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 CONFIDENTIAL :
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HQDA Ltr 525-74-16
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

HOLY TO
ATTVNTIO.'i or i

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (28 Mar 74) DAM0-0DU 15 April 1974

Expires 15 April 1975

CO
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel John P. Geraci,
Corrmander, Security Assistance Force Asia, 14 Aug 71-6 Jul 73 (U)
to
SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U),

2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel John P. Geraci,

subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized

from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not
be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or
of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR J25-14, as

• result of subject report should be provided to the Headquarters,
DA (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310 within 90 days of receipt of
covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: D D C

"■ttttMü nftau
n™
SubJPc
t to Crtl.. M.jor^ner.1, USA UUECSEinJ
'''The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Commanders
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
US Army Materiel Coirmand
Commandant
S S SLS'S oenerai sta« coUege R«^*!«! unclassified when separated
US Army Armor School fj-Offl Classified inClOSUfe.
US Army Aviation School
(Continued on page 2)

CONFIDENTIAL
 Best
Available
Copy
 1 CONFIOENTML
DISTPIBUTION (Continued)
US Amy Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School

Copies furnished:
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Chief of Engineers
Commanders in Chief, US Army Europe
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commandant, The National War College
Defense Documentation Center

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HBADQUARTERS. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE ASIA

1ST SPECIAL FORCCS GROUP (AIRBORNE). «ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96331

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)

RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

THRU: Commander
United States Army Base Command, Okinawa
APO San Francisco 96331

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
APO San Francisco 9Ö558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

ATTN: FOR OT UT
Department of the Army D D C
Washington, D. C. 20310 arprmnt?
APR SSflR

Debrit ting Report

Duty Assignment:
by: Colonel John P. Geraci uuEcsEinrE
Commander, Security Assistance Force Asia
Inclusive Dates: 14 August 1971 - 6 July 1973
Date of Report: 29 June 1973

1. (U) IATRODUCTIGN: This report is prepared in accordance with

AR 525«14 and is based on the personal impres&iovis and obnervatioiis
rnndc during the period tM:il the undersigned commanded Security
Assistance Force Asia (SAFAsia). The following remarks are intended
to provide an overview of the unit, its activititssj current status and a
record of conclusions drawn and les&ons learned as a result of the
assignment.
CLASSIFIED BYjgM ("UÜmA fHtf ,
ÜAM0-0DU SUBJECT TO OKNKKAI pEChASSHTCATION
7 3B045 SCIIKDI-'LK i)l; KXECUTlVfi ÜJtLiER »6«
Inclosure l>ECLAäb.lFY ON *il 6tt /»»#
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

2. (C-NOFORN) OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Organization. SAFAsia is composed of a nucleus of the 1st

Special Forces Group with the attached units of the 1st Civil Affairs
Battalion, 539th Engineer Detachment, 441st Military Intelligence
Detachment and the 400th Army Security Agency Special Operations
Detachment comprising the remainder of the Security Assietance Force
(SAF). Task organised on a permanent basis, the unit provides a
pool of highly trained skills and resources from which tailored teams
can be formed and committed to designated Pacific Command (PACOM)
areas to assist a U.S. command or agency in accomplishing iti> mission.

b. Mission. SAFAsia's role in the PACOM is unique. The v.nit

serves as ihe single USARPAC asset specifically configured, trained
and oriented to conduct Internal Defense/Internal D^velopm'-m (ID/ID)
missions and is the major PACOM Unconventional Warfare (tJW) lorce.
Although the participation of U.S. forces in hostiiitics in Asia is pres-
ently drawing to a close, SAFAsia, because of its unique caoabi Ijlies,
is continuing its vital peacetime role of training and assisting Asian
allies in humanitarian, nation-building efforts. It is felt that ih'.t role
will receive ever increasing importance in the future and i.v in judieiuui
accord with the Nixon Doctrine. When this doctrine was Announced in
1971, SAFAsia leaders were queried in the field as to the dolc-tcriuufl Im-
pact for future operations/training by military officers of several of the
nations involved in mutual or combined SAFAsia operations n.;>rea and
Thailand were among these countries). SAFAsia's subsequent iow pro-
file presence in this forward line of bulwark nations has reassured asian
peoples of US concern and continued moral support. Our »rfiorts, :.r.i oi
a give-away nature, enhanced understanding within the host country to
recognise its weaknesses and increase its efforts to improve nation?.]
strengths, internal and external defcn.'.e capabilities.

