भारत सरकार

नागर विमानन महावनदे शालय

Government of India
Directorate General of Civil Aviation

ADVISORY CIRCULAR
ANSS AC 01 of 2023
Ref. DGCA-21040/1/2023-ANS
Issue date: 24. 11.2023

Sub: GNSS INTERFERENCE IN AIRSPACE

1. Introduction

1.1 A vast range of applications in civil aviation use GNSS for timing, position and
navigation, both in aircraft and in space-based or ground-based systems.

1.2 GNSS Signals, being weak, are susceptible to interference. The interference
which could be intentional or unintentional has potential to affect the services which
require reliable GNSS signals.

1.3 With increased reliance and dependency on GNSS, GNSS interference

including jamming and spoofing has become a real threat in airspace, and as such,
active measures are required by all concerned to effectively deal with it.

2. Purpose

2.1 The purpose of this circular is:

(a) to increase awareness among aviation personnel about potential threats
of GNSS Interference,
(b) to establish roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in
monitoring and mitigating threats,
(c) to establish an unambiguous channel for reporting GNSS Interference,
and
(d) to establish a threat monitoring and analysis network.

3. Applicability

3.1 This circular is applicable to all Aircraft Operators and Air Navigation Service
Provider (ANSP) for information, guidance and compliance.

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4. Terms

4.1 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)

A worldwide position and time determination system that includes one or more satellite
constellations, aircraft receivers and system integrity monitoring, augmented as
necessary to support the required navigation performance for the intended operation.
At present, GNSS includes satellite constellations of USA’s Global Positioning System
(GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, Europe’s Galileo and China’s BeiDou.

4.2 GNSS Jamming

Intentional transmission of high-power signals creating interference (noise) with GNSS

signals leading to loss of signal integrity at receiver, making GNSS unusable.

4.3 GNSS Spoofing or Smart Jamming

Intentional transmission of false GNSS−like signals that may be acquired and tracked
in combination with or instead of the intended signals by receivers causing false and
potentially confusing, or hazardously misleading, position, navigation, and/or date/time
information in addition to loss of GNSS use.

5. GNSS Interference and affected areas

5.1 GNSS enables PBN and provides navigation guidance for all phases of flight,
from en-route through to precision approach. By providing position information, GNSS
enables ADS-B, ADS-C, moving map displays, multilateration, terrain awareness and
warning systems (TAWS) and synthetic vision systems. Emergency locator
transmitters (ELTs) also use GNSS position data. GNSS also supports a wide variety
of precision timing applications.

5.2 GNSS signals are vulnerable to intentional and unintentional sources of

interference and to certain ionosphere effects.

5.3 Unintentional interference could be due to variety of sources like in-band and
out-of-band emitters, including mobile and fixed VHF communications, harmonics of
television stations, certain radars, mobile satellite communication, microwave links,
ionosphere effects, solar activity, multi-path error, GPS repeaters and even some
systems on-board aircraft. However, these are usually localized and intermittent in
impact.

5.4 Intentional interference due to jamming or spoofing attack could lead to

hazardously misleading information which could affect the flight safety adversely. The

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impact could be temporary with recovery on leaving the affected areas, or permanent
with non-recoverable failure.

5.5 GNSS Interference cases have been observed with increased frequency in
geographical areas surrounding conflict zones, southern and eastern Mediterranean
and Black sea, Baltic Sea and Arctic area, especially in Istanbul and Ankara FIR in
Turkey, Baghdad FIR, Tehran FIR, Tel Aviv FIR, Cairo FIR, Amman FIR among others
in Mid-East region, Samara FIR, Moscow FIR and Minsk FIR.

5.6 The areas mentioned above in Para 5.5 are not exhaustive and subject to
revision as new information becomes available.

6. Possible Impact of GNSS Interference

While there are no specific flight crew alerts for GNSS Interference, it is understood
that both jamming and spoofing affect some or all of the applications that use GNSS
input in aircraft. At present, it is difficult to distinguish one from the other conclusively
based on impact. Further, impact is also dependent on aircraft avionics and system
architecture. And as such, each operator should consult their OEM to understand
possible impact on their aircraft fleet to remain aware of the vulnerabilities.

Some common list of examples are given below for reference:-

6.1 Impact on aircraft

Loss of or degradation in or misleading output in GNSS input based systems as

illustrated in table below:-

GNSS Input based system Impacted systems/capability

 Ground or wind speed on Navigation display(ND)

Positioning System
 Map shift
 RNAV, RNP capability
Navigation System  SLS, GLS capability
 INS/IRS

 Time shift in clock

Timing Systems  Fuel computation system
 Flight management system

 Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)

 Terrain Awareness/Ground Proximity Warning
Surveillance System
 Wind shear warning
 Runway Alerting Systems

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6.2 Impact on ground-based systems

6.2.1 Loss of surveillance capability (ADS-B, MLAT).

6.2.2 Degradation of ATM/CNS Systems.

6.3 Other Impact

6.3.1 Deviation of an aircraft from flight planned route may lead to separation minima
infringement or airspace infringements.

6.3.2 Loss of GNSS signal could result in larger search areas for Emergency Locator
transmitters (ELTs).

6.3.3 Loss of situational awareness could increase workload of flight crew and ATC.

7. Mitigation measures

Mitigation measures should consider first developing strategies for prevention, then
reducing impact by building resilience and finally, reacting appropriately to GNSS
service interruptions to ensure safety of flight operations.

GNSS interference may occur in any stage of flight (enroute, approach, etc.), and thus,
it is important to consider associated risks and response time available to operational
personnel concerned while developing the contingency procedures.

7.1 Airlines

7.1.1 Action by Aircraft Operators

(a) Understand the potential impact of GNSS Interference on their aircraft fleet.

(b) Conduct a safety risk assessment by assessing risks and hazards that may
occur due to loss of on-board GNSS based systems. Refer Para 10.

(c) Coordinate with OEMs to obