Helpdesk Report

Youth in South Sudan: livelihoods

and conflict
Roz Price* and Anna Orrnert**
*Institute of Development Studies and **Future Seed C.I.C.
17 November 2017

Questions
 What does the available evidence say about the current livelihood options, choices and
motivations of youth in South Sudan?
o What are the livelihoods options currently available for South Sudanese youth in the
current context of severe/protracted economic crisis?
o What are the key determinants (“push” and “pull” factors) of South Sudanese youth’s
decision making about livelihood options, particularly violent or potentially violent
ones? How would you weight the relative significance of each push and pull factor
identified in decision-making? Is there a significant difference in those determinants
between armed/ethnic groups?
 What are the main social norms guiding male youth’s decision making on whether or not
to participate in violence (through joining youth groups involved in violent activities, or
more structured militias or armed groups)?
 What are the trusted actors and channels of communication that could be used to
promote attitudinal and behavioural change amongst youth in South Sudan?

Contents
1. Overview
2. Youth livelihood options in South Sudan
3. Push and pull factors of livelihood decisions
4. Youth decision making and violence
5. Trusted actors and channels of communication
6. Knowledge gaps and further research
7. References

The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid desk-
based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.

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1. Overview
This review looks at livelihood issues related to “youth” in South Sudan, focusing on factors
influencing decision-making by young men on livelihood options (both violent and non-violent)
and trusted avenues of communication. In South Sudan, youth is not a fixed biological category,
but a fluid social construct, and broadly refers to young men aged between 18 and 40/45. It is not
possible to give definitive answers to the questions posed, and by its nature this review
generalises motivations and choices. Therefore, when considering this review’s findings, it is
important to bear in mind the diversity of youth and their motivations in South Sudan, the
complexity of its different ethnicities and cultural identities, and that these identities remain highly
flexible and may change in response to the dynamic environment.

South Sudan is culturally, socially, economically, politically, ecologically and spiritually diverse.
The literature suggests that there are multiple motivations for youth livelihood choices, including
engagement in violent conflict, and these need to be understood in relation to their specific
contexts (Walton, 2010). It is difficult to capture all the choices and motivations behind these
decisions, and with the limited time available for this review the findings are not exhaustive. Local
context is also key to a discussion of actors and channels of communication trusted by youth in
South Sudan. There is evidence that engagement with youth, as well as levels of trust by youth
in various actors, varies in different communities. The most recent outbreak of violence, and
continuing volatility on the ground, has, however, impacted on the availability of up-to-date
information for several areas.

There is also imbalance in where research has taken place within South Sudan, with some areas
(especially those around Juba, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria and Jonglei states1) having
a much greater wealth of information available than others. The literature reviewed here offers
only a snapshot into these complex interrelated issues, and highlights the rapidly changing
situation in South Sudan. It also brings up a number of knowledge gaps related to youth in South
Sudan, particularly at the local level (see below). The majority of literature reviewed takes into
consideration gender differences and inequalities in relation to youth. However, the focus of this
review has been on young men in South Sudan and so much of the literature on young women
has been omitted. The evidence reviewed is not strong enough, both in terms of spatial coverage
and subject matter, to adequately address the following aspects of the final query: How would
you weight the relative significance of each push and pull factor identified in decision-making? Is
there a significant difference in those determinants between armed/ethnic groups?

The review has been divided into four sections to cover the query questions, overviews of each
section follow.

Youth livelihood options in South Sudan

There is a lack of academic, peer-reviewed literature on livelihood choices specifically for youth
in South Sudan, much of the information is anecdotal or taken from broader country analysis.
Findings include:

1 In October 2015, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir decreed that the country’s ten states would be sub-divided
into 28 states, a measure that was subsequently approved by parliament. In January 2017, President Salva Kiir
decreed that this number would increase from 28 to 32. This review refers primarily to the ten state borders that
existed prior to these announcements, for ease and clarity of reference.

2
  A series of recent internal and external shocks have seriously destabilised the South
Sudanese economy; a steady escalation of the conflict, a drought, and a rapid
depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound have all contributed to propelling the country
into a severe crisis, with particularly serious food security issues (Pape, 2017).
 Traditional livelihood systems in South Sudan rely on a combination of agricultural
production, cattle rearing, fishing, gathering of wild foods and trade. Cattle-keeping has
particular economic and cultural significance, and are primary long-term assets for many
families.
 Employment in South Sudan is characterised by low-productivity, unremunerated work
concentrated in the agriculture sector. Informal employment is the main source of
income.
 According to the High Frequency Survey (HFS) from 2015, almost 30% of the youth
(defined here as those aged 15-35) identified themselves as currently inactive (not
engaged in any economic activity over the past 12 months, are currently not enrolled in
any educational activity, and are not looking for a job either).
 Activities such as farming, hunting and fishing were major modes of employment for
youth surveyed by the HFS; others operated some form of non-farm business (especially
urban youth); salaried labour formed only 11% of the overall employed labour force; only
3% of the overall youth workforce identifies themselves as employed in professional or
managerial services (Foust et al, 2015).

Push and pull factors of livelihood decisions

 Unemployment: the term “unemployed” in South Sudan can more often refer rather to
those who are underemployed within the informal economy. However, economic
instability and lack of jobs in South Sudan has led many of the working age youth to drop
out of the labour force.
 Lack of opportunities: the biggest constraints to livelihood security for youth in urban
areas in South Sudan are a lack of access to financial capital, education, relevant and
marketable skills, and scarce work opportunities. Another issue has been the heavy
reliance on foreign labour (both skilled and unskilled).
 Social norms: cultural expectations constrain the choice of jobs considered acceptable
for boys and girls in South Sudan.
 Different backgrounds and aspirations: there was a crisis of expectation for young people
after independence, who were expecting a “peace dividend” which did not materialise.
There are differences in education levels and aspirations of returnee youth and those that
remained in South Sudan during the civil war. Returnee youth also have views on
education, repatriation and integration which often differ from those of their Sudan-born
elders. There are also unrealistic views by some South Sudanese youth of their earning
potential and viability as workers.
 Rural vs urban: a number of factors influence the mobility of youth away from rural areas
to urban areas. Pull factors include the hopes of generating an income, pursuing better
education opportunities and the desire for a “modern” lifestyle. Push factors include low
income levels, limited access to land. However, there is competition in the urban labour
market from more educated returnee Sudanese and migrant workers. Young men from
rural areas are also being pushed to Protection of Civilian sites to avoid ongoing
recruitment into the conflict.

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Youth decision making and violence

 Non-violent decision making: it is important to recognise that, in general, the majority of

youth do not get involved in violence in conflict settings. However, the motivations behind
this decision is poorly understood and researched for South Sudan.
 Youth violence: individual motivations in violent conflict around the world differ
significantly across sex, age, ethnic, religious and other social, cultural, political and
economic group divisions. Key groups to consider in the South Sudan context are cattle
camp youth and urban gangs.
 Social norms: are one way that violence “transmits” within groups. It has been argued
that within conflict settings violence becomes a normalised way of life and survival.
 Exclusion, culture and family: inequalities between generations in South Sudan have
grown rapidly over the past few decades; youth are largely excluded from formal political
processes and continue to be subject to age-based systems of authority. Some have
focused on the vulnerability of youth to capture by the military, and family roles and
responsibilities as the primary consideration in the decisions taken by youth.
 Insecurity: much literature points to the issue of insecurity and lack of government ability
to ensure security as a factor in local “youth” violence. With the eruption of violent conflict
in 2013, different ethnic and youth militias emerged such as the White Army, Gelweng
and others as a way of protecting their own communities when the state failed.
 Masculinity: a common requirement to attaining manhood in Africa is achieving some
level of financial independence, employment, and subsequently starting a family; this can
be interrupted in post-conflict situations, leaving young men in a state of limbo and
making them more likely to engage in violence. Violent conflict is often associated with
producing “militarised masculinities”; in South Sudan these are being reproduced by both
men and women, reinforcing the association between masculinity and cattle raiding.
 Marriage dowries: increasing inability of male youth to meet rising dowry (bride price)
demands, leading to many male youth enlisting in militias or joining cattle raids.
 Inequalities of power: Politicians and military leaders in South Sudan are increasingly
capable of mobilising their youth base to settle political scores. Young men’s participation
in conflict can also become ways to obtain empowerment.

Trusted actors and channels of communication

In the limited time allowed for this query it has not been possible to conduct a detailed
assessment of these actors and channels by locality. Instead, this review highlights some key
overall findings and key sources, as well as identified gaps, which can begin to build a bigger
picture. The categories of actors and communication channels outlined in this review were
focused on as they were the most frequently mentioned in the relevant literature. This review
highlights evidence predominantly from 2013 onwards. However, where an earlier source might
be considered particularly interesting or relevant, it has also been included.

The key findings from this section of the review reveal that:

 Aside from face-to-face interactions and personal networks, radio is overwhelmingly cited
as the most effective and trusted source of information for diverse communities across
South Sudan. The existence of multiple radio networks, including community-based radio

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 stations who broadcast in local languages, are able to reach areas beyond Juba and
other cities and towns.
 Radio has also been used as a tool to specifically target youth for attitudinal and
behavioural change, often with positive outcomes. Relevant programmes include Sawa
Shabab (supported by PeaceTech Lab and USIP), Hiwar al Shabab and Sergeant
Esther (supported by UNICEF and Search for Common Ground).
 Several surveys and evaluations were identified which have examined in detail the reach
of radio, audience and listening habits, levels of trust etc. These have found that although
radio is an effective and trusted tool for mass communication, there are disparities in
access to radio, related to gender, age, geographic location as well as income.
Nevertheless, there is evidence of a “trickle” effect from using radio – that is, the
information communicated via radio is transmitted onwards beyond the immediate
listeners.
 Performance theatre has been used to support and strengthen the impact of radio
initiatives. Such performances are also considered effective given the rich cultural
heritage of story-telling in South Sudan and the potential to engage with communities
face-to-face and perform in local languages. Obstacles to using performance theatre as a
communication channel include the volatile environment created by conflict (which can
impact on access to communities), difficulties sustaining performances over the longer
term, and challenges bringing performers from different backgrounds across ethnic and
political divides.
 Access to, and trust in, other types of media is weaker. There is evidence that print
media is neither accessible (due to low literacy rates, language barriers, high cost, and
lack of distribution beyond the capital) nor considered trusted or impartial. Similarly,
television is impacted by lack of infrastructure and electricity, and also suffers from
perceptions of government bias. Internet usage is low. Mobile phone usage, however, is
on the rise. Media access is shaped by gender disparities – all types of media are less
accessible for South Sudanese women, than for men. Access is also shaped by income
and education levels.
 Additional initiatives that are cited as successful in bringing together youth from different
backgrounds, and disseminating important messages to them, are arts and culture-based
ones such as Ana Taban and Likikiri Collective or sports events. Nevertheless,
detailed information about these and their effectiveness in engaging youth does not seem
readily available. Overall, there appears to be greater acknowledgement of their potential
to engage youth than empirical evidence to support this.
 Spiritual and religious leaders as well as community leaders, chiefs and elders are often
mentioned as trusted actors, although their roles have also been contested. The history
of conflict has, in different contexts, either increased or decreased the level of trust in
them. Although there is evidence that Nuer spiritual leaders have yielded a high degree
of influence over youth who have fought in the conflicts, there is otherwise limited
evidence over how engaged youth are with the large number of religious institutions and
actors, or how trusted these are by youth. There is also evidence that the relationships
between youth and community elders can be fraught. This is also impacted by the high
numbers of “returnee” youth (many who, due to the conflict, may never have lived in the
country of their elders before), whose aspirations of “modern”, urban life may be in direct
contravention to the values and lifestyles espoused by traditional leaders, particularly in
rural agricultural areas. Intergenerational tensions have also arisen as a result of

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 decisions made by chief’s customary courts, which have in some cases been seen to
discriminate against women and youth.
 In the time allocated for this review, it has been difficult to find detailed and accurate
information on other relevant civil society actors who are considered important
stakeholders in the peace process, such as youth groups or women's groups. This may
be in part due to the changing civil society landscape shaped by the conflict in recent
years. For example, groups may have ceased to exist, or changed in name or form, or
may have a limited online presence even if they are active on the ground.
 Relationships between police and wider communities also seem to be contested. In many
cases, citizens see the value of what police should be doing to maintain security in
communities, but are also acutely aware of their shortcomings. Mistrust of police is also
related to the fact that many police are former actors in the conflict. There is some
evidence that the implementation of community-based approaches to policing have
begun to create greater degrees of trust.

Knowledge gaps and further research

Over the past few years, significant progress has been made in the collection of data on South
Sudan. However, in general there is limited rigorous evidence of how people live in contexts of
conflict: what choices people make, how institutional arrangements impact on and are affected
by these decisions (Justino et al, 2013). Empirical and long-term research on livelihoods in
conflict-affected South Sudan remains a key evidence gap (d’Errico et al, 2014). Youth are
perceived to be important players in the state violence in South Sudan, but there is limited
knowledge on the causes and drivers of such violence, and much of the “evidence” is anecdotal.
Inclusive data collection and analysis of social and economic indicators in South Sudan need to
be improved but efforts are hampered by the current conflict situation.

A key gap in the literature is related to the type of youth that have been studied in South Sudan.
The focus is overwhelmingly on understanding the roles and perspectives of youth
(ex)combatants and urban youth; little research is focused on youths who have lived through war
as civilians or rural youth in general, and the motivations of those who have resisted getting
involved in the violence. There is also a need for critical research into how young people deal
with unemployment in South Sudan and navigate opportunities in the informal sector, and how
this might relate to other forms of social and political action (Oosterom, 2016). Aspirations and
long-term prospects of returning youth migrants is another area for further research (Ensor,
2013a). More detailed information on the role of civil society in youth’s lives and the level of
engagement and trust youth have in religious institutions and actors is also needed.

2. Youth livelihood options in South Sudan

Youth
There is no universally agreed definition of youth; it is a social and cultural construction bound by
a range of indicators including age, marital status and financial dependency (Oxfam, 2016: p.5).
These indicators vary considerably across cultures and contexts. The definition of “youth” in
South Sudan is very broad and highly contested (Sommers and Schwartz, 2011: p.2). While the
United Nations define youth as those aged between 18 to 24 years, in South Sudan it is more
commonly considered to be those aged 18 to 40, but even this loose definition is disputed
(Manasseh Zindo in Chatham House, 2016: p.4). The concept of youth in the country is based on

6
roles, responsibilities and social traditions within communities, which do not necessarily fit into a
uniform age bracket (John Luk Jok in Chatham House, 2016: p.6). Although females also go
through a youth phase in South Sudan, the local concept of youth typically signifies males
(Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2013: p.5). It is also important when discussing youth in South Sudan to
distinguish between different age segments, but also between cattle camp youth and urban youth
(Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2013: p.9-10).

Current economic situation

A full consideration of the recent political history of South Sudan is beyond the scope of this
report, some background information is given below on the current economic situation. For
detailed history of South Sudan and the conflict see Maxwell et al (2012), Pendle (2015) and
Young (2016).

A High Frequency Survey (HFS) carried out in South Sudan in 2015 and 2016 by the World Bank
highlights the current situation in the country, which has been experiencing a macroeconomic
crisis since 2015 (Pape, 2017). More than half of the population is below 15 years of age, almost
35% are between 15 and 35 and only 15% are above 35; the majority of South Sudan’s young
population live in rural areas (Pape, 2017). According to the last census, youth form 72% of the
population (Lam Akol Ajawin in Chatham House, 2016: p.4; UNOCHA, 2016: p.a3).

A series of internal and external shocks have seriously destabilised the South Sudanese
economy since a short-lived period of relative stability following the December 2013 conflict. A
steady escalation of the conflict, a drought, and a rapid depreciation of the South Sudanese
Pound (SSP) have all contributed to propelling the country into a severe crisis, that has partly
manifested itself through high levels of inflation driven primarily by increasing food and fuel prices
(Pape, 2017: p.9). The cost of living has risen exponentially, with the South Sudan annual
Consumer Price Index increasing by 835.7% from October 2015 to October 2016, the highest
year-on-year inflation rate in the world (UNOCHA, 2016: p.a2). The HFS found that poverty in
urban areas of South Sudan increased from 49% in 2015 to 70% in 2016 using the international
poverty line of US$ 2011 PPP 1.90. This has instigated a shift in the South Sudanese economy
towards greater self-reliance and own-production of food (through subsistence farming, hunting
and fishing) (Pape, 2017: p.25). The South Sudanese economy is heavily reliant on imports,
especially to meet its food needs. Thus, the rapid depreciation of the SSP has exerted
inflationary pressure through the large import-containing consumption basket of the South
Sudanese (Pape, 2017: p.9-10). There is widespread food insecurity, which has been
exacerbated by drought and lower than average food production across East Africa.

UNOCHA (2016: p.a21) report that food security in South Sudan is likely to deteriorate to
unprecedented levels in 2017, with thousands of people at risk of famine. It is projected that
more than five million people will be in urgent need of food security and livelihoods support
during the lean season in 2017. The current conflict has led to the widespread displacement of
people within and outside South Sudan, as shown in Figure 1.2 Pape (2017) highlights that as
South Sudan’s crisis becomes even deeper and more prolonged, and more people are displaced
over wider areas for longer periods of time, the livelihood options for South Sudanese
households and kinship networks become ever more constrained. There are scattered reports of

2 For more information on the current status of displacement in South Sudan see UNOCHA (2016).

7
people leaving Juba to return to the countryside, having exhausted their urban options. Hundreds
of thousands of people have crossed the borders into Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan (see Figure
1). Livelihoods have been decimated by the crisis, for example about 50% of all harvests have
been lost in areas affected by violence, and many farmers have been unable to plant or harvest
due to insecurity and restrictions on freedom of movement (UNOCHA, 2016: p.a21). However,
Pape (2017) highlights that many people were in a dire situation prior to the current armed
conflict, due to livelihoods stress stemming from the previous civil war(s), ongoing political and
inter-communal violence, seasonal natural hazards such as floods and droughts, livestock
disease, lack of infrastructure, and many other extreme challenges that South Sudan has faced.

Figure 1: Map showing movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in South Sudan

Source: OCHA and partners, Nov 2016 taken from UNOCHA (2016: p.2).3

Traditional livelihoods
Historically, the oil industry and the public sector have dominated southern Sudan’s formal
economy (Munive, 2014: p.339). However, only 12% of the population depends on wages and
salaries for their main livelihood and less than 4% of the population is engaged in entrepreneurial
activities, which illustrates the formal economic sector’s limited importance. Traditional livelihood
systems in South Sudan rely on a combination of agricultural production (c.85% of households
cultivate land), cattle rearing (c.65% of households own cattle), fishing, gathering of wild foods
and trade, with various combinations of these elements making up specific household economies

3 Please note that the boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the republic of South Sudan and the
republic of Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of Abyei region is not yet determined.

8
depending on each zone’s agro-ecological conditions and tribal traditions and culture (Ensor,
2013a: p.40; Maxwell et al, 2012: p.8). Cattle-keeping has particular economic and cultural
significance throughout all of South Sudan, and are the primary long-term assets for many
families, with the size of a herd signifying both wealth and status. The country has huge
agricultural potential, with over 90% of its land suitable for agriculture, however, the vast majority
remains uncultivated except for subsistence practices and there is limited crop diversification
(Ensor, 2013a: p.40). Most formal businesses in South Sudan are small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs), these dominate all sectors of the economy, including retail and wholesale
trade, construction, hotels, restaurants, transport and communication. SMEs are highly
diversified in terms of ownership, type of enterprise, number of employees, capital investment
and stage of development (AfDB et al, 2012: p.6). Urban households are more likely to earn their
livelihood through wages and salaries or through their own business enterprise compared to rural
households in South Sudan (Pape, 2017: p.11). Livelihood systems in South Sudan are highly
dependent on mobility and trade. Although households have traditionally been able to survive
mobility and trade restrictions caused by regular occurrences through coping strategies,
restrictions resulting from years of prolonged conflict have significantly disrupted livelihoods and
food security (Livelihoods Analysis Forum, 2006 in Maxwell et al, 2012).

Existing research shows that livelihoods in both Jonglei and Upper Nile are heavily dependent on
livestock (in particular cattle) (d’Errico et al, 2014: p.12). The Nuer are traditionally agro-
pastoralist; the Shilluk are predominantly agriculturalists. Agriculture is a supplementary source
of both food and income for many households. Cattle raiding has been a significant factor in
Jonglei and Upper Nile for many generations, but it has become more politicised and linked to
commercial interests in recent years, and relies on modern weaponry. Due to raiding, particularly
in Jonglei, livestock ownership is subject to sharp swings. A panel survey of the Upper Nile and
Jonglei states carried out by d’Errico et al in 2012 found that livelihoods were severely
constrained with very little diversification, with only about 5% of the population reporting more
than two livelihood activities the year before (2014: p.14).

Maxwell et al (2016: p.1) highlight that livelihoods were in a precarious state in South Sudan
even before the outbreak of the current armed conflict in December 2013. The assumption was
that conflict had been the factor driving vulnerability, and that after the civil war (with the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)) recovery would take off. But this recovery
largely did not occur. Localised conflict was driven more by politics, control of livestock, and
cycles of retribution than competition over land and water resources. Problems regarding land
access in South Sudan continue. Despite signing the CPA in 2005, only 4% of arable land is
cultivated, and livestock production is estimated at only 20% of its potential (Maxwell et al.,
2012). More recently, livelihoods in communities hosting large numbers of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) have been negatively impacted due to limited land resources available to
newcomers for living on, livestock grazing and crop planting (Maxwell et al, 2016).

Youth employment choices

There is limited literature that focuses specifically on youth livelihoods in South Sudan; a larger
literature looks at livelihoods options for the population in general, which provides insights into
the youth position (for example the HFS in 2015 – see Pape, 2016 and 2017; Foust et al, 2015).
There have also been some localised studies into livelihood choices and options but these are
limited and are often “grey literature” undertaken by donors or non-governmental organisations

9
(NGOs). There is a lack of academic, peer-reviewed literature on livelihood choices for youth in
South Sudan and recent empirical data, much of the information is anecdotal.

More generally, for those of working age in South Sudan (defined as all persons aged 15-64)
agriculture is the dominant sector of employment, followed by the services sector and defence,
while the manufacturing sector and education remain small. Those working in urban areas are
also much more likely to work in services or manufacturing than those in rural areas (Pape, 2016:
p.17). Afeti and Thomas (2014) discuss that employment in South Sudan is characterised by low-
productivity, unremunerated work concentrated in the agriculture sector. About 84% of those
employed are in non-waged work, for their family, for others or on their own account. The
agriculture sector accounts for 63% of total employment and only a small minority of workers
enjoy formal salaried employment or employment in the tertiary sector. The composition of
employment varies between states, but, non-waged work and the agriculture sector predominate
in all of them. Unemployment rates differ between urban and rural areas. Munive (2014: p.346)
argues that South Sudanese are resourceful in generating cash-income, especially in the
informal economy. These activities include: brewing and selling alcohol from maize, cassava,
sorghum and sesame; making flour (sorghum, cassava and maize) and pastes (sesame,
groundnut); cutting and selling grass and bamboo (for thatch and fodder); making and selling
charcoal; trading vegetables; and engaging in casual labour. Maxwell et al (2012: p.30) highlight
that although informal employment is the main source of income in South Sudan, no in-depth
case studies exist on how entrepreneurial activities and small businesses have developed and
how to support endogenous growth. Similar evidence is also lacking in rural areas, especially in
the context of farmers and traders who are expanding and diversifying their activities.

Some studies provide more specific insights into youth livelihood choices in South Sudan.
According to the HFS from 2015, almost 30% of the youth4 identified themselves as currently
inactive (defined as those who were not engaged in any economic activity over the past 12
months, are currently not enrolled in any educational activity, and are not looking for a job either),
irrespective of their gender, area of residence (rural or urban), or level of education (Foust et al,
2015). Among those who reported themselves as employed (Foust et al, 2015):

 activities such as farming, hunting and fishing were major modes of employment;
 others operated some form of non-farm business (especially urban youth);
 salaried labour formed only 11% of the overall employed labour force;
 only 3% of the overall youth workforce identifies themselves as employed in professional
or managerial services;
 5% comprises of those working in support services such as clerical jobs).

Mercy Corps (2014: p.12) highlights agriculture as representing an important sector for youth as
it plays such a critical role in South Sudan’s economy. In Warrap and Unity States, agricultural
production is stagnant and is focused on a limited number of crops. Although myriad challenges
in agriculture exist, Mercy Corps (2014: p.12) argue that understanding and strengthening
youth’s role in the sector could enable young people to earn sufficiently as well as promote food
security for their families. Data from the Mercy Corps (2014: p.8) surveys provides a snapshot of
the typical economic activities in Warrap and Unity States. Youth shared that the most common

4Youth defined by Foust et al (2015: p.6) as those aged 15 to 35, their calculations are based on HFS data from
2015

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livelihoods activities performed in their households include jobs with local business, NGOs, and
the government (36%) and selling agricultural products (29%). Surveys confirmed that work in
the agricultural sector is less common in urban areas and is focused primarily in rural areas and
small towns.

A food security and livelihoods assessment carried out in the Sudan refugee camps in Maban,
Upper Nile for the Danish Refugee Council in 2014 (Forcier Consulting, 2015c: p.ix), found that
refugee youth are more likely to be engaged in shop ownership and teaching, while host youth
make money through selling tea and gardening. Ensor (2013a: p.42) highlights that many
returnee youth acquired skills abroad in trades such as carpentry, masonry and auto mechanics.
Demand for this kind of qualifications is rising as the urban economy expands in South Sudan,
although not fast enough to keep pace with the rapidly increasing numbers of job-seekers. The
main sources of employment available to unskilled returnee young males (and their local
counterparts) in urban areas include collecting firewood, breaking stones, brick-making, digging
latrines and similar forms of casual labour, while females clean and cook at restaurants and
hotels, carry water on constructions sites, and engage in various forms of petty trade and small
business. Furthermore, jobs are seldom reliable sources of income, including for those working
for the government, as salary payment has remained erratic after independence. The
predominant income-generating activity is thus usually complemented by a range of other
livelihood strategies which may include part-time farming as a way to supplement food
availability, rather than as the primary way for returnees to support themselves and their families
(Ensor, 2013a: p.42).

3. Push and pull factors of livelihood decisions

Unemployment
Sommers (2015) argues that there is a difference between work and livelihoods for African youth;
“work” is often defined as a salaried job, whereas a livelihood is normally “whatever it takes” to
get by. Economic instability has led many of the working age to drop out of the labour force, with
the labour force participation rate in urban South Sudan dropping from one half to one third
between 2015 and 2016 (Pape, 2017: p.15). A food security and livelihoods assessment carried
out in the Sudan refugee camps in Maban, Upper Nile for the Danish Refugee Council in 2014
(Forcier Consulting, 2015c: p.ix), found that the lack of jobs is the major reason for
unemployment for male and female youth. To gain employment, youth desire skills in vegetable
and fruit selling, business and marketing, as well as computer and healthcare skills. Sommers
and Schwartz (2011: p.11) find that while some “elite” returnee youth with some degree of
secondary and university education, who have returned from East Africa and Khartoum, have
found lucrative positions in government and NGOs, most are unemployed.

