AVON/ N137/ 950 A

FiuE smHSH moiiTHS on

HmERICfl'S BESTSEbbER bISTS!

THE
PEnKousKiy

"One of the
most extraordin
documents in the hi^n|
of espionage." nEUISIUEEK

"*^*^'^^^-— -^
When The Penkovskiy Papers was pub-
lished in hardcover by Doubleday and
Company, it aroused the greatest contro-
versy to be stirred by a book in years.
Denunciations and praise are still being
hurtled from Moscow to London to Wash-
ington. Below is a selection of comments
from the world press since the hardcover
publication of The Penkovskiy Papers:

iVcM?York Herald Tribune:

"The Soviet Ambassador to Britain has pro-
tested against this book's publication there, call-
ing crude fabrication'—thereby increasing
it *a

the work's credibility. In this country, some

questions have been raised—not so much about
the information that the book contains (which
ranges from the Jove-life of Soviet leaders to dis-
astrous—and long concealed— nuclear missile ac-
cidents), as about its presentation. Questions
that, as the editor says, can't be answered now
wiE continue to be asked. . . . This work is both
a revelation and a puzzle."

TASS, Moscow:
"Only an absolute idiot could believe that a

rabid spy feared he was suspected would

who
on
have detailed diaries and extensive comments
Soviet policy which coincided exactly
with anti-

Soviet propaganda."
Manchester Guardian Service, London:
"The book can have been compiled only by
the Central Intelligence Agency. No other or*
ganization in the West, apart from British intel*
ligence, and certainly no individual, could have
had access to the information of which the book
is made up."

Washington Star:
"This book is a strange one. It already has be>
come a sort of cause celebre as many expose
books do . . . like any "inside" book it contains a
great deal of gossip about the private lives of
•**
certain Soviet leaders • •

The Soviet Embassy:

"The publication of THE PENKOVSKIY
PAPERS is to be regarded as nothing but a pre-
meditated act in the worst traditions of the
'Cold War.' Such actions cannot but damage the
interests of the development of friendly relations
between the Americans and the Soviet peoples."
 John Barkham, Saturday Review Syndicate:
"It is a remarkable commentary on life inside
the U.S.S.R. Quite apart from its valuable data
on Soviet armaments, its debunking of Soviet
military leaders, and its disclosures of policy, it
\ throws a startling light on the mores and morale
of the Russian people. Making due allowance for
the fact that Penkovskiy was out of step with his
fellow Russians, its revelations of drunkenness
and debauchery among the professional elite and
the disillusionment rampant among the younger
intelligentsia make one wonder just how mono-
lithic the Soviet state really is.

THIS UNQUESTIONABLY THE SPY

IS
STORY OF THE YEAR AND ONE UNLIKE
ANY OTHER I HAVE EVER READ, IF ONLY
BECAUSE, FOR ONCE, WE OF THE WEST
WERE THE BENEFICIARIES. Penkovskiy
I knew precisely the risk he was taking, but this
never deterred him. It may be that, in years to
come, when all the cards are on the table, he
may be seen to have beena decisive factor in our
handling of events such as the Cuban missile
crisis. THE PENKOVSKIY PAPERS should

create a sensation on both sides of the Iron

Curtain."
Los Angeles Times:
"A revealing view into some of the darker
comers of Soviet activity and official life. . . •
"Whatever the real story of how these papers came
to the West, their intrinsic value and interest
remain great, and they deserve careful reading.'*

Publisher's Weekly:
"As a true spy story with a grim message, this
book has few peers."

Library Journal:
"The spy story fan, the student of Soviet affairs,
and the general reader will find the hook a fas-
cinating and unique reading adventure."

John Chamberlain:
"Penkovskiy's book should be 'must' reading
in every Congressional office,"

FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN

THE STORY OF THE PENKOVSKIY
PAPERS, READ YOUR DAILY NEWS-
PAPER. THE STORY IS NOT ENDED
YETI
 IHE

OLEG PENKOVSKIY

Introduction and Commentary

by Frank Gibney

Foreword by Edward Crankshaw

Translated by Peter Deriabin

I
AN AVON BOOK
€^
Excerpts from articles by Greville Wynne from the Sunday
Telegraph are reprinted by permission of the Sunday Tele-
graph and Mr. Greville Wynne.

AVON BOOKS
A division of
The Hearst Corporation
959 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Copyright ©1965 by Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Preface Copyright ©
1965 by Edward Crankshaw.
Published by arrangement with Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-24909.

All rights reserved, which includes the right to

reproduce this book or portions thereof in any
form whatsoever. For information address
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 277 Park Avenue,
New York, New York 10017.

First Avon Printing, November, 1966

Cover photo by Lester Krauss

Printed in the U.S.A.

 EDITOR'S NOTE

This book isprimarily based on three documentary

sources: the Penkovskiy Papers themselves, as they were
sent out of the Soviet Union; the oflBlcial Soviet record of
the Penkovskiy-Wynne trihl, pubUshed by the PoUtical
Literature Publishing House (Moscow, 1963); and press
reports and discussions of Penkovskiy's arrest and trial
which appeared in Europe, the United States, and the
Soviet Union itself. I have also had long conversations
with Greville Wynne. In the interests of telling a con-
nected story, however, I have refrained from citing each
source separately in the various introductory passages to
the Papers themselves. In the few instances where sources
outside the above-named are used, they are cited and
specifically identified. At various points in the Penkovskiy
narrative, I have added footnotes where some explanation
of imfamiliar terms or personalities seemed necessary.
In questions of methodology, custom, and terminology
used by the Soviet intelligence services, I have drawn lib-
erally on the knowledge and experience of Peter Deriabin,
the translator, who was once a Soviet intelligence officer
himself. It was Deriabin who received the Penkovskiy Pa-
pers, after they had been smuggled out of the Soviet
Union, and instantly recognized their importance. Not
only did he translate the Papers, but his informed guid-
ance and evaluation were instrumental in bringing them
to publication. He has been of invaluable help in prepar-
ing the footnotes and other explanatory material.
To the author of the Papers this book is dedicated, in
viii EDITOR'S NOTE
the hope that Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovskiy, reviled by
Soviet propaganda as a common traitor, may be appre-
ciated by both the American and Russian peoples for
what he really was: a single-minded revolutionary who
gave his life in a lonely fight against a corrupt dictator-
ship.
It is only fitting that the bulk of the proceeds from the
sale of this book will go to a special fund set up in Oleg
Penkovskiy's name to further the cause of genuine peace
and friendship between the American and Russian peo-
ples.
Frank Gibney
 FOREWORD

by Edward Crankshaw

r When Oleg Penkovskiy was sentenced to death and shot

in Moscow in the spring of 1963 few people inside or
outside the Soviet Union had realised the scale of his
operations as a voluntary agent for the Western intelli-
gence services. In the West his case was overshadowed by
the trial of Mr. Greville Wynne. In the Soviet Union he
counted only as one more shabby traitor, whose activities
had attracted inevitable retribution and served as a re-
minder of the everlasting need for vigilance. Both Mos-
cow and London had their own reasons, diametrically op-
posed, for playing down the value of the immense amount
of material he had smuggled out to the West.
In fact he was much more than a routine traitor. Mr.
Gibney in his explanatory introduction to this volume
leaves us in no doubt of that. He was a key member of
the Soviet intelligence service occupying a position of
great trust and enjoying access by virtue of his work and
his family connections to an extraordinarily wide range
of the most confidential information. In working against
his own government he did not regard himself as a trai-
tor: like Fuchs, Nunn May, and others he acted out of the
deep conviction that he was serving the cause of human
progress.
Had Penkovskiy been an Englishman we should never
have heard the end of him. His connections with high-
ranking members of the Establishment would have been
widely exposed in the press. His trial would have been
written up by star reporters. There would have been end-
ix
less
FOREWORD
questions in the House of Commons and resignations
I
from Ministries and the Services. Without a doubt, there
would have been yet one more imposing commission of
enquiry into the conduct of the security services. In the
end, Miss Rebecca West would have written a book about
it all.

This is illustrative of some of the differences between

the Russians and ourselves. The Russians have no star re-
porters, no Members of Parliament to harry Ministers, no
Miss West. Their reactions to the Penkovskiy scandal
were kept very much to themselves and not publicised at
all. Nobody attacked Mr. Khrushchev, at any rate in pub-
lic, for the failure of the Soviet security services to detect
the fact that one of their senior officers had been passing
over top-secret documents to the enemy for sixteen
months on end. All the same, the reactions, though hidden,
were sharp enough. There was a commission of enquiry
all right, but it operated unannounced and in secret. As a

was a wholesale recall of serv-

result of its findings there
ice attaches to Soviet embassies abroad, and there were
a number of significant demotions and disappearances.
But for one thing we over here would be as ignorant
as the Russian people of just what sort of a person
Penkovskiy was, of the real nature and extent of his activi-
ties, of the way in which his case repeats in reverse many

of the features of the best-known incidents of individuals

turning traitor against the West in the cause of the
Soviet Union. That one thing is this book. During all the
period during which Penkovskiy was turning over informa-
tion to the West, he sat up night after night composing a
sort of journal— not a diary, not an account of his day-to-
day activities in the Western cause, not a summary of the
—
material he passed to the West rather, a sort of apologia,
an account of his own life, his upbringing and training,
his disillusionment, interspersed with an elaborate narra-
tive and commentary about the detailed functioning of
the Soviet intelligence services— running through it all a
continuous indictment of the Soviet system in general and
the methods and policies of Khrushchev in particular. This
account is all the more fascinating and convincing be-
cause it is such a hotchpotch. Penkovskiy was not a bom
writer, and, in any case, he was working under great
strain. He had a message to get over to the West, per-
 :

I FOREWORD
haps to posterity too in Russia. It was an urgent message, a
self-justification and a warning combined. And the fever-
heat in which he wrote and the strength of his feeUngs
and beliefs to us far more sharp-
communicate themselves
ly through broken, discursive, and sometimes incon-
this
sequential outpouring than would have been the case had
he been given the time and the leisure to produce a tidy,
polished narrative.
I imagine that the general reader, particularly those
who have not had to read pretty well everything that has
been pubUshed about espionage and counterespionage on
the part of the Russians will be most fascinated by Pen-
kovskiy's inside account of the workings of the Soviet in-
telligence system. He may very well be appalled and dis-
mayed by their scope and sheer magnitude. But I think
we should try to keep a sense of proportion here. This is
perhaps easier for me because, having hved for so long
in the shadow of the Soviet security services, I have come
to take many of these things for granted. I am not out-
raged by the presence of microphones in any room in
which I happen to find myself in the Soviet Union; I ex-
pect them to be there, even if they are not. I am not
shocked by the knowledge that some of my pleasantest
and most inteUigent Russian acquaintances are members
of the KGB in plain clothes, or at least part-time in-
formers: if they are not, I expect them to be and no
doubt in this I have done an injustice to some who, in
fact, may have been as innocent as they seemed. Inot am
appalled by Penkovskiy's statement that at least 60 per
cent of all Soviet diplomatists are employees either of the
KGB or GRU (working, as a rule, in fairly bitter rivalry)
it had never occurred to me to expect anything else. It is

all quite true, and it is as well that as many readers

as possible should know this truth. But they should not

be cast down by it.
What I find interesting isthat Penkovskiy himself is so
shocked by the reality of which he formed a part. I am
not for a moment suggesting that either the British or the
American secret service is anything like so heavily staffed
as the KGB and GRU. The Russians, not to put too fine a
point on it, have always been nuts about espionage and
counterespionage; and 4hey have always been hair-rais-
ingly reckless in the wasteful expenditure of manpower.
xii FOREWORD
But the difference, it seems to me, is quantitative rather
than qualitative. It is hard not to believe that the British
and American secret services are up to all the tricks re-
vealed by Penkovskiy —
and more besides.
Whether the game is worth the candle is another mat-
ter. I am quite sure that the material the Russians re-
ceive from their agents is not worth anything like the ex-
penditure of manpower, ingenuity, and cash which they
consider an appropriate price. I am not an expert in these
matters, but there is one thing that stands out even to a
layman: that is that some of the most valuable intelli-
gence coups ever achieved by the Russians have fallen
into their laps, contributed by oddities like Nunn May
and Fuchs, acting from individual conviction. Conversely,
invaluable information presented to us by Penkovskiy was
obtained not as a result of the efficiency of our own secret
services, but as a free gift arising from the idiosyncratic
behaviour of an individual Russian.
Penkovskiy, as I have said, was shocked by the size
and magnitude and malevolence of the secret service of
which he formed a part. He was also shocked by the be-
haviour of Khrushchev and others. Here, I think, he can
be very misleading. He was brought up as a young Com-
munist and developed into quite an eager careerist in the
regular army, on the look-out for patronage, keen for
promotion, cultivating the sort of gifts which enabled him
quite naturally and easily to make an extremely useful
marriage, one of the privileged new class and enjoying
it. It is impossible to decide from his Papers the precise

point at which the whole thing went sour, and why. If he

underwent some sudden and traumatic experience which
caused him to regard Khrushchev as the de\11 himself, he
does not tell us what it was. That he took violently
against the whole system, for the reasons he gives, is en-
tirely understandable: tens of thousands of intelligent Rus-
sians, hundreds of thousands, indeed, feel the same way.
But this does not lead them to spy on their own country
for the benefit of the West.
—
One thing is very clear and this should be borne in
mind steadily when considering Penkovskiy's indictment
of Khrushchev as a man actively preparing to launch a
nuclear war, and that is that hke so many defectors
from the West, this Soviet Army colonel was in some
1
^Bo
FOREWORD
easure unbalanced (a man who will take it upon himself
betray his government because he is uniquely con-
^Kinced that he is right and they are wrong is by definition
xiii

^iinbalanced, although he may also be a martyr), and, al-

most certainly, this lack of balance made it impossible for
him to distinguish between government intentions and
government precautions. Or, like so many others, he con-
fused loose, menacing talk with tight-lipped calculation;
contingency planning with purposive strategy. This con-
fusion is liable to overtake all sorts of individuals in all
sorts of governments and military machines. Inexperienced
in the cruder and rougher aspects of defense planning
they are appalled by the apparent frivolity and reck-
lessness of the professional approach to questions involv-
ing the survival or destruction of half of humanity. Im-
prisoned in a world in which the secret telegrams of alHes
are laboriously deciphered, in which kidnappings and as-
sassinations are prepared with total callousness, in which
the lie is the main stock in trade, in which plans are laid
for every possible contingency up to and including a pre-
ventive nuclear war, in which the fearful weapons of the
atomic age are treated almost as small change, certainly
as common currency, in strategic thinking, they feel they
have penetrated into a madhouse. Most individuals shrug
their shoulders and get on with it, in due course becom-
ing acclimatised. A few do not, and it is they who go
mad. This explains the behaviour of some celebrated West-
em traitors who have convinced themselves that America
has been deliberately planning a preventive war against
the Soviet Union. Penkovskiy was one of these in reverse.
—
He really believed Khrushchev's threats about Berlin,
about the biggest bomb in the world, about Cuba. Per-
haps if he had been at liberty to see Khrushchev back
down over Cuba he would have had second thoughts, but
I doubt it: he had already seen him back down over the
Middle East, over Berlin.
He detested Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership.
Other Russians have with him; but most have decided
felt
for themselves that the chief victims are the people of
Russia, not the outside world, and that it is for the people
of Russia alone to work out their own salvation.
One can read Penkovskiy also for the light he throws
on the Soviet world, which is an illumination rarely
xiv FOREWORD
vouchsafed to foreigners. For myself, the most fascinat-
ing and valuable parts of the book are those which offer
an inside view of the ways of life enjoyed by the Soviet
elite —^men whom we think of as Communists, corrupt
and living like princes at the expense of the unfortunate
masses, to whom Communism is a joke word. Others be-
side Penkovskiy would like to put a bomb under this
world. Perhaps one day they will.
 A PERSONAL COMMENT

by Greville Wynne

Oleg Penkovskiy was a most extraordinary man. I have

some knowledge of the vast contribution he made to the
West with his intelligence information. But I knew him
not only as an intelligence ofi&cer, but first as an associate
and later as a firm friend. He was an intense man. He
wanted not merely to give intelligence information, but
also to let the people of Britain and the United States
know about his motives.
It was an unforgettable experience to accompany this
man, particularly during his first visits to London and
Paris, and to see the tremendous impact of our free so-
ciety on a decent and, by Soviet standards, sophisticated
man, but a man who had been sheltered all his life inside
the Soviet system.
It was the people in the West who impressed him most.
He was amazed, for example, to find that the assistants
in department stores were clean, neat in dress, and well
groomed, that nearly all the young ladies were attractive,
smiling, and anxious to please. I had often visited the
gloomy GUM department store in Moscow and the drab
shops in Gorkiy street with their drab, surly attendants. So
I had some idea of the mental contrast he must have been
making.
Oleg was an immensely curious man. He would ques-
tion me constantly about everything around him wherever
we went. He was interested in religion. He had indeed
been baptized himself by his pious mother. In London one
day we were passing the Brompton Oratory. He asked me
 xvi A PERSONAL COMMENT
whether it was a church and whether he could go m to
look around. He was fascinated. "This is good," he said.
"Perhaps the religious doctrine is not entirely correct, but
at least it gives us a principle to guide our life. At home
in the Soviet Union we have nothing. There are no prin-
ciples — only what the Party tells us."
It was a revelation to him to find that when he visited
friends' apartments or joined groups in restaurants or
clubs, in both London and Paris, he was never ques-
tioned as to why he was in Western Europe, what his
backgroimd was, or any searching details whatsoever.
Wherever we went he was accepted as my friend. This first
amazed him, but also pleased him immensely. Such a ter-
rific contrast from the Soviet system where it is still
highly dangerous for citizens to mix socially with West-
erners.
Of course own seriousness never left him for long.
his
He was about the Soviet regime. He would weep,
bitter
quite literally, when he talked about its misdeeds and the
sufferings or unhappiness of his friends in the Soviet
Union.
The more I knew him, the more I realized that Oleg
Penkovskiy was an extraordinarily high-minded man. He
—
was a positive man ^he would keep using that phrase in
English, "I know He did what he did be-
perfectly well."
cause was the one way he, as an individual, could
it

strike back at a system that had debased his country. I

never saw him waver from this basic decision from the
moment we first met.
He was a man who had thought things through many
months before I first made contact with him. He was will-
ing to put up with the basic deceptions of spying and the
tremendous strain of this lonely life, because he believed
in a cause. He believed simply that a free society should
emerge in the Soviet Union, and that it could only come
by toppling the only government he knew. He was a heroic
figure.
I shall never forget him.
 CONTENTS

I
^^Foreword
A Personal
by Edward Crankshaw
Comment by
General Introduction
Greville Wynne
ix

xv
21

Chapter 1. The System in Which I Live 46

Introduction to Chapter II 75
Chapter II. The Dark World of the GRU 81

Introduction to Chapter III 107

Chapter III. The Prikhodko Lecture 114
Introduction to Chapter IV 170
Chapter IV. Penkovskiy's Committee 178
Introduction to Chapter V 200
Chapter V. The Khrushchev Cult 205
Introduction to Chapter VI 222
Chapter VI. Khrushchev's Army 230
Introduction to Chapter VII 258
Chapter VII. Espionage Notes 264
Introduction to Chapter VIII 287
Chapter VIII. The Great Ones 293
Introduction to Chapter IX 315
Chapter IX. Atomic Weapons and Missiles 320
Introduction to Chapter X 336
Chapter X. Trouble in Moscow and Abroad 341
Epilogue: The Trial 359
Appendices I, II, III 383
 .

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

by Frank Gibney

May 11, 1963, in a small but crowded hearing

)m of the Soviet Supreme Court in Moscow, a forty-
mr-year-oid Soviet Army officer named Oleg Penkovskiy,
a colonel of the military intelligence arm, was sentenced
to be shot for treason. He was charged with the ultimate
offense against the Soviet state: espionage on behalf of
the United States and Great Britain. Greville Wynne, a
British businessman, was sentenced with him to a long
prison term, for acting as a "spy go-between."
In his trial Colonel Penkovskiy was identified as a "re-
serve colonel" of artillery, who had an official position as
a "civilian employee" of the State Committee for the Co-
ordination of Scientific Research Work, an organ of the
U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers which handles all scien-
tific and technical liaison activities with foreign coun-

tries, as part of its over-all responsibility for the tech-

nological side of Soviet economic planning. The Soviet
prosecutors emphasized that the information Penkovskiy
passed to the West was principally of an economic and
technical nature, with only certain additional pieces of
military intelligence. But the type of information, as men-
tioned in his indictment, gave the lie to them. It was the
sort of thing that any military intelligence officer could
only describe as juicy: "Top-secret information ... re-
ports . . .documents of great value ... of an economic,
political, and military nature and Soviet space secrets . . .

[material on] Soviet troops in Germany . . German .

peace treaty . .

21
 22 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
"List of generals and officers command personnel
. . .

of the antiaircraft defenses . photographs of passes to

. .

a military establishment . . new Soviet war material

. . . .

[material on] atomic energy, rocket technology, and the

exploration of outer space .
.".

The open trial of Oleg Penkovskiy lasted only four

days and showed signs of haste in its preparation. None-
theless it occasioned a heavy, savage burst of publicity in
the Soviet press. Virtually every Soviet newspaper repeated
the angry sunmiations of Lieutenant General A. G.
Gomyy, the military prosecutor: ". . the accused Pen-
.

kovskiy is an opportunist, a careerist, and a morally de-

cayed person who took the road of treason and betrayal
of his country and was employed by imperialist intelli-
gence services. ..." A Soviet state publishing house
printed 100,000 copies of the trial transcript, for distribu-
tion to local Communist leaders, the armed services, and
other interested parties. Eight British diplomats and five
Americans were summarily declared personae non gratae
in the U.S.S.R.— as an alleged result of Penkovskiy's ac-
tivities.
In the West the trial of Penkovskiy and Wynne at-
tracted a brief spate of newspaper accounts and articles
principally because a British subject, Wynne, had been
sentenced to a Soviet prison term. A
few perceptive news-
men made a connection between Penkovskiy's vague but
apparently sensitive position in the Soviet government
only the most trusted Soviet ofiicials are allowed to deal
officially with foreigners and foreign organizations and —
the fact, among others, that there was an unusual num-
ber of transfers and shake-ups in the Soviet Army com-
mand at the time of the Penkovskiy disclosure, including
a wholesale recall of attaches stationed abroad. "There
seems to be no question," the New York Herald
Tribune told its readers, "that Colonel Penkovskiy's ex-
posure as a spy blew a huge hole within the entire Soviet
information-gathering operation." "There have been de-
fectees from Communism before, but never a Soviet one
as high up as this," Joseph Harsch wrote in The Christian
Science Monitor. And Charles Bartlett in the Washington
Star suggested that "the internal significance of the trial
is fully comparable to the significance attached to the

Alger Hiss case in this country."

I GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Neither press nor public received any further enlighten-
23

ment from the American and British intelligence organi-

zations with whom one must assume Penkovskiy worked.
Like the wartime submariners, they are "silent services."
, was to be expected, therefore, that a blas6 American
It
|>ublic, inured to fitful bursts of spy exposes almost as
boroughly as it is inured to television commercials, could
p back to its daily round, preferring to take its espionage
itemally, in increasing dosages of James Bond or The
py Who Came in From the Cold. The name of Pen-
ovskiy quickly faded from view, as did the very fact of
his existence. Even as knowledgeable a commentator on
espionage matters as Rebecca West could write two years
after his arrest, in The New Meaning of Treason, only
that "Oleg Penkovskiy [was] a Soviet scientist charged
with acting as a British agent. ... As the facts of this
case are not known, it is impossible to describe or dis-
cuss it."
Yet behind this long blackout of silence and unconcern
Kes the story of a remarkable man and a still more re-
markable achievement, which it is now possible to dis-
close. For Colonel Penkovskiy was no mere agent, hand-
ing over moderately useful military tidbits on Soviet order
of battle or economic development. On the contrary,
the extent and ingenuity of his work for the West add up
to the most extraordinary intelligence feat of this century.
Alone, Oleg Penkovskiy cracked the security system of
the world's most security-conscious government and left
it virtually in pieces after his disclosures. The gravity of

his work is suggested by its immediate aftermath: one

chief marshal of the Soviet Union, and in charge of tac-
tical missile forces at that, was removed from his post
and demoted; the Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence,
General Ivan Serov, (the "hangman" of Hungary in 1956)
transferred, then publicly demoted; some three hundred
Soviet intelligence officers almost immediately recalled to
Moscow from foreign posts.
From April 1961 to the end of August 1962, Pen-
kovskiy furnished the West with current, high-priority in-
formation on the innermost political and military secrets
of the Soviet Union. The sixteen months during which he
was, so to speak, operational, spanned a peculiarly intense
time of crisis between the Khrushchev regime and the new
24 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
administration of John F. Kennedy. Historians may one
day term it the near-freezing point of the Cold War.
Throughout this period, at a time when the invaluable
U-2 surveillance of the Soviet Union had been neces-
sarily abandoned, Penkovskiy gave information on both
the current trend of Soviet political intentions and the
current condition of Soviet military preparations infor- —
mation which effectively canceled out the normal advan-
tage of Soviet military secrecy and diplomatic inscruta-
bility. 1961, we must remember, was the year of the
Berlin Wall. Khrushchev's threats grew to force a military
showdown, if necessary, over Berlin and the East Ger-
man peace treaty. 1962 was the year of continuing crisis
in Berlin and the Soviet introduction of long-raiige mis-
siles into Cuba, a year of nerve-racking maneuver which
ended in the successful American missile confrontation
with Moscow in October 1962. A
key factor in this was
American ability to identify the extent and nature of
the Soviet missile sites on Cuban soU. The millions who
breathed their sigh of relief after that confrontation will
probably never know the extent to which the disclosures
of one Soviet officer made the American success possible.
The story of Colonel Penkovskiy's achievement would
have remained locked in the intelligence and counter-
intelligence files of three countries had it not been for
the strange, arresting document which comprises most of
this book. It is not a diary, nor even anything like a
formal autobiography. I have called it simply tibe Pen-
kovskiy Papers. The Papers are a series of hastily writ-
ten notes, sketches, and conmients, begun early in 1961, at
a time when Penkovskiy was trying to make his first
contacts with Western intelligence. What is probably the
last entry (only a few of them are dated) was written on
August 25, 1962, when Penkovskiy was already imder
heavy surveillance by the State Security forces (KGB)
and barely a few weeks before he was taken into custody.
(The official date of Penkovskiy's arrest was October 22.)
In the fall of 1962, about the time of Penkovskiy's
arrest, the Papers were smuggled out of the Soviet Union
to an Eastern European country.^ From there they were

1 Like some thirty major pieces of fiction and memoirs over the
last ten —
years including works of Pasternak, Tertz, Tarsis, and
Akhmatova — the Penkovskiy Papers were smuggled out in highly
I GENERAL INTRODUCTION
transmitted to Peter Deriabm,^ himself a former defector
25

from the State Security forces, who undertook the long

preliminary work of translation and selection. Their au-
thenticity is beyond question. The wealth of personal
—
documentation which accompanied them family pictures.
Communist Party membership cards, copies of official or-
ders —
could have had only one source: Penkovskiy him-
self. They are the jottings of a lonely man playing what
he knew was a lonely and desperate game, in which there
was little chance of winning.
An odd combination of angry protest, exhortation, and
dispassionate exposition, the Papers are arranged with lit-
tle attempt at order and none at literary style. highly A
personal comment on some prominent acquaintance may
be followed by an almost technical observation on tactics
or weapons. But they represent the political opinions,
warnings, and observations of a man who, to say the least,
had no one in whom he could confide. Certainly Pen-
kovskiy hoped that they would someday be published in
the West, if not the Soviet Union, to clarify his motives
and, definitively, to clear his own name. TTiey comprise
a conscious testament. He obviously had no time for re-
vision or polishing; the last entries were written when lie
knew he was under "observation" by the State Security,
with little chance of escape.
Because the Papers are so fragmentary it seemed not
only useful but necessary to add certain introductory re-
marks which may help fix their importance in their time
and place. Aman like Dag Hammarskjold can leave be-
hind scattered fragments of his writings ^ and they will
be understood, because they are almost automatically
read in context. He was a well-known figure and what he
stood for was well known-. Not so with Penkovskiy or his
situation. Neither the importance of his position nor

anonymous circumstances. Within a few weeks they were safe in

the United States. Beyond this it is impossible to describe the de-
tails of the memoirs' transmittal. To do so, even in the scantiest
outline, would serve only to incriminate some people and point a
finger of suspicion, justly or unjustly, at others.
2 Deriabin, then a major in the Soviet State Security, left Soviet
headquarters in Vienna in 1954 and received asylum in the U.S.
3 In the posthumously published Markings (Alfred A. Knopf,
New York, 1964).
26 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
—
still less the significance of his personal protest will be
immediately clear to most Americans. To put them in their
historical setting can make a great deal of difference.
If we cannot thoroughly understand the precise feelings
of a Soviet citizen at a particular time in his history, we
can at least appreciate them.
The Papers, furthermore, must be read in the context of
the weeks and months in which they were written. Much
that was important in 1961 or 1962 may be of academic
interest at the moment. But we must not forget that the
shape of the world we are living in today is the result in
no small measure of decisions, actions, and counteractions
taken then.
I have tried, therefore, to preface the Papers with some
minimal editorial explanation for the following questions:
1) Who was Colonel Penkovskiy and what was his real
position? 2) What actually did he tell the West? 3) What
was the historical context in which he gave his informa-
tion? 4) Why did he do it?

Who was Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovskiy? His own

memoirs, which can be confirmed from other evidence
available, paint the picture of a far different man from
the "poseur" of the Soviet prosecutors. To begin with
his position: he was not the casual "civilian employee" of
the Scientific Research Conmiittee, as the prosecution
stated, but was in fact Deputy Chief of its Foreign Sec-
tion, charged with the constant overseeing of delegations,
missions, and other technical intelligence work with for-
eign countries. He was not a reserve colonel. As his own
Soviet documents show, Oleg Penkovskiy was a regular
Array colonel on active service with Soviet military in-
telligence and had been since his graduation from the
Military Diplomatic Academy (the Army intelligence
school) in 1953. His official assignment was with the Chief
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff.
As he explains amply in the Papers, his job with the Com-
mittee was a working cover.
Behind him he had a brilliant career both as a career
Army officer and a faithful Communist Party servant. A
former assistant military attache in Turkey, he was a
graduate of the Military Diplomatic Academy, the Frunze
Academy (the Soviet General Staff College), and the Dzer-
I GENERAL INTRODUCTION
zhinskiy Artillery Academy, where he had taken an
27

in-

tensive nine-month course in military missiles. He had

been a regimental commander, as well as a staff officer and
general's aide. Had he not elected to enter the intelligence
arm, with its traditionally low ranks, Penkovskiy would
almost unquestionably have been promoted to general of-
ficer's statushimself by the early 1960s.
In the political double-entry bookkeeping of the Soviet
leadership, in which Communist party organizations and
their leaders constantly check on the work of formally in-
dependent government departments and ministries, a
strong Party record is indispensable for preferment. Pen-
kovskiy became a Communist Party member in 1940,
after several years in the Komsomol, the Party youth or-
ganization. Throughout his career he was a trusted political
leader in the Armyformations in which he served.
Adding to Penkovskiy's credentials were his associa-
tions with the great and powerful in the Soviet hierarchy.
In World War II he had served as aide to Marshal Sergey
S. Varentsov, then artillery commander of the First
Ukrainian Front. And he continued as the Marshal's close
friend, confidant, and protege after Varentsov became
a Chief Marshal of Artillery in charge of the Tactical Mis-
sile Forces. His great-uncle Valentin Antonovich Pen-
kovskiy was by 1956, a lieutenant general and Commander
of the Far Eastern Military EHstrict. Penkovskiy's wife was
herself the daughter of a general with significant political
connections within the Communist Party. Colonel Pen-
kovskiy was on the friendliest terms with General Ivan
Serov, who became Chief of Military Intelligence in 1958,
and he maintained close relations, through Varentsov,
with a number of prominent Soviet generals and political
leaders.His access to secret files and information was in
some respects more extensive than that of a man in charge
of a Soviet ministry. Through his close connections with
Varentsov, also, he had a constant pipeline into the de-
liberations of the Soviet Supreme Military Council, of
which Varentsov as Chief Marshal of Artillery, was a
member. (Khrushchev himself was Chairman.)
On the record Penkovskiy was a life-sized working
model of the new, postrevolutionary Soviet official, part
of the consciously established "New Class" of the Soviet
Union. And out of the two-dimensional black and white of
28 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
official records, orders, and citations we are able in Pen-
kovskiy's case to reconstruct something better. Thanks to
his frequent contacts with foreigners and their recollec-
tions of him, we can put together the picture of an engag-
ing, sometimes arresting personality. A medium-sized,
rather handsome man whose red hair was barely flecked
with gray, Penkovskiy had a forceful but generally pleas-
ant character. He liked good food, good wine and con-
versation; and thanks to his position he had grown accus-
—
tomed to them ^the sort of man who is used to having
doors opened for him and who expects to be remembered
by head waiters.
Penkovskiy had good manners. What was perhaps a nat-
ural feeling for social shadings was accentuated by his
knowledge of the unending struggle for prestige and posi-
tion within the Soviet hierarchy. He was almost painfully
anxious to be correct, in any situation. Far more than
the average Soviet official, even including those of some
sophistication, Penkovskiy enjoyed small talk; he was a
genuinely social man. He had a good sense of humor, if
somewhat on the salty, sardonic side. Although more of
an engineer than a scholar —
enjoyed tinkering and, as
^he
we shall note later, had devised
several useful, patented
inventions —
he used the language weU. He was a good
family man. His occasional dalliances with ladies would
be comparable to similar situations in capitalist societies,
and far less frequent than the incidence of such behavior
among the Soviet marshals and generals of his acquaint-
ance.
Yet behind this good-humored facade, Oleg Penkovskiy
was essentially a loner. Few men's characters can profita-
bly be subjected to logical analysis, Penkovskiy's less than
most. If he had many friends and acquaintances, he had
few intimates outside of the iU-fated Marshal Varentsov
(and there the official relationship was always present).
His intelligence experience contributed to his reluctance
to form very close or lasting friendships. That way, he
could give himself one more safeguard against possible
entrapment. When he decided to work for the West, this
natural inner reserve needed no reinforcement.
As his Papers reveal, this outwardly convivial man pos-
sessed a powerful capacity for indignation. That quality,
too,was one better concealed than exhibited in the Soviet
I GENERAL INTRODUCTION 29

society which he knew best. The indignation, the zeal, the

scorn for injustice he kept well below the surface. Even
in the prisoner's dock at his trial, he was remarkably
self-possessed. He frequently corrected the prosecutor on
points of fact and, although he faithfully hewed to the
approved confession of guilt, he went out of his way not
publicly to incriminate some Moscow acquaintances who
had been summoned to testify against him.
In only one other important instance was he far from
typical —
a circumstance which not only left a great many
red faces in the Soviet State Security after his trial, but
played no small part in Penkovskiy's own decision. His
family came from the upper ranks of the czarist civil
service. This fact in itself is still a damaging item in a
Soviet security dossier. But his father, a young engineer-
ing student from western Russia, had also fought against
the revolution as an officer of the White Army. It was a
very significant matter of reflection for Oleg Penkovskiy,
after he himself began to turn against the Soviet system,
to note that his father had been killed fighting the Com-
munists on the outskirts of Rostov.
Under the Soviet system any relationship to a former
czarist or White officer is automatically a black mark on
—
a citizen's record enough to prevent him from ever
traveling abroad, for example. Penkovskiy lived with this
mark for the twenty-five years of his career in the Army,
although it was not known, apparently, until very late in
the game. It is one reason why he had so little contact
with his great-uncle, the general. Each had this private
matter to hide. Neither wished to call attention either to
the family origins or to the family name.

The of intelligence information depends on

collection
two factors:access and evaluation. The most ingenious
spy in history might just as well spend his time writing
memoirs or selling dry goods unless he finds some access
to the secrets of the government spied upon. It is equally
true —
and more significantly so in our time of complicated
—
military technologies ^that a man may have complete
access to a government's secrets but remain of little use
unless he knows what to look for and how to make an
on-the-spot evaluation of what he finds.
The capacity for evaluation is high, or presumed so,
30 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
among senior professional intelligence officers. But they
rarely are in a position of direct access to vital security
materials. Colonel Rudolf Abel, the enigmatic Soviet
"Illegal" rezident * who was arrested in New York in
1957 and ultimately exchanged for Francis Gary Powers
in 1962, was manifestly a person of great political
sophistication and deeply engrained intelligence training
(as anyone who encountered him at his American trial
can attest). Yet Abel did his work in deliberate obscurity,
in a dingy Brooklyn studio, associating only with a few
hack artists (for such was his cover) and cut off from the
humblest of "decision-making" circles in the United
States. Abel and other Soviet rezidents relied for their in-
formation on various agents who were more or less inno-
cent of the Big Picture, as Soviet intelligence saw it, but
could be maneuvered into sensitive locations and told to
pass on specific pieces of information. A young U.S.
Army technician like David Greenglass, for example, could
contribute only one small if vital piece of information on
the manufacture of the A-bomb to his employers, and
he was used for that purpose alone. While Abel had the
evaluative capacity without direct access, Greenglass had
the access with only a minimal capacity for evaluation.
So with the average agent, who is generally a person of
relatively little prominence or position and must be given
the most specific kind of instructions.
Now turn to Penkovskiy. Here by contrast is a man
who decides of hisown free will to become a spy for the
West. He
has automatic access to a great many Soviet
secret and top-secret materials and he sits close to the
seat of Soviet power. But he is also a trained intelligence
officer, who has spent a decade of his professional life
learning exactly what kind of military, economic, and
political information is valuable, what kind useless, what
kind merely marginal. Combine with his intelligence ex-
perience, his official position as a collector of desired

4 An Illegal rezident is the chief of a group of two to six staff

officers of the Soviet intelligence service who
are serving together
abroad under false, non-Soviet documentation, the better to conduct
espionage, undercover political action, or sabotage and similar mis-
sions. In this book we use the exact Russian transliteration, to dis-
tinguish this technical term from the normal English word "resi-
dent."
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 31

scientific and economic information for the Soviets,

through his Committee in Moscow.
Penkovskiy's own personal fund of information was
large. Any graduate of the Soviet *missile school —
not to
mention the Frunze Academy and the Military Diplomatic
—
Academy could tell Western intelligence much about the
quality and quantity of Soviet missiles, their deployment,
accuracy, the troops manning them, etc. A Frunze
Academy oflBcer will know a great deal about basic mili-
tary doctrines and their revisions. A
graduate of the in-
telligence school will in the first instance know the true
identities and missions of great numbers of Soviet in-
telligence officers (who normally operate under more or
less heavy cover) as well as Soviet intelligence tactics. If,
for instance, the order has gone out to arrange all meet-
ings of Soviet agents in the U.S. in movie theaters, dis-
•

closure of that fact will be of invaluable service to the

FBI, which is responsible for catching them.
The range of Penkovskiy's information was literally en-
cyclopedic. The design of a new tactical missile, the de-
—
ployment pattern of Soviet missile installations ^how use-
ful this proved in Cuba —the exact planned dimensions
of the Berlin Wall, the name of the new Soviet intelligence
rezident in London, the defects in a new military heli-
copter, the degree of unrest in Soviet factory towns and in
•the —
East German garrisons ^thousands of pieces of in-
formation were swept up by the busy, curious mind of a
man who combined the selective faculty of the intelligence
officer with a capacity for memorization that can only be
described as total recall. Even the most intelligent of
agents will have severe inherent limitations. An infantry
battalion commander will presumably know little about
high-level staff planning. A scientific Uaison expert will
have little knowledge of military affairs. A diplomat will
not be acquainted with his country's industrial potential.
Penkovskiy, however, was something of a generalist. He
himself combined the functions mentioned above, as well
as others, and his perceptions had been sharpened by
training in various strikingly different disciplines.
As a good intelligence officer, furthermore. Colonel
Penkovskiy only trusted his recollection when he had to.
Every possible bit of useful information he committed to
film. Ilie three Minox cameras in his possession received
32 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
hard and constant use. His Soviet prosecutors at the tria |

themselves admitted that Penkovskiy had passed on tc

Western intelligence some 5000 separate photographec ]

items of secret milital^, political, and economic intelli ]

gencel i

Here again, access was important. Security officers firs;=

took little notice of Colonel Penkovskiy so frequentlj' i

using the General Staff library. It hardly occurred to then,

that he was doing research for the United States. j

In the normal course of talking military shop with his j

friends, Penkovskiy would run into hundreds of itemi. i

of useful information about the deployment of Sovie: }
troops, their readiness, morale, etc. He knew a good deal ^
about specific future plans, e.g., the operation to overrun I
Iran in case of international trouble, the Soviet backup !

for an East German confrontation with Western forces \

over BerUn. He came to know a great deal about the whole |

decision-making process within the Soviet hierarchy, as

well as shifts in the regime. ]

If the Soviet marshals are muttering angry private !

criticism of their political leadership, this is a piece of i

information well worth having in the West. If a riot \

over food in the industrial town of Novocherkassk has \
to be suppressed by troops, that is information worth
j

having. Penkovskiy's unique pipeline into the rigorously \

classified meetings and decisions of the Soviet Supreme

Military Council was comparable to the Soviet Union \

having a foreign agent in the United States, with a pri- ;

vate pipeline into some of the National Security Council's j

White House meetings. \

It is diflScult, if not impossible, to make exact com- i

parisons between the status of Penkovskiy in the Soviet j

system and that of a man similarly situated in the United j

States. But conjure up this sort of person: a vice presidenti

of the Rand Corporation and member of the President's \

advisory committee on science, a Ford Foundation con-

sultant who was also in charge of the State Department's
program for foreign visitors. A career Army officer, ;

whose wife's father had been an assistant chief of staff \

of the U. S. Army, he would be a graduate of West I

Point, the Conmiand and General Staff School at Fort ^

Leavenworth, and the Military War College, and a close 1
friend of the Air Force general in charge of SAC. The i
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 33

same man was secretly a division head in the Central

Intelligence Agency, with important contacts in the Penta-
gon due to his former military activities. In addition to
these official credentials, he had a wide acquaintance in
Democratic Party cirples.
If we object that no American could possibly do all the
above-mentioned jobs and keep up the associations, we
are putting our finger on one difference between the Soviet
system and our own. Even an Alger Hiss or a Klaus
Fuchs can know only one or two segments of the com-
plex working society of a democracy. But in Moscow
few are called and fewer are chosen to join the top layer
of the power structure. The lucky few grow used to
doubling in brass. Accordingly, a Penkovskiy, living near
the apex of a tigiitly centralized society, can see clearly
up and down the mountain. Americans can best estimate
the value of Penkovskiy's information to the West by
adjusting their eyes to the perspective of the peculiarly
centralized power structure in which he resided.
Penkovskiy's betrayal of the Soviet regime ranks with
classic espionage cases Uke those of Yevno Azef, the Rus-
sian poUce spy who penetrated the leadership of the
Social Revolutionary Party in czarist days; or Colonel
Alfred Redl, the dandified Austro-Hungarian staff offi-
cer who sold his country's mobilization plans to the
Russians in 1913. For Penkovskiy, like them, was linked
warp and woof with the leadership he betrayed. He was
a member of the club. His information was damaging, not
merely because of its quality but because it was given
at all. In the impact on its society the Penkovskiy affair
more than equaled the Alger Hiss case in the United
States.

For thesixteen months of Colonel Penkovskiy's career

as an agent, the makers of United States policy were in
the position of a poker player who is given fleeting glimpses
of his opponent's hand and without the other fellow in
the least suspecting it. That brief time of crisis under-
scores as nothing else the importance of Penkovskiy's dis-
closures to the West. The two most tantalizing questions
any general or diplomat asks about a potential antagonist
concern his capabilities and his intentions: what does he
have and what does he plan to do with it? In 1961 and
 34 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1962 Penkovskiy enlightened the Americans and the British
in both these departments with the most current infor-
mation. (Thanks to his three trips to Western Europe
in that period, he could respond to specific questions, as
well as volunteer information on his own.) In facing down
the Soviet regime over the Beriin issue and in the Cuban
missile crisis, the West used Penkovskiy's information to
decisive effect.
In May 1960, after the public exposure of the U-2
overflights, Nikita Khrushchev bulled his way out of the
Summit Conference in Paris and set a new hard line of
hostility to the United States. This was not the first time
such a shift had occurred. For many years the state of
Soviet-American relations had swung back and forth like
an erratic pendulum or the rise and fall of tides in the
Bay of Fundy. But Khrushchev found many reasons to
; justify a hardened line now. His public poUcy of "peace-
ful coexistence" was shaken by President Eisenhower's
very public admission of personal responsibility for the
U-2 overflights. Whether or not Khrushchev himself was
sincere about the coexistence policy —
and Penkovskiy for
—
one believed he was not it was already under heavy fire
from the Chinese Commimists, as well as influential forces
within the Soviet Party. Inside the Soviet Union, Khrush-
chev's internal problems were multiplying, from shortages
of consumer goods and failure in wheat production to
rising discontent over his repression of young writers,
artists,and musicians, including the malodorous episode
of Boris Pasternak and Doctor Zhivago. Certain currents
of opposition to the regime were gathering among the So-
viet people. In Khrushchev's book it was a good mo-
ment for mobilizing them all against the old reliable
external foe.
Thefirst few months of John F. Kennedy's adminis-
tration encouraged a new Soviet belligerence. To Khrush-
chev the American failure at the Bay of Pigs seemed
evidence of growing weakness and indecision. Khrush-
chev's June 1961 conference with the new President at
Vienna very evidently did not shake him in his mis-
conception that the Kennedy administration could be both
outfaced and outfoxed. The time seemed ripe, doubtless,
for using threats to achieve important political victories.
In that same month of June, therefore, Khrushchev de-
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 35

Glared thathe must have a settlement of the Berlin

question, on Soviet terms, by the end of the year; and
within the same time limit he avowed Soviet determina-
tion to sigtt the long-threatened treaty with East Ger-
many, thus leaving Berlin under Walter Ulbricht's less
than tender care. Soviet incidents and "provocations" in-
creased. On August 13 the Wall was raised in Berlin, with-
out any sharp retaliation or reaction from the Western
alUes.
On September 1, 1961, after continued threatening
references to new high-yield bombs, the U.S.S.R. began
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, deep within Soviet
Asia. Khrushchev threatened to explode a fifty-megaton
nuclear weapon, the largest in history to be detonated.
That fall American and Soviet tanks faced each other
across the barriers at the sector boundaries of Berlin.
At the last minute Khrushchev backed down from his
year-end ultimatum about a Berlin "solution" and an East
German treaty, but rather in the manner of a racing
driver making a split-second decision not to cut a
dangerous comer. Soviet aircraft, however, continued to
provoke incidents in the air traffic corridors above Berlin.
The disarmament conference at Geneva was virtually sabo-
taged by Soviet representatives, who went into their fa-
miliar slow-motion act, now refusing to discuss plans
which had once seemed promising subjects for negotiation.
In 1962, of course, there was the crisis over Cuba. By
October 15 the White House had in its hands clear
and unmistakable evidence of the emplacement of Soviet
offensive missiles on the island of Cuba.
Throughout this period Penkovskiy supplied the West-
ern allies with a running account of Soviet military prep-
arations in East Germany, as well as the backup within
the Soviet Union. As the Papers show, he was privy to the
entire Soviet plan for fighting a localized war, if neces-
sary, in Germany to enforce an effective East German
control over Berlin. (We may assume that the actual in-
telligence reports he transmitted
observations in the Papers — —
quite distinct from his
cited chapter and verse of the
military deployment.) He continued to report the con-
viction of Khrushchev and the Soviet political leadership
that the United States and the NATOallies would shrink
from any actual military confrontation in the Berlin area.
36 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
He noted the misgivings of some Soviet generals
also
about what would happen, in case the West called their
hand. (One wonders what might have happened if some
German Colonel Penkovskiy had gone over to the British
at the time of Hitler's first aggressive moves in the Cen-
tral Europe of the thirties.)
The by the West in Berlin forced
strong stand taken
Khrushchev back off from his insistence on a 1961
to
treaty. Penkovskiy could in turn report the reactions to
that inside the Soviet High Command. In reading the
Papers it is interesting to confirm how an announced
increase in the U.S. miUtary budget or a call-up of re-
serves has a quick, sobering effect on "adventurist" ten-
dencies in Moscow.
While warning about the carefully prepared Soviet
trap in East Germany, Penkovskiy continued to write
about Khrushchev's drive to build up the missile forces.
Significandy, the Papers begin in 1961 to mention Cuba
as a focus of Khrushchev's "adventurism." Few actual
technical details of missiles, missile carriers, deployment
sites, and their configurations are noted in the Papers
except to prove a point in passing. The Papers are a per-
sonal testament, not an intelligence report. But it is safe
to conjecture that the information which Penkovskiy
passed on in his regular reports was well used by the
U.S. photo interpretation experts, before they called the
turn so precisely on the number and types of Soviet
missilesphotographed moving into their sites in Cuba.
Beyond the question of technical specifications, more-
over, Colonel Penkovskiy had helped educate an Ameri-
can President and his staff to Nikita Khrushchev's ca-
pacity for sudden and reckless chance-taking. It was an
invaluable piece of political pedagogy. It is ironic that
the date of Penkovskiy's arrest by the State Security was
announced as October 22, just six days before Nikita
Khrushchev finally told President Kennedy that he would
"dismantle the arms which you described as offensive" and
return them from Cuba to the U.S.S.R.

In June 1937 an eighteen-year-old high-school grad-

uate named Oleg Penkovskiy left his mother's house in
Ordzhonikidze, in the northern Caucasus, and took the
long train ride to Kiev, where he successfully passed the
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 37

entrance examination at the Second Artillery School, to

begin training in the oflBcer candidates' class. For the next
twenty-four years Penkovskiy lived the life of a loyal
Soviet citizen, a devoted member of the Communist Party.
By 1939, when he was appointed politruk (poUtical officer)
of an artillery battery, he was already stepping up the
lowest rungs of the Soviet leadership class. His war record
—
was distinguished ^two Orders of the Red Banner, Order
of Aleksandr Nevskiy, Order of the Fatherland War, Order
of the Red Star, and eight other assorted medals cer-
tified him as a war hero. As his military career advanced
he distinguished himself not merely by ability but also
by zeal. He worked at the Frunze Academy, and it
hard
took no mean degree
of effort to emerge first in his class at
the missile school. In the intelligence service he was known
as an alert Party man, quick to complain when he felt
that the Party's orders or its best interests were violated.
In the sixteen months between April 1961 and August
1962, Colonel Penkovskiy coolly and carefully turned his
back on these twenty-four years of Communist dedication
and went to work for the two powers which he had been
taught — —
and had himself taught others ^were the Soviet
Union's greatest enemies. It was no chance commitment.
He had already tried to make
contact with American
authorities in Moscow 1960, six months before he
in
established communication with the British, through
Greville Wynne. His first contacts with Western intelli-
gence he had worked out in his own mind far in advance,
as well as the information he first selected to show them,
as a kind of bona fides.
As the Papers show, he transferred his allegiance to the
West almost passionately. "Khrushchev and his regime,"
he would note, "are demagogues and liars who are ad-
vocating their love of peace as a pretense. I consider it
my duty and purpose in life to be a soldier for truth and
freedom to a tiny degree. . . ."

Whydid he betray his government? And why at this

time, not before? Although Penkovskiy devotes a great
deal of space in his Papers to answering these questions,
a few prefatory comments may be in order. Penkovskiy's
own comments and explanations of his motives are lim-
ited by his frame of reference. He presumed in his read-
38 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
ers a greater knowledge of the Soviet situation than most
of us possess. Nor did he reckon with the curious moral {

relativism which leads so many professionally fair-minded 1

products of Anglo-Saxon education to equate the motives

|
for betraying the Soviet Union with the motives for be- |
traying the United States or another free society, with j

equal disapproval of the "turncoat." |

We might begin by eliminating some obvious motives |

attributed to spies, traitors, or defectors by people who I

live in comfortable homes. There was no woman in the ^

case —and, unlike Anglo-American defectors, Penkovskiy I

was certainly not a homosexual. Penkovskiy was a dutifiil J

if not exactly a loving family man. When his ultimate
;j

danger was brought home to him, his last desperate \

thoughts were to extricate his family, somehow, from the ]

U.S.S.R. (In fact, his quiet co-operation at the trial, not J

to mention his willingness to "confess" his guilt, suggests |

strongly that Penkovskiy had made a deal with his State i
Security jailers, to save his family.) The worst the Soviet i

prosecution would charge him with at his trial, in this i

regard, was that he went out with single ladies occasionally

\

and once, in the classic manner, drank champagne from ;

a girl friend's slipper. I

Penkovskiy could hardly have done his espionage work ]

for money. Again, the worst his Soviet prosecutors could i

charge was that he once received 3000 rubles from his j

Western contacts for certain expenses of which he paid

2000 back.
|

Nor was he a "defector" in the accepted sense of that

term. Three times he was able to travel to London and I

Paris while he was engaged in active espionage work. On i

any of these occasions he could have claimed asylum !

and remained in the West; and on the last, as the Papers ;

show, he thought long and hard about the possibility. Yet

j

each time his final decision was to return and finish his
work. As he wrote on October 9, 1961: "I must continue
for another year or two in the General Staff of the
U.S.S.R., in order to reveal all the villainous plans and plot-
tings of our common enemy. I consider that as a soldier
in this task, my place in these troubled times is on the
front lines."
Strange, grandiloquent language
American sounds
—which to a modem
as stilted as the battle exhortations in
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 39

our own Civil War memoirs. But we must remember that

Penkovskiy was not a modern American. He attacked the
Soviet regime with the same Pravda-type invective with
which he had once defended it. This was the only kind of
language he knew. In fact, Penkovskiy's Slavic idealiza-
tions and hyperbole might have come out of an old David
Zaslavskiy or Ilya Ehrenburg editorial or a passage in a
propaganda play like Kremlin Chimes, but with the sig-
nificant difference that the good guys and the bad guys
are now reversed. Talleyrand's old cynical injunction of
"not too much zeal" would make no more sense to Pen-
kovskiy than it would to Mikhail Suslov if he were asked
to discuss the "serious deviationist errors" of his former
boss Khrushchev in the calm vocabulary of the Harvard
Yard, or, for that matter, to Nikolay Gogol if it were
suggested that his wild troika passage in Dead Souls be
rewritten m
the style of Walter Lippmann or Henry Adams.
Several basic reasons do underlie Penkovskiy's sudden
adherence to the West. First was his sudden projection
into the snake pit of Soviet intraregime politics. Until
the close of World War II he was a simple professional
soldier and a loyal member of the Communist Party;
the Army and the Party were the only firmament he knew.
But very speedily thereafter his abilities, his well-placed
marriage, and his association with Marshal Verentzov
brought him into close association with the Soviet power
elite. Such an exposure is rarely kind to one's boyhood
illusions. Penkovskiy, with his highly developed capacity
for indignation, did not take easUy to the constant byplay
of intrigue, intimidation, and downright cheating, as gen-
erals and marshals fought their way to and from the top.
Had he stayed in a line unit, this artillery colonel
would have remained reasonably well insulated from sim-
ilar goings-on in the Army. But, on the advice (and with
the assistance) of his father-in-law, he went into staff
work, and after that, intelligence. Here he could see
everything on a double level. From 1949, the year he
entered the Military Diplomatic Academy, he worked for
an intelligence arm dealing with sabotage, subversion,
and the most secret tricks of clandestine organizations,
whose own officers were under the double surveillance of
their superiors and a rival, more highly regarded counter-
intelligence, the State Security. His official job for the
 40 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Committee was itself a lie. And he was continually
amazed that foreign scientists and businessmen who dealt
with the Committee took its mission of liaison at face
value.
Needless to say, Penkovskiy did not set out on his
career with the prospect of becoming disillusioned. He
was a man who Hked to get ahead. He was at first fasci-
nated by his associations with those in high places, and
when he had influence he rarely hesitated to use it. He
was, in a sense, a "careerist," like almost everyone else
in a closed hierarchical system of government in which
merit can carry one only so far without intrigue and in-
fighting added. Yet underneath his aspirations in the
Party and in the intelligence apparatus, he remained first
and last a professional soldier, whose basic loyalties were
formed in a period of war, when the obvious danger to
the Russian Motherland overrode anything else. His only
working tradition was a military tradition of obedience,
respect for authority, and confidence in rank and station.
He returned to the Soviet Union from his first foreign
assignment, in Turkey, in November 1956, at a time when
the whole set of normal loyalties in Soviet society had been
shaken by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in Febru-
ary at the Twentieth Party Congress. The year after his
return Marshal Zhukov was removed and disgraced by the
Khrushchev leadership. This was surely a blow to the
simple faith of a career military man. Zhukov's popularity
among the Soviet officer class was tremendous. Penkovskiy
in his Papers calls him "the Suvorov of our times." With
his high connections and his intelligence information,
Penkovskiy was hardly disposed to accept the conven-
tional explanation given the Soviet people of Zhukov's
downfall. It did not wash.
The colonel just returned from Turkey was not the
only Soviet officer who nursed a feeling of disturbance and
suspicion at the shabby treatment of his country's great-
est military hero. We must not forget how rooted in the
Soviet military establishment Penkovskiy was. His best
friends were officers of general's or colonel's rank. His
memories were military memories, his ambitions military
ambitions. It was precisely this which later led Soviet
authorities, at his trial, to play down his character as a
professional serving officer. For it is evident in Penkov-
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 41

skiy's constant references to conversations with fellow

officers that he was not some chance freak but a well-
connected, personable man who reflected the opinions, the
fears, and the discontents of a critical segment in Soviet
society. By 1960, after a decade of shake-ups, sudden
changes, and bewildering rises and falls from power, a
great many officers were singing the Soviet "BaUad of a
Soldier" more than slightly off-key. As his British associ-
ate, Wynne, wrote in his own memoirs: "Penkovskiy was
like the top part of an iceberg. There were a lot like him
submerged below the surface."
All this background might have produced a disillu-
sioned, cynical man, outwardly conformist but passively a
member of what the old Russians used to call the "inner
emigration." What probably, more than any single factor,
drove Colonel Penkovskiy to active rebelUon against the
Soviet regime was his fear of a sudden nuclear war,
which might be triggered by Khrushchev's adventurism.
Penkovskiy was one of a handful of Soviet citizens who
knew the truth not only about Soviet preparations for
nuclear warfare but about the recklessness with which
Khrushchev threatened its use. This fact is absolutely key
to understanding his motives.
We have grown used to crusaders against nuclear war-
fare in the West, to people who advocate unilateral
disarmament as the only hope for some kind of survival,
to prominent citizens like Lord Russell whose horror of
atomic warfare warps their common-sense judgment of
conflicting poUtics and policies. Because the Soviet security
system screens the problems and inner motives of Soviet
citizens from our view is no reason to suppose that a
similar horror of nuclear warfare does not haunt the
Soviet people, just as it does us.
Penkovskiy, to begin with, had little confidence in
Khrushchev's fidelity to his policy of peaceful coexistence.
He knew, from where he sat in intelligence, that the years
of the public coexistence policy coincided with Khrush-
chev's orders to intensify Soviet intelligence and Illegal
espionage activity throu^out the Western world. So he
—
was understandably skeptical and increasingly concerned
— over what he felt was the gullibility of the United
States and Britain in taking Khrushchev's peaceful state-
ment at face value.
42 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Nothing was the same for Penkovskiy from the day lay lie \

first saw the secret training film showing effects of the

Soviet nuclear tests. He brooded over this awesome option
of the Soviet leadership. What shocked him most was the
real brinkmanship which Khrushchev was apparently pre-
pared to use, invoking threats of nuclear warfare to extract
political gains. For if he conceded that Khrushchev would
use nuclear warfare only as a last resort, he had no
confidence that the last resort might not be reached, at
Khrushchev's decision, today, tomorrow, or the next day.
Penkovskiy was aware of Soviet weaknesses as well as
Soviet strength. He saw a highly risky political offensive
—
opening over Berlin and later developmg over Cuba
at the very moment when the Soviet military forces were
in a state of turmoil. The men replacing Zhukov were
apt to be political generals, picked for their ability to take
—
orders rather than to give advice this note of worry
obtrudes throughout the Papers. As a career officer
Penkovskiy grew more and more worried over a policy
that threatened mass destruction, without even the guaran-
tee of strength or technical competence behind it. Khrush-
chev, clearly, was not much of a general. And there is
nothing more unsettling to a professional military man
than the prospect of amateur night at the General Staff.
As he pondered on the apparent collision course of
Soviet policy over Berlin he also reflected on the help-
lessness of the Russian people and their ignorance of the
fate that might be in store for them. It was the historic
—
tragedy of the narod and the nachalstvo the "people"
who have from
traditionally felt apart, if not estranged,
their "leadership.""The people," he once wrote, "are much
like soldiers. They wait. They are lied to, suppressed,
abused, but they always hope for the best. I see how our
Soviet leadership propagates and exploits this waiting doc-
trine. We wait all the time. How wonderful to wait. Die
and others will wait. But in a nuclear age can a man just
wait for certain death?"
In his despair the memory of his father must have
come back to him. The father he had never met had not
waited. He had died fighting the same regime which he
himself now set out to destroy.

Casual newspaper readers, accustomed to thinking solely

 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 43

in terms of a steady "relaxation" or "thaw" in the U.S.S.R.

since the death of Stalin, may be surprised at the story of
espionage, repression, and ruthlessness in the following
pages. Unfortunately Penkovskiy's story is all too true.
The ultimate warrant of legitimacy within the Soviet
government remains the possession of power. The elabo-
rate mechanism of Party organization, Supreme Soviets,
Republics, cultural and workers' groups remains more or
less a facade. The real business of the Soviet state is
conducted behind it, by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its subordi-
nates.
Everything about Penkovskiy was tinged with deceit
or manipulation. His real occupation was not what he
stated. His real superior was not his nominal superior.
His strength and position in Soviet society could not be
expressed in any formal terms. Even the circumstances
of his birth and ancestry were not as he had to represent
them. In the fullest sense of the words he was forced to
live a lie twenty-four hours a day — ^long before he entered
into an intelligence relationship with the West. Through
it all he was in a position to see the ruthlessness of the
Soviet power struggle. He saw this as few men are per-
mitted to see it, conspicuously including the average Soviet
citizen.
This is not to say that the thaw and relaxation within
the Soviet society are nothing but illusion. It is true that
the revisionist reforms of Khrushchev loosened the ideo-
logical bonds of Soviet society and eliminated many of its
doctrinaire Marxist contradictions. It is true, and demon-
strably so, that the controlling police apparatus has relaxed
its coercions and eased its restrictions in the twelve years

since the death of Stalin. The very fact that the Soviet re-
gime attempted to give some semblance of legality to
Penkovskiy's trial argues the reality of these changes.
The Soviet public is no longer docile enough to accept the
shameless confessional purge trials of the Stalin period. If
many Soviet "tourists" who go abroad are "co-opted" by
the State Security beforehand, they are nonetheless Soviet
citizens and allowed some amount of travel. If the Soviet
people have little comprehension of the democratic sys-
tems of government, they are nonetheless able to exert in-
creasing pressure on their regimes in the form of de-
44 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
mands for consumer goods, housing, and education. These
are at least the beginnings of public opinion.
Nonetheless the fact remains that Soviet society is still

controlled by the security arm. The fact remains that the

citizens of the Soviet Union have few personal freedoms
as the West The fact remains that the entire
sees them.
Soviet state, and the world, can be swung into war or
headed on a collision course toward war by a decision
of a few men in the Central Committee. This horrendous
dependence of his people on individual whim came to
haunt Penkovskiy and it inspired his lonely revolt. We
must never forget that the degree of his revulsion with
the Soviet system increased in direct proportion to his
awareness of the regime's unrestricted power and his con-
viction of its fundamental irresponsibility. If ignorance is
bliss, it was Penkovskiy's peculiar folly to be wise. Un-
fortunately not many Soviet citizens are equipped to un-
derstand the premises which governed Penkovskiy's con-
clusions.
The Penkovskiy Papers, therefore, are not printed in any
effort to worsen relations with the Soviet Union or to
hinder the understanding between the two nations which
our mutual nuclear knowledge makes mandatory. This
book is not for those who contend that one must be
either completely ^'understanding" toward another nation
or completely hostile. It is written for those who want
realistically to appreciate the greatest problem still re-
maining in the way of a rapprochement with the Rus-
sians, as well as the progress made toward this rapproche-
ment. That problem is the continuing power of the security
apparatus over Soviet citizens.
The State Security mechanism continues to resist all the
pressures to change it within Soviet society. It continues
to serve as the principal prop of the Soviet Central Com-
mittee's leadership. Over the past four years the activities
of the "vigilant Chekists" of the KGB
and GRU
have re-
ceived steadily increasing publicity in the Soviet press;
and the former State Security Chief Aleksandr N. Shelepin
has become one of the most powerful figures in the Soviet
hierarchy.5 As it stands, the State Security cannot be

5 Shelepin, who bossed the KGB between 1958 and 1962, was
elevated barely one month after Khrushchev's downfall in October
1964 to full membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 45

modified. It will either continue to hold its power or be

destroyed.
It was Penkovskiy's thesis and his earnest conviction
that the State Security forces had to be attacked at their
roots before the Russian people, his people, would be
capable of leading the peaceful national life he knew they
deserved. And that is the thesis of this book.

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union —a necessary spring-

board to supreme power in the U.S.S.R. Shelepin's protege,
Vladimir Ye. Semichastnyy, the present Chief of the KGB, was
promoted to full membership in the Central Committee CPSU at
the same time. These promotions, rewards for KGB help in ousting
Khrushchev, set the sealon the renaissance of KGB influence,
which had been only slightly attenuated in Khrushchev's time. As
of July, 1965 Shelepin held more prominent Party and government
posts than any other prominent Soviet leader.
 CHAPTER I

n
The System in Which I Live

My name Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovskiy. I was bom

is

on April 23, 1919 in the Caucasus, in the city of Ordzhoni-

kidze (formerly Vladikavkaz), in the family of a salaried
employee; Russian by nationality, by profession, an officer
of military intelligence with the rank of colonel; I have
had higher education; I have been a member of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union since March 1940; I
am married; as my dependents I have my wife, one daugh-
ter,i and my mother; I have never been on trial for
criminal or political offense; I have been awarded
thirteen government decorations, five orders, and eight
medals; I am a resident of the city of Moscow, and live on
Maksim Gorkiy Embankment, house no. 36, apartment
59.
I am beginning the notes that follow to explain niy
thoughts about the system in which I live and my revolt
against this system.
I would like people in the West to read what I am say-
ing here, because they can learn much through my experi-
ence. I can expose Khrushchev's fallacies and deceits by
facts and actual examples. I know more than most about
his plans and his policies. I am fully aware of what I am
setting out to do —
I ask that you believe in my sincerity,
in my dedication to the real struggle for peace.
I have tried to set down my thoughts in order, but I
must apologize in advance for their condition. I must

1 Penkovskiy's second daughter was bora on February 6, 1962.

46
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I IIVE 47

write hurriedly. If a fact is important, or even a name, I

at least list it, in the hope that I will someday have the
time to elaborate or explain it. I am unable to do this all
at —
once or to write all I know and feel — for the simple
physical lack of time and space. When I write at home I

disturb my family's sleep (our apartment is only two

rooms) and typing is very noisy. During working hours I
—
am always busy ^running like a madman between the
visiting delegations and military intelligence headquarters
and the offices of my Committee. My evenings are
generally occupied —^it is part of my job. When I visit

my friends in the country it is worse. Someone may al-

ways ask what I am doing. Here at home at least I have a
hiding place in my desk. My family could not find it,
even if they knew. And they know nothing. It is a
lonely struggle. As I sit here in Moscow, in my apart-
ment, and write down my thoughts and observations I can
only hope that the persons in whose hands they eventually
fall will find them of interest and use them for the truth
they say.
First, let us elaborate my own personal characteristics,
as our Party saying goes.

Position: Senior Officer, Special Group, Chief Intelli-

gence Directorate, General Staff of the Soviet Army; pro-
moted to the rank of Colonel in February 1950.
Operational Cover: Senior Expert, Deputy Chief of
the Foreign Section, State Committee for the Co-ordina-
tion of Scientific Research Work.

My Parents and Relatives

Father: Penkovskiy, Vladimir Florianovich, born some-
time between 1895 and 1897, Russian native of the city
of Stavropol, killed in the Civil War of 1919. I never
knew my father at all. According to my mother, he fin-
ished the Lyceum and the Polytechnic Institute in War-
saw and was an engineer by profession.
Mother: Penkovskaya, Taisiya Yakovlevna, bom in
1900; has been living with me since 1941.
Brothers and Sisters: None.
Grandfather: Penkovskiy, Florian Antonovich, died

I
48 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
before the Revolution of 1917; a judge in the city of
Stavropol.
Grandfather's Brother: Penkovskiy, Valentm Antono-
vich, Lieutenant General 2 of the Soviet Army; Com-
mander of the Far East Military District. Prior to 1937 a
Regimental Commander in the Antiaircraft Defense
Force, Far East. In 1937-39 he was in prison, released at
the beginning of World War II. He occupied the following
posts during the war: Chief of Staff of the 21st Army;
Chief of Staff of the Far East Military District under
Malinovskiy. He was appointed Commander of the Far
East Military District troops when Marshal Malinovskiy
was made Minister of Defense.
Aunt: Shivtsova, Yelena Yakovlevna, prior to 1959 a
housekeeper in the Afghan and Italian embassies, an in-
formant for the State Security, resides in Moscow.
Wife: Penkovskaya {nee Gapanovich), Vera Dmitri-
yevna, born in 1928 in Moscow, Russian, comes from a
military family, knows French, does not work.
Wife's Father: Gapanovich, Dmitriy Afanasyevich,
former Major General of the Soviet Army, member of the
Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate
of the Moscow Military District, died in Moscow in
1952.
Wife's Mother: Lives with two grown children in
Moscow. After her husband's death she received a single
grant of 75,000 rubles ^ and was simultaneously awarded
a monthly pension of 2500 rubles.

Education

1937: Graduated from secondary school in the city of

Ordzhonikidze.

2 The literal Russian translation is colonel general {general

polkovnik) Here and throughout the Papers, however, we have used
.

the corresponding American or British equivalent ranks, to suggest

more clearly the individual's relative position in the military
heirarchy. A
one-star general we designate as brigadier general, as
in the U.S. Army, although he is called general mayor in the
Soviet Army. A
two-star general (U.S. major general) is a general
leytenant. A
three-star general (U.S. lieutenant general) is general
polkovnik.
3 At this time the official exchange rate was four rubles to a
dollar, the unofficial from ten to twenty rubles. In these Papers all
amounts are given in old rubles.
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 49

1937-39: 2nd Kiev Artillery School.

1945-48: The Frunze Military Academy (Combined
Arms Department)
1949-53: The Military Diplomatic Academy.
1958-59: Higher Academic Artillery Engineering
Courses on New Technology, at the Dzerzhinskiy Artil-
lery Engineering Military Academy.

Soviet Army Service, Including Studies

1937-39: Cadet of the 2nd Kiev Artillery School m

Kiev.
1939-40: Battery Political Officer (Politruk)^: 1st West-
em Front (during the Polish campaign); 91st Rifle
Division of the Siberian Military District and later on the
Karelian front (in the war against the Finns).
1940-41: Assistant Chief of Political Section for Kom-
somol work at an artillery school in Moscow.
1941-42: Senior Instructor of the Political Directorate
for Komsomol work in the Moscow Military District.
.

1942-43: Special Assignments Officer of the Military

Council of the Moscow Military District.
1943-44: Chief of Training Camps and then Artillery
Battalion Commander in the 27th Tank Destroyer Regi-
ment of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
1944: Wounded, in a hospital in Moscow.
1944^5: Liaison Officer for Commander of Artillery of
the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery
Sergey S. Varentsov (then convalescing in Moscow).
1945: Commanding Officer of the 51st Guards Tank
Destroyer Artillery Regiment, 1st Ukrainian Front.
1945-48: Student at the Frunze Military Academy.
1948: Senior Officer in the Organization and Mobiliza-
tion Directorate, Moscow Military District.
1948-49: Staff Officer with Commander in Chief of
Ground Forces, Ministry of Defense of the U.S.S.R., in
Moscow.
1949-53: Student at the Military Diplomatic Academy
in Moscow.
1953-55: Senior Officer of the 4th Directorate (Near

4 A person who is in charge of political work in units of the So-

viet armed forces.
50 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
East Desk), Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Staff
of the Soviet Army.
1955-56: Assistant Military Attache, Senior Assistant
of the Military Intelligence (GRU) Rezident in Ankara,
Turkey.
1956-58: Senior Officer of the 4th Directorate ^ of
GRU in Moscow (Preparation for going overseas as GRU
Rezident in India)
1958-59: Student at the Higher Academic Artillery
Engineering Courses of the Dzerzhinskiy Military Artil-
lery Engineering Academy in Moscow.
1959-60: Senior Officer of the 4th Directorate, Chief
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet
Army in Moscow.
1960: Member of the Mandate Commission,^ Military
Diplomatic Academy in Moscow; Senior Officer, Special
Group of the 3rd Directorate,^ Chief Intelligence Direc-
torate (GRU), General Staff of the Soviet Army.

Party Record: Member of Komsomol from 1937 to

1939; candidate member of the CPSU from 1939 to 1940;
member of CPSU since March 1940, Party Card No.
01783176.
Government Awards: Two' Orders of Red Banner;
Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy; Order of the Fatherland War,
1st Class; Order of Red Star; eight Medals.

Thus, one can have some idea as to who I am and what

I am.
There is more to be said, of course, than the bare record.
I was born in the thick of the Civil War during which my
father was lost. Mother told me that my father saw me for
the and last time when I was only four months old.
first

This occurred soon after my christening, for which purpose

I was taken to Stavropol. That was in accordance with

5 GRU area Directorate responsible for collecting intelligence in

the Near and Far East in 1960.
6 A group of GRU directorate chiefs and medical examiners
who make the finalselection of the candidates for the incoming
class of GRU's Military Diplomatic Academy each year.
7 GRU
area directorate responsible for collecting intelligence in
the United States, Canada, South America, and Great Britain.
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH! LIVE 51

my grandfather's wish. My
grandfather was a judge, but
that was long ago, in the old days.
Data on my father was given to me. 1918: Ensign
(proporshchik) in the 25th Reserve Infantry Regiment.
Ensign in the 112th Infantry Regiment. 1919: Second
Lieutenant {podporuchik) in the 1st Artillery Brigade. May
9, 1919, confirmed in the rank of lieutenant.
My father was a soldier in the White Army. My father
fought against the Soviets. In reality I never had a father
— ^that is what .our Conmiunists would say. I still do not
think they know the whole truth about him. If the KGB
had known all along that he was in the White Army
(although I was only a few months old at the time) every
door would have been closed to me: for an officer's
career, for membership in the Party, and especially for
the intelligence service.
The Civil War ended with the Red Army's victory and
I was a child without a father. My mother reared me as
best she could. I was brought up in a Soviet environment.
From the very beginning of my school days I showed
promise, or so people say.
When I was eight years old I went to school. By 1937
I had finished ten grades of the school at Vladikavkaz.
Immediately after graduating from the secondary school
there, at the age of eighteen, I entered the 2nd Kiev
Artillery School. I wanted to be a commander of the
Soviet Army. While in the school I had joined the Kom-
somol. I participated actively in the Komsomol and vari-
ous public activities, and was an outstanding student. I
loved the artillery. While still in school I made my first
contribution to the service by proposing a valuable tech-
nical improvement for which I was cited in the school's
order of the day.
My future seemed quite promising; I was one of the
few in my class who had finished secondary education,
and the chances of my advancement seemed very good.
Artillery has always been in a privileged position in
Russia. From the time of Peter the Great we Russians
have always been considered excellent artillerymen.
In 1939 I finished the 2nd Kiev Artillery School and was
commissioned an artillery lieutenant. Shortly before
graduation I was accepted as a candidate Party member.
Because of my active work in the Komsomol and the

l
52

fact that I
politruk of an
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
had become
I
a Party candidate, I was appointed
artillery battery, instead of receiving a
direct assignment as a troop commander.
I remember very I reported to my
well how, soon after
unit, our regiment was visited by Army Commander of
the First Rank (now Marshal) Timoshenko.^ At that
time he was the commanding general of the Ukrainian
Military District. To us young oflBcers he was a legendary
hero of the Civil War together with Budennyy. As the
saying goes, they had chopped White officers to pieces.
Later Timoshenko became one of Stalin's favorites and
for a short time, before the war, he occupied the post of
People's Commissar of Defense. I remember him talking
—
with our army commander I believe that it was Golikov
(now a marshal) and with another man whom I had never
seen before. Later we were told by the commissar of our
regiment that he was one N. S. Khrushchev, a member
of the District Military Council. His uniform fitted him
like a saddle fits a cow.
Soon I was to participate in the Polish campaign. In
September 1939 we crossed the old Polish border and
arrived in Lvov, after meeting only negligible resistance
from the Poles. Even at that time one could notice a big
difference between life in our own country and in bour-
geois Poland. We literally bought up everything we could
lay our hands on. Because we did not have enough cash,
we paid the Poles with our government bonds, thus cheating
them. The Poles were quite surprised and puzzled. They
asked us: "Why are you buying up everything, do you
have nothing at home?" We answered, "Oh, yes, we
have everything, but it is just difficult to get things.
Soon after the Polish campaign I was transferred to the
91st Rifle Division of the Siberian Military District
which was being formed in the small town of Achinsk. I
was appointed a battery politruk in the 321st Artillery
Regiment. As soon as the division had reached its full
strength we were sent to Finland, where our Red Army
was trying to break through the Mannerheim Line. We

Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko, bora in 1895; 1940-41

8
People's Commissar of Defense; commanded the troops of a front
during World War II; in 1949, commanded the Belorussian Military
District; in 1960 appointed to responsible work in the Ministry of
Defense; candidate member of the Central Committee CPSU.
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 53

arrived at the Karelian front, it seems to me, at the end

of January 1940. Here for the first time I saw victims of
the war. Wounded and frozen soldiers and officers with
blood frozen around their wounds could be seen every-
where. Many of them lost their fingers or toes, some of
them lost ears. Battles fought against the well-trained
Finns were very hard. We
suffered heavy casualties.
Our division remained in reserve until our troops began
the assault on Vyborg.^ It was here that both my battery
and I received our baptism of fire. On the very first day
of battle our division lost more than half of its personnel.
All three regimental commanders were killed. It was
March when we finally succeeded in breaking through the
Finns. Their resistance ceased, and the "short" war was
over. Many of the survivors in our division were awarded
decorations and medals. I received thanks and a cigarette
case. The division was sent back to Achinsk to re-form.
I did not go with my division. As one of the best and
youngest political workers, I was placed at the disposal of
the Moscow Military District's Political Directorate for
further assignment in the service.
Now a new era in my life began. Upon arriving in
Moscow, I as Assistant Chief of the Po-
was assigned
litical Section for Komsomol Work at the Krasin Artillery
School. In 1940, life in Moscow, as compared to life in
Siberia or at the Karelian front, was rather pleasant. In
spite of being quite busy, I often found time for personal
amusements, and made new acquaintances in Moscow.
For the students at the school I organized cultural trips to
the movies and theaters of Moscow. Still, the largest part
of my time was consumed organiidng propaganda and
agitation among the students: lectures, political information,
discussions, reading of newspapers and journals, etc. So
much that I became sick of it myself. I knew the Short
History of the Communist Party {Bolshevik) almost by
heart, and yet regardless of this, I continued to study,
study, and study. Such is the fact of being a political
worker in the Soviet Army.

©Vyborg was successfully defended by the Finns during the

Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40, but it was ceded to the U.S.S.R.
following Finland's defeat. It was retaken by the Finns in 1941
but captured by the Russians in 1944 and became a permanent part
of the U.S.S.R. under terms of the peace treaty in 1947.
54 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
All my efforts to make my lectures and political infor-
mation interesting were unsuccessful. The students quite
often dozed and in some cases actually slept during their
political studies. Having actively developed Komsomol
work at the school, I achieved certain positive results, but
my ardor soon disappeared. Quite often students visited
me with various complaints about poor conditions at home.
One complained about his parents being heavily taxed;
another complained that his family's only cow was taken
away for back taxes; a third said his old father had been
imprisoned because he had not gone to work, and so on.
On the one hand, I sympathized with the students and
helped them as much as I could. Yet at the same time I
had to write reports to the District Political Directorate
on unhealthy attitudes among the students, and combat
these attitudes myself. My basic duty as a Komsomol
worker was to raise the quality of studies and strengthen
Conmiunist discipline. While inwardly disagreeing with
many rules and regulations of the military service, I never-
theless continued to put the Party line into practice. I
had no other choice. I did not think of quitting the Army
because there was no other place for me to go. The life
of a Soviet officer is better than that of an engineer. Every-
body knows that. I had no other specialty.
While still in the artillery school, I was accepted as a
Conmiunist Party member. My only desire at that time
was to switch from political work to a command assign-
ment in the field, but this would entail great difficulties.
Although I had the advantage over other political workers
because I had finished an artillery school, it was not until
much later, during the war, that my wish to get a com-
mand assignment was finally realized.

