vogosca, and north
of government-held Kosevo. ARBiH troops probably numbered 8.000, with the usual
complement of about 50 percent possessing small arms.
The VRS artillery preparation began on 22 July, and UN military observers counted
over 3.700 shells impacting the Sarajevo area on that day. The brunt of the attack hit the
ARBiH 1st Motorized Brigade, which had led the attack that captured the mountain in
December. As the infantry fighting intensified, the Serbs kept up the artillery support, firing
another 3.000 rounds into Sarajevo on 25 July and reportedly using tear gas against ARBiH
trenches. By 28 July VRS troops had seized several key positions on Zuc from the 1st
Motorized, left rudderless after the brigade commander, Enver Sehovic, was killed in action.
In response, the 1st Corps shifted some of its best units, including Bosnian Ministry of
Internal Affairs special police troops, to Zuc for a counterattack. By 30 July joint ARBiH and
MUP forces were able to retake most of the Serb gains and the fighting tapered off. The
successful VRS assault against Igman and Bjelasnica began the next day. Although the Zuc
attack itself had failed, the VRS had diverted many of the 1st Corps reserves away from its
main operation.
The December 1993 battle for the Zuc area appears to have been less intense,
although it lasted almost as long, and occurred simultaneously with renewed fighting in the
Grbavica-Jewish cemetery area (see below). On 21 December, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
stepped up its bombardment of the Zuc area, with UN observers reporting 1.500 rounds on
Sarajevo, primarily Zuc, that day. Fighting continued for the next two days but subsided on
Christmas Eve. On 27 December VRS troops attacked Zuc before dawn, capturing several

1354
See Annex 36: Battles on the Drina, Round Two, December 1992 – August 1993.

499
trench lines from ARBiH forces. The Serbs, however, failed to drive government units from
the mountain and Zuc remained under ARBiH control.

The Battles for Grbavica and the Jewish Cemetery

The Grbavica section of Sarajevo was the only Serb-controlled central district of the
city, and it allowed the VRS to fire on key government-held areas. As a result, the trench and
bunker lines that ran through the yards and buildings along the Miljacka River near the
Vrbanja Bridge and the Jewish cemetery and up the slopes of Mount Trebevic were some of
the most heavily contested positions in the entire city.1355 The Jewish cemetery and the
adjoining slope formed the right shoulder the Serb position in Grbavica. As a result, the
ARBiH made repeated attempts to seize this sector in the hope that its loss would force the
Serbs out of the area. The government forces also hoped to sever the tenuous road link
between Pale and the Serb-controlled suburb of Lukavica – a key VRS garrison – that ran
along Trebevic.
Although clashes were frequent throughout the year, some of the larger battles
were fought in mid-January, late May, and throughout December. Troops from the ARBiH
10th Mountain Brigade, until October under the command of the notorious Musan
Topalovic – Caco – faced elements of the VRS 1st Sarajevo Mechanized and 1st Romanija
Infantry Brigades. They fought pitched battles from the pine-tree lined slopes of Trebevic to
the surreal ruins of the Jewish cemetery. Two descriptions of this front from 1994 and 1995
illustrate these continuous scenes of battle:
A stubble of pine forest climbs the hillside [along Trebevic], its trees snapped and
scorched by months of artillery fire ... [to] the left ... the old Jewish cemetery lies in
ruins – ornate balustrades and gravestones toppled, mausoleums shattered by
relentless machine-gun and mortar exchanges.1356
Many of its centuries-old tombs and monuments have been blasted into oblivion
by shellfire, and military trenches now snake through the tangled undergrowth of what
was once a manicured graveyard.1357
A few abandoned houses dot the lane with gaping holes in their red tile roofs and
walls pocked by shrapnel. Unexploded mortar bombs and rocket-propelled grenades lie
in driveways and weed-infested gardens.
Clusters of mines lurk amidst the litter of empty shell casings, rain-sodden
garbage, and bullet riddled barricades.1358
Despite the intensity of the combat, the Bosnian Army efforts to capture the
cemetery or cut the road were for naught and the two sides faced each other across the
trenches for the rest of the war.

1355
Trebevic was the site of the 1984 Winter Olympics bobsled events.
1356
Reuters, Russian Troops Patrol Sarajevo’s Hottest Hot Spots,by Kurt Schork, 9 March 1994.
1357
Reuters, Passover Book Safe in Sarajevo, Much Else Lost by Kurt Schork, 15 April 1995.
1358
Reuters, Russian Troops Patrol Sarajevo’s Hottest Hot Spots by Kurt Schork, 9 March 1994.

500
 Operation “Trebevic-1”: The Bosnian Army Cleans House
In late October 1993 a battle was conducted within Sarajevo itself as the Bosnian
Army cracked down on two of its own units that had gotten out of hand. These were “Celo”
Delalic’s 9th and “Caco” Topalovic’s 10th Mountain Brigades, two units that had begun in
the early days of the war as criminal gangs that had their own guns and proved ready and
able to defend Sarajevo. But these patriotic criminals soon became home-front problems,
extorting money and coercing labour from the neighbourhoods they were supposed to
defend. In mid-October 1993, Topalovic’s 10th brigade overstepped the line, stealing two
UN armoured personnel carriers and causing a major embarrassment for the Bosnian
Government. The authorities responded by mounting operation“Trebevic-1” on 26 October
1993, a joint army / police action intended to round up “Caco”, “Celo”, and their most
notorious associates. Both bandit chiefs resisted. “Caco” took several MUP special police
troops hostage and tortured them to death before the army was able to track him down and
capture him. “Celo” seized 25 civilians as hostages but eventually released them unharmed
and gave himself up. About 20 people including 6 civilians were killed in shootouts during
the operation. Of more lasting importance, the “Trebevic-1” operation was the first and
most dramatic step in Commander Delic’s campaign to regularize and professionalize the
Bosnian Army.1359

1359
“Caco” Topalovic was killed (under highly suspicious circumstances) while allegedly trying to escape. “Celo”
Delalic was arrested and sentenced but was subsequently freed with a reduced sentence. He eventually
became a restaurant owner in Sarajevo and reputedly maintained his ties to organized crime.

501
 Annex 39
“The Man Who Would Be King”,
Fikret Abdic and the Autonomous Province of Western
Bosnia in 1993
Within a strange and complex civil war, the rise and fall of Fikret Abdic and his self-
proclaimed “Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia” (APWB) was one of the strangest
and most complex interludes.
Fikret Abdic was one of Yugoslavians most charismatic but controversial figures
even before the breakup of the country. In the twilight period of Socialist Yugoslavia’s
massive state-owned industries, he had become famous as the director of the
“Agrokomerc” food processing consortium – the Bihac area’s largest employer. A self-made-
man, Abdic had started out as an employee in a tiny food co-op and over the course of two
decades built it up into a huge empire comprising some 13.500 employees, 430 farms, and
52 factories.1360 One secret of Abdic’s success emerged in 1987, when it turned out that his
company had issued roughly half a billion dollars worth of un-backed promissory notes – the
company had in effect been printing its own money. The ensuing scandal rocked the
Yugoslav government and its banking system but Abdic, though found guilty of fraud
charges, was only briefly imprisoned.1361 1362
Apparently unharmed by the scandal and his conviction, Abdic was by 1990 one of
the most prominent Muslim politicians in Bosnia. In the then-republic’s first multiparty
elections he won the largest number of votes of any Muslim SDA candidate. Although this
entitled him to be President of Bosnia, Abdic stepped aside – for reasons still unexplained –
to allow the SDA’s second-largest vote-getter, Izetbegovic, to take office as the republic’s
President.1363
By June 1993, as Izetbegovic’s hold on power appeared to be waning, Fikret Abdic
was being seriously regarded as a challenger to his leadership of the Bosnian Government.
The first public signs of division within the Muslim camp came on 21 June in the run-up to
one of the EC-sponsored discussions in Geneva. Izetbegovic announced he would not attend
the meeting because what he called the “genocidal” new Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan
would codify the gains of Serb ethnic cleansing and the de facto partition of the country into
Serb, Croat, and Muslim-controlled areas.1364 Abdic publicly criticized Izetbegovic’s refusal to
attend, setting off an uproar within Bosnia’s nine-member collective Presidency.1365 The
next day Abdic and the other Presidency members announced that they had met without

1360
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 15.
1361
Vulliamy, Ed: Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia’s War, New York St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 301-302.
1362
Malcom, Noel: Bosnia: A Short History (2nd Edition), Macmillan (Papermac), 1996, p. 209.
1363
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 210-211.
1364
Reuters, Izetbegovic Says Not Going to Geneva Talks by Steve Pagani, 22 June 1993.
1365
Reuters, Bosnian Presidency Meets without Izetbegovic by Steve Pagani, 21 June 1993.

502
Izetbegovic and voted to attend the peace talks even if the President did not.1366 Many
interpreted this to mean that Abdic was seeking to displace Izetbegovic. Although Abdic
denied the claims, he appeared to be a serious contender for the future leadership of
Bosnia. 1367
Only days later, however, the story took another turn. The Bosnian Interior Ministry
announced on 26 June that Abdic was being sought by the Austrian government on charges
of defrauding Bosnians resident in Austria who had contributed money to help war refugees
through the Agrokomerc company’s Vienna- based subsidiary.1368 Ignoring the charges – and
Izetbegovic’s objections to the EC peace proposals – Abdic remained the Bosnian
Presidency’s Muslim representative at the Owen-Stoltenberg negotiations in Geneva.
By the end of the summer Abdic had gone beyond open defiance of Izetbegovic’s
presidential authority. On 7 September a self-selected parliamentary assembly met in
Abdic’s home town of Velika Kladusa to discuss the possible creation of an “autonomous
province” within Bosnia-Herzegovina.1369 Abdic stopped short of declaring that this would
mean the full secession of all or part of the Bihac region from the Sarajevo government, but
the distinction was a purely academic one. Even before the assembly vote on 27 September
formally proclaimed Abdic the head of the newly-established “Autonomous Province of
Western Bosnia”. Abdic had already assembled his own privately-raised military force and
used his money and influence to build a local empire in the north-western corner of the
country.1370 Sarajevo responded by ejecting Abdic from the Bosnian Collective Presidency on
2 October.
With now two rival claimants for sovereignty over the besieged Bihac enclave –
Fikret Abdic and his APWB “army” versus the Bosnian Army’s 5th Corps then under Ramiz
Drekovic – it remained to be seen where loyalties lay and who would control which
territory. Abdic called on the 5th Corps brigades to defect to his new flag, while Izetbegovic
ordered the army to remain loyal and stamp out this new insurrection. Abdic rapidly
established his authority in the Velika Kladusa, the municipality that had long been his
power base. Abdic loyalists quickly claimed control of the Bihac enclave’s central town of
Cazin, but a flying column of 500 Bosnian Army troops from Bihac (ironically, driving in
“Agrokomerc” vehicles) arrived in Cazin on 20 September and eventually secured it for the
ARBiH 5th Corps.1371 1372 Abdic’s support was weakest in Bihac itself, which generally sided
with the Izetbegovic government.
When the decision was forced, two Bosnian Army brigades – the 521st and 527th,
both raised from the Velika Kladusa area – defected virtually wholesale to the Abdic camp.

1366
Reuters, Bosnians to Attend Peace Talks without Izetbegovic by Giles Ellwood, 22 June 1993.
1367
Reuters, Bosnian Moslem Leader Denies Presidency Ambitions, 22 June 1993.
1368
Reuters, Bosnia’s Abdic Wanted in Austria on Fraud Charges, 26 June 1993.
1369
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 22.
1370
Reuters, Moslems Declare Autonomous Province in Maverick Enclave, 27 September 1993.
1371
Reuters, Bosnian Troops Swoop on Rebel Moslim Town by Paul Holmes, 30 September 1993.
1372
Bosnian Government security forces sprayed the ground in front of a crowd of Adbic supporters in Cazin
with gunfire, but do not appear to have killed or injured anyone in dispersing the crowd. Reuters, Bosnian
Enclave’s “Father” Tries to do it Alone by Paul Holmes, 1 October 1993.

503
(These were to be re-designated as the APWB’s 1st and 2nd Brigades, respectively). Much of
the 504th and part of the 503rd Brigade in Cazin also changed sides. The 517th Brigade from
the small town of Pjanici remained loyal to the Government, but lost many of its men to
defections. These units were to provide the manpower equivalent of about three to four
brigades to the rebel forces.
Open violence between the rival forces began in the first days of October, as for the
first time Muslims fought not only Serbs and Croats but also other Muslims. UNPROFOR’s
General Briquemont tried to negotiate a truce between the two factions before the violence
escalated out of hand, but the Abdic representatives refused to attend the talks.1373
Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs welcomed this opportunity to stand down and let their
Muslim opponents fight among themselves.
Bosnian Army forces at first confined the Abdic supporters to the extreme northern
area around Velika Kladusa, but Drekovic’s overtaxed 5th Corps lacked the troop reserves to
guard against both the Bosnian and Krajina Serb armies while simultaneously putting down
the Abdic rebellion. On 15 October Abdic’s forces made a comeback, regaining control over
Cazin without firing a shot, but the following day Bosnian Army troops hastily assembled
from the surrounding area forced them back out after a brief, sharp fire-fight.1374 1375 1376
(Government sources claimed – credibly – that the Bosnian Serbs helped the Abdic rebels by
mounting simultaneous attacks in several areas to tie down ARBiH forces while the APWB
moved into Cazin.) The Bosnian Army mounted a counterattack on 18 October, shelling
Velika Kladusa, but was unable to eliminate the APWB as a military threat.1377
While the Bihac situation hung in the balance, the wily Abdic moved to cover his
flanks by seeking separate agreements with the Croats and Serbs. His first move was to
secure a deal with the Croats, travelling to Zagreb on 21 October to sign an agreement
whereby Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban would arrange a truce with the Bihac HVO.1378
The following day, press reports announced that Abdic had met with Bosnian Serb leader
Karadzic and Serbian President Milosevic in Belgrade, where Abdic concluded a similar deal
with the Bosnian Serbs.1379 A public statement followed, to the effect that the Abdic forces
and the Serbs had signed a peace agreement, while Karadzic’s Republika Srpska (itself
unrecognized) announced it was recognizing the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
as a separate entity.1380 Abdic completed his triad of deals on 28 October by placing his seal
on a nonaggression pact with the Krajina Serbs that included the demilitarization of the
Serb-held Bosanska Bojna area inside Bosnia, which the Croatian Serbs had seized in late

1373
Reuters, UN Fails to Stop Intra-Muslim Battles in Bosnia by Paul Holmes, 5 October 1993.
1374
Reuters, Rebel Moslems Seize Bosnian Town by Giles Elgood, 15 October 1993.
1375
Reuters, Bosnian Army Takes Back Town from Rebel Moslems, 16 October 1993.
1376
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 22.
1377
Reuters, Moslem Rebels Say Bosnian Troops Launch Attack, 18 October 1993.
1378
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 23.
1379
Reuters, Bosnian Moslem Dissident Meets Karadzic, Milosevic, 22 October 1993.
1380
Reuters, Rebel Moslems Sign Peace Deal With Bosnian Serbs, 22 October 1993.

504
April.1381 Ever the consummate opportunist, Abdic had thrown in his lot with his former Serb
opponents in order to gain backers for his breakaway empire.
Abdic’s forces regained the initiative when fighting resumed on 4 December, after
Krajina Serb forces allowed Abdic’s troops to travel through Serb-held territory in Croatia
and mount a flanking attack from the western side of the Bihac pocket near Licko Petrovo
Selo. Advancing from this unexpected direction, a relatively small number of APWB troops
(perhaps 1.000-1.500) was able to gain a significant foothold in the western Bihac enclave,
occupying a strip of territory several kilometers deep along the Croatian border and
advancing as close as 10 km outside Cazin itself. At the same time, Abdic forces in the north
succeeded in capturing Johovica and Skokovi, two hotly contested towns several kilometers
south of Velika Kladusa. UN observers confirmed that the Serbs, in addition to allowing the
rebel forces to transit their territory, supported the APWB attack with artillery and tank
fire.1382 1383 1384 1385 1386
The ARBiH’s newly-appointed Bihac area commander, Atif Dudakovic, reacted
promptly and effectively, committing forces stripped from his southern defensive line
opposite the Bosnian Serbs. This risky move proved successful, containing the Abdic
advance by 8 December and eventually shrinking the APWB encroachment to negligible
proportions.1387
The end of 1993 left Abdic’s APWB twice-surrounded empire very modest in size –
roughly the north-western third of the Bihac enclave – but still too powerful for the Bosnian
Army 5th Corps to reduce or eliminate. Abdic had built himself a small army of six brigades –
5.000 fighters or so – from his own followers and major elements of two defecting Bosnian
Army brigades. The Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic back in Belgrade welcomed a Muslim proxy
force of limited capabilities that could be used to draw off 5th Corps fighters, and they
carefully saw to it that Abdic’s forces were adequately outfitted with small arms and
mortars but were prevented from obtaining heavy artillery or armour.1388 When actively
supported by the Krajina or Bosnian Serbs – as they were in November and December – the
APWB army could threaten the ARBiH and take ground from it, but it lacked any actual
offensive potential of its own. For the time being, Abdic’s rebel forces had achieved a
standoff with the Bosnian Army.

1381
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, pp. 17-18, 23.
1382
Reuters, Rebel Forces Say They Advance in Bosnia Pocket, 11 November 1993.
1383
Reuters, Rebel Moslems Gain Ground Against Bosnian Army by Maggie Fox, 6 December 1993.
1384
Reuters, Rebel Moslems Get Serb Help for Assault on Bosnian Army by Maggie Fox, 6 December 1993.
1385
Reuters, Serbs Shell Bosnians to Support Rebel Moslems, 15 December 1993.
1386
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 26.
1387
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 27.
1388
Reuters, Bosnian Army at Standoff with Rebel Moslem Enclave by Maggie Fox, 8 November 1993

505
 Annex 40
The “Ahmici Massacre” of 16 April 1993: A Military Analysis
They are criminally responsible for the murder and wounding of Moslem civilians or
detainees, the attacking and bombarding of undefended towns, villages and dwellings,
deliberate attacks on the civilian population, the unlawful destruction of businesses, homes,
personal property and livestock...
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Lasva Valley indictment

...it is clear to me that the attack on Ahmici was a well-organized and systematic
Croat operation. It took place only four kilometers away from Blaskic’s own Headquarters
and only five hundred meters away from a local Croat Headquarters.
Lt. Col. Bob Stewart, UNPROFOR British battalion commander1389

The centrepiece of the HVO’s ethnic cleansing strategy for the Lasva Valley was the
“Ahmici massacre” of 16 April 1993. The massacre came to light almost by accident, when
UNPROFOR’s British battalion commander, Lt. Col. Bob Stewart, met a group of Bosnian
Army soldiers ranging for revenge because the Croats had killed the entire population of a
town, including its babies. Not willing to believe the outlandish claims, Stewart diverted his
peacekeepers from their route to disprove the accusations and lay the matter to rest.1390
They soon found out that the Bosnian claims were all too true: the entire village
had been systematically destroyed. Most visibly, the main mosque had been burned and its
minaret felled by explosives detonated at the base. Most of the houses had also been put to
the torch, their roofs collapsed by the flames. The few exceptions proved to be Croat-owned
residences, which were left intact. Cars were destroyed in driveways: dead livestock littered
the streets and gardens. An entire family of seven was found dead in one house, at least
two of them young children who had almost certainly burned to death. The images from this
small central Bosnian town – the Guernica of the Bosnian conflict – were to shock and
outrage the world.1391 1392 1393
It is difficult to reconstruct exactly what happened that day, but investigations by
the UN and other agencies indicate that the village was taken by surprise early in the
morning – about 05:00 – by simultaneous attacks from the north and south. Mortar rounds
and sniper fire cut down anyone who tried to escape across the open ground. Within the

1389
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, p.
310.
1390
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp.
278-299.
1391
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp.
278-299.
1392
White Warrior: The Cheshires in Bosnia, 1st Battalion the 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment, Regimental HQ,
Chester, 1994, pp. 57-60.
1393
Bell, Martin: In Harm’s Way: Reflections of a War-Zone Thug, London Penguin Books, 1996, pp. 152-155.

506
town, squads of soldiers moved methodically from house to house, killing the occupants
with close-range gunfire. After everyone in the town had been killed, many of the bodies
were dragged into their homes and the buildings were set aflame with gasoline – probably
in an effort to conceal or destroy as much evidence as possible.1394 1395 1396
The UN counted at least 176 buildings, including two mosques, destroyed, and
determined that at least 103 people, including 33 women and children, died at Ahmici; the
actual number likely was considerably higher. According to the indictment published by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Ahmici’s official population
had been 466, of whom 356 were Muslims. However, the town’s population on the morning
of the attack may have been as high as 800 because of an influx of refugees from Jajce,
Foca, and Visegrad. Of those who survived, perhaps half escaped into the hills and
eventually made their way to Muslim-held territory. The remainder were taken prisoner by
the HVO but were not otherwise harmed – possibly as a result of prompt UN intervention
and the international outcry at the massacre’s discovery.1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402
Several days later, on 24 April, HVO Central Bosnia Operational Zone (OZ)1403
commander Tihomir Blaskic – later promoted to become commander of all HVO forces –
acknowledged to the UN that HVO forces in his area of responsibility had been responsible
for the attack on Ahmici. But Blaskic and the HVO command in Mostar denied that they had
ordered the attacks, maintaining that “some commanders and their troops are acting and
behaving on their own initiative and taking independent actions”. The HVO authorities
claimed that those responsible would be identified and prosecuted, but failed to name any
individuals or units.1404
All the available evidence suggests that the Ahmici operation was pre-planned and
executed by a select group of assault troops. Unsubstantiated but persistent rumours claim
that a group of senior Bosnian Croat leaders met on 15 April, the night before the attack, to

1394
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp.
278-299.
1395
White Warrior: The Cheshires in Bosnia, 1st Battalion the 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment, Regimental HQ,
Chester, 1994, pp. 57-60.
1396
Bell, Martin: In Harm’s Way: Reflections of a War-Zone Thug, London Penguin Books, 1996, pp. 152-155.
1397
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp.
278-299.
1398
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp.
57-60.
1399
1399 The figures of 800 residents during the attack and 500 before the war are taken from UNHCR
estimates. British peacekeepers saw HVO soldiers escorting at least 150 Muslim prisoners away from
Ahmici after the assault. When the British soldiers demanded to know what was going on, the HVO soldiers
changed direction and eventually released the prisoners to the UNHCR. The prisoners firmly believe they
were about to be executed and that UNPROFOR’s intervention saved their lives. Stewart, Col. Robert:
Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp. 278-299.
1400
Reuters, U.N. Tribunal Turns Attention to Croat War Crimes by Andrew Kelley, 9 May 1995.
1401
White Warrior: The Cheshires in Bosnia, 1st Battalion the 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment, Regimental HQ,
Chester, 1994, pp. 57-60.
1402
Reuters, Croatian War Crime Suspects Surrender to UN by Andrew Kelley, 6 October 1997.
1403
Later renamed the Vitez Corps District.
1404
Reuters, Croat Commander Promises Inquiry into Family’s Death by Corinne Duflca, 24 April 1993.

507
decide whether to mount the operation, which they allegedly referred to as “48 hours of
blood and ashes”.1405
Several HVO units have been implicated in the Ahmici operation, with varying
degrees of evidence against them. Two of these were special forces units: the Jokeri
(“Jokers”) and the Vitezovi (“Knights”). Both were company-sized elite units subordinate to
the Central Bosnia Operational Zone (a corps-level equivalent). A third unit was the HVO’s
local “Vitez” brigade, then under the command of Mario Cerkez.1406 1407
The Jokeri special forces detachment has frequently been mentioned, by a variety
of sources, as a main suspect in the Ahmici massacre. The detachment was formed early in
the war, and apparently as an independent unit directly subordinate to the Central Bosnia
Operational Zone. During the Croat-Muslim war, the unit was employed as a mobile reserve
for the Croat-held Vitez enclave (the Vitez, Busovaca, and Novi Travnik areas). By the
beginning of 1994, the “Jokers” had apparently been re-subordinated as the “intervention”
or “anti-terrorist” company of the HVO’s 4th MP Battalion, headquartered in Vitez.
• At the time of the Ahmici massacre, the detachment – with strength of perhaps 100-
150 troops – was commanded by Ante Furundzija and headquartered in the small
town of Nadioci, 5 km east of Vitez. The detachment probably was large enough to
have accomplished the human and material destruction inside the village itself
(although it did not necessarily do so); UN peacekeepers later estimated that about 70
HVO soldiers had assaulted Ahmici.1408
• As a special forces or military police unit, the Jokers would have been well equipped
with personal weapons (e.g. assault rifles, grenades, flak jackets, and communications
equipment) but would not normally carry heavy weapons other than hand-held rocket
launchers.
The Vitezovi special purpose detachment (Postrojba Posebne Namjene – PPN) has
also been accused at times of participating in the Ahmici massacre. The unit was formed
sometime in late 1992 or at the beginning of 1993, and was headquartered in the Vitez area.
The unit apparently was active through January 1994 as an independent subordinate of the
HVO’s Vitez Corps district, according to press reports. Shortly thereafter, the unit appears to
have been absorbed into another HVO unit – probably the then-forming 3rd HVO Guards
brigade. The unit’s primary responsibility was the defence of a key hill north of Novi Travnik
that overlooked the Muslim-held Pucarevo weapons factory.1409 1410

1405
There are 200 Who Are Worse!, Split Feral Tribune, 20 November 1995; an interview with Ivan Santic,
former president of Vitez Opcina.
1406
Vjeran Grkovic: Death Came From Herzegovina, Split Feral Tribune, 20 November 1995.
1407
Jasna Babic and Visnja Gotal: The Hague Tribunal, According to the Secret Bill of Indictment, is Demanding
that the Croatian Government Extradite Miroslav Bralo Cicko, Former Member of the HVO Special Unit,
Zagreb Nacional, 7 January 1998.
1408
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, p.
298.
1409
Reuters, Croats Battle Mud, Exhaustion in Bosnian Trenches by Kurt Schork, 12 December 1993.
1410
Reuters, Croats Left With No Escape in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 21 September 1993.

508
 • The Vitezovi unit was led by Darko Kraljevic, the nephew of Blaz Kraljevic – a
prominent commander in the HOS organization – who was assassinated by the HVO in
August 1992. The younger Kraljevic – who had been accused of war crimes during the
Croat-Muslim conflict but was never indicted – died in a car accident on 26 June
1995.1411 1412
The HVO’s Vitez brigade1413 was the locally raised, territorial-based unit that had
general responsibility for the defence of the area. Unlike the Jokeri or Vitezovi, the Vitez
brigade was composed largely of draftees. A relatively large HVO brigade, the Vitez brigade
had at least three battalions and probably about 1.500 troops. The brigade fielded about a
dozen heavy and medium mortars and probably one or two 76 mm field guns of its own. If
necessary, it could also call on some of the Central Bosnia Operational Zone’s artillery
resources for additional fire support.1414
• The available evidence suggests that the Vitez brigade and/or the Central Bosnia
Operational Zone’s mixed artillery battalion at least supported the assault force with
heavy weapons fire, even if they did not contribute troops to the actions inside the
town. UN peacekeepers reported signs of shellfire and UN investigators reported that
mortars were used in the attack, while the Tribunal’s indictment states that the HVO
troops first shelled the town from a distance with mortars, rockets, and anti-aircraft
guns. The use of such heavy weapons would imply the involvement of the Vitez
brigade or the mixed artillery battalion – the only units in the Vitez enclave equipped
with mortars or heavy artillery.
• Even if the Vitez brigade was not the main perpetrator of the Ahmici massacre, it is
likely that Cerkez still exercised overall tactical control of the operation. Cerkez was by
this point a fairly senior HVO commander – at least within the Central Bosnia
Operational Zone – and units such as the Jokers that operated within his geographic
area and were supported by the Vitez brigade and the OZ’s artillery battalion would
doctrinally have fallen under his operational control.
The Ahmici attack was not a legitimate military operation, it was a deliberate
massacre: the HVO troops positioned themselves so they could catch any civilians
attempting to flee the town in fields of fire, while others systematically executed the
inhabitants. Nor would a straightforward military attack have required the cover-up
operations that followed immediately afterward.
Moreover, the indications that one or both of the relatively small, special-purpose
units directly subordinate to the Operational Zone commander – Blaskic – was employed
strongly suggest that the Ahmici massacre was planned, ordered and executed as exactly
that. These were not, as Blaskic and the HVO were quick to claim and then insist on, any sort
of renegade units operating outside HVO command authority. The Jokeri and Vitezovi were
1411
Rijeka Novi List: Officer Ivica Rajic Arrested for Massacre of Muslims, 12 July 1995.
1412
Vjeran Grkovic: Death Came from Herzegovina, Split Feral Tribune, 20 November 1995.
1413
Later redesignated the 92nd “Vitez” Home Defense Regiment.
1414
What was then the Central Bosnian Operational Zone was supported by a mixed artillery battalion, later
redesignated the 35th Mixed Artillery-Rocket Battalion.

509
among the HVO’s most select units of their size, and they were frequently given the most
difficult missions in the area. The presence of either unit would imply a higher level of
command attention and involvement than a similar operation by the local territorial brigade
might have.

510
 Annex 41
The Croat-Held Vitez Enclave: Vitez, Busovaca, and Novi
Travnik, June-December 1993
In 1991, the entire Vitez opstina was about 45 percent Croat, 41 percent Muslim,
and 5 percent Serb.1415 A fairly populous town of 28.000 residents, Vitez occupied a position
right in the middle of the Lasva Valley, about a third of the way along the highway between
Travnik and Kiseljak. But in addition to Vitez’s strategic location, it had one vital facility both
sides desperately wanted to control: the “Slobodan Princip Seljo” explosives factory two
kilometers west of the town centre. For all of these reasons, Vitez and its environs were
bound to be hotly contested between the Croat and Muslim factions.
What would later become the Vitez enclave had been a battleground even before
the main Croat-Muslim conflict began in April, thanks especially to the republic-wide conflict
over subordination of ARBiH and HVO units to each others’ commands. In Vitez the HVO’s
demand in late January 1993 that the Bosnian Army units in the area disarm or subordinate
themselves to local HVO command precipitated a substantial fire-fight with the numerically
superior Muslims in which the Bosnian Croats clearly were the losers. The action started
when the Muslims surrounded the Croat-held areas of Busovaca and shelled the town.
Intense fighting raged for two days before a cease-fire was arranged on 27 January.
According to the HVO’s own statement, the incident left 44 HVO troops dead and 82 others
injured – a noteworthy loss by any standard for such clashes in the Bosnian conflict.1416 1417
1418 1419 1420 1421

Intermittent but much less severe fire-fights continued through February.1422 1423 By
the end of February, Croat-held Busovaca was effectively blockaded by surrounding Muslim
forces and both sides had established checkpoints and barricades on roads throughout the
area.1424 Another local cease-fire was signed on 3 March, but it was evident that the
underlying problems were too serious to be contained by cease-fires alone.1425
Although the January and February clashes may have been seen as harbingers of
events to come, the really serious fighting in the Vitez area began with the HVO offensive in
mid-April. During the HVO’s Lasva Valley offensive the Vitez area was to endure some of the
bloodiest and most violent Croat-Muslim clashes of the war. The bellwether of violence in
the area was the detonation of a huge truck bomb outside a mosque in Muslim-majority

1415
Vjeran Grkovic: Death Came From Herzegovina, Split Feral Tribune, 20 November 1995.
1416
Zagreb Radio, 25 January 1993, FBIS London LD2501204893, 25 January 1993.
1417
Zagreb Radio, 26 January 1993, FBIS London LD2601191693, 26 January 1993.
1418
Paris AFP, 26 January 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2601213993, 26 January 1993.
1419
Zagreb Radio, 26 January 1993, FBIS London LD2601224093, 262240Z January 1993.
1420
Zagreb Radio, 27 January 1993, FBIS London LD2701194093, 271940Z January 1993.
1421
Zagreb Radio, 27 January 1993, FBIS London LD2801000393, 280003Z January 1993.
1422
Zagreb Radio, 2 February 1993, FBIS London LD0202154893, 021548Z February 1993.
1423
Zagreb Radio, 4 Februarv 1993, FBIS London LD0402155293, 041552Z February 1993.
1424
Zagreb Radio, 27 February 1993, FBIS London LD2702173393, 271733Z February 1993.
1425
Zagreb Radio, 3 March 1993, FBIS London LD0303011693, 030116Z March 1993.

511
Stari Vitez on 16 April, killing or injuring nearly two hundred civilians and levelling most of
the old town’s centre.1426 1427
The HVO’s lightning offensive in the Lasva valley allowed the Bosnian Croats to
capture or destroy many of the villages in the area immediately around Vitez in a couple of
days. Cautious of its gains, though, and with limited resources, the HVO Vitez Brigade did
not press the attack strongly after the first few days of fighting. The HVO brigade appears to
have tried to link the Vitez enclave with the HVO-held Kiseljak area some 10 km to the east
with an attack along the highway on 25 April, but was blocked by significantly superior
Bosnian Army forces determined to keep the two Croat-held areas separate.1428 With the
advantage of surprise and against negligible or disorganized opposition, the Bosnian Croats
had seized territory easily, but now they were stymied against determined Muslim
opposition. After another cease-fire in late April brought another vexed calm to the area,
the HVO assumed a largely defensive posture, giving the ARBiH 3rd Corps an opportunity to
build its forces for a counterstroke.1429 1430
The battle for the Vitez enclave resumed in earnest with the a major area-wide
counteroffensive launched by the Bosnian Army on 5 June as it wound up the expulsion of
HVO forces from nearby Travnik.1431 After the capture of Travnik on 10 June, the ARBiH 3rd
Corps intensified its offensive with attacks north and northeast of Vitez itself.1432 The HVO’s
“Frankopan” and “Travnik” Brigades, after being driven from Travnik, had established
blocking positions to the northwest along the line Puticevo-Mosor-Guca Gora, and it was
along this line that ARBiH and HVO forces clashed in late June.1433 1434
The Bosnian Army forces pressed the Croats relentlessly until the HVO held a
roughly barbell-shaped position extending from just east of Novi Travnik to just west of
Busovaca, along the main highway adjacent to the Lasva river. But at the same time the
Bosnian Muslims were surrounding the Vitez enclave the Bosnian Croats were laying siege
to the Muslim- majority neighbourhood of Stari Vitez deep inside the city where about
1.300 Muslims defended a tiny Government-held enclave of perhaps a kilometre on a
side.1435
The fighting declined for most of August but resumed on 1 September. Bosnian
Army forces again pressed the Croats hard from two directions, launching repeated attacks
over the next several days against the villages of Jardol and Divjak to the northwest and
Zaselje to the southwest. The HVO counterattacked on 8 and 9 September, pushing outward

1426
Reuters, U.N. Tries to End Moslem-Croat Clashes in Bosnia by Steve Pagani, 20 April 1993.
1427
Stewart, Col. Robert: Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London HarperCollins, 1994, pp.
289-290.
1428
Zagreb Radio, 25 April 1993, FBIS London LD2504122693, 251226Z April 1993.
1429
Paris AFP, 28 April 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2804110393, 281103Z April 1993.
1430
Zagreb HTV, 12May 1993, FBIS London LD 1205180493, 121804Z May 1993.
1431
Pale Radio, 5 June 1993, FBIS London LD0506180693, 051806Z June 1993.
1432
Sarajevo Radio, 10 June 1993, FBIS Vienna AU 1006120793, 101207Z June 1993.
1433
Zagreb Radio, June 1993, FBIS London, LD1906151093, 191510Z June 1993.
1434
Zagreb Radio, 23 June 1993, FBIS London LD2306151693, 231516Z June 1993.
1435
Reuters, Siege Within a Siege Strands Bosnian Moslems, by Kurt Schork, 16 July 1993.

512
a short distance to establish control over important Bila hill northwest of Vitez and the
nearby towns of Divjak and Grbavica.1436 But the Bosnian Government retained the initiative
and resumed its offensive along a broad front to the north on 10 September.1437 1438 1439 1440
1441 1442

On 16 September the Bosnian Croats threatened to flatten the Stari Vitez enclave-
within-an-enclave after the Bosnian Army’s massacre of Croat villagers in Uzdol. UN sources
confirmed that the Bosnian Croats first demanded that the neighbourhood’s Muslims
“vacate the area by noon or face the consequences” and then opened fire with mortars and
artillery after the deadline passed without a response.1443
Un-deflected, on 18 September the Bosnian Government again took up the
offensive with a broad, coordinated assault on the Croat-held portions of the Lasva valley. It
had regrouped its forces since its last major effort, and now the Bosnian Army was able to
open a multi-pronged, general offensive, driving on Vitez while renewing the fighting in and
around Travnik, Fojnica, Busovaca, Nova Bila west of Vitez, Gornji Vakuf, and Mostar.
Government attacks on several towns around Vitez were a major feature of the
broader offensive. Bosnian Army forces attacked simultaneously from the north and south
to pinch the Vitez enclave tighter near its narrowest point east of Vitez. The ARBiH’s elite
17th Krajina brigade captured the village of Bobas 3 km southeast of the city, but the HVO’s
“Vitezovi” special operations unit led a counterattack that retook the village shortly
afterward. Muslim forces also pressed the village of Krcevina 2km north of the city, hoping
to relieve the embattled Stari Vitez neighbourhood. They broke through HVO lines at one
point and reached up to the edge of Vitez, but were ultimately forced back with no net
gains.1444 1445
At the same time the Bosnian Army was attacking Vitez town from the north and
south, it was also attacking from the southwest in the direction of the Croat-held explosives
factory. Rather than give it up the Croats went so far as to claim that they had made the
entire explosives factory into a giant “Doomsday Bomb” which they would blow up along
with the surrounding town if the Muslims tried to capture it. The Bosnian Croats wired
detonation cord and explosives to the tanks of sulphuric and nitric acid and claimed they
had created a giant fuel-air explosive which would generate hundreds of tons of explosive

1436
Paris AFP, 9 September 1993, FBIS Vienna AU0909142193, 091421Z September 1993.
1437
A group of about 100 Muslim refugees petitioned the UK battalion for asylum in Vitez at this time. They
were refused entry to the UNPROFOR compound, but were turned over to UN relief authorities in Zenica a
few days later. Reuters, Moslem Troops Seek UN Protection as Croats Advance by Kurt Schork, 9 September
1993.
1438
Reuters, Fate of Moslems Linked to Massacre of Croats in Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 16 September 1993.
1439
Zagreb Radio, 8 September 1993, FBIS London LD0809123793, 081237Z September 1993.
1440
Sarajevo Radio, 9 September 1993, FBIS Vienna AU0909164093, 091640Z September 1993.
1441
Zagreb Radio, 10 September 1993, FBIS London LD100944293, 101442Z September 1993.
1442
Zagreb Radio, 13 September 1993, FBIS London LD1309124293, 131242Z September 1993.
1443
Reuters, Fate of Moslems Linked to Massacre of Croats in Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 16 September 1993.
1444
Reuters, No-Surrender Croats Say Moslems Plan New Attack by Kurt Schork, 20 September 1993.
1445
Reuters, Croats Left With No Escape in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 21 September 1993.

513
force and fling acid into the air. No one ever learned how serious the Croats were since the
Muslims never captured the factory.1446 1447 1448
Fighting dragged on through the entire month of October with serious casualties on
both sides – especially the outnumbered Bosnian Croats – but only marginal changes in the
confrontation lines.1449 Toward the end of the month Government forces began positioning
themselves for another major push and on 26 October succeeded in rolling back the HVO in
the extreme west of the enclave, capturing the town of Loncari and the adjacent 650-meter
hill. On 7 November – just after the Bosnian Government capture of Vares – the ARBiH
intensified its pressure on the Vitez enclave. The 17th Krajina Brigade drove HVO defenders
out of the villages of Zabrdje and Jelik and seized a commanding 1.105-meter peak 5 km
southwest of Vitez. Hard-pressed HVO forces struggled to hang on to the high ground
overlooking the explosives factory, finally rallying to retake the peak after an intense
barrage. Three more assaults the following day by the 17th Krajina failed to capture the
factory.1450 1451 1452
Toward the end of the year the Bosnian Government took one last crack at the
Croat enclaves, launching coordinated attacks on Kiseljak, Gornji Vakuf, and Zepce enclaves
just one day before a Christmas-New Year’s cease-fire was due to take effect. The 22
December attacks pressed especially hard against the western edge of the Vitez enclave at
the Croat-held villages of Lazine and Vecerske, but made no significant gains.1453 Although
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day were quiet, the last few days of the truce would again see
fairly sharp fighting in the suburbs around Vitez.1454 1455 1456

1446
Reuters, Croats Threaten to Blow Explosives Factory in Bosnia bv Kurt Schork, 21 September 1993.
1447
Reuters, Croats Craft “Doomsday Bomb” in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 12 November 1993.
1448
Reuters, Moslems Resume Attacks in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 25 September 1993.
1449
Reuters, Croats Use Exploding Trenches in New Bosnian Tactic by Kurt Schork, 15 October 1993.
1450
Reuters, Croats Fear Sell Out in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 9 November 1993.
1451
Reuters, Moslems Shell Croat Munitions Factory by Kurt Schork, 8 November 1993.
1452
Reuters, Three Children Among Eight Dead in Sarajevo bv Mark Heinrich, 10 November 1993.
1453
O’Shea, Brendan: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 28.
1454
Reuters, Moslems Attack Croats in Central Bosnia Valley, 22 December 1993.
1455
Zagreb Radio, 22 December 1993, FBIS London LD2212172593, 221725Z December 1993.
1456
Zagreb Radio, 22 December 1993, FBIS London LD2212131393, 221313Z December 1993.

514
 Annex 42
The Kiseljak Enclave in 1993:
The Battles for Kiseljak, Kresevo, and Fojnica
Kiseljak itself was a town of about 24.000 residents, slightly over half of them
Croats. About 40 percent were Muslims and the remainder Serbs and other nationalities.
Since the latter half of 1992, Kiseljak’s claim to fame had been as the black market capital of
Bosnia. The siege of Sarajevo had made Kiseljak – a few kilometers northwest of the city
centre – the key gateway for smuggling supplies into the city. Croats and Muslims wanted
control of the road that made the lucrative black market trade possible.1457 1458 Interethnic
tensions were already high in the region following a number clashes in early 1993.1459 1460
When full-scale ethnic warfare came to the Kiseljak area, it was the HVO that struck
first, massing north-west of the town on 18 April to shell the Muslim-majority town of
Bilalovac and destroying parts of Svinjarevo, Gomionica, and Rotilj after forcing their
inhabitants to flee.1461 Muslim civilians in Kiseljak were either rounded up and detained or
forced to leave the town.1462 Battles continued for an arc of villages several kilometers west
of Kiseljak, with the HVO gaining effective control over Svinjarevo, Jehovac, Gromiljak,
Visnjica, and Rotilj by the end of April.1463 1464 1465
Heavy fighting resumed north and west of Kiseljak at the very end of May around
the villages of Lisovo and Kazagici.1466 On 1 June, according UN observers, the HVO launched
a pre-emptive attack against a Muslim-held ridge overlooking the road to the northwest.1467
The countrywide truce agreed to June 10 in Kiseljak by Bosnian Army commander Delic and
HVO commander Petkovic brought the local fighting to a halt the following week.1468
Unsurprisingly, the cease-fire failed to hold and fighting resumed in the area shortly
thereafter. In mid-June the Bosnian Army opened an offensive effort against the Croat-held

1457
Reuters, Bosnia’s Black Market Town Braces tor War by John Fullerton, 3 June 1993.
1458
Filip Svarm: War Crime: Fighting to the Last Booty, Belgrade Vreme, 8 March 1993, FBIS Reston
VA93BA0793A, 061944Z April 1993.
1459
Sarajevo Radio, 27 January 1993, FBIS London LD2701203493, 272034Z January 1993.
1460
Zagreb Radio, 16 February 1993, FBIS London LD 1602221993, 162219Z February 1993.
1461
Sarajevo Radio, 19 April 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1904124493, 191244Z April 1993.
1462
Sarajevo Radio, 21 April 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2104161893, 211618Z April 1993.
1463
Zagreb Radio, 24 April 1993, FBIS London LD2404161993, 241619Z April 1993.
1464
UNPROFOR spokesmen reported on 30 April that the villages of Hercazi, Ulsnjica, and Gomionica had been
damaged or, in the case of Gomionica, destroyed outright, but did not specify which side had been
responsible for the destruction. Paris AFP, 20 April 93, FBIS Vienna AU3004114393, 301143Z April 1993.
1465
The Bosnian Government charged the HVO on 25 May 1993 with violence against the civilian populations
of a number of villages during the April-May fighting in the Kiseljak area, including the burning down of
between 450 and 500 houses. Specifically, the War Presidency of the Kiseljak Municipality accused the
Bosnian Croats of crimes against people and/or property in Rotilj, Visnjica, Svinjarevo, Gomionica,
Gromiljak, Mihovac, Mehrici Mahala, Rudnik, and Gazagici. Sarajevo Radio, 25 May 1993, FBIS London
LD2505211093, 252110Z May 1993.
1466
Zagreb HTV, 30 Mav 1993, FBIS London LD3005221693, 302216Z May 1993.
1467
Reuters, Bosnia’s Black Market Town Braces for War by John Fullerton, 3 June 1993.
1468
Sarajevo Radio, 10 June 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1006120793, 101207Z June 1993.

515
Kresevo area south of Kiseljak, first attacking the village of Mratinici just east of Kresevo on
17 June and shelling Kresevo itself on 18 June.1469 At the same time the Bosnian Army’s 3rd
Corps squeezed the opposite end of the enclave by attacking Croat-held towns north and
northeast of Kiseljak.1470 Other ARBiH 3rd and possibly 1st Corps forces brought in from
Fojnica and Tarcin pressed the southern tip of the Kiseljak enclave very hard over the next
few days, and by 22 June Kresevo appeared in danger of falling.1471 Nevertheless, the HVO
managed to hang on and stabilized the defence lines just outside Kresevo.
After pressing the southern edge of the Kiseljak enclave, the Bosnian Army shifted
its emphasis to the west and attacked Fojnica at the beginning of July. Fojnica, a quiet
lumber town of some 15.000 residents in the mountains west of Kiseljak, was one of the last
places to give itself up to Croat-Muslim violence: UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Morrillon
had cited the ethnically-mixed town as an “island of peace” only days before it became yet
another central Bosnian battleground. The dove of peace fluttered away and the battle
began when a single mortar round exploded outside the police station in the Croat half of
the town. Bosnian Army forces, apparently brought up from the south after their attacks on
Kresevo, supported their attack with scarce artillery and mortar rounds for two days.
Following up with pitched battles for the town streets, the Bosnian Army occupied the town
on 3 July and removed one point of the Fojnica-Kiseljak-Kresevo triangle that had previously
defined the Croat-held enclave.1472
It was about this time in early July that evidence began to accumulate of open
Bosnian Croat-Bosnian Serb collusion in the Kiseljak area. Croats and Serbs were seen
manning positions together and jointly attacking Muslims in the Kiseljak and Zepce areas.
UN military observers reported Bosnian Serb tanks passing unhindered through Croat-held
territory in the Kiseljak enclave and passed on unconfirmed reports of HVO soldiers riding
atop the VRS armour.1473
After the Bosnian Army capture of Fojnica, the Kiseljak enclave enjoyed a relative
reprieve for the next few months. Intense fighting flared in mid-July on Mt. Inac just west of
Kresevo, where the HVO managed to retain control.1474 1475 There was another flare-up of
fighting in early October as the Ban Josip Jelacic Brigade attempted unsuccessfully to wrest
part of the Kiseljak-Tarcin road from the ARBiH’s 9th Mountain Brigade.1476 1477 The two
sides also periodically shelled each other’s villages, hurting civilian lives and property with
negligible military impact.
On 12 November, as the Bosnian Army effort against nearby Vitez was grinding to a
halt, the Kiseljak HVO made its most substantial counterattack of the year. HVO forces from

1469
Sarajevo Radio, 17 June 1993, FBIS London LD1706170293, 171702Z June 1993.
1470
Zagreb Radio, 18 June 1993, FBIS London LD1806181093, 181810Z June 1993.
1471
Reuters, Moslems Ignore Truce and Attack in Central Bosnia by Gilles Trequesser, 22 June 1993.
1472
Reuters, Bosnian Town’s Dream of Peace Blown to Pieces by Gilles Trequesser, 3 July 1993.
1473
Paris AFP, 2 July 1993, FBIS Vienna AU0207062593, 020625Z July 1993.
1474
Zagreb Radio, 12 July 1993, FBIS London LD 1207180793, 121807Z July 1993.
1475
Zagreb Radio, 20 July 1993, FBIS London LD2007150693, 201506Z July 1993.
1476
Paris AFP, 4 October 1993, FBIS Vienna AU0410101493, 031014Z October 1993.
1477
Sarajevo Radio, 12 October 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1210194793, 121947Z October 1993.

516
the enclave punched outward in the Citonje-Bakovici area several kilometers due west of
Kiseljak. The HVO drive – visibly backed by Bosnian Serb armour and artillery support, and
simultaneous with a Serb-only offensive against Muslim-held Olovo – captured the town of
Bakovici and pushed Bosnian Government forces back about five kilometers by 13
November.1478 1479 HVO troops reached right up to the edge of Fojnica, but failed to occupy
it.1480 Government forces appeared ready to cede Fojnica – which would have returned the
Croat-held enclave to its original borders – but they were able to stall the HVO offensive just
short of victory, after which the Bosnians rallied on 15 November and managed to reoccupy
the town.1481 1482 1483 1484
The HVO’s failed attempt to recapture Fojnica in November marked the end of
large-scale fighting in the area. For the remainder of the winter, both sides dug in,
regrouped, recovered ... and awaited the resumption of fighting in the coming year.

1478
Reuters, Moslems Attack UN Headquarters Town in Bosnia by Mark Heinrich, 12 November 1993.
1479
Reuters, Bosnian Leaders Press for Truce But Troops Fight On by Mark Heinrich, 13 November 1993.
1480
The UN at this time was chiefly concerned about the safety of some 570 patients at two hospitals in Fojnica
and Bakovici. UNPROFOR troops eventually posted guards around the facilities and looked after the
patients after the hospital staffs fled. Reuters, UN Troops Guard Front-Line Hospitals in Central Bosnia by
Kurt Schork, 14 November 1993.
1481
Sarajevo Radio, 12 November 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1211212693, 122126Z November 1993.
1482
Paris AFP, 15 November 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1511113893, 151138Z November 1993.
1483
Reuters, Croats, Moslems Step up Peace Talks by Mark Heinrich, 12 November 1993.
1484
Reuters, Moslems and Croats Fight, Leaders Call for Truce by Mark Heinrich, 12 November 1993.

517
 Chart 1
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Order of Battle,
Kiseljak Enclave, 1993

3rd (Central Bosnia) Operational Zone, HQ Gornji Vakuf

(Glavni Stozer Oruzanih Snaga Srednja Bosna)
(Later Vitez Corps District)
Established 19 May 1992
Col. Tihomir Blaskic, Commander
Franjo Nakic, Dep. Commander

Operational Group 2, HQ Kiseljak

Col. Ivica Rajic, Commander through early November 1993

Ban Josip Jelacic Brigade, HQ Kiseljak

(Later split into the 94th “Ban Josip Jelacic” and 95th “Marinko Bosnjak” Home
Defence Regiments)
Established 20 December 1992
Formed from the Kiseljak, Kresevo, Fojnica municipal HVO headquarters; re-
designated the Ban Josip Jelacic brigade probably in late 1992.
Ivica Rajic, Commander

Nikola Subic Zrinski Brigade, HQ Busovaca

(Later the 93rd “Nikola Subic Zrinski” Home Defence Regiment)

Bobovac Brigade, HQ Vares/Dastansko

(Later the 96th “Bobovac” Home Defence Regiment)

Kotromanic Brigade, HQ Kakanj

(Later disbanded)

518
 Annex 43
The Bosnian Army Capture of Bugojno, July 1993
During the summer 1993 fighting between Croat and Muslim forces in Central
Bosnia one of the most heavily contested towns was Bugojno, both because of its location
and the presence of the “Slavko Rodic” munitions factory, damaged but still functioning at a
reduced level. Bugojno was a large town that before the war had numbered about 46.000
residents with a Muslim plurality (42 percent) and substantial minorities of Croats (34
percent) and Serbs (about 20 per cent). The ethnic balance in the town began to change
soon after the war began in the spring of 1992, when most of the Serbs left almost
immediately for Serb-controlled areas, while both Bosnian Croat and Muslim refugees
streamed in from Jajce and other areas lost to the Bosnian Serb Army. Although the town’s
total population remained roughly the same, the Serb exodus and the refugee influx had
probably increased the proportion of Bosnian Muslims by mid-1993, when the Muslims
decided to take over the town for themselves.
The town had been defended from the Bosnian Serbs by the HVO’s “Eugen
Kvaternik” brigade and the Bosnian Army’s 307th Mountain Brigade. Interethnic relations
were relatively good until the first Croat- Muslim fighting began in Gornji Vakuf in January
1993, after which they became extremely tense. The two brigade commanders agreed to
allow each other’s troops free movement with their weapons, but the armed truce was
punctuated by a series of incidents between January and July, most of which appear to have
been Muslim provocations against Bosnian Croats.
At the time the commander of the HVO’s “Eugen Kvaternik” brigade was Ivica
1485
Lucic. The unit had been established in May 1992 and charged with defending the
greater Bugojno area from Bosnian Serb attacks.1486 Most of its soldiers were local Bosnian
Croat residents, some of whom brought their own weapons, and they entered combat with
little or no formal training. The brigade apparently captured a few crew-served weapons
from the munitions factory in town, but may have lacked adequate ammunition and skilled
crews for these weapons. In theory, the Eugen Kvaternik brigade had strength of perhaps
1.000-1.200 troops, organized into three battalions, a military police company, and a small
mixed artillery battery. In reality, however, the force was not as strong as it looked. The
unit’s nominal manpower total probably included 200 or more Muslims – who would have
deserted before or during the July 1993 fighting – and most of the brigade’s Croat troops
were on leave or deployed outside the town on the day the Muslims attacked. The HVO’s
actual fighting strength may have been no more than 200-400 at the specific time and place
of the Bosnian Army attack.

1485
Often called simply the HVO “Bugojno” brigade, but here referred to as the “Eugen Kvaternik” brigade to
distinguish it from the Bosnian Army’s Bugojno brigade.
1486
Initially referred to as the “Bugojno municipal HVO headquarters” the force adopted the title “Eugen
Kvaternik brigade” in probably October 1992.

519
 The ARBiH unit that launched the mid-July attack was the town’s own 307th
“Bugojno” Brigade under Tahir Granic.1487 The 307th Brigade was assigned to the ARBiH III
Corps’ “Operational Group West”, then commanded by Brigadier General Selmo Cikotic,
(Like other Bosnian Army Operational Groups, OG West was a semi-permanent tactical
headquarters established to coordinate the operations of several brigades.) Typically, the
307th had many troops but relatively few weapons. At the time it could probably field
3.000-3.500 troops at full mobilization, with as many as three to four dozen mortars but no
field artillery or armour.
The Bosnian Army forces began their attack on Bugojno early in the morning of 18
July 1993. Street battles raged in and around the town for the next several days, with the
numerically superior Muslims progressively forcing the Croats back. After particularly heavy
fighting in the town centre on 21 July, the Bosnian Army occupied most of the key facilities –
including the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade’s barracks – the following day.1488 The HVO brigade’s
third battalion, surrounded in an elementary school in town and down to 73 effectives from
its authorized strength of 350 troops, surrendered on 23 July, and the other two battalions –
the first had only 40 men left – gave up under similar circumstances. The last large pocket of
Bosnian Croat resistance – the military police company surrounded in the Kalin Hotel –
surrendered on 25 July.1489 The last fighting in the area, in which Croat and Muslim soldiers
fought over several Muslim villages on the road to the southeast, was over by about 29 July.
The intense fighting caused high casualties on both sides.1490 1491 1492 The Bosnian
Army and the HVO each lost several dozen killed, and probably about 350 HVO soldiers were
captured.1493
The battle for Bugojno was one of the few in the Bosnian war in which the
advantages lay with the Bosnian Army. The 307th Brigade probably had at least three times
as many troops as its HVO opponent, and was comparably or better equipped. The HVO’s
Eugen Kvaternik brigade had no apparent advantage in leadership, and observers described
its officers as inexperienced and disorganized. The Bosnian Army’s advantages were
magnified by the factor of surprise: the HVO troops were caught unprepared,
undermanned, and ill-positioned. With its forces separated, the HVO in Bugojno had to fight
three separate battalion-sized battles rather than one brigade-sized one. Outnumbered and
surrounded, the HVO battalions were defeated in detail. But even against an unimpressive
opponent, the Bosnian Army was beginning to display greater proficiency.