As noted by a report by Page (2013: p.2) “for the great majority of African young people, the
“youth employment problem” is more about the quality of the job than the absence of a job”. For
those lacking the networks to support themselves in periods of inactivity, the problem is often
better characterised as being one of underemployment, poor working conditions and low pay.
This means that the term “unemployed” often refers rather to those who are underemployed
within the informal economy. Many have linked youth un(der)employment with recruitment as
soldiers during conflict, and that for unemployed youth with no real alternative conflict is regarded
as an income-generating activity. Munive (2014: 336) is more critical of the issue of unemployed
youth and sees it as being securitised by state actors and international agencies, he highlights

11
that “[t]here are, however, no empirical grounds for the common assumption of a strong,
automatic causal connection between unemployment, underemployment or low-productivity
employment, violence and war”. Moreover, there are many “unknowns” about the linkages
between forms of youth engagement in the economic, social and political sphere, particularly for
contexts of violence.

Finn and Oldfield (2015: p.31) argue that young men in Freetown, Sierra Leone, struggling to
build livelihoods, instead enact a form of dynamic “waithood”. This is seen as a “period of
experimentation, of improvisation and of great creativity as young Africans adopt a range of
survival strategies to cope with the daily challenges of their lives” (Honwana, 2014: p.24 in Finn
and Oldfield, 2015: p.31), suspended between being youth and adults. They argue that young
men are not simply inactive or idle in Freetown, and that waithood is not “empty time” but an
opportunity to build social networks, learn new business strategies, and imagine and plan a
different future (Finn and Oldfield, 2015: p.38). They argue for a more complex understanding of
young men at work in Freetown and of the “youth bulge” in general in African cities.

Lack of opportunities
Hilker and Fraser (2009: p.5) find that “structural exclusion and lack of opportunities faced by
young people effectively block or prolong their transition to adulthood and can lead to frustration,
disillusionment and in some cases their involvement in violence”.

Maxwell et al (2012) find the biggest constraints to livelihood security in urban areas are a lack of
access to financial capital, education and skills. The lack of infrastructure development and poor
security, an ineffective regulatory regime and economic shocks in South Sudan have added to
the lack of employment opportunities for the youth (Foust et al, 2015: p.55). Suffering additionally
from credit constraint, young entrepreneurs are restricted from fully embracing their potential
(Foust et al, 2015: p.55). Obtaining credit in South Sudan is among the most difficult in the world.
With only around 1% of households having a bank account, South Sudanese businesses face
constraint to access formal credit. Additionally, high interest rates ranging from 18 to 23% and
limited financial services outside urban areas mount to undeniable cases of credit constraint.
These high cost in borrowing make investment less desirable and business start-ups or
expansion unattainable for some (Foust et al, 2015: p.35). Microcredit programmes have been
geared towards addressing urban populations’ needs, despite the fact that limited access to
credit remains a significant constraint on re-establishing rural livelihoods (Maxwell et al, 2012).
The main factors limiting the expansion of microfinance institutions into rural areas include lack of
security and limited transport.

Mercy Corps (2014: p.7) found that a significant factor thwarting youth in their pursuit of work in
South Sudan is the heavy reliance on foreign labour and expertise within the private sector. In
meetings with youth and other stakeholders alike, there was agreement that foreigners (including
Darfurians, Ethiopians, Kenyans and Ugandans) and those who studied outside of South Sudan
did better than South Sudanese in business opportunities (Mercy Corps, 2014: p.8). Maxwell et
al (2012: p.6) also highlight the large influx of both skilled and unskilled foreign workers into
South Sudan (especially Juba) since the signing of the CPA. It is estimated that over 85% of
skilled labour in Juba is provided by immigrant workers. There have been reports this has
created animosity among some Southern Sudanese, who feel they are being deprived of
employment opportunities (Martin and Mosel, 2011 in Maxwell et al, 2012: p.6).

12
Another issue highlighted by some is that the current generation born into war in South Sudan
has low levels of literacy5; limited education and often non-existent work experience. As a result
there is a common reliance on humanitarian aid. Such low levels of human capital create
challenges for companies to hire adequately skilled South Sudanese (Foust et al, 2015: p.14).

Social norms6
In South Sudan (as in other places) cultural expectations constrain the choice of jobs considered
acceptable for boys and girls (Ensor, 2013b: p.11). Oosterom (2016: p.12) highlights that across
the world, young people navigate not only economic opportunities, they also navigate culturally
defined norms and expectations, and cultural models imposed by others in society, including
about what good moral behaviour is for young people and what forms of work are considered
appropriate for young men and women.

UNDP and the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration (2012: p.32) point out that “for some men, having a job may not be enough; rather
they see the type of job they are doing as a direct reflection of their manhood”. They point to ex-
combatants in Liberia, who expressed resistance to jobs they deemed as “unmanly” or “women’s
work”. In many cases, regardless of market demands and skill-sets, young men may reject work
in “traditional” sectors such as agriculture in the belief they deserve more “modern” mechanical
or technical jobs or that those jobs connote a greater level of prestige associated with
achievement socially expected gender roles.

Oosterom (2016: p.5, 36) has formulated a useful conceptual framework for studying the
(understudied) connections between economic, social and political engagement of young people
in contexts of violence and conflict. She states that “in the everyday lives of young people in
Africa, engagement in formal or informal livelihood activities is rarely separated from their social
lives and politics, especially the politics that operate in the local economy. As young people are
embedded in social and, possibly, also in political relationships, the ways in which they pursue
opportunities for work will depend not only on their skills and demand for labour, but on their
navigation of the political actors that shape the nature of the local labour market and economy.
The conceptual framework consists of: the political nature of the local economy, social navigation
and situated agency, and youth identity” (Oosterom, 2016: p.5, 36).

Oosterom (2016: p.12) also highlights that the forms of paid work that young people are involved
in are important for the construction of youth identities in various ways. Different types of work
have different forms of status attached to them, both from the perspective of young people and
the adult generations. Rather than for simply materialistic purposes of getting an income, young

5
However, literacy levels among the youth are higher than the population as a whole, indicating that past
education reforms have had an effect. The literacy rate for youth in South Sudan is 59 percent, compared to
overall literacy rate of 48 percent (Foust et al, 2015: p.16).
6 The World Bank Human Development Report 2015 defines social norms as “broadly shared beliefs about what
group members are likely to do and ought to do[, these] are informal governance mechanisms that exert a
powerful influence on individual decision making and behaviour” (World Bank, 2015: p.51). Humans are hard
wired to develop and adhere to norms; imitation is one of the key ways humans learn strategies for interacting in
the world.

13
people may pursue the intangible outcomes of doing certain kinds of work: the lifestyle or
subculture associated with doing such work, the places where one can go.

Different backgrounds and aspirations

The lives of young people in South Sudan are characterised by conflict-induced displacement
and movement between various locations. Returnees constitute a highly heterogeneous group
whose motivations and objectives vary according to a number of factors, including family
structure, education, socioeconomic status and conditions in exile. Sommers and Schwartz
(2011: p.6-7) argue that there are three new identities for South Sudanese youth:

 those who remained in South Sudan during the civil war;

 IDPs who fled to Sudan’s capital city, Khartoum (known as “Khartoumers” or,
disparagingly, as “Jalaba” (Arabs));
 “diaspora youth”, including those who lived as refugees in East Africa or beyond.

Fieldwork by Ensor (2013b: p.7) among South Sudanese refugees in Cairo, Egypt and Adjumani,
Uganda, reveals views on education, repatriation and integration which often differ from those of
their Sudan-born elders. Many young returnees were exposed to functioning cash economies in
Egypt, Kenya, Uganda or Khartoum, and arrived in South Sudan with relatively high educational
standards and expectations that local conditions in South Sudan are currently unable to meet
(Ensor, 2013b: p.7).Some would have preferred to remain in the diaspora, at least until
educational and employment opportunities improved back home. Unlike older generations, most
of these young people, particularly those based in Cairo and Khartoum, are urbanised and
unaccustomed to the rural lifestyle they associate with South Sudan. Those who grew up in
Khartoum face mistrust and rejection from locals who identify them as members of the Arab
culture of the North (Ensor, 2013b: p.7). Meanwhile many of the diaspora youth arriving from
Kenya, Uganda, or other refugee asylum nations face a different set of challenges than their
counterparts returning from Khartoum, being seen as “foreigners” importing an alien, dangerous,
and threatening culture (Sommers and Schwartz, 2011: p.7).

Job allocation also commonly reflects ethnic affiliation and often relies on kin networks, placing
uprooted returnees at a clear disadvantage (Ensor, 2013b: p.42). On the other hand, a study by
Mercy Corps in 2013 (2014: p.13) did not find significant divisions or tension resulting from
competition for training and jobs between groups returning to Warrap and Unity states from
Khartoum or East Africa and those who remained inside South Sudan during the civil war.
Moreover, many of the “elite” returnees who are fluent in English and have degrees from
respected foreign institutions have secured high-status, well-paid jobs, including with
international donors and NGOs (Sommers and Schwartz, 2011: p.6-7). Most categorically reject
any kind of manual labour, especially farming, which they see as incompatible with their urban
life style and beneath their superior qualifications (Ensor, 2013b: p.11). On the other hand, Ensor
(2013b: p.11) highlights that some diaspora boys and girls and, to a lesser degree Khartoumers,
appear to have a more flexible outlook on job acceptability. She suggests this attitude may have
been born out of survival in the available limited livelihood options or alternatively could signal
additional efforts to rebel against constraining traditional social mores.

Peter Biar Ajak (Chatham House, 2016: p.15) argues that a key issue after the initial peace in
2005 was a crisis of expectation. Young people were expecting a “peace dividend”, and when
this did not materialise they hoped that independence would bring new opportunities. Mercy

14
Corps (2014: p.14) reports that the pervasive view among youth that “skills plus capital equal
success”, without absorptive capacity in the informal and formal economy, has the potential to
increase the frustration of youth. In 2013 young people in Warrup and Unity States reported to
Mercy Corps (2014: p.7) that skills and training are the most promising pathways to economic
independence, but these tend to be disconnected from market opportunities and raise false
expectations of actual employability.

Sommers and Schwartz (2011: p.8-9) argue that the youth unemployment situation in South
Sudan persists due to:

 an overwhelming focus on a finite number of government jobs;

 widespread nepotism;
 South Sudanese youth refusal to do many jobs (e.g. youths reported being criticised by
peers, relatives, and elders for selling water, clearing land, cleaning buildings, and
working in hotels);
 unrealistic views by some South Sudanese of their earning potential and viability as
workers.

Rural vs urban
With rapid urbanisation in South Sudan, a once almost exclusively rural populace is rapidly
moving to towns in search of meaningful employment opportunities. There is competition in the
urban labour market (both formal and informal) from more educated returnee Sudanese and
relatively large numbers of migrant workers from neighbouring countries (Maxwell et al, 2012:
p.37). Maxwell et al (2012) highlight that it is often men that have migrated to urban centres,
most notably Juba, which has left many female-headed households in rural South Sudan, an
environment endemic with insecurity (Maxwell et al, 2012).

A number of factors influence the mobility of youth away from rural areas to urban areas. Pull
factors include the hopes of generating an income, pursuing better education opportunities and
the desire for a “modern” lifestyle. Push factors include low income levels, limited access to land.

Rural youth

Nevertheless, a large proportion of young people remain, or are based, in rural areas (Kristensen
and Birch-Thomsen, 2013: p.176). Although there has been little research on rural youth
livelihood strategies specific to South Sudan, Kristensen and Birch-Thomsen (2013: p.179)
highlight three livelihood strategies, which are typically pursued by young rural people in Sub
Saharan Africa:

 To stay in the village and engage in farming, thereby continuing a traditional agriculturally
based livelihood strategy, where farming is the main source of income.
 To stay in the village and diversify the choice of livelihood strategies to include non-farm
activities (e.g. retail, manufacturing or service provision); farming may be the main or a
secondary source of income.
 To migrate from the village to an urban area in search of education or employment, either
as a cyclical pattern (e.g. seasonal migration during the agricultural off-season) or a
permanent move. Links with the village of origin may vary; in some cases, young people

15
 may assist with labour on a regular basis (e.g. during school holidays) or contribute to
household income through remittances.

Young men in rural areas can be easily and quickly mobilised for community defence, to raid
cattle and recover cattle raided, as well as retaliatory attacks. These fluid groups are loose and
opportunistic structures with a particular purpose and goal that often disperse afterwards (Danish
Refugee Council, 2017: p.13).

The Danish Refugee Council (2017: p.13) released a report that explores some of the issues
facing male youth in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Bentiu Protection of
Civilian (PoC) site and in both urban and rural areas of Rubkona county (previously in Unity
State). Ongoing recruitment of young men and boys into the conflict, especially in Guit and
Rubkona, remains a serious issue, currently pushing young men from rural areas to the PoC.
Rural youth in the PoC in most cases chose to move after losing their cattle and livelihoods and
possibly having temporarily joined armed groups as soldiers, they are also moving to escape
military recruitment. Young men who have deliberately chosen to remain inside the PoC are also
taking a stance in this conflict, actively choosing not to fight. Outside the PoC, young men are at
risk of enlisting with armed groups, being forcefully recruited and exposed to cattle raids (Danish
Refugee Council, 2017: p.13). This has caused most young men in Rubkona to go into hiding
and the villages visited were largely deserted of men (Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.14).

Rural communities, who are both the primary victims as well as major perpetrators of violence in
South Sudan, are largely excluded from national peace processes and dividends. White Armies
leaders are rarely given prominent roles in regional and national peace processes. Instead
educated youth representatives and politicians are prioritised, which deprives the cattle camp
youth directly involved in these conflicts of representation and a sense of ownership over
agreements and their implementation (Breidlid and Arensen in Saferworld, 2017: p.39).

Urban youth

Ensor (2013a: p.11) carried out a research project on the reintegration of refugees and IDPs
returning to South Sudan since the signing of the 2005 Peace Agreement, focusing on the role
played by displaced youth. She found that many returnees were choosing to resettle in urban
locations, either because they lack the skills necessary to work as farmers after years of living in
northern cities or refugee camps, or because they lack interest in returning to an agro-pastoralist
lifestyle. Most anticipate that economic and educational opportunities will be superior in urban
locations. However, employment opportunities in South Sudan’s urban areas are, at present, not
sufficient to absorb the large influx of people (Ensor, 2013a: p.10). Juba attracts the highest
number of young returnees, other rapidly urbanising regional towns such as Wau, Bor, Malakal
and Torit have similarly attracted displaced youth (Ensor, 2013a: p.17). The difficulties inherent in
finding paid employment in the face of rising expectations and unfavourable socioeconomic
conditions are at the core of practices of continuing mobility among young returnees in South
Sudan (Ensor, 2013a: p.38).

Ensor (2013a: p.32) also draws attention to data from Lakes State that suggest that many of the
boys and young men who move with the cattle camps, weary of the escalating conflicts over
cattle resulting intertribal fighting, are seeking alternative livelihoods. Since pastoralist groups
have traditionally perceived farming as undignified, and agriculture is not always feasible in some
of the most arid states, urban life appears to constitute an increasingly powerful lure for these

16
youth. Typically lacking any formal education or marketable skills, many young cattle herders
nonetheless express an interest in vocational training and a settled lifestyle.

4. Youth decision making and violence

Non-violent decision making
First of all it is important to recognise that in conflict settings in general the majority of young
people do not get involved in violence and that young people can make a positive contribution to
peacebuilding and development. A number of academics express concern about some of the
language and assumptions made in the youth bulge literature that risks stigmatising young
people (Hilker and Fraser, 2009: p.3). The literature suggests that there are multiple motivations
for youth engagement in armed violence, that these need to be understood in relation to each
particular context, and that there may be considerable variation in the motivations of individual
youth within any given context. In-depth case studies suggest that while youth unemployment
may provide part of the explanation of why armed violence occurs, this factor is rarely a main or
direct cause of violence (Walton, 2010).

However, for south Sudan, little in-depth research or literature could be found during this review
on the motivations and decision making of youth deciding not to participate in violence, and this
is an important knowledge gap. Some anecdotal research was found but this did not go into
detail on the motivations. For example, a study by the Danish Refugee Council (2017) into youth
in Bentiu PoC highlights that rural youth were are also moving to the PoC to escape military
recruitment, and young men who have stayed in the PoC deliberately were taking a stance by
actively choosing not to fight.

Youth violence in South Sudan

Key conflict groups7

Nevertheless, youth have been key actors in the conflict and violence in South Sudan. The
literature reviewed for this report has mainly focused on youth’s role in violence in South Sudan
through cattle raiding, militias and urban gangs. Table 1 shows the key conflict groups that have
been active or emerged since the eruption of violence in December 2013 in South Sudan and a
simple identification of their motivations as developed by Gebreyes et al (2016: p.25-26).
Although this table oversimplifies the motivations for youth engaging in violence in South Sudan,
it is a useful representation of the different ethnic and communal militia groups that have
emerged and gives an indication of the complexity of youth defence forces across the country.

7See http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/category/south-sudan/ for up-to-date information on the current conflict

and Raleigh et al (2016) for information on communal and political militias

17
Table 1: Typology of conflict groups and actors in South Sudan’s recent conflict

Major Conflict Motives for Conflict Livelihood Areas Affected

Actors Systems
State control and All states but
All livelihood
Government legitimate control of particularly Greater
systems
violence Upper Nile region
Sudan People's
Liberation Eastern Flood
Contesting the legitimacy Greater Upper Nile
Movement-in- Plains, Pastoral and
of state region
Opposition Nile-Sobat Rivers
(SPLM-IO)
Western Dinka
Youth Armies: Youth and cattle keepers
Western Flood
Gelweng/Titweng/ employment and States of the
Plains, Pastoral and
Dut Ku Beny/ engagement opportunities Greater Bahr el
Nile-Sobat Rivers
Mathiang Anyoor/ and Communal self- Ghazal region
Tit Baai/Machar protection
Anyar
Youth and cattle keepers
Nuer Youth White Eastern Flood
employment and States of the
Armies Plains, Pastoral and
engagement opportunities Greater Upper Nile
(Lou/Jiekeny and Nile-Sobat Rivers
and Communal self region
Bull)
protection
Youth and cattle keepers
employment and
Murle Youth Arid/Pastoral and
engagement opportunities Jonglei State
Army Hills and Mountains
and Communal self-
protection
Youth employment and
Arrow Boys Army engagement opportunities Western Bahr el
Greenbelt
and Communal self- Ghazal State
protection
Youth and cattle keepers
Eastern Flood
employment and
Eastern Dinka Plains, Pastoral and States of Greater
engagement opportunities
Youth Armies Nile-Sobat Rivers Upper Nile region
and Communal self-
protection
Shilluk Youth
Communal self-protection Nile-Sobat rivers Upper Nile
Army
Maban Defence Eastern Flood
Communal self-protection Upper Nile State
Forces Plains
South Sudan Arid/pastoral, Hills Eastern Equatoria
Communal self-protection
Defence Forces and Mountains State
Securing free movement Eastern flood plains,
Dinka Bor Armed
and access to pastures Arid/Pastoral and Jonglei State
Pastoralists
and water to their livestock Nile river

Source: Gebreyes et al (2016: p.25-26)

Research by Justino et al (2014: p.16) points out that individual motivations in violent conflict
around the world differ significantly across sex, age, ethnic, religious and other social, cultural,
political and economic group divisions. They also depend crucially on processes of group
mobilisation and interactions with local institutions and norms that will impact on individual and

18
household decisions to participate or refrain from participating in violent conflicts. Whereas
traditional macro explanations have mostly focused on one factor (either greed or grievance) to
explain individual participation in violence, the micro-level perspective identifies the often
complex and multiple motivations involved in the behavioural choice (Justino et al, 2014: p.16).

Cattle raiding

In states such as Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Unity,
inter-communal violence and cattle raiding have become an important part of communities’
livelihoods and economy (Gebreyes et al, 2016). However, since the latest conflict, the dynamics
of cattle raiding have changed both in scope and magnitude, becoming more violent and with the
deliberate destruction of assets (Gebreyes et al, 2016: p.1). The increased availability of small
arms in recent years has made cattle raids more deadly, often sparking revenge attacks and
provoking cycles of violence (Saferworld, 2014: p.7). Cattle-keepers and youth are becoming
increasingly militarised and easily mobilised to take part in the current conflict (Pendle, 2015).
Subsequent revenge raids have trapped communities in a web of continuous animosity
(Gebreyes et al, 2016: p.1). Livestock resources, which should function as suppliers of
household food and social security, have become liabilities for which communities are killed,
maimed and robbed of their assets (Gebreyes et al, 2016: p.1).

There are multiple motivations for youth engaging in violence in South Sudan, for example, the
choice to engage in cattle raiding and counter-cattle raiding has been attributed to the absence of
any form of security, as a mode of socialisation or as a livelihood strategy (Tsuma, 2012: p.132).
Rolandsen and Breidlid (2013: p.8) found that accumulation of cattle wealth is an important
incentive for youth’s continued engagement in violence. Since participants in large-scale raids
and attacks receive the main share of loot, some youth have accumulated large amounts of
cattle wealth. Many elders, on the other hand, have lost their herds in raids and have not been
sufficiently compensated by the government or their own youth.

“Nigga” groups8

Part of the landscape of most post-conflict societies in Africa includes refugee camps, temporary
settlements for IDPs and “protected villages”. These are sites of particular disenfranchisement for
young men, who are unable in such environments to fulfil most of the internal and external
expectations of manhood held by their societies (Porter, 2013: p.494). One coping mechanism is
joining gangs.

Sometimes called “teams”, “gangs” or locally in South Sudan “niggas”, these boys and young
people coalesce together as a social group with a particular type of moral code seeking to
connect to a wider global culture, who sometimes also engage in criminal activities and fighting
among themselves (importantly not all the “Nigga’s” in the PoC are criminals and vice versa)
(Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.15). “Nigga” groups are both a social and economic
community, providing members with a sense of belonging, identity, protection, a coping
mechanism and support system (Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.15-16). “Niggas” were
prevalent across urban areas of South Sudan pre-crisis and also exist in the Juba and Malakal

8The term “nigga” has no negative racial undertones, rather it is associated to American hip-hop culture and its
subversive contestation. For more details see also McCrone, 2016; Sommers and Schwartz, 2011.

19
PoCs, many of the ‘nigga’ groups in the Bentiu POC were established in Bentiu town by post-CPA
returnee youth (Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.15; McCrone, 2016: p.53). However, not all
returnees are “Niggas” and vice versa. Many young men have sought membership in “Nigga”
groups as a way to access an alternative largely western culture, identity and social world and
the privileges associated to it (Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.16).

The Danish Refugee Council (2017: p.13) found that in a militarised society where masculinity
and status are in great part proven through one’s ability to protect the community and provide for
the family and household, young people in the PoC and those outside are exposed and attracted
to different types of violence. The PoC hosts both rural and urban youth but “nigga” groups are
mostly from a broadly urban background and tend to get involved in competition fighting between
youth groups and petty criminal acts (Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.13).

Motivations for participating in violence

There is a literature exploring the motivations behind youth participation in violence and
livelihood decisions more generally, which has relevant analysis for understanding the situation
of youth in South Sudan. For example, Hilker and Fraser’s (2009: p.5) review of youth exclusion
and violence in fragile states found a number of approximate factors that, given underlying
conditions of exclusion, can lead to the mobilisation of specific individuals and groups into
violence. These include: recruitment, coercion and indoctrination into groups; gender inequalities
and socialisation; identity politics and ideology: charismatic leadership and organisational
dynamics: trigger events. Another summary (Ebata et al, 2006: p.19-25) lists the popular theories
on motivations for youth to engage in violent conflict as:

 The youth bulge, i.e. young people fight because they are too many;
 Coercion, i.e. young people fight because they are forced to either by physical abduction,
or because of a lack of other alternatives for survival;
 A youth crisis, this brings in a more complex and multifaceted dimension and can be
defined as either a societal crisis impacting on youth, resulting in a feeling of
“uneasiness” in the face of societal changes and constraints, or a crisis originating from
youth and impacting on society at large;
 Lack of education opportunities;
 Lack of employment opportunities;
 Exclusion from participation and decision making.

Social norms

Work by Lilleston et al (2017, p.124) points out that social norms are one way that violence
“transmits” within groups. Through the fear of social sanctions, desire to win approval, and
internalisation of normative behaviour, perceived social norms can influence people to
perpetrate, condone, or challenge violence.

Normalisation of violence

It has been argued that youth in conflict experience a process of asocialisation into a polarised
existence of hostility and are denied the normal cultural, moral and value socialisation usually
gained from family and community set-ups. The collapse of customary socio-economic systems

20
during civil war creates a decision-making vacuum and reduces the possibilities of addressing
issues in a non-violent manner. The choice to respond violently to any perceived threat becomes
a common occurrence, and youth therefore become the custodians of security (Tsuma, 2012).

Since 2009, thousands of women have been abducted in Jonglei state in retaliatory attacks in the
conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities. Lacey (2013: p.91) argues that killing and
violence aimed at women in the conflict by male cattle-camp youth has increased to a point
where it could be said to have become normalised practice, where women are considered
legitimate spoils of war, along with livestock and other chattel. She argues that abductions,
sexual slavery, and sexual violence in the current conflict are not just a by-product of the conflict,
but are a product of underlying patriarchal structures that value women solely for their
reproductive capabilities and linked to this their role in commanding value for the procurement of
cattle.

UNDP and the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration (2012: p.22-23) according to Social Learning Theory, individuals learn behaviour
through observation, imitation, and modelling. In both conflict-affected and peaceful
environments, violent masculinities and femininities are shaped by socially constructed and
perpetuated norms related to the use of violence. Violence is a result of a socialisation process,
whereby “people acquire those behaviours essential for effective participation in society”. They
point out that in southern Sudan (now South Sudan), most individuals and communities
were in some way supporting either the largely volunteer-based Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) or other armed groups, thus contributing to the normalisation of violence as a way
of life. The SPLA promoted violence as a legitimate way for the southern Sudanese to attain their
political and economic goals, and instilled in its recruits a sense of hyper-masculinity that glorified
the “raw power” of the gun. In the post-conflict period, the notion that manhood is closely
associated with gun ownership and warfare still persists (UNDP and the United Nations Inter-
Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 2012: p.22-23).

Exclusion, culture and family

Tsuma (2012: p.135) argues that the family plays a significant role as an accountability structure
for young people, and its absence increases the risk of youth to indulge or get absorbed into
crime and other unlawful activities. People are identified according to their tribal and family lines
in Africa. Tsuma (2012: p.135) therefore argues that combined with the collapse or distortion of
the family as a key unit of identity, the youth have adopted other means of shaping their own
identity, i.e. joining a famous rebel group of vigilantes which becomes their new identity and
instils a sense of pride.

An Oxfam (2016: p.2) Briefing Paper argues that inequalities between generations have grown at
an alarming rate over the past few decades, and that youth are largely excluded from formal
political processes and continue to be subject to age-based systems of authority. They lack
forums and opportunities for political participation and influence; and are often underrepresented
in influential government positions or in hierarchical systems that favour elders (Oxfam, 2016:
p.9). Leonardi (2007) examined the structural opposition between the sphere of
military/government (the “hakuma”) and the sphere of “home” in South Sudan, and argued that to
be a “youth” in Southern (South) Sudan means to inhabit the tensions of the space between
these spheres. While attempting to resist capture by either sphere, youth have used their
recruitment by the military to invest in their home or family sphere. Leonardi (2007) highlights that

21
“informants for the article did not cite either resentment against chiefs or generational
antagonisms as significant reasons for youth recruitment into the armed forces, or indeed as the
primary concerns of youth during the war. Instead, they repeatedly focused on the vulnerability of
youth to capture by the military, and cited family roles and responsibilities as the primary
consideration in the decisions taken by youth during the war”. She questioned the universal
applicability both of an African “youth crisis”, and of the relevance of generational tensions to the
involvement of Southern Sudanese youth in civil wars. Rather than seeing youth as between
childhood and adulthood, the article saw youth as operating between two spheres: “hakuma” and
“home”. Frustration in the youth was in relation to their marginalisation or repression within the
government sphere, rather than over their status in relation to elders.