The news about the German attack on the Soviet Union

in June 1941 came as a shock to me, as it did to the
majority of those serving in the Red Army. We simply re-
fused to believe the news about the crushing defeats in-
flictedupon our troops at the border. When Stalin on
July 3 began his radio address to the Soviet people with
the words "brothers and sisters," we all realized that some-
thing extremely serious had happened. Stalin had never
addressed the people like this before.
At approximately the same time, I was transferred from
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 55

the Artillery School to the political Directorate of the

Moscow Military District as instructor to the members of
Komsomol. One of the first documents which came to my
attention in my new fjosition was the order for the arrest
and execution of General Pavlov, Commander of the
Western Front, and his Chief of Staff, General Kli-
movskikh, as well as some others who failed to stop th&
German advance on their sectors of the front.
Soon the rumors about the mass surrender of Soviet
oflBicers and men reached Moscow, Moscow had also
learned about the German encirclement of two of our
armies in Belorussia, the retreat in the Ukraine, the heavy
fighting in the Smolensk area, etc. Wounded men began
to appear in the hospitals in Moscow, and they related
frightful stories about German invincibility, especially
about their ceaseless air raids and aerial bombardment,
carried out almost unpunished because our own Air Force
had been destroyed on the ground during the very first
days of the war. Whatever little remained of it was para-
lyzed by the Germans. Our ground forces were left with-
out any cover or support.
As the fall of 1941 came, the news from the front be-
came worse and worse. In October the Germans broke
through our defensive lines east of Smolensk and Bryansk
and encircled six or seven of our armies, taking about
half a million prisoners. After this, the road to Moscow
was open.
General Zhukov was hastily summoned from Leningrad
to assume command of the Western Front. At the same
time, Major General Artemyev, Commander of the Mos-
cow Military District, was appointed Commander of the
capital's defense. Artemyev was an NKVD
general; he first
commanded an NKVD ^^ division in Moscow and then,
in 1941, had become the Commander. At
District that time
most of the commanding generals assigned by Stalin to
various posts in the defense of Moscow were NKVD
10 The initials NKVD stood for the People's Commissariat for In-
ternal Affairs, a forerunner or predecessor of the present KGB
the Committee for State Security. NKVD
troops were most trusted
by Stalin and were used during the war to prevent, by force if
necessary, the retreat of Red Army units and to set examples of
courage in the face of enemy attacks. NKVD
officers were ranked
in military fashion, as are KGB
officers today.
56 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
generals. Artemyev's political commissar was Konstantin
Fedorovich Telegin, the Commandant of Moscow, General
Sinilov, and the Commandant of the Kremlin, General
Spiridonov. Army commanders such as Ivan Ivanovich
Maslennikov and Khomenko also were NKVX) generals.
Later all these commanding generals from the NKVD
p^-etended to be real Red Army generals, but only one of
them, Khomenko, has proven himself as a good combat
general. However, Maslennikov later became the com-
mander of a front.
It remains a fact, however, that all these NKVD gen-
erals were assigned to various posts in Moscow by Stalin
in 1941; they proved very valuable to Stalin during the
panic which enveloped the city during the period of Oc-
tober 16 to 19. By that time the Party leadership and
NKVD and militia officials had begun to flee to the East.
Looting was taking place everywhere. The government de-
clared the city in a state of siege, and began to mobilize
the population to dig trenches and build fortifications. The
local population was also used to form **volunteer" di-
visions and "people's militia" which were sent to the front
untrained and half-armed in order to stem the German
advance and give Zhukov time to regroup his depleted
troops.
The struggle for Moscow reached its highest point in
earlyDecember 1941. Zhukov had nerves of steel. He
would not commit his reserves to battle until the Germans
advanced too far, stretching their communication lines,
and got stuck in deep snow only a few kilometers from
Moscow. Tanks without fuel and with their tracks frozen
found themselves buried in snow, while their ak forces
were grounded by terrible blizzards. Then our entire force
was thrown at the Germans, inflicting a great defeat upon
them. Zhukov, Konev, and Rokossovskiy led their armies
skillfully, and the spirit of the troops rose considerably
when they realized that they could defeat the Germans.
By the end of the winter of 1941-42, our troops had driven
the Germans back almost as far as Smolensk.
In the summer of 1942, when our troops were retreating
on the Southern Front in the direction of Stalingrad and
the Caucasus, I was assigned to the War Council of the
Moscow Military District, again to do political work. My
superior at that time was Division Commissar [i.e., a
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 57

political major general] Dmitriy Afanasyevich Gapano-

vich, Chief of the District Political Directorate. Dmitriy
Afanasyevich became quite fond of me and treated me
very well. Once he invited me to his home and introduced
me to his family, including his daughter Vera, a very at-
tractive girl about fourteen years old, with dark hair, whom
I happened to see quite often later during my stay in
Moscow.
At that all our thoughts were riveted on
time, however,
the South, where our exhausted troops ha4 already begun
to entrench themselves in the ruins of Stalingrad on the
Volga. The summer and the fall for us in Moscow were a
period of endless, agonizing waiting. We were aware of the
daily bombardment to which the city was subjected by
German bombers and heavy artillery, of the way our
soldiers fought the Germans in ruined buildings of the
city, crawling toward each other among fires and through
the smoke and dust which constantly hung over the city.
Finally, in the middle of November, it became known to
us that our army had gone on the offensive, encircling
the 6th German Army and part of the 4th Armored Army.
Two and a half months later, in February 1943, the re-
sistance of the besieged German garrison was broken and
more than 300,000 prisoners were taken.
I my colleagues in the district headquarters
heard from
that my
grandfather's brother, then Brigadier General
Penkovskiy, participated in this battle as Chief of Staff
of the 21st Army commanded by General Chistyakov. He
distinguished himself and was awarded a decoration.
Several months later our armies met the German armies
in a large battle between Orel and Kharkov. This was the
third decisive battle of the war. The special feature of
this battle was the mass employment of tanks by both
sides. We used about five tank armies in this batde.
The ended in August with the complete victory
battle
of Soviet arms. The Germans began a general retreat along
the entire Dnepr River line. Our troops displayed great
skill, combat and heroism. Later I heard from
proficiency,
General Gapanovich, who had friends in the Political
Directorate of the Voronezh front (one of the four fronts
which participated in the battle), that a serious argument
took place between General Zhadov, Commander of the
5th Guards Army, and General Rotmistrov, Commander
58 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
of the 5th Guards Armored Army, in regard to their re-
I
spective actions during the battle. Each accused the
other of having exposed the other's flank to the Germans
by his premature retreat. Some members of the staff com-
pared it to the well-known argument between General
Rennenkampf and General Samsonov during World War
I.

Coming up to the Dnepr, our troops crossed the river

under heavy enemy fire and in November 1943 took Kiev.
be sent to the front; after all, I was a
I tried constantly to
skilkd artilleryman with combat experience acquired in
the Finnish War. At long last my request was granted
and in November 1943 I was placed at the disposal of
the artillery commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front in
the Kiev area.
So ended my life in Moscow, the life of a rear-echelon
drudge, and my political work. I said good-by to it with-
out regret and was impatiently waiting for the chance to
measure swords personally with the Germans. After all,
at that time there were already several himdred decorated
heros of the Soviet Union, but all I had was a cigarette
case which I got for fighting the Finns. I expected to be
assigned as a battalion commander; I was already visual-
izing myself as a commander of an artillery regiment.
I must confess that when I arrived at the front my new
comrades greeted me with a certain amount of mis-
trust. They were battle-seasoned veterans who had fought
in the Ukraine and at Stalingrad, who more than once
had looked death in the eye, and who had earned many
combat decorations. Their tanned, wrinkled, stern faces
spoke of heated skirmishes with the Germans. And then
there was I, a major, an ofl&cer since 1939 who quietly
sat out almost the entire war in Moscow without any com-
bat experience against the Germans. The reception given
me made my desire to get to the front lines as soon as pos-
sible even stronger. I was quite disappointed, therefore,
to find out that I was being appointed chief of training
units in which new replacements for the Antitank Artillery
of the 1stUkrainian Front were received and trained.
These units were furnishing replacements to the antitank
artillery regiments, which had suffered considerable losses
at the front. At that time we had twenty-seven such reg-
iments. I received partly trained recruits as well as old
I THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 59

artillerymen returning from hospitals, sorted them out,

and sent them to the units where they were most needed,
according to instructions.
While occupying this position I had the opportunity to
meet Lieutenant General of Artillery Sergey Sergeyevich
Varentsov, Commander of Artillery of the First Ukrainian
Front. From the very start I became very fond of this
veteran artilleryman and patriot. He had been at the front
since 1941, had been wounded, and after a succession of
combat commands had reached the post of Artillery Com-
"
ander, first of an army and then of a front. Sergey
rgeyevich was a powerfully built man with broad
shoulders and a shock of white hair on his head he —
could be recognized half a kilometer away when he was
without his cap. I think he was taken with me. When I
complained to him that I was once more given an adminis-
trative rear-area job, instead of bawling me out as most
of the generals would have done, he took me aside and
told me that he liked my enthusiasm but that I had
spent too much time in the rear. Therefore I needed
some time to become adjusted to field conditions prior to
taking a combat command assignment.
Such an opportunity presented itself in February 1944. I
was sent to the 8th Guards Antitank Artillery Brigade.
The brigade consisted of three Guards regiments (the
322nd, the 323rd, and the 324th), each having six bat-
teries (57-mm and 76-mm antitank guns and a certain
amount of 100-mm guns), and approximately five hun-
dred men in each regiment (when at full strength, which
never happened). The Commander of our brigade was
Lieutenant Colonel Chevola, a strict, skillful, and experi-
enced artilleryman who liked to be under enemy fire to-
gether with his soldiers. The regiment to which I was
assigned was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union
Major Tikvich, a gay, cheerful, happy-go-lucky man who
liked his drink. Soldiers loved him for his personal bravery
in battle. Soon after my arrival in the regiment, Tikvich
got into serious trouble because of a woman and he was
removed from his post. In March, upon General Varent-
sov's recommendation, I was appointed regimental com-
mander.
After we took Kiev and defended successfully the forti-
fied bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dnepr, our
60 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Supreme High Command organized a large concentration
of forces, which were to push beyond the Dnepr and the
4th German Panzer Army, which was located between
the Dnepr and the Carpathians. During the preparation
for this new advance our brigade was visited by Com-
mander of the Front General Nikolay Fedorovich Vatutin,
Khruschchev, a member of the War Coimcil of the front,
and General Varentsov.
On February 28, however, the jeep in which General
Vatutin was riding was ambushed by Ukrainian nationa-
lists who were operating in this area as guerrillas, and

General Vatutin was mortally wounded. He soon died in

one of the hospitals in Kiev. Marshal Zhukov was ap-
pointed the new conmiander of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
Despite the fact that he was considered an outstanding
military commander, veteran officers said that this change
just before the start of the offensive operation had a nega-
tive effect on its course.
Some people feel that Zhukov failed to take sufficiently
decisive measures to strengthen the weak spots, whereas
he himself maintains that certain army commanders (in-
cluding Grechko and Badanov) let him down. At any
rate, the Germans escaped full encirclement, going south
and west, and we thus missed a chance to set up an-
other Stalingrad for them in the Dnestr area. Later, in
the middle of April, our 60th Army, which was then com-
manded by General Kurochkin (at present he is the Chief
of the Fnmze Military Academy in Moscow) took Terno-
pol, where my regiment participated in defending the
cityfrom German counterattacks.
By
the end of the month both sides went over to the
defense. Marshal Zhukov was taken away from us and
appointed to the General Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command. Assigned in his place was Konev, who
had just been promoted to the rank of marshal for his
successful operations in the Ukraine. Sergey Sergeyevich
Varentsov told me later that there was no better soldier in
the Red Army than Marshal Zhukov; he never hesitated
using strong language to display his authority. Marshal
Zhukov was always popular among ordinary soldiers and
junior officers, with whom he tried to be on even terms.
They saw him as a legendary Russian warrior-hero. At
the very same time, he was extremely strict with his gen-
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 61

erals, bawling them out and using the roughest kind of

language in the presence of their officers. Some of these
generals, General Batov ^^ for example, have not forgotten
this. For this reason, when Khrushchev decided to re-
move the Marshal in 1957, he had no trouble finding
enough senior commanders who were willing to help him
in this matter.
A
lull set in on the 1st Ukrainian Front, lasting until
June, after which preparations started for a new offensive,
in the direction of Lvov and southern Poland. In this
period of preparation, during a reconnaissance operation,
I was wounded in the head. It was a serious wound. I
received a concussion, and both my upper and lower jaw
on the right side of my face were damaged. I was sent to
a hospital. It was only after a two-month period of treat-
ment that I began to get ready for my return to the front.
During a short stay in Moscow I visited General
Gapanovich and again met his daughter Vera. Right then
and there I fell in love with her. She was now sixteen
years old, a real beauty.
General Gapanovich told me that General Varentsov
was in a hospital in Moscow where he was being treated
after an accident which happened to him at the front.
It seems that he was riding in a car to see Marshal Konev
when, due to the driver's carelessness, the car collided
with a tank. Sergey Sergeyevich suffered a broken hip.
Doctors told him that he would have a limp for the rest-
of his life. He was a patient in the Generals' Hospital on
Serebryannyy Lane in Moscow.
When I visited him I found his spirits very low. Not
only was he suffering from physical pain, but he was also
depressed by rumors about a tragedy that had occur
in his family, who were Uving at that time in Lvov,
then the headquarters of our front. Sergey Sergeyevich
appointed me his personal liaison officer with the Artillery

11 Pavel Ivanovich Batov, bom 1897; joined the Red Army

in
in 1918; during World War II first a corps and
he commanded
then an army; in 1954-55 he was the first Deputy Commander of
Soviet Forces in Germany; from 1955-60 he was the Commander of
the Carpathian and Baltic Military Districts; at the present time he
is the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed
Forces and Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the
Warsaw Pact countries.
62 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Staff Headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front. When he
sent me
to Lvov, he asked me to find out exactly what
happened to his mother and two daughters and, if neces-
sary, to take care of them. My assignment to Varentsov's
staff it possible for me to travel freely to Moscow.
made
So went to Lvov. There I really foimd a tragedy.
I
Sergey Sergeyevich had been married twice. His first wife,
Anya, died of tuberculosis in Leningrad, and after this
Varentsov married Yekaterina Pavlovna, who was the
wife of a venereologist. (They fell in love and she got a
divorce from the doctor.) From his first marriage Varentsov
had one daughter, Nina, who was working in a hospital
near Lvov. She was married to a major whose name was
Loshak. He was a Jew. He and two other officers were
caught stealing "socialist property," tried by a military
tribunal, and shot. Actually, they had been selling cars
and spare parts on the black market.
Nina loved her husband very much. After he was shot,
nobody wanted to talk to her, nobody wanted to have
anything to do with the wife of a man who had been
executed. She could not bear this, and once when a
wounded lieutenant was passing her in the hospital cor-
ridor, she grabbed his pistol and shot herself. At that time
Varentsov's old mother was in Lvov. She was unable to
handle the arrangements for Nina's burial, and no one
wanted to help her. As soon as I saw this situation, I
quickly made my decision. I sold my watch, bought a
coffin and a black dress, and had Nina buried. I also
helped Varentsov's mother to get some coal and firewood
— she was sitting home freezing.
Major Loshak had been arrested by "Smersh"; ^^ at
the trial he was accused not only of stealing socialist prop-
erty, but also of sabotage and undermining the power of
the Red Army.
This is the way things have always been done in our
country, and that is how they are done today. person A
12 Smersh (literally "death to spies") was in fact the Chief
Directorate of Counterintelligence of the Soviet armed forces. It
became a part of the MGB in 1946 and remained so until February
1947, at which time the name disappeared. Today it is known merely
as the Chief Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB for the
Soviet Armed Forces (3rd Chief Directorate)
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 63

is arrested for speculation, but then some political signif-

icance must always be attached to it.
Upon my return to Moscow I gave Sergey Sergeyevich
a detailed account of everything that had taken place in
Lvov and what I had done. He embraced me, kissed me,
and said, "You are now like my own son." My
friendship
with Varentsov and his family has continued since then.
He calls me his boy and son, and frankly he has taken
my father's place. When talking about Smersh and Nina,
Sergey Sergeyevich has often mentioned that he now un-
derstands what the families of those whose husbands and
relatives were arrested by the NKVDhad to live through.
He did not believe Rokossovskiy ^^ and others before,
but now after Nina's death nothing will make him for-
give those who are responsible for her death. This in-
cident that occurred in Varentsov's family made a deep
impression on me.
I continued traveling between Moscow and the Front
Headquarters with instructions from General Varentsov to
his deputy. General Semenov, the Commander of the 7th
Artillery Corps Korolkov; and the Divisional Artillery
commanders Sanko (who at present is serving under
Sergey Sergeyevich in the Chief Artillery Directorate),
Kafanov, and others. At the end of 1944 I returned to
the front, where I was assigned Commander of the 51st
Guards Tank Destroyer Regiment. It was just at the right
moment; preparations were starting for a new offensive
whose purpose was the final hberation of southern Poland
and a direct assault against southeastern Germany.
Our offensive began in the middle of January. Despite
snow and severe weather our assault units broke through
the German lines, our armored units advanced and took
Krakow, and the very same month we crossed the old
German border and captured our first German city, whose
name, as far as I can remember, was Kreuzburg.
The entire Army rejoiced. The day of the capture I
13 In 1937 Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy was
imprisoned and brutally tortured for allegedly participating in a
clique which had supported Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskiy, who
was liquidated in 1937 for "treason." Later Rokossovskiy was re-
leased and reinstated, minus his teeth. During the period of the
Great Purge of 1936-38, by conservative estimates, from 20,000 to
35,000 officers were purged. This was 35 to 50 per cent of the Soviet
officer corps.
64 > PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
happened to be at the Headquarters. Sergey
Artillery
Sergeyevich, in high introduced me to Marshal
spirits,
Konev, Commander of the Front, telling him that I had
recently come up with an excellent idea on how to de-
crease the amount of time spent in training antitank guns.
It must be mentioned here that we were having diffi-
culties turning the guns from one direction to another
when German tanks broke into our defense zones, espe-
cially when only one or two men were left to man a gun
because of losses among gun crews. It occurred to me
that a steel plate with a spindle in the center could be
installed on the ground, covered with heavy gun grease,
and then another plate put on top of it with the wheels
of the gun secured to it. The crew could then turn the
gun quickly in any direction to fire at the advancing tanks.
My invention had already been adopted by Sergey
Sergeyevich; Marshal Konev, after pondering the idea
for a while, commended me for initiative and inventive-
ness. "Here is a good candidate for the Military Academy
Sergey Sergeyevich," said Konev before leaving, pointing
at me. Later, for this invention and for a combat operation
that had been conducted well, I was awarded the Order
of Aleksandr Nevskiy. All this lifted my spirits consider-
ably, and I went back to my regiment anticipating a
brilliant military career.
The struggle against the Germans continued to be ex-
tremely savage, especially in the thickly populated region
of Silesia, where for the first time I experienced the charms
of street fighting. The German tanks appeared unexpect-
edly from side streets and alleys, in front and behind us;
sometimes we had to fire at them point blank, turning the
guns around and training them on the target at the
last moment. Men choked from the dust rising above the
heaps of broken stone and brick of the demolished build-
ings, while ashes from the burning lumber settled on the
snow, turning its color from white to dirty gray or black.
In February we emerged from the industrial regions,
pursuing the Germans across the Oder. We advanced as
far as the Neisse, where we stopped for a respite before
the final offensive against Berlin. I was pleased to see my
old brigade, the 8th Guards Tank Destroyer Artillery Bri-
gade, mentioned several times in Stalin's orders, as well
as the 32nd Brigade, whose commander. Colonel Ivan
I THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE
Vladimirovich Kupin, was a good friend of mine. At the
65

present time he is a general and is in command of

artilleryof the Moscow Military District. Kupin is also
a good friend of Varentsov's and is indebted for many
things to Sergey Sergeyevich, who got him out of trouble
many times. (Kupin's nephew is married to one of Varent-
sov's daughters by his second marriage.)
April 1945 came, and the war was almost over. My
regiment was providing support for the southern group
of the front which was advancing through Dresden and
Prague and then through Czechoslovakia into Austria,
where we replaced the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The head-
quarters of our Central Army Group, under the command
of Marshal Konev, were in Baden. I took the opportunity
to remind Sergey Sergeyevich of Konev's remark about
my attending the Military Academy. At that time I was al-
ready a lieutenant colonel with five decorations and
six medals —
and besides I wanted to marry Gapanovich's
daughter Vera and live in Moscow.
Sergey Sergeyevich immediately agreed. At the end of
August 1945 he wrote an official recommendation for my
acceptance at the Frunze Academy. I passed the entrance
exams and began my studies in the academy. In the fall
Vera and I, with the blessing of her parents and my mother,
were married.
My studies at the Frunze Military Academy continued
for three years. For me this was a period of intensive
study and of a happy family life. Our first child was
born in 1946. It was a girl whom we named Galina. In
the same year, with the help of my father-in-law. Gen-
eral Gapanovich, I was able to get an apartment in a
new nine-story house built on Maksim Gorkiy Embank-
ment with a view of the Moscow River, where I am
still living at the present time.
Then studying at the academy were a number of prom-
ising officers, some of whom are generals now. I remember
two of them particularly well: Lieutenant General Yag-
lenko and Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel
Vasiliy lUarionovich Shcherbina, who is now serving in
the Volga Military District in Kuybyshev. The Com-
mandant of the academy was an old man. Lieutenant
General Tsvetayev, an army commander during the war.
 66 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
chronically ill, which was the reason why we very
seldom saw him. He died, I think, in 1950.
My was
father-in-law, as a well-placed political general,
a man of some was often present in his apart-
influence. I
ment when he was visited by his friends and acquain-
tances and there I became acquainted with many senior
officers of the Moscow Military District Staff, the Moscow
Garrison, and the General Staff.
After 1946 I temporarily lost contact with Varentsov.
He was assigned to the Transcaucasian Military District.
I did not see him until he came to Moscow to attend
some courses at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy
and the Dzerzhinskiy Engineering Artillery Academy.
Myacquaintanceship with representatives of the higher
circles of command, acquired through my father-in-law
and Varentsov, aroused a certain amount of envy among
my colleagues at the academy. I am almost sure that it
was one of them who denounced me to organs of the
MGB 1^ as an alleged black-market speculator, a charge

of which I was absolutely innocent. I was summoned to

the Smersh Counterintelligence Directorate of the MGB,
which, I must confess, scared me very much, but the whole
thing was happily resolved.
At that time Soviet Army officers had to watch them-
selves very carefully because many high posts in the Mos-
cow Garrison were occupied by MVD and MGB generals.
Understandably, a great deal of enmity existed between
them and the regular Soviet Army officers. Some of the
latter, such as General Yegorov, who was then my father-
in-law's deputy in the District Political Directorate, openly
talked of the "Chekists" occupying posts in the district
headquarters. But there were also others, like General
Zolotukhin, who had a reputation for licking the boots
of the MGB. Some of my father-in-law's colleagues even
accused him of being too friendly with the MGB.
In 1948 I completed the course in the Frunze Academy
and pinned on my chest the diamond-shaped insignia of

14 One
of the responsibilities of the MGB
(Ministry of State Se-
curity) and
its successors was that of counterintelligence and se-
curity within the Soviet armed forces. The component of the MGB
responsible for this function was, and still is, known conmionly as
the Special Section [Osobyy Otdel], The MGB
was a successor of
the NKVD and a predecessor of the KGB.
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 67

a graduate. Now I had to decide what

do next. I had
to
an offer to enter the Military Diplomatic Academy, which
would open the way for a career of a military intelligence
officer and a chance to be a military attache abroad.
This idea appealed to Vera, but her father advised me
to pass this offer up for the time being. He maintained that
it would not be wise for me, a young and highly
qualified artillery officer, to give up a career which had
started well in this field and
change for work in the
to
GRU, which would prove to be a dead end for me. In-
stead, he advised me to get an assignment in the Moscow
Military District. I agreed with my father-in-law's argu-
ments and got an assignment in the Organization and
Mobilization Directorate of Lieutenant General Sandalov,
the District Chief of Staff. Unfortunately, General Sanda-
lov, a fair and sympathetic person, was later badly
maimed in an airplane accident. He is now living as an
invalid with his legs paralyzed.
I served in the District Staff a total of six months.
Shortly before my arrival, sudden changes had taken place
in the district. General of NKVD
Artemyev was replaced
by Marshal Meretskov, and my father-in-law was assigned
to one of the remote military districts in the Urals. Some
people said that the one behind it was Marshal Bulganin,
then Minister of Defense, who was trying to gain the
favor of Army officers —
many of whom, General Yegorov
and General of Armored Troops Butkov, for example,
were openly expressing their satisfaction on this score.
Their joy, however, was short-lived.
In 1949 General Artemyev returned, and what was even
worse, especially for the Air Force officers, Stalin ap-
pointed his son Vasiliy Commander of the Air Forces of
the district. Vasiliy Stalin was a drunk and a rowdy.
Everybody hated him. He was especially rude toward
Lieutenant General (now Marshal) Moskalenko, Com-
mander of the Antiaircraft Defense of the city of Moscow,
deriding him for always being sick. He said he ought to be
riding in a wheel chair instead of a staff car. I was not
at all surprised by the fact that "Vaska" (as many called
Stalin's son) was getting along so well with the NKVD
generals. But as soon as his father died he was removed
from his —
post ^in fact, removed altogether from the Air
Force.
68 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
After serving six months in the Moscow Military Dis-
trict, I succeeded in getting transferred to the Staff of the
Ground Forces. The Commander in Chief was then
Marshal Konev and his Chief of Staff was General Malan-
din. Among the officers I met here I became most friendly
with Major General BaJdanov, Chief of the Physical
Training Directorate. Baklanov, who at the present time
holds the post of Commander of the Siberian Military
District, was a tall, well-built man with excellent military
bearing. He distinguished himself during the war when
commanding one of the Guards divisions of the 5th
Guards Army of General Zhadov, which was included in
the 1st Ukrainian Front. Baklanov and Zhadov were great
friends. 1 foresee that Baklanov ^^ will advance far in
the service. In the past he owed much to Zhadov, but I
would not be surprised if in the future Baklanov will be in
a position to protect Zhadov.i^
At the end of 1949 the question again arose of my
transfer to the military intelligence service and study at
the Military Diplomatic Academy. I finally gave my con-
sent and entered the regular course of the academy, with
the idea of becoming a professional military intelligence
officer. Soon after that, on February 6, 1950, I was pro-
moted to the rank of colonel.
At this point it will be enough to mention only that at
the academy I learned how to conduct military espionage
and completed a three-year course in the English language,
which I mastered, I believe, fairly well. On July 22, 1953,
I was graduated from the academy and assigned to the
Chief Intelligence Directorate [GRU] of the General
Staff of the Soviet Army. I was made Senior Officer of
the 4th Directorate responsible for the Near East.
In March Stalin had died. Soon thereafter came
Beriya's arrest and there began the rule of the so-called

15 Gleb Vladimirovich Baklanov, born in 1910; joined the Soviet

Army command
in 1932; held various positions during Worid War
II; 1960-64 was the Commander of the Siberian Military District; at
present commands the Northern Group of Forces, a lieutenant
general.
Aleksey Semenovich 23iadov, bom in 1900; in 1953 he was the
16
Commandant of the Frunze Military Academy; in 1954 the Com-
mander of Soviet troops in Austria; in 1957 the Deputy Commander
in Chief of Ground Forces; in 1959 he became First Deputy Com-
mander in Chief of Ground Forces.
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 69

which consisted of Malenkov, Mol-

"collective leadership,"
otov, Bulganin, and Khrushchev. The new leadership
undertook formulation of a new policy: economic and
political penetration of theNear East. Soviet military in-
telligence was interested not only in the strength of the
British and their intentions in the Suez Canal zone, but
also in the potential of Egypt as an anticapitalist miUtary
power in the Near East. My work was directed against
Egypt.
In August 1954 I was transferred to the Pakistan Desk
and began to prepare myself for the post of assistant
military attache in Karachi. However, the Pakistani re-
fused to give their approval to the expansion of the Soviet
military attache's staff in their country. Soon after that I
prepared to go to Turkey, to be an assistant military
attache there.
In the summer of 1955 I arrived at my new post in
Ankara. My wife Vera also came with me. At the be-
ginning, when I was acting military attache, we had to
attend all the official receptions and pay various visits.
In January 1956, the newly assigned Soviet military
attache. Brigadier General of GRU Nikolay Petrovich
Rubenko, arrived in Turkey. My
relations with him grad-
ually became quite strained, and as a result, in November
1956, I was recalled to answer various charges. The cir-
cumstances leading to my recall bear retelling because
they had an important effect on my career. Rubenko, whose
real name Savchenko (Rubenko was used as an opera-
is
tional "cover"), had once worked as military attache in
Kabul. He was an older man, about sixty, and rather
crude in his approach to our work. One of his assistants
named lonchenko, tried to recruit some agents in Turkey
by brazenly propositioning them. He would meet a Turk
in the street, invite him to a restaurant, and almost im-
mediately propose that he become a Soviet agent, for
good pay. "You love me, and I will take care of you," he
would say. "Now get me a military manual. Here is the
money. Take it!"
This sort of thing was soon noticed by Turkish coun-
terintelligence. So it was no surprise that another time,
lonchenko ^^ was apprehended at a meeting by Turkish
17 lonchenko was nearly discharged as a result of this action but
was assigned finally to the Military Diplomatic Academy as an in-
70 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
police. I had to goget him out. He had gone to the
meeting with Savchenko's permission, at a particularly
ticklish period, during a visit of the Shah of Iran to
Turkey, when Moscow had forbidden any meeting with
agents. When I gave Savchenko my opinion about his
violating Moscow's orders, he became angry and told me
to mind my own business. To straighten out this matter,
I sent a cable to Moscow through the channels of our
other intelligence organization in Turkey, the rezidentura
of the KGB. When GRU
headquarters discovered this,
I was recalled, accused of writing a report about my chief
and sending it through channels of our bitter rival ^this —
interservice jealousy between the GRU
and KGB runs
through most Soviet intelligence activities.
The matter did not end with my recall. The disagree-
ment was finally reported to Khrushchev, who keeps a
close watch on intelligence activities. Khrushchev gave
orders to have the matter thoroughly investigated, to find
out who was right and who was wrong. I was spoken to
rather sternly for not having treated my superiors with
proper respect; at the same time, I was told that my action
itself in alerting Moscow was correct. After the investiga-
tion Savchenko was punished by the Party and dismissed
from the GRU. At the present time he is a department
head in the Institute for Oriental Studies.
Despite this vindication, my stay in the reserve dragged
on. As Smolikov, Chief of Personnel, told me: "In principle
you were right to denounce Savchenko, but you must
remember that Savchenko is a general, and not many
generals will accept you after this incident." After this, I
decided to see Sergey Sergeyevich Varentsov. I told him
about my differences with the GRU, and I expressed the
desire to go back to a command assignment in the artillery.
Sergey Sergeyevich promised to do all he could to help me.
After a long wait, in September 1958, I was sent to the
Dzerzhinskiy Military Artillery Engineering Academy to
attend a nine-month academic course for the study of mis-
sile weapons. I happened to be the senior colonel among
the sixty oflScers in my course and was appointed sergeant
major of the course. I thought that in this way I had
finally finished with my work in the GRU. However, when

structor and then to Vietnam as an advisor to Ho Chi Minh on in-

telligence matters.
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 71

I finished the course (with an excellent rating) in May

1959, I was not permitted to return to a line unit. In-
stead, I was again placed at the disposal of the GRU. In
November 1960 I was given a new assignment, the one I
am working on now while writing these lines. As a serving
officer in military intelligence, I was detailed to the State
Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research
WorkoftheU.S.S.R.

That is the outline of my life in this system. I began as

a good Komsomol. From the beginning I had showed prom-
ise, or so people said, for becoming a builder for Com-
—
munist society as A. Bezymenskiy has written, "a Kom-
somol to the nth degree.." As a politruk I worked as a guide
and educator of the soldier masses. I believed in the Soviet
system and was ready to fight anyone who even talked
against it.

was first during the struggles of World War II that

It
I became convinced that it was not the Communist Party
which moved and inspired us all to walk the fighting
road from Stalingrad to Berlin. There was something else
behind us: Russia. We believed in the end that we were
fighting for the Russia of Suvorov and Kutuzov, of Minin
and Pozharskiy, not for Soviet Russia but for Mother
Russia.
Even more than by the war itself, my eyes were opened
by my work with the higher authorities and general of-
ficers of the Soviet Army. I happened to marry a gen-
eral's daughter and I quickly found myself in a society of
the Soviet upper classes. I realized that their praise of the
Party and Communism was only in words. In their private
lives they lie, deceive, scheme against each other, intrigue,
inform, cut each other's throats. In their pursuit of more
money and advancement for themselves they become in-

formants for the KGB on their friends and fellow workers.

Their children despise everything Soviet, watch only for-
eign movie films, and look down on ordinary people.
Our Commimism, which we now have been building
for almost forty-five years, is a fraud. I myself am a part
of this fraud; after all, I have been one of the privileged.
Years ago I began to feel disgusted with myself, not to
mention with our beloved leaders and guides. I felt before,
and I feel now, that I must find some justification for my
72 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
existence which would give me inner satisfaction. I argued
with myself. I swore at myself. Finally I became certain
that what we call "our Communist society" was only a
fa9ade. One cannot helpagreeing with Molotov, who after
Stalin's death stated "by mistake" that we were still far
from having built socidism, to say nothing of Commu-
nism.
Inwardly I have not grown one bit, and I have the feel-
ing that every day our "Communism" is pulling me back
instead of moving me forward. Some disease or infection
is gnawing and eating at our country from within, and we

must do something to stop it. I do not see any other

choice, and this is the main reason why I am joining the
ranks of active fighters for a better future for my people.
The Communist system is harmful to our people. I can-
not serve a harmful system. There are many people who
think and feel as I do, but they are afraid to unite for
action. So we all work separately. Each man here is alone.
I feel contempt for myself, because I am part of this
system and I live a lie. The ideals which so many of our
fathers and brothers died for have turned out to be noth-
ing more than a bluff and a deceit. I know the army
and there are many of us in the officer corps who feel the
same way.
I praise our leaders, but inside me I wish them death. I
associate with highly placed, important people: ministers
and marshals, generals and senior officers, members of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. These people have not done me any harm
personally; on the contrary, some of them have helped
me to obtain my present position. Several still help me
today. Nonetheless I can no longer abide this two-faced
existence.
Khruschev's a government of adventurers. They are
is
demagogues and covering themselves with the ban-
liars,
ner of the struggle for peace. Khrushchev has not re-
nounced war. He is quite prepared to begin a war, if cir-
cumstances turn favorable to him. This he must not be
permitted to do.
In the past, our General Staff and our foreign representa-
tives condemned the concept of surprise attack such as
Hitler used. Now they have come around to the view-
point that there is a great advantage to the side that makes
 THE SYSTEM IN WHICH I LIVE 73

a sudden massive attack first. They prepare themselves

to
be in a position to do so. Since he cannot muster enough
strength to strike at all potential enemy countries simul-
taneously, Khrushchev singles out the U.S. and Britain
as his attack targets. He estimates that the other Western
allieswould disintegrate due to differences among them-
selves. They would be happy to be alive.
From what have learned and what I have heard, I
I
know that the leaders of our Soviet state are the willing
provocateurs of an atomic war. At one time or another
they may lose their heads entirely and start an atomic
war. See what Khrushchev has done over Berlin.
The Soviet leaders know exactly that the Western world
and especially the Americans do not wish an atomic war.
This desire of my Western friends for peace is what the
Soviet leaders try to use to their own advantage. It is
they who wish to provoke a new war. This would open
the road to the subjugation of the entire world. I fear
this more every day. And my fears confirm my choice to
make this invisible fight.
In MoscowI have lived in a nuclear nightmare. I
know the extent of their preparations. I know the poison
of the new military doctrine, as outlined in the top-secret
"Special Collection"^the plan to strike first, at any costs.
I know their new missiles and their warheads. I have
described them to my friends. Imagine the horror of a
fifty-megaton bomb with an explosive force almost twice
what one expects. They congratulated themselves on this.
I must defeat these men. They are destroying the Rus-
sian people. I will defeat them with my allies, my new
friends. God will help us in this great and important work.

It is necessary somehow
to drain the energy and to
divert the great material and
living strength of the Soviet
—
Union to peaceful purposes not to bring about a great
world conflict. I think it is necessary to have meetings,
secretly conducted. Not summit meetings. Those Khru-
shchev welcomes. He will use the decisions reached at
summit meetings to increase his own prestige vis-d-vis
the U.S. and England. This you in the West must under-
stand.
This is why I write these observations of mine to the
people of the United States and Great Britain.
74 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Many my new dedica-
things have contributed to this
tion. The last years of my life have been very
three
critical, both to my way of thinking and in other matters,
about which I will report later.
I have thought long and hard about the course I am to
follow. I ask only that you believe the sincerity of my
thoughts. I wish to make my contribution, perhaps a
modest one but in my view an important one, to our
mutual cause. Henceforth I am your soldier, pledged to
carry out everything which is entrusted to me. I will give
all my strength, knowledge, and my life to this new obUga-
tion.
In presenting the above, I want to say that I have not
begun work for my new cause with empty hands. I
imderstand perfectly well that to correct words and
thoughts one must add concrete proof confirming these
words. I have had, and do have now, a definite capa-
bility for doing this.
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER II

Itwas natural for Penkovskiy to begin with the bare facts

of his life. There is no dispute about them. Even the prose-
cutor at his 1963 trial conceded that "Penkovskiy looked
like quite a good worker. He rose rapidly up the ladder in
his career. .." The biography is one of the few well
.

connected segments in the entire Papers. Until the year

1949 it presents the normal record of a better than
average artillery officer in the Soviet Army, who could
attain colonel's rank at thirty-one. That year Penkovskiy
entered the Military Diplomatic Academy. It was the turn-
ing point. In the months that followed, the newly created
Soviet colonel took leave of what had been a relatively
simple, uncluttered life as a professional soldier to enter
the intelligence arm.
The Soviet intelligence service is not like the American
or British or French, a body organized on more or less
confidential lines for the purpose of seeking out the mili-
tary secrets of foreign nations and preventing the detection
or theft of one's own. In the Soviet system the intelligence
services constitute a weird fourth dimension of the na-
tional society, inmianent and indispensable — as that society
is now organized. The Committee of State Security (KGB)
and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the So-
viet General Staff divide the intelligence mission between
them; and as Penkovskiy frequently notes, the KGB is
the larger, more pervasive, and more powerful of the two.
But the GRU itself is far more than a miUtary intelligence
75
76 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
organ. Its functions include political espionage and sub-
version to an almost unlimited degree.
Penkovskiy set his usual high standard during his three
years at the Military Diplomatic Academy and he did
well in the attache's office at Ankara. He appeared there
as a rather better edition of the Soviet attache than is
normally encountered. He was personable and spoke Eng-
lish wellenough to get along. His wife, who spoke French,
was a pretty, demure lady who rarely projected herself
into conversations, but struck people as well mannered
and rather pleasant.
In Ankara, Penkovskiy on his own developed a regard
and a sort of envious affinity for the Western military men
which they did not at the time perceive. As far as the
Turks were concerned, he was a standard Soviet attache
who bore watching. Aside from one trip to Trebizond,
to look after the remains of a crashed Soviet military
aircraft,he stayed in the capital and stuck to the normal
routine of diplomatic association. For the first few months
of his stay, Penkovskiy served as acting rezident, a posi-
tion of authority which he extremely enjoyed. He made
the usual military intelligence rounds and supervised what
agent work the GRU controlled.
Beneath the surface, however, the activities of the Soviet
inteUigence missions Ankara had more than their
in
share of backbiting and mtemal bitterness. (Penkovskiy's
own wife was propositioned by Vavilov, the KGB Chief
a matter which he did not take lightly.) When the new
rezident, Rubenko (ne Savchenko), arrived, things did not
go smoothly. He was rude, overbearing, and a general.
When he overrode Penkovskiy's advice once too often, on
the matter of his agent handling, Penkovskiy reported him
to Moscow, as he notes in the first chapter.
Penkovskiy's trouble with his chief was hardly a unique
occurrence in the Soviet system, in which confficts between
rival bureaucrats are more the rule than the exception. Yet
for a General Staff colonel, however justified and however
well connected, to challenge the authority of his superior,
a general, was somewhat like the case of the obstinate
motorist who "died defending his right of way." The GRU
is a military organization, and no general likes to have
a subordinate go over his head to the leaders of the Party.
 THE DARK WORLD OF GRU 77

When Penkovskiy returned to Moscow he received some-

thing less than a hero's reception at GRU headquarters
on the Arbat. His wife, Vera, was upset and disappointed
that her long-awaited tour overseas had been cut short,
after little more than a year; she missed the foreign
colony's parties and the chance to use her French. And
one ex-artillery colonel was up on the shelf, indefinitely,
awaiting reassignment. It took Marshal Varentsov's inter-
vention, as Penkovskiy admits, to have him posted to the
Dzcrzhinskiy Artillery Engineering School, for the nine-
month course in missiles.
Although Penkovskiy was graduated first in his class
from the Dzcrzhinskiy School, he did not receive a field
conmiand. Instead, he was returned to the Fourth (Asia)
Directorate of the GRU. Soviet intelligence is somewhat
like the priesthood. Once ordained, one finds it highly
difficult to leave. Penkovskiy was ticketed for the military
attache's job in India, however, a responsible post
which probably promised a promotion to general's rank.
It was then, after twenty-three years of constant secur-
ity checks, that someone in the KGB apparently unearthed
the information that his father had been a White Army
officer. When the GRU personnel chief. Major General
Shumskiy, confronted him with this fact, Penkovskiy
produced a statement by his mother explaining the cir-
cumstances, 'which was then put in his file. Penkovskiy
himself did not believe that his father's story was accur-
ately known or widely circulated. But the suspicion was
disturbing enough to knock out his assignment to India.
He spent another uneasy two months in the reserves
while the implications of this "counterrevolutionary an-
cestry" were considered. For a Soviet inteUigence agency it
was a serious matter. In the end the powers-that-be de-
cided that Penkovskiy's experience was too valuable
to be canceled out by his heritage. He was returned to
acUve duty as a senior desk officer in the Fourth Direc-
torate.
In June 1960, Penkovskiy was assigned to the Mandate
Commission {Mandatnaya Komissiyd) the selection board
,

which presided over the entrance of students to the Mili-

tary Diplomatic Academy, the GRU training school. He
78 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
was designated of the incoming class, a sort of
chief
military senior tutorship and a post which was usually
given to a general. He did not, however, get any inkling
that he would be promoted to general's rank.
After ten years in grade and five years in higher staff
schools. Penkovskiy did not take kindly to this new dis-
tinction. A
restless man, he preferred to work in the field.
At length he persuaded General Shumskiy to rescind this
appointment in favor of an operational assignment. On
November 15, 1960 Penkovskiy was assigned to a special
group of GRU officers slated for work in various Soviet
government organizations which had official dealings with
foreign countries. Penkovskiy's general assignment here
was the State Committee for Science and Technology^
(GNTK). It was a coveted assignment, with a promise of
extensive foreign travel.
Penkovskiy's intelligence experience was thus as an
attache, an instructor, scientific and technical expert,
and foreign liaison specialist. So in the following portion
of the Papers, describing the GRU, he has been able to
supply a peculiar insight into Soviet intelligence operations
in foreign countries, as well as measures taken against for-
eigners inside the U.S.S.R. As he wrote this section barely
four years ago, the people he writes about are for the
most part still on active service and the numbers he uses
are reasonably accurate. It sobering to contemplate the
is

total he gives of 3000 staff intelligence officers out of the

5200 Soviet representatives in the Soviet embassies and
consulates in some seventy-two non-Conmiimist countries.
Add to this Penkovskiy's calculations about the number
of Soviet representatives "co-opted" for work with intelli-
gence organs and the number of "pure" Soviet diplomats
shrinks to something less than 20 per cent of the total. One
is tempted to ask, with Penkovskiy, "Where have the legiti-
mate Soviet diplomats gone?"
Penkovskiy himself was of course accustomed to the
ubiquitous nature of Soviet "intelligence organs." He could
not imderstand why people in the West did not more
generally realize this fact. In the comments that follow,

iThe predecessor of the State Committee for Co-ordination of

Research Work (GKKNR). The
Scientific GNTK
was abolished in
April 1961 when the GKKNRwas estabhshed.
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 79
and in most of the Papers, he is constantly warning his
"friends" that they have little concept of the real scope of
the Soviet intelligence effort. These pages are often frag-
mentary, as he tries to jot down names of people and
functions while he remembers them. They add up, how-
ever, to a Brobdingnagian apparatus of Soviet espionage
and subversion operating under the guise of diplomacy,
press, tourism, scientific exchanges, and trade.
If the tone of his jottings about the intelligence ap-
paratus is somewhat stilted and professorial, it is the tone
of a Soviet military instructor who was, in a sense, address-
ing his class. There is no doubt that Penkovskiy felt a
"double mission: 1) to give the West immediate information
oJlfie Soviet leadership's plans; and 2) to sketch as best
he could the rationale and the mystique behind these
plans.
What makes Penkovskiy's explanations about the Soviet
intelligence so peculiarly effective, also,is that he wrote
it all down not from recollection after the fact, but while

he was working in the midst of the Moscow "Center." ^

The passages on the GRU
were probably begun in the
first months of 1961. At that time Penkovskiy had yet
to make actual contact with anyone on the Western side.
It is a known fact that he had approached several Ameri-
can students in Moscow late in 1960 with a letter offering
his services to the United States. The letters were for-
warded to the U. S. Embassy, but the officials there were
apparently too cautious to open discussions. Similar
offers are often made to Americans by Soviet counter-
intelligence agents in the time-honored device of "provo-
cation," with the hope that the American officer respond-
ing can then be accused of espionage on a trumped-up
charge, deported or even imprisoned for propaganda pur-
poses. The time making such an overture, too, was
for
particularly unfortunate, coming so soon after the highly
publicized trial of Gary Powers and the high tide of anti-
Amterican sentiment then running in Moscow. And it was
probably inconceivable to the Americans who received the
message that a man as high up as Penkovskiy would have
become so openly disenchanted with his system.

2 The Center is the name traditionally given to Soviet intelligence

headquarters in Moscow.
80 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
It was certainly incx)nceivable to the Soviets, and it has
remained so. As for the GRU's effect on Penkovskiy and
his personal reaction against it, he best describes this him-
self.
 CHAPTER II

The Dark World of the GRU

I have been collecting material on the GRU for two years.

I already have over five hundred pages of notes and over
seven hundred names of officers and civilians who either
work directly in the GRU or are connected with the GRU
as collaborators
—
"co-opted," as they say.
The Soviet government goes in for espionage on a gi-
gantic scale. That is what "peaceful coexistence" and
Khrushchev's "struggle for peace" really mean. are We
collecting intelUgence always and everywhere. Daily we
are improving and expanding our already swollen spy ap-
paratus. I speak basically of military espionage. When I
say "military" it does not mean that we are engaged
only in military espionage. We conduct technical, scien-
tffic, and economic espionage as much as military ^we —
operate in all directions. By saying "military" I mean
the espionage conducted by the GRU.
I know less about the specific activities of our "neigh-
bors," the KGB.i The number of people working there
is several times larger than in the GRU. They are trusted

more and they get more money. They are always as-
signed more positions in the embassies and in aU our
representation abroad.
Besides the GRU and KGB, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade each has its

iln Soviet military intelligence parlance, sosedi ("neighbors")

always refers to the KGB, who in turn call theGRU "our mihtary
neighbors."
81
82 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
own Everybody is involved in spy-
intelligence department.
ing — all Soviet committees, the Academy of
ministries,
Sciences, etc. Anyone who has anything at all to do with
the work of foreign countries, or who is connected with
foreigners in the course of his work, is perforce engaged
in intelligence work. We are all spies. If a committee or
a ministry has no intelhgence section of its own, the
GRU or KGB, upon approval by the Central Committee
CPSU, will organize our own intelligence sections there
or else assign our intelligence officers to them.
Here is a hst of some of the Soviet ministries and vari-
ous committees through which we conduct intelligence
and where we [i.e., the GRU and the KGB] have our
representatives; some of these state institutions are com-
pletely staffed with KGB or GRU personnel;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

—
Byurobin (now the UPDK) ^the office providing serv-
ices for the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Inturist (ahnost 100 per cent KGB, only a few GRU
officers)
All-Union "International Book" Association (almost ICK)
per cent KGB)
All-Union Chamber of Commerce
State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Re-
search Work (my own Committee — I shall speak
about it separately)
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries
Council for the Affairs of Religious Sects, imder the
Council of Ministries, U.S.S.R.
Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church
TASS (The Soviet Union Telegraph Agency)
Union of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent So-
cieties
Committee of Soviet Women
Ministry of Culture, U.S.S.R.
Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace
Committee of Youth Organizations, U.S.S.R.
The Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University
(The Pro-rector is Colonel Yerzin, a KGB
officer who
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 83

formerly was the KGB

Chief in Turkey and India)
Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries (Anglo-Soviet Friend-
ship, Soviet-Indian Friendship, etc. Over forty such so-
cieties)
Soviet Committee of the World Federation of Trade
Unions
Soveksportfilm
Sovimportfilm
The Moscow Post Office, 26 Kirov Street
Central Telegraph, 7 Gorkiy Street
The Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.
Lomonosov State University

—
This list is not complete it could be made much longer.
In short, there is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does
not have in it an intelligence officer or agent of either
the GRUor KGB. Furthermore, the majority of the per-
sonnel in Soviet embassies abroad are and KGB GRU
employees. The proportion of KGB
staff officers to the rest
of Soviet embassy personnel is usually two men out of
five. GRU staff officers number one man
in five. There
are generally fewer GRU
men, but we must be counted
separately because our "neighbors" and we rarely work
together. In most embassies it can be stated without error
that 60 per cent of the embassy personnel are serving
officers in intelligence, either KGB or GRU. Obviously
most of the other embassy employees are regularly co-
opted for intelligence purposes.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Foreign Trade exist as such only in Moscow. Abroad
everything is controlled by the KGB and us, the GRU.
The West is trying to accomplish some improvement of
relations with the Soviet Union by diplomatic means.
We
do not even have diplomats, such as the West under-
stands the term. We do aU kinds of work except diplo-

matic, r u o
An ambassador is an employee first of all of the Cen-
tral Committee CPSU, only secondly of
the Ministry of
the
Foreign Affairs; often he himself is part of either
GRU or the KGB. Now a great many of the Soviet
are
ambassadors stationed in non-Communist countries
former intelligence officers from the GRU or KGB.
84 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
The KGB and GRU rezidents invariably have high dip-
lomatic rank —counselor of embassy is a favorite cover.
The other big jobs in the embassy, according to a de-
cision of the Central Committee CPSU, are divided among
GRU and KGB intelligence personnel. And if there are a
few literate people in the embassy who work solely for
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they are there only be-
cause they know protocol procedures and know how to
write notes. They do nothing else. Even such "real"
diplomats are co-opted into intelligence work either by
the KGB or GRU, whoever gets them first.
Prior to my trip to Turkey I thought that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the embassies were important organ-
izations with authority. But now I know there is only
the Central Committee CPSU, and in the embassy two
intelligence rezidenturas: GRU and KGB. They are the
ones who handle everything. The Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs stays in the background.
The GRU is of course part of the Soviet General Staff.

The entire work of the General Staff, especially of the

GRU, is supervised by the Central Conmiittee CPSU,
which has for this purpose certain special sections.
The Central Committee sections most closely connected
with the GRU are:
Administrative Section: Head of the section is Nikolay
Romanovich Mironov,^ Major General of the KGB.
Foreign Political Personnel Section: Head of the sec-
tion is Aleksandr Semenovich Panyushkin, former chief
of KGB Foreign Intelligence, ambassador to China and
the U.S.A.3
Political Section: This is the Chief Political Director-
ate of the Ministry of Defense, but it has the status of a
section of the Central Committee CPSU. See how they
lock together. Chief of the section is Marshal of the Soviet

2 Mironov was killed in an airplane accident in Yugoslavia

on October 19, 1964, along with Marshal Biryuzov.
3 Aleksandr Semenovich Panyushkin, bom in 1905, was graduated

from the Frunze Military Academy in 1935; 1939-44 served as am-

bassador to China; 1947-52 ambassador to the U.S.A.; 1952-53
ambassador to Communist China; in 1953 he was a general in the
MVD, Chief of the Foreign Intelligence. In 1962 he was named
head of the Central Committee CPSU Section and identij&ed as a
major generaL
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 85
Union Filipp Ivanovich Golikov.* He is a member of the
Central Committee CPSU and a Deputy of the Supreme
Soviet, U.S.S.R. As Minister of Defense, Marshal of the
Soviet Union Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovskiy is also re-
sponsible for the activities of the GRU. He is also a
member of the Central Committee CPSU and a Deputy
of the Supreme Soviet, U.S.S.R.
Next in line is Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of
the Soviet Union Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov,^ who at
the same time is First Deputy Minister of Defense of the
U.S.S.R., Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, U.S.S.R., and
member of the Central Committee CPSU. During the
period of 1950-51, he was briefly Chief of the GRU.
He was not a marshal then, but only a general. Zakharov
was not an experienced intelligence officer at that time,
but since he became Chief of the General Staff he has
been following GRU activities with interest. He has es-
tablished good mutual relations with Serov. Thus, two
intelligence officers are directing the work of the GRU:
Zakharov, the military man, and Serov, originally from
the KGB.
Following Zakharov, during the period approximately
from 1951 to 1956 and again from 1957 to 1958, the
Chief of the GRU was Lieutenant General Mikhail Alek-
seyevich Shalin. He is considered a good, experienced in-
telligence officer. He
has been working in intelligence
since the war. Hea friend of Generals Kislenko and
is

Starchenko. They drink together and divide between them

the presents which their officers bring them from abroad.
During the period of 1956 to 1957, the Chief of the
GRU was Lieutenant General Sergey Matveyevich Shte-
menko. At one time he was also the Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff.
Since January 1959, General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov
has been Chief of the GRU. He used to be Beriya's

4Golikov was released from his position in May 1962 for "rea-
sons of health." He was succeeded by General Aleksey Yepishev,
who was ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time of his appointment
5 In February 1963, following the Cuban crisis, Zakharov was

relieved of this position and replaced by Marshal Biryuzov, a rocket

expert. Zakharov was reappointed as Chief of the General Staif in
October 1964, after Biryuzov was killed in an airplane accident
and, coincidentally, after the fall of N. S. Khrushchev.
86 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Deputy. After the latter's execution and untU 1959, he
was Chairman of the Committee (KGB).
State Security
The GRU one of the largest Chief Directorates of
is

the General Staff and of the entire Ministry of Defense. It

is the Second Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Gen-

eral Staff. The GRU is subdivided into Desks and Groups.

The Chief of the GRU, General I. A. Serov, has two
Deputies: Major General Aleksandr Semenovich Rogov,
for operational matters, and Major General Khadzhi D.
Mamsurov, for general, i.e., administrative, matters.
Animportant role in the work of the belongs to GRU
the GRU Party Committee, whose Secretary is Colonel
Alikin. Colonel Vasinin is an aide to Serov.
GRU intelligence work is divided into three main parts:
(1) Strategic Intelligence, (2) Operational Intelligence, (3)
Combat Intelligence.
Organizationally, the GRU breaks down as follows: i

The 1st Directorate— ^Illegals; Chief, Rear Admiral Lj.

K. Bekrenev.^
The 2nd Directorate— Strategic Intelligence for Eu-
ropean Countries; Chief, Major General Aleksey An-
dreyevich KonoValov.
—
The 3rd Directorate Strategic Intelligence (Anglo-
American); Chief, Brigadier General V. S. Sokolov.
All Central and South American countries are in-
cluded in the 3rd Directorate, which has an individual
Desk for each American country. Countries friendly
to Great Britain, former dominions, and others also
are included in the 3rd Directorate.
The —
4th Directorate Strategic Intelligence for the
Countries of the Middle and Far East; Chief, Major
General P. P. Melkishev.
—
The 5th Directorate Diversion and Sabotage; Chief,
Major General Mikhail Andrianovich Kochetkov.
The 6th Directorate— Operations Directorate — Intelli-

gence Posts (RP) in military districts bordering on

foreign countries.

6 Rear Admiral Leonid Konstantinovich Bekrenev was Chief of

the Illegals Directorate of the GRU
until his assignment to the
U.S. in 1962 as the Soviet naval attache. He departed for the
U.S.S.R. early in 1963 probably as a result of Penkovskiy's arrest
and disclosures to the Soviet interrogators.
 THE DARK WORLD OF GRU
87
Information Directorate-Evalu^t^s,
processes, and pub-
hshes intelligence sent back from
stations abroad-
also in charge of the Classified
Library; Chief, Major
General N. A. Korenevskiy.
Naval Intelligence Directorate—No
longer exists* a
smaU section or group remains for the
co-ordination
of intelligence on the naval forces.

Recently an African Section of Strategic

Intelligence
has been organized, whose Chief is Naval
Captain Ivliyev
Next, within the GRU there are so-called Operations
Sections:

Scientific-Technical Intelligence Section: Chief, Brig-

adier General Sheliganov.
Communications Section (Coding and Decoding) Chief :

of this section is Colonel Silin. The Communications

Section has in it a group for receiving and dispatch-
ing diplomatic mail. The Chief of the group is Major
Serebryakov.
Section for the Countries of the People's Democracies,
In the past this was a directorate, which mcluded all
the countries of the people's democracies as well as
China and Korea. Presently China and Korea have
been transferred to the Far East Directorate. There
has been talk about transferring the entire directorate
for the people's democracies to the 10th Directorate
of the General Staff, of course only as far as the
subordination is concerned. The personnel will re-
main ours.
Foreign Relations Section: Chief, Brigadier General
Mikhail Stepanovich Maslov. This is an operational
section which under the cover of Ministry of De-
fense directs all dealings with foreigners in the so-
called official manner.

After this comes the normal service sections:

Communications and Radio Intelligence

Organizational Section (selection of cover)
Archives Section
Administration and Supply Directorates and Sections
Personnel Directorate, etc.
88 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
There is an important
Training School Section, in
charge of following schools: Military Diplomatic
the
Academy (head of the academy is Major General of
Armored Troops Vasiliy YeJBmovich Khlopov); Military
Institute of Foreign Languages; Institute of Conmiunica-
tions; Intelligence School in Fili, for junior officers; Train-
ing School for Illegals, part of the 1st Directorate
(Illegals) —
head of the school is Colonel Dubovik; School
for Saboteurs, part of the 5th Directorate (Diversion and
Sabotage).
In addition to the schools I have noted, six- or nine-
month refresher courses are periodically conducted
under the Military Diplomatic Academy. There are prob-
ably other schools and courses of the which areGRU
unknown to me. At one time the Military Institute of
Foreign Languages was part of the Academy, but it later
became an independent institute again.
There are many different technical laboratories and even
some small plants and shops in and around Moscow which
do work for the GRU.
Even this brief enumeration of our directorates, sec-
tions, and groups should give one a fairly good idea of
the GRU's scope. We are engaged in espionage against
every country in the world. And this includes our friends,
the countries of the people's democracies. For, who knows,
some fine day they may become our enemies. Look what
happened with China! Months before the break with
China became clear, we had already transferred all our
workers from the 10th Directorate for the Countries of
the People's Democracies^ to the Far East Desk. In-
structions came direct from the Central Conamittee CPSU
to begin intensive intelligence activity against China.
Not only do we of the GRU conduct military, political,
economic, and scientific intelligence, but we are engaged
in propaganda activities, provocations, blackmailing, ter-
and sabotage. These are the basic methods of
roristic acts,
our work. The difference between us and the KGB is only
that we do not work against the Soviet people, we do not

7 earlier, this directorate was downgraded to a section

As noted
in the but in the General Staff the 10th Directorate remains
GRU,
as the directorate for the countries of the people's democracies
and works actively with the Warsaw Pact nations in all matters
pertaining to military subjects.
 THE DARK WORLD OF GRU 89

Spy on them; but as far as foreign intelligence work is

concerned, we do the same as the KGB. It is true that we
pay more attention to collecting information on the armed
forces and military installations of the Western countries.
But directives come to both of us from one and the
same center, the Central Committee CPSU. By directive
of the Central Committee, we maintain close contact with
"our neighbors" of the KGB. We constantly compete with
each other in espionage. We try to prove that we work
better and they try to prove the opposite.
We do not like them, and they know it. The KGB
Special
Section has its informants and co-optees among GRU
officers. But we are not in a position to complain. We just
have to live with them, especially now that Serov has come
over from the KGB to become our Chief. The KGB is in
the dominant position. They are the ones who investigate
us and run clearances on us. It is they on whose recom-
mendations officers are ousted from the GRU. It is they
who rummage through our personal affairs, like policemen
searching a suspect's hotel room. Even for a GRU
officer

to go abroad, KGB approval is necessary.

The 1st Directorate, or the Illegals Directorate, is re-
sponsible for the establishment of deep-cover agent net-
works in Western states. An agent being sent to another
country as an Illegal,^ i.e., a deep-cover agent, does not
necessarily have to be a Soviet citizen or an officer of the
GRU; he may be a citizen of any country. Prior to the
war, the majority of our Illegals were foreigners. At the
present time several precautionary measures have been
taken, and in most cases only Soviet citizens trained
and
documented in the U.S.S.R. are used. An Hlegal agent
who is not a Soviet citizen and who has no
relatives in the

U.S.S.R. is much more difficult to control.

For the past few years the GRU
has been engaged in
training Soviet Army civilians to be sent to
officers and
agents
other countries as illegal rezidents^ or principal

World
8 Richard Sorge, in Japan prior to the outbreak of the
War II, was a GRU Illegal. Colonel Abel
in the U.S., menUoned in

the Introduction, was an example of a KGB Illegal.

9 An Illegal rezident is the head of the network
and has his
com-
own communication channels to Moscow, separate from the
in the same
munication channels of any other Illegal's network
officers ot
country and separate from the conmiunications used by
90 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
outside the U.S.S.R. These Illegals leave the country under
deep cover, equipped with thoroughly prepared documen-
tation that is beyond any suspicion.
Great importance is attached to the selection of Ille-
gals. The GRUhas a special school for training them, but
most Illegals must pass a lengthy individual training course
as well. Sometimes this training course lasts several years.
Assignments are distributed among the new graduates
of the Military Diplomatic Academy in the presence of the
chiefs of all the directorates, the Communist Party Chief
of the GRU, and some senior officials of the GRU. These
people do more than look at the students' final grades.
They also consider their personal moods, hobbies, and
temperament, the color of hair, eyes, etc. On the basis of
this scrutiny some of the graduates are later assigned to
Illegal work, while the rest go into legal operational work.
Young and unmarried graduates are usually assigned to
Illegal work and then only a few carefully selected officers.
For example, one year eighteen persons were chosen for
the 1st Directorate. At the most, only four or five of
them will actually become Illegals. Thus, for instance,
Boris Putilin was being prepared to go to Spain, but they
found something wrong while investigating his relatives,
so now he is working in the Military Publishing House.
He was even discharged from the GRU.
My friend Shcherbakov was an Illegal for eight years.
By the time he returned to the Soviet Union he had almost
forgotten Russian. For eight years he never spoke one
word of Russian, and they had to assign an interpreter to
him.
Myasoyedov is also an Illegal. The "safe" apartment
house for Illegals is on the outskirts of Moscow. There
are many such apartments there.
Besides the Illegals Directorate, each national or area
Desk has its own groups of Illegals. Illegal rezidenturas
and Illegal agents exist in almost every country and in
rather large numbers. In recent years the General Staff,
Serov, and Khrushchev himself have begun to show partic-
ular interests in Illegals. They say that only with the help
of Illegals can one establish exactly what our enemies are
doing and what their potential and their capabilities are.

the rezidentura under cover of the Soviet Embassy or other oflBcial

Soviet representation, as in the United Nations in New York.
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 91

Bekrenev has done a fairly good job of organizing the

Illegals' work, but apparently the results are not too
good
because he is constantly scolded and criticized by Serov.
At a Party meeting of the 1st Directorate, Serov tore
Bekrenev to pieces. He said that Bekrenev did not work
hard enough, hence the Illegals' network was weak. Special
emphasis in that respect was placed upon our "principal
enemy" — the U.S.A. Serov claimed that all our attaches
were doing was collecting newspapers and rubbish; every-
thing that was of value came from the Illegals. Therefore
special emphasis must be placed on intensifying the work
of Illegals in the future.
All foreigners recruited by Soviet intelligence must
sign an agreement that in case they are exposed or ar-
rested, they will never reveal their connection with Soviet
intelligence.
All Illegals are instructed not to admit that they are
Soviet agents or Soviet citizens in case they are caught.
It is preferable that they should commit suicide, take
poison, shoot themselves, jump out the window. One of the
tasks of the intelligence service is to remove agents who
are not needed any more by murdering them, poisoning
them, or by some other means. A GRU
agent may be shot
or poisoned if it is feared that he is breaking down or is
telling what he knows, or, simply, if he knows too much.
Or a warning may be received that a given agent is a
foreign provocateur or that he may commit a provoca-
tion. Then orders are given to kill him and he is eliminated
by any means.
Illegals in the U.S. are of the greatest significance.
There is a special room
3rd Directorate of the
in the
GRU in Moscow where communications with the Illegals
in the U.S. are maintained day and night by three opera-
tors.
use radio receivers. Sometimes it is done this
Illegals
way: A radio receiver is purchased
in the coimtry to which
the Illegal is going. This radio receiver is brought to
Moscow, altered in the necessary manner, and then it is
sent back to the country where the Illegal is waiting for
it, and turned over to him. Thus, the radio receiver has
the appearance of a locally produced set which will not
arouse anybody's suspicion.
92

Denis Polyakov/^
mittee, was
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
who works with me
1960 with a delegation,
sent to the U.S. in
His primary task on behalf of the 1st Directorate was to
collect the addresses of some of the buildings in Washing-
in the
1
Com-

ton and New York that have been torn down, so that we
might use these addresses in the future for Illegals ^i.e., —
if a citizen of that particular country had lived in a build-

ing which was later demolished, it would be quite difl&cult

to establish his exact identity. Polyakov did get several
such addresses in Washington, one in New York, and one
somewhere else. These addresses will be used someday in
the activities of Illegals.
As a rule, Illegals are given the task of joining some
club, perhaps even two clubs; money for their activities
is deposited in some particular bank. But all this must still

be backed up by a good solid cover story. Where does this

money come from? It could of course be inherited. In
practice it is often transferred from one bank to another,
or sent from some other country, from a foreign bank
for deposit to the Illegal's checking account. For example,
ifan Illegal had a barbershop and has saved, let us say,
10,000 pounds sterling or dollars (of course, with the help
of the GRU)
and is moving from London to Birmingham
or vice versa, orfrom one country to another, for instance,
from England to Canada, or to the United States, or
Australia, or France, it will look natural if he brings his
own savings with him. He must not appear to have re-
ceived money from some unknown place in some unknown
way.
small financial companies and small banks,
It is felt that
i.e.,branches of large banks, are best to deal with because
they do not investigate their clients so thoroughly. It is
also believed that it is much more convenient to keep a
small account in a small bank, transferring it later to
another bank.
Good cover activities: barber shops, tailor shops, shoe
repair shops, small companies and small stores, watch
repair shops, photo studios, etc.
Communications with the agent network operating in
foreign countries, as well as other types of intelligence
work against neighboring countries, are carried on from

10 Also a GRU officer.

 THE DARK WORLD OF GRU 93

various points —from merchant ships, warships, various

coastal stations. When a Soviet ship sails to a foreign
country, there are always three or four intelligence em-
ployees among its crew —
sometimes a whole group. They
carry with them radios and other technical equipment,
to establish commimications with the agents in that coun-
try. For example, in the Black Sea area, where intensive
intelligence work is conducted against Turkey, there are
special posts in Batumi, Sukhumi, Leninakan, Sevastopol,
and other cities, from which radio communications with
the agent network are maintained and other operational
activities are conducted.
In all the cities mentioned above there are intelligence
posts [in Russian: razyedyvateVnyy punkt] from which
intelligence work against neighboring countries and espe-
cially against Turkey is carried out day and night. Even
on board the Soviet ship that brought Khrushchev to
New York there were some and GRU
intelligenceKGB
officers with specific tasks to perform. When Khrushchev
visited England in 1956, he brought Serov with him on the
ship, with a large group of Serov's people.
There are well-organized large Illegal rezidenturas in
Spain. The work of the Illegals there is aided by Dolores
Ibarruri, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of
Spain. She now lives in France. That organization exists
solely on money from the Soviet Union.
The creation of Illegal rezidenturas in Spain is facili-
tated by the fact that many Spaniards went to live in the
Soviet Union after the Spanish Civil War. They speak both
Spanish and Russian well. Some of them are recruited
by Soviet intelligence as Illegals and then sent to Spain. It
should be added here that these people not only conduct
work against the Franco government but also
intelligence
spy on the American bases in that country. Because there
is no legal rezidentura ^^ in Spain, all espionage work

there is based on Illegal rezidenturas.

While I was still in Turkey, preparations had begun for
creating one or two Illegal rezidenturas in Turkey and the
creation of additional Illegal rezidenturas in Egypt, Paki-
stan, and Afghanistan. It is possible that by now they are

11The U.S.S.R. does not have diplomatic relations with Spain so

it has no ofladal representation to provide legal cover in Spain.
94 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
was contemplated to use Turks from Bul-
in operation. It
garia as well as Bulgarians who had settled in Turkey
and had been living there for a long time. The agent
network operating in Turkey at present is of little value.
It is trivial. Turks are very difficult to recruit; they im-
mediately run to the police and report.
The counselor of our embassy in India, whose name is
Sergey S. Veshchunov, once revealed to me that there was
one Illegal rezidentura of the GRU
in New York, consisting
of Soviet agents who had been infiltrated through third
countries, while a second, small Illegal rezidentura also
existed there, consisting of operational employees of the
GRU. There probably is an Illegal rezidentura in Wash-
ington, but I have heard from the members of the 3rd
Directorate ^^ that in Washington the agents are old and
their capabilities limited.
From the viewpoint of the GRU, the tactics of the
agent network include the following: recruitment of an
agent, training of an agent, organization of the reziden-
tura, and operations. The recruitment procedure includes
spotting a prospective agent, establishing his motivation,
studying all the facts about him. When the operations
officer is certain that the candidate can be recruited, he
must obtain permission from Moscow to do so. The whole
recruitment process lasts several months, sometimes several
years, before the new agent is ready to operate.
Spotting is considered a very important, if not the most
difficult, part of agent recruitment. Often months, and
sometimes years, are spent in finding a candidate. special A
course on the mechanics of recruitment is taught in the
Military Diplomatic Academy. Instructors and senior in-
structors teaching this course are usually experienced
operations officers who themselves served abroad as legal
or Illegal rezidents.
Sometimes, for special reasons, a specialist in agent
spotting may be sent from Moscow to the local reziden-
tura. The GRUdevotes much of its time and attention to
the selection of such specialists. First of all, a recruitment
specialist must be a cosmopolite, know foreign languages,
know the outside world and many other things not always
12 Area Directorate of the GRU responsible for intelligence opera-
tions in the United States.
 THE DARK WORLD OF GRU 95

known by an ordinary officer. He must be able to discuss

Western literature, art, sports, etc. The officer's own char-
acter extremely important. He must be able to get along
is

with people and enjoy their confidence. Naturally, a man

who shows antagonism toward others cannot be a suc-
cessful agent spotter, because personal contact is one of
the means used by an Illegal rezident in looking for candi-
dates. Information for spotting may be obtained by a
rezident during parties, card games (bridge, poker), and
from various kinds of conversations. Various types of
foreign artists (actors, musicians, dancers, etc.) are often
used for spotting because they usually have easy access
to highly placed circles in government, finance, science,
etc. At the present time there is quite a large number of
such artists, who had or still maintain contact with Soviet
agents as well as with prominent physicists or other scien-
tists.

The intelligence service has four sources from which to

select agent candidates: first, candidates who are already
being processed by intelligence officers for one purpose
or another; second, candidates recommended by the local
Communist Party; ^^ third, persons who can be used under
their official cover; fourth, persons with important social
connections.
Sometimes a candidate who is being processed by an
becomes a valuable source of
intelligence officer in turn
other possible candidates. In the process of submitting
information concerning himself, he mentions his friends
and acquaintances, who may prove to be valuable intelli-
gence material.
Intelligence officers of legal rezidenturas always use
their official cover, such as assistant attache, TASS cor-
respondent, member of a trade mission, etc. They use this
cover for spotting. In accordance with their official posi-
tions, they visit the appropriate ministries and agencies of
the country to which they were sent. These visits are

13 In I960 a directive of the Central Committee CPSU was cir-

culated to aU GRU overseas installations stating that postwar re-
pur-
strictions on the use of foreign Communist Parties for espionage
poses no longer applied. From that date on, they were free
to

recruit foreign Communist Party members as agents

without pnor
approvaL
96 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
made ostensibly in the line of official duty. In reality,
however, these officers are seeking persons suitable for
recruitment. The GRU
is constantly in need of agents
among the employees of all different kinds of foreign gov-
ernmental institutions, especially in the field of atomic
energy, industry, armed forces, and in political circles.
For thispurpose intelligence officers use the so-called "so-
cial approach" method. Recently, secret directives have
been sent out to all rezidenturas ordering establishment
of social contacts with as many Americans as possible.
The entire purpose of developing social "friendships" is
to seek out new agents. In conducting these meetings and
contacts, the GRU's special attention is directed toward
persons in interesting official positions or with access to
needed information, as well as people with "democratic
leanings" who because of their political naivete are
easy prey for Communist propaganda and can be easily
recruited. Both the GRU and theKGB are always looking
for persons who are easy subjects for blackmail because
of their sexual inclinations, people who have relatives in
the U.S.S.R., etc.
Official receptions at Soviet embassies, consulates, for-
eign missions, etc., are carefully planned, with invitations
sent to all those of interest to the intelligence service.
Employees of the embassy, consulate, or mission are
chosen in advance to establish contact with the target.
As soon as the intelligence officer becomes acquainted with
the candidate, he begins to pay much attention to him.
During the time he is making the acquaintance, the in-
telligence officer may express regret that they cannot
continue their talk, suggesting another meeting under more
convenient circumstances, i.e., dinner, the theater, or a
meeting at some Soviet institution in order to see a Soviet
film.
In some areas and cities the GRU
gets some informa-
tion on prospective agent candidates from monitored tele-
phone conversations. Information obtained in this manner
from conversations carried on between government in-
stitutions is of considerable interest for the intelligence
service.
Once a person appears to be a suitable candidate, the
intelligence officer prepares his preliminary appraisal of the
candidate and starts his processing. He must obtain com-
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 97
plete information about the candidate's personal life,
which in some cases
quite difficult to do. This type of
is

information includes details on the candidate's family, his

personal habits, interests, leanings, etc. All this must be
reported in writing.
A candidate may be transferred from one operations
officer to another during processing. Sometimes spotting is
done from Moscow. Moscow extracts data from official
documents (on scientists, engineers, etc.) which are doc-
umented in reports registered in card files.
In recruiting, the GRU tries first of allto use material
inducements, blackmail, and all sorts of pressures and
threats. Of course, agents are recruited also on an ideologi-
cal basis; but these represent the smallest percentage of
agents recruited.
When processing a candidate, the operations officer
proceeds on the basis of two principles: first, establish
friendly relations; second, create conditions which will
make the candidate feel indebted to the intelligence serv-
ice.
In doing this work, the operations officer must put the
candidate in such a position that the latter would not be
able under any circumstances to turn down recruitment
To accomplish this, the operations officer must see to it
that the candidate, by being given various small assign-
ments and errands to run, becomes involved in some kind
of intelUgence work even prior to his actual recruitment.
Upon completing a candidate's processing, when the
operations officer becomes certain that the candidate is
capable of carrying out intelligence work and that he
cannot refuse being recruited, he must obtain permission
to recruit the candidate. The length of time it takes to
receive the permission varies. Usually it takes two or
three weeks.
After receiving permission the operations officer carries
out the recruitment and makes it formal by obtaining the
candidate's signature and giving him a pseudonym. When
an agent is recruited, however, he is not told for which
particular intelligence service he is going to work; he is
simply told that he is going to work for the Soviet Union.
Upon completion of his recruitment, the agent is regis-
tered m
the central operations file in Moscow. After
several
98 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
meetings with the newly recuited agent,
of his recruitment takes place.
final
n
confirmation ^
At the beginning I thought I would put down on paper
everything that is known to me about the GRU
and the
entire Soviet espionage network, but I can see now that
I have not time to accomplish this. The amount of ma-
terial is too great to digest. And my writing conditions are
far from ideal. I am pressed on every side. I will try to
be brief, because there is so much to cover. It is not my
own life that I want to describe. I am writing the biography
of a system. Abad system.
Each person living in the West must fully understand
one thing: espionage is conducted by the Soviet govern-
ment on such a gigantic scale that an outsider has diffi-
culty in fully comprehending it. To be naive and to
underestimate it is a grave mistake. The Soviet Union
has many more representatives in countries such as, for
instance, England, the United States, or France, than these
countries have in the Soviet Union. In England alone, we
have a whole battalion of them. Western countries must
reduce the allowed number of Soviet representatives. As
soon as another Soviet agent is caught, send a note pro-
posing that the personnel in Soviet embassies, trade mis-
sions, consulates be cut. This will create confusion. It
will, in turn, reduce Soviet espionage.
KGB and GRU personnel in Soviet embassies: I have
noted already the ratio of KGB officers in an embassy. In
a Soviet consulate, almost 100 per cent of the personnel
are KGB, with one or two GRU
officers included. Even
the GRU has always had a hard time trying to use
consular cover for its people; every opening is taken by the
KGB.
In an embassy the KGB
spies on all personnel, including
us in the GRU. The KGB
men watch absolutely everything
that goes on: the purchases people make, how they live
and whether it accords with their salary, where they go,
which doctors they visit, whom they meet, how much
drinking they do, their morals. The KGB
listens constant-
ly to what the people say. In short, almost every move in
an embassy employee's life is known to the KGB. Mean-
while we in the GRU watch the KGB in turn. We want to
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 99

establish which of our GRU men are connected with the

KGB or work as their informants or co-optees.
The GRU and KGBhave people in every Soviet repre-
sentation abroad: the UN,
the trade missions, TASS, Aero-
flot, Merchant Marine, newspaper correspondents, etc. Not

all our GRU officers are highly learned people, but the
majority of them have had engineering or enough scientif-
ic training to carry on discussions with representatives of
the scientific world. Because of the shortage of scientific
personnel in the GRU, we ,co-opt our scientists for work
with us, and these scientists carry out intelligence assign-
ments in accordance with our instructions. This is done
upon instructions from the Central Committee CPSU.
Even the head of the Soviet hospital in Iran, Colonel
Makarov, was an intelUgence officer. He is a graduate of
the Kirov Medical Academy. Another friend of mine,
Colonel Yanchenko, went to Guinea as a news correspon-
dent. He is an officer of strategic intelUgence of the GRU
and always works under TASS cover.

One more thing. In the past the senior military attaches

were automatically also the GRU rezidents in their respec-
tive embassies. This not true any more; they were too
is

easy to expose. Now the job of rezident is assigned to an-

other man who usually operates under a civilian cover in
the embassy. He may be an ambassador, counselor, first or
second secretary. Of course, a military attache is also a
GRU intelligence officer, but never the rezident. This re-
organization also provided the GRU with the opportunity
to have an extra GRU officer in the embassy. The rezident
usually is a* colonel or a general.
The military attaches were relieved of their duties as
rezidents by a special decree of the Central Committee
CPSU dated January 22, 1961.
Personal letters of all embassy personnel, including the
GRU and KGB, are read by special persons prior to being
— —
mailed especially letters written by the wives to see that
nothing out of order appears in them. Even the most
simple things are frowned on. For example, to say that
we eat well here and have plenty of meat and milk, we
drink milk every day, etc., is considered bad, because it
should not be revealed in letters back home that there is
plenty of everything outside the U.S.S.R. "Why write about
'00 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
things like that? One can get along without writing such
drivel." In these cases the person responsible is given a
warning that in the future he must be more discreet; he
should warn his wife, too.
All drivers of GRU abroad are
officers' cars GRU in-
telligence officers themselves. Some
of them even have the
rank of major and higher. Senior Lieutenant Fokin is the
driver for a military attache. In the U.S. a lieutenant
commander in the Soviet Navy also was a driver.
Women work in the GRU
only as secretaries and typists,
or do some other type of nonoperational work. There are
several who work in the Illegals Directorate and in the
Directorate for Sabotage and Diversion. There was a
woman who lectured at the Military Diplomatic Academy,
but later it was discovered that her brother had been
executed, which she had concealed from the GRU, and
she was fired immediately.
At the present time intelligence work is conducted in
India with great care. However, recruitment of agents and
contact with the agent network continue. Operations will
remain frozen until a given time, but when the signal
comes to start again, our agents will go to work imme-
diately. Meanwhile the agents are being supplied money
and equipment, and new candidates for recruitment are
being selected. Both the GRUand KGB
have good agent
facilities Both are constantly watching Nehru,
in India.
his government, and its policies, as well as all its diplomat-
ic actions.
In Pakistan there are more agents intended for subver-
sion and sabotage, because it is not considered so friendly
a country as India. When I was working on the Pakistani
Desk, even then the plans for sabotage activities and
were completed. They included
their objectives in Pakistan
damaging the sources of water supplies, dams, poisoning
of drinking water, and so forth, in order to spread panic
among the population. At the same time there already
exists printed propaganda material and material misin-
forming the population that all these acts of sabotage
were perpetrated by Indians and Americans. This is to in-
tensify the ill feeling between Pakistan and India. The
KGB has more representatives in Pakistan than the GRU.
Here is an example of how Khrushchev, by using
Afghanistan, wants to spoil relations between Pakistan
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 101
and India. Marshal Sokolovskiy was on a trip to
Afghani-
stan in September and October 1961 with
a large group of
senior officers. The purpose of the trip
was to study the
combat xeadmess of the Afghan armed forces, so
that we
might draw up plans to improve the military
skill of
these forces and increase their fire power.
Plans are being
made, also, for extensive training of Afghan officers
in
Soviet mihtary schools as well as the dispatch
of large
numbers of Soviet mihtary instructors to Afghanistan.
Under discussion is the possibility of sending Soviet troops
into Afghanistan at the appropriate time for joint
opera-
tions against Pakistan. Sokolovskiy also had orders to
re-
connoiter certain specific areas of Afghanistan, for selec-
tion as possible missile sites. These areas will later have
the necessary geodetic and engineering work carried out in
them. The Afghan Army will be partially rearmed and
will receive new armament.
At the same time, a group of GRU officers was busy
preparing to dispatch agents to Pakistan from the terri-
tory of Afghanistan. These agents are to work ostensibly
as agents of India, but of course actually for Soviet in-
telligence. Thus the GRU can create the impression of
India spying against Pakistan.
India was, of course, the biggest target of all in this
area. I very nearly went there myself. Immediately after
my graduation from the Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy
in 1959, Serov, who had been informed of my progress,
suggested that I go to India. India is considered to be our
territory— ^that is, we might conduct extensive operations
in that territory in the future. It would be useful if an
officer with my background in missiles were sent there
because it is possible that in the not too distant future mis-
siles may be given to India.
I was almost completely processed for my departure.
—
Pavlov had been the military attache there he has since
—
been removed and now there is a brigadier general, a
troop commander. There is a new tendency not to have
career intelligence officers occupy the military attache's
slot. Because the new military attaches do not need to
have any intelligence background to fulfill their functions,
the GRU —
can take people from the troops just run-of-the-
mill people who have no language or area knowledge-
just a general to represent the armed forces of the Soviet
102 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Union. So a general was sent there. Now his assistant is a
classmate of mine. Just as was all set to go as his
I
assistant, my trip was postponed and then canceled.
I heard something of conditions there from my friend
Shapovalov from the London GRU office. He was in India,
a secretary in the military attache's office. He was an
assistant to the military attache —
he knows English badly
["badly" Was written in English.] He is working in the
scientific group which is like the one subordinated to me.
His chief is Pavlov, who is married to Voroshilov*s daugh-
ter.
The military rezidentura in India has its agent net on
ice. There is a radio operator with everything cached
away. There are two brothers in the agent network. They
get money; we feed and support them; we check their
health, etc., so that they are always available to put the
radio in operation. Mr. Nehru should be told all this. All
is held in reserve. Everything is cached in zinc boxes

which are soldered and are airtight. There we are waiting.

This is the way we operate everywhere, making our
provocations while we scream in public about "peaceful
coexistence.'*

The 5th GRU Directorate, which engages in diversion

and terroristic activity, has plans not only for immediate
crisis points like Berlin. It has complete plans on what
buildings should be blown up, who must be assassinated,
what must be destroyed in New York, Washington, Lon-
don, etc. Of course, this is not to be done now, but if and
when it becomes necessary, the signals will be given.
This directorate assigns tasks to all Army, Air Force,
and Navy attaches to gather information on the objectives
which must be sabotaged or destroyed in case of general
war or a specific local crisis. In addition, attaches are
also directed to gather informationon areas best suited to
land airborne forces, etc., while they travel around the
countries to which they are assigned. This is done to
prevent such mistakes as, for example, dropping para-
troopers in a swamp where they may all be annihilated.
This 5th Directorate has very broad tasks to fulfill in
peacetime, as well as in case of war.
The 5th Directorate is responsible for so-called misin-
formation activity to confuse the population. Plans have
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 103

already been made about broadcasts which will go on the

air; the leaflets and other types of propaganda materials
have already been printed for use in disorientating the
populations in the areas where a war or an incident might
take place.
At the present time the chief of the 5th Directorate is
Major General Kochetkov, former head of the Military
Diplomatic Academy. The 5th Directorate is also engaged
in establishing rezidenturas in all countries, including the
countries of the democratic bloc. The rezidenturas and
separate agents prepare staging areas for future landings
of airborne forces in accordance with the plans of the
General Staff, and they train small groups of agents for
the destruction of specific objectives. At the present time
they are not engaged in any active sabotage activity, but
they are ready for it.
The 5th Directorate also directs a school for training
saboteurs and terrorists, in which approximately two hun-
dred inveterate cutthroats are periodically undergoing
training. If time will allow, I shall speak about this activity
in more detail later.
A
few more words about the GRU leadership. When
Lieutenant General Shtemenko was Chief of the GRU,
he worked very hard and introduced many wise reforms.
As I have said before, during Stalin's time he was a
general and Chief of the General Staff. After Stalin's
death he fell into disfavor and he was reduced to a major
general. Then, when Khrushchev took over, Shtemenko
was made Chief of the GRU and was promoted to lieu-
tenant general. He was a good chief, mainly because of
his administrative abilities but was disliked by the generals
of the General Staff.
The present Chief of the GRU, Serov, is not the most
brilliant of men. He knows how to interrogate people, im-
prison them, and shoot them. In more sophisticated in-
telligence work he is not so skillful. Serov was a Beriya
man. Beriya took a liking to him and shot him up to the
top quickly.
As Chairman of the KGB, Serov was a minister, be-
cause that position automatically confers ministerial rank;
when he was transferred over to the GRU, he became a
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, but lost his ministerial
rank. At the GRU, Serov studies the intelligence situa-
104 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Major General Rogov, does most of
tion, but his deputy.
the work. Another deputy,Major General Mamsurov, an
Armenian, handles housekeeping and administrative af-
fairs only. The GRU
people respect Serov because he
did not interfere with the normal chain of command.
There were no official orders about closer co-operation
between the GRUand the KGB
after Serov's transfer. But
when the GRU sent the KGB any inquiries regardmg
foreigners, new Soviet Illegals, etc., itwas noticed that the
KGB now sent prompt replies. After all, Serov's former
subordinates among
the "neighbors" respected his signa-
ture. Fundamentally, however, there were no real changes
in the KGB relationship.
Serov expects to be promoted to marshal, but it is doubt-
ful he will get it. He knows absolutely nothing as far as
military affairs are concerned. m
Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov. My first acquaintance with
Serov came through the Turkish assignment, when I sent
the cable through KGB channels to the Central Conmaittee
CPSU about the incorrect actions of our rezident,GRU
Rubenko. The cable got into Serov's hands (he was then
the KGB Chairman) and only then was forwarded to the
Central Committee. Smce that time Serov has remembered
my name, and after his appointment as Chief of the GRU,
he became personally interested in my work. Eventually
a certain degree of friendship developed between us,
and
I visited him several times at his
apartment and at his
country house. Although I had no personal desire to culti-

vate him, I was one of his subordinates. As such I did

everythmg Serov ordered me to do and tried to curry
favor with him, for my own advancement. When
other
and
senior officers chiefs of GRU
directorates found out

about good relations with Serov, their attitude toward

my
me changed noticeably, for the better. My personal rela-
tionship with Serov placed me in the forefront of GRU
officers.
Serov lives on Granovskiy Street. Many ministers,

members of the Central Committee, and marshals also

live there. Rudenko, the Procurator of the
U.S.S.R., lives

on the same floor as Serov. When Serov was the KGB

Chairman, he arrested people, and Rudenko signed the
death sentences. One would drop in the other's place in
 THEDARKWORLDOFGRU 105

the evening for a drink, and they together would de-

cide who should be put in jail and who should be shot.
Very convenient. Below Serov is Marshal Zhukov's apart-
ment. One floor up lives Suslov, member of the Central
Committee CPSU, and above Suslov lives Furtseva.^*

Additional Notes

Major General Fedenko was Deputy Chief of the GRU;

He is now in Moscow.
Brigadier General Fedorov is Chief of the 10th Direc-
torate of the GRU
for the People's Democracies.
Brigadier General Tyulenev also works in the 10th Di-
rectorate.
Colonel Kondrashev, the military attache in Turkey,
an engineer, is now an instructor at the Military Diplomatic
Academy in the Area Studies Department. He spent five
years in Turkey. His work was poor.
One Turk, while on business in Afghanistan, was re-
cruited by Soviet intelligence. His father is a Kurd, but
he conceaJs this fact.
All Africans, as well as representatives of Afghanistan,
Turkey, and Iran, are called by us simply colored (black-
skinned). This is the usual name used in all Soviet direc-
torates and sections.
The Chief Directorate of the General Staff is Oper-
1st
ations. The 2nd Chief Directorate of the General Staff
is us (GRU).

Major General Konovalov's deputy for a long time

was Brigadier General Melkishev. At the present time
Brigadier General Melkishev is Chief of the 4th Eastern
Directorate in place of Brigadier General 2k)tov. Zotov
was military attache in Italy and in France. He is now
going as military attache to Hungary.
Chiefs of the Military Diplomatic Academy: Slavin,
formerly was ambassador to Sweden; Major General Drat-
vin; Major General Kochetkov.
There are ninety-eight to a hundred students in each
Academy class.

is occupied by a large number of Soviet hierarchy.

14 This building
It has been reported that Khrushchev himself now has an apartment
there.
106 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
The military attache in Pakistan
is Colonel Dubrovin,

a Strategic Intelligence officer.

Our agent "Kapral" in Ceylon has given us very valuable
information.
Colonel Vasiliy Maksimovich Rogov, who is short,
should not be confused with Major General Rogov,
Serov's deputy.
The head of the First Section of the GRU
is Brig-
adier General of Aviation Sheliganov. The section has a
photographic section, secret writing section, etc.
Acting rezident in London is Karpekov, a Tartar.
The GRU rezident in India, Sergey S. Veshchunov,
and the rezident in Egypt, Postnikov, were present at the
conference of rezidents at the Central Committee which
was held during the second half of June 1961.
In Japan the ambassador's advisor for scientific and
technical matters is Colonel Sergeyev, a GRU officer. Ser-
geyev is not his true name.
Major Nikolay Kishilov works for Konovalov; Colonel
Fukovskiy is in Iran; Colonel Bokarev is Smolikov's
deputy; Colonel Bychko works in the 3rd Directorate
(previously he was in Canada recruiting agents).
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER III

I have mentioned that some of Penkovskiy's Papers

read like lectures. Like many Russians he had a strongly
didactic cast of mind. But along with his own injunctions
and observations he did send out a few lectures which
—
were formally delivered in a classroom probably many
times. They were part of a series given in 1960 and 1961
to the students of the Military Diplomatic Academy, the
GRU higher training school from which Penkovskiy him-
self was graduated in 1953. Penkovskiy mentions several
lectures deaUng with agent work in Western European
countries, as well as various aspects of the intelligence
trade. One of them, however, is particulariy interesting.
Its title is "Characteristics of Agent Communications and
of Agent Handling in the U.S.A."
The "American" lecture was delivered by Lieutenant
Colonel Ivan Ye. Prikhodko, presumably of the GRU's
Anglo-American Affairs Directorate, a veteran intelligence
ofl&cer who had been, ostensibly, a working member of
the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations in New York,
between 1952 and 1955. Behind this scholarly title the
lecture itself is something of a hair-raiser. Although the
language is dry and rather technical at times, it should be
read assiduously, for it is nothing less than a professional
operating manual for Soviet spies in the United States.
To get Prikhodko's lecture out of the GRU's security
files was an extraordinary coup. Never before have the

operating methods of a modern intelligence service been

laid bare with such embarrassing clarity. Rarely, also, has
107
108 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
a single document so heavily underlined the limitations
of the Soviet mind, in any of its attempts to make an
objective appraisal of another country and another culture.
We assume that Penkovskiy sent copies of this lecture
and any other material of a similar nature to his Anglo-
American intelligence contacts. But Penkovskiy's motive
in sending the Prikhodko lecture along with the Papers
was a wider one than the mere dissemination of intelli-
gence information. As his few words of introduction
state, he wanted to warn "the American people" of the
espionage effort which was being directed against them.
Penkovskiy, in all his writings, displayed an almost ob-
sessive fear that the British and the American publics were
disastrously unaware of the real extent of Soviet intel-
ligence work. By sending the lecture he hoped to convince
them. In this, as in all the Papers, Penkovskiy had a case
to state. He was a zealot who wanted to be heard, if not
appreciated. He was after a wider audience than the
sophisticated experts of the Anglo-American "intelligence
conununity."

In the lecture quoted. Colonel Prikhodko was trying to

be objective. Essentially his comments are intended as a
handy little secret agent's Baedeker, with strong overtones
of Emily Post, a technical and social set of do's and don't's
for the man with a Soviet secret mission. For one thing,
the Colonel advises, a good Soviet intelligence officer must
get to know the New York subway system (". the
. .

subway system there is quite complicated and should be

studied carefully before planning to use it for operational
purposes"). Motels are excellent places for meetings with
agents, because of their separate entrances. Rented cars
are an excellent means of conveyance. The intelligence
officer must develop the habit of walking a lot to accus-
tom counterintelligence surveillances to his peripatetic
journeys to contact points. Public telephones are a fine
means of communication ("The telephone is an integral
part of the American way of life"). But officers should
be on their guard against counterintelligence wire tapping.
Prikhodko cautions officers living in the U.S. to make
the acquaintance of a laundry and a good dry cleaner's:
Americans "try always to have a clean suit, well pressed
 THE PRIKHODKO lECTURE 109
With a good crease in the trousers. ... It is customary to
change white shirts and socks daily."
He was impressed by both bars and brand names For
example: "Americans like to spend a great deal
of time in
bars. ... In order not to attract undue
attention the in-
telligence officer must know how to order
sufficiently
well; for example, to ask, 'Give me
a glass of beer.' It
also is necessary to name the brand of beer
CSchlitz'
'Rheingold,'etc.)."
As for the movies, he observes that "Americans are not
content with only a smgle feature film. Therefore, movie-
theater proprietors show two films one after the other."
Prikhodko finds nearly empty movie theaters excellent
for agent rendezvous purposes, while drugstores are just
fine for making fast phone calls.
Classified ads, Prikhodko suggests, are a great way to
keep in touch with one's agent network in the U.S. and
easy to insert. (Because of their dependence on advertis-
ing profits, he advises, American newspapers accept ads
"very readily.") Agood Soviet intelligence operative will
avoid meeting agents near banks, jewelry shops, the
United Nations building in New York, or the vicinity of
the Soviet Embassy in Washington. And he is cautioned
—
not to schedule meetings on Staten Island accessible
at that time only by ferry or by bridge from New Jersey.
Flawed GRU linguists in New. York need not worry
about their foreign accents showing ("since a large seg-
ment of the city's population speaks with an accent"). But
they must study up on their sports. A golf course, Colonel
Prikhodko advises, is an excellent place for an agent meet-
ing, but would-be golfers must get their practice in Mos-
cow before going abroad. The Colonel cautions: "To
hold successful meetings at golf courses ... a basic re-
quirement is to know the game and how to play it. There-
fore students should learn this game while still at the
academy."
Officers on duty in the U.S. must check carefully the
restaurants where they are to have their meetings. (If they
follow Prikhodko's advice, however, they may not be
—
overly popular he anachronistically suggests that a 10-
per-cent tip is adequate.) Typewriters should be used
wherever possible, handwritten notes avoided. Parks are
excellent locations for leaving communications for agents,
no PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
although they have their disadvantages. "One must bear in
mind," Prikhodko writes, "That a number of American
parks (for example, Central Park in New York) have many
squirrels which can destroy the dead drop^ (especially in
hollow trees) and carry off our material." Ofl&cers in the
U.S. must remember the conversion to daylight-saving time
when they arrange their rendezvous and they should avoid
being caught at department-store sales. ("In their efforts
to advertise the sale, the proprietors invite news photog-
raphers to the opening of the sale. To avoid being caught
by the photographer's lens, our intelligence officers and
members of their families should not visit the store during
the beginning of the sale.")
The American reader should not be deceived by the un-
intentional humor into thinking of the GRU
officer's life
in the United States as a jolly round of mischievous
squirrels, department-store shopping expeditions, and
bracing walks to the agent rendezvous at the sixteenth
hole. The bulk of Prikhodko's lecture consists of warnings
to secure communications, to avoid any unnecessary agent
contacts, to report all meetings immediately after they
occur. Speed is of the essence. The methods of dodging
surveillance are almost endlessly elaborate, involving
hours of dull, apparently unnecessary travel. Through the
entire lecture runs a certain professional and personal
horror of getting caught.
There is no doubt that American counterintelligence
makes life difficult for even the most accomplished GRU
visitor. To the GRU and the KGB, the FBI is more than a
set of initials; it is a shrewd, relentless, and omnipresent
enemy. That the number of Soviet agents apprehended in
the U.S. has steadily risen attests to the Justice Depart-
ment's steadily growing efficiency in this area.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, as Prikhodko says
over and over again, runs "a severe counterintelligence
regime." On almost every page of his lecture he refers to
"constant surveillance." He warns of listening devices
which the FBI can install in automobiles, allowing them to
track an agent down and/ or listen to his conversation.

lA dead drop (called taynik in Russian) is the technical term

used for a hiding place where an agent can leave a packet for an
officer to pick up later, at a set time, without the two parties
meeting.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 111

He notes that even the U. S. Customs Service uses the

latest achievements in technology to detect smuggled
material. "Not long ago," he adds, "the chief of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Edgar Hoover, proposed
the use of X rays to screen baggage transported in air-
craft." Thanks largely to the FBI, working conditions for
Soviet officers in the United States are what Prikhodko
understandably calls "complex."
Agreat deal of planning in the Soviet intelligence net-
work involves the business of communications. Besides
the use of normal radio channels Prikhodko even suggests
the possibility "of a radio station on an earth satellite"
to speed up Soviet agent communications with the Center
in Moscow. Much of the communications planning centers
on wartime conditions. "In time of war," Prikhodko
warns, "the maintainance of direct communications be-
tween the Center and the rezidenturas will be considerably
more difficult." Among other things he warns officers to
locate themselves and their agents, whenever possible, in
areas away from big population centers and hence liable
to Soviet attack. He ".
adds: one of the most important
. .

tasks of the rezidentura under official cover during peace-

time is to train agents and prepare agent nets ... for
operation during wartime."
The most revealing and distressing part of this lecture,
however, is its curiously uneven picture of the American
character. Note some of his typical observations. "An
American's circle of interests is often rather small."
"Many Americans do not read books. Their main interest
in newspapers lies in advertisements, sports news, and
cartoons."
"Generally speaking bourgeois society demoralizes
people." "The absolute power of money in the U.S.A.
arouses one desire in many people to make more —
money." "Wall Street does everything possible to keep
Americans from devoting their free time to meditation and
deliberation. Movies, cheap concerts, boxing, parks, horse
races, baseball, football, restaurants — all these are used to
divert the masses from the realities around them."
Yet at the same time "most Americans are energetic,
enterprising, and open people, having a great sense of
humor." Also, "They can be described as having business
112

acumen and as
PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
being resourceful, courageous,
I
and in
dustrious."
Over and over again he warns the visiting Soviet
telligence officer to develop a sense of humor, "somethinj
which is valued highly by American agents." The urbam
GRU man should be able to tell jokes appropriate!]
"despite the fact that very important problems are bein
discussed at a meeting." The lecturer warns that Americai
intelligence agents, despite their love of jokes, are apt U
be hard to handle. ("Americans do not like discipline am
are always demonstrating their independence.")
Above all, the intelligence officer must not knock thing
American. Prikhodko notes that "an unfortunate stat©
ment, for example, about some popular U. S. Presiden
(George Washington, Abraham Lincohi, Thomas Jefferson^
might offend the agent."
Thus, "The intelligence officer who knows the nationi
traits of Americans should be able to establish rappo:
quickly with the agent and positively influence him." Offi
cers are advised to play on the American's desire fo
financial gain by upping the ante when more work needs
to be done. ("Americans like money. Money is their
favorite topic of conversation.")
On the other hand Prikhodko concedes that "Americans
are distinguished by their efficiency and their resourceful-
ness," and "that the technical knowledge of the average
American is rather high." Finally: "Americans, to a larger
degree than representatives of many other peoples, have a
natural love of freedom and independence."
Seen through American eyes, the cautious analyses of
Colonel Prikhodko are sometimes hilariously incongruous
—De Tocqueville as translated by Charles Addams and
Milton Berle. The overriding impression is one of con-
fusion. The Americans, as the GRU
sees them, are an
independent, resourceful, fun-loving people hopelessly
undermined by the "demoralization" of bourgeois society,
yet doing their best "to save money for a rainy day" be-
cause of their desperate greed for material things. The
lecture reminds us that to a great extent even the best-
informed Soviet officials can be victims of their own
propaganda. Prikhodko's observations, a dialectical inter-
pretation of GRU
experience in the field, are a mixture of
operational shrewdness and country-cousin gullibility, the
 THE PRIKHODKO lECTURE 113

work of men whose own indoctrination and upbringing

has left them a little like Plato's bound prisoners in the
cave, who saw the worid only in terms of the fire-lit
images cast on the opposite wall.
For all its humorous sidelights, the estimate of the
American character is a bit frightening. Consider that
men like Prikhodko are the same people who prepare the
position papers predicting American reactions to Soviet
initiatives and some very frightening reflections come to
mind. Are the Americans always "swayed by money" and
"indifferent" to anything not connected with business? If
the Presidium of the Central Committee in Moscow thinks
we are, it may one day make some irretrievable miscalcula-
tions.
In its own curious way this document constitutes a
powerful argument for a greater, not a less degree of in-
ternational exchange. No country wants to be deluged
with GRU and KGB representatives, yet we could do
worse than introduce as many of these Soviet gentry as
possible to the real facts of American thought processes
and living conditions. Perhaps the GRU
training at the
Military Diplomatic Academy, by tacit arrangement,
might be supplemented by a tour of U.S. college campuses,
Iowa small towns, Chicago conventions, etc. There the
serious Soviet Army Staff officers might be encouraged
to look more closely at a society which they now see
through their own red-shaded glass, rather darkly.
 CHAPTER ill

The Prikhodko Lecture

We spy eveiywhere. Sometimes it is the neighbors, some-

times it is our own rezidents who take the lead. But there

is no country on earth where we do not have our in-

telligence officers recruiting, arranging meetings, doing
everything possible to establish permanent networks of
Llegals. Whether the country is friendly or not is not im-
portant. We spy on neutrals as much as we spy on the
NATO countries. The officers who teach in the Military
Diplomatic Academy have acquainted themselves with
the most intimate aspects of other countries, so we can
use this knowledge. Our experts in Italy, for example, give
our officers detailed information about where to plant
agents and how to organize contacts in Rome.
Rome is a good place for intelligence operations. So
our officers say. There are many foreigners there and the
Romans themselves get along well with foreigners, seeing
in them a source of income. Therefore we can operate in-
conspicuously. The Italians are excessively talkative. That
helps us, too, even though the police are alert and often
conduct surprise document checks, which can be embar-
rassing. There is a large Communist Party in Italy. In-
structors at the academy advise our officers that "our
Italian friends" ^ can be of great service in operations.
Operations in a large country hke Italy might be ex-
pected, yet we work even in a small peaceful country like
Denmark. Our "brave" Chekists are even working in little

1 This of course refers to the Italian Communist Party,

114
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 115

Denmark. Officersare given detailed information about

such things automobile travel between Copenhagen
as
and various towns in Jutland. They are advised about the
best times to make trips to remote areas, as well as the
extent of counterintelligence surveillance possible. Every-
thing is detailed for them. There is a special lecture on
Italy and Denmark given at the Military Diplomatic
Academy.
Some of these lectures I had heard myself and later
seen in written form. With the GRU's instructions on the
U.S.A. I am particulariy familiar.
When the question of my trip to the U.S.A. as chief of
a delegation was under discussion, my supervisor. Colonel
Rogov, sent me for a briefing to our GRU 3rd Directorate,
which is responsible for Anglo-American affairs. There I
was instructed on the agent/ operational situation in the
U.S.A. I was given the lecture to read, "Characteristics of
Agent Communications and of Agent Handling in the
U.S.A." by Lieutenant Colonel I. Ye. Prikhodko. Prikhodko
is quite a young officer of the GRU. From 1952 to 1955

he was in New York City as an Intelligence officer under

United Nations cover. This short lecture is one of the
better training lectures for our intelligence officers operating
in the U.S. It reveals all the hypocrisy of our "peaceful
coexistence." I have never visited the U.S. and it is very
hard for me to judge what is true and what is false in
Prikhodko's lecture. But. even the ordinary American,
untutored in intelligence, will understand what we conceal
under the wing of the United Nations. Because this
lecture was given to me only for a few hours and I have
no time to make comments on it, I made a photocopy of
it and include it together with my papers. And I will
be more than glad if one day this lecture reaches the
shores of the U.S. It is part of my warning to the American
people.

Lieutenant Colonel I. Ye. Prikhodko

Characteristics of Agent Communications
AND OF Agent Handling in the U.S.A.
Training Manual ^
1961
2 editor's note: Certain portions of this lecture have been de-
leted because of excessive repetitions and technical discussion of
scant interest to the general reader.
116 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
In this training circular we shall examine only those
questions of operating conditions in the U.S.A. and those
facets of American counterintelligence tactics which affect
our own agent communication and handling.
The great distance which separates the U.S.A. from the
Soviet Union complicates the organization and support of
direct agent communication between the Center and our
intelligence units in the U.S.A. This forces our intelligence
to employ duplicate communications along many lines.
There is a wide use of the most modern radio equipment
with a large operating radius, and, in case of need, we
resort to radio relay stations. Radio communication is of
vital importance to rezidenturas operating on the territory
of the U.S.A. At the same time, the extensive economic
relations which the U.S.A. has with other countries of the
world facilitates the support of direct communications be-
tween the intelligence units located on the territory of
the U.S.A. and the Center and by postal and telegraph
conmiunications.
The factor of time has always played an important
role in agent operations. Under modern conditions, when
our potential enemy is preparing for a war with wide-
spread use of nuclear missile weapons and intends to
launch a/ surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. and other coun-
tries of the socialist camp, this factor has become even
more important.
Therefore it is necessary to work out in advance, during
peacetime, a reliable system of communications techniques
which an agent can use to inform the Center instantly
about enemy measures directed toward unleashing a
sudden war.
To transmit these messages one must use the most
modem and most highly developed electronic technology,
which should be improved on continually.
If the imperialists unleash a war, the U.S.A. will be the
target of a crushing retaliatory strike causing damage to all
the most important political and economic centers of that
country. Soviet intelligence should thus adopt timely meas-
ures to guarantee the security of its intelligence net.
To achieve this it is necessary to disperse operating rezi-
denturas and to move valuable single agents some distance
outside the limits of large cities. As for agent nets en-
gaged in collecting intelligence on atomic and missile
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 117

bases, they should preferably consist of individual sources

equipped with radio having direct communication with the
Center.
Wemust mention that, to a significant extent, success
in performing intelligence tasks in the U.S.A. depends
on agent handling. Therefore we must devote serious atten-
tion to this subject.

I. Characteristics of Agent Communication

The of agent communications basically

characteristics
amount methods in organization
to the use of specific
and utilization. These depend on the characteristics of
operating conditions.
The way of life, customs, temper, demeanor, and per-
sonality traits of Americans have specific significance.
Most of Americans are energetic, enterprising, and open
people, having a great sense of humor. They can be
described as having business acumen and as being re-
sourceful, courageous, and industrious.
The over-all situation and the absolute power of money
in the U.S.A. arouses just one desire in many people to —
make more money. In describing a person Americans often
use the expession, "He knows how to make money,"
which means that such a person has a lot of money. The
other side of the question, specifically, where the money
comes from or how it is "made," is not, as a rule, of in-

terest to anybody. It can be said that Americans encourage

any method of getting rich.
American bourgeois propaganda tries in every way to
convince the population that anyone can make money if
he is sufl&ciently resourceful.
Such a one-sided upbringing engenders in some of the
people an indifference to everything unconnected with
business, profits, and gain. An American's circle of in-
terests is often rather small. Many Americans do not read
books. Their main interest lies in advertisements, sports
news, and cartoons; on the front pages they only glance
at the large sensational headlines.
Generally speaking, bourgeois society demoralizes peo-
ple.
Every American family tries to save money for a "rainy
118 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
day"; therefore a certain amount is set aside from
pay check.
Wall Street does everything possible to keep Americans
I
from devoting their free time to meditation and delibera-
tion. Movies, cheap concerts, boxing, parks, horse races,
baseball, football, restaurants —
all these are used to divert

the masses from the realities around them.

In general, an American's wants consist of having his
own automobile, a comfortable apartment, and a good time.
Most Americans, both men and women, smoke.
Americans are very concerned about clothes and out-
ward appearances. They try always to have a clean suit,
well pressed with a good crease in the trousers, a clean
shirt, and shoes well polished. They send their suits
regularly to the cleaner and their shirts to the laundry,
both of which are everywhere in the U.S.A. It is cus-
tomary to change white shirts and socks daily.
Clothing styles in the country change every year. Just
as one can determine accurately from specific features
the year and make of an automobile, so can one determine
from outward appearances the class level of any American.
Despite the frequent ch^ige of styles, several general
characteristic features of American dress can still be
noted: narrow and short trousers, short sleeves, white
shirt with a starched collar (on important occasions), and
always with a necktie. In clothing, light colors predomi-
nate. Americans like loose-fitting shoes, as a rule one or
two sizes larger than necessary.
In his free time, when not at work, and especially dur-
ing the summer, the Americans wear sports clothes: light
trousers, short-sleeved shirts, no necktie. Sunglasses are in
common use. Outside the office an American's behavior
is free and relaxed. Many Americanslike to keep their
hands and chew gum.
in their pockets
Agent communications and agent handling involves first I
and last working with people, as a rule from the bourgeois
world. For this work to be successful, it is necessary to
know these people well, their characteristics and their
personality traits, and the political and economic circum-
stances which condition their behavior.
An who does not know the charac-
intelligence officer
teristicsof the American way of life or who neglects
those aspects cannot be a full-fledged agent handler. Thus,
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 119

for example, an intelligence officer who has an outward

slovenly appearance will not command respect from an
agent. If an agent does not have sufficient dedication to
our intelligence service, the result of this and similar er-
rors on the part of an intelligence officer may leave the
agent with the impression that he is working with an
inadequate and imreliable organization.
In the organization and utilization of agent communica-
tions knowledge of the local area and local conditions is
of the utmost importance. Not only the country as a whole,
but even every city, has its own individual features which
influence agent communications. They may complicate
them or, on the contrary, facilitate their successful ac-
complishment.
New York, for example, is distinguished by its large
size and by the great number of its parks, museums, ath-
letic grounds, movie houses, libraries, and other public
buildings. People of the most different nationalities com-
prise a large segment of the population. The city public
transportation system, especially the subways, is extensive,
and there are a great many buses and taxis.
In New York it is easy to establish a cover story for
going downtown either during the day or at night, be-
cause New York has many public places. Skillful use of
transportation facilities makes it possible to make a good
check for the detection of surveillance. Finally, an intelli-
gence officer who speaks with an accent in New York is
quite acceptable since a large segment of the city's popula-
tion speaks with an accent.
There are many large cities in the U.S.A. including such
giants as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, etc. The
large cities in the U.S.A. offer favorable conditions to
organize agent commimications and to estabUsh a cover
story for them.
On the other hand the organization and utilization of
agent commimications in Washington are full of difficul-
ties because of the city's small size, its limited number of
public places, no subways, and an inadequate public trans-
portation system, especially in the suburbs.
As we know, there are essentially two t)rpes of agent
communications: personal and impersonal.
Because they do not involve personal contact between
case officer and agent, impersonal communications afford
120 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
the greatest degree of secrecy to the activities of opera-
^1
tional agents and they greatly complicate the work of
counterintelligence in the identification and exploitation
of our intelligence officers.
In the U.S.A., a country with a highly developed
counterintelligence effort, the basic type of agent com-
munications is impersonal communications, the importance
of which is constantly growing. The task of operational
agents consists of using impersonal communications cre-
atively and perfecting their manner of organization.
However, one must remember that proper agent han-
dling and the development of the greatest effectiveness
in working with agents require periodic personal meet-
ings with them.

1. Personal Communications 1

Only by personal contact between intelligence officer

and agent is it possible to study the agent better, to dis-
cover his real feelings, to check on and control his work,
— —
and finally and this is of utmost importance to instruct
the agent, to train him in new methods and in professional
intelligence skills, to develop him, and to exert an in-
fluence on him through personal example.
The basic types of direct communications are the meet-
ing, the recognition meeting, ^ and communications
through a cutout or transmission points.

Meetings

A meeting between intelligence officer and agent is one

of the most vulnerable means of communications. There-
fore, in organizing a meeting, an intelligence officer must
anticipate everything in order to guarantee security.
In organizing a meeting, the closest attention must be
paid to such questions as the meeting time, the meeting
place, the meeting agenda, the meeting cover story, and
the measures to ensure security.
Meetings should be varied as to time of day, days of

3 A"recognition meeting" is an intelligence contact at which a

Soviet intelligence officer and an agent meets first for the purpose of
mutual recognition, on the basis of prearranged place, time, and
identifying marks.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 121

the week, and dates of the month. For example, meetings

should not be held on the fifth day of each month, on
Wednesday of every week, or consistently at 8 p.m., be-
cause such consistency in the activities of an intelligence
officer makes the work of counterintelligence easier. In
fact, in order to compromise an operation it would be
sufficient for counterintelligence to intensify its surveil-
lance on our intelligence officer for only one day of the
month (for example, the fifth of the month), for one day
of the week (for example, on Wednesday), and even for
—
only a certain time ^until 8 p.m.
Neither, however, should there be an unlimited jug-
gling of times. In choosing a time for a meeting, one
must take into consideration the agent's working condi-
tions, his hours of work, his family situation, and the
meeting place and area. Consideration should be given
to the fact that the agent must have a plausible explana-
tion for his absence from work or his departure from
home.
Most Americans spend their days off and holidays with
their families or with relatives and friends. Besides this,
an agent has family holidays — ^birthdays of members of
the family. An intelligence must consider these
officer
circumstances, hear the agent's views, and not schedule a
meeting on days which are holidays for the agent and for
members of his family.
Most meetings are held in the evening. As a rule, the
agent does not work in the evening and does not have to
ask permission of his boss to leave. In addition, evenings
provide the greatest security. It is not reconmiended, how-
ever, to hold meetings in a park, because, unlike Euro-
peans, Americans parks only during the day. At the
visit
approach of darkness nobody uses the parks. At that time
of the day only criminal elements and persons who are
mentally ill can be found in the parks. In the press one
can find special warnings concerning the danger in going
to parks in the evening. It is not unusual for the news-
papers to publish detailed accounts of rapes and murders
which were committed in the parks during the night.
One may also hold meetings in the middle of the day
and during lunch (Americans have their lunch from 1 to
2 P.M.). If it is within his pattern of activities, the agent
122 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
may leave his office during the day. If such is the case,
one can meet him at any time of the day.
Finally, meetings can be held in the morning, before
work, because the majority of office workers start work at
9 A.M. and some even at 10 a.m.
We know that at certain periods, which may last from
one to several months, counterintelligence concentrates
its main efforts on working days during the working hours

of Soviet installations, while during preholiday days

and holidays, as well as during the morning hours, only
preventive measures are in force. Our intelligence officers
must always take into consideration all aspects of the
counterintelligence agents' modus operandi and conduct
their clandestine activities during those days and hours
when counterintelligence is least active. The selection of
times and dates must always be selected with the agent.
As a rule, meetings should be as short as possible;
therefore very careful preparations are necessary. In or-
ganizing communications from a third country, or from
the Center to the U.S.A., and especially in organizing
radio communications, one should consider the American
practice of changing the time during the summer to be
one hour ahead of standard time. Clocks are moved ahead
one hour (so-called summer or daylight time, "daylight-
saving time") starting at 2 a.m. on the last Sunday in
April and ending at 2 a.m. on the last Sunday in Septem-
ber, when clocks are moved back one hour throughout the
U.S.A., with the exception of Indiana and Nebraska
where daylight time is in effect all year.
In choosing a meeting site, it is necessary of course to
consider the characteristics of the country as a whole and,
above all, the characteristics of the area. As a whole, con-
ditions in the cities of New York and Washington, for
example, are favorable for the organization of agent com-
munications. However, not all areas of such cities are
suitable for this. For example, of New York's five sec-
tions, which are called "boroughs," Richmond is less
suitable than the other areas for organizing agent commu-
nications. The reason for this is its isolation from the main
city. One can reach the island only by ferry (ferry cross-
ings for Richmond are made from Manhattan and from
Brooklyn) or by the bridge connecting Richmond with
Bayonne and Jersey City.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 123

—
New York's other four sections Manhattan, Bronx,
—
Brooklyn, and Queens are widely used by our intelli-
gence officers for the organization of agent communica-
tions.
However, differences exist not only among the five sec-
tions of New York, but also among different sections
of the city within the very same area. For example, let us
take Manhattan, which is the business area of the city.
Negro Harlem is unsuitable for the organization of agent
communications in Manhattan. It is located north of Cen-
tral Park, and the Chinese quarter, located downtown, is
also difficult for agents. Extreme squalor distinguishes
the Chinese quarter. A properly dressed person will
stand out sharply there. As for Negro Harlem, white people
cross it only by automobile. A white person is unsafe
there, because the Negroes regard every white person who
comes there as a curiosity-seeker who came to view them
much as people go to the zoo to view the animals in cages.
We do not recommend that meetings be held in the area
between Forty-second and Thirty-fourth Streets. This is
the busiest part of midtown and therefore has the widest
coverage by the police and by counterintelligence.
Likewise, it is inadvisable to hold meetings in the vi-
cinity of the UN Building (along the shore of the East
River, between Forty-second and Forty-eighth Streets),
near buildings of the permanent representations of various
countries to the UN and, above all, the delegations to the
UN of representations of socialist countries (the rep-
resentation of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations is locat-
ed at 680 Park Avenue) nor in the vicinity of large banks,
,

jewelry stores, etc.

In Washington, meetings should not be held in the central
part of the city, where Congressional buildings, the White
House, departmental buildings and other governmental
offices, large banks, stores, and restaurants are located.
Neither should they be held on the main streets of the
city, or in areas where foreign embassies and, especially,
the embassies of the U.S.S.R. and other countries of the
socialist camp are located. Meetings should also not be
held in areas near military objectives or in the Negro
district.
Generally, an operation can be compromised through
the improper selection of a meeting site. For example, an
124 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
intelligence officer, who did not know the city well, once
selected a meeting place with an agent on a street corner
in the evening. A large bank stood on this comer. The
intelligence officer arrived for the meeting exactly at the
appointed time. The agent was late. The intelligence officer
was there for less than two minutes when a policeman
approached, asked him what he was doing there, and
requested him to move along. The intelligence officer had
to leave quickly. In addition, two plainclothesmen fol-
lowed him until he entered a subway station. The meeting
was not held.
In another instance, the site selected for a recognition
meeting was a bus stop served by only one bus. Our in-
telligence officer who was supposed to meet an agent at
an appointed time arrived at the meeting site. To guarantee
the security of the meeting, another intelligence officer
countersurveilled the meeting from a bench in a square
near the meeting site. Because the agent did not appear
for the meeting that day, both intelligence officers went
home. This was repeated two more times. On the third
day the agent himself approached our intelligence officer,
not the one waiting for him at the bus stop, but the one
sitting on the bench in the square and made contact with
him. It was later learned that the agent passed the meeting
place each time, sat on a bench in the square, and watched
the intelligence officers. He had decided not to come to
the bus stop, as he considered it unnatural to wait there
because he had no plausible cover story. Only on the third
day was the agent convinced that the man sitting in the
square was a Soviet inteUigence officer. He then approached
him, because he considered the square a more appro-
priate meeting site.
The best boroughs for holding meetings are the Bronx,
Brooklyn, and Queens, as well as various parts of Man-
hattan (the area near Columbia University, the area adjoin-
ing Riverside Park, the area east of Lexington Avenue, and
others).
As we know, we must select a meeting site that is secure
and convenient for holding the meeting. It must also be
such that an appearance there can be explained plausibly
and convincingly by a cover story. Among such places
are crowded streets, parks, sports fields, sports clubs,
restaurants, motels, beaches, etc.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 125

Most streets in American including Washington

cities,
and New York, are quite regular and well planned, and
intersect at right angles.
In New York many streets have ordinal numbers as
names. In Manhattan, for example, only the far downtown
district has word names for streets. North of Houston
Street begins the numbered streets: First, Second, etc.,
through 207th. Fifth Avenue divides Manhattan into two
parts: west (in the direction of the Hudson River) and east
(in the direction of the East River) Addresses therefore are
.

indicated as follows: 302 W. Fifty-sixth St., N.Y. This

means: house (more often, the entrance) no. 302, the
western part of Fifty-sixth St., N.Y. One should also give
an address this way when speaking. Manhattan avenues
run north-south, and many of them are numbered.
Streets cross from east to west. In general, the city is well
planned, and a person can learn his way around with
relative ease. Queens and the Bronx have a good many
*
quiet streets which are good places to meet.
In Washington, all the north-south streets have number
names, and those which go from east to west have a letter
(for example: A Street or D Street) or a name. Avenues
run diagonally and are named after states. Because a
street with the same number or name can be in each of the
four sections of the city, in writing an address it is neces-
sary to indicate the section of the city. For example, 415
Fifteenth St., N.W., Washmgton, D.C.
Because of the way New York and Washington are
laid out, they offer the possibility of holding meetings
while walking outdoors. For such a meeting an agent is
told not the spot (point) of an area but the location of the
route, as a rule a small (short) street along which he is to
walk at a given time. In such a case, the intelligence
officer can observe the agent to determine whether or not
he is under surveillance and can then establish contact at
the most convenient place.
In selecting a meeting site, one must consider possible
sudden changes in the weather which are quite typical of
the climate in the coastal areas of the U.S.A. Sunny
weather frequently becomes rainy, and vice versa. Ameri-
cans listen to the weather forecast and, if bad weather is
predicted, they take an umbrella and raincoat; Americans
do not wear rubbers. Both men and women use umbrellas.
126 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Thus, before going to a meeting, an intelligence officer
should listen to the weather forecast and, if necessary, take
an umbrella or a raincoat. In addition, he should plan for
the possibility of rain by selecting a covered place in the
vicinity where a meeting can be held (store entrances,
subway stations, movie theaters, museums, libraries, res-
taurants, drugstores, and others).
The existence of a subway in New York helps locating
different places in the city. It should be borne in mind,
however, that the subway system there is quite com-
plicated and should be studied carefully before planning
to use it for operational purposes.

In learning the subways and the city, one should make

extensive use of directories, guidebooks, and maps.
Parks can serve as meeting places. New York parks are
usually grassy fields with only occasional patches of trees
and bushes. There are many play areas in the parks. The
footpaths are of asphalt. Main roads often cut through the
parks.
Washington parks are even more unusual. They are
usually full of wooded areas and are dissected by main
roads near which there are a number of parking places
and picnic areas. In general, there are no footpaths. It is
not customary to take strolls through the parks.
All of the parks are free. The people make considerable
use of them for resting, sports, and exercise. Walking on
the grass is permitted in many parks.
Most athletic clubs are open to the public, including
foreigners. Golf is the most popular sport among the well-
to-do. Agent meetings can be held at golf courses as easily
as in other athletic clubs. During the week there are very
few people at the golf courses. On these days the in-
telligence officer and his agent can arrive at the golf course
(preferably at different times, twenty to thirty minutes
apart), each can begin to play alone, and at a previously
designated time can meet at, let us say, the sixteenth hole
or at some other hole (there is a total of eighteen holes).
Saturdays and Sundays are less suitable days for holding
agent meetings at golf courses because on these days many
players gather, tournaments are held, and single play is
not permitted. Golf courses are found on the edges of
wooded areas or parks in broken terrain where there are
many hidden areas. These hidden areas are the best places
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 127

for holding meetings. In some cases, meetings can be

held in clubhouse restaurants.
To hold successsful meetings at golf courses, one should
learn the conditions there ahead of time. A basic require-
ment is to know the game and how to play it. Therefore
students should learn this game while still at the academy.
Club membership is rather expensive. Also, not all
clubs are equally accessible to our intelligence officers. It
is even difficult for local residents, to say nothing of
foreigners, to get into some golf clubs, if they do not
have a certain position in society.
As a rule, a candidate for membership must be recom-
mended by two or three club members.
New York has golf courses in Pelham Bay Park, Van
Cortlandt Park (the Bronx) in Dyker Beach Park (Brook-
;

lyn); in Porest Park and Alley Park (Queens); in Latour-

ette Park and Silver Lake Park (Richmond); and others.
With club memberships so difficult to obtain it is advisable
to use public golf courses.
New York and Washington have numerous restaurants,
many of them representing different nationalities. Each
restaurant has its own distinctive characteristics. One
may specialize in steaks (the most expensive steaks are
sirloin and T-bone steak), another in seafood; some res-
taurants have orchestras, others have not. Before selecting
a certain restaurant as a meeting site, one should learn
everything about that restaurant; the system of service, the
type of customers, whether it has a bad reputation with
the police, etc.
It is the practice in all restaurants to tip the waitress 10
per cent of the amount shown on the check.
Depending on the nature of the agent operation, the
officer and agent may sit at the same table and hold the
meeting during dinner. Or they may sit at separate tables,
keeping only visual contact for the purpose of exchanging
prearranged signals, and have the meeting later on the
street after leaving the restaurant. Restaurants are fre-
quently used as a refuge from bad, rainy weather.
Americans like to spend their time in bars. Many bars
have no tables. Customers sit on high round stools next to
the bar. As a rule, bars do not provide snacks or hot
dishes. One can order only drinks: whisky, gin, beer,
etc. In order not to attract undue attention the intelli-
128 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
gence officer must know how to order sufficiently well. It
is not enough, for example, to ask, "Give me a glass of
beer." It is also necessary to name the brand of beer
("Schlitz," "Rheingold," etc.). For the customers' amuse-
ment, most proprietors install a television set in a comer
above the bar. Customers often sit over a single glass of
beer for several hours watching television programs.
It is highly recommended to hold meetings in small
restaurants located in the residential area of a city.
The American pharmacy (drugstore) is quite different
from European pharmacies. Its assortment of goods is not
limited to medicines. In many drugstores one can buy the
latest newspapers or magazines, purchase food products,
have a cup of coffee, or make a telephone call. American
drugstores, especially in the large cities, have almost be-
come department stores. Therefore they are never with-
out customers. Drugstores can be used to hold short meet-
ings, as well as for other agent activities (signaling,
clandestine phone calls).
Along the highways between cities and near cities there
are manymotels. A motel is a small hotel by the highway
where people traveling by car can spend the night. Gen-
erally there are vacancies. The manager always writes
down the license number of the car and the driver's name
in a special register. No registration is required of other
passengers.
Each motel room has its own entrance. One may leave
the motel at any time. Also, the manager need not be in-
formed in advance of one's departure. As a rule, people
depart from a motel early in the morning. The bill is paid
when the room is rented.
It is easy to hold meetings in a hotel of this type.
It is advisable to use motels in cases in which it is
necessary to hold a long meeting with an agent in a
closed and isolated location, e.g., when it is necessary to
train an agent in radio or in the use of operational tech-
niques. The ability to park the car near one's room or in a
nearby garage facilitates the secret unloading of equipment
Even American movie theaters are distinctive. Most
movie theaters in large cities are open from 12 noon to
1 A.M. Moviegoers enter as soon as they get their tickets

and they may take any unoccupied seat. The moviegoer

leaves whenever he wishes, but, as a rule, he leaves when
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 129

another showing begins. Films are shown continuously.

Americans are not content with only a single feature film.
Therefore, movie-theater proprietors show two films, one
after the other, which lasts three to four hours.
Intelligence officers can make extensive use of movie
theaters when organizing agent communications by spend-
ing a certain amount of time in them before a meeting.
The fact is that there are few people in most movie
theaters, especially on weekdays during working hours.
Movie theaters located away from the center of the city
are often practically empty. Thus, by arriving at a des-
ignated time at a previously determined movie theater
and taking advantage of the many empty seats, the in-
telligence officer and agent can hold a meeting ri^t in the
theater. As an alternative, they can use the foyer where
there are frequently many vending machines selling
cigarettes, cold drinks, chewing gum, etc.
Agent meetings can also be held in outdoor movie
theaters (drive-in theaters) where one can see the films
from one's car.
In the U.S.A. where the counterintelligence effort is
highly developed, planning and preparation for a meet-
ing are of the greatest importance. In planning a meeting
one should give the greatest consideration to the above-
mentioned characteristics of the people and of the country,
the working and family situation of the agent, his capabili-
ties, etc. Insofar as the intelligence officer himself is con-
cerned, he should thoroughly work out his own conduct.
All his movements, his daily routine, his appearances in
the city, and his visits to movie theaters, libraries, and
sporting events must be subordinated to one purpose
achieving a more flexible and covert system of agent
communications. In this regard, all his activities must be
natural and plausible.
In planning a meeting, one must consider the site, the
nature of the ^te, and the time of the previous meeting, so
that the next meeting be held at a different site and, if
possible, at a different time. In New York, for example, it
is possible to alternate the use of the different "boroughs"
— ^the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, Richmond, and Man-
hattan.
At the same time a meeting site is selected, places must
be provided along the route to the meeting site where
130 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
signals can be posted. Signals can be arranged along this
route to cancel a meeting. This is done with the help of
radiotechnological means in those cases in which it is
established that the officer who is on his way to an agent
is under surveillance. Before going to the meeting site, the
officer must ascertain that there are no signals which
cancel the meeting.
The question of leaving for a meeting must be
thoroughly planned. It is particularly important that those
officers working in a rezidentura under cover know how to
leave their offices quite naturally at both a reasonable and
required time, how to explain their visits to certain public
places, and how to make their "spot checks" along the
route. The continuity and regularity of agent communica-
tions depend on such planning.
Under present working conditions, one should start for a
meeting not later than two to three hours before the
scheduled time. During this time one must check along
the stipulated route to detect any surveillance *by the
counterintelligence service. If surveillance is detected, one
must carry out his cover reason for leaving, then return
to the point of departure to attempt to make another
secure departure. At times the intelligence officer will have
to make several tries before he succeeds in evading
surveillance. In most cases, therefore, the intelligence
officer leaves his office quite early. For example, if on
the day of a meeting, while on his way to or from lunch,
an intelligence officer notices that he is not being watched,
there is no need for him to go home for lunch or to
return to work after lunch. He goes to the city, makes
another very careful check, spends the rest of his time in a
movie theater or some other area which affords security,
and appears at the meeting site at the designated time.
Below are several examples which illustrate an intelli-
gence officer's method of departure for a meeting and the
nature of an intelligence officer's actions.
An had a Sunday meeting scheduled
intelligence officer
for the latter part of the day. After breakfast he took his
family for a walk in the park. He usually took such a
walk every Sunday. On the way he invited a friend. The
two families chose some benches in the park and seated
themselves in the sun. The adults talked and glanced
through newspapers and magazines which they had bought
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 131

at a stand, while the children played nearby. They all

visited the zoo together, and they also looked at some
monuments. While passing a movie theater, they looked at
the advertising display and decided to see the new film.
They all went inside. The intelligence officer who had a
meeting scheduled quickly departed through a side door
and left for the meeting site along a previously selected
route. The meeting was successful. Toward evening the
intelligence officer and his family returned home after a
restful Sunday.
In another case, a meeting was designated for a Monday
evening. After work on Saturday, the intelligence officer left
for the house in the country where some families spent all
summer and where most of the Soviet officials spent Satur-
days and Sundays. As usual on Monday morning he re-
turned to the city in his car. On the way, observing that
he was not under surveillance he decided to take advantage
of this opportunity. He did not go to work but parked his
car instead on a street (some distance from his place of
business —
and from the meeting site). He then took a
subway and went to a different part of the city. He got off
the subway at an uncrowded station and confirmed the
absence of surveillance; he then bought a newspaper and
again boarded the subway. Later the intelligence officer got
off at another station and went to an Automat for break-
fast. Still there was no surveillance. After breakfast the
intelligence officer made several trips on the subway
more
and fully confirmed the absence ofany surveillance. To
avoid being detected on the streets by the counterintelli-
gence service, the intelligence officer entered a movie
theater. Twenty to thirty minutes before the scheduled
meeting, he left the movie theater and proceeded to the
meeting site, again checking en route. The meeting took
place at the designated time.
The
intelligence officer must think through in advance
allsuch problems connected with the planning and conduct
of a meeting, including possible variations of departures,
and make a report for the rezident.
Conduct of a meeting is the basic phase of agent
operations. Meetings play an important role in the training
of an agent. Therefore they should be conducted in a
precise, well-planned manner, with a thorough knowledge
of the case and paying attention to all circumstances.
132

During the meeting the

PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
intelligence officer
describe the order of the meeting with the agent and the
cover story for the meeting, review the instructions
i
must not only ^

for the alternate meeting, hear the agent's report, and as-
sign him tasks, but he must also instruct him in various
matters, listen to his questions, and give him competent
answers. The officer must take a constant interest in the
agent's personal affairs and situation so that the agent
can be cautioned in advance, if need be, about possible
errors in his conduct.
Because meetings should not be too lengthy, the in-
telligence officer must be well prepared for each meeting.
During the meeting he must be alert to catch the most
fleeting changes in the agent's mood. To a large extent, an
officer's authority depends on his conduct, his discussion
of operational matters, the ability to conceal the fatigue
which he might be feeling after a long trip and many
security checks. Nor should he show any nervousness,
whatever the external reasons might be. If the officer ex-
hibits stability and self-control, the agent will acquire
confidence in working with our intelligence service.
Despite the fact that very important problems are being
discussed at a meeting, the case officer should have a
sense of humor, something which is valued highly by
American agents, be able to tell appropriate jokes, and en-
liven the conversation. This aids in establishing good
rapport with the agent.

Recommendations for the Conduct of Intelligence Officers

Engaged in Personal Communications

The conduct of an intelligence officer bears directly

on his work with agents. The people with whom the
intelligence officer comes
contact must be convinced
in
that all his actions andbearing are determined by
his
his job, by the nature of his personal life, and by his
cultural tastes. He must accustom those around him to a
pattern of activities which naturally includes agent work.
To overcome the obstacles of counterintelligence, our in-
telligence officers, besides following the general rules of
intelligence operations, must adopt special measures. The
intelligence officers in a rezidentura under cover, who are
under constant surveillance by the counterintelligence
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 133

service, are particularly compelled to make considerable

use of these measures.
Weknow that stationary counterintelligence observa-
tion posts carefully record the time that all employees
of Soviet installations arrive for work and the time they
depart. The counterintelligence service can draw up charts
on the arrival and departure of our colleagues using
them to organize their surveillance. To invalidate such
"charts" and make it impossible for the counterintelligence
service to establish any kind of regular or recurrent pat-
tern of the length of time our colleagues stay inside an
installation, we must explain trips to the city on opera-
tional matters by hiding and disguising them. Such trips
are made under the pretense of conducting personal busi-
—
ness ^visits to movie theaters, museums, exhibitions, and
athletic events, the purchase of personal articles, etc.
During a trip to the city, the intelligence oflBcer checks
for surveillance. If he is sure that he is not under sur-
veillance, the intelligence oflBcer uses this trip to the city to
get a better knowledge of the city, to choose new meet-
ing places, dead drops, and locations for posting signals,
and to select and confirm routes along which checks
can be made for surveillance. If he detects surveillance, the
intelligence oflScer must act according to a previously
conceived cover plan: he can act like a person who is
very interested in books and, consequently, visit a num-
ber of bookstores, or he can pretend to be a devotee of
baseball, the most popular sport in the U.S.A. It would
be helpful if an intelligence ofi&cer could give the im-
pression that he is fond of taking walks about the city.
At the same time, he must try to learn the methods
of surveillance. Under no circumstances must he reveal
that he has detected the surveillance, in order not to
show his familiarity with the modus operandi of the
counterintelligence service. Similarly, an intelligence oflBL-
cer who is under surveillance must not exhibit nervous-
ness or do anything which is unnatural.
The oflScer should analyze each trip to the city, make
conclusions on the operating methods of the counterin-
telligence service and on the city and public places.
These conclusions should be written down in a special
notebook. Gradually the intelligence oflScer will accumu-
late a collection of very valuable material. The intelli-
134 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
gence oflficer having such notes can adjust more e;eS^^
to operating conditions. He can select meeting places
ahead of time in widely scattered areas, as well as dead
drops and places for posting signals. He will be able to
develop more plausible cover stories for his actions con-
nected with agent operations.
American stores periodically hold sales of their mer-
chandise at lowered prices. At the beginning of the sale
a large number of people usually gather at the store.
In their efforts to advertise the sale, the proprietors in-
vite newspaper photographers to the opening of the sale.
To avoid being caught by the photographer's lens, our in-
telligence officers and members of their families should
not visit the store during the beginning of the sale.
It is recommended that intelligence officers take more
frequent walks about the city at different times. Depend-
ing on his work load and the purpose for the walks, he
can take walks after work, before work, and during his
lunch hour. After he "accustoms" the counterintelligence
service to such walks, the intelligence officer can use them
later to support agent communications (posting or check-
ing of signals), agent meetings, servicing dead drops, etc.
Every intelligence officer who handles agents must have
previously selected and well-learned countersurveillance
check routes which afford the most favorable opportuni-
ties for the detection of surveillance.
A countersurveillance check route may include travel
by automobile (which can then be parked on a side street
or in some city garage); the use of uncrowded streets,
especially in those areas where parallel surveillance is
impossible; travel by subway with several transfers at
quiet stations; visits to large stores and other buildings
with numerous elevators, entrances, and exits, and which
also have direct access to subways (Pennsylvania Station,
Macy's and Saks department stores, Chrysler Building,
and others).
At the same time that such routes are being selected,
a good cover story should also be developed to explain
the intelligence officer's presence in a certain area.
Detecting surveillance, the intelligence officer must not
go to meet the agent; but he must spend some time
naturally in the city, thereby convincing the counterin-
telligence agents of his reason for being in the city, and
 THE PRIKHODKOLECTURE 135

then return home. Thus, the surveillance agents will have

to report that their quarry was not seen committing any
clandestine act.
Generally, as we mentioned, there is no particular need
for the intelligence officer to return to the rezidentura
late after an evening meeting. Nevertheless, he must, in-
form the rezident about the meeting by passing or posting
a prearranged signal: "Meeting held; all is well," or,
"Meeting did not take place," etc. The type of signal will
depend on particular conditions: the working and personal
relationships between the officer and rezident, etc. The
signal can be noted by the rezident himself, by his
chauffeur, or by any other intelligence officer who is free
that day. A detailed report on the operation can be made
the next day.
The U.S. counterintelligence service regards all Soviet
employees as possible intelligence officers and constantly
attempts to determine which of them has special work to
do. With this in mind, a number of means are employed,
the main ones are eavesdropping (in apartments, in auto-
mobiles, on the street, etc.), surveillance, and the study
and analysis of the conduct of Soviet employees. With
this fact in mind, the intelligence officer must not discuss
operational matters outside the confines of the specially
equipped room in the rezidentura and he must conduct
himself so as not to arouse the suspicion of those around
him. It is vital that he avoid establishing a pattern in his
intelligence work.
In organizing agent communications the intelligence
officer will often have to make use of the public trans-
portation system. The subway is the primary means of
transportation in New York.
There are no ticket collectors on the subway. There
are special metal revolving gates at the entrance. The
ticket office does not sell tickets but only metal tokens
which cost fifteen cents. In passing through the revolving
gate, the passenger inserts the token in a special slot.
An intelligence officer should always have several to-
kens with him, especially on the day of a meeting, so as
not to waste any time in buying them at the subway en-
trance.
It is hard to imagine how an operation for maintaining
agent conamunications can be conducted in New York
136 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
without using the subway, which, despite its complexity,
facilitates one's orientation in the dty. It also affords
a convenient place to check on the existence or absence
of surveillance.
Inadequate knowledge of the city's means of trans-
portation, especially the subway, can sometimes lead to
the cancellation of an agent meeting. The following ex-
ample imderscore this point:
will
Our a meeting at the designated time.
officer left for
After carrying out a carefully planned check, he was
convinced that he was not under surveillance. Twenty
minutes remained before the meeting. During that time
he had to go to the meeting site and once more confirm
the lack of surveillance. According to his plan, he was
required to use the subway for this purpose. At a quiet
station he boarded a subway going in the opposite di-
rection from the meeting site, and planned to get off
at the next station and take a train back to the meeting
site.

There were hardly any passengers in the subway car.

A man sat down near him, opened a paper, and began
to read.
The passed one stop and then got off. The man
officer
with newspaper, apparently recollecting something
the
suddenly, folded his newspaper quickly and also got off
the subway. The intelligence officer was alerted. He got
on the next train and sat down. The man with the news-
paper sat down in the same car and again began to read
his paper. The intelligence officer became alarmed — ^this

was obvious surveillance. He rode past his stop. The man

with the newspaper did not appear to be paying any at-
tention to him. Finally, the intelligence officer could stand
it no longer and got off the subway. The stranger did not

even lift his head and rode on. None of the other pas-
sengers got off. The intelligence officer went out on the
street —
and made a check no external surveillance. But
by then it was too late to make the meeting. He made
another check, confirmed the lack of surveillance, then
went home. An important meeting was canceled.
It was later determined that the mtelligence officer had
at first taken a local train, had passed his stop, and then
had taken an express going in the opposite direction.
Local residents frequently do the same thing, when they
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 137

have a long way to go. They get on at the nearest in-

termediate station and take a train going in the direction
of the closest express stop and then transfer to an ex-
press. Our ofl&cer did not consider this, because he did
not know the subway system.
Buses stop at the request of passengers. Before his
stop, the passenger must pull a cord overhead which
serves as a signal to the driver. The driver also stops the
bus when signaled by passengers waiting at a stop, provid-
ing, however, that there is room on the bus.
Buses operate without conductors.
One enters a bus through the front door and exits
through the rear. By the driver is a small meter similar
to a small box into which the passenger drops fifteen
cents in New York and twenty cents in Washington. The
driver allows the entrance and departure of passengers,
makes change, and hands out transfers (at the request
of the passenger). He gives change for bills but only up
to five dollars. Thus the intelligence officer must always
be certain that he has small change or one-dollar bills.
Tickets are not used on buses. The system for street-
cars is the same as for buses.
Taxis do not have stands. In addition, they are not
allowed to stop on the street for any length of time,
because the streets are full of traffic. Taxis move con-
stantly, stopping only for passengers. A
taxi can be
stopped anywhere; this is done merely by waving the
hand or by loudly shouting, "Taxi I" when an empty one
passes.
The driver writes in his log the place a fare entered
the taxi, the place he got out, and the time. Therefore
an intelligence officer must never take a taxi directly to
the meeting place. To
use taxis properly in operational
work, the officer must know several addresses in different
areas and to be prepared to give the driver a destination
at a moment's notice.
In the U.S.A. our intelligence officers make extensive
use of personal cars (especially in Washington), not as
a site for meeting or talking with an agent, but as a way
of going to the meeting area, and of detecting and losing
surveillance. The reason is that the counterintelligence
service can secretly install in Soviet employees* cars special
138 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
eavesdropping microphones or devices which emit a signal
giving the location of the car.
Automobiles are very widely used as a means of trans-
portation in the U.S.A. An automobile is a necessity in
the way of life of the American family. All the streets
in the large cities are jfilled with automobiles. It is difficult
to find a free place to park. There are not enough garages
and parking lots to meet the demand. Nevertheless, there
is always room on parking lots and in garages (old large
buildings are often made over into garages). This is be-
cause their fees are so high. For example, the cost of
parking a car in the center of Manhattan can be as much
as seventy-five cents, and even one dollar, for the firsts-
hour, up to a maximum of three dollars per day. mm
The intelHgence officer using an automobile in arrang-^"
ing communications should always park his car in a garage
or a particular place a considerable distance from the
meeting site, even in a different borough. He should con-
tinue his mission using public transportation.
There are many companies in the U.S.A. which rent
cars. All that is required to rent a car is to present one's
driver's license and leave a small deposit. Use of rented
cars in the organization of agent conamunications is recom-
mended, because this has a number of advantages. For
instance, an intelligence officer can drive to the city in his
own car, check for surveillance, and then leave it in a
suitable area or in a parking lot. He can then complete
his job in a rented car. This use of automobiles makes
the work of the counterintelligence service more difficult.
The largest car rental company is the "Hertz Rent a
Car Service."
There are many bridges and tunnels in the U.S.A.
toll
The toll is collected by a policeman (about twenty to
twenty-five cents for a one-way trip). We assume that at
these points notice is taken of cars with diplomatic plates,
especially of those cars whose drivers are employees of
Soviet installations. Therefore we must avoid such places
when carrying out intelligence tasks and use, instead,
bridges without tolls where it is more difficult to keep
track of cars.

[Editor's Note: At this point one page is missing

from the original document The missing material
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 139

evidently includes further discussion of clandestine

meetings between intelligence operatives, as well as
types of recognition signs and key words ("paroles")
for mutual identification of Soviet officers and their
agents.]

which can be with initials, with some kind of figure in

the form of a stamp or mark, or some kind of special
stone. Besides rings, women wear many ornaments around
the neck, on the hands, and on their clothing. Depending
on the sex of the agent, any of these can be used as a
recognition sign.
Americans make widespread use of various wrapping
papers with advertisements in the form of writing, photo-
graphs, colored pictures, etc. Small objects (a box for
vitamins or chewing gum) with a distinctive packaging
can also be used as recognition signs.
The best parole is the question, and the countersign,
the answer to the question. Both parole and the counter-
sign have predetermined words or phrases. These prede-
termined words can be the names of museums, movie
theaters, libraries, and monuments or the titles of movies,
books, newspapers, magazines, etc. Both the question and
answer must be short and simple in content and in pro-
nunciation. We know that it is difficult to pronounce
some English words. In this regard, additional difficulties
may confront our officers who have just arrived in the
country.
In arranging for a recognition meetuig and, above all,
for the recognition signs, parole, and countersign, the in-
telligence officer has sufficient opportunity to exhibit his
initiative, resourcefulness, and creativity, and to solve all
problems with originality and with due consideration to
local conditions.

Communication Through Cut-outs* and Live Drops

In individual cases it becomes necessary to resort to

cut-outsand live drops as a means of arranging communi-
cations.

4A "cut-out" is an agent or subordinate officer used as an in-

termediary between the officer and an agent, to make surveillance
more difficult.
140 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
I
In each agent operation, the case officer very carefully
hillv
trains a cut-out: he instructs and trains him, instills in
him the desired qualities, and monitors his fulfillment of
tasks. Even when communications are through a cut-out,
it is still necessary for the case officer to meet periodi-

cally with the agent to determine personally whether the

work is going properly and whether the tasks are con-
veyed to the agent. The officer must take an interest in
the relations between the cut-out and the agent in order
to influence the entire course of the work.
If the agent lives in another city, the cut-out must
have the opportunity of visiting that city. The following
people have this opportunity: service personnel of the
various types of passenger and freight transportation; rep-
resentatives and agents of trading and manufacturing
firms, insurance companies, and real-estate offices; cor-
respondents, etc.
The cut-out receives (from the agents) only such in-
formation as is required for his work. As a rule, the
names and addresses of the case officer and agent are
not given to the cut-out.
In commvmications via a live drop there is no personal
contact between the agent and the intelligence officer.
Operational materials from the agent to the case offi-
cer, and vice versa, are passed through a third person who
more often than not is the proprietor of a small private
business (bookstores, secondhand bookstores, antique
stores, drugstores, etc.).
Thecase officer visits the live drop to receive ma-
terialsonly after a special signal is given. The proprietor
of the live drop places the signal after receiving material
from the agent.

2. Impersonal Communications

Under the complex operating conditions existing in the

U.S.A., the primary type of agent communications is
impersonal. Experience has shown that this is the most
secure type of communication, because there is no direct
contact between agent and officer.
Impersonal communication is used to pass operational
materials, to assign tasks, and to pass material— technical
supplies —
to the rezidentura and individual agents.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 141

used between the Center and a rezidentura, as

It is

well as within a rezidentura.

The basic forms of impersonal communications are
radio communications, communications via dead drops,
communications via postal-telegraph systems, telephone,
press, and communications via signals.

Radio Communications with the Rezidentura

Ultrashortwave (UHF) radio sets are used for communi-

cations within a rezidentura. These sets greatly improve
the efl&ciency of agent communications. They have a
small operating radius. Nevertheless, while on the air,
accidental or intentional radio monitoring is possible;
and our intelligence service cannot afford to ignore this
consideration. The use of specially devised codes, ciphers,
signal system, and operating schedule makes the use of
this set completely secure. Radio can be used to call the
agent for an emergency meeting, to tell him when a dead
drop has been loaded or unloaded, to notify him about a
change in dead drops, etc. UHF
radio can also be used
within rezidenturas to assign tasks to an agent and to
receive intelligence information from an agent Radio
communications over UHF
must be short.
There are many different ways of using a portable
UHF set. Following are only some of the uses:

. . . when the intelligence officer and the agent are travel-

ing along different streets;

. . . when the intelligence officer and the agent are driving

in different parts of the city;

. . . when the intelligence officer is in the city and is trans-
mitting while on the move, and the agent is receiving in his
apartment;
. . . when the intelligence officer is on shore, and the agent
is in a boat.

To have communications via UHF, one must set up

a schedule for radio communications. This schedule pro-
vides for a location for each radio station, the precise
time to start radio communications (date, hour, and min-
ute), which radio station will begin transmitting first, and
other details.
142 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS

Dead drops
Dead-Drop Communications

are extensively used for

1
communication
within a rezidentura, as well as for conmiunications be-
tween the Center and Illegal rezidenturas, within agent
nets, or with individual agents.
The use of dead drops in conmiunications with agents
has several advantages over personal meetings. Some of
these advantages are:
. . dead-drop conmiunications are safer as there is no
.

direct contact between the officer and agent;

. . . they are more secure, because the agent need not
know the intelligence officer with whom he is in contact
via the dead drop;
... by using a dead drop it is unnecessary for the in-
telligence officer to have a good knowledge of the local
language;
. . when necessary, it is possible to replace or substitute—
.

one intelligence officer with another; SI

. . .there is the possibiUty of wide flexibility in time. ™"
The use of dead drops, however, is not without its draw-
backs. The dead drop is an intermediate link between the
officer and agent, and materials placed in a dead drop
are outside their control for a certain length of time.
Therefore we must reduce to a minimum the length of
time during which materials are located in a dead drop.
In practice, stationary, portable, and mobile dead drops
are used.
Stationary dead drops are selected or specially pre-
pared in parks and squares, in trees, in the ground, in
fences, in benches, in monuments, in public buildings, and
beyond populated places such as forests, fields, seashores,
riverbanks, etc.
In selecting and preparing a dead drop in a park, one
must bear in mind that a number of American parks (for
example, Central Park in New York) have many squirrels
which can destroy the dead drop (especially in hollow
trees) and carry off our material.
As a
rule, a dead drop is used only one time, after which
a different one is used. In the U.S.A., it is preferable to
adopt a system consisting of a series of dead drops for the
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 143

agent and a certain number for the case officer. One

should work out a schedule for using dead drops so that
the agent will know the dead drops to be used in January,
those to be used in February, etc. The schedule can be
prepared for a half year or for a full year, depending on
the number available.
The Use of portable dead drops is more worthy of con-
sideration because it is considerably easier to find places
for them.
We have no particular difficulty in finding places in
American cities which contain many discarded objects
(boxes, tubes, bottles, cans, match boxes, cigarette packs,
paper, and others). Often those objects lie around in plain
sight for long periods of time without arousing any in-
terest. Among such objects, which are of no use to any-
body, and which can be found in yards, in parks, etc.,
an intelligence officer may leave a similar object with
agent material concealed in it at a preselected place to
have it picked up later by another agent.
American household articles, medicines, and many other
articles are packaged in all kinds of boxes, cans, tubes,
cases, and made of cardboard, metal, and plastic. Hence
there is an extremely wide selection of packages which
can be used as portable dead drops.
Among the items which can be used as portable dead
drops and which can be prepared in advance are pieces
of wood, stone, brick, clay, cement, plastic, gypsum, and
others.
Wide use can be made of magnetic containers in New
York, which has many metallic structures. They can be
attached to anything metal.*^
In communication through a dead drop the agent re-
ceives his assignments in written form. These agent as-
signments must be encoded or enciphered. Also, the ma-
must be in a form suitable for passing through
terial itself
a dead drop. Therefore we must train the agent in the
use of ciphers, codes, the preparation of soft emulsion
film, microdot, and secret writing.
The technical knowledge of the average American is

5 Use of such devices was cited by U.S. authorities in the 1958

spy trial of the Soviet rezident Colonel Rudolf AbeL
144 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
rather high. In his everydaylife he makes wide use of
machines, equipment, and instruments. Therefore the
training of an American agent in operational technology
is all the easier.
Thetypes of signals and the places for posting them
in connection with dead-drop communications are the
same as those which were discussed in the [deleted] sec-
tion "Characteristics of Other Types of Meetings." Here
we need only to emphasize the particular importance
and convenience of radio in exchanging signals.
The intelligence officer in the U.S.A. who has initiative
and imagination will be able to use dead drops frequently
when organizing agent conmiunications.
One or two days prior to loading or unloading a dead
drop, the intelligence officer submits his plan for the
operation to the rezident and receives his approval.
Several hours before the operation (no later than one
and a half to two hours) the intelligence officer travels
to the city. He uses the time available for a thorough
check to determine whether or not he is under surveil-
lance. At the same time, he checks a prearranged place
for a danger signal if such arrangements have been made.
As a rule, the check for a danger signal is made in an
area other than the area where the dead drop is located.
Having determined that he is not under surveillance
and that there is no danger signal, the intelligence officer
goes to the dead drop. In the immediate vicinity of the
dead drop he must once more confirm that conditions are
right; then, without losing any time, go to the dead drop,
load (unload) it, and proceed on the prescribed course.
On his return trip the intelligence officer can place his
signal that the dead drop has been loaded (unloaded).

The Clandestine Use of the Posted and Telegraph Systems

The American postal and telegraph system is highly

developed.
The enormous stream of mail sent abroad, as well as
that sent inside the country, can be successfully used for
intelligence purposes both in peacetime and in war.
The posti and telegraph service is quite efficient, and
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 145

letters are rarely lost. Thus, we have favorable conditions

for using the postal and telegraph system in the interests
of intelligence in support of agent communications.
The postal and telegraph system is used to send con-
cealed intelligence messages. Intelligence messages must in
no way differ from an ordinary letter, either in super-
appearance or in their overt contents.
ficial

To make effective use of the postal and telegraph sys-

tem in agent communications, we must learn everything
concerning the writing and sending of letters and tele-
grams. All this is especially important for the Illegal in-
telligence officer.
In the U.S.A. the name of the addressee is written first

on the envelope, then the house address and name of the

•
street, and finally the city and state.
Most, business letters, and many personal letters as
well, are typewritten. Intelligence officers should also type
theu* operational letters in order to conceal the hand-
writing of the sender.
There is a standard form for business letters. Samples
of different letters can be found in the specially issued
brochures (letter-writing manual)
When making clandestine use of the postal and tele-
graph system to send operational messages, we must make
full use of ciphers, codes, secret writing, and other means
of concealing the message being sent.
Because there is competition among business firms
fierce
in the U.S.A., ita usual practice to send enciphered
is
messages addressed both to business enterprises and to
private individuals. This helps the work of our intelligence
officers in their use of the postal and telegraph system
for intelligence purposes.
To have effective agent communications via the postal
and telegraph system even in wartime, we must train the
agent in peacetime in the use of ciphers, codes, secret
writing, and microphotography, while providing him with
accommodation addresses. This is important also because
there will be a tightening of the censorship of the postal
and telegraph system in time of war.
There are different methods of organizing communi-
cations with a rezidentura, Rezidents receive correspon-
146 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
dence from agents either at their home address or at an
accommodation address. Correspondence to the agent can
be sent to his home address, to a hotel address, or to a
post-ofl&ce box rented by the agent.

Clandestine Use of the Telephone

The telephone is an integral part of the American way

of life. Many business and commercial affairs are trans-
acted by telephone. There are more than four million
telephones in New York alone. Besides private (personal)
and office telephones, there are also many public tele-
phones. Typical of American public telephones is that
they have their own numbers and can receive calls. This
can be used in agent communications. For example, on a
predetermined date and time the intelligence officer can
talk from a public telephone with an agent who goes to
another previously specified public telephone at a prear-
ranged time. It is preferable to select a telephone in a
sparsely populated area and to use it during working
hours when public telephones are not busy. In addition,
public telephones can also be used as a signaling means.
The most convenient telephones for an intelligence offi-
cer to use are those located in large department stores,
subway stations, and drugstores.
One can also call other cities from a public telephone.
To make such a call, one dials the operator by depositing
ten cents and then gives the city and telephone number
of the person being called. In such a case, an additional
sum is needed which the operator will indicate; therefore
the intelligence officer should have with him one to one
and a half dollars in change.
If the circumstances are favorable, it is possible to use
an agent's home or office telephone. In both cases the
officer must know the time and the days when the agent
is at home and at work, who might answer the phone,

what the agent usually discusses at that time, etc.

The U.S. counterintelligence service makes extensive
use of telephone tapping; therefore our intelligence offi-
cers under cover rarely use the telephone and when they
do, they do so covertly.
Telephone conversations must be short and well planned.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 147

Special phrases (designating an emergency meeting or

something else) must always be within the context of the
conversation.
Experience shows that individual agents not infrequently
forget the communications arrangements, resulting in a
break of the work routine. It is, therefore, advisable to
check periodically the agent's knowledge of individual
parts of the communications arrangements, including code
words and their meaning.
The following case can serve as an example. code A
phrase had been agreed upon to call an agent to a meeting
from another city. When the need arose, the intelligence
officer called the agent at work from
pubUc telephone.
a
The by his code name
intelligence officer identified himself
and then gave the code phrase, "My wife and I would like
to thank you very much for the gift you sent us for our
family vacation."
The bewildered agent asked, "Who? I? Sent a gift? What
gift?" The intelUgence officer realized that the agent had
forgotten the communications arrangements. He then calm-
ly repeated his name (code name), then asked, "Ap-
parently you didn't recognize me?" He repeated the code
phrase once more. This time the agent understood. He
shouted happily into the receiver, "Excuse me, my dear
friend, I didn't recognize you at first. I'm very glad that
you both were pleased with my modest gift." week A
later the agent appeared for the emergency meeting.
It is an American custom to spell out difficult words,
especially surnames. (In the U.S.A., the word is first spelled
and then, as in England, pronounced.) Our intelligence
officer, especially the Illegal intelligence officer, must be
able to spell out loud; he must be able to spell any word
quickly and unhesitatingly. This is perfected through train-
ing. One must prepare a telephone conversation very
carefully so that neither the context of the conversation
nor the speaker's accent arouses the suspicions of an
outsider.
If one plans to use a telephone when organizing agent
communications, he must give serious consideration to
the use of a cut-out telephone.
As a rule, a cut-out telephone is called from a public
148 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
telephone. Such conversations are m
code and should cor-
respond to the cut-out telephone owner's work so that
they will not vary in the least from the owner's daily
telephone conversations. Signals can be given over the
telephone (by voice or by rings). In transmitting signals
over the telephone, we must pay careful attention to the
time set for the signal; the time of day, code phrases, and
the number of rings should be changed frequently.
The case officer plans the arrangements for teleplione
conmiunications, as well as the code, taking into considera-
tion the agent's suggestions.

The Use of the Press and a Signaling System

The U.S.A. has up to two thousand daily newspapers

with a circulation of about fifty-seven million, and more
than seven thousand magazines. Both newspapers and mag-
azines give considerable space to advertisements and all
kinds of announcements. Newspaper companies receive
sizable profits from advertisements and announcements
and therefore accept them very readily.
For example, in 1958, readers paid a total of one to one
and a half billion dollars for newspapers, while represen-
tatives of financial and industrial circles paid out more
than three billion dollars for advertising. Thus, publishing
houses receive several times more in profits from adver-
tisements and announcements than they do from the sale
of newspapers.
Advertisements published in American newspapers dif-
fer greatly in content and in length. The most common
ones deal with the sale and rental of livmg quarters, the
sale of personal effects, employment opportunities, an-
nouncernents of weddings, divorces, births, and deaths, the
loss of valuables and pets, etc. Below are several samples
of advertisements which could be used in intelligence
work. [Following samples appear in English.]

POSITION WANTED

Housework — Mature Columbian maid speaking a lit-

tle Eng. will give considerable care to children or
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 149

invalid lady; do efficient general housework. $25-$30

per wk. Exeter 4-0482, 7-10 p.m.

DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT

Chauffeur, white — ^wanted. Age 35 married. 12 years

exp. Intelligent alert neat. Fordham 4-7457 before
noon.

PUBLIC NOTICES AND COMMERCIAL NOTICES

My wife, Jane Smith Doe, has left my bed and

board. I am no
longer responsible for her debts. John
Doe, 17 Leslie Lane, Dobbs Ferry, New York.

LOST AND FOUND

Briefcase left in taxi Wednesday afternoon Jan. 4th

traveling Idlewild Airport to 1506 Woodside Avenue,
New York. Reward Dunhill 4-0892, ext. 534.

CATS, DOGS AND BIRDS

Poodle tiny white. Lost in Queens, New Year's Day.

Answers to the name "Tiny." $250 reward. Humboldt
6-9016.

One can see from these examples that many advertise-

ments can be adapted quite easily to the transmittal of
information. Among the code words which can be used
are: the names or description of a lost article; a description
of the circumstances; the place and time it was lost;
the size of the reward for returning the valuable or pet;
etc.
Illegal rezidenturas have a greater opportunity to make
use of the press in arranging agent communications.
Rezidenturas under cover may use the press on a lesser
scale, primarily to transmit information or signals from
agent to intelligence officer. On the whole, the U.S.A.
presents favorable conditions for the use of the press for
intelligence work.
A sum of money is paid to place an advertisement or
150

these
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
some kind of announcement in the press. The
advertisements will contain a prearranged coded
of
I
text

secret message.
In arranging communications involving the use of the
press, it is necessary to specify the particular newspaper
or magazine in which the coded intelligence information
will appear, the approximate dates of publication, and the
form of the correspondence (advertisement, announce-
ment, etc.)
Coded announcements in the press can serve as a
means of communications not only within a rezidentura.
but also with the Center. In communicating with the
Center, the major newspapers which are sent abroad should
be used {The New York Times, New York Herald Tribune,
and others). Within a rezidentura, however, it is better
to use small local newspapers because there is less likeli-

hood of censorship over them and because it is simpler

to place announcements in them.
As a rule, signaling plays an auxiliary role in organiz-
ing communications. When using dead drops and when
holding personal meetings and recognition meetings, in-
telligence officers use signaling a great deal.
Signals should be varied as much as possible. We must
also make sure that the signals are natural and do not
attract the attention of an outsider. They must be suffi-
ciently legible and precise to preclude any misinterpreta-
tion.
Agents must exchange signals at a distance while in
sight of each other. Various objects may be used for this
(handkerchief, gloves, cigarettes), as well as a certain color
of clothing and other means.
Signals can also be given by specially constructed tech-
nical means. To transmit infrared signals not visible to
the eye, a pocket flashlight equipped with a special in-
frared light filter can be used. Infrared signals are re-
ceived with the binoculars "B-I-8," which have a special
"phosphorus" element for this purpose that changes in-
visible infrared rays into visible ones.
Signals may be transmitted by an announcement in the
local press or by postcard, letter, or telegram.
Lastly, sound signals can be sent by radio or telephone.
Thus, signals can be subdivided into graphic, object,
light, sound, and personal signals.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 151

Graphic signals are prearranged marks in the form of

geometric figures, lines, letters, ciphers, etc., written in
pencil, chalk, nail, or some other sharp object in a specific,
prearranged place.
Object signals are various small objects put in a specific,
prearranged place. The object itself may serve as a signal;
as can its position; or the object and its position together
may be a signal.
A thorough study of the specific features of the country
enables one to select the most natural signals. For example
one of our intelligence ofl&cers called an agent for an
introductory meeting by sending the newspaper Washing-
ton Daily News to his apartment. The intelligence officer
went to the city, made a careful check, and then called
the newspaper ofl&ce from a public telephone and asked
them to start delivery on the next day to the address
he gave them (the agent's address). A
week after delivery
started, the agent appeared at the prearranged meeting
place. Signals can also be made by sending the agent
books, magazines, or merchandise from self-service stores
(markets) where it is the practice to deliver these things
to the home.
A large variety of signals allows great diversification in
the use of signaJs and prevents patterns. Certain signals
(graphic and object) are used with dead drops; others
(light signals, and sound signals transmitted by phone or
radio) are used to call an agent for a meeting and to
warn of danger. The third group (signals given by radio
and signals given through the mails or press) issued for
communicating with the Center or with an agent living
in another city.
Thus, the selection of signals and the methods for their
transmission depend on the circumstances, the tasks, and
the operational siluation.

Nature of the Organization of Direct

Agent Communications between the Center and
Intelligence Organs in the U.S.A,

The U.S.A. is not only a great distance away from the

Soviet Union, but it is also located in another hemisphere.
This complicates the systematization of direct communi-
cations between the Center and the American rezidenturas.
152

This is
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
the principal characteristic influencing the organi-
zation of direct agent communications.
I
We must, however, maintain regular communications
between the Center and the rezidenturas in both peace
and war.
We have three types of direct communications between
the Center and rezidenturas: radio communications,
courier communications, and communications through the
use of the postal-telegraph system. A brief description o£
each type follows below.