1487
The unit may have been reinforced for the attack by elements of the 17th Krajina Brigade from Travnik or
the 7th Muslim Brigade from Zenica, but there is no substantial confirmation of this.
1488
Sarajevo Radio, 21 July 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2107191193.
1489
Sarajevo Radio, 25 July 1993, FBIS London LD2507151293.
1490
Reuters, Moslems, Croats Battle for Bosnian Town by Davor Huic, 20 July 1993.
1491
Reuters, Sarajevo Shelling Intensifies as Peace Talks Near by Mark Heinrich, 22 July 1993.
1492
Reuters, Bosnia’s Moslem-Led Army Takes Central Town of Bugojno, 22 July 1993.
1493
The Eugen Kvaternik Brigade was essentially destroyed in this operation. Its remnants were regrouped into
a single battalion and eventually combined with two other defeated and exiled HVO units – the former
“Kupres” and “Jajce” brigades – to form the 55th Home Defense Regiment.

520
 Annex 44
Northern Herzegovina: Konjic, Jablanica, and Vrdi in 1993
My enemy’s enemy is my best friend.
Mirko, a Bosnian Serb soldier sharing brandy with his former HVO adversary in the
hills overlooking Konjic1494

Konjic and Jablanica – just under 20 km apart from and due east and west of each
other – were the two main towns anchoring northern Herzegovina. Jablanica, to the west,
was the smaller of the two, with a pre-war population of about 4.500 citizens. About three-
quarters of these residents were Muslims, with a bit under 20 percent Croats and a small
number of Serbs. To the east, Konjic was substantially larger, with a pre-war population of
about 14.000. Slightly over half of these residents were Muslims, with another one- quarter
Croats and about 14 percent Serbs.1495
On the whole, the Bosnian Serb threat to northern Herzegovina was not great,1496
and although the area held by the Croat and Muslim forces were subject to occasional
shelling there was little threat of major offensive action from the already overtaxed VRS
Herzegovina Corps. Rather, the greatest threat lay within – the Croat-Muslim schism that
threatened to rip the area apart like other mixed areas of Bosnia. The problem was
intensified by the prospect that, although Croats represented only a small fraction of the
population in both Konjic and Jablanica, all of northern Herzegovina was to be assigned to a
Croat-majority canton under the Vance-Owen peace plan. The seeds of discord had already
been sown: Vance- Owen stimulated them to germinate.
The sizeable Muslim population of northern Herzegovina was reflected in the
substantial force raised from the area, all collective elements of ARBiH General Arif Pasalic’s
4th Corps.1497 Probably the premier unit in the area was the 43rd “Suad Alic” Mountain
Brigade,1498 drawn from the Konjic area. In addition, there were the 44th “Neretva”
Mountain Brigade from nearby Klis and the 45th “Neretvica” brigade raised from the
Jablanica area. Together, these three Bosnian Army brigades could probably field at least
5.000 fighting men, though they suffered from a paucity of supporting heavy weapons.
The Croatian Defence Council, by contrast, had only a single, subdivided unit in the
region. This was the “Herceg Stjepan” Brigade headquartered in Konjic, an essentially
isolated element of HVO General Miljenko Lasic’s South-eastern Herzegovina Operational
Zone. In each area where the Bosnian Army had a brigade, the HVO had only a subordinate

1494
Reuters, Serbs und Croats Bury the Hatchet in Battle for Bosnian Town by Natela Cutter, 26 June 1993.
1495
Reuters, Serbs und Croats Bury the Hatchet in Battle for Bosnian Town by Natela Cutter, 26 June 1993.
1496
The Konjic area was within easy shelling distance of the Bosnian Serb lines, and the VRS would occasionally
shell the town. The VRS, however, had neither the resources nor the inclination to mount a serious attack
to capture the area. Jablanica was essentially secure from Bosnian Serb attack.
1497
These units were transferred to the ARBiH 6th Corps when it was formed in early June 1993, and then
transferred back to the 4th Corps when the 6th Corps was disbanded in 1994.
1498
Originally the 7th “Suad Alic” Mountain Brigade, and later redesignated the 443rd.

521
battalion of the Herceg Stjepan Brigade. Moreover, although the Herceg Stjepan Brigade
might have been slightly larger than an ARBiH mountain brigade, it was probably no better
equipped and could not count on the support of other HVO or HV units from adjacent areas.
If the Croat-Muslim contest came to blows here, the HVO was outnumbered roughly three
to one and ill-positioned for success.
Local tempers first rose dangerously in mid-January as Croats and Muslims battled
openly in the streets of Gornji Vakuf some 40 km to the northwest. But although the two
races came to the brink of violence, there were no clashes in the Konjic-Jablanica region.1499
Croat-Muslim tensions spiked once again two months later when HVO soldiers arrested
three prominent Muslim leaders from Konjic on 23 March.1500 Sharp fire-fights supported by
artillery fire exploded until HVO commander Petkovic and ARBiH 4th Corps Pasalic
intervened to defuse the crisis.1501 The situation in Konjic calmed after the three detained
Muslim were released and a ceasefire took effect on 28 March, quieting the area for just
less than two weeks.1502 1503 1504 Fighting resumed outside Konjic on 8 and 9 April, followed
by yet another uneasy calm.1505 1506 1507 Sharpening these tensions was the HVO’s 15 April
deadline for the voluntary disarmament or departure of Bosnian Army units in Croat-
designated cantons – which included the Konjic and Jablanica areas. The roots of conflict
were the same as in the Lasva valley to the north. But in this area, unlike the Lasva Valley,
the Muslims would have the upper hand – and would strike first.
The first deliberate attacks between Herzegovina’s armed Croats and Muslims
came on 14 April – one day in advance of the HVO’s disarmament deadline – when Bosnian
Muslims attacked the Croat-held village of Busici outside Konjic.1508 HVO forces responded
by attacking and capturing three villages northeast of Jablanica – Kostajnica, Buturovice, and
Ljesevina – on 15 April. UNPROFOR could only confirm that the fighting had begun, not who
had started it.1509 The Bosnian Army then claimed the Croats had looted and burned the
Muslim villages of Sovici and Doljani northwest of Jablanica on 23 April.1510 Clashes continue
in Sovici and Doljani, as well as at Ostrozac northeast of Jablanica, on 25 April.1511 More
fighting raged as Bosnian Croat forces were expelled from Konjic and Jablanica, incidentally
blocking the main route for UN relief convoys between the coast and Sarajevo.1512 The
crucial hydroelectric power dam near Jablanica was also hotly contested, ultimately

1499
Sarajevo Radio, 19 January 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1901164093, 191640Z January 1993.
1500
Sarajevo Radio, 23 March 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2303121593, 231215Z March 1993.
1501
Reuters, Bosnian Commander Orders Halt to Battle With Croats, 25 March 1993.
1502
Sarajevo Radio, 23 March 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2303201493, 232014Z March 1993.
1503
Sarajevo Radio, 24 March 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2403105295, 241052Z March 1993.
1504
Reuters, Bosnian Ceasefire Close to Collapse, 15 April 1993.
1505
Zagreb HTV, 8 April 1993, FBIS London LD0804192393, 081923Z April 1993.
1506
Sarajevo Radio, 9 April 1993, FBIS Vienna AU0904155293, 091552Z April 1993.
1507
Zagreb HTV, 9 April 1993, FBIS London LD0904193693, 091936Z April 1993.
1508
Reuters, Bosnian Croats Say Moslems Attack Croat Villages, 14 April 1993.
1509
Edin Logo: Bridges of Defense and Friendship, Sarajevo Prva Linija, June 1997, pp. 37-38.
1510
Reuters, U.N. Group Heads for Bosnia as Serbs Ponder Peace Plan by Mark Heinrich, 23 April 1993.
1511
Reuters, Croat, Muslim Forces Start Disengaging But Fighting Persists by Mark Heinrich, 25 April 1993.
1512
Reuters, At least 50 Killed in Moslem-Croat Fighting by Steve Pagani, 17 April 1993.

522
remaining in Muslim hands.1513 The intensity levelled off in the area at about the same time
as the Lasva Valley fighting burned out, towards the end of April. But an UN-mediated cease
fire had even less effect in the Konjic-Jablanica area than elsewhere in Bosnia.1514 1515
Fighting resumed after only a matter of days, first along the area’s key road routes
on 7 and 8 May. HVO artillery and mortars shelled the now Muslim-controlled towns of
Konjic and Jablanica and some of the surrounding villages. The Bosnian Croat shelling of
Konjic was occasionally joined by Bosnian Serb artillery.1516 Meanwhile, the Bosnian Muslim
forces consolidated their control over the areas immediately around Konjic and Jablanica by
occupying most of the smaller villages around both major towns, though in some directions
their lines extended only a few kilometers outside each town. Yet another UN-sponsored
ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed by the two army commanders, but although
it alleviated the fighting in areas such as Mostar the agreement had little visible effect
around Konjic and Jablanica.1517
By early June the former Bosnian Croat residents of Konjic had been expelled from
the town limits1518 and the HVO troops of the Herceg Stjepan Brigade found themselves
holding a very small area just to the south. In almost every direction these Croats were cut
off and surrounded by kilometers of Muslim-held territory. Lacking any other options, the
Konjic HVO allied with the local Bosnian Serbs with whom they shared a small border to the
east. The Konjic HVO was to rely entirely on the VRS for artillery, logistic, and medical
support.1519
Meanwhile, the Muslims holding Jablanica were linked only with Konjic to the east.
The ARBiH’s challenge was to connect Jablanica with another Muslim-held city to the
northwest, as the Croat-held area commenced around Doljani just a few kilometers
northwest of Jablanica, firmly blocking any road traffic along the highway in that direction.
Eventually that same road went through HVO-held Prozor and on to Gornji Vakuf and
Bugojno. To the south, the highway was secure for about ten kilometers until it reached the
Muslim-held town of Dreznica. From there southwards the HVO could interdict the next 20
km of road south to Mostar.
Substantial fighting resumed once again around 20 June when the Bosnian Croats
launched a serious attack against the Jablanica area.1520 Absorbing the attack, the Bosnian
Army around 1 July took its turn at the offensive, pushing south from Jablanica in the hopes
– unfulfilled, as it turned out – of linking up with a simultaneous Muslim thrust north from

1513
Paris AFP, 24 April 1993, FBIS Vienna AU, 241301Z April 1993.
1514
Reuters, Croat-Muslim Fighting Halves U.N. Aid to Central Bosnia, 7 May 1993.
1515
Sarajevo Radio, 4 May 1993, FBIS Vienna AU0405094893, 040948Z May 1993.
1516
Reuters, Serbs Launch Attack in Brcko Area by Kurt Schork, 14 May 1993.
1517
Zagreb HTV, 12May 1993, FBIS London LD1205192993, 121929Z May 1993.
1518
Indeed, the HVO “Herceg Stjepan” brigade lost command of its own headquarters in Konjic on 15 April, the
second day of sustained fighting. Thereafter, the brigade carried on from outside Konjic proper, Zagreb
Radio, 15 April 1993, FBIS London LD1504211593, 152115Z April 1993.
1519
Reuters, Serbs and Croats Bury the Hatchet in Battle for Bosnian Town by Natela Cutter, 26 June 1993.
1520
Reuters, Bosnian Rivals Fiercely Contest Territory by Giles Ellgood, 21 June 1993.

523
Mostar.1521 Despite hard fighting that continued for the rest of the summer and into the fall,
neither side made any significant progress in northern Herzegovina until early October.
After months of bloody but inconclusive fighting the Bosnian Army mounted a
sizable offensive effort in the area east of Prozor on 14 September. It was during this action
that the “Uzdol massacre” of 14 September occurred in the Croat-held village of Uzdol
seven kilometers east of Prozor. The incident appears to have begun as a successful military
operation in which a company-sized unit of 70 to 100 ARBiH military police infiltrated past
the Bosnian Croat defence lines and wiped out an HVO command post in the village. But
having completed their military mission, the Muslim troops went on a killing spree,
murdering the inhabitants of Uzdol and adjacent Kriz with firearms, knives, and axes and
burning down some of the houses. UNPROFOR observers and western reporters
corroborated Croat claims that the Muslims had killed 34 civilians during a three-hour
rampage.1522 1523
Between Prozor and Jablanica, the ARBiH 44th “Neretva” Brigade pushed the
confrontation line slightly to the west.1524 After several days of fighting, the UN confirmed
that the Government forces had advanced south from Jablanica and Dresnica towards
Mostar, capturing a band of territory along a 20-km segment of the highway.1525
A focus of the Government attack was the town of Vrdi, a small town on the
Neretva River halfway between Jablanica to the north and Mostar to the south. After an
artillery bombardment the Bosnian Army first attacked the town unsuccessfully with
infantry on the morning of 19 September, while also battling for the nearby Medvjed Hill
and Mt. Cabulja to the west.1526 Shortly after the failed effort, UN observers reported seeing
Government reinforcements being brought in from the north.1527 A second Bosnian Army
effort, begun on 4 October, was more successful: the ARBiH entered the town the following
day, although Vrdi was to remain on the confrontation line for the remainder of the war.1528
1529

The situation between Vrdi and Mostar was violent and chaotic. For a time no
frontline could be fixed as units from both sides roamed up and down the hills and battles
erupted wherever the two armies met.1530 Still further to the south the Bosnian Army tried
again to break the siege of east Mostar on 17 September, and ARBiH and HVO troops
tangled in Mostar city and its Bijelo Polje and Rastani suburbs.1531 1532 ARBiH forces attacked

1521
Reuters, Serbs Halt Aid Convoy As Guns Pound Moslem Enclave by Giles Ellgood, 1 July 1993.
1522
Reuters, Croats Say Civilians Massacred in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 15 September 1993.
1523
Reuters, U.N. Urges Punishment After Village Massacred, 16 September 1993.
1524
Sarajevo Radio, 18 September 1993, FBIS London LD1909023793, 190237Z September 1993.
1525
Sarajevo Radio, 20 September 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2009161893, 201618Z September 1993.
1526
Zagreb Radio, 19 September 1993, FBIS London LD1909123793, 191237Z September 1993.
1527
Paris AFP, 21 September 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2109105993, 211102Z September 1993
1528
Sarajevo Radio, 4 October 1993, FBIS London LD0410225493, 042254Z October 1993.
1529
Reuters, Overnight Fighting Reported in Bosnia, 5 October 1993.
1530
Paris AFP, 21 September 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2109105993, 211059Z September 1993.
1531
Zagreb Radio, 17 September 1993, FBIS London LD1709134693, 171346Z September 1993.
1532
Zagreb Radio, 20 September 1993, FBIS London LD2009073593, 200735Z September 1993.

524
outward from the city in three directions, making some limited gains.1533 The HVO
responded by blocking aid convoys into east Mostar and dropping an intense artillery
barrage on the city on 23 September,1534 following up with a fruitless infantry counterattack
the following day.1535 Artillery duels continued to smash the shattered city, but neither side
was able to make significant headway on the ground. However, Government “recon-
diversionary” forces appear to have caused considerable confusion south of the city,
operating behind HVO lines and conducting ambushes and sabotage operations.1536 After
several days of negotiations fighting wound down and yet another Mostar cease-fire took
effect on 3 October.1537
After the Bosnian Army’s Vrdi offensive fighting in the area virtually ceased for the
remainder of the year. The ARBiH’s attention and resources were to be directed elsewhere,
most notably towards Vares, permitting a relative calm to permeate northern Herzegovina
as the winter set in and 1994 drew to a close.

1533
Reuters, Mostar Moslems Launch Three-Pronged Attack on Croats, 20 September 1993
1534
Reuters, Croats Shell Moslem City of Mostar, 23 September 1993.
1535
Reuters, Croat and Moslem Fighters battle in Mostar by Giles Ellgood, 24 September 1993.
1536
Paris AFP, 21 September 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2109105993, 211059Z September 1993.
1537
Reuters, U.N. Confirms Ceasefire in South Bosnian Town, 3 October 1993.

525
 Annex 45
The Vares Enclave and the Stupni Do Massacre:
October-November 1993
The Nordic battalion found that all 52 houses in the village had been burned to the
ground. At last report, UNPROFOR soldiers had searched half the houses and found the
bodies of 15 persons who had either been shot or burned to death.
UNPROFOR public statement, 27 October 1993

It seems there was a massacre committed in Stupni Do, but not of the size it was
reported earlier.
HVO spokesman Veso Vegar, 27 October 1993, after repeated Bosnian Croat
denials that there had been a massacre in the village.1538

Background: The Vares Enclave

At the outset of the Bosnian war, Vares was a small mining town with a slight Croat
majority among its population of about 12.000 residents. It is located roughly 50 km
northwest of Sarajevo, at the end of a primary road running north from Sarajevo through
Breza and connected thereafter by secondary roads to Tuzla.1539 The Vares area had been
more or less free of inter-ethnic tensions even through the summer of 1993, despite the
Croat-Muslim violence that had torn through central Bosnia only 20 or 30 kilometers away.
The Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim leaders remained relatively moderate, and the two
communities continued to coexist while the rest of Bosnia collapsed around them.1540
Problems first began to surface in Vares after the Bosnian Army’s mid-June
counteroffensive forced the Bosnian Croat population out of the Kakanj area about 20 km to
the west. Some 12.000-15.000 Croat refugees streamed into Vares from Kakanj and its
surrounding villages, roughly doubling the population of Vares itself.1541 The Bosnian Croats,
with more people than housing, responded by forcing the Muslim residents out of three
villages outside Kakanj on 23 June.1542 The Bosnian Croats also demanded that the Muslims
in several nearby villages – including Stupni Do – turn over their arms to the HVO, although
this ultimatum appears to have been ignored.1543
While the residents of Vares were coping with a refugee influx that skewed the
ethnic balance, the Muslim and Croat military leaders were disputing the issue of overall

1538
At one point, an official HVO communique claimed that the massacre victims were in fact Serbs from the
town whom the Muslems had used as human shields during a Bosnian Army attack on the HVO defense
lines. Paris AFP, 31 October 1993, FBIS Vienna AU3110153193, 311531Z October 1993.
1539
Reuters, Huge New Refugee Problem in Central Bosnia by Gilles Trequesser, 23 June 1993.
1540
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Deuth of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 300-302.
1541
Reuters, Moslems Said to Capture Key Central Town by Mark Heinrich, 16 June 1993
1542
Reuters, New Wave of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia, by Giles Ellgood, 23 June 1993.
1543
Paris AFP, 18 June 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1806082693, 180826Z June 1993.

526
military control in the region. The Bosnian Croats had military control over the Vares area
itself, with the locally-raised “Bobovac” Brigade occupying the town and guarding against
Bosnian Serb forces to the east. The Bosnian Army’s Second (Tuzla) Corps, however, began
pressuring the Vares Croats to re-subordinate themselves from the HVO’s Central Bosnia
Operational Zone to the ARBiH 2nd Corps (as, for instance, the HVO’s 108th and 110th
brigades had already done further north). In effect, the Bosnian Muslims were asking the
local HVO to acknowledge Sarajevo’s political and military authority over the region. The
Vares Croats tried to balance their relations with the Bosnian Muslims, who surrounded
them on all sides, with their allegiance to the Bosnian Croat mini-state of which they were
also part, but it was a losing proposition.1544
At this delicate juncture in mid-October 1993 – with an enclave on the edge of war
but not yet come to blows – came a convergence of events that was to culminate in the
Stupni Do massacre and the eventual Muslim takeover of Vares.
On the Bosnian Croat side, the situation in the Vares enclave changed dramatically
with the arrival of Ivica Rajic1545 – commander of the HVO Central Bosnian Operational
Zone’s Second Operational Group, hailing from the hard-line Bosnian Croat Kiseljak enclave
to the south – on or before 20 October.1546 (To reach Vares, surrounded on three sides by
the Bosnian Muslims, Rajic and his followers transited through friendly Bosnian Serb
territory to the east.) In what could best be described as a local coup, Rajic and an armed
group of extremist Croat supporters assumed political control of the Vares enclave on 23
October – the same day as the Stupni Do massacre. Rajic ousted and jailed the mayor and
police chief, replacing them with supporters from outside. Similarly, Rajic placed Kresimir
Bozic, one of his allies from Kiseljak, in charge of the HVO’s local Bobovac Brigade. Then the
municipality’s substantial Muslim population, who had until then been left alone, were
harassed, robbed, and systematically driven from their homes. Within days most of the
enclave’s Muslim population had fled to the village of Dabravina well to the south.1547 1548

1544
Sarajevo Radio, 1 Septembar 1993, FBIS Vienna AUD109202093, 012020Z September 1993.
1545
Also known as Viktor Andric.
1546
The Second Operational Group (OG) was a more or less permanent subcommand under the Central Bosnia
Operational Zone (OZ). The Second OG was established in 1992 and remained in existence through the end
of the war in 1995. It was one of three (initially four) groupings of brigades under the Central Bosnia OZ.
The Second OG, headquar tered in Kiseljak, had responsibility for the HVO’s defense of the Kiseljak-Kakanj-
Busovaca-Vares area. Under its command fell the “Nikola Subic Zrinski” Brigade (Later the 93rd “Nikola
Subic Zrinski” Home Defense Regiment, transferred to the First OG) headquartered in Busovaca, the “Ban
Josip Jelacic Brigade” (later split into the 94th “Ban Josip Jelacic” and 95th “Marinko Bosnjak” Home
Defense Regiments) headquartered in Kiseljak, the previously-mentioned “Bohovac” Brigade, (later the
96th “Bohovac” Home Defense Regiment) headquartered in Vares, and the “Kotromanic” Brigade
headquartered in Kakanj. (The “Kotromanic” Brigade was disbanded and incorporated into the “Ban Josip
Jelacic Brigade” after the fall of Kakanj in June 1993.) In addition, the Second OG may have had nominal
authority over the HVO’s “Kralj Tvrtko” Brigade in Sarajevo, but by the fall of 1993 the Bosnian Croats in
this unit had been disarmed or resubordinated to the ARBiH 1st Corps. Ivica Rajic appears to have been the
Second OG’s commander from its creation through all of the events of the Vares and Stupni Do fighting.
1547
Sarajevo Radio, 26 Oct 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2610095593, 260955Z October 1993.
1548
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 300-302.

527
 At roughly the same time that Ivica Rajic was arriving and installing a hard-line
Bosnian Croat government in Vares, the Bosnian Army was massing its forces to attack the
enclave. Which event precipitated which – or, indeed, if the two are even linked – remains
uncertain. But whether or not it was Rajic’s arrival that spurred the ARBiH into action, it is a
fact that the Bosnian government had transferred all or part of at least three brigades into
the area and was poised to attack by late October.
Although the Bosnian Croats may have instigated events by driving the Muslims
from their homes, the Bosnian Army was the first to begin actual military operations in the
Vares area. The ARBiH appear to have made its first attack against the town of Ratanj,
halfway between Kakanj and Vares, on 19 October. Government forces went on to capture
the Croat-majority village of Kopjari – 10 km southwest of Vares – on 21 October, killing
three HVO soldiers and forcing the town’s population to flee. This latter attack apparently
infuriated Rajic, and evidently motivated him to order an HVO assault against a Muslim
village in response. It is possible that Rajic and the Vares Croats had already concluded that
the Vares enclave was indefensible, and were planning to evacuate the population to Serb-
held territory to the east. If so, the HVO may have concluded that it had to clear out Stupni
Do to secure the escape, since it lay along the road to the south. For whatever reason, Rajic
directed his anger against Stupni Do, a tiny town of some 260 Muslim residents on one side
of a mountain about 4 km south of Vares itself.1549 1550

The HVO Assault on Stupni Do, 23 October 1993

The HVO infantry attack began on the morning of 23 October, probably supported
with mortars and some artillery.1551 Unlike Ahmici, Stupni Do was defended, although only
by a platoon-sized force of 39 Bosnian Army troops with no heavy weapons. Resistance was
ineffective at best, and in all likelihood any armed Muslim residents of Stupni Do were
asleep, scattered, caught by surprise, and unable to mount any form of organized
resistance. Over the next several hours, the attacking HVO soldiers completely destroyed
the town, dynamiting or burning every single building to the ground and killing any residents
who did not escape in time.1552
The HVO, while denying that a massacre had occurred, at first prevented UN
peacekeepers from entering the village to investigate Bosnian Government claims of Croat
atrocities. HVO troops simultaneously placed mines on the road approaches to the town
and threatened UN vehicles with anti-tank weapons. Troops from UNPROFOR’s newly-

1549
There is, however, another road to the north and east of Stupni Do that the Vares Croats could probably
have used instead, undermining this theory.
1550
Reuters, New Showdown Looms Between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 30 October 1993.
1551
UN peacekeepers reported hearing mortars and artillery fired in the area into the night of 23 October, but
also saw little evidence of shell impacts or mortar fragments when they gained entry into the town on 26
October. It seems likely that the HVO removed any evidence of shelling – as it did with spent small-arms
cartridges – but it is difficult to prove this, especially after the town’s structures were subsequently burned.
Reuters, Charred Bodies, Smouldering Ruins in Bosnian Hamlet by Kurt Schork, 26 October 1993.
1552
Reuters, Evidence Mounts of Massacre in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 25 October 1993.

528
arrived Nordic Battalion 21553 were blocked at the outskirts of the town on 25 October, but
were able to approach close enough to at least confirm that the village had indeed been
razed.1554
Swedish peacekeepers finally gained access to the destroyed village late on 26
October, three days after the attack. While it was clear that the Bosnian Croats had used the
intervening time to clean up the town and remove or destroy evidence, there was still
enough left that there was little question what had happened. Most striking was the
discovery of three dead women who had been discovered hiding under a trap door and then
executed. An investigation conducted by UNPROFOR military police found that all 52 houses
in the village had been burnt, and some of these “were described as having the appearance
of crematoria”. An absolute minimum of 23 residents were confirmed killed, with another
13 unaccounted for, but the actual figure is probably higher. The Bosnians claimed at the
time that the HVO had killed 60 of the village’s 260 residents.1555 An exact accounting may
never be possible; for while it is clear that dozens more were killed, most of their bodies
were never found.1556 1557
Although some of the Bosnian Croat soldiers attacking the village were seen
wearing HVO insignia, there are no reports of specific unit insignia that would conclusively
identify which HVO unit was responsible. The UNPROFOR report – based primarily on
interviews with most of the 193 identified survivors of the attack – indicated that many
witnesses saw HVO troops wearing black uniforms with white bands on the left shoulder
(probably a recognition sign) or green camouflage uniforms.1558
At the time, the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff, Brigadier Angus Ramsay, took the highly
unusual step of publicly assigning blame for the massacre to a particular unit and individual,
stating on 27 October that “This was done by the Bobovac Brigade whose commander is
Kresimir Bozic. But his soldiers are not soldiers, they are scum, if they do this sort of
thing”.1559 It is not in fact certain that the Vares-based Bobovac Brigade was the main unit
responsible – or indeed if it even participated in the massacre. There is no direct evidence of
the Bobovac Brigade’s involvement, although it is true that Bobovac Brigade elements in
Vares consistently obstructed UNPROFOR in the area before and after the Stupni Do attack
(e.g. troops from the brigade were almost certainly responsible for firing on a Swedish APC
attempting to check on Muslim prisoners at a schoolhouse in Vares on 26 October). The
strongest implication comes from the numerous reports of heavy weapons activity during
the day on 23 October. If mortar and especially artillery fire were indeed used, they most

1553
The Nordic battalion 2 was reinforced over the next few days by a company from UNPROFOR’s Canadian
battalion 2 and a platoon from the British battalion.
1554
Reuters, Evidence Mounts of Massacre in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 25 October 1993.
1555
Reuters, U.N. Aid Convovs Caught in Bosnian Crossfire by Mark Heinrich, 24 October 1993.
1556
Reuters, Charred Bodies, Smouldering Ruins in Bosnian Hamlet by Kurt Schork, 27 October 1993.
1557
Reuters, U.N. Identifies Croat Extremists as Massacre Suspects by Anthony Goodman, 14 February 1994.
1558
Reuters, U.N. Identifies Croat Extremists as Massacre Suspects by Anthony Goodman, 14 February 1994.
1559
Reuters, Croat Attack in Bosnia a War Crime – U.N. Official by Sean Maguire, 27 October 1993.

529
likely came from the Bobovac Brigade, the only unit within the Croat-held enclave that had
its own artillery and mortars.
There is circumstantial but persuasive evidence that the attack was in fact carried
out – or at least spearheaded – by the “Maturice”, an entirely different unit brought in from
outside the Vares pocket shortly before the attack. Ivica Rajic himself reportedly founded
the Maturice special forces unit with troops from the Kiseljak area in early 1993. The unit
was known for its composition of extreme Croatian nationalists, a substantial percentage of
whom may have been Bosnian Croat refugees. The Maturice reputedly were used for
“special missions” like the secret executions of Muslims around Kiseljak. (They also likely
indulged in war profiteering – Kiseljak being the gateway to besieged Sarajevo and the
capital of the black market trade.) During the 1993 fighting, the Maturice defended the
Croat-held Kiseljak, Kresevo, and Fojnica areas against primarily Muslim opponents.1560 1561
Both Muslim and Croat sources strongly suggest that Rajic brought with him to
Vares a sizable group of hard-line HVO fighters who would have been ideally suited for an
operation like the Stupni Do attack. Sarajevo Radio claimed that when he arrived in Vares a
few days before the Stupni Do attack he was accompanied by 700 special fighters (probably
an exaggerated figure) from Kiseljak. Shortly after the massacre the previous Bosnian Croat
municipal authorities (who incidentally had a powerful incentive to pass the blame on to
someone else) also charged “a special HVO unit from Kiseljak led by Col. Ivica Rajic” with
responsibility. Finally, the UNPROFOR investigation found that “The main suspects for the
commission of these crimes appear to be extremist elements of the Croatian Defence
Council from Kiseljak, Travnik, and Kakanj under the command of Ivica Rajic... Those wearing
black uniforms also wore black baseball caps and were suspected to be members of an HVO
‘death squad’ or a special forces unit from Kiseljak”. Perhaps most significantly, the UN
report notes that of the over 100 interviewees, “with only two exceptions, none of the
witnesses recognized any of the HVO soldiers as being from the local area, nor did they hear
any names being used, other than nicknames”.1562 1563 1564
The Bobovac Brigade probably does not bear primary responsibility for the Stupni
Do massacre, but after the operation was over it clearly obstructed UN investigative efforts
and threatened UN peacekeepers. While the UNPROFOR investigation report points to
Kiseljak extremists as the primary suspects, it goes on to say that “The HVO Bobovac
Brigade, operating under its Deputy Commander [sic], Kresimir Bozic, prevented UNPROFOR
units from entering the village after the attack”.1565 The Bobovac Brigade was almost
certainly also involved with the rounding up of Bosnian Muslims in Vares on the morning of
23 October, and their subsequent detention in a school in the town. A few months after the

1560
Rijeka Novi List: Officer Ivica Rajic Arrested for Massacre of Muslims, 12 July 1995.
1561
Sarajevo Ljiljan: The Croatian List of Bosnian Officers to be Killed by Aziz Handzic, 6-13 March 1996, FBIS
Vienna AU1203091296.
1562
Zagreb Velebit, They Defended Central Bosnia by Anto Pranjkic, 12 January 1996.
1563
Paris AFP, 18 November 1993, FBIS Vienna AU1811090093, 180900Z November 1993.
1564
Reuters, U.N. Identifies Croat Extremists as Massacre Suspects by Anthony Goodman, 14 February 1994.
1565
Reuters, U.N. Identifies Croat Extremists as Massacre Suspects by Anthony Goodman, 14 February 1994.

530
Stupni Do operation, on 18 January 1994, the Maturice were incorporated into the 2nd
“Kiseljak” Battalion of the newly established 3rd HVO Guards Brigade.1566

After the Massacre: The Bosnian Army Takeover of Vares

The Bosnian Army’s capture of Kopjari and the HVO’s destruction of Stupni Do
escalated the series of strikes and counter-strikes that would peak with the Bosnian Army’s
occupation of Vares a week and a half later.
Vares was now cleansed of all Muslims except for 110 terrified civilians clustered
around the Swedish UN contingent’s vehicles for safety. The last week of October was a
time of utter pandemonium as the town’s Croat residents looted the abandoned Muslim
homes and businesses. Then, suddenly, word spread that the Bosnian Army was coming. In
the early morning hours of 3 November, the town’s remaining residents gathered
everything they could carry and fled the town.1567 1568
When morning came, the advancing Bosnian Government forces found Vares an
eerily silent ghost town.
Against all expectations, the Bosnian Army walked into the former Bosnian Croat
bastion without firing a shot. Coming from two directions, the ARBiH 2nd and 3rd Corps
entered the town simultaneously. (Other, probably secondary, elements of the ARBiH 6th
Corps were also involved.)1569 The 3rd Corps’ 7th Muslimski Brigade occupied Vares from
the west, while 2nd Corps forces entered from the north.1570 1571
The Croats having sown havoc in the days before, the Muslims raised havoc in the
days to follow. Drunk and disorderly Muslim soldiers roamed the streets of Vares for days,
carrying off anything the Bosnian Croats had left behind. Ill-disciplined 2nd and 3rd Corps
troops almost came to blows before the Bosnian Army command stepped in and restored
order. Over the next few weeks, Vares’ ejected Muslims returned to their homes while
formerly Croat residences were occupied by thousands of Muslims cleansed out of other
areas of Bosnia during the Croat-Muslim war.1572
Meanwhile, most of the thousands of Bosnian Croats who had lived in Vares fled
for Kiseljak, leaving only a minuscule Croat-controlled island (not more than two square
kilometers) around the little town of Dastansko 4 km southeast of Vares. In just a few weeks
Vares itself had gone from an ethnically-mixed population to an exclusively Croat one to a
majority Muslim one. When Ivica Rajic began expelling Muslims from their homes in late
October, he had originally intended to force the Muslims out of the Vares region and claim it

1566
Velebit: Pillars of the Defense, 3 January 1997, FBIS Reston WA2805185297.
1567
Laura Silber and Allan Little: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, 1995, pp. 300-302.
1568
Reuters, Moslems Tell of Rape, Murder in Central Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 2 November 1993.
1569
Reuters, Looting Continues in Moslem-Captured Bosnian Town by Kurt Schork. 5 November 1993.
1570
Reuters, Izetbegovic Says Bosnian Forces Entering Croat Bastion, 4 November 1993.
1571
Reuters, Looting Continues in Moslem-Captured Bosnian Town by Kurt Schork, 5 November 1993.
1572
Reuters, Looting Continues in Moslem-Captured Bosnian Town by Kurt Schork, 5 November 1993.

531
for the Bosnian Croats. Less than a month later his actions had resulted in exactly the
opposite outcome.

532
 Section V
Bosnia 1994

533
 Annex 46
On the Ropes: An Analysis of VRS Resiliency, 1994
The VRS had always been an army divided in two. At brigade level and higher, the
VRS generally operated as a well-oiled military machine, efficiently planning operations,
ordering the movement of units, and procuring and distributing supplies. This, as has been
stated many times earlier, was a product of its professional JNA origins. Below brigade level,
the VRS often resembled a rabble, the result of having mobilized with insufficient field-grade
and junior officers and NCOs who had little time to train their conscripts and reservists
before shoving them into battle. When soldiers who lacked discipline and training had to
endure the Republika Srpska’s dismal wartime economy, low pay, extended frontline duty,
and heavy casualties, morale plummeted and desertions soared. By 1994 many units had
grown so brittle that they collapsed when they encountered unexpected tactical situations.
The sanctions imposed on Federal Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska by an
outraged international community, combined with the draining effects of war, virtually
destroyed the Bosnian Serb economy. The impact on the enlisted soldiers was profoundly
debilitating. Most enlisted men received little or no pay, and their army rations were
meagre. Bereft of paid employment by their conscription in the army, they could no longer
provide their families with even the basic necessities of life, and their widows and orphans
received pittances as pensions. The knowledge that a small bevy of wealthy war profiteers
were driving expensive cars and living well did not help the spirit of the foot-slogging
frontline soldiers.1573
The shortage of citizens to man the frontline meant that the infantry was often
overtaxed and forced to serve long frontline tours; more frequent leaves would have
dangerously weakened the thin defences and strained the defenders even more. As
casualties increased in 1994 combat units strained ever harder to operate with fewer and
older personnel. Martin Bell recorded a snapshot of the situation drawn from the war diary
of a Yugoslav Army officer serving in the VRS:
On the 14th of January 1994 he recorded the strengths and weaknesses of the
2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry [Brigade] to which he was attached. It had thirty-four

1573
A captured VRS document prepared by General Mladic and described in the Bosnian Muslim newspaper,
Ljiljan, reports that:
“As a special problem that influences the morale of the army ... the problem of the regularity, the
amount, and the way the soldiers are being paid”. Mladic wrote that by 24 July 1994 his soldiers had
received salaries only for the first three months of 1994; in other words payments were over three
months late. In places where there are no Serbian dinars, soldiers get government bonds payable
after 18 months. Mladic stated that his soldiers “had understanding for the objective difficulties”. but
that “they were irritated by things that degrade the position of the soldiers”. As proof of this, he
claimed that “the employed” of Sokolac had received their June salaries in the first half of July,
whereas soldiers had still not received their April salaries!
Based on a letter from General Mladic to the Chairman of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and Government of
the Republika Srpska, and forwarded from 1st Krajina Corps as Document No. 262-1/94 “Highly
Confidential”. This report was summarized in S. Cehajic: My “Serbian Republic” Is Shaking, Sarajevo Ljiljan,
9 November 1994, p. 15.

534
 officers where it should have had eighty and forty NCOs where it should have had
seventy-seven. Its numbers were further reduced by casualties. In his entire brigade of
1.672 men, 271 had been lightly wounded, 120 seriously wounded, and 164 killed.
Every able-bodied man in the region was already mobilized, and many from outside.
Pavlovic wrote: “Any chance to draft more people is gone. The problem is influencing
our chain of command and our readiness. The BiH (Bosnian) Army does not have these
problems....”1574
Because the VRS line brigades were constantly being stripped of their best and
youngest men to maintain the effectiveness of the elite assault, reconnaissance, and
intervention units, the combat effectiveness of the brigades suffered a straight-line decline
that boded ill for the future.
As conditions worsened, soldiers’ families went without food and amenities, and
more and more soldiers died or were wounded, the decline in army morale led to a
tremendous increase in desertions.1575 Discipline in the remaining ranks collapsed as the
poorly trained junior officers and NCOs, whose original ineffectiveness had hardly improved
in two years, proved unable to deal with the conditions and complaints of their troops and
even compounded their problems with exploitative black marketeering.1576 1577 The ex-JNA
officers at the higher-levels, while clearly aware of these difficulties, could do little to
alleviate endemic structural problems in the officer and NCO corps, let alone the economic
and pay situations.

1574
Martin Bell: In Harm’s Way: Reflections of a War-Zone Thug (Revised), London Penguin Books, 1996, pp.
242-243.
1575
The Mladic letter cited above also noted that:
... soldiers were refusing to obey orders and they were arbitrarily leaving the frontlines and
refusing to take part in combat. Since their position is horrible, the soldiers try to leave the army and
find a job with a company or at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Mladic even points out that “there is
an increasing number of trivial and serious crime” in the army.
Mladic letter in S. Cehajic: My “Serbian Republic” Is Shaking, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 9 November 1994, p. 15.
1576
Ljiljan cites a captured report from the VRS 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade that reported:
... 10 percent of the soldiers of this brigade are in prison for disciplinary offenses, and that
another 10 percent are absent from the front lines. The same author writes about one of the soldiers:
“He comes to the trench drunk, drinks in the trench, and is drunk when he leaves the trench”.
S. Cehajic: My “Serbian Republic” Is Shaking, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 9 November 1994, p. 15.
1577
The same Ljiljan article cites another captured VRS document produced by Colonel Vladimir Arsic’s VRS
“Doboj” Operational Group 9 / 1st Krajina Corps entitled “Experiences from Muslim Offensive Combat
Activities; Mistakes and Weaknesses of the 1st Krajina Corps units”. Highly Confidential Document No.
4017-1, 17 August 1994. It was distributed to tactical group headquarters and chiefs of staff. Ljiljan writes:
The most important element in commanding direct combat does not function in Mladic’s army.
The command system, divided into the command of platoons and companies, is either bad or does
not function at all. Serbian soldiers are therefore “incapable of acting and performing combat
activities on their own”. Serbian soldiers at the front lines are apathetic because “they have poor
intelligence about the enemy”, and their reconnaissance units have not infiltrated the rear of the
Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina at all. They can perform no terrorist or sabotage actions, which –
according to the Serbian generals – Bosnian soldiers do every day. The Serbs have no reserve
positions ... “Unit commanders do not go into the field for 10 months at a time; they do not talk to
soldiers; they do not check whether their soldiers are in condition to carry out combat operations.”
S. Cehajic: My “Serbian Republic” Is Shaking, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 9 November 1994, p. 15.

535
 As a result, many units that on the surface appeared strong and well-armed were
thin, burned-out formations with little cohesion, primed to collapse at the slightest push or
– in particular – when caught off guard. A Bosnian newspaper article quoting VRS
documents captured in 1994, states:
The units are unfit and therefore subject to any kind of surprise, especially if the
enemy appears from the back of their own defence lines – instead of fighting, they flee
in panic, leaving behind their personal weapons and other combat equipment as well
as their wounded comrades in an attempt to save their own lives ... the lowest
commands do not function ... a company’s commander is usually stationed in a
comfortable facility two or three kilometers from the front line, so that when it comes
to an attack he is not where he should be, he is far away from his soldiers, so that they
reach him fleeing from the field of battle more quickly than he can reach them on the
frontline to organize the defence. The same is true of battalion commanders... the
Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is succeeding – by infiltrating two or three sabotage
battalions – in breaking Serbian ‘battalions, even brigades’, seizing most of their
weapons and ammunition and ‘worst of all, killing Serbian soldiers, as has been the
case in Vijenac, Vlasic, near Donja Brka, etc.’.1578
It was only the professional skills of its officers at the brigade level and above
directing its array of mechanized firepower that enabled the VRS to compensate for these
deficiencies at the lower levels.
But now the resources that the motorized and fire power-oriented VRS used to win
its battles were beginning to run low. Two years of combat had drained much of the pre-war
JNA stocks, while poor discipline and training among soldiers and junior and mid-level
officers caused troops to damage equipment and waste ammunition.1579 In 1994,
expenditures increased as the tempo of the war picked up and battles broke out all over
Bosnia. The most vital commodity was motor fuel, which allowed the VRS to rapidly shift its
best units to threatened spots throughout the country. Without this mobile support local
reserves would have been quickly overwhelmed.

1578
Information drawn from the Arsic analysis cited in footnote above. S. Cehajic: My “Serbian Republic” Is
Shaking, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 9 November 1994, p. 15.
1579
Milutin Kozarica: Discipline – The Foundation on Which An Army Is Built, Srpska Vojska, 28 December 1995,
pp. 17-19; a critical article summarizing an end-of-war VRS conference on discipline and the internal
condition of the army.

536
 Annex 47
My Enemy, My Ally:
The End of the Croat-Muslim War and the Washington
Agreement, January-March 1994
By early 1994 developments born of necessity had put the Bosnian Army at least on
a par militarily with the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). The HVO was still probably better
organized at the unit level, may have had a higher fraction of professional (ex-JNA) officers,
and had on average more and better equipment. However, the Bosnian Army had made
major advances in organization, discipline, and coordination of larger military operations. It
had become a fairly even fight, and – even in the case of the Croatian Army’s intervention in
support of Herceg-Bosna – the Bosnian Army had the weight of numbers on its side.1580
The new year’s fighting commenced on 9 January 1994 with a Bosnian Army attack
on the Vitez enclave – just hours before peace talks began between Croat and Muslim
representatives in Germany. Government troops attacking from the north apparently
surprised the HVO defenders with a pre-dawn attack. The offensive fell hardest on the
towns of Dubravice and Santici as the Bosnian Army drove to cut the Vitez-Busovaca enclave
in two at its narrowest point.1581 Infantry battles raged in the Vitez suburbs on 9 and 10
January, supported by the liberal use of heavy weapons fire on both sides. Another Bosnian
Army drive from the south against Croat-held Kruscica further squeezed the HVO, to the
point where the Croat defenders held only a few hundred meters on either side of the road.
By 14 January Bosnian Army attackers had pushed even slightly further, reaching the edge
of the road on the north side. But the desperate HVO defenders hung on doggedly and
never surrendered control on the south side. The small village of Buhine Kuce, along the
Vitez-Busovaca road, was the most fiercely contested point of battle, with hand-to-hand and
house-to-house fighting over shattered buildings that changed hands each day. Although
the Croats were at times reduced to a little less than a kilometre-wide isthmus, the HVO
managed to retain control of the vital east-west road link – although road traffic was always
vulnerable to Bosnian Army gunfire.1582 1583 1584 1585
At this point – roughly the third week of January – the Government forces eased
their offensive on the Vitez enclave, for reasons that remain unclear. The Bosnian Army
offensive may simply have run out of steam, with its exhausted troops daunted by the
prospect of the infantry assaults across level ground that probably would have been
required to overrun the Croat positions. Or the Bosnian Government may have decided to

1580
For a good general discussion of the shifting military trends in Bosnia at this time, see A New Stage in the
Bosnian Conflict by Patrick Moore, RFE/RL Research Report, 4 March 1994, pp. 33-36.
1581
At its narrowest point, the Vitez enclave was less than 2 kilometers wide – narrow enough to see across.
1582
Reuters: Moslem Offensive in Central Bosnia Clouds Peace Talks by Nicole Courtney, 9 January 1994.
1583
Reuters: Moslems Battle Outnumbered Croats in Central Bosnia by Dan de Luce, 10 January 1994.
1584
Reuters: Moslems Press Offensive against Croats, Snub Peace Talks by Dan de Luce, 11 January 1994.
1585
Reuters: U.N. Says Jets Violate No-Fly Zone in Bosnia by Samir Koric, 14 January 1994.

537
simply contain the pocket, either for military reasons or political ones. The Bosnian
Government appears to have been more concerned with gaining control over the Vitez
munitions plant and the Vitez-Busovaca road than in occupying Vitez town itself.1586 The
Army leadership may have concluded that containment of the Croat-held enclave would be
adequate – especially in view of the Croat threats to demolish the munitions plant rather
than allow it to fall into Muslim hands – and therefore decided that their military resources
were better directed elsewhere. It is also possible that at this delicate juncture – with Croat-
Muslim peace talks beginning and the international community’s attention focused on the
Bosnian Government – the Sarajevo leadership concluded that the political fallout
associated with occupying the enclave would have outweighed the military gains. On the
one hand, the capture of Vitez would have essentially secured all of central Bosnia and its
lines of communication for the Bosnian Government, allowing several thousand displaced
Muslims to return home. But the town’s capture would almost certainly have disrupted the
tentative steps toward a Croat-Muslim peace so badly needed by the Sarajevo government
and drawn the ire of the international community by – intentionally or not – prompting the
mass exodus of thousands upon thousands of Bosnian Croats, as had occurred at Vares the
previous year. Whatever the reason, the Bosnian Army failed to press home its advantage at
a crucial moment. The Bosnian Croats counterattacked and regained a little breathing space,
and the Vitez- Busovaca enclave remained in Croat hands.1587 1588
Beginning on 24 January, the HVO made a weak counterpunch from the south,
attacking from Prozor in two directions. One blow was directed northwards against the
Muslim-held areas around Gornji Vakuf, while another was aimed southward towards
Jablanica.1589 The HVO made some gains on the first day, taking the village of Here and its
road junction east of Prozor.1590 However, by 26 January, UN spokesmen were reporting
that the offensive had died out, degenerating into destructive but militarily insignificant
shelling of the two towns.1591 The HVO continued its attacks on the residential areas around
Gornji Vakuf for the next several days, making a few modest advances but failing to achieve
any decisive breakthroughs.1592 1593 1594
While the fiercest battles of the 1994 Croat-Muslim war occurred in the central
Bosnian Lasva Valley, the other towns along the Croat-Muslim fault lines were by no means
peaceful. Muslim-held east Mostar remained the subject of unrelenting HVO artillery
bombardment, which slowly pounded the eastern half of the city into dust and rubble.
1586
During the Croat-Muslim meetings in Bonn, Izetbegovic proposed an arrangement whereby the HVO and
ARBiH would withdraw their forces from Vitez and Busovaca and turn administration of the towns over to a
joint Croat-Muslim police force. An understandably skeptical Bosnian Croat leadership rejected the offer.
Sarajevo Radio, 10 January 1994, FBIS London LD1001224294, 102242Z January 1994.
1587
Zagreb Radio, 21 January 1994, FBIS London LD2101233794, 212337Z January 1994.
1588
Zagreb Radio, 18 February 1994, FBIS London LD1802230194, 182301Z February 1994.
1589
Reuters: Croat Guns Lash Moslem Targets in Bosnia by Mark Heinrich, 25 January 1994.
1590
Zagreb Radio, 24 January 1994, FBIS London LD2401200494, 242004Z January 1994.
1591
Reuters: Bosnian Croat Attack Peters Out, 26 January 1994.
1592
Sarajevo Radio, 1 February 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0102194994, 011949Z February 1994.
1593
Sarajevo Radio, 3 February 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0302191294, 031912Z February 1994.
1594
Zagreb Radio, 13 February 1994, FBIS London LD1302125394, 131253Z February 1994.

538
Southeast of Mostar, Muslim-held Blagaj was also shelled frequently from adjacent Croat-
held Buna. Although Maglaj’s Muslim defenders’ foremost foes were Serbs, there were also
exchanges of mortar fire and occasional infantry clashes between the ARBiH and the HVO
forces along the northern edge of the Zepce enclave.1595 Bosnian Croat forces south of
Konjic and west of Jablanica also periodically shelled Muslim-held positions and villages. The
Bosnian Army continued to occupy most of Gornji Vakuf, but the Croats had the
preponderance of artillery in the area and frequently shelled the Muslim-held parts of the
town. The Kiseljak enclave, though not pressed nearly as hard as nearby Vitez, suffered
sporadic fighting and shelling. However, in none of these areas was either side able to make
any significant gains, and the outlines of a potential military stalemate were becoming
visible to both sides.
With both the Bosnian Army and HVO offensive efforts stymied at the beginning of
February, it fell to Zagreb – with the strong prodding of the international community – to
formally broach the subject of a peace arrangement. Croatian President Tudjman and his
associates had been feeling the heat more than usual over the past few days, as UN
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had publicly accused the Croatian Army of sending units
into Bosnia, and Italy had threatened to call for European Union sanctions against Croatia
for its military involvement. Determined to avoid economic sanctions like those that were
crippling his counterpart Milosevic in Serbia, Tudjman ordered a diplomatic initiative to
appease the international community. On 10 February Croatian Foreign Minister Mate
Granic and Bosnian President Izetbegovic met in Geneva and issued a joint statement calling
for Bosnian Government-Bosnian Croat talks on a possible cease-fire arrangement. ARBiH
commander Delic and HVO commander Roso were to meet in Kiseljak ten days later to
begin the talks.1596 1597 1598 1599 1600
At only their second meeting in Zagreb, on 23 February, the two army commanders
signed a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal agreement – to the surprise of many.1601 Even
more surprising, the cease-fire agreement (which took effect at noon on 25 February) was
generally observed after several days of lingering Croat-Muslim violence. At the beginning of
March the two sides began exchanging prisoners and tensions very gradually began to
subside over most of Bosnia. Both sides cautiously drew their heavy weapons back from the
confrontation lines and a tenuous peace took root.1602 1603

1595
The HVO’s 111th Home Defense Regiment in the Zepce enclave also obstructed UN aid convoys into
besieged Maglaj at this time.
1596
Specifically, Boutros-Ghali’s letter charged that the Croatian Army had 3.000 to 5.000 troops from the 1st,
2nd, 5th, and 7th HV Guards Brigades, the 114th and 116th Brigades, and various military police elements.
1597
Reuters: UN Chief Lists Croatian Military Units in Bosnia by Evelyn Leopold, 2 February 1994.
1598
Reuters: Italy Tells Croatia it Faces Possible Sanctions by Paul Holmes, 3 February 1994.
1599
Reuters: Bosnia, Croatia Request UN Border Monitors, 10 February 1994.
1600
Sarajevo Radio, 20 February 1994, FBIS London LD2002194394, 201943Z February 1994.
1601
Zagreb Radio, 23 February 1994, FBIS London LD2302220794, 2322078Z February 1994.
1602
Reuters: Moslems, Croats, British Forces Wary of New Bosnian Truce by Kurt Schork, 24 February 1994.
1603
Reuters: 189 Moslem, Croat Prisoners Freed in Bosnia, 1 March 1994.

539
 Peace came slowly – and never completely – in some parts of the country. The
divided city of Mostar remained just as divided, literally as well as politically. Gornji Vakuf
(or, as the Croats called it, Uskoplje) remained similarly partitioned. Relations were at best
strained with the tiny Croat enclaves outside Vares and Konjic. Croat-Muslim peace perhaps
came hardest in the chaotic world of the Zepce enclave, where the Croats had allied with
their Serb opponents against their erstwhile Muslim allies. They were now in the awkward
position of again turning their coats to ally with the Muslims they had just been shelling
against the Serbs who had just been backing them with heavy weapons fire. The HVO’s
Zepce-based 111th Home Defence Regiment ended up attempting to play both ends against
the middle, no longer attacking the Muslims in formerly-besieged Maglaj but allowing Serb
units to pass through Croat-held territory to attack the town.1604

The Washington Agreement, 1 March 1994

Only a fool fights in a burning house.
Klingon proverb, from “Star Trek”

The Croat-Muslim peace was formalized with the Washington agreement, signed in
the United States on 1 March 1994. The political aspects of the treaty established a federal
arrangement governing the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, and a special confederal
relationship between this new “Bosnian Federation” and Croatia. Under the military
provisions of the treaty, the Bosnian Army and the HVO – until the day before, military
adversaries – would henceforth become a “Federation Army” (Vojska Federacije, or VF)
consisting of two separate but cooperating armed forces. This military arrangement was
further elaborated in the “Split agreement” signed by the two army commanders on 12
March.1605 In a development reminiscent of Orwell’s “1984”, two formerly warring factions
overnight became allies against a third opponent.
Each party signed for its own reasons – although none of them had a fundamental
stake in the long-term success of the newborn Bosnian Federation. The Sarajevo-based
Bosnian Government arguably took a step backwards in terms of its sovereignty, but its
leaders knew they had to seem to be agreeable to maintain the support of the international
community. Much more importantly, the Croat-Muslim peace allowed the ARBiH to end its
desperate two-front war and concentrate on the crucial conflict with its Bosnian Serb foes.
The Bosnian Croats were probably even less enthusiastic about the political arrangements of
the Bosnian Federation, but by early 1994 they needed to get out of a losing military
struggle even more than the Bosnian Muslims. Having narrowly avoided international
censure and sanctions for their military intervention in Bosnia, they even came out of this
venture with an image as peace brokers. Zagreb’s improved standing with the international
community undoubtedly helped it to secure a much-needed $125 million loan from the

1604
Reuters: Croats Wedged Between Moslems, Serbs in Bosnian Town by Kurt Schork, 15 March 1994.
1605
Zagreb Radio, 12 March 1994, FBIS London LD1203125094, 121250Z March 1994.

540
World Bank shortly thereafter,1606 and also allowed the Croatian military to disengage from
Bosnia and devote its energies toward Croatia’s core concern – the re-conquest of the Serb-
held Krajina.
A temporary convergence of three self-interests, codified in a treaty essentially
imposed from outside, was not a very auspicious genesis for the Bosnian Federation. But at
the time it was the best there was, and in such desperate circumstances an imperfect peace
and an uneasy alliance were better than the available alternatives. Bosnia’s Croats and
Muslims might still keep one eye on each other, but now they could both start looking
toward their common Serb enemy.

The Croat-Muslim Cease-Fire: A Quiet Success

Within days of the initial signing of the Croat-Muslim Federation agreement on 1
March 1994, UNPROFOR took on yet another new role as cease-fire monitors, juxtaposing
UN peacekeepers between the formerly warring parties as the two armies withdrew from
the confrontation lines and the full terms of their new alliance were worked out. UN
peacekeepers were quickly dispatched to take over former ARBiH and HVO checkpoints in
and around Mostar, Vitez, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, Konjic, and Jablanica.1607 Following an
arrangement similar to that employed for the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone – and
which would later be copied in the Dayton Agreement – the two sides agreed to withdraw
their heavy weapons a set distance from the former confrontation lines (10 km for mortars,
20 km for tanks and artillery) or to place them into five UN-monitored collection points.1608
1609 1610 1611

UNPROFOR’s role in facilitating the Croat-Muslim peace was one of the UN's largely
unrecognized successes in Bosnia. This is true despite the fact that many, perhaps most, of
the heavy weapons were never withdrawn or turned in as agreed, and that sporadic cease-
fire violations and interethnic disputes erupted long after the agreement was signed. The
fundamental point was that the Croat-Muslim conflict had been ended before either side
had exhausted itself or succumbed, and that UNPROFOR in some measure helped make this
possible by facilitating the military disengagement of the ARBiH and HVO. This success
illustrated a crucial fact about peacekeeping operations in the Balkans: UN forces could and
did play an important role in monitoring and facilitating agreements that were in the best
interests of the several parties involved. Sadly, such circumstances – or the recognition of
them – were all too rare in the Bosnian war.

1606
Reuters: Bosnia Accord Paves Way for IMF Help to Croatia by Kolumbina Bencevic, 20 March 1994.
1607
Paris AFP, 4 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0403135994, 041359Z March 1994.
1608
Paris AFP, 5 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0503193294, 051932Z March 1994.
1609
Paris AFP, 7 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0703120294, 071202Z March 1994.
1610
Zagreb Hina, 7 March 1994, FBIS London LD0703152594, 071525Z March 1994.
1611
Paris AFP, 8 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0803184394, 081843Z March 1994.

541
 Annex 48
Sarajevo, 1994: The Guns Are Silenced, But the Siege
Continues
February 1994: The First Marketplace Shelling and the International
Response
The Sarajevo area had been relatively quiet during the early part of 1994, although
the usual VRS siege tactics of sniping and sporadic shelling continued at their normal pace,
punctuated by occasional clashes along the frontline. On 5 February 1994, however, a 120
mm mortar round hit the Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo, killing 68 people and
wounding approximately 200 more.1612 It was one of the worst single shelling incidents in
the Bosnian war.
International outrage over the incident brought a new UN effort to achieve a cease-
fire and a NATO ultimatum issued on 9 February.1613 The new UN commander, General
Michael Rose, called for the creation of a 20-kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone
around the city as part of his draft cease-fire agreement, which the NATO ultimatum was
designed to enforce.1614 The deadline for Serb compliance was 20 February.
The Bosnian Serb political and military leadership at first refused to comply, fearing
that VRS forces deprived of their heavy weapons would be overrun by Bosnian Army

1612
The UN never announced definitively which of the warring parties was responsible for the attack. UN
experts were able to determine only that the market was hit by a 120mm mortar round fired from the
north east, where both Bosnian Serb and Government forces had positions and probably mortars.
Circumstantial evidence pointed to the Bosnian Serbs but both sides publicly traded accusations of
responsibility. It seems unlikely to the authors that a Bosnian Army mortar crew would have been able to
intentionally hit a difficult target like the market – wedged between several buildings – without first firing a
few ranging shots. It seems more likely that the mortar round was fired randomly from VRS positions and
happened to hit the market. For a detailed discussion of the UN investigation, see David Binder: Anatomy
of a Massacre, Foreign Policy, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 70-78. Also see Silber and Little, pp. 310-311 for an
informative commentary on the idea that the Muslims fired the mortar round at themselves. An excerpt
from their analysis notes:
The common sense observation that if you fire around 500.000 mortar, artillery, and tank rounds
into a small city over twenty-two months (as the Bosnian Serbs did) – many of these randomly lobbed
into civilian areas – sooner or later one will land somewhere where crowds are gathered, was swept
away in the ensuing row.
1613
This account is based primarily on Silber and Little, Chapter 24: A Question of Control: The Market Square
Bomb and the NATO Ultimatum, February 1994, pp. 309-323.
1614
Rose’s ”Four Point Plan” called for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of heavy weapons outside of a 20-kilometer
exclusion zone (or their placement under UN control), the interpositioning of UN troops along the
confrontation line, and the creation of a joint implementation committee. Silber and Little, p. 313. For a
description of General Rose’s flamboyant personality, see Martin Bell: In Harm’s Way: Reflections of a War-
Zone Thug (Revised), London Penguin, 1996, pp. 174-185. For a discussion of Rose and the UN strategy in
early 1994, see James Gow: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War,
New York Columbia University Press, 1997. pp. 145-155.

542
infantry.1615 A Russian commitment to send a battalion of paratroopers to help monitor the
agreement offered on 17 February broke the ice. The VRS promptly began to pull out a large
proportion of its heavy weapons, placing the rest under UN “control”.1616 By the deadline,
the VRS had more or less completed the withdrawal, placing about half its heavy weapons
(defined as anything 20 mm and over) in UN-monitored storage sites, and redeploying the
other half. Sarajevans could now move around the city in relative safety for the first time in
almost two years.
The unusually strong Western response eased the situation of the people of
Sarajevo considerably. The shelling stopped, people no longer died at random, and citizens
could walk freely around the city. The city’s tram cars started up again, and food was
allowed in more regularly. But the city remained surrounded, the frontlines were still
manned, and occasional fire-fights broke out. The VRS could very easily resume a shooting
siege – defying the NATO threat – any time the Serb leaders ordered it. It was a siege
without the shooting. As Silber and Little note:
Even as the Serb guns finally fell silent it became clear that the siege would
remain as tight as ever. The inter-positioning of UN troops along the front line,
particularly in the city centre, brought the eventual partition of Sarajevo – a key Serb
war aim – a step closer.1617
The Serbs had clearly made the best of a difficult situation, complying with the
letter of the imposed agreement without giving up anything vital to their interests.
Strategically, the agreement had even less effect. The ultimatum did not apply to
any other Serb military operations going on at the time of the incident (Maglaj-Tesanj and
Bihac),1618 nor was there any deterrent effect on VRS or ARBiH military planning for the rest
of the year. It did not influence the ARBiH decision to assume the strategic offensive in
March nor did it stop the Serbs from attacking Gorazde in response during April. The only
impact was to decrease the Serbs’ ability to make the siege of Sarajevo a political pressure
point against the Bosnian Government.
The NATO ultimatum represented another step toward international engagement
with the former Yugoslavia. After its successful application of an ultimatum to the Mount
1615
The Serbs demanded on 12 February that the Bosnian Army withdraw its infantry from the frontlines in
exchange for the pullback of their heavy weapons. The Serbs demanded on 12 February that the Bosnian
Army withdraw its infantry from the frontlines in exchange for the pullback of their heavy weapons.
1616
Silber and Little note that the UN’s definition of “control” quickly slid from UN personnel maintaining
physical possession of the weapons to what became mere observation of them as monitors desperately
struggled to obtain compliance and keep the threatened air strikes at bay. The Serbs were even allowed to
choose the “weapon control points”, many of which were broadly defined field-deployed areas where
mortars and artillery pieces were already stationed to maintain the siege. Silber and Little, pp. 316-317.
1617
Silber and Little, p. 318.
1618
Predictions by the Bosnian Government and others that the VRS would simply move all the heavy weapons
allowed to withdraw from Sarajevo to attack the Muslims elsewhere proved to be greatly exaggerated. In
theory there was no bar to the VRS using the sidelined armor and artillery units in other sectors, but their
importance to the defense of Serb-held portions of Sarajevo in the event that fighting resumed required
that they be kept close at hand. Some were in fact used in operations near the city, such as Gorazde and
the Nisici plateau, although the VRS should have been able to mount the Gorazde operation without this
equipment.

543
Igman situation in 1993, NATO, with Russian help, had again forced the Serbs to comply
with a Western demand. Western satisfaction with this apparent success overlooked the
minimal effect it had on the Sarajevo battlefront even as it reaffirmed the Western
preoccupation with Sarajevo rather than the broader conflict.

March: The Sarajevo Exclusion Zone and the Serb Tank Affair
The UN’s credibility among the warring parties was further diminished by the
revelation on 4 May 1994 that the United Nations Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia,
Yasushi Akashi, had agreed to allow seven Bosnian Serb tanks to pass through the Sarajevo
heavy weapons exclusion zone so they could participate in a battle the Serbs claimed the
ARBiH was planning to initiate near Trnovo to the south.1619 (In exchange, the Bosnian Serbs
said they would unblock a convoy of 170 British troops and allow UN observers into Brcko.)
Bosnian Government officials were predictably outraged at this exception to the exclusion
zone terms, and Akashi was forced to back down and rescind the deal the following day.1620
But the story was still unfolding. On 6 May UN spokesmen announced that the Bosnian
Serbs would be allowed to transit the zone after all because UN headquarters’ decision to
cancel the deal had not been communicated from Zagreb to Sarajevo in time.1621 The story
grew more surreal when the UN – which had insisted that the tanks were no threat since
they were under UN supervision at all times – admitted on 8 May that one of the Serb tanks
had managed to escape while travelling in an UN-supervised convoy and was at large
somewhere in the Sarajevo exclusion zone.1622 Having waived its own rules to favor one
belligerent over another, reversed itself twice, and misplaced a fully-armed tank in the
space of a week, the UN emerged from the “Sarajevo tank affair” covered in something less
than glory.1623

September: The ARBiH at Sarajevo – Sedrenik

Following the 5 February marketplace shelling and the establishment of the 20-
kilometer heavy weapons exclusion zone, Sarajevo remained largely quiet for most of 1994.
“Quiet” was a relative term, as sporadic sniper and small-arms fire continued to terrorize
the civilian population. But the terrifying artillery and mortar fire that had caused most of
the casualties and devastated portions of the city had essentially ceased.
The one noteworthy break in the calm came in September, when the Bosnian Army
launched a very small offensive to capture part of the Sedrenik neighbourhood in the north-
eastern part of the city north of Sarajevo’s old quarter. ARBiH forces from the Muslim-held
Grdonj neighbourhood launched a surprise attack against Serb-held Sedrenik on 18

1619
Reuters: UN Allows Serbs Exception to No-Weapons Zone by Giles Elgood, 4 May 1994.
1620
Reuters: Boutros-Ghali Says Akashi Has His Full Confidence by Philippe Naughton, 5 May 1994.
1621
Reuters: UN Restores Tank Escort Deal with Serbs, by Giles Elgood, 6 May 1994.
1622
Reuters: Serb Tank Affair Dents UN Credibility, by Giles Elgood, 8 May 1994.
1623
Paris AFP, 8 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0805154494, 081544Z May 1994.

544
September.1624 The Bosnian Army gained ground on the first day and fighting intensified as
the Serbs counterattacked the following day. The isolated two-day fight ended with minor
ARBiH gains, and UN observers reported that the VRS had recaptured some of its lost
ground.

1624
Paris AFP, 18 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1809190894, 181908Z September 1994.

545
 Annex 49
Operation “Zvezda 94”:
The VRS Assault on Gorazde, April 1994
The Bosnian Serb leaders feared the onset of what they called the Muslim “spring
offensive”, which dashed their original expectations that early Serb military successes would
force the Bosnian Government to accept Serb terms for a permanent, countrywide cease-
fire. Still hoping to avoid a protracted war, they planned a strategy of placing in jeopardy an
important territorial holding of the Bosnian Government.1625 The target they chose for the
operation was the embattled Gorazde enclave. If the Sarajevo government refused the Serb
terms, the VRS was prepared to eliminate the enclave, which would consolidate another
Serb war aim – the occupation of the Drina valley.

Order of Battle and Campaign Planning

The VRS

The Main Staff assigned Major General Radovan Grubac’s Herzegovina Corps the
task of undertaking Operation “Zvezda 94“, giving it control over all VRS forces surrounding
the Gorazde enclave to ensure unity of command.1626 General Mladic and other
representatives of the Main Staff closely monitored the operation.
The campaign plan called for a three-pronged advance from the north, east, and
southeast. The south-eastern axis was to be the main thrust, driving along the main road
between Serb-held Cajnice and Gorazde and clearing the entire southern (right) bank of
ARBiH forces. Here, the Herzegovina Corps set up a forward command post or operational
group headquarters under Colonel Jezdimir Lakicevic to control the attack frontage from
roughly the Drina south of Ustipraca through Cajnice (Lakicevic’s headquarters) over to Foca
(Srbinje). Lakicevic’s spearhead was a 2.000-man tactical group drawn from nearly every
brigade in the Herzegovina Corps and the MUP Special Police Brigade.1627 It reinforced the

1625
See statements from President Karadzic and General Mladic on 7 April. Mladic refused to negotiate with
Bosnian Army commander General Delic, demanding that “only an instantaneous halt of all combat
activities on all the separating lines in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina can be discussed”. Belgrade Radio 7
April 1994. According to Belgrade Tanjug, “in connection with the situation in Gorazde”, Karadzic said that:
the Serb side had earlier warned of the planned Muslim spring offensive, saying that it would
respond with all available forces. If the Muslims do not stop attacking, we will launch a counter-
offensive and then let the Security Council save them...
Belgrade Tanjug 7 April 1994. Silber and Little seem to misconstrue the offensive as Mladic’s attempt to
eliminate the Gorazde enclave before peace talks solidified the frontlines. Rather, as the general’s own
statement indicates, he and the Serbs wanted the assault to lock in their territorial gains by forcing the
Muslims into an early agreement. See Silber and Little, p. 325.
1626
Normally, the Herzegovina Corps controlled only the southwestern corner of the frontline, while the Drina
Corps manned the southeast and northeast sectors and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps guarded the
northwest.
1627
The tactical group appears to have been comprised of four to five battalions, one each from the 1st
Herzegovina Motorized Brigade (Trebinje), 8th Herzegovina Motorized Brigade (Nevesinje), 15th

546
sector-holding units of the 3rd and 4th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades (previously part of
the Drina Corps) and the 11th Herzegovina Infantry Brigade. All told, VRS forces on the main
axis numbered about 6.000 troops backed by an armoured battalion and probably two
composite corps artillery groups (large battalions).1628
A Drina Corps operational group or forward command post under corps
commander Major General Milenko Zivanovic commanded the northern and eastern attack
axes. On the northern axis the VRS intended to advance from the Rogatica area through the
Jabuka pass toward the town, while in the east the VRS would cross the Praca River west of
Serb-held Ustipraca and push along the main road into Gorazde through Kopaci. Zivanovic
normally had three sector-holding brigades – 1st, 2nd, 5th Podrinje – of Tactical Group
“Visegrad” assigned to these areas, to which he appears to have added an armoured-
mechanized battalion borrowed from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade.1629 Zivanovic
probably formed a tactical group from the rest of his corps, and each axis probably had the
support of a corps artillery group. In total, he likely had about 5.000 to 6.000 troops.
Rounding out the Serb forces along the north-western frontline were sector-holding
elements of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps with three to four infantry battalions.1630 The VRS
probably fielded 13.000 to 14.000 troops for the entire operation.

The ARBiH

Only a single Bosnian Army operational group defended Gorazde, the East Bosnian
Operational Group under the command of Colonel Ferid Buljubasic. Buljubasic was both
outmanned and out-gunned. His OG had only five brigades – 1st Drina, 1st Rogatica, 1st
Visegrad, 31st Drina, and 43rd Drina – comprising about 8.000 troops strung out in a cordon
defence along the frontline. Buljubasic’s primary reserve appears to have consisted of the
OG’s reconnaissance-sabotage company and perhaps one or two battalions drawn from the
line brigades. He had little artillery or mortar support, and essentially no armour.

Herzegovina Infantry Brigade (Bileca), and 18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade (Gacko), plus probably a
battalion from the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade (Kalinovik). The 8th Herzegovina Motorized also
contributed an armored-mechanized battalion. The tactical group may have been designated the
“Combined Herzegovina Brigade”. The MUP Special Police Brigade, under Goran Saric, assigned two
detachments (probably the 3rd Detachment from Trebinje and the 9th Detachment from Srbinje) to help
lead the attack. Saric and his deputy Ljubisa Borovcanin personally led Special Police units during the battle
1628
Despite Muslim claims that major elements of the Yugoslav Army’s Uzice Corps took part in the operation,
there are no indications that this was the case. Some elements of the VJ’s Corps of Special Units or Serbian
MUP Special Police may have been involved, but, if they were, likely numbered no more than 100 to 300
personnel.
1629
Sarajevo Radio claimed on 3 April that an armored battalion had arrived in the Gorazde area from Pale the
night before. Sarajevo Radio 3 April 1994. This is entirely plausible given the additional armor assets from
1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade available to the VRS when it drew substantial forces from Sarajevo after
the February 1994 NATO ultimatum.
1630
The Pale, Jahorina, and Praca Battalions, which probably were part of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized
Brigade, were the normal sector units here. They probably received an additional battalion from other
parts of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

547
 Operation “Zvezda 94” Commences, 28 March – 10 April 19941631
The VRS artillery preparation began on 28 March followed by combined infantry-
armour attacks on all three axes the next day.1632 In the northern and eastern sectors, ARBiH
31st Drina and 1st Visegrad Brigade defences running along a series of ridges from the Drina
northwest through the Trovrh area to Jabuka pass blocked a rapid Serb advance. Initial
progress was slow, with VRS troops inching forward along much of the front. By 7 April, the
Drina Corps forces on both axes had penetrated no more than two kilometers.
The VRS was more successful in the southeast. On 31 March Serb units, probably
from the 3rd and 4th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades, claimed to have captured Gostunj hill
on the far south-eastern corner of the enclave, although ARBiH troops appear to have
maintained their hold on part of the hill. The biggest breakthrough came on 5 April when
the Herzegovina tactical group pierced the ARBiH 43rd Drina Brigade lines along the main
Cajnice-Gorazde road, allowing Serb forces to advance four kilometers on an eight-
kilometre front between Trebinjaca hill and Gradina hill. By 8 April Serb forces had advanced
another two kilometers, seizing the village of Biljin and isolating ARBiH forces on the
southern bank in two pockets, one centred on Uhotic Hill and the other around Gradina. On
10 April VRS forces eliminated the pocket around Uhotic while continuing the advance along
the road, capturing the village of Zupcici. The VRS now controlled the Drina River bank up to
Zupcici.1633 The 43rd Drina Brigade troops nevertheless hung on at Gradina – the key to
ARBiH defences in the sector – despite repeated VRS attempts to capture it.1634

NATO Arrives, 10 April 1994

Talks between the two sides, which the UN had scheduled for 7 April, never began
because the Bosnian Government refused to accept the VRS precondition for the meetings –
an “instantaneous halt” to all combat operations throughout the country.1635 The Sarajevo
government, recognizing that acceptance of these terms was tantamount to agreeing to the

1631
This narrative is based on 1:50.000 scale map analysis of Sarajevo Radio, Belgrade Radio, and Belgrade
Tanjug reporting covering 25 March 1994 to 26 April 1994.
1632
Despite claims to the contrary, there is no evidence of any large or small ARBiH attacks against the VRS
near Gorazde that might have “provoked” the VRS offensive. The ARBiH made harassing raids from the
enclaves throughout the conflict. Any ARBiH attack or raid that happened to precede a VRS offensive was
used as a pretext for an operation that was already in preparation. See Martin Bell: In Harm’s Way:
Reflections of a War-Zone Thug (Revised), London Penguin, 1996, p. 180 for claims that Muslim attacks
caused the Serb offensive; such claims clearly originated with biased UNPROFOR reports that sought to
blame the Muslims for getting themselves attacked and thereby discomfiting the peacekeepers.
1633
Elements of the 1st Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, plus probably the 11th Herzegovina Infantry Brigade,
appear to have been involved in the assault at Uhotic, while elements of the 18th Herzegovina Light
Infantry Brigade and the Special Police Brigade, together with armor from the 8th Herzegovina Motorized
Brigade, advanced along the road toward Zupcici. The Special Police Brigade commander, Goran Saric, was
in the van of the attack. See Belgrade Tanjug, 12 April 1994.
1634
UN reports on 9 April 1994 that the VRS had taken the hill were in error, or else the ARBiH managed to
retake the hill after VRS troops had captured it.
1635
See footnote 1625.

548
partition of the country, pinned its hopes for Gorazde’s survival on the West. And, indeed,
as the Serb offensive gathered steam. Western concern about Gorazde’s fate grew. When
the Herzegovina Corps approached the out skirts of the town on 10 April, the UN asked for
NATO air strikes against VRS targets on the south eastern approaches, ostensibly to
safeguard the lives of UN personnel but in reality to deter the Serb attack. US Air Force F-
16s and US Marine Corps F/A-18s made two separate air strikes during 10 and 11 April.1636
The first, on 10 April, hit a VRS command post 12 kilometers southwest of Gorazde and the
next day VRS armour two kilometers from the town was hit. Although the VRS seems to
have suffered little damage (and at least one bomb did not detonate), it nevertheless halted
its advance1637 – but then “detained” about 150 UN personnel, holding them until the
Gorazde crisis was resolved.1638

VRS Resumes the Advance, 15 April – 20 April 1994

The VRS halt proved to be nothing more than a pause in its attack, and might not
even have been a response to the air strikes but simply a planned pause to reorganize and
resupply its units. In any event, on 15 April, the VRS launched a major assault along all three
axes and the ARBiH lines quickly buckled. In the north and east, Drina Corps units overran
the main ARBiH defences along the ridgeline, capturing the Jabuka pass and reaching
Kopaci, an advance of some four kilometers.1639 By 18 April VRS troops had pushed on
another five kilometers from Jabuka and Kopaci and seized three more hills – Jelah,
Konjbaba, and Sjedokosa – ringing the town from the north and east. In the southeast,
Herzegovina Corps troops finally took Gradina on 16 April and then quickly pushed on
toward the town, seizing the last important ARBiH-held hilltop, Biserna, less than a
kilometre from town, on 17 April.1640 With these advances, the VRS now had Gorazde
surrounded on three sides and could pour direct fire into the town with impunity. Gorazde
was at the mercy of the Serbs.

1636
British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel infiltrated into the enclave acted as forward air controllers for
the strike. Silber and Little, p. 328. See Reuters, 11 April 1994, for descriptions of the attacks.
1637
A 13 April 1994 Associated Press photo shows what clearly is an unexploded US-made iron bomb, probably
a Mk 82, being guarded by two VRS soldiers. According to the caption, the bomb passed through two floors
of a building without exploding. See James Gow: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and
the Yugoslav War, New York Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 149-151 for a discussion of the chaos in
the UN/NATO chain of command over use of airpower at Gorazde.
1638
Silber and Little, p. 328.
1639
Two SAS personnel were wounded (one later died) during this attack when the VRS overran the ARBiH line
so quickly that the two were hit by Serb fire. Silber and Little, p. 329. In this deteriorating situation, the UN
requested additional NATO air strikes, but UN Special Representative Akashi refused to authorize them.
1640
NATO’s earlier air strikes had not deterred the assault, and on 16 April the VRS downed a British Royal
Navy Sea Harrier about to make a bombing run. The VRS Herzegovina Corps’s 7th Light Air Defense Artillery
Regiment claimed to have downed the plane. See Slavko Aleksic’s article on post-war VRS 7th
(Herzegovina) Corps’ air defense regiment in Srpska Vojska, 26 December 1997, p. 11. The current
commander of the regiment has a piece of the Sea Harrier mounted on his wall.

549
 Cease-Fire Talks and the NATO Ultimatum, 18 to 22 April 1994
Again, Western pressure on the Serbs to halt the offensive grew as the Bosnian
Army’s defences crumbled. On 18 April Karadzic’s office announced that at a meeting with
UN Special Representative Yasushi Akashi the Serbs had agreed to a UN proposal for a
cease-fire, including the withdrawal of VRS troops from a three-kilometre exclusion zone on
the left bank of the Drina and the deployment of UN troops to the town.1641 The so-called
agreement appeared to have no effect whatever on the VRS, which continued to shell
Gorazde, apparently including its hospital, and on 20 April armour and other units again
attempted to capture the ammunition factory just north of the town. Beset by public and
official demands to “do something”, NATO finally reacted to the Serbs’ defiance with a new
ultimatum on 22 April.1642 Unless the VRS halted its shelling, pulled its troops back the
previously stipulated three kilometers, and allowed UN aid into Gorazde by 24 April, NATO
air strikes would be sent against military targets within 20 kilometers of the town.1643
Karadzic – now under pressure from both NATO and Serbian President Milosevic – agreed to
the terms the same day.1644 In addition to the pullback of VRS troops, heavy weapons were
be withdrawn from the 20-kilometer zone or placed under UN observation. After some
fumbling, the VRS carried out the ordered withdrawals as UN troops and military observers
took up position to monitor the three-kilometre zone and the heavy weapons
withdrawal.1645 By 24 April the VRS claimed it had pulled all its forces, including heavy
weapons, outside of the zones.

Evaluation of the Gorazde Operation

Despite the clear battlefield successes of “Zvezda 94”, none of the operation’s
primary objectives were achieved. Holding the enclave hostage had failed to frighten the
Bosnian Government into accepting a permanent cease-fire because the price – permanent
partition – was just too high. Even if the entire enclave has been captured it seems unlikely
– given the resurgence of the Bosnian Army in northern and central Bosnia – that Sarajevo
would have agreed to the Serb terms. Likewise, for the Bosnian Serb leaders the cost of
eliminating Gorazde and securing the Drina valley would have been full NATO involvement

1641
In addition, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow medical aid to reach Gorazde and permit the UN to evacuate
wounded and sick from the town. UNHCR and the Red Cross were to be allowed to continue humanitarian
aid convoys and freedom of movement for all humanitarian workers was to be guaranteed throughout the
Serb republic. Belgrade Tanjug, 18 April 1994.
1642
See Silber and Little, pp. 332-333 for a discussion of the wrangling within NATO that preceded the
ultimatum.
1643
Paris AFP 22 April 1994 carries the text of the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s senior political decision-
making body) ultimatum.
1644
Karadzic met with Milosevic and Akashi in Belgrade on 23 April. Belgrade Tanjug, 23 April 1994.
1645
The initial UN force comprised about 500 French, British, Russian, Norwegian, Egyptian, and Ukrainian
troops. Reuters, 25 April 1994.

550
in the war, which in their view outweighed those territorial gains.1646 All the VRS had to
show for its military prowess was the capture of additional ground around Gorazde,
including nearly the entire southern (right) bank of the Drina.
But “Zvezda 94”, classically planned and executed, had also demonstrated that the
VRS could take Gorazde at almost any time it chose. As with most successful VRS offensives,
the Serbs exploited their advantages in organization, staff work, and heavy weapons to
overwhelm the undermanned and under-gunned Bosnian Army troops. The unity of
command that the VRS Main Staff imposed on the operation through General Grubac and
the Herzegovina Corps Headquarters, together with the use of division-level forward
command posts and operational groups to control each major sector, demonstrated the
VRS’s skill in higher-level staff and command functions. The relatively weak defences the
VRS faced around Gorazde and the Bosnian Army’s lack of any significant reinforcements
allowed the VRS to exploit its armour and artillery advantages to the full, which kept its
losses to a modest estimate of about 100 killed and some 300 to 350 wounded in action.1647
Nevertheless, if the VRS was able to defeat the isolated ARBiH forces in Gorazde
but could not achieve any lasting success in its earlier operations against main line ARBiH
units in Olovo, Maglaj-Tesanj, or Bihac, it was clear that the balance of military effectiveness
was shifting. It was not that the VRS was any less capable but rather that the Bosnian Army
had dramatically improved. The East Bosnian Operational Group was not a representative
sample of the new Bosnian Army. It was isolated from central Bosnia, could receive few
troop reinforcements or supplies, had even fewer heavy weapons than other Bosnian Army
forces, and probably was not organized or disciplined as tightly as the forces in central and
northern Bosnia. Nevertheless, these Muslim troops did fight hard – UN claims to the
contrary notwithstanding – against overwhelming VRS skill and firepower. There is no
compelling evidence that ARBiH forces intentionally let their defences collapse in order to
win NATO sympathy and support, as was suggested at the time.1648 On the contrary, the

1646
Gow claims that the threat of air strikes around Gorazde achieved only a tactical success, and that
strategically they were a failure because the operation “undercut the role that air power might play in the
future”. Gow, p. 150. However, Gow fails to look at the impact the NATO ultimatum appears to have had
on Serb decisionmaking and thus on their strategic objectives. Certainly the entire process of air strike
requests and their execution during the crisis was muddled and often completely ineffective – particularly
the early “pinprick” attacks. Nevertheless, the Serbs did not achieve their secondary aim – the capture of
the Gorazde enclave (after the Muslims refused to be coerced into agreeing to the Serbs’ primary
objective) – directly because of the NATO threat.
1647
This estimate is based primarily on Colonel Lakicevic’s reported totals for the Herzegovina Corps only,
which he claimed as 30 killed in action and 160 wounded in action (of which 40 were seriously wounded).
Belgrade Tanjug 25 April 1994.
1648
See Bell, p. 184. General Rose certainly believed that the Muslims had intentionally let themselves be
defeated; in his words:
I mean, how the h___ they let a tank down that g_____ route. One man with a crowbar could
have stopped it. It’s a five-mile road down a wooded ravine; they could have just dropped a boulder
on it. I think they basically turned and ran and left us to pick up the bits.
Despite General Rose’s beliefs, the VRS had clearly demonstrated over the past two years its ability to seize
rugged ground from the most dogged of Bosnian Army defenders. Bosnian Army troops under Naser Oric
fought desperately and sacrificially to halt the VRS advance at Srebrenica a year earlier in terrain just as
difficult as Gorazde, yet they were crushed just the same as those at Gorazde. Rose’s assumption that if the

551
ARBiH defenders suffered rather heavy losses. Their casualties appear to have numbered
about 300 killed in action and almost 1.000 wounded – a 16 percent casualty rate.1649

VRS pushed armor up a mountain road unsupported by infantry on its flanks it could be stopped by Muslim
infantry and antitank units shows that he did not have sufficient information on VRS mountain warfare
tactics and ignored the ARBiH’s lack of anti-tank weapons.
1649
See Silber and Little, p. 332. It is difficult to separate military and civilian casualty figures for the Muslims.
Presuming that army casualties were a far greater percentage than civilian, and that many Muslim dead
may not have been recovered, these totals seem to be in the ballpark. Claims that most of the casualties in
the enclave were civilian seem unlikely given that the VRS was intent on hitting ARBiH defense positions
and troops. Civilians seem to have fled their villages that found at at the first sign that the VRS was about to
overrun them, and the VRS typically set fire to Muslim villages after they seized them. This is not to imply
that there were not many civilian casualties, only that most of them were military.

552
 Annex 50
“Just Out of Reach”:
Donji Vakuf, 1994
Background
Before the war, Donji Vakuf had had a population of some 25.000 residents, a little
over half of them Muslim and the remainder Croats and Serbs.1650 The Bosnian Serbs,
however, took over the town early in 1992, driving thousands of Muslims from their homes
to join the thousands of other refugees in the Travnik area. The triumphant Serbs renamed
the town “Srbobran” and incorporated it into their expanding republic. After the Bosnian
Governments capture of Bugojno in July 1993, however, the Serb-Muslim frontline had been
pushed back to within a few kilometers of the outskirts of Donji Vakuf. The Bosnian Muslims
– foremost among them ARBiH 7th Corps commander Mehmet Alagic – made no secret of
the fact that Donji Vakuf was high on the list of places they intended to retake.1651 But the
prize remained out of reach. The few remaining kilometers between Bugojno and Donji
Vakuf were to prove some of the hardest-fought and most bitterly contested battlegrounds
of the entire war.
On the Bosnian Army side, the newly established 7th Corps was eager to flex its
muscles. Composed largely of Muslims evicted from the Donji Vakuf area (including the
displaced 770th “Donji Vakuf” brigade)1652 the 7th Corps fighters had been hardened by the
experience of ethnic cleansing and were coldly determined to return to their homes. As
always, the 7th Corps could call upon its crack 17th Krajina Brigade (similarly composed of
displaced Muslims) to move out front whenever an offensive had to be led. Additional
support could be drawn from the local 707th Mountain Brigade1653 from Bugojno just to the
south, and some from Travnik to the north – elements of the 727th Krajina,1654 705th
Jajce,1655 and 706th Mountain1656 brigades. But most of the latter brigades were dedicated
to the concurrent assaults on nearby Mt. Vlasic to the northeast and were thus unavailable
for the planned attacks toward Donji Vakuf.
On the Bosnian Serb Army side, the 19th Krajina and 11th Mrkonjic Grad Light
Infantry Brigades of the 1st Krajina Corps’s 30th Light Infantry Division, commanded by
Colonel Jovo Blazanovic, bore the weight of the defence of the Donji Vakuf area. The 19th
Brigade was deployed directly in front of the town, with the 11th on the 19th’s left flank to
the north. Still further north was the 30th Division’s other brigade, the 1st Sipovo Light
Infantry Brigade, facing the town of Turbe west of Travnik. The division probably mustered

1650
Reuters: Bosnian Army Readies Attack on Donji Vakuf by Kurt Schork, 8 November 1994.
1651
Reuters: Belgrade Concerned Over Bosnia War Escalation by Jovan Kovacic, 27 June 1994.
1652
At the time known as the 370th Donji Vakuf Mountain Brigade, previously of the ARBiH 3rd Corps.
1653
At the time known as the 307th Bugojno Mountain Brigade, previously of the ARBiH 3rd Corps.
1654
At the time known as the 27th Krajina Mountain Brigade, previously of the ARBiH 3rd Corps.
1655
At the time known as the 305th Jajce Mountain Brigade, previously of the ARBiH 3rd Corps.
1656
At the time known as the 306th Mountain Brigade, previously of the ARBiH 3rd Corps.

553
about 6.000 troops in all. Colonel Blazanovic’s command was to receive reinforcements as
the year progressed, including one battalion from the 1st Novigrad Infantry Brigade and
composite units drawn from several other 1st Krajina Corps formations, totalling some
1.500 troops.1657 To help lead VRS counterattacks, elements of the elite 1st Military Police
Battalion were dispatched to the area as an “intervention” unit.1658 Elements of the 1st
Mixed Artillery Regiment and the 1st Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade, plus at least one tank
company, provided fire support.
The fighting around Donji Vakuf during 1994 consisted of straightforward battles
for trenches and bunkers along forested mountains and hilltops. Even the expert infiltrators
of the ARBiH infantry would have to close with and slug it out with VRS units that were dug
in and backed by armour and artillery. It was to be a slow, grinding series of attacks to take
bits of ground from the VRS.

The ARBiH Assaults on Donji Vakuf, March – November 1994

The Donji Vakuf section of the front enjoyed, with most of the rest of Bosnia, a
relatively quiet time from January through March of 1994. The Bosnian Serbs would
occasionally shell Bugojno and the Bosnian Army would shell Donji Vakuf, but there were no
serious infantry assaults. This would change with the coming of spring: Donji Vakuf was one
of the first objectives of the Bosnian Army’s spring offensive of 1994. In mid-March, at the
same time the ARBiH was attacking towards Teslic to the north and Mt. Vlasic to the east,
the first of its many attempts to retake Donji Vakuf was launched.
The assault on Donji Vakuf opened on 16 March with the capture of the peak at
Mala Suljaga from the VRS 19th Brigade; the ARBiH also cut the water supply from Bugojno
to Donji Vakuf.1659 1660 Apparently taken by surprise, the VRS yielded more ground to the 7th

1657
The 6th and 5th Battalions /1st Novigrad Infantry Brigade each undertook one tour of duty in the line
during the year, attached to the 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade. A VRS journal article notes that
personnel from Sanski Most (6th Sanska Infantry Brigade), Gradiska, (1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigade),
Knezevo (22nd Infantry Brigade], Banja Luka (1st – 4th Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigades or 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigade), Celinac (1st Celinac Light Infantry Brigade), Laktasi (1st Laktasi Light Infantry Brigade),
and Prijedor (43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade) all served in the “Srbobran” sector. The brigades from these
towns probably contributed at least one company-sized unit each to form composite units for attachment
to the 30th Division. Nedeljko Rudic: The Gates to the Heart of Krajina Are Sealed on the Srbobran
Battlefield: Krajina is Defended Here, Krajiski Vojnik, 15 November 1994, pp. 22-23; an article on the 11th
Mrkonjic Grad Light Infantry Brigade.
1658
VRS military journal articles (plus one Bosnian Muslim article on a VRS unit) covering the Donji Vakuf
battles in 1994 include:
• Nedeljko Rudic: Enemy Offensive Stopped, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 23.
• Milka Tosic: The Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 52; an article on the 1st Military Police
Battalion.
• Nedeljko Rudic: The Gates to the Heart of Krajina Are Sealed on the Srbobran Battlefield: Krajina is
Defended Here, Krajiski Vojnik, 15 November 1994, pp. 22-23; an article on the 11th Mrkonjic Grad
Light Infantry Brigade.
• Dzemal Sefer: Krajiski Osvetnici Su Vratili Vlasima Dio Duga!, Travnik Bosnjak, 21 November 1995, p.
21; an article on the VRS 1st Novigrad Brigade.
1659
Sarajevo Radio, 16 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1603104794, 161047Z March 1994.

554
Corps the following day, losing a T-55 tank and a substantial amount of other equipment.1661
Although the attack stopped short of the town itself, the Muslim troopers were within
heavy mortar range, and had advanced close enough to alarm the town’s Serb
population.1662 1663 The VRS 30th Division counterattacked on 22 March, blunting the
Bosnian Government advance but failing to take back any ground.1664
A little over a week later the 7th Corps tried again, gaining hope when the attack on
2 April captured the Urija area from the VRS 19th Brigade and placed the most advanced
Bosnian Army units about five kilometers southeast of Donji Vakuf.1665 Alagic’s forces
pressed the attack from two directions, advancing from Prusac to the south and Bugojno to
the east.1666 Again they were stopped and the offensive wound down by 6 April.1667 Fighting
was desultory and sporadic during the rest of April and May while the Bosnian Army built up
its forces for another attempt.
On 29 May the 7th Corps renewed its operations, attacking the VRS 30th Division
all along its three-brigade front from the Komar Mountains south of Turbe to the Koscani
plateau south of Donji Vakuf. They seized several Serb-held villages in the Komar, some 10
kilometers southwest of Turbe, from the 1st Sipovo and 11th Mrkonjic Brigades,1668 then
pressed hard along a roughly 20-km front, trying on 5 June to seize Koscani, 7 km southwest
of Donji Vakuf. Fighting continued in earnest on 11 June – disregarding the declaration of a
countrywide cease-fire with the Serbs which began on 10 June.1669 1670 In mid-June the
Bosnian Army pressed simultaneous offensives in the adjacent Donji Vakuf and Mt. Vlasic
areas and appears to have made gradual gains over the next two to three weeks. By the end
of July it claimed to have retaken a total of 100 square kilometers in the Donji Vakuf-Vlasic
area.1671 1672
The last major push toward Donji Vakuf in 1994 began around 19 October with
another ARBiH general offensive; 7th Corps forces again pushed the confrontation line back
a short distance to the northwest.1673 1674 1675 Eventually, however, the October drive on

1660
Reuters: On Some Bosnian Fronts, No Truce, No Peace by Laura Pitter, 18 March 1994.
1661
Sarajevo Radio, 17 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1703102094, 171020Z March 1994.
1662
Belgrade Tanjug, 19 March 1994, FBIS London LD1903214994, 192149Z Mach 1994.
1663
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 March 1994, FBIS London LD2103202894, 212028Z March 1994.
1664
Sarajevo Radio, 22 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2203191694, 221916Z March 1994.
1665
Sarajevo Radio, 2 April 1994, FBIS London LD0204175994, 021759Z April 1994.
1666
Belgrade Tanjug, 4 April 1994, FBIS London LD0404091794, 040917Z April 1994.
1667
Belgrade Tanjug, 6 April 1994, FBIS London LD0604155794, 061557Z April 1994.
1668
Nedeljko Rudic: The Gates to the Heart of Krajina Are Sealed on the Srbobran Battlefield: Krajina is
Defended Here, Krajiski Vojnik, 15 November 1994, pp. 22-23; an article on the 11th Mrkonjic Grad Light
Infantry Brigade; Paris AFP, 31 May 1994; FBIS Vienna AU3105114494, 311144Z May 1994; Pale Srpska
Radio-Televizija, 31 May 1994, FBIS London LD3105150294, 311502Z May 1994.
1669
Belgrade Radio, 5 June 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0506143294, 051432Z June 1994.
1670
Belgrade Radio, 11 June 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1106152094, 111520Z June 1994.
1671
Zagreb Vecernji List, Interview with General Rasim Delic, Commander of the General Staff of the Supreme
Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, We Are Prepared For Launching Offensives by Slobodan
Lovrenovic, 26 June 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0107085594, 010855Z July 1994.
1672
Sarajevo Radio, 22 July 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2207202094, 222020 July 1994.
1673
Sarajevo Radio, 19 October 1994, FBIS London LD1910221594, 192215Z October 1994.
1674
Reuters: U.N. Running Out of Fuel Under Bosnian Serb Ban by Kurt Schork, 19 October 1994.

555
Donji Vakuf merged with the Bosnian Army’s simultaneous and adjacent effort to capture
Kupres, some 20 km to the southwest. Although the once Muslim-majority Donji Vakuf was
a more important, longer-term objective, Kupres, where Croats had been in the majority,
became the more immediate focus of the simultaneous ARBiH/HVO offensive. After the
Bosnian Croats recaptured Kupres, the Bosnian Army could advance no further south and
again redirected its main efforts toward Donji Vakuf to the north.
On 4 November the 7th Corps mounted determined infantry assaults against the
19th Brigade defenders of Koscani (about 7km southwest of Donji Vakuf), Kopcici, and
Urije.1676 Extensive preparations, equipment movement, and probing assaults preceded the
major assault toward Donji Vakuf – then about 16 km away – from the southwest on 7
November.1677 The Bosnian Croats provided an artillery barrage to support the Bosnian
Army attack on Serb defence lines between Kupres and Donji Vakuf.1678 1679 But despite a
day of heavy shelling, the Bosnian Army could not push past Prusac, 7 km south of Donji
Vakuf. The ARBiH and VRS tried to push each other off the strategic high ground over the
next few days, but neither could dislodge the other.1680 The Bosnian Army made another
hard push on 16-20 November, shelling and assaulting Serb-held Koscani, which sat atop
high ground overlooking Donji Vakuf.1681 1682 1683 The end of November and December saw
weeks of bitter but inconclusive fighting, uphill and downhill, between the 7th Corps and
the 30th Division along the ridge-lines surrounding the town. As November turned into
December, both sides abandoned the offensive and settled in for a dug-in winter facing
each other across the trench lines running up and down the pine-forested ridges. The war of
manoeuvre was over, at least until the following spring.

Conclusions
Donji Vakuf is not an area of national interest to the Croats but Jajce is ... You have
to take Donji Vakuf to get to Jajce.
HVO Gen. Tihomir Blaskic, November 19941684

The Bosnian Army and the Bosnian Croats cooperated to a surprising degree during
the latter stages of the attack on Donji Vakuf. Although the Croats apparently took over
Kupres without fully informing their Bosnian Army counterparts of their intention to do so,
relations remained so good that the Bosnian Croats were supplying the Bosnian Army with

1675
Sarajevo Radio, 27 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2710191194, 271911Z October 1994.
1676
Belgrade Tanjug, 4 October 1994, FBIS London LD0411161194, 041611Z November 1994.
1677
Reuters: Bosnians Plan Fresh Offensives – U.N. by Sean Maguire, 7 November 1994.
1678
Reuters: Serbs Hit New Bombardment in Bosnia by Sean Maguire, 7 November 1994.
1679
Reuters: Bosnian Muslims, Croats Pound Serbs around Kupres by Kurt Schork, 7 November 1994.
1680
Reuters: Bosnian Serbs Said Attacking Croat Troops, 14 November 1994.
1681
Reuters: Bosnian Army Attacks in Central Bosnia, 16 November 1994.
1682
Paris AFP, 16 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1611100594, 161005Z November 1994.
1683
Belgrade Tanjug, 20 November 1994, FBIS London LD2011172894, 201728Z November 1994.
1684
Reuters: Croat-Muslim Alliance Scores First Victory by Kurt Schork, 10 November 1994.

556
weapons during its attacks on Donji Vakuf.1685 HVO guns and rocket launchers actively
supported Bosnian Army units in early November, with a mixed team of Croat and Muslim
artillery spotters directing fire from both armies.1686
Whether the Bosnian Army could eventually capture Donji Vakuf depended on
three competing factors: its own logistics and capabilities, Bosnian Croat willingness to
support the Muslims, and the Bosnian Serbs’ will to fight. The Bosnian Army had been
moderately successful at taking on the Serbs in the rugged, forested slopes around Donji
Vakuf. Indeed, such terrain made for an infantryman’s war – and the ARBiH was an
infantryman’s army. But even an infantry army requires supplies, which the Bosnian Army
was hard-pressed to obtain and push forward into the mountainous terrain. It was largely
dependent on its notoriously capricious Bosnian Croat allies for weapons, ammunition, and
artillery support. And while the HVO had an interest in taking back Croat-majority Kupres, its
only interest in Muslim-majority Donji Vakuf was as a route to Jajce, which had once
contained a sizeable population of Croats as well as Muslims. The last variable, the Bosnian
Serb Army’s determination to carry on the fight, seemed immutable – during 1994 at least,
the Serbs stuck to their guns.1687
The Bosnian Army had come frustratingly close to Donji Vakuf, but as 1994 drew to
a close success remained out of reach. From the hills to the south and southwest Alagic’s
7th Corps soldiers could see – but not yet enter – Donji Vakuf. The Bosnian Serbs still held
the even higher peaks to the northwest and northeast that gave them a secure defensive
position for the winter months. As it turned out, the war for control of Donji Vakuf would be
fought from ridgeline to ridgeline for almost another year.1688

1685
Reuters: Croats Supplying Arms to Bosnian Army – Commander by Kurt Schork, 6 November 1994.
1686
Reuters: Bosnian Muslims, Croats Pound Serbs around Kupres by Kurt Schork, 7 November 1994.
1687
Reuters: Bosnian Army Readies Attack on Donji Vakuf by Kurt Schork, 8 November 1994.
1688
Reuters: Bosnian Army Readies Attack on Donji Vakuf by Kurt Schork, 8 November 1994.

557
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle,
Donji Vakuf Area, 1994

ARBiH 7th Corps, HQ Travnik

(Elements) Brig. Gen. Mehmet Alagic, Commander

17th Krajina Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

– At least one battalion normally, possibly the entire brigade during attacks
– Deployed southwest of Donji Vakuf from Bugojno

707th “Bugojno” Mountain Brigade, HQ Bugojno

(Previously the 307th “Bugojno” Mountain Brigade of the 3rd Corps)
– Probably most or all of the brigade during attacks

770th “Donji Vakuf” Mountain Brigade

(Previously the 370th “Donji Vakuf” Mountain Brigade of the 3rd Corps)
– Deployed near the town of Prusac

[Possible reinforcements from Travnik]

727th “Banja Luka” Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

(Previously the 327th “Banja Luka” Mountain Brigade of the 3rd Corps)
(Engaged at Mt. Vlasic)
– Probably most or all of the brigade during attacks

705th “Jajce” Mountain Brigade

(Previously the 305th “Jajce” Mountain Brigade of the 3rd Corps)
(Engaged at Mt. Vlasic)
– Probably one battalion normally, entire brigade during attacks

706th Mountain Brigade, HQ Han Bila

(Previously the 306th Mountain Brigade of the 3rd Corps)
(Engaged at Mt. Vlasic)
– Probably the entire brigade during attacks

558
 Chart 2
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle,
Donji Vakuf Area, 1994

VRS 1st Krajina Corps, HQ Banja Luka

(Elements) Lt. Col. Gen. Momir Talic, Commander

30th Light Infantry Division, HQ Mt. Vlasic

Colonel Jovo Blazanovic, Commander

1st Sipovo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Sipovo

– Deployed west of Turbe in Komar Mountains

11th Mrkonjic Grad Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Mrkonjic Grad

– Deployed north of Donji Vakuf in Komar Mountains

19th Krajina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Donji Vakuf (aka Srbobran)

– Deployed around Donji Vakuf town

559
 Annex 51
A Contest of Wills:
The Struggle for Mt. Majevica and the Stolice Transmitter,
1994
The Majevica region is a hilly area about 20 km east of Tuzla. Serb artillery in the
Majevica hills could shell much of Government-held northeast Bosnia – ranging as far as
Tuzla itself – and the Bosnian Army ached to push the confrontation line farther back and
move Tuzla outside shelling range. But the crucial prize in the hills was the Stolice radio
tower, atop 916-meter Mt. Majevica itself. This tower was a vital communications node
relaying radio, television, and telephone communications. Both sides wanted control of the
summit and the transmitter, and 1994 was to see a prolonged struggle on the slopes of Mt.
Majevica.1689 1690
For the defence of the general Majevica area – including the Stolice transmitter –
the Bosnian Serb Army’s East Bosnia Corps created the Tactical Group “Majevica”, with five
subordinate brigades assigned to it, under the command of Colonel Momir Zec. On Mt.
Stolice itself was the 2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade. To the northwest were the 3rd
Majevica and 1st Semberija Light Infantry Brigades. The 1st Majevica Infantry Brigade held
the confrontation line to the northeast of Mt. Stolice. Altogether, Tactical Group Majevica
had some 7.000 troops under its direct command, supported by at least one battalion of the
3rd Mixed Artillery Regiment, plus most of the brigades each had a T-34 tank company
under command. If required, the East Bosnian Corps’ 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry (“Panthers”)
Brigade and 3rd Military Police Battalion, plus the local MUP Special Police detachment (all
from Bijeljina), could deploy to the sector whenever a counterattack was needed.
Across the confrontation line were the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps’ Fourth and Fifth
Operational Groups. The Fifth Operational Group, headquartered in Tuzla, had responsibility
for most of the confrontation line opposite TG Majevica, facing the 1st Semberija, 3rd
Majevica, and most of the 2nd Majevica Brigades. The Fourth Operational Group occupied
the entire “Sapna thumb” area, and thus manned the line east and northeast of Stolice
where the 1st Majevica Brigade was deployed. From west to east, the Fifth OG fielded the
2nd Tuzla (later 252nd) Mountain Brigade, the 1st Tuzla (later 250th) Mountain Brigade, and
the 3rd Tuzla Brigade (later 253rd), which faced Mt. Stolice directly. The Fourth OG was on
the 3rd Tuzla Brigade’s right flank, with the 1st “Hajrudin Mesic” (later 255th) Teocak
Mountain Brigade generally opposite the VRS 1st Majevica. Altogether, the Bosnian Army
had about 8.000 troops in the Majevica area, but only about a dozen heavy mortars and 40
or 50 medium ones for fire support.

1689
1689 Karlo Jager: The Tuzla Corps Has Gotten Through Almost to Han Pijesak, General Mladic’s
Headquarters!, Zagreb Globus, 27 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0706183794, 071837Z June 1994.
1690
Among other things, Stolice was the broadcast point for Pale television.

560
 During the winter months of early 1994 the Majevica region saw only occasional
Serb shelling and intermittent infantry fire-fights. But the Bosnian Army began massing its
forces in the area in April, and its forces first assaulted the mountain on 11 May.1691 The
ARBiH 2nd Corps mounted repeated attacks on Mt. Majevica and a secondary elevation on
adjacent Banj Brdo, with at least two brigades (the 206th and the Hajrudin Mesic Brigade)
committed to the fiercest of the government assaults on 14 and 15 May.1692 1693 The Serbs
replied with heavy shelling of Bosnian towns and infantry counterattacks on 15 and 16 May.
During the attack, Bosnian Army forces got close enough to shell and damage the Stolice
relay – temporarily shutting down Serb TV and telephone links in the region – but could not
capture and occupy the summit from the 2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade, which was
probably reinforced with elements of the 3rd Military Police Battalion.1694 Fighting tapered
off around 20 May as the Bosnian Government offensive wound down and the Army paused
to regroup and reinforce.1695 Apparently undaunted, the ARBiH resumed the attack on 27
May, again assaulting the Stolice peak and Banj Brdo.1696 1697 The TG “Majevica”
counterattacked and drove south several kilometers from Stolice, retaking much of the
ground they had lost to Government forces earlier in the month.1698 When the June cease-
fire took effect, the Bosnian Army had been pushed back out of most of its recently won
territory. The Majevica region was relatively quiet for most of the summer while the Bosnian
Army directed its primary offensive efforts at the Ozren mountains region. A series of small
Government attacks in the Majevica hills all drew negative results, the first from 29 June to
2 July – concurrent with an attack in the Ozren – a second from 21 July to 24 July, and a
third from 8 to 13 September. On each occasion, the VRS responded with heavy shelling of
Muslim-held towns, particularly Kalesija and Tuzla.1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704
In early November, the Bosnian Army made another serious attempt to capture the
Stolice radio relay. Preliminary probes appear to have begun as early as mid-October when
“recon-sabotage” groups – small, specialized infantry formations – scouted ahead, probably
looking for weaknesses in the Serb lines.1705 1706 The main offensive began on 9

1691
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 May 1994, FBIS London LD1105150594, 111505Z May 1994.
1692
Belgrade Tanjug, 14 May 1994, FBIS London LD1405133794, 141337Z May 1994.
1693
Sarajevo Radio, 15 May 1994, FBIS London LD1505175094, 151750Z May 1994.
1694
Belgrade Tanjug, 15 May 1994, FBIS London LD1 505215194, 152151Z May 1994. See Slobodan Markovic:
“Subscribed” for the Hardest Tasks, Srpska Vojska, 26 August 1995, p. 38, for an article on the VRS 3rd
Military Police Battalion.
1695
Belgrade Tanjug, 20 May 1994, FBIS London LD2005215294, 202152Z May 1994.
1696
Reuters: Bosnian Rivals Blame Each Other Over Talks by Kurt Schork, 27 May 1994.
1697
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 Mav 1994, FBIS London LD2705 132492, 271324Z May 94.
1698
Belgrade Tanjug, 27 May 1994, FBIS London LD2705153294, 271532Z May 94.
1699
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 June 1994, FBIS London LD2906234494, 292344Z June 1994.
1700
Belgrade Radio, 3 July 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0307183594, 031835Z July 1994.
1701
Belgrade Radio, 21 July 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2107145694, 211456Z July 1994.
1702
Sarajevo Radio, 24 July 1994, FBIS London LD2407133894, 241338Z July 1994.
1703
Sarajevo Radio, 8 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0809194694, 081946Z September 1994.
1704
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 September 1994, FBIS London LD1309213894, 132138Z September 1994.
1705
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 October 1994, FBIS London LD1210163994, 121639Z October 1994.
1706
Belgrade Tanjug, 20 October 1994, FBIS London LD2010224394, 202243Z October 1994.

561
November.1707 By 13 November Government soldiers had managed to capture several
important hills – including nearby Velika and Mala Jelika – but not Stolice itself.1708 1709 Once
again, fierce fighting around the Stolice transmitter damaged the relay but the Bosnian
Army again failed to gain control of the Mt. Majevica summit.1710
When, in the course of the November offensive, the Bosnian Army encircled some
30 Bosnian Serbs on the secondary Vitovaca peak near Majevica itself, the local VRS
commander threatened to pound Tuzla – an UN-declared “safe area” – with artillery fire
every hour until his “lost platoon” was released.1711 1712 The threat was no bluff, and regular
shelling of the urban Tuzla area began early on the morning of 21 November and continued
periodically while the Bosnian Army doggedly pursued its infantry attacks against the
mountaintop.1713 There is no reporting to indicate the captured Serbs were released, but in
any event both the Bosnian Government assaults and the Bosnian Serb shelling of Tuzla
tapered off by the end of November.1714 1715 1716 1717
As 1994 drew to a close, the situation in the Majevica hills was not far different
from the year’s beginning. Small infantry clashes – generally begun by Bosnian Army forces
– erupted occasionally on the slopes below the Stolice transmitter, but the confrontation
lines advanced marginally if at all. VRS forces shelled Tuzla and the smaller towns of the
“Sapna thumb” regularly, causing substantial destruction but accomplishing little from a
military standpoint. Casualties mounted on both sides of the confrontation line, for little
visible gain.

1707
Belgrade Tanjug, 9 November 1994, FBIS London LD0911231894, 092318Z November 1994.
1708
Zagreb Hina, 13 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1311151694, 131516Z November 1994.
1709
Sarajevo Radio, 15 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1511164494, 151644Z November 1994.
1710
Zagreb Hina, 17 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1711160794, 171606Z November 1994.
1711
Sarajevo Radio, 17 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1711195494, 171954Z November 1994.
1712
Zagreb Hina, 19 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1911172694, 191726Z November 1994.
1713
Zagreb Hinu, 21 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2111152894, 211528Z November 1994.
1714
Zagreb Hina, 24 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2411090094, 240900Z November 1994.
1715
Belgrade Tanjug, 24 November 1994, FBIS London LD2411011894, 240118Z November 1994.
1716
Sarajevo Radio, 24 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2411092994, 240929Z November 1994.
1717
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 November 1994, FBIS London LD2911194994, 291949Z November 1994.

562
 Annex 52
Kladanj, 1994
The Muslim-held town of Kladanj was only about 7 km from the confrontation line
at its closest point, but was shielded from the Bosnian Serbs by a series of high ridges and
peaks. This was a great blessing, for although the town was well within range of the Bosnian
Serb field guns, without an observation point the VRS could not shell Kladanj accurately. The
Bosnian Serbs shelled the area fairly frequently in 1993 and early 1994, but the town was
not as heavily damaged as other locales – like nearby Olovo – that were in direct line-of-
sight.
Like Olovo, Kladanj’s strategic importance derived from its position along the main
north-south road from Sarajevo to Tuzla.1718 The road link between Olovo and Kladanj was
of particular importance, and the Bosnian Serbs’ control of a segment of this road denied it
to the Bosnian Government.
The primary defenders of the Kladanj area were two brigades under the ARBiH 2nd
Corps’ “6 East Operational Group”, which held the section of frontline from south of Kladanj
northwards almost to Kalesija.1719 The two Kladanj-based units were the 121st Mountain
Brigade (later re-designated the 243rd) and the 1st Muslim Podrinje Brigade (later re-
designated the 244th). Of these brigades, the 121st Mountain Brigade was more directly
engaged, holding the line due east of Kladanj. To the north of Kladanj was the ARBiH’s 119th
“Banovici” brigade; to the south was the 1st Olovo Brigade.
Opposing the ARBiH to the east were elements of the Bosnian Serb Army’s Drina
Corps, under the command of Major General Milenko Zivanovic. The corps had the 1st Milici
Light Infantry Brigade northeast of Kladanj, the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade
immediately east of Kladanj, and two battalions of the 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade
southeast of Kladanj. In addition, the 2nd Romanija Brigade had one battalion from the 1st
Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade attached. The total force numbered about 2.500 to 3.000
troops. The 1st Birac Infantry Brigade was deployed to the north of the 1st Milici, centred
around Kalesija, away from the main action.
All appearances indicated that the ARBiH was not content with merely holding its
positions along the Olovo-Kladanci confrontation line. Between 12 and 17 January its 121st
Mountain Brigade pushed slightly forward, capturing the towns of Jelacici and Majdan along
the boundary between the VRS 1st Milici and 1st Birac Brigades, about 10km northeast of
Kladanj.1720 1721 1722 1723 Exchanges of artillery and mortar fire, punctuated by occasional

1718
UN designated “Route Python” from Kladanj south to Sarajevo, and “Route Skoda” running north from
Kladanj.
1719
In early 1994, the 2nd Corps “Operational Group 3”, headquartered in Kladanj and consisting of the 121st
and 1st Muslim Brigades, was incorporated into Operational Group 6.
1720
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 January 1994, FBIS London LD1201182694, 121826Z January 1994.
1721
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 January 1994, FBIS London LD1301211694, 132116Z January 1994.
1722
Belgrade Tanjug, 14 January 1994, FBIS London LD1401183894, 141838Z January 1994.
1723
Sarajevo Radio, 17 January 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1701124494, 171244Z January 1994.