Lehmann (2015: p.26) highlights conflicting opinions on the roles of youth and elders: “Some
youth argued that elders encourage the youth to go raiding, for cows for their children’s dowry
payment and to gain prestige in the community…A few key informants emphasised that elders
are powerless in light of the availability of guns in the hands of the youth.”

Insecurity

Economic and social incentives also encourage many youth to participate in violence (Breidlid
and Arensen in Saferworld, 2017: p.35). Rolandsen and Breidlid (2013: p.5) explain that the
military role of youth (young men) in many cultures in South Sudan is related to social status and
specific privileges: it affords them respect, the right to participate in decision making, and the
ability to socialise with girls. Participatory Action Research in Eastern Equatoria’s Budi County in
2015 (Lehmann, 2015: p.27) found that youth respondents perceived conflict in two ways: some
youth, often formally more educated, emphasised the negative aspects of conflict; other youth,
often warriors or youth without formal education, perceived conflict, as well as fighting, as an
avenue to access resources such as cows for marriage.

The civil war shaped new structures for leadership and mobilisation of young men in rural areas,
which are still employed for protection and large-scale inter-communal violence (Rolandsen and
Breidlid, 2013: p.8). Aside from mobilising youth to be part of the forces of the warring parties,
the Nuer and Dinka in South Sudan also organised their own sub-group youth militias (such as
the White Armies and Gelweng) to protect their communities and form a kind of community police
apparatus (Pendle, 2015). Other ethnic groups adopted similar strategies to mobilise community
self-defence groups based on armed youth, giving rise to the Murle (Yau Yau group), the Arrow
Boys in Western Equatoria, the Monyemiji among the Lotuko of Eastern Equatoria, and the
Maban Defence Force in Upper Nile State (Pendle, 2015; Young, 2015: p.18).9 Current violence
in much of South Sudan is closely linked to the prevailing security vacuum in rural areas. Hence,
the participation of youth in violence must be understood as a consequence not only of their
social role and responsibilities as protectors of the community, but also of the political economy
of civil war and large-scale violence (Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2013: p.3).

The White Armies’ involvement in violent conflict largely reflects their social obligations to protect
their families and livestock; community defence and justice provision, in the form of revenge, has
long been one of the strongest motivators for participation in the White Armies (Young, 2016:

9See Saferworld (2017) Informal armies: Community defence groups in South Sudan’s civil war for more details
on these groups and their motivations.

22
p.11). While participation in the White Armies is mainly voluntary, during times of high intensity
conflict every able-bodied male is expected to join local units (Breidlid and Arensen in
Saferworld, 2017: p.35). Social pressure to participate in the White Armies is especially strong
during times of war, making it difficult for youth to stay behind (Breidlid and Arensen in
Saferworld, 2017: p.36). There has been a growing number of educated youth in the White
Armies and the average age of fighters has increased; today it is not uncommon to find fighters
in their thirties and even forties (Young, 2016: p.39; Breidlid and Arensen in Saferworld, 2017:
p.36).

For youth in Jonglei state, their sense of social worth and identity depends on success in
executing their role as keeper of cattle and community protector, which also entails participation
in intercommunal feuds and conflicts, and even largescale revenge attacks (Rolandsen and
Breidlid, 2013: p.6). Youth and their communities at large consider participation in such violence
as legitimate and moral (Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2013: p.6).

Mercy Corps (2014: p.20) emphasises that pressure by elders, politicians or family on youths in
South Sudan to defend against outside aggression or become aggressors themselves will
continue in the foreseeable future and that while dangerous, these violent acts are calculated
choices by young people to improve their chances of survival, social status and communal
influence. Some young men have joined the rebellion in search of financial rewards, and South
Sudan’s dire economic situation may well have fed this dynamic, increasing the movement of
Western Equatorians from rural areas to towns in search of livelihood opportunities, spurring
criminal activity and increasing the attractiveness of armed rebellion (Schomerus and Taban in
Saferworld, 2017: p.15).

Masculinity

Versions of manhood in Africa are socially constructed, fluid over time and in different settings,
and plural; there is no such thing as a “typical” young man in sub-Saharan Africa. However, a
common key requirement to attaining manhood in Africa is achieving some level of financial
independence, employment or income, and subsequently starting a family (Barker and Ricardo,
2005: p.2). Barker and Ricardo (2005: p.2) also highlight that older men “have a role in holding
power over younger men and thus in defining manhood in Africa”. Rites of passage are important
factors in the socialisation of boys and men throughout the region. This is also true of South
Sudan. Barker and Ricardo (2005: p.v) find that young men who do not achieve a sense of
socially respected manhood may be more likely to engage in violence.

Porter (2013: p.492) highlights that post-conflict contexts are marked by norms of masculinity
that are extremely negative: highly rigid, militaristic, and associated with violence, toughness, the
objectification of women, and repression of all emotions other than anger. Men who have been
members of (informal) armed groups are often heavily influenced by these norms even after
conflicts have ended (Porter, 2013: p.493). Gender norms are also implicated in the practice of
cattle raiding; owning a gun and participating in a cattle raid are rites of passage for adolescent
boys, and for men these are symbols of manhood and virility which confer social status
(Saferworld, 2014: p.7). Recruitment into the SPLA or non-state armed groups is closely linked
with militarised notions of masculinity, and can provide a sense of identity and self-worth which
would otherwise be difficult to find (Saferworld, 2014: p.7).

Oosterom (2017: p.191) points out that war and violent conflict are often associated with
producing “militarised masculinities”, but that these are not simply reproduced by the behaviours

23
of ex-combatant males. Notions of masculinity are negotiated and reproduced in local institutions
and everyday social interactions, by both men and women (Oosterom, 2017: p.187). In
Oosterom’s study of gendered insecurity and agency among the Latuko, one of the Equatorian
ethnic minorities living in Imatong state, it became clear that, in light of ongoing insecurity in
South Sudan since the end of the civil war, (non-combatant) women actively seek to influence
hybrid governance institutions but also reproduce the masculinities within the Amangat (a village-
level decision making body of adult males) (Oosterom, 2017: p.199). 10 Search for Common
Ground (2016b) highlight research which indicates that women in South Sudan are just as likely
as men to believe violence is a valid way to solve conflicts, this is important as they influence
attitudes and behaviour in informal social spaces like the home. Pendle (2015: p.426) highlights
how “local popular discourse and bull songs often honoured militarised acts of the youth and
referenced the bravery of the titweng. Women discussed their pride in sons who were part of the
titweng and described methods used from an early age, such as storytelling, to foster in their
sons a responsibility to participate in community defence”. Highlighting the role of women in
sometimes encouraging violence among young men and reinforcing the association between
masculinity and cattle raiding.

Marriage dowries

To be recognised as full adults, male and female youth in South Sudan must marry and build a
family (Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.20). Sommers and Schwartz’ (2011: p.1) field research
in Juba and two South Sudanese states found an increasing inability of male youth to meet rising
dowry (bride price) demands. Consequently many male youth enlist in militias, join cattle raids, or
seek wives from different ethnic groups or countries. Recent research by the Danish Refugee
Council (2017: p.20) supported these earlier findings. It found that many young men in Rubkona,
especially those in the PoC and towns, deprived of their livelihoods and made destitute by cattle
raids, are under severe pressure to meet escalating bridewealth costs. Kuol (in Saferworld, 2017:
p.23) also highlights rising bride prices in the post-2005 period as increasing the susceptibility of
young men to elite patronage, where cattle protection and military loyalty are exchanged for gifts
from elites of guns and ammunition.

In Lehmann’s (2015: p.24-25) research into conflict in Budi County, one of the prime motivations
to raid cattle is to be able to pay the bride price. Other reasons identified by respondents to
explain the youth’s engagement in conflict include: the pride people take in being “warriors‟ who
defend the community; peer pressure; and low levels of education (Lehmann, 2015: p.25).

Inequalities of power

It appears that politicians in South Sudan are increasingly capable of mobilising their youth base
to settle political scores (Mercy Corps. 2014: p.11). Mercy Corps (2014: p.14) states that “Youth
seeking to establish their social and financial independence and influence, yet struggling under
the burden of a lack of education, relevant and marketable skills, and scarce work opportunities
to apply those skills, are prime targets for politicians searching for foot soldiers to carry out their
battles to gain political influence”. Military commanders also have language and terminology to
mobilise young cattle keepers by associating fighting with moral justice and community protection
and rights. Military commanders are also known to establish military loyalty by contributing to the

10 This study was carried out before violent conflict re-erupted in December 2013.

24
bridewealth of their soldiers, who have in many cases lost all their cattle and are unable to marry
(Danish Refugee Council, 2017: p.14). Raleigh et al (2016: p.5-7) point out that in South Sudan
the presence of armed youth militias (especially the Dinka) is not simply just “a product of local
disputes, but rather the effect of government forces arming cattle herders as a method of
creating proxy fighters to ally against any existing opposition forces, as well as ensuring that new
opposition is not created (by keeping local communities content and feeling able to defend
themselves)”.

Barker and Ricardo (2005: p.vi) found that in some settings, young men’s participation in conflict
and use of violence become ways to obtain empowerment, or essentially a means to achieving
and wielding power, for young men who perceive no other way to achieve it. There may also be a
sense of camaraderie with male peers for young men in some armed insurgency groups, and in
some cases, male role models or surrogate fathers, and substitute families (Barker and Ricardo,
2005: p.vi).

5. Trusted actors and channels of communication

Media

Radio

Reviews of radio as a communication channel for youth and wider communities

Radio is widely cited as the most accessed, and often most trusted, channel of communication in
South Sudan. Radio has therefore frequently been used by donors and other organisations to
target attitudinal and behavioural change in youth. The reasons for radio’s popularity includes its
potential to reach mass audiences around the country, through networks that can reach beyond
urban areas as well as local language programming. There are dozens of stations in operation
and most of the population now lives within reach of frequency modulation (FM) and Medium
Wave broadcasts; however, many remote areas remain outside of reach and coverage can be
inconsistent. Shortwave transmissions of regular broadcasting stations do reach some of the
more remote areas of the country (Forcier Consulting 2015b).

Radio is also an effective tool to use in the highly volatile context in South Sudan, which can
change actors’ access to different areas relatively quickly. In such an environment, when it can
become difficult or impossible to physically visit certain locations, the use of media approaches –
particularly radio – ensures that programming can continue to reach affected populations, even
when their communities are inaccessible or when people are displaced (Search for Common
Ground 2016a). For example, following the July 2016 violence, when NGOs were forced to
evacuate and suspend their activities, Search for Common Ground and its partner the Catholic
Radio Network were, however, able to continue engaging with their target audience through the
two radio programs they jointly produce and broadcast.

Given the popularity of radio, it is perhaps not surprising that several detailed surveys and
evaluations have been carried out to assess the media landscape as well as the effectiveness of
radio communication initiatives. For example, in 2015 a survey commissioned by Internews (with
support from USAID) was carried out by Forcier Consulting to conduct a detailed assessment of
the media landscape in accessible areas of South Sudan (Forcier Consulting 2015b). This study
is a key source of detailed information on reach and accessibility of various media sources

25
across the country. Building on an earlier survey commissioned by Internews in 2013, it collected
information on South Sudanese media access and consumption to inform the strategies and
programming of media houses and initiatives.

For the 2015 study, research was carried out by Forcier Consulting in five fully accessible states
(Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Western
Equatoria) and five states that were, due to the ongoing conflict, only partially accessible
(Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Upper Nile (Malakal and Melut counties only), Unity (Leer county
only), and Jonglei (Bor South county only)). Although the study was not youth-specific, the
majority of respondents were under the age of 35, making the findings highly relevant to
understanding the relationship of South Sudanese youth to the media. Key findings included:

 There are a sizeable number of people (one in three) who have never had access to any
form of media or device
 Despite this, radio remains the most commonly accessed type of media (51%) and has a
larger weekly reach (38%) than all other forms of media.
 While access to television, newspapers, and internet remains sparse, mobile phone
penetration levels are nearing levels of radio access.
 As media access increases, trust in radio as a source of information also increases.
 Individuals who have never had access to media say they trust religious leaders (25%) or
face-to-face conversations with friends or family (21%) the most as sources of
information, while individuals with high access to media trust the radio (69%) the most.
 Those with media access tend to choose radio as their source of news and information,
even if they have access to other forms of media.
 Regardless of media access, radio broadcasts are thought to help reduce conflict and
provide vital safety information.
 Information heard on the radio trickles down to reach beyond listeners. Nearly two-thirds
(63%) of respondents say information from the radio has helped them to stay safe,
regardless of whether they have regular access to a radio.

Forcier Consulting (2016a) also mapped its radio audience in Juba, based on an audience
ratings system it has created. The results presented in the report are drawn from data collected
between January and June 2016 and are representative of the three payams (administrative
divisions) in urban Juba (Juba Town, Kator, and Munuki). It provides insights into the dynamics
of Juba’s radio market, audience preferences, composition, and behaviour. The study found that
the average radio listener was under the age of 34, educated and lived in either Munuki or Juba
Town. Other key findings included:

 Eye Radio is the top station in urban Juba. With an average 41% weekly reach in Juba,
Eye Radio is the most popular radio station in the capital. It is closely followed by Radio
Miraya, which has an average weekly reach of 40%.
 Radio listenership is high among the population in urban Juba.
 On average, nearly three-quarters (73%) of the population in urban Juba listens to the
radio at least once a week, suggesting that radio remains a key means for reaching
residents with important information.
 While high, radio listenership is not yet universal. Almost one in five people (18%) in Juba
have never listened to the radio.