Organization and Implementation of Agent

Communications in Peacetime

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

Radio communications provide the most rapid means

for transmitting orders and instructions from the Center
to rezidenturas and for sending reports from rezidenturas
to the Center.
Every Illegal rezidentura must train a radio operator
and then properly legalize him. It must also get in ad-
vance the latest radio equipment (from the Center) and
check its operation. This must be done even now, in
peacetime.
Because of our distance from the U.S.A., should the
need arise, we can set up radio relay stations which can
be located on ships, submarines, and aircraft. We also
must not exclude the possibility that in the not too dis-
tant future we can install a radio station on an earth
satellite.
For successful maintenance of radio communications
between the Center and rezidenturas, we must work con-
tinuously to improve high-speed radio equipment with
long operating ranges.
The broad introduction of radioelectronic equipment
and the large number of specialists in this field facilitate
our work of selecting, training, and legalizing radio op-
erators.
The Center can use our broadcasting stations to
transmit instructions to by coded signals.
rezidenturas
Such signals must be planned in advance and given to
rezidenturas.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 153

For communications from the Center to Illegal

rezidenturas widespread vise is made of one-way radio
communications sent by the Center by way of enciphered
radiograms, signals, and prearranged phrases.
The Illegal intelligence oflB.cer is given an operational
code and a schedule of one-way radio transmissions in
which are indicated the date, time, and frequencies of the
radio broadcasts.
The intelligence ofl&cermay acquire a radio receiver
locally with a shortwave band, to receive coded W/T
messages. Ownership of such a receiver by the intelli-
gence officer arouses no suspicion whatsoever in the
U.S.A. There is no registration of radio and television
sets in the U.S.A., nor is there a fee charged for their
use. The radio operator receives one-way radio broad-
casts from the Center in his own apartment
Radio-operating conditions in a country may change,
depending on internal conditions and international re-
lations. Therefore every intelligence officer must constant-
ly study these conditions carefully and promptiy report
any changes to the Center.

COURIER COMMUNICATIONS

The great progress in aircraft construction and ship-

building, and the expanded network of air and sea com-
munication routes between the U.S.A., and other countries
of the world, most of all between the U.S.A. and European
—
countries on which himdreds of thousands of passengers
and thousands of tons of freight are carried yearly, facili-
tate our organization of Illegal courier communications.
In organizing Illegal courier communications in peace-
time between the Center and rezidenturas in the U.S.A.,
great assistance can be furnished by the rezidenturas
under cover. The Center sends mail (currency, docu-
ments, operational equipment, etc.) to the rezidenturas
under cover by diplomatic pouch. The rezidenturas under
cover then transfer materials to Illegal rezidenturas
through the Center's dead drop. Any materials for the
Center from Illegal rezidenturas are recovered from dead
drops by operatives of the rezidenturas under cover and
are sent to the Center by diplomatic pouch. Such an
154 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
organization of communications, however, does not guar^
antee clandestinity and security. This is particularly
of the U.S.A., where our intelligence ofl&cers working
under cover in Soviet installations are kept under stric
surveillance by the counterintelligence service.
Therefore, even in peacetime we must organize ai
use Illegal courier communications which are capable ol
functioning efficiently in wartime.
The quick delivery of materials is vital. Therefore,
when organizing courier communications, it is advisablea'
to use the airlines between the U.S.A. and Europe.
The U.S.A. has air communications not only with the
NATO countries (Denmark, Norway, England, France,
Iceland, Italy, Turkey, the Benelux countries, Portugal,
S
West Germany) but also with the neutral countries (Swed-
en, Austria, Switzerland). This facilitates the selection of
itineraries for the Center's couriers.
The aircrews of the airlines know the operating con-
ditions at the airports They should be used as
well.
couriers —also ground crew personnel who can deliver ma-
terial from the U.S.A. to one of the countries of Europe
(and from Europe to the U.S.A.) with the help of mo-
bile dead drops in aircraft.
Steamship companies which maintain service between
the U.S.A. and Europe can also be used to conduct
courier communications between the Center and
rezidenturas in the U.S.A,

USE OF POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS

Commxmications with Illegal intelligence officers are

maintained through the use of the postal-telegraph sys-
tem. All postal correspondence is sent only to specific
addresses. Therefore the Illegal intelligence officer is pro-
vided with accommodation addresses (primary and al-
ternate) to which he writes letters intended for tiie Center.
While the Illegal intelligence officer does not have an
address, the Center can send letters to him addressed
to the hotel where he is planning to stay or where he had
stayed. After renting an apartment the Illegal officer is in
a position to receive correspondence at his place of resi-
dence. He must immediately send his address to the
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 155

Center, and he must do this in at least two or three

letters.
The mails can be used as a way to deliver graphic
and object signals. The following can denote signals:
sending a certain letter; the color and size of the en-
velope or paper; the cost or number of stamps; the nature
of the letter; the kind of salutation; the signature; etc.
The signal must look natural and not attract the at-
tention of postal employees or censors. This is important
because the letters containing signals go through the usual
postal channels.

Organization and Use of Agent Communications

in Wartime

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

In time of war, the main type of communication be-

tween the Center and individual Illegal intelligence officers
and rezidenturas can be two-way radio communications.
We must remember that in wartime the conditions for
maintenance of direct communications between the Center
and rezidenturas will be considerably more difficult. The
search for Illegal radio stations will be intensified; there
will be interruptions in the power supply; there will be
fewer opportunities to obtain radio spare parts locally;
and there wiU be less power.
To ensure reliable wartime communications during
peacetime we must provide for the following:
1) reserves of radio sets and parts (and providing for
reliable and long safekeeping)
2) storage batteries for radio sets;
3) selection of alternate apartments for radio operations;
4) timely evacuation of radio equipment from large in-
dustrial centers which could be hit by missile strikes;
5) supplying rezidenturas with radio operators in case the
latter are mobilized or given special assignments.
Modem agent radio communications, with high-speed
equipment and separate installations for two-way and one-
way com iTiuni cations, reduces to a minimum the operat-
ing time of an Dlegal radio station. At the same time,
this almost completely precludes its being located by
counterintelligence direction finding.
156 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
In wartime we must conduct
continuous monitoring for
individual radio-equipped agent nets, and rezi-
sources,
denturas on assigned frequencies for high-speed equip-
ment.

COURIER COMMUNICATIONS

In wartime. Illegal couriers cannot be replaced, be-

cause they are the only means that can be used to send
documents, materials, and technical means. Therefore their
organization calls for special preparation.
Experience has shown that in wartime the possibilities
for using civilian aviation and ocean liners for courier
purposes are reduced; fewer passengers travel to and
from Europe; customs inspections are stricter, and it is
much more difficult to provide cover stories for travel
abroad by a foreign courier (from Europe to the U.S.A.,
and return).
In the inspection of baggage the customs service in the
U.S.A. makes extensive use of the latest achievements in
science and technology. Not long ago, the chief of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Edgar Hoover, proposed
the use of X rays to screen baggage transported in air-
craft.«
For couriers between the Center and Illegal reziden-
turas in wartime, it better to use the crews of ships
is
and of civihan and military aircraft. We
should therefore
try to have agents on steamships (among ofl&cers, sea-
men, stevedores, cooks), on aircraft (among the crew
members), at airports, and in the offices of steamship
companies.
In the recruitment of agents preference should be given
to Americans because they are highly trusted both in the
U.S.A. and in the countries of Europe. It is much easier
for an American agent to deliver mail for the Center
from the U.S.A. to one of the West European countries
(neutral countries or an ally of the U.S. A.) and mail
to rezidenturas in the U.S.A.
We must not exclude the possibility of getting a courier
to the American mainland by submarine. It must be re-
membered, however, that the U.S.A.'s shore defenses are

^The New York Times, April 2, 1960.

 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 157

Stronger than those of other countries of the American

continent. Therefore one should not always attempt to
land an agent directly in the U.S.A. At times it is pos-
sible to send mail to a third country (for example, Mexico)
and then deliver it overland to the U.S.A. Mail sent
in this manner can be placed in the Center's dead drops.
To ensure stable courier conmiunications in wartime
we must provide in advance for the replacement of
couriers who might be called into service and select
individuals who for some reason (because of age or
health) will not be subject to military mobilization.

Use of the Postal and Telegraph Services

With the outbreak of hostilities, censorship will be

tightened and a number of restrictions may be adopted
in connection with postal and telegraph correspondence.
During World War II the U.S. censor checked practically
all correspondence going abroad, making broad use of
special chemical reagents to test for secret writing.
Without changing the over-all meaning, the censor is
permitted to alter the word order of telegrams and strike
out words or entire phrases in letters.
The purpose of all these measures is to hinder the
activities of foreign intelligence services. Neither the U.S.A.
nor any other country, however, has the censorship
capability to subject all postal and telegraph correspon-
dence to control.
In our opinion, business correspondence between Amer-
ican and foreign firms will continue in time of war.
Many American firms specialize in selling merchandise
imported from other countries. For example, some firms
sell British woolens in the U.S.A., others sell West Ger-

man radios, while still others sell S>wiss items, etc. Busi-
ness, therefore, compels these firms to maintain communi-
cations, including postal and telegraph, with their over-
seas suppliers.
Therefore accommodation addresses should be acquired
even in peacetime, based on American organizations and
enterprises which will maintain business correspondence
with foreign governments even in time of war. They can
then be effectively used during wartime.
158 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS

II. Handling an Agent Net

In this section we shall examine only some of

problems concerning agent handling; and specifically:
. . ensuring the completion of the principal intelligence
.

tasks;
. . . ensuring clandestinity of agent net operations;
. . . ensuring a state of readiness in an agent net;
. . . consolidating agents in intelligence nets.

1. Fulfillment of the Principal Intelligence Tasks

Definition of the Basic Intelligence Tasks and

Directing Agent Nets for Their Fulfillment

Intelligence tasks of strategic agent intelligence are de-

fined by the General Staff of the Soviet Army.
Under modem conditions, when
the U.S.A., as the
principal imperialist preparing to unleash a
power, is

surprise war with the mass employment of nuclear/ mis-

sile weapons, the basic tasks of strategic agent intelligence
are the early warning of U.S. preparations for an armed
attack against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries
and the report of this to Headquarters.
In view of the probable nature of a future war, an
important task is the systematic collection of the most
complete data on the following questions:
1 the locations of missile bases, depots for nuclear weap-
ons, plants producing atomic weapons and missiles of
various' designations, scientific research institutes, and lab-
oratories developing and perfecting weapons of mass de-
struction;
2) information as to the nature and results of scientific
research work in creating new models of nuclear and mis-
sileweapons and improving existing ones;
3) the status of antiaircraft defense, including the entire
radar detection and warning system;
4) the plans of U.S. military commanders on the use of
nuclear/ missile weapons;
5) U.S. military preparations in the various theaters of
operations.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 159

Strategic agent intelligence in the U.S.A. must learn

of preparations for a surprise attack against the U.S.S.R.
and other countries in the socialist camp and warn Mos-
cow of it. That is its primary task.
To assure the further strengthening of the defensive
power of the Soviet government, we depend to a large
extent on the successful fiulfillment of tasks levied on
the intelligence organs in the U.S.A.
During a crisis period, intelligence efforts must be di-
rected toward the prompt disclosure of the enemy's im-
mediate preparations for attack and the reporting of his
grouping of forces and means, primarily his means of
nuclear attack. The most important task of intelligence
is the prompt reporting of objectives in the U.S.A. against
which we plan to carry out the first strikes.

Assignment of Targets to Agent Nets

We must assign targets to agent nets in accordance

with the basic intelhgence tasks and the operational capa-
bilities of the agents. First of all, we must have agent
nets in those government installations possessing the most
complete, authentic information on matters of intelhgence
interest, primarily data on military planning. The follow-
ing organs of the supreme military command are in this
category:
National Security Council, Department of Defense, Armed
Forces Policy Co-ordinatmg Council, Jomt Chiefs of
Staff, Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy
and their staffs, and the Strategic Air Command.
It is vital to introduce agents in those targets where it
is possible to obtain data on the work of enterprises pro-

ducing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Such targets are:
1) Atomic Energy Commission (includes twelve depart-
ments and ten operations groups, co-ordinating the ma-
jority of atomic plants, laboratories, and testing stations);
2) Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee;
3) Specially-created Department for the Construction of
Atomic Installations;
4) Military Co-ordinating Committee of the Department of
Defense;
160 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
5) Bureau of Atomic Energy of the Department of th«
Navy.
The following centers for the production of nuclear fuel
are of great intelligence interest: Oak Ridge (Tennessee),
Hanford (Washington), Paducah (Kentucky), and others.
One of the largest centers for the production of atomic
weapons is Los Alamos (New Mexico).

2. Establishment of Clandestine Agent Net Operations;

Transfer of Agent Nets to Impersonal Types of Com^
munication

As has been mentioned, in the U.S.A., under conditions

of severe counterintelligence activity, impersonal forms
of conmiunications constitute the basic method of com-
munication, because they provide the greatest degree of
security and clandestinity in the conduct of clandestine
operations. The intelligence officer's task is to train his
agents properly and to transfer them to impersonal forms
of conununication promptly. Before converting an agent
to worldng through dead drops, as one of the forms of
impersonal communications, the intelligence officer must
train the agent in the use of dead drops and in the use
of signals.
Initially the agent will not trust the reliability of dead
drops and will be reluctant to place classified materials
in them. The agent can be convinced of the reliability
of dead drops gradually, for example, by first placing
money in it for him if he is being paid for his work. I
An example proves this point. For a long time Agent
S was work via dead drops. The intelligence
reluctant to
officer'sattempts to convince S of the security of working
via dead drops were completely unsuccessful. Then the
intelligence officer cleverly began placing money in the
dead drop for the agent. The first time S came to the
dead drop ahead of the case officer and watched hi m
place the money in it. As soon as the case officer had
gone a short distance from the dead drop, the agent ran
up to the dead drop and removed the money. The second
time, the agent removed the money more calmly. Gradually
he began to trust the dead drop as a form of clandestine
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 161

communication and was no longer afraid to place opera-

tional materials in it.

Transfer of an agent to impersonal communications

requires the case officer to be considerably more careful
than when maintaining communications. He
personal
must instruct the agent thoroughly in such matters as the
modus operandi of the counterintellipence service, ad-
herence to proper operational techniques in agent opera-
tions, etc.

Briefing of Agents and Indoctrinating

Them in Conspiracy

Conspiracy in agent operations is directly dependent on

the of the agent and on the skill and
indoctrination
efficiency with which the officer conducts his briefing. The
officer must brief the agent on specffic points, keeping
in mind the main objectives: to provide assistance, to
demonstrate how to fulfill his assigned task better and
more securely, to help correct mistakes he has committed
or eliminate shortcomings, and to teach him the qualities
required in clandestine operations and in intelligence. It
should be emphasized that the national characteristics of
American agents are such that they are often careless in
their operations and they make poor conspirators. They
therefore need extremely careful briefing.
A good case officer always attempts to be authoritative
in the agent's eyes. Precise, businesslike briefings are
very important in earning respect.
The agent should be briefed very carefully on how to
behave properly in front of his family, at work, and in
public. When necessary, the intelligence officer must brief
the agent on how smuggle material out of an installa-
to
tion, how to return it imdetected, and how to reproduce
the material at home or at work. It is very important
that the agent know how to develop a proper and plausible
cover story for his extra income and for his periodic
absences. Depending on his assignments, the agent is
given certain information on the work of the counterin-
telligence service. In briefing the agent on this subject, the
officer must not frighten the agent with any exaggerations.
The officer is forbidden to use special Soviet intelligence
 162 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS I
terminology in briefing his agents or to reveal intelligence
operating techniques.

3. Providing a State of Readiness in an Agent Net

Training of Agents and Agent Nets for Independent

Communications with the Center

It is obvious that the operating conditions of"

rezidentura will change in time of war. From previous
experience, the rezidentura under cover will stop opera-
tions as soon as official Soviet installations are closed.
Therefore one of the most important tasks of a rezidentura
under official cover during peacetime is to train agents^
aAd prepare agent nets to maintain independent commu-
nications with the Center for operation during wartime.
Such training is very complex and includes the following:
Training the agent to operate radio sets; providing him
with a radio set; setting up a reserve radio set in case the
agent's radio breaks down, and against this eventuality
securing an independent power supply; supplying reliable
and long-time safekeeping of all radio equipment; renting
safe apartments for operational radio communications;
carrying out trial runs of radio nets in peacetime in order
to keep radio operators in reserve and systematically to
check the combat readiness of the equipment.
Arranging special reserves of currency and articles of
value; establishing permanent recognition meetings in two
or three countries which will permit contact to be made
with the Center's couriers; acquiring accommodation ad-
dresses, and putting them to use promptly.
Training programs providing for independent communi-
cations with the Center must give both the individual
agent and principal agent detailed instructions on the
problems of organizing and conducting intelligence opera-
tions, but only to the degree necessary for them to carry
out the work specifically assigned to them. They are
made familiar with some of the operating procedures of
the counterintelligence service vis-a-vis intelligence targets.
During training the case officer devotes particular atten-
tion to making sure that they are thoroughly briefed and
indoctrinated.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 163

The Center makes the decision to transfer an agent or

an agent group to a status of independent communica-
cations. The intelligence officer handling the agent gives
the Center all information necessary to make such a
decision. Therefore it is the intelligence officer's responsi-
bility to know the agent and, above all, his operational
capabilities, his political orientation, and his feelings to-
ward the U.S.S.R. We
should note that some intelligence
officers try too hard to learn everything about an agent
in one meeting. This immediately puts the agent on his
guard. Studying an agent should involve a systematic,
planned, and gradual acquisition of information concern-
ing him. In view of the fact that individual agents re-
act very adversely to attempts by the intelligence officer
to learn specific pieces of information about them, the
officer must prepare very carefully for every meeting with
an agent
Finally, we need to have preliminary talks with every
agent scheduled to be assigned to an agent net to get his
agreement to continue working under the guidance of a
local person (principal agent).

Location of Agent Nets in

a Future War

In a future war, despite the irreconcilable contradic-

tions between the capitalist and sociahst countries, both
sides wiU pursue the same political and military objec-
tives.
To protect their socialist achievements the Soviet Union
and other coimtries in the socialist camp will be forced
to fight for the complete defeat of the enemy's armed
forces and the disorganization of his rear area. We an-
ticipate that in order to frustrate the plans of the U.S.A.,
if it should unleash a war, mass missile strikes will be

launched against the most important enemy objectives,

including the deep rear. We can assume that in a war
which will see the mass employment of the most modern
and destructive means of war, including nuclear missiles,
the borderline between front and rear disappears.
Under modem conditions, therefore, agent nets must
be located in new locations, with consideration given to the
164 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
nature of a future war. To save valuable agents in war-
time, we must disperse the agent net over the entire
country, preferably in small cities which do not represent
important targets for nuclear/ missile strikes. With the
advent of a crisis we must take steps for the prompt
movement of agents, if this has not been done earher,
away from targets for nuclear strikes. In view of these
new conditions rezidenturas and agent nets must be small.
In special cases, individual agents can be equipped with
radios for direct communications with the Center to re-
port on such targets as nuclear weapon depots and mis-
sile and other military bases.

4. Consolidation of Agents Nets

d
in Intelligence

Methods of Incentive and Coercion

One of the means of consolidating agents in an intelli-

gence net is the proper use of the measures of incentive

and coercion. The use of either measure depends on

the actions and deeds of the agent. Therefore the case
have a thorough knowl-
oflacer's first responsibility is to
edge of the agent, because only in this way can he prop-
erly assess the agent's work and skillfully take appro-
priate measures in order to control the agent. The in-
telligence officer who knows the national traits of Ameri-
cans should be able to establish rapport quickly with the
agent and positively influence him.
For example, knowing that Americans do not like dis-
cipline and are always demonstrating their independence,
the intelligence officer must refrain from resorting to
obvious pressure on the agent. One should not burden the
agent with decisions, but should skillfully encourage and
direct intelligent initiative on the part of the agent.
As we know, Americans are distinguished by their
efficiency and resourcefulness. Therefore the intelligence
officer must exhibit a high degree of precision and effi-
ciency in working with American agents, respond quickly
to their reports, and provide intelligent instructions and
orders.
Americans have a great love of money and a desire
for financial gain. This American trait can be exploited
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 165

by paying an agent for his work in order to increase his

personal interest in working for us. Payments must be
prompt and equitable. This disciplines the agent and im-
proves the case officer's authority.
As we know, all measures employed in influencing an
agent are divided into those which are moral and those
which are material. Material measures are primarily used
with agents recruited on a material and financial basis,
while moral measures are used with agents recruited on
an ideological basis.
A similar is made between incentive and
distinction
coercive measures.
Among the incentive measures are: praise of the agent's
work by the case officer, statements of appreciation to the
agent, gifts to the agent, and the transfer of more valuable
and deserving agents from piecework payment to a regu-
lar salary.
Among the coercive measures are: noting shortcomings
in the agent's work, reducing his salary, suspending his
salary for a definite period of time, using threats (employed
in extreme cases).

[Editor's Note: One page of text is missing here.

In the following passage, the lecturer continues his
discussion of American living conditions.]

We must bear in mind the standard of living in the

country and the agent's ability to provide a cover for
the receipt of additional funds. As we know, the standard
of living in the U.S.A. is quite high. A
qualified industrial
worker, for example, earns about four hundred dollars
a month, which is several times higher than workers earn
in European countries.
In our practice, agents are usually paid by the job,
money is paid for each specific piece of material and
according to its value. With this system of payment, an
agent quickly realizes the necessity for conscientious work.
A
system of payments by the month and by the job
also induces the agent to make the fullest use of his
operational capabilities. Under the system of material in-
ducement an agent who is working poorly can have his
monthly payments reduced or stopped. To encourage an
166 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
agent, monthly payments are increased or bonuses,
awards, or valuable gifts are given.
Thus, for example, Agent B, who was on a monthly
salary, reduced his production appreciably. His attendance
at meetings and visits to dead drops were irregular. Des-
pite rebukes by the intelligence oflacer, the agent's work
did not improve.
The intelligence officer decided that he would have
to use material inducement. With the Center's permis-
sion he began to pay the agent only for those months
during which the agent actually worked and performed
his operational activities. Soon B realized that further
backsliding would result only in the loss of all his extra
income. He began to perform his tasks more efficiently. As
a result regular communications with him were now pos-
sible.
Payments are used both as an additional inducement
to work and as a reinforcement of the ideological moti-
vation of an agent.

How to Use the Basic National Traits and the Customs,

Habits, and Way of Life of Americans in Agent Handling

In the U.S.A. people from various strata of society

have their own habits, customs, and standards which fre-
quently become unwritten laws.
The intelligence officer who knows all these character-
istics well have a greater understanding of the
will
American agent and his actions. This understanding is
vital for effective agent handling and indoctrination.
Realizing that the majority of Americans are open,
straightforward, and happy people with a great sense of
humor, the intelligence officer can prepare for and con-
duct a conversation with an agent that is not dull but
lively and witty. When preparing for a meeting he must
try to anticipate the agent's questions, prepare good an-
swers to them, and at the meeting to answer the agent
in such a manner that the agent will feel that the in-
is being frank with him.
telligence officer
During a meeting questions may arise which require
a decision by the rezident. The officer must know how to
evade such questions at the meeting without showing his
lack of authority in this.
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 167

A
proper regard for these American characteristics wiU
help the intelligence officer to win over the agent. As is
known, a frank conversation is the best way of learning
the agent's political orientation and his biography.
Americans, like other people, are patriots. They are
proud of their country's achievements; they honor their
national heroes, and value their cultural monuments.
Therefore the intelligence officer must be careful not to
indiscriminately criticize things American, but must re-
member that an unfortunate statement, for example, about
some popular U. S. President (George Washington, Abra-
ham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson) might offend the agent.
A negative result might also come from an officer's
imderrating American culture.
The officer can skillfully put to use such American
traits as efficiency, resourcefulness, boldness, and per-
severance. These will help the agent to carry out opera-
tional tasks and to exploit his operational capabilities fully.
Americans, to a larger degree than representatives of
many other peoples, have a natural love of freedom and
independence, and do not like discipline. The officer must
respect this characteristic and not resort to open pres-
sure on the agent. He must not assign tasks rudely but
must skillfully direct the agent's work and praise his
intelligent initiative. He must not order the agent around.
An officious tone of voice by the officer will just antago-
nize the agent
An officer, especially a beginner, who does not know
English well must be very careful of what he says and
not use such unfortunate expressions as, "I order," "You
must," etc. Such expressions usually evoke a negative reac-
tion.
As we have said before, Americans have a strong desire
to make extra money, to get rich. This characteristic can
and must be taken into consideration when carrying out
the task of consolidating agents in an agent net.
A
thorough understanding of the national characteristics
of Americans, as well as other traits, will help the con-
solidation of agents into agent nets, allow the fuller use
of their operational capabilities, permit their thorough
indoctrination, and increase the officer's authority.
168 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS

Conclusions

The basic principles of organizing agent communica-

tions and agent handling, which have been accumulated
and through many years of experience in Soviet
verified
strategic agent intelligence, may be applied to all rezi-
denturas regardless of the country, be it the U^.A. or
some other country.
Therefore, the characteristics of agent communications
and handling in the U.S.A., are governed not merely by
these principles but also by the proper and thorough re-
gard for the operating conditions in the country and by
the consideration of the national traits of Americans,
their way of life, their customs and habits. They are also
conditioned by the role played by the U.S.A. in ag-
gressive military blocs and by the country's geographic
location.
In this training material we have examined only some
of the characteristics which exist in the country at the
present time. We
must keep them constantly in mind in
working with agents.
It is necessary, however, to keep something else in
mind: each year sees many changes in people's lives. Old
buildings and entire city blocks disappear, to be replaced
by new buildings and parks. Libraries will be filled with
new books, new movies will appear, and people will ac-
quire new customs and different tastes. Technology will
develop rapidly. In the U.S.A., a highly industrialized
power, these changes will occur to a greater extent than
in other countries. Therefore the job of every officer is
to seek and consider all such changes which might exert
an influence on the organization of agent commimications
and handling.
The intelligence officer must be prepared to make in-
dependent decisions on operational matters during prac-
tical work. The degree to which he is able to consider
the characteristics country, a specific city, the
of the
American people, and of a specific person, an
finally,
agent, will determine the extent to which he learns and
acts properly and the extent to which he will be successful
in his handling of agents.
The difficult but very absorbing work of organizing
 THE PRIKHODKO LECTURE 169

agent communications and handling demands that the of-

ficer apply all his strength and energy to this task. He
must seek constantly new ways of finding solutions to
operational questions.
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER IV

The Mount Royal Hotel in London is a squat, unprepossess-

ing beehive commercial travelers and middle-priced
of
tourists, which occupies its own block on Oxford Street,
within sight of Marble Arch. Trafl&c around it is generally
busy and people rush in and out of its entrances with an
air of serious if transient purpose. At 11 p.m. on the
night of April 20, after a rather hectic bilingual din-
ner, a trimly dressed visitor, whose accented English
marked him as probably a foreign businessman, left his
own party, passed through the crowded lobby, and went
upstairs to an inconspicuous suite. There his knock was
answered by an Englishman of his acquaintance, who
quickly opened the door and let him in. There were four
other gentlemen in the room, two of them British and
two American. It was Oleg Penkovskiy's first encounter
with Western intelligence.
For hours he talked. He had first handed over two
packets of closely handwritten notes and documents, ma-
terials which he had been preparing for some time on
Soviet military missiles and other matters, by way of
showing his credentials. They were eagerly scanned. There
was understandably an air of intense interest in the room
as he went through the facts of his background and posi-
tion. For it must have been quickly apparent that Colonel
Penkovskiy represented a major intelligence breakthrough,
better even than his advance billing had suggested.
The meeting in the Mount Royal was the fruit of a
contact which Penkovskiy had established with a visit-
ing Englishman in Moscow, and sedulously cultivated.
170
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 171

Greville Wynne was a sort of commercial traveler on an

international scale, specializing in the import and export
of heavy industrial equipment between Soviet-bloc coun-
tries and the West.
In 1960 Wynne had organized the visit to Moscow of
a British trade delegation. He arrived there in December,
almost a week ahead of the delegation, and perforce spent
a great deal of time with Penkovskiy, who represented the
Soviet authorities in this matter, arranging the delega-
tion's meetings and itinerary. Penkovskiy had "studied"
Wynne. His earlier efforts to establish contact with US.
intelligence having failed —
intelligence agencies seem to
display either excessive boldness or excessive caution when
—
faced with the main chance Penkovskiy now saw the
opportunity to state his case to the British. As he said
later during his questioning at the Moscow trial: "Having
become acquainted with Mr. Wynne, I decided to try to
make contact with British intelligence through him, but
I did not do this at once. I wanted to study him first in
order to discuss this question at subsequent meetings."
In their talks during Wynne's December visit, he and
Penkovskiy had arranged for a Soviet delegation to fly to
London early in 1961, in order to visit various British
firms interested in Soviet trade. When the promised delega-
tion did not appear, Wynne went back to Moscow to find
out what was wrong. Again, Penkovskiy was the man he
had to see. By this time the two were on a first-name
basis. Penkovskiy —
quite unknown to Wynne —
seized the
opportunity of Wynne's second visit as his chance to make
contact with the West. This happened in the first week of
April 1961.
To the Soviet mind, anyone in Wynne's position would
have had to be some sort of intelligence agent. So to
Penkovskiy, who despite his exposure to foreigners in-
evitably retained the tactical outlook and limitations of a
Soviet educational product.
By this time Penkovskiy had made up his mind to go
over to the Western side. The uncertainties of his life
within the GRU must have been a catalyzing factor, given
the steady dissatisfaction which had been building up
within him over the dangerous "adventurism" of the So-
viet regime and the nostalgia he continued to feel for the
freer life of Westerners, even the bit he had glimpsed in
172 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
his year's service inTurkey. As he wrote later, in the
Papers: "Years ago I began to feel disgusted with myself,
not to mention with our *beloved' leaders and guides. I felt
before, as I feel now, that I must find some justification
for my existence which would give me inner satisfaction."
It is the voice of a man seeking new roots, of a soldier who
was looking for a new flag.
Not the least of the factors spurring Penkovskiy's searcl^
was the State Security's discovery of his father's identity
as a White officer. Twenty-three years of hard work and
initiative in the Soviet service were now clouded by an-
other man's decision, taken in 1918, to fight the Bolshevik
Revolution. Why, Penkovskiy might ask himself, had the
ubiquitous KGB not known of his father before this?
Why had the information suddenly been used as a club
over him? He had secretly been proud of his father's
memory, despite their difference of allegiance. More and
more, his own experience now suggested to him that
Vladimir Penkovskiy had made the right choice in 1918.
When Penkovskiy saw Wynne in his room at the Hotel
National in Moscow, he was able to assure Wynne that
the promised Soviet delegation was already selected. As
he had before, he talked a great deal about himself, in the
course of discussing plans for the delegation's visit. Wynne
was quick to detect a certain agitation in the behavior
of his Soviet contact. As they walked through the
official
Moscow from the danger of being overheard,
streets, safe
Penkovskiy's comments about the Soviet scene became less
circumspect. The Russian began to deride the official ex-
planations for Soviet economic shortages and he made
some fairly critical remarks about the regime. The life of
the ordinary Soviet citizen, Penkovskiy implied, was far
from a happy one.
Things came to a head when Wynne finally saw a list

of the Soviet delegates. He objected that the distinguished

delegates, principally professors and technical research ex-
perts, were people who had litde if anything to do with
commercial negotiations. They hardly constituted the bus-
inesslike trade delegation that his companies expected.
It was clear to Wynne that the Russians were interested
in obtaining information, not in purchasing goods.
Penkovskiy admitted that Wynne's objections were
sound. But he pleaded with Wynne to accept the delega-
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 173

tion, as constituted. "Please don't object to the delega-

tion, Grev," he said. "I must come to England. If you
make trouble, I cannot come. For if you do not accept this
delegation, there will be no chance of my going to London
at all — since I am
scheduled to lead these delegates."
With this, first time Penkovskiy told Wynne
for the
bluntly about his fears for the Russian people. The situa-
tion in the Soviet Union, he said, was intolerable and its

leadership dangerously unstable. He possessed certain

facts about Soviet conditions which he must convey to
"interested parties" in the West. Above all, he must talk
himself to people in the West, "to tell them what condi-
tions in the Soviet Union are really like."
Wynne was aware that the Soviet regime specialized in
having secret police provocateurs tell similar stories of
disenchantment with their own government, in the hope
of entrapping Western visitors. But he was a shrewd judge
of character. He had never met anyone quite like
Penkovskiy. Not only had he come to believe in the
man's sincerity, but he was able to appreciate the value
of a man like Penkovskiy to the Western intelligence
contacts whom Penkovskiy was obviously seeking. From
his extensive travels in Eastern Europe, Wynne knew the
conditions which Penkovskiy was endeavoring to describe.
He agreed, therefore, not to question the suitability of
the Soviet delegates to London, so that Penkovskiy might
have his chance to go there himself and tell his story to
the "interested parties" he sought. Before he left Moscow,
on April 12, 1961, Wynne had been given a double-
wrapped, double-sealed envelope containing a letter from
Penkovskiy addressed to British intelligence. Penkovskiy
gave Wynne the further information that he planned to
arrive in London, in about a week's time.
It was a sign of the GRU's trust in Penkovskiy, and his
value as an intelligence officer, that he was sent to Lon-
don, in charge of a delegation (with nothing more said in
the Arbat offices about his damaging ancestry). He was
shepherding a large group of Soviet technical and trade
experts, for the ostensible purpose of making contact with
British firms and discussing certain trade prospects and
technical exchanges. He did this in his official capacity
as deputy head of the foreign department, in the State
Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research
174 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Work. As a colonel in the GRU, his real mission was of
course an intelligence one: to conduct what industrial and
technical espionage he could, and if possible develop some
British contacts in the companies visited —
all the while
keeping an eye on the members of his own Soviet delega-
tion. The visit of the delegation had been arranged
through the oflSce of Anatoliy Pavlov, counselor of the
Soviet Embassy and the Conmiittee's representative in Lon-
—
don actually himself also a GRUcolonel and deputy
chief_ of GRU activities in the U.K. (If nothing else, both
the Soviet delegation and the British firms it visited en-
joyed more than their quota of security supervision.)
Penkovskiy's visit to London lasted until May 6. For
those sixteen days he led an extraordinary triple life. His
delegation from Moscow obediently respected him as a
trusted state and Party ofl&cial. Less obviously, he was
greeted by the GRU rezidency in London as a working
senior intelligence officer, with good political connections.
The brand-new third layer of his existence was happily un-
suspected by either of his two sets of Soviet colleagues.
He continued to hold night meetings with Western in-
telligence officers, after he had arranged the affairs of his
delegation during the day, and with them planned the
pattern of his future work in Moscow. Wynne continued
to be useful here, as an intermediary. Since he represented
some of the firms the Russians contemplated doing busi-
ness with, his presence was plausible.
Penkovskiy boldly ordered his official work to fit his
new intelligence mission. When he was hard put to ar-
—
range enough secret meetings ^because the delegation had
to visit a succession of British factories outside of London
— Penkovskiy asked the Soviet ambassador for permis-
sion to stay an extra four days. He wished, he said, to show
the delegation the British Industrial Fair then about to
open in London. Permission was granted, and Penkovskiy
was thus enabled to have two additional sessions with the
four Western intelligence officers, known to him only,
in the words of his 1963 Soviet trial, as "the British intel-
ligence officers named Grille and Miles and the representa-
tives of the American intelligence service, who called
themselves Alexander and Oslaf." For the sake of con-
venience and to avoid suspicion, they continued to meet
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 175

in the Mount Royal Hotel, where members of the visiting

delegation were housed.
Penkovskiy*s energy was prodigious. While continuing
to do his duty by the Soviet technical delegation, political-
ly and socially (Penkovskiy had charge of their money, in
the best Soviet tradition, so he supervised their shop-
ping trips in the London stores), he received an intensive
short course in intelligence communications. As he later
admitted at fiis 1963 trial, he was given a Minox miniature
camera and instructed in its use, as well as a transistor
radio receiver for keeping up one-way communications
with the West. It was arranged to maintain contact with
him through Wynne, or another Western emissary, if he
proved unable to return to Western Europe in the near
future. He drilled himself in radio procedures and all the
technical but vital minutiae of the spy in action. -

His Soviet trial soberly records: "The foreign intelligence

officers recommended to Penkovskiy that he keep this
spy equipment in a secret hiding place that was specially
equipped in his apartment. Alexander and Oslaf warned
Penkovskiy that Wynne would soon be arriving in Mos-
cow and would bring him a letter from them, but if
necessary, appropriate instructions would be trans-
mitted to him by radio.
"At the same time Penkovskiy . . . received the assign-
ment to photograph secret documents for the foreign in-
telligence services."
Penkovskiy asked in return that he be granted U.S.
or British citizenship and work commensurate with his
experience, in case events ever forced him to flee the
Soviet Union.
Having thus crossed his Rubicon, Penkovskiy returned
to Moscow, laden with presents for some of his high-
placed Soviet friends, a full report of the trade and
technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success),
and an unobtrusive Minox camera with a great quantity
of film.
The next entry in the Papers was written with new con-
fidence. It was begun, evidently, on May 16, just ten days
after Penkovskiy's return from London. In it he outlines
the real work of his Committee —as yet far from appreci-
ated by the West — and continues his rundown on Soviet
personalities and their problems.
176 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Penkovskiy's Committee was, and is, virtually a min-
istry in size and importance.^ It represents the greatest
I
national effort ever made for the systematic collection of
industrial, scientific, and technological intelligence.
The research and development of modem
activities
science and industry have swelled to vast proportions. In
the decade between 1953 and 1963, for example, the.
yearly bUl for industrial research and development in the
United States alone had jumped from $4.3 to $13 billion.
The Soviet Union, for all its sputniks, steel nulls, and
scientific remains far from the advanced in-
advances,
dustrial society which it would like to be (and generally
claims it is). And in their desperate rush to accelerate de-
velopment both in heavy industry and in consumer goods
areas, Soviet economic planners —
to put it charitably —
often lack the luxury of time to do their own research.
The State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scien-
tific Research Work, accordingly, works like a surrepti-
tiously operated clearinghouse for new developments in
virtually every area of modem industry and technology.
Few industrial countries escape its notice. A
Committee
directive to its agents in Canada, for example, asks for
information on everything from diagrams of Raytheon's
ultrasonic saws to the Ministry of Agriculture's plans for
exploiting subsurface peat deposits and drawings of an
"installation for the continuous production flow of mar-
garine" at Lever Brothers. Soviet trade missions, members
of the Academy of Sciences, and almost every delegation
sent overseas on technical business work under the Com-
mittee's aegis. Its key personnel are drawn equally from
the Soviet Academy of Sciences and those two scientifically
oriented organizations, the KGB and the GRU.
The Committee's activities are world-wide. Its represent-
ative in Germany will be praised for sending in informa-
tion about the production of semiconductor rectifiers by
the Siemens firm —
the techniques were immediately util-
ized by Moscow's "Dynamo" electrical equipment plant
in Kirov. The Committee's English representative proposes
a liaison plan for work with the huge British chemical
complex, ICI. Moscow takes it under consideration.
1 Typically, the Soviet leadership altered the Committee's organi-
zation slightly, after Penkovskiy's arrest, but its size, its functions,
and its personnel remaiued the same.
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 177

At the top of the Committee sits a fifteen-man presid-

ium, a sort of "scientists' soviet," as Penkovskiy called it.
Under its direction a large staff of highly trained experts
(447 in Penkovskiy's time) continually maps out targets,
assigns information-collecting duties to its men in the
field,then processes the results — to be distributed to So-
viet science and industry. Overt exchanges of technical in-
formation are part of the Committee's job its "re-—
ceivers" in foreign countries do nothing but collect tech-
nical books, pamphlets, and manuals; but where espionage
methods work more quickly, they are used. Hence the
heavy percentage of Committee employees who are co-
opted by the GRU and KGB, if not actually on their
staffs.
Other countries have their collections or exchanges of
technical information, butnowhere on such a methodical
and clandestine level. And the exchanges are apt to be
one way. As Penkovskiy writes: "In the Soviet Union we
were very careful to give our exchange visitors generally
worthless information. We show them only what they
know already."
Until Penkovskiy's disclosures very little was known
about the real scope of the Committee's activities, to say
nothing of its incorporation in the Soviet intelligence ef-
fort.
 CHAPTER IV

Penkovskiys Committee

During our sixteen-day period of work, a new Alliance

was created, an Alliance of friendship and struggle for
our common goal. I believe that this Alliance will be

eternal. GOD will help us in this great and important

work.

May 16, 1961.

Our Committee was formeriy called the Scientific-Tech-

nical Committee. In 1961 was completely reorganized
it

and was given its present name: State Committee for Co-
ordination of Scientific Research Work (GKKNR) of the
Council of Ministers U.S.S.R. Address: 11 Gorkiy Street,
Moscow. The number of employees was considerably
increased, the largest expansion taking place in the Di-
rectorate for Foreign Relations (in the past this was just
a section). This was done to improve the collection of
scientific and technical intelligence information from the
West by working with delegations from Western states,
as well as by sending our own delegations of scientific
specialists abroad and organizing various exhibitions in
foreign countries. Our Committee conducts this work joint-
ly with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the All-Union
Chamber of Commerce.
To make it easier for a foreign reader to understand
how scientific research work is "co-ordinated" in the
U.S.S.R., I have drawn an organizational chart of the
178
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 179

Committee which is enclosed with these notes.^ One can

see from this chart which are the questions in which
Soviet intelligence is most interested and how the entire
work is co-ordinated. The Committee, in short, is now
like a ministry. Its Chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the
privileges of a minister. !

All these directorates are subdivided into sections and

groups. The directorate for collaboration with Socialist
countries is specially organized into twelve joint conmiis-
sions: for Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hun-
gary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, China,
Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. This di-
rectorate has its own section for sending Soviet specialists
abroad to the countries of the so-called socialist camp
only.
In addition to the directorates and sections mentioned
above, there are many organizations and institutions under
the jurisdiction of the Committee, e.g., the Consortium
of Publishing Houses of Scientific Research Material
(ONTIZ); State Energy Publishing House (GOSENER-
GOIZDAT); the All-Union Institute of Scientific-Techni-
cal Information; other institutes of scientific-technical in-
formation; the Exhibition of the Achievements of the
National Economy of the U.S.S.R. Various libraries also
fall under the Committee's jurisdiction.
There are Committees for the Co-ordination of Scientif-
ic Research Work in each union republic. Thus, the Chair-
man of the Committee for Co-ordination in the R.S.F.S.R.
is Pavel Ivanovich Abroskin; in the Georgian S.S.R.,
G. Sh. Mikeladze; in the Moldavian S.S.R., Nikolay
Dmitriyevich Chernyavskiy.
Rudnev's appointment as Chairman of the Committee
was not an accident. His appointment throws even more
light upon the activities of our Committee, i.e., what
type of scientific research work we co-ordinate. Previously,
Rudnev worked for a long time in the Ministry of Arma-
ment; he was later Chairman of the State Committee
for Defense Technology. He is a member of the Central
Committee CPSU and at the same time is one of
Khrushchev's deputies in the Council of Ministers.
Therefore it is no surprise that Rudnev always em-

1 See Appendix L
180 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
phasizes collection of information and technical inventions
which are primarily suited for military use. Some of the
I
people in our Committee say that we are merely an
appendage of the Ministry of Defense and the State Com-
mittee for Defense Technology. I know this to be the
case, as do the other military intelligence officers at-
tached to the Committee; but the Committee's ordinary
engineers and scientists talk about it secretly, as if it
were some hidden discovery.
Rudnev's predecessor Khrunichev (now deceased) also
had worked almost exclusively in war industry prior to
becoming the Chairman of the Committee. At one time
he was Minister of the Aviation Industry.
I do not mean to convey that we work for military
purposes only. The Committee has many different sections
and directorates which work strictly in the field of the
national economy. The direction of all our so-called co-
ordination of scientific research work, however, is un-
doubtedly of a military nature.
This also makes it clear why there are so many GRU
and KGB Committee. I landed
intelligence officers in our
in the Committee as a result of Khrushchev's policy of
"peace." The Committee is used as a good cover to collect
espionage information abroad through our delegations, as
well as inside the U.S.S.R. by the friendly receptions and
"services" we render foreign delegations. Such friendly
contact and exchange we might better call "friendly de-
ceit." Often we officers of the GRU and KGB in the
Committee cannot understand how the foreigners believe
us. Do they not understand that we show them in the
U.S.S.R. only those things which are well known to every-
body and do not represent any technical improvements?
If there is something new under way at a plant being
shown to foreigners, we simply give orders to its director:
"Show them everything but have Shops
. . . 1 and 5 closed
for repairs." That is all; short and clear.
I have on my
desk a list called "Cities and Areas of
the U.S.S.R. Closed to Foreigners." This Hst is the basis
for our planning of receptions and trips for foreign dele-
gations in the U.S.S.R. For example: a delegation of
four Canadians received permission to visit Krivoy Rog.
There are some large plants there, but not too much work
is done for defense. For the sake of speed, they had
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 181

asked to be allowed to go there by air with a stop in

Dnepropetrovsk, which is very close to Krivoy Rog. This
request, however, was categorically refused. They had to
go by train, thus taking twenty-two hours before reaching
Krivoy Rog. For the Committee has categorical orders
not to allow any foreigners to visit the Dnepropetrovsk
area. The reason is that in Dnepropetrovsk there are many
metallurgical and defense production plants, including one
of our largest missile plants.
The city of Gorkiy is also closed to all foreigners,
including representatives of the satellite countries. Gorkiy
is closed because of its closeness to the city of Sormovo,
where all kinds of secret things are built, including sub-
marines. In addition to the large automobile plants in
Gorkiy, one of the largest aviation plants is also located
there.
I shallsay a few words about the Directorate of Foreign
Relations, in which I "work" under the cover title of
Deputy Chief of the Foreign Section. To make every fool
believe that I am a legitimate employee of the State
Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research
Work (GKKNR), I was issued an ID card No. 0460,
Registration No. 79. (We are still using the old ID ap-
plication blanks of the State Scientific-Technical Com-
mittee; their replacement by new ones is being prepared.)
A photostatic copy of the same is enclosed herewith, as
well as two "real" calling cards in Russian and English,
which I use as part of my cover when dealing with foreign
delegations and "exchanging" scientific information with
them. [See photographs.]
The Chief of our Foreign Directorate, Dzherman
Mikhaylovich Gvishiani, seemingly does not belong to any
intelligence service. However, if one recalls the fact that
Gvishiani's father was a distant relative of Stalin's and
a KGB general, one can assume that our Gvishiani is also
connected with the KGB. Unfortunately, I cannot be posi-
tive about it. Many of our KGB neighbors brag about
their true status, but Gvishiani is more careful about this.
Gvishiani is married to Kosygin's daughter. Many times
in discussions with his son-in-law, Kosygin openly criti-
cized Khrushchev and bluntly stated that Khrushchev was
completely messing up our industry and economy. One
day, when he was drunk, Gvishiani told me, "Oleg
182 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Vladimirovich, our day will come." Because of this even
Rudnev is rather afraid of him. He always greets him

with a handshake like an old friend.

Gvishiani has two deputies: Yevgeniy Ilich Levin, a
colonel in the KGB and the KGB rezident on the Com-
mittee, has been abroad many times on intelligence as-
signments. Viktor Nikolayevich Andrianov, lieutenant
colonel and the GRU rezident on the Committee, worked
as a GRU intelligence officer in Austria and Germany.
Andrianov often bragged to me about his good connec-
tions among the Americans in Austria, adding that he
even had intimate relations with an American woman
when his wife was in Moscow. There is talk that Andrianov
will go to Switzerland as a Soviet consul.
Valentina Ivanovna Chumakova, a KGB employee, is
Gvishiani's secretary.
Our directorate has several sections: j
Department for Relations with Foreign Countries. The i
Chief Boris Georgiyevich Lopatenko, who is also an
is

intelligence ofl&cer in the KGB. He works in close contact

with Levin.
The Deputy Chief is Denis Nikolayevich Polyakov, a
lieutenant colonel in the GRU. He works with me; we
share the same office. He served in India as First Sec-
retary of the Soviet Embassy. He was quite successful
and recruited several agents. He was ordered to leave
India within twenty-four hours when it was discovered
that his wifehad had intimate relations with one of the
embassy employees. Twice in 1960 and again in 1961,
Polyakov went to the U.S.A. with Soviet delegations to
carry out intelligence assignments. Early in 1962 he went
on temporary duty to Cuba to tram deep-cover Illegal
agents for work in the U.S. and Latin American countries.
His comments about the Cuban people were, to say the
least, uncomplimentary; he called them "stupid half-breeds,
dirty and uneducated." He complained about not being
able to find a single decent woman with whom to have a
pleasant time. Polyakov is an artillery-man by profession;
he is a graduate of the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Military
Academy, and in 1953 he finished the Military Diplo-
matic Academy.
In the Committee, Polyakov, using the cover of Deputy
Chief of the section, is actually the Chief of the Ameri-
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 183

can Desk and sometimes substitutes for Andrianov as

the GRU rezident.

GRU as well as KGB intelligence officers occupy all

the key positions foreign relations sections of those

in
Soviet ministries which contain them. They conduct in-
telligence work among foreign delegations, tourists, etc.,
visiting the U.S.S.R. Our section of the GRU
which
operates in Moscow under the cover of foreign relations
sections of the GKKNRhas in it about eighty or ninety
senior officers from strategic intelligence.
The question of how many GRU and KGB
intelli-

gence officers should be assigned to what organization,

for example, to our Committee, is decided joindy by repre-
sentatives of the GRU, the KGB, and the Central Com-
mittee CPSU. Each representative has to explain why he
needs the number of officers requested and for which par-
ticular assignments. The final decision is made by the
Central Committee CPSU through its Administrative Sec-
tion. Itshould be mentioned, speaking of our Committee,
that a special top-secret decree of the Central Commit-
tee CPSU and the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R. was
issued plainly stating that "the State Committee for the
Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work of the Council
of Ministers U.S.S.R. is to have within its ranks twenty-
five to thirty men from the Chief Intelligence Directorate
(GRU) of the General Staff." That is how closely Khrush-
chev and the Central Committee direct Soviet intelli-
gence work and manipulate our "covers."
The Committee and the Council of Ministers pay us
our salaries in accordance with the positions occupied by
us in the Committee, but the financial details are handled
jointly by the finance section chiefs of the GRU
and
the Committee. The money we spend in conjunction with
our work on the Committee is reimbursed from the funds
of the GRU or the Ministry of Defense.
A decree similar to the one regulating the number of
GRU intelligence officers in the Committee exists also in
regard to the number of KGB officers in the Committee.
I do not know the exact number, but as usual there are
more of them than of our officers. The KGB has many
more co-opted civilian specialists who have signed an agree-
ment to work as KGB informants. They are especially
 184 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
useful in technical and scientific situations, such as
have at the Committee.
4
Our
existence as intelligence officers in the Committee
—KGB or GRU—
is known only to the Chairman of

the Committee and his deputy, in my particular case

to the Chief of the Directorate for Foreign Relations,
Gvishiani. The others can only guess. Those working in
the Committee, however, often notice that we are busy
doing some other kind of work. For example, I am absent
from the Committee quite often. Sometimes I say that I
have to go to the post office or to the bank; sometimes
I use some other excuse for leaving the office. But people
are not fools. They come to know that some other ac-
tivity besides routine work is being done. The nonintelli-
gence employees notice that none of us is ever punished
for long absences or even given warnings. They naturally
surmise that we are carrying out some other type of work.
After a visiting Soviet delegation has been formed and
each of its members has been given permission to go
abroad by the Central Committee CPSU, we select cer-
tain scientists, engineers, or any other suitable members
of the delegation, summon them to the GRU, and in-
struct them individually on the type of information we
need and what they should direct their attention to while
abroad. Such co-optees sign a special document stating
that they must not make known their connection with
the GRU. Divulging any connection with the GRU
is a
—
punishable offense this is stated in the document.
Co-opted speciaUsts are very useful (especially when a
delegation does not have enough regular GRU
officers
assigned to it). They are given extra money while abroad
and upon their return they get some kind of a bonus,
say 1000 or 500 rubles, an expression of gratitude. We
tell a successful co-optee: "You do good work. If there is

a war, we will take you into the Army and give you
senior officer's rank."
Aside from this basic type of work in the Committee,
we have a direct order to screen the civilian personnel for
young specialists, engineers, scientists, etc., whom we
could recommend for assignment to the Illegals Director-
ate under Bekrenev. When such a specialist is spotted,
his name is submitted to Bekrenev. After the proper in-
 '.
PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 185

vestigation, the person is given specific training and be-

comes an Illegal.
Our main task as GRU
intelligence officers in the Com-
mittee is recruitment of agents among the foreigners visit-
ing the U.S.S.R. Of course, it does not often happen
that a foreigner is recruited. We also collect information
through personal contacts and conversations, by eaves-
dropping, by stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets,
examining baggage, etc.
To maintain our cover effectively, we are well docu-
mented and well versed in technical matters. Naturally
we wear civilian clothes.
Thus while I am a colonel on active duty in the GRU
(as my real identity card states) here in the Committee
and am merely
as far as our "neighbors" are concerned, I
a "colonel in the reserve."
The reception of each foreign delegation in Moscow
requires very careful preparations on our part. We pre-
pare quarterly, monthly, and daily plans in which our
experts describe in minute detail how the members of
the delegation should be treated and cultivated.
The operations of GRU
officers serving abroad as mem-
bers of delegations of Soviet scientists and specialists are
covered by another separate plan. There is a separate set
of operating instructions covering the work done with
Soviet delegations going abroad, e.g., co-opting their mem-
bers to carry out various intelligence tasks, organizing co-
optee nets, selecting candidates for Illegal work.^
E^ch Soviet specialist who goes abroad has to submit
a detailed report of his trip, and if this report contains
nothing valuable, he is reprimanded, criticized, and, as a
rule, is never sent abroad again. When some valuable in-
formation is obtained by a member of a delegation, it is
immediately reported to the GRU
rezident or sometimes
to the ambassador himself, and the material is immediately
dispatched to Moscow either by diplomatic pouch or by
cable.
All Soviet delegations traveling abroad are
members of
carefully as to what types of conversations
instructed
they should engage in and how to answer various ques-

2 A photostatic copy of one of these plans, covering the third

and fourth quarters of 1962, appears in Appendix XL
186 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
tions. I can say in all honesty that there is nothing
that the Western scientists and specialists could learn J

the Soviet specialists; neither will they get any valuable

information when visiting Soviet exhibitions abroad. Thi
for example, the exhibits prior to being shipped to tl
London Exhibition of 1961 were carefully checked bj
KGB technical specialists to make sure that there wj
nothing new which the foreign scientists could see
steal. Some exhibits in fact, are purposely put together ii
a distorted form, e.g., the cone of the sputnik on exhibit
was not built that way, the spheres were of another type.
This was done to confuse the viewer, technically speaking,
while making a strong impression in a propaganda way.
Almost all the exhibits in London connected with the
sputnik were experimental or distorted. They did not rep-
resent the real sputnik that was launched by the Soviet
Union.
As a rule, Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians
who work directly in the production of missiles and missile
armament are not allowed to go abroad. But lately, be-
cause these scientists must know something •about U.S.
missiles and about those of other countries, they have
been given permission to travel abroad, provided they
have not participated in any production work connected
with the Soviet missile program for the past two years
— and, of course, only if they have been carefully checked.
The Central Committee CPSU exercises extreme caution
in this matter. It is very careful about letting these people
go abroad. These people are high-ranking scientific, and
specialist personnel of the Central Committee CPSU. The
two-year waiting period was established because it was
figured that during the two years the techniques would
advance to the point where what was known to these
people two years before would have lost its importance.
Therefore, if they defected to the West, they would not
be able to talk about these techniques in such detail as'
they could have done two years earlier; and they would
not know about the latest innovations.

The Western countries, specifically the United States,

Great Britain, France, and Canada, must maintain maxi-
mum vigilance in conducting the exchange of scientific
research delegations and various exhibits. They should in-
 PENKOVSKiY'S COMMITTEE 187

troduce the same kind of strict procedure and control

that is used in the U.S.S.R. The way things stand now,
when visiting the U.S., Canada, or any European country,
we travel freely around these countries, see everything
we wish to see, and steal all the secrets needed by us.
But when foreign delegations visit the U.S.S.R., they en-
counter all sorts of restrictions and are sent only to those

places where we want them to go. What do we let them

see? Only that which is of no value. When foreigners
express a desire to see something that is new and really
valuable in regard to science, we find all sorts of excuses
to refuse their requests. On my desk I have a list of
pretexts and alternate proposals which we use to keep
foreigners out of certain areas of the UJS.S.R.
1. The plant is under repair.

2. A bridge is closed.
3. There no airport, and the railroad tracks have
is

been damaged by recent frost; therefore, temporarily, there

are no trains running.
4. The weather is unfavorable at the particular time
of the year (rains, snowstorms, etc.).
5. The local hotel is not ready for guests.
6. There has been a case of plague in the area; there-
fore it isinadvisable to go there.
7. All hotels are completely filled with tourists, etc.
There are also cases when we take a delegation through
museums and parks in Moscow until its members are
so tired that they themselves call off the trip to a plant
or a factory, preferring to go to their hotel to rest. Or,
instead of taking the delegation by plane, we put it on a
train. As a has enough time to see
result, the delegation
only one or two installations in which they are interested
instead of five or six that they could have visited had
they made the trip by plane. Their visas expire, and
they have to leave after having seen nothing but vodka
and caviar.
As the co-ordinating organization in these matters, our
Committee maintains close contact with the Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.S.R., the State Committee for Eco-
nomic Relations with Foreign Countries, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, the All-Union Chamber of Commerce,
and with many other organizations. All of them have
188 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
within their ranks dozens of both GRU and KGB of-
ficers.
When I began my work in the Committee, I myself was
not just surprised but simply astounded by the number of
GRU and KGB officers working in the Committee. When
one walks along the hall, one can see many saluting each
other in the military manner. They have conspicuous diffi-
culty getting away from their military habits and getting
used to their civihan clothes. —
Almost daily GRU officers are documented through oifl
Committee, on their way abroad either as members oP
delegations or as tourists. It is very seldom that there is
not at least one representative of the GRU
Strategic Ii^
telligence. If a delegation is small, let us say, two o^
three people, and it is difficult to insert a GRU officer
into it, a co-optee is sent. If there is not one available

they will make one in one day. Summon a man to

General Staff, talk to him for a while, get his signature LireH
and that is all. When a small delegation does not have
among its members a GRU
officer, there must be a KGB
officer or a KGB co-optee in it. No delegation ever goes
abroad without some form of KGB
involvement. Not only
is the KGB distrustful of the regular members of a dele-
gation, but does not even trust us
it GRU
officers either.
KGB with delegations even when it is hard
officers travel
to believe that there could be any intelligence officers in
the delegation.
In October 1961, a Soviet delegation went to Paris to
attend a conference of the International Oceanographic
Commission. Among its members, by the decision of the^
Central Committee of the CPSU, were two officers of the"
GRU naval intelligence, Rear Admiral Chekurov and Cap-
tain Ryzhkov.
In November 1961, two senior GRU officers who
worked with me in the Committee left for Cuba, Colonel
Meshcheryakov and Lieutenant Colonel N. K. Khlebnikov.
In Cuba they will work as intelligence consultants in the
Castro government, naturally against the U.S. and the
Latin American countries. Khlebnikov was replaced in the
Committee by Captain Boris Mikhaylovich PoUkarpov.

Now a few words about misinformation. We have been

given a special directive from the GRU leadership to
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 189

Spread, through our scientists, all sorts of provocative

rumors and misinformation among foreign scientists and
businessmen. This is done in the following way: Soviet
scientists and engineers spread rumors among foreigners
about various types of scientific work or construction
work or about other major on which Soviet scien-
projects
tists are allegedly working at the present time, whereas

in reality they are not even considering work on such

projects. This makes the foreign scientists and their gov-
ernments work seriously on expensive projects which are
not of practical use, and they spend enormous sums of
money on this. Sometimes it works the other way. The
West builds or conducts costly scientific research work
in some scientific or technical field while the Soviets just
sit and wait and collect information on this work. Then,

as soon as the West has basically finished the work on

this projector problem, our scientists, having collected all
the information, start working on the same project or
problem, which costs them much less because all the pre-
liminary scientific research work has been done by the
West.
There are also many other ways this is done.

Back to my own specific role in all this. The GRU

has assigned me to make a study of the members of
British delegations visiting the Soviet Union. My job is

to establish friendlier relations with these men, assess

their intelligence possibiHties, and establish the fact that
they are of definite value to our intelligence service. Then
I will write a detailed report on them to our rezident
in London. After that, their processing will begin. Pos-
sibly the rezident will assign one of the intelligence of-
ficers, for example, either Shapovalov or Pavlov, to the
case. I will then introduce the subjects to them, after
which it will be up to the London rezidentura to work
on their possible recruitment. It all depends on how they
react. The basic material to be used in the recruitment
operation is the collection of possible compromising in-
formation on these men, e.g., problems- in their family
life, gambling, personal finances, amorous adventures, the

financial position of their companies.

My other task is to obtain as much scientific informa-
tion as possible of some definite value for our industry.
190 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
For example, when one British scientist visited us in Mos-
cow, he gave me an unclassified brochure on how to get
fresh water from sea water. Our specialists were very in-
terested in this brochure. Using the methods by which
we now get fresh water from sea water in the U.S.S.R.,
one cubic meter of water costs six rubles [old rubles];
using the method which was described in the brochure,
it would cost ninety-seven kopecks. I received a com-
mendation for obtaining this brochure. Thanks to visits
to our country by foreign delegations, we obtain a vast
quantity of such very valuable information on the basis
of which new and improved methods are adopted by agri-
culture and industry in the U.S.S.R.
I often substitute for Andrianov, our GRU rezident
in the Committee, who has twice gone on missions to
Germany on Serov's orders; and then I formulate opera-
tional plans for our GRU officers and co-optees myself.
I am permanently responsible for seven of our GRU of-
ficers assigned to the Committee.

Trips of Soviet delegations to foreign countries require

careful preparation.The departure of each delegation re-
quires a separate decree of the Central Committee
CPSU. Take my second trip to London in July-August
1961. The decision of the Central Committee to send our
delegation to London took place on July 1, and on July 4
the order was issued by the Chairman of the Committee
to select and send forty-five Soviet specialists to the Soviet
Industrial Exhibition in London. I was appointed leader
of the delegation, inasmuch as I had already been in
London once before, and at that time I had established
some connections and made acquaintances with certain
people.
I selected mostly people who already had their exit
documents ready in the Central Committee CPSU. There
was not enough time to provide new people with the
necessary credentials. Among the forty members of the
delegation were three employees of the Central Committee
and two Central Committee analysts. At the same time,
ten GRU military officers left for London in the guise
of members of the delegation or tourists. Representing
the interests of our Conmiittee were three other GRU
colonels besides myself: I. Ya. Petrov, A. P. Shchepotin,
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 191

and V. F. Tebenko. Besides their special technical assign-

ments, they were also carrying out several intelligence
tasks: selecting dead drops in London, checking the exist-
ing ones, arranging locations for meetings with the agent
network, etc. During our stay in London, we maintained
constant contact with the GRU
rezident in London, Lev
Sergeyevich Tolokonnikov.
In order to demonstrate more clearly the way we work,
I am enclosing several reports concerning my trip to Lon-
don. For instance:

1. In traveling from London to Sheffield (High-

way A-1), I observed for the second time in the
southern outskirts of the city of Stamford a mili-
tary airfield, on which were based planes of the
British Air Force, and to the north of this same city
a launch site for the antiaircraft system. I had the
opportunity to study more carefully the indicated ob-
jectives, their location, their co-ordinates, etc. I made
additional sketches of the indicated objects, the de-
scription of which I have included as a separate ref-
erence. . .

This is the sort of "scientific" reporting which our Com-

mittee favors.
Upon completion of my London duty, to satisfy the
ego of my Chief, Gvishiani, A. Pavlov, the deputy rezident
in London, wrote him a personal letter thanking him and
wishing him further successes. It was, so to speak, a routine
form letter to the civilian chief in Moscow from an "or-
dinary" counselor at the embassy to London. All the re-
ports covering our trip were sent to Serov in the GRU
and from him to the various GRU
directorates and sec-
tions. The samples of my own reports indicate the kind
of work in which I and other members of the delegation
were engaged. I did not accomplish more because, in the
first place, I did not want to. In any case, I would not

have had the time, being the leader of the delegation.

Another of my tasks while in London was to make new
acquaintances among the employees of the companies
which our delegation visited, then report on them to the
rezident in London and later in Moscow. If the London
rezident decided that some of my new acquaintances were
192 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
of interest to us, my job was to have them meet one of
the members of our rezidentura prior to my departure for
Moscow. Each GRU officer assigned to the delegation was
obliged also to study the methods used by British coun-
terintelligence against members of the delegation, e.g.,
what kind of provocative questions the British ask; what
kind of anti-Soviet discussions they try to conduct.
Shortly before my departure for London all Soviet em-
bassies and in particular all GRU
and KGB
rezidenturas
abroad received a circular letter from the Central Com-
mittee CPSU. The letter enumerated 150 different targets
or designations in the United States against which intel-
—
Hgence work should be directed military, industrial, ag-
ricultural. Where it is impossible to obtain certain infor-
mation directly in America, the letter directs the reziden-
turas elsewhere to obtain this information through third
countries.
A similar list was also given to the Canadian Desk, with
thirty different targets for its intelligence work against
Canada. These even such a marginal
thirty targets include
military secret as the manufacture of artificial fur. But
this was important to us. Our specialists still do not know
how to manufacture artificial fur with cloth backing. Such
fur is manufactured in a very simple manner in Canada
and in America, yet our scientific research institutes still
have not been able to solve this problem. It is manufac-
tured by two companies in the U.S. and one in Canada.
One of them offered to sell us the machine. Of course,
Moscow has no intention of buying it, but by studying
its operations, they propose to learn the entire manufac-
turing process. Then, if possible, they will build this same
machine in the U.S.S.R. at a much lower cost. The most
important task of the delegation is to steal the secret
formula of the glue by which the fur is glued on the
cloth. We consider Canada to represent the synthesis of
the high scientific-technical ideas of the Americans and
the British. It is relatively difficult to steal secrets in the
U.S. and Britain, but in Canada, in some cases, it is
easier to get technical data. Also, it is much easier to get
entry visas to Canada for various Soviet delegations. I
cite this example to show the thoroughness of our Soviet
technical intelligence operations.
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 193

When someone goes abroad, everybody wants him to

buy some presents or just some things a person needs
which are impossible to get in Moscow. But it is impos-
sible to fulfill all the requests. Usually one makes up a
long list of things to be purchased. Sometimes one cannot
bring everything requested of him because of a shortage
of foreign currency on hand or too much baggage. Never-
theless I always tried to satisfy everyone to the best of
my ability.
Shortly before my departure for London as leader of a
delegation, I was summoned by Serov. During the con-
versation which lasted a few minutes Serov informed me
that his wife and his daughter were also flying to London
as tourists. He asked me to look after them and render
them any assistance they might need while in England. I
told the general that I would do anything in my power
to help his family while they were in London.
The next day at the airport Serov introduced me to his
wife and his daughter and wished us a good trip. I was
very surprised to see how Serov kissed his wife and his
daughter good-by with genuine affection. Somehow I
found hard to believe that this cold, hard-boiled man
it

with bloodstained hands could show such warmth toward

those near to him.
When we arrived in London, nobody was there to meet
us. Something apparently happened to the embassy auto-
mobile (although Serov had sent a telegram beforehand to
the rezident in London). Finally the car arrived, and I
took the Serovs to their hotel, promising to meet them the
next day. During the next few days I showed them Lon-
don. I took them shopping and escorted them to restau-
rants in the evening. They treated me very nicely, kept
addressing me in the familiar form, and thanked me for
everything.
Serov's daughter Svetlana is finishing the Mikoyan Avia-
tion Institute in Moscow, where she is studying aircraft
electricalinstruments and equipment. She invited me to
dance rock-'n'-roll in a London night club. One evening I
hired a car and took them to several night clubs, includ-
ing the Piccadilly. However, we did not do any dancing
because we were afraid that we would attract too much at-
tention. Both of them were extremely pleased by these
outings in London. Serov's wife invited me to visit them
194 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
at their country house near Moscow, saying that they
fresh strawberries there all year round and also had their
II
own apiary. (Serov suffers from rheumatism, and he let
himself be stung by the bees, which is supposedly an ol
Russian treatment.) I also visited my new acquaintances'
several times at their hotel. I treated them to candy,
fruit, and wme. They were very grateful. They would not
have had the courage to go sight-seeing around London
all by themselves. Had the English press known about
their presence in London, there would have been mu<'
publicity.
While in the Serovs had some trouble wit
London
money. I they did not have enough pounds. Aj
felt that
parently they had spent most of their travel allowanc
shopping. I offered them my assistance and twice loam
them twenty to thirty pounds. At first Mrs. Serov refuse
to accept themoney, but finally she agreed, saying tl
her husband would settle up with me upon my return to'
Moscow.
Mrs. Serov wanted to buy a swing for her grandchil-
dren, but when she found out that both the price and the
weight were high, she gave up the idea and asked me to
get drawings of this swing so that her husband could have
it made at one of the factories in Moscow. Knowing that
they were to return by ship, I insisted that I would buy
the swing for them, but Mrs. Serov asked me to buy
something else for her husband; she suggested an electric
razor.
I myself had no extra money left, especially pounds,
be-
cause I had been issued only enough to cover my oflacial
expenses for my trip. It is interesting to note that all the
presents bought by me for Serov and his family were pur-
chased with money I had taken from our rezident in Lon-
<jon —a handy use of the state treasury. Serov's family]
left London on board a Soviet ship. There were no inci-
dents, and I was very happy.
After returning to Moscow I visited the Serovs several;
times. They on Granovskiy Street, house no. 3, second
live
entrance, apt. 71, and also have a fine country house
near Moscow. They gave me a party including supper and
drinks. I gave Serov the electric razor and several records
by Leshchenko and Vertinskiy, two very popular Russian^
emigre singers of Russian gypsy songs and ballac*"
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 195

These are Union, almost impos-

real rarities in the Soviet
sible to find. Later, when Svetlana and I met alone, she
told me that her father was very pleased and played the
Leshchenko and Vertinskiy records almost every night.
Here are the survivals of capitalism in the minds of the
Soviet people —
razors and records from London, per-
fumes and eau de cologne from Paris. No, these traces wiU
never be stamped out. After all, if they are so strong on
the top level, what is there to say about the ordinary
people?
Prior to my next regular trip abroad, I was called again
by Serov to receive his instructions. He told me that he
was very pleased with my work and wished me a success-
ful trip. At the same time, he asked me to come to his
apartment in the evening, as he put it, "to receive addi-
tional instructions from my wife." When I came to see
them Mrs. Serov gave me a long list of
in the evening,
things to buy in Paris, and her husband asked me to buy
him a lightweight tennis jacket. At the same time, they
presented me with several jars of caviar and also offered
me some good sausage for the trip. I accepted the caviar
but politely refused the sausage.
Survivals of capitalism are in everybody's mind, espe-
cially love for good things. "We have everything in the
Soviet Union, and everything we have is better than in
the West," we keep saying every day. Yet all our best we
bring from the West. Even underwear, which the wives of
Serov and Churayev ^ asked me to buy for them abroad.
One isasked to buy in London or Paris such things as
socks, notebooks, eau de cologne, perfume,
stockings,
electric razors, dry-cell batteries, fountain pens, cognac,
phonograph records, sweaters, shirts, neckties, etc., etc.
During my last two trips alone I had lists with more than
a himdred items which I was asked to purchase abroad.
There it is, our Soviet socialist society! "Everything is
available, everything is better." Even such simple items as
socks or neckties are hard to get. Everything has to be
brought from abroad, for Central Conmiittee members,

3 Viktor Mikhaylovich Churayev was the Chief Deputy Chair-

man of the Central Committee Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R., the largest
of the fifteen Soviet Republics, and one of Khrushchev's right-hand
men.
196 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
marshals, and generals only. And what about night Clubs
and restaurants? If there were any worthy of the name in
Moscow, I am certain that all the Central Committee
i
members would patronize them, not to mention us ordi-
nary officers.
On my second trip to London I bought many presents
for Varentsov and his family. I bought two fountain pens,
a wallet, several bottles of perfume, and some playing
cards for General Smolikov, the Chief of the Personnel
Directorate. He asked me especially to bring the cards be-
cause he is an ardent "Preferans" [Russian card game]
player. I also brought back to Moscow perfume, face
powder, lipstick, cigarettes, playing cards, and many other
things for Gvishiani's wife. I brought some twelve-volt
dry-cell batteries for Rudnev, the Chairman of the Com-
mittee. You see, here is a minister. Chairman of the State
Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research
Work, and he asks people to bring some batteries from
abroad! There are simply no batteries available in the
U.S.S.R. I think that this alone is good proof of what we
have, as against what we show foreigners.
During my trips to England and France during 1961 I
was given the mission, just as other GRU
officers were, of
collecting information of a military and scientific nature.
As I was of the delegation, I did not par-
in charge
ticipate in, as we call it, active operational work. I estab-
lished contacts, made acquaintances, collected literature
which would be of interest to the GRU, etc. I was well
received in both France and England, and I met many
interesting and prominent people in the scientific and
business worlds.
I was very impressed with the completely free and easy
attitude of these people. In Turkey, the only foreign coun-
try which I had visited before, I always felt that the
population was not too kindly disposed toward Soviet peo-
ple and that the Turkish police had me under surveillance.
In France and England people talked to me freely, invited
me to their homes, restaurants, and offices. I was aston-
ished by this because in the Military Diplomatic Academy
I was taught entirely different things about the French
and British secret police. After spending some time in
those two countries I saw how natural and unaffected the
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 197

people behaved, as though there were no such thing as

the secret police.
I did not find a single word in either the British or the
French press about the arrival of our delegation, and all

the people with whom I dealt were of the opinion that I

was the same kind of businessman as they, sent abroad
by my firm in the U.S.S.R. Are the British and the
French really so naive? Or is it that suspicions and
denunciations, so widespread in our country, simply have
no place in the life of England and France? I have not
found the exact answer to this question, but this idea has
become firmly implanted in my mind, and I cannot rid
myself of it.

Additional Notes

Foreign Department of the Committee

The Chief is Mikhail Fedorovich Kachalov, a KGB

ofiicer, whoserved in Italy for a long time as deputy
rezident of the KGB. His cover was Second Secretary of
the Soviet Embassy in Rome.
The Deputy Chief is myself, Oleg Vladimirovich Pen-
kovskiy, colonel in the GRU.
Following is a short list of other and KGB
GRU
workers known to me in our directorate:
Yuriy Borisovich Tikhomirov, senior specialist (Chief of
Protocol), a KGB employee, specializing in American op-
erations. He brags about the good contacts he established
with American diplomats when he worked in Syria.
Ivan Petrovich Rybachenkov, senior specialist, a GRU
employee and a miUtary intelligence oJQficer with great ex-
perience.
P. N. Ulyanenko, specialist, KGB captain, who spent
approximately two years in London. A
very high-strung
person.
Georgiy Ivanovich Suvorin, specialist. Navy command-
er, employee of the GRU, is used at the present time for
special assignments. He is often summoned by General
Rogov.
Dmitriy Dmitriyevich Novoselov, specialist, KGB colo-
nel. Levin uses him as an advisor.
 198 PENKOVSKIYPAPERS
Nikolay Ilich Kopytov, specialist, former major in the
KGB, works together with Levin.
Vladimir Vasilyevich Krivoshchekov, senior specialist.
An intelligence ofl&cer, but I do not know exactly whether
he works for the GRUor for the KGB.
Vladimir Nikolayevich Travkin, specialist, lieutenant
colonel in the GRU. He worked for a short time at the
UN in New
York, but was recalled because of stupidity.
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BHznakov, specialist, GRU
colonel. At one time worked in the Illegals Directorate
under Admiral Bekrenev. He has been sent on temporary
duty to India and to Japan.
Viktor Mikhaylovich Ryazantsev, specialist, KGB of-
ficer, in 1961 was sent to the U.S. to attend some con-
ference.
Viktor Filippovich Golopolosov, specialist, employee of
the KGB. Levin refers to him as "my boy."
Nadezhda Ivanovna Tsapp, specialist, is used by both
the GRU and KGB
as a co-optee.
Yuriy Yakovlevich Malik, specialist. I do not know
whether or not he has anything to do with intelligence
work, but his father, the former ambassador to Great
Britain and Japan, at one time was Chief or Deputy Chief
of the "Information Committee" under the Council of
Ministers, U.S.S.R. That is what the Soviet intelligence
service was called at the time when the GRU
and the
MGB intelligence were united into one single service
called the Information Committee and headed at different
times by Molotov and Vyshinskiy.
Igor Viktorovich Milovidov, specialist, KGB
agent,
travels abroad with Soviet delegations and watches Soviet
citizens abroad. He approached me several times express-
ing the desire of working for the GRU, asking me to help
him sever his ties with the KGB. When I mentioned the
possibility of using Milovidov in GRU
activities to Levin,
he answered, "Leave him alone; we need him."
Vadim Vadimovich Farmakovskiy, specialist, GRU of-
Ueutenant commander in the Navy, visited Italy and
ficer,
Sweden as a member of Soviet delegations, speaks English.
Valentin Dmitriyevich Khrabrov, specialist, GRU
colonel, a good friend of another
is GRU
intelligence of-
ficer. Lappa. I believe he served in Paris as assistant mili-
tary attache.
 PENKOVSKIY'S COMMITTEE 199

Nazar Kalistratovich Lappa, specialist, GRU colonel,

is responsible for receiving delegations from France,
Italy,Belgium, and Holland.
Pavlovich Shvarts, senior reviewer, English lan-
llya
guage translator, KGB agent. He is avoided by the em-
ployees of the Committee because they know that he
informs the KGB against everyone. His main job is to
watch the Soviet employees of the Committee and see
which of them have friendly contacts with foreigners. He
made several trips abroad as an interpreter and KGB
agent.
Antonovich Berdennikov KGB agent and
Nikolay ,

works on the British Desk, which in-

senior specialist,
cludes Canada and other English-speaking nations. He has
made several trips to London and to the U.S. on KGB
assignments as a member of various Soviet delegations. He
knows English well and often goes to night clubs in Mos-
cow with Levin.
Boris Vasilyevich Nikitin, senior specialist, GRU
colonel, works on the Desk covering India, Pakistan, and
Ceylon.
Aleksandr Yakovlevich Smurov, senior specialist, KGB
employee, either a colonel or a lieutenant colonel, spent
several years in Germany.
More names could be added to the list. Those already
listedshould be sufficient to give one an idea of the kind
of espionage apparatus which exists under the cover of
the State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific
Research Work of the Council of Ministers U.S.S.R.
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER V

On May 6, 1961, Oleg Penkovskiy returned to Moscow

with what was apparently a precise concept of his mission.
He carefully stored his camera, film, and radio instruc-
tions in a secret drawer of his desk in the apartment
which he and his family still occupied on Maksim Gorkiy
Embankment. Then he began work in earnest. With free
access to the Ministry of Defense and the GRU, as well
as his own Committee, he photographed documents al-
most wholesale, most of them in the top-secret category.
Some were technical papers or highly classified instruc-
tions and tactical manuals in use by the ground (tactical)
missile force. Others were less technological, dealing with
intelligence procedures, Soviet personalities or the goals
and operations of the Committee.
On May 27 Wynne flew into Moscow, to resume some of
the negotiations with the Soviets on behdf of the firms he
represented. Colonel Penkovskiy met him at Sheremetyevo
Airport and drove him back to the city. On the way he
handed Wynne a packet of some twenty exposed films and
other materials, which Wynne transmitted to a representa-
tive of British intelligence later in the day.
That evening Penkovskiy visited Wynne in his room at
the Metropol Hotel. As he later admitted in their Soviet
trial, Wynne gave Penkovskiy a package containing thirty

fresh rolls of film and further instructions from the intel-

ligence officers who had met him in London. It is hard to
believe, from such goings-on, that Wynne was not himself
an intelligence officer. He was not, however. It had simply
200
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CUIT 201

happened that Penkovskiy chose him for his contact; and

when he reported this, British intelligence inevitably asked
him to keep up the connection and transmit certain pack-
ages, etc., to Penkovskiy. Wynne's position gave him a
facility for meeting Penkovskiy that could not easily be
duplicated —at least not without arousing Soviet suspi-
cions. (Even at the well supervised Soviet trial, Penkovskiy
insisted that Wynne never actually saw the information he
was passing.)
Far from suspecting anything strange in his behavior,
however, Penkovskiy's superiors at the GRU and the Com-
mittee were delighted by his British associations. People
like Greville Wynne were just the sort of contacts any
good Soviet intelligence officer in Penkovskiy's shoes might
be expected to make. They arranged to send him to Lon-
don with another delegation of Soviet technical experts,
this time to attend the opening of the Soviet Industrial
Exhibition there.
The delegation arrived in London on July 15, 1961, but
Penkovskiy came alone three days later, since he was not
required to travel with the delegation. Fortuitously, no
one from the Soviet Embassy was on hand to meet him.
This oversight allowed him to telephone Wynne from the
airport, whereupon the Englishman drove out to meet
—
him a pleasant encounter which was later related in
painful detail at the 1963 trial. Penkovskiy went along to
Wynne's house, shaved, bathed, and turned over another
fat batch of films and documents which he had brought
with him. Then Wynne dropped him off at the Kensington
—
Close Hotel, where he had a reservation conveniently
close to the old mansions in Kensington Gardens which
comprise the working quarters of the Soviet Embassy.
Because most of his official work this time was con-
centrated in London, Penkovskiy was able to spend a
great deal more time than formerly with the four British
and American operatives who were waiting for him in one
of MI-6's "safe houses." He would spend most of the day
working at the Soviet Embassy or at the exhibition with
his delegates; but even this did not make too great de-
mands on his time because the delegation was subdivided
by specialties. Each division had its own subleader. Pen-
kovskiy handled only the over-all direction.
Evenings he reserved for the rendezvous with his n§w
202 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
friends: "Alexander," "Miles," "Grille,"and "Oslav." They
went over the material he had previously given them in
some detail, it having been checked by experts meanwhile.
They made, further assignments.
By this time, presumably, the first fruits of Colonel
Penkovskiy's photography work with his new Minox had
been received and evaluated in London and Washington.
It was a tense summer in Europe that year. The Continent
still reverberated from Khrushchev's threats over Beriin

and the East Germany treaty. If anything, the Vienna

meeting of Khrushchev and President Kennedy had only
intensified the political electricity in the air. Against the
background of a possible military showdown, therefore,
in which Marshal Varentsov's missiles would play a heavy
role, the personal reports and observations of his former
aide had even greater value. That July, Penkovskiy's ses-
sions with the intelligence officers lasted as long as ten
hours at a stretch. To provide for the day when face-to-
face communications might not be so easy, he was given
further training in the use of a long-distance radio re-
ceiver.
Throughout necessarily concentrated, grueling in-
this
doctrination in Western intelligence procedures,
course
Penkovskiy managed to preserve his amazing sang-froid.
Only a few mortals are gifted with a natural talent for
leading a double Hfe and Oleg Penkovskiy was evidently
one of them. Thanks to his diligent escort duty with Gen-
eral Serov's wife and daughter on his first London trip,
he had accumulated quite a reputation among Moscow's
upper crust as a man who knew his way around the West.
This time he had a heavy shopping list with him. In his
notebook, along with various orders and gift specifications,
he had taken the trouble to draw the foot contours of
various influential Soviet ladies and gentlemen, so he
would make no mistake in purchasing the right shoes for
them. (Shoes from abroad are a popular Soviet gift item,
and ever since Khrushchev's famous Italian suit purchase,
there had been much official leniency in the matter of
foreign clothing articles.) The Colonel purchased as much
as his official allowance would allow, more than enough
to qualify him as a latter-day Grandfather Frost (the Rus-
sian Santa Claus) on the flight home. (It was fortunate
that Soviet customs rarely touched his baggage.) With
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 203

some of his purchases —a few shirts, a watch or two, and

other oddments — Wynne helped him.
At the same time, Penkovskiy managed to keep up with
his Soviet intelligence observations, which he forwarded
in the normal way to GRU headquarters through Colonel
Pavlov, the local deputy rezident. It can be assumed that
his Western contacts gave him some "material" for for-
warding to Moscow that was apparently valuable, if in
fact relatively harmless. But such information was enough
to continue his reputation as a hard-working "Chekist."
With what must have been a profound sense of irony, he
also went on advancing his standing as a zealous Party
man. One morning he quietly took a trip to Karl Marx's
grave in Highgate Cemetery and discovered that it was in
bad state of neglect. Through Communist Party channels,
he wrote a letter of protest direct to the First Secretary of
the Central Committee in Moscow. Comrade Penkovskiy
told Comrade Khrushchev that as a "loyal Marxist" he
found such neglect appalling, a reflection upon Com-
munism, the Soviet Union, and, specifically, the local
Soviet Embassy officials whose job it was to take care of
such things.
Moscow took swift action on receipt of the letter and
Penkovskiy was commended for his "socialist vigilance."
The London embassy was ordered to set things right im-
mediately. Promptly the grave was cleaned up and deco-
rated. Penkovskiy, although hardly popular in Soviet Em-
bassy circles in London as a result of his letter, was treated
with increased respect.
In two hasty visits to the open society, Penkovskiy had
seen enough to confirm his admiration for the West and
his wrath — the word is used advisedly — at the regime
which kept his own people behind the walls and conven-
tions of a garrison state. "Oh, my poor Russian people,
my poor Russian people," he had exclaimed to Wynne,
when looking through his first London department store
in April. It was not the abundance which intrigued and
amazed him so much as its obvious accessibility to people
of all walks of life, in contrast to conditions back home.
He remained fascinated by London and enjoyed walking
about the city, quietly observing its still stately manners.
He dressed well, in conservative taste. Although a moder-
ate drinker who generally contented himself with a few
204 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
glasses of wine in the course of an evening, Penkovskiy
was fond of socializing. In the midst of his other activities
in London, he even managed to find time to take a few
dancing lessons, in which he sampled the mysteries of the
twist and the cha-cha.
He returned to Moscow on August 10, having already
received commendations for his mission from his Soviet
superiors. In an August letter to Gvishiani, at the Com-
mittee, Colonel Pavlov wrote his own endorsement of
Penkovskiy's good work in England. The Western opera-
tives were even more pleased. As his Soviet prosecutor
later reported: "The foreign intelUgence officers gave new
assignments to Penkovskiy in which special emphasis
was put on the collection of intelligence information on
the Soviet armed forces, missile troops, troops assigned to
the German Democratic Republic, and the preparation for
the signing of a peace treaty with the G.D.R."
Penkovskiy had investigated the documentation neces-
sary for applying for both British and American citizenship
and received assurances that he would receive responsible
employment and a decent position in Western society,
whenever he was prepared to leave the Soviet Union for-
ever. Two years later, Soviet investigators found in his
apartment two photographs of Penkovskiy, taken in Lon-
don, wearing the full uniform and regalia of a British
and an American Army colonel.
All of this was clearly part of a deeply thought out
transfer of allegiance, from a military man in whom the
tradition of obedience and loyalty was ingrained. Pen-
kovskiy was not merely interested in helping the West;
he had to be part of the West himself. Moscow had never
seemed to be so far away.
He went back there, however, and the depth of his
disgust with the world he was going back to can be
gathered from the next section of the Papers. It is clear
to see, too, how this career soldier had developed a hatred
for Khrushchev which was, originally, as much profes-
sional as it was ideological. Over the years, however, it had
become something akin to obsession.
 CHAPTER V

The Khrushchev Cult

It is interesting to observe our prominent Soviet personages

in the privacy of their own intimates. What a difference
there is between them when they are on the speaker's
platform and when they are in their family circles with
a glass of vodka in their hands. They become entirely
different types. They are very much like the personalities
which are portrayed by Gogol in Dead Souls and The
Inspector General, It is clear that such classic, unfortunate
Russian types have not become extinct with the advent
of the "Soviet Period." Indeed, I would say that they
are now more numerous and more obvious.
There are no more Communists such as our old Bol-
sheviks who used to operate in the underground [podpoV-
schiki], not to mention Marx or Lenin. Among my
friends, Party members of today, there is none that be-
lieves in Communism. They, like me, are looking for the
answer to the question: "Is our path a correct one? Where
are we going? What are we building? Why are we living
for someone else and for tomorrow rather than for our-
selves and for today?"
Many months ago I had an interesting conversation with
one of my old friends, an instructor of a course on
"Foundations of Marxism-Leninism." We were discussing
that standard classic, the New History of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. "Poor History of the CPSU;
how many times it has been rewritten!" were my friend's
words.
I myself had studied the various editions of the
205
206 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
History of the CPSU: the Knorin edition, the Yem.
Yaroslavskiy edition, the edition of the CC, VKP (b)
(Stalin's), and now the CC CPSU (Khrushchev's) edition.
Why are these histories different? One reads them and
wonders. According to one edition, Tukhachevskiy and
Gamamik were enemies and foreign spies, yet another
one treats them as patriots and brilliant miUtary leaders.
In one edition Stalin is called father of the workers of the
entire world, while in the other he is called a criminal, an*
enemy, and a murderer. Yesterday nobody knew that
Khrushchev was at Stalingrad; today he is the Hero of
Stalingrad. . . .