563
small infantry clashes along the line east of Kladanj, continued through February and March.
The pace of fighting picked up around 14 April, as the Bosnian Army stepped up its infantry
actions all along the confrontation line.1724 During the latter half of April and the first week
of May, UN observers noted a steady build-up of military supplies and additional
Government forces into the area – including the spearhead 7th Muslim Brigade and
elements of the army’s elite “Black Swans”.1725 When the ARBiH 2nd Corps began restricting
the movements of UN military observers south of Tuzla, the observers took this as an almost
certain sign of an impending offensive.1726 The UN – and the Bosnian Serbs – watched and
waited for the blow to fall.
They did not have long to wait. The Bosnian Army launched its expected offensive
east of Kladanj in the second week of May – concurrent with other 2nd Corps attacks at Mt.
Majevica-Stolice and Mt. Vijenac in the Ozren mountains – moving in the general direction
of Sekovici and Vlasenica, astride the Serb supply corridor from Serbia to Han Pijesak and
Sokolac. By 15 May the UN was reporting significant Bosnian Army gains in the area.1727 The
Bosnian Army’s most significant breakthrough came the following day, when rapid advances
captured some 32 square kilometers along the boundary of the 1st Vlasenica and 2nd
Romanija Brigades.1728 1729 Under the leadership of Becir Mekanic, the last peacetime mayor
of Vlasenica, the 1st Muslim Brigade seized 1.300-meter Mt. Sokolina – in sight of Mekanic’s
hometown, only 12km away.1730 Further south, the ARBiH also took the 1.100-meter Mt.
Stijena peak.
The VRS responded by shelling Tuzla on 16 May followed by very heavy shelling all
along the Kladanj front on 19 May.1731 By about 21 May, the VRS Drina Corps appears to
have halted the Bosnian Army attack, regaining Mt. Stijene and some of the surrounding
ground in a counterattack.1732 Doggedly pressing forward a kilometre at a time in the hilly
and wooded terrain, the Bosnian Army was able to make a few small gains until, apparently
worn out, it gave up the struggle in early June, leaving the Olovo-Kladanj front largely quiet
during the summer months except for sporadic Serb shelling.1733 1734
The Bosnian Army advance had reached its farthest point by mid-May, a 15-km
thrust that brought it within 10km west of Vlasenica and pushed the Serb lines back in a
bulge east of Kladanj.1735 But there had never been a chance of actually taking Vlasenica and

1724
Belgrade Radio, 14 April 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1404192694, 141926Z April 1994.
1725
Paris AFP, 8 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0805155294, 081552Z May 1994.
1726
Reuters: Moslem “Safe Haven” Shelled After Serb Town Hit by Davor Huic, 11 May 1994.
1727
Reuters: Bosnian Rivals Report Increased Fighting, 15 May 1994.
1728
Sarajevo Radio, 16 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1605190194, 161901Z May 1994.
1729
Reuters: Tuzla Shelled After Moslems Claim Military Gains by Dan De Luce, 16 May 1994.
1730
Reuters: Moslem Chief Aims to Retake “Cleansed” Drina Valley by Davor Huic, 17 May 1994.
1731
Sarajevo Radio, 19 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1905185994, 191859Z May 1994.
1732
Reuters: Serbs Widen Battle Fronts in Bosnia by Dan De Luce, 21 May 1994.
1733
Paris AFP, 29 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2905132294, 291322Z May 1994.
1734
By 23 May, the 121st Kladanj Brigade was apparently relieved by the 119th Banovici Brigade, Belgrade
Tanjug, 23 May 1994, FBIS London LD2305144794, 231447Z May 1994.
1735
Karlo Jeger: The Tuzla Corps Has Gotten Through Almost to Han Pijesak, General Mladic’s Headquarters!,
Zagreb Globus, 27 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0706183794, 071837Z June 1994.

564
the advance did nothing to break the Serbs’ control of the Olovo-Kladanj road, so the
Bosnian Army’s gains were more important morally than militarily. Still, even threatening
Vlasenica and the Bosnian Serbs’ lifeline from Serbia was a major accomplishment that gave
the Serbs a scare and the ARBiH a propaganda victory.

565
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle Kladanj Area, 1994

ARBiH 2nd (Tuzla) Corps, HQ Tuzla

Brigadier Saad Delic, Commander

3rd Operational Group, HQ Kladanj

1st Muslim Podrinje Brigade

(Later re-designated the 244th Mountain Brigade)
Becir Mekanic and/or Hakija Hodzik, commander

121st Mountain Brigade, HQ Kladanj

(Later re-designated 243rd Mountain Brigade)

566
 Chart 2
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle Kladanj Area, 1994

VRS Drina Corps, HQ Vlasenica (Elements)

Major General Milenko Zivanovic, Commander

1st Birac Infantry Brigade, HQ Sekovici

– Deployed north of Kladanj: not significantly engaged in Kladanj fighting

1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Milici

– Deployed northeast of Kladanj

1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Vlasenica

– Deployed east of Kladanj

Elements, 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, HQ Sokolac (-)

– Deployed southwest of Kladanj

Podrinje Detachment “Drina Wolves” / 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade

– Deployed as counterattack unit

567
 Annex 53
Tesanj and Teslic, 1994
After staving off the Bosnian Serb offensives against the surrounded Tesanj enclave
from December 1993 through the signing of the Croat-Muslim ceasefire in March 1994, the
Bosnian Army switched almost immediately to the offensive. Although relations with the
HVO’s 111th Zepce Brigade remained uneasy, the ARBiH no longer needed to actively
defend its “southern front” and could turn its newly available resources against the VRS. For
the first time the Bosnian Army’s defenders of Tesanj could seriously consider a drive
westward toward their own objective – Serb-held Teslic, several kilometers west of the
Muslim-held pocket.
The Bosnian Army forces in the area had been designated the “Operations Group 7-
South” – originally under the 2nd Corps but transferred to the 3rd Corps in mid/late 1994.
Like the ARBiH 5th Corps in the Bihac pocket, the 7-South Operations Group had proved
themselves a courageous, hardy, and determined body of fighting men, in spite of the fact –
and more likely because of it – that the Tesanj pocket was cut off from the rest of
Government-held Bosnia and had to fend for itself. OG 7-South had at this time four
brigades and one independent battalion totalling about 10.000 troops. In addition, the
HVO’s 110th “Usora” Brigade (which had remained operationally allied to the ARBiH
throughout the Croat-Muslim war) held the northeast corner of the enclave with another
2.000 troops.
The Bosnian Serbs clearly accorded high priority to Teslic and dedicated substantial
forces to its defence. The VRS 1st Krajina Corps’s “Doboj” Operational Group 9 had
responsibility for the entire area: the segment of the confrontation line immediately west of
the “Maglaj finger” around Tesanj was assigned to “Doboj” OG’s Tactical Group 2 (TG-2).1736
Tactical Group 2 consisted of six subordinate brigades spread from southwest of Teslic to
the northwest corner of the enclave. These included the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade
(which provided the headquarters for the tactical group and was strongest formation in the
sector), the 1st Teslic Infantry Brigade, the 1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigade, and probably
the 1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade.1737 The 2nd Teslic Light Infantry Brigade was deployed
further south, opposite the Croat-held Zepce enclave. Still further south and west was the
27th Motorized Brigade, the westernmost unit along OG 9’s segment of the confrontation
line. TG-2 was supported by at least one OG or corps-level artillery battalion, and during
critical operations would be reinforced by elements of corps-level elite units, such as the 1st

1736
This TG may have been designated as Tactical Group 3, vice TG-2.
1737
Zeljko Petrovic: The Sure Hand of “Gara’s” Soldiers of the 16th Krajina on the Doboj-Teslic Battlefield: Years
of Brilliant Victories, Srpska Vojska, 15 November 1994, p. 27. Although the 16th had its own frontline
sector north of Teslic, elements of the brigade probably acted as the tactical group’s reserves and were
shifted to meet developing threats accordingly.

568
MP Battalion and 1st Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company and the OG’s 2nd Armoured
Brigade.1738
The Muslim counteroffensive came only days after a local HVO-ARBiH cease-fire
took effect on 19 March. On 23 March the displaced 204th “Teslic” Mountain Brigade began
a drive towards its original hometown.1739 1740 The attack rolled forward briskly and by 26
March had rolled up gains one to two kilometers deep along a six-kilometre front against
the VRS 1st Teslic Infantry Brigade. The higher ground south of Tesanj and Teslic had been
taken and the critical 577-meter Husar elevation was under assault.1741 The advance looked
promising, and hopes were high that Teslic itself might soon be reached. But it was not to
be. Infantry battles and artillery exchanges extending into April slowed the advance and
brought it to a halt five or six kilometers east of Teslic.
It was about 22 May before the ARBiH was ready to try again, this time with the
more limited objective of capturing only a few more pieces of higher ground. And this time
the HVO’s 111th “Zepce” brigade – OG 7-South’s former foes – appears to have contributed
at least two tanks to the fight.1742 1743 1744 Even these limited objectives proved unattainable,
and the ARBiH was able to push the confrontation lines only a little bit forward.1745 It did
gain control over a line of peaks 5-15 kilometers southeast of Teslic from the VRS 1st Teslic
Brigade, but it was unable to push the last few kilometers to the west to reach the Velika
Usora river valley, the adjacent north-south road into Teslic, or the town of Teslic itself. OG
7-South’s best efforts had failed to make the hoped-for territorial gains before the
countrywide cease-fire took effect on 10 June.1746 1747
The summer months saw little more than artillery exchanges, with the great
preponderance of force coming from the VRS side. Bosnian Army and, less often, HVO
artillery would at times shell Teslic to the west or Doboj to the northeast. The VRS shelled
Tesanj and almost all of the other villages of any size in the pocket. The one important
development during this time was the ARBiH’s capture of the long contested Husar
elevation – almost exactly halfway between Tesanj and Teslic – on 19 August.1748 The VRS
made several attempts to regain possession of the peak, but this time the Muslims were
able to hold onto their gains.1749 1750

1738
M. Tosic: The Majority of the Glorious Ones – Tank Units, Krajiski Vojnik, August 1995, p. 34, an article on
the 2nd Armored Brigade.
1739
Sarajevo Radio, 23 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2303202594, 232025Z March 1994.
1740
Sarajevo Radio, 25 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2503180394, 251803Z March 1994.
1741
Sarajevo Radio, 26 March 1994, FBIS London LD2603174994, 261749Z March 1994.
1742
Paris AFP, 24 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2405163694, 241636Z May 1994.
1743
Belgrade Tanjug, 24 May 1994, FBIS London LD2505023194, 250231Z May 1994.
1744
Paris AFP, 25 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2505123094, 251230Z May 1994.
1745
Paris AFP, 26 May 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2605142294, 261422Z May 1994.
1746
Paris AFP, 9 June 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0906120994, 091209Z June 1994.
1747
Paris AFP, 11 June 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1106204694, 112046Z June 1994.
1748
Sarajevo Radio, 19 August 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1908105494, 191054Z August 1994.
1749
Sarajevo Radio, 23 August 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2308094994, 230949Z August 1994.
1750
Sarajevo Radio, 31 August 1994, FBIS Vienna AU3108193594, 311935Z August 1994.

569
 The Bosnian Army’s most ambitious effort of the year in the Teslic area began on 3
October and would continue for nearly two months. The October-November offensive was
to be significantly larger and more complex, requiring major operations by both Operations
Group 7-South east of Teslic and by the 3rd Corps’ Operations Group “3-North” well to the
south of Teslic. Each of the two operations groups contributed three reinforced brigades to
the attack, for a total of perhaps 14-16.000 troops.
The battle was to extend over a period of weeks, and in the end would bring mixed
success for the Bosnian Army, claiming substantial advances in the south but only marginal
progress in the north near Teslic itself. The first day’s attacks in the southern area – spear
headed by the 7th Muslim Brigade and the “El Mujahid” Detachment of foreign Islamic
volunteers and followed up by the 319th Mountain and 330th Light Brigades – caught the
VRS defenders off guard and some 20 square kilometers were taken in a matter of hours
from the 27th Motorized Brigade.1751 The ARBiH made a similar thrust west of Tesanj – with
the 202nd Mountain Brigade taking the lead – but without similar success.1752 VRS forces
halted the ARBiH advances in short order and TG-2 – probably reinforced – counterattacked
on 10 and 11 October.1753 1754 VRS artillery also retaliated with heavy shelling of Muslim-held
villages in the area. Bosnian Government forces advanced against the VRS 1st Teslic Brigade
as far as the Teslic suburb of Banja Vrucica, but could go no further.1755 1756
But while the Bosnian Government advance was being stopped cold in the north,
the 3rd Corps attack in the south was continuing to make steady gains. As OG 7-South drew
VRS reserves into the defence of Teslic. OG 3-North was able to make further advances
against the 27th Motorized Brigade, pushing north and west to take another 50 square
kilometers or so in a series of short advances of 2-3 kilometers a day along a 10-km-wide
front.1757
By late October it began to look as if the two-front attack might succeed.
Operations Group 7-South was still fighting in Banja Vrucica, close enough to Teslic to worry
the Serb defenders. Meanwhile, OG 3-North was advancing slowly but seemingly inexorably.
VRS TG-2 forces made several counterattacks around Teslic, retaking some territory, but the
ARBiH 3rd Corps countered with yet another offensive by OG 3-North on 8 November. Once
again, the crack 7th Muslim Brigade led the way in an advance that took more than 30 more
square kilometers over the next ten days.1758 1759 1760
The ARBiH 3rd Corps advance from 8 to 17 November was to mark the last major
success in the Tesanj-Teslic area, as winter set in and the ARBiH 3rd Corps’ elite units were

1751
Sarajevo Radio, 3 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0310202794, 3 October 1994.
1752
Sarajevo Radio, 7 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0710095494, 7 October 1994.
1753
Sarajevo Radio, 10 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1010195294, 10 October 1994.
1754
Sarajevo Radio, 11 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1110210394, 11 October 1994.
1755
Sarajevo Radio, 12 0ctober 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1210120394, 12 October 1994.
1756
Sarajevo Radio, 12 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU 1210193394, 12 October 1994.
1757
Sarajevo Radio, 19 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU 1910205894, 19 October 1994.
1758
Sarajevo Radio, 8 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0811195694, 8 November 1994.
1759
Sarajevo Radio, 9 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0911204494, 9 November 1994.
1760
Sarajevo Radio, 17 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1711124194, 17 November 1994.

570
redirected toward the Kupres and Donji Vakuf fronts. In the end, VRS forces were able to
hold on, pushing Government forces back a short distance from the Teslic suburbs and
digging in along a new confrontation line opposite OG 3-North. But even though the
objective of Teslic was never reached the October-November offensive can be considered a
substantial success. The Bosnian Army’s 3rd Corps had demonstrated its ability to mount
sizeable, coordinated operations within its area of responsibility. The VRS, which had begun
the year on the offensive, was forced to end it on the defensive. And over 100 square
kilometers of territory were captured – a significant gain by the standards of the Bosnian
war. The goal had not been reached, but the effort itself had been worth it.

571
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle,
Tesanj-Teslic Area, 1994

Operational Group 7 South, HQ Tesanj

(Previously Tesanj Operational Zone, HQ Tesanj)
(Later the 37th Division, HQ Tesanj)
[Established 8 March 1993]
Mustafa Cerovac, Seven-South Operational Group, commander.

Tesanj Independent Battalion

Tesanj Independent Battalion

202nd “Tesanj” Chivalrous Brigade, HQ Tesanj

(Previously the 1st Famous Tesanj Brigade)
(Later the 372nd “Tesanj” Mountain Brigade)

203rd “Doboj Bosna” Famous Motorized Brigade

(Later the 373rd Doboj Bosna Mountain Brigade)
Ismet Memagic, commander [after September 1993]
Adnan Bajraktarevic, commander [through September 1993]

204th “Teslic” Famous Hill Brigade, HQ East of Teslic

(Later the 374th “Teslic” Mountain Brigade)
Ismet Memagic, Chief of Staff [through September 1993]
Anniversary of Teslic Brigade noted, 24 December 1994.

207th Gallant Mountain Brigade, HQ Tesanj

(Later the 377th “Jelah Pousora” Mountain Brigade)
Aden Omahic, commander [After September 1993]
Ismet Avdic, commander [Became 7 OG South commander, September 1993]

110th “Usora” HVO Brigade, HQ Jelah

(HVO unit functioning cooperatively with the ARBiH)
(Later the 110th “Usora” Home Defence Regiment)

572
 Chart 2
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle,
Tesanj-Teslic Area, 1994

“Usora” Tactical Group 2, HQ Teslic/Banja Vrucica1761

Lieutenant Colonel Vlado Topic, Commander

1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Omanjska

1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Cerovica

16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, HQ Vitkovici

1st Teslic Infantry Brigade, HQ Teslic-Banja Vrucica

2nd Teslic Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Donji Komusina

27th Derventa Motorized Brigade, HQ Blatnica

1761
This TG may have been designated as Tactical Group 3, vice TG-2.

573
 Annex 54
The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren Mountains,
June – July 1994
As the Bosnian Army’s confidence in its ability to take the war to the Serbs grew,
the ARBiH General Staff prepared plans for a much more ambitious offensive in the Ozren
mountains. The objective of the attack was to cut off and capture the southern lobe of the
Serb-held Ozren salient around Vozuca. This would reconnect an important route – the UN’s
so-called “Route Duck” – between the cities of Tuzla and Zenica by freeing up a short stretch
of road – only 12 kilometers – that ran between Muslim-held Zadovici and Banovici through
Serb-controlled Vozuca. Though the Tuzla-Zavidovici link appears less than a direct route, it
was in fact the best and quickest road to Zenica. The road would also open a firm,
convenient link between 2nd and 3rd Corps and facilitate coordination of hoped-for joint
operations against the Doboj-Ozren area.1762 And a defeat in the Ozren would further
reduce VRS forces and resources and give the ARBiH a major psychological victory. The
operation would be the largest conducted to date by the ARBiH and would involve a
coordinated attack by major elements of the 2nd and 3rd Corps – up to 14.000 assault
troops – under General Delic’s personal supervision.

Order of Battle and Campaign Planning

The ARBiH

The Bosnian Army General Staff, which directly managed and coordinated the
operation, assigned the 2nd and 3rd Corps the mission of capturing “Route Duck”.1763 The

1762
General Sadic and Brigadier Mahmuljin both had explained the importance of “Route Duck” to the their
Muslim constituents. Zagreb Globus, after interviewing Sadic, wrote in 1994:
The Zavidovici-Banovici communication toward Tuzla is of vital importance. It is the fastest
connection between Tuzla and Zenica, as it is fully asphalted. The roads through which supplies are
brought into the Tuzla area at present will, with the first autumn rains, become unsafe. [According to
Sadie] “for instance, at Konjuh Planina, through the village of Milankovici, you already have to be
towed by a tractor, and when the earth is drenched with rain...”
Mahmuljin stated in 1995 (after the ARBiH finally conquered the area) that:
Our strategic task was above all to reestablish communications – telecommunications and
transportation, and this internal linkage of the free territory made it possible to move on further.
Nedzad Latic: They Will Never Again Think of Moving Against Us That Way, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 15 November
1995, pp. 5-6; an interview with Brigadier General Sakib Mahmuljin.
1763
Brigadier General Hazim Sadic, commander of the 2nd Corps, stated in August 1994 that:
The operation that is under way, is being directly conducted by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army
headquarters, and, apart from our corps, the Zenica [3rd] Corps formations are also involved – they
have captured the most important facilities on the western side of Ozren. We almost managed to
have the corps connected, in which case Vozuca, the main Chetnik stronghold, would have been cut
off.
The operation has been going on for quite a while, which we expected, but we will not stop before
we have complete control over the area. The Chetniks have launched a counterattack, and retrieved a
village above Podsijelovo, but the distance between the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Corps is now only 3

574
“Bosna” Operational Group / 3rd Corps, under the leadership of Colonel Fadil Hasanagic,
would lead 3rd Corps’ attack. The 3rd Corps commander, Brigadier Sakib Mahmuljin, and his
staff probably supervised Hasanagic’s command. The “Bosna” OG’s mission was to attack
from Muslim-held positions on the east bank of the Bosna River around Hajdarevici
southeast along the Krivaja River to link up with 2nd Corps forces. Normally, the OG’s sector
opposite the sector running from the important Blizna hill north of Zavidovici south to
Vozuca was manned by the 318th Zavidovici and 309th Kakanj Mountain Brigades. For this
operation, however, the OG was reinforced with assault troops believed to have been
drawn from the “El Mujahid” Detachment of foreign Muslim volunteers, the 7th Muslim
Mountain, 303rd Mountain, 311th Light, 314th Mountain, 320th Light, and 330th Light
Brigades. In addition, special operations units from the corps’ 3rd Recon-Sabotage Battalion
and the General Staff’s 120th Liberation Brigade “Black Swans” probably took part. All told,
the OG probably had about 7.000 assault troops, plus 5.000 sector-holding personnel in the
309th and 318th Brigades.
The other attack axis was under the command of 2nd Corps’ 6th “East” Operational
Group and, like the 3rd Corps’ OG at least part of the operation would be supervised by the
corps commander, Brigadier Hazim Sadic, and his staff. The 6th OG’s mission called for an
attack from the Banovici area – near newly captured Vijenac (see below) – along a
secondary road through the Seona / Lozna area to link up with the “Bosna” OG coming
south. In addition to the normal sector-holding troops from the 119th Banovici Mountain
Brigade, the OG appears to have been reinforced with both the 212th and 251st Liberation
Brigades to stiffen the spearhead of the attack. Very likely, elements of several more
brigades were collected to bolster the assault forces, drawn from the 211th Liberation,
210th Mountain, 117th Mountain, and all three Tuzla brigades. The total assault force
probably numbered 6.000, backed up by about 5.000 sector-holding personnel in the 117th
and 119th Mountain Brigades.

The VRS

VRS forces in the Ozren mountains came under the command of Major Milovan
Stankovic’s “Ozren” Tactical Group 6, part of Colonel Vladimir Arsic’s “Doboj” Operational
Group 9 / 1st Krajina Corps. Stankovic controlled at least six light infantry brigades – 1st
through 4th Ozren and 1st Vucijak Light Infantry Brigades, plus attached elements of the 1st
Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade.1764 Elements of the “Doboj” OG’s 2nd Armoured Brigade and

km. We expect to take complete control of the Banovici-Zavidovici communication, across the Krivaja
River valley, before the first rains...
Zeljko Garmaz and Sasa Buric: The Offensive Aimed At Cutting the Corridor and Lifting the Blockade of
Sarajevo Has Started, Zagreb Globus, 12 August 1994, pp. 2, 4, 13. Although Sadic exaggerates when he
claims that the offensive was still ongoing – in August – his statement regarding the conduct of the
operation and the results are generally accurate, although they also exaggerate the ARBiH successes.
1764
Going around the salient clockwise, the “Ozren” Tactical Group deployed its brigades as follows:
1st Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, northeastern sector along the Spreca River,

575
the corps-level 1st Mixed Artillery Regiment supported the tactical group. Of this array,
however, it would be only the 1st Vucijak east of Hajdarevici at Podsijelovo and the 4th
Ozren at Vozuca, and elements of the 2nd Ozren northwest of Banovici – some 2.500 troops
– bearing the brunt of the attack. Major Stankovic could call on the tactical reserves of his
other line brigades to strengthen his defences in the critical area, but these probably
numbered only about 1.000 troops. And to conduct a major counterattack, he would have
to ask for elite reserves controlled at the OG and corps levels (see text below).

Preliminaries:
Operation “Proljece 94”, The Capture of Vijenac Hill Area,
April – May 1994
Well before the battle’s planned commencement the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps
launched a small preliminary operation during April and May – “Proljece (Spring) 94” – to
secure important observation and jump-off positions for the main attack. The primary
objective was the occupation of Vijenac hill, a 700-meter feature from which the VRS could
look down on the Muslim-held town of Banovici, some 10 kilometers to the southeast. In
ARBiH hands, it would provide excellent observation over the Vozuca area for the attack. On
12 April troops from the 212th Liberation Brigade seized the approaches to Vijenac in a 40-
minute battle.1765 The attack should have been a wake-up call for the VRS 1st Krnjin Light
Infantry Brigade, but its troops were taken by surprise when on 11 May the ARBiH moved
against Vijenac itself. Again the 212th Liberation Brigade, now supported by the 117th
Lukavac and 119th Banovici Brigades, stormed and overwhelmed the VRS positions.1766 The
VRS lost a full company of troops, some 70 soldiers being captured and 21 killed in
action.1767 The ARBiH also captured a sizeable number of heavy weapons, including three
ZIS-3 76 mm field guns, four 120 mm mortars, and four 82 mm mortars.1768 It was a small,
quick action but it gave the ARBiH an enormous psychological victory that it could trumpet
for the rest of the year.

2nd Ozren Light Infantry Brigade (possibly with elements of the 1st Krnjin Brigade), southeastern sector
along the Spreca opposite Lukavac
4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, far south around Vozuca itself
1st Vucijak Light Infantry Brigade, southwestern sector, opposite Zavidovici
3rd Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, western sector opposite Maglaj
1765
Said Huremovic: 222nd Liberation Brigade: “Young Lions” Standard Bearers of Freedom, Prva Linija, March
1997, p. 23-24; article on 212th Liberation Brigade (later redesignated 222nd Liberation Brigade); Rifet
Haxkovi: Travnik Bosnjak, 17 October 1995, pp. 28-29; article on 117th Lukavac Brigade.
1766
Said Huremovic: 222nd Liberation Brigade: “Young Lions” Standard Bearers of Freedom, Prva Linija, March
1997, pp. 23-24; Rifet Haxkovi: Travnik Bosnjak, 17 October 1995, pp. 28-29; article on 117th Lukavac
Brigade; Sarajevo Radio, 13 May 1994.
1767
B. M., LJ. C: Mount Ozren Remains Serbian, Belgrade Vecemje Novosti, 20 May 1994, p. 5; Belgrade Tanjug.
23 November 1994.
1768
Said Huremovic: 222nd Liberation Brigade: “Young Lions” Standard Bearers of Freedom, Prva Linija, March
1997, pp. 23-24.

576
 The Battle of Vozuca Opens, 18 June 19941769
On 18 June the ARBiH opened the offensive and rolled over the VRS frontline
defences.1770 By 19 June more than 1.000 Serb civilians had fled their villages near the
frontline as the Muslim attack gathered steam. “Bosna” Operational Group forces appear to
have had the most success, and by 24 June ARBiH troops had seized six villages east of
Zavidovici, driving back the VRS 1st Vucijak Brigade. Meanwhile, the 6th OG / 2nd Corps
pushed northwest from the Banovici area against the 2nd and 4th Ozren Brigades. Two days
later, 2nd and 3rd Corps troops were only three kilometers apart and had nearly cut off VRS
4th Ozren Brigade forces around Vozuca. Muslim light infantry and special units penetrating
behind the Serbs’ thin frontline defences apparently disrupted a number of units, leading in
some cases to panic. But around the important Blizna hill on the northwest flank of the

1769
The narrative of the Battle of Vozuca is based on the following sources, including a large number of reports
using UN and VRS information, plus Sarajevo Radio and Belgrade Tanjug reporting. Note that few Bosnian
Army sources even obliquely refer to the June operation, a sure sign that it did not go according to plan.
• Kurt Sehork: Heavy Fighting Further Damages Bosnian Truce, June 18 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Serb Civilians Flee Moslem Attack, 19 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Bosnian Serbs Say Moslems Press on With Attacks, 19 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Serbs and Moslem-Led Army Clash in Central Bosnia, 22 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Serbs Flee As War Tide Turns in Central Bosnia, 24 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Bosnians Battle On Amid Peace Plan Preparations, 26 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Bosnian Armv Grabs More Ground From Serbs, 26 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Ceasefire Collapsing in Central Bosnia, UN Says, 28 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: UN Says Peace Plan Ready But Ceasefire Threatened, 29 June 1994.
• Kurt Sehork: Serbs Push Back Moslem-Led Forces in Bosnia, 2 July 1994.
• Sarajevo Radio, 27 June 1994.
• Sarajevo Radio, 29 June 1994.
• Sarajevo Radio, 1 July 1994.
• John Pomfret: Bosnians Keep Faith in Fighting, Washington Post, 10 July 1994, A1, A12 (An interesting
after-action account, based primarilv on UN reporting; it provides a fairly detailed description of the
ARBiH defeat).
• Said Huremovic: 222nd Liberation Brigade: “Young Lions” Standard Bearers of Freedom, Prva Linija,
March 1997, p. 23-24; article on 212th Liberation Brigade (later redesignated 222nd Liberation
Brigade).
• Sarajevo Ljiljan, 2 November 1997; interview with Brigadier Sakib Mahmuljin.
• Milka Tosic: The Striking Fist, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 52; an article on the VRS 1st MP Battalion.
• Zoran Grgurevic: The Pincers Will Not Close, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 22.
• Ljubomir Paljovic: The Eyes and Ears of the Corps, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 53; an article on the
VRS 1st Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company (later redesignated 1st Reconnaissance-Sabotage
Detachment)
• Lidija Zaric: From Lipa in Victory and Glory, Krajiski Vojnik, June 1994, p. 50; an article on the VRS 1st
Vucijak Light Infantry Brigade.
• M. Tosic: The Majority of the Glorious Ones – Tank Units, Krajiski Vojnik, August 1995, p. 34; an article
on the VRS 2nd Armored Brigade.
• Ljubinko Curic: 3rd Ozren Brigade: Barrier Against the Winds of Islam, Krajiski Vojnik, August 1995, p.
33.
Nenad Cjetkovic: Ozren Brigades of VRS Do Not Yield Before the Enemv: Ungovernable Mountain, Srpska
Vojska, 15 November 1994, pp. 28-29.
1770
The ARBiH attack broke an eight day old cease-fire which the UN had brokered, causing no small amount of
anger in UNPROFOR over what the UN perceived as Muslim “aggression”.

577
Muslim attack VRS units (apparently 3rd Ozren Brigade) were able to block ARBiH efforts to
widen the advance and protect the primary thrust.

The VRS Launches its Counter-strike, 28 June – 5 July 1994

Despite the rapidity of the Muslim advance and its near success, the VRS defenders
were not finished yet, and the 1st Krajina and East Bosnian Corps rushed reinforcements
into the Ozren. The 1st Krajina Corps sent in two motorized battalions from the 27th
Motorized Brigade, plus many of its elite units: elements of the 1st Military Police Battalion,
1st Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company, the “Wolves of Vucijak” Assault Detachment, and
probably the 9th Reconnaissance Company and 9th Military Police Battalion from “Doboj”
Operational Group – about 1.750 troops. The East Bosnian Corps also sent its veteran 1.000-
man 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers” under Major Ljubisa Savic (“Mauzer”) to
the area.
With the arrival of the “Panthers” on about 26 June, the “Ozren” Tactical Group
was ready to begin its counterattack. Perhaps the 1st Krajina Corps reinforcements had
blunted and roughed up the ARBiH advance, because the ARBiH began to rotate its front
line units just as the VRS was preparing to make its move. In addition, communications
between the 2nd and 3rd Corps may have broken down.1771
The “Panthers”, joining with the 1st Krajina Corps reinforcements, appear to have
attacked on 28 June into the Hajdarevici area to strike the flank of “Bosna” OG’s
spearheads. The elite VRS troops sliced through the ARBiH’s exposed positions, seizing
several villages. As 3rd Corps shifted forces to meet the threat on about 1 July, the VRS
appears to have intentionally pulled back its spearheads, luring Muslim troops into an
artillery killing ground strewn with mines. Reeling ARBiH forces took heavy losses in the
ensuing fire storm.1772 In the chaos and shock that followed this set back, the “Ozren”
Tactical Group launched a general counterattack against both the 2nd and 3rd Corps thrusts,
and by 4/5 July they had driven the disorganized Muslim forces back to their start line. A
once promising advance disintegrated into a discouraging defeat.1773

Evaluation of the June Vozuca Operation

Like so many of its ambitious attacks in 1994, the operation against Vozuca was a
learning experience for the Bosnian Army. The dramatic shift in the fortunes of the battle
over a span of less than four days made the failure in the Ozren one of the ARBiH’s more
spectacular setbacks, capturing the front page of the Washington Post. Despite its lack of

1771
John Pomfret: Bosnians Keep Faith in Fighting, Washington Post, 10 July 1994, A1, A12.
1772
A Bosnian Army officer reportedly stated that: “It was massacre...” John Pomfret: Bosnians Keep Faith in
Fighting, Washington Post, 10 July 1994, A1, A12.
1773
Bosnian Army casualties numbered at least 600 to 700 men killed and wounded, and possibly up to 1.500
over about 17 days of fighting. Reuters: Serbs Stop Bosnian Offensives, Reaffirm Superiority by Davor Huic.
7 September 1994.

578
success, the operation displayed some important new ARBiH strengths. The ability of the
General Staff and its two corps to organize, move, and supply such a large number of troops
was an impressive feat for an army more used to defending than attacking. And, as in many
of its offensive operations in 1994, ARBiH units, particularly elite recon-sabotage forces,
demonstrated great effectiveness in penetrating VRS defences and sowing panic behind
Serb lines to disrupt the VRS defensive effort. But key ARBiH weaknesses left the army still
vulnerable to many of the VRS’s unique strengths. In particular, the ARBiH appears to have
failed to properly consolidate its gains at the tactical and operational levels, leaving its main
thrust overextended and vulnerable to the VRS counter-strike. This was a constantly
recurring problem with many of the ARBiH attacks during 1994, most dramatically
demonstrated at Bihac four months later. Limited tactical radio communications made it
difficult for ARBiH commands to coordinate the actions of many units in the attack, which
further hampered the advance.
The operation in the Ozren also displayed the Bosnian Serb Army’s traditional
strengths and weaknesses. The VRS’s ability to organize and rapidly deploy elite reserve
formations to mount a major counterattack again showed the Serbs’ superiority in staff
work, logistics, and mobility. It was the tried and true professional skills of the VRS mid-level
and senior commanders in integrating these units and exploiting the classic VRS firepower
that produced the effective artillery and minefield “ambush” tactics that confounded the
ARBiH offensive. But the VRS defensive performance was also marred by several troubling
failures that were characteristic of its actions during 1994. As frequently noted earlier, at
the battalion level and below most VRS brigades were poorly led, disciplined, and trained,
and too often they appear to have panicked too easily and fallen back precipitously,
particularly when surprised by ARBiH sabotage units. At the strategic and operational level,
VRS commanders and staff had to operate with insufficient reserve forces that could quickly
be inserted into a difficult battle situation. The 1st Krajina Corps had an impressive array of
elite reserves to draw on to halt and disperse the Bosnian Army offensive, but they had to
be shifted a considerable distance. The fact that the “Ozren” Tactical Group had to rely so
quickly and so heavily on these corps-level reserves signalled an ominous dependence that
would grow worse. Most of the elite 1st Krajina units would be called on for every major
battle fought during 1994, because there simply were few local reserves available.

Battle for Vozuca Resumes, November 1994

Much later that year the ARBiH revived its campaign against Vozuca, but with major
differences. This time the attack was timed with 2nd and 3rd Corps attacks on Doboj and
Teslic and, in contrast to the failed June-July operation, the two corps’ assignments were to
seize and hold key hills and villages that would form the starting blocks for a later operation
to win back Vozuca and “Route Duck”. The “Bosna” Operational Group / 3rd Corps was
charged with squeezing the narrow waist of the Ozren-Vozuca salient; a week’s fighting

579
penetrated about a kilometre deep into the VRS defences.1774 The 6th “East” Operational
Group / 2nd Corps attacked south and northeast of Vozuca at the same time, achieving even
greater success by capturing several hilltops and villages at the waist or around Vozuca.1775
Counterattacks by the local VRS forces kept the ARBiH from squeezing further, but, without
elite reinforcements, were unable to retake the lost positions. The VRS’ corps-level reserves
were already containing the 2nd and 3rd Corps attacks around Doboj and Teslic and
supporting the Bihac counteroffensive; they could not be spared for a major action to retake
the limited ARBiH advances at Vozuca.

1774
Sarajevo Radio 10-19 November 1994, Belgrade Tanjug, 10-19 November 1994. “Bosna” OG forces,
probably drawn primarily from the 303rd and 314th Zenica Mountain Brigades, and the 318th Zavidovici
and 309th Kakanj Mountain Brigades, faced the VRS 1st Prnjavor and 1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigades /
“0zren” Tactical Group 6.
1775
Sarajevo Radio 14 November 1994; Rifet Haskovic: Travnik Bosnjak, 17 October 1995, pp. 28-29; article on
117th Lukavac Brigade; Said Huremovic: 222nd Liberation Brigade: “Young Lions” Standard Bearers of
Freedom, Prva Linija, March 1997, pp. 23-24, article on 12th Liberation Brigade (later redesignated 222nd
Liberation Brigade); elements of the 117th, 119th, 121st, 220th, and 216 Mountain and 212th Liberation
Brigades were involved in the operation.They faced the VRS 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, reinforced
with a battalion from the 1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigade, and possibly elements of the 1st Prnjavor
Light Infantry Brigade / “0zren” Tactical Group.

580
 Annex 55
Back and Forth on Mt. Vlasic, 1994
The commanding heights of the massive Vlasic feature – 1.933 meters high atop its
tallest peak, Mt. Paljenik – overlooked the entire western Lasva valley; its strategic
significance was obvious to all the warring factions. It had been seized at the very outset of
the war by the Bosnian Croats, but the JNA occupied the peak in May 1992 and its Bosnian
Serb Army successors retained possession thereafter. From the slopes of Mt. Vlasic the
Bosnian Serbs could shell Muslim-held Travnik and Zenica at will, causing relatively little
physical damage but spreading constant fear among the townspeople. The summit was also
the site of a key military communications facility and civilian radio and television
transmitters. A key terrain feature at a critical location, Mt. Vlasic was the gateway to Donji
Vakuf and Jajce – and that gate was firmly closed.
Responsibility for the defence of the mountain fell to the Bosnian Serb Army’s
“Vlasic” Operational Group of the 1st Krajina Corps, formed from the headquarters, 22nd
Infantry Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Janko Trivic. The “Vlasic” OG
was comprised of three infantry / light infantry brigades – the 1st Kotor Varos Light Infantry,
22nd Infantry, and the 1st Knezevo Light Infantry Brigades, supported by an artillery
battalion and one tank company.1776 The 22nd Infantry was stationed directly on the
mountain and opposite Turbe to the south, while the 1st Kotor Varos occupied the
Meokrnje feature to the north of Vlasic.
Holding the Muslim territory immediately adjacent to Mt. Vlasic were the two or
three Bosnian Army brigades based in Travnik. The attacks on the mountain, however, were
conducted by the ARBiH 7th Corps, and major elements of the corps were dedicated to
Vlasic’s seizure in some of its most important operations of the year. For the larger
offensives in 1994, the 7th corps committed its spearhead 17th Krajina Brigade from Travnik
(along with the 3rd Corps’ analogous 7th Muslim Brigade), the 27th Banja Luka Brigade also
in Travnik, at least elements of the 305th Jajce Mountain Brigade, 306th Mountain Brigade,
and 325th Mountain Brigade, and possibly also the 333rd Mountain Brigade.
At the very end of March the Bosnian Army mounted the first of its many assaults
on Mt. Vlasic feature, apparently as a secondary effort in support of its concurrent attack
toward Donji Vakuf. These attacks continued well into April. After weeks of uneventful
skirmishing, elements of the ARBiH’s newly formed 7th Corps finally broke through near the
boundary between the VRS 1st Kotor Varos and 22nd Infantry Brigades in the Mt. Meokrnje-
Javorak area on 28 April, and made some important tactical gains.1777 The VRS, however,

1776
The 1st Knezevo Light Infantry Brigade appears to have been a second-line formation, probably composed
of older and less capable personnel; it appears to have been held in reserve behind the 22nd Infantry
Brigade.
1777
Sarajevo Radio, 28 April 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2804124394, 281243Z April 1994.

581
contained the advance the following day and recaptured some of the lost territory over the
next two weeks.1778 1779
After a short lull, Government forces resumed their attacks on 24 May, launching a
major attack against the “Vlasic” OG along the entire Vlasic frontline in an effort to encircle
the mountain. Although the Bosnian Army was able to press the Serb-held flanks back and
gain control of much of the Vlasic feature’s perimeter, it was unable to complete the
encirclement and the VRS remained able to resupply their forces on the mountain. It was,
however, a close-run thing: the “Vlasic” OG reserves were all but exhausted and the VRS
was just barely able to maintain the line.
Fighting picked up again around 25 July when VRS forces counterattacked in the
Javorak area – on the southeast part of the Vlasic feature – trying to take back some of the
Government gains. But the VRS offensive efforts were similarly unsuccessful, and little
ground changed hands. Things remained quiet atop the mountain for the next few weeks as
the Bosnian Army again built up its forces for yet another offensive push.
The beginning of September saw what was apparently the last major Bosnian Army
attempt in 1994 to take over the mountain, followed by another limited VRS counterattack
in the Vlasic-Turbe area on 6 September.1780 The offensive won some more ridge lines but
again fell short of its goal. With winter approaching, the Bosnian Army reluctantly
abandoned the idea of occupying Vlasic in 1994, and the ARBiH redirected some of its forces
on Vlasic southwest to support its October-November offensives in the Donji Vakuf and
Kupres areas. The VRS relied primarily on artillery fire for the remainder of the year,
continuing to shell Travnik and its environs and only occasionally mounting small-scale
infantry attacks in the direction of Turbe.
The ARBiH’s operations on Mt. Vlasic in 1994 illustrated many of the Bosnian
Army’s weaknesses at this time. The strategic concept was sound: mount a limited attack in
sufficient force to capture a key terrain feature overlooking several roads and towns. But
the plan largely broke down in the execution phase as the lightly armed Bosnian attackers
tried and failed to break through the multiple layers of well prepared Serb defences. (In
places, the VRS units atop Vlasic fought from concrete bunkers behind four concentric rings
of minefields.) Lacking the heavy artillery needed to dislodge entrenched enemy forces, or
even enough mortars for suppressive fire, the ARBiH infantry had to throw itself against
dug-in opponents on mountainous terrain behind minefields and barbed wire. It was a
recipe for high casualties and small gains, as repeatedly proved to be the case.
The Bosnian Army’s 1994 campaigns had tied down some VRS forces during ARBiH
attacks elsewhere and won some modest territorial gains, but had done little to force the
offending artillery off the Vlasic plateau. The Serbs could still shell Travnik and Zenica from
the heights with impunity, and they made the ARBiH pay for its offensives by stepping up
their shelling of the two towns. Weighed against the high casualties the ARBiH 7th Corps

1778
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 April 1994, FBIS London LD2904125894, 291258Z April 1994.
1779
Reuters: Moslems Seized Land While World Watched Gorazde – UN by Davor Huic, 6 May 1994.
1780
Reuters: Serbs Stop Bosnian Offensives, Reaffirm Superiority by Davor Huic, 7 September 1994.

582
had sustained in its offensives, the Bosnian Army leadership had to accept that costs had
probably exceeded gains. Despite this hard reality, Alagic’s 7th Corps had by no means given
up on Vlasic. The homes of the thousands of displaced soldiers in the 7th Corps’ ranks lay on
the far side of Vlasic, and they were as determined as ever to go through, over, or around
the mountain in order to get there.

583
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle
Mt. Vlasic Offensives, 1994

ARBiH 7th Corps, HQ Travnik

Brig. Gen. Mehmet Alagic, commander

7th Muslim Brigade, HQ Zenica

(Note: ARBiH 3rd Corps subordinate, opcon to 7th Corps for Vlasic operations)
– Probably most or all of the brigade during attacks

17th Krajina Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

– At least one battalion normally, possibly the entire brigade during attacks

27th Banja Luka Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

– Probably most or all of the brigade during attacks

305th Jajce Mountain brigade

– Probably one battalion normally, entire brigade during attacks

306th Mountain Brigade, HQ Han Bila

– Probably the entire brigade during attacks

325th Vitez Mountain Brigade, HQ S. of Vitez

– At least one battalion

333rd Mountain Brigade, HQ Kacuni

– Possibly one battalion

584
 Chart 2
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle
Mt. Vlasic Offensives, 1994

VRS 1st Krajina Corps, HQ Banja Luka

Lt. Col. Gen. Momir Talic, commander

“Vlasic” Operational Group, HQ Vitovlje

Lt. Col. Janko Trivic

1st Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kotor Varos

– AOR Javorak-Meokrnje northeast of Vlasic feature

22nd Infantry Brigade, HQ Skender Vakuf (aka Knezevo)

– Deployed on Vlasic itself

1st Knezevo Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Skender Vakuf (aka Knezevo)

– Deployed behind 22nd Brigade near Babanovac

585
 Annex 56
The Battles for Herzegovina, 1994
September: The ARBiH Push from Konjic
As 1994 began, Muslim-held Konjic faced a small, hostile Croat community
immediately to its south and a Serb-occupied confrontation line only a few kilometers to the
east. Konjic was well within Serb artillery range, and the Serbs’ regular shelling of the town
gave the Muslims a powerful incentive to push the confrontation line a few kilometers back.
Strategically, moving Konjic out of artillery range would secure the all- weather north-south
road into Sarajevo for relief convoys and the military supplies that would be coming up from
Croatia following the signing of the Washington Agreement. All these considerations figured
into the ARBiH planners’ decision to make Konjic the focus of their next 1994 offensive.
The main Bosnian Army 43rd “Suad Alic” Brigade was raised from Konjic itself, and
manned the confrontation line in the area around the town. To the west of Konjic, the 49th
Brigade held the Bijelemici area. When called on for offensives, the 43rd and 49th Brigades
were probably reinforced by corps-level reserves, including at least the 4th Muslim Brigade.
The Bosnian Serb Army’s 2nd Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade of the Herzegovina
Corps bore primary responsibility for defending the Konjic area, supported by the corps-
level artillery that harassed the town from the hills. The brigade held a salient along the
Neretva river southeast of Konjic, with Bosnian Army forces to the north, west, and east of
it. The left flank of the 2nd Herzegovina’s line was about 15km south of Konjic, and the right
flank of its horseshoe-shaped line was near the town of Glavaticevo about 15km southeast
of Konjic. The VRS-held line ran as close as 3km to Konjic itself, just south of the town. The
18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade bounded the 2nd Herzegovina on the right near
Glavaticevo.
To the south of Konjic, a tiny Croat-held area was controlled by the HVO’s 56th
“Herceg Stjepan” Home Defence Regiment. Until the signing of the Washington agreement
the HVO regiment would periodically shell the Muslim lines, supplied and abetted by
Bosnian Serb forces.1781 1782 1783 Following the Washington Agreement, the HVO regiment
faced toward the Serbs, took charge of a small segment of the front, and provided marginal
assistance to the ARBiH, but it was never fully trusted by the Bosnian Army’s Fourth Corps
leaders.
In addition to the three combatant forces, there was a fourth actor in the Konjic
area: The UN’s Malaysian battalion, whose first elements arrived in the Konjic area on 9
February.1784 1785 The battalion was one of those the UN directed to patrol the frontline

1781
Sarajevo Radio, 3 February 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0302103294, 031032Z February 1994.
1782
Sarajevo Radio, 12 February 1994, FBIS London LD1202185094, 121850Z February 1994.
1783
Sarajevo Radio, 21 Feburarv 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2102100594, 211005Z February 1994.
1784
Sarajevo Radio, 9 February 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0902144294, 091442Z February 1994.

586
between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats just after the signing of the Washington
Agreement. Malaysian peacekeepers took over the checkpoints in the area formerly
manned by ARBiH and HVO soldiers.1786
Konjic was shelled regularly (though not especially heavily) during most of 1994,
but on the whole it was a secondary theatre and infantry clashes were minor and
infrequent. Beginning in late August, though, the pace of fighting began to escalate –
possibly as both sides sent forward infantry probes to determine each other’s intentions
and seek out weaknesses in the opposing lines.1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 Bosnian Serb shelling of
Konjic also increased.1792 This activity rose to a crescendo on 11-12 September when the
Bosnian Army opened a determined offensive, launching infantry assaults on three Serb-
held suburbs: Bijela, Borci, and Glavaticevo.1793 As expected, the VRS responded
immediately with heavy shelling of the front lines and Konjic itself.1794 The Bosnian Army
made steady advances over the next few days, systematically eliminating VRS bunkers and
strong-points and occupying the high ground overlooking Bijela, a sizable village southeast
of Konjic.1795 1796 By 15 September, the UN confirmed the ARBiH capture of Bijela.1797
So far, the HVO’s 56th “Herceg Stjepan” Home Defence Regiment had been a part
of the offensive, securing its section of the confrontation line and supporting the Bosnian
Army advance with mortar fire.1798 With the capture of Bijela, however, the HVO regimental
command reversed its position and advised that it was pulling out of the line.1799 This
announcement caused substantial consternation in the Federation camp. ARBiH and HVO
officials quickly called a meeting in Sarajevo that same day, 15 September, and both sides
issued soothing statements playing down the rift. US diplomatic pressure helped to avert a
crisis within the nascent Federation, and the HVO eventually reversed its position and
agreed to cancel plans to withdraw from the fight.1800 1801 1802
Meanwhile, the Bosnian Army pressed on with its successful offensive southward,
extending the front line some 10 km on 15 and 16 September and taking about 40 square

1785
By July, the UN Malaysian battalion (Malbatt) had a total of 1.487peacekeepers in Bosnia, of which 687
were stationed in Konjic. Kuala Lumpur Bemama, 3 July 1994, FBIS Bangkok BK0207092694, 020926Z July
1994.
1786
Paris AFP, 4 March 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0403135994, 041359Z March 1994.
1787
Belgrade Tanjug, 25 August 1994, FBIS London LD250S221494, 252214Z August 1994.
1788
Sarajevo Radio, 29 August 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2908120894, 291208Z August 1994.
1789
Sarajevo Radio, 30 August 1994, FBIS Vienna AU3008192194, 301921Z August 1994.
1790
Ljubljana Radio, 7 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0709142394, 071423Z September 1994.
1791
Belgrade Tanjug, 9 September 1994, FBIS London LD0909161794, 091617Z September 1994.
1792
Sarajevo Radio, 6 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0609192894, 061928Z September 1994.
1793
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 September 1994, FBIS London LD1209165294, 121652Z September 1994.
1794
Reuters: Moslems Evacuated After Bosnian Serb Assault by Kurt Schork, 13 September 1994.
1795
Sarajevo Radio, 14 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1409100794, 141007Z September 1994.
1796
Belgrade Tanjug, 14 September 1994, FBIS London LD1409114994, 141149Z September 1994.
1797
Reuters: Bosnian Serbs Vow To Defy U.S. Ultimatum by Kurt Schork, 15 September 1994.
1798
Paris AFP, 15 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1509093494, 150934Z September 1994.
1799
Paris AFP, 15 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1509100894, 151008Z September 1994.
1800
Paris AFP, 15 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1509182894, 151828Z September 1994.
1801
Zagreb Hina, 19 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1909184194, 191841Z September 1994.
1802
Sarajevo Radio, 20 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2009205094, 202050Z September 1994.

587
kilometers from the 2nd Herzegovina Brigade.1803 1804 1805 1806 Steady fighting continued
through the following week, with steady but smaller Bosnian Army advances.1807 A brief lull
was followed by a renewed Bosnian Army push along the Borci-Glavaticevo line southeast of
Konjic beginning 23 September.1808 At the beginning of October, the Bosnians extended
their advance slightly further, taking the important Riser hill south of Konjic and rolling on to
the south.1809 There the advance ceased, after which back and forth fighting through the
rest of the year reclaimed some lost territory for the VRS, but the front lines had generally
stabilized, leaving the Bosnian Army in possession of almost 100 square kilometers beyond
Konjic’s former perimeter.1810 In terms of net gains, the Konjic-area offensive was to be one
of the ARBiH’s most successful operations of the year.

Nevesinje in November
Serb-held Nevesinje was about 20 km due east of Muslim-held Blagaj and Croat-
held Buna. The confrontation line was well west of the town, and Nevesinje had been
virtually untouched by the war. The Bosnian Army and sometimes the HVO would
occasionally shell some of the intervening Serb-held towns, but on the whole it was a quiet
section of the front.
The first serious action in the Nevesinje sector began shortly after the 15
September Bosnian Army offensive from Konjic, well to the north. While still pressing its
attacks outward from Konjic, on 19 September the Bosnian Army shifted its emphasis to the
Mostar- Nevesinje axis, pressing its attacks for a week through 26 September with no
apparent gains.1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 It tried another offensive push in the Mostar-
Nevesinje area a month later, this time launching infantry attacks eastward from Blagaj
beginning on 12 October. This effort also halted after a few days without visible gains.1818
1819 1820

1803
Zagreb Radio, 15 September 1994, FBIS London LD1509161994, 151619Z September 1994.
1804
Zagreb Hina, 15 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1509171494, 151714Z September 1994.
1805
Sarajevo Radio, 16 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1609171694, 161716Z September 1994.
1806
Zagreb Hina, 17 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1709144194, 171441Z September 1994.
1807
Sarajevo Radio, 20 September 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2009144894, 201448Z September 1994.
1808
Belgrade Tanjug, 23 September 1994, FBIS London LD2309192794, 231927Z September 1994.
1809
Reuters: Serbs Renege on Pledge to Unblock U.N. Convoys byKurt Schork, 2 October 1994.
1810
Belgrade Tanjug, 10 October 1994, FBIS London LD1010160994, 101609Z October 1994.
1811
Belgrade Tanjug, 19 September 1994, FBIS London LD1909105994, 191059Z September 1994.
1812
Belgrade Tanjug, 19 September 1994, FBIS London LD1909200394, 192003Z September 1994.
1813
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 September 1994, FBIS London LD2109150794, 211507Z September 1994.
1814
Belgrade Tanjug, 24 September 1994, FBIS London LD2409183994, 241839Z September 1994.
1815
Belgrade Tanjug, 25 September 1994, FBIS London LD2509141194, 251411Z September 1994.
1816
Belgrade Tanjug, 25 September 1994, FBIS London LD2509192894, 251928Z September 1994.
1817
Belgrade Tanjug, 26 September 1994, FBIS London LD2609161794, 261617Z September 1994.
1818
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 October 1994, FBIS London LD1210130894, 121308Z October 1994.
1819
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 October 1994, FBIS London LD1310111094, 131110Z October 1994.
1820
Belgrade Tanjug, 19 October 1994, FBIS London LD1910213294, 192132Z October 1994.

588
 The Bosnian Army’s main offensive effort came the following month, when the
ARBiH 4th Corps attempted to cut the road to Nevesinje. The night before the main attack
the 4th Corps sent in elite “recon-sabotage” elements – most likely from the General Staff’s
crack “Black Swans” unit – to infiltrate VRS 8th Herzegovina Motorized Brigade lines at
Sipovac and Podvelezje, northwest of Nevesinje. The conventional assault began with the
Bosnian Army shelling Serb positions on the morning of 11 November, followed by an
infantry attack from Blagaj.1821 1822 1823 The conventional assaults had only limited success,
but the infiltration teams appear to have caused considerable disruption in the VRS rear
area, striking at Cobanovo Polje (about 4km east of Blagaj) and as far away as Rabina (about
10 km east of Blagaj).1824 However, at least some of the infiltration teams had to fight stand-
up engagements with Bosnian Serb Army units and likely took heavy casualties on the way
back out. The Bosnian Army offensive halted around 20 November, with apparently heavy
casualties on both sides.1825 1826 1827 1828

1821
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 November 1994, FBIS London LD1111143994, 111439Z November 1994
1822
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 November 1994, FBIS London LD1111153694, 111536Z November 1994.
1823
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 November 1994, FBIS London LD1211141294, 121412Z November 1994.
1824
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 November 1994, FBIS London LD1211190594, 121905Z November 1994.
1825
Belgrade Tanjug, 12 November 1994, FBIS London LD1211192694, 121926Z November 1994.
1826
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 November 1994, FBIS London LD1311203494, 132034Z November 1994.
1827
Belgrade Tanjug, 18 November 1994, FBIS London LD1811210494, 182104Z November 1994.
1828
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 November 1994, FBIS London LD2111180294, 211802Z November 1994.