26
  Radio access is gendered. On average, weekly reach of radio is 78% among men, but
only 68% among women.
 Radio access is highly correlated with socioeconomic factors. The Upper and Middle
class have much higher levels of radio access than the Lower class.
 Listenership varies by location, even within the city. For general radio listening, Munuki
has the highest weekly reach by payam, followed by Juba Town and Kator.
 Radio listeners in Juba look to radio as a key source of news and information. News
about South Sudan is the most popular type of radio programming, followed by
international news.
 Radio listeners in Juba prefer to listen in the mornings (6am-9am) and evenings (6pm-
9pm).

McMurry and Lockhart (2013) reviewed Internews’ community radio programmes in South
Sudan. The purpose of this study was to assess the current information needs of the populations
served by Internews’ network of community radio stations in South Sudan, and how the stations
were meeting those needs. The McMurry and Lockhart study found that radio was viewed as an
effective tool for providing guidance to young people. “As a platform that connected youth with
other individuals – elders and traditional authorities in particular – it could serve as a kind of
moral compass and have a potentially strong social impact on local issues” (2013: 13).
Nevertheless, the study also identified two groups – women and returnees – who experienced
the most problems accessing information. An additional problem was the spatial diffusion of
information – including radios and other information sources – beyond the main town where the
community radio station was located. Additional challenges identified were different expectations
placed on community radio stations by their listeners on the one hand and the South Sudanese
government on the other. Listeners/community members clearly see the role of community radio
as a government watchdog and in terms of social advocacy. Not surprisingly, several
government officials who were interviewed for this study viewed the role of community radio as a
mouthpiece for government itself, even suggesting that increased monitoring of program content
was necessary.

Specific radio programmes and initiatives targeted at South Sudanese youth

This review has identified several specific radio programmes and initiatives that were targeted at
youth with the aims of affecting attitudinal or behavioural change:

The radio peace drama series Sawa Shabab (which translates as “Youth Together”) was widely
cited as a successful example of radio programming targeted at youth. Since 2014, the
programme has been produced locally by Free Voice South Sudan (and more recently by
Ammalna) in collaboration with the United States Institute of Peace and the Peace Tech Lab.
Sawa Shabab aims to promote peace and stability by hosting a continuing conversation with
youth and changing attitudes about their roles in resolving conflict (Dolan 2015). Episodes are
broadcast in English and Arabic as well as Nuer and Dinka, airing on Radio Miraya, the Catholic
Radio network and other local radio stations. The show claims to reach, and aims to speak to, all
communities, including South Sudanese outside of the country.

In 2014, UNICEF and Search for Common Ground, with support from USAID, carried out the
“Communicating for Peace in South Sudan: A Social and Behaviour Change Communication
Initiative”. This targeted youth and youth influencers through radio programming and outreach

27
activities, aiming to “foster behaviours leading to more social cohesion” and “strengthen
resilience against conflict” (Forcier Consulting 2016a: 1). In addition to communication
workshops for religious leaders (who were considered to have considerable influence on youth)
and media staff training and participatory theatre, a main component was radio programming
targeted at youth. This included two radio programmes:

1. Hiwar al Shabaab - a talk show that aimed to provide an opportunity for youth to discuss
the drivers of conflict in their communities
2. Sergeant Esther - a radio drama about Esther, a policewoman who resolves conflict in
her community through peaceful dialogue and speaks up against the misuse of power

The non-radio components of this programme are discussed later in this review. With regards to
radio programming, Forcier Consulting, who evaluated the initiative in 2016(b), found that:

 Effectiveness was measured according to three different criteria: reach (or whether the
programme reached the intended audience); resonance (which indicates whether the
broadcasted messages are relevant to local people); and response (linked to knowledge,
behaviour and attitude changes associated to being exposed to the show).
 Although the reach of the programme can still be improved, Hiwar al Shabaab proved
quite successful in reaching local communities in Juba and Wau (Sergeant Esther was
not reviewed in this study as it had only started broadcasting a month before the
research began).
 Hiwar al Shabaab listeners held a positive view of the programme, indicating that it was
very effective in promoting peace. They highlighted the relevance of the topics and the
usefulness of allowing local people to call in and express their views.
 The final evaluation survey revealed that 95.4% of Hiwar al Shabaab listeners did not
believe their communities approve of violence against other tribes, compared to 82.2% of
non-listeners. This difference was mostly due to the results recorded in Juba, where
sentiments against the use of violence appeared to be much stronger among listeners
than among non-listeners.

Another evaluation completed by Forcier Consulting in 2017 of two different projects (“‘I Love My
Country’: Promoting Localised Understanding and Peaceful Coexistence in South Sudan” and “‘I
Love My Country’: Strategic Communications for Peace Building in South Sudan”, the latter
being of particular relevance to this review). These projects promoted peace, tolerance and
reconciliation, and included radio drama and short media productions as well as participatory
theatre components. Examination of the indicators that track the reach and efficacy of
interventions as well as those of social cohesion, suggest that radio programming and
participatory theatre performances continue to be important and relevant platforms for
transmitting messages about peace, tolerance, and conflict resolution. Nevertheless, several
recommendations emerged from the evaluation of these projects that may improve their capacity
to promote social cohesion and may have wider resonance for other similar projects:

 Targeted programming may be necessary to address pervasive issues in the

communities. These are context-specific.
 Target areas may require different levels of programme resources and interventions
should build on existing local capacities.

28
  The reach and resonance of these theatre performances can be multiplied if
performances are captured on audio and/or video and re-played elsewhere.
 Informational activities that help listeners be discerning consumers of media may help
counter misinformation, bias, and a medium promoting unity rather than division.
 Additional research is needed on why those with no formal education are less likely to
listen to radio and attend theatre performances.
 Donors and implementing partners should consider methods for promoting positive
intertribal contact as part of participatory theatre activities and other community outreach
efforts. Theatre performances can be shown to an ethnically diverse audience, followed
by informal discussion groups, for example. Other public spaces where positive contact
between tribes can be promoted are schools and churches, where conflict is less likely to
occur.

Together We Can was a six month pilot project carried out between 2015 and 2016 by Search
for Common Ground, with support from UNDP. The aim of the project was to promote peaceful
coexistence between Madi and Acholi communities in Magwi County. The project built on
existing grassroots networks to train leaders from both communities to identify root causes and
consequences of the conflict and create safe spaces for dialogue. In order to amplify the impact
of the results and share the projects findings with the wider community, roundtable discussions
were held on local radio stations.

Radio has also been effectively used as a medium for communicating with IDPs in camps. For
example, Boda Boda Talk Talk is a radio program, developed by Internews, and airs in U.N.
camps for IDP in Juba and Malakal. To circumvent the problem of lack of access to radios, this is
broadcast on speakers in tents, or attached to speakers driven around the IDP camps on
motorbikes (called boda bodas). This programme offers a news update with local information and
NGO-sponsored info about services for displaced people. Greetings can also be sent from camp
inhabitants to others and two-minute soap operas on relevant issues acted out by locals
comprise the rest of the program. Internews trains local citizen journalists on how to gather
information in the camps and investigate what the displaced communities’ needs are. The goal of
the program is to help humanitarian NGOs communicate more effectively with displaced people
in need of services (Dolan 2015). In March 2015, Internews also launched a radio station called
Nile FM aimed at displaced communities (Dolan 2015).

Challenges for radio programming

Forcier Consulting (2015b) concludes that the use of the radio is an appropriate means to target
youth and promote peace, given its popularity in South Sudan. Moreover, media has the potential
to generate social and individual change while providing useful information and entertainment to
local populations. Nevertheless, the study also identified challenges. Remote areas remain
outside of radio reach and coverage can be inconsistent. Additionally, the entire media sector
faces a weak legal framework and a climate of fear. The civil war has exacerbated existing
fragilities caused by weak legal institutions and political pressures. Government raids of major
media outlets, harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary detentions are common.

Dolan (2015) also reflects on some of the challenges facing radio programming. These include
lack of local language media content and poor information infrastructure – these factors limit the
reach of media projects. The resurgence of war has created additional challenges. For example,
several community stations were destroyed. Some have been rebuilt, while others have broken

29
new ground. Additionally, the political space for open debate and press freedom has been
narrowed as a result of the on-going violence. Local media faced scrutiny prior to the first
outbreak of fighting, control has increased since December 2013. Several journalists have been
arrested and attacked. Local radio stations such as the Catholic Radio Network’s Radio Bakhita
have been shut down, while the U.N.’s Radio Miraya has been threatened with closure. Self-
censorship by journalists and media houses is therefore widespread.

Other media: print media, television, computers and mobile phones

Trust in most other media sources remains low (Saferworld 2015). Forcier Consulting’s (2015b)
media landscape study finds that:

 Access to television and visual media are hampered by poverty and limited electricity and
telecommunications infrastructure. The state-owned South Sudan TV dominates among
existing channels. Saferworld (2015) also notes the lack of trust in state-run television.
 Print media is not readily available beyond the capital and remains inaccessible for large
portions of the population due to low literacy rates and language barriers. Newspapers
are often expensive given that there are only two printing presses in the country; many
papers are printed in neighbouring countries and imported into South Sudan for
circulation.
 Internet access is extremely limited for the majority of the population: the 2015 study
found that fewer than 1 in 10 respondents had ever accessed the internet.
 Mobile phone penetration levels are nearing the same levels as radio access and usage.
Overall, 44% of respondents have access to a mobile phone: three out of ten (31%)
respondents have their own mobile phone and 13% have access to the phone of
someone close to them such as a friend or relative.
 There are persistent gender disparities in access to all types of media.
 Greater levels of media access are associated with more favourable socio-economic
indicators and higher education levels.

Arts, culture and sports events

The potential of initiatives centred around arts and culture to effectively engage with youth across
the existing divides has been highlighted by several sources. This may be because of their
potential to engage youth more easily than other types of initiatives, but also because they may
be able to operate more easily, in the current repressive political climate, without the threat of
being shut down by the government.

Almquist Knopf (2013) suggests that cultural initiatives have the potential to capitalise on South
Sudan’s heterogeneity (often a root of ethnic tension) in order to create potential unifiers. She
argues that if ways can be found to create appreciation and respect for diversity which is rooted
in culture, these may be harnessed to foster a new, unifying, national identity. Such a process
would include identifying, documenting, preserving, and celebrating the rich cultural heritage that
exists in South Sudan as well as shared histories of liberation struggle (Almquist Knopf 2013: 35)

Similarly, Forcier Consulting (2015a: 12) cites sport, games, music and cultural activities such as
traditional dance as popular unifiers which can increase social cohesion and enhance nation-
building efforts. Search for Common Ground (2016a) also suggests that traditional dance, music

30
and sports such as football and wrestling can provide opportunities for people to gather and
engage in dialogue across dividing lines.

Despite numerous references to culture as a mechanism for engaging wider communities,

including youth, this review found that detailed information about these types of initiatives, and
particularly their impact on youth engagement or the ways in which they are perceived by youth,
remains elusive. References are mostly anecdotal, referred to in journalistic accounts, (I)NGO
and academic literature in passing or mentioned by the experts contacted. In the timeframe
available for this review, no detailed sources were identified which are able to shed light on the
degree of trust enjoyed by arts, culture and sports-based initiatives amongst South Sudanese
youth. It is, therefore, difficult to assess to what extent these are trusted by, able to reach, and
effectively engage with youth.

Nevertheless, the following section details some of the key arts, cultural, theatrical and sports
events which were highlighted during the course of this review:

Arts, culture and performance theatre

Ana Taban (translates as “I’m tired” in Arabic) is a group of young musicians, fashion designers
and poets who are using art and culture to demand peace in South Sudan (Dahir 2016). Ana
Taban holds regular open-air performances around the capital Juba and in other towns to call for
peace and to educate their fellow citizens on the need for a non-violent resolution of the conflict
(Campeanu 2017). Because the literature on Ana Taban is limited to anecdotal accounts and
short pieces in the local and international press and other “grey literature” it is not possible to
ascertain any detail on the effectiveness of the group’s efforts in engaging and mobilising youth.

Likikiri Collective is a multimedia arts and education organisation located in Souq Militia, Juba.
The term “Likikiri” means “stories” in Bari, a language spoken in several communities in South
Sudan. According to the organisation’s website, Likikiri builds on the broader South Sudanese
oral tradition which is “historically a vehicle for the intergenerational transmission of social and
cultural information and values”. Its arts and humanities-based projects document the life,
explore the cultures, and voice the concerns of South Sudanese, and seek to make connections
across various sectors, including education, culture, development, and peacebuilding. Reflecting
the ideas put forward by Almquist Knopf (2013) above, Likikiri Collective’s founders state that:
“We believe that culture plays an essential role as a resource for nation-building, and to this end,
we are dedicated to working with a diverse range of cultural producers–from amateurs and
students to scholars and professionals in every field–and to empowering and mentoring
marginalised voices.”

Some of the activities carried out by Likikiri Collective include;

1. Community oral history and memory programme, in collaboration with educational

institutions, government institutions, religious associations, civil society and community-
based organisations and students at all levels. Aims to recover, reflect on, record and
share South Sudanese oral histories.
2. An annual theatre lab and festival called Planting Possibilities focused on education,
public entertainment and civic engagement.
3. Intercultural dialogue workshops sponsored by UNESCO in 2017.