My friend explained this in a very simple manner: "Our

Party, as is well known, was founded by Lenin, who
carried on Karl Marx's cause. However, while Marx's cause
was carried on by Lenin, Lenin's cause was continued only
by enemies and traitors. Let us classify our leading Party
members, as they have been celebrated in succeeding issues
of the Party history:

Mercenary agent and imperialist hireling Trotskiy

Traitor to the working class Zinovyev
Rightist opportunist and double-dealer Bukharin
Enemy of the people Rykov
Saboteur and dissenter Kamenev
Enemy of the workers Pyatakov
Dissenter Raskolnikov
Enemy and traitor Yagoda
The enemy of Communists Yezhov
Enemy of the Fatherland and spy Tukhachevskiy
Generally speaking an enemy Gamarnik
Imperialist agent and traitor Beriya
Unmasked criminal Stalin
Enemy of the Party Molotov

Enemies in general Malenkov,

Kaganovich,
Bulganin
Double-dealer Shepilov
Khrushchev's enemy, Zhukov
etc., etc."
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 207

My
friend stopped, and later added: "Only Khrushchev,
the all our people, remains unmasked."
enemy of
I did not know how to answer my friend. clear How
and simple all this was. I myself used to think that our
history was not a true history, but I never was able to
put it in such a clear and witty form. And I think that it
is clear to anyone now that to work for, and especially
to serve, such a group of saboteurs is difficult and even
impossible. This is the reason why I came to final my
decision.
I am joining the ranks of those who are actively
fighting against our rotten, two-faced regime, known by the
name of Dictatorship of the Proletariat or Soviet Power
[Sovetskayav vlast]. Yes, it is a dictatorship, not of the

Proletariat, but of a small group of persons. It deceives

my countrymen while they, being innocent, give their lives
for this dictatorship, without knowing the entire truth.
And they will probably never learn it, unless I or people
like myself tell them the truth. I want to be with the
common Russian people; I want to cry and laugh together
with them; I want my old friends, ordinary human beings,
to accept me back into their fold instead of avoiding me,
because of my position. I want to be a soldier of my Rus-
sians, the common people. I am joining the ranks of a new
army, the true people's army. I know that I am not
alone; we are many. But we are still afraid of each other
and we act only as individuals. The hour will come when
we shall open our souls to each other, act together, serve
the true people's representatives and ourselves instead of
the group of saboteurs at the top.
Apparently we just cannot live without a dictator, with-
out the personality cult. The big break came for Khru-
shchev in 1957, when he pushed back Bulganin, Molotov,
Shepilov, Pervukhin, Malenkov, and others the so- —
called anti-Party group. For three days before they were
ousted by the Presidium and the Central Committee
CPSU, Khrushchev was not in power. He had been voted
the Minister of Agriculture. That was all. Khrushchev,
however, dispatched his men all over the Soviet Union in
order to call a Central Committee plenum in Moscow. Al-
most all Central Committee members, secretaries of oblast
and kray committees, and also secretaries of the Union
RepubUcs came urgently by plane with the help of the
208

KGB. Most of
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS I
them were people previously appointed by
Khrushchev, who were ready to support him. They did,
successfully.
Now he has also created for himself a solid base in
the Army: he many to higher generals' ranks,
elevated
promoted some of them to the rank of marshal. In 1961,
three hundred colonels were made generals. They are the
ones whose support he depends on now.
Khrushchev is not too clever, but he has vast energy. It
is his energy that saved him during that period. When the

necessary quorum was assembled for the plenum of the

Central Committee CPSU which had been urgently called
by Khrushchev, he announced the existence of the so-
called anti-Party group. The majority of the Central Com-
mittee members supported Khrushchev. At that time
>

Zhukov also was on Khrushchev's side. Zhukov hates

Bulganin and Kaganovich, and at the plenum he said
bluntly: "The Army is behind Khrushchev." And that
was all! And so the anti-Party group was ousted. Khru-
shchev was victorious. Furtesva helped him a great deal;
she worked day and night dispatching planes, and some say
that she herself made some of the flights campaigning
for support for Khrushchev. Everybody in Moscow calls
her "Catherine the Third."
Anyhow, Khrushchev received the majority of votes and
became czar. Chairman of the Council of Ministers and
First Secretary of the Central Committee. And so again, a
new cult of personality, a dictator.
However, there are still many people in the Central
Committee who support Molotov, Bulganin (although the
Army does not like him), Malenkov, Marshal Voroshilov,
and others, as for instance Pervukhin, our ambassador to
the German Democratic Republic.^ Rumors have been
seeping through that Khrushchev has frequent quarrels
with Mikoyan.
I have seen Churayev many times, the R.S.F.S.R. Com-
munist Party leader. Churayev says that there are many
foreign poUcy questions on which Mikoyan disagrees

1 Mikhail Georgiyevich Pervukhin was a member of the anti-

Party group and later Soviet ambassador to East Germany. He was
replaced on November 30, 1962 and has not figured since in Soviet
public life.
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 209

with Khrushchev. When Varentsov asked Churayev one

time why nothing had been heard about Mikoyan or his
whereabouts recently, Churayev answered: "They are at
each other's throats again." Incidentally, Mikoyan is

against the hard policy on Berlin.

Thus there smoldering opposition within the leader-
is

ship, but it not allowed to come out into the open for
is

fear that Khrushchev may again announce the existence

of some new anti-Party group.
There is also the possibility of a split in the top eche-
lon, for instance, on the Berlin question. Many leaders
realize that we are not ready for a major war; we have
many bottlenecks in our economy as well as in our military
problems. Steadfast, realistic people may say: "It is too
early, we should not get ourselves involved in a war be-
cause small wars (we call them 'Khrushchev's adventures')
may lead to a major war." Many generals bluntly say:
"What in hell do we need this Berlin for? We have en-
dured it for sixteen years; we can endure it a little more.
One of these days Khrushchev will catch it good! They
will hit him in his teeth so hard that he will lose every-
thing!"
Of course, the opposite may happen. The restraining
forces will be unable to keep this fool in check, and he
will carry out his own policy. If the opposition wins, it will
say that he is a- sick old man, or that he himself asks to
be released, the way he did with Malenkov. Or else he may
simply be kicked out and they will tell him, "Go to your
Kalinovka and stay there as chairman of the kolkhoz
[collective farm]." ^ If this ever happens, the entire
population will be very happy.
Khrushchev is not popular among the people. There
are all kinds of anecdotes, jokes, and remarks about him.
Everybody calls him an adventurer. Everybody criticizes
him. Everyone laughs at him, especially at his slogan:
"Let us catch up with and surpass America." The people
are smart, and they immediately responded with a joke:

In production of milk,
We have overtaken America,

2 Kalinovka, a village in Kursk oblast, in the heart of European

Russia, is Khrushchev's birthplace.
2ie PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
But in meat we have failed,
The bull's penis got broken.^

Or another one:

Khrushchev had distributed a questionnaire

among the people with the question:
"What are you going to do when we overtake
America?"
One person answered: "I'll stay right there, while
you run farther if you wish."

Very clever. How

long have we been overtaking Amer-
41
ica? We were overtaking America under Stalin; and now
under Khrushchev we are still overtaking America. The
fool. At least he could try to say something sensible. Of
course, he personally has overtaken quite a bit: he has
three country houses near Moscow, several in the Cau-
casus, in the Crimea, near Kiev, and most likely in some
other places, too: first, a country house somewhere beyond
the university in Moscow; second, a country house along
the Rublevskoye Highway, beyond the settlement of Kunt-
sevo (it is said that Stalin and Beriya's country houses

were located in that area; it would be very amusing if

Khrushchev were living in Beriya's country house); third,
a country house along the Dmitrovskoye Highway. There
are large forests there and an atomic center nearby.

[Editor's Note: After this disgression on Khru-

shchev and his private reputation, Penkovskiy returns
to his discussion of other Soviet regime leaders.]

Kozlov^ is a devil and frequently attends the meet-

ings of the Supreme Military Council together with

3 My Ameriku dognali,
Po nadoyu moloka,
A po myasu ne dognali,
Khren slomalsya u byka,
4Frol Romanovich Kozlov was a member of the Presidium and
Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU. Before his stroke in
1963 he was a leading contender to succeed Khrushchev, On No-
vember 16, 1964, following the fall of Khrushchev, he was dropped
from the Presidium. He died on January 30, 1965.
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 2H
Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Suslov.s Kozlov is very much
interested in military matters. He sticks his nose into
everj^hing and wants to know all the details.
Varentsov often attends the Supreme Military Council
meetings. He says that it sounds so ridiculous when the
others call Khrushchev Supreme Commander in Chief.
Even Kozlov and Suslov cannot help smiling. "It is a
terrible mess all around," says Sergey Sergeyevich. "Stalin's
firm hand is missing."
He Molotov and Malenkov are out. But
also regrets that
it is all the same
me. It is six of one or half a dozen of
to
the other. In private Varentsov criticizes Khrushchev, but
when he was given a rank of Chief Marshal of Artillery
he made a toast, saying: "Let us drink to the health of our
dear Nikita Sergeyevich." Varentsov is my friend and I
like him, but why this pretense, why this hypocrisy?
Molotov's health is quite poor, and it is possible that he
will die soon. I have not seen him for more than a year.
I suspect that when he dies, it will not even be mentioned

in the newspapers. One can expect anything from the

scoundrel Khrushchev.
Kaganovich lives in Moscow, not far from Varentsov,
on the Frunze Embankment. He often takes a walk in the
evening. He looks rather well but has gained weight and
.looks older. He is not doing anything. His wife died re-
cently, but this was not mentioned in the newspapers.
Shepilov is in Moscow and often walks along Gorkiy
Street. He is clever. Once I met him near our Committee.
He was in good spirits. In general, he is an interesting,
smart person.
Malenkov is somewhere in Siberia. Once in a while he
comes to Moscow.
Bulganin drinks, drinks from grief and disappointment.
Voroshilov used to drink a lot. Now he is quite an old
man. Probably he will also die soon.
Pervukhin and Saburov ® are nothing much, they are

5 Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov is a member of the Presidium and

Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU and the chief Party
ideologist.
6 Maksim Zakharovich Saburov, duringthe period of 1955-57,
was the First Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers
U.S.S.R.,was connected with the anti-Party group and then dis-
appeared from the scene.
212 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
small fry, and nobody among the people remembers them
at have heard that Pervukhin was rather smart,
all. I
but that Sabvrov was nothing much, an upstart. No-
body seems to know why Stalin appointed him Chief of
Gosplan.
Now Voznesenskiy was a true walking encyclopedia, he
knew everything.

During one of my visits to Serov's apartment he told

41
me an interesting incident about Khrushchev's personality
cult. Serov said that when he was selecting materials for
Khrushchev to use in his speeches on Stalin and his crimes,
he tried to persuade Khrushchev not to attack Stalin too
severely. Khrushchev would not even listen to him. And
now, says Serov, all this has turned against Khrushchev
himself. This was a serious error on Khrushchev's part.
A Party conference of the Frunze Rayon of the city of
Moscow was held on September 9, 1960. Colonel Lazarev,
head of a department in the Frunze Military Academy,
made a speech at the conference as a delegate. He spoke
out against the Khrushchev cult. Lazarev said: "Khru-
shchev did the right thing when he debunked Stalin's per-
sonality cult, but now he is creating the same cult for
himself." He was interrupted, and the chairman of the
conference immediately submitted the question of Laz-.
arev's speech to the conference for discussion. He called
the speech apolitical and incorrect, and introduced a pro-
posal to deprive Lazarev of his credentials as a conference
delegate. The vote was taken immediately, and this de-
partment head of the academy was expelled from the
Party conference. It must be assumed that for his bold
speech against Khrushchev's cult he will also be expelled
from the Party and from the Frunze Academy.
This is our Party democracy, our spirit of criticism
and self-criticism.
If Khrushchev may im-
dies, the international situation
prove somewhat. Things may
be quiet for one or two
years, while the struggle for power is taking place in our
country. What happens after that, heaven alone knows.
Right now we do not have a single candidate who could
be a good leader of the country. The most clever of them
all is Mikoyan. He is a Leninist, but he will never be
elected and will never win the struggle for power. Molotov
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 213

is illand probably will not join the struggle. Kozlov and

Brezhnev both dislike Mikoyan. They have achieved their
status only because of Khrushchev. If Khrushchev dies,
both will be kicked out. Suslov is a possibility. I mentioned
Suslov to Churayev, but his comment did not amount to
much. He is afraid to foul the nest by any criticism.
Among the leaders those who are opposed to Khrushchev
keep their mouths shut because they are afraid of losing
their positions.
In my considered opinion, as an officer of the General
Staff, I do not believe Khrushchev too anxious for war
is

at the present time, but he is preparing earnestly; if the

situation is ripe for war he will start it first in order to
catch the probable enemy, i.e., the U.S.A. and the Western
states, unawares. He would of course like to reach the
level of producing missiles by the tens of thousands,
launch them like a rainstorm against the West, and, as he
calls it, "bury capitalism." In this respect even our mar-
shals and generals consider him to be a provocateur, the
one who incites war.
The Western powers must do something to stop him.
Today he will not start a war. Today he is playing with
missiles, but this is playing with fire, and one of tiiese days
he will start a real slaughter.
Today the Soviet Union is not ready for war. This is
the precise truth. All this is agitation and propaganda
"on the one hand we stand for peace, and on the other
hand we will cover you with missiles" which some of—
the Western leaders take literally. This must not be taken
seriously by the West. This is a policy of the moment,
to gain time. On one hand we are for peace, on the other
we frighten with missiles.
Look what happened during the Hungarian events and
the Suez crisis. We in Moscow
felt as if we were sitting
on a powderkeg. Everyone in the General Staff was against
the "Khrushchev adventure." It was better to lose Hungary,
as they said, than to lose everything. But what did the
West do? Nothing. It was asleep. This gave Khrushchev
confidence, and after Hungary he began to scream: "I was
right!" After the Hungarian incident he dismissed many
generals who had spoken out against him. If the West had
slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in
power today and all of Eastern Europe could be free.
214 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
Kennedy must carry out a firm and consistent policy in
regard to Khrushchev. There is nothing to fear. Khru-
shchev is not ready for war. He has to be slapped down
again and again every time he gets ready to set off on one
of his adventures.
Kennedy has just as much right to help the patriots
of Cuba as we had when we "helped" the Hungarians.
This is not just my opinion. Everyone at the General
Staff said this. It was said in Varentsov's home, even on
the streetcars in Moscow. If the West does not maintain
a firm policy, then Khrushchev's position will become
stronger, he will think even more about his might and
right, and in this case he might strike.
Everyone should know this. Once other countries begin
to believe in his strength, Khrushchev will begin to dictate
anything he wants. Khrushchev's government, and pri-
marily he himself, thinks that if war is inevitable, we
should strike first, create panic, and send our hail of
missiles. This is calculated to produce a fast victory and
stun the enemy. The Soviet Union is not capable of carry-
ing on a long war. The internal situation is very bad, the
standard of living is low, there is financial insecurity.
There will be thousands of deserters on the very first day
of the war. This is why Khrushchev prefers a lightning
strike. It will stun the enemy, it will not worsen the
situation internally, it will avoid mass desertion or sur-
render of troops, and it will allow him to retain the
people's democracies in his camp.
This plan has been worked out in every detail and is on
filein the General Staff. Staff exercises have been conducted
in accordance with this plan. That is the Soviet position.

The people are very unhappy with Khrushchev's militant

speeches. One can hear this everywhere. Now one can
breathe a little easier than in Beriya's time, and one can
hear and say a few things.
On the other hand, the world can be thankful to
Khrushchev for his militant words. They forced Kennedy,
Macmillan, and De Gaulle to double or triple their military
budgets and defense preparedness. If Stalin were alive he
would do all this quietly, but this fool Khrushchev is loud-
mouthed. He himself forces the Western powers to
strengthen their defense weapons and military potential.
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 215

The generals on the General Staff have no love for

Khrushchev. They say that he is working to his own detri-
ment. He blabs too much about Soviet military successes
in order to frighten the West, but the West is not stupid,
they are also getting ready. What else can they do?
Khrushchev will not consider the fact that our Army is
not ready for a major war. Varentsov says that we have
no confidence in our state of readiness, that we are taking
a great risk. Certainly we are training our troops, keeping
them in combat readiness every moment, but we are not
certain that we are ready in all respects. The entire Central
Committee CPSU, leading government officials, marshals,
and generals spend all their time among the troops, check-
ing, exhorting, making improvements, so as to be ready
at a moment's notice.
Several hundred generals were present during maneuvers
in the Odessa Military District; the entire General Staff
was there. During the Berlin crisis the entire Central
Committee visited factories and plants, especially those
involved with defense production. The city of Moscow
was empty. Everyone had gone out on Khrushchev's
orders. Churayev also often has to leave on temporary
duty to the provinces. All these representatives of the
Central Committee visited factories and plants, appealing
to the workers to work better and produce more. This
happens not only during a crisis, it goes on all the time.
It was especially noticeable during the Berlin crisis.
The General Staff works night and day formulating
various plans of attack. Everything is marked on maps,
including places where it is proposed to aim the first
missiles. True, the marking is done in a secure manner;
everything is directed against the "probable enemy." But
this is simple deceit. It would be brazen and risky to
name the enemy and the targets openly. Everyone knows,
however, who the "probable enemy" is; it is America.
(In our military and GRU literature we frequently refer
to the U.S.A. as the "probable enemy," while in KGB
and Central Committee CPSU circles I have heard the
U.S.A. referred to as the "main enemy." This latter term
is probably indicative of their true feelings.) I believe

Varentsov and Churayev; it was they who claimed that

Khrushchev said, "I will drop a hail of missiles on them."
Khrushchev does not want a world war because he
216 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
knows he cannot win but he will keep on trying to in-
it;

But if he feels that he can

stigate various local conflicts.
win in a specific place, such as in Berlin, and thus in a
way slap down the U.S., England, and to some extent
France, he might order a general attack, hoping that the
West and the Nato countries will get into a squabble and
split. Recently even the General Staff has begun to agree
with Khrushchev's concept of delivering a sudden light-
ning strike, as Hitler used to do. The General Staff be-
lieves that there are advantages in such an attack, par-
ticularly if a mass missile strike is used, and right now
they are preparing strenuously for this. The General Staff
considers that if it is impossible to strike at all the targets
at once, it is at least possible to hit the United States
and England first, cause a split in the NATO
alliance, and
then pick up the pieces without a general war.
The Western leaders should have a secret meeting, with-
out Khrushchev, and quickly decide what to do. It is
urgent that the leaders of all the Western states meet to
work out a firm, common line. A
summit meeting should
not be called; Khrushchev would attend such a meeting
with pleasure in order to increase his prestige and author-
ity. He will again try to steer any summit conference in
his direction, using his propaganda of peaceful co-
existence and disarmament.
The West has already won a small victory in the Berlin
matter. Khrushchev began to write notes and talk about
new negotiations. But this is an old story. This shows that
the Western leaders acted wisely. This is the only correct
way. He should be treated the same way in the future.
Of course, he wlQ continue to make long speeches about
peaceful coexistence and disarmament, he may even lower
his voice at the conference in order to be believed. Actually
he is holding a rock inside his fist and keeping his powder
dry.
always wonder: Why does the West trust Khrushchev?
I
It is difficult tounderstand. We in the sit around, GRU
talk, and laugh: What fools, they believed us again! Of
course, the West must talk with Khrushchev, but it must
maintain a firm pohcy. Do not retreat a single step from
a firm policy, let Khrushchev know that the time of lis-
tening to his military psychosis has come to an end.
Under no circumstances give any concessions to Khru-
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 217

shchev. He only gains time and by this prolongs his exist-

ence. If the West again makes even the smallest concession
to Khrushchev, he will scream loudly about his power
and will proclaim to the entire world: "See how power-
ful I am," etc.
It is who is often very ill, has
said that Grotewohl,
spoken out against the signing of the German treaty.
Ulbricht, who enjoys no authority with the Germans, is
fighting for the "obligatory" signing of the treaty. It is
my personal opinion that Khrushchev is seriously con-
sidering signing a peace treaty with the German Demo-
cratic Republic, but just now he is looking for the best
—
way to do it so that at first glance it would appear to
be acceptable to the West. Later Khrushchev would be
the one to gain. Or else he would declare, at the end
of the negotiations, that the West is to blame for every-
thing.
Khrushchev has now become confused on the Berlin
matter, particularly because he has realized that the West
is firm there. He would like to pursue a hard policy and
rattle his saber, but our country suffers from a great many
shortages and difficulties which must be eliminated before
the West is to be frightened further. Khrushchev will not
scream so loudly if he feels that the West is holding a
hard line in all directions.
When Khrushchev heard the categorical statements
made about Berlin by Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle,
Adenauer, and Strauss, his reaction was the same as it
—
was in 1961 ^he did not like it. He did not expect the
Western powers to take such a firm stand and to under-
take all possible measures in retaliation. The Soviet gov-
ernment and Khrushchev specifically expected the West
to react in the following, usual manner: ". let's wait
. .

a bit, in addition to everything else they have plenty of

missiles, we really have no basis to start hostilities be-
cause of Germany. ." Khrushchev and his close as-
. .

sociates expected everything to go according to plan, but

it did not happen that way. This was weU done by the

Western states.
In 1961 the Soviet government was very unpleasantly
surprised by the publication of Mr. Kennedy's statement
regarding the three-billion-dollar increase in the military
budget. This made a very strong impression. Good for
218 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
him! That kicked them in the teeth! The Soviet High Com-
mand, moreover, is certain that the Western powers have
still other secret funds (the Soviet Army has always had

such funds) so they were sure that the budget was actually
increased not by three but by six or nine biUion dollars.
Our General Staff also knows that our nuclear weapons
and plants are poorly hidden and camouflaged. The Gen-
eral Staff does not want a large-scale nuclear war, but it
sometimes supports Khrushchev simply to please him, to
curry his favor.
Our leaders proclaim loudly that our equipment is
better, that we have more weapons in our arsenals, and
that everything in the West is inferior. If this is indeed
so, why do not the Western governments take urgent
measures to improve their defense and increase their mili-
tary forces? That is the elementary dialectic of survivaL
After all, they are responsible for the Hves of their
people! Every medium must be put to use newspapers, —
radio, television; it must be demonstrated to the world
where is truth and where is falsehood. It is Khrushchev,
the Central Committee CPSU, and the Soviet govern-
ment, together with the General Staff, who are responsible
for the continuation of the cold war.
There is no need to Usten to Khrushchev any longer.
It is enough. There is also nothing to be afraid of. His
speeches are all the same, there is nothingnew any of
in
them: "We are armed to the teeth, we haveplenty of
everything, life here is wonderful, I will punch the West
in the nose so hard that it will fall apart. . . ." This
is the essence of all his speeches.
The General
Staff studies each of his speeches as part
of Party-pohtical training. But one reads the beginning
its
and the end and that is clear enough without having to
read the whole thing. He
is screaming about peace, and
we in the GRU hundreds of agents and saboteurs
train
of all types and dispatch them daily to the West.
When I was in our embassy in London I heard many
comments on Kennedy's speech. It was excellent. Every-
one criticized Khrushchev, including the GRU and KGB
rezidents: "There is no reason to be surprised. Ken-
nedy's speech is the answer to Khrushchev's saber
rattUng."
In our embassy in London there was a very strong re-
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 219

action to Mr. Kennedy's address and to the speech made

by Nixon. Those were very good and wise words.
At the embassy, TASS intercepts and prints all communi-
cations which do not find their way into the Soviet press.
This is done for all the ambassadors, ministers, and deputy
ministers. In the GRU they are read by everyone down
to and including the chief of a directorate. This is how
they learn about everything that goes on in the world but
does not get into their press.
At the embassy I saw a short comment on Mr. Ken-
nedy's speech. The speech was called the militant speech
of the President of the United States. That is what was
said officially. The TASS reports, however, contain the
entire speech, point by point: first, second, third. First,
Kennedy's reference to the increase in the budget, next,
the increase in the strength of the armed forces, in con-
nection with the new Army draft, then the new specific
categories of naval aviators, etc. If necessary, the increases
must be even greater.
De Gaulle is a clever man, so is Adenauer. They
brought a new element into politics. Why is this bald devil
of ours allowed to do what he pleases? Why do the
Western powers not a conference and tell Khru-
call
shchev: "You you announced that you wanted
scoundrel,
to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany, but you have
forgotten, we fought with you, fed you, gave you weapons,
machinery, etc. If the Soviet Army did not have Amer-
ican Studebakers during the war, the entire artillery, of
all calibers, would have been stuck in the mud of your

impassable roads; and now you arbitrarily want to take

the whole world and make it serve you"? The best way to
handle Khrushchev is to throw him off balance ^here, —
there, everywhere, by propaganda, and by actual deeds.
Training is going on right now to prepare our troops some-
how forcombat readiness, to raise their combat spirit,
train them better, and equip them better so that they will
be ready for any emergency. At the present time there is
no assurance that they are ready.
The essence of Khrushchev's policy is to frighten the
whole world with his missiles. As soon as a problem
arises, or a hot spot develops, Khrushchev immediately
begins to talk about missiles.
220 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Volodya Khoroshilov came home on leave. He is chief
of the artillery staff of the tank army in Dresden under
General Kupin. He was called back to duty, however,
two weeks ahead of time. Before his departure we went
to a restaurant for dinner and he told me: "As soon as
the treaty with Germany is signed, an alert will be de-
clared immediately, and the troops in East Germany will
occupy all the control points and will take over their de-
fense and support. Our troops will stand by on alert, but
they will not occupy these routes immediately because
this might be considered a provocation. Wewill simply
say, 'Please,Americans, British, and French, go to Berlin,
but you must request permission from East Germany.' If
the Americans, British, and French do not want to confer
with the Germans and try to use force, the Germans will
open fire. Of course, the Germans do not have enough
strength, and then our tanks will move directly into
Berlin." I heard this from many officers, specifically from
General Pozovnyy, and also from Fedorov and Varentsov.
Varentsov, however, added, "We are taking a risk, a big
risk."
In 1961, when Khrushchev decided to resolve the Berlin
question, the General Staff, GRU, KGB planned in
and
advance not one but several provocations in order to feel
out the Western powers and NATO. It was already
planned to have one tank brigade standing by for an at-
tack. If the Western powers knocked out this brigade, an-
other one would be sent in, and then the second echelon
would commence action. This echelon was brought to
combat readiness on the border in the U.S.S.R. as well
as in Czechoslovakia and Poland. That is the truth.
The NATO countries should give particular attention to
antitank weapons. Why? Because East Germany has two
tank armies in full readiness, this is in addition to the
tank armies which are part of the second echelon located
on the territories of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and
Poland.
Khrushchev personally attaches a great deal of impor-
tance to tank troops, especially in the fight for Berlin.
These tank armies are equipped with guns and missiles
which are mounted on the tanks, as well as with the usual
machine guns and other automatic weapons.
So much importance is attached to taiiks in connection
 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 221

with the Berlin crisis that controversies have already

broken out in the General Staff regarding finances. They
are afraid that too much money has been allotted for the
tank troops and that there will not be enough for missiles,
electronics, and other types of equipment
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER VI

The years 1960 to 1962 spelled crisis to a great number of

professional Soviet officers. There was professional crisis,
in the beginnings of an unprecedented military debate
on the whole nature of the Soviet war machine. There was
personal crisis, with the wholesale transfers of officers in
the higher ranks and a gathering wave of forced retire-
ments and replacements. There was political crisis, as the
Soviet armed forces strained under the tight control of a
Party politician whose flair for international military risk-
taking was matched by the erratic nature of his domestic
military decisions.
In January 1960, Nikita Khrushchev made his famous
speech to the Supreme Soviet on the Soviet military
posture. He reminded his audience, and his generals, that
nuclear warfare in the missile age called for a new set
of strategic plans and postulates. By Khrushchev's lights,
the U.S.S.R. was strong enough to rely on its own nuclear
might as a deterrent to any "imperialist aggression." "Fire-
power for manpower" ran the slogan. Given the new rules
of nuclear warfare, Khrushchev went on, the Soviet Army
no longer needed such heavy ground forces. The Premier
and First Secretary accordingly proposed a reduction in
strength amounting to one third of his military man-
power.
What might be facetiously called Khrushchev's "more
rumble for a ruble" policy was a direct parallel to similar
attempts in the United States over the preceding fifteen
years to cut mass military strength in favor of "more
222
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 223

bang for a buck." The policy arose not only from Khru-
shchev's new look at Soviet strategy, but from his desperate
efforts to stretch the resources of the SovietUnion, which
were looking less and he could pay
less inexhaustible, so
for the expensive new missiles he kept brandishing, without
skimping on the industrial expansion he kept promising.
The announcement of this enforced demobilization partic-
ularly disturbed the Soviet generals, however, because it
came at a time when the Army's very position in Soviet
society, as well as its modem military concepts, was in a
state of confusion.
Historically, a Soviet general's billet has never been noted
for job security, although the fringe benefits, in season,
its

can be impressive. The collective mind of the Soviet Gen-

eral Staff —
and there is one, with full' consciousness of its
—
own and the national tradition ^has never forgotten the
bloodbath of the late thirties, when Stalin virtually wiped
out the higher echelons of the officer corps. Executions
extended into the thousands, and there are few Soviet his-
torians today who would defend any
of them. The great-
est strategist of the Union, Marshal Mikhail
Soviet
Tukhachevskiy, was shot in 1937 (along with his family)
for allegedly plotting with the Germans. (Ironically it was
Tukhachevskiy who kept warning Stalin about Hitler's
mihtary menace.) He was finally rehabilitated, by Khru-
shchev, and a two-volume edition of his works was pub-
lished in Moscow in 1963.
'nie thought of Tukhachevskiy, Marshal Vasiliy Blyuk-
her, and thousands less well known was
not far from the
average Soviet senior officer's mind after the regime's dis-
grace of Marshal Zhukov in 1957.^ Under the umbrella of
Zhukov's personal power, the post-Stalin Army had freed
itself of Communist Party control to a degree previously
unheard of. With Zhukov's removal, the Party bosses
moved back into the Defense Ministry and their control
apparatus had Khrushchev's name on it. By the spring of
1960 only two marshals were left on the active hst who had
not worked with Khrushchev in World War II, either at
Stalingrad or on the Ukrainian front. Those two were

1 With Penkovskiy the memory of the old purges was particularly

relevant.His uncle, the general, had been arrested in 1937 and
spent two years in prison. He was lucky to have escaped alive.
224

Konev and
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Sokolovskiy; and Konev, at least, 1
had1
porarily bought favor with his two-page denunciation of
Zhukov in Pravda three years before. They were both
tenP"

retired by the end of the year.

Khrushchev's drive to control the military was neither
singular nor sinister, taken in its Soviet context. Every
Soviet leader is put willy-nilly in the position of the
juggler trying to balance three rusty balls in the air: the
Army, the managerial leadership, and the Party ^with —
the KGB, one might add, acting as referee. These are
the time-honored components of the Soviet power struc-
ture. And, although the Soviet regime can increasingly be
influenced by popular stirrings, the interplay of these three
major forces remains the closest approximation of a
democratic check-and-balance system which the Soviet so-
ciety possesses. As long as a regime balances the three
balls skillfully, plays them off against each other, and
—
above all keeps them in the air, the regime is in good
shape. If one of the balls drops out of sight, watch out.
That is exactly what had been happening with the Army
in the late fifties, and Khrushchev was out to restore the
balance.
The two domestic enemies of the professional
great
and budget cuts. When the budget
soldier are politicians
cuts are accompanied by heavier political control, they are
all the more painful. With the political control dominated

by a mercurial amateur strategist who made decisions only

fitfully but concentrated all power in his hands, the gen-
erals' resentment was bound to grow.
By the summer of 1961, with the Berlin pot boiling
over and plans made for possible ground action in Europe,
Khrushchev had frozen 1960 demobilization project
his
As we see in the Papers, Penkovskiy thought they were a
fraud anyway. But Khrushchev had meanwhile com-
pounded the confusion among the generals by encouraging
a semipublic debate on the new shape of the Soviet military
machine. The debate was long overdue. It was essentially
the same argument about deterrents and "first-strike"
philosophies, mass retaliation versus the use of conven-
tional armaments, which had raged in the U.S. years
before. Because of the restrictions of the Stalin era, how-
ever, the Soviet strategists had not previously been al-
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 225

lowed a forum to discuss the implications of their un-

precedented new weapons.
The Soviet debate was something of a three-cornered
battle. There were the "traditionalists" and the "modern-
ists" within the Soviet General Staff. Then there was
Khrushchev. A more headlong "modernist" than any of
the generals, he was trying at the same time to keep the
armed forces under the Party's thumb. In his recent book
Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, 2 Thomas W. Wolfe
neatly summed up the problem:
". . the debate
. centered essentially on efforts
. . .

deeply involved, to reorient Soviet military doctrine and

forces in a direction considered more suitable for the needs
of the nuctear-missile age. These efforts have met with
varying degrees of resistance and dissent from some
quarters of the military, perhaps with tacit backing among
other elements of the Party-state bureaucracy whose in-
terests were engaged in one way or another."
The outward sign of the great military debate was the
1962 publication of the journal Military Strategy, a col-
lection of by Marshal Sokolovskiy and others,
articles
which appeared a year later in a second edition
also
with some meticulous revisions. This book, as Wolfe
labels it, was "the most ambitious treatment of doctrine
and strategy attempted in the Soviet Union in many years."
Although the Sokolovskiy articles wavered between the
modernist and traditionalist approaches, they tended to
favor the former. Sokolovskiy and his co-authors cover
such topics as the dangers of escalating local wars, the
use of nuclear power as a deterrent force, and the possible
necessity of a nuclear first-strike theory, in case war
threatened. Among American military commentators, these
themes have long been familiar. But they were a novelty
in the Soviet Union, where the regime likes to keep its

military discussions intensely private.

Behind these published observations was a much more
significantdocument, with a much more limited reader-
ship. The "Special Collection of Military Thought" was
published in Moscow in 1960 as a result of Khrushchev's
new look at military thinking. It was given a top-secret
classification, its distribution limited to division com-

2 Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1964.

226 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
manders and above. Khrushchev had encouraged some of
the younger generals to explore the possibiUties of a
blitzkrieg nuclear war, based on the premises that con-
ventional warfare is hopelessly outmoded. The "Special
Collection" was the result of their ponderings. (The
Sokolovskiy papers and other segments of the military
debate were directly inspired by the "Special Collection.")
The boldest of these thinkers. Lieutenant General A. I.
Gastilovich, Deputy Commandant of the General Staff
Academy, followed Khrushchev's lead in arguing that the
Strategic Rocket Forces were now the main branch of the
He advocated putting all the Soviet eggs in
Soviet military.
one big basket of missilery. "We will concede," he wrote,
"that nuclear weapons and missiles alter the conditions
of war, but having said 'a' we shrink from saying *b.'
After making our bow in the direction of missiles and in-
troducing some minor revisions in the theory of the
military art, we maintain the old positions we held
still

at the end of World II. We strive without success to

War
fit missile-nuclear weapons into the framework of the
familiar needs of our miUtary doctrine, only modernizing
it slightly. We forget that this doctrine bases itselfon the
use of weapons not comparable with contemporary
weapons."
The older marshals liked this not a bit. They pointed
out to Khrushchev that the NATO
countries were still ex-
panding their armament (this was, of course, in 1960 and
1961). Many of them were naturally conservative. An old
artilleryman still likes to see battles in terms of howitzers,
and old airmen are as dedicated to their obsolescent
bombers as cavalrymen were to their horses. "Of course
we must be interested in missiles," Varentsov used to say,
"but we must not ignore conventional artillery, our old
mother cannon."
Also, Khrushchev's obvious sponsorship of the modernist
views in the "Special Collection" added a disturbing new
dimension to their natural fears about new weaponry. As
Penkovskiy notes in the Papers, some of the authors of
the "Special Collection" went beyond the deterrent
philosophy which Khrushchev publicly advocated. They
pushed for a first-strike stance which was the next thing
to preventive war. The older generals were not especially
pro-American. But they were prudent men. And they were
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 227

painfully aware that the Soviet armed forces were being

moved to a cataclysmic first-strike mentality, when they
lacked the weapons to carry it through.
Penkovskiy shared their qualms, as he shared their con-
fidences. In 1961, when he himself first read the "Special
Collection," it looked ominously as if the Soviet Union
was being committed to a dangerous reflex principle of
"strike first and ask questions after fallout." Now, as then,
it remains a hair-raising prospect, completely out of line

with the peaceful image which the Soviet public-relations

—
machine continually propagates and hopelessly compro-
mising a nation whose people were then, as now, tired
of war.
Penkovskiy was horrified when he reflected on these
documents and their meaning. He was well aware of
Khrushchev's capricious command qualities, which some-
times drove Varentsov and the other generals to despair.
Now he had the added thought that the awful weapons
Kiirushchev was blustering with would be mobilized in a
first-strike posture, leading ultimately to preventive war.
Penkovskiy echoed the private opinions of Varentsov and
other generals in holding that such "adventurism" would
half-wittingly plunge the world into a war of thermo-
nuclear extermination, a war which everybody would
lose. Within the Soviet Army, Khrushchev's almost casual
displays of brinkmanship were regarded as reckless to the
point of folly. The First Secretary of the Party was not
only committing the cardinal military sin of threatening a
power he did not possess, but he was playing a gambler's
game of diplomacy in an awesome new dimension of war.
As an intelligence officer with more than the average
knowledge of the West's plans and people, Penkovskiy had
long felt sure that aggression would not come on the
Soviet Union from that quarter. He was less and less con-
fident of his own leader's prudence on this score. And in
1961, we must remember, there was little sign that
.

Khrushchev's reign could be overthrown three years later,

or ever.
There is no doubt that this fear and confusion among
his own helped form Colonel Penkovskiy's
officer friends
decision to work against his government. In the following
passages, and elsewhere in the Papers, he constantly
harps on the dictator's shabby treatment of a loyal officer
228 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
class. As a military technician he had no objection to a
modernization of forces. On the contrary, his own tech-
nological aptitudes fitted him remarkably well for the
new nuclear-age Army. But Penkovskiy was bitterly crit-
ical of the brutal way in which career oflBcers were thrown
out of the service, with the scantiest of pensions and
scanty prospects of finding another honorable, useful
career outside the Army. This he blamed on Khrushchev^
as did most of his friends. "His control of the Army is
strong," Penkovskiy writes sadly in the Papers. "As a
General Staff colonel, I hate to write this."
Penkovskiy's indignation expressed itself in a zealot's
direct logic: if Khrushchev was betraying the Army, he
would betray Khrushchev. This was no small part of his
rationale for working with outside powers in order to
bring down the regime he hated in his country. After all,
Lenin had once invoked the Germans to war against the
czar. Again, there emerges the Russian distinction be-
tween the narod and the nachalstvo, the people and the
regime. If this distinction is hard for some Americans to
comprehend, it is almost impossible for us to understand
the kind of regime the Soviet people have always lived
—
under and the detached, relatively helpless feeling of a
Soviet subject. In the U.S. the citizen thinks of the gov-
eniment as "we"; in Russia it has always been "they."
When the news of Penkovskiy's arrest and trial broke
in the West, some newspaper articles suggested that he
might have been part of a half-formed conspiracy against
Khrushchev among high-ranking Soviet Army officers. The
word "conspiracy" is overstatement. It is doubtful that
Penkovskiy ever thought of recruiting any co-plotters in
his lonely espionage activity; But there was a certain im-
plicit silent conspiracy against the regime in the form of
many like-minded protestors whose public silence was
governed by their inability to communicate with one an-
other. It is certain, as the Papers tell us, that Penkovskiy's
hatred of the Khrushchev regime mirrored a large gath-
ering resentment among the Soviet generals.
We know now that this resentment in the Army con-
tributed heavily to Khrushchev's eventual ouster. As
early as October 1961, Marshal Malinovskiy was at least
implicitly criticizing Khrushchev's military policies. By
the time the dam broke, in October 1964, Khrushchev's
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 229

"more rumble for a ruble" policies had been put in the

background. The huge conventional forces remained,
with more than a little restored caution about the use of
missiles and the advisability of a pre-emptive first strike.
By the early part of 1965, the generals had rushed into
print with harsh words about Khrushchev's governance,
as well as his military policies. "Bimgling and superficial
concepts," Marshal Zakharov, the new Soviet Chief of Staff,
wrote in Red Star. It was dangerous to base a whole de-
fense poUcy on the ICBM. "The Soviet Union," General
Shtemenko wrote in February, "is prepared to face the
fact that a war could last a long time." The first-strike
philosophy, therefore, was not the only military answer.
As another leading article in Red Star had it, in January
1965, the armed forces had been victimized by "bird-
brained planning."
Their language was beginning to sound like Penkov-
skiy's.
 CHAPTER VI

Khrushchev^s Army

On Victory Day, May 9, 1961, Khrushchev promoted 372

marshals and generals to their next respective ranks. All
those promoted to the rank of marshal and higher were
announced in the newspapers, but those promoted to vari-
ous grades of general were not. These latter promotions
were classified as generals were promoted
secret. Sixty
to full general, lieutenant and major general.
general,
Over three hundred colonels were promoted to the rank
of brigadier general. Sergey Sergeyevich Varentsov was
promoted (at last) to the rank of Chief Marshal of Ar-
tillery. My relative Valentin Antonovich Penkovskiy was
made a full general.
Among the GRU
personnel, eleven men were given
generals' Korenevskiy, Chief of the Information
ranks.
Directorate, is now a major general; his deputy,
Kholoptsev, is also a major general; the other nine were
promoted to brigadier general. Among those were:
Chizhov, Deputy Chief of the 3rd Directorate, Mayorov,
Secretary of the Party Committee of the Military Diplo-
matic Academy; Leontyev, who is now in Germany; V. I.
Sudin (I believe he is going to Turkey soon), Patrikeyev,
Vnukovskiy, and others.
This mass (and secret) promotion to generals' ranks ex-
plains much. This is how our "peacemaker" Khrushchev
fights for peace, this is how he is disarming. His military
"kitchen" is working at full speed.
There was another reason for the mass promotions
morale and discipline in the armed forces have fallen very
230
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 231

low. They are too low for some cheap promotions to fix.
It was not just the demobilization. It was Khrushchev's
political intrigues.
On January 14, 1960 when Khrushchev made the an-
nouncement about demobilization, he actually had no
thought of demobilizing either soldiers or officers. He
simply carried out a self-styled purge, and saw to it that
the first personnel dismissed were those who were either
sick, old, or insufficiently trusted. But then many good
officers followed, booted out for no clear reason. This
was his self-styled purge of the armed forces of the Soviet
Union.
The entire Army is in a state of turmoil; everyone in
the Army recalls Stalin and says that under Stalin things
were better, that is, Army, but
Stalin never insulted the
this scoundrel has dismissed good officers from the Army.
And now this same scoundrel lifts his goblet high and
drinks a toast, saying, "I love our Army." The officers
say to themselves, "You scoundrel, right now you are
drinking a toast to my health, and tomorrow I must die
for you. If I do stay alive, then two years from now you
will throw me out again."
When Khrushchev made a speech at the Military
Academy graduation, he announced that we were slowing
down demobilization and that the order had gone out to
the military commissariats to recall demobilized officers,
particularly the technical personnel. To this the officers
—
answered among themselves, of course: "Sure, now we
are needed again because we have Berlin, Germany, Cuba.
We may have to shed our blood again. When you dis-
missed us before, you did not even give us a decent pen-
sion, you just got rid of us because it was economically
expedient. You
gave 200 rubles to the officers and 300
rubles to generals —
ten rubles, or one gold piece a day,
that is your price for a general —
and with this money I
am supposed to live and support a family, etc.^ You
took away all our privileges after we had spent our entire
life in the service."
The situation in the Army is bad, as bad as it is in the
country. This old man Khrushchev wants to create marvels
iThe rubles mentioned here are obviously new rubles, the in-
flated official value of which is approximately one dollar.
232 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
during his lifetime in order, perhaps, to get a golden bust
or monument erected to himself while he is still aUve. He
is muddying the waters. He is the instigator, the inspirer,
the creator. Everyone says that what he is doing is dirty
and smacks of intrigue. If there were no Khrushchev, if he
were to die or be killed, the situation in the country would
undergo a very great change. He knows that he is old,
but still he Ues and lies and lies. He knows that his days
are numbered, but he still acts like a maniac. Probably his
age is making him senile. His thinking at the present time
is all along in one direction to make all kinds of adven-
tures. His -control of the Army is strong, however. As a
General Staff colonel, I hate to write this.
Here are some notes on our political direction. If I
have time, I will discuss in detail the 1st Military Section
in the Administrative Organs Department of the Central
Committee CPSU, as well as the Chief PoUtical Direc-
torate of the Ministry of Defense with the status of a
Central Committee's section. There is also a Supreme
Military Council directly under the Presidium of the
Central Committee CPSU, chaired by Khrushchev and in
his absence by Kozlov or Mikoyan. There are always a
few members of the Presidium of the Central Committee
CPSU in attendance at the meetings of the Supreme Mili-
tary Council. The Ministers of Defense and the com-
manders in chief of the service arms are automatically
members of the council. Minister MaHnovskiy is in this
case just an ordinary member of this council.
Each council member had the right to state his views at
meetings of the council on questions concerning his par-
ticular field of work. Each commander in chief speaks for
his own arm of the service and presents his problems to
the council members for their decision. In most cases
Malinovskiy just sits there and says nothing. A very dull
figure indeed! All the commanders in chief accept the
orders of Khrushchev or of other members of the Presid-
ium because they consider them more authoritative than
Minister Malinovskiy.
As a rule, the Supreme Military Council meets at defi-
nite intervals, but in cases of some extraordinary events
its meetings may be called more frequently. The presence

of all the commanders is not compulsory in cases- in which

the problems on the agenda concern certain specific arms
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 233

of troops or specific types of weapons. None of the

commanders in chief may have direct contact with any of
the plants or factories doing defense work. All contacts
and all instructions to civilian enterprises engaged in
defense work and the production of weapons are effected
through certain sections and directorates of the Central
Committee CPSU and the Council of Ministers. From
there directives are issued through the appropriate ministry
to the specific plant or factory.
Each member of the Central Committee Presidium
has under his control five or six ministers and state com-
mittees whose work he directs. And the ministers shake
with fear before these members of the Central Committee
Presidium.
Despite the fact that he is the President (Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.),
Brezhnev,2 as a member of the Central Committee
Presidium, is still responsible for many problems of de-
fense and armament.
In case of disagreements between the Ministry of De-
fense and civilian ministries on problems of military de-
liveries or weapon production, breakdown of a plan, short-
age of funds, etc., the Supreme Military Council and the
Central Committee CPSU decide. Once during Khru-
shchev's absence Marshal Biryuzov raised the question of
additional funds for missile tests in a council meeting.
Suslov and Mikoyan, who were present at the meeting,
failed to solve the problem. Varentsov said afterward:
"They started beating around the bush and kept talking,
but never reached a decision. If Stalin were alive, he
would have given the word and the whole thing would
have been resolved right then and there, but now it's a
big mess, just like a kolkhoz meeting. There is no order."
The armed forces are also controlled by the Central
Conmiittee CPSU through the political organs. There is a
Political Directorate in each Chief Directorate of the
Ministry of Defense and in each military district. Below
this level come political sections and Party organizations.
All of them get direction from the central point, the Cen-
tral Committee CPSU.

2 When Brezhnev became First Secretary of the CPSU in October

1964, he was replaced as President by Anastas Mikoyan.
234 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Political workers are the eyes and ears of the Army
or, at least,the Party's eyes and ears in the Army. I
discussed this subject before. I myself was a political
worker for a long time. But Zhukov was right in decreas-
ing the political workers* importance. He understood the
soldier's soul. He wanted to give the soldiers something
-besides political lectures and political information.
Khrushchev was scared when Zhukov cut down the politi-
cal aspect. He has now estabUshed a still greater political
control. More hours have been allocated for political study
—
and other kinds of propaganda in order to distract the
soldier from other thoughts. Nobody believes in Khru-
shchev's military policy. Of course, naen go back and serve.
One must feed his family. There is no other way in our
country. But the Army's mood is bad. Khriishchev knows
about this mood, and that is what he is so afraid of,
afraid that if a major war starts, soldiers will start nm-
ning. They will not fight for him. This is why he prefers
all sorts of minor clashes at the present time.
I remember that Varentsov once told me a very interest-
ing story about two officers, a major and a lieutenant
colonel, who were discharged from the Army and had no
jobs. Both were engineers and they had been fine of-
ficers in the Soviet Army. They went to see Patriarch
Aleksiy and told him they wanted to become priests.
Patriarch Aleksiy, who has a direct line to the Kremlin,
called Zhukov and told him: "Comrade Marshal, I have
here with me two oflBcers who want to become priests."
Zhukov answered: "Send them to me, and thank you for
letting me know about this." This happened a year before
Zhukov's trip to Yugoslavia.
Zhukov saw the two officers personally. They told him
the whole story, and Zhukov reinstated them in the Army.
After that, Zhukov wrote a detailed report to the Central
Committee and asked that the two officers not be arrested
and that no drastic action be taken against them. For
there might be other cases like this one and after all they
were good officers. The officers stated that in a legal sense
they had not done anything wrong because they knew
that according to the Soviet law and the Constitution all
clergymen in the Soviet Union are Communists and work
either under the Central Committee CPSU or in the KGB.
Why, then, could they not be priests? Besides, there is a
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 235

special committee under the Council of Ministers of the

U.S.S.R. which is responsible for all church affairs —
state institution. Everybody in Moscow was talking about
this case.
During the time when Khrushchev denounced the per-
sonality cult and had the intra-Party struggle with the
Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov group, Marshals Timo-
shenko, Rokossovskiy, and Konev had many points of
disagreement with Khrushchev, while they often agreed
with Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. In many cases
Voroshilov, too, was in disagreement with Khrushchev, as
was Pervukhin. But because all these leaders were quite
popular and well known among the Soviet people, Khru-
shchev was afraid to have them arrested or take other
strong measures against them. He just said "Let them stay;
:

the time will come when I can get rid of them."

Of course, he did get rid of Zhukov in the end. More
on Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov is loved by all
this.
Soviet officers and soldiers as well as by the entire popula-
tion. Oiir people call him "today's Suvorov" and "the
military genius of our time."
At first Khrushchev bestowed on Zhukov the honors
which he fully deserved. Zhukov was both Minister of
Defense and a member of the Presidium of the Central
Committee CPSU. Zhukov helped Khrushchev to consoli-
date full power in his hands at the time of the struggle
against the anti-Party group. He supported Khrushchev.
Later Khrushchev got scared of Zhukov. When Zhukov
was still in power, Khrushchev began to reduce the supple-
mentary pay for officers in order to save money for the
production of armament. Zhukov opposed this and de-
clared: "I do not want my officers to become beggars. If
they become beggars, they will not fight; indeed, nobody
will be able to recognize them as officers. An officer must
be well fed and be able to provide more or less adequate
support for his family." Zhukov hated Marshal Bulganin
intensely. When Zhukov was Commander of the
Sverdlovsk Military District, Bulganin telephoned him and
said, "This is Marshal Bulganin speaking." Zhukov an-
swered, "I do not know any such marshal," and hung up.

Zhukov was for centralization of authority in the Army.

He also reduced the time used for poUtical indoctrination.
236 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
As I said, he tried to lower the political workers to the
second echelon. All these things, however, were not the
main reason for Khrushchev's fear. A
case in point: Gen-
eral Shtemenko, who at that time was Chief of the GRU,
had organized a sabotage school near Moscow, where
about two hundred inveterate cutthroats were being
trained as saboteur agents and terrorists. Zhukov knew
about this school, but he had not reported its existence to
Khrushchev. At least what Khrushchev claimed.
this is

Actually I think this school had been in existence for

years. Besides, Zhukov had once stated, "The Army will
always follow me." All these things scared Khrushchev,
and he decided to get rid of Zhukov. This question was
decided secretly while Zhukov was in Yugoslavia.
When Zhukov returned from Yugoslavia, it was an-
nounced to him right at the airport that he had been re-
moved from his post of Minister of Defense. After this,
large meetings of Party activists were held in all cities,
and Zhukov's "cult of personality" was discredited on
Khrushchev's orders. A
large meeting of the Moscow
party aktiv was held which I myself attended. It was held
in St. George's Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. It
began with a speech by Khrushchev, who then left the
hall. Next came a speech delivered by a minister, who
also left the hall several times. Then came the regular
propaganda speeches directed against Zhukov. Finally the
minister returned once more and apologized for leaving
the hall so many times but said that he had been called to
the government.
In his speech at the meeting in the Kremlin, Khru-
shchev tried to prove that Zhukov was creating a new cult
of personality, was displaying some Napoleonic ways, and
was underestimating the role of the Party organs in the
armed forces. As an example of Zhukov's cult of per-
sonality, Khrushchev cited the fact that there was a large
picture of Zhukov on a white horse hanging on the wall
at the Soviet Army Club. "What else can it be called but
Zhukov's cult of personality?" But when Khrushchev had
seen this picture before, he had always admired it, saying:
"A fine picture! Zhukov is our hero and he has earned this
honor!"
That is how this scoundrel Khrushchev operates. When
he needed Zhukov, he called him a hero, but as soon as he
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 237

felt that full power was own hands, he decided to

in his
get rid of this popular hero. Zhukov's cult of personality
really scared him. But what about the cult of personality
he has created for himself? There is not a word about it
from him! Many people have already lost their heads for
criticizing Khrushchev's cult of personality. So, here is
truth for you, here are Lenin's standards of Party life!
My poor Russian people!
Khrushchev, criticized Zhukov also for his alleged
attempt to government civilian posts with military
fill

personnel. Zhukov, ostensibly, had proposed that Serov

be removed from the post of KGB Chairman, to be re-
placed by Marshal Konev. Khrushchev talked about this
at the meeting of the aktiv of the Moscow Military District
held on October 24 and 25. In the same speech Khru-
shchev accused Zhukov of creating the sabotage school,
etc. Actually the school had existed long before Zhukov's
time, and it exists now, and continues to train assassins
for Khrushchev's purpose. This, of course, is all right!
This is permissible! How I would like to see these cut-
throats attack Khrushchev and the Presidium one fine
day.
Soon after Zhukov's removal by a special decree of the
Council of Ministers he was permitted to retire from
service. He was given a pension of 5500 old rubles a
month.3
Zhukov has a nice apartment, on Granovskiy Street,
house no. 3, but he spends most of his time at his country
house near Moscow, on the Rublevskoye Highway.
Later, in 1961, during the Berlin crisis Khrushchev
proposed that Zhukov, Sokolovskiy, and Konev, to prove
their loyalty to the Party and the country, return to active
work with him. Sokolovskiy and Konev agreed, but Zhu-
kov refused although he is still in good physical condition
and could still do some work.
See what a scoundrel Khrushchev is! When Zhukov was
needed, he gave him a fourth star of Hero of the Soviet
Union. Then he dismissed him. Then for propaganda
purposes he wanted to use Zhukov once more. Zhukov
did the right thing by refusing.

3 This was not a large sum of money. A good pair of shoes,

for instance, cost 400 rubles at that time.
 238 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
The disagreement between Marshals Timoshenko,
Konev, Rokossovskiy and others on one side and Khru-
shchev on the other began after Zhukov was removed from
his duties. Another source of friction: Khrushchev had
reduced their pay and discontinued payments of the ad-
ditional money which they and other officers of the Soviet
Army had been getting; he had also reduced generals*
and officers' retirement pay. In addition, the marshals and
generals mentioned above did not agree with Khrushchev's
policy of cutting the Air Force, the ground forces, and
other —including
forces the Navy —
in favor of missile
armament.
In 1960 Sokolovskiy went to see Khrushchev and told
him: "Just look at the military forces which are needed,
and the money allocated for them. Under these conditions
I cannot provide adequate defense for the country. Look
how many enemy bases surround our country. I cannot
maintain the strength of the troops at the level at which it
should be especially in case of an enemy attack." Khru-
shchev answered him: "If that is what you think, then get
out of here."
After that, Khrushchev recalled Zakharov from East
Germany and appointed him Chief of the General Staff in
place of Sokolovskiy. He also recalled Chuykov from
Kiev, where he was Commander of the Kiev Military
District, Grechko by that time was already in Moscow.
Sokolovskiy, however, had prestige among the generals
and within the Army as a whole. Khrushchev therefore
had to play his game carefully, removing his adversaries
one by one, until finally he had got what he wanted. He
defeated the anti-Party group, then fired Zhukov, and also
got rid of the unwanted marshals, moving those who dis-
agreed with his policies to less important posts.
At the present time Khrushchev holds three offices:
one at the Central Committee, one in the Kremlin (as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers), and one at the
Ministry of Defense.
Although it is amusing, Khrushchev is called "Supreme
Commander in Chief." The Supreme Military Council
chaired by him often acts as substitute for the Minister of
Defense, making decisions concerning the least important
matters. Often Khrushchev, bypassing the minister, issues
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 239

directions to Vershinin, Moskalenko, Biryuzov, and

others.
After Khrushchev's purge of the Army, many generals
died from various illnesses, especially from heart attacks
and nervous breakdowns. Those deaths that have been
announced in the newspapers are just a few. Many took
their own lives. Asmall number resigned themselves to
their new status and tried to start a new life outside the
Army. For example, one former general started growing
strawberries, and his wife sold them at the market. The
general was helped by a peasant from a kolkhoz, who was
sick. So what happened? The general was accused of
engaging in private enterprise activities and exploitation
of another person's work; he was expelled from the Party
and his pension was taken away. And all this after he
had served more than thirty years in the Army and had
participated in two wars. This is how Khrushchev cares
for his people!
All officers, especially marshals and generals, were quite
unhappy when Khrushchev cut their pay and took away
many of the privileges which they had enjoyed imder
Stalin. The Chief of the General Staff is now paid a
monthly salary of 2000 rubles; the commanders in chief
of arms of troops, like Biryuzov, are paid 1800 rubles
per month; Varentsov is paid 1200 rubles per month. This
is the way Khrushchev is saving money for missiles. When
cutting pay and other material advantages, Khrushchev
said: "They have gotten fat! We cannot and must not raise
such intelligentsia and capitalists." Generals' and officers'
pensions were reduced by two to two and a half times.
Because no other sources of income are available for these
people in the Soviet Union, it is difficult even to make
ends meet on this pension.
Many marshals were against this policy of Khrushchev's;
but it is all carried out under the guise of reorganization
of the armed forces, economy, etc. Marshals Konev,
Sokolovskiy, and Timoshenko disagreed with Khru-
shchev and the dull-witted Malinovskiy on all questions
dealing with the reorganization of the armed forces and
especially on Khrushchev's policy in regard to the Army
personnel. "The reductions among the middle-level Army
officers will reduce them to a state of pitiful vegetation,"
they said.
240 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
At first the dismissed marshals and generals were not
invited anywhere. Later Khrushchev began to send invi-
tations to them to attend all sorts of receptions, banquets,
conferences. Eventually some were invited to return to
active service. Some of the marshals and generals sub-
mitted to Khrushchev and returned to the service. Others
went to work for Khrushchev out of fear for their own
fate. Besides, it must be remembered that all of them
have families who have to be fed and clothed.
Discontent within the Army still continues, especially
in connection with Khrushchev's reorganization of the
armed forces and the reduction of pay. Here are some of
the details.
As of January 1960, all previously established pensions
for retired generals and officers of the Soviet Army were
abolished. In the past, Soviet Army generals' and officers'
retirement pay was 90 to 100 per cent of their regular
pay when on active duty. Now the "ceiling" for colonels
is 2000 rubles.* For generals it is 3000 rubles, and at
that,only after twenty-five calendar years of active service
in theArmy. Those with less service than indicated above,
according to the new Khrushchev decision, are paid:
colonels from 1000 to 1400 rubles, and generals from
2000 2500 rubles per month. Because colonels and
to
generals used to get 4500 to 7000 rubles per month while
in active service, the difference is quite great. As a result,
the mood among the retired is very bad. Everybody
keeps his mouth shut. They know that any complaint
even this pension.
will result in losing
In the past the families of officers and generals who
died or were killed in the war received a pension averag-
ing 50 per cent of the salary of the deceased. As of
January 1, 1960, even these pensions were cut by more
than 50 per cent
Khrushchev is carrying out a so-called "rejuvenation"
of the Army. Large numbers of generals and officers who
are not in the best of health or whose record has been
marred in some way have been discharged after twenty
years of service.
All the money made available as the result of Khru-

4 Here Penkovskiy reverts to old rubles.

 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 241

—
shchev's reorganization ^the money saved in personnel,
dismissals, reductions in pay and pensions —^is used to
train new cadres for the missile service and for the pro-
duction of all types of missiles and sputniks. A new En-
gineering Missile Academy has been created. New
technical schools of different specialties have been organ-
ized. And new military plants for the production of mis-
siles and missile equipment are being built. They are
spending many billions of rubles on new equipment. An
enormous amount of money is also spent on supporting
the satellite countries and for other purposes. This, is the
economic reason for Khrushchev's reduction of the armed
forces and its personnel. It was not merely a purge.

Maneuvers in October

At the beginning of October 1961, the general strategic

military exercises will commence. There have never been
exercises like these in the history of the Soviet Army.
All the stalls of military districts and groups will par-
ticipate. All rear-area depots, etc., will also participate.
That is, absolutely every Soviet military installation will
take part in these games. The military establishments will
support these maneuvers as if a real war had begun. The
military staffs of all the people's democracies will also take
part.
These exercises will take place over the entire territory
of the Soviet Union and the territory of the people's
democracies, with the main strike directed against Ger-
many —on maps, of course. These maneuvers are called
strategic because all troop arms of the Soviet Army will
participate in them and because they are to be carried
out in great depth. The exercises will last about one month.
What is the purpose of these exercises? To take a close
look at everything as a whole, to see who is capable of
what, who is able to carry out an order for an offensive,
for an attack, for defense, etc.; to study staff training on
all levels, take a look at the combat readiness of the

troops, their co-operation and cohesion — and of course

to give them some good training.
These will be almost actual combat exercises, with just
242 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
one exception: there will be no actual enemy. Everyone
understands, of course, that the "probable enemy" is the
U.S. Recently included in this category are England,
France, West Germany, all the NATO
countries, and, most
recently, Japan.
If anything unfortunate occurs in Germany after the
signing of the East German peace treaty (which will be
signed immediately after the Twenty-second Party Con-
gress), these exercises will have brought everything up to
combat readiness and it will then be possible to deliver a
strike. This is what Khrushchev is underwriting, under the
guise of these maneuvers. He also insures that a peace
treaty with East Germany will be signed —
if, as Khrushchev

says, the NATO countries will swallow this second pill.

He considers that they swallowed their first pill on Au-
gust 13, 1961, when Berlin was closed off and the build-
ing of the wall began.
I learned about the Berlin closing four days before the
Soviet government actually closed it off.
Why is this done more or less in the open? Because
under modem conditions and with modem intelligence it
is very difficult to prepare for military operations secret-
ly, or for war. Under the guise of military exercises, Khru-

shchev is getting everything up to combat readiness. It is

even possible that during these military exercises actual
hostilities will start.
All of Moscow is now swarming with military rep-
resentatives of the countries of the people's democracies
and various Soviet military commanders. The city is over-
flowing with the military. The General Staff works night
and day. Some of these representatives from people's
democracies wear their uniforms, but many wear civilian
clothes.
Soviet troop maneuvers will be conducted jointly with
the troops of the people's democracies. During maneuvers
the divisions of the satellite countries are included in the
T/O of the SovietArmy. This is necessary because we
still do not them; they might tum their guns against
trust
the Soviets or run to the West.
The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, which opens
on October 17, 1961, will be the aggressor-congress. At
least that is what it should be called. The congress will be
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 243

very polemic in tone, and strong propaganda

speeches are
being readied for it.
Decisive speeches against imperialism and colonialism
have the following purposes: to untie our hands with the
blessings of the congress from the Soviet Union, from the
countries of the people's democracies, and from the Com-
munist Parties of capitalist countries, support the decisions
of the Twenty-second Party Congress. In other words, we
support the policy of Khrushchev and his government.
Then Khrushchev will act resolutely. That is to say: if,
after the congress is over, he leads us into war by his
policies, he will refer to the general support given these
policies by the Soviet population, represented by the dele-
gates the congress, as well as by all the Com-
at
munist countries and the world's Communist Parties.
Many leaders of Communist Parties in capitalist countries
are coming to the Twenty-second Party Congress some —
of them illegally, in secret. In this manner, Khrushchev
would like to win the support of all the Communist Parties
in the world, as well as to learn in advance which way they
will turn if hisadventure is launched.
It must be noted here that a resolution of the Soviet
government and the Central Committee CPSU was
adopted not to admit a single foreign delegation into the
Soviet Union during the month of October. They will
make every effort during this period to have as few
foreigners and foreign delegations in the Soviet union as
possible. Active preparations are already going on. The
hotels are being cleared of foreigners and rooms readied
for the visiting delegates and guests of the congress. Al-
though many foreigners and foreign delegations continue
to ask permission to visit the Soviet Union now, we are
refusing them under various pretexts.
Our GKKNR specialists are also very busy right now be-
cause they are taking an active part in the work of the
Twenty-second Party Congress.
All the Communist leaders who have been invited to
the congress will remain to celebrate the October Revolu-
tion and to view the parade which will be held in Red
Square on November 7.
Thorough preparations are already going on to set up
a very strict counterintelligence system in Moscow and
Moscow o blast.
244 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
To insure the success of the Twenty-second Party Con-
gress, a great many KGB
operational employees have
been called back from the various oblasts and republics,
including those employees in various educational institu-
tions.
Immediately after the Twenty-second Party Congress,
Khrushchev wants to sign the peace treaty with East Ger-
many. At the time of the signing he wants to have all of
his armed forces ready to strike if the need arises. This
is something which, by the way, he intends to be the first
to do. If there only a local skirmish, he will be ready
is

to repel it, butthings reach a world scale, he feels

if

that he must be absolutely ready to deliver the first strike.

At the present time a third army, the 8th Mechanized
Army, is being sent into the territory of the German
Democratic Republic. Before this there were only two. This
was mentioned by Malinovskiy as he was leaving Varent-
sov's party before going to Lvov. He said that he must
go and take a look at how our 8th Army was preparing to
move to Germany. This army is being sent to Germany
from the Transcarpathian Military District. It consists of
three tank divisions and two motorized divisions. At the
same time, six regiments of antiair defense of the V-75
type are being urgently sent to Germany; I do not know
where these were previously stationed. The V-75 is a two-
stage missile. These are individual regiments in the PVO
[antiaircraft defense] system.
A decision has been made to defer the discharges from
the Soviet Army of which Khrushchev spoke earlier. If
these soldiers and ofl&cers are not discharged, troop
strength will increase by 400,000. A decision has been
made to put off demobilization until spring. This is Khru-
shchev's policy. If the Western states swallow the second
pill, agree to a peace treaty with East Germany, and rec-

ognize it, then after this there may be a decision about

demobilizing the Army. Not at present.
During the Twenty-second Party Congress, all military
units have been instructed to be at combat readiness No. 1.
Pozovnyy also told me that the PVO troops have been
brought up to combat readiness and are ready to fire at
any moment.
The Berlin problem is not on the agenda of the Twen-
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 245

ty-second Party Congress. But during the sessions of

congresses there are always various secret and so-called
"official" meetings, to take advantage of the presence of
all the members of the Central Committee even before
the congress —
to be announced subsequently to the mem-
bers of the Central Committee CPSU. It may also hap-
pen that Khrushchev be removed. Then there is the
will
third possibility —
^that Klirushchev will overcome them all,
carry through his policy, and run the risk of war.

Civil Defense

On August 17, 1961, by a decree of the Central Com-

CPSU and the Soviet government, a Civil Defense
mittee
Command was created. Marshal Chuykov was appointed
Chief of the Civil Defense of the Soviet Union, hav-
ing been relieved of his duties of the Commander of
Ground Forces.
A special regulation states that the Civil Defense Com-
mand will be directly subordinate to the Minister of De-
fense. This conmiand was created for a "special period."
It has the task of protecting the population from enemy
strikes. This special period is set by the Party, the gov-
ernment, and the military command. The term refers to a
time in which the Soviet authorities consider that
hostilities may commence.
The regulations on Civil Defense list the duties of all
the ministries, the vehicle industry, motor transport, rail-
roads; what is expected of the Ministry of Defense, etc.
Every government establishment and ministry in its own
way takes care of defense and evacuation procedures with-
in its area of responsibility. These regulations indicate
various underground structures, shelters for people, and
equipment, etc. Although it is called the Civil Defense
Command, Chuykov's title is not Commander but Chief
of Civil Defense.
At the present time the post of the Commander of
Ground Forces under the Ministry of Defense is vacant,
because Chuykov left it. According to Varentsov, it has
been suggested that the new commander will be Krylov. He
is now Commander of the Moscow Military District. There
246 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
are rumors that he has refused this new post. For the
time being, the duties are being discharged by Zhadov.
This man's name used to be Zhidov, but Stalin changed
the "i" to an "a," and now he is 23iadov.^
The structure of the Civil Defense Command will be
as follows: at the top will be the Civil Defense High
Command, and in each military district will be subunits.
The regulation states that the civil defense subunits must
work in very close co-ordination with ablast, kray, rayon,
and other local party and Soviet organs.^

Chemical Warfare

In preparing for atomic and hydrogen warfare, Khru-

I
shchev is also preparing for chemical warfare. There is a
special 7th Directorate in the General Staff which is in-
volved in working out methods of chemical and
bacteriological warfare. The Chief Chemical Directorate
of the Ministry of Defense is also concerned with the
problems of chemical and bacteriological warfare. We also
have the Voroshilov Military Academy of Chemical De-
fense, several military-chemical schools and scientific-re-
search institutes and laboratories in the fields of chemistry
and bacteriology.
Near Moscow there a special proving ground for
is

chemical defense. I know

a new gas has been invented
which is colorless, tasteless, and without odor. The gas is
avowed to be very effective and highly toxic. The
secret of the gas is not known to me. It has been named
"American"; why this name was chosen, I can only guess.
Many places in the country have experimental centers
for testing various chemical and bacteriological devices.
One such base is in Kaluga. The commanding oflftcer of
5 Stalin considered the name "Zhidov" to have a "Jewish"
sound to while Zhadov was more Russian. The word zhid in
it,

Russian means "Jew" and is derogatory, among generally anti-

Semitic Soviet leaders.
6 It is interesting tonote that this new network of civil defense
units, under Chuykov's command, was only recently announced of-
ficially. U.S. newspapers carried a news item about it on March
17, 1965.
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 247

this base is Nikolay Varentsov, the brother of Sergey

Sergeyevich Varentsov.
Near the city of Kalinin, on a small island in the Volga,
there is a special bacteriological storage place. Here
they keep large containers with bacilU of plagues and
other contagious diseases. The entire island is surrounded
by barbed wire and is very securely guarded. But my
readers must not be under any illusions. This is not the
only place where there are such containers. Soviet artillery
units all are regularly equipped with chemical-warfare
shells. They are at the gun sites, and our artillery is
routinely trained in their use. And let there be no doubt:
if hostilities should erupt, the Soviet Army would use

chemical weapons against its opponents. The political

decision has been made, and our strategic military plan-
ners have developed a doctrine which permits the com-
mander in the field to decide whether to use chemical
weapons, and when and where.
I recently read an article which wastes no time and
minces no words on this subject. It opens with the state-
ment that under modem conditions, highly toxic chemical
agents are one of the most powerful means of destroy-
ing the enemy. Then the article describes the character-
istics of chemical weapons and the principles of using
them effectively in combat. There is no mention made of
waiting until the enemy uses chemical weapons; there is
no reference to the need for a high-level political de-
cision for the use of such weapons. From start to finish
the article makes it clear that this decision has been
made, that chemical shells and missiles may be considered
just ordinaryweapons available to the military command-
er, by him when the situation calls
to be used routinely
for it. The article specifically states: "The commander
of the army (front) makes the decision to use chemical
weapons. . .
."

The authors add that one of the most important uses

for chemical missiles will be the destruction of the enemy's
nuclear-strike capability. Specific mention is made of the
"Little John," "Honest John," "Lacrosse," "Corporal,"
"Redstone," and "Sergeant" imits, the width and depth
of their dispersed formations under tactical conditions,
and their vulnerabilities to the chemical attack. Also Amer-
248 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
ican cruise missile and atomic artillery units. The article
contains the usual precautions about the necessity of pre-
venting damage to friendly troops, and discusses the op-
erational situations in which chemical weapons could be
used to greatest advantage. This is how it concludes:
"The purpose of this article is to present the main
fundamental principles of using chemical missiles. Those
principles should not, under any circumstances, be con-
sidered as firmly established, because they can be de-
fined with greater precision as practical experience is ac-
cumulated."
Soviet officers generally consider Americans to be ex-
tremely lax in matters of training and discipline for de-
fense against chemical attack. I have heard that American
soldiers even boast of throwing away their gas masks and
other protective equipment and claiming they have lost
them. I can hardly believe this, but even if it is only
partly true, it is a training deficiency which must be cor-
rected immediately. Such crucial flaws in an enemy's de-
fensive armor are not overlooked by Soviet planners.

The New Military Doctrine

In 1958 a seminar-discussion began in the General Staff
on problems of military art and a future war. All high-
ranking officers, from army commander up, representa-
tives of all arms of troops, participated in these seminars.
The seminars were of a secret nature, and the conversa-
tions and discussions that took place there must not be
revealed to any outsiders. The basic questions discussed
were those of a future war and the state of Soviet Military
art.
By 1959 all the top military brains of the General Staff
agreed that Soviet military doctrine needed to be revised.
Future strategy must be developed on the basis, fiirst of
all, of the availabihty of nuclear weapons and missiles.

Beginning in 1960, the magazine Military Thought

started periodic publication of a top secret "Special Col-
lection of Articles." It was devoted to a discussion of the
problems of a future war and of the new Soviet military
doctrine.
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 249

Among the authors of the collection are the Minister of

Defense, hisdeputy, commanders of military districts,
senior officers of the General Staff, chiefs of military
academies, and the professors and teachers of the higher
miUtary educational institutions.
I have had my own interest in the "Special Collection."
I have read it from cover to cover, making appropriate
notes. I have jotted down some passages as particulariy
meaningful. The theme for the entire series was set by
Lieutenant General Gastilovich in his article **The Theory
of Military Art Needs Review" (Special Collection No. 1,
1960). Noting that wars formeriy began on the borders of
warring countries, where troops were concentrated, he
says: "If war starts now, military actions will evolve in a
different way because countries have available means of
delivering weapons over thousands of kilometers. . . .

"About 100 nuclear charges, exploded in a brief period

of t^e in a highly industrialized country with a ter-
ritory of about 300-500 thousand square kilometers, will
suffice to transform all of its industrial areas and ad-
ministrative-political centers into a heap of ruins, and
the territory into a lifeless desert contaminated with dead-
ly radioactive substances."
This is their premise. Gastilovich concludes his long
discussion of warfare under conditions of nuclear arma-
ment with an invitation to Soviet military leaders and
theoreticians to contribute their thoughts in the form of
articles to the "Special Collection." I hope the notes on
the "Special Collection" will suffice to give my readers a
clear picture of the military doctrine which is evolving
in the Soviet Union. It would be more accurate to say
this doctrine has already evolved.
One thing must be clearly imderstood. If someone were
to hand to an American general, an English general, and
a Soviet general the same set of objective facts and scien-
tific data, with instructions that these facts and data must

be accepted as unimpeachable, and an analysis made and

conclusions drawn on the basis of them, it is possible
that the American and the Englishman would reach sim-
ilar conclusions —
I don't know. But the Soviet general
would arrive at conclusions which would be radically dif-
ferent from the other two. This is because, first of all, he
250 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
begins from a completely different set of basic premises
and preconceived ideas, namely, the Marxian concepts of
the structure of society and the course of history. Sec-
ond, the logical process in his mind is totally unlike that
of his Western counterparts, because he uses Marxist
dialectics, whereas they will use some form of deductive
reasoning. Third, a different set of moral laws governs and
restricts the behavior of the Soviet Fourth, the Soviet
general's aims will be radically different from those of the
American and the Englishman. Here is an example an —
article on nuclear/ missile armament by Major General of
the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryainov. You will
see how he uses American data, taken from open Amer-
ican sources, on the characteristics and effects of nuclear
weapons, and you will see that the conclusions he reaches
are quite different from those which were reached by the
Americans who used the same facts.
Goryainov complains that nuclear weapons are not yet
being evaluated properly. He thinks the necessary re-
shaping of tactical and operational doctrines to take best
advantage of this new warfare is proceeding too slowly
and somewhat in the wrong direction. To quote him:
"Specifically, the reason for this is that the new weap-
onry is for the most part considered as a way of increasing
the fire-power of the Army to a considerable degree; there-
fore from the organizational viewpoint, there is basically
nothing new here. There has appeared a new technical
—
means of combat a new arm of troops has been created,
as happened with aircraft, tanks, and even earlier, with
artillery. The old arms of troops are modernized as much
as possible and *assimilate' nuclear charges and missiles.
Armies continue to consist of the usual arms of troops
(modernized, of course) — ^plus missile troops.
"In other words, the process of assimilating the new
weapons which is occurring now can be characterized in
the following way: based on the experience of the past
and considering the achievements of the present, armies
are adapting nuclear/ missile weapons to the established
views on the preparation for and conduct of war.
—
"This is a logical process sanctified by past experience
— of an empirical approach to the solution of problems
which have not been greatly explored. Such an approach.
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 251

the only one which is possible and normal for the mili-
tary science of capitalist countries, is completely out of
the question for the armies of the socialist countries,
whose military science is built on Marxist-Leninist teach-
ings on war. It is obvious that we must go faster and
further both in the theory of using nuclear/ missile weap-
ons and in their production."
Having set the proper political tone, he assumes a very
serious, studious air of objectivity —
^what a fraud ^to ex- —
plain why he is forced to use American data in his
study: He can't get access to similar data on our own
Soviet weapons!