589
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle,
Konjic Area, 1994

ARBiH 4th Corps (Elements)

43rd “Suad Alic” Mountain Brigade, HQ Konjic

(previously the 7th Suad Alic Brigade)
(later the 443rd Suad Alic Mountain Brigade)
[Established 3 November 1992]

450th Light Brigade

(Probably the former 649th Brigade)
[Established 30 November 1993]

590
 Chart 2
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Order of Battle,
Konjic Area, 1994

HVO Mostar Corps District, HQ Mostar (Elements)

56th “Herceg Stjepan” Home Defence Regiment,

(Formerly the Herceg Stjepan Brigade)
– HQ south of Konjic

591
 Chart 3
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle
Konjic Area, 1994

VRS Herzegovina Corps, Forward Command Post at Trebinje

2nd Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Borci

– deployed in Konjic-Glavaticevo area

18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Gacko

– deployed in Glavaticevo-Treskavica area

592
 Annex 57
“Twin Peaks”:
The Battles for Mts. Bjelasnica and Treskavica, 1994
There are two commanding peaks just south of Sarajevo. One is Mt. Igman (968
meters), less tall than its neighbour but more important by virtue of its proximity to the city
and the fact that the Igman road, one of besieged Sarajevo’s few lifelines, ran over the
mountain. The other peak is Mt. Bjelasnica (2.067 meters), slightly south and west of Mt.
Igman and one of the highest peaks in Bosnia. In addition to its towering height, Bjelasnica’s
summit had additional value as the site of a huge radio and television transmitter – one of
Sarajevo’s more recognizable landmarks.
Both Igman and Bjelasnica had been captured by the Bosnian Serbs in mid-1993,
but were placed under UN control after the threat of NATO airstrikes compelled the VRS to
withdraw from the mountains. Since the 14 August 1993 UN-imposed demilitarization
agreement, the UN held control of the peaks with the understanding that UN peacekeepers
would keep the DMZ free of combatants or equipment from any of the factions.1829 The
ostensible demilitarization did not, however, keep the Bosnian Army from stationing troops
on both peaks. Probably as many as 2.000 ARBiH troops occupied the “UN-controlled”
mountains at any given time, and even more worked on prepared defences, bunkers and
trench lines within the demilitarized zone. Swedish UN peacekeepers tried and failed to
sweep the Government forces off the mountains in late 1993.
In its many assaults on the peaks the Bosnian Army’s real, ultimate objective was
neither Bjelasnica nor Treskavica themselves, but the town of Trnovo. The town lay astride
the major road running south out of Sarajevo, connecting Serb-held Herzegovina to the
Serb-controlled areas around Sarajevo. Trnovo was also a gateway to the Drina Valley,
where a road continued on to Serb-held Foca and – ultimately – Gorazde. By virtue of its
location, Trnovo became one of the most sought-after ARBiH objectives in eastern Bosnia.
The 1994 offensives against both Bjelasnica and Treskavica were carried out by the
ARBiH’s 1st Corps, with only a minor supporting attack by the 4th Corps to the south.
Mt. Bjelasnica lay within the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps area of responsibility.
The siege of the city and the defence of the Serb-majority neighbourhoods of Sarajevo was
this corps’ primary responsibility, and a comparatively weak holding force manned the
confrontation line to the east of Bjelasnica. Elements of the 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry
Brigade and the entire 12th Kotorsko Light Infantry Brigade – attached from the 1st Krajina
Corps – held roughly 20 km of defensive positions along the edge of the demilitarized area,
starting from the southern outskirts of the city near Sarajevo airport to Trnovo itself.
Elements of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade and the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment

1829
In addition to being demilitarized (i.e. no troops or equipment belonging to any faction were supposed to
be on or transit across the mountains), both mountains were within the 20 km heavy-weapons exclusion
zone in any case.

593
provided armour and artillery support, while the 4th Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment
“White Wolves” was available to act in the “intervention” (counterattack) role.
Southeast of Mt. Bjelasnica was the equally imposing Mt. Treskavica (2.088
meters). Treskavica was just south of the 20 km artillery exclusion zone and had not been
included in the August 1993 demilitarization agreement, so there were no restrictions on
weapons or forces on its slopes and heights.
The area to the south of Trnovo – including Mt. Treskavica – all lay within the area
of VRS Herzegovina Corps. Within the corps, the VRS defence of the Treskavica area was
assigned to Tactical Group “Kalinovik”, formed from the headquarters of the 1st Guards
Motorized Brigade and headquartered in Kalinovik with two subordinate brigades. The
area’s main defence centred on the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade – a VRS Main Staff
subordinate that was attached to the Herzegovina Corps. In addition, TG “Kalinovik”
controlled the 18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade from Gacko, which bounded the 1st
Guards on the left, south of Treskavica.
Total VRS forces on the Trnovo-Treskavica front probably numbered about 5.500 to
6.000 troops. Both the Sarajevo-Romanija and Herzegovina Corps probably could also draw
on some VRS Main Staff elements, primarily the 65th Protection Motorized Regiment, plus
parts of the MUP Special Police Brigade, to counterattack any ARBiH advances.1830

October 1994: The Bjelasnica Controversy

Around the end of September, the Bosnian Army began massing its forces on and
around Mt. Bjelasnica – site of the former Alpine skiing, bobsled, and luge runs in the 1984
Olympic Games – for a substantial offensive directed through the demilitarized zone and
against Serb positions on the mountain’s far side.1831 The first of October marked the
commencement of ARBiH offensive operations in the Bjelasnica-Treskavica area. The attack
was launched by probably most of two full 1st Corps brigades – the 82nd Mountain and 1st
Mountain Brigades – as well as elements of at least three other brigades, further supported
by the Interior Ministry’s elite “Lasta” (Swallows) special police battalion.1832 The offensive
started against the town of Rakitnica on the slopes of Mt. Bjelasnica, and soon expanded to
include fighting along the entire Bjelasnica-Treskavica frontline.1833 Trnovo itself came under
Bosnian Army artillery fire the following day.1834 (Still further to the south, the Bosnian Army
was also taking the offensive from Konjic towards Kalinovik.) French UN peacekeepers
blocked some 300 Bosnian Army troops of the 1st Corps’ 1st Mountain Brigade transiting
the mountain on 3 October, but others were clearly getting through.1835 1836

1830
Milenko Kuzmanovic: Offensive Against Bjelasnica, Treskavica, and Igman Stopped: Fury Because of
Powerlessness, Srpska Vojska, 15 November 1994, pp. 24-24, FBIS Reston 98E08022A, 211625Z November
1997.
1831
Belgrade Tanjug, 20 September 1994, FBIS London LD2009170994, 201709Z September 1994.
1832
Sarajevo Radio, 15 December 1994, FBIS Vienna VA1512202794, 152027Z December 1994.
1833
Sarajevo Radio, 1 October 1994, FBIS London LD0110170X94, 011708Z October 1994.
1834
Belgrade Tanjug, 2 October 1994, FBIS London LD0210135594, 021355Z October 1994.
1835
Paris AFP, 3 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0310102294, 031022Z October 1994.

594
 Controversy erupted the following week, on 6 October, when the Bosnian Serbs
charged that a Bosnian Army sabotage unit had massacred and then mutilated 20 Serb
troops – including four female nurses – at a VRS battalion headquarters of the 2nd Sarajevo
Light Infantry Brigade location near Mount Bjelasnica. The UN initially appeared to
corroborate the Bosnian Serb reports, and UN Special Envoy Akashi told reporters that in
many cases the Serb bodies had been “mutilated or burned and disfigured”.1837 Details of
what had happened atop the snow-covered mountain remained unclear.
The Bosnian Serb reaction was prompt and typically threatening. The VRS Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps issued an ominous statement that “this criminal act by the Muslim side has
made Sarajevo a tinderbox that can ignite the whole area” – implying though not stating
that general Serb shelling of the city could resume despite the creation of the heavy-
weapons exclusion zone.1838 Bosnian Serb President Karadzic asserted that the Bosnian
Serbs might demand the return of Mts. Igman and Bjelasnica and suggested that the Serbs
might also cease to guarantee the safety of UN relief flights into Sarajevo airport.1839
The UN took immediate action, hoping to forestall a general VRS offensive by
clearing the mountains of Muslims. French UN peacekeepers swept over the Igman and
Bjelasnica areas on 7 October, forcing Bosnian Army soldiers out of their positions and off
the mountains. On the first day, some 550 ARBiH troops were escorted out of the
demilitarized zone – occasionally with the additional persuasion of French warning shots –
and their bunkers were destroyed with anti-tank rockets.1840
At this point, a clearer picture began to emerge of what had taken place during the
attack that night. First, the UN retracted its charge that the Bosnian Army had mutilated the
enemy corpses. Instead, it turned out that four sentries had had their throats slit in a
commando-style operation. Others had been shot at close range but apparently during
combat. What had happened began to look less and less like a massacre. Under closer
scrutiny, the evidence pointed instead to a sophisticated, swiftly-executed sabotage
operation against the command post of the VRS 3rd (Trnovo) Battalion / 2nd Sarajevo Light
Infantry Brigade.1841 An indignant Bosnian Government demanded a formal apology for
Akashi’s earlier assertions that the Bosnian Army had executed its prisoners. The UN
levelled the counter-accusation that the Bosnian Army was not supposed to be operating in
the demilitarized zone in the first place.1842

1836
Belgrade Tanjug, 5 October 1994, FBIS London LD0510184494, 051844Z October 1994.
1837
Reuters: U.N. Withdraws Mutilation Charge in Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 7 October 1994.
1838
Reuters: Serb Corpses Mutilated in Attack by Kurt Schork, 6 October 1994.
1839
Reuters: Serb Threaten to Ignite Sarajevo After Atrocity by Kurt Schork, 7 October 1994
1840
Reuters: U.N. Drives Bosnian Troops From Mountain DMZ by Kurt Schork, 7 October 1994.
1841
Reuters: U.N. Withdraws Mutilation Charge in Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 7 October 1994; Sarajevo Radio, 7
October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0710200494, 072004Z October 1994; a press conference with Bosnian
President Izetbegovic.
1842
Reuters: Bosnian President Demands U.N. Public Apology by Kurt Schork, 7 October 1994.

595
 Meanwhile, UN forces continued to force Government troops off the mountains,
both to preserve UN credibility and to forestall VRS retaliation against Sarajevo city.1843 1844
On 9 October, the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Government, and the United Nations agreed
to form a joint commission to inspect the demilitarized zone and verify that it had been
cleared of Government forces.1845 UNPROFOR Bosnian Commander Rose met with Mladic
on 10 October to discuss the demilitarization, while Karadzic continued to threaten that if
UNPROFOR did not clear the mountains, the VRS would retaliate “against selected targets
on the Muslim side” and would “teach the Muslims how to behave in a demilitarized
zone”.1846
The dispute dragged on. Not only did the Bosnian Government keep delaying the
joint inspection of the mountains, the Bosnian Army brazenly ran a second attack through
the Igman DMZ to ambush a VRS unit just outside the demilitarized area. The Bosnian Serbs
retaliated with heavy weapons fire from within the exclusion zone. On 13 October, VRS
Chief of Staff Gen. Milovanovic issued a one-week ultimatum, asserting that if the UN did
not evict the Bosnian Army from Igman and Bjelasnica, the Bosnian Serbs would reoccupy
the peaks and clear them by force.1847 Talks broke down on 18 October, with the Bosnian
Government refusing to withdraw the 500 or so troops remaining on the two mountains
unless the withdrawal was linked to UN assurances that UNPROFOR would safeguard traffic
over the Mt. Igman road into Sarajevo. The UN refused, and Bosnian Serb retaliation looked
imminent.1848 1849
The 20 October deadline came and went with the standoff by no means resolved.
When UN personnel confronted the Bosnian Government forces in the DMZ on 24 October,
the troops opened fire on a group of French peacekeepers. The French responded in kind,
and a sharp firelight ensued before tempers cooled and the two forces disengaged. An
apologetic Bosnian Government, apparently recognizing that it had gone too far, ordered its
remaining troops off the mountain. With the three-way standoff finally defused – for a time,
at least – as October faded the focus of activity and attention was to move from Mt.
Bjelasnica to Mt. Treskavica, its neighbour to the south.1850 1851 1852

1843
A warning of sorts came on 8 October, when Bosnian Serb troops used machine gun fire – not defined as
heavy weapons – to attack city trams and pedestrians, killing one and wounding 11. The 12-minute volley
of fire represented the worst single attack since the Merkale market shelling and the subsequent creation
of the 20 km heavy weapons exclusion zone in February 1994. Reuters: Serb Guns Avenge Moslem Attack
As Victims Buried by Kurt Schork, 9 October 1994.
1844
Reuters: U.N. Resumes Vital Airlift into Sarajevo by Kurt Schork, 9 October 1994.
1845
Reuters: Bosnian Rivals Agree on Demilitarized Zone, 9 October 1994.
1846
Reuters: Serbs Block Aid to Moslem Civilians by Kurt Schork,. 11 October 1994.
1847
Reuters: Bosnian Serbs Give Moslems Deadline to Clear Zone, 13 October 1994.
1848
Reuters: Talks on Demilitarized Zone Break Down in Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 18 October 1994.
1849
Reuters: Sarajevo DMZ Pact Faces New Hitch by Kurt Schork, 23 October 1994.
1850
Reuters: Bosnian Army Fires on French Peacekeepers in DMZ by Kurt Schork, 24 October 1994.
1851
Reuters: Bosnian Government, U.N. Agree to Clear DMZ by Kurt Schork, 25 October 1994.
1852
Reuters: U.N. Chief Defends Peacekeeping Commander by Kurt Schork, 25 October 1994.

596
 November: The Treskavica Offensive
The beginning of November marked the transition to a new phase of the ARBiH
offensive, one directed further south toward Mt. Treskavica and the Sarajevo-Trnovo road
segment. Events began on 29 October – just as the Igman-Bjelasnica withdrawal was to be
completed – when Bosnian Government troops again advanced south through the Mt.
Bjelasnica demilitarized zone to attack two Serb-held villages at the foot of the mountain.
The Bosnian Army also shelled a nearby UN observation post with a heavy artillery piece
from within the exclusion zone.1853 1854 The following day, heavy artillery rained shells on
Serb-held Javorak on the south side of Bjelasnica and ARBiH forces moved in to capture the
town.1855
The Bosnian Army continued its advance in early November, attacking further to
the east after taking Javorak near the boundary between the VRS 12th Kotorsko and 1st
Guards Brigades and moving onto the Hojta ridge line connecting the flanks of Mounts
Bjelasnica and Treskavica.1856 In a successful push over the next few days, the Bosnian Army
took additional territory, advancing the frontlines several kilometers to the east and taking
three towns along the smaller north-south road which ran several kilometers west of
Trnovo.1857 However, the VRS Herzegovina and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps troops halted the
ARBiH advance around 6 November, with the frontline still several kilometers west of the
main highway, and counterattacked with elements of the 11th Herzegovina Infantry and
18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigades – probably led by the VRS 65th Protection
Regiment and MUP special police units – brought in as reinforcements.1858 1859 On 14-15
December, the Bosnian Army made its last push of the year in the direction of the Trnovo
road, despite more reinforcements from the VRS Drina Corps.1860 Again the ARBiH
advanced, claiming gains of 20 square kilometers – but still failed to secure the road from
the VRS.1861 At the end of the year, the Bosnian Army had taken a total of some 100 square
kilometers on Mts. Bjelasnica and Treskavica and captured at least five highly-prized tanks,
several small artillery pieces and mortars, and sizable munitions stores.1862 1863 1864
Nevertheless, although the Bosnian Government gains were substantial, they still fell short
of the primary goal of interdicting or capturing the Trnovo road. The ARBiH had made a
valiant and worthwhile effort, but Trnovo still lay beyond its reach.

1853
Reuters: Moslems Spread Offensive to Zone near Sarajevo, 29 October 1994.
1854
Reuters: U.N. Threatens Bosnian Army with NATO Strikes by Kurt Schork, 29 October 1994.
1855
Reuters: Bosnian Army Resumes Shelling From DMZ, 30 October 1994.
1856
Reuters: Bosnian Army Closing in on Serb-held Trnovo by Kurt Schork, 31 October 1994.
1857
Sarajevo Radio, 1 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0111210294, 012102Z November 1994.
1858
Reuters: L. N. Reports Bitter Fighting for Northwest Town, 6 November 1994.
1859
Belgrade Tanjug, 4 November 1994, FBIS London LD0411234294, 042342Z November 1994.
1860
At least one battalion / 1st Bratunuc Light Infantry Brigade, plus probably additional Drina Corps composite
units, reinforced TG “Kalinovik” in November-December.
1861
Sarajevo Radio, 15 December 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1512105994, 151059Z December 1994.
1862
Sarajevo Radio, 3 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0311134994, 031349Z November 1994.
1863
Reuters: Bosnian Army Claims Advances on Serb-held Town, 1 November 1994.
1864
Zagreb Hinu, 5 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0511140294, 051402Z November 1994.

597
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order Of Battle,
Mt. Bjelasnica Offensives, October 1994

1st Corps Mixed Artillery Regiment

1st Corps LARD PVO

82nd “Foca” Mountain Brigade

1st Muslim Drina Brigade

– Probably one battalion

1st Motorized Brigade (-)

– Probably one battalion

4th Motorized Brigade (-)

– Probably one battalion

598
 Chart 2
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order Of Battle,
Mt. Bjelasnica Battles, October 1994

VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, HQ

2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade

3rd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade

599
 Chart 3
Bosnian Army Order Of Battle,
Mt. Treskavica Offensives, November 1994

MUP “Lasta” Battalion, HQ Sarajevo

1st Bosniak Brigade [sic]

82nd Foca Brigade

4th Motorized Brigade (-)

5th Motorized Brigade (-)

1st Glorious Brigade

2nd Chivalrous Brigade

600
 Chart 4
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order Of Battle,
Mt. Treskavica Battles, November 1994

Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
Major General Dragomir Milosevic. Commander

Elements, 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade

– deployed northeast of Mt. Igman

12th Kotorsko Light Infantry Brigade / 1st Krajina Corps (attached)

– deployed east of Mt. Igman-northwest of Trnovo

Herzegovina Corps
Major General Radovan Grubac, Commander Tactical Group Kalinovik, HQ Kalinovik
Colonel Milenko Lazic, Commander

1st Guards Motorized Brigade, HQ Kalinovik

– deployed at Trnovo-Treskavica, northwest of Kalinovik

18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Gacko

– deployed south/southeast of Treskavica

601
 Annex 58
“With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?”
The HVO-Bosnian Army Capture of Kupres, November 1994
Background
Serb-held Kupres had been a prize long sought, especially by the Bosnian Croats,
ever since the town’s fall to the then-JNA in the first days of the war. The HVO hungered to
avenge that humiliating defeat and take back the Croat-majority town, but it also wanted
control of the road junction from Tomislavgrad toward Bugojno and Sipovo. The Bosnian
Muslims also longed to free Kupres; though their historical attachment to the town might be
less strong than the Croats, they too had a strategic purpose: they wanted to extend their
hold on nearby Bugojno through Kupres and open lines of communication to the real
Muslim objective in the area – Donji Vakuf, 20 kilometers to the northeast.
In mid-March, the Bosnian Army 370th “Donji Vakuf” Mountain Brigade, probably
supported by at least the 307th “Bugojno” Mountain Brigade, essayed an attack westward
from Bugojno against the VRS 30th Light Infantry Division / 1st Krajina Corps.1865
Government forces advanced towards Serb-held Mt. Suljaga on 16 and 17 March,1866 cutting
off the water supply line into Donji Vakuf and capturing a substantial amount of equipment
from the apparently surprised 19th Light Infantry Brigade.1867 A VRS counterattack took back
some of the lost ground and the two armies battled it out for the next week or so.1868 When
the Government offensive halted around 29 March, the Bosnian Army had advanced the
front lines about five kilometers to the west.1869

Phase 1: The Bosnian Army Presses from the Northwest

Not until late in the year was the Bosnian Army ready to make a serious offensive
effort against Kupres itself, which abutted the boundary between the VRS 1st and 2nd
Krajina Corps and was held by the 7th Kupres-Sipovo Motorized Brigade / 2nd Krajina Corps.
1870
It was a considerably larger effort than the one mounted in March: the 7th Corps
committed at least three full brigades – the 17th Krajina, 307th “Bugojno”, and 370th “Donji
Vakuf” – and probably at least battalion-sized elements of five others. The offensive was
further supported by available elements of the 7th Corps’ Mixed Artillery Regiment and by a
detachment of Interior Ministry special police forces. The campaign began on 20 October
with infantry attacks along a roughly 14-km front northeast of the town.1871 1872The VRS

1865
Belgrade Tanjug, 16 March 1994, FBIS London LD1603210194, 162101Z March 1994.
1866
Sarajevo Radio, 17 March 1994, KBIS Vienna ALU 703102094, 171020Z March 1994.
1867
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 March 1994, FBIS London LD2103 152 194, 211521Z March 1994.
1868
Belgrade Tanjug, 21 March 1994, FBIS London LD2103152694, 211526Z March 1994.
1869
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 March 1994, FBIS London LD2903134594, 291345Z March 1994.
1870
Reuters: Moslems Poised for Bosnian Offensive, U.N. Says by Laura Pitter, 31 March 1994.
1871
Belgrade Tanjug, 20 October 1994, FBIS London LD2010224394, 202243Z October 1994.

602
30th Division responded typically with heavy artillery shelling along the front and into
Bugojno itself the following day.1873 By 23 October, the ARBiH had advanced close enough to
Kupres to reply with mortar fire into the town, but the Army’s 7th Corps continued to make
only slow advances in the difficult, mountainous terrain against the 30th Division, while the
Bosnian Serbs kept up their punishing shellfire.1874 Bosnian Government forces moved
progressively closer to Kupres town over the next few days, capturing one peak at a time
but never managing to achieve a decisive breakthrough against the 1st and 2nd Krajina
Corps defenders.1875 1876 The struggle ground on, and by 27 October UN observers were
reporting Bosnian Serb forces in retreat and over 2.000 Serb civilians fleeing the town for
the safety of Serb-held Sipovo. But Kupres itself had not been taken.
Why, at this point, the Bosnian Army failed to keep pressing all the way into Kupres
remains unclear. There could have been a variety or a combination of reasons. The advance
had been slowed by fog, rain, and the need to consolidate gains against the likelihood of
counterattacks. Even against the thinly-stretched Serb defenders, advancing through the
rugged mountains northeast of the town was a costly and wearing process. The 7th Corps
leadership may simply have concluded that a pause in the offensive would be prudent, and
that the ARBiH – just a few kilometers outside the town – could make the final push a little
later on. Or a prior agreement with the Croats may explain the delay. Whatever the cause,
the Bosnian Army’s pause – of just a few days – was to prove crucial. By the first of
November, when the ARBiH 7th Corps had driven to the front gates of Kupres, it would be
the HVO that would race into the town through the other, unguarded gate.

Phase 2: The HVO Races into Town from the South

Thus far, the HVO had elected to remain on the side lines of the battle for the
former Croat territory, watching and waiting for an opportune moment to step in. Now,
with the Bosnian Army tying down the Serb defenders and on the verge of taking the town,
the time had come to launch Operation “Cincar”, the Croat plan for their own capture of
Kupres.
Much of the HVO’s best was assembled to participate in the Kupres battle, and elite
HVO forces had been coming into the area for days beforehand. HVO commander Ante
Roso’s newly-established HVO Guards brigades would form the backbone of the operation:
three of the four Guards brigades would contribute to the operation, supported by the 60th
“Ludvig Pavlovic” battalion, Bosnian Croat MUP special police troops, and HVO corps-level
artillery.

1872
Paris AFP, 3 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AL0311133894, 031338Z November 1994.
1873
Sarajevo Radio, 21 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2110203194, 212031Z October 1994.
1874
Belgrade Tanjug, 23 October 1994, FBIS London LD2310203794, 232037Z October 1994.
1875
Sarajevo Radio, 26 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2610130594, 261305Z October 1994.
1876
Sarajevo Radio, 26 October 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2610173894, 261957Z October 1994.

603
 Carefully choosing its moment, the HVO elected to enter the fray on 1
November.1877 A public announcement stated that the Croats were responding to attacks by
Serb snipers on Croat civilians visiting gravesites in Sujica on All Saints’ Day. 1878 On this
pretext the HVO mounted a two-pronged offensive from the south against the thinly
stretched VRS 7th Motorized Brigade. VRS attempts to stem the ARBiH 5th Corps advance at
Bihac had left both the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps without enough reserves to hold back
what was now a combined ARBiH/HVO assault. One HVO spearhead drove north from Suica
along the main road into Kupres. This western axis captured Donji Malovan on 1
November,1879 and continued several kilometers further to take smaller Gornji Malovan on 2
November. A second spearhead advanced in parallel to the east, moving from Ravno to the
Serb-held village of Rilic on 2 November. 1880
Kupres – by this time an abandoned ghost town – fell the following day to a
lightning Croat advance. The ARBiH had been plodding methodically ahead and announced
on 3 November the capture of the heights at Kupreska Vrata – a mere 3km from the centre
of town.1881 The message anticipating an ARBiH victory was both premature and too late:
Bosnian Croat special police and HVO special forces detachments were the first to enter
Kupres, a little after midday.1882

Cooperation or Competition?
Exactly what had been agreed to before the offensive remains unclear. Just before
the HVO intervened, ARBiH 7th Corps commander Alagic had announced that the “HVO is
not participating, but I hope they will”.1883 (Alagic may have gotten more than he had hoped
for.) Just after the town fell, HVO commander Ante Roso told reporters that “This is a very
good moment for cooperation”.1884 Asked if the Croats and Muslims were operating under a
joint command, however, he qualified the statement with “We’re coordinating, we don’t
need a joint command.” It seems likeliest that the two factions had discussed their
intentions to mount a simultaneous attack in the direction of Kupres, but withheld their
actual operational plans from each other.
The Bosnian Army may not have had its heart set on capturing Croat-majority
Kupres, but its soldiers had paid for the town in blood slogging through the hills to the
north, and it was undoubtedly less than pleased to discover that the Croats had meanwhile
raced in from the south to occupy the town. Regardless, the Bosnian Government
leadership evidently came to calculate that Croat military cooperation was more important

1877
Zagreb Radio, 2 November 1994, FBIS London LD0211132994, 021825Z November 1994.
1878
Zagreb Hina, 2 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0211212094, 022120Z November 1994.
1879
Zagreb Radio, 3 November 1994, FBIS London LD0311112394, 031123Z November 1994.
1880
Sarajevo Radio, 3 November 1994, FBIS Vienna AU0311154294, 031541Z November 1994.
1881
Mostar Croatian Radio, 3 November 1994, FBIS London LD0311172794, 031727Z November 1994.
1882
Ivan Sabic: I Do Not Wish to be at War With Press Reporters, Zagreb Vjesnik, 14 November 1994; an
Interview with Bosnian Croat Official Valentin Coric.
1883
Reuters: Bosnian Army Claims Advance on Serb-held Town, 1 November 1994.
1884
Reuters: Bosnian Serbs Lose Key Town of Kupres by Kurt Schork, 3 November 1994.

604
than ownership of traditionally-Croat Kupres, and that vying for the town could well reignite
the Croat-Muslim war that had already proven so destructive to both sides.
The operation to capture Kupres was the first visible example of major Croat-
Muslim cooperation in military operations since the signing of the Federation agreement in
March 1994. As such, it was both a test case and a public relations example of military
cooperation. If it is true that no military plan survives contact with the enemy, in this case
whatever plans may have been made did not even survive contact between the allies.
For all its flaws in planning and execution, the Croat-Muslim capture of Kupres was
a step in the right direction – militarily, politically, and geographically – and a step closer to
both factions’ ultimate objective of Jajce. But it left unclear whether the ARBiH and the HVO
were advancing down the road alongside each other or racing each other to the finish.

605
 Chart 1
Bosnian Army (ARBiH) Order of Battle
Kupres, October – November 1994

ARBiH 7th Corps, HQ Travnik (Elements)

Brig. Gen. Mehmet Alagic, commander

7th Corps Mixed Artillery Regiment (elements)

Operational Group West, HQ Bugojno

(Exercised operational control over the Kupres offensive)
Tahir Granic, commander after March 1994
Selmo Cikotic, commander until March 1994

305th “Jajce” Mountain Brigade

– Probably at least one battalion, possibly the entire brigade

307th “Bugojno” Mountain Brigade

– Probably the entire brigade

317th “Gornji Vakuf” Mountain Brigade

– Probably one battalion

370th “Donji Vakuf” Mountain Brigade

– Probably the entire brigade

Bosanska Krajina Operational Group, HQ Travnik

(Committed additional forces in support of OG West)
Fikret Cuskic, commander from late 1993 through early 1994
Mehmet Alagic, commander through late October / early November 1993

17th Krajina Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

– Probably the entire brigade

27th “Banja Luka” Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

– Probably at least one battalion

37th Brigade, HQ Travnik

– Probably at least one battalion

325th “Vitez” Mountain Brigade

– Probably one battalion

Ministry of Internal Affairs Units

One Special Police detachment (company/ battalion size)

606
 Chart 2
Croatian Defence Council / Croatian Army (HVO/HV) Order of Battle,
Kupres, 1994

Brig. Gen. Tihomir Blaskic, operational commander

Herceg-Bosna MUP Special Police Brigade elements:
– First unit to enter Kupres

“Ravens” Special Purpose Unit

60th “Ludvig Pavlovic” Guards Battalion

– Probably about 300 troops.

1st HVO Guards Brigade

– 1st HVO Guards Brigade remained at Kupres after Cincar-94

2nd HVO Guards Brigade (-)

– 2nd HVO Guards Brigade participated in Operation Cincar-94

3rd HVO Guards Brigade (-)

– 3rd HVO Guards Brigade participated in Operation Cincar-94

607
 Chart 3
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Order of Battle,
Kupres, 1994

Elements, 30th Light Infantry Division / 1st Krajina Corps

Colonel Jovo Blazanovic, commander

19th Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Donji Vakuf (Srbobran)

– deployed east / southeast of Donji Vakuf to boundary with 2nd Krajina Corps

Elements, 2nd Krajina Corps

Major General Grujo Boric, commander

7th Kupres-Sipovo Motorized Brigade, HQ Kupres

Colonel Drago Samardzija, commander

608
 Annex 59
The Demise of Abdic’s Empire,
January – August, 1994
It’s absolutely crazy here. There’s a joke going around: Three people die on the
Abdic side, and then three people die on the Government side. Who wins? The Serbs, 6:0.
A U.N. official in Bihac, June 19951885

As 1994 opened, Fikret Abdic’s breakaway Autonomous Republic of Western Bosnia

(APWB) held sway over about 600 square kilometers of territory, anchored on its “capital”
of Velika Kladusa and comprising roughly the northwest third of the Bihac pocket. Abdic’s
military, under the direction of APWB “Peoples Defence” (Narodna Odbrana) commander
Hazim Delic, could field a force of six infantry brigades and a small artillery unit totalling
perhaps as many as 10.000 troops with a handful of tanks and other heavy weapons.
In mid-January the Bosnian Army’s 5th Corps mounted the year’s first serious
attack in the back-and-forth war between the Bosnian Army and Abdic’s rebels. ARBiH
forces pressed along a broad front, advancing about two kilometers and capturing the town
of Skokovi.1886 1887 1888 The fighting paused at the end of the month as the opposing Muslim
factions signed a cease-fire and exchanged bodies of those killed in action.1889
Beginning on 16 February, however, the tables turned, as Abdic’s forces and their
Bosnian Serb allies hit the ARBiH 5th corps with simultaneous attacks from two
directions.1890 Bosnian Army Brig. Gen. Arif Pasalic confirmed on 21 February that APWB
forces had advanced to within 10 km of Government-held Cazin. At the same time, UN
officials reported that Bosnian Serb units of Gen. Boric’s 2nd Krajina Corps, reinforced by
additional forces brought up from Prijedor, were hammering 5th Corps defenders with
artillery along the entire line from Bihac to Bosanska Krupa.1891 1892 1893 For a time, the
situation looked almost critical, but Dudakovic’s resilient 5th Corps managed to rally yet
again and hang on despite the pounding. No further advances were reported, and
comparatively little fighting took place along the Abdic-5th Corps internal confrontation line
during most of spring 1994.1894
The signing of a cease-fire between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs
in early June finally allowed Dudakovic’s 5th Corps to devote its full attention to the Abdic

1885
Reuters: Sarajevo Forces Advance in Bihac Conflict by Mark Heinrich, 20 June 1994.
1886
Reuters: Sarajevo Pounding Continues Despite Airstrike Threat by Chris Helgen, 11 January 1994.
1887
Belgrade Tanjug, 11 January 1994, FBIS London LD1101132394, 111323Z January 1994.
1888
Zagreb Radio, 11 January 94, FBIS London LD1101151994, 111519Z January 1994.
1889
Reuters: Serbs Planning Offensive on Bihac – Croat Commander, 27 January 1994.
1890
Brendan O’Shea: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 35.
1891
Reuters: Sarajevo Ultimatum Fails to Stop Bosnia Fighting, 21 February 1994.
1892
See the section Ending the War? Bosnian Serb Offensive Operations, November 1993 to March 1994 for
additional details.
1893
Brendan O’Shea: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 63.
1894
Reuters: Bosnian Radio Reports Fighting in Gorazde, 21 April 1994.

609
separatists. Since Abdic had not signed the agreement, the 5th Corps was free to redeploy
scarce resources northward to take on the until-then secondary APWB opponent.1895 Fifth
Corps forces struck the first blow on the night of 2 June with a tentative attack around
Liskovac, followed by a similar probe around Pecigrad the following day. Abdic’s forces
replied with a powerful counterattack on 10 June, hitting Government-held territory
between Pecigrad and Skokovi and making some minor gains.1896 1897 1898 The battlefield
situation changed rapidly, though, and by 13 June the Bosnian Army had regained the
initiative, advancing to the towns of Todorovo and Golubovici and up to the outskirts of
Pecigrad – a small but crucial town astride the key north-south highway from Cazin to
Abdic’s strong hold of Velika Kladusa. The ARBiH claimed to have captured 30 square
kilometers and two companies of Abdic troops during its advance.1899 The losses stung
Abdic; the following day, reports emerged that he had purged his ranks, arresting 500 or
more of his own supporters suspected of disloyalty.1900
Whether inspired by Abdic’s leadership or by fears of arrest, the APWB forces
rallied on 15-16 June and halted the 5th Corps advance with a counterattack near
Liskovac.1901 By 20 June, however, the UN reported that Government forces had resumed
their advance, approaching to within 13 km of Abdic’s de facto capital of Velika Kladusa.1902
The fiercest fighting occurred in and around the town of Golubovici, which sat atop high
ground overlooking the approaches to Velika Kladusa.1903 The UN observers – fearing an
escalation of the conflict – watched nervously as Krajina Serb troops supported the Abdic
rebels with tank and artillery fire from across the border in Croatia.
The emphasis of the fighting now centred on the key town of Pecigrad, which had
been fiercely contested for over a week.1904 Both the assaulting ARBiH 5th Corps and Abdic’s
defending 4th Brigade knew that the town’s capture would open the way for the Bosnian
Army to advance into Velika Kladusa. Abdic’s 4th Brigade – known as the APWB’s best
formation – did not give ground, but found itself threatened with encirclement by fast-
moving Bosnian Army units. Fifth Corps forces had surrounded the town on three sides by
22 June, and then pressed the attack on the village of Pivka on the remaining north side.
Abdic himself conceded that his 3rd Brigade “fell apart” during the town’s defence,
eventually leaving the 4th Brigade still blocking the Government advance but trapped in
Pecigrad.1905 1906 1907

1895
Reuters: U.N. Says Fighting Decreases With Bosnian Ceasefire, by Kurt Schork, 11 June 1994.
1896
Reuters: Bosnian Ceasefire Gradually Taking Hold – UN by Kurt Schork, 11 June 1994.
1897
Reuters: U.N. Says Fighting Decreases With Bosnian Ceasefire by Kurt Schork, 11 June 1994.
1898
Brendan O’Shea: Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia’s Bloody Battlefield, UK Sutton Publishing, 1998, p. 71-72.
1899
Reuters: Bihac Fighting Dims Hope of Bosnia Truce Lasting by Kurt Schork, 14 June 1994.
1900
Reuters: Fierce Bihac Fighting Adds to Peace Doubts by Kurt Schork, 15 June 1994.
1901
Reuters: Rival Moslem Forces Fight in Bosnia, by Kurt Schork, 16 June 1994.
1902
Reuters: Sarajevo Forces Advance in Bihac Conflict by Mark Heinrich, 20 June 1994.
1903
Reuters: Sarajevo Forces Advance in Bihac Conflict by Mark Heinrich, 20 June 1994.
1904
Reuters: Bihac Fighting Continues as Bosnia Truce Falters by Kurt Schork. 18 June 1994.
1905
Reuters: Rebel Moslems Count on Serb Help against Enemy Kin by Mark Heinrich, 22 June 1994.
1906
Reuters: Bosnian Government Forces Attack Rebel Moslems by Mark Heinrich, 22 June 1992.
1907
Reuters: Army Attack on Moslem Kin Will Fail – Rebel Tycoon by Mark Heinrich, 23 June 1994.

610
 Recognizing his desperate position, Abdic appealed to his last hope, the Krajina
Serbs. The Krajina Serb forces had been supporting the Abdic rebels all along with artillery
fire but had remained unwilling to commit Serb infantry into the battle itself. On 30 June,
UN monitors reported that Krajina Serb forces had removed at least 20 heavy weapons from
UN-monitored weapons collection sites in Croatia and moved them into Abdic-controlled
territory.1908 The action inspired grave concern among the UN observers that now the
Croatian Serbs would cross over to battle the 5th Corps in Bosnia, but in the event the
Krajina Serbs elected – at least for now – not to commit any ground troops in support of
Abdic’s failing regime.

The Battle of Smoke and Mirrors: Operation “Tigar-Sloboda 94”

In the seesaw battle that Bihac had become, one of the oddest operations of the
entire Bosnian war was about to take place. The intricate and audacious Operation “Tigar-
Sloboda 94” (Tiger-Freedom 94) was to prove perhaps the most daring and unorthodox
stunt of ARBiH 5th Corps commander Dudakovic’s career.
The first reports of odd developments in the Bihac pocket came on 7 July, when
both local and western news organizations reported that 5th Corps troops had surrounded
the French UN peacekeeping contingent’s compound in Bihac city. The UNPROFOR troops
were told only that armed terrorists had infiltrated from the north and the peacekeepers
had to be confined to base for their own safety. The French battalion naturally objected to
being placed under house arrest, but could do little about it.1909 Later in the day, Abdic’s
news agency reported that the chaos inside the 5th Corps had been caused by mutinying
troops who had refused to continue fighting their Muslim brothers on the rebel side. On 9
July, UNPROFOR spokesmen reported gunfire and explosions in Bihac itself, but as the
French were still confined to base, the UN could not confirm exactly who the 5th Corps was
fighting.1910
Reports began to filter in that loyal 5th Corps troops were battling “peace force”
defectors who had gone over to Abdic’s side. At the same time, Abdic’s own brigades –
again backed by Krajina Serb artillery and mortar fire – were supporting the mutiny with an
assault along the Krivaja-Cajici segment of the confrontation line. Things looked bleak
indeed for Dudakovic’s 5th Corps, at the same moment fighting against the Bosnian Serbs,
the Krajina Serbs, the Abdic rebels, and “peace force” mutineers within its own ranks.1911
On 10 July, however, the Bosnian Army announced triumphantly that the entire
“peace force” rebellion had been a charade – a staged mutiny – engineered by the 5th Corps
headquarters and executed largely through the unwitting collaboration of the Abdic forces.
As it turned out, the 5th Corps had confined the UN to base to prevent its finding out the
truth while feeding foreign and Serb reporters selected pieces of information. Handpicked
1908
Reuters: Serbs Give Heavy Weapons to Rebel Moslems by Davor Huic, 30 June 1994.
1909
Reuters: Bosnian Army Surrounds UN Compound in Bihac, 7 July 1994.
1910
Reuters: Moslem Troops Hold Aid Workers in Bosnia by Mark Heinrich, 7 July 1994.
1911
Reuters: Rebel Moslems, Serbs Jointly Attack Bosnian Army bv Mark Heinrich, 10 July 1994.

611
Bosnian Army and MUP special police troops out of sight of observers staged phony battles
with blank cartridges, lighting fires and setting off grenades. Bihac radio and television
announcers feigned damage from pro-Abdic fifth columnists. The capstone of the effort was
an appeal for assistance by a fictional “Seventh Brigade” of Abdic supporters in the town of
Izacic. Eager to recruit the supposed defectors, Abdic, supplied by the Krajina Serbs, sent
truckloads of small arms, rocket launchers, and ammunition to his alleged supporters. Of
course, on arrival in Izacic the 5th Corps took gleeful possession of both the weapons and
the Abdic agents sent to deliver them. It was a classic “Trojan Horse” operation – in
reverse.1912
In the end, the operation proved a brilliant and completely successful combination
of deception and execution. The desperately under-armed 5th Corps gained 3.000 weapons
and over 200.000 rounds of ammunition provided by its APWB and Serb opponents, no less.
As a bonus, the ruse had inspired a handful of key Abdic supporters in Bihac to show their
true colours, allowing the 5th Corps to round up the enemy sympathizers within its ranks.
And Dudakovic had achieved a public-relations coup, boosting morale within his own forces
and exposing the Abdic rebels as Serb collaborators. While his later battlefield successes
were undoubtedly greater in scope, in many ways “Tigar-Sloboda 94” was the wily
Dudakovic’s masterstroke.1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920

Abdic’s Last Hand: Velika Kladusa Falls

Although “Tigar-Sloboda” had provided a boost to 5th Corps morale and enough
small arms to outfit an entire new brigade, the war with the Abdic forces was by no means
over. Indeed, the APWB continued to press the offensive it had begun, securing the town of
Cajici on 11 July after a heavy shelling by Krajina Serbs.1921 The Bosnian Army responded by
mirroring the UN’s fears – 5th Corps forces crossed the border into Serb-held Croatia on 14
July to attack the Krajina Serb positions that had been shelling into the enclave, crossing

1912
Reuters: Bosnian Army Stages Mock Mutiny to Flush Out Rebels, by Mark Heinrich, 10 July 1994.
1913
Sarajevo Radio, 9 July 1994, FBIS London LD0907215694, 092156Z July 1994.
1914
Zagreb Radio, 10 July 1994, FBIS London LD1007180494, 101804Z July 1994.
1915
Karlo Jeger: The 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Has Cut the Una Railroad at the Serb Corridor to
Knin Again!, Zagreb Globus, 15 July 1994, FBIS Vienna AU1907203394, 192033Z July 1994.
1916
1916 Sarajevo Radio, 23 August 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2308113694, 231136Z August 1994.
1917
Karl Jeger: The Command of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army Announces: We Will Enter
Velika Kladusa and Put Fikret Abdic on Trial As a Traitor, Zagreb Globus, 19 August 1994, FBIS Vienna
AU2508104794, 251047Z August 1994.
1918
Mustafa Borovic and Mirsad Sinanovic: The War Comedy in Which We Made a Jackass Out of Fikret Abdic,
Sarajevo Ljiljan, 4 October 1995; an interview with brigade commander Hamdija Abdic. FBIS Reston VA,
96BA0015D, 020323Z February 1996.
1919
Sarajevo Televizija Bosne I Herzegovine, 7 July 1996, FBIS London LD0707214696, 072146Z July 1996.
1920
Z. Seferagic: The Anniversary of the Formation of the 517th Liberation-Light Brigade, 15 August 1997: On
the Road to Freedom, Sarajevo Prva Linija, September 1997, FBIS Reston VA, 96E08028A, 151724Z January
1998.
1921
Reuters: Bosnians Enter Last Week to Decide on Peace Plan by KurtSchork, 11 July 1994.

612
back into Bosnia after a short engagement.1922 Heavy fighting and high casualties marked
the rest of July but gained the Bosnian Army little ground.1923
While Abdic and the 5th Corps battled to the north, the VRS continued its own
operations against Dudakovic’s forces.1924 In July, Major General Grujo Boric’s 2nd Krajina
Corps completed plans by which it hoped to finally occupy the entire Grabez plateau and
seize the southern (right) bank of the Una River, which it had been trying to do since 1992;
its last attempt had been in February 1994. The capture of these areas would allow the
Corps to take over important railroad lines running through the outskirts of Bihac city. The
new operation, “Una 94”, appears to have begun on 11 July – concurrent with the Abdic /
Krajina Serb push toward Cajici. The first objective of the three light infantry brigades
leading the attack was to capture important hills on the plateau – objectives that had been
perpetually contested – then grab the villages lining the Una below the hills.1925 But the Serb
troops again made little or no progress against the defending Muslims, and the battle had
ended by 15 July.
At the beginning of August, the focus of the conflict shifted once again to the little
town of Pecigrad, where Abdic’s surrounded defenders continued to put up a determined
resistance. Bosnian Army forces had pounded the town with mortar and artillery fire, but
Abdic’s 4th Brigade – led by its capable commander, Nevzad Djeric1926 – hung on
doggedly.1927 Pecigrad finally yielded on 4 August, after Djeric refused a 5th Corps surrender
offer. As a UN official narrates the rest of the story:
The Fourth Brigade realised they were in a rather parlous position. Their
commander was a hero but they were trapped in their castle HQ...
The message came hack [to the 5th Corps] “OK, kill us all”.
So Dudakovic fires one tank round straight through the door of this fort, kills the
brigade commander and everyone there says: “Well, this is a bad idea, let’s forget
it...”1928
Thus fell Pecigrad, opening the way for the 5th Corps to continue its advance. At
least 800 Abdic defenders – and their much-needed weapons – were captured, and roughly
2.000 Bosnian Army troops were freed up to fight elsewhere.1929
As August progressed, Abdic was increasingly hemmed in around his self-declared
capital. Two major towns in the west, Trzac and Sturlic, fell on 9 August, and Abdic
established a new defensive line anchored on the towns of Johovica and Marjanovac about

1922
Reuters: Troops from Moslem Enclave Clash With Serbs, 14 July 1994.
1923
Reuters: UN Comes Under Fire in Fierce Bihac Battle, 30 July 1994.
1924
The narrative is based primarily on Sarajevo Radio reports from 7 July and 11 July to 15 July 1994 and Paris
AFP reports from 11-13 July and 15 July.
1925
The 1st Dravar, 3rd Petrovac, and 17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigades were the main VRS combat formations.
1926
Nevzad Djeric had previously been commander of the ARBiH 503rd Cazin Brigade.
1927
Abdic declined a UN offer to evacuate the town’s civilian population, reasoning that if the town’s
population left Pecigrad’s defenders would see no reason to carry on the fight. Reuters: Inter-Moslem
Fighting Traps Up to 2.000 Civilians by Richard Meares, 4 August 1994.
1928
Reuters: Separatist Bosnian Moslem Leader Vows to Fight On by Davor Huic, 10 August 1994.
1929
Reuters: Moslem Rebels Surrender as Bosnian Town Falls by Richard Meares, 4 August 1994.

613
10 km southeast of Velika Kladusa. With the handwriting clearly on the wall, he became
uncharacteristically open to a negotiated settlement.1930 But it was too late. The Bosnian
Government rejected Abdic’s cease-fire proposal and demanded his unconditional
surrender. Abdic refused, electing to fight it out with his last two brigades (one of them
down to one-third of its original strength) in Velika Kladusa.1931
On 21 August, just hours after Abdic refused the governments unconditional
surrender demand, Bosnian Army troops overran Velika Kladusa.1932 1933 The Bosnian
Government announced a three-day amnesty period for any former rebels, but hundreds of
Abdic soldiers abandoned their weapons and joined the massive column of 10.000 or more
refugees fleeing Velika Kladusa for the Serb-held sections of adjacent Croatia.1934 Abdic
himself abandoned Velika Kladusa for the relative safety of Croatia, where he would seek
Serb backing for a comeback attempt.
There was to be little rest for the Bosnian Army’s triumphant 5th Corps. Within
three weeks of the rout of Abdic, the VRS and Krajina Serbs would counterattack with
Operation “Breza 94”.

1930
Reuters: Moslems. Serbs Send More Troops to Battle Zone by Mark Heinrich, 11 August 1994.
1931
Reuters: Rebel Moslem Leader Tries to Rallv Forces by Davor Huic, 12 August 1994.
1932
Reuters: Bosnian Government Troops Crush Abdic Revolt by Mark Heinrich, 21 August 1994.
1933
There are conflicting reports regarding the behavior of the 5th Corps forces that occupied the town after
11 months of fighting. UN observers initially reported that they were disciplined and professional, taking
the town with a minimum of casualties and causing little damage during and after the attack. Reuters:
Moslem Refugees Block French UN Troops by Davor Huic, 23 Aug 1994. But later reports from Abdic
refugees and at least one UN observer maintained that Bosnian Army troops had fired on retreating Abdic
soldiers and civilians as they fled Velika Kladusa. Reuters: Refugees Accuse Bosnian Forces of Killings by
Davor Huic, 24 August 1994.
1934
Reuters: Bosnian Government Troops Crush Abdic Revolt, by Mark Heinrich, 21 August 1994.

614
 Chart 1
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
People’s Defence (“Narodna Odbrana”),
Order of Battle, 1994

Fikret Abdic, President

Asim Delic, APWB Military Commander

1st Brigade, HQ Vrnograc

(Formerly ARBiH 521st Brigade)
Mirsad Huskic, Commander

2nd Brigade, HQ Velika Kladusa, FCP Johovica

(Previously ARBiH 527th Brigade)

3rd Infantry Brigade, HQ Todorovo

4th Infantry Brigade, HQ Pecigrad

Col. Nevzad Djeric, Commander

5th Brigade, HQ Kudici

6th Infantry Brigade, HQ Trzac

615
 Chart 2
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH),
Order of Battle, Bihac, 1994

5th Corps, HQ Bihac

(Formerly Unsko-Sanska Ops Group)
Atif Dudakovic, Commander.
Mirsad Selmanovic, Dep. Commander / Chief of Staff

1st Bosnian Liberation Brigade, HQ Cazin

(Later the 510th Liberation Brigade)
Maj. Amir Avdic, Commander

501st Glorious Mountain Brigade, HQ Eastern Bihac

(Previously the 1st Bihac Brigade)
Brig. Senad Sarganovic, Commander

502nd “Tigrovi” Heroic Mountain Brigade, HQ Western Bihac

(Previously the 2nd Muslim-Croat “Crne Pume” Brigade)
Col. Hamdo Abdic, Commander

503rd Cazin Brigade, HQ Cazin

(Previously 1st Cazin Brigade)
Brig. Muhamed “Hamda” Delalic, Commander
[Established probably 23 August 1992]

504th Cazin Light Brigade

Maj. Salih Omerovic, Commander

505th Viteska Buzim Brigade, HQ Buzim

(Formerly 105th Buzim Muslim Krajina Brigade)
Brig. Izet Nanic, Commander

506th Velika Kladusa Light / Liberation Brigade, HQ Velika Kladusa (after its capture)
(Established in July 1994 from former 521st and 527th Brigade troops)
Maj. Mias Mirkovic, Commander
[Established 21 July 1994]

511th “Bosanska Krupa” Brigade, HQ Bosanska Krupa (Pistaline area)

(Previously 1st / 111th Bosanska Krupa Brigade)
Maj. Mirsad Sedic, Commander.

517th Light Brigade, HQ Pjanici

Maj. Ibrahim “Baja” Nadarevic, Commander
[Established 15 August 1993]

616
101st HVO Brigade, HQ SE of Bihac
Gen. Vlado Santic, Commander

617
 Annex 60
Operation “Breza 94”:
The Bosnian and Krajina Serb Armies Attack Bihac,
September 1994
In the midst of the continuing ARBiH offensive operations, the VRS began planning
in August for a new offensive against the Bihac enclave. “Breza (Birch) 94”. The VRS plan
called for 2nd Krajina Corps to lead off the offensive with new attacks on the Grabez plateau
to seize the line of the Una River and eventually seize rail lines on the east side of Bihac city.
The 1st Krajina Corps, in conjunction with the Krajina Serb Army’s 39th Banija Corps, would
then follow with an assault between the two towns of Buzim and Bosanska Otoka on the
north-eastern side of the enclave. Once VRS forces broke through here, the Serbs would
push on to the Bihac enclave’s central road and the logistics hub around the town of Cazin.
The loss of Cazin, splitting the enclave in half, would virtually ensure the complete defeat of
the 5th Corps. Events would outrun their plans, however, for when the ARBiH 5th Corps
defeated Fikret Abdic’s rebel Muslim forces the major attack axes it faced were reduced
from three to two.

Order of Battle and Campaign Planning1935

1935
The narrative of “Breza 94” is based on a combination of daily Sarajevo Radio reporting covering 30 August
to 15 September, Reuters pieces, and magazine / newspaper articles, including in particular those from the
Bosnian Army journal, Prva Linija. Other than Sarajevo Radio, the following sources were used:
• Rockets Kill 3, Wound 60 in Moslem Enclave, Reuters, 6 September 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Croatian, Bosnian Serbs Attack Moslem Enclave, Reuters, 8 September 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Serbs Take Two Bridgeheads in Bihac Offensive, Reuters, 9 September 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Heavy Fighting Reported in Bihac Enclave, Reuters, 10 September 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Fightins Rages in Bosnia after Pope’s Visit, Reuters, 12 September 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Bosnian Serb Shelling Prompts Moslem Evacuation, Reuters, 13 September 1994.
• Samira Dzanic: On the 3rd Anniversary of the Defeat of the “Birch (Breza) 94” Offensive: Unbreakable
Krajina, Prva Linija, October 1997, p. 24; an article describing the ARBiH defeat of the “Breza 94”
operation.
• Zemka Seferagic: Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the First Cazin 503rd Glorious Mountain
Brigade, 17 August 1997: From Mokres to Sanski Most, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 24.
• Samira Dzanic: Ponos Bosne i Bosnjaka, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 22; an article on the 505th
Motorized Brigade.
• Zemka Seferagic: The Anniversary of the Formation of the 517th Liberation-Light Brigade, 15 August
1997: On the Road to Freedom, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 23.
• Antun Masle and Eduard Popovic: We Will Enter All the Occupied Towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina With
Arms, Just As the Serbs Did Two Years Ago, Zagreb Globus, 30 September, 1994, pp. 7-9; interviews
with Brigadier Ramiz Drekovic and Atif Dudakovic.
• S. Hodzic: A Knight and a Hero, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 5 March 1996, p. 6; an article on Izet Nanic,
commander of the ARBiH 505th Motorized Brigade.
• Zilhad Kljucanin: Not A Single Foot of Buzim Soil Ever Fell Into the Hands of Anyone, Sarajevo Nova
Bosna, 17 October 1995, p. 12; an interview with Sead Jusic, the commander of the 505th Motorized
Brigade after Nanic.

618
 The VRS

The Main Staff plan for Operation “Breza 94” called for separate attacks by 1st and
2nd Krajina Corps, supported by Krajina Serb Army (SVK) forces. The campaign would lead
off with a new 2nd Krajina Corps attack to seize its long-time objectives on the Grabez
plateau and the Una River near Bihac city. In this sector, General Boric’s forces had been
trying to take control of key hills and villages near the Una River northeast of the city since
1992 – the last offensive, “Una 94”, had occurred in July. The capture of these positions
would allow Serb forces to take over the road and rail links running north from Bihac city
along the river. As with the previous month’s operation, the 1st Drvar, 3rd Petrovac, and
17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigades, supported by the 15th Bihac Infantry Brigade – about
5.000 to 5.500 troops – would spearhead the new attack.
The second and larger part of the operation was undertaken by 1st Krajina Corps
under Mladic’s direct supervision.1936 While 2nd Krajina Corps would be attacking in the
same old place, the Main Staff decided to switch its main effort to a previously untried axis
and call on the SVK to help. Major General Momir Talic, the corps commander, assembled
two brigade-sized forces for the operation: a tactical group with at least a battalion each
from the 5th Kozara Light Infantry, 6th Sanska Infantry, and 43rd Prijedor Motorized
Brigades, and the 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers” from the East Bosnian Corps.
Elements of the corps’ special units, the 1st Military Police Battalion and 1st
Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company, reinforced the infantry formations as shock troops.
These assault forces were backed by the sector-holding 1st Novigrad Infantry Brigade on the
eastern/north-eastern side of the Bihac enclave near the town of Bosanska Otoka. In
addition to corps artillery units, elements of the 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade / 2nd
Krajina Corps would provide fire support from its positions along the facing bank of the Una.
Colonel Zarko Gajic’s SVK 39th Banija Corps mobilized the 33rd Dvor Infantry Brigade along
the border, plus 155 mm howitzer units, to support the VRS attack. Total VRS/SVK forces in
this sector numbered about 4.000 assault troops, plus up to 3.000 sector-holding infantry.
The corps plan called for an initial advance towards Otoka along the Una River with the
objective of seizing the town and then driving along the main highway through Bosanska

• The Command of the Army of the Serbian Republic Believes That Mladic Has Been Betraved By Order
of Belgrade, Belgrade Telegraf, 12 October 1994, p. 11.
• Milan Jelovac: The Bihac Front – Mladic’s Headlong Flight, Zagreb Danas, 20 September 1994, pp. 12-
13.
1936
Brigadier General Dudakovic stated in October 1994 that:
In early September, a coordinated action of the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs was started, headed by
General Mladic himself ... The best units of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps were brought to the area of
Bosanski Novi [Novigrad], Dvor, and the village of Zirovac, and some of the units of the 39th Corps
were also included in the operation...
The main attack was planned in the direction of Buzim, and the auxiliary one on the line Otoka-
Bosanska Krupa. The Serbs intended to destroy and break the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Army and besiege Bihac...
Antun Masle and Eduard Popovic: We Will Enter All the Occupied Towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina With Arms,
Just As the Serbs Did Two Years Ago, Zagreb Globus, 30 September, 1994, pp. 7-9; interviews with Brigadier
Ramiz Drekovic and Atif Dudakovic.