c. Area of Operation^ SAFAsia is capable of operating anywhere

within the PACOM. Ideally stationed on Okinav.a, the unit is vituatcd in
a forward centrally located position which permits deployment to virtually
any area of the PACOM within three hours by jol aircraft. Thil carrcnt
location not only facilitates rapid employment for contingenc .c«-, bur also

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

provides easy access to training areas thereby enhancing the unit's

ability to maintain continuous area orientation. Concurrent with long
range planning for contingency missions should be the consideration
of where to locate SAFAsia in the event Okinawa becomes untenable
as a base of operations. Notwithstanding present treaties in force and
potentially costly transfers, two primary locations appear suitable as
a home base for SAFAsia in the 1975-80 period. In my estimation, the
first choice would be the Republic of the Philippines, preferably in the
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay locale. This site would provide means
for immediate response to operational areas in Southeast Asia. Addi-
tionally, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay offer excellent special training
locations for HALO, SCUBA and underwater demolitions. The islands,
themselves, offer ideal terrain for difficult and imaginative jungle and
survival operations, presently denied us here on Okinawa. A five year
period of friendship and service between SAFAsia and Military/Civil
officials has successfully prepared the Filipino people for face to face
operations with SAFAsia personnel. Undoubtedly lengthier and more
productive programs could be maintained with our forces stationed
permanently in country. My second choice as a permanent base of
operations would be South Korea. We have continually served with
EUSA, UNC and ROK forces in the past 24 months. A strong bond of
friendship, trust and mutual respect iias allowed our UW training,
adventure training and civic action joint efforts to prosper. Suitable
airbases and numerous off shore sites offer opportunities for combined
planning and rapid response.

d. Operational Environment. SAFAsia enjoys an outstanding

reputation and the importance of the unit's operational capabilities are
recognized throughout PACOM by both US and Allied commanders. It
presently exercises a fine and very necessary working relationship
with parallel and supporting Army, Air Force and Navy units. From
these considerations, SAFAsia's operational environment is ideal.
The areas of SAFAsia's ojierationaj interest have remained relatively
stable; however, training areas and the number and type of training
and ID/ID missions have varied greatly because of everchanging political
considerations beyond the control of SAFAsia. It is readily apparent,
therefore, that all SAFAsia activities must be characterized by flex-
ibility and the ability to make rapid adjustments lo insure that our
3

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CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

activities are not counterproductive to US national interests. Despite

these inhibiting circumstances, SAFAsia's employments during the
past fiscal year increased some 300 percent and have included repeated
deployments to Indonesia, Korea, mainland Japan, Micronesia,
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Training on Okinawa has
become increasingly difficult since reversion; however, considering off-
island training opportunities these restrictions have not markedly de-
creased the mission effectiveness of the unit.

3. (FOUG) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: SAFAsia is under the oper-

ational control of the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific (CINC-
USARPAC), with the Commander, US Army Japan (Cdr, USARJ) ex-
ercising command loss operational control of SAFAsia elements located
on Okinawa through the Commander, United States Army Base Command,
Okinawa (Cdr, USARBCO). As a result SAFA&ia receives direct oper-
ational and training guidance for other than local matters from ÜSARPA.C;
however, to execute these directives the unit is dependent upon USARBCO
for administrative and logistical support. In addition to providing this
support, Cdr, USARBCO, because of the command relationship, closely
monitors SAFAsia's deployments and mission accompUshmcnts. This
present relationship, as viewed by SAFAsia, has proven to be satis-
factory from both a command and operational aspect.

4. (C-NOFORN) EXPERIENCFS IN COMMAND]

a. Concept of Operation. As outlined in Letter of Instrut lion.