What is at the heart of Goryainov's views? The fact

that maximum radioactive fallout is now to be considered
a military advantage. After citing pages of facts and
figures from American sources, he says clearly in his text:
". . . radioactive contamination of terrain by megaton
bombs can be a principal factor of combat.'*
At another point in his text he says, "In our view, it
should be absolutely clear from the above that nuclear
bombs of great yield are above all a means of radiological
contamination of vast areas with all the resulting con-
sequences."
There is the difference between Western logic and Marx-
ist dialectics! The Americans are always trying to reduce
fallout, and on the basis of their own data General
Goryainov concludes that fallout should be maximized!
With this in mind, he goes on to say:
"The chemical composition of the ground and soils of
the blast areas can also be very influential in increasing
the effectiveness of the blast products. Such elements
as sodium, iron, silicon, and others can increase sub-
stantially the radioactive mass of particles which are
blown up into the air. An exact knowledge of local
meteorological conditions in possible strike areas acquires
enormous significance in the proper use of powerful
bombs. One should study these conditions well in ad-
vance. . .
."

In this statement we can see the germ of a requirement

for the GRU. Soon some of my colleagues, perhaps as-
sistant military attaches in Washington, London, or Paris,
252 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
will be out buying unclassified geologic studies and maps
of the areas of the major population and industrial cen-
ters, so that Goryainov and his analysts can calculate the
precise size and type of weapon, and the exact height
of burst to create optimum radioactive fallout in each
target area. Goryainov goes on to extol the military virtues
of large bombs (in the megaton range) over small bombs.
This is because the large bomb can contaminate with
radioactive fallout a much larger area. He analyzes the
number of weapons required to defeat the United States
(he figures would take about 120 bombs of twenty-
it

megaton and moves on to study

yield, properly placed)
the question "Is victory for one side possible in the age
of nuclear weapons?'*
It is, he says. Probably not under conditions of a pro-
longed nuclear/ missile war, but to quote the most sig-
nificant statement in his paper:
"Victory by one side depends on readiness and ability to
finish the war in the shortest possible time."
The impUcations of this statement are clear.
It is important for Westerners to know and understand
the new Soviet military doctrine; it is equally important
to know and understand the Soviet concept of Western
military doctrine. The Soviet concept of Western doctrine
could be and, in my opinion, is vastly different from
Westerners' concept of their own doctrine. For the of-
ficial Soviet concept of the U.S. and British military

doctrines must fit the Marxist concepts of the nature of

capitalism and the course of history. If objective facts
(for instance, intelligence reports) do not seem compatible
with the Marxist concepts, it is the function of dialectics to
warp and bend them until they are; Goryainov gives a
politically correct analysis of the Western position:
"How are these new conditions reflected in the interests
and the ideology of the warring classes?
"First of all, it must be kept in mind that no normal

man can be interested in the destruction of mankind. This

is seen differently, however, from the viewpoint of the rul-

ing classes, which are disappearing from the historical

scene.
"History has shown more than once that a dying class,
a dying social order, produces theories and dogmas of
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 253

human destruction characterized by such phrases as,

*apr^s le deluge* and 'better dead than Red.* For
moi
reactionary forces, who are doomed to perish because of
historical hopelessness, a long war (like any other war) is
not ruled out, particularly because preparation for such a
war is economically advantageous for certain monopolistic
circles.
"Preparation for an extended war is immensely more
costly than for a shortwar and thus the profits of cap-
italists immensely higher.
"Therefore, because of economic reasons and partly be-
cause of the aspirations of groups connected with mili-
tary production which are out to preserve the command-
ing position they hold in the economy of a country like
the U.S.A., the theory of an extended war is circulated
very widely. This theory ties in well with the necessity
of keeping colonial and economically underdeveloped
war and even to thrust wars
countries under the threat of
upon them.
"The interests of the progressive forces of the world
dictate a different approach. The material prerequisites
for the victory of the socialist system over the capitalist
system by using peaceful means have already been
created. Therefore the progressive forces are keenly in-
terested in avoiding war. But if war becomes inevitable,
the newworld, of course; must strive to keep war losses
to a it should, therefore, do everything
minimimi and
possible to keep the war short and, in any case, to put an
end to the decisive phase of the war prior to substantial
atmospheric contamination over large areas!"
In striving for political correctness, from the Marxist
point of view, an author is frequently led into contradic-
tions. For instance, Goryainov says that the capitalist
coimtries favored blitzkrieg because they were afraid that
arming the masses and conducting prolonged wars would
lead to revolution. On the very next page he says that
capitaUsts favor long wars because they lead to greater
profits. Now, I fear for the health of any Soviet citizen
who dares to say that arming the masses in capitalist
countries would not lead to revolution, and also for any
Soviet who might say capitalists prefer shorter wars and
smaller profits. Probably no one has pointed out this
 254 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
contradiction to Goryainov, because it is safer to avoid
such prickly questions.

I am
sorry that I cannot copy here the entire "Speci
|i
Collection." I have sent it to my intelligence contacts. I
will, however, give my views on it, for in my opinion the
trend in it is unmistakable, as is the nature of the final
doctrine which will emerge from this discussion.
First, let me say that virtually all the authors recognize
the importance of the first thermonuclear strike.
In the first place, to be the first one to deliver a nuclear
strike is important not only as far as the initial stage of
the war is concerned, but also because it concerns the en-
tire course and the outcome of the war.
Secondly, strategic nuclear missiles, which will play a
tremendous part in the initial stage of the war, will also
make it possible to achieve the necessary strategic goals
of the war within the shortest possible time.
All military men understand perfectly that the final
decision "to attack" rests with the political leadership, in
this case with the Presidium of the Central Committee
CPSU and with Khrushchev personally. Participating in
the discussion, the Soviet generals naturally try to do
everything in their power to prove their abilities to Khru-
shchev and to earn his praise.
This new military doctrine must become, or perhaps
has already become, a sort of guide for the Soviet state
in preparing its armed forces for a war, and it sets forth
in detail where and how future military actions should
start.
A future war with a sudden nuclear strike
will begin
against the enemy. There will be no declaration of war.
Quite to the contrary, an effort will be made to avoid a
declaration of war. When circumstances are favorable
for delivering the first nuclear strike, the Soviet Union
will deliver this strike under the pretense of defending it-
self from an aggressor. In this way it will seize the ini-
tiative.
All operational-strategic plans of a future war are being
developed in this direction; This does not mean that the
plans exclude so-called local wars; on the contrary, Khru-
shchev is for local wars as a prelude to a future "big"
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 255

war, for which intensive preparations are being made.

Knowing the meaning of Khrushchev's slogans on
"peaceful coexistence" and "the struggle for peace," So-
viet military leaders are making intensive preparations for
a future war, although many of them are against any kind
—
of war actually they are for peace. They are working out
war plans as professional soldiers, carrying their Party
cards in their pockets. These cards compel them to carry
out implicitly the dkectives of the Presidium of the Cen-
tral Committee CPSU and those of Khrushchev personal-
ly. After all, they occupy their high posts only thanks to
the Party card, which, as we say, "gives them food and
drink."
Despite the fact that all authors of the "Special Col-
lection" agree with the importance of the initial sudden
strike, some of them realistically suggest that the fol-
lowing term be included in the doctrine: "Try to achieve
victory with a short war (by a lightning strike) but be pre-
pared for a prolonged war."
The Soviet Union does not wish to wage a long war.
The Soviet Union will not be able to achieve victory in a
long war because the country's economy and the people's
morale willnot endure prolonged ordeals. Gastilovich's
article says: "One cannot replace strategic art by urgent
demands on the moral fiber of the people, and neither can
one plan strategy on the basis of fear of calculated risk
and the sacrifices connected with it."
As a General Staff officer, as a true fighter for peace,
and as a soldier of a new army fighting for freedom and
democracy, I have made my own conclusions about the
new Soviet military doctrine. I do not wish, however, for
my countrymen here in the U.S.S.R. as well as the people
of the West and of the entire world to think that these
are my own personal conclusions alone. I have tried to
substantiate all I said above about the new Soviet mili-
tary doctrine and Soviet plans for a sudden attack with
facts and documents which I saw due to my official posi-
tion. I am certain that I and many others Uke me have
provided sufficient military information to the Western in-
telligence services to confirm my words fully.
Khrushchev's peculiar variety of "peaceful coexistence"
has advanced so far that Khrushchev could decide for
256 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
the period of 1962-63 ". basically to complete the
. .

production of the necessary number of strategic missiles

with nuclear warheads so that by adding them to the weap-
ons of mass destruction which are already available one
may be capable of directing these weapons against all
the NATO countries and their bases." (Such missiles are
already directed against England, Italy, and the U.S.A.;
ballistic weapons have been made combat-ready. large A
number of laimching mounts against West Germany are
in the Carpathian Mountains.)
Once and for all, preference has been given to Mos-
kalenko*s missile troops. His staff and control wiU not be
combined with Varentsov's. The infantry and tanks will
not be given so much attention and money as was done
previously, in 1960. The number of Moskalenko's troops
will be increased quickly, and a very large portion of the
budget wUl be given to them. In the near future new units
will be deployed under Moskalenko's command. It is con-
sidered that the large number of tanks and other infantry
weapons which are at hand are sufficient for the present,
and it is necessary to make a mass shift in the country's
material and technical potential toward weapons for Mos-
kalenko's troops. This does not mean that the production
of missile and other weapons for an infantry army will
cease completely, but the scale will be reduced.
Although at the present time Khrushchev prefers to wage
small wars and to avoid a world war, Khrushchev and the
members of the Presidium of the Central Committee
CPSU have adopted the new military doctrine of the sud-
den employing atomic and hydrogen bombs for their
strike
strict guidance. The entire economy of the country is
directed toward this end. An urgent reorganization of all
the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. is being conducted.
It should be taken into account here that the Anglo-
American forces, as well as NATO
as a whole, are
capable of a strong counterblow, in connection with which
the antiair defense troops are being quickly reorganized
and strengthened. That is why the Chief Headquarters
for Civilian Defense was created.
Having failed to resolve the Berlin and other interna-
tional crises according to his own taste and desire by
 KHRUSHCHEV'S ARMY 257

shouts, threats, etc.,Khrushchev continues to struggle to

gain time. He uses this time to continue further the mad
nuclear and missile armament race.
People of the world, be vigilant!
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER VII

In the days before the revolution quiet old ladies used

to sell flowers {tsvety) along the broad center strip of
Tsvetnoy Boulevard. Some still do. The boulevard, a pleas-
ant, tree-lined double thoroughfare between Trubnaya
Square and Samotechnaya Square, lies in the heart of
Moscow, not far from the old "Birds Market" which
Chekhov lovingly recalls in the essay "On Trubnaya
Square."
Late in the afternoon, one bright September day in 1961,
three pleasant English children were plajdng by a sandbox
along the boulevard, while their mother sat watching them
on a bench nearby. A well-dressed Russian civilian stopped
for a moment near the children, evidently in the course
of a leisurely walk. He smiled, talked to them for a mo-
ment or two, and offered one child a box of candy which
he had pulled out of his pocket. The child accepted the
candy and the smiling stranger walked on. Then the child
brought the candy box over to the mother, as children
often do.
It was in this manner that Oleg Penkovskiy transmitted
a highly important package of exposed film concealed in
the package of Drazhe candy drops, to Mrs. Janet Anne
Chisholm, the wife of an attache in the British Embassy
in Moscow.
Penkovskiy had met Mrs. Chisholm during his second
trip to London and he had been drilled in this procedure
by his Western intelligence contacts. A month before,
GreviUe Wynne had arrived again in Moscow to attend
258
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 259

the French industrial fair. Penkovskiy as usual had visited

him at his hotel. In Wynne's room at the Metropol,
Penkovskiy had turned over film and several packets of
information, as well as a broken Minox camera (he had
dropped it during one of his nocturnal photography ses-
sions). Wynne gave him a replacement camera, as well as
the little box of Drazhe lozenges to use in the contact
with Mrs. Chisholm, along with detailed instructions for
rneeting the children. The box was just big enough for
four rolls of film.
The meeting with Mrs. Chisholm was the first contact
Penkovskiy made with a person other than Wynne. In a
city where foreigners are as closely watched as they are
in Moscow, the novelty of "the meeting" was understand-
able, to say nothing of their caution in arranging it.
Wynne, however, Penkovskiy could meet without fear of
suspicion, virtually as often as he wished. Not only was
Penkovskiy Wynne's official contact on the Committee,
but Wynne represented a promising prospect for the
GRU, which was anxious to recruit a British businessman
for use as an agent. As far as his military intelligence
superiors were concerned, Penkovskiy was "developing"
him. When Penkovskiy saw Wynne in August, he told
him that he was about to take a trip to Paris himself
with another Soviet trade delegation for the purpose of
attending the Soviet industrial fair there.
When Penkovskiy arrived at Le Bourget Airport, near
Paris, on September 20, 1961, Wynne met him and drove
him to his hotel. Not knowing the exact day of his arrival,
Wynne had gone to the airport for two weeks, watching
every Moscow flight. From the standpoint of Western in-
telligence, his vigil was well spent. Penkovskiy brought
with him at least fifteen rolls of exposed film: photographs
of documents, secret processes, missile design, highly clas-
sified military memoranda, and other pieces of scientific
and technical information which his Soviet accusers later
nicely lumped together under the heading "espionage ma-
terial."
Three days after Penkovskiy's arrival, Wynne drove
him to one of the Seine bridges, where he was met, a
few minutes later, by one of the Anglo-American intelli-
gence officers. The four members of the Anglo-American
intelligence team evidently saw a great deal of Penkovskiy
260 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
during the next month, when he was not conferring at
the Soviet Embassy or visiting the Soviet exhibition in
Paris, which had been the pretext for this trip.
Penkovskiy worked hard with his intelligence contacts
during this third visit to the West. He not only discussed
his information at some length, but he laid the ground-
work for a system of contacts in Moscow by which he
could later transmit information and receive instructions
with a minimal amount of risk. Here, ironically, the terse
language of his Soviet trial provides a concise account of
a most successful intelligence mission:
"While in Paris, Penkovskiy repeatedly met representa-
tives of the British and American intelligence services at
secret apartments. At these meetings he reported about
the official assignment which he had been given for his
stay in France, discussed a number of workers at the
Soviet Embassy in Paris in whom the inteUigence officers
were interested, identified those persons for them in photo-
graphs, gave them brief histories of these persons, and on
a floor plan of the Soviet Embassy showed them the
places where those persons worked. In addition, he rec-
ognized and identified for them, on the basis of photo-
graphs, several other Soviet citizens who were of interest
to the intelligence services,he gave important informa-
tion, underwent instruction in espionage work, and re-
ceived this assignment: to continue to photograph secret
materials; select in Moscow and describe in detail eight
to ten dead drops for impersonal contact with the in-
telligence services; establish new friendships among officers
and workers of the State Committee for the Co-ordina-
tion of Scientific Research Work; study the possibility of
obtaining espionage information from them; and collect
information concerning new Soviet military equipment by
making use of his acquaintance with members of the rocket
forces. In addition, in Paris, Penkovskiy continued to study
espionage radio equipment which the foreign intelligence
officers promised to send him in Moscow through Wynne
or Janet Anne Chisholm.
"During one of the meetings Janet Anne Chisholm was
present and specffic details were worked out for main-
taining contact between her and Penkovskiy in Moscow.
At the next meeting in Paris, Penkovskiy was introduced
to a highly placed person in American inteUigence. . . .
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 261

"Having received from the foreign intelligence services

in Paris thirty rolls of film and new treated paper for
the preparation of secret reports, Penkovskiy returned to
"
Moscow on October 16, 1961
What the Soviet indictment naturally did not include
was the fact thatmost of the "Soviet citizens" Penkovskiy
discussed were themselves members of either the GRU
or KGB. It is clear that Penkovskiy gave precise details
of the large Soviet inteUigence and subversive network
operating out of the Paris embassy. In intelligence terms,
he "blew" a major segment of the Soviet spy network.
In this Paris visit Penkovskiy behaved with his custom-
ary energy. He continued to handle a multitude of varied
tasks and interests conjointly —^performing all with Faust-
ian zest. (This is probably one reason why his Soviet
superiors took so long to credit the suspicion tiiat he might
be playing a double game.) We can only conclude that the
Colonel took more than a little pleasure in playing his
perilous double game. In Paris as in London he was an
avid tourist. The paintings in the Louvre and the night-
club extravaganzas at the Lido he absorbed with ap-
parently equal interest. The experience of the West was
stni new, still strangely free.
In his own memoirs, published in London in September
1964,^ Wynne recalled some of his companion's impres-
sions. By now they had become good friends:
"He used to attend the Embassy or the exhibition dur-
ing the day; go to some official dinners at the Embassy;
but whenever he got away I was always waiting for him
in a car at a prearranged rendezvous and in Paris you
can easily lose yourself. So we had quite a lot of amuse-
ment there, doing the usual tourist things, and he seemed
to enjoy it very much. But he said he preferred England.
"Later, when we were in Paris, we went to cabarets at
the Lido and Moulin Rouge. It was the first time he had
ever seen such spectacular shows, with the chorus girls
in line: they don't have that in Moscow. 'Why can't the
Russians have this, too?' he said. 'It is a lively and happy
art, and not so serious as the ballet.'
Yet Oleg Penkovskiy was hardly the Russian version of

1 Copyright London Sunday Telegraph, Reprinted with permis-

sion.
262 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
the stereotyped "How you going to keep 'em down on the
farm" Parisian tourist. When he had time to himself in
Paris, as in London, he would simply walk the streets, ob-
serving people and looking in shop windows. The dif-
ferences between this open society and his own were borne
in upon him in the smallest ways, e.g., rather vain about
his looks and growing bald, he even reveled in the large
available store of Western European hair tonics.
He was surer than ever that the course he bad chosen
was the correct one. The only remaining question in his
mind was: should he escape now? He knew the risks he
took by returning to Moscow. And the intelligence officers
with whom he was in contact were, by Wynne's later
testimony, perfectly willing to have him remain in the
West. The information he had already given was so great
that they were concerned about his future personal se-
curity and were thus extremely careful not to jeopardize
his security in Moscow.
For days Oleg Penkovskiy debated with himself as he
walked the streets of Paris. He had family considerations
at home — a pregnant wife, a mother, and a daughter.
Could he cut them off from his life forever? To leave
his own familiar society, much as he hated the regime,
meant a considerable wrench.
On the other hand, he was captivated by the bright new
—
world in the West. There were the lights, the stores and,
itmight be added, the girls. For Penkovskiy, who could
not be accused of puritanism, had managed to make a
few pleasant acquaintanceships in the course of this trip.
Everything in his inmiediate surtoimdings argued that he
stay.
He almost did. His plane back to Moscow had been
delayed by fog and the omen did not escape him. He
hesitated, literally, at the customs barrier, but at the last
second he turned, said good-by to Wynne, and marched
back into a world from which he had emigrated in spirit.
He had a job to do in Moscow. He had said this many
times to Wynne as he argued aloud the pros and cons of
his departure. He felt himself a "soldier" of his new alle-
giance. He said as much in the Papers, shortly after his
return to Moscow: "I feel that for another year or two
I must continue in the General Staff of the U.S.S.R.,
in order to reveal all the villainous plans and plottings
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 263

of our common enemy, i.e., I consider, as your soldier,

that myplace during these troubled times is on the front
line. I must remain on this front line in order to be
your eyes and ears, and my oppdrtunities for this are
great. God grant only that my modest efforts be useful
in the fight for our high ideals for mankind." To have
stayed in Paris seemed too easy, when there remained a
force in Moscow which he wished to stop.
 CHAPTER VII

Espionage Notes

While the events of my recent trips to Europe are fresh

m my mind, I shall put down some notes on the work of
Soviet intelligence in foreign countries and its direction
by the KGB and by the GRU. Some of this pertains
directly to the work of Communists and Communist
Parties in the West. More and more, as I see this work,
I realize the overriding power of the KGB.
There was a period at the end of Stalin's rdgn when
the Central Committee CPSU issued an order restricting
the active use of Conmiunists in intelligence work. At
that time, contact with some of the GRU Conmiunist
agents was ended. There had been several exposes of
Communist agents, and the prestige and authority of the
Conmiunist Parties in the West was somewhat imdermined.
Experience later showed that it was much more difficult
to work without the help of the Communists. So Khru-
shchev and the Central Conmiittee put out a directive to
the KGB and GRU to activate recruitment of Communist
Party members for intelligence work. In 1956 and 1957
we again began to recruit Communists in the West. We
would use them as spotters and agents, and, through them,
spread misinformation and propaganda. Contact was re-
established with former agents, and in general Communists
in the West proved of invaluable help. Because the Com-
munist Parties in the West are able to exist openly, they
have every opportunity to organize conspiratorial activities
in their respective countries in support of Soviet intelli-
gence work. Many of the leaders of these Conmiunist
264
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 265

Parties move in the highest circles of theu- governments,

and many are ministers or members of parliaments. For
example, after the Khrushchev and Kennedy conference
in Vienna, a secret letter was sent out by the Central
Committee CPSU directly to certain leaders of the Com-
munist Parties of the West (France, England, Italy, and
others). The Soviet ambassador in Rome personally read
this letter to Togliatti.
Pavlov, Shapovalov, and Milovidov also said that a di-
rective had been received from the Central Committee
and the GRU to employ all agents and friendly contacts
with England in order to collect information. The am-
bassador had a conference with the GRUand KGB
rezidents and gave them instructions from the Center.
Shortly after this all the ofl&cers in the embassy took off
in various directions all over England to gather the needed
information. The entire force of operational, strategic,
and political intelligence services was mobilized for this.
I cannot understand at all why the Communists are
permitted to operate so freely in England and France.
Why are they not shown who is boss? Where are the
counterintelligence services of the Western countries? What
are they doing? Everything is being stolen right from
under their noses, and they are doing nothing to fight
the Communists. The Communist Parties of West Ger-
many and the U.S.A. have been declared illegal; why are
not similar measures taken in England, France, Italy,
and other countries? These are all "fifth columns" which
support our work,
Ananyev, our oflficer in Paris, told me that the GRU
and KGB have very close working relations with Commu-
nists, especially those who work in the government. Army,
and NATO. Ananyev and Prokhorov had both told me
that it was very easy to carry on Illegal operations in
France, especially in Paris. Prokhorov also remarked that
in comparing the working conditions in France with, for
instance, those in Turkey, France does not present any
particular difficulties in our dealings with agents, espe-
cially if they are French Communists.
It is true that if we approach an ordinary Frenchman
and he learns that he is speaking with Russians, he will
inmiediately run and report the contact to the police.
But French Communists, generally speaking, readily agree
266 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
to work for only directions on how and what
us, asking
to do. They and obtain military informa-
act as spotters
tion. According to Prokhorov, we could not work so well
in France without Conmiunist help. He actually made the
statement that we bought France easily and for a cheap
price. A
great many Communists in France have direct
contact with Khrushchev. They can cause much trouble
for the Western governments.

The GRUhas levied a requirement on all rezidenturas,

I
especially those in France, to obtain information on the
new models of NATO weapons. They are to obtain
this information by any means available to us — for cash,
through agents, through confidential sources, by stealing
when there is the need and opportunity to steal, by simply
picking up information in those instances when vigilance
and security measures are weak. They are to use all
possible contacts, including all the representatives of the
countries of the people's democracies, acquaintances, and
Communists.
Other assignments made by the GRU were to obtain
a model of the NATO American equipped with a
rifle,

NATO cartridge; to obtain samples of some kind of new,

improved American and British gas masks. Soviet in-
telligence is very interested in charcoal, which absorbs
poisonous substances in these gas masks. Also they want
to get information on the anticorrosive coatings used for
submarines and ships. There were many other require-
ments regarding the collection of information of various
sorts, including approximately twenty to twenty-five items
directly concerned with electronics, especially technology
as used by missile troops of the American and British
Armies. We were also directed to obtain information about
certain kinds of small American missiles launched from
aircraft, which create various forms of interference in the
air and disrupt radar scanning. All operational intelligence
officers were assigned the task of visiting chemical enter-
prises in France, America^ and England in order to learn
the process and ingredients of solid fuel for missiles. In-
formation was desired on heat-resisting steel; there seemed
to be some reason to believe that the U.S.A. had done
some very good work in this field. The GRU considers
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 267

that theFrench have an excellent solid fuel for missiles

and have made great progress in this direction.
Here is a copy of my own orders to Paris. This shows
how we subordinate everything to the intelligence task.

Approved. Top Secret

Major General Single Copy

A. Rogov

September 1961.

MISSION
for Colonel O. V. Penkovskiy, departing for a short
oflBcial trip to France from 13 September through
8 October 1961.

Through the channels of the State Conmiittee for

the Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR you are sent to
France as leader of a group of Soviet scientific re-
search representatives in order to get acquainted with
some French enterprises and to maintain contacts
with business circles while the Soviet Industrial Ex-
hibition is being held in Paris.
During your stay in France, you must fulfill the
following intelligence tasks:
1. In case of interest by officials of the local

rezidentura, together with them you will seek oppor-

tunities to transfer your acquaintances to the local
case officers. It would be desirable for you to re-
cruit two or three people from among French scien-
tific research specialists.
2. You will give a description of the measures taken
by counterintelligence organs against Soviet represent-
atives.
3. In traveling about the country in order to visit
French enterprises, pay attention to any military ob-
jectives you may notice (missile launch sites, airports,
troop locations, etc.). As
far as possible, try to photo-
graph these objectives and also determine their co-
ordinates.
268

4.
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Acquire information on equipment produced
firms for military purposes.
After your arrival in Paris, establish contact with
the rezident, to whom you must report the tasks as-
signed to you. In case of need, he may assign addi-
n
tional tasks.
In fulfilling this assignment, act in strict accord
with your ofl&cial position.
After you have finished your work in France, re-
port to the rezident about its results, and after
your return from the trip, submit a report on ful-
filling your assignment

Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers

N, Khlebnikov
12 September 1961

I have studied the assignment and will fulfill it

Colonel

O, Penkovskiy
12 September 1961

I told the rezident in Paris that I would be traveling

through France and could select suitable sites for dead
drops. The rezident replied that they had all the dead-
drop sites needed. He told me not to waste my time on
this.

Ananyev has said that in Paris one can travel 600

kilometers and have surveillance aU the way. It is, how-
ever, an ostentatious type of surveillance which the French
employ. It can be eluded when you leave your apartment
or the embassy. Everyone loves Paris very much, there
are many famous places to see and visit, and many con-
venient places for intelligence work because there are all
—
kinds of alleys, courtyards, gateways ^it is easy to lose
surveillance. The rezident also said that it was very easy
to arrange agent meetings in France, to transmit and re-
He even indicated that dead drops
ceive materials, etc.
were seldom used because it was simple to arrange direct
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 269
meetings with agents. These are not set up very frequently,
however, only when necessary.
I have mentioned Soviet operations in the U.S. There
Soviet intelligence officers, in order to evade FBI sur-
veillance, sometimes stay in the embassy overnight, sleep-
ing on desks, then get up early in the morning to leave
the embassy unnoticed. In this way they manage some-
times to avoid surveillance.
In London there are three GRUofficers working under
the cover of the Soviet Trade Delegation.
Shapovalov loves England. He says, "It is pleasant to
live and work in Mother England."
While I was in London I asked about Gagarin's visit
to England.! Gagarin does not speak English but he had
some excellent translators. Everyone assigned to him was
selected from our "neighbors," the KGB. Shapovalov told
me that it was uncomfortable to see so many KGB
types surrounding Gagarin. While he was in London he
lived in house no. 13, on the second floor (Kensington
Palace Gardens). People by the hundreds stood in the
streets in order to see him, and one British girl waited
eighteen hours to catch a glimpse of him. When Gagarin
was told about this, he said, "What a fool! It would
have been better if she had shared my bed for a couple
of hours." Here is the new historical personality for you.
During my stay in London, by chance I met a chauffeur
from our embassy; the number of his car was 603. This
chauffeur was the one who taught me back in Moscow
how to set up a concealment device for carrying classified
documents in an automobile. He gave me lessons on
Gritsevets Street, the motor pool for GRU operational
cars. He is also extremely clever in making all kinds of
operational modifications in cars. For instance, one trick
he told me about was the installation of a switch which
would enable the driver to turn off the inside dome light
and the outside rear brake lights. Thus when one of our
people is picking up an agent at night the brake lights
do not come on when he stops and the dome light does
not come on when he opens the door to let the agent
get in the car. Thus even if the local counterintelligence
service is following at a discreet distance, quite possibly

1 The successful Cosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin arrived in Lond(Hi on

July 11, 1961.

I
270 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
they not even be aware that he has stopped and
will
picked up someone. Here is a typical embassy chauffeur
for youl .

[Editor's Note: Here Penkovskiy digresses, with

more fragmentary notes on Soviet intelligence opera-
tions elsewhere.]

When I was never hired any local

in Turkey, we
specialists or do work in the embassy.
technicians to
Even the charwomen were sent from Moscow. In Mos-
cow, however, the foreign embassies have a great many
Soviets working for them. Each and every one of these
Soviets is either an agent or has been co-opted by the
KGB, as was my aunt, for instance.
The KGB sets up audio-surveillance devices in all the
embassies in Moscow. Hundreds of Soviet intelligence
technicians sit and listen day and night.
Our GRU Moscow as well as abroad, have
officers, in
the right to invite foreigners to a restaurant, to their
apartment or to receptions and affairs at Soviet embassies,
provided that the foreigner is of some interest, from the
intelligence viewpoint, or is already being developed and
prepared for recruitment. We
have no right to carry on
any other type of friendship with foreigners; they are all
our enemies. For instance, during 1954 and 1955 Shikov
was working with a secretary of the Egyptian Embassy
who was passing information to him about codes. For
contact with the Egyptian, Shikov had a special telephone
line installed, and a separate telephone instrument was
set up on his safe. Shikov and the Egyptian conversed in
French and met either in a restaurant or in a safe-house.
There are Soviet agents also among the Scandinavian
diplomats. Some of these are quite valuable. I learned
this from several officers who worked with Slavin in
Sweden.
After the conviction of Soviet agents in London (one of
whom was given a forty-two-year sentence) ^ the rezi-
dentura received a special letter from the GRU, which
issued the warning to maintain greater security in their

2 George Blake was sentenced to a total of forty-two years in

prison in May 1961 for spying for the Soviets.
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 271

work. The mood in the rezidentura was bad; everyone

was depressed. They were afraid that the arrest and trial
would tend to keep many Britishers from making contact
with the GRU.
My good friend Vasiliy Vasilyevich Petrochenko was
an Illegal for a long time in Austria, Switzerland, and
France. He was graduated from two academies, the
Zhukovskiy Air Force Academy and the Military Diplo-
matic Academy. He was almost caught in France and was
recalled to Moscow. They wanted to send him as rezident
to London instead of Pavlov, but they were afraid that the
British would not give him a visa. Petrochenko speaks
French, German, and English. After liis return from
France, he worked in the school for Illegals. I made a
copy of his GRU identification card, and a copy of his
work book which clearly shows when he was an Illegal in
France.
Sudin (Sudakov is his alias) a brigadier general, was in
,

charge of the Illegals in Turkey. He organized an Illegal

rezidentura consisting of Iranians, Afghans, Bulgarians,
and one Swede. He was the First Secretary of the Soviet
Embassy in Turkey. He knows many jokes, speaks Turkish
and a little English and French. His wife's name is
Yekaterina, and they have three children.
Ivan Yakovlevich Melekh is a Soviet intelligence oflBcer.
He has the military rank of lieutenant colonel. He knows
English very well. At one time he graduated from the
Military Institute of Foreign Languages, and for a long
time after this he was an instructor of English at the Mili-
tary Diplomatic Academy, which trains ofl&cers for the
GRU. After receiving some special training, Melekh was
sent under the cover of the United Nations Secretariat in
New York in 1955 to carry out his intelligence missions.
On October 27, 1960 he was arrested by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation on charges of espionage. In April
1961 the U.S. government dropped its charges on the con-
dition that Melekh leave the U.S. before April 17. This
should help us to judge the value of Soviet protests and
declarations at the UN.

Intelligence Work in the US. A.

The Soviet strategic intelligence service has three rezi-

272 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
denturas on the territory of the United States. One ii

—
Washington, D.C. ^under the cover of various military
apparatuses (which include individual Soviet Embassy sec-
retaries, commercial representatives, and other employees).
There are two rezidenturas in New York, one under the
cover of the UN. The other, the Illegal rezidentura, has
direct,independent contact with Moscow. The Washing-
ton rezidentura has a great many Soviet operations officers
and an insignificant number of agents; these are basically
"old-timers" who were recruited a long time ago. The
New York rezidenturas are of greater strength. They have
new agents from whose ranks they built up the Illegal
rezidentura.
In all the rezidenturas the Soviet operations officers are
actively engaged in locating suitable prospects (often
throu^ spotters) and in their development as potential
agents. Sometimes agents are sent in from a third country.
Once properly documented, these will be transferred to
the local rezidenturas. Among the agents are many for-
eigners who reside and work in the United States. Soviet
operations officers are active in collecting large amounts
of information on the U.S. and other countries, but most-
ly on the U.S., "the principal enemy."
After the Powers affair (after May 5, 1960, approxi-
mately) Khrushchev issued an order to all imits of the in-
telligence services, especially those in the U.S., to cease
their active —
work temporarily in order to take no chance
of putting into the hands of the enemy any evidence
pointing to Soviet espionage against the U.S. and other
countries. In November 1960 this order was rescinded.
Intelligence activities began again in fuU swing.
In addition, at the beginning of 1961 a resolution was
adopted about training aU agents in one-way communica-
tions. This was done in the event of a worsening agent or
political situation in a certain country, and also by way
of creating more secure working conditions for Soviet in-
telligence officers. The agents began to be taught coding,
receipt of cables from headquarters, and the use of dead
drops. Accordingly, the agents receive the needed technical
equipment and guidance for maintaining impersonal, one-
way contact, i.e., from top to bottom. This last precaution
is being carried out also because in the summer of 1960
there were several incidents of Soviet establishments and
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 273

embassies being visited by agents attempting to re-

establish contact with their Soviet superiors. (These su-
periors had had to suspend agent meetings abruptly im-
mediately after the Powers affair.)

While I was in London I talked with one of the rezi-

dentura members, my old friend Shapovalov. When he
was preparing to go to England, we were afraid that the
British would not grant him a visa, and we were very sur-
prised when they did. He sought my advice in regard to
some difficulties he had encountered in his agent work.
This is the way our rezidenturas work. Everyday some-
thing happens. One person gets his fingers burned, the
other just washes his hands and laughs at the first person's
misfortune. This joy in another's misfortune is not just a
personal thing. The GRU
and the KGB rejoice over each
other's failures. When the GRU rezident in London
found out that the "neighbors" had had two agents ar-
rested, he gleefully rubbed his hands and said, "That is
just fine, thank heaven that everything is all right with
me."
The KGB
has more representatives everywhere, espe-
cially in the U.S. and England. Both the GRU
and the
KGB try to be the first to send information to the Cen-
tral Committee in order to receive praise. Neither of the
intelligence services shares any information with the other
in the rezidenturas, although sometimes we hold con-
ferences together and even exchange agents. For instance,
Colonel Pavel Dmitriyevich Yerzin, the former KGB
rezident in Turkey, never gave me any intelligence infor-
mation, not even of a military nature. He was always in
a hurry to deliver all his information to Moscow, trying
to show how actively he was working. The morning after
he had sent it off, he would boast to me about the informa-
tion which he had given the Central Committee. He was
in Ankara for approximately one year. He had some sort
of unpleasantness with Serov at that time, even though he
had recruited some Western diplomat and paid him 5000
Turkish liras on the spot. He borrowed this money from
my operational fund and returned it a few days later
when he received the money from Moscow. Yerzin's dep-
uty, Vavilov, was a good friend of mine and I advanced
him this money on his signature.
274 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
After Yerzin returned from Turkey, he had quite& a bit
of trouble with Serov. Yerzin had bought an automobile
in Syria and subsequently exchanged it in Odessa for a
Volga. This is so that he would not attract too much at-
tention with a car of foreign make. When we met in
Moscow, he gave me a ride in his new car, and during
our conversation he used some very "choice" words to
describe Serov. He said that Serov did not want to listen
to anything that he, Yerzin, had to say.
For some time Yerzin worked as a KGB representative
with the State Committee for Cultural Relations with
Foreign Countries, at the time when Georgiy Zhukov ^
was Chairman of the Committee. (Often his name is writ-
—
ten as Yuriy Zhukov not to be confused with the mar-
shal.) Yerzin had a complete operational staff on this Com-
mittee, and there were, and still are, some GRU ofl&cers
there. There was one colonel from the tank troops (I have
forgotten his name) who had been in Afghanistan twice
at an earlier date.
Yerzin was recently promoted to the rank of brigadier
general and was appointed as prorector of the Patrice
Lumumba Friendship University. The entire faculty of
that university is made up of KGB
employees, even the
people in charge of the dormitories. Only a few professors
work there as co-optees. Yerzin told me that he wore two
hats there, as the Chief of a KGB
section and the other
as the prorector. The university is located in a building
which formerly housed the Voroshilov Military Academy
under the General Staff. The basic task of the Friendship
University is to prepare a fifth column for the African
countries. Many of the students have already been re-
cruited and are now working for Soviet intelligence service.
They are studying Marxism and Leninism, being prepared
politically to become the future leaders of African coun-
tries. As a first step, after their return from Moscow, they

are directed to organize strikes, demonstrations, over-

throw governments, etc. In the university they are well

3 For a
time, 23iukov served as a Soviet correspondent in Paris.
He was also co-opted for espionage activities by the KGB. He was
extremely successful in his espionage activities in Paris, and after
his recall from Paris he was used extensively by Khrushchev for
contacts with foreign Communist Parties and other prominent for-
eigners.
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 275

fed, clothed, and given money. They live better than the
average Soviet student; almost everything is paid for.
To understand our "neighbors" fully, one must recall
—
something of their background and Khrushchev's as-
sociation with them. Terrible things were done to our
people under Stalin and Beriya. We all knew this even
without Khrushchev's denunciation of the personality cult.
Khrushchev did not justify himself by this; he only threw
more dirt upon himself. He was right there together with
Stalin and Beriya. Many people even say that there was
more order under Stalin, that this fool has ruined every-
thing, in both industry and agriculture. He liquidated the
machine-tractor stations, not using his stupid head. Now
he wants to organize them again, but he fears the people
will laugh.
I have my own
accounts to settle with the KGB. My
great-imcle (my
grandfather's brother) spent several years
in prison before the war —
^because his brother had been
a judge in Stavropol before the revolution! His brother
died in 1919. I was afraid to maintain contact with this
great-uncle, thinking that it reflect upon my career.
might
This although he is Even now we do not main-
a general.
tain close relations. When Malinovskiy was at Varentsov's
birthday party and Varentsov introduced me to the min-
ister,Malinovskiy asked me: "Are you a relative of Gen-
eral Penkovskiy?" I replied: "Only very distantly." When
Varentsov told Malinovskiy that I was from Serov's outfit
[GRU], he answered, "Oh, that is very good, very good."
I know from Varentsov that Malinovskiy does not par-
ticularly care for Serov, but he can do nothing about it.
They removed Serov from his position as Chairman of
the KGB in 1958 and sent him to us in the GRU. He is
Deputy Chief of the General Staff and at the same time
Chief of the GRU. Everyone in the GRU is unhappy
with this appointment. Serov should have been shot to-
gether with Beriya and not given the rank of general.
But that was impossible. One hand washes the other.
I am an officer of the General Staff, I work with generals
and marshals. They all say: "Why do we need this Serov?
If they shot Beriya, they should hang Serov." We do not
say this openly, but sometimes we get together, drink, and
talk about it. The old Russian proverb is correct that
says: "The sober man thinks what the drunkard says."
276 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
There are various rumors about how Beriya was shoi hWF
heard from Varentsov and Churayev that he was shot in
the basement of the Moscow Military District Head-
quarters building. General Kozlov shot him in the presence
of other generals. During this operation all the Moscow
Military District buildings were surrounded by tanks and
armored cars; all the troops had been brought to combat
readiness. There was some apprehension that Beriya's
MVD cohorts would try to seize the headquarters and
free him. After the execution, Beriya's corpse was soaked
with gasoline and burned there in the cellar.
In the basement of the MVD
(now the KGB) building
there is a prison and also many "investigation" rooms
with special equipment. These are the rooms where in-

—were —
nocent Russian people prominent people, intelligent peo-
ple, patriots subjected to inhuman tortures. There
was a special room with pipes leading into it,
special
through which rats could be let into the room. Persons
who did not confess and who did not say what the in-
vestigator wished to hear from them were led into this
room. Someone said to them over a microphone: "Well,
now will you confess, you scoundrel?" If a man did not
confess, they would first release one hungry rat, which be-
gan to run around the person, biting him. If he still did
not confess, they would release more rats, which would aU
throw themselves upon the victim.
Through the microphone interrogators shouted: "Now,
will you confess, you dog?" It was terrible. People went
out of their minds. And they confessed. Then the guards
would release a stream of cold water with terrible force,
to wash out the rats. The innocent man had confessed,
the investigator was satisfied, the death sentence was
signed, the victim was written off.
Khrushchev lies when he says that he knew nothing of
this. He worked together with Beriya, and Serov was
Beriya's deputy. It may be true that Khrushchev no longer
has rats, but technology has indeed moved ahead and
now itmay be possible to get a confession without rats.
Of course, lately this terror has slackened. Khrushchev
has eased it. He has released those who were held illegally

in jail and rehabilitated those who were shot. And their

families —
their families who were banished God knows
where, they have now received rooms and little pensions
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 277

for those who have perished. "Excuse us," they were told,
"a little mistake."
There are thousands of families in this situation. There
were thousands of acknowledgments like that. Thousands!
"Their enemies did that for enmity's sake. We apologize.
Here is an order allocating a room to you; here is a pen-
sion of two or three hundred rubles. Excuse us that a
small error was committed."
Before, Stalin and Khrushchev shot and poisoned peo-
ple like rats, those who confessed and those who did not
Now Khrushchev without Stalin shoots people for specula-
tion and petty thievery. And they shout: "We are strength-
ening socialist legality!"
The Russian people are fools. They are good, fine peo-
ple, but they are fools. They allow themselves to be tied
up with ease. They cannot organize themselves. But if
they could only establish conditions in which the KGB
could not shoot them from behind, then these people
could cry out that they had been deceived too long and
suffered too much. That is why Lenin sprang forward
—
with such a surge in 1917 the czar had taken so many
wrong attitudes to the people's grievances.
Khrushchev wishes to justify himself and the organs of
the KGB, he wishes to gain the love of the Russian people
by announcing some amnesty and rehabilitation for those
innocent people who had been executed and eaten up by
rats. But the people at least see through this artifice. The
people say: "You have thought of that too late. One can-
not resurrect the dead. Who needs your rehabilitation,
when the people long ago rotted away?"
When Khrushchev accompanied Sukarno to Leningrad,
the Leningrad workers (known of old as the Petersburg
proletariat) shouted during the meeting: "Long live
Sukarno, away with Khrushchev!" Churayev told me that
Khrushchev was struck dumb. He did not know what to
say. The Leningrad people are good fellows. Churayev
said frankly: "The devil only knows what is going on.
Stalin hated the Leningrad party organization, but none-
theless the Leningrad people prefer Stalin and Molotov,
anyone but Khrushchev."
If it were not for the KGB and Serov, Khrushchev
could never have become the Supreme Commander in
Chief. And Khrushchev handled even Serov in typical
278 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
fashion. After he had replaced many of the leading KGB
personnel with his own party cadres from the Central
Committee and the Ukraine and was sure that he was se-
curely in power, he removed Serov. He gave him the rank
of full general and sent him to us at the GRU. In place
of Serov he put his toady Shelepin, the former First Sec-
retary of theKomsomol Central Committee.
KGB employees are everywhere, literally everywhere. I
saw fewer of them even under Stalin than now. They con-
trol our whole Army and especially the GRU. Here
with us in the Committee they comprise more than 50
per cent of the key staff. During preparations for the
Twenty-first Party Congress thousands of KGB
em-
ployees were summoned from the provinces to help.
Guards were everywhere, documents were checked, and
the streets of Moscow were patrolled at night.
We all were very happy when they jeered Serov and
threw him out of England.* But the English did not
know that during Khrushchev and Bulganin's trip to Eng-
land, Serov was aboard the ship where they stayed the
whole time. He directed their security.
These KGB scoundrels even forced my aunt to be an
informer. She worked for them the whole time while she
was a cleaning woman and housemaid in the Afghan and
Italian embassies in Moscow. My poor aunt often came
to my mother, crying and complaining about the degrad-
ing and dishonest things she had to do. She eavesdropped,
stole documents, cleaned out waste baskets, wrote reports
on diplomats, helped with provocations against them, etc.
Many times she complained to me, but this was still be-
fore I began working for the GRU, and I could give her
no advice, just sympathy. After she was discharged be-
cause of age, she was forbidden not only to receive pres-
ents which the foreigners gave her on holidays, but even
to be seen close to their embassies. If this were to happen
now, I could give her much useful advice. NowI myself

am a senior officer in strategic intelligence. I could teach

her how to talk to KGBemployees.

4 In 1956 Serov visited England to make security arrangements

for Khrushchev's visit. The press raised such a hue and cry about
"the butcher" that he was not a part of the official party when
Khrushchev finally arrived.
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 279

When Khrushchev arrived on his ship in New York

for the session of the UN General Assembly in 1960, one
Khrushchev on the spot, as he
sailor fled the ship. This put
could not control the questions put to him by the foreign
press. But what did Khrushchev say to the foreign jour-
naUsts? One of my friends, a GRU
general who at that
time was with Khrushchev's ship in New York, told me
that Khrushchev promised to give the sailor financial aid
if he needed it. But this was only in public. In private
Khrushchev bluntly commented that the U.S.S.R. now
had "one scoundrel less." Here is real propaganda. But
the Klochko case did not put Khrushchev in such a spot,
and his reaction to it shows clearly who is the real
scoundrel.
When our scientist Klochko, who went to Canada
through our Committee, refused to return to the Soviet
Union, the whole Central Committee was alarmed.^ For
two weeks the KGB looked for one of Klochko's friends
or acquaintances to send to Canada, to meet him and
persuade him to return. After Khrushchev had received
the report, he said: "That is enough. Take all measures to
find and bring him back. If it is impossible to bring him
back, destroy the wretch. Let this be a lesson to others."
Here isKhrushchev for you, a fine peasant. Who said
that he was no criminal or murderer?
When one goes to the Central Committee CPSU, one
does not know whom one will meet, a Central Committee
man or one of the KGB. They are in almost all sections
and directorates there. They enjoy greater confidence. Un-
der Stalin they worked only on Dzerzhinskiy Square, but
now they work also in the offices of the Central Commit-
tee CPSU, the Council of Ministers, in ministries, and in
all state institutions.

Khrushchev himself directly supervises the work of the

KGB. In this matter he trusts no one else; he controls
the KGB organs as First Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee CPSU and not as the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers. It is said that Shelepin spends more time in
Khrushchev's office than in his own office on Dzerzhinskiy

5 Mikhail Antonovich Klochko asked for political asylum from

the Canadian government on August 16, 1961. He is the author of
a book, recently published, on his experiences as a Soviet scientist
in Communist China.
280

Square.
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Khrushchev and the Presidium of the Central
Committee CPSU regularly receive reports from the KGB
I
on the activities of our intelligence services and the moods
of the people. Also we make and regularly send GRU
reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee.
The Central Conmiittee has a so-called Administrative
Organs I>epartment. Its Chief is Nikolay Romanovich
Mironov. He is a former high officer of the KGB. This
section has nothing at all to do with administrative mat-
ters. It work of the KGB, the Ministries of
directs the
Internal Affairs of the Union Republics, the courts, the
procurator's office, and us, the GRU. This Mironov is
czar and god over us. Everything goes to him, and from
him to Khrushchev and other members of the Presidium
of the Central Committee CPSU.
The newspapers is the Chief of the Ad-
write that he
ministrative Section of the Central Committee CPSU,
but they never write what this section does. It is a secret.
From whom? From their own people. All of the people
in Mironov's section are KGB, MVD, and GRU
person-
nel; only a few are from the court and procurator's ofl&ce
of the U.S.S.R.
Mironov is a member of the Central Committee
CPSU and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
Our General Serov stands at attention before him, indeed
before any employee of his section. All appointments and
replacements in the GRU and KGB go through Mironov.

Overseas Spying and the KGB

The Exit Commission of the Central Committee CPSU
had close relations with us in the GRU—
I encountered
this section before my trip to Turkey. The head of the
commission is Aleksandr Semenovich Panyushkin, former
Soviet ambassador to China and to the U.S.A. Panyushkin
also is an intelligence officer and a KGB
employee.
Panyushkin's commission is concerned with selecting and
placing personnel abroad. It selects and confirms all am-
bassadors, counselors, trade representatives, military at-
taches, rezidents, etc., that is, everyone coimected with
work abroad.
If a dispute arises between the GRU
and the KGB
over a question of cover, or over the allocation of posi-
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 281

tions in embassies and representative agencies abroad,

then the sections under Mironov and Panyushkin act as
an arbitration commission. The KGB always wins out.
They enjoy greater trust than we and they always get
more. To put it briefly, we suffer much from the KGB
directly in the GRU, where they have their Special Sec-
tion, and in the Central Committee, where both Pan-
joishkin's and Mironov's sections are made up almost en-
tirely of KGB
workers. Panyushkin's commission is never
even mentioned in the newspapers. One can see how
secret it is. And from whom is this hidden? Again, the
—
answer is ^from their own people.
At one time Panyushkin was Chief of the First Chief
Directorate of the KGB (at that time called the MVD),
which was responsible for foreign intelligence. This First
Chief Directorate of the KGB now is called the Intel-
ligence Directorate. We frequently correspond with it, but
we do not use the word "intelligence." We just write: to
the Chief of the First Chief EHrectorate of the KGB
imder the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
All intelligence rezidents of the GRU as well as of the
KGB are approved by the Central Committee CPSU. All
of them are summoned to the Central Committee before
their departure overseas. Periodically, approximately once
a year, all rezidents are summoned to Moscow to the
Central Committee CPSU for the briefing [instruktazh],
where they report on their intelligence activities and re-
ceive instructions for their future work. One of the secre-
taries of the Central Conmiittee CPSU, and sometimes
even Khrushchev himself, conducts such conferences of
rezidents, Suslov directed the work of one such confer-
ence.
In Turkey our military attache was Brigadier General
Kazakevich, who simultaneously was the secretary of the
embassy Party organization (overseas we call Party or-
ganizations "trade unions"). When he was called to Mos-
cow, Suslov conducted his briefing. On Ambassador
Ryzhev's suggestion Kazakevich pointed out to Suslov that
in Rj^ev's and his opinion our government was pursuing
an incorrect policy in regard to the new Turkish govern-
ment (the Turkish people were poor, the lira had dropped,
Americans did not provide enough help, etc.). He held
that a large loan should be given to the Turks, so as in
 282 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
this way to win them over from the Americans. Suslov an-
swered: "What kind of experiments are you proposing, to
spend millions of rubles! And what assurance do you have
that the Turks will turn to us? They will probably accept
the loan, eat it up, and again fall into the American fold."
As a result of this proposal, Kazakevich was accused of
political shortsightedness. He was removed from both his
position as military attache and as secretary of the Party
organization. This is the way we are treated by the Cen-
tral Committee. One makes a proposal and then waits to
see what happens to him. For this reason we all keep our
mouths shut, ambassadors included, and wait until the
Central Committee tells us what to do.
To process people traveling abroad for long as well as
short trips, there is a Special Commission on Trips Abroad
under the Central Conmiittee CPSU. It consists entirely
of KGB members.
Any person, even a tourist, going overseas comes for a
conference to the Central Conmiittee CPSU. He thinks he
is talking to a member of the Central Committee, but in

reality he is talking to a KGB

officer. The majority of the
instructors of this commission are KGB
colonels and
lieutenant colonels, but they all wear civilian clothes.
A person is called by the commission only after a full
•clearance has been completed on him by the KGB. At the
commission the departing person fills out a special form
—
and acquaints himself with the instructions ^which include
the rules for his conduct abroad. He also signs a secrecy
agreement and a Party and Soviet government loyalty
pledge.
The form includes the following questions to be an-
swered:
1. Last name, first name, and patronymic.

2. Was the last name, first name, or the patronymic

ever changed? If so, where and when?
3. Year, month, and date of birth.
4. Nationality.
5. Party status.
6. Education.
7. Country of travel.
8. By whom and in what capacity is the person being
sent abroad?
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 283

9. Family status (indicate full names of wife and chil-

dren).
10. Members of the family accompanying subject.
11. Had subject ever been abroad before? In what ca-
pacity and where?
12. Had subject any relatives abroad?
13. Home
address and telephone number.
14. Date. Signature.
When I was leaving, this scoundrel Daluda from the
KGB poked through my file for two hours.What was he
looking for? I have been a Party member since 1940. He
questioned me about all my relatives, living and dead,
about my family Ufe, whether I quarrel with my wife,
about drinking, whether I want to go abroad, etc. He even
asked me some questions on international problems. This
was done to me, an officer of the General Staff and of the
GRU! I was graduated from two academies, and here he
was talking to me as if I were a first grader.
How many forms and autobiographies must be filled out
before a trip abroad is processed And all of them in four
I

and sometimes in five copies! One even has to bring with

him a residence registration certificate when it is perfectly
clear to everyone where one lives, because no one can
live in Moscow without registering. I submitted eighteen
photographs! What are they going to do with them, mari-
nate them? This is such a tremendous job! My wife and I
worked on it for two days, and still we could not finish it
all.

The instructions also state that when you are traveling

by conductor should seat you with your own
train the
sex. The instructions further state: do not drink, do not
talk too much, and do not say anything you are not sup-
posed to say, report all incidents to the ambassador or the
consul or some other embassy representative who is re-
sponsible for these matters. Do not carry any secret ma-
terials or letters with you, do not make any notes, but if
you have made some, keep them on yourself at all times,
do not leave them in your hotel room, etc.
I remember that early in 1961 we sent a delegation to
the Federal Republic of Germany. An engineer from Lenin-
grad went with this delegation. He was co-opted by the
GRU and making notes in his notebook. He put this
notebook in his raincoat and forgot the raincoat in a car
284 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
when he left. A
search was conducted. The raincoat
was found, but no notebook. He became so upset that
when his comrades went to do some shopping he hanged
himself in his hotel room. He used the cord of an electric
iron which he had attached to the light fixture in the ceil-
ing. They had taken this portable iron with theni to save
money on pressing. He used the cord of this iron.
His body was sent to Leningrad by plane. Later, at the
place where he had worked, it was announced that he had
not been normal and that he had suffered from constant
headaches. This is how things are done in our country.

I have already mentioned the scientist Klochko, who

defected in Canada. Our Committee for the Co-ordination
of Scientific Research Work did not suffer because of his
defection, although we felt very uncomfortable, because
all the Committee had done was to obtain his passport

for him. (Because it is designated as a Co-ordinating

Committee, all requests for passports go through it.) For
example, if the Academy of Sciences processes its in-
dividuals for a delegation, they do all the basic work and
all the Committee does is to submit the formal request
for a passport to the Consular Section of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. There was a tremendous upheaval in the
Academy of Sciences, however, and a number of people
were discharged. It was later discovered that at one time
Klochko was up for dismissal from the Party, allegedly for
having a personal argument with someone in which he
was accused of calumny. This action had been dropped as
unsubstantiated.
I become involved in the Klochko case when Lieutenant
General Rogov called me, Serov being in Poland at the
time, and asked me to get whatever files the Committee
had on this man. As I noted before, Khrushchev and the
CPSU Central Committee issued an order to have Klochko
assassinated. The Academy of Sciences submitted all its
files on him to the KGB, which took whatever action was
necessary. I was sent to the Personnel Section of the
Committee where I told them that GRU headquarters was
interested in knowing what the Conmiittee had on this
man, because it had processed his passport application
forms.
There was a tremendous upheaval, because he was the
 ESPIONAGE NOTES 285

author of some seventy works, a member of the Com-

munist Party since 1930, the holder of a Stalin Prize. He
was fifty-nine years of age and he had knowledge of some
three hundred special chemical formulas in his head. When
the balance of the delegation returned they were questioned
by Andrianov and myself. They told us all the details of
how Kochko sneaked out of his hotel. Later we heard
what was said at the conference when he announced that
he would not go back. The counselor of the embassy
was there and one of the members of the delegation (a
KGB man) was also present. Therefore although it was
uncomfortable for our Committee, the real upheaval
and blame was on the Academy of Sciences. Klochko had
worked seventeen or eighteen years at the Academy of
Sciences and was the director of a laboratory. One of the
workers in the Central Committee involved with the exit
permits was dismissed. Three more received reprimands in
Party proceedings for short-sightedness and for letting a
man of that age "who does not have a long tail" (i.e.,
—
insufficient hostages left behind in the U.S.S.R. ^Klochko
has no family) go abroad.
Apparently both the embassy coimselor and the KGB
rezident had tried to talk Klochko into returning, but they
failed. The first day Klochko hid in the cellar of a Cana-
dian police station. Before the first meeting Klochko de-
clared to embassy representatives that he would not talk
to them until they brought his suitcase with his belongings
from the hotel. This was done. Then the embassy coun-
selor declared: "Conu"ade Klochko, the way the case stands
now, we are examining your deed simply as an error
and delusion on your part, but in two hours it will be-
come a crime against the state." Klochko replied: "I am
sick and tired of this propaganda, and if you continue to
try to persuade me, I shall simply not talk with you any
more." All his life, Klochko told them, he had been
persecuted and bullied. He had decided to defect a long
time ago but never had the opportunity. Only by leaving
the Soviet Union could he do anything good and useful
— and that was his only good in life. He said: "I have
decided to continue my scientific work here in the West
and will endeavor to develop those ideas I have in my
head. And you can just go to hell!"
The order on doing away with Klochko is still in force.
286 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Measures ought to be taken for his security, or he ought
to be warned about it. There were also other similar cases
— one man was assassinated in Iran and another one in
Turkey. So here is your peace-loving Khrushchev! Who
believes that Khrushchev has abolished terror? I do not,
and nobody else does in the U.S.S.R.

Additional Notes

Fedor Fedorovich Solomatin was graduated from the

Frunze Academy and also the Military Diplomatic Acad-
d
emy in 1950. He is a KGB employee and was in the U.S.
Formerly Solomatin worked on the British Desk in Mos-
cow. His wife Katya bought several dozen fur coats and
then sold them in Moscow. Katya also worked in the KGB.
She was fired for speculation. Now through connections
she is trying to get a job in the GRU. It goes without say-
ing that it would be a good candidacy; we have many
petty tradesmen of our own.
Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Tudin, chief of the Inturist
group in France, is a KGB employee.
Deterkin is a former KGB employee. He finished the
KGB school or institute which is near the Belorussian
Station in Moscow. Now Deterkin works for us in the
GRU.
In the last graduating class of the Military Diplomatic
Academy, 30 to 40 per cent of the graduates were taken
by the KGB. This was done by decision of the Central
Committee CPSU.
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER Vlil

It is customary to say that the spy lives in "a netherworld

of shadows," or words to that effect. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Netherworld it may be; but the
world of the spy, the intelligence agent, or whatever terms
we use, is far from shadowy or vague. On the contrary, it
is furnished with incidents, images, and interior decora-
tion of the most precise nature. A meeting scheduled for
1900 hours is useless, or at best dangerous, if it occurs at
1911. If a black briefcase is to be picked up, a brown one
must be ignored. If three rings of a telephone are set as
a prearranged signal, a phone that rings twice is nothing
more, nor less, than an object of suspicion. The whole
success of an undercover operation hangs on its exploi-
tation of the commonplace act, word, or gesture to con-
ceal a most uncommon transaction.
As a professional intelligence officer himself, Penkovskiy
needed to be told little about this aspect of his craft. In
his earliest conversations with British and American in-
telligence,he took pains to specify exact locations and ex-
act dimensions. In Paris that autumn he had painstakingly
researched every detail of the methods by which he would
transmit his information. He knew better than most the
degree of surveillance exercised on the streets of Moscow.
He knew the consequences of a careless act and the im-
portance given by Soviet counterintelligence to the slightest
occurrence or meeting that seemed out of the ordinary.
Accordingly, he delivered his information to the West in
three ways: 1. by chance encounters which could take
287
288 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
I
place without exciting suspicion, yet were regulated in a
most precise manner by the participants; 2. by meetings at
the homes or offices of British or Americans whom he
would be normally expected to visit; and 3. by the safe
but often circuitious device of the dead drop, the incon-
spicuous hiding place where a packet can be left for a
later pickup. Each contact, however, was prearranged to
work manner.
in a clear, specific
On October 21, just two weeks after his return from
Paris, Penkovskiy had his first meeting with one of his
contacts. At 9 p.m. he was walking along the Sadovni-
cheskaya Embankment near the Balchug Hotel, smoking a
cigarette and holding in his hand a package wrapped in
white paper. Aman walked up to him, wearing an over-
coat, unbuttoned, and also smoking a cigarette. "Mr. Alex,"
he said in English, "I am from your two friends who send
you a big, big welcome." The volimie changed hands and
another hoard of documents and observations on Soviet
military preparations was on its way westward.
"Alex," for such was his code name, coolly kept on
with his work of collecting and transmitting information,
without skimping on his normal daily rounds. More than
ever, he kept up contacts with his friends in the Army. He
showed himself at his favorite restaurants and cafes, the
Baku on Neglinnaya Street, the Peking on Bolshaya
Sadovaya, or the restaurant at the Gorkiy Park of Culture
and Rest, but no more than was expected of him. Because
of his work on the Committee, he was expected to do a
good bit of entertaining. He exuded confidence. In mid-
November he took his wife off for a month-long vacation.
First they went to the quiet spa at Kislovodsk in the
Caucasus, where most of the Soviet ministries have rather
large rest houses. Then they traveled south, to the Black
Sea beach resort of Sochi to round out a lavish Soviet-
style vacation.They returned to Moscow on December 18.
In December and January, Penkovskiy resumed meetings
—
with his Western contacts, this time according to the
—
Moscow trial with Mrs. Chisholm, the same lady to
whom he had passed the candy on Tsvetnoy Boulevard.
But he quickly alerted himself to possible surveillance. On
January 5, after he had passed some more film to Mrs.
Chisholm in an elaborately casual encounter, he noticed
a less than casual third party hovering in the background.
 THEGREATONES 289

A small car, violating traffic regulations, had entered the

small lane, then swung around, while its two occupants
surveyed the scene, before moving off in the direction of
Arbat Square.
On January 12, the date of the next meeting, nothing
happened. But the week following, the same car appeared
again, a small brown sedan with the license plate SHA 61-
45, driven by a man in a black overcoat — enough to warn
anybody off. Penkovskiy wrote a letter to a prearranged
address in London, advising that no further meetings with
Mrs. Chisholm be attempted.
From that time on, Penkovskiy relied on the two re-
maining methods of communication. He either handed
over material in the houses of Westerners, to which he
was invited in the course of his duties, or relied on the
relative anonymity of dead drops. Over the course of the
next six months his intelligence contacts supplied him with
some more ingenious methods of transmitting his film,
including a can of Harpic disinfectant, with a removable
bottom, in which film could be inserted. (The Harpic jar
was to be found in the bathroom of a British attache's
house, where Penkovskiy would occasionally be invited
for receptions. The occasion to use it never arose, how-
ever.) But he was able to pass on his packages at the few
social occasions to which he might be invited, without
causing undue suspicion. He was sometimes invited to
formal parties or, on occasion, to informal British or Amer-
ican parties like the special Moscow showing of Shelagh
Delaney's film A Taste of Honey.
The dead drops were, of course, the safest way to com-
municate. But they had their own peculiar suspenses and
horrors. An agent must take the gamble that whatever he
puts in a dead drop will not be disturbed and that neither
he nor the receiver of the item will look suspicious in
the transaction. In some ways, an agent working through
dead drops finds himself playing a grown-up game of
blind man's buff.
Through the spring of 1962 Penkovskiy's existence was
bounded by a collection of these inconspicuous hiding
places. Drop no. 1 was located in the doorway of No.
5/6 Pushkin Street. To the right of the doorway, as one
entered, stood a radiator painted dark green and fastened
with special hooks. Between the radiator and the wall was
290 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
a gap about three inches wide. The message to be sent
was placed in a matchbox wrapped in light blue paper,
bound with cellophane tape and wire, and hung on a cer-
tain hook behind the radiator.
When Penkovskiy had something to leave there, he was
to make a black mark on post no. 35 on the Kutuzov
Prospect. He would then put the materials in the drop,
and make two telephone calls to nos. G 3-26-87 and
G 3-26-94, each with a set number of rings. When the
person answered he would hang up. But the "interested
parties" would then know to expect something.
Most of the caches where Penkovskiy deposited his
notes and films were to be used only once, to minimize
the danger of detection. There were selected places of
mutual convenience, but always with the thought that they
should be normally accessible to foreigners in Moscow.
One of them which he selected himself was in the Vagan-
kovskoye Cemetery, near the grave of the celebrated
Soviet poet Sergey Yesenin,^ another in a house entrance
on Gogol Boulevard, where there was also a public tele-
phone. In his trial Penkovskiy described a third location:
"... I chose one place on Brusovskiy Lane, in the
vicinity of a church which was in use, a corner house —
do not remember the number, but it was the first entrance
from the comer, where I had seen a whole system of
radiator pipes, a convenient place for putting magnetic
containers. . .
."

Later in the trial the prosecution read from a document

purporting to be from Western intelligence, which was
found by Soviet investigators in the hidden drawer of
Penkovskiy's desk. Although it is hard to vouch for its
authenticity, the instructions have the ring of truth about
them and they suggest the regularity with which Pen-
kovskiy transferred his information.
". B. Caches. They will be the basic method for
. .

sending reports and materials by you. For the effective-

ness of this method, we need a description of the caches
which you have promised. You will have to find others in
the future also. In choosing caches, keep in mind they

1 Sergey Aleksandrovich Yesenin was bom in 1895. He com-

mitted suicide in the Angleterre Hotel in Leningrad on December
26, 1925, after a checkered career as an international man of
letters.
 THEGREATONES 291

should be in places normally accessible to foreigners. We

consider that it would be best if we co-ordinate in ad-
vance the day and the hour when you will place the pre-
arranged cache, so that we can immediately remove it
without waiting for a signal. We propose the following
basic plan:
1) You will fill a cache no oftener than once a month.
2) Each cache can be used only once (we will consider
a cache used once we have checked for material, even if
you did not place anything there).
3) You inform us in advance of the dates and times
will
when you and which they will be, dur-
will place caches
ing the next three months. We will confirm by radio
. . .

,"
when a cache is emptied. . .

If there were to be any changes in his assignment, or

sudden travel orders, Penkovskiy was to inform Western
intelligence through use of some prearranged postcard mes-
sages. (The postcards, already written out, were supplied
him.) For example, one postcard addressed to a Miss R.
Cook in London said: "I am having a very interesting time
and enjoying myself. There are so many interesting
things here that it is difficult to decide even where to
begin. I'll see you soon." Signed "John." (This was pre-

sented as evidence at his Soviet trial.)

This meant that Penkovskiy was scheduled to leave the
U.S.S.R. within the next two weeks.
As the Soviet record of Penkovskiy's activities grimly
continued: "Subsequently the espionage meetings between
Anne Chisholm and Penkovskiy were carried out at
official diplomatic receptions, to which he was invited be-
cause of the nature of his work.
"On March 28, 1962, at a reception given by an em-
ployee at the British Embassy in Moscow, Penkovskiy
transmitted to Anne Chisholm a written report and six
rolls of film on which he had photographed secret ma-
terials.
"On March 31, 1962, at a reception in the British Em-
bassy in Moscow which was held in honor of the Queen's
birthday, Penkovskiy received from Anne Chishohn a
letter of instruction from the intelligence headquar-
"
ters
While thus continuing what historians of espionage will
probably record as one of the great information leaks of
292

modem times,
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
I
Penkovskiy managed to keep up his normal
life in Moscow, now become an elaborate cover: a constant
and rather intimate association with the highest Soviet
military circles. Since his arrest the Soviet regime has
been nervous about revealing how high Penkovskiy's con-
tacts actually reached. For a whole year the Soviet press
attempted to play down his influence, as witness the char-
acterization from Izvestiya, on May 10, 1963: "... a
rank-and-file official whose contacts and acquaintances did
not go beyond a limited circle of restaurant habitues,
drunkards, and philanderers.. .
."

How true this characterization was may be gauged from

the Papers themselves, a record of which the regime was,
of course, ignorant
 CHAPTER VIII

The Great Ones

At the beginning of my notes I promised to tell the entire

world about our important personages, members of the
Central Committee CPSU, marshals, generals, etc. about—
the cream of Soviet society, as our people say. Many of
these highly placed figures are my good friends or ac-
quaintances. With most of them I enjoy considerable re-
spect.
At thought that perhaps it would be better not to
first I
mention some of them at all, but after thinking it over
decided to tell everything I know about all of them. I
myself am part of this society, and I have told everything
about myself.
I shall begin with the one who is closest to me, Sergey
Sergeyevich Varentsov, I have already mentioned him
in my notes and I will again, but now, if time permits, I
shall try to set down ever5rthing I know about him and his
family without concealing anything.
Sergey Sergeyevich was bom on September 15, 1901.
His rank is that of a Chief Marshal of Artillery; his official
post is Commander of Missile Troops and Artillery under
the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, Ministry
of Defense, U.S.S.R. Simultaneously he is a member of
the Supreme Military Council of the U.S.S.R., whose
Chairman is "Supreme Commander" Khrushchev. That
title sounds most ridiculous. When talking about Khru-

shchev as Supreme Commander, Chuykov once said that

Khrushchev was better fit to lead a herd of swine than to
chair the Supreme Council.
293
294

1920.
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Varentsov has been serving in the
He comes from a peasant
Army
family. He
I
since 1919 or
is a real Rus-

sian muzhik. He did not even finish a secondary school

but he has attended several different artillery courses.
Prior to the war he was a junior artillery commander.
During the war he proved himself a capable artillery
officer and advanced rapidly, until he reached the post
of artillerycommander of a front.
He became a Party member much later, I believe, at
the beginning of the war, 1940 or 1941. After the war he
was artillery commander of a military district and then
was transferred to Moscow. Because his post of Com-
mander of Missile Troops and Artillery is such a re-
sponsible one, Varentsov was elected a candidate member
of the Central Committee CPSU.
There were those who were against promoting him to
the rank of Chief Marshal of Artillery, including Malinov-
skiy and other officers of the General Staff. Khrushchev
personally reprimanded Malinovskiy because he did not
include Varentsov on the promotion list. Khrushchev has
known Varentsov personally since the time Varentsov com-
manded the artillery of the 1st Ukrainian Front under
Vatutin. Varentsov would also like to be promoted to a
—
higher post but he lacks formal education many call him
a muzhik behind his back. He has many enemies, although
it must be said that Marshal Konev always supports him.

Varentsov once ran into very serious trouble with

Malinovskiy. Working very hard and delving into every-
thing, Varentsov was very concerned about shortcomings
in the missile units. When he realized how many de-
ficiencies there were, Varentsov wrote a personal letter to
Khrushchev complaining about poor management in mis-
sile production, lack of funds, and other trouble of the
missile artillery. To see Khrushchev personally was im-
possible, so Varentsov sent a top-secret letter to him. But
it so happened that at that moment Khrushchev was not

in Moscow, and the letter was given to Suslov. Having

read the letter, Suslov called up Malinovskiy and told him:
"Varentsov, your Commander of Missile Forces, sent us a
letter complaining about serious shortcomings in the mis-
sile artillery, and it seems to me that he is right. Investi-
gate this and take the necessary measures." Later Khru-
shchev found out about the letter, but by that time it had
 THEGREATONES 295

already been forwarded to Malinovskiy's headquarters.

Malinovskiy had a very serious talk with Varentsov:
"What are you doing?" asked Malinovskiy. "You write
denunciations of me to the Central Committee behind
my back. Why did you not come to me directly with
your problems and proposals?" The Commander in Chief
of Ground Forces, Chuykov, was also upset when he
found out about Varentsov's letter.
Varentsov is very strict with his own ofl&cers and gen-
erals and always teaches them by personal example. In
short, Varentsov sticks his nose into every little detail
and in that way tries to achieve improvements.
It was only by personal hard work and persistence that
Varentsov achieved the rank of Chief Marshal of Artillery.
Many plain, ordinary persons often come to seek help from
Varentsov as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. He works
a great deal, and writes all kinds of letters to various
government officers asking help for people. He gets very
angry and upset when his requests remain unfulfilled or
imanswered, due to bureaucracy.
At the present time Varentsov must be considered one
of the best artillerymen. Voronov, who for a long time
was the only Chief Marshal of Artillery, is more intelli-
gent than Varentsov, but now he is ill and old. As far as
his military career is concerned, he is through.
In addition to his apartment in Moscow, Varentsov has
a country house outside Moscow, not far from the town of
Babushkin. In the same area, not far away, there is a
large base of the Chief Artillery Directorate. Soldiers
from this base often go to Varentsov's house to do some
work: dig around the trees, take away the trash, etc.
Varentsov's old mother and two sisters Uve near the
city of Dmitrov, not far from Moscow, in the direction of
our atomic center at Dubna. I often go there with
Varentsov to take groceries to them or just for a visit.
There is a nice little garden there where it is pleasant to
rest. They need help and Varentsov gives them 500 [old]
rubles a month.
Varentsov's daughter Natasha, who was bom in 1946,
lives with her father and mother in Moscow. Varentsov's
brother, Nikolay Sergeyevich Varentsov, a colonel in the
engineers, is a very nice fellow. He, his brother, and I
fought together in the 1st Ukrainian Front during the
296 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
war. Nikolay is married to his brother's former "PPZh"
Diteraily polevaya pokhodnaya zhena, a campaign wife
— a woman with whom one could live while at the
front.] One day during the war when Sergey Sergeyevich
and his PPZh were together at the front, his wife arrived
at the front and caught them by surprise. When she found
some items of female attire in Sergey Sergeyevich's dug-
out, she gave her husband hell. At this point Sergey
Sergeyevich's brother Nikolay came to the rescue, saying
that he had been in the dugout with his girl friend. Soon
after this,Nikolay married his brother's PPZh, although
by that time she was pregnant by Sergey Sergeyevich. So,
of the three children they now have, the father of one
daughter is not Nikolay but Sergey Sergeyevich Varentsov.
They arranged the whole thing in a friendly family way.
Varentsov's daughter Yelena is married to Artillery Cap-
tain Leonid Goncharov. They live in Leningrad. He is at-
tending the Leningrad Artillery Academy. Prior to that
he served in East Germany, then Sergey Sergeyevich
helped him to get a transfer to Leningrad and enter the
academy. They come to Moscow quite often and stay at
Varentsov's country house. Sergey Sergeyevich helps them;
he gives them 1000 [old] rubles each month. They
have two children, Sasha and Seryezha. Yelena is very
capricious and spoiled; her father spoiled her. The Varent-
sovs have two maids and a gardener. Besides this, several
soldiers come to the house, as they say, to help with the
housework. Varentsov has a car with a chauffeur, an Army
sergeant. All this is paid for by the government —except
the gardener, whom Sergey Sergeyevich pays out of his
own pocket.
Varentsov is getting old. He drinks only in moderation.
Before my trip to London he asked me to bring back from
England some pills against sexual impotence. At least
the desire is still there and that is good.
Preparations for the celebration of Varentsov's sixtieth
birthday in 1961 took some time. His family, relatives,
friends— everybody wanted to contribute. Everyone had a
present for him. Although Varentsov's birthday is Septem-
ber 15, the celebration was to take place Saturday,
September 16.
On the morning of September 15, I met Varentsov at
the station in Moscow. He had gone to Leningrad to be
 THEGREATONES 297
elected delegate to the Twenty-second Party Congress. I
was the first one to congratulate him on his sixtieth birth-
day and give him my presents: a razor, a cigarette case,
and a cigarette Ughter made like a missile with his name
inscribed on it. I had purchased all these presents during
my trip to London. Then I gave him the package which
contained a bottle of French cognac with the vintage year
1901 appearing on its label. His sixtieth birthday and
sixty-year-old cognac! (Actually, I had to buy a fifty-year-
old cognac and afix a 1901 label to it.) Sergey Sergeyevich
was quite touched, and we kissed each other. Two of
Varentsov's assistants also met him at the station. They
offered their congratulations, and Varentsov shook hands
with them warmly.
The party was held at Varentsov's country home. Many
guests were invited, including Marshal Malinovskiy. My
whole family, including even my mother, was invited
long in advance. Yekaterina Karpovna, Varentsov's wife,
asked me to be master of ceremonies [tamadan.]
On September 15, as soon as he returned from Lenin-
grad, Varentsov went to his headquarters and found the
entire directorate assembled waiting for him. A
speech of
congratulations was read, and a decree of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet was read awarding Varentsov
the Order of Lenin. The old man was quite touched by all
this, and he almost cried.
Some actors, singers, and musicians were also invited
to the birthday party.
On the evening of September 16 the guests began to
arrive: Marshal Malinovskiy with his wife; Churayev,
Khrushchev's right-hand man in the Central Committee
Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R.; Lieutenant Ryabchikov; Major
General Semenov; and many others. All the military were
in civilian clothes with the exception of Malinovskiy, who
came wearing his uniform. Some of those invited could
not come because they were busy, many of them out of
town on business trips. The most important guests, of
course, were Malinovskiy and Churayev. Both arrived in
Chaykas.i
Malinovskiy presented Varentsov with a large (three-
liter) bottle of champagne, Churayev gave him a large

iThis is a luxury Soviet automobile used by high officials.