619
Krupa to link up with 2nd Krajina Corps forces opposite the Grabez. Once this attack was
under way and (it was hoped) drawing in the 5th Corps reserves, the VRS would send a
second column, led by the “Panthers” and the 33rd Dvor Brigade, towards Buzim with the
initial objective of taking the town and then pushing on towards the vital road and logistics
hub of Cazin. The loss of Cazin would bisect the enclave and allow the VRS to defeat 5th
Corps piece by piece. After Cazin’s fall, VRS troops would then swing south toward Bihac city
and the Grabez.
Their timely defeat of Fikret Abdic’s Muslim separatist troops around Velika
Kladusa in August freed up forces of ARBiH Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic’s veteran 5th
Corps to meet the Serb offensive. Around Bihac city and the Grabez, 5th Corps defences
relied on the 501st Bihac, 502nd Bihac, 503rd Cazin, and 1st Bosnian Liberation Brigades to
hold the line. On the Buzim-Otoka axis, the corps had the entire 505th Buzim Motorized
Brigade and most of the 511th Bosanska Krupa Mountain Brigade. All told, the 5th Corps
mustered about 15.000 troops for the battle.

Battle for Grabez Plateau, 31 August – 6 September 1994

The 2nd Krajina Corps attack at Grabez began on 31 August and proceeds in the
same manner as most of the previous VRS attempts to seize the Una valley had gone. Initial
objectives for the Serb brigades were the Alibegovica Kosa and Barakovac hill (Hill 453)
areas, the capture of which would have permitted VRS units to take the river plain and the
villages of Spahici, Jezero, and Srbljani. The rail lines running north from Bihac city would
then be in striking distance. As usual, the VRS made some progress in taking both hill
masses, but 5th Corps did not crack. Instead, it launched a counterattack on 6 September,
led by the 503rd Cazin Mountain Brigade, that erased VRS gains and even seized some
previously Serb-held ground.1937 Although sporadic fighting continued on the plateau for
several more days, for 2nd Krajina the battle was essentially over.

1937
Captain Mirko Marcetic, the commander of the 2nd Battalion / 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade – apparently
attached to the 3rd Petrovac Light Infantry Brigade – described the fighting on 6-8 August in the 6th
Brigade’s journal:
In the morning of 6 September I went to the front line with the goal of reconnoitering from Vrsko
to the Kamenicki vrh ... upon arriving, I was informed by the commander of the 4th Company that the
enemy had executed a penetration ... since the enemy was now coming from behind us, the
commander requested a withdrawal to a reserve position. I denied this request and immediately
organized a unit out of some reserve troops and headed out to provide assistance to Hasin vrh. As I
climbed towards the target, I realized that the situation was much more serious than I had thought.
Our right flank company had to withdraw from four trenches which the enemy now controlled. The
enemy was continuing on from Hasin vrh towards Krmacke vrh. However, I didn’t have any comms
with my superiors ... we began to fire on the enemy with artillery and I, along with some other
fighters, moved in for a counter-attack. The enemy retreated after losing a few of the trenches and
we succeeded in consolidating the line and regaining some self confidence. The enemy had been
driven back and was now behind the battalion command. During the [ensuing] battle, I ordered a
portion of our artillery to withdraw to a designated location. I further ordered them to equip each
artillery piece with an explosive charge in case we were unable to withdraw. By 12:00 the battle had
let up. At nightfall, I ordered that a platoon of 76 mm-B1 cannons be withdrawn to the Drenovo
region, while the 82 mm and 120 mm mortars, along with the kitchen, had already been repositioned

620
 Battle for Buzim-Otoka, 5 September – 15 September 1994
The 1st Krajina Corps opened its battle on 5 September with a salvo of “Orkan”
long-range rockets loaded with cluster sub-munitions from the 89th Rocket Artillery Brigade
against targets in Cazin and Buzim.1938 VRS ground forces then attacked on about a 10-
kilometer front towards Otoka with their left on the Una River.1939 The 1st Krajina Corps
tactical group appears to have led the advance on this axis. Over the next four days, VRS
units gradually pushed elements of the ARBiH 511th Mountain Brigade back towards Otoka,
crossing the Bastra River on 8-9 September. At this point, the attack towards Otoka – now
only one kilometre from the town – stalled. Muslim troops dug in around two key hills
above Otoka, Vuckovac and Plavna. For four days the VRS hurled strong attacks against the
hills, whose capture would have given them the town, to no avail.
On 8 September, the same day as the attack across the Bastra, the “Panthers” and
the SVK 33rd Dvor Brigade, supported by at least a company of tanks, attacked about 10 to
15 kilometers north of Otoka, between the Corkovaca and Radac hills on the Croatian-
Bosnian border. Their objective was Buzim, some 10 kilometers down the road. Facing
Major Izet Nanic’s ARBiH 505th Motorized Brigade, the VRS penetrated two kilometers into

to a more secure location. The next morning was abnormally quiet and one could feel the
premonition of the fates of the previous day. At around 13:00, the sky opened up and the enemy
commenced a fierce attack, again in the direction of Petrovac ... they again succeeded in penetrating
the line to our left. We placed all of the reserve units in support of the Petrovac battalion. We told the
aggressors that if they were true heroes they would fire on us, but instead they continued to fire on
the weak spot. Our young men began to lose their patience, including, in particular, the entire
contingent of the 3rd “Crni Djordje” Company. They hit the enemy from the flank and, together with
sniper artillery from our battalion, our fighters managed to capture a large amount of weaponry and
ammunition. We later found out that the enemy lost 26 fighters and that another 50 had been
wounded ... following the battle, our position was visited by the commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps,
General-Major Grujo Boric who recognized the soldiers of the 2nd battalion, 6th Sanska Infantry
Brigade for their efforts.
Captain Mirko Marceta: The Dragons Don’t Want a Border Near the Sana: The Battle of Grabez, 6, 7 and 8
September 1994, War Bulletin of the fith Sanska Infantry Brigade, October 1994, pp. 4-5; Zemka Seferagic:
Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the First Cazin 503rd Glorious Mountain Brigade, 17 August 1997:
From Mokres to Sanski Most, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 24; Antun Masle and Eduard Popovic: We Will
Enter All the Occupied Towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina With Arms, Just As the Serbs Did Two Years Ago,
Zagreb Globus, 30 September 1994, pp. 7-9; interviews with Brigadier Ramiz Drekovic and Atif Dudakovic.
1938
Reuters, 6 September 1994; Samira Dzanic: On the 3rd Anniversary of the Defeat of the “Birch (Breza) 94”
Offensive: Unbreakable Krajina, Prva Linija, October 1997, p. 24; an article describing the ARBiH defeat of
the “Breza 94” operation. The targets for these rockets remain unknown. The VRS had fired long-range
rockets at targets in the Bosnian Army rear areas in the past that often appeared to indiscriminately target
civilian areas but in reality were aimed at supposed logistics or artillery sites and missed. In any event, the
rockets caused a number of casualties, almost all civilians.
1939
In the far northeast corner of the enclave around Bosanska Bojna, SVK troops from the 24th Glina Infantry
Brigade / 39th Corps attempted to take and hold territory at the end of August. Troops from the 505th
Motorized Brigade defeated the SVK attempt, which probably was an effort to divert ARBiH troops from
sectors further south.

621
Muslim defences on 8-9 September.1940 Attacks on 10-11 September, despite strong artillery
support from inside the RSK, yielded only minor gains.
On 12 September the “Panthers” renewed the attack, pummelling ARBiH defences
southwest of Corkovaca. The 5th Corps, however, had been preparing a major
counterattack. Elite recon-sabotage units of the 505th Motorized Brigade – the “Hamza”
and “Gazije” companies and the “Tajfun” battalion-had been withdrawn from the frontline,
while additional recon-sabotage elements from at least the 502nd Bihac Mountain and
517th Light Brigades were transferred to the area.1941 As the VRS assault struck the ARBiH
defences, the regrouped Muslim special units, which had apparently infiltrated
neighbouring SVK positions, struck the “Panthers” in the flank.1942 The Serb attack collapsed,
and the “Panthers” and the SVK 33rd Dvor Brigade troops withdrew in disorder.1943 ARBiH
units pursued the retreating Serbs to the border, taking up to 20 square kilometers of
ground previously under VRS control and nearly capturing General Mladic.1944 Muslim
troops even pushed across the frontier into the RSK. The resounding defeat of the VRS/SVK
opposite Buzim put an abrupt and final end to the Serb offensive.

Evaluation of “Breza 94”

The VRS operation against Bihac was a typical Serb offensive, organized and
conducted in ways similar to those it had fought throughout Bosnia during 1993 and 1994.

1940
Nanic was 29 years old and had graduated from the JNA military academy. He left the JNA in January 1992.
Nanic was killed in action during 1995. See S. Hodzic: A Knight and a Hero, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 5 March
1996, p. 6; an article on Izet Nanic, commander of the ARBiH 505th Motorized Brigade.
1941
Samira Dzanic: On the 3rd Anniversary of the Defeat of the “Birch (Breza) 94” Offensive: Unbreakable
Krajina, Prva Linija, October 1997, p. 24; an article describing the ARBiH defeat of the “Breza 94” operation;
Zemka Seferagic: The Anniversary of the Formation of the 517th Liberation-Light Brigade, 15 August 1997:
On the Road to Freedom, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 23.
1942
The Command of the Army of the Serbian Republic Believes That Mladic Has Been Betrayed By Order of
Belgrade, Belgrade Telegraf, 12 October 1994, p. 11. The article states that:
... the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) recently let through its lines one unit of the
5th Corps of the Muslim Army, which attacked the units of General Ratko Mladic from behind. This
happened on the Bihac front, near Bosanska Krupa (sic). On that occasion 17 Serbian soldiers were
killed, while 76 were wounded, 28 seriously.
1943
Samira Dzanic: On the 3rd Anniversary of the Defeat of the “Birch (Breza) 94” Offensive: Unbreakable
Krajina, Prva Linija, October 1997, p. 24; an article describing the ARBiH defeat of the “Breza 94” operation;
Zilhad Kljucanin: Not A Single Foot of Buzim Soil Ever Fell Into the Hands of Anyone, Sarajevo Nova Bosna,
17 October 1995, p. 12; an interview with Sead Jusic, the commander of the 505th Motorized Brigade after
Nanic; Milan Jelovac: The Bihac Front – Mladic’s Headlong Flight, Zagreb Danas, 20 September 1994, pp.
12-13.
1944
Dudakovic stated that:
In the area of the village of Majdan, two “Puchs” [a light truck favored by Mladic], and a ground
vehicle were captured. According to the statement of a prisoner, this is where Mladic fied from. I do
not know the details ... We have confiscated many documents, working maps...
Antun Masle and Eduard Popovic: We Will Enter All the Occupied Towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina With Arms,
Just As the Serbs Did Two Years Ago, Zagreb Globus, 30 September, 1994, pp. 7-9; interviews with Brigadier
Ramiz Drekovic and Atif Dudakovic. Nanic and his successor used Mladic’s captured “Puch” as their
personal vehicle the rest of the war. S. Hodzic: A Knight and a Hero, Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 5 March 1996,
p. 6, an article on Izet Nanic, commander of the ARBiH 505th Motorized Brigade.

622
VRS strengths and weaknesses were the same that had brought it victories and limited its
successes. The more interesting aspect of the operation has to do with the tactics the ARBiH
5th Corps used to defeat the offensive.
The VRS achieved little in its attacks on the Grabez plateau, and ARBiH forces
defeated Serb troops in that battle through the time-tested methods of fortifications backed
up with strong counterattacks. The Serb defeat also owed something to the weak forces the
VRS assigned to the mission (three to four light infantry brigades instead of more elite
mobile formations) and the fact that these units had repeatedly failed against the same
ARBiH defences.1945
However, it was in the Buzim sector where the ARBiH’s superiority in the use of
small, elite reconnaissance-sabotage units came into play. These types of Muslim units had
been causing the VRS no end of trouble throughout the year during the ARBiH’s own
offensive operations. In this instance, the long front line held by the 505th Motorized
Brigade should have enabled the VRS to penetrate Muslim defences and push quickly
towards its objectives. Instead, ARBiH troops fought hard, delaying the Serb attack while the
Muslims grouped and infiltrated a large number of recon-sabotage units into the VRS/SVK
rear in preparation for a major counterattack. These forces were then able to exploit the
forward momentum and focus of the VRS “Panthers” (together with poor coordination and
flank security between formations) to crash into the Serb assault troops’ open flanks.1946
This time superior ARBiH tactics overcame the VRS’s advantages in firepower and command
skills.

1945
Although three light infantry brigades sounds like a sizeable force, and in some ways it is, the ARBiH had
successfully repelled these brigades’ attempts to advance in this sector for over two years and the Muslim
formations had the moral ascendancy over these VRS brigades. They were simply not up to storming and
holding the positions against a more motivated and skillful foe without additional reinforcement or much
stronger fire support.
1946
Even Mladic’s biographer notes that:
The Muslim attacks were certainly strong – and cunning, especially with the infiltration of sabotage units
which were very familiar with the terrain. On one occasion, even Mladic found himself surrounded by
them.
Jovan Janjic: Srpski General Ratko Mladic, Novi Sad Matica Srpska Press, 1996, Chapter 12.

623
 Annex 61
Punch and Counter-Punch:
Bihac Operations, October – December 19941947

1947
This narrative is based on extensive and detailed combat analysis on 1:50.000 scale maps using Sarajevo
Radio, Belgrade Tanjug, SRNA, and Paris AFP reporting from 24 October 1994 to 1 January 1995, plus the
Reuters pieces listed below. AFP and Reuters regularly carried operational and tactical information
provided by UNPROFOR on the battlefield situation. This daily reportage has been supplemented by a
collection of journal, magazine, and newspaper articles also listed below.
• Colonel Milovan Milutinovic: Loss of Supreme Command, Belgrade Nin, 1 November 1996, pp. 19-22; a
letter to the editor from the Chief of the VRS Information Service.
• Novo Scekic: We Are Not Bosnjaks, Belgrade Nin, 17 February 1995, pp. 22-23; an interview with
Fikret Abdic.
• R. Kovacevic: Is Zametica Still Karadzic’s Adviser?, Belgrade Politika, 11 November 1994, p. 12.
• Dragoljub Petrovic: Courier Jovica’s New Assignment, Belgrade Nasa Borba, 22-23 November 1997, p.
7.
• Beta, 27 October 1994.
• Milena Markovic: The Comeback with People, Belgrade Vecemje Novosti, 15 November 1994, p. 5; an
interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic.
• Zoran Petrovic-Pirocanac: The Angrier the Serbs in Serbia Get At Us, the More We Love Them, Belgrade
Duga, 10-23 December 1994, pp. 25-28; an interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic.
• Mira Lolic-Mocevic: Interview with Serb Republic Defense Minister Manojlo Milovanovic, Banja Luka
Srpska Televizija, 10 February 1998.
• Ranko Vojvodic: We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities Militarily: Power is Power, Banja Luka
Nezavisne Novine, 21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22; an interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic.
• Zemka Seferagic: On the Occasion of the Liberation of Cojluk (11 July 1995) and the Victory of the
511th Glorious Brigade: The Great Victory of the Krajina Soldiers, Prva Linija, July 1997, p. 32.
• Zemka Seferagic: Fifth Annivesary of the Formation of the First Cazin / 503rd Glorious Mountain
Brigade, 17 August 1997: From Mokres to Sanski Most, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 24.
• Zemka Seferagic: The Anniversary of the Formation of the 517th Liberation-Light Brigade, 15 August
1997: On the Road to Freedom, Prva Linija, September 1997, p. 13.
• Zemka Seferagic: The Krajina Bulwark of Bosnia, Prva Linija, November 1997, pp. 20-21; an article on
the fifth annivesary of the 5th Corps.
• Vildana Selimbegovic and Ozren Kebo: I Know My Fighting Men By Sight, Sarajevo Dani, February
1996, pp. 40-44; an interview with General Atif Dudakovic.
• Zarif Safic: No One Can Prevent Us From Taking, Taking Back What Belongs to Us!, Travnik Bosnjak, 9
January 1996, pp. 12-14; an interview with Brigadier Senad “Sargan” Sarganovic, commander of the
501st Bihac Mountain Brigade.
• Mustafa Borovic and Mirsad Sinanovic: The War Comedy in Which We Made a Jackass Out of Fikret
Abdic, Sarajevo Ljiljan, 4 October 1995, p. 12; an interview with Hamdija Abdic, commander of the
502nd Mountain Brigade.
• Mirza Sadikovic and Azra Delic: The Chetniks Are Punishing Civilians for Their Defeat, Oslobodjenje, 13
April 1995, p. 5.
• Denis Kuljic: Serbian Brigades and Corps Are Already Court-Martialing Deserters, Zagreb Globus, 2
December 1994, pp. 2, 18.
• Mark Heinrich: Bosnian Army Push Back Serbs around Bihac, Reuters, 26 October 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Bosnian Army Tries to Break Out of Bihac Enclave, Reuters, 27 October 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Bosnian Army Presses Ahead With Offensive, Reuters, 26 October 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Moslems Make Big Gains in Northwest Bosnia, Reuters, 27 October 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: 7.000 Serbs Flee Bosnian Army Onslaught, Reuters, 27 October 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Moslem-Led Army Advances in Northwest Bosnia, Reuters, 27 October 1994.
• Bosnian Serb Army Threatens Retaliation, Reuters, 27 October 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Bosnian Serbs Issue Fresh Threats, Reuters, 28 October 1994.

624
• U.N. Warns Bosnian Serbs Over Sarajevo Threat, Reuters, 28 October 1994.
• Bosnian Serb Leader Declares “State of War”, Reuters, 29 October 1994.
• Moslem-Led Army Advances on Serb-Held Town, Reuters, 29 October 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Sarajevo Comes Under Shelling Attack, Reuters, 31 October 1994.
• Bosnian Croats Help Moslem Offensive, UN Says, Reuters, 1 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: UN Says Moslem Offensive May Be Blunted, Reuters, 1 November 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Serbs Gird for Riposte against Bihac Moslems, Reuters, 1 November 1994.
• Bosnian Army Claims Advances on Serb-Held Town, Reuters, 1 November 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Moslems Flee Their Own Forces in Bosnia, Reuters, 2 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: All Bosnia Factions Pitch Into Latest Fighting, Reuters, 2 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Bosnian Serbs Face Moslem Assault on Town, Reuters, 2 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Bosnian Serbs Face Joint Croat-Moslem Attacks, Reuters, 2 November 1994.
• Serb Missiles Hit Safe Haven, Wound Seven – UN, Reuters, 4 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Serb Leaders Defer Martial Law to Parliament, Reuters, 4 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: UN Sees Signs of Serb Fight-Back in Bosnia, Reuters, 5 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Battle Rages for Northwest Bosnia, Reuters, 5 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: UN Reports Bitter Fighting for Bosnian Town, Reuters, 6 November 1994.
• UN Says Serbs Gain Ground Near Bihac, Reuters, 9 November 1994.
• Serb Aircraft Attack Bosnian Target, UN Says, Reuters, 9 November 1994.
• Bosnian Serbs Push Moslem Led Forces Back, Reuters, 9 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Serb Aircraft Attack Bihac Enclave of Bosnia, Reuters, 9 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: UN Says Bihac Enclave Conies Under Air Attack, Reuters, 9 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Bosnian Serbs Strike Back in Northwest, Reuters, 10 November 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Croatia’s Rebel Serbs Bombard Bosnian Moslems, Reuters, 10 November 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Croatia May Hit Krajina Serbs Bombarding Bosnia, Reuters, 10 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Bosnian Moslem Enclave Hit by Heavy Shelling, Reuters, 10 November 1994.
• Bosnian Serb General Urges Moslems to Surrender, Reuters, 11 November 1994.
• Bosnian Serbs Will Capture Bihac, Karadzic Says, Reuters, 11 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Serb Attack on Bihac Gathering Momentum, Reuters, 11 November 1994.
• Serbs Mobilise Moslem Refugees to Fight in Bihac, Reuters, 12 November 1994.
• UN Says Serb Advance on Bihac Has Slowed, Reuters, 13 November 1994.
• Serb Forces Retake Lost Ground around Bihac, Reuters, 14 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Bosnian Serbs Advance on Bihac Enclave, Reuters, 14 November 1994.
• Metka Jelenc: Mobilised Moslem Refugees Ready to Fight Back, Reuters, 15 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Serbs Co-Opt Rebel Moslems for Bihac Campaign, Reuters, 15 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Moslems Put Up Stiff Fight for Bihac, Reuters, 15 November 1994.
• Moslems Prepare to Fight Moslems in Bosnia, Reuters, 15 November 1994.
• Sean Mastuire: Serbs Close in On Bihac Enclave, Reuters, 16 November 1994.
• Rebel Moslems Return to Bihac Supported By Serbs – UN, Reuters, 16 November 1994.
• Rebel Moslem Forces Enter Bihac Pocket, Reuters, 16 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Bosnian Serb Army Threatens to Overrun Enclave, Reuters, 16 November 1994.
• Bosnian Army Surrounded in Velika Kladusa, Reuters, 17 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Rebel Moslem Force Is Serb Trump Card in Bihac, Reuters, 17 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Bosnian Government Fighting Desperate Defence, Reuters, 17 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Croatian Serbs Back Moslem Assault on Bihac, Reuters, 17 November 1994.
• Fighting Rages Round Bosnian Town, Reuters, 18 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Serb Planes Reported in New Bihac Raid, Reuters, 18 November 1994.
• UN Says Napalm Used in Bihac Air Raid, Reuters, 18 November 1994.
• UN Reports Street Fighting in Moslem Town, Reuters, 18 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Serb Forces Defy UN in Assault on Bihac, Reuters, 19 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: UN Condemns “Villainous” Serb Napalm Attack, Reuters, 19 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: Serbs Launch New Air Raid on Bihac Pocket – UN, Reuters, 19 November 1994.
• Zoran Radosavljevic: Serb Planes Hit Refugee Homes, Several Injured, Reuters, 19 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: Serb Plane Hit Refugee Apartments, Pilot Killed, Reuters, 19 November 1994.
• Serbs Claim Recapture of Ground Lost to Moslems, Reuters, 20 November 1994.
• Sean Maguire: Serb Air Raids Distract From Ground Assault, Reuters, 21 November 1994.

625
 Dudakovic on the Attack: Operation “Grmec 94”
By the fall of 1994, Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic’s ARBiH 5th Corps was a
confident, experienced, and battle-hardened force. Absolutely loyal to their charismatic
commander, the 5th Corps troops thought they could beat anything – even the long odds
that still faced their surrounded force even after the defeat of Fikret Abdic’s rebels. Indeed,
flushed with victory after trouncing their “Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia”
opponents, and having weathered the Bosnian Serb “Breza-94” offensive against them
immediately afterward, the 5th Corps’ troops were ready to take the offensive.

• NATO Attacked Airfield, Not Serb Planes – Source, Reuters, 21 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: Udbina Strike NATO’s Biggest in Europe, Reuters, 21 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Serb Attack On Bihac Continues Despite NATO Raid, Reuters, 22 November 1994.
• Serbs Attack Bosnian Troops in Bihac – UN, Reuters, 22 November 1994.
• Hand to Hand Fighting in Bihac Suburb – Agency, Reuters, 22 November 1994.
• Serb Forces Reported Closing In On Bihac Town, Reuters, 22 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Serbs Press Attack on Bihac despite UN Warnings, Reuters, 22 November 1994.
• Bihac Town Shelled As Refugees Pour In, Reuters, 23 November 1994.
• Fierce Battle inside Bihac Safe Area, Reuters, 23 November 1994.
• Serb Goal Not Bihac Town – UN, Reuters, 23 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Serbs Bent On Destroying Bihac Defenders, Reuters, 24 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Serbs Capture Key Hill South of Bihac – Bosnian PM, Reuters, 24 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Fighting Around Bihac As NATO Fails to Endorse Plan, Reuters, 24 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: UN Commander Says Bihac Unable Withstand Serbs, Reuters, 25 November 1994.
• Heavy Detonations Continue in Bihac – Local TV, Reuters, 25 November 1994.
• Serbs Have Up to Fifth of Bihac Zone – UN Sources, Reuters, 25 November 1994.
• Bosnian Army Reports Corpses in Roads to Bihac, Reuters, 25 November 1994.
• Serbs Have Quarter of Bihac Safe Area, UN Says, Reuters, 26 November 1994.
• Fighting Erupts near Bihac Hospital, UN Says, Reuters, 26 Novem ber 1994.
• UN Says Bihac Defenders Pushed Back by Serbs, Reuters, 26 November 1994.
• Fighting Continues Around Bihac, Reuters, 27 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: Evacuation of Bihac Unrealistic – UN Source, Reuters, 27 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: UN Fears Serbs Could Close Bihac Escape Road, Reuters, 27 November 1994.
• Bihac Defenders Sav Heavy Fighting Under Way, Reuters, 27 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: Bihac, Resigned and Anguished, Awaits Its Fate, Reuters, 27 November 1994.
• Kurt Schork: Refugees Queue for Food Under Serb Guns in Bihac, Reuters, 28 November 1994.
• Zoran Radosavljevic: No Truce Here, Say Bihac’s Moslem Defenders, Reuters, 28 November 1994.
• Zoran Radosavljevic: Bihac’s Defenders Fight on at Heavy Cost, Reuters, 28 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: Bodies Lie in Streets of “Forgotten” Town, Reuters, 28 November 1994.
• Moslems Being Pushed Back in Bihac – 5th Corps, Reuters, 28 November 1994.
• Douglas Hamilton: UN Says North Bihac Town Could Fall Soon, Reuters, 29 November 1994.
• Metka Jelenc: Bihac Defenders Place No Hope in Latest UN Moves, Reuters, 30 November 1994.
• Metka Jelenc: Better to “Eat Grass” Than Abandon Bihac – Defenders, Reuters, 30 November 1994.
• Serbs Encroach on Bihac. Civlian Shot Dead, Reuters, 30 November 1994.
• Giles Elgood: Bihac Fighting Switches to Town Further North, Reuters, 3 December 1994.
• Dan De Luce: Karadzic Indicates Readiness to Talk Peace, Reuters, 7 December 1994.
• Mortar Bomb Kills Child in Moslem “Safe Area”, Reuters, 14 December 1994.
• Rebel Moslems Close Circle Around Kladusa, Reuters, 15 December 1994.
• Dan De Luce: Government Rejects Bosnian Serb Peace Plan, Reuters, 15 December 1994.
• UN Says Rebels Control Strategic Area of Bihac, Reuters, 16 December 1994.
• Moslem Rebels Capture Town in Bihac, Reuters, 17 December 1994.
• Miki Stojicic: Rebel Moslems. Serbs Capture Town in Bihac, Reuters, 17 December 1994.
• Bosnian Government Admits Loss of Town in Bihac, Reuters, 19 December 1994.
• Mark Heinrich: Serbs Rocket Moslem Enclave While Agreeing Truce, Reuters, 20 December 1994.

626
 On 25 October, almost the entire 5th Corps was unleashed against its Bosnian Serb
opponents to the south, with only a relatively small holding force defending the enclave’s
borders with the Krajina Serb Army. Dudakovic’s forces achieved near-complete surprise,
and their gains on the first day were substantial. Government forces, comprising the 501st
Mountain, 502nd Mountain, 503rd Mountain, and 1st Bosnian Liberation Brigades, captured
the Grabez barracks and much of the long-contested Grabez plateau east of Bihac from the
four long-suffering infantry/light infantry brigades of the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps on the
plateau.1948 The Grabez barracks and plateau directly overlooked Bihac itself, and Bosnian
Serb forces had shelled the town constantly from these positions. For the first time in two
and a half years, Bihac’s residents could enjoy a reprieve from the threat of shelling.1949
By the second day of the offensive, the Bosnian Army had made major advances,
taking over a hundred square kilometers of territory and advancing along two main axes
south and east of Bihac. One prong of the attack, led by the 501st and 502nd Mountain
Brigades, drove south toward Serb-held Ripac, in the direction of Orasa, Kulen Vakuf,1950 and
ultimately Bosanski Petrovac some 40 km to the south. Another prong, comprising elements
of the 503rd Mountain, 511th Mountain, and 1st Bosnian Liberation Brigades, drove
eastward along the south bank of the Una River, in the direction of Bosanska Krupa,1951
about 20km east of Bihac.1952 Serb citizens – some 3.500 initially, eventually as many as
10.000 – fled ahead of the Muslim advance, a sure sign of shaky confidence in the Bosnian
Serb Army’s defence line.1953
By 27 October the Bosnian Army had taken between 100 and 150 square
kilometers of territory, and had captured several pieces of precious heavy equipment
abandoned by the Bosnian Serbs during their headlong flight.1954 The always-underequipped
Bosnian Army forces had also seized and distributed the contents of the just-captured
Grabez barracks, an infusion that magnified the weight of their advance. Meanwhile, Major
General Grujo Boric’s VRS 2nd Krajina Corps, still off-balance, continued to fall back in
disarray. Fifth Corps forces advanced about 10 km south towards Bosanski Petrovac and
reached right up to the edges of Bosanska Krupa to the east.1955 But although the exultant
5th Corps brigades continued to press forward, the ARBiH advance was beginning to
outpace itself. Movement began to slow as the 5th Corps strove to consolidate its gains and
allow its rudimentary logistics system to catch up with the advancing frontline forces.1956
At this point, the Bosnian Serb leadership was genuinely alarmed about the military
situation in northwest Bosnia, and they were outraged that the United Nations had watched

1948
Reuters: Serbs and Moslems Battle in Northwest Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 21 October 1994.
1949
The 15th Bihac Infantry, 17th Kljuc Light Infantry, 1st Drvar Light Infantry, and 3rd Petrovac Light Infantry
Brigades.
1950
Reuters: Bosnian Army Push Back Serbs around Bihac by Mark Heinrich, 26 October 1994.
1951
Renamed by the Serbs to Spasovo.
1952
Renamed by the Serbs to Krupa na Uni.
1953
Reuters: Bosnian Army Tries to Break Out of Bihac Enclave by Mark Heinrich, 27 October 1994.
1954
Reuters: Bosnian Army Presses Ahead With Offensive by Kurt Schork, 26 October 1994.
1955
Reuters: Moslems Make Big Gains in Northwest Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 27 October 1994.
1956
Reuters: 7.00O Serbs Flee Bosnian Army Onslaught by Mark Heinrich, 27 October 1994.

627
with apparent unconcern as the Bosnian Government mounted a massive offensive out of
the UN’s supposedly demilitarized “Safe Area” of Bihac. On 27 October, Bosnian Serb Army
Main Staff chief Manojlo Milovanovic issued a public statement demanding that the UN
require the Bosnian Army to pull back to its confrontation line of 23 October. His
accompanying threat was two-pronged: if the Muslims failed to pull back the VRS would
“retaliate by attacking the area from which their attacks are launched”, i.e., the UN Safe
Area.1957 The following day Bosnian Serb President Karadzic called for an all-out
counteroffensive to recapture the lost territory, and demanded retaliation “regardless of
the safe areas”.1958 Dismissing the Bosnian Serb rhetoric, UNPROFOR Bosnia commander
Rose responded with a counter-threat of NATO airstrikes should the Bosnian Serbs shell any
of the UN- declared safe areas.1959
On 29 October the Bosnian Serb President underlined the Pale leadership’s concern
over the situation by declaring a “state of war” in the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps’ area of
responsibility. What this declaration meant, more than two years into the conflict, was not
entirely clear, but it required the suspension of all leaves for soldiers, directed full
mobilization within the corps area, and – in an effort to prevent thousands more from
fleeing – imposed movement restrictions on all citizens in the Serb-held municipalities of
northwest Bosnia.1960 On this same day it appears that the Bosnian Supreme Command –
the RS national command authority – also issued General Milovanovic his orders for an early
counteroffensive.
By the end of the eventful 29th of October the Bosnian Army had encircled – but
not captured – the very sizeable town of Bosanska Krupa, once the home of 58.000 pre-war
residents. Bosnian Serb Army units from the 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade trapped
inside the town on the east side of the Una River could not get out – but neither could the
encircling ARBiH units force their way in.1961 To the south, the Bosnian Army had captured
the town of Kulen Vakuf, on the Bosnian-Croatian border fully 30km southeast of Bihac.
The last two days of October would mark the high-tide line of the 5th Corps’
autumn 1994 advance. On 30 October heavy fighting raged all around newly besieged
Bosanska Krupa as troops from the 511th Mountain Brigade, supported by the 505th
Motorized Brigade, attempted to wrest control of the town from its Serb defenders. Intense
battles raged for two days as elements of the two brigades forced their way into Bosanska
Krupa itself, only to be driven back. The embattled Bosnian Serbs held fast to their positions,
and Bosanska Krupa marked the end of the offensive’s eastward surge.1962
Though the Bosnian Army continued to press forward in the south, its lines were
becoming dangerously overextended. Overeager 5th Corps attackers took another 30
square kilometers on 30 and 31 October, bringing the total captured area to almost 250

1957
Reuters: Moslem-Led Army Advances in Northwest Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 27 October 1994.
1958
Reuters: Bosnian Serb Army Threatens Retaliation, 27 October 1994.
1959
Reuters: Bosnian Serbs Issue Fresh Threats by Kurt Schork, 28 October 1994.
1960
Reuters: U.N. Warns Bosnian Serbs over Sarajevo Threat, 28 October 1994.
1961
Reuters: Bosnian Serb Leader Declares “State of War”, 29 October 1994.
1962
Reuters: Moslem-Led Armv Advances on Serb-Held Town, 29 October 1994.

628
square kilometers.1963 But the goal was no longer one of capturing territory – 5th Corps now
faced the challenging task of hanging on to what it had just won.

The VRS Defends Bosanska Krupa, Late October – Early November 1994
As the 5th Corps began its attempt to break out of the Grabez plateau on 27
October, two key Serb-held positions stood in their way: the ridgeline at Veliki and Mali
Radic (covering the Bihac-Krupa road) and the Serb-held half of Bosanska Krupa on the
southern (right) bank of the Una River. Although VRS 2nd Krajina Corps defences had
collapsed on the southern side of the Grabez, Serb forces on the northern half – apparently
the 3rd Petrovac Light Infantry Brigade – fell back in better order. As a result, 5th Corps
formations, probably the 503rd Cazin and 1st Bosnian Liberation Brigades, had difficulty
forcing VRS troops off of the Radic ridges. The VRS stand delayed the capture of the features
until 29 October.
Meanwhile, the 511th Mountain Brigade was moving east from Grabez toward
Krupa – held by the VRS 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade – while preparing to cross the Una
River north of Krupa in a bid to encircle the town. The main attack did not really get under
way until 29 October, possibly because of the Serbs’ dogged grip on the Radics. Then a
successful river crossing by the 511th and probably the 505th Motorized Brigade, together
with the frontal attack from the west, quickly cut most of the roads into the town. VRS
reinforcements, however, had already begun to arrive. Major General Rajko Balac, the
commander of the VRS Centre for Military Schools in Banja Luka, led a cadet battalion,
together with a battalion from both the 6th Sanska Infantry and 43rd Prijedor Motorized
Brigades, into the battle on 30 October. Balac’s forces hit the right flank of the 5th Corps
forces southwest of Krupa, bringing their advance to an abrupt halt and apparently
reopening some Serb entry points into the town.1964 Over the next five days the ARBiH
repeatedly tried and failed to drive into the town from their stalled position.
The VRS defence of these critical positions and the timely arrival of reinforcements
turned the key that locked the door on the ARBiH advance. The Serbs had managed to
contain the left side of the hitherto rapid 5th Corps thrust, slowing it with their stubborn
defence of Radic and halting it with their stand at Krupa. As a result, the 5th Corps was
unable to broaden the base of its offensive. But there was more at stake than just the loss of
momentum and an opportunity for further advances by the ARBiH. On the right of the
corps, along the Bihac-Petrovac / Kulen Vakuf axis, the VRS collapse had permitted the 5th
Corps to make a quick 20-kilometer march clear to Kulen Vakuf. This success, however,
rapidly became a liability with the failure on the 5th Corps’ left flank because the VRS’s
defence perimeter now left 5th Corps units around Kulen Vakuf overextended in a
vulnerable salient, with insufficient forces to hold the new frontage. The VRS would soon
move to exploit the situation.

1963
Reuters: Sarajevo Comes Under Shelling Attack by Kurt Schork, 31 October 1994.
1964
Reuters: Serbs and Moslems Battle in Northwest Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 21 October 1994.

629
 Milovanovic Organizes the Counteroffensive,
Late October – Early November 1994
Lieutenant Colonel General Manojlo Milovanovic, the Chief of the VRS Main Staff,
arrived in the Krupa area on 30 October. Milovanovic’s mission was to analyze the situation
and determine what should be done.1965 The general had already put in motion plans to
shift significant resources to the sector in order to restore the situation and mount a
counterattack. He assumed command of all VRS formations in the Bihac theatre the same
day, establishing his command post in the village of Jasenica, some 13 kilometers southeast
of Bosanska Krupa. A new unit commanded by General Balac-whose scratch relief force had
helped stop the 5th corps’ left wing outside of Krupa on the day of Milovanovic’s arrival –
formed the first wave of this plan. Balac’s unit was a new composite 1st Serbian Brigade, the
first of three composite brigades that Milovanovic had earlier ordered formed from
throughout the VRS, drawing on each corps. (Because of the large number of elements from
so many different units, Milovanovic gave the honorifics; “1st, 2nd, and 3rd Serbian
Brigades”, to these formations.)1966 Milovanovic appears to have superimposed three
tactical group headquarters over these new units and elements of the 2nd Krajina Corps
then in the process of regrouping. The tactical groups, together with another formed later
from the 11th Krupa Light Infantry and 1st Novigrad Infantry Brigades, comprised the bulk of
the VRS force, which eventually grew from an initial 6.500 personnel to some 14.000 troops
with strong armour and artillery support.1967
Milovanovic, operating under direct orders from the RS Supreme Command, was
given the mission of retaking all lost Serb territory, establishing the RS “border” on the Una
River – an objective 2nd Krajina Corps had failed to achieve for over two years – and,
especially, defeating the ARBiH 5th Corps. Milovanovic made this clear on several occasions:
My task is to regain Serbian territories occupied by the 5th Corps between 24 and
31 October and I say: my exclusive mission is to break up the 5th Corps, to recapture
territories ... I have no intention to leave the 5th Corps alone until I have rendered it
militarily harmless, so that after a month I do not have to beat them once again.1968

1965
Ranko Vojvodic: We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities Militarily: Power is Power, Banja Luka
Nezavisne Novine, 21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22; an interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic.
1966
Ibid. 7
1967
Milovanovic later stated:
... I had ordered the corps commanders ... that three brigades be formed from all units. The 1st,
2nd, and 3rd Serbian Brigades ... I did not expect that the corps commanders, of all people, would
have an easy time with that. However, the response was massive. I even excluded the Herzegovina
Corps from that order because I knew that they were having a crisis replenishing their personnel.
However, I received a complaint from the commander of the Herzegovina Corps ... asking why I did
not want Herzegovinians in any of those brigades. When I arrived in Jasenica, the frameworks of
those brigades were already in place. Not all the units had arrived in their entirety, but the command
structures were already in place, there were two, in some places three battalions...
Ranko Vojvodic: We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities Militarily: Power is Power, Banja Luka
Nezavisne Novine, 21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22; an interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic.
1968
General Milovanovic outlined the number of personnel involved in the operation during a February 1998
interview. See Mira Lolic-Mocevic, interview with Serb Republic Defense Minister Manojlo Milovanovic,

630
 No asset would be overlooked in the Serbs’ campaign to secure western Bosnia
once and for all. Krajina Serb Army forces would assist in this operation, with strong support
from Yugoslav Army and Serbian State Security (RDB) units. Even the remnants of Fikret
Abdic’s rebel Muslim forces would be included and, after 5th Corps forces had been
knocked out, the Serbs planned to reinstate Abdic as the puppet ruler of the enclave.

Banja Luka Srpska Televizija, 10 February 1998. However, the exact composition of the tactical groups
remains unclear, but appears to have involved the following formations:
Tactical Group 1
1st Serbian Brigade
Schools Battalion / Center of Military Schools
1 battalion / 43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade
1 battalion / 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade
1 composite battalion / Drina Corps
Major elements, 3rd Petrovac Light Infantry Brigade (-)
Tactical Group 2
2nd Serbian Brigade
3 composite battalions
Major elements, 1st Drvar Light Infantry Brigade
Tactical Group 3
3rd Serbian Brigade
3 composite battalions
Major elements, 15th Bihac Infantry Brigade
Major elements, 17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade
1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers” (-)
Podrinjc Special Forces Detachment “Drina Wolves”
Battle Group / 7th North Dalmatian Corps SVK
Tactical Group 4
11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade
1st Novigrad Infantry Brigade
The 2nd Serbian Brigade’s composite battalions appear to have been formed from platoons and companies
of the brigades of probably the East Bosnian Corps, Sarajevo-Romanija, Drina, and probably the
Herzegovina Corps. The 3rd Serbian Brigade’s composite battalions appears to have been drawn from the
1st Krajina Corps, including platoons and companies of the 2nd Krajina Infantry, 1st Celinac Light Infantry,
11th Dubica Infantry, 43rd Prijedor Motorized, 1st Gradiska Light Infantry, 1st Doboj Light Infantry, 22nd
Infantry, 11th Dubica Infantry Brigades – all from the 1st Krajina Corps – and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Semberija
Light Infantry Brigades / East Bosnian Corps, plus the 3rd Military Police Battalion / East Bosnian Corps. In
addition, several other units were involved in the counteroffensive although their exact subordination
remains unclear. These included the corps troops from 2nd Krajina Corps (2nd Military Police Battalion, 2nd
Mixed Artillery Regiment, 2nd Recon-Sabotage Company), elements of the 65th Protection Motorized
Regiment, plus up to a battalion of armor from the 1st Krajina Corps (either 1st or 2nd Armored Brigades),
probably a corps artillery battalion from 1st Krajina Corps, and the 6th (Banja Luka) and 7th (Prijedor)
Detachments / MUP Special Police Brigade. Each tactical group probably was supported by a tank company
and a mixed artillery battalion. See especially Ranko Vojvodic: We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities
Militarily: Power is Power, Banja Luka Nezavisne Novine, 21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22; an interview with
General Manojlo Milovanovic, and also Vladimir Jovanovic: Live Mud of Bihac, Podgorica Monitor, 25
November 1994, pp. 21-22 and Denis Kuljis: 20. 000 Serb Soldiers From Croatia and Bosnia Are Entering
Bihac!, Zagreb Globus, 25 November 1994, pp. 3-5.

631
 Operation “Stit 94” Kicks Off, 4 November – 20 November 1994
Milovanovic’s counteroffensive, Operation “Stit (Shield) 94”, began on 4
November.1969 Tactical Groups 1 and 3 (TG-1 andTG-3), spearheaded by the 1st and 3rd
Serbian Brigades respectively, composed the main strike force with Tactical Group-2 (TG-2),
including the 2nd Serbian Brigade, linking the two main axes. Tactical Group-3’s attack along
the main Bihac-Petrovac road made the most visible and rapid progress during the first
week of the counteroffensive. VRS troops had already reoccupied Kulen Vakuf on 3-4
November, probably after 5th Corps realized the VRS was building up for a major
counteroffensive and concluded that its exposed positions there could not be held.
Elements of the 501st and 502nd Bihac Mountain Brigades comprised the main force
opposing the Serb attack, but their units were spread too thinly to halt the assault.1970 On 6
November, VRS units – supported by SVK 15th Lika Corps artillery fire – seized the village of
Cukovi, some 14 kilometers north of Kulen Vakuf, which controlled key high ground north of
the town and adjacent to the main highway. By 8 November, TG-3 had taken Dubovsko.
another seven kilometers north of Cukovi, and had pushed on to positions at or near the
village of Racic, only 10 kilometers southeast of Bihac city. At the same time, TG-2 was
driving northwest on TG-3’s right flank, pushing into the Tihotina and Hrgar areas on 9-10
November. The next objective was the important former Serb-controlled village of Ripac
and key hilltops surrounding it on the south-eastern approaches to Bihac city and the
Grabez plateau.
On the VRS right flank, Balac’s 1st Serbian Brigade and the rest of Tactical Group-1
faced stiffer opposition. ARBiH units here had less ground to give and proportionally more
troops to hold their ground with. Balac himself was killed in action on 4 November while

1969
Zoran Petrovic-Pirocanac: The Angrier the Serbs in Serbia Get At Us, the More We Love Them, Belgrade
Duga, 10-23 December 1994, pp. 25-28; an interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic; see also Milena
Markovic: The Comeback With People, Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 15 November 1994, p. 5; in which
Milovanovic states:
Our goals are as follows: the total military elimination of the 5th Corps, to the last man who could
in any way pose a danger to the Army of the Serbian Republic and the establishment of the borders of
the Serbian Republic precisely where our people and deputies in the assembly decided they should
be... at the Una River.
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic stated on 11 November 1994 that
We are going to disarm the 5th Corps and pacify the region.
Bosnian Serbs Will Capture Bihac, Karadzic Says, Reuters, 11 November 1994.
Major General Milisav Sekulic, former Chief of Operations and Training for the Main Staff of the Krajina
Serb Army also states that the goal of the operation was to destroy the 5th Corps, take over western Bosnia
– the Bihac enclave – and proclaim the “Republic of Western Bosnia” under the control of Abdic. Sekulic
indicates that the achievement of this would free up significant VRS and SVK forces for other sectors. Major
General Milisav Sekulic: Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag, 2001. p. 92.
1970
Mira Lolic-Mocevic: Interview with Serb Republic Defense Minister Manojlo Milovanovic, Banja Luka Srpska
Televizija, 10 February 1998 and Ranko Vojvodic: We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities Militarily:
Power is Power, Banja Luka Nezavisne Novine, 21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22; an interview with General
Manojlo Milovanovic.

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leading his tactical group into battle.1971 Over the next five days, the 1st Serbian Brigade
pushed ARBiH units – probably from the 503rd Cazin, 511th Krupa, and 1st Bosnian
Liberation Brigades – back from the western side of Krupa toward Grabez. The VRS re-
conquered the Veliki and Mali Radic area on 8/9 November, and had driven another five
kilometers deep into ARBiH defences by the next day, taking the important Drenovo Tijesno
junction on the Krupa-Bihac road. In addition, on 8/9 November, Tactical Group 4 forces
around Krupa drove back elements of the ARBiH 505th and 511th Brigades on the north-
eastern side of the town. These Muslim troops had remained on the south side of the Una
after the 5th Corps attack had been halted at the end of October.
On the far left, southwest of Bihac city, the SVK 103rd Donji Lapac Light Infantry
Brigade / 15th Lika Corps attacked on 8 November in support of a VRS attempt attempting
to penetrate HVO/ARBiH lines around Veliki and Mali Skocaj. Although the SVK attack
gained little ground, combined with a successful Serb air strike on an ammunition storage
depot and artillery fire, it helped keep ARBiH forces around Bihac pinned down and less
available to block the primary VRS attacks.19721973
Very briefly, Milovanovic halted the advance and called on the 5th Corps to
surrender. The nearer the 5th Corps troops were forced to their original October positions,
however, the harder and more grimly the Muslims fought. Milovanovic resumed the
operation, determined to retake all the lost territory on the Grabez plateau and probably
move on Bihac’s line of communications to the north. In a week of heavy fighting, all three
tactical groups battered their way forward. By 16 November, TG-1 appears to have driven
5th Corps units back another six kilometers, reaching the village of Grmusa on the Una
River, while TG-2 and 3 retook Ripac, and the Lohovsko Brdo area. It took the VRS another
four days to recapture the last of the territory lost to the 5th Corps offensive, when
Milovanovic proclaimed the Serb victory. Phase one of Operation “Stit 94” appeared to be
over, and phase two had already begun.

Phase Two: The Resurrection of Fikret Abdic, the Involvement of the Krajina
Serb Army, and the Campaign to Destroy the 5th Corps
While the VRS was closing in on Bihac and the Grabez plateau from the southeast,
the Krajina Serb Army, with support and guidance from Belgrade, was reconstituting the
Muslim “People’s Defence” forces of Fikret Abdic’s defunct “Autonomous Province of

1971
Mustafa Borovic and Mirsad Sinanovic: The War Comedy in Which We Made a Jackass Out of Fikret Abdic,
Sarajevo Ljiljan, 4 October 1995, p. 12; an interview with Hamdija Abdic, commander of the 502nd
Mountain Brigade.
1972
Banja Luka Televizija and Banja Luka Srpski Radio 4 November 1996.
1973
The first observed Serb air strike since the VRS Air and Air Defense Force tried to bomb the Novi Travnik
plant earlier in the year (and lost four aircraft to US F-16 fighters) was a flashy and successful attack. The
Serbs launched an “Orao” strike aircraft from Udbina Air Base in the RSK. Just as the aircraft neared the
Bosnian border, it loosed two US-made “Maverick” missiles. The target was an ARBiH ammunition storage
depot in Bihac, which the missiles spectacularly destroyed.

633
Western Bosnia”, apparently in preparation for phase two – the planned destruction of the
5th Corps.
After Abdic’s forces had been defeated and dispersed from their “capital” in
August, most of his supporters and former soldiers fled into the RSK, settling in refugee
camps in UN Sector North, southeast of Karlovac. On 8 November, UN observers noted that
the SVK had begun recruiting able-bodied Muslim males from among the refugees. The SVK
was reforming some 4.000-5.000 of Abdic’s troops into three brigades: 1st Velika Kladusa,
2nd Cazin, and 3rd Vrnograc Brigades. On 10 November, the new formations began taking
up positions along the RSK border near Velika Kladusa.
In actual command of these puppet troops was a newly formed Operational Group
“Pauk” (Spider) commanded by SVK Major General Mile Novakovic and Serbian State
Security Department (RDB) Colonel “Raja” Bozovic, a veteran special operations officer. A
key deputy of RDB chief Jovica Stanisic, “Frenki” Simatovic, oversaw Novakovic and
Bozovic’s work.1974 To stiffen the Abdic units – as well as allied SVK ground forces –
Novakovic and Bozovic could call on a bevy of elite Yugoslav Army and Serbian RDB and
Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG) troops.1975 Elements of the VJ’s 63rd Airborne Brigade /
Corps of Special Units, plus Simatovic’s “Red Beret” special operations unit, as well as
elements of the SDG – probably about 500 troops combined – were to provide the
spearhead for the APWB attack.1976

1974
Novakovic was an ex-JNA officer who formerly had served as the Chief of the SVK Main Staff. Prior to this,
he had commanded the VRS Tactical Group 2 (composed of SVK/RSK MUP troops) during Operation
“Corridor 92” and had served in the 1991 war. See Dragoljub Petrovic: Courier Jovica’s New Assignment,
Belgrade Nasa Borba, 22-23 November 1997, p. 7, for references to Bozovic and Simatovic. See also
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic:
Prosecution’s Second Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002,
www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed June 2002, p. 119, which cites “Pauk” Operative Diary and
“Pauk” Operations Logbook No. 1, which apparently covers 16 November 1994 to 1 December 1994.
1975
General Sekulic states that:
... a decision was made in Belgrade to destroy the Muslim 5th Corps and for the Serb armies (the
SVK and the VRS) to take over the territory of western Bosnia, which would subsequently become the
“Republic of Western Bosnia” with Fikret Abdic at its head. It was planned to create a special military
grouping under the name “Pauk” (Spider) into which, besides Fikret Abdic’s People’s Defense units,
would enter units of the RSK Ministry of Internal Affairs with reinforcements from Serbia and a
number of elements of the Serb Krajina Army. The formation of the “Pauk” grouping commenced in
October 1994, and the constitution of its command was completed by 15 November ... General Mile
Novakovic was appointed commander of “Pauk”...
From the leadership perspective, an unusual construct of a command system was created. The
command of “Pauk” was the key one, and it was not subordinated to either the Main Staff of the
Republika Srpska Army or Main Staff of the Serb Krajina Army. The “Pauk” command was
subordinated to (in part to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia and in part to the
competent element of Serbian State Security.) The task of providing “Pauk” with rear services was
entrusted to the Main Staff of the Serb Krajina Army.
Major General Milisav Sekulic: Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag.
2001, pp. 91-92.
1976
Operational Group “Pauk” appears to have been organized into three tactical groups that probably
exercised control over specific sectors, each controlling one of the three APWB brigades and any SVK, VJ, or
RDB/RDB-affiliated troops in that sector. RDB Colonel Radojica (“Raja”) Bozovic-“Kobac” likely commanded
Tactical Group-2 and SDG Colonel Mihajlo Ulemek-“Legija” commanded Tactical Group-3. See International

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 The SVK also contributed about 6.500 troops drawn from all six of Major General
Milan Celeketic’s SVK corps.1977 These forces were grouped to conduct and support
operations in two main sectors. The first, west/northwest of Bihac city, operated in
conjunction with VRS forces to the east and were organized in two or three tactical groups
under the control of Colonel Stevo Sevo’s 15th Lika Corps – about 4.500 troops altogether
(plus at least 500 APWB personnel).1978 1979The second, around Velika Kladusa, would mesh

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic: Prosecution’s Second
Pre-Trial Brief (Croatia and Bosnia Indictments), 31 May 2002, www.un.org/icty/latst/index.htm, accessed
June 2002, p. 120. The ICTY cites an SVK parade video from 1995 that show Bozovic and Ulemek as
commanders of-as the ICTY puts it-“VRS TG-2” and “VRS TG-3” respectively. Given the known affiliation of
both Bozovic and Ulemek with OG Pauk, it is likely that these tactical groups were actually part of OG Pauk.
1977
Major General Sekulic states that a total of 6.638 SVK soldiers “took part in combat operations against the
Muslim 5th Corps during December”. He breaks down the total as follows:
1.100 troops in two reinforced battalions drawn from several different units of the 11th East-Slavonia-
Baranja Corps
1.000 troops from the 39th Banija Corps, not including the 33rd Infantry Brigade “the whole of which
was engaged in positions facing the Muslim 5th Corps”.
2.553 troops from the 21 st Kordun and 15th Lika Corps “in the structure of ‘Pauk’” [probably about
1.500 from the 15th Corps and about 1.000 from the 21 st Corps]
1.450 troops from the 18th West Slavonian Corps
213 troops from the 7th North Dalmatian Corps attached to the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps
150 special operations troops from Captain Dragan’s Alpha Training Center
Note that Sekulic’s breakdown does not add up to 6.638. In addition, based on publicly released reports
from SVK prisoners held by the ARBiH 5th Corps, the SVK 7th Corps also appears to have had an additional
battle group with 15th Corps. This probably comprised another 250 troops. The 33rd Infantry Brigade near
Dvor does not appear to have been engaged in offensive operations during November or December which
is probably why Sekulic did not include its troops in the total. If the 33rd Brigade is included, the total SVK
forces involved probably numbered over 8.000 troops.
Major General Milisav Sekulic: Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade), Bad Vilbel Nidda Verlag.
2001, pp. 92-93. For the prisoner reports, see Rozita Vukovic: To War for 300 Cigarettes, Split Slobodna
Dalmacija, 7 December 1994, p. 5.
Celeketic had taken over as Chief of the SVK Main Staff in February 1994 from General Novakovic. Celeketic
previously commanded the SVK 18th West Slavonian Corps and the VRS 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade.
1978
The 15th Lika Corps forces appears to have been comprised of the following units:
1 company / 63rd Airborne Brigade / VJ Corps of Special Units
Tactical Group 5
103rd Donji Lapac Light Infantry Brigade (-)
1 composite battle group / 11th Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Corps
1 tank company
1 mixed artillery battalion
May also have included one of the 18th Corps battle groups
Tactical Group 6
1 battalion / 9th Gracac Motorized Brigade
1 battalion / 18th Korenica Infantry Brigade
1 battalion / 50th Vrhovine Infantry Brigade
1 composite battle group / 11th Eastern Slavonia-Baranja Corps
Elements, “Scorpion” Special Battalion / 11th Eastern Slavonian-Baranja Corps
1 tank company / 50th Vrhovine Infantry Brigade
1 mixed artillery battalion
May also have included one of the 18th Corps battle groups
Tactical Group 7
1 composite battle group / 7th North Dalmatian Corps
1 battalion / 70th Plaski Infantry Brigade

635
with the VJ / Serbian forces to provide essential stiffening to the Muslim APWB troops. It
was organized into probably two tactical groups (some 2.000 troops), one each from Colonel
Veljko Bosanac’s 21st Kordun Corps (Tactical Group 8) and Colonel Zarko Gajic’s 39th Banija
Corps (possibly Tactical Group 9), operating under Operational Group “Pauk” control.1980
SVK artillery batteries would provide fire support to both forces from inside the RSK.
The role of these SVK groups in the renewed Serb offensive was to divert, stretch
and thin the 5th Corps defenders so that one of the three main forces – SVK, APWB, or VRS
– could break the 5th Corps front in one of the main sectors and deal a mortal blow to
Dudakovic’s force. To this end the first operational group (15th Lika Corps) had as its
immediate tactical objective the seizure of key terrain and lines of communication to the
west/southwest of Bihac city while threatening Cazin and the important resupply airfield at
Coralici. The mission of the second operational group (OG “Pauk”) was to seize Velika
Kladusa, then move on toward Cazin to link up with the first group and/or the VRS.
At the same time that the SVK/APWB forces joined the battle, General Milovanovic
– who presumably directed the entire Serb force (or was at least responsible for its
coordination) – would renew his VRS assault on the Grabez plateau, while attacking the
Bihac city approaches in conjunction with the SVK. Once 5th Corps had been defeated on
Grabez, the VRS plan appears to have called for its forces to punch across the Una north
toward Cazin. At the same time, the VRS was to open a new attack axis, crossing the Una
River at Krupa to outflank the Grabez defences. As SVK, APWB, and VRS forces converged on
Cazin, the 5th Corps would be destroyed. Interestingly, it appears that Milovanovic did not

Elements / Alpha Training Center

1 tank company
1 mixed artillery battalion
The subordination of two composite battle groups / 18th West Slavonian Corps is unclear.
1979
The exact designators for these tactical groups are unclear, but may have been numbered TG-5, TG-6, and
TG-7; the VRS and SVK tactical groups appear to have been sequentiallv numbered, TG-1 throughTG-9.
1980
Operational Group “Pauk” and its Tactical Groups-1, 2, and 3 appear to have been comprised of the
following units:
2 companies / 63rd Airborne Brigade / VJ Corps of Special Units
Elements, “Red Beret” Special Operations Unit / Serbian State Security Department
Elements, Serbian Volunteer Guard
HO-National Defense of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
1st Velika Kladusa Brigade
2nd Cazin Brigade
3rd Vrnograc Brigade
Tactical Group 8 / 21 st Kordun Corps
1 battalion / 11th Vojnic Infantry Brigade
1 battalion / 13th Slunj Infantry Brigade
1 battalion / 19th Vrginmost Infantry Brigade
1 armored battalion
1 mixed artillery battalion
Tactical Group 9 / 39th Banija Corps
1 battalion / 24th Glina Infantry Brigade
1 battalion / 31st Petrinja Infantry Brigade
1 tank company
1 mixed artillery battalion

636
plan to physically occupy Bihac city, although the Serbs were to surround it (see discussion
below).
With the expected defeat of the 5th Corps, the Serbs planned to withdraw VRS and
SVK forces slowly to the RSK and to the RS “border” along the Una. This would leave Fikret
Abdic and his Serb-controlled military in charge of the enclave, safeguarding the SVK and
VRS rear. Both Serb armies would then be able to reorient their newly released forces to the
fronts opposite the Croatian and Bosnian Armies.