Subject: Employment, of SAFAsia, HQ, USARPAC, 12 May L;72, SA-FAsir.
constantly trains to insure that the unit can execute succcssiully any of
its war or peacetime contingencies. Proficiency is maintained pvimarily
through the deployment of Advisory/Training Task Forces (ATTF's),
Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) and Technical Assistance Teams (TAT's)
to allied host countries thoughout the PACOM. This experience is sup-
plemented with Field Training Exercises (FTX's), Command Pott Exer-
cises (CPX's), Operational Readiness Training (ORT's), on-island lang-
uage training and formal area study. As a result of this viable a:v:1 real-
istic training program SAFAcia is capable of deploying on short notice by-
air, land, or sea, all or any part of the unit to conduct unilateral or joint/
combined operations ranging from unconventional warfare to compreher.sivc
civic action.

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

b. Command and Control. Because of the variety of missions and

circumstances under which they are conducted, and the self-sufficient,
cellular organization of both the Special Forces Group and the attached
SAF units, the command of SAFAsia is centralized, but the control is
decentralized. In this connection when a mission is received, and time
permitting, the team is carefully selected and prepared prior to its
departure. The final decision regarding the team's ability to accomplish
the forthcoming mission is made by the Group Commander. The formal
mechanism established in this decision making process is referred to as
the Commander's Prc-Mission Briefback. Upon completion of the mission
the team undergot? a Post Mission Briefback where lessons learned and
recommendations for operational/administrative improvements are dis-
cussed. Some deployments of SAFAsia are sensitive and require a low
profile on the part of the deployed force, the inherent rank structure of
subordinate units coupled with individual professionalism enables SAFAoia
to accomplish all missions covering the entire spectrum of cold war
activities with the highest standards of excellence. This can be attested
to by the numerous letters of commendation received by SAFAsia from
high US and host country government officials. SAFAsia has purposely
maintained a very low profile on Okinawa in the part two years primarily
due to two political considerations- (1) the return of Okinawa to Japanese
sovereignty which necessitated changes in on-islaml training anr) residency
policies and (2) sensitivity of ♦he Japanese legislative body to SAFAsia
operations off island. I instituted and have continued a ro-punhcity status
here to avoid bringing limelipht to this command. Although many of our
off-island commitments have earned international recognition and very
well, with my approval, could have produced major favorable press cov-
erage such as disaster assistance in the Philippines in 197?., I feel that such
friendly press attention would be an invitation for undue press interest in
our activities elsewhere.

c. Operations. SAFAsia's significant operations conducted during the

period of this report have been recorded in accordance with AR 525-15 and
local historical requiremenfs. In retrospect, these operations included:

(1) Indonesia:

(a) Continuous TAT assistance.

(b) A M-60 machine gun MTT. 5

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

(2) Korea:

(a) ATTF's all Special Forces MOS skills and in the special-
ized skills of HALO, SCUBA and Rough Terrain Parachuting.

(b) Foal Eagle, the annual Joint Combined Unconventional

Warfare FTX.

(c) Numerous small scale FTX's.

(d) Adventure training in Recondo and Riverine techniques

for the US Army, 2nd Infantry Division.

(e) Operational Readiness Training (CRT's).

(3) Mainland Japan: Cold weather training.

(4) Micronesia: Continuous Army Civic Action Team support.

(5) Philippines:

(a) Engineer Control and Advisory Detachment (ECAD) ATTF.

(b) Numerous comprehensive combined civic action mitfiona«

(c) Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) support, "Opera-

tion Saklolo".

(d) ATTF 4-72 (School Construction),

(e) ATTF's in intelligence and communication.

(6) Taiwan:

(a). Rough Terrain parachute training.

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

(b) ATTF's in Intelligence and Air Mobility.

(c) Joint Combined DART training exercises.

(7) Thailand:

(a) An Intelligence MTT.

(b) TDY Assistance,

(c) FREEDOM RUNNER TOE Assistance.

(8) Vietnam:

(a) MTT CG 1151-72X (Friday Gap).

(b) MTT 1-73 (Task Force Madden).

(9) Okinawa:

(a) Four Basic Airborne Courses (To meet cpcrational

vequiremonts and serve as adventure training fur PACOM units).

(b) Four Jumpmastor Courses in order to insure requisite

qualified personnel for the many and varied type of airborne operations
conducted.

(c) Rough Terrain Parachute Training on a continuous basis

with a view towards qualifying all SFOD's in this technique.