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Participatory theatre also emerged as a popular communication medium, utilised by a number of
initiatives in South Sudan:

Masraa Ta Shaab (Citizen’s Theatre) is a national theatre movement for reconciliation and
social change through forum theatre. Although it is difficult to measure the impact of forum
theatre, this is often cited as an effective tool to complement other communication initiatives such
as radio, SMS and film (see, for example, Search for Common Ground 2016a). The effectiveness
of forum theatre in South Sudan is attributed to several factors, including the country’s
longstanding cultural tradition of storytelling, as well as the use of local language in theatre
performances. Masraa Ta Shaab has, since 2012, trained over 800 secondary school students
across the country in “citizen’s theatre” (a South Sudanese version of Augusto Boal’s Theatre of
the Oppressed). Whilst the initiative is aimed at youth, performances engage the wider
communities, including through corresponding radio and film production. The main issues tackled
by this forum theatre initiative are peaceful co-existence and national identity, need for youth
empowerment and gender inequality. Citizen Theatre trainings, performances and festivals have
taken place so far in 7 of the 10 states. A case study on Masraa Ta Shaab claims that
participating in forum theatre and youth group work can have a positive impact at the individual
level. This initiative is building a national network of theatre groups, through its work with
secondary school students and youth groups.

UNICEF and Search for Common Ground’s Communicating for Peace in South Sudan: A
Social and Behaviour Change Communication Initiative (discussed in the previous media
section) involved a participatory theatre component. Actors travelled to different communities,
researched the main local drivers of conflict and designed a relevant performance to be acted out
interactively with community members and discussed with the audience (Forcier Consulting
2016b). In its evaluation of this initiative, Forcier Consulting (2016b) concluded that while
participatory theatre was perceived as an effective method for educating people, performances
faced challenges. These include delays in transportation between performance locations and
tribal divisions that prevent Nuer from performing in Dinka areas and Dinkas from performing in
Nuer areas. Additionally, female performers felt that their role as peace promoters in the
community was diminished by the fact that they were women.

Sports events

Sports, such as wrestling, football, running and basketball, have also been cited as potential
unifiers across ethnic divides (Andruga 2016; Forcier Consulting 2016b; Search for Common
Ground 2016a; Almquist Knopf 2013). Forcier Consulting (2016b) suggests that sports events
have two key benefits: (1) bringing together different ethnic groups and helping to build
relationships between them, as well as (2) providing psychosocial benefits for people who have
experienced trauma.

Along these lines, targeted sports events have been used to engage South Sudanese
adolescents and youth, to provide entertainment, foster dialogue between divided communities
and communicate important information. For example, in 2014, UNICEF’s Peacebuilding
Education and Advocacy (PBEA) partnered with the locally based NGO Sports for Hope to
organise a sports tournament for 7,000 adolescents and youth in Juba from Dinka, Nuer, and
Zande ethnic groups. The event was also used to disseminate information on HIV/AIDS
prevention, community resilience, and peacebuilding (Forcier Consulting 2016b: 3).

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Wrestling is also popular amongst South Sudanese youth. In 2016, a Wrestling for Peace
competition for Greater Yirol was organised by Solidarity Ministries Africa for Reconciliation &
Development (SMARD), supported by UNDP’s Community Security and Small Arms project
(UNDP 2016). This aimed to promote social cohesion and foster friendly ties between the
communities. A not-for-profit organisation called South Sudan Wrestling Entertainment
(SSWE) was founded in 2010 to engage youth from different backgrounds in reconciliation efforts
through wrestling as well as promoting youth employment. Its website states that: “The game of
wrestling is endowed with cultural riches and at a crucial moment in the nation’s history, the time
is right for the people of South Sudan to look inward and build on things that unite them rather
than the differences that exist among them. Tribes in Jonglei, Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, and
Central Equatoria states practice wrestling; wrestling can be a building block towards a common
national identity.”

According to SSWE’s website, the organisation received funding from USAID in 2016, to hold a
wrestling tournament. After the tournament a group of wrestlers convened to discuss cattle
raiding issues in their communities, which led to the successful return of some stolen cattle.

Whilst sports and wrestling initiatives appear popular, there is little empirical evidence, despite
anecdotal outcomes cited above, on what impact they ultimately have on the attitudes and
behaviours of South Sudanese youth.

Civil society actors and organisations

The definition of civil society in South Sudan is diffuse. Tubiana (2014) notes civil society is
generally defined as “everything between the state and the family”, but excludes the business
and political worlds. Importantly, as pointed out by Virk and Nganje (2015: 1) “the nature and role
of civil society in South Sudan has largely been shaped by a Western narrative that equates civil
society with NGOs, while tending to ignore existing institutions such as local chiefs and traditional
authorities”. According to Virk and Nganje (2015), there are more than 5,000 registered NGOs in
South Sudan, including “briefcase NGOs” (which have been formed mainly to access donor
funding).

A number of problems have been identified related to South Sudanese NGOs. According to Virk
and Nganje (2015), many lack sufficient capacity, clear objectives, subject-specific knowledge
and skills. Others operate without adequate funding and technical support, in part because the
majority of funding tends to go to Juba-based organisations. In turn, competition for donor
resources can undermine crucial collaboration between NGOs as well as distort organisational
agendas. The return to conflict in 2013 has further damaged relations between South Sudanese
NGOs by heightening divisions based on political and/ or ethnic affiliations, whilst different parties
to the conflict have sought to co-opt NGOs. Tubiana (2014) therefore cautions against the
“widely held belief that [civil society actors] are broadly pro-peace and less ethnically divided and
“political” than others – but still able to influence armed actors”. He notes that efforts to involve
civil society in de-escalating the crisis have been fraught since community-based leaders have
often expressed their support for various armed factions. It has been suggested that during the
conflict between South Sudan and Khartoum, one unified agenda which made it easier for civil
society to engage with, and across, communities. Following the outbreak of violence in
December 2013, however, ethnic divisions have been strengthened, which makes it more difficult
for civil society organisations to work across ethnic lines (Rift Valley Institute 2016a: 38). In other
cases, NGOs operate in “a climate of fear, intimidation and harassment” due to the current
political climate (Virk and Nganje 2015: 1).

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It is widely agreed that the context in which South Sudanese NGOs operate has changed
dramatically since the outbreak of conflict. Kurki (2015) highlights that the protracted civil war
forces civil society organisations (CSOs) to operate in a volatile and constantly changing
environment. With a lack of appropriate resources and support, it can be difficult to keep
operating. Indeed, with the outbreak of conflict, many NGOs ceased operations whilst others
went underground. Some have resumed activities, but others remain weak, lacking in human and
structural resources.

Given the timeframe available for this review, as well as the complex landscape within which
South Sudanese NGOs operate, it has not been possible to carry out a detailed survey of the
role of South Sudanese NGOs in engaging with youth or the levels of trust enjoyed by these.
Additionally, the majority of existing literature relates to the more traditional CSOs referred to by
Virk and Nganje (2015), such as spiritual and religious leaders and organisations as well as
chiefs, elders and community leaders. Whilst this does not mean that there are not CSOs –
including youth and women’s groups - working effectively to engage youth, the evidence on
these is much more limited (see for example Reeve, who in his 2012 assessment of the South
Sudanese conflict concludes that there is a need for additional research on the structures of
youth organisations and leadership in different communities in South Sudan and how these might
be engaged constructively in support of peace).

This section of the review therefore focuses primarily on the more traditional types of CSOs,
including spiritual and religious leaders as well as community leaders, chiefs and elders.

Spiritual and religious leaders

A number of sources highlight the trusted status of spiritual and religious leaders at the
community level (including Andruga 2016; Search for Common Ground 2016a; Forcier
Consulting 2016b, 2015b; International Crisis Group 2014; Almquist Knopf 2013). However, with
the exception of Breidlid and Arensen’s (2014) work on traditional Nuer spiritual leaders, much of
this literature refers to the positions of respect and trust held by churches and religious leaders
more widely within communities, and evidence on the relationship between religious institutions
and leaders with youth more specifically is limited. Despite this, several international
organisations have included religious leaders as key stakeholders in their programmes targeting
youth. This implies that there is a perception that these actors are, or have the potential to be,
trusted by youth. For example, the UNICEF-Search for Common Ground initiative outlined in a
previous section of this review included communication workshops for religious leaders as one of
its key components (Forcier Consulting 2016b: 4).

Traditional spiritual leaders

Breidlid and Arensen (2014) note the continuing authority of traditional spiritual leaders in the
Nuer community as well as their influence over youth in the White Army. The authors explain that
Nuer spiritual leaders held significant roles during the civil war and post-CPA period, and several
were important actors in the renewed conflict. The most influential spiritual leaders were relied on
for blessings, through the sacrifice of bulls, and are perceived to protect and direct youth during
fighting through visions of the future. They also helped to resolve internal disputes and were, on
some occasions, key to unifying rival Nuer factions in the face of a common enemy. Because of
their perceived powers they often enjoy close relations with White Army leaders and youth in
general, although their influence also rises and falls according to the efficacy of their

34
pronouncements. Breidlid and Arensen argue that while the international community primarily
engages with political and military leaders in times of crisis, spiritual leaders are too often
ignored.

Religious institutions and leaders

Almquist Knopf (2013) suggests that churches are one of the few platforms in South Sudan
which can create social bonds and networks across social divides. She notes that churches are
trusted because of their historical role in the country’s conflicts. For example, during the war,
mission-run boarding schools provided one of the only civilian platforms for building social
networks. Leaders of the 12 main churches represent more than 60% of the population. Because
churches have been perceived as a credible, independent voice, they have been able to facilitate
engagement across ethnic divisions.

Forcier Consulting (2016b) highlights that the key role of religion in South Sudanese society
means that churches, mosques, and other religious gathering points can be important neutral
meeting places in communities. This is supported by Search for Common Ground (2016a), who
suggests that churches are spaces where people from diverse backgrounds can gather and
engage in dialogue across dividing lines. Religious gatherings are often used to pass messages
and information to community members. A 2015 survey by Forcier Consulting finds that 26% of
respondents in the study reported receiving their news and information from religious leaders.
They are particularly trusted by individuals who do not access radio or other media (2015b: 3).

Reeve (2012) also suggests that Christianity is one of the more unifying aspects of South
Sudanese identity, in part because church congregations are often ethnically mixed. However,
his research also found emerging divisions between senior churchmen and the newer grassroots
clergy members. Additionally, coordination between the churches, government and traditional
leaders remains weak. Reeve also identified Islamic leaders as important intermediaries,
especially in cities and northern states, and potentially with Sudanese communities north of the
border.

Breidlid and Stensland (2011) attribute trust in churches and church leaders to the fact that these
were often among the few actors that stayed and suffered with the local populations during the
civil war. Because of this, they were often effective in bridging intercommunal differences. The
authors argue that the role of the churches has diminished more recently due to both internal and
external causes, including a problematic merger between the New Sudan Council of Churches
(NSCC) and the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). Financial mismanagement in the SCC has
also impacted on perceptions of the church. Despite this, churches remain present in rural
communities, and possess high degrees of indigenous knowledge and local legitimacy, which
makes them well-suited to play an active role in grassroots peacebuilding. Since women are
already active members in their congregations, churches also provide an important arena for
strengthening the position of women in local peacebuilding.

Nevertheless, Breidlid and Stensland also identify several factors which can undermine trust in
churches or weaken their capacity to operate effectively, including corruption, nepotism and
ethnic politics. Following the CPA, some church organisations became fragmented. Others
began to focus on internal organisation-specific interests, rather than ecumenical cooperation,
weakening cohesion across denominations. The brain-drain phenomenon has also weakened
the capacity of many local churches.

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Community leaders, chiefs and elders

Forcier Consulting (2015a and 2016b) notes that community leaders and chiefs are often trusted
to promote peace at the local level. Of the respondents in Forcier’s 2015a study, over half stated
that they would choose to consult with community leaders or elders to resolve intra-communal or
inter-tribal conflict. Community chiefs are considered credible sources of information, and are
responsible for implementing customary and traditional law. Search for Common Ground (2016a)
also find that community leaders and elders are perceived as critical in shaping the overall
attitudes and behaviours of community members and establishing societal norms.

Almquist Knopf (2013) writes that many South Sudanese hold higher levels of respect and
confidence in their tribal leaders than in political officials. In some cases, this has created tension
between the new state and traditional authorities. She also notes that in some places, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army’s (SPLM/A) appointment of civil/military administrators to
supervise tribal chiefs in liberated areas disrupted traditional processes and militarised the
chieftaincy structures. In others, however, it helped to reduce violence. Nevertheless, Almquist
Knopf points out that this practice has eroded the connection between citizens and their leaders
by making chiefs accountable to a different set of interests (i.e., the SPLM/A) than those of
citizens.

Santschi (2012) argues that chiefs are significant stakeholders at the local level, because of their
ability to mobilise community members for local projects and campaigns, mediate disputes as
well as administer customary law. She notes, however, that their influence has diminished since
the war began and that their role remains contested. Considered by some as apolitical
representatives of community interests, others have been implicated in their relationships to
government institutions, co-opted by colonial and post-colonial powers, manipulated by the
national elite and/ or acted in their own interests. Santschi suggests that further research is
needed to gain insights into the relations between chiefs, communities, and local government
institutions.

Others have also acknowledged the contested roles of local chiefs, highlighting that this can
result in specifically intergenerational tensions. Reeve (2012: 55) suggests that the authority of
traditional leaders is often contested by the youth. He argues that traditional leadership declined
during the war due to their politicisation by armed factions or co-option by occupying military
forces, which can also be linked to the escalation in cultures of violence among young men since
the war. He reflects that “it is uncertain whether this authority can be re-established” (ibid).

Willems and Rouw (2011) also suggest that the influence commanded by traditional leaders has
declined in more recent years, although to varying degrees in different parts of South Sudan.
Local contexts are key to understanding the relationships between chiefs and youth.

The declining respect of chiefs and traditional leaders, including amongst youth, is widely
acknowledged by chiefs who took part in a meeting to discuss the role of chiefs and elders in
peace and conflict (Rift Valley Institute 2016b).