The Battle for Velika Kladusa Begins, 16 November – 1 December 19941981

The combined SVK/APWB force attacked across the border on 16 November. The
Novakovic/Bozovic plan apparently called for their units to cut off Velika Kladusa, with a
pincer movement around the north and south sides of the town, possibly in hopes of
avoiding a costly street-by-street battle that would also wreak havoc on the homes of their
Muslim troops. This meant the initial SVK/APWB attack consisted of one thrust to seize key
ridges directly north of Velika Kladusa on the border – thus pinning the defending 506th
Kladusa Mountain Brigade inside the town – while the rest of the force attempted to sweep
around the 506th’s flanks from the north and the south. Other SVK/APWB units attacked in
the Serb-populated Bosanska Bojna area, some 15 kilometers to the east, pressuring the
rear of the forces around Velika Kladusa and threatening the town of Vrnograc.
Against the much larger SVK/APWB force, the outmanned 5th Corps troops put up
a strong defence. Troops from the 506th Brigade repelled the assault on the ridges north of
Velika Kladusa. The Serbs and rebel Muslims, however, quickly penetrated the flanks. In the
north, the SVK/APWB units pushed in about one to two kilometers in the Ponikve-Poljana
area, while to the south they drove in about two to three kilometers in the Smrekovac area.
Over the next week, SVK/APWB troops edged their way forward in heavy fighting, pushing
into built-up outskirts of Velika Kladusa. In particular, they worked their way along the
southern flank of ARBiH defenders (now reinforced with elements of the 503rd Cazin, 505th
Buzim, and 517th Light Brigades) in an attempt to sever the main road between Velika
Kladusa and Cazin, because the loss of the road would cut off ARBiH forces in the town. On
19 November, APWB forces claimed to have taken Keserovici Brdo, a 235- meter hill
overlooking central Velika Kladusa and the road.1982 Meanwhile, SVK/APWB units continued
to press 5th Corps in the north along the Daterovica Brdo-Elezovici sector (supported by
attacks from Bosanska Bojna), despite strong resistance by 505th Brigade in the east and
506th Brigade in the west. By 21 November, SVK/APWB troops had advanced five
kilometers from the border to positions five kilometers south of town and attacked 5th
Corps positions in Trn and Polje along the Kladusa-Cazin road.

1981
Opening the second phase, the VRS salvoed a number of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles from the 155th Air
Defense Rocket Brigade, used in the ground-to-ground mode, at targets across the enclave.
1982
On 18 November, APWB forces claimed to have taken a total of 365 5th Corps troops prisoner during the
fighting at Velika Kladusa, further claiming that 100 of these had joined APWB units.

637
 The SVK/APWB gains came only slowly and grudgingly as 5th Corps units contested
every attack. By the end of November, however, the SVK/APWB advantages in manpower
and firepower had begun to tell and 5th Corps forces were stuck in a tenuous salient with a
vulnerable exit route. Both the Velika Kladusa-Cazin and Velika Kladusa- Vrnograc road were
on the verge of being cut. SVK/APWB units also were beginning to penetrate further into the
town itself. As December began, the Serbs and Abdic’s rebel Muslims were positioning
themselves for a final push to seize the town and the northern half of the enclave.

The Battle for Bihac City, 16 November 1994 – 1 December 1994

While the battle for Velika Kladusa ground on, the international community was
more concerned with the renewed SVK/VRS assault on the Bihac city area and the Serbs’
penetration of the UN-declared “Safe Area” there. On 16 November, the SVK 15th Lika
Corps launched its attack against the western and south-western approaches to Bihac as
part of phase two of the Serb campaign plan. The corps attacked with three tactical groups.
Tactical Group 7 / 15th Corps pushed into the Bugari area, some 20 kilometers northwest of
Bihac, along the route toward Cazin. Tactical Groups 6 / 15th Corps and Tactical Group 5 /
15th Corps focused more directly on the road and terrain features around Bihac itself. TG-6
attacked the Izacic-Zeljava Air Base sector, while TG-5, in conjunction with VRS Tactical
Group-3 on its right, was to assault the direct approaches to Bihac from its position in the
Pljesevica Mountains.
Initially, however, only SVK TG-6 and 7 / 15th Corps attacked, together with the
VRS forces on the Grabez plateau (see above). TG-7 / 15th Corps made a quick penetration
of the ARBiH 517th Mountain Brigade’s border zone at Bugari. At the end of the first day,
SVK units, backed by “Gazelle” light attack helicopters, had advanced three kilometers on an
eight-kilometre front, approaching the village of Gata Ilidza. However, further south, TG-6 /
15th Corps had less success in its attack toward Izacic, making less than a kilometre of gains
against the 501st Bihac Mountain Brigade. TG-6 and TG-7 assaults, together with VRS
attacks on Grabez, continued over the next four days, but gained little ground, although
they did pin down 5th Corps troop reserves. Serb airstrikes against 5th Corps headquarters
in Bihac on 18 November and against an ammunition storage site in Cazin on 19 November
missed their targets and had little impact on the ground battle.
With 5th Corps partially diverted, the SVK TG-5, together with the VRS TG-3, now
launched the main Serb assault on the Bihac city defences. On 20 November SVK/VRS units
hit the weak HVO 101st Bihac Brigade – some 500 men – in the Croat villages of Veliki
Skocaj, Mali Skocaj, Medudrazje, and Zavalje directly south of Bihac. HVO defences rapidly
collapsed, and elements of the 502nd Bihac Mountain Brigade quickly shifted to the area
were unable to halt the Serb advance. By 23 November SVK and VRS infantry were
preparing to assault the vital 570-meter Debeljaca hill directly overlooking Bihac city.
Debeljaca fell to Serb forces on 23/24 November. Meanwhile, to the west, TG-2 troops also
had pushed 501st Bihac Brigade elements back to the village of Klokot, where the city’s

638
water works was located.1983 On 26 November the village of Vedro Polje fell and SVK/VRS
troops pushed into Zegar, less than two kilometers from the centre of Bihac and less than a
kilometre from the city hospital. NATO air strikes against the SVK’s Udbina Air Base on 21
November (in response to the Serb air strikes launched from there) and against VRS air
defence sites east of Bihac had no effect on the Serb attack. Both SVK and VRS units now
had overrun almost 20 percent of the UN’s so-called “Safe Area”. The captured Muslim and
Croat villages were burned.
Meanwhile, on the Grabez plateau, VRS units from all three tactical groups had also
renewed their assault and, against strong resistance, penetrated another kilometre into
ARBiH defences to reach the village of Orljani and the important Pritocka Glavica hill by
29/30 November. From this direction, Serb troops were within four to five kilometers of the
centre of Bihac city. However, 5th Corps troops stood firm on most of the plateau.
The Serb approach to Bihac had evoked open expressions of concern from the UN
and the international community that the Serbs would attempt to capture and occupy the
city and drive out its 70.000 residents.1984 The Croatian government had warned that it
would take a hand in the fighting if Bihac were threatened. Now the SVK and VRS appeared
to have Bihac at their mercy. To the relief of some, however, although the Serbs continued
fighting for some outlying villages and positions, they seemed to be making no effort to
capture the city itself. General Milovanovic claimed after the war that Serb forces never
intended to enter Bihac. In one interview, he said:
If I had entered Bihac – it is true that I tried to motivate soldiers to head toward
Bihac – I would have been very unpleasantly surprised, just as I was on Mount Igman
and Mount Bjelasnica, [when Karadzic ordered VRS units to withdraw in 1993 from the
key mountains because of the threat of NATO air strikes] when I was the one who led
the army there and then had to take them back. I feared the same would happen in
Bihac as well, since Bihac was a protected zone ... I was not ordered to get to Bihac. I
even had restrictions with regard to that. I was not allowed to target Bihac with heavy
artillery. I could not seize such a town using a slingshot. Imagine if I had entered Bihac,
lost several hundred soldiers, and then withdrew.1985
In an earlier interview, Milovanovic stated, with regard to an attack on Bihac city:
I did not dare to do such a thing without a decision from the Supreme
Command.1986
We believe Milovanovic’s statements are generally accurate, and that
occupying Bihac city was irrelevant to the overriding VRS/SVK objective of eliminating

1983
An article in Zagreb Globus claims that the main water works for Bihac are actually in the village of Privilica,
about two kilometers southeast of central Bihac, which the VRS seized on 23/24 November. Klokot was the
location of the auxiliary pump system. Denis Kulji: Serbian Brigades and Corps Are Already Court-Martialing
Deserters, Zagreb Globus, 2 December 1994. pp. 2, 18.
1984
Jane’s Defence Weekly: UN/NATO Powerless to Stop Serbs, 3 December 1994, p. 1.
1985
Mira Lolic-Mocevic: Interview with Serb Republic Defense Minister Manojlo Milovanovic, Banja Luka Srpska
Televizija, 10 February 1998.
1986
Ranko Vojvodic: We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities Militarily: Power is Power, Banja Luka
Nezavisne Novine, 21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22; an interview with General Manojlo Milovanovic.

639
the 5th Corps and installing Fikret Abdic as a puppet ruler over the enclave. Karadzic
and the RS Supreme Command almost certainly believed that the conquest of Bihac
would have been too costly politically and might have incited NATO air strikes, and
they would have refrained from ordering or allowing Milovanovic to assault and
capture the city itself.

Battle for Bosanska Krupa, 20 November – 1 December 1994

Just as the VRS was finishing up its initial push back into Grabez on 20 November,
Milovanovic ordered another attack on a new axis at Bosanska Krupa. VRS Tactical Group 4
units had earlier managed to drive back 505th and 511th Brigade troops on the southern
bank northeast of town. Now, the VRS mounted its own river crossing, pushing across the
Una and seizing several key hills around the village of Hodzinac, about a kilometre from
Krupa. Milovanovic’s apparent objective was to seize the Krupa area and then push north,
outflanking ARBiH defences on Grabez and pushing on toward Cazin. After three days of
heavy fighting, however, the 511th managed to contain the attempt, although claims that it
had recaptured the sector appear to have been in error. The VRS then tried again
(apparently less than a week later on 25 or 28 November), making another crossing
southwest of Krupa, into the Cojluk hill area. Again, however, the 5th Corps stymied TG-4’s
efforts to break out of the bridgehead and surround the town.

Zagreb Threatens Intervention

The shrillest voice in the international outcry opposing the VRS move on Bihac was
that of the Croatian Government, whose worst nightmare would be realized if Bihac’s fall
permitted the SVK and VRS to consolidate their position in western Bosnia. Zagreb therefore
published a warning to the Serbs on 10 November and again on the 14th that it was
considering intervening if Bihac were about to fall to a Serb assault. This was as far as the
Croatian leaders felt able to go under the intense pressure the US was exerting on them to
stay out of the conflict. But on 29 November the Croatian Army joined the HVO in Operation
“Zima (Winter) 94” in the Livno valley, hitting a long-quiet 2nd Krajina Corps sector in a
move partly designed to draw off Serb forces around Bihac. 1987 One day later, on 1
December, Croatian Defence Minister Susak issued yet another warning of Croatian
intervention, with no apparent effect on the VRS/SVK drive toward Bihac.1988

1987
See the section: Operation “Zima 94”: Croatia Enters the Bosnian War Again, November – December 1994.
1988
Giles Elgood: Croatian Would Intervene to Stop Bihac Fall, Reuters, 1 December 1994.

640
 Fighting Around Bihac City, Grabez, and Krupa Smoulders On,
1 December 1994 – 1 January 1995
Although most Western attention was focused on Bihac city, the 5th Corps’ staunch
defence of the vital Grabez plateau and the western approaches to Bihac and Cazin in late
November signalled that the main SVK/VRS drive had begun to falter. The success of the 5th
Corps stand became even more apparent when Milovanovic had to renew the VRS/SVK
drive during December, trying to drive Dudakovic’s forces from the Grabez and from the
western approaches to Bihac city. VRS and SVK formations attacked in the Bugari, Izacic,
Grabez, and Krupa areas, but failed to break out on to the plain. In the Bugari area,
elements of the 502nd and 517th Brigades even managed to retake most of the ground lost
in November. At Krupa, VRS TG-4 efforts to expand its bridgeheads also failed, despite help
from “Gazelle” light attack helicopters firing AT-3 antitank missiles. Clashes in the southern
half of the enclave petered out with the implementation on 1 January of former US
President Carter’s proposal for a nationwide cease-fire. The cease-fire left the Serbs with
only one relative success in that part of the enclave, the seizure on 7/8 December of most of
the village of Klokot, which SVK 15th Lika Corps forces had finally managed to wrest from
501st Bihac Brigade troops along with the site of the Bihac city water works.1989
The decision to halt the fighting appears to have been taken by the RS Supreme
Command – and specifically Karadzic – over the strong objections of the VRS. RS President
Biljana Plavsic and former senior Main Staff officers have since claimed that the operation
against the 5th Corps was cut short by the Supreme Command despite VRS demands that it
continues.1990 Colonel Milovan Milutinovic, the chief of the VRS Information Service, claimed
in a now-famous (or infamous, if you are an SDS supporter) letter that:
The Supreme Command’s decision to hear out former President of the United
States Jimmy Carter and agree to yet one more cease-fire, thus halting the operation to
break up the 5th Muslim Corps near Bihac, was surprising. According to numerous
assessments, the halting of the operation near Bihac was a big mistake, the
consequence of which was the loss of the strategic initiative.1991
Certainly the VRS Main Staff believed that agreeing to a cease-fire was a mistake
and that they could have knocked out the 5th Corps. However, given the failure of VRS and
SVK forces to gain any significant ground around Bihac city, Grabez, or Krupa during
December, it seems questionable that the Serb forces would have been able to knock out
the 5th Corps even if they had been allowed to continue. It remains a difficult question,
especially in light of the disasters that befell the VRS during 1995, in which the surviving 5th
Corps played a major role. The RSK leaders might have done better to allow Milovanovic to

1989
Zarif Safic: No One Can Prevent Us From Taking, Taking Back What Belongs to Us!, Travnik Bosnjak, 9
January 1996, pp. 12-14; an interview with Brigadier Senad “Sargan” Sarganovic, commander of the 501st
Bihac Mountain Brigade.
1990
Beta, 27 October 1997.
1991
Colonel Milovan Milutinovic: Loss of Supreme Command, Belgrade Nin, 1 November 1996, pp. 19-22; a
letter to the editor from the Chief of the VRS Information Service.

641
continue the offensive, possibly shifting forces to the Velika Kladusa axis or other sectors to
try to force a breakthrough.

The Battle for Velika Kladusa Ends, 1 December 1994 – 1 January 1995
While the Serbs ground away at the southern approaches to Bihac all through
December, the main focus of attention in the north was the continuing battle for Velika
Kladusa and the northern half of the Bihac enclave. The nibbling tactics Operational Group
“Pauk” had been forced to adopt during November gradually eroded 5th Corps territorial
holdings around Velika Kladusa until 5th Corps positions in the town became completely
untenable.
During the first week of December, SVK/APWB troops attacked along the northern
flank and frontally toward Kladusa. On 4 December, the APWB command claimed that its
troops had finally seized the Drmeljevo-Halatusa ridge position northwest of town on the
border and had also captured the important Plazikur hill and Trnovi area at the northeast
corner of town. However, 505th Buzim Brigade troops apparently retook the hill; otherwise,
its loss probably would have forced the withdrawal of 5th Corps from Kladusa then and
there.
The modest but important 5th Corps success notwithstanding, the SVK units of OG
“Pauk” – elements of the 21st Kordun and 39th Banija Corps, led by VJ and Serbian special
units – redoubled their efforts along the 5th Corps’ main northern flank defence line
between Velika Kladusa and Bosanska Bojna as well as directly into the town itself.
Nevertheless, it took over a week of more SVK/ APWB pounding before the 5th Corps
defences gave way. On 14/15 December, SVK/APWB units finally seized the vital positions
around the Plazikur hill and Trnovi for good, while continuing the pressure on the south. SVK
artillery fire pounded 5th Corps positions with a barrage that a Reuters crew described as
“one constant roar”.1992 With SVK/APWB troops on the verge of severing the 5th Corps’s last
link out of town, the ARBiH pulled out, withdrawing its remaining units to positions about
five kilometers southeast of Kladusa on the Cazin road. Velika Kladusa finally fell on 17
December, but the battle for the northern half of the enclave would continue on into 1995.

Evaluation of Bihac Operations, October – December 1994

The operations around Bihac, stretching from late October through December,
encompassed some of the most confusing and complex fighting of the war. More
importantly, however, the battles clearly illustrated the year’s shifting military balance of
power the strengths and weaknesses exhibited by the forces engaged.
By autumn the Bosnian Army had been gnawing away at the VRS for most of a year,
seizing bits and pieces of terrain, terrorizing Serb infantry units with surprise raids, and
often creating mayhem in VRS rear areas. The ARBiH demonstrated a growing tactical

1992
Rebel Moslems Close Circle Around Kladusa, Reuters, 15 December 1994.

642
superiority over the VRS, particularly in its effective use of elite recon-sabotage units, which
had achieved moral dominance over nearly all VRS infantry formations, including even the
Serbs’ elite units. However, this tactical superiority was often offset by the VRS’s better staff
work and, of course, its firepower. This dynamic played itself out through most of the
operations covered in this year’s combat narrative.
What should have been, and briefly was, the pinnacle of the ARBiH achievements
of 1994, the 5th Corps’ Operation “Grmec 94”, appears to have been planned and executed
in the same manner as most other ARBiH offensive operations during 1994 – albeit even
more effectively and professionally than elsewhere thanks to General Dudakovic and his
staff, the best in the ARBiH. Two of the corps’ finest brigades, the 501st and 502nd Bihac
Mountain Brigades, kicked off the October offensive, sending their elite “Tajfun” and “Tiger”
Assault / Recon-Sabotage Battalions plunging into the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps’ rear.
This time the 2nd Krajina Corps finally cracked and disintegrated under the force of
the Muslim attack. Major General Grujo Boric’s corps had always been the weak sister to
the other five VRS corps in terms of resources and troop reserves but had to man an equally
extensive frontage. It was already less able than its stronger brethren to absorb the
constant pounding by the ARBiH, and it had suffered a particularly unsuccessful year, having
battered itself futilely against 5th Corps defences on the Grabez plateau in at least three
significant operations. These ARBiH successes gave Dudakovic’s infantry a singular moral
superiority over their Serb opponents, so that when the 5th Corps attacked on October 24-
25 all of the 2nd Krajina Corps’ problems crystallized. The persistently poor training and
discipline that beset the entire VRS below the brigade command level, together with what
appears to have been inordinately low frontline manning, led to the complete disintegration
of the VRS frontline brigades when 5th Corps elite units arrived in their rear.1993 The 2nd
Krajina Corps command staff was overwhelmed by this collapse, which neither it nor the
corps’ relatively weak firepower assets could compensate for. With the VRS suddenly
scattering and fleeing before it, the 5th Corps was able to advance almost at will.
His corps’ retreat cost Major General Boric his command.1994 Boric and his staff
were competent, professional ex-JNA officers. They knew their business and had properly
analyzed the inherent structural flaws in their command, just as other VRS corps commands
and the Main Staff had done elsewhere. No one, not Boric or the rest of the VRS command
and staff, had been able to repair the defects in the VRS ranks despite, or perhaps because
of, more than two years of steady combat nor, without enough troop-level cadres to impart
training and enforce discipline, could they be expected to. In other corps at other times, the
deployment of a few elite units backed by artillery and adeptly manoeuvred into position
had been able to halt an apparently successful ARBiH attack. In October 1994 the 2nd

1993
A Bosnian Serb official, Momcilo Mandic, claimed that some VRS brigades had only 15 percent of their
“fighters” on the frontline when the attack came. R. Kovacevic: Is Zametica Still Karadzic’s Adviser?,
Belgrade Politika, 11 November 1994, p. 12.
1994
Colonel Radivoje Tomanic replaced Boric. Boric took over as commanderof the VRS Center of Military
Schools, now given the honorific “Rajko Balac” in honor of its former commander, killed during the VRS
counteroffensive.

643
Krajina Corps lacked those few luxuries essential to stopping the 5th Corps, and it faltered,
fled and nearly died.
The late 1994 campaign at Bihac, however, is often best remembered for the Serb
riposte rather than Dudakovic’s initial blow. Almost exactly one month after the 5th Corps’
spectacular breakout from Bihac, VRS and SVK troops were back at the gates of the city and
the ARBiH forces seemed on the brink of defeat. Why?
As with 5th Corps’ earlier victory, there were several reasons behind the Serbs’
successful counteroffensive. In this case, the geographical disposition of the enclave and
poor operational-tactical dispositions by the ARBiH operated to the advantage of the Serbs’
traditional strengths in professional command and staff work and in firepower to nearly
crush the life out of Dudakovic’s corps. But a key initial factor in General Milovanovic’s
ability to organize VRS forces to strike back was the defence by the discredited 2nd Krajina
Corps of the Veliki/Mali Radic-Bosanska Krupa position. As discussed earlier, this prevented
the 5th Corps from widening its attack and left its more successful units strung out along the
Bihac-Petrovac axis in a vulnerable salient. In addition, the 2nd Krajina Corps’s delaying
action gave Milovanovic time to collect reinforcements that had to be drawn from
throughout the Republika Srpska and preserved for Milovanovic staging areas within striking
distance of 5th Corps positions.
General Milovanovic’s rapid redeployment of disparate VRS units and his creation
of ad hoc combat commands for the quick initiation of a major counteroffensive was one of
the greatest demonstrations of VRS command staff skills in the war. It was his tactical skill
combined with the Serbs’ normal firepower advantages that exploited the unfortunate
operational-tactical disposition of the 5th Corps that enabled VRS forces to swiftly eject
ARBiH troops from the extensive territory they had so quickly captured. It was his rapid
injection of SVK and APWB forces to help the regular VRS forces retake lost ground and the
opening of a broad front covering almost the entire border of the enclave that brought the
5th Corps to its knees. The three Serb or Serb-stiffened armies mustered more than 25.000
troops against the 15.000 Dudakovic could field. The 5th Corps probably could have dealt
with these odds in a straight-ahead, limited-frontage fight, but the many attack axes opened
so far apart against the 5th Corps made it almost impossible for Dudakovic to stretch his
thin forces to cover all the gaps. He was fortunate that not all of these attacks appear to
have been pressed home with the vigour necessary to overcome the Muslims’ fabled
powers of resistance.
When it all came down to the wire, Dudakovic and the 5th Corps prevailed. The 5th
Corps soldiers had a certain spirit about them that kept them fighting on against daunting
odds – the will to win. The Bosnian Army had demonstrated the superiority of its morale
compared to the Serb forces throughout the war. Around Bihac the 5th Corps combined an
apparently even stronger intensity, borne of the adversity of its isolation, with discipline and
military skills second to none. It was these qualities that finally stopped the Serbs.

644
 Annex 62
Operation “Zima 94”: Croatia Enters the Bosnian War Again,
November – December 1994
The Croatian Government had several important strategic reasons for wanting to
keep VRS/SVK/APWB forces from overrunning the Bihac enclave. There was the near-
certainty that Bihac’s fall would allow the SVK and VRS to consolidate their position in
western Bosnia, virtually integrating the RS and RSK and making Zagreb’s goal of reclaiming
its Serb-controlled territory doubly difficult. And the Croatian Army’s plans for attacking the
RSK would be made even more complicated if the capture of Bihac also relieved the SVK of
the 5th Corps threat to its rear. Under pressure from the US not to intervene in the conflict,
Zagreb at first limited its actions to warning the Serbs, twice – on 10 and 14 November –
that it would “consider” intervening if Bihac seemed about to fall. By 29 November,
however, it was ready to join with the HVO in launching Operation “Zima (Winter) 94” in the
Livno valley, hitting a long-quiet 2nd Krajina Corps sector. In this it expected both to relieve
pressure on Bihac and to position HV forces for an eventual campaign against the RSK
capital of Knin. Two days later, on 1 December, Croatian Defence Minister Susak explicitly
warned that the Croatians would directly intervene against the RSK if necessary: “If Croatia
should estimate that Bihac will fall, Croatia will intervene before that happens”.1995
Apparently undeterred by either the initiation of “Zima 94” or the Croatian threats, VRS/SVK
forces continued their operations around Bihac.

Campaign Planning and Order of Battle

“Zima 94” sought to achieve two strategic objectives. As stated by General Ante
Gotovina, commander of the HV Split Corps District, these were:
– to weaken and halt the enemy offensive against Bihac.
– to create a favourable operational-strategic zone for liberation of the parts of
the [Croatia] and Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the rebel Serbs.1996
(In other words, make territorial gains such that eventually HV troops could
threaten the Krajina Serb capital of Knin and the rest of Serb-controlled UN Protected Area
South.)
To meet these strategic objectives, the Main Staff of the HVO and General
Gotovina’s Split Corps District set the following operational-tactical goals:
– In the part of Dinara under HVO control, from the Donji Rujani [village]-Maglaj
[mountain] line, to rout and repulse the enemy forces in the direction of Poviruse-
Troglav [mountain tops], in that way eliminating the danger of a possible enemy flank
blow in the direction of Rujani-Sinj.

1995
Giles Elgood: Croatian Would Intervene to Stop Bihac Fall, Reuters, 1 December 1994.
1996
Colonel General Ante Gotovina: Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin Split
Corps District, 1996. p. 25.

645
 – East of Livanjsko Polje, along the Celebic-Radanovci-Bogdasi line, to push the
enemy forces from the eastern edge of Livanjsko Polje and limit their manoeuvring
room, thus securing the right flank of the forces on the Dinara line of attack.
– With deep spearhead wedges skirting the basic communication lines east and
west of Livanjsko Polje, to gradually expand the attack and develop it on the flanks,
thus ensuring our forces’ freedom of movement across Livanjsko Polje while splitting
the enemy forces between Dinara and Staretina [Mountains].1997
To achieve this, the HV/HVO were to:
– With a simultaneous frontal and flank attack, together with the insertion of
combat groups into the enemy’s tactical depth, and with strong artillery-rocket
support, to rout the enemy forces and push them back from their forward positions and
the dominant elevations.
– To repulse any enemy counterattacks, and then to fortify and establish
obstructions at the achieved line, from which fresh forces are introduced.
– To ensure stable logistical support and to be prepared to continue the
attack.1998
The operation was planned to proceed over a period of 10 to 15 days.1999
Operation “Zima 94” came under the nominal command authority of the HVO Main
Staff, headed by Major General Tihomir Blaskic. Most of the HV forces involved in the
operation, however, remained under the direct control of their HV commanders, who made
sure that all their actions were closely coordinated with the HVO. The joint Croat forces
established two operational groups for the attack, taking over normal command and control
for the Livno-Glamoc-Kupres area from the HVO Tomislavgrad Corps District.
The command responsible for the main effort in “Zima 94” was the “Livno”
Operational Group, which was formed from the staff of the HV Split Corps District,
commanded by Major General Ante Gotovina. The “Livno” OG was an all-HV force assigned
the mission of attacking along the Croatian-Bosnian border in the Dinara Mountains and on
the western side of the Livno valley. The Split Corps District earmarked several formations
for the attack so that the assault units could be rotated and refreshed on a regular basis.
These units included the 4th Guards Brigade, the 7th Guards Brigade, and the 126th Home
Defence Regiment. In addition, the corps committed special composite companies from the
6th Home Defence Regiment, the 114th Split Brigade, the 142nd Home Defence Regiment,
plus corps-level assets such as the Split Corps District’s Tactical Sniper Company, 264th
Recon-Sabotage Company, and the Antiterrorist Group / 72nd Military Police Battalion. The
corps-level 14th Artillery Battalion provided fire support while the 40th Engineer Battalion
helped the HV forces deal with the problems of difficult terrain, weather, and Serb
minefields. All told, the “Livno” OG could call on some 7.000 troops, but probably no more

1997
Gotovina, op. cit., p. 27.
1998
Gotovina, op. cit., p. 27.
1999
Gotovina, op. cit., p. 28.

646
than 2.000 to 4.000 of these were engaged in combat or support roles in Bosnia at any one
time.
The “Kupres” Operational Group was an HVO command, stiffened by an HV special
operations unit, with the mission of clearing the Staretina and Hrbina-Slovinj Mountain
areas and seize positions around the town of Glamoc. On the right, southeast of Glamoc,
the 1st HVO Guards Brigade “Ante Bruno Busic”, reinforced with a battalion each from the
2nd and 3rd HVO Guards Brigades, was the primary combat formation. On the left, attacking
in support of the “Livno” OG was a mixed HV/HVO tactical group comprising elements of the
elite 1st Croatian Guards Brigade, the 1st HGZ (the main combat formation of President
Tudjman’s guard force, the 1st Croatian Guards Corps), the HVO 22nd Sabotage
Detachment, and a battalion-size unit of Bosnian Croat Special Police. In addition, troops
from the HVO 79th and 80th Home Defence Regiments were available to hold less
important sectors or take over captured ground. Elements of the HVO Main Staff’s 10th
Artillery-Rocket Regiment, plus assorted HVO engineer, MP, and air defence assets,
probably were in support. The total force, including both HV and HVO personnel, numbered
some 4.500 troops. The HVO Main Staff could also call on major elements of the HV 5th
Guards Brigade – about 1.000 troops – in reserve around Livno, to reinforce any sector as
needed.
The VRS 2nd Krajina Corps had three brigades defending the front from the
Croatian-Bosnian border to north of Kupres. On the Serb right (HV left), the 9th Grahovo
Light Infantry Brigade manned the front over to about halfway between Livno Valley and
Glamoc Valley, in the Staretina Mountains. From here, the 5th Glamoc Light Infantry Brigade
took over and linked up with the 7th Kupres-Sipovo Motorized Brigade about 15 kilometers
southwest of Kupres. The motorized brigade probably had only one battalion involved on
the HV/HVO attack front. In total, the 2nd Krajina Corps had only about 3.500 troops to
defend some 55 kilometers of frontage. The corps lacked any operational-level reserves to
deal with a major attack, and the brigades had hardly any tactical reserves either. Because
there had been little or no fighting in the area since 1992, most of the VRS brigades
probably were not fully mobilized until just before the operation began.

Terrain and Weather

The Livno-Glamoc-Kupres front tended to be a quiet one because its geography
exerted even more dramatic effects on combat operations than was usual in Bosnia; now,
the addition of the terrible winter weather common to the region was going to make
military activity very, very difficult. This sector lies in the karst region of former Yugoslavia.
Quoting an earlier section of this study, karst:
consists of dissected, rocky surfaces, almost exclusively limestone, covered with
only sparse vegetation; interspersed in the region are “polje-s”, which are large, open
valley plains. The limestone in karst regions has been eroded, producing fissures,
sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns. The region’s scattered mountain ranges

647
 have many peaks over 1.500 meters, while the hills crest primarily between 200 to
almost 550 meters. Most of the scattered rivers are small, less than 60 meters wide at
high water, while very shallow at low water. Large scale combat operations in the
region, especially using large numbers of mechanized or motorized transport, would be
difficult in the rocky, steep terrain and given the limited road network. In addition,
winter adds deep snow, making many roads impassable. The flat “polje-s” also become
flooded or mud-covered during winter, making movement difficult. The population lives
primarily in the “polje-s” and on the coast, with scattered villages across the
remainder.2000
Between Livno and Glamoc lay two prominent “polje-s” (hereafter referred to as
valleys), Livanjsko Polje and Glamocko Polje. On the west side of Livno Valley are the
towering Dinara Mountains. Between Livno and Glamoc Valleys are the equally imposing
Staretina Mountains and on the east side of Glamoc Valley are the Hrbina-Slovinj
Mountains. All of these rise in several places over 1.500 meters, and many over 1.800
meters. In addition, as noted above, it was impossible to attack directly up the valleys
because snow and melt-water make the plains impassable in winter.
That winter the terrain difficulties were compounded by weather that was
“abnormally bad” and bone-chillingly cold. Heavy snow blanketed the area and, according to
an HV article on the 5th Guards Brigade, temperatures were between -20 and -30 degrees
Celsius (-4 and -22 degrees Fahrenheit).2001 In conditions like these, all military activity slows
down. Personnel have to be rotated frequently to avoid freezing to death, while equipment
operates sluggishly and requires intensive maintenance.

“Livno” Operational Group Advances in the Dinara,

29 November – 10 December 19942002

2000
See Annex 9: Military Geography and Weather in Croatia, in the section on the Croatian War 1990-1991.
2001
Gordan Radosevic: Slavonia, Land of the Falcons, Zagreb Velebit, 24 November, 1995, pp. 16-17
2002
The combat narrative for Operation “Zima 94” is based primarily on General Gotovina’s account in
Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin Split Corps District, 1996. It has been
supplemented by a series of articles in the Croatian Army newspaper, Velebit, which has proven
particularly useful in identifying units participating in “Zima 94”. In addition, Belgrade Tanjug and Zagreb
Radio reports covering the period 29 November to 24 December 1994 have helped corroborate Gotovina’s
narrative detailing HV/HVO territorial gains during the operation. The following Velebit articles (and some
others) have proven to be the most useful:
• Eduard Milicevic: Heroes Never Die, Zagreb Velebit, 15 March 1996, p. 11; an article on Brigadier Ante
Saskor, the deputy commander of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps (1st HGZ).
• Gordan Radosevic: Slavonia, Land of the Falcons, Zagreb Velebit, 24 November 1995, pp. 16-17; an
article on the 1st Infantry Battalion / 5th Guards Brigade.
• Gordan Radosevic: Slavonian Glories, Zagreb Velebit, 8 December 1995, pp. 16-17; an article on the
Reconnaissance Company / 5th Guards Brigade.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: They Fulfilled Every Task, Zagreb Velebit, 19 April 1996, pp. 14-15; an article on the
3rd Infantry Battalion / 4th Guards Brigade.
• Nikolina Sutalo: Pumas’ Leaps to Victory, Zagreb Velebit, 26 Apri 1996, pp. 12-13; an article on the 1st
Infantry Battalion / 7th Guards Brigade.

648
 The leading elements of General Gotovina’s forces jumped off on 29 November as
the 3rd Battalion / 126th Home Defence Regiment (HDR) began infiltrating seven platoon-
size groups behind VRS lines in the Dinara Mountains that day. These infiltration tactics –
similar to those the Bosnian Army had been using throughout 1994 – were important to the
attack’s initial success. Gotovina writes:
The aim of infiltrating combat groups in the enemy’s rear before the onset of the
frontal and flank attack was to achieve a positional advantage over the enemy. By
using the element of surprise, the mission was to capture as many prominent
elevations under enemy control as possible.
Placing combat groups in the enemy’s rear was exceptionally difficult because of
the heavy snow and low temperatures. The combat groups encountered the enemy,
and one of their members was also captured. Some positions in the enemy’s rear were
not fully captured, but very importantly the left flank ... was secured.2003

• Statement by Major General Ivan Korade, Zagreb Velebit, 13 September 1996, p. 14; a statement on
the 7th Guards Brigade.
• Vesna Puljak: Steel for the Pumas Leaps, Zagreb Velebit, 12 January 1996, pp. 16-17; an article on the
Armored Battalion / 7th Guards Brigade.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: Side By Side With the Guard Brigades. Zagreb Velebit 7 February 1997, p. 13, an
article on the 6th Home Defense Regiment.
• Zoran Vukman: Victorious Trail on All the Battlefields, Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 June 1996, p. 8; an
article on the 114th Infantry Brigade.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: Defense of the Homeland – A Sacred Task, Zagreb Velebit, 8 December 1995, p. 14;
an article on the 126th Home Defense Regiment.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: The Pride of Drnis, Zagreb Velebit, 4 April 1997, p. 13; an article on the 142nd Home
Defense Regiment.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: Lethal and Precise, Zagreb Velebit, 20 December 1996, pp. 16-17; an article on the
14th Artillery Battalion.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: Few But Effective, Zagreb Velebit, 3 January 1997, pp. 16-17; an article on the 264th
Recon-Sabotage Company.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: Proven Countless Times, Zagreb Velebit, 10 January 1997, pp. 16-17; an article on
the Tactical Sniper Company.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: They Successfully Responded to All Challenges, Zagreb Velebit, 20 December 1996;
an article on the 72nd Military Police Battalion.
• Zeljko Stipanovic: Proven in Every Task, Zagreb Velebit, 22 November 1996, pp. 16-17; an article on
the 40th Engineer Battalion.
• Gojko Jelic: We Had An Honorable Mission – We Were the First to Enter Kupres, Mostar Hrvatski List, 3
1 March 1995, p. 30; an interview with Bosnian Croat Special Police commander Brigadier Zlatan Mijo
Jelic.
• Neven Miladin: Flight on the Wings of Victory, Zagreb Velebit, 12 July 1996, pp. 16-17; an article on
the 2nd HVO Guards Brigade.
• Gordan Radosevic: Hawks of the Lasva Valley, Zagreb Velebit, 19 July 1996, pp. 16-17; an article on
the 3rd HVO Guards Brigade.
• Gordan Radosevic: Pillars of the Defense, Zagreb Velebit, 3 January 1997, pp. 18-19; an article on the
2nd Infantry Battalion / 3rd HVO Guards Brigade.
• N. M.: The Visitor’s Return, Zagreb Velebit, 15 December 1995, p. 32; an article on the 80th HVO
Home Defense Regiment.
2003
Colonel General Ante Gotovina: Offensive Batiles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin Split
Corps District, 1996, p. 29. In addition, a Belgrade Tanjug piece from 4 December 1994 outlined detailed
information gleaned from captured 126th HDR personnel who were paraded on Knin TV. This information
matched closely that in Gotovina’s study.

649
 The main attack began on 30 November, with the “Livno” OG pushing two battle
groups forward. The 3rd Battalion / 126th HDR attacked on the left, along the border where
its earlier moves to seize and occupy important elevations like the 1.572-meter Veliki
Sokolac had loosened the VRS 9th Grahovo Brigade’s defences and facilitated the advance.
By 1 December 126th Regiment troops had advanced some seven kilometers into VRS lines.
Meanwhile, on the right, a composite battle group (Rapid Reaction Company / 114th
Brigade, 264th Recon-Sabotage Company, Tactical Sniper Company), attacked along the
main Grahovo road, keeping pace with the 3rd / 126th HDR and seizing the villages of
Caprazlije, Provo, and Gubin (north of Rujani).2004 Overall, although the VRS forces were
unable to halt the HV attack they managed to slow it and prevent the Croatians from
achieving a breakthrough.
The excruciating weather forced “Livno” OG to make frequent rotations of the sub-
elements of 3rd / 126th HDR with a variety of disparate units, which apparently
compounded command and control problems already exacerbated by the weather.
Nevertheless, the HV pressed the attack over the next week. On 4 December, a battle group
from Brigadier Damir Krsticevic’s 4th Guards Brigade, including an armour-mechanized
company, replaced the composite battle group in the right hand attack. By 5 December,
126th HDR and 4th Guards units had advanced another five kilometers, reaching a line
running roughly between Veliki Troglav mountain and the village of Sajkovic. On 7
December, Brigadier Ivan Korade’s 7th Guards Brigade relieved both the 126th HDR and 4th
Guards, taking over “Livno” OG’s entire front. Korade’s troops immediately attacked and
gained another two kilometers in some places.
However, over the next three days, the VRS 9th Grahovo Brigade, probably
reinforced with elements of the SVK 1st Vrlika Light Infantry Brigade and other VRS odds and
ends, was able to counterattack and temporarily retake some ground from the 7th Guards.
General Gotovina states:
Eight days after the commencement of the offensive activities on Dinara and the
eastern edge of Livanjsko Polje, there were increasing signs pointing to the need for
greater caution and reinforcement of the line of defence. The enemy made unsuccessful
attempts at limited counterattacks in several directions. One such counter attack was

2004
For whatever reason. General Gotovina’s study only mentions elements of the 114th Split Brigade on this
axis. However, an HV Zagreb Velebit article makes it clear that elements of all three units, the Rapid
Reaction Company of the 114th Brigade, the 264th Recon-Sabotage Company, and the Tactical Sniper
Company, fought together in the operation. See Zeljko Stipanovic: Few But Effective, Zagreb Velebit, 3
January 1997, pp. 16-17, an article on the 264th Recon-Sabotage Company. See also Zeljko Stipanovic:
Proven Countless Times, Zagreb Velebit, 10 January 1997, pp. 16-17; an article on the Tactical Sniper
Company, and Zoran Vukman: Victorious Trail on All the Battlefields, Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 June 1996, p. 8;
an article on the 114th Split Brigade. In the latter article, the brigade commander, Colonel Marko Skejo,
states:
For those operations [Zima 94, Ljeto (Summer) 95, and Oluja (Storm) 95], we separated out
volunteers from all the battalions, and formed one Rapid-Reaction Company, which first left for the
Rujani-Grahovo line, and broke through the line ahead of the 4th Guard Brigade, which afterward
continued the operation.

650
 on 10 December at Dinara, when he managed to temporarily regain some less
important positions that he had previously lost.2005
Though these VRS counterattacks failed to retrieve any important ground, they
appear to have disrupted the HV advance and forced a pause.

“Kupres” Operational Group Partially Stymied,

29 November – 10 December 1994
On the right wing of the HV/HVO attack, the operation proceeded less successfully.
The “Kupres” OG attack plan called for a two-pronged advance. On the left, the mixed
HV/HVO tactical group was to attack up the right hand side of the Livno Valley, along a road
and in the Staretina Mountains, in support of the “Livno” Operational Group. On the right,
“Kupres” OG was to make its main effort, with a reinforced 1st HVO Guards Brigade
attacking the Staretina and Hrbina-Slovinj Mountain areas toward the town of Glamoc.
When “Kupres” OG apparently kicked off its attack on 29/30 November, neither of
its two prongs were able to advance, running into stiff opposition from the VRS 5th Glamoc
Light Infantry Brigade. The HV/HVO special operations units on the left side were unable to
drive Serb troops from the fortified village of Celebici, less than a kilometre from the start
line. On the right, the HVO Guards troops also failed when they tried to establish HVO
control over key mountain tops, particularly Koricina and Kujaca on either side of the
Glamoc Valley, and this helped stifle the Croat assault.
On the right, however, 1st HGZ, 22nd Sabotage, and Bosnian Croat Special Police
troops – possibly with assistance from the HV 5th Guards Brigade – finally took Celebici on 6
December.2006 With the loss of this stronghold, 5th Glamoc Brigade defences appear to have
almost collapsed, and HV/HVO units pushed forward seven to eight kilometers on 7
December, reaching the village of Vrbica and securing the key mountains flanking the attack
axis along the road.

The Final Push, 10 December – 24 December 1994

With the capture of Celebici, the HV/HVO paused briefly again. Taking the time to
provide unity of command for a concerted drive up the valley, the “Livno” OG assumed
command of the right side of the Livno valley.2007 The rest of “Kupres” OG appears to have
gone the defensive. In preparation for a renewed assault along all three axes (left sector:
Dinara; centre sector: Grahovo road; right sector: Staretina / right-hand valley road), the

2005
Colonel General Ante Gotovina: Offensive Batiles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin Split
Corps District, 1996, p. 30.
2006
Gotovina seems to indicate that the 5th Guards were not inserted into combat until after 10 December,
but a Zagreb Velebit article claims that the brigade was involved in the capture of Celebici. See Gordan
Radosevic: Slavonia, Land of the Falcons, Zagreb Velebit, 24 November 1995, pp. 16-17; an article on the
1st Infantry Battalion / 5th Guards Brigade.
2007
Colonel General Ante Gotovina: Offensive Batiles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin Split
Corps District, 1996, pp. 26, 31.

651
“Livno” OG attacked with 7th Guards Brigade and took a series of mountaintops along the
Velika Divjakusa-Donji Kazanci line, moving forward another two kilometers.
To make the final push, “Livno” OG rotated fresh formations into the frontline,
inserting the 4th Guards Brigade on the left and in the centre, and taking Brigadier Ivan
Kapular’s 5th Guards Brigade from reserve and placing it on the right. VRS 2nd Krajina Corps
defences, already under intense strain, buckled under the onslaught. By 19 December, HV
units had driven forward another seven kilometers in the centre and right-hand sectors,
taking several villages, including Przine, Gornji Kazanci, and Bogdasi.2008 At the same time,
the VRS Main Staff and 2nd Krajina Corps appear to have made the decision to withdraw
from the rest of the valley to more defensible positions along the northern rim. By 24
December, the VRS had pulled back to the Dinara-Crni Lug-Grkovci-Nuglasice-Staretina
Mountains-Glamoc town line, protecting the main pass toward Bosansko Grahovo – the
HV’s eventual objective.

Evaluation of “Zima 94”

Although a resounding battlefield success, Operation “Zima 94” failed to achieve its
immediate strategic objective of relieving Serb pressure on Bihac. This was not a reflection
on the HV/HVO strategy but rather the result of a conscious choice made by the VRS Main
Staff to continue its assault on the enclave rather than detach troops to relieve the
threatened sector. This reflected the perpetual strategic dilemma faced by the VRS Main
Staff – the lack of strategic and operational-level troop reserves. The difficult choice forced
on Mladic and Milovanovic in 1994 would be amplified during 1995.
The VRS’s failure to shift forces to cover Livno, however, definitely contributed to
the Croats’ success in achieving the second important objective of the campaign. The HV’s
goal was to bite off a portion of Serb territory in the Dinara-Livno sector so that HV troops
might eventually reach positions from which they could more easily strike Knin, the Krajina
Serb capital. Despite their long frontages and limited resources, the VRS defenders rallied
enough to slow the able HV assault and stop the HVO. If the VRS command had been able or
willing to commit more units to the battle, the HV gains could have been curtailed even
further. That might have made it more difficult for the HV to position itself for its mid-1995
offensive in time to defeat the RSK.
The VRS decision to withhold forces from Livno and the 5th Corps’ stand at Bihac
gave Zagreb the best of both worlds and achieved both of its main objectives. If “Zima 94”
did not relieve Serb pressure on Bihac, the 5th Corps nevertheless was able halt the Serb
attack. Because the Serbs concentrated their limited forces on Bihac, the troop reserves that
might have stopped the Croat advance were not available. The convergence of Croat and
Muslim interests in 1995 would combine the Bosnian Army’s dogged ability to pressure the
Serbs despite limited gains and the Croatian Army’s lightning operations, a war-winning
combination that the VRS could not defeat.

2008
Belgrade Tanjug 19 December 1994.

652
 Operation “Zima 94”, the first major HV operation since 1993, was an important
gauge of the improvements the army had made. The HV attack was able to achieve sizeable
territorial gains in a relatively short period of time, making a 20-kilometer-deep penetration
and taking 200 square kilometers of territory. Earlier, Dudakovic’s 5th Corps had taken as
much territory and advanced even further and much faster after the 2nd Krajina Corps’s
defences completely collapsed. Opposite the HV/HVO, some of the same VRS units seem to
have fought pretty hard and given a better account of themselves in delaying the HV attack
despite their marked inferiority in numbers. In this they were aided by the horrible weather
and difficult terrain, which made it impossible for the Croatians to maintain any kind of
operational momentum against the need for constant rotation of frontline units. As stated
earlier, in these circumstances the Croat attack probably could have been slowed even more
or even halted if the VRS had been willing to commit more troops to the defence.
Overall, though, the HV/HVO campaign was well planned and executed. In
particular, the Croats effectively integrated armour and artillery support with their infantry
advances in a demonstration of the combined arms capability that would help propel HV
troops across the Krajina and Bosnia in 1995. All in all, the operation gave the HV an
excellent training opportunity to blood its units and work out bugs in its system in
preparation for greater things to come the next year. In 1995, the HV was to demonstrate
an ability to seize far more ground far more quickly than it had in “Zima 94”.

653
 Annex 63
UNPROFOR in 1994: Towards Escalation or Evacuation?
By early 1994, United Nations peacekeeping was widely perceived as having
reached a state of crisis – not only in the former Yugoslavia, but around the world. The UN,
under Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s energetic though controversial leadership,
fielded no fewer than 70.000 troops from 70 countries under its flag in 17 nations around
the world – a force, for the sake of comparison, more than half the size of the British Army
and bigger than the entire Canadian military.2009 2010 But while a British or Canadian military
operation would have been supported and directed by phalanxes of civilians in London or
Ottawa, the tens of thousands of UN peacekeepers scattered across the planet were
directed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ miniscule staff of 267
(including secretaries).2011
With over 36.000 total peacekeepers under three commands in Croatia, Bosnia,
and Macedonia, policing the former Yugoslavia had become the UN’s largest and most
visible operation in the world.2012 Rightly or wrongly, UNPROFOR was increasingly seen by
many as an exemplar of all that was wrong in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The
operation was big, expensive, seemingly unclear of purpose, and had no clear end in sight.
But its very size and visibility also made it too big to abandon, for to do so would be to admit
failure, further compromising the credibility of the UN and its troop-contributing nations.
UNPROFOR had become UN Secretary General Boutros- Ghali’s albatross.
Following the pattern of previous years, UNPROFOR would expand both its size and
its mandate during the course of 1994. But it remained unclear whether UNPROFOR’s
expanding forces – and the growing range of military options made available to it – were
helping UNPROFOR gain control over the Bosnian conflict or merely drawing the UN further
into it.

Changing Forces
UNPROFOR began the year 1995 with about 12.000 peacekeepers in Bosnia; it
would roughly double in size to some 24.000 troops by year-end. Largely as a result of this
rapid expansion – and “donor fatigue” on the part of the overstretched, downsizing NATO
militaries – UNPROFOR’s composition became visibly less NATO-generated in the course of
the year. Desperately in need of additional forces to carry out its ever-expanding list of
missions (including the task of maintaining a credible presence in all six of the UN-declared

2009
The Economist: United Nations: Sea of Blue, 30 April 1994, p. 52.
2010
The Economist: United Nations Peacekeeping: Trotting to the Rescue, 25 June 1994, pp. 19-22.
2011
Largely because of its small staff, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations enjoyed a reputation
as one of the most efficient elements of the UN’s bloated and Byzantine bureaucracy. The Economist:
United Nations Peacekeeping: Trotting to the Rescue, 25 June 1994, pp. 19-22.
2012
Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York
Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 99.

654
“safe areas”), UNPROFOR had to accept contributions from a wider range of nations. By the
end of 1994 about one-third of its troops were from non-NATO Scandinavian, Eastern
European, and Asian contributors, who were distributed throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Some of these forces lamentably proved to be liabilities rather than assets,
obliging UNPROFOR headquarters to support and defend them but adding little capability to
the UN command.
While some of these newer contingents – like the 1.000-strong Swedish
contribution to the composite “Nordic” battalion based in Tuzla2013 – were drawn from well-
equipped, highly professional militaries that could be readily integrated into the existing
NATO command and logistic structure, others were not. The 1.200-man Bangladeshi
battalion that replaced the French contingent in Bihac in November 1994 was to prove
worse than ineffective. Not only did they arrive in Bosnia without equipment – later
provided by the Germans from former East German military stocks – but most of the men
lacked rifles and the most rudimentary infantry supplies. Their utter lack of cold-weather
clothing assured that the Bangladeshis – who had never seen snow before – during the
harsh winter of 1994-1995 would suffer terribly from the moment they disembarked,
rendering them completely ineffective as a peacekeeping or even an observing force.2014
As in previous years, UNPROFOR’s peacekeeping troops were generally deployed in
national battalions, operating under the direction of Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC), a
de facto multinational division headquarters in Sarajevo. BHC was subdivided geographically
into three brigade-equivalent sectors: UN Sector Sarajevo, UN Sector South West, and UN
Sector North East. The French had primacy in Sector Sarajevo, which still had French,
Egyptian, and Ukrainian subordinate battalions and was responsible for the capital and its
immediate environs. The British formed the core of UN Sector South West, headquartered
in Gornji Vakuf and comprising British, Canadian, Spanish, and Malaysian battalions. UN
Sector North East was a composite command, including Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and
Dutch components.2015

Towards the “Mogadishu Line”

UNPROFOR in Bosnia began the year with a new commander, British Lt. General Sir
Michael Rose. Rose – a former Special Air Service (SAS) officer – took over from Belgian
General Francis Briquemont on 5 January, after Briquemont had complained of fatigue and
publicly expressed his frustration with the UN’s repeated unwillingness to commit the
additional peacekeeping forces pledged in UN Security Council Resolutions.2016 By mid-year

2013
Although designated the “Nordic Battalion”, NORDBAT was in effect a Brigade (-). It was comprised of
roughly 1.000 Swedish, 730 Norwegian, and 120 Danish troops. Jane’s International Defense Review: Nordic
Troops Remain Committed to Bosnia Mission, March 1995, p. 6.
2014
UN Force Attracts More non-NATO Troops, Jane’s International Defense Review, November 1994, p. 10.
2015
Tim Ripley: Bosnia Mission Forces UN To Grow With the Times, Jane’s International Defence Review, May
1994, pp. 63-65.
2016
Paris AFP, 20 January 1994, FBIS Vienna AU2001161394, 201613Z January 1994.

655
Rose also had been rendered disillusioned and despairing by his dealings with the Bosnian
factions and the UN civil authorities.
UNPROFOR’s mission and mandate had become a bewilderingly complex tangle
derived from literally dozens of UN Security Council Resolutions. (By December 1993, no
fewer than 54 UN Security Council Resolutions had been passed on the former Yugoslavia,
perhaps half of these explicitly defining or refining UNPROFOR’s mandate.2017) French
General Philippe Morillon, a former UNPROFOR Bosnia commander, had observed that the
UN’s Security Council Resolutions were “like the Koran – everything was there, including its
opposite”.2018
Rose and UNPROFOR were plagued by a seemingly inexorable process of “mission
creep” during the course of the year. Moreover, the already-challenging task of fulfilling
UNPROFOR’s varied missions was necessarily aggravated by the intrinsic difficulties of
“peacekeeping with a war machine”. Such difficulties were borne of the mismatch between
the problems UNPROFOR routinely confronted, and the punitive measures available to it –
when UN headquarters allowed any measures at all. As Rose characterized it upon the
conclusion of his term as commander:
You have NATO, which is a high-tech, highly-integrated war-fighting machine –
the most powerful one the world has ever seen, which has based its entire strategy and
doctrine on the mass application of force and total destruction of the enemy in a
limited timeframe – having to learn the art of peacekeeping...
UNPROFOR was never there to protect one party from another. Even though one
may be a legitimate sovereign power and the other one may be a renegade regime.
That’s not what peacekeeping is about. The dangers are that you lose sight of what you
are here to do because you are sucked in and you get manipulated by internal and
external pressures. Then you lose your mission and cross “the Mogadishu line” using
more force than you should and end up with the sort of disaster we saw in Somalia.2019
The “Mogadishu line” – that intangible point when a peacekeeping force crosses
over and becomes a combatant effectively allying itself with one of the sides in the conflict –
was always at the forefront of the thinking of UN civilian and military thinking after the
horrific American debacle in Somalia. But events constantly seemed to pull UNPROFOR
continually closer to this line, like tides drawing a ship inexorably toward a reef. And in
1994, the means by which UNPROFOR commanders found themselves most directly
engaged in the conflict was the use of NATO airpower.