(d) Four SCUBA Courses of 5 weeks dviration. In this regard

SAFAsia's capability to perform amphibious type UW operations is excel-
lent. *

(e) Central Area Command, charged with internal security of

US Installations during prolonged work stoppages, civil disturbances and
nalura] disasters.

CONFIDENTIAL
■ •

CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

d. Intelligence. SAFAsia basic intelligence requirements are

primarily met by review and extraction of applicable intelligence pro-
duced and distributed by Department of Defense or governmental
agencies. With the exception of civil affairs estimates prepared by the
1st Civil Affairs Battalion, SAFAsia is not actively engaged in gather-
ing intelligence information. However, SAFAsia units, because of
their composition and deployments, possess a vast untapped oppor-
tunity to gather low level inte Hgence of value to higher headquarters.
Additionally, the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment has and can
continue to make a significant contribution to the enhancement of
indigenous forces intelligence caoabiiities through the use of MTT's
and ATTF's.

e. Training.

(1) Personnel reporting to the Special Forces Group, and in

most cases the SAF units, have received extensive military occupational
speciality (MOS) training in the continental United States (CONUS) prior
to assignment to SAFAsia. The major exception to this is the shortage
of school trained personnel available for assignment to the Civil AUairs
Battalion and the Signal Company of the Group's Support Batlalion.

(2) Although there is vast combat experience found in all of

SAFAsia's units, the unit continuouslv trains its personnel to insure
continued individual and unit proficiency. Realistic training within the
bounds of political limitations is conducted both on and off Okinawa. The
Special Forces Group emphasizes joint training with other services as
well as individual MOS cross-training within the operational detachments.
Perhaps the most realistic of Ist Special Forces Group training programs
is our no notice Operational Readiness Training (ORT). Paired with our
sister PACAF 1st Special Operations Squadron, we penetrate and test the
air defenses of South Korea and then parachute one or more Special I orccf
Operational Detachments into harsh terrain objective areas such as the
Chiri and Taebak San. From pre deployment to debriefing 96 hours later,
the SFOD feels it has participated in a realistic and challenging operation.

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

(3) Decentralized training is conducted to the maximum extent

possible; however, for the efficient utilization of resources, centralized
instruction is conducted for airborne and waterborne techniques, lang-
uage training, cultural relations, race relations and MAP-TOE instructor
training. Due to physical training limitations on Okinawa, certain HALO
and SCUBA training must be conducted elsewhere.

f. Organization.

(1) The 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa currently consists

of two Special Forces battalions and a Support battalion. Those units
are organized under a modified H scries Table of Organization and
Equipment (H series MTOE). The SAF units are presently operating
under the G series MTOE; however, they will be converting to flic H
series prior to the end of fifcal year (FY) 74. To supplement these
MTOE's, an equipment modified Table of Distribution and Allowances
(MTDA) has been authorized to meet garrison and training requirements.

(2) Conversion from the G to H series MTOE by the Special

Forces Group resulted in a savings ol approximately $250, 000. iQ in
personnel and equipment costs during FY 73. Additional benefits alsn
accrued in the change of MTOE through the acquisition of a badlv needed
helicopter platoon, which, when fully operational, will expand ihe
operational and training capability of SAFAsia.

(3) To execute standing Special Forces advisory missions in

Korea and Taiwan, there are permanent change of station ret-ident
detachments in eaeli location drawn from the Mtrcngth of the Croup on
Okinawa. A SAFAsia coordinator, provided from the assets of the 1st
Civil Affairs Battalion, is assigned with a permanent duty slatior in the
Philippines to coordinate activities in that country. Although these
personnel account for only a small portion of SAFAsia's strength, their
presence and activities are important in keeping the lines of communication
open between the allied forces of that country and SAFAsia.

g. Personnel Management.