 298 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
carved wooden eagle, someone even gave Sergey Sergey-
evich a black dog. The best and the most original presents
were those from me and my family. They were the things
I had bought in London. Varentsov openly admitted it
by declaring loudly: "My boy has really outdone himself
this time!" And my presents went from one guest to
another. Everyone asked where and how I had managed
to get such beautiful things. Mrs. Varentsov and my wife
quietly explained to the guests about my latest trip to
London. The answer was always the same: "Oh, well, that
of course explains it."
While the table was being arranged, everybody went for
a short walk in the garden. Many of those who were not
known to Malinovskiy introduced themselves to him, the
military giving him their respective ranks, and the civilians
the names of the oflBces in which they worked. I pre-
sented myself as "Colonel Penkovskiy," to which
Varentsov added: "A Serov man." Malinovskiy shook my
hand and asked me if I was related to Lieutenant General
Penkovskiy who served together with him in the Far East.
I answered, "Yes, like a second cousin twice removed."
When everything was ready, Yekaterina Karpovna in-
vited us to the table. When everybody was seated and it
had become quiet, as the master of ceremonies I opened
the bottle of cognac, announcing that this cognac was
sixty years old and had been purchased especially to mark
the "sixtieth birthday of our dear Sergey Sergeyevich."
When people heard about this cognac, again their eyes
popped, and again they asked the same question:
"Where did you get it?" And when told, they again had
the same reaction: "Well, that explains it," while somebody
jokingly said: "I hope we will not be accused of admiring
the West because we are drinking French cognac brought
from London."
After I had poured cognac into everybody's glasses (I
everybody's glasses except those of Malinovskiy,
half-filled
Varentsov, and Churayev, whose glasses I filled to the
top), everybody turned toward Malinovskiy, who was
ready to propose a toast. He said a few congratulatory
words, everybody clinked glasses with Sergey Sergeyevich,
and some of those closer to him kissed him. After the
noise had subsided, Malinovskiy began to praise the
cognac; he called it an incomparable drink, with a real
 THEGREATONES 299

bouquet. The second toast was a reply from Varentsov,

who thanked all those who had come.
Then got up. In my congratulatory speech I put the
I
emphasis on the Order of Lenin, which had been awarded
to Sergey Sergeyevich (somehow everybody seemed to
have forgotten about this fact and it had not been men-
tioned by anyone). This statement of mine was followed
by a loud round of applause.
The cognac lasted only three rounds at half a liqueur
glass for each person. Malinovskiy relished each sip, and
one could see that he liked cognac and was a connoisseur
of its taste. When the cognac was gone, Malinovskiy asked
me to open the bottle of champagne he had brought. While
opening the champagne bottle, I did a little apple-polishing
by saying: "And now champagne presented by our dearest
guest Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovskiy."
Everybody applauded and drank bottoms up. Sometime
during all this, Varentsov took the empty cognac bottle
and said to me: "Oleg, I am going to save this bottle as a
most cherished relic; after all, it has the year 1901 on its
label."
A short toast was proposed by Churayev, and from
then on, the guests kept having drinks informally for
Varentsov's wife, for Malinovskiy's wife, and for others
present at the party. Mrs. Varentsov and one of the maids
served hors d'oeuvres to the guests and attended the table.
The first name and the patronymic of our Minister of
Defense Marshal Malinovskiy is Rodion Yakovlevich. My
mother's patronymic is the same as his: Yakovlevna.
At some point while the party was in full swing, my
mother approached Malinovskiy and out of a clear sky
asked him: "Forgive me, an old woman. Comrade Min-
ister, my dear Rodion Yakovlevich, tell me please, will
there be a war? This question worries all of us so
much!" Marshal Malinovskiy answered her in these words:
"It is hard to tell, Taisiya Yakovlevna, but I would rather
not discuss it now because I think almost all of the time
about whether there will be a war or not. But generally
speaking, the situation is difficult. Our enemies refuse to
yield. It is true that they swallowed one pill; ^ the whole

2 The erection of the Berlin wall and closing of the border be-
tween East and West Germanies.
300 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
thing was handled very skillfully by us. As for the future,
I can tell you only one thing: we are totally prepared for
any eventuality. We keep our powder dry." Not only my
mother but everybody present was listening with interest
while Malinovskiy answered my mother's question. I was
so afraid that my mother might blurt out something
foolish, but everything went fine without any hitches.
Soon after this, Malinovskiy departed, saying that the
next morning at ten he was flying to Lvov. He was going
there to attend a Party conference at which he was to be
elected a delegate to the Twenty-second Party Congress.
In addition, as he said, he had to see how the preparations
for the coming large-scale maneuvers were progressing.
After Malinovskiy had left, the real drinking began.
People drank Armenian cognac, starka [a special type of
aged vodka, stronger and more expensive than the regular
kind], and just vodka. Churayev drank mainly
plain
starka and vodka. He
soon got drunk and began to say all
kinds of foolish things; he even embarrassed Varentsov
several times.
While Malinovskiy was still at the party I went out to
the street several times to see if everything was in order,
and was surprised to find security men stationed around
the country house. Until then I never knew that besides
his aides and various orderlies Malinovskiy also had a
special security force.
Churayev approached me several times during the party
asking me to buy him some Chanel No. 5, Arpege, and
other perfumes for his wife if I went on another temporary
duty trip abroad. Other guests asked me to buy them
razors, batteries, and some of the generals wanted attache
cases. At first I wrote these things down, but later I simply
said I would try to get them.
Later Churayev began to brag about having 20,000
roses and other flowers at his country house, as well as
having various small structures, etc., there. I thought to
myself: "What a louse, he has 20,000 roses while ordinary
people are starving." It was especially unpleasant for me
to Usten to his boasting about his wealth and fine life
because he told us at this very party about the imrest
among the people in a small town between the towns
of Mineral'nyye Vody and Groznyy in the northern Cau-
casus, where things had gotten so bad that several militia-
 THEGREATONES 301

men had been A similar incident

killed. had occurred in
the city of Aleksandrov near Moscow, where the local
population had attacked some militiamen and members
of the MVD. He also told about the city of Murom, where
during a strike the militia had fired on the crowds; several
people were killed and many were wounded.
When Varentsov tried to stop Churayev, the latter would
not listen to him. Churayev went on to tell us about a
larger hunger riot that had taken place in Ivanovo, where
approximately four hundred people attacked the militia.
According to him this was a real hunger riot. The people
demanded that they be supplied the same food as people
in Moscow and asked, "Why is it that they have almost
everything in Moscow while we here have nothing? In
Moscow and Leningrad one can fill his stomach somehow,
while here we and our families are starving." The militia
began to drive the crowd away from the oblast Party
committee and the oblast executive committee. Then the
crowd attacked the militia, and the shooting began.
The militiamen aimed at the ground near the feet of the
crowd in order to scare the people and make them dis-
perse. There was a great scramble, and many were arrested.
The oblast Party committee secretary came out on a
balcony and tried to quiet the crowd. The people booed
him and would not listen to him. The militia then once
more opened fire on the crowd but were unable to dis-
perse it. At this point troops were called out in support of
the militia. They did not fire and just pushed the people
with their own bodies and rifles, and finally drove the
,

crowd away. The food situation in the country remains

extremely serious. There is much dissatisfaction. Street
holdups, burglaries, and murders are frequent. Further-
more there have been more instances of people attacking
the militia. Those who attack the militia are not hooUgans;
they are ordinary citizens who want to vent their anger
on somebody representing the government.
Finally, when Churayev started telling how the Central
Conmiittee employees wrangle with each other, how much
drinking and gambling takes place among them, how they
chase after women, Sergey Sergeyevich took him by the
arm and led him outside to get some fresh ah*.
After listening to all these stories many people felt

depressed, and in order to somehow enliven the spirits of

302 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
the guests I proposed another toast, filled everybody's
glasses with vodka. After everyone had drunk, conversa-
tion ceased, and everybody began to listen to the smging
and the anecdotes told by the actors.
So, there is Churayev, an "authoritative" representative
of the Central Committee: 20,000 roses, a Chayka limou-
sine, two maids, a personal chauffeur, an apartment in
Moscow, his own country house in the outskirts of Mos-
cow, a gambler, a drunkard, and a blabber. But he is on
the Central Committee. It is impossible to touch him be-
cause he is next to Khrushchev! And one would not be
surprised if this man soon became one of the secretaries
of the Central Committee and one of our leaders and his
pictures would be carried during the parades on Red
Square.
But to me he is just scum, a drunkard and a bloodsucker.
Just think, 20,000 roses.The scoundrel! And all this while
people in Voronezh have to stand in line for horsemeat!
Just see what is the result of all this. Although Sergey
Sergeyevich is my friend, his table almost collapsed with
food, sahnon, fish in aspic, sprat, cheese, ten different
kinds of sausage, over fifty bottles of vodka and cognac,
champagne, cakes, pastry, ice cream, and so on. And yet
people are hungry! I cannot remain indifferent to this. I
myself have a fairly comfortable life; my pay is about
ten times that of an ordinary laborer, but what can I do
alone? I simply do not know how to help my people. I,
too, could move higher along the bureaucratic ladder, but
I just cannot, I do not want to do it, it is against my
personal convictions. I do not wish to become part of our
eUte.
Perhaps this attitude of mine has already been detected
by others. I do not am even glad if this is true.
care, I
After all, one has to stop and think; today the people
are venting their anger on the militia, but tomorrow
who knows, they may start doing this to those who are
dressed well, who are fed well, to such persons as Chura-
yev, perhaps to me, because I, too, wear civilian clothes. I
do not think the people will turn against the Army; they
know that the Army consists of their sons, the same
peasants and workers as they themselves are. But against
the well-dressed, well-fed, fat-bellied leaders— ^yes, one
 THE GREAT ONES 303

fineday something may start, especially against the Party

members.

Malinovskiy is a member of the Central Committee

CPSU, and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. During the
war he was commander of one of the fronts, but he did not
distinguish himself in any particular way. He is the most
colorless of all the marshals, of limited mental capacity,
and has not contributed anything new or come up with
any original ideas in the military field. In short, he is
one of those men whose principle is: "Don't bother me,
and I will not bother you." These are probably the very
reasons why Khrushchev chose him for the post of Min-
of Defense.
ister
Malinovskiy is a yes man. He does not have the firm-
ness that Zhukov Khrushchev feels safer and happier
has.
with Malinovskiy. There is never any opposition from
Malinovskiy. But things are not so well organized under
him as they were under Zhukov. The General Staff does
not respect him either. Malinovskiy is taciturn by nature.
At the meetings of the Supreme Military Council he
usually keeps silent and waits for Khrushchev to speak,
and then, Uke a record, he repeats: "I agree. Yes, Sir, it
will be done." There are never any objections nor any
opposition to Khrushchev's ideas. He always agrees with
Khrushchev.
Malinovskiy has very few friends. His closest friend is
Lieutenant General of Artillery Fomin. They served to-
gether somewhere in the past, I believe, in the Far East or
in China. There have already been rumors about
Malinovskiy's being replaced, yet, on the other hand,
frequent changes in that post are considered unwise.
Just the same, the rumors about his replacement are quite
persistent. Who his replacement will be is hard to say.
The well-known marshals have gotten old. It may possibly
be Biryuzov, or Grechko, and Chuykov has also been
prominently mentioned as his successor.

[Editor's Note: The following passages tend to

be fragmentary, as Penkovskiy provides brief bio-

graphical notes about various highly placed acquaint-
ances in the Soviet Army.]
304 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
General Antonov. Under Stalin he was Chief of the
General Staff and also Commander of the Transcaucasian
Military District. Now he is Chief of the 10th Directorate
of the General Staff, which concerns itself with the satel-
lite countries.
Marshal Moskalenko, Commander in Chief of all Mis-
sile Troops. At one time he was Commander of the
Moscow Military District. He is about as dull as Malinov-
skiy, but he has some kind of pull with Khrushchev. He
suffers from stomach ulcers. He has to apply hot-water
bottles to his abdomen even at work. When he was pro-
moted to marshal, Varentsov was indignant and said,
"Can you imagine, they made this stupid ox a marshal."
There has been a rumor that if Marshal Grechko be-
came Minister of Defense, Moskalenko would be made his
deputy and Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces.
Moskalenko's headquarters are located not far, from the
Golitsyno Station near Moscow, on the territory of the
small town where the School for Advanced MiUtary Po-
litical Studies used to be located. The headquarters are
hidden in a large forest next to the village of Perkhushovo
along the Mozhaysk Highway. There is a large lake there
and a very nice recreation area, but there is only limited
access to it. Swimming and fishing are prohibited. The
entire area is fenced in.
Nearby are Marshal Budennyy's cottage and the
writers' settlement. The country house which formerly
belonged to Fadeyev, the writer who committed suicide,
is also located there. Other writers including the old lady

Marietta Shaginyan also live in the same area. Although the

writers are not particularly pleased with the neighbors,
there is nothing they can do; there is no other place for
them.
It is not so important to be the commander of a certain
category of troops as it is to belong in the category of
deputy minister. That means a better car, better food sup-
ply, more esteem, larger allowance for domestic help, a
better country house, i.e., definite and highly advantageous
privileges. This is the position Moskalenko ^ occupies:
he is at the same time Commander in Chief of the Mis-
sile Troops and Deputy Minister of Defense.

3 Moskalenko has now been put out to pasture. He is in the

Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense.
 THE GREAT ONES 305
Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Kh. Bagramyan,
Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of the Chief Directo-
rate for Rear Area Administration, a rear-area pen-
pusher. He considered a rather inteUigent marshal but
is

is old; he is about sixty-five. He holds the

getting too
title of Hero of the Soviet Union and is a member of

the Central Committee CPSU. I do not know exactly

when he joined the Party, but I heard people say that he
was criticized for being a late-comer, and was asked why
he joined the Party so late. Most likely he joined the
Party during the war in 1941 or 1942. He has two
offices: one at the Ministry of Defense and the other at
Building No. 2 on Red Square.
Lieutenant General Beloborodov used to be the Com-
mander of the Voronezh Military District. At the present
time he is Chief of the Chief Directorate of Personnel of
the Ministry of Defense. The Chief Directorate of Person-
nel is one of the largest in the Ministry of Defense.*
Brigadier General Ivan Vladimirovich Kupin, my good
friend through Varentsov. He is Varentsov's protege and
a distant relative of his; Varentsov's daughter Yelena is
married to Kupin's nephew. Kupin is the Commander of
Artillery and Missile Troops of the Moscow Military
District. Prior to this post, Kupin served in the German
Democratic Republic as Commander of Artillery of the
1st Tank Army. He was in a lot of trouble due to his
amorous escapades. While in Germany he lived with his
cipher clerk, Zaytseva. After Kupin's departure from Ger-
many she hanged herself because Kupin had left her
pregnant. During the investigation a photograph of Kupin
had been found among her belongings. Kupin confessed
that he had lived with Zaytseva while concealing this fact
from his wife; he admitted that he promised Zaytseva to
marry her. When he arrived in Moscow, General Krylov,
Commander of the Moscow Military District, refused to
see him, because the decision concerning Kupin's
but,
assignment had already been approved by the Central
Committee CPSU, the case was hushed up. Varentsov
persuaded Krylov to forget the whole thing.
This is the way it goes in our country. As long as the

4 At present he is the Commander of the Moscow Military

District.
306 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Central Committee approves, as long as one has connec-
tions, one can get away with anything, even crimes; but
I
if a similar incident happens to an ordinary ofiBcer with-
out any connections, he is punished immediately
either his rank is reduced or he is discharged from the
Army entirely.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Ivanovich ChuykoVy
the of Stalingrad, Commander in Chief of the
hero
Ground Forces, recently appointed Chief of the U.S.S.R.
Civil Defense.
Varentsov says that Chuykov is a boor and scum. Once
during maneuvers Varentsov got the best of Chuykov.
When Chuykov tried to hurry Varentsov in obtaining
the co-ordinates, Varentsov answered him in a singsong
manner: "Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, one
does not fry co-ordinates like pancakes."
General Krylov, former chief of Chuykov's staff in
Stalingrad, now Commander of the Troops of the Mos-
cow Military District. He was offered the post of Com-
mander of the Ground Forces but turned it down. I am

certain that he will go far and will be appointed to a higher

post.5 I knew him well through mutual friends. Krylov's
son, a lieutenant colonel, is serving in the 1st Tank Army
in East Germany.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Filipp Ivanovich Golikov,
head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet
Army, one of Khrushchev's proteges. He supported
Khrushchev when Marshal Zhukov was removed. He is a
member of the Central Committee and deputy of the
Supreme Soviet. He is completely bald. «
Vice Admiral Platonov, Commander of Submarines in
the Soviet Navy.
Brigadier General Arkhangelskiy, former Deputy Chief
of the Lenin Military PoUticalAcademy. Last September,
Arkhangelskiy was summoned by the Chief of the
Academy, Lieutenant General Zheltov, who told him: "We
have decided to retire you." Arkhangelskiy was stunned
by the unexpected news and began to cry: "This is a

5 Krylovis now a marshal, a Deputy Minister of Defense, and

the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops.
6 Since 1 962 he has been one of the main advisors in the Minis-
try of Defense.
 THEGREATONES 307

tragedy. . . . What will I tell Nina, my children . . . ?

That their husband and father, a general in good health,
is being dismissed because he did not do his work well?
That I am lazy, stupid? Or that I am a criminal, or some-
thing else?"
Arkhangelskiy used to be a division commander. His
wife is a doctor, and they have three children. After his
dismissal Arkhangelskiy used all his connections in an
effort to remain in the service bjit without any results.
Lieutenant General Beloborodov, head of the Chief Di-
rectorate of Personnel, told him: "There is nothing I can
do for you. I have not dozens but hundreds of generals
who have to be dismissed. The old ones go, and new
ones take their place. You know yourself that a new
broom sweeps clean. It was not my decision. It came from
above." After this discussion Arkhangelskiy suffered a
heart attack, was taken to a hospital, and soon died.
I participated in his funeral as one of the honor guards.
Permission was not given to have him buried at the
Novodevichye Cemetery, so after much difficulty a plot
was obtained by his family at the German Cemetery and
he was buried there. After his death it was discovered
that Arkhangelskiy had written a letter to Malinovskiy in
which he complained like a child. The letter was never
answered.
My father-in-law Major General Gapanovich was not
buried at the Novodevichye Cemetery either; no approval
was given. Apparently he also had not quite reached
the political stature necessary for being so "honored," as
some others have been.
After being dismissed, many generals could not find a
place for themselves in civilian life, they turned to drinking
and became regular alcoholics, as for example Lieutenant
General Biryukov. Biryukov was well known during World
War II and was respected by Stalin himself. After Stalin's
death he quarreled with Zheltov, who was then the head
of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army, and
the latter did everything he could to have Biryukov dis-
missed. Biryukov was a good friend of Krupchinskiy's.
They drank, played chess, and chased after women to-
gether. Biryukov is married to a Jewish woman. Now one
can see him often either drunk or in the company of some
woman.
308 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Lieutenant General Georgiy Spiridonovich KariofilH,
Varentsov's Chief of Staff. On his sixtieth birthday he did
not get the Order of Lenin but only a gold watch. This
was probably because he had a fight with General
Zhadov, Chief of Staff for the Commander in Chief of
the Ground Forces.
Krupchinskiy, head of the School for Nurses and a
friend of General Smolikov's. They drink together and
indulge in sexual orgies with girls attending the school.
Krupchinskiy also provides girls for other generals of the
General Staff.
Mamsurov, Serov's deputy; he almost died from a heart
attack he suffered during the New Year's celebration from
dancing too much.
Lieutenant Colonel Mikoyan, the son of Mikoyan,
Khrushchev's First Deputy; at one time he was commander
of a small airbase in Kubinka.
Lieutenant General Perevertkin, was Deputy Chairman
of the KGB; he was killed during maneuvers. He had
offices in both the General Staff and the KGB.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Klimentiy Yefremovich
Voroshilov, well known to everybody. At one time the
President-Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. He was the first one to be given the
rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Now retired because
of old age. He participated in the anti-Party group against
Khrushchev.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Semen Mikhaylovich
Budennyy. Retired, but he has his own office and a staff
of several officers. I believe he is writing his memoirs.
His office is located in the Antipyevskiy Lane, but he
lives at his country house near Moscow. He receives the
full pay of a marshal, 1200 new rubles a month.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov, chief of some
kind of special group of senior military advisors under
the Minister of Defense. This group consists of a small
number of marshals and generals.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovskiy, one of the
cleverest marshals next to Zhukov. At the present time he
is in retirement because of ill health, but he belongs to the

same special group of advisors under the Minister of De-

fense.
Marshals Konev, Vasilevskiy, Sokolovskiy, and Time-
 THE GREAT ONES 309

shenko are all in retirement because of "ill health.*' Actual-

ly all of them are perfectly healthy. They were forced to
retire "on own" or were requested to retire. Why?
their
None of them agrees with the new Khrushchev military
doctrine, putting the main emphasis on missiles in all
branches of the Soviet armed forces. Many of them are
counselors or consultants to the Minister of De-
listed as
fense,and they have their own offices at the Ministry.
General Tyulenev also belongs to this group of advisors.
At one time he was the Commander of the Moscow
Military District.
One can see Rokossovskiy, Konev, and Sokolovskiy
quite frequently, the others very seldom.
Lieutenant General Zhdanov, Head of the Chief
Artillery Directorate.He wants to become a marshal very
much but so far has not been promoted. In the past this
post was occupied by Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, who
was put in jail by StaUn for having done a poor job of
organizing the country's antiaircraft defenses; as a result
they proved inadeqxiate. Zhdanov is very sick, and re-
cently he suffered a heart attack. Zhdanov and Varentsov
do not like each other. When Zhdanov was taken ill,
Varentsov said that the only thing left to him was to re-
tire.
Commodore Vasilyev, retired, one of my old acquaint-
ances. He refused to go to Red Square to watch a parade.
He said, "That is another parade demonstrating mihtary
power. I am for peace."
Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, at the present time
Biryuzov's deputy in the Antiaircraft Defense of the
country. When Yakovlev was put in jail during Stalin's
rule, his wife went crazy, and his son was discharged from
the Army.
Lieutenant General of Artillery Volkotrubenko, former
deputy of Yakovlev, at the present time he is chief of the
artillery school in Voronezh. He was
jail with in
Yakovlev.
Chief Marshal of Artillery Nedelin, former Commander
in Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces of the country
and Deputy Minister of Defense for New Weapons, one
of the smartest artillery marshals. He was killed in Oc-
tober 1960, during the testing of a new long-range
missile, although the official government announcement
310

made
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Committee CPSU and the
in behalf of the Central
I
Council of Ministers stated that he was killed in an air-
plane crash. This, of course, was just a big lie. jAl
Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko, Commander o^"
the Warsaw Pact Forces and First Deputy of the Minister
of Defense. It is said that he is in some way related to
Khrushchev, and there are already rumors that he will
be the next Minister of Defense. He is the youngest of
all the marshals. Biryuzov considers him a narrow-minded
person.
Brigadier General Andrey Romanovich Pozovnyy^
Chief of Political Directorate of the Antiaircraft De-
fense Troops. He used to be Varentsov's deputy at the
First Ukrainian Front. They are close friends.
Pozovnyy is married and has two children. When his
son was entering the Artillery Academy I got the examina-
tion questions for him in advance. This is a normal thing
with us: people gain admittance to schools of higher edu-
cation with the help of influential friends, by using pull or
pressure or money.
General Pozovnyy says that he has been very nervous
latelyand that the doctors found that he is suffering from
nervous exhaustion. I brought him some pills against
sexual impotence from abroad.
Pozovnyy also refused to attend the parade on Red
Square. He called it a pure provocation and called Kru-
shchev all kinds of dirty names.

I have absolutely no intention of defaming the marshals

and generals mentioned above. Many of them are fine old
soldiers and Russian patriots. I did not wish to go into
their biographic data or to describe aU their exploits and
heroic deeds. I mention only those whom I know and I
have said about them only what I know about them per-
sonally. I intentionally omitted the subject of moral deg-
radation and drunkenness among the top military per-
sonnel —because there are already too many dirty stories
on this subject. I know one thing for sure, though: all
our generals have mistresses and some have two or more.
Family fights and divorces are a usual occurrence, and
nobody tries to keep them secret. Every month at our
Party meetings in the GRU we examine three or four
cases of so-called immoral behavior and lack of discipline
 THE GREAT ONES 311

among our officers. The Party committee and the Chief

Political Directorate of the GRU examine the cases in-
volving generals and colonels, while those cases involving
marshals are examined by the Central Committee CPSU.
The Central Committee naturally discusses such matters
behind closed doors, in order to conceal from the gen-
eral public and the rank-and-file officers the dirt in which
our high-command personnel is involved. Besides, marshals
are not punished so severely as others. In most cases they
are just given a warning. The explanation for this given
by the Central Committee is the same simple answer once
given by Stalin: "A marshal and his services are more
valuable than a female sex organ."
The Central Committee employees themselves are not
exactly saints when it comes to morality. Drunkenness and
sexual relations with office secretaries and other women are
a usual thing among the Central Committee employees
as well as in all Soviet ministries and departments.
Khrushchev and Furtseva have set the example. Moral
decay penetrates all levels of Party and government
leadership.
Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey got himself so deeply
involved with some actress that it almost led to a divorce.
He was given a warning by Khrushchev himself to be more
careful in his adventures. Adzhubey is the chief editor of
the newspaper Izvestiya, and every day he writes articles
about Communist morality. Yet look at his own behavior.
All the other journalists hate him. Even Satyukov, the
editor of Pravda, has slid down to second place after
Izvestiya. Adzhubey received a Lenin Prize for his so-called
work about Khrushchev's trip to the United States. This
•Vork" was compiled and written by the Central Com-
mittee. AH Adzhubey did was put his signature to it as
its editor.

It helps to be Khrushchev's son-in-law. There is an old

Russian proverb: "It is better to have 100 friends than
100 rubles." There is a new variant of this: "It is better
to be married like Adzhubey than to have 100 rubles."
Here are some other examples of our "Communist
morality." Podtserob, who at one time was the Soviet am-
bassador in Turkey, was living with his stenographer,
Shura Andrianova. The entire embassy knew about this.
I do not know how this affair ended, but I remember that
312

everybody called
Our
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
Shura, Podtserob's bed companion.
this
naval attache in Turkey was living with one of
I
the embassy typists whose husband was also in Turkey at
the same time. When we lived in Turkey, my own wife
was boldly approached by one of my brother ofl&cers, who
wanted to sleep with her.

[Editor's Note: Another case of repetition. Pen

kovskiy had discussed this before.]

In our own Committee

in Moscow, Yevgeniy Hich
Levin, KGBworker and Gvishiani's deputy, is a drunkard
and dissolute man. The stories he tells about the cheap
dives he frequents are hardly consonant with what the
Party tells us about "socialist morality." After his nightly
drunken escapades and amorous adventures, Levin in-
variably sleeps until noon. Almost every morning Gvishiani
looks for him: "Where is my deputy?" Someone says: "He
has not arrived yet. Probably he is at his other office
(that is KGB)." Gvishiani is afraid of Levin. He knows
very well that Levin is at home sleeping off his rough
night, but he will do nothing.

The do very well in our

relatives of the highly placed
Socialist society. Almost
of the marshals' sons have
all
finished the Military Diplomatic Academy. All of them
would like to be sent abroad to work, but the government
will not let them. There is a special decree of the Central
Committee CPSU forbidding the sons of marshals to go
abroad. Many of them tried, but to no avail.
Marshal Sokolovskiy's son was given a twenty-five-year
prison term. He belonged to a large group of sons of
—
marshals and ministers some of our so-called "Golden
—
Youth" who had organized drunken orgies at their coun-
try houses outside Moscow. At one of these orgies, a girl
who had just come to Moscow from Leningrad was raped
by the gang. She happened to be the niece of some minis-
ter. After she was raped the girl was placed in a car
and taken somewhere behind the Belorussian Railroad
Station, where they dumped her. Because the whole gang
was drunk, the driver of the car was driving very poorly.
A militiaman noticed this and blocked the car. One of the
boys in the car grabbed a pistol and fired a blank shot.
 THEGREATONES 313

The car was stopped. This happened under Stalin, and he

said, "I respect Sokolovskiy very much, but there will be
a trial just the same." And so a trial was held, and
Sokolovskiy's son was given a twenty-five-year prison term.
He stayed in jail only three years, however, and then he
"became ill," allegedly suffering from an ulcer or some-
thing of that sort. He was released.
Marshal Konev's son, Gehy Ivanovich Konev, is a
woman-chaser and a drunkard. He also is a member of
that same group of sons of marshals and other high officials.
He is a motorcycle enthusiast, and he loves to play the
horses.
I studied with Geliy at the Military Diplomatic Academy.
During that time Geliy had an accident while riding his
motorcycle. He hit a man who later died. Papa, however,
took care of everything, and Geliy was not jailed. He was
graduated from the academy in 1953, and is now working
in the Information Directorate of the GRU, on the Amer-
ican Desk. He knows English well.
Konev's present wife is not Geliy's mother. After the
war was over. Marshal Konev left his wife and two chil-
dren, his son Geliy and daughter Irina, and married the
directress of a mess hall of the 1st Ukrainian Front, where
he then commanded.
Colonel Pavlov, a good friend of mine, is married to
Voroshilov's daughter. Pavlov is the GRU
deputy rezident
in London.
Rogov's son (Rogovis Serov's deputy) also works in
the GRU. They did not want to allow him to attend the
Military Diplomatic Academy because during the war he
had worked with British and American flyers.
Gorkin, Chairman of the Supreme Court, has taken good
care of his two sons-in-law. One of them. Colonel Kon-
stantinov, a GRU employee, was the Air attache in Great
Britain; he is married to Gorkin's elder daughter, Irina.
Serov wanted to dismiss Konstantinov from the GRU but
was unable to because of Gorkin's intervention. Konstan-
tinov likes to drink and loves women, especially the fat
ones.
Gorkin's other son-m-law is Lieutenant Commander
Ivanov, a GRU employee.^ He and I studied together at
7 This is the same Ivanov who was connected with the Profumo
scandal in England.
314 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
the Military Diplomatic Academy. At present he is the
assistant naval attache in Great Britain. His wife is one
of Gorkin's daughters. He loves going to night clubs in
London.
As one can well see, all the sons and relatives of our
Soviet leaders and high-level personnel are well taken
care of. I have told only about those who work in the
GRU. But the same thing may be said about those who
are in the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers,
the KGB, and various other ministries. The sons, daughters,
sons-in-law, etc., of all our important Party and govern-
ment officials finish higher educational institutions and
have good jobs even though some of them are quite
stupid. All roads are open for them. They are the first ones
who get promoted to higher ranks and better jobs. Every-
thing is done by pull, through friends and family con-
nections.The newspapers scream that a struggle must be
waged against such practices. But what happens? They
punish some factory director for giving a job to his niece,
and he is criticized for it in the newspapers. But we must
look higher and see what is going on at the top level.
That is where all the big crimes are conmiitted. It is they
who set the example for the others to follow.

I
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER IX

Penkovskiy celebrated the Fourth of July 1962 by at-

tending a reception at the American Embassy in Moscow.
There he apparently made contact with the U.S. intel-
ligence officer to whom he later turned over a detailed
plan of new Soviet missile construction. Two days before,
Greville Wynne had arrived in Moscow. Penkovskiy met
him at the airport in a borrowed car and drove him to the
Ukraina Hotel. He was nervous. Wynne later observed
that he had never seen Penkovskiy so agitated. "I am
under observation," he said.
Wynne passed some materials to Penkovskiy and a letter
from the West, which visibly improved his spirits. Western
intelligence officers had apparently arranged a passport
for Penkovskiy to use, under another name, within the So-
viet Union, in case the surveillance on him intensified to the
danger point. Penkovskiy was now actively considering
methods of escape. At one point, in his European visit,
the possibility of his leaving Moscow and making a ren-
dezvous with a submarine in the Baltic had been at least
scouted. He had been thinking of this, how feasible it
—
was, and whether it would be possible ^by some means or
other— to get his family out as well.
Through this period Penkovskiy continued to get out
his information at an almost frantic pace. Although he
was well aware of the dangers involved, he was equally
well aware of the need to get his information to the West.
Soviet military preparations which were to culminate in
the Cuban missile crisis had already begun. So he was
315
316 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
caught in the age-old vise of the spy who has been alf too
successful.A less bold character would have sharply cur-
tailed his activities, but this was not Penkovskiy's way.
Yet while he continued to send out ever-increasing amounts
of information, he worried about his predicament. He
had never wholly faced up to the idea of the danger to
his family. Now he did. And now that he had a skill-
fully forged domestic passport to use for an escape, he
pondered over the best way to bring the family out with
him.
He knew that the KGB was
at least somewhere on his
trail. As had written:
early as January he
"Supposedly the 'neighbors' have information that my
father did not die and is located abroad. This information
appeared at the end of 1961. An immediate search of the
place where my father was buried did not produce any-
thing —
the grave was not found. Also, no document con-
cerning the death of my father was found. My com-
mand does not give this special attention and believes
that my father is deceased."
By early spring the degree of interest in his investi-
gation had obviously grown strong enough to block any
of his pending travel plans. For months he had counted
on making a trip to the U.S. in April with a Soviet mobile
book exhibition. This had not worked out. With some
agitation he wrote in the Papers:
"If all is well, I will take ojff for the U.S. on April

19. But at present things go badly. They are continually

searching for my father's burial place. They cannot find
it—and therefore they are conjecturing that my father is

alive. And therefore in the future it would not be suit-

able to send me on overseas assignments. My command
considers these meaningless and they defend me
fears
from all these conjectures of the 'neighbors'—everything
must be decided soon."
He was relieved by the messages which Wynne brought
from the outside. But he had grown progressively more
nervous about his contacts with Wynne himself. Greville
Wynne had taken a terrible risk in returning to Moscow
at all, and he knew it. But in his own agitation Penkov-
skiy worried whether Wynne had kept up the high
degree of caution necessary at this point in their relations.
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 317

Wynne was a very circumspect man. Penkovskiy's fear

was probably the result of his own jumpiness.
On July 5 he had a last meeting with Wynne at the
Peking Restaurant, where it was obvious that they both
were under heavy surveillance. Trying to sort out the
events of this day in his mind he wrote down this ac-
count in the Papers:
"Up to his recent trip to Moscow everything went nor-
mally, there were no questions, and the embassy was given
approval for his visa. The first days of his work passed
normally, but a day before his departure Levin told me
that his people [KGB] were interested in the aims of
Wynne's visit. I told him that besides the Committee,
Wynne must visit the Trade Council or the Ministry of
Foreign Trade about the question of organizing the mobile
exhibition. Levin said that he knew all this, but that for
some reason they have become interested in Wynne. 1
—
learned all this in the afternoon after I had given Wynne
the second batch of material. I had made a date with
him for 2100 hours that same day for a farewell supper.
I was working officially with Wynne, and the organs
—
[KGB] had been informed of this in such cases the
*neighbors' are not supposed to surveil us. On approaching
the Peking I noticed surveillance of Wynne. I decided to
go away without approaching him. Then I became afraid
that hemight have some return material for me before his
departure from Moscow. I decided to enter the restaurant
and to have dinner with Wynne in plain sight of every-
one. Entering the vestibule I saw that Wynne was *sur-
roimded' (and that surveillance was either a demonstrative
or an inept one). Having read that there were no free
tables, I decided to leave, knowing that Wynne would fol-
low me. I only wanted to find out if he had material for
me and then to part with him until morning, having told
him that I would see him off. Having gone 100-150 meters
I entered a large through courtyard with a garden, Wynne
followed me, and the two of us immediately saw the two
detectives following us. Exchanging a few words, we
separated.
"I was very indignant about this insolence, and on the
following day, after seeing Wynne off, I reported officially
to my superiors that KGB workers had prevented me from
dining with a foreigner whom we respect, have known for
 318 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
a long time, with whom we have relations of mutual trust,
with whom I have been working for a long time, etc. I
said that our guest felt uncomfortable when he saw that
he was being tendered such 'attention.' My superiors agreed
with me that this was a disgrace, and Levin [the KGB
representative] was equally indignant about the surveil-
lance. Levin said that the Conmiittee and I as its represen-
tative granted the necessary courtesies to Wynne and that
*we' [KGB] do not have any claims on him. . .".

Wynne's own report of the meeting, as given in his

memoirs, bears repeating:
"I happened to get to this restaurant a little earlier than
I should and I walked up and down the pavement. I saw
some characters standing around, but they didn't pay too
much attention, for the moment. But then, after about
ten minutes, Penkovskiy came along with his briefcase on
his arm. I crossed the road and went up to him, but in-
stead of greeting me, he just put his hand to his nose,
lowered his head, and went straight into the doorway.
"I followed him into the hotel, where there were people
coming and going. He went up to the entrance door, and
looked into the restaurant, walked about and as he was
passing me he said something that sounded like, 'Follow
behind me.' I gathered there was something wrong and I
took the hint.
"Penkovskiy went out into the street and walked for a
few hundred yards to where there was a gap in the
buildings leading to a tenement area of wooden houses.
He went in As I was coming by he spoke to me,
there.
*Grev, quick!' went into the alleyway and he said, 'You
I
must go away now, quick. I might see you at the airport
tomorrow, but you are being followed. Go.' And he went
the other way.
"As I came out of
the alley I saw two men standing
there. And
of course later in Lubianka I saw photographs.
They had had cameras. .'*
. .

Wynne had already booked passage to London on a

flightwhich left Moscow \Aq next afternoon. He decided
to check out of his hotel as quickly as possible and go to
the airport, before the KGB might make its own decision
to apprehend him. (Despite the widely vaunted omniscience
of Soviet security forces, they do not move without some-
thing of the same consultations, approvals, and counter-
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 319

signatures which are necessary in any bureaucracy.) He

reached JSheremyeteyevo Airport at five thirty the next
morning.
At the airport, Wynne made no move to change
at first
his ticket. He merely sat down on an outer bench in the
waiting room, to see if Penkovskiy would come. Wisely,
he set out to make himself as inconspicuous as possible.
Forty-five minutes later, after two taxis had rolled up to
the airport entrance, Wynne saw a private car come up to
the outer gates of the airport, then park outside. Pen-
kovskiy quickly got out of the car and walked into the
terminal. He first walked past Wynne —
as was his custom
— to check any possible surveillance. Then he turned and
sat beside him. He told Wynne he must leave immediately.
Using his authority with customs officials and the air-
port staff, Penkovskiy personally changed Wynne's tick-
ets, rushed him through customs, and booked him on

the first available flight to the West, an S.A.S. flight to

Copenhagen leaving about 9 a.m. Although Penkovskiy
succeeded in overawing the airport guards, it was obvious
that for the long term his precipitate action killed what-
ever chances remained to him of neutralizing the regime's
suspicion, or at least explaining away his connection with
Wynne. It was an act of self-sacrifice and Wynne never
forgot it.
For the next two months, instead of lying low, Pen-
kovskiy redoubled his intelligence activity. Perhaps he
knew that the game was up. But it was more likely that
he was driven by the importance of what he had to com-
municate. In the following passages of the Papers he un-
derlines again and again his concern about Khrushchev's
nuclear preparations.
 CHAPTER IX

Atomic Weapons and Missiles

The responsibility for all nuclear equipment and its safe-

keeping rests with the Chief Artillery Directorate (CAD)
of the Ministry of Defense. This directorate is also re-
sponsible for the production of nuclear equipment. In
accordance with the decision of the Central Committee
and the Supreme Military Council, CAD
supplies the nec-
essary nuclear weapons to the military districts, military
groups abroad (as for example, in Germany) separate
armies, and all other units which, according to the Gen-
eral Staff's plans, must be armed with nuclear weapons.
Of course, the CAD is also responsible for supplying
nuclear weapons to all the missile troops.
The KGB is responsible for the security of all nuclear

plants, scientific research institutes, laboratories, and the

installations where the nuclear bombs and missiles are
stored. KGB troops escort nuclear equipment while it is
being transported. For this purpose the KGB
has special
vehicles, railroad cars, aircraft, etc.
The U.S.S.R. conducts scientific research work on the
uses of nuclear energy for peaceful and strictly scientific
purposes. But this represents a very small portion of our
activities in nuclear energy. Only a few projects, such as
the icebreaker Lenin and several atomic reactors, are de-
voted to peaceful purposes. All the others are military.
Many of our nuclear explosions (tests) have been con-
ducted in the central part of the U.S.S.R., mostly in
Kazakhstan. Some of the smaller tests were not noticed
at all and were not recorded by the Western states. The
320
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 321

large nuclear explosions are reported by TASS and the

Soviet press, but nothing is ever said about the smaller
ones. At the General Staff we sometimes know of tests
being conducted on a certain type of nuclear weapon, and
we wait to see what TASS will say about this. If TASS
keeps silent, then we keep silent, too.
Testing of various new types of nuclear weapons is
conducted daily. Nuclear test explosions take place more
often than reported by TASS or the Soviet press. All this
talk about the Soviet Union advocating the prohibition
of nuclear tests is nothing but lies. Khrushchev will fire
anyone who mentions complete suspension of nuclear tests.
He is not ready for it. He will sign an agreement pro-
hibiting nuclear tests only after he becomes convinced
that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the U.S. in the use of
nuclear energy for military purposes. The negotiations
can last another ten years without any results.
When our first atom bomb was detonated, the entire
event was recorded on movie film, from the preparations
to the explosion. This film is classified Secret, and it
was never shown publicly. I saw it when I was studying
at the Military Diplomatic Academy, where it was shown
to us as intelligence officers. At the beginning the film
showed the transportation of the bomb by a truck with
heavy rubber tires. Officers and soldiers are guarding the
vehicle. The film showed the airport and the airplane
it —
was hard to tell its type and the transfer of the atom
bomb from the truck to the airplane. Then there were
—
pictures of a forest, birds singing, etc. and a spot on the
ground, indicated by a circle, where the bomb was to be
dropped. Within a radius of two kilometers or more
around this spot were placed all sorts of vehicles, tanks,
ordinary and reinforced concrete buildings. Animals
—
cows, horses, sheep, dogs, and others were tied to trees
or the structures, or simply put to graze in designated
areas. This sort of arrangement was made around the tar-
get in several echelons, beginning at a distance of two
kilometers from the target.
The bomb was dropped from the aircraft at a great
altitude by a radio signal sent from the ground. The pilot
had no control over the release of the bomb. The bomb
fell not far from the prescribed target.
For a long time after the explosion various studies were
322 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
conducted as to effect on vegetation, animals, struc-
its
tures, vehicles, These studies lasted several months.
etc.
A number of prominent scientists, doctors, engineers, and
various other specialists participated, using the latest scien-
tific methods.
Asa rule, neither Khrushchev nor Malinovskiy is pres-
ent at atomic tests, but there are always some representa-
tives of the Central Committee CPSU, the government,
and the Ministry of Defense in attendance.
Khrushchev did attend twice, however, during practice
firing of missiles.This took place at Kapustin Yar ^ and
also somewhere else in the South. Often it happens that
the missiles do not leave their launching pad. This oc-
curred once during practice firings in the presence of
Khrushchev himself. As always happens in cases like this,
there was a big uproar, followed by an investigation, etc.
Foreign observers, including those from the satellite
countries, are not allowed at the nuclear bomb and weap-
on tests. When practice firing of missiles is conducted,
observers from countries of the people's democracies are
—
sometimes allowed with the exception of China.
There is a shortage of atomic raw materials needed
for the atom bombs and missiles with nuclear warheads.
This problem is being dealt with by the Chief Directorate
for Atomic Energy under the Council of Mim'sters of the
U.S.S.R. They control the consumption of raw materials.
Almost all the ore containing uranium comes to the Soviet
Union from Czechoslovakia. Recently some uranium ore
deposits have been found in China, but they are very
insignificant Soviet monazite sands and ore deposits are
not particularly rich either in elements necessary for
atomic energy.
In view of this shortage of atomic raw materials, it is
small wonder that our government is so interested in estab-
lishing Soviet control in the Congo. The largest uranium
ore deposits are in the Congo. When Lumumba was tem-
porarily in power the Soviets sent twenty-three planeloads
of officers (including generals) there via Egypt and Sudan.
The aircraft were of the IL-14 and IL-18 types; heavier
types could not land on the Sudanese airfield, and other

1 Kapustin Yar is a town about seventy-five miles to the east of

Volgograd, formerly Stalingrad.
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 323

countries would not give permission for the Soviet air-

craft to land for refueling.
A good friend of mine, GRU Major Aleksey Guryev,
was the first one to fly to the Congo with the Soviet
generals. The primary task of this mission was to establish
Soviet control over the uranium ore in the Congo.

Major General Semenov, Varentsov's second deputy,

spends almost all of his time in Central Asia where the
nuclear tests are conducted. One of Moskalenko's deputies
always goes with Semenov, too. Lieutenant General
Pyrskiy, another of Varentsov's deputies, could not be
present at his chiefs birthday party because he was at-
tending atom-bomb tests on the island of Novaya Zemlya.
There is a large nuclear base on Novaya Zemlya, as well
as a missile base equipped with R-12 and R-14 missiles.
Malinovskiy told this to Churayev at Varentsov's party.
Other nuclear bases and storage areas are located in
Norilsk, on the island of Franz Josef Land, and not far
from Vorkuta. These are all in the North. In the South
there are bases in Krasnovodsk, Kirovabad, and on Artem
Island. Varentsov, Kariofilli, and Buzinov sometimes travel
to these bases.
On September 8, 1961, there was a regular experimental
atomic explosion of a sixteen-megaton bomb. This was
the first test explosion of a bomb of such force in the
Soviet Union. An R-12 missile was used in this test.
The missile was launched from Kapustin Yar. Varentsov
was present when the missile was launched.
Later, when a fifty-megaton bomb was tested, to every-
body's surprise the explosion's actual force equaled that
of eighty megatons. Such great force was not expected.
It was believed that some unforeseen chemical changes in
the charge must have taken place after it was prepared.
It is now thought that such a bomb with a calculated
force of 100 megatons may actually produce an explo-
sion equaling that of 150 or 160 megatons.
More on uranium ore deposits: Uranium is mined in
the area of the city of Pyatigorsk in the Caucasus. The
mines are located in the mountains and are named as
follows: "Byk" —
^where the rock contains high percentage
of uranium; "Beshtau," "Verblyud," and "Zolotoy Kur-
gan." Twelve kilometers from Pyatigorsk is the new town
324 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
of Lermontov, where the workers engaged in the mining
and processing of the uranium ore live. A
uranium ore
concentration plant is located on the outskirts of Lermon-
tov. Uranium is mined in the area of the city of Nalchik,
near the small town of Kendzha. Uranium ore deposits
have also been found in the area of the city of Elista.
Why did Khrushchev unexpectedly begin to conduct new
nuclear tests? ^ All nuclear tests have had and some still
have two phases. The first phase deals with the explosive
force in TNT equivalents. In these tests the bombs were
dropped from aircraft or from special masts. The second
phase tests nuclear payloads hfted by missiles.
The present tests are almost exclusively of the second-
phase type. Almost all of them are conducted with mis-
siles. First, the missiles are fired for distance and accuracy

without a nuclear charge. Next, the same types of missiles

are launched at the same targets, with nuclear warheads.
Thus, for example, the R-12 missile, now being mass
produced, has a range of 2500 kilometers. The R-14 mis-
sile is only in the development stage and is being readied
for mass production. The range of the R-14 missile
with a nuclear warhead is 4500 kilometers. The range of
the R-14 missile with conventional warhead is much
greater.
According to Buzinov, the cost of the missiles is very
high. For example, the R-11 missile with a conventional
demolition warhead costs 800,000 rubles; the same missile
with a nuclear warhead will cost from five to ten times
as much, depending on the particular TNT equivalent of
the warhead. That is where the people's money goes. That
is the reason why a laborer is paid sixty to eighty rubles
a month.
Why is Khrushchev pushing his nuclear tests? Why is
he unwilling to sign the agreement forbidding nuclear
weapons' tests? Because most of our missiles have not even
passed the necessary tests, let alone reached the mass-
production stage. There have been many instances of mis-
siles and satellites exploding in the air or disappearing
completely. But Khrushchev persistently does everything

2 The Soviets resumed nuclear testing on September 1, 1961.

They contmued the practice untU the nuclear test-ban treaty of
1963 with the U.S. Subsequent Soviet tests have been underground,
apparently, to suit the terms of the test-ban treaty.
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 325

possible to improve missile weapons. He wants to seize

the initiative and to show the West that he is ahead in
the field of missile production, as regards quaUty as well
as quantity. Khrushchev and our scientists are still quite
far from being able to prove such a superiority; but they
are working hard to improve all types of missile weapons.
Khrushchev often boasts about the Soviet missiles or
spreads all kinds of propaganda about them. Often a new-
model —
missile is still only in the testing stage in fact,
the tests may have proved unsuccessful — but there he is,
already screaming to the entire world about his "achieve-
ments" in new types of Soviet weapons. The idea of
Khrushchev and the Presidium of the Central Committee
is to demonstrate somehow Soviet supremacy in the nuclear

field by any possible means: by launching new sputniks,

by nuclear explosions, etc. In short, Khrushchev often brags
about things we do not yet have. Varentsov, when com-
menting on Khrushchev's behavior, often says: "We are
only thinking about those things, we are only planning.
Even if we have actually achieved some successes here
and there, we still have a long way to go before we
actually achieve the things about which Khrushchev keeps
talking and boasting." Varentsov has always stressed the
fact that we do not have enough qualified personnel, that
their training is inadequate, that the quality of produc-
tion is poor, and the quantity is inadequate.
Sometimes this pushing of Khrushchev's for premature
achievement has disastrous results. The sudden death of
Marshal Nedelin, chief of our missile forces, was a case
in point.
Khrushchev had been demanding that his specialists
create a missile engine powered by nuclear energy. The
laboratory work concerning such an engine had even been
completed prior to the forty-third anniversary of the Oc-
tober Revolution in 1960, and the people involved wanted
to give Khrushchev a "present" on this anniversary —
missile powered by nuclear energy. Present during the
tests on this new engine were Marshal Nedelin, many spe-
cialists on nuclear equipment, and representatives of sev-
eral government committees. When the countdown was
completed, the missile failed to leave the launching pad.
After fifteen to twenty minutes had passed, Nedelin came
out of the shelter, followed by the others. Suddenly there
326 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
was an explosion caused by the mixture of the nuclear
II
substance and other components. Over three hundred peo-
ple were killed.
A few people miraculously survived, but all of them
were in deep shock. Some of them died soon afterward.
What was brought to Moscow were not Nedelin's and
other victims' remains, but urns filled with dirt. Yet we
all had read in the "truthful" official government state-

ments printed in the newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya

only that Nedelin died, "... in the line of duty— in an
air accident," and we also read about how these bodies
were cremated, as well as other details
about the funeral.
The were buried quietly, without any
rest of the victims
fanfare. A period of mourning was announced in cities
where some of the scientists who perished had lived or
gone to school. I know that a long mourning period was
announced in the city of Dnepropetrovsk.

This, incidentally, is not the first time that a missile

accident took place. There had been others before this,
but the government keeps silent about them. It would be
appropriate at this point to tell of another terrible acci-
dent that happened to a helicopter about which Kru-
shchev at one time bragged to President Eisenhower.
In May 1961, near Odessa, practice firing of combat
missiles was being conducted with representatives from
the satellite countries attending. On May 17 a group of So-
viet generals including General Kolpakchi, Chief of Com-
bat Training of the General Staff; General Perevertkin,
Deputy Chairman of KGB; General Goffe, Varentsov's
deputy; General Morozov, Chief of the Operations Direc-
torate of the Odessa MiHtary District; and others were
flying to the proving grounds near the city of Nikolayev
in a helicopter belonging to Lieutenant General Babad-
zhanyan, Commander of the Odessa Military District.
While they were already over the proving grounds, one
of the large rotor blades broke loose, and the helicopter
crashed into the ground. Everybody including the crew
was killed. All bodies were mangled terribly, and the rela-
tives were not even allowed to see them. Soviet newspaper
accounts of this tragedy merely said that they died in an
air accident. After the cremation the urns were placed on
display at the Central Theater of the Soviet Army. The
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 327

funeral was attended by hundreds of generals and officers,

including Varentsov, who was very much upset by the
death of his deputy. There were also other accidents
involving this same type of helicopter.
Here is a striking example of effrontery and deceit!
After that, how can one trust the statements of the central
Party organ and the government, which always claim that
they say nothing but the truth? Let the entire world know
that Marshal Nedelin perished in a nuclear explosion,
and that there has been such an accidenti

The Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy (now the Missile

Academy) has a total of 2500 students. From 450 to 600
officers are graduated from this academy every year. But
there is only one Missile Academy, and even after their
graduation from it the officers will have to have several
years of special training in order to become qualified and
valuable missile specialists, capable of controlUng modem
equipment. A missile is not a cannon on two wheels which
can be turned in any direction. Khrushchev is blabbing
that we are ready, we have everything. This is just so
much idle talk. He himself probably does not see the
whole picture. He talks about the Soviet Union's capability
to send missiles to every corner of the world, but he has
not done anj^hing about it because he knows that we
are actually not ready. Of course, we can send our missiles
in different directions as far as the United States, or
Cuba, etc. But as far as launching a planned missile at-
tack to destroy definite targets is concerned, we are not
yet capable of doing it. We simply do not have missiles
that are accurate enough.
According to the information acquired from Varentsov
and others, many of our big missiles are still on the
drawing boards, in the prototype stage, or are still under-
going tests. There are altogether not more than a few
dozen of these, instead of the "shower" of missiles with
which Khrushchev has been threatening the West.^ The
launching of the first sputnik required the combined ef-
forts of all Soviet scientists and technical personnel
with the entire technological capacity of the country at
their disposal.

3 Here Penkovskiy is referring to the ICBM, not the IRBM,

which was in production at that time.

328 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS I
Several sputniks were launched into the stratosphere and
never heard from again. They took the lives of several
specially trained astronauts.
Khrushchev's boasting is also meant to impress the So-
viet people and to show them that we are strong. Of
course, there have been some fine achievements in the
development and improvement of tactical and operational
short-range missiles. It is still too early, however, to speak
of strategic missiles as perfected. Accidents and all sorts
of troubles are daily occurrences. In this connection, there
is much talk about shortcomings in the field of electronics.
There have been many cases during the test launchings
of missiles when they have hit inhabited areas, railroad
tracks, etc., instead of the designated targets, after de-
viating several hundred kilometers from their prescribed
course.
The vigilance of the Western powers, however, must
not be weakened by the shortcomings mentioned above.
If at the present time the Soviet ballistic missiles are still
far from being perfect, in two or three years
— —
even sooner ^Khrushchev will have achieved his goal;
perhaps

this is something for everyone to keep in mind.

Right now we have a certain number of missiles with
nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States
or South America; but these are single missiles, not in
mass production, and they are far from perfect. Every
possible measure is taken to improve the missiles and
their production. Money is saved everywhere and allo-
cated to the building of "kindergartens," the slang expres-
sion we use for missile production. Scientific and techni-
cal personnel are being mobilized.
Many different towns have been built for the scientists
and the technical and engineering personnel. Not only
have scientists and engineers been awarded decorations
and medals, but some have been awarded the title of
Hero of Socialist Labor three or four times. They have
received the Lenin Prize and other prizes. The work of
these people is not pubUcized and their pictures do not
appear in the newspapers. Sometimes they may be seen
at some important conferences or at Party congresses
which they are invited to attend. From this it may be
deduced that they are secretly given awards, Lenin
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 329

Prizes, titles of Hero of Socialist Labor, etc.; this is not

made public.
Thus, for example, Vladimir Nikolayevich Chelomey,
a missile designer, is the foremost specialist on missiles.
He has two laboratories in Moscow. Khrushchev's son
works in one of them. Chelomey is a civilian engineer.
He developed the "cruise" missile which has been adopted
as armament on submarines. It is also used by the ground
troops.
The cruise missile will have several different combat
designations. A
very sensitive altimeter and a special range
finder have been developed for this missile, which will
enable it to fly around various heights and mountains
when launched to the height of 200 to 300 meters above
the horizon. Soviet specialists claim that when launched
to this height (200 to 300 meters) and with its high speed
of flight, this missile will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to destroy in the air along its trajectory. Tests
conducted with regard to these features proved completely
successful. In its flight around obstacles over 300 meters
in height, the missile's maneuverings will be automatic,
i.e., ail changes in its flight wLU be controlled by instru-

ments on board the missile.

For example: Suppose the missile is launched to the
height of 250 meters above the horizon. Thirty seconds
later it must fly over a mountain 1000 meters high. At
twenty-five seconds after the start the missile instruments
record the approaching mountain and the missile begins
itsgradual ascent remaining at 250 meters from the moun-
tain slopes, i.e., when the missile flies over the highest

point of the mountain, it will be 1250 meters above the

horizon. After flying over the mountain it will come
down 1000 meters, etc.
When Khrushchev announced at the beginning of 1960
that the Soviet Union possessed a completely new and
terrifying type of ballistic missile, he actually had in mind
the order he issued to invent or prepare a new type of
propellant based on nuclear energy. Some of the work in
this direction has proved quite successful, but it is still
far from what Khrushchev has in mind. There is a big lag
in electronics.There were many accidents during tests.
In this respect my sympathies are with the Americans.
If they have an accident, it is all in the papers; everyone
330 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
knows about it. But in our country everything is kept
secret.
There were several unsuccessful launchings of sputniks
with men killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the mis-
sile would explode on the launching pad, or it would go
up and never return.
When Gagarin made his flight, it was said officially
that there was not a single camera in his sputnik. This
was nothing but a big lie. There was a whole system of
cameras with different lenses for taking pictures and for
intersection. The photographic equipment was turned on
and off during the flight by the astronaut. But Khru-
shchev tells everybody that nothing was photographed. Pho-
tographic equipment has been installed on all sputniks,
but this has been denied in order to prevent the Ameri-
cans from launching espionage sputniks or, as we call
them, "spies in the sky."
Our people in the General Staff felt very uncomfortable
when they learned that the Americans had launched a
satellite which would fly over the tenitory of the U.S.S.R.
They denounced this as a spy satellite. They believe that
this satellite can make photographs, which frightens them.
Immediately an order was issued to all major Soviet mili-
tary targets to improve their camouflage.
All Soviet missiles made at the present time are of the
two-stage type. In the past we had some three-stage mis-
siles, but then it was decided that the two-stage missiles

were easier to control.

General Grigoryev, conunander of a brigade of strategic

missiles under Marshal Moskalenko (his brigade is sta-
tioned in the Far North), told Pozovnyy that his depot,
which contained nuclear warheads, was flooded by water.
Therefore it was necessary to move the warheads to an-
other location. Malinovskiy has two launching pads. The
launching capacity of each pad is one missile a day.
Colonel Fedorov is commander of a ground-forces mis-
sile brigade in East Germany.
Brigadier General Vinogradov is also the commander
of a missile brigade in East Germany.
There is a large, well-equipped airfield in the area or
city of Zhitomir, where long-range heavy bombers ca-
pable of carrying atom and hydrogen bombs are based.
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 331

Training flights by bombers with these bombs are made

regularly from this airfield. Serving at this airfield is
General Pozovnyy's nephew, a lieutenant, who recently
visited Moscow and told Pozovnyy that he frequently
makes flights in the westerly direction all the way to the
border of the U.S.S.R., with atom bombs in his bomb bay.
Recently in Moscow I saw Colonel Igor Andreyevich
Gryzlov, Deputy Chief of the Missile Artillery Supply
Directorate of the Soviet Army (the Directorate's Chief,
Colonel Gorelikov, has been recommended for promotion
to a general), who was on a ten-day visit. Gryzlov is a close
friend of mine, and when I was studying at the Dzer-
zhinskiy Academy, he was Deputy Chief of the 4th Faculty
of the Academy.
Colonel Gryzlov told me that the 34th Artillery Division
is included in the composition of the Soviet forces sta-

tioned in East Germany.

Colonel Nikiforov, Varentsov's former Chief of the Per-
sonnel Section, had arrived in Germany and assumed com-
mand of a missile brigade (same type of brigade as the
one commanded by Colonel Fedorov.)
Besides the missile-firing ground at Kapustin Yar, two
new firing grounds have been equipped and put in opera-
tion, one at Shklo Yar in Lvov oblast, and one in the
area of Nikolayev in Odessa oblast. The command-staff
exercises of the Warsaw Pact Command personnel held
last April in Moscow at the General Staff were followed
in May by practical exercises with troops and with field
firing of missiles. They were attended by representatives
of those satellite countries which have received missile
equipment.
Missiles were fired from two firing ranges. The Yauer
firing range's missile impact area is in Poland, and that of
the Nikolayov firing range in Rumania (the impact bases
are located in some marshy areas)
So, we fire at Rumanian cornfields, or as we say, at
Rumanian "mamalyzhniki." [Mamalyga is a Rumanian
national dish which is made from com.]
At the end of 1961 a firm directive was issued to equip
the satelUte countries with missile weapons. This was by
a special decision of the Central Committee CPSU. In
this regard Marshal Varentsov made the following com-
ment: "They say we must give our brother Slavs missile
332 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
weapons. So we give them missiles now, and later they will
stick a knife in our back."
Marshal Varentsov flew to Poland, to Hungary, and to
other countries of the people's democracies, including
North Korea and China. This was approximately at the
beginning of 1961. To this day Varentsov still receives
presents from the Chinese —
^real Chinese tea which he

loves to drink.
The first country to receive missiles from the U.S.S.IL
was East Germany, in 1960.

There have been many cases in which the construction

of small factories, apartment houses, or office buildings
was suspended in order to divert funds to the defense
industry and give assistance to the satellite countries.
In my opinion as a General Staff officer, it will take a
year or a year and a half for us to be able to equip
all our satellite countries with missiles. In order to stop
this armament of Khrushchev's and his attempts to launch
an attack, the Western countries must triple both their
efforts at unity and their increase in armaments. Only
then will Khrushchev realize that he is dealing with a '

strong adversary.
I wish to repeat that I know the exact location in some
areas of the launch sites for missile troops where nuclear
warheads have been set up: Novaya Zemlya is the number-
one center; Norilsk; farther, in the area of Franz Josef
Island; in the Vorkuta area. This is all in the North. Now
the South: in the areas of Krasnovodsk and Kirovabad;
these are directed against Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Here is an interesting note. A Japanese by the name of
Sato was on a visit in the U.S.S.R. He wanted us to show
him the island of Artema near the city of Baku because
he was interested in the problems of drilling underwater
oil wells. We sent a special inquiry to the General Staff.
The answer, which was classified Secret, stated that no
foreigners were allowed on the island; a missile base and
an antiaircraft defense base were located there.
The sputnik-lsMnclnng base is located near Orenburg
(formerly Chkalov). Gagarin was launched from there.
Missile bases directed against England are located north
of Leningrad, in Karelia.
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 333

There are missile plants in the Urals and in Gorkiy.

Also, there are so-called "powder candies [porokhovyye
konfety] in the Ukraine. Everybody calls missiles "mod-
ern weapons," i.e., when someone does not want to discuss
secrets, he refers to missiles as "modem weapons."
The warheads for atomic shells are manufactured in
the city of Khntsy.
One very important airbase is located near Zhitomir.
There is also a large airbase near Lvov. By order of
Khrushchev, the personnel of this airbase have been
trainecl. in handling and carrying atomic bombs. The air-
craft can fly across Rumania and Bulgaria.
I have heard already some talk about a woman astronaut
being readied for a flight into the stratosphere in a
sputnik for propaganda purposes. All the higher com-
manders think that such a flight will have a strong prop-
aganda effect. The launching is planned for the beginning
of 1963.*
A huge artillery base is located in Mozhaysk.^ A
certain Captain Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Sklyarov works
there. He was not allowed to go abroad because he has no
parents. In the Soviet Union persons who have no par-
ents or close relatives are not allowed to go abroad be-
cause it is feared that they will leave and never return.
China has not been given a single nuclear missile, nor
any other kind of nuclear weapon. The Chinese have
been given conventional missiles just as the other coun-
tries of the people's democracies, and it is possible that
they will be given nuclear missiles if it becomes necessary.
But so far they have not received any. The Chinese
themselves can manufacture conventional missiles, using
our blueprints.
A kind of headquarters has been built underground in
the Urals to be used in case of war by the Central Com-
mittee CPSU, the Ministry of Defense, and all the other
vitally important government agencies. Also in the Urals
are many aviation plants and hangars, hidden deep under-
ground.
A new type of aircraft with a delta wing has been de-

4Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova was launched into orbit

on June 16, 1963,
6 Town about sixty-five miles west of Moscow.
334 PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
signed and undergoing extensive tests. The ceiling of
is

this aircraft higher than thirty kilometers.

is

A few more words about artillery and missiles. There

are two higher educational institutes in the U.S.S.R. which
train personnel for conventional and missile artillery;
this is not counting the schools and separate courses which
provide training in narrow fields.
The academies are: The Dzerzhinskiy Military Engineer-
ing Artillery Academy in Moscow and The Leningrad
Artillery Academy in Leningrad; it is a conamand school
rather than an engineering school.
For a long time there was a Foreign Department 'in the
Moscow Academy in which officers of the satellite coun-
tries of Eastern Europe as well as Korea and China were
trained. But after two Germans, one Pole, and one or two
Hungarians were arrested for spreading anti-Soviet prop-
aganda and having contact with foreign embassies in Mos-
cow, this department was moved to the city of Voronezh.
Each department also has its chief, deputy chief, and a
full-time secretary of the Party bureau. Then there are the
senior instructors, instructors, teaching assistants, and lab-
oratory technicians.
Periodically, higher academic courses are organized by
the academy to teach the latest missile techniques and
other problems of artillery art. I finished one of these
special courses in 1959. When I was there, there were
eighty students attending this course —twenty of them
upon finishing the course were assigned to the ballistic
missile troops.
In 1959 the Military Academy for Antiaircraft Defense
was organized in the city of Kalinin, in close conjunction
with the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. It is now training artillery
missile personnel for antiaircraft defense.
Besides this academy, on Khrushchev's orders, a special
has been organized to work on
scientific research institute
the problems of control and communications in the field
of electronics, etc. One experimental missile battalion has
been attached to this institute. The entire work of this in-
stitute is directed toward the development of means of
antimissile defense, or antimissile missiles. Varentsov,
Pozovnyy, and Buzinov told me, "Thank goodness,
Khrushchev is finally turning from loud words to deeds."
I must say frankly that on the basis of what I heard
 ATOMIC WEAPONS AND MISSILES 335

from VarentsoV and others, we have no existing means to

fight enemy missiles. Work
being conducted, however, in
is

that direction with a considerable rate of speed.

Noting such shortcomings and gaps in the missile ar-
tillery, Varentsov and the other artillery men often express
their views approximately in this manner: "Our approach
to things is always one-sided. We were carried away by
missiles. Of course we must be interested in missiles, but
we must not ignore conventional artillery, our 'old mother
cannon.' We have ignored conventional artillery, which still
exists in all our regiments and divisions, and therefore,
because of these missiles, we are suffering shortages in the
old classical artillery. And in general, because of these
missiles, we are also short of other types of armament."
 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER X

After Wynne had left Moscow, Penkovskiy prepared for

trouble. His Committee and the GRU still maintainec.
confidence in him —or said they did. As he noted in the
Papers, representations were being made to the KGB
to
obtain clearance for another trip abroad with a delega-
tion. "Only God knows what their answer will be," ho
wrote. But he knew himself that a second denial of his
travel request could well mean that he was under sus-
picion, and for something far more serious than the matter
of his father's allegiance to the White Army.
In the event, he decided to await the decision of "the
neighbors" and plan his course of action accordingly. It
was possible that he might simply be removed from the
Committee and further contact with foreigners. The ex-
posure of his father's identity, if pressed by enough people,
would be enough to warrant such treatment. If this hap-
pened he planned to appeal to Varentsov and Serov, if
necessary, in an effort at least to stay in the Army. He
might have to leave Moscow. If so, he would try to remain
somewhere in European Russia, preferably in Leningrad.
(He said at his trial that his Anglo-American advisors had
suggested Lemngrad as the best alternative.)
In the midst of this uncertainty Penkovskiy kept up
with his dangerous photography work and attempted to
pass on the information he was accumulating. On Septem-
ber 5 he brought some film to an American Embassy
reception, but he could find no safe opportunity for trans-
mitting it. The next day he tried to make contact with
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 337

one That effort, too, proved abortive.

of his British sources.
On October 22, according to Soviet sources, Oleg Pen-
kovskiy was arrested by the KGB. On November 2, Gre-
ville Wynne was kidnapped by the KGB in Budapest,
where he had gone with more plans for a mobile trade
exhibition in Eastern Europe. He was taken to Moscow.
He next saw Penkovskiy through a peephole in Lubianka
Prison.
The inevitable question occurs: what betrayed them? It
was probably not shrewd, farseeing detective work either
on the part of the KGB or the GRU. That is where real
life so often departs from the spy stories of fiction. Ac-
cording to the canons of espionage literature, there must
have been a lynx-eyed KGB colonel somewhere who had
been patiently accumulating a mosaic of fact and hy-
pothesis in the "Penkovskiy case," each element of which
was innocent in itself but damning as part of a totality.
The Soviet authorities, in fact, finally produced this master
sleuth, one Lieutenant Colonel A. V. GvozdUin, although
he was not unveiled until two years after the trial. (See
Epilogue.)
Yet thereal-life KGB, with or without Colonel Gvoz-
dilin,took twenty-three years to find out that Penkovskiy's
father was a White officer, a fact which does not suggest
the presence of any Soviet Arsene Lupins or even Sam
Spades buried in its Table of Organization. There is no
evidence available that the KGB acted with any greater
speed or shrewdness in determining that the GRU colonel
was betraying the Soviet regime.
Penkovskiy had detected signs of surveillance early in
1962, but such KGB activity was hardly a rarity in the life
of the most trusted Soviet official. Although his chance
meetings with Mrs. Chisholm look suspicious in hindsight,
actually none of Penkovskiy's associations with foreigners
— ^not even the circumstances of his casual meetings
had been out of line with his normal duties on the Com-
mittee and in GRU. Only by the summer were the signs
of surveillance multiplying. Even then, Greville Wynne
himself felt that, at worst, the KGB thought he and Pen-
kovskiy might have been engaged in some black-market
trading.
Acautious man would have run to cover at the first signs
of continuing surveillance. In July, for example, Penkov-
338 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
skiy could have sent off a message to London that he was
breaking off communication, eased off his Western contacts
for some months, and — —
above all destroyed the in-
criminating home-espionage kit in the hidden compart-
ment of his desk drawer.
Penkovskiy was a cautious man by training, but not by
nature. Every human has his own "hubris," as the Greek
dramatists used to tell us, and Oleg Penkovskiy was no
exception to the rule. In some hues of work pride goeth
before a fall and rises again; the victim of hubris can re-
cover and go on to great heights, if humbler and wiser
for having had his overconfidence shaken. But a spy can
make only one mistake. He receives no second chance.
The same private personal assurance which made Pen-
kovskiy so successful was undoubtedly what brought him
down. Ivan Berzin, who had commanded the GRU in
1934, once made the classic comment about his craft:
"In our work boldness, daring, risk, and great audacity
must be combined with great prudence. Dialectics!" Pen-
kovskiy never lost his audacity or his sense of risk. He
chose to sacrifice his prudence.
When in January 1962 he suspected that he had been
observed during at least one rendezvous with one of his
contacts, he quickly called off further meetings at that
time and resorted to the use of the dead drop. But he
continued to pass on documents and write down his
observations. His friends and superiors at the Conmiittee
continued to trust him. He continued to feel secure in the
GRU offices on the Arbat. He knew that the danger, if
it came, would come from the KGB, which had pre-
sumably been tinkering with his dossier since the dis-
covery of his father's allegiance to the White Army. As
the Papers indicate, he was aware of the danger.
It is easy to explain, by hindsight, how the KGB could
have worked up its case against Penkovskiy. KGB agents
abroad as well as in Moscow were trained to report any
Soviet official's contacts with foreigners, as a matter of
routine. By the spring of 1962 Penkovskiy's frequent meet-
ings with Wynne and other foreigners must have occasioned
many individual routine notations in his KGB file. Al-
though they could be explained by virtue of his position,
the number of observations were probably enough to cause
the faintest kind of question mark.
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 339

The mass of gifts and which Penkovskiy

presents
brought back from the West must also have aroused the
suspicions of the KGB in Moscow —
even if most of them
were destined for his superiors or co-workers. The presents
were obviously worth more than Penkovskiy, given his
earnings and expense allowances, could have spent for
them. This might add up to another question mark on his
—
record not enough evidence of any trouble, but enough
to deepen suspicion a little, even if only suspicion of
black-market dealings.
There is another important factor. Through the spring
and summer of 1962, as tension with the West increased,
the KGB was tightening its surveillance of all foreigners.
Thus even the casual contacts which Penkovskiy had made
in Moscow with British and American attaches were now
noted with more care than they might have been ^since—
the foreigners were under closer watch.
Penkovskiy continued to feel free in meeting Wynne
because he knew Wynne was not himself an intelligence
officer but a businessman who was exactly what his calling
card stated. The KGB, however, dbviously regarded Wynne
as a suspicious character, if only for his repeated trips to
—
Moscow and despite the fact that the GRU looked on
the Englishman as a possible recruit.
Penkovskiy kept up his visits to libraries in the Ministry
of Defense, where he read classified literature on many
areas obviously not in his immediate purview. Given the
volume of information that he transmitted, it is reasonable
to assume that someone must have seen him and, again,
made some small notation.
Penkovskiy constantly relied on his well-placed con-
nections with people like Marshal Varentsov and General
Serov to divert suspicion. But to the KGB mind these
connections could arouse suspicion, as well as respect
At the first hint of suspicion, the KGB
is apt to make its
own secret search of a suspect's apartment. Someone must
inevitably have taken a close look at his desk. Once the
secret drawer was found, the jig was up. But when this
happened, no one here knows.
We do know that Penkovskiy's meeting with Wynne in
July was recorded and photographed. Wynne notes this
in hisown recollections of his trial: "They would produce
a tape recorder and there would be Penkovskiy's voice,
340

and mine. That was

PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
sufficient to tell me
1
they had been
listening to conversations. ... In the conversation I could
be heard saying, 'I wish you well, Alex,' and, 'I have a
letter for you from them,* and Penkovskiy's voice
—
'Yes,
in the letter they say very good things. .'
. .

Either Wynne's room happened to be bugged, as the

rooms of so many foreigners in Moscow are, and the tran-
script led to Penkovskiy's search —
or Penkovskiy's apart-
ment was searched, which led to the KGB's watch on
Wynne's room. In any event, someone in the KGB finally
put two and two together.
We still do not know when this moment of truth came
to the KGB. It was probably not in July. We assume that
Penkovskiy was still sending out information to the West
late in August, time of the last notations in the
at the
Papers. And highly doubtful, given the tensions of the
it is

Cuban missile effort, then abuilding, that someone of Pen-

kovskiy's station would be allowed to continue sending
out information, even for the purpose of tracking his con-
tacts. He was too big a fish for any counterintelligence
agency to dangle on a line.
More probably, given the normal mill of Soviet bu-
—
reaucracy imagine the job of recording and processing
thousands of taped conversations by foreigners each day
it took weeks before the evidence against Penkovskiy and

Wynne was put together and brought to the proper au-

thorities.
What follows was evidently the last entry in the Pen-
kovskiy Papers.
 CHAPTER X

Trouble in Moscow and Abroad

The ordinary Soviet man in the street has learned to speak

out a little. We are not so afraid as before. Even in restau-
rants one can hear Khrushchev criticized: "Why is he
bothering about Berlin again? Why do we need Germany?
We have already fought twice against the Germans in this
—
century do we have to lay down our lives there again?
So many have died before. . We live in semistarvation,
. .

there are shortages everywhere. What will we gain by

fighting for BerHn? We have lived without the treaty for
sixteen years and nothing happened, why change things
now? To hell with Germany."
The intelligentsia is of the same opinion.
Similar sentiments are expressed about Cuba: "Well,
what about Cuba? It is thousands of kilometers away
from us. We never heard anything about Cuba before, and
now we have to feed Castro while we are short of clothing
and bread."
Everyone knows that Khrushchev is playing the dema-
gogue when he states that we shall catch up with America
in the production of meat, milk, etc. In Moscow one can
see long lines, and in the provinces there is neither meat
nor milk. People are butchering rabbits and horses.
Varentsov says the same thing, that the people's morale
is very bad. They do not beheve Khrushchev, they do
not believe the government, and they are just as hungry
now as they were before. The people are very unhappy
about his militant speeches. They say that Khrushchev is
forcing Kennedy, Macmillan, and De Gaulle to arm them-
341
342 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
selves. Then what will we do? People say that if Stalin
were here, he would at least keep quiet. Khrushchev is

criticized for his garrulity, his stupid bluntness, for the

way he himself indiscreetly blurts out state secrets. .^,

At the present time even Moscow and Leningrad ar^

feeling the shortage of vodka.The only vodka sold on
the market comes from old reserve stock, since alcohol is
presently being hoarded by the government for use in the
missile program. For the present, people drink cognac and
wine. Whenever any vodka from the old reserve stock ap-
pears for sale, there are long waiting lines in the stores,
and people come to blows in order to get a bottle.

Why is Khrushchev constantly threatening everyon II

with nuclear war? because he fears dissatisfaction
It is

among the people. He thinks that by mentioning nuclear

war every day, he will hold the people in fear and obedi-
ence.

By nature I am not a religious man. I do not go to

church, but I remember that when I was a boy my mother
used to take me there. 1 know that I was baptized my —
mother told me. She is very religious and attends church
every Sunday and on religious holidays. She knows that I
am a member of the Party and an intelligence ofl&cer. In
our family we have worked things out as follows: Mother
does not talk to me about church and religion, and I do
not talk to her about my beliefs. She is very old now, and
I never attempted to discuss these matters with her, as I
did with soldiers and officers in the days when I was the
chief of the political section for the Komsomol and con-
ducted antireligious propaganda. But here is something in-
teresting: I remembered God during the war and often in
thought crossed myself and prayed. This is something
within me which cannot be explained.
Since I moved to the Maksim Gorkiy Embankment, I
pray silently every day. Across the street from my apart-
ment is a pretty little church, and, in my heart, I go there
and pray. I say again that in this I am not alone. Most
officers have the same sentiments in this respect as I.
Recently the number of ordinary people attending
church services has grown considerably, and what is more
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 343

interesting,even the young people are now having mar-

riages performed in church. There are even instances of
church marriages among ofl&cers, something which was al-
most impossible before the war.
In order to turn the young people away from church
marriage ceremonies, the Komsomol, at Khrushchev's di-
rection, has organized a campaign to promote so-called
"Komsomol weddings." Although to some extent this acts
as a deterrent to religious practices, nevertheless young
people, even if only a small percentage, today have ttteir
marriages performed by the church. Baptism of children,
even those of important Party officials, can be described
as a widespread phenomenon. AntireHgious propaganda
has been intensified during recent years, but the population
continues to attend church. Khrushchev rants and raves,
but c§n do nothing.
There are even jokes circulating about "religious free-
dom" in the U.S.S.R. For example: during the Vienna con-
ference Kennedy and Khrushchev were discussing the
question of freedom, specifically freedom of religion.

Kennedy: Mr. Khrushchev, you are talking nonsense,

you do not practice religious freedom; you do not
even aUow people to go to church.
Khrushchev: Not only do I forbid them to go to
church, I am
conducting antireligious propaganda.
• . . There is —
only one problem ^the people still
persist in attending church.
Kennedy: May I give you some advice?
Khrushchev: Yes, please do; after all, you are a
Catholic yourself.
Kennedy: Take all the icons out of the churches
and replace them with your portraits. No one will
go into the churches after that.

That was a typical Soviet joke in the year 1961.

In this connection a few words should be said about the
building of the Palace of the Soviets. The area selected
for the site was occupied before the revolution and in the
1920s by the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. On the
orders of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Com-
munist Party (Bolshevik), this cathedral was dynamited
and razed, to make room for the Palace of Soviets. This
344 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
was before World War II. Construction was halted because
of the war, and after the war it was discovered that all
the cellars of this palace were flooded. The ground was too
soft for the construction of a multistoried building. The
people, however, have their own explanation for this:
because the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour was de-
stroyed, no palace could stand in its place. The place
belongs to God, they say.
A large swimming pool has now been built there. How-
ever, during the summer months many people drown there,
and the people persist in their explanation along the same
lines: nothing can be built on the site of the Cathedral of
Christ the Saviour because this belongs to God. Sub-
sequently the government spread a provocative rumor in
Moscow that the Baptists had specially trained a few good
swimmers who would dive, grab swimmers by their feet,
and pull them down so that they would drown! This talk
is all over Moscow now.

To support their falsehoods about the Baptists, a special

anti-Baptist film was produced on orders from the Central
Committee CPSU. I went to see this movie myself, but I

do not remember its name now. Everyone ridicules the

story, but because it is a well-produced film, people still

go to see it.

Anti-Semitism

We have almost no Jews in the GRU. They have aU

been thrown out. Anti-Semitism is in full bloom. The Jews
were just weeded out of the intelligence services under
Stalin, and now no Jews are taken in. We had quite a few
Jewish generals, a good sprinkling of colonels and other
ofl&cers. Their purge began under Stalin and finally ended
in 1954 or 1955. There has not been a single Jewish stu-
dent in the Military Diplomatic Academy for many years.
In the GRU there is to my knowledge only one Jew,
Major Rabinovich. He is retained because he knows Urdu,
Hindi and other languages. He even translated the Koran.
There are a few Jewish engineers working for our Com-
mittee. They are excellent specialists and very intelligent
people. In conversations, however, we refer to them as
Armenians or Georgians. Some of the Jewish population.
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 345

specifically thoseengaged in trade, live quite well, but in

general their situation is not to be envied. None of them
is in any type of supervisory work, and none is employed
by the KGB.
Here is one of the jokes on the subject, currently cir-
culating: A Jew is called into the KGB Headquarters, and
the investigator is interrogating him:

Q. Why are you concealing the fact that you have a

brother residing abroad?
A. I have no brother living abroad, and I have never
concealed such a thing.
Q. Have you forgotten, you scoundrel, that your
brother lives abroad? Why are you concealing the
fact that he is in Israel?
A. I am concealing nothing. My brother is living in
the homeland, not abroad; I am the one who is
living abroad.

So much for jokes. They can tell much about the

grimness of our situation.

[Editor's Note: After these observations on religion

and popular morale, Penkovskiy switches back to his
principle themes of international relations and the
war danger.]

More on Berlin. There is talk in higher military circles,

especiallyamong Kupin's group and others stationed in
East Germany, that in case of a Berlin crisis or a war we
would have to kill both West and East Germans. Every-
thing isready to fight against not only West Germany
but East Germany as well, because the Germans have
anti-Soviet sentiments. In this connection various bases
of operations and military points are being readied to be
used not only against West Berlin and West Germany,
but also against the East Germans.
In September 1961 a directive went out, ordering fami-
lies of military personnel to be evacuated from East Ger-

many.
346

Fedorov
PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
me that the military, in spite
specifically told
of their great strength, are afraid that the Germans will
set up barricades, trap them, and make it impossible for
I
them to get back to their bases. The Soviets stationed in
East Germany are afraid that during the very first night
of hostilities the Germans will begin to massacre all the
Soviet military personnel in East Germany.
Last year Fedorov made a special report on the existing
situation in East Germany to his commanding officer in
that area. The latter in turn sent a special political report
to the Central Conmiittee CPSU regarding our relations
with the population of East Germany.
Varentsov and Fedorov are good friends. Varentsov
visited East Germany twice for a so-called inspection of
artillery units. During both of the trips he spent all his
time with Fedorov.
Kupin's headquarters is in Dresden. The Army Head-
quarters is located in Dresden, and Kupin is the Com-
mander of the Army Artillery.
Fedorov used to say to me: "Oleg, let us make a jump
with our brigades and mechanized regiments and make a
riot in Germany. We shall kill all the Germans, one after
another because the average German in East Germany
hates us." Here are his exact words: "The leadership of
East Germany does not treat us too badly because we
feed them, give them money, clothes, shoes, etc., but the
ordinary East Germans hate us. If it comes to war, they
will stone us, shoot us, start fires, commit all kinds of
sabotage, etc."
Pozovnyy has been very critical of Khrushchev for
also
his reckless policies. He
used to say that Khrushchev had
a big, loud mouth but that we were not yet ready to make
a big noise. He came right out and said that the Western
states could slap us down so hard that the people's blood
will flow. There is no doubt about this.
All this has also been corroborated by Major General
Korenevskiy, the GRU information chief, by Zasorin, and
by others who work with me in GRU. Korenevskiy has
good connections in the Central Committee CPSU and
is called there occasionally to give reports.
I repeat again —Khrushchev will someday sign a peace
treaty with East Germany after he has brought everything
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 347

Up to combat readiness. Khrushchev has already prepared

nine armies for operations in East Germany, and now he
is preparing a tenth army. There are only two armies in

Germany itself, but the rest are standing by on the Ger-

man border and can be brought in very quickly.
Khrushchev decided to kill not two but three birds with
one stone. First, to have everything in combat readiness in
order to frighten other countries. If the West adopts a
hard line and shows Khrushchev who is boss, he will cer-
tainly feel it. Otherwise there will be trouble. Although
many in the command echelon do not agree with Khru-
shchev's policies, the Army is still under Khrushchev. If
the command is given, the Army will fight.
Fedorov told me that many acts of sabotage were com-
mitted by German civilians who were sometimes permitted
to do odd jobs at the Soviet military installations in
Germany. They drill hdes in equipment, break automo-
bile parts, let out the fuel. There was an instance when
they drilled a hole in a missile, and the fuel leaked out.
There were three instances of sabotage in his brigade.
Similar instances were discovered in other units of the
Soviet army stationed in East Germany.
Kupin says there are insufl&cient defense facilities in
case of war, particularly as regards defense against radio-
active substances.Although we tell our people working in
defense plants that everything is under control and that
there is no danger of contamination, they are still afraid.
Many become ill after working for six months or a year.
Even our nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin is a floating
deathtrap because of its badly designed valves which
allow radioactive leakage.