2017
Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York
Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 118.
2018
Ed Vulliamy: Where UN Angels Fear to Tread, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 21 January 1996.
2019
Tim Ripley: Peacekeeping with a War Machine: Interview with General Rose, Jane’s International Defence
Review, January 1995, p. 11.

656
 NATO Airpower: A “Blue Sword” but Not a Silver Bullet
Unable to command the respect or compliance from the forces of the warring
factions – most notably, the Bosnian Serbs – UNPROFOR’s Bosnia-Herzegovina Command
and, more reluctantly, the UN civilian leadership, began to use the threat of NATO airpower
more actively as an instrument of policy. In the early cases – Sarajevo in February 1994 and
Gorazde in April – the mere threat of substantial airpower proved an effective means of
influencing Bosnian Serb actions and helped bring about the creation of the heavy weapons
exclusion zones around the two cities. But by the end of the year, when NATO aircraft were
actually striking Bosnian and Krajina Serb targets on the ground, neither the threat nor the
use of NATO air power was modulating Bosnian Serb behaviour in the manner the UN had
hoped it would – perhaps because when the hammer fell it did not fall as hard as the Serbs
had feared. By the end of 1994 the Bosnian Serbs still tried to avoid NATO airstrikes if
possible but at times they could and did defy the UN even at the risk of air reprisals.
On 28 February 1994 NATO conducted its first official combat action of the
alliance’s 45-year history. On that date six Krajina Serb “Galeb” light ground-attack aircraft
took off from the Serb-held area in adjacent Croatia to raid the Muslim-held Pucarevo arms
factory just outside Novi Travnik. En-route they were detected by NATO AWACS aircraft and
four US F-16 fighters were vectored in to intercept them. After almost 11 months of DENY
FLIGHT Operations with no combat activity, NATO pilots had for the first time encountered
unmistakably military aircraft conducting combat operations in clear violation of the No-Fly
Zone. It was all over in less than three minutes as four of the six Krajina Serb aircraft went
down while the other two escaped out of Bosnian airspace and the No-Fly Zone’s
jurisdiction.2020
The contrast between the success of the DENY FLIGHT enforcement operation –
whose response to visible violations required no additional authorization from UN officials –
and the failures of the UN’s cumbersome system for close air support of threatened ground
troops was to be highlighted not long afterward. On 13 March the dangerous inefficiency of
the UN’s close air support mechanism (known as “Blue Sword” missions) was illustrated by a
much-publicized incident when NATO aircraft arrived over Bosnia hours after a request for
assistance from threatened French peacekeepers. UNPROFOR Bosnia commander General
Rose had approved the request and relayed it to overall UNPROFOR commander General
Jean Cot, and thence to UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi, who exercised final civilian control
over all airstrike requests. But by the time Akashi had concurred in the request the
offending Bosnian Serb guns had long since vanished.2021 Although no French casualties
resulted from the hours-long delay, the embarrassing ineffectiveness of the airpower
response mechanism precipitated a long series of demands to have the UN – specifically, UN
Special Envoy Akashi – taken “out of the loop” in the airstrike decision process. NATO Allied
Forces Southern Europe commander Admiral Leighton Smith offered perhaps the most

2020
First Shoot Down by NATO, Air International, April 1994, p. 170.
2021
Ian Kemp: UN Chiefs Call for CAS Streamlining in Bosnia, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 March 1994, p. 6.

657
direct commentary on the lessons NATO had drawn from this parallel military-civilian chain
of command arrangement:
Don’t ever have another dual key ... It is a hell of a lot easier if there is a single
chain of command, with one guy in charge ... I would not make that mistake again.2022
Although the directed use of NATO air power against ground targets – as distinct
from downing No-Fly Zone violators or providing close air support to embattled
peacekeepers – had been threatened around Sarajevo in February 1994, NATO air power
was first actually used in early April against Bosnian Serb ground targets around Gorazde.2023
At this time, the Bosnian Serb army was on the verge of overrunning one of the six UN-
declared “safe areas”, and the front lines were only three kilometers from the centre of
Gorazde. On 10 April, when both Western and UN anxieties had reached a crescendo,
UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander Rose and UN Special Representative Akashi authorized
NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb ground targets after several forward air controllers of
the British Special Air Service came under Serb fire.2024 2025
Late that afternoon two US Air Force F-16s struck a Bosnian Serb command post 12
kilometers southwest of Gorazde with three bombs. When the first strike had no apparent
effect, a second was authorized the following day. Two US Marine Corps F/A-18s struck the
Serbs on 11 April, hitting a group of VRS armoured vehicles that had been firing into the
town.2026 NATO’s bare-minimum aerial sorties seem to have done little in the way of
material damage, but they had the effect of temporarily halting the VRS advance on
Gorazde.2027 The UN’s satisfaction with its success at Gorazde was short-lived; the furious
Bosnian Serb commander, General Mladic, promptly “detained” about 150 UN personnel
and held them for the duration of the Gorazde crisis.2028
Even worse, the VRS continued its offensive against Gorazde despite the NATO air
actions and after the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to accept a UN proposal to cease fire,
withdraw their forces from a three-kilometre exclusion zone on the eastern bank of the
Drina, allow the deployment of UN peacekeepers into the town, and agree to let medical aid
and relief workers to reach the town.2029 With its threats disregarded after only a few days,
NATO issued a second ultimatum to the Serbs on 22 April, threatening air strikes against VRS
military targets within 20 kilometers of Gorazde unless the VRS complied with the terms of
the UN agreement by 24 April.2030 2031 Stubbornly defying the UN and the international

2022
The Jane’s Interview: Admiral Leighton Smith, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 January 1995, p. 32.
2023
See Annex 49: Operation “Zvezda 94”: The VRS Assault on Gorazde, April 1994 for a more detailed
discussion of the VRS offensive against Gorazde and the NATO airstrikes and ultimatum.
2024
Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, p. 328.
2025
Ripley, Tim: Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower, Shrewsbury, UK Airlife Publishing, 1996, pp. 70-82.
2026
Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin USA, p. 328; see also Reuters, 11 April
1994 for description of the attacks.
2027
Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New York
Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 149-151.
2028
Silber and Little, p. 328.
2029
Belgrade Tanjug, 18 April 1994.
2030
Silber and Little, pp. 332-333.
2031
Paris AFP, 22 April 1994, carries the text of the North Atlantic Council ultimatum.

658
community, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic finally bowed to pressure from Serbian President
Milosevic and directed General Mladic to comply with the terms of the NATO ultimatum. As
at Sarajevo, Serb heavy weapons were to be withdrawn from a 20-kilometer radius from the
town centre or placed under UN supervision; VRS troops were to withdraw from a three-
kilometre sub-zone, which would be monitored by UN peacekeepers and military observers.
The Serb forces withdrew as ordered, and had withdrawn at least most of their troops and
heavy weapons to the specified distances by the 24 April deadline.2032 2033
The unquestioned technological superiority of NATO aircraft operating over Bosnia
did not make them invulnerable during the April Gorazde crisis. The Bosnian Serbs
demonstrated their ability to defend their territory (at least close to the ground) on 15 April,
when the VRS damaged a French carrier-based Etendard IVP aircraft with a SA-7 shoulder-
fired SAM. The damaged aircraft was able to make it back to sea and land safely, but a
British aircraft was not so fortunate the following day, when a Royal Navy Sea Harrier was
felled by a similar missile while searching for a Bosnian Serb tank firing at Gorazde’s city
hospital.2034 2035
Although the military consequences of the NATO air actions around Gorazde were
negligible, the precedent had been established of offensive air strikes against ground targets
not directly related to the defence of UN peacekeepers.2036 The slow evolution of NATO air
actions away from the immediate defence of UN ground forces toward retaliatory actions at
times and places of NATO’s choosing would eventually reach its culmination in the
DELIBERATE FORCE air campaign almost a year and a half later.
NATO’s April 1994 air actions notwithstanding, by late summer the Bosnian Serbs
were openly flouting the Sarajevo heavy-weapons exclusion zone, presenting an increasingly
embarrassing problem for the UN and NATO. For months the UN had elected to quietly
overlook most violations as long as the Bosnian Serbs did not resume shelling the city itself.
But it became increasingly obvious that the Serbs were not only moving weapons around
but practicing with them inside the UN weapons collection depots and firing them in full
view of UN observers.2037 NATO’s resolve was tested a little too blatantly when Bosnian Serb
troops removed a tank, two armoured vehicles, and two anti-aircraft guns from a UN
collection point on 5 August in defiance of an explicit threat by General Rose.2038 When the
VRS refused to return the weapons, Rose ordered a retaliatory airstrike. The ensuing NATO
actions produced more sound and fury than significance. Two US A-10 aircraft supported by
2032
White Dragon: The Royal Welch Fusiliers in Bosnia, Wrexham, UK, The Royal Welch Fusiliers Regimental
Headquarters, pp. 9-13.
2033
The initial UN peacekeeping force in Gorazde was a composite battalion of British, Ukrainian, and Canadian
troops; over the time the peacekeeping force in the enclave was to become predominantly British. White
Dragon: The Royal Welch Fusiliers in Bosnia, Wrexham, UK, The Royal Welch Fusiliers Regimental
Headquarters, pp. 9-13.
2034
Ripley, Tim: Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower, Shrewsbury, UK Airlife Publishing, 1996, pp. 70-82.
2035
UN Officials Dismayed Over Serb Attack, Lack of Solid Support, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 April 1994,
p. 6.
2036
Barbara Starr: NATO Ready For Wider Air Strikes on Serbs by, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 April 1994, p. 4
2037
Reuters: Serbs Flout U.N. Weapons-Free Zones by Mark Heinrich, 2 August 1994.
2038
Reuters: U.N. Vows to Stop Serbs Raiding Arms Collection Depot by Mark Heinrich, 3 August 1994.

659
Dutch, French, and British aircraft fired some 600 30 mm cannon rounds at what turned out
to be a derelict World War II-era M-18 tank destroyer 12 km south of the airport.2039 The
misdirected demonstration of force nevertheless prompted the Bosnian Serbs to back down
and return the five stolen weapons the following day.2040
Continuing Bosnian Serb violations of the Sarajevo exclusion zone – culminating in a
series of attacks on UN vehicles and personnel – prompted a second NATO air action on 22
September. Two British Jaguar aircraft dropped 1.000 lb bombs while another US A-10
strafed a Bosnian Serb T-55 tank west of Sarajevo. Poor weather prevented two French
Mirage jets from locating the target. This second strike in defence of the Sarajevo area was
hardly more successful than the first. The offending vehicle was reported destroyed, but the
Bosnian Serbs promptly reacted by obstructing UN humanitarian efforts across the country,
blocking relief convoys and forcing the closure of the Sarajevo airlift, leaving the city with
only two weeks’ food. VRS commander Mladic went so far as to threaten retaliation against
captive UN peacekeepers if NATO mounted another air attack. With the UN now under
pressure to restore Sarajevo’s food supplies, UNPROFOR and the VRS settled the standoff in
a few days, but it remained debatable which side had called the other’s bluff.2041 2042 2043 2044
NATO’s largest and most dramatic air action of 1994 was the November airstrike
against the Krajina Serbs holding Udbina airfield in Croatia. Despite the loss of four aircraft
to NATO on 28 February, the Krajina Serbs continued to fly occasional brief strike missions
against the Muslims of the Bihac enclave, only minutes away and just over the Bosnian-
Croatian border. After Krajina Serb Air Force Galebs were detected bombing in November,
the UN accepted a NATO proposal to put a stop to the flights with an airstrike against the
airfield from which they had been operating. On 21 November a NATO strike package of
more than 30 combat aircraft struck Udbina with a mix of 80 laser-guided bombs, iron
bombs, and cluster munitions.2045 The airfield runway was damaged – though not
irreparably – and the immediate objective of stopping Krajina Serb flights over Bosnia was
achieved – at least temporarily.2046 Czech peacekeepers reported the airfield back in
operation less than three months later, apparently supporting Bosnian Serb Army
operations around Bihac in early February 1995.2047
NATO’s punitive airstrike raised the ante over Bosnia for both sides. The following
day, 22 November, the Bosnian Serbs almost downed their second Royal Navy Sea Harrier
with another SAM. NATO responded by mounting heavily-armed “suppression of enemy air
defence” (SEAD) missions. The next day, it was NATO’s turn to chalk up a win when a
Bosnian Serb SAM battery turned on its radars near Bihac. NATO aircraft struck the battery

2039
Reuters: NATO Planes Hit Serb Target around Sarajevo by Mark Heinrich, 5 August 1994.
2040
Reuters: Serbs Hand Back Guns under Air Strike Threat by Mark Heinrich, 6 August 1994.
2041
Reuters: NATO Stages Air Strike against Bosnian Serbs by Davor Huic, 22 September 1994
2042
Reuters: General Rose Says British, U.S. Planes Hit Serb Tank by Kurt Schork, 22 September 1994.
2043
Reuters: Serbs Block UN Operations in Bosnia by Davor Huic, 24 September 1994.
2044
Reuters: Sarajevo Could Run Out of Food in Two Weeks – U.N. by Davor Huic, 25 September 1994.
2045
UN Forces Attack Serb-Held Targets, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 November 1994, p. 3.
2046
Ripley, Tim: Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower, Shrewsbury, UK Airlife Publishing, 1996, pp. 70-81.
2047
Flashpoints: Croatia, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 February 1995, p. 15.

660
with three high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) that homed in on the Serb radars.
NATO aircraft continued to search for Bosnian Serb SAMs for the rest of the day, firing three
more HARMs and dropping several unguided bombs on other air defence sites.2048
Within just a few days, NATO aircraft and the Bosnian Serbs’ air defences were
effectively at war – a far cry from UNPROFOR’s original vision of impartial, on-the-ground
peacekeeping. And by 25 November NATO was threatening all-out airstrikes against Bosnian
Serb tanks shelling Sarajevo in open violation of the heavy weapons exclusion zone. At
General Rose’s request, NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) assembled another 30-
plane strike package and launched it to disable the Serb tanks. Meanwhile, though, things
had gotten very ugly on the ground. To deter further NATO airstrikes, inflamed Bosnian
Serbs took more than 300 UN military observers and peacekeeping troops hostage, tying
some up and placing them across the runway at Banja Luka airfield and holding other
hostages as “human shields” at weapons collections points around Sarajevo.2049
The weakness inherent in the UN’s effort to use NATO airpower as the “bad cop” to
coerce the Serbs was now all too apparent: UNPROFOR – the “good cop” – was effectively
unarmed and defenceless. More threatened than threatening, the UN and General Rose
were forced to call off the NATO strike already in the air and defuse the crisis. UNPROFOR,
fearing for the lives of its peacekeepers, requested that NATO temporarily stop its flights
over Bosnian airspace until the release of its personnel had been negotiated. The standoff
was gradually resolved as the UN hostages were progressively released and NATO air action
was held in abeyance. After this last, most serious, confrontation between the Bosnian
Serbs and UNPROFOR ended, both sides walked away with black eyes, but nothing
fundamental had been resolved. The experience did not bode well for the coming year.

UNPROFOR and the Contact Group Peace Plan

On the ground in Bosnia, two great fears had developed among UNPROFOR’s
commanders by mid-1994. Both grew out of the Contact Group’s peace plan, which had
been drafted in Geneva and presented to the three factions as a “take it or leave it”
proposal with a 19 July deadline for acceptance or rejection by the Bosnian Muslim, Croat,
and Serb leaderships.
The first fear was that the Bosnian Serbs would not sign, in which case they were to
be subjected to an escalating package of international coercive measures, beginning with
tighter sanctions and stricter enforcement of the heavy weapons exclusion zones, and
potentially ranging up to punitive airstrikes. UN commanders were deeply concerned that
such coercive measures could lead, as they had before, to Bosnian Serb retaliation against
the overstretched and under-protected UNPROFOR peacekeepers scattered across Bosnia.
As one UN source in Sarajevo characterized it:

2048
Ripley, Tim: Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower, Shrewsbury, UK Airlife Publishing, 1996, pp. 70-81.
2049
Ripley, Tim: Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower, Shrewsbury, UK Airlife Publishing, 1996, pp. 70-81.

661
 Our concern is that the international community will do something stern and
punitive against the Serbs, suddenly making us confrontational ... Given the way
UNPROFOR is configured now, the only we can operate with any acceptable margin of
safety is on the basis of voluntary agreements.2050
Ironically, UNPROFOR’s other great fear at that moment was that the Bosnian Serbs
would sign the Contact Group plan, requiring UNPROFOR to transition almost immediately
from peacekeeping to countrywide enforcement of the peace agreement. UN commanders
repeatedly protested that they did not have enough forces for even the tasks already
assigned to them, let alone a broad treaty-enforcement mission. General Rose had earlier
stated that implementation of a Geneva-like peace agreement – assuming the consent of
the Bosnian parties – would require about 12.000 additional troops (preferably American),
including two logistics battalions, two engineering battalions, and two to three helicopter
regiments.2051
As it happened, it was the UN commanders’ first fear that was more or less
realized, although it developed incrementally and in the course of more than a year. The
international community did over time move from confrontation to coercion, and in some
degree to the realization of the second great fear. When UNPROFOR eventually transitioned
to a peace-enforcement mission, it would require even more than the notional force
General Rose had laid out.

What a Tangled Web: UNPROFOR’s Withdrawal, Lifting the Arms Embargo,

and Plan 40104
Plagued with shrinking defence budgets, downsizing militaries, and an expensive
and open-ended military commitment in Bosnia, several key UNPROFOR contributors began
to call into question the mission’s utility and their own continued participation in it. For
nearly two years the internationally-brokered peace talks had seemed to be going nowhere,
while obstructions to humanitarian aid deliveries and risks to UN peacekeepers seemed if
anything to be on the rise. It was in France (which had contributed the most troops and
taken the most casualties) that the debate over UNPROFOR’s success or failure, and
whether the peacekeeping force should remain, increase in size, or withdraw completely,
was played out perhaps most visibly, but the same issues were being agonized over in the
policy circles of Washington, London, and virtually every nation that had contributed
peacekeeping troops to the region.2052 2053 2054
At different times during 1994, France, Great Britain, and Canada – who between
them contributed nearly half of UNPROFOR’s total force in Bosnia and Croatia – signalled
that they might withdraw their peacekeeping contingents from the region if the peace

2050
Reuters: U.N. Weighs Bosnia Options if Serbs Refuse Plan by Kurt Schork, 14 July 1994.
2051
Reuters: U.N., NATO Weigh Military Options for Bosnia by Kurt Schork, 14 July 1994.
2052
Reuters: New Talk of UN Troop Pullout from Bosnia by Patrick Worsnip, 11 May 1994
2053
Reuters: Bosnian Enforcement Issues Divide World Powers by Kurt Schork, 10 July 1994
2054
France Weighs Its Options in Bosnia, Jane’s International Defense Review, October, 1994, p. 6.

662
negotiations didn’t soon produce some results.2055 2056 2057 France was the most explicit in its
statements, warning in mid-March that it would begin withdrawing its peacekeepers from
Bosnia if there was not visible progress on the peace talks by mid-June. The NATO allies
reacted sharply to the French public statement – but mostly because they had not been
consulted in advance.2058 2059 Only days later, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd told
reporters that, although British policymakers were not “so precise about dates” as the
French, they were in agreement in principle regarding a possible troop pullout: he asserted
that “We certainly have no desire to keep British troops indefinitely in Bosnia”.2060 Much of
the public soul-searching that followed was probably posturing designed to frighten the
Bosnian Muslims into accepting a less-than-desirable peace settlement to avoid a UN
pullout. But the concern expressed by the NATO allies over escalating costs, unfocused
missions, and indefinite timelines were certainly genuine enough.
At this point, however, the possibility of a complete UNPROFOR pullout had
become inextricably linked with two other issues. The first question was the wisdom of
lifting the UN arms embargo on Bosnia. The second was that of NATO assistance to an
UNPROFOR extraction operation.
The issue that arose first was the proposed lifting of the UN’s arms embargo
against all former Yugoslav republics, which had been imposed by UNSC Resolution 713 on
25 September 1991 in a vain attempt to limit the scale of the fighting. This option, seen as a
way to help the outgunned Muslims and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Serb
military machine, was supported by many elements of the US Government and conditionally
by some European governments. The idea was in conflict with the conventional wisdom
that, while lifting the arms embargo might eventually help to “level the playing field” by
allowing the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to acquire additional weapons and
approach military parity with the Bosnian Serbs, in the short term new arms deliveries
would simply drive up the body count. More weapons and ammunition injected into an
already vicious war zone would increase the intensity of fighting and leave the international
community indirectly responsible for even more bloodshed. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs
would have every incentive to press their offensive as hard and as fast as they possibly could
to smash the ARBiH and HVO before either military could acquire, distribute, or effectively
utilize the weapons that a cessation of the embargo would bring. And these prospects
convinced virtually everyone that lifting the arms embargo would make the situation on the

2055
2055 France was the largest contributor to UNPROFOR, with over 6.000 troops deployed in the former
Yugoslavia in the spring of 1994. France Weighs Its Options in Bosnia, Jane’s International Defense Review,
October, 1994, p. 6.
2056
London had roughly 2.600 troops in Bosnia at the beginning of 1994. The Christian Science Monitor.
"Britain Mulls Withdrawing Its Peace keepers in Bosnia" 24 January 1994. p. 4
2057
At this time, Canada had just under 2.000 peacekeeping troops deployed in the former Yugoslavia.
Canadians Rethink Role as International Peacekeepers, The Christian Science Monitor, 31 January 1994, p.
3.
2058
Reuters: France Says Mid-June Talks on Bosnia Decisive by Paul Taylor, 19 May 1994.
2059
Reuters: NATO Allies Criticize France on Bosnia Pullout Threat, 24 May 1994.
2060
Reuters: British Troops Not In Bosnia Indefinitely – Hurd, 26 May 1994.

663
ground completely untenable for UN peacekeepers and international aid workers, leading to
the corollary conclusion that before the embargo could be lifted all international forces and
relief personnel would have to be withdrawn from Bosnia – with all of the risk, effort, and
expense the planners calculated that would entail.2061
The issue of the UN arms embargo came to a head in October 1994, when the
United States seriously entertained the possibility of lifting the arms embargo over the
strong objections of its European allies and the Russian government. Furious diplomacy
ensued, out of which came the conclusion by the Bosnian government that, rather than risk
the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, it would be best off accepting the continuation of the UNSC
arms embargo, importing what weapons it could via its covert pipeline through Croatia
while retaining the meagre protection afforded by the continued presence of the
peacekeepers and hoping that the Bosnian Serbs’ own embargo – imposed by Serbian
President Milosevic on 4 August – would begin to bite into their opponents’ capabilities. It
therefore announced that it would accept a six-month delay in implementation of any
future Security Council decision to lift the embargo. With the Bosnian government no longer
lobbying for the right to gain more arms, the issue of the UN arms embargo could be
postponed, though not resolved.2062
Counter-intuitively, the second, related issue was whether and how NATO would
send more troops into Bosnia, which would be required to facilitate the safe withdrawal of
the UNPROFOR troops assigned there. NATO planners had concluded that covering the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR under hostile fire could require seven to nine NATO manoeuvre
brigades, totalling between 30.000 and 45.000 troops, thousands of tanks and armoured
vehicles, three aircraft carriers, 70 combat aircraft, and 180 helicopters. It was clear that the
extraction option would not come cheap, either. Costs could run $275 million to start and
$100 million per month thereafter – or much, much more.2063 Moreover, implicit in any
NATO-run extraction operation (a series of contingency plans officially designated
“Operation Plan 40104”) was the idea that the US would contribute not just air and sea lift
but also its own ground forces to help secure transit corridors out of Bosnia.2064 All could
agree that UNPROFOR might have one leg caught in the Bosnian bear trap – but the
available ways of removing the leg from the trap looked more painful than leaving it in.
A three-way impasse had thus been reached. Many believed that the simplest and
most just solution would be to lift the arms embargo and let the Bosnian Muslims fight it
out on their own. But it was already a given that lifting the arms embargo would require
pulling out the peacekeepers. This in turn necessitated the commitment of major NATO

2061
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated on 6 July 1994 that:
We would not be very happy with a possible lifting of the arms embargo because that could lead
very rapidly to the withdrawal of the Canadian troops and probably those of other countries ...The
same feeling was expressed by the French and the British.
Reuters: UN May Withdraw if Bosnia Plan Fails – Canada, 6 July 1994.
2062
Only Postponing, The Economist, 1 October 1994, pp. 65-66.
2063
Marc Rodgers: Bolster or Withdraw: NATO Looks at Options, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 January 1995.
2064
Kathleen Bunten: Clinton Says US Troops Will Aid UN Pull-Out, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 December 1994,
p. 4.

664
forces to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR’s 24.000 peacekeepers and at least implied a
requirement for what Washington had opposed from the start of the Balkan hostilities –
direct involvement of US ground forces. The long-term goal of reduced expense and
international disengagement had as its price a massive near-term commitment of money
and troops, and the hitherto unacceptable engagement of American ground forces. Partly
because of the interlinked nature of UNPROFOR withdrawal, cessation of the UN arms
embargo, NATO force deployment, and the potential commitment of US troops – each
highly contentious issue in themselves – the matter of UNPROFOR’s withdrawal was long
discussed but never resolved until its successor Implementation Force (IFOR) eventually
arrived to replace it in December 1995.

665
 Section VI
Bosnia and Croatia 1995

666
 Annex 64
UNPROFOR in 1995:
From Vacillation to Retaliation to Peace Implementation
After nearly three years in the no-man’s land between traditional UN peacekeeping
and peace enforcement, UNPROFOR2065 in early 1995 clearly began to tilt from the former
type of operation toward the latter. Traditionally, UN peacekeeping forces (such as those in
Cyprus or the Golan Heights) had almost always been called in after a formal agreement had
been reached between two parties. A small, lightly-armed peace keeping force could thus
serve as an impartial observer mission which would give both sides confidence that the
other was adhering to the terms of the agreement. On the other hand, “peace
enforcement”2066 missions are very different, potentially involving direct confrontation or
coercion of the parties and correspondingly require a much larger and better-armed
peacekeeping force. UNPROFOR, however, lay in between these two extremes, deployed
during an ongoing conflict and assigned many peace monitoring responsibilities, but also at
times attempting to compel compliance by the warring parties although lacking the
resources or mandate to do so effectively.2067
The organization, composition, and doctrine of the UN’s ground forces changed
fundamentally with the incorporation of the “Rapid Reaction Force”, and the escalation
from the ineffectual, pinprick air attacks of 1994 to the countrywide DELIBERATE FORCE air
campaign of August-September 1995. The latter, especially, demonstrated beyond question
the international community’s new philosophy of political coercion through the direct
application of military force. Having tried since 1992 to persuade the warring parties
(specifically, the Bosnian Serbs) by using the velvet glove – and having been consistently
humiliated for its efforts – the UN was finally prepared to switch hands and try using the
iron fist in dealing with Bosnia.
Having concentrated on its humanitarian mission during the winter of 1994-95,
UNPROFOR was drawn back into the centre of events in Bosnia very soon after the ARBiH
“spring offensive” put an end to the winter cease-fire. After the Bosnian Government
resumed hostilities on 20 March 1995 with its attacks on Mt. Vlasic and the Stolice radio
tower, the Bosnian Serbs responded by removing heavy weapons from UN weapons

2065
In the spring of 1995, the UN changed its designations so that the new term “UNPF” (United Nations Peace
Forces) was used to refer to UN operations in the entire former Yugoslavia, whereas the term “UNPROFOR”
(United Nations Protection Force) was reserved for operations within Bosnia alone. Colloquially, though,
“UNPROFOR” was fre quently still used to refer to any UN peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia right up
through the end of the Croatian and Bosnian wars in late 1995.
2066
Exemplified, perhaps, by the very proactive “peacemaking” doctrine of the Russian military.
2067
One reflection of this schizophrenia of mission was the fact that many of the UN Security Council
Resolutions which defined UNPROFOR’s mandate were based upon Chapter VI of the UN Charter (the
pacific settlement of disputes) whereas others were based upon Chapter VII of the Charter (enforcement
measures). Gow, James: Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, New
York Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 118.

667
collection points. These Serb violations of UNSC resolutions in turn led to international
objections, prompting calls for a UN response. Events soon escalated rapidly and drastically.
Not long after the Bosnian Army offensive began, the Bosnian Serbs responded by
harassing the UN relief airlift into Sarajevo. On 8 April, a US C-130 transport took
machinegun fire while approaching Sarajevo air port. The plane landed and departed safely,
but UNHCR closed down the airlift in response – almost until the end of the war, as it turned
out. NATO jets overflew Sarajevo as a threat to the Bosnian Serbs, but did not bomb any
targets. The NATO show of force had no apparent effect.

The Last Straw: The UN Hostage Crisis of May – June 1995

In May Bosnian Serb actions reached a new and unacceptable level of impudence,
forcing the new UN Bosnia Commander, 52-year old British Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith,2068 to
raise the stakes once again. After Bosnian Serb troops removed four heavy weapons from an
UN-monitored compound and proceeded to use them to shell the city, Smith delivered an
ultimatum, warning that airstrikes would be launched unless the Serbs returned or
withdrew the four heavy weapons. When no weapons were forthcoming, Smith ordered
NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb ammunition depots just outside the Republika Srpska’s
self-proclaimed capital of Pale, 15 kilometers east of Sarajevo.2069
American F-16s and Spanish F-18s struck the Pale ammunition depots on 25 May,
raising a giant mushroom cloud visible from Sarajevo and signalling that the UN – through
NATO – was taking its involvement to a new level. Up until this point UNPROFOR had
confined its punitive air actions to tactical, ground-support operations against VRS weapons
and vehicles that were directly violating UNSC resolutions. By bombing a highly visible
Bosnian Serb infrastructure target at a time and place of its choosing, NATO had escalated
the level of confrontation between the UN and the Bosnian Serbs.
The Bosnian Serbs responded swiftly and unmistakably, shelling five of the UN-
declared “safe areas” that evening. In one of the artillery barrages, a single shell – in what
was almost certainly a fluke hit – impacted near a crowded Tuzla outdoor cafe. Seventy-one
civilians were killed and more than 200 were wounded. News of the bloody massacre at the
Tuzla outdoor cafe spread instantly around the world, prompting renewed NATO airstrikes
against the intransigent Bosnian Serbs the following morning. Twelve NATO aircraft struck
six more bunkers at the Pale ammunition depot complex at around 10:30 AM on 27 May,
reportedly damaging or destroying them all.2070

2068
The new commander of UN forces in Bosnia, British Lt. General Rupert Smith replaced Gen. Rose at the
beginning of the year. Smith had commanded the UK’s 1st Armored Division during the Gulf War and
subsequently served as Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff during much of the British deployment in the
former Yugoslavia. Reuters: Smith, New U.N. Commander in Bosnia, Faces Long Haul by Paul Majendie, 19
January 1995; Reuters: General Rupert Smith Was Key Player in Gulf War by Peter Millership, 23 January
1995; Reuters: U.N. Commander Smith Exits Bosnia With Top Marks by Kurt Schork, 19 December 1995.
2069
Headline News: NATO Poised as Serbs Retaliate, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 June 1995, p. 5.
2070
Joel Brand and Juliana Mojsilovic: Serbs Take Hostages After Airstrike, The Washington Post, 27 May 1995.

668
 Following the second round of NATO airstrikes, the Bosnian Serbs pushed the
stakes still higher by taking 377 UN peacekeepers and military observers hostage on 27 and
28 May.2071 Most of these were UNPROFOR troops, who were surrounded, disarmed, and
detained at the “UN-controlled” weapons collections points around Sarajevo. But some
others were used as “human shields” to deter further NATO airstrikes. Bosnian Serb
television promptly broadcast pictures of these peacekeepers – from a wide spectrum of
nations – chained to military installations, bridges, and other potential targets across the
Republika Srpska.2072
Nor was that all. An embarrassed UN command was obliged to report that it had
also surrendered hundreds of flak jackets and rifles, six French light tanks, and 11 French
and Ukrainian armoured personnel carriers to the Bosnian Serbs.2073 (In fact, a total of 616
UNPROFOR vehicles of all types were captured or stolen by the various former Yugoslav
factions between 1991 and 1995.2074) The UN’s fears that the captured equipment would be
abused were immediately validated when Serb troops disguised as French peacekeepers,
complete with blue helmets, infiltrated a French observation post on Sarajevo’s Vrbanja
Bridge and captured the position and 12 UNPROFOR troops.
Stung into action, a French platoon responded with UNPROFOR’s first infantry
assault of the war. After a sharp gun battle that left two French and four Bosnian Serb
soldiers dead, each side was left holding one end of the bridge.2075 Extremely tense
negotiations followed, during which the Bosnian Serbs forced two French peacekeepers to
kneel on the ground with rifles to their heads, and threatened to execute them both unless
UNPROFOR released the four captured Serbs. In the end, the two French soldiers were
spared and the French regained control of both ends of the bridge by 28 May. The battle at
the Vrbanja bridge had shown both the possibilities and – with two peacekeepers killed and
twelve wounded – the potential costs of the UN’s proposed new “robust peace keeping”
doctrine.2076 2077

2071
More precisely, a total of 372 UN peacekeepers were siezed, detained, held hostage, or otherwise
restricted beginning on 27 and 28 May. An additional five UN personnel were taken into custody on 2 June,
bringing the overall total to 377.
2072
This was not the first time the Bosnian Serbs had taken UN personnel into custody: in late November 1994,
in the face of NATO threats to bomb Serb airfields and military targets, the Bosnian Serbs had taken some
300 UN peacekeepers and military observers hostage, similarly using some as “human shields” at key
locations.
2073
Joel Brand: Bosnian Serbs Seize More U.N. Troops, The Washington Post, 29 May 1995.
2074
Thalif Deen: UN Liberia Mission is Latest Robbery Victim, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 April 1996.
2075
George J. Churc: Pity the Peacekeepers; The Serbs Respond to NATO Bombings by Chaining Hostages, Time,
5 June 1995.
2076
Roger Cohen: Conflict in the Balkans: UN Forces, Bosnia Battle Shows UN’s Pride and Limits, The New York
Times, 6 June 1995.
2077
The French peacekeepers also captured four Bosnian Serb fighters in the battle. They were returned to the
Bosnian Serbs via the International Committee of the Red Cross on 20 June, at the same time the Bosnian
Serbs released the last of the detained UNPROFOR personnel. In a public statement, the UN denied any
linkage between the release of the four Bosnian Serbs and the UN peacekeepers – a claim regarded with
intense skepticism by observers inside and outside of Bosnia.

669
 At this point, the UN had a full-blown catastrophe on its hands. Faced with the
obvious risk of killing their own personnel with any more airstrikes, UNPROFOR and NATO
backed away from the further use of air power. NATO’s 16 foreign ministers met in the
Netherlands to rethink UNPROFOR’s basic strategy and configuration.2078 Meanwhile,
diplomats negotiated frantically for the release of the detained UN peacekeepers. The first
breakthrough came on 3 June when the Serbian State Security Service (RDB) chief, Milosevic
henchman Jovica Stanisic, arranged the release of 121 UN hostages through Zvornik to
Serbia and from there to freedom.2079 Subsequent negotiations between Bosnian Serb
President Karadzic, RDB chief Stanisic, and two Greek envoys (Foreign Minister Karolos
Papoulias and Defence Minister Gerrassimos Arsenis) led to the release of another 111 UN
hostages on 7 June. All but 26 UN personnel were freed on 13 June. On 18 June the UN in
turn released the four Bosnian Serb soldiers taken prisoner during the Vranja Bridge battle
on 27 May. This cleared the way for the release of the remaining 26 prisoners on the
following day, 19 June.2080 2081 2082
Though the United Nations had managed to negotiate the release of the hostages
without loss, this seeming success was obscured by a haze of concessions, compromises,
and allegations of secret deals. Almost a month after the UN had insisted on the “immediate
and unconditional” release of all hostages2083, the deal had to be facilitated by RDB Chief
Jovica Stanisic, a very shady character indeed, who had previously armed the likes of Serb
gangster “Arkan” and undoubtedly had no small amount of innocent blood on his hands.
There were also reports that Paris had secretly bargained through former UN commander
Gen. Bernard Janvier for a settlement whereby the UN hostages would be traded for a
guarantee that there would be no further NATO airstrikes against Serb positions.
Spokesmen admitted that secret meetings had been held, but denied that any concessions
had been made. Never confirmed or refuted, the rumours persisted.2084 2085 2086
In fact it was almost irrelevant whether an explicit bargain had been struck or not.
The reality was that the UN made substantial concessions to the Bosnian Serbs in order to
secure the safe release of its personnel. The Republika Srpska’s dire threats and drastic

2078
Steven Greenhouse: Conflict in the Balkans: In Europe, U.S. and NATO Demand Quick Release of the
Hostages, The New York Times, 31 May 1995.
2079
Reuters: U.N. Says it Gave Nothing for Bosnia Hostages, 3 June 1995.
2080
Christine Spolar and Bradley Graham: Hostages Release Called Imminent; Serb Captors Bow to Belgrade’s
Urging, The Washington Post, 6 June 1995.
2081
Bradley Graham and Christine Spolar: Bosnian Serbs Free 108 More Hostages; 148 Still Held; No Sign of
Downed U.S. Pilot, The Washington Post, 7 June 1995.
2082
Bruce W. Nelan: Unshakeable Vacillation: The Serbs Release Hostages, But Down a U.S. Plane, Time, 12
June 1995.
2083
Michel Viatteau: UN Refuses to Negotiate on Hostages, US Appeals to Milosevic for Help, Paris AFP, 1 June
1995.
2084
Julian Borger: Bosnia: France Took Lead in Secret Deal to Free Hostages, Manchester Guardian, 24 June
1995.
2085
Julian Borger: France Took Lead in UN Hostages Deal, Manchester Guardian, 2 July 1995.
2086
Roy Gutman: Srebrenica’s Fall: Deck Deck, The Montreal Gazette, 2 June 1996.

670
measures had won the high-stakes poker hand it had played out against the international
community. But it was not the last hand of the game.

The UN’s New Strategy: Consolidation and Retaliation

Peacekeeping in a country at war is an impossible mandate to carry out. Our
mandate must therefore be amended ... At present, however, I lack the means to carry
out genuine military missions or to impose peace.
French Gen. Herve Gobillard, UN Sector Sarajevo Commander, June 19952087

Even before the hostage debacle, the UN had begun to consider consolidating its
forces into less vulnerable groupings, relying increasingly on airpower and the as yet un-
deployed Rapid Reaction Force to defend the six Safe Areas and prevent attacks on UN
peacekeepers. But the hostage-taking catastrophe jarred both the UN and NATO into
adopting a new concept of operations in early June. In what would be termed the “dual-
track” strategy, NATO and the Contact Group sought to coordinate their military and
political activities, combining a more muscular military stance with a stepped-up diplomatic
effort. As one part of this two-track campaign, UNPROFOR and NATO would undertake
major changes in where they positioned their forces and how operations were conducted.
At the same time, a diplomatic campaign would concentrate on persuading Serbian
President Milosevic to apply pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to sign a peace settlement, in
exchange for a suspension of the international economic sanctions against Milosevic’s
regime.2088
The manifest vulnerability of isolated UN forces demonstrated during the hostage
crisis – and continuing threats by key troop-contributing nations to pull their contingents
entirely of Bosnia – forced UNPROFOR to fundamentally rethink both its force structure and
its operating strategy. UNPROFOR’s new strategy was to have several planks: consolidation
of the UN peacekeeping troops into larger, more defensible groups, withdrawal of the
extremely vulnerable UN Military Observer teams then scattered across Serb-held Bosnia,
deployment of the much-touted Rapid Reaction Force, aggressive opening of overland
supply corridors between cities and the besieged enclaves, and an increased readiness to
use NATO air-power when necessary.
The first order of business was to remove UN forces remaining at risk so that the
hostage crisis could not simply be repeated. Part of this consolidation had already been
accomplished by the UN’s de facto abandonment of its efforts to enforce the Sarajevo heavy
weapons exclusion zone, which it suspended in exchange for the release of the last UN
hostages on 20 June. Simultaneous with the Bosnian Serbs’ release the last 26 of their
captives, the UN peace keepers abandoned the ten heavy-weapons collections sites where
2087
French General Urges New UNPROFOR Mandate, Paris Le Monde, 1 June 1995, FBIS Daily Report WEU, FBS-
95-00096312.
2088
Rick Atkinson: Strategy to Make War, Not Peace: Buildup Suggests More Frustration Than Resolve, The
Washington Post, 1 June 1995.

671
UNPROFOR had supposedly been controlling all Bosnian Serb tanks and artillery from the 20
km zone around Sarajevo since February 1994. Sixteen months after its initiation, NATO’s
high-profile effort to safeguard Bosnia’s capital had formally been declared dead, and the
UN had abandoned all pretence of enforcing the Sarajevo heavy-weapons exclusion zone.
“The policy of weapons-collection points has now been abandoned”, as a UN spokesman
openly conceded.2089
UNPROFOR’s troop consolidation process rapidly gained momentum following the
fall of Srebrenica in mid-July, after the isolated Dutch battalion trapped in the enclave was
held hostage in yet another successful Serb bid to stave off NATO airstrikes. Shortly
thereafter, the Zepa safe area was also lost to the Bosnian Serbs, with its company-sized
detachment of Ukrainian peacekeepers likewise unable to prevent the loss of an UN-
declared safe area. Gorazde – the last remaining UN safe area in eastern Bosnia – was
evacuated between 24 and 28 August, as the UN successively pulled 90 Ukrainian and 170
British peace keepers out of the still-encircled enclave. With the horrors of Srebrenica
perpetrated only weeks earlier still vivid in everyone’s mind, Gorazde’s populace remained
unconvinced that 12 UN Military Observers and the threat of NATO airstrikes would be
enough to safeguard Gorazde if the Serbs determined to take the enclave.2090 But a
combination of threats and surprise allowed the British peacekeeping contingent to escape
under cover of night and cross the border into Serbia and thereafter to the UK.2091 One way
or another, UNPROFOR had left all of the eastern enclaves.
Now, having successfully consolidated its forces into a smaller number of bases,
UNPROFOR had indeed made itself less vulnerable. But by essentially withdrawing its
peacekeepers into UN firebases UNPROFOR had also left itself open to questions about
what exactly it was there for. If it was not going to man observation posts, monitor
contested areas, or deliver relief supplies to remote areas, why be there at all? Conversely,
if it was to force its way through road blocks in spite of opposition, might UNPROFOR simply
become another combatant in the Bosnian war? Looming uncertainties about UNPROFOR’s
underlying purpose – whether to safeguard itself or to attempt to impose its will upon the
Bosnian factions – would be raised often in conjunction with the UN’s highly visible new
effort, the Rapid Reaction Force.

The Rapid Reaction Force

It isn’t rapid, it isn’t a force and it isn’t reacting.
Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, July 1995.2092

2089
Roger Cohen: Captives Free, U.N. Gives Up Effort to Free Sarajevo, The New York Times, 20 June 1995.
2090
Bosnian ”Bandits“ Killed in Attack on UN Peacekeepers, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 September 1995, p. 14.
2091
White Dragon: The Royal Welch Fusiliers in Bosnia, The Royal Welch Fusiliers Regimental Headquarters,
Wrexham UK, November 1995, pp. 66-70.
2092
Reuters: Allied Bickering on Bosnia ”Pathetic“ – Gingrich by Mike Cooper, 15 July 1995.

672
 Consolidation of UNPROFOR’s forces into less vulnerable positions was only one
side of the UN’s new strategic coin. The other side was to be the prompt defence of UN
peacekeepers threatened anywhere in Bosnia, and retaliation if necessary for any violations
of UN resolutions. And the striking arm of UNPROFOR’s aggressive new doctrine was to be
the new “Rapid Reaction Force” (RRF).
UNPROFOR’s plans to establish a land-based deterrent force coincided with the
demands of many of UNPROFOR’s contributors – in particular, the British and French – for a
better way to enforce UN resolutions. There had been nebulous plans for a multinational
mobile reaction unit at the time of the May-June hostage crisis, but the size, organization,
command, and national contributions needed to make this force a reality had yet to be
worked out.2093 After the hostage crisis, it seemed clear that UNPROFOR had to be
transformed from a dubious liability into a credible deterrent.
The proposed solution eventually became the Rapid Reaction Force, intended to be
a ground-based, mobile, and heavily-armed contingent that could rapidly respond to any
threats to the peacekeeping contingents. Unlike other UNPROFOR forces, the RRF was
supposed to be able to blast its way past any adversary that tried blocking its convoys or to
demolish any heavy weapons that flouted UN exclusion zones restrictions.2094 (As a small
but visible symbol of the RRF’s new mandate, its vehicles and weapons were painted in
camouflage green, not UN white.) And although few would say so publicly, it was also
understood that the Rapid Reaction Force could also be used to facilitate an UNPROFOR
withdrawal – if it came to that.2095
Organizationally, the RRF emerged as a two-brigade force composed of British,
French, and Dutch troops.2096 One of the two deployed brigades was the all-British 24th
Airmobile Brigade, 5.500 strong and brought directly from the UK. The second was a British-
French-Dutch Multinational Brigade.2097 (A 200-man Belgian para-commando field artillery
battery was also designated and trained to be part of the RRF, but owing to a series of
delays it did not arrive in country before the war’s end.2098 2099) The RRF as a whole was
supported by a composite artillery regiment atop Mt. Igman equipped with French 155 mm
howitzers, British 105 mm light artillery, and Dutch 120 mm heavy mortars. Mobility –

2093
Dave Todd and Aileen McCabe: Allies Ponder Strike Force for Bosnia; Bosnian Serb Leader Says “Slaughter”
Will Follow Attempt to Rescue Hostages, The Ottawa Citizen, 2 June 1995.
2094
Ian Kemp: Rapid Reaction Force Set Up for UNPROFOR, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 June 1995, p. 4.
2095
Ten Thousand Troops to Bosnia – Russians Fear Reduction of Their Influence Due to Rapid Reaction Force,
Amsterdam De Volkskrant, 6 June 1995, pp. 1, 5.
2096
A third French Army brigade was designated as a standby force, but never was sent to Bosnia.
2097
This multinational brigade consisted of two battalions. One battalion was an all-French composite force
drawn from troops of the 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment, the 1st Foreign Legion Cavalry Regi ment
(mounted in AMX-10 armored reconnaissance vehicles), and the already-deployed UN French Battalion 5
(FREBAT-5). The second battalion was an Anglo-Dutch force including mechanized infantry elements of the
British Army’s Devon and Dorset Regiment, a reconnaissance squadron of the UK’s Household Cavalry
Regiment, a British armored engineer squadron, and a 120 mm heavy mortar battery manned by Royal
Dutch Marines.
2098
Belgian Unit Set for Bosnia, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 August 1995, p. 8.
2099
Joris Janssen Lok: Belgian Artillery Beats a Path to Bosnia, Jane‘s Defence Weekly, 9 September 1995, p. 18.

673
deemed an essential element of the RRF – was contributed by a sizeable contingent of
British and French transport helicopters.2100 2101 2102 2103
UN Security Council approval for the force was delayed into mid-June, as the US
and its European allies haggled over who would pay the estimated $380 million for the
force’s first six-month deployment – the troop-contributing countries or the United
Nations.2104 2105 (In the latter case, under UN regulations the US would be assessed for 31
percent of the associated costs even if it had no troops participating.2106) In the end,
Washington relented and agreed to partially fund the operation through the UN. On 16 June
1995, UN Security Council Resolution 998 authorized the creation of the Rapid Reaction
Force and its deployment to Bosnia.
Although advance elements of the UK 24 Airmobile Brigade were supposed to
begin deploying through Ploce in the first week of July, Bosnian Croat authorities obstructed
the RRF’s entry into Herzeg-Bosna, demanding a clearer explanation of the new force’s
mandate, duration, strength, and deployments.2107 Thanks largely to this delay, the RRF was
neither deployed nor ready for action when the Dutch battalion was surrounded and taken
prisoner during the VRS capture of Srebrenica in mid-July. The RRF’s seeming haplessness
added to the UN’s mounting humiliation as critics began to castigate UNPROFOR for failure
to prevent the massacres and atrocities that followed the fall of Srebrenica.
On 24 July – as the full scope of the Srebrenica disaster was becoming apparent to
the world – the Rapid Reaction Force made a much-publicized deployment of its tri-national
artillery formation atop Mt. Igman near Sarajevo. The first functional RRF element in Bosnia,
the powerful force eventually included two infantry companies (one British, one French), a
French AMX light tank squadron, a battery of eight French 155 mm howitzers, a battery of
12 British 105 mm light howitzers, and a composite battery of 12 Dutch and French heavy
mortars.2108 2109 Its immediate purpose was to show the UN flag. But it would indeed serve
its specified aim of defending UN troops and retaliating for Bosnian Serb provocations later
on, during the DELIBERATE FORCE air campaign of August-September.2110
Even after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa in late July, however, both the Croatian
and Bosnian Governments continued to impede the deployment of the RRF with an
assortment of legal and procedural obstacles. By mid-August, the obstructionism had gotten

2100
Ian Kemp: Country Briefing: United Kingdom, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 15 July 1995, p. 23
2101
Reuters: NATO Bombs, U.N. Artillery Shells Rock Sarajevo by Kurt Schork, 30 August 1995.
2102
Reuters: U.N. Troops Fires 600 Shells at Bosnian Serbs by Sabina Cosic, 30 August 1995
2103
Tim Ripley: A DELIBERATE FORCE on the Mountain, Jane’s International Defense Review, October 1995, pp.
27-30.
2104
Reuters: Confusion over Finances Delays U.N. Bosnia Force by Anthony Goodman, 15 June 1995.
2105
Reuters: Western Nations Bicker Over Cash for Bosnia Force by Patrick Worsnip, 15 June 1995.
2106
Reuters: Chirac Believes U.S. Will Allow New Bosnia Force by Evelyn Leopold, 15 June 1995.
2107
London Press Association, 5 July 1995, FBIS London LD0507145295.
2108
Reuters: Reaction Force Arrives on Mountain Above Sarajevo, 24 July 1995.
2109
Paris AFP, 19 August 1995, FBIS Vienna AU2908133095, 291330Z August 1995.
2110
See the section DELIBERATE FORCE: NATO Airpower Over Bosnia, 30 August – 20 September 1995 for a
more complete disucssion of the NATO air campaign and the RRF’s concurrent military operations during
this period.

674
so bad that UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was publicly criticizing the demand by
Zagreb and Sarajevo for additional money for the UN’s use of facilities and for control over
the RRF’s movements. Although part of this intransigence was simple haggling over money
(as with the Bosnian Government’s insistence on compensation for “environmental
damages” caused by RRF forces) the underlying issues were more serious, and centred
around deeply-rooted concerns about the true potential function of the RRF. Some Bosnian
Government officials feared that the RRF might simply become the “UN Self-Protection
Force”. (Or, worse still, the “UN Rapid-Extraction Force” if UNPROFOR was to evacuate
Bosnia.2111) Other officials were concerned that while the RRF might indeed curb Serb
excesses, it might also impede the Bosnian or Croatian armies from taking the offensive
themselves. As one Bosnian official put it:
Our concern may sound silly at a distance, but we know the first goal of Britain
and France is to contain the war. Our goal is to win the war. We are worried that if the
two goals conflict, Britain and France could use the force to try to obstruct our army or
even attack it.2112
As a result of this seemingly endless series of delays, it was not until August that
UNPROFOR’s RRF became a truly functional force. And just in time, too – for the UN
(through NATO) was just about to take the offensive with the DELIBERATE FORCE air
campaign and the RRF’s concurrent artillery strikes around Sarajevo.

From UNPROFOR to IFOR

In the last few weeks before the Dayton Agreement was signed, UNPROFOR was
already making plans to simultaneously draw down and plus-up. On the one hand, some
national contingents were released from duty with UNPROFOR after the US-brokered cease
fire took effect in late October. On the other hand, though, the multinational peacekeeping
force was also preparing itself to be transformed at the stroke of a pen from a peacekeeping
force into a peace enforcement force with the signing of the Dayton Agreement.
As part of the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR, NATO’s Allied Command Europe
Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC) mobile headquarters would take over from UNPROFOR HQ as
the corps-equivalent command element. Bosnia would, in turn, be administratively divided
into three division-equivalent sectors, to be placed under American, British, and French
command headquarters. Each of these three “framework” divisions would in turn include
brigades, battalions, and even companies and platoons from nations as diverse as Germany
(deploying its armed forces out-of-area for the first time in half a century), Russia (operating
alongside its erstwhile NATO adversaries of only a few years before), the newly-independent
Baltic States, Malaysia, Jordan, and Albania.2113

2111
Ebbing Force, The Economist, 8 July 1995, pp. 44-45.
2112
Reuters: UN Chief Raps Bosnia, Croatia Limits on UN Troops by Evelyn Leopold, 18 August 1995.
2113
Ian Kemp and Barbara Starr: UN Forces to Be Cut By a Third As Bosnia Stabilizes, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14
October 1995, p. 3.

675
 IFOR was to be much more than simply a bigger UNPROFOR. Its forces, equipment,
mandate, and rules of engagement were to be very different. Even after the introduction of
the Rapid Reaction Force, UNPROFOR had been a 24.000-strong UN-mandated
peacekeeping force, with broadening powers of self- defence but still a limited mandate
within Bosnia. IFOR, by contrast, was a 60.000-strong, explicitly NATO-run peace-
enforcement mission armed with tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery, combat
aircraft, and attack helicopters – and, just as important, a mandate explicitly laid out under
the terms of the Dayton Agreement which allowed IFOR to essentially run the country.
Whereas UNPROFOR had essentially operated when and how the three Bosnian factions
would allow, after Dayton IFOR would dictate when and how the three Bosnian factions
could operate. All at once, the tables had turned.
With the transition on 20 December 1995 from UNPROFOR to IFOR, the
international peacekeeping force completed the four-year journey from the first
peacekeepers in the now-nonexistent UN Sectors of Croatia to the 60.000 peace enforcers
policing the de facto NATO protectorate of Bosnia. If the handful of mediators, negotiators,
and observers present in Sarajevo in April 1992 could have seen the veritable international
army which would eventually follow them in December 1995, they might well have been
amazed.

676
 Chart 1
NATO Rapid Reaction Force

The Rapid Reaction Force

2 Signal Regiment (UK)

21 Signal Regiment (UK)

72 Aircrew Workshop (UK)

80 Postal and Courier Squadron (UK)

Multi-National Brigade, HQ Tomislavgrad

“Task Force Alpha” (Anglo-Dutch), HQ Vitez

1st Battalion, Devon & Dorset Regiment (UK)

3 x Cos each of 14-16 x Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles

51 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers (UK)

armoured bridge-layers and engineering vehicles

Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron, Household Cavalry Regiment (UK)

12 x Scimitar Light Tanks, 4 x Striker, 5 x Spartan

“Task Force Bravo” (French), HQ Tomislavgrad / Mt. Igman

UNPROFOR French Battalion 5 (FREBAT-5)

3 x Mechanized Infantry Cos each with 14-18 VAB APC

elements, 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment

elements, 1st Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment

12 x 105 mm AMX-10 armoured reconnaissance vehicles

Combat Support Company

Combat Engineer Company

Artillery Component, Deployed Mt. Igman

1 x battery 155 mm howitzers (France), Deployed Mt. Igman

8 x 155 mm GCT self-propelled howitzers

19 Regiment, Royal Artillery (-) (UK)

2 x batteries each of 6 x 105 mm L-118 light howitzers

1 x Co 120 mm mortars (Royal Dutch Marine Corps), Depl. Mt. Igman

677
 6 x 120 mm heavy mortars

5e Regiment d’Helicopter de Combat (-) (French Army), HQ Ploce

8 x Gazelle attack (HOT anti-tank missiles)

7 x SA330B Puma transport

24 Airmobile Brigade (UK), HQ Ploce, Croatia

1 Royal Anglican Air Mobile Infantry Battalion

(1 Light Infantry Battalion remained in the UK on standby)

21 Air Defence Battery, Royal Artillery (UK)

24 Combat Service Support Battalion (UK)

19 Field Ambulance Co (UK)

3 Regiment Army Air Corps (UK)

9 x Gazelle attack

9 x Westland Lynx AH Mk 7 TOW

9 x Westland Lynx AH Mk 9 transport

RAF Support Helicopter Force (UK)

6 x Chinook HC Mk2 transport

6 x Puma HC.1 transport

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