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

(1) Maintenance of Unit Strength, Throughout the period of my

command the strength of SAFAsia, with the exception of Signal Company,
has remained both at a reasonably constant and acceptable level. There
has not beer a shortage of enlisted personnel possessing the basic Special
Forces hard skills (i.e., operations, intelligence, weapons, etc), however,
the conversion from the G to H series MTOE's has resulted in a continuing
shortage of maintenance, signal and supply MOS's in the Group's Support
Battalion. In consequence we have been obliged to accept non airborne,
non Special Forces qualified personnel in the soft skills in order to fulfill
our day to day operational requirements. Currently, we have approx-
imately 175 personnel in this category. While the majority perform their
duties in an acceptable fashion, they do not exhibit the same degree of
motivation ami dedication as do the volunteers. A concerted jflort should
be made by higher headquarters to insure the enlisted personnc! nil in
the soft skills be, as a minimum, airborne qualified or an air'oorr.c vol-
unteer. Although the fill of officers has been adequate, many officers aie
still assigned directly to the Group without Special Forces trainint;, and
few officers reporting to the Civil Affairs Rattaiion have formal civil
affairs training. Despite the earnest efforts on the part of the? • officers,
both they and SAFAsia are somewhat handicapped due to this lack of
formal training. Since SAFAsia operations often require its efficers to
work with allied counterparts having rank two or three grades higher than
their own, it is critical for successful mission accomplishmcn; thai only
highly qualified dedicated and professional officers are assigned to this
organization. Relow is a profile cf Majors, Captains and Lieutenants
assigned to SAFAsia as of 20 June, It should be noted that loss than 50^:
of the Majors are Regular Army with 70% meeting US Army civilian .duca-
tion goals. Less than 20% Ol my Captains are RA with fewer, appioxin ately
60%, meeting the basic undergraduate degree requirements. Tile Captains
are the hard chargers in this unit and usually work with foreign officers of
high rank. For instance, my Resident Detachment Commander in Korea, i.1-
a Captain who regularly assists a ROK Major General who has three Special
Forces Brigades under his^comrnand. SAFAsia If more than 100% over-
strength in Lieutenants with 11% RA and about 60% college gradnücs.
Obviously, the shortfall lies in assignmcnl of RA and Special Force! qual-
ified Captains. The 90 da/ forecast does not at this time appear to offer
any significant upgrading to this less than bright ti-bleau.

10

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 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCSCSFOR-74 (U)
20 June 1973
GRADE AUTH ASGN RA MIL ED CIV ED PREFIX 3
AUTH ASGN
MAJ 38 20 9 BcJsic = 2 HS = 3 22 12
Adv = 18 2yx= 3
Dep = 10
Adv Deg= 4

CPT 151 116 23 None =1 HS = 15 99 66

Basic = 55 2yr= 34
Adv = 60 Deg=56
- Adv Deg= 11

LT 35 82 9 Basic = 82 HS = 10 29 49
2yr= 16
Deg=55
Adv Deg= 1

(2) Morale, Health and Discipline. The overall morale of

SAFAsia is excellent. This attitude, in my opinion, can be attributed
to meaningful training, challenging TDY deployments and stabilized
accompanied tours; in short, job satisfacticn. The commendatory
remarks resulting from the USARPAC Annual General Inspection which
noted only several discrepancies in the unit has done much to bolster
this feeling for supporting staff personnel. Current promotion cutbacks
do not appear at this point to have adversely affected morale or rcenlist-
ments. The unit, as I am sure most others, lost some fine officers to
the recent rcduction-in-force (RIF). The RIF has presently caused con-
siderable concern and uncertainty among my officers and I cannot evaluate
the long term effect of this action on the remaining personnel. The health
and physical condition of the unit is outstanding. The discipline of the unit
is good, with military and civil violations being less than in comparable
sized units on Okinawa.

h. logistics. SAFAsia is dependent on USARBCO for external log-

istical support. The present amngement has proven responsive to the
unit's requirements. SAFAsia has experienced some internal Jogistical
prohlems since the unit converted to the H serier MTOE because of the
continuing shortage of certain MOS qualified personnel in the Group's
Suppon Battalion. Operational experience has proven, however, that the
use of a support battalion is a valid concept, so when properly manned the
present shortcomings should be corrected