Whenever possible, our soldiers try to escape to West

West Germany. Surveillance, however, has been
Berlin or
increased to such a point that it is almost impossible to
escape. Fear is another controlling factor. The soldier is
told that if he is captured he will be shot immediately.
Even the East German police have been instructed to cap-
ture our soldiers. No German girl is allowed to enter an
area where a Soviet military unit is stationed. Soldiers and
officers are dissatisfied with service in East Germany be-
cause they stay in the barracks day and night and cannot
348 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
leave. They hear nothing but propaganda. Khoroshilov;
and Kupin told me that the officers stationed in German;
no longer receive a supplement in German marks. O
regular soldier gets eight to ten marks per month, not
even enough to buy cigarettes.
Fedorov, Kupin, and Varentsov all agree that our com-

bat readiness in Germany is at a low level. Every mon

various commissions from the Central Committee CPS
and from the General Staff are sent to East Germany
check on the combat readiness of troops and lend as-
sistance. Fedorov is sick and tired of his duty in East
Germany and is constantly hoping that Varentsov will
transfer him back home.

The West must be ready. They must be prepared

retaUate with antitank forces, etc. The troops must
trained as well as possible. The Soviet plan to create
conflict in Berlin is simply a bid to win without a fight
but to be -ready for a fight if it comes. It is planned to
use tanks to close all the roads and thus cut off all
routes to East Germany and to Berlin.
The first echelon will consist of East German troops,
the second of Soviet troops. As a whole, the plan provides
for combined operations by Sotiet and German troops. If
the first echelon is defeated, the second echelon advances,
etc. Khrushchev hopes that before events have reached
the phase of the second echelon, the West will start
negotiations in which East Germany will also participate.
This will result in recognition of East Germany. The
Soviet and German troops will participate jointly in this
operation because the Germans cannot be trusted to act
independently. In the first place, the Ea^ German Army
is poorly equipped and insufficiently prepared because we
are afraid to supply them with everything. The Germans
have no love for us, and there is always a chance that in
the future they may turn against us, as it happened with
the Hungarians.
The entire East German Army is only at 80 per cent of
full strength. We are afraid. One of my friends among
the Soviet troops in Germany told me that the Germans,
especially the civilians, are very dissatisfied with us. He
also said that East German officers cannot be relied upon
either. About 50 per cent of the soldiers are against us.
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 349

Khrushchev and China

Judging by what I know and what is known in the Com-

mittee and in the GRU, our relations with China are get-
ting worse day by day.
It is not only a matter of ideological differences, but of
differences on all matters of, so to speak, a practical na-
ture. We are even conducting intensive intelligence opera-
tions against China. We have almost stopped calling
China the Chinese People's Republic.
It is interesting to follow tlie way this name has been
changed by us. At first there was the Great China, then
the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.), and now simply
China. And it would not surprise me one bit if we soon
started calling them what we called them under the czars:
"Salty-Eared Chinks" or "Chinks with a Queue." Right
after the revolution of 1917 we used to tease the Chinese
by saying: "Do you need some salt, Khodya?" And the
Chinese would answer: "And do you need your Soviet
power?"
The fact that we are conducting intelligence operations
againstChina is a deep secret. But we have orders from
the Central Committee CPSU
to conduct active intelli-
gence work against the C.P.R. with the purpose of ob-
taining objective information on the internal situation in
the country and about the immediate plans of its present
leadership.
Almost all intelligence operations against China are
conducted by our "neighbors," the KGB, who are re-
sponsible for all intelligence work directed against the
countries of the so-called socialist camp. Khrushchev
wants to know who among "our friends" are his true
friends. Naturallyhe was distressed when Marshal Peng
Te-huai was dismissed as Chinese Minister of Defense in
1959. He is especially interested in the opinions and ac-
of the younger cadres among the leading officials
tivities
of the Chinese Communist Party. Khrushchev and some
of the other Soviet leaders think that Chairman Mao is
too old and that this, as well as his poor health, makes it
quite obvious that soon the time will come when they will
350 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
have to deal not with him but with representatives of
the new, younger generation. Khrushchev hopes that the
younger leaders will renounce Mao's mistaken Trotskyite
policy of world revolution and the inevitability of another
war, and instead respect the first socialist state in the
world, the Soviet Union. They should be more concerned
with the problem of how to provide more rice and trousers
for their peasant hordes.
The differences with our "Chinese brothers" brought
us to the brink of severing diplomatic relations with thenL
After Khrushchev exposed Stalin's cult and his crimes,
the Chinese took the position that Khrushchev had made
an irreparable mistake. They held he not only had de-
livered a crushing blow to the cause of building Com-
munism in the U.S.S.R., but had even betrayed the in-
terests of the world Communist movement. When repre-
sentatives of labor and Conmiunist parties gathered in
Moscow in a special conference to celebrate the forty-
third anniversary of the October Revolution in 1960, the
Chinese delegation brought up this matter for discussion.
A heated argument developed between Khrushchev and
Liu Shao-chi. Khrushchev lost his temper and in a fit of
anger almost shouted at Liu Shao-chi: "If you need Stalin
that badly, you can have him, cadaver, coffin, and all I'*
Ninety per cent of the conference time was spent on the
Soviet-Chinese differences, e.g., the subjects of peaceful
coexistence, the inevitability of war, the correctness of
the U.S.S.R. foreign policy.
The efforts of aU the participants of this assemblage
were directed basically at preventing a break between the
Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties. To a certain de-
gree they were successful. The Chinese refused to yield
on some points, but by means of compromises and pro-
posals a general "understanding'* on several questions
was achieved by the conference.
Despite the fact that the only differences mentioned
in the declaration of the conference were those on ques-
tions of tactics and strategy, actually the differences on
an questions were so great that there is almost no hope
that they can ever be reconciled.
Later, apart from the conference declaration, the Cen-
tral Committee CPSU issued a special letter for the in-
formation of CPSU members in the U.S.S.R. only.
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 351

Since the conference the has become even wider.

split
The Chinese "comrades" (we still call them that) are not
only pubUcly denouncing the Soviet leadership and chal-
lenging it. They are also propagandizing the correctness
of their views among other Communist and fraternal par-
ties and are seeking active support from them against the
CPSU leadership and Khrushchev personally.
Of is something new for the leadership of
course, this
our Party. Under Stalin our Soviet leaders were accus-
tomed Communist Parties under their
to keeping other
strict making them dance to the tune of their
control,
choosing. Thus, when the Hungarian revolution and the
events in Poland took place in 1956, our leaders were
confused; in the first few days no one knew what to do
and what measures to take. Some proposed crushing the
revolution (in the Soviet Union it was called a "counter-
revolution") by all possible means, others were against
using drastic measures for fear that it would further com-
plicate the situation and make the revolution spread into
other coimtries. This was still the time when the Chinese
comrades were giving us advice, telling the Soviet leaders
what to do and how to do it. Later, Khrushchev of course
felt too ashamed to thank the Chinese for their advice.
This, naturally, made them angry.
It is interesting to note that Khrushchev is trying every-

thing, including deceit, and, if one may call them that, all
sorts of speculative machinations, hoping that the Chinese
will finally capitulate because they cannot get along with-
out Soviet economic, technical, and other assistance which
they need to make the big leap, as we say, "from the
wooden plow to the blast furnace." And therefore there is
much talk in the Central Committee CPSU about whether
Khrushchev is right. It is known to me that we have cur-
tailed, and in many cases completely stopped, our help to
China because we reached the conclusion that the Chinese
—
could not be bought therefore it was useless to waste
our gold and our machinery on them.
Another very important question is: Who is the better
Marxist-Leninist, Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung? After
Stalin's death Mao decided that he was much better
trained in the matter of a correct understanding and prac-
tical application of Marxist-Leninist teachings than Khru-
352 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
shchev and the other leaders of the CPSU; and that be-
cause he had been a professional revolutionary all his life
he was better prepared to be head of the world Com-
munist movement. He looks upon the present Soviet lead-
ership, and especially upon Khrushchev, as smalltime poli-
ticians who found themselves at the helm of the CPSU by
accident, without possessing any particular talents for it.
Without any real revolutionary background, he feels they
cannot remain at the head of a world revolutionary move-
ment.
I personally have little to do with China, but I have
many friends in the GRU and here on the Committee
who are concerned with Chinese problems. One of my
friends who lives next door works as an engineer in the
Ministry of Light Industry. He spent eighteen months in
China, and he told me that there were no friendly feel-
ings between us and the Chinese. The majority of our
representatives in China live isolated from the Chinese,
and their relations with the Chinese are strained. Our en-
gineers and technicians do not get any moral satisfaction
working with the Chinese because the latter are not suf-
ficiently educated and trained and do not know the basic
principles of respect. On the other hand the Chinese,
without realizing this, act with suspicion and at every
opportunity try to insult our specialists or simply ignore
their advice.
In conversations with the Soviets the Chinese Com-
munists always try to show off by quoting from Marx and
Engels, thus upsetting the Soviet people even more. I
have also heard that the Chinese, on their part, consider
our people uncultured and insufficiently civilized. The
higher the position of the Chinese leader, the more notice-
able this becomes, and the Chinese actually try to stress
their superiority.
Varentsov visited China several times and, it seems to
me, found a common language with them. [As already
noted,] whenever some group of Chinese comes to the
U.S.S.R., they always bring Varentsov two or three boxes
of real Chinese tea.
The fact China does not possess any nuclear
that
weapons keeps from breaking its relations with the
it

U.S.S.R. Research work is being conducted there in the

 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 353

field of atomic energy, and we have given them much

help, but I doubt very seriously that we would ever give
them nuclear weapons. Varentsov is of the same opinion.
Of course, if something very serious takes place and
Khrushchev feels that the Chinese need help, then we
will simply send our own troops with nuclear weapons
and will give them the necessary help. I think it will be
three or four years before China has its own nuclear
weapons.
Judging by the way our relations with China have been
developing, our leaders must be quite apprehensive about
the time when China will have its own nuclear weapons.
As I have already said, our relations with China are get-
ting worse every day. Still, as Party members, we are told
that nothing serious will come from it and that our rela-
tions with China will eventually improve.
I wish only to warn the Western states that despite the
serious differences that exist between the U.S.S.R. and
China at the present time, these differences could disap-
pear if a serious situation develops in the world. The argu-
ment and the differences between Khrushchev and Mao
Tse-tung are basically concerned with the problem: which
is the best and quickest method of burying capitalism.

This must not be forgotten.

Khrushchev would like to combine his provocations

in Berlin with the Iranian problem.
•
He
already has a
plan worked out: If any complications develop in Berlin •
or Cuba, Khrushchev will send his troops into Iran. The
Soviet troops' entry into Iran would not be a single iso-
lated act, but would coincide with the start of military
operations in other directions. In fact, many of our GRU
officers now stationed abroad have been instructed to tell

their Western contacts that the Cuban problem would be

solved in Iran.
It is not considered expedient to take the troops into
Iran at the present time because this would create even
greater tension, and possibly even war. Soviet troops are
being prepared for such an entry, however. It is con-
jectured that this may take place in October.
In connection with this problem, the GRU
rezident in
Iran, Panteleymonov, was summoned to Moscow to re-
354 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
ceive some instructions. Other rezidents from countries in
the Middle and Near East were also summoned to Mos-
cow for a conference.
There are maps in the General Staff on which the mis-
sile bases of the Western states are indicated, including
three American missile bases in Iran. Buzinov and Zasorin
told me about this. So did Varentsov.
While I am on the subject of neutral countries I should
mention Egypt. Khrushchev is very unhappy because Nas-
ser is oppressing the Communists there; the Communist
Party of Egypt has been banned. Khrushchev once said
frankly that Nasser was Tito No. 2. Nasser's nationalism,
his policy of independence, and his insignificant support
of the Soviet Union worry Khrushchev considerably. The
Soviet Union, however, has no intentions in the near fu-
ture of straining its relations with Egypt further this —
might have an adverse effect on its relations with other
Arab states. In addition, as everybody knows, the Soviet
Union is building a large dam in Egypt. It would be
rather awkward to abandon this construction now and
spoil relations with Egypt. It is better to maintain the
status quo with Egypt than to have nothing.
Khrushchev has tried since the Suez crisis to exploit
Nasser's nationalism. So far he has not got anywhere. At
the present time Khrushchev prefers to have Nasser's posi-
tion grow weaker and weaker, and he is even disposed to
having Nasser removed and replaced by someone else.
The friendship which exists today with Egypt is not to
Khrushchev's taste at all.
When the American troops disembarked in Lebanon in
July 1958, Marshal Rokossovskiy was appointed the Com-
mander of the Transcaucasian Military District. At that
time Varentsov was also in the Transcaucasian Military
District, although he was not officially stationed there.
This was done not because the Soviet Union was ready to
go to war, but simply to show the world: "See what an
important military leader has been appointed! Take care,
we are ready to fight!" It is true that Khrushchev ordered
everything brought to combat readiness, but actually he
did not intend to send his troops into Lebanon.

Some notes on our international aircraft incidents:

 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 355

The RB-47 Incident: The U.S. aircraft RB-47 shot

down on Khrushchev's order [on July 1, 1960] was not
flying over Soviet territory; it was flying over neutral
waters. Pinpointed by radar, it was shot down by Khru-
shchev's personal order. When the true facts were reported
to Khrushchev, he said: *'WeU done, boys, keep them from
even flying close."
Such is our way of observing international law. Yet
Khrushchev was afraid to admit what had actually hap-
pened. Lies and deceit are all around us. There is no
truth anywhere. I know for a fact that our military leaders
had a note prepared with apologies for the incident, but
Khrushchev said: "No, let them know that we are strong."
When it became known about the Berlin tunnel and the
monitoring of Soviet telephone conversations by Western
was great commotion in Moscow, es-
intelligence,^ there
pecially among GRU and KGB people. An investiga-
the
tion was conducted by the KGB, and many Soviet mili-
tary and civiUan personnel in East Germany were pun-
ished. We heard lectures on this subject at the Military
Diplomatic Academy in which we were told that many
important secrets and much valuable information had
fallen into enemy hands. This incident is considered a
very serious failure on the part of the Soviet counterintelli-
gence.
At a dinner at Varentsov's house, Churayev, while dis-
cussing intelligence work with me, bragged to me that he,
too, knew a few things about intelligence. "An American
industrialist, after having a few drinks, offered Nikita
Sergeyevich his services as an informant. This industrialist
supposedly has a friend who occupies an important posi-
tion in high U.S. circles."
The U-2 Incident: Prior to the Powers flight, other
U-2 flights had been made in the Kiev-Kharkov direction,
but Khrusiichev kept His mouth shut because at that time
there were no missiles that could be effective at the alti-
tudes at which the U-2 aircraft were flying.
When Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk, it was
not a direct hit but rather the shock wave that did it. The

iln April 1956, Soviet inilitary authorities in East Germany ad-

mitted that U.S. intelligence agents had tunneled into East Berlin to
set up and operate an elaborate system for wiretapping telephone
lines.
356

aircraft
PENKOVSKiY PAPERS
simply fell apart from it. During his descen
I
Powers lost consciousness several times. He was uncon
scious when they picked him up from the ground; there
fore he was helpless to do anything and did not put u|
any resistance. This incident happened on May 1, when
was duty officer at the GRU. I was the first one to repoi
it to the GRU officials. Powers was brought to Moscow
by plane after he had been shot down, and the KGB a
the moment did not have an English interpreter. I wa
supposed to talk to him because I was the only one aroun(
—
who had some understanding of English I had alread
reported the incident to some generals. If they had no
found a KGB interpreter at the last minute, I would hav
been the first one to interview Powers.
Ultimately they called up to say that I was not needej
and the KGB Chief, this young fellow Shelepin, who used
to run the Komsomol (he replaced Serov at the KGB),
wanted to make the report to Khrushchev personally. So
he got an interpreter and picked Powers up. But the mili-
tary had knocked Powers down and Powers was con-
sidered to be a military man. He should have been turned
over to the General Staff. Nonetheless the KGB seized
him, took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, and made their
own report. He was being treated medically because he
was still in shock.
Marshal Biryuzov was reprimanded because he had not
correctly estimated the probable direction of the U-2
—
flights he misgauged the importance of the targets. They
wanted to fire when the aircraft from Turkey flew over
Kiev, but there was nothing to fire with and the aircraft
escaped. Powers would have escaped if he had flown one
or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path.
On the fifth of May, after Powers was knocked down,
Khrushchev ordered a suspension of agent operations to
avoid the risk of being caught by a Western provocation
or of possibly furnishing material for Western counter-
propaganda [a fact Penkovskiy reported previously].
There were many protests about dropping scheduled meet-
ings and other contacts, but it had to be done. The rezident
in Pakistan decided on his own to pick up material from
a dead drop which was already loaded in order to avoid
 TROUBLE IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD 357

possiblecompromise to the agent. For this he was severely

reprimanded by his superiors at the GRU, even though
he did the right thing. Thus, Khrushchev ordered cessa-
tion of agent contacts during the period when he was
going to capitalize on the Powers incident despite the —
damage it did to the agent nets.
Khrushchev followed Powers' investigation and trial
with great interest. He personally conducted the prop-
aganda activity connected with the case. He was the first
who began to shout about the direct hit, although actually
there had been no such thing. Khrushchev wanted to brag
about his missiles.
Khrushchev lied when he said that Powers was shot
down by the first missile fired. Actually, fourteen missiles
were fired at his plane. It was the shock wave produced
by the bursts that caused his plane to disintegrate. The
examination of Powers' plane produced no evidence of a
direct hit; nor were there any missile fragments found in
One of the fourteen missiles fired at Powers' plane shot
it.

down a Soviet MIG-19 which went up to pursue Powers.

Its pilot, a junior lieutenant, perished.

Things are going very well on the Arbat and in the

Committee. In these organizations I am treated in the best
manner. Serov, Smolikov, Gvishiani, and other friends
very much want to send me on another temporary duty
mission abroad: either to Australia or to Japan or the
U.S.A. with the mobile book exhibition or to France with
Rudnev and Gvishiani. They will try to talk the KGB
and the Central Committee uito granting the necessary
temporary duty orders. If the KGB clears me of suspicion,
they will sanction my travel.
I have already grown used to the fact that I note
periodically some degree of surveillance and control over
my movements. The "neighbors" continue to study me.
There is some reason for this KGB
activity. I confuse
and lose myself in guesses and suppositions. I am very far
from exaggerating the dangers. Still, I am an optimist and
I try to evaluate the situation objectively.
I am not disappointed in my life or my work. The most
important thing is that I remain full of strength and de-
sire to continue this work. To tell the truth about this sys-
358 PENKOVSKIY PAPERS
tern —
it is the goal of my life. And if I succeed in co]
tributing my little bricks to this great cause, there ca
be no greater satisfaction.

August 25, 1962

 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL

On May 7, 1963, in Moscow in the Court Session

Hall of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., there
began an open trial in the criminal case of the agent
of the British and American intelligence services and
citizen of the U.S.S.R., O. V. Penkovskiy, and the sub-
ject of Britain and spy go-between, Greville Wynne.

— ^Information release, Military

Collegium of the Soviet Supreme
Court

The trial of Colonel Penkovskiy and Mr. Wynne lasted all

of four days, and one of these days was occupied by a
closed session. The verdict of "guilty" was never in doubt.
Both defense attorneys devoted themselves, principally, to
arguing for a slight mitigation of the sentences; for most
of the trial their arguments and attitude varied little
from that of Lieutenant General A. G. Gomyy, the chief
military prosecutor. Both defendants confessed their guilt,
although Wynne displayed some obvious reservations. As
he intended, he left little doubt about the extent of his
coaching and coercion. When a telling point was made
by the prosecution, or a damaging admission by Penkov-
skiy, the two-hundred-odd "representative of the workers
of Moscow" who had attended the trial cheered and
jeered, per instructions.
Yet the trial emetges as far from the document the
KGB had hoped for. Penkovskiy and Wynne were no
road-show Rubashovs, already preconditioned to play
359
360 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
whatever parts were assigned them in a display trial like
those of the thirties. They were the knowing, unrepentant
victors in a long battle of wits with Soviet counterin-
telligence; and even under their captors' thumbs they could
not be squeezed too far. Anxious to preserve the newly
avowed Soviet respect for judicial form, the prosecutors
did their best to avoid the avenger stereotype of Andrey
Vyshinskiy at the prewar purge trials. At times they were
hesitant, and by their hesitance betrayed the uneasiness
about repression which has characterized recent Soviet
leaderships. This experience in court was no Stalinist in-
vasion of the Baltic States, so to speak. But it did re-
call the backing and filling before the Khrushchev recon-
quest of Hungary.
The very fact that a trial had to be held must have
been embarrassing. Other Soviet officers had been ar-
rested for espionage against their government and shot out
of hand. In December 1962, just a month after Penkov-
skiy's arrest, an infantry officer known in the Soviet press
as Lieutenant Colonel P. was shot for treason, as a spy
of the American intelligence service. While the comments
lavished on him ("egocentric and secretive . . . lacked
common, everyday courage ... an obviously weak in-
dividual") prefigured the "moral" case later made
against Penkovskiy, there was no thought of a public trial.
Penkovskiy, however, had to have a public trial. Not
only had eight British and U.S. diplomats been declared
personae non gratae for their connections with him. Not
only was a foreign national, Wynne, directly imphcated.
But Penkovskiy himself was too big a fish to dismiss with
the minimal angler's report reserved for most such of-
fenses. The wave of transfers and demotions in the So-
viet intelligence service and the Army was too large to
avoid explaining. And Penkovskiy's associates in the Army
were too highly placed to avoid the most public sort of
warning. Deep down, the trial of Colonel Penkovskiy may
have represented the Communist Party's warning to the
military that seditious thoughts about the regime's leader-
ship could meet with only one unfortunate end.
For six months the prosecution worked out the details
of these four swift days in court. Thanks to his subsequent
exchange in 1964, Greville Wynne returned from the
Lubianka to give the outside world an uncensored ver-
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 361

sion of this preparation —

a subject's view of how Soviet
intelligence stages its juridical proceedings.
Wynne had been JBown to Moscow in a Soviet aircraft
on November 3, less than twenty-four hours after his ab-
duction in Budapest by Soviet and Hungarian security
men. He had gone to Budapest in the first place with
deep reservations, for it was clear after his last meeting
with Penkovskiy that July that they were both under
heavy surveillance. But he felt that to renege on his
scheduled trip to Eastern European countries would kill
whatever slim hope remained to Penkovskiy to pass off
their meetings in Moscow as routine business conversa-
tions. Wynne was apprehended about two weeks after he
arrived in Hungary.
From the day of his arrival in the Lubianka, Wynne was
subjected to interrogation, some of it not very gentle, by
a KGB general and his assistants. He was shown some of
the evidence against Penkovskiy and himself, which in-
cluded photographs of their meetings and what was ap-
parently a taped transcript of their last conversation in
Wynne's room at the Ukraina Hotel. Ultimately his jailors
arranged a meeting with Penkovskiy, a joint interroga-
tion designed as prelude to an arranged public trial.
As Wynne described his experience, he had first hoped
that the only charge would be that of bribing Penkovskiy
—
with presents much was made of the packages he had
brought with him from the West. But the KGB general
and his colleagues soon made it clear that Wynne, like
Penkovskiy, was to be charged with espionage. He was al-
lowed to make the distinction that he had no direct knowl-
edge either of the intelligence information or the instruc-
tions which he had passed to the Soviet colonel. The
prosecution was content to describe him as the dupe of
British intelligence. He was a man "forced by threats to
do this dirty work," the Soviet defense attorney stated.
At their meeting inside the Lubianka, Penkovskiy
begged Wynne to co-operate in a public trial. Unless
there was one, he said, "I am sure I will be shot." But if
he co-operated, he said, "they have promised me my
Hfe."
It was certain that the KGB had also promised some
degree of protection for Penkovskiy's family if he and

Wynne faithfully played the roles assigned to them.

•
362 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
Wynne agreed to co-operate with the KGB, within limits.
After six helpless months in a solitary cell of the Lubianka,
there was Uttle option left to him. But his limits were im-
portant ones. It took great courage for anyone to ob-
serve them — most especially for Greville Wynne, who
was not an intelligence officer himself, but a patriotic
British businessman who simply had carried through an
operation in which circumstances had put him, because
he was aware of its importance.
In the pretrial interrogations Penkovskiy, who had ob-
viously had a rough time of it, made no attempt to dis-
guise his motives and his actions. He told the KGB in-
terrogators that he had acted not primarily to help the
West, but in the best interests of his own people, the Rus-
sian people. This was hardly a defense which the Soviet
court would permit to be repeated. (It is of interest
that the final statements of both defendants were made in
closed session.)
The two defense attorneys assigned to Wynne and
Penkovskiy went through the motions of talking to their
"clients," but only after the KGB interrogation had fin-
ished. (Wynne's attorney, who spent most of time in
his
court agreeing with the prosecution, later presented him
with a capitalist-sized bill.)
Soviet publicists in fact went to great lengths to drama-
tize the work of their "vigilant Chekists" in the Penkov-
skiy investigation. As late as 1965, in a little paperback
book called The Front-line in the Secret War,^ one Lieu-
tenant Colonel Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gvozdilin, who was
apparently Penkovskiy's chief interrogator, was publicized
in the best spy-story tradition. "On this overcast Novem-
ber evening," the story begins "in one of the windows of a ^
building standing in Dzerzhinskiy Square in Moscow, a
light glowed for longer than usual. .. Aleksandr V.
. ;

tilted back in his chair, closed his weary eyes and before
him as if in a kaleidoscope there passed most of what he
had discovered and heard in recent times. .
."
.

The authors of The Front-line continued their drama- ]

tization. "Only under the pressure of irrefutable evidence 1

presented by the investigator did [Penkovskiy] finally

1 Published as Front Taynoy Voyny by S. I. Tsybov and H. F. -j

Chistyakov. Military Publishing House, Defense Ministry, Moscow. '.

 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 363

confess that he was a spy. ... He still hedged for a long

time and spoke confusedly of the concrete facts of his
treachery and espionage. However the keen mind and
. . .

patience of Aleksandr V., his clear logic and his skill in

conducting an investigation had their effect. .". .

In the Soviet authors' version, Lieutenant Colonel

—
Gvozdilin established that Penkovskiy "long since dis-
—
charged from the Army" had ferreted out his military
secrets only from "the irresponsible chatter of a number of
servicemen with whom this enemy met and caroused."
About Penkovskiy's motives they were silent. Although the
question was asked "When and how had he gone astray?"
neither Aleksandr V. nor, as we shall see, the prosecution
at the trial was ever able to estabUsh a satisfactory an-
swer.

When the trial was finally staged, both defendants had

been rehearsed thoroughly, even to the point of visiting
the courtroom in advance. The trial went on in the flat,
prosy manner of most such proceedings. The military
court, presided over by Lieutenant General V. V. Borisol-
glebskiy, called four witnesses, two of them acquaintances
of Penkovskiy's, and produced nine experts to certify the
equipment found in Penkovskiy's apartment, the security
nature of the information which he gave, etc. In an order-
ly process of question and answer the whole story of
Penkovskiy's espionage against the Soviet Union was re-
peated and summarized, from the first confrontation with
the British and American intelligence officers in London.
General Gomyy summarized it at the outset: ". the . .

accused Penkovskiy is an opportunist, a careerist, and a

morally decayed person who took the road of treason
and betrayal of his country and was employed by im-
perialist intelligence services. By the end of 1960 he at-
tempted to get in touch with the American intelligence
service, further exploiting the undeserved trust placed in
him and his position as deputy head of the Foreign De-
partment of the State Committee for the Co-ordination
of Scientific Research Work —
having, through the nature
of his work, the opportunity to meet foreigners visiting
the Soviet Union as members of the various scientific and
cultural delegations. . .
."

In the humdrum legalese of the court's question and

364 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
answer, packets of intelligence material were again passed
and received, dead drops were utilized, and contacts weje
made; radio frequencies were identified and coding sets
discussed.
Occasionally Penkovskiy and Wynne disagreed on mat-
ters of fact, but not seriously. Penkovskiy, to his credit,
did insist that Wynne had no knowledge of the contents
of the packets. But the first few hours of testimony were
enough to reveal that Penkovskiy had successfully trans-
mitted information of considerable if undisclosed value
to the West. Representatives of foreign news organiza-
tions were invited to the trial. They reported no evidence
either that the defendants had been drugged, or that
any undue coercion was used to elicit their answers.
Nonetheless the KGB took few chances on any untime-
ly disclosures. Greville Wynne tartly notes in his memoirs
that the Moscow police department blocked off trafl&c on
some streetsnear the Supreme Court building, rerouting
it so that it ran directly under the courtroom windows^

Western representatives at the trial confirmed that they

had difficulty hearing the testimony.
Since Wynne threatened to deviate from the prepared
script, the microphone was turned off whenever he spoke.
This made almost all of his replies unintelligible. Once he
managed to make a noticeable departure, when he said:
"Well, it is no secret to people in my country and people
in other countries that there are microphones planted in
diplomats' apartments in Moscow." (This was rendered in
the Soviet transcript of the trial as "I must also say ^I—
have been told that in apartments occupied by diplomats in
Moscow there are very often microphones for listening
in.") At this, the presiding oflScer of the court immediately
changed the subject. Wynne was later threatened by KGB
interrogators with severe consequences if he made an-
other such gaffe again.
With the facts of the case, the prosecution might have
rested. Had General Gornyy been content with stating
that espionage had been done and had he then demanded
the punishment for espionage under Soviet law, he might
have shown the world an irreproachable example of stand-
ard judicial procedure. The evidence against Penkovskiy
and, to a lesser extent, Wynne admitted of litde dispute.
There was the secret drawer in the Colonel's desk at
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 365

home, the rolls of exposed film with the most com-

promising sort of military information, the instructions
from Western intelligence officers, the Continental type-
writer, no. 213956, which experts testified had been used
to write the intelligence reports found in Penkovskiy's
apartment.
The catalogue of material confiscated, as read off at the
Soviet trial, would in itself offer ample grounds for an
espionage conviction:
"During the search at Penkovskiy's apartment, in addi-
tion to the already mentioned records with the telephone
numbers of the foreign intelligence officers, six message
postcards with instructions for them, the report, and the^
exposed rolls of film, the following articles were discov-
ered in a secret hiding place installed in his desk, and
were attached to the file as tangible evidence: a forged
passport, six cipher pads, three Minox cameras and a
description of them, two sheets of specially treated paper
for writing secret text, a memorandum with an indica-
tion of the frequencies on which Penkovskiy received in-
structional radio transmissions from the foreign intelli-
gence services, the draft of a report from Penkovskiy
to the intelligence headquarters, the article which Penkov-
skiy had received from the foreign intelligence services
and which he intended to publish in the Soviet Union,
fifteen unexposed rolls of film for the Minox camera, and
various instruction manuals provided by the foreign intel-
ligence services: on taking photographs with the Minox
camera, on the encipherment and decipherment of radio
communications, on the procedure for receiving radio
transmissions from the intelligence headquarters, and on
the selection and use of secret drops.
"In addition, during the search at Penkovskiy's apart-
ment, the following were also confiscated and attached to
the file as tangible evidence: the Soniya [Sony] radio ^

receiver which he had received from the foreign intel-

ligence services and which he used to receive enciphered
radio messages from the intelligence headquarters, and
the typewriter on which Penkovskiy typed his reports."
Nor was there much doubt about the fact that British
and American officers had kept up constant contact with
Penkovskiy in his intelligence mission for them. Under
questioning at his trial Penkovskiy described his contacts
366 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
in great detail. The summation of General Gornyy, to
ward the makes an
trial's close, instructive piece of re;

ing material; and in the following concrete illustrations,

least, there is little reason to doubt its accuracy:
"While he was in Paris Penkovskiy was told of a secret et
_,
American hiding place in the entrance to the building
5/6 Pushkin Street in Moscow and the rules were e:
plained for using it: before depositing espionage materials
in the hiding place Penkovskiy was to make a black mark
on the no. 35 lamppost on Kutuzov Prospect then, after
depositing the materials, was twice to call the telephone
numbers G
3-26-87 and G
3-26-94, and having heard an
answer, to hang up the receiver. This would mean that
the intelligence officers could come to the pickup. One of
the calls should be answered 'Jones' and the other 'Davi-
son.' Later Penkovskiy was told that instead of 'Jones,' the
answer would be 'Montgomery.'
"Penkovskiy was to use these same telephone numbers
also in case he found himself in difficulties. Then he was
to make a black cross on no. 35 lamppost and then,
having called the numbers mentioned, was to blow three
times into the mouthpiece.
"Penkovskiy wrote all this down on a piece of paper
which was taken from him when he was arrested and of-
fered as material evidence [Vol. 8, point 11 0].
"As the telephone book declares and as you, members
of the court, know, the telephone G 3-26-94 is located in
the apartment of the assistant Army-Air attache of the
U.S., Aleksis Davison, and the telephone G 3-26-87 in the
apartment where the Second Secretary of the American
Embassy WiUiam Jones lived until February 1962.
"They will teU you that the fact that Penkovskiy had
telephone numbers of diplomatic representatives in his
possession is no evidence at all that he had traitorous re-
lations with such persons since Penkovskiy's official duties
required him to maintain contact with foreigners, to at-
tend diplomatic receptions, and that, in general, to know
such telephone numbers is not so difficult.
"The investigation foresaw the possibility of such state-
ments and, not simply taking Penkovskiy's explanations
at face value, made an objective check on them.
"As you already know, for this purpose a check was
carried out in accordance with Art. 183 of the Criminal
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 367

Procedure Code RSFSR on November 2, 1962. Observa-

tions were made of the visits of intelligence officers to
the hiding place which had been shown to Penkovskiy.
You also know that thirty minutes after the telephone
calls the assistant Army-Air attache of the U.S., Davison,
was examining lamppost no. 35 on Kutuzov Prospect, and
some time later on the same day Richard Jacobs, an of-
ficial of the U. S. Embassy, came to the hiding place
where he was apprehended.
"Penkovskiy's statements together with the materials
taken from him and the results of the experiment con-
stitute convincing evidence incriminating Penkovskiy him-
self and the American diplomatic personnel Davison
and Jacobs. The nature of their activities is truthfully re-
vealed and cannot be evaded.
"Moreover, in accordance with the principles of Soviet
law of evidence we have grounds for believing Penkov-
in addition to the telephone num-
skiy's statement that,
bers mentioned, he was given the number K
4-89-73 for
calling intelligence officers to by call-
the pickup place
ing any Monday 21:10 hours twice with arr interval
at
of one minute and hanging up after blowing three times
into the mouthpiece. This telephone is located in the
apartment occupied to June 1962 by the former British as-
sistant naval attache in the U.S.S.R., John Barley, and
from July 1962 to March 1963, by the embassy official of
the same country, Ivor Russell.
"Upon returning from Paris Penkovskiy, it was learned,
on October 17, 1961 called the number G3-13-58 and after
blowing three times replaced the receiver, which signified
his safe return to Moscow. This telephone is located in
the apartment in which the British Embassy official
October 1961.
Felicita Stuart lived in
"Carrying out the instructions of his *bosses,' Penkovskiy
selected places, for spare pickups in various sections of
Moscow and for such very prosaic purposes planned to use
the grave of the poet Sergey Yesenin in the Vagankovskiy
Cemetery.
"In July 1961 Wynne came to Moscow with assignments
from British intelligence. He was received at the British
Embassy and handed over to Penkovskiy further instruc-
tions, warning postcards, 3000 rubles in cash, and an
article prepared by intelligence officers which Penkovskiy
368 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
wished to have published in the Soviet press for the p
pose of publiciidng his name.
"Penkovskiy studied the photographs shown to him
Wynne of persons with whom he was to main
espionage contacts; these included the attache of t
U. S. Embassy in the U.S.S.R., Rodney Carlson, and al
the wife of the second secretary of the British Emb
in —
Moscow, Gervaise Cowell Pamela Cowell. Penkovs
was to identify Carlson by his necktie pin encrus
with red stones.
"Penkovskiy was to transmit spy material to Pamela
Cowell by depositing it in a container in a jar of Harpic pic .
powder.
"You will remember, comrades of the court, the sto:
of this jar of Harpic. Wynne first studied it with Chisho
and there was a silent scene: Chisholm opened the jar'
took the material out, and showed the container while
Wynne watched carefully. Then, in the Ukraina Hotel thte
roles were reversed: Wynne displayed the material anfl
Penkovskiy observed.
"During this meeting in Moscow with Wjoine Penkov-
skiy transmitted to him various espionage materials.
"The warning postcards received from Wynne were or-
dinary Soviet picture postcards with views of Moscow, with
English texts and addresses. Penkovskiy was to mail these
postcards in order to give notice of changes in his activi-
ties.

"For example, in case he changed his place of work, he

was to send a card with a view from the Kotelnicheskiy
Embankment addressed to Mrs. N. Nixon, Berks, England,
with the message T am having a pleasant time and have
even found that I like vodka. Moscow actually looks this
way and you should see the size of the streets. I will
give you all the details on my return. With love, Dick.*
"Penkovskiy succeeded in sending onl}^ one postcard;
the others were taken from his hiding place and lie be-
fore you. During this time he was not spending his time
enjoyably and was not delighted but was looking around
him in all directions in a cowardly fashion and sweating
from fear. He felt that the noose was closing on him and
that the end was near.
"On July 4, 1962 at a reception at the American Em-
bassy on the American national holiday. Independence
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 369

Day, Penkovskiy became acquainted with Carlson and in

August, at a reception at Khorbeli, handed over to Carlson
seven exposed photographic plates with secret material
and a report on one of the Soviet missiles. At this meet-
ing Penkovskiy received from Carlson a package with a
fictitious Soviet passport in case he had to go underground
and a letter of instructions in which the foreign intel-
ligence agents demanded information on the state of the
defenses of the capital of our Fatherland and on the
troops in the Moscow Military District."
All of this secret maneuvering would have made a real-
lifeJames Bond proud (although the intricate communica-
tions details might have taxed Bond's attention span).
The prosecutor's indignation at Western attaches' "un-
ceremoniously violating the norms of international law"
is, to say the least, ironic, considering how Soviet dip-

lomats have trampled on international law throughout

the world as a matter of standard operating procedure.
Nonetheless the expulsion of Western attaches after
Penkovskiy's arrest was to be expected and, from the of-
ficial Soviet point of view, the prosecutor's fulminating
against the Western intelligence services was amply justi-
fied:
"A leading role in this belongs to the Central Intel-
ligence —
Agency of the U.S. the support of the most ad-
venturist circles in the U.S. Like a giant octopus it ex-
tends its tentacles into all corners of the earth, supports a
tremendous number of spies and secret informants, con-
tinually organizes plots and murders, provocations and
diversions. Modem techniques are put to the service of
espionage: from the miniature Minox cameras which you
see before you up to space satellites, 'spies in the sky.'
"The British Intelligence Service, which has been in ex-
istence for about three hundred years, is no less insidious
and astute in its methods but it attempts to remain more
in the background. The activities of these major espionage
centers against the U.S.S.R. are connected and closely
co-ordinated, as can be clearly seen in the present case,
but this, however, does not reduce the contradictions be-
tween them or their struggles against each other."
But a straight verdict of "guilty" was not what the So-
viet prosecutors sought. The Soviet system is still too
brittle to permit what to the Western mind seem com-
370 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
monplaces of the judicial system, like an accused led M\
fending and explaining his motives, with a defense nse iW'
tomey actively seeking a verdict of "not guilty." A West-
ern traitor like Klaus Fuchs or Julius Rosenberg could
give voice to whatever protest against his system he
wished to make. Even a professional Soviet agent, like
Rudolf Abel, could avail himself of a skilled American
defense counsel, sworn to defend Abel to the best of his
ability, whoselegal expertise could make things quite dif-
ficult for theU.S. government prosecutor. But an Oleg Pen-
kovskiy had to "confess." Because the Soviet system can-
not admit any open controversy or disagreement with its
ruling Party, Penkovskiy's trial would be useful only if he
admitted utter guilt in Marxist theological terms. He could
not be allowed to be simply a lawbreaker. He had to join
the demonology of "wreckers, diversionists, assassins, and
spies," to use Andrey Vyskinskiy's old 1938 term, for, ob-
viously, only a serious moral character defect could lead
a Soviet citizen to betray his regime.
The trial of Oleg Penkovskiy, in short, was held not to
establish guilt, but to establish a motive and publicize it
We must understand that the Soviet managers of the
trial were not remotely conscious of any immorality, not
to say illegality in this rigging process.^ In a system
whose ideological underpinnings have been steadily weak-
ening, the trial of a Penkovskiy was something of a last
rally.
All other considerations, therefore, were sacrificed to
the cause of proving Penkovskiy's Conmiunist immorality
and holding him up to the world as a horrendous example.
And it was precisely there that the staging broke down.
To begin with, the Soviet prosecutors could not prop-
erly identify their man. His real identification cards could
not be used as elementary evidence. To have given Pen-
kovskiy's real service, title, and function would have been
tantamount to unmasking his Committee, an important

2 In the words of the popular textbook Communist Morality

(Molodaya Gvardiya Publishing House, Moscow, 1963): "Devotion
to Communism —behavior appropriate to the needs of the construc-
—
tion of Communist society ^is the moral behavior of people. We
judge the moral image of a man from the point of view whether
his actions are in accordance with the needs for the construction of
Communism."
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 371

and on its face respectable Soviet organization, as little

more than an intelligence machine. So Colonel Penkovskiy
had to be classed merely as a "colonel in the reserve.*'
There was never a mention in the trial that Penkovskiy's
primary position was that of an intelligence officer in the
Soviet General Staff and that he had been occupied since
1949 exclusively with intelligence missions. The GRU "ex-
perts" who
testified at the trial were described simply as
officers belonging to the Ministry of Defense.
Similariy the Soviet court was very cautious about Pen-
kovskiy's associations. As he tells us in the Papers, he
moved constantly in senior mUitary circles of the Soviet
Army. His friends were generals and colonels, of his own
rank and outlook. According to the trial, however, Pen-
kovskiy operated in an ephemeral Moscow demimonde of
cabarets and high-priced restaurants. Witness Izvestiya*s
comment on May 10, 1963, summing up the trial testi-
mony: "A rank-and-file officer whose contacts and ac-
quaintances did not go beyond a limited circle of res-
taurant habitues, drunkards, and philanderers." The only
two witnesses summoned who allegedly knew Penkovskiy
were I. P. Rudovskiy and V. Ya. Finkelshteyn. Finkel-
shteyn was identified as "the director of a shop for ap-
plied art" and Rudovskiy merely as a translator and the
owner of a car.^
The prosecutor did his best to characterize Penkovskiy
as a sort of overage hipster, in the Soviet sense, who con-
centrated most of his energies on having a good time. In
his own well-rehearsed statement, throwing himself on the
mercy of the court, Penkovskiy himself admitted to "the
meanest moral decay caused by almost con-
qualities, the
stant daily use of alcoholic beverages and dissatisfaction
with my position in the Committee. ... I lost the road,
stumbled at the edge of an abyss, and fell. Vanity, vain-
glory, dissatisfaction with my work, and the love of an
easy life led me to the criminal path. Morally base
. . .

3 It is too, that both of these "friends" questioned

significant,
bore Jewish
names. This little touch of the anti-Semitism for
which the Soviet regime is famous could still be counted on to
strike a popular note with Russian newspaper readers. There was
more than a little hint in this positioning of "close friends" that
Penkovskiy was Jewish himself.
372 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
qualities
."
and cx)mplete corruption — I admit to all

this. . .

Both Finkelshteyn and Rudovskiy were questioned al-

most exclusively about Penkovskiy's alleged dissipation and
womanizing. Hence this typical exchange:
Prosecutor: "Witness Rudovskiy, tell us please, were
there any evening or other meetings when the slippers ol
his beloved were used as goblets?"
^|
Witness Rudovskiy: "One time on the birthday of -HI
friend Penkovskiy, his lady, and I were at the Poplavok
restaurant in the Park of Culture. I had no woman with
me and did not drink from the sHpper. I don't know ii
it was to show his love for the girl or because it waj

Western practice, but Penkovskiy poured wine into the

slipper and drank it."
It was all very bizarre and very suspect. The accusa-
tions of his drinking champagne from a slipper suggestec.
that Penkovskiy's KGB interrogators were at least men
of imagination. But it hardly sounded like the accused'^
behavior.
Despite such official efforts to paint Penkovskiy's life aii
a latterday "Rake's Progress," the witnesses themselves,
inadvertently, did much to substantiate Penkovskiy's con-
trary description of himself in the Papers. And the pic-
ture they give of him is consistent with everything we
know of his character. As Finkelshteyn remarked, "Pen-
kovskiy was always tense, always hurrying, always agi-
tated, very vain; he always wanted to express his own
opinion and reacted strongly to those who did not agree
with him. He was punctiHous in small things, very obsti-
nate; he loved to pose, there was much of the histrionic
about him."
There is this passage, also from Finkelshteyn: "We
usuallymet with Penkovskiy on his initiative, always
somewhere in the city. He usually telephoned and named
the place of meeting — either in the Moscow Restaurant
or somewhere else. As a rule, Penkovskiy proposed hav-
ing a glass of champagne, sitting in a cafe or dining. If
we had dmner, then Penkovskiy always attempted to pay
the check. It was decided that we should pay according
to the so-called —
German principle that is, each for him-
but very often Penkovskiy impulsively threw money
self,

on the table and paid for all, explaining that he earned

 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 373

more money than the rest of us and that it meant nothing

to him to spend ten to twenty rubles."
The prosecution was anxious, also, to portray Pen-
kovskiy as strictly a lowbrow. As Finkelshteyn again
noted under questioning: "Penkovskiy was not attracted
to the theater. It would seem that a person with a higher
education would have some interest in theatrical matters,
movies, various events, art, Uterature, etc. but Penkovskiy»

to my knowledge, was not so interested. In my opinion,

he did not read books or if he did, it was only best-sellers,
although he bought books. I also like books very much
and often buy them. Penkovskiy's interests were mainly
concentrated on his work about which I, to speak honestly,
know very little. I explained everything by the extreme
pressures of his work."
This kind of reticence about his work and the tendency
to concentrate on small talk were less the characteristics
of a rake than those of a good intelligence officer. And the
lack of intellectual interest in the theater was not neces-
sarily a black mark against a professional military man
whose hobbies were tinkering and inventing. It says some-
thing for the insularity of KGB interrogators that testi-
mony which they obviously selected as particularly dam-
aging to Penkovskiy redounds somewhat to his credit
when viewed outside a Soviet courtroom.
The second basic problem the Soviet court had with
Penkovskiy was to identify the kind of information he had
revealed to the West. Prosecutor Gornyy made the point
that the information Penkovskiy gave was "90 per cent
economic," as befitting a reserve colonel who had long
been working in the civilian sector. Yet here the prosecu-
tion kept tripping itself up. Almost every mention of
Penkovskiy's information in the Soviet trial involved some-
thing of a military nature: "information concerning one
type of Soviet rocket," "information on the Moscow
Military District," information on "a state and military
secret," "two military journals." . . . Such citations occur
continually.
Once again the prosecution faced a dilemma. While
General Gornyy wanted to emphasize the serious nature of
Penkovskiy's crime, he did not want to explain either
the extent of what Penkovskiy had really told the West
or the fact that this apparently ineffectual reservist had
374 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
had access to such a store of top-secret military
infonnS
propaganda yielded to security. The real
tion. Inevitably,
story of the information delivered and the charges mad^
was told in closed session.
Even after the trial was over, Chief Prosecutor GomyjfJ
felt it necessary to give the following statement tq
Izvestiya:
"After the trial certain Soviet citizens had the impress
sion that Penkovskiy had given away to the enemy alt
most all our secrets connected with military equipment
and the defense capacity of the Soviet Union. Such claims
are without foundation. Penkovskiy in his position was
far removed from information connected with the arma«
ment of our troops and their deployment and with the
employment of new types of weapons. He passed on to
foreign intelligence services information on some tech-J
nical reports of Soviet specialists who had gone abroai
and some scattered data of a military nature that he had
pumped out of loose-tongued friends and had taken from
classified publications. He also passed on various ma-
terials of an internal poUtical nature." M
The prosecution fell into its worst pitfall with the at-
tempt to establish Penkovskiy's motive. With Wynne, there
was no problem. He was an Englishman and thus could be
expected to have furthered his own country's interests,
although as a courageous man he did not go nearly so
far in his "recantation" as the Soviet prosecution wished.
But it was more than sufficient for the Soviets to slander
Wynne as a weak "middleman," a foreigner suborned by
his own intelligence service to "work in a dirty business."
Penkovskiy's problem the Soviet prosecutors were never
able to solve. On the one hand they had to concede a
promising record as an exceedingly competent soldier, a
^gilant Party man, and a clever worker. The worst that
could be said of him was that he was a careerist. They
struck a note of perplexity throughout that someone who
had advanced so far in their system could so thoroughly
betray it.
Witness the comment of Prosecutor A. G. Gomyy:
"From outward appearances, Penkovskiy looked like quite
a good worker. He rose rapidly up the ladder in his career,
but by dint of the development of his base inclinations.
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 375

he became more and more preoccupied not with the in-

terests of state and society but .with his personal career
."
and well-being. . .

Or, as A. V. Apraksm, the state-appointed attorney for

the "defense," summarized things: "Over a short period
of time he spanned an important career —
from a student
artillery officer to colonel and commander of a tank-
destroyer regiment.
"He received many awards for his battle service. The
ease and briUiance of manner with which he carried
out his military service particularly strikes me. . . .

"The war over, Penkovskiy went back to his desk to

resume his studies. Thanks to his capabilities, to his love
of work, and to his stubbornness
— —
all this cannot be taken
away from him ^he managed to graduate from two higher
educational institutions in the postwar period. Then, out
of the Army, he found his place in Ufe and had consid-
erable success in his civilian profession. The job he last
held, with the State Committee for the Co-ordination of
Scientific Research Work, was a high position, a position
which carried sufficient authority. . .
."

Penkovskiy's past credentials were thus certified: a war

hero, a brilliant officer (and even more brilliant if one
included his real record in the GRU), and a responsible
Soviet official. Then suddenly came The Fall in 1960. De-
spite all the prosecutors' attempts to trace the beginning
of careerism, it was as they depicted it, a fall as abrupt as
original sin and about as rationally explainable. An ex-
traordinary gap yawned between the able, hard-working,
trusted Soviet official and the cringing specimen of "moral
depravity" whom General Gomyy presented, in a summa-
tion labeled on the Soviet trial transcript as "Penkovskiy's
path from careerism and moral degradation to treachery."
The result was inevitable. "Penkovskiy is dead," Gen-
eral Gomyy told Izvestiya, and the world, a few days
later, "The sentence was carried out on May 16, in the
second half of the day. . ..When it was announced to
him that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had denied
his petition for mercy and he was to be executed, there
was not a trace of the poseur's manner which he had
maintained in court. He met death like a despicable cow-
"
ard
Having so said. General Gomyy returned to the editing
376 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
of the trial transcript, of which 100,000 copies were prmt
ed, for use as information and object lesson, within the
Soviet Union.
In the unlikely event that the trial had taken place in a
Western court and in the even less likely eventuality that
a Western court had been so desperately interested in de-
veloping the defendant's motives, the prosecution would
undoubtedly have drawn from Penkovskiy something of
the same explanation which he fortunately sent out in the
Papers. There would have been the protests against the
Soviet system, the anger at Khrushchev, the fear of nu-
clear war, the fascination with the freedoms of the West,
the gathering contempt for Communism, along with the
arrogance, the ambition, the fancied slights, the restless-
ness, the snobbery of one man's exceedingly complicated
character. But no such explanation could be permitted by
a regime which still must rely for its raison d'etre on a
political theory of temporal infallibility. Penkovskiy was
of course required to forswear his original statement to his
interrogators about his hostility to the regime. In its place
he substituted, according to orders, a careful statement
that he had never the slightest poUtical disagreement
with the Soviet system.
Some explanation for his behavior had to be construct-
ed, however. Here are Comrades Gornyy (for the prosecu-
tion) and Apraksin (for the defense) busy with hanamer
and saw:
Gornyy:
"In reviewing the present case, this question inevitably
arises: how can it be that a man like Penkovskiy, who was
bom, was brought up, and received his education during
the years of Soviet power, within our society, could so
completely lose the moral qualities of a Soviet man, lose
his shame, conscience, and elementary feelings of duty,
and end up by committing such serious crimes? Jl
"A partial answer to that question was provided by ^
Penkovskiy himself when he pointed out, in his testi-
mony in court, that it was the base quaUties which have
brought him to the prisoner's docki envy, vanity, the
love of an easy life, his affairs with many women, his
moral decay, brought about in part by his use of liquor.
All of these blotches on his moral character which were
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 377

named by Penkovskiy undermined him; he became a

degenerate, and then a traitor. . .

"The exceptional careerism, egoism, and ambition of

Penkovskiy manifested themselves long ago. He sought
constantly to mingle with people of authority and influ-
ence, to please and to fawn upon them, and to glory in his
closeness to them.
"He lived it up at the restaurants, drank wine from
the slippers of his mistresses, having learned such habits
from night clubs in London and Paris which Wynne
took him to in the process of acquainting him with the
*charms' of Western culture.
"He was mercenary and, although he was well paid by
the state, was fully provided for, and had savings in the
bank his 'appetite' grew excessively. He was particularly
partial to tripsabroad. Strictly speaking, his dissatisfac-
tion with his job and his bitterness were born out of the
fact that he was not offered a job abroad.
' "Of course, such degenerates and renegades as Pen-
kovskiy, who evoke a feeling of indignation and loathing
in all Soviet people, are a passing phenomenon in our
society.But this example shows clearly what danger is
hidden in the vestiges of the past, vestiges resurrected
by an ideology which is inimical to us, and what they
might develop into if we do not take notice of them in
time and decisively uproot them."
Apraksin:
"What indeed was it that led Penkovskiy into the camp
of agents of the British and American intelligence serv-
ices?
"A difference in views as to the path to be followed in
the development of our society? The existence of some
sort of private political postulates? A difference or lack of
agreement with the policy of the building of a Com-
munist society being conducted by our Party and our
government? Or hatred for the people, whose son he hap-
pens to be?
"No, I do not think that it was any of these. Crimes
for political motives have not been committed in our
country for a long time now. When this question was put
to him, to Penkovskiy, during the prehminary examina-
tion as well as in the courtroom, he replied: T had no
378 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
whatsoever with Soviet authority.' (Vol.
political conflicts
25)
3, file
". such motives for the crimes committed by Pen-
. .

kovskiy did not exist and could not exist, because there
were no grounds or basis for such conclusions in the life
of Penkovskiy.
"Thus, to say and to think that Penkovskiy became a
criminal out of some sort of political motives, well,
neither you nor I, nor the representatives of the state
prosecutor, have any basis for it.
". Penkovskiy himself was dazzled by his career. He
. .

began to take stock of himself again. He wanted more

than he actually had, and he learned to be respectful and
obliging to those upon whom his career depended, upon
whom his promotions depended. His head was turned by
success.
"It is but he did place great hope in souvenirs,
sad,
trinkets, French cognac, as well as telephone
bracelets,
calls from abroad, more than he did on conscientious
work for and selfless service to his Motherland. He got
used to this and made use of it.
"His views on life changed, his comrades changed, an*
his social interests changed.
"There was, it is true, someone else who saw th Ii
something bad had come of Penkovskiy. It was his wife,
who, upon being queried at the preliminary investiga-
tion, testified that:
" 'Over the past year, in general, he became nervous
and suspicious. By his very nature, Penkovskiy was vain,
touchy, and incUned toward adventures. These negative
features in his character had been developing over the
course of his entire life. These were promoted by the
praise of his achievements which he received from his
relatives, comrades, and friends. He and his job went
along at rather an easy pace. He had never suffered any
great hardships in his hfe.' (Vol. 4, files 152-158)
"The entire conscious life and the activities of Pen-
kovskiy, to the day of his fall, forces us to realize that,
for our society, he is a man who is not lost but who has
wandered, that he is not an enemy of our society, a society
which raised him. He is a Philistine who is far along
into his own delusions, a man who by dint of his activities
—
has come to the logical end for all PhiUstines to crime."
 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL 379

To any Western reader of this book, an obvious super-

ficial explanation of Penkovskiy's Philistine "crime" against
the Soviet Union was the fact that his father was a White
officer. Whether from an extraordinarily green memory or
from resentment at the Soviet social and political prejudice
shown against White Army family connections, he would
have a basic motive there. "Here was a man whose own
father was a White Guardist, the blackest of reactionaries.
From the beginning he plotted secretly in his father's
memory to destroy the revolution, to sabotage the work of
his comrades. .
." We can almost hear any spirited Soviet
.

prosecutor heating up his violin on this theme. But one

problem intervenes. Any allusion to Penkovskiy's ancestry
would throw an even more embarrassing question back
at the prosecution: Why had the KGB
and GRU
Chekists
allowed a man with this damaging a background to rise
to this level of prominence in Soviet society? Why had
they never found out? What was wrong with the system?
From the KGB's point of view, therefore, this solution
was impossible. The only "out" possible for the prosecu-
tion was to portray Penkovskiy as a man hopelessly cor-
rupted by greed and debauchery. Yet their own evidence
at the trial produced nothing more than the sum of
3000 rubles which was given to him by Wynne, of
which he paid back more than two thirds, plus promises
of a steady income in the event he managed to reach the
West. If this represented greed, the definition was an ex-
tremely scholastic one.
As for debauchery, the only evidence to be introduced
was a few meetings with an unidentified lady named
Galya, in company with Mssrs. Finkelshteyn and Rudov-
skiy. At one of these meetings, apparently, Penkovskiy
had attempted to drink out of Galya's slipper. The exist-
— —
ence of the slipper and of Galya remains open to ques-
tion.
The real underlying motivation of Penkovskiy, of
course,was the one thing which the Soviets could never
admit. He was making a protest against the regime on
behalf of the people. It mattered little to Penkovskiy that
the Russian people did not particularly solicit his services.
He neither possessed nor sought accomplices. But many
Russians before him had made a lonely personal violent
gesture of protest. He declared war on his society and he
380 EPILOGUE: THE TRIAL
used whatever weapons were at hand. He was in a tradi-
tion.
It would be idle to conclude that Penkovskiy was a
reasonable, stable citizen. He was a zealot. He was an
angry, driven man. He was vain and overconfident, surely,
in thinking he could carry on his secret work indefinitely.
He was hardly mindful of the great danger in which he
had placed his family, although he loved them and ulti-
mately made his confession to save them.
Is Penkovskiy aUve today? No one knows. Perhaps,
somewhere. Greville Wynne thinks so, as his articles
reveal, basing his belief on the Soviets' continuing interro-
gation of Wynnehimself after the trial. We know that
Prosecutor Gomyywent to the trouble of insisting that
sentence^ had been carried out, on May 16, in a press
conference a week after the trial.
By some intelligence standards, the KGB
would have
been wise to keep him alive, so they could have a constant
check on what he really told the "American and British
intelligence agents" memorialized in the Moscow trial.
Needing information, the Soviet authorities would be un-
likely to eUminate their best source. But if he is alive,
he must be paying a dread penalty. Then again, pressure
must have been strong to have him executed and seal his
lips forever —
especially by those whose secrets he must
have known.
Was Penkovskiy completely committed to the West?
From the intensity of what he wrote and the extent of
what he did, there is no doubt. For, it must be repeated,
no man before or since has succeeded in such a daring and
sweeping intelligence operation, with such powerful con-
sequences in its train.
It is probable that Penkovskiy represented a current
trend of thinking within the ranks of Soviet Army officers
and officials, albeit to an extreme degree. As Wynne had
said, "He was like the top part of an iceberg." Certainly
the Penkovskiy Papers bear out this discontent. There is
no doubt that the Khrushchev version of personality cult-
ism was highly unpopular within the Soviet Union, and
played a major role in bringing Khrushchev down, two
years later. There is no doubt that pressures were then and
are now mounting in this closed society, pressures for
greater personal freedom, greater creature comforts,
 EPILOGUE: THE TRrAL 381

greater personal initiative. As the Papers well demon-

strate, the motives of people working toward a freer so-
ciety within the U.S.S.R. are not unmixed ones; but the
important thing is that they exist. What Penkovskiy wrote
in 1961 is five times truer in 1965.
Oleg Penkovskiy's initial overtures toward the West
were made from disgust at his own Soviet system. His
visits there turned this into a more positive sentiment. He
was almost awe-struck at the experience of the Open
Society. He wanted his own people to have this society at
home. He wanted to share in it himself, whether the
Russian people could or not.
If he was a flawed hero, he was a hero nonetheless. His
struggle was one of heroic proportions, as was his achieve-
ment. If he served by this struggle to blunt the forces of
aggression and reaction within his own country, he will
have served well.
In any case, by any standard, Oleg Penkovskiy was a
most uncommon man.
 APPENDIX I

Organizational Chart of the State Committee for

Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work
r Council of Ministers of the U55R !

State CojiiBlttee for Co-ordination Central Coouaittee j

I
of Scientific Research Work of the CPSU

Chairman: Konstantin Nikalayevich Rudnev

Deputies: ileksandr Mikhaylovlch Sanarln
G. G. Gotsiridze Party Cownittee
G. V. Aleksenko
Secretary: Sergey Andreyevicb
Tsuprov
.

de Unioi Koasomol
cCommittee Conmittee

Directorate for Foreign Department for Co-ordination of Academy

Relations of Sciences USSR, Academies of Sciences
of the Union Republics, and Higher
Administrative Director* Educational Institutions
.ate
Departraent for Training and Registra-
Directorate for Colla- tion of Cadres
boration with Socialist
Countries j Materiel-Technical Support Department "~^

Scientific •Technical Department of Finance and Capital In-

Information and Propa< yeytwents
eanda Directorate
I Fuel Industry Department
Committee for Interna-
tional Pewer Supply Department for Light Industry and the
Associations Food Industry

Supply Department

Department for Power, Electrical Tech-

nology. Instrument Manufacture, and
Communications

Lumber, Cellulose, and Paper Industry

Department

Scientific Councils on Individual Prob-

lems

Combined Deot. for Science and Economic!^

Rare Meta ls Commission I

I ChemlstTY"

I
Metallurgy DepartmerTr
I Department of Mac hine Construction I

Transportation Department^ =1
 APPENDIX II

The Directorate for Foreign Relations (to Which Penkovskiy

Belonged) of the State Committee for Co-ordination of
Scientific Research Work (Penkovskiy Identifies the
Department Heads as Intelligence Officers)

DIRECTORATE FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS

Chief: Dxkeraan Mikhavlovich Gvisklani

Deputies: Yevgeniv Ilich Levis, XGB
Viktor Nlkolayevich Andrlanov. GRU

DepartBent for Relations Foreign Oepartaent

with Foreign Countries
Chief: Mikhail Pedorovich
Chief: Boris Georgiyevich Kachalov, KGB
Lopatenko, KGB Deputy: Olee Vladiairovich
Deputy: Denis Nlkolayevich Penkovskiy. GRU
Polyakov. GRU

Department for Foreign Science and Tecbnology

Chief; Innokentiy Grigoryevich Fofanov
Deputy Nikolay Andreyevich Vasilyev ,
 APPENDIX 111

Pravda Editorialand Izvestiya Interview Concerning

Penkovskiy's Trial and Execution
 LET'S INCREASE OUR REVOLUTIONARY
VIGILANCEI

Editorial, Pravda, May 17, 1963

The entire Soviet nation, with a great degree of approval,

met the just sentence of the Military Collegium of the
Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in the criminal case of the
traitor to his Motherland and agent of the British and
American intelligence services, Penkovskiy, and the spy
go-between, Wynne. The sentence of the court is the high-
est measure of punishment — execution for Penkovskiy and
eight years of imprisonment for Wynne.
During period there has been a steady flood
this entire
of letters to the editorial oflBce of Pravda and other
agencies of the press and to radio stations in which Soviet
citizens of the most varied professions and ages have ex-
pressed their feeling of profound satisfaction with the
manner in which the glorious Soviet Chekists have de-
cisively suppressed the foul work of the British and Ameri-
can intelligence services. From the pages of these letters
one can loudly hear the voice of laborers, workers in
agriculture, and Soviet intellectuals angrily holding up to
shame the reactionary circles of the capitalist countries
which are carrying on subversive activity against the
Soviet Union.
In their letters the Soviet citizens recall the words ex-
pressed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
to the effect that subversive activity against the Soviet
Union is being openly supported and paraded by reac-
tionary circles in a number of capitalist countries. "There-
fore," N. S. Khrushchev said, "we must do everything pos-
sible to increase revolutionary vigilance in the Soviet peo-
"
ple
From the first days of its existence, the Soviet state
has been the object of continuous hostile acts on the part
of international imperialism. During the years of the civil
and Great Patriotic wars, enemies attempted to destroy
the world's first socialist state by force of arms. They were
defeated by the Soviet people. They also failed disgrace-
389
390 APPENDICES
fully in their computations that our nation would prove
to be unable to provide for the development of our
economy, technology, and science, and would be forced
to return to the path of capitalism. During all these years
the imperialists, in addition to open political, economic,
and military warfare, carried out a "secret war" against
our Motherland, resorting to espionage, diversion, and
other types of subversive activity. In a number of im-
perialist states, subversive and intelligence activity has
been raised to the level of state policy. But all these
criminal plans and actions of the reactionary forces were
doomed to failure.
In our time, when the ratio of power on the world
scene has changed radically in favor of socialism, open
military acts against countries in the socialist camp in-
evitably end in the destruction of those undertaking them.
However, international imperialism has still not re-
nounced its vile plans against the socialist state, and con-
tinues to organize various intrigues against socialism. The
trial of Anglo-American spies which ended several days
ago is only one of the acts of this "secret war."
The imperialist states are attempting, at any price and
by any means, to gain information about the outstanding
achievements of the Soviet Union in the field of economy,
science, and technology, and about the armed forces of
our country. At the trial it was irrefutably proved that,
by unceremoniously trampling the norms of international
law, they also use the diplomatic service of those powers
for purposes of espionage. A
private decision of the Mili-
tary Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. con-
tains the names of seven British and five American
diplomats, accredited to the U.S.S.R., who, by abusing
their official status, engaged in activities hostile to our
country. Certain foreign businessmen, tourists and mem-
bers of various foreign delegations are also drawn into the
dirty work of espionage.
Does that mean that Soviet citizens, as Western prop-
aganda states, are inclined to see an enemy in every
foreigner? Is it really necessary to say that such state-
ments are completely without foundation and are^ stupid,
or that they are malicious slander against Soviet citizens?
The peace-loving Soviet nation, educated by the Com-
munist Party in the spirit of proletarian internationalism,
 APPENDICES 391

has always come out, and will continue to come out, for
the strengthening of friendly relations with other nations,
for the complete development of international contacts,
and for the broad exchange of cultural values. The whole
world knows the hospitality with which we greet every-
one arriving in our country with a pure heart and an
open one. Let everyone know that Soviet citizens do not
put an equal sign between vigilance and suspiciousness:
they are far from presupposing that all their guests have
bad intentions. But let everyone also remember that the
striking sword of the Soviet agencies of State Security in-
evitably falls on any snake that tries to crawl into the
beautiful building of Communism which was erected by
our people.
Any intrigues of foreign intelligence services are doomed
to failure, since they do not have and cannot have any
social support in the Soviet society. The moral and polit-
ical unity of our people, the high degree of patriotism
of Soviet citizens, constitutes the most reliable of the walls
standing in the way of the scouts of the capitalist world.
That is why the intelligence services of the imperialist
powers persistently search out individuals affected by the
wormholes of idealistic unreliability and moral turpitude,
adventurers, careerists, and persons with self-interests,
who, under definite conditions, might yield to recruitment
and take the criminal path of treason against one's Mother-
land.
In our Penkovskiy are
socialist society, degenerates like
doomed contempt and annihilation. Two hun-
to universal
dred and twenty million Soviet patriots have xmanimously
expressed their anger against the traitor. The raising of
the vigilance of the Soviet people against the intrigues of
the imperialist powers constitutes the answer that Soviet
citizens give the subversive actions of the British and
American intelligence services, which have been unmasked
before the entire world at the trial which was held in
Moscow. One should not forget that any connivance with
respect to the survivals of the past or to their bearers,
any leniency toward vices, and any gullibility manifested
by individual persons are inadmissible; they lead to the
loss of political vigilance.
In addition to espionage, enemies of our Motherland,
enemies of peace and socialism, have been resorting more
and more persistently in recent times to methods of
392 APPENDICES
ideological subversion. Attempting to undermine the might
of the Soviet system, they are searching for any and all
holes through which they can exert their pernicious in-
fluence upon individual unstable characters. Therefore any
lessening of the struggle against bourgeois ideology, which
serves as a means of keeping alive the survivals of capital-
ism, can create conditions in which it is most convenient
for the petty soul-hunters sent by the imperialist intelli-
gence services to operate. And the more actively the So-
viet citizens fight the influence of bourgeois ideology, and
the dog-eat-dog morality of the capitalist world, the greater
their political vigilance and their abihty to recognize an
—
enemy, in whatever guise he appears the more reliably
we will be able to close up all the chinks through which
enemy agents might penetrate.
In the name of the Motherland, in the name of the
people, and in the interests of peace on earth, the Soviet
court has punished the criminals in full measure for the
crimes that they committed. The far-reaching plans of
the ruling circles of the imperialist powers to penetrate
into the state secrets of the Soviet Union have failed.
The high vigilance of Soviet citizens who remember well
the instructions of V. I. Lenin that, having undertaken
peaceful construction, it is necessary to be constantly on
alert, and to cherish as the apple of one's eye the de-
fense capacity of our Motherland, constitutes the most
reliable guarantee that no one will ever be able to pre-
vent us from achieving our great goal. Let us always be
on the alert, let us increase our revolutionary vigilance!
that is today's motto of the Soviet people, the builders of
Communism.

THE OLD FOX'S TAIL

Interview Given to Correspondents of Izvestiya by
Chief Military Prosecutor General Lieutenant of Justice
A. G. Gornyy

The of the spy Penkovskiy and his accomplice

trial
Wynne The world's
attracted the attention of the world.
newspapers were filled with comments. In many of these
papers the progress of the trial was treated objectively,
 APPENDICES 393

and the fairness of the sentence given was acknowledged.

But there were also those press organs which carried articles
containing quite a bit of malicious fabrication.
The Soviet people have unanimously approved the sen-
tence passed on the spies. In their letters to the editors,
readers hold up to shame the organizers of this subversive
—
activity the American and English imperiaUsts. Readers
have also asked the editors to answer several questions con-
nected with the spy case.
To fulfill the requests the editors of Izvestiya turned to
Chief Military Prosecutor General Lieutenant of Justice
A. G. Gornyy, who was the state prosecutor at the Pen-
kovskiy trial. Following are Gornyy's answers to the ques-
tions of our correspondents V. Goltsev and V. Kassis.
Correspondents: "The editors of Izvestiya have re-
ceived a number of letters in which readers have wanted
to know how great is the damage to our defense capacity
as a result of Penkovskiy's activities.'*
A. Gornyy: "After the trial several Soviet citizens had
the impression that Penkovskiy had given away to the
enemy almost all our secrets connected with military equip-
ment and the defense capacity of the Soviet state. Such
claims are without foundation. Penkovskiy in his position
was far removed from information connected with the
armament of our troops and their deployment and with
the employment of new types of weapons. He passed to
foreign intelligence services information on some tech-
nical reports of Soviet specialists who had gone abroad
and some scattered data of a military nature that he had
pumped out of loose-tongued friends and had taken from
classified publications. He also passed on various material
of an internal political nature.
"It should be noted that in the initial period of his spy
activity Penkovskiy was closely watched and checked by
the foreign agents so they afterward could give him as-
signments to collect material that particularly interested
them. But by the beginning of 1962 Penkovskiy was put
under conditions that made liaison with foreign intelligence
services difficult. This is shown by the fact that a large
amount of secret material he had collected was discovered
in his possession when he was arrested. These materials
later served as material evidence at the trial. Penkovskiy
was not able to pass material at will. He was hindered by
394 APPENDICES
the vigilance of the Soviet people and our Chekists
[KGB agents].
"After becoming a spy, Penkovskiy passed to the Amer-
ican and English intelligence services certain important
information, part of which was connected with a state
secret of the U.S.S.R. He commited a most serious crime
against the Motherland, for which he was sentenced to
death. However, it can be asserted with full responsibility
that the materials he passed could not cause any serious
harm to the defense capability of the Soviet Union."
Correspondents: "Readers in their letters have been
asking: what got Penkovskiy started on the path of treason
and espionage?"
A. Gomyy: "The material of the court examination
convincingly shows that Penkovskiy became a hireling of
foreign intelligence services as a result of his amorality,
careerism, and egoism. A
poseur and careerist, Penkovskiy
sought personal glory and personal mercenary successes.
Embittered at everyone and everything because he was
discharged from the regular Soviet Army and was not given
a permanent job overseas, Penkovskiy sold himself to for-
eign intelligence services."
Correspondents: "Several readers want to know why
Penkovskiy was not arrested immediately after his activ-
ities became known to State Security organs."
A. Gomyy: "I already said that after the State
Security organs noticed the suspicious contacts of Pen-
kovskiy with foreigners he was placed under difficult con-
ditions. Despite his persistency in trying to get overseas
he was not given such an opportunity. There were also
set up obstacles to his collecting information and meeting
with untrustworthy persons. However, there was still not
enough evidence to arrest him. In addition, all of his
criminal contacts with foreigners, in our country and
abroad, had not been found out. I have in mind the
diplomatic employees of the Moscow embassies of the
U.S.A. and Great Britain. It was necessary not only to
collect irrefutable proof of Penkovskiy's spy activity but to
establish his criminal contacts with imperialist intelligence
agencies, to document these contacts and to collect irrefut-
able proof that foreign intelligence agencies and diplomats
were engaged in subversive activities. The spy was sur-
rounded like a bear in his den. As a result the State
 APPENDICES 395

Security organs were able to collect important evidence

that not only convicted Penkovskiy and Wynne as spies,
but also exposed the subversive work against the Soviet
state of a large group of American and British diplomats."
Correspondents: "Our readers are interested in knowing
whether the persons closely associated with Penkovskiy and
who knew of his amoral and suspicious conduct will be
punished in any way."
A. Gom)^: "Penkovskiy was associated with many
people both officially and in his private life. Some of them
turned out to be gullible and loose-tongued. Others used
to drink with Penkovskiy and contributed to his degener-
ation. However, the majority of the Soviet people he
associated with were honest and loyal to our Motheriand.
They were very helpful to the security organs in convicting
Penkovskiy as a spy. It was their warnings that formed
the basis of the active work of our Chekists in exposing
Penkovskiy and Wynne. By the way, I should mention
that the group of Soviet citizens who helped to expose the
spies was officially thanked and awarded with valuable
gifts by the Committee of State Security under the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
"As concerns the friends and drinking companions of
Penkovskiy, they, as was established at the preliminary in-
vestigation and in the court examination, did not know
about his spy activity and therefore cannot be held crimi-
nally responsible. But their conduct deserves the sternest
public condemnation. I should say that they have all been
subjected to strict administrative and Party punishment
For example, former Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varen-
tsov has been demoted in rank and position because he
gave credence to Penkovskiy's ^complaints' that he was
allegedly iQegally discharged from the regular Soviet
Army. So Varentsov succeeded in having a negative
efficiency report re-examined and was instrumental in
getting Penkovskiy a job in the State Committee for Co-
ordination of Scientific Research of the U.S.S.R.
"Penkovskiy's close acquaintances, General Major A.
Pozovnyy, Colonel V. Buzinov, and former employee of the
State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research,
U.S.S.R., V. Petrochenko, all of whom shared official in-
formation with Penkovskiy in violation of existing re-
gulations, received strict disciplinary punishment.
396 APPENDICES
"His drinking companions V. Finkelshteyn and I.
Rudovskiy were also condemned by all the personnel at
their places of work.
"I would hope that all these people will reform, learn
their lessons, and get on the right track."
Correspondents: "In the Western bourgeois press various
*doubts' have cropped up about the sincerity of Penkovskiy
and Wynne's confessions in court. What can you say on
this point?"
A. Gornyy: "I must say that the respectable bourgeois
press organs and telegraphic agencies that were repre-
sented at the trial were compelled to admit the irrefuta-
bility of the evidence presented by the prosecution against
the spies in the dock. For example, in reference to the
trial the American papers The New York Times and New
York Herald Tribune wrote that no one even doubts
that the defendants are guilty. The correspondent for the
Swedish newspaper Svenska Daghlaget reported from Lon-
don during the trial that *judging from unofficial English
commentaries one cannot help seeing that the Wynne trial
has put the EngUsh government and security service in a
difficult position, because nothing has been presented to
counter Wynne's confession to espionage.'
"Similar statements were contained in other newspapers.
But as always, there were attempts to sow distrust of
Soviet justice. Malicious and fantastic fabrications are
favorite methods of the cheap bourgeois press. The Turkish
newspaper Eni Istanbul claimed that a 'brainwashing oper-
ation' was performed on Wynne while in prison. I think
that such fabrication can only provoke laughter even from
readers who have no objective information.
"The fact that Wynne and Penkovskiy confessed to
such serious crimes isexplained simply by the irrefuta-
bility of the evidence so laboriously gathered during the
preliminary investigation and presented at the trial. The
prosecution had available and presented to the court ample
proof of the defendants' guilt. This proof was completely
objective and not dependent on the testimony or con-
fessions of the defendants. Wynne and Penkovskiy un-
derstood this perfectly. Even during the preliminary in-
vestigation they became convinced that they had been ex-
posed and caught red-handed. For this reason the spies
 APPENDICES 397

decided to confess their guilt and to repent in some

measure.
"Incontrovertible, objective proof of their guilt is rep-
resented in the spy equipment seized from Penkovskiy
and Wynne upon their arrest: Minox miniature cameras,
cipher books, diaries, instructions from spy headquarters,
radio receivers, numerous written documents, and the ex-
periments carried out during investigation. Under such
conditions Penkovskiy and Wynne had no choice but to
admit their guilt and confess to the crimes."
Correspondents: "There are rumors that link Penkovskiy
and the family of the late Chief Marshal of Artillery
M. I. Nedelin."
A. Gomyy: "These rumors are nonsense. Penkovskiy
had no connection at all with the family of Marshal M. I.
Nedelin. He was married to the daughter of General G.,
a former political worker who died several years ago.
General G. did not serve in the missile troops, so
Penkovskiy would not have been able to get any informa-
tion on our missiles through family channels. It was
established by the preliminary and court examinations
that Penkovskiy's wife and relatives did not know of his
criminal activity. They were deeply shocked and indignant
when they found out his true face. Penkovskiy managed to
give foreign agents fragmentary information concerning
old-model missiles that he had obtained during his Army
service."
Correspondents: "What can you tell us about the activi-
ties of imperiahst intelligence operations against the
U.S.S.R. on the basis of spy cases heard in recent years
by the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R.?
A. Gomyy: "Espionage and subversive activities against
the U.S.S.R. have been raised to the level of state policy
in a number of imperialist states. The leading role in
espionage against the U.S.S.R. is played by the Central
Intelligence Agency of the U.S.A. The best and most mod-
em equipment has been made available for espionage
from Minox miniature cameras to space satellites, the
so-called 'spies in the sky.'
"The trial of Penkovskiy and Wynne gave a pinch to
the old fox's tail —that is, the British Secret Intelligence
Service. It has been in existence for around three hun-
398 APPENDICES
dred years and continues to use more and more deceptive
and refined methods. In so doing it tries to remain in the
background, but not very successfully, as is clearly shown
by the Penkovskiy-Wynne trial.
"It is becoming ever more diflScult for the imperialist
intelligence services to conduct their subversive activities
in the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries. In our
country there is no social base for recruiting agents for
foreign agencies. Therefore the English and American
agencies rely on professional spies who are trained in
special schools and then sent by various means to our
country. But they all end up facing Soviet justice.
"Trampling standards of international law, American
and English intelligence agencies utilize as spies members
of various delegations, businessmen, cultural
scientists,
figures, students, and tourists who
our country. This
visit
is shown particularly by the unmasking of tourist spies

such as Kaminsky and Makinen, Sonntag and Naumann,

the Werner couple, Yakher Lou and Reydon, and others.
was also proved at the trial of Penkovskiy and Wynne
"It
that seven English and five American diplomats were in-
volved in spy activity. All of them have been shamefully
expelled from the Soviet Union —
one during investigation,
the others after the trial. These facts allow us to conclude
that the imperialist intelligence services do not hesitate
to turn the diplomatic missions in the U.S.S.R. into es-
pionage centers. Is it necessary to say that such dirty ac-
tions by the English and American intelligence services
cause great harm to the cause of increasing trust among
peoples and states and hinder the development of scientific
and cultural co-operation and international trade?
"At the same time, as was revealed by the Penkovskiy
trial, the intelligence services of the bourgeois states strive
to find even among Soviet citizens individual renegades
who might work for them and betray the interests of the
Motherland and the people. Such people are usually moral-
ly degenerate, unprincipled careerists, and egoists who are
willing to sell out to the enemy for pieces of silver. But
these renegades do not take root in our Soviet life, which
is why they inevitably and quickly fail. They are quickly

exposed by the organs of State Security with the active

help of the workers."
Correspondents: "Some persons in the West doubt that
 APPENDICES 399

Penkovskiy's sentence was carried out. What can you say

regarding this?"
A. Gornyy: "Striving to discredit the Penkovskiy trial,
which nailed the intelligence services of the U.S.A. and
England to the pillory, the cheap Western newspapers are
resorting to monstrous lies and fabrications. The reac-
tionary English paper Sunday Telegraph wrote on May
19, after Penkovskiy's sentence had already been executed,
the following: 'Western officials in Moscow think that Oleg
Penkovskiy's death sentence is a complete fake.' As one
diplomat put it, Penkovskiy's execution 'amounted to hav-
ing his passport destroyed and then being issued another
one.'
"This report is a shameless newspaper lie. Penkovskiy is
dead. The sentence was executed in the second half of
the day of May 19. The evening before Penkovskiy was
allowed a meeting with his mother. During the night he
wrote several letters. When it was announced to him that
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had
denied his petition for mercy and that he was to be exe-
cuted, there was not a trace of the poseur's manner that
he had maintained in court He met death like a despicable
coward."
Correspondents: "What lesson should our people learn
from the Penkovskiy case?"
A. Gornyy: "This case is a reminder to all Soviet people
that it is necessary to maintain revolutionary vigilance and
be firm against gullibility, loose talk, and carelessness,
which can help foreign spies to carry out their dirty work.
I think that the evidence produced at the trial also con-
vincingly shows the need to intensify the fight against
narrow-mindedness, Philistinism, lack' of principle, and
vestiges of the past that eat away the conscience of cer-
tain morally unstable people. From Philistinism to moral
degeneration is just one step, and moral degeneration and
lack of principle can lead a person into the nets of im-
perialist inteUigence services.
"In connection with the Penkovskiy case there has been
started in the West a noisy campaign about alleged spy
mania in our country. This is of course a propaganda
trick. The Soviet people are not disposed to see a spy in
every foreigner- They hospitably open their doors to all
who come to our country with good intentions. We are
*** APPENDICES
against spy mania and unnecessary suspiciousness, which
only bring nervousness and actuaUy harms
the struggle
against the real enemies of our socialist state. But we are
for revolutionary vigilance, which must
be the standard
of conduct for every Soviet man,"

From Izvestiya, May 29, 1963.

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