Ensor (2013a) examines the impact of the two million returnees to South Sudan since 2005. Her
study focuses on the role played by the return of displaced youth and the intergenerational
tensions that have emerged as a result. These are often due to displaced youths’ aspirations to a
“modern” – often meaning urban – way of life perceived as incompatible with traditional
livelihoods and social relations. For the youngest generations, the terms “return” and
“reintegration” can be misnomers, as they are settling in the land of their elders for the first time,

36
often adopting unaccustomed lifestyles which do not often meet their expectations. Many
returnees resettle in urban locations, either because they lack the skills necessary to work as
farmers after years of living in northern cities or refugee camps, or because they lack interest in
returning to an agro-pastoralist lifestyle – or, in the case of children and youth, who were born
and raised in cities and towns, have never actually done so. The author argues that
intergenerational differences regarding reintegration needs and aspirations are still largely
unexamined and insufficiently understood.

Customary courts can also provide some relevant insights into chief and elder relationships with
youth on a local level. Ibreck and Pendle (2016) examine customary chief’s courts at PoC sites in
South Sudan. Although the UN civilian police service (UNPOL) was responsible for policing
within the PoCs, its capacity to do so was dwarfed by the scale and nature of the task. Because
of this, PoC residents turned to customary authority. While chiefs’ courts are often the only
functioning justice mechanism at community level, chiefs have been found to yield both
“structural benefits” and “harms”. That is, whilst some chiefs can effectively manage conflict and
pursue legitimate justice, others have been implicated in perpetuating norms that reproduce
gender and generational inequalities. Reflecting findings in other studies of customary justice,
court decisions can reproduce inequalities between elders and youth and, in particular, the power
of families and communities over women. Ibreck and Pendle suggest that rather than classifying
authorities, chiefs, church leaders or militia groups along a spectrum, contradictions and changes
which create evolving relations between authorities and citizens should be anticipated and
examined.

Youth leaders and youth groups

From the limited evidence identified in the time allocated for this review, it is unclear to what
extent youth leaders and organisations are engaging with, and trusted by, youth across South
Sudan to serve as their representatives and/ or serve as trusted sources of information. This is
supported by Reeve’s (2012) research, which suggests that there is a lack of detailed and
reliable data on the structures of youth organisations and leadership in South Sudanese
communities, including how they might be engaged constructively in the peace process. The
relevant evidence that was identified tended to be somewhat dated, indicating that there is less
available data from the years following the outbreak of the most recent conflict. As noted earlier
in this review, the conflict has significantly altered the landscape in which CSOs and NGOs
operate, and this is likely also the case for youth organisations.

Sommers and Schwartz (2011) note that youth groups were instrumental in the 2011
independence referendum campaign. The authors observe that, since then, “most youth groups
generally appear to be withering from decreasing support and either underemphasising or
overlooking the issues facing South Sudan’s massive, undereducated youth majority” (2011: 12).
Youth representatives from different states, who also sit on the Youth Parliament, have been
cited as possible influencers. Research by Sommers and Schwartz found, however, that “the
Youth Parliament is essentially inoperative and mostly unknown”. The authors also emphasise
what they term “the elite youth factor”. They highlight that while the majority of youth in South
Sudan are undereducated and poor, a small influential group of educated elite youth are located
in Juba and the state capitals. Some of these elite youth have gained employment with national
and international NGOs and government. They also comprise South Sudan’s “recognised civil
society organisations”. Despite this, they often articulate a different set of priorities from their

37
poorer, non-elite and rural counterparts and it is therefore questionable to what extent they are
representative of, or trusted by, South Sudanese youth more widely.

Taflinski (2012) notes that youth are involved in various capacities and at various levels (at local,
state, regional and national). This involvement is organised very differently from state to state. He
finds that:

 In most states, state-wide youth umbrella associations were identified that link county-
level youth organisations (e.g. Lakes State Youth Union). Yet, some states did not
possess such structures. In other cases, these were politicised during the 2010 elections
by the SPLM, which resulted in the cessation of activities by the association (e.g. in
Western Bahr el Ghazal). Additionally, in Jonglei State county-level youth associations
maintained liaison offices in the state capitals, representing the county youth at state-
level but also liaising closely with other youth associations (e.g. with umbrella structures),
a coordination mechanism not found in other states.
 In some states active CSOs were identified that focused on youth (e.g. Eastern Equatoria
and Western Equatoria States). These also exhibited context-specific traits. For example,
In Western Equatoria State, a CSO was found that was headed by an individual active
with the Arrow Boys. In other states, there was little organisation in terms of youth CSOs
and youth associations, although the governor had a dedicated youth advisor (e.g.
Western Bahr el Ghazal).
 Youth structures linked to religious groups were also identified. Churches (including
Catholic, Episcopal and Pentecostal) often ran youth groups. In addition, in some states
the Islamic Councils (e.g. Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile State) also ran youth
activities.
 Taflinski identified student-organised unions in several states. Student associations also
existed in states without universities. At times these were structured along tribal lines.
 In other states, scout groups were identified. Their aims varied greatly and there were
salient differences from one group to another.
 On a more regional and national level, organisation of youth also varied greatly: The Bahr
el Ghazal area has recently witnessed the creation of the “Greater Bahr el Ghazal Youth
Association” following the Bahr el Ghazal Youth Conference on 24-27 November 2011 in
Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal. There have been reports and claims that the other
regions (Equatoria and Upper Nile) might follow suit.
 In addition, diverse organisations also sought to unify youth at national level: The
organisation GEBU is working on fostering links between regional youth, and the Youth
Parliament in Juba is also drawing in youth from across South Sudan. An additional
noteworthy finding concerns youth activity in Juba: the team identified youth who are
following the proceedings in the National Assembly as youth observers.
 Youth were also involved in traditional society, particular amongst some South Sudanese
tribes: the Monyemiji in some Eastern Equatorian tribes (e.g. Lopit and Lotuko), held the
particular assignment of protecting the communities. The Monyemiji were the ruling youth
age groups in their communities and their primary role was to provide security, look into
livelihood issues (for instance in times of drought), consult and petition the rain maker,
and handle all social issues of their communities. These were often grouped by age. In
some communities the ruling period of Monyemiji was between 20 to 23 years while other
communities had a specific term limit of 12 years before yet another group was initiated.

38
 Monyemiji from one village were developing a network with other neighbouring villages
as a way to bolster the security situation in that locality, while in other tribes youth were
responsible of keeping the cattle.

Taflinski’s research does not indicate to what extent these various youth representatives and
organisations are, or are not, trusted by youth. It is also unclear to what extent these identified
groupings still exist following the most recent outbreak of conflict.

Women’s groups

While this review came across references to women’s groups as community influencers (for
example, Andruga 2016), it was not possible to identify reliable evidence of these. It is possible
that women’s groups suffer the same challenges as youth organisations in the current civil
society landscape in South Sudan. Furthermore, there are additional challenges for women,
despite being key stakeholders that hamper their meaningful participation in the resolution of the
South Sudanese conflict (Chugtai 2016). Pervasive gender inequality may also shape their
involvement. Relatedly, these groups may also find it more difficult to access support and
resources. Case (2016: 4) notes that although “women’s networks arose immediately after the
conflict erupted and have been working for peace since […] their sustained engagement requires
dedicated funding from the donor community.” Search for Common Ground (2016a) notes that
community actors are often involved in conflict in different ways and that influences are likely to
shift from private to public spheres; between open and hidden influencers. They note that while
elders may be more visibly involved, for example, women may be working more behind the
scenes. This may contribute to the challenges identifying evidence of their influence amongst
youth. Examples this review came across were largely anecdotal. For example, Fordham (2012)
notes that women often possess information on the ground, since they are at home and know
what is going on. Yet, often they have not been empowered to use their knowledge. She
describes the role of a group of South Sudanese women on a non-violent peace force team on
the outskirts of Juba, noting that “for many of these women, their participation in the teams is the
first time they have had an active, recognised role in this kind of group.” She goes on to cite
some examples of successes these women achieved mediating amongst men, including youth,
within the community. Nevertheless, wider credible evidence of the role of women as influencers
of youth remains elusive.

Police
Democratic policing is still weak in South Sudan, where local police forces often operate in
paramilitary style (Small Arms Survey 2017). Jok (2013: 1) refers to the “very negative public
image” suffered by the South Sudanese National Police Service (SSNPS), related to incidents of
drinking on the job, engaging in corruption or extorting money from the public. The need to build
trust between communities and police is widely acknowledged and evident in the emphasis on
community-based approaches to policing initiatives. Attitudes towards, and trust in, local police
are mixed in many communities.

The examination by Willems and Rouw (2011) of the local security context in Jonglei, Western
Equatoria State and Eastern Equatoria State, including roles and perceptions of police, can shed
some light on some of the challenges that undermine community members’ trust in the police.
The authors note that in their research areas, most of the police consisted of former SPLA
soldiers who are too old to fight, and with aged senior personnel “retired” from the SPLA in the

39
command of the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS), junior recruits with training are restricted in
their work. Furthermore, the police remained poorly trained, underequipped, and most police can
be found at headquarters rather than at payam and boma administrative levels. The authors
found that perceptions of police are mixed. For example, many communities saw the logic in
reporting their security issues to the police, but they also recognise the inherent limitations of an
underequipped and small police force. In addition to lack of capacity, lack of trust is created by
the high median age of the police forces. Another component adding to frustration with the police
is when “the police are from the same tribe as the raiders, they will have contact with them and
do not come until the raiders are gone” (2011: 23). These insights correspond with survey
findings indicating that “although most people surveyed say they would report insecurities to the
police, many remain unconvinced of the capacity and efficacy of the police” (2011: 23).

Saferworld’s work on community-based approaches to policing in South Sudan also reveal mixed
perceptions of police. Whilst community members consider the police as the primary security
provider in their communities, they also recognise their shortcomings (Daley 2015). As a part of
its community-based approaches to policing, Saferworld advocates for female police offers to be
based at local police stations. In some of these cases, female police officers have begun to play
an important role in working with youth to prevent them from becoming involved in violence and
crime (Brethfeld 2015). It was not possible, however, to identify more detailed information about
this Saferworld initiative or its outcomes.

6. Knowledge gaps and further research

Given the patchy nature of the evidence in South Sudan, scarcity of academic literature on South
Sudanese youth, and the complexity of the issues, this section provides a small selection of key
knowledge gaps and ideas for further research. However, these suggestions are not
comprehensive. Over the past few years, significant progress has been made in the collection of
data on South Sudan. However, in general there is limited rigorous evidence of how people live
in contexts of conflict: what choices people make, and how institutional arrangements impact on
and are affected by these decisions (Justino et al, 2013). It is also important to recognise that
South Sudan’s social, economic and political context has been and is still changing very rapidly.

Taking into account the limitations of working in a conflict-affected country, where possible, future
research and analysis of youth in South Sudan needs to be more in-depth, longer-term,
empirical, and evidence-based. Prominent issues vary widely from state to state and from county
to county, as do the livelihood options available and interest groups, local context is hence key.
Moreover, further research needs to take into account the types of youth studied (i.e. rural vs
urban, younger (under 18) vs older (18+), IDPs vs settled, ethnicities etc.) and the geographical
extent covered (i.e. having a more even spread, focusing on less studied areas of South Sudan
away from Juba and Central Equatoria (whilst not disregarding these completely), looking at both
rural and urban areas within states/counties). The following suggestions are some of the broad
thematic areas that could be looked at further, but these are is not exhaustive:

 More in-depth research that focuses specifically on youth livelihoods in South Sudan,
looking at the types of employment young men are being employed in (e.g. non-waged
work in the informal sector, working in the agricultural sector, formal sector,
entrepreneurship etc., especially in rural areas).

40
  There is a need for critical research into how young people deal with unemployment and
navigate opportunities in the informal sector, and how this might relate to other forms of
social and political action (Oosterom, 2016).
 Aspirations and long-term prospects of returning youth migrants is another area for
further research.
 More in-depth understanding of the motivations and mechanisms of youth who do not
engage in conflict or who deal with conflict in a non-violent manner, bearing in mind that
this is the majority of South Sudanese youth (especially focusing on youths who have
lived through war as civilians or rural youth in general).
 More nuanced and in-depth understanding of the complex and varied motivations and
drivers for (some) youth to engage in violence, especially on a micro-level (see Justino et
al, 2014) (e.g. a better understanding of the many motivations behind cattle raiding, such
as the influence of dowry payments, community pressures, social norms and wealth
accumulation etc.).
 More detailed information on the role (and presence) of civil society in youth’s lives in
different communities (especially youth groups and women’s groups), and the level of
engagement and trust youth have in religious institutions and traditional community
leaders.
 More nuanced and in-depth research into the degree of trust enjoyed by arts, culture and
sports-based initiatives amongst South Sudanese youth, and the impact of these on
youth engagement.

7. References
AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA (2012) South Sudan: Youth Unemployment Briefing, African
Economic Outlook 2012, African Development Bank.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the following experts who voluntarily provided suggestions for relevant literature or
other advice to the author to support the preparation of this report. The content of the report does
not necessarily reflect the opinions of any of the experts consulted.

 Alex de Waal, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

 Becky Carter, Institute of Development Studies
 Daniel G. Maxwell, Tufts University
 Emmely Benschof, The Hague Academy of Local Governance
 Guy Njike, UNMISS
 Hannah Logan, The London School of Economics
 Hayley Umayam, Forcier Consulting
 Justin Flynn, Institute of Development Studies
 Marc Sommers, Boston University
 Marisa O. Ensor, Georgetown University
 Martina Santschi, Swiss Peace
 Naomi Pendle, London School of Economics
 Patricia Justino, Institute of Development Studies
 Dr Philip Mader, Institute of Development Studies
 Ross Wignall, University of Sussex/Oxford Brooks
 Theo Dolan, PeaceTech Lab

Key websites
 Pulse of South Sudan http://www.thepulseofsouthsudan.com/
 South Sudan Peace Portal https://www.southsudanpeaceportal.com/

48
Suggested citation
Price, R.A. and A. Orrnert (2017) Youth in South Sudan: livelihoods and conflict. K4D Helpdesk
Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

About this report

This report is based on eighteen days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid
syntheses of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific
questions relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact [email protected].

K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI).

This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International
Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for
non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any
consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing
organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2017.

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