CONFIDENTIAL u

Mi
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

i. Civil Affairs. Although SAFAsia's organization includes a civil

affairs element, the functional capabilities of the unit have been greatly
curtailed due to the reduction of the unit from a group to a battalion. In
my opinion, based on the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion's current organization,
manning and operational experience, the unit is best utilized in PACOM
in an active Army role to conduct comprehensive civic action missions.
These missions have proven very popular with our Asian allies and have
done much in rural Asia to upgrade health and living conditions of indig-
enous personnel, to expand and strengthen lines of communicaticn and
to further the Nixon Doctrine. Intentions are to modify the 1st Civil
Affairs Battalion's MTOE when it converts to the H series, so th.it the
unit will be more suitably structured to perform at an even higher standard.

j. Psychological Operations. SAFAsia does not possess an organic

psychological operations capability and therefore relies on the 7lh Psy-
chological Operations Group on Okinawa for support. The two units, work
closely during comprehensive civic action missions, DART ^xercisos and
exercise Foal Eagle.

k. Communications.

(1) Operations. Many changes have occurred in the SAFAsia

Gommunications/Electronics program. Th^e changes assure the cornrnard
of virtually instantaneous contact with any deployed element whita providing
maximum training to communications personnel. All SFOD radio traffic to
SAFAsia Headquarters is transmitted by either 300 word per rnir.ute "burst",
or manual CW. Continuous Wave (CW) has been changed from stand'jrd
International Morse Code (IMC) to "cut numbers" in order to mor« rtadily
blend with normal code practices in the Orient. All messages arc encrypted.
Larger deployments requiring a high-volume traffic capability are supported
by AN/GRC 122 radioteletypes handling encrypted traffic. The SAFAsia
base station operates continuously performing the mission it would be
assigned in a wartime situation.

(2) Training. Beth formal and semi-formal training has been est-
ablished for our communicators. A centralized communications school is
conducted on a quarterly basis. An eight hour officers orientation course

12
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 I I I—^—111 I ■ I —_____

CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCSCSFOR-74 (U)

is conducted semi-annually. All radio operators are assigned for their

first six weeks in this command to the base radio station. They become
familiar with SAFAsia operating procedures and the "cut number" system.
I am well satisfied with communications progress, but have urged com-
manders and my signal staff to continue to improve the overall communi-
cations/electronics posture.

5. (C-NOFORN) RELATIONSHIPS WITH HOST NATION FORCES?

GOVERNMENT: SAFAsia's relationships with host country military
forces throughout PACOM are excellent. Governmental relations and
political considerations beyond the control of SAFAsia have reduced the
scope of the unit's activities in Japan (to include Okinawa) and Taiwan.
Although military forces in both countries appear anxious to cooperate,
political considerations in Japan have altered such activities as cold
weather training, work with nuclear weapons trainers, troop foot marches,
and underwater demolitions. Political considerations in Taiwan have
adversely affected SAFAsia's ability to conduct HALO and rough terrain
parachute operations and caused the cancellation of DART II.

6. (U) CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS: SAFAsia currently supports

USARBCO for installation/facility security operations in a.cordance with
USARBCO OPLAN 461. An overview of SAFAsia's responsibiKrics and
methods of operation were reported in SAFAsia's Operational Report«
Lessons Learned, for the period ending 30 April 1972.

7. (U) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SAFAsia's recent involve-

ment in research and development has been limited; however, the unit does
correspond and receive publications from the U.S. Land Warfare Labor-
atory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. SAFAsia's deploymems,
however, provide a continuing means of field testing many items of equip-
ment under varying conditions throughout Asia.

8. (C-NOFORN) AREAS IN NEED OF INCREASED EMPHASIS: It must

be emphasized at the Department of the Army and Department of State
level that Special Forces and their associated SAF units have a valid and
most important peacetime role. This is particularly trur in PACOM.
Because of their rapid deployability, ability to teach and employ diverse

13

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

skills, and inherent ability to work with indigenous personnel in their

area of interest, the units are ideally suited to the furtherance of US
National Objectives. Proven peacetime missions presently being ex-
ecuted in PACOM by SAFAsia include the DART operations, the TAT
in Indonesia, the ECAD and comprehensive civic action missions in the
Philippines, and the Army Civic Action Team in Micronesia. All of
these nation building programs, while assisting our allies to help them-
selves during time of peace, also affords SAFAsia a continual opportunity
to strengthen bonds of friendship, cooperation and communication that
are so vital if and when SAFAsia is called upon to execute its wartime
contingencies.

9. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. I anticipate that SAFAsia's deployment for the forsecablo future

will be more in the realm of nation building type assignments ralhcr than
hot war type missions. Further, it is recognized that SAFAsia is not a
credible detertnt force, per se, as are the nuclear capable units; how-
ever, SAFAsia's location on Okinawa does provide for a visible U.S.
presence in the Western Pacific and does provide USARPAC with an
organization which is capable of helping to achieve US national objectives
in this area of the world. There is no question, Special Forces and their
associated SAP' units have a valid peacetime mission.

b. The performance by SAFAsia has been best characterized by the

assignment of dedicated, highly qualified officers and soldiers. liowcvcr,
the attrition rate has been high in the past two years due to Reduction in
Force and realignment of officer strengths/priorities in CONUS. For
SAFAsia to continue its high excellence a more experienced professional
fill is required.

c. The rapid expansion of SAFAsia missions since August 197] may

be attributed in large meaaure to decentralization of control incorporating
policy guidance^ from my office. I was fortunate in having highly motivated
and greatly experienced subordinate commander'; who skilfully carried out
my mission tvpe orders, SAFAsia was also helped immensely by key
knowlodgeable action officers at CINCUSARPAC. CINCPAC, MAC THAI,
MEDTC and UNC Headquarters. The relevent experience of these action
officers plus their personal knowledge and confidence in each other allowed
us to plan and move rapidly when a challenging situation arose. I would

i4 CONFIDENTIAL
— ■-'■"- Jgg^mi^ii ^jj^^^^Uffyillgglfliy^
 CONFIDENTIAL
BCOSFCDR 29 June 1973
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci)
RCS CSFOR-74 (U)

be remiss in not crediting them for their active and professional support.

10. (C-NOFORN) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Political proscriptions notwithstanding, meaningful and realistic

training can be conducted both on and off Okinawa.

b. A constant educational process is necessary at all levels of higher

command to illustrate the capabilities of SAFAsia units or individuals. Our
rapid response to imperative situations has been a result of commanders
or staff officers of other commands being aware of our capabilities. The
periodic turnover of key officers in thece commands requires that a con-
tinuity of learned knowledge about SAFAsia be passed along or new briefings
presented.

c. SAFAsia must be prepared for any type mission whether directly

relevent to our mission or not. Our activities have included presenting close
in security procedures to Nike Hercules Batteries in Korea in r< 'ction to
f.n international threat by the Black September Group, to refreshes train-
ing of ARVN infantry battalions in Vietnam July - November 1972. SAFAsia
is basically a unit of trainers.

d. SAFAsia must be prepared to shift priorities and realign forces

already committed to formal exercises; for example; the welcomod, but
unexpected commitments to Thailand in October 1971, caused a substantial
last minute shift in exercise play during Foal Eagle 72 in order to fill both
recuircrnents.

a-J-PJL JOHN P. GlTRACI

. (J COL, IN
Commanding

15

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-PL (29 Jun 73) Ist Ind

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John P. Geraci) RCS
CSFOR-74 (U)
JlJ!
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 88 '973

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: OT UT,

Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(C) USARPAC agrees with COL Geraci*s report and has taken the following
actions in regard to his significant observations. These actions have
been keyed to paragraphs in the report.

a. Para 2c. COL Geraci proposes the Philippines and Korea as possible
alternative sites for SAFASIA in the event Okinawa becomes untenable. This
proposal was previously studied by this headquarters and rejected because
removal to any location in PACOM would eventually result rn similar
problems of tenure except where the American flag is firmly planted.
Organizations with politically objectionable missions should not be moved
except to locations where they can operate under US political control.
Retention of SAFASIA on Okinawa remains the first priority objective
with the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) as the alternative
site for SAFASIA basing.

b. Para 4g(l). Every effort is being made to obtain qualified

officer and enlisted personnel for SAFASIA. Request DA assistance in
obtaining the goals pointed out in the report.

c. Para 8. Concur in the desire for increased awareness at the

national level of SAFASIA's vital role in furthering US national objec-
tives In PACOM.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

ROBERT R. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel John P. Geracl, Coramander,
Security Assistance Force Asia, 14 Aug 71-6 Jul 71

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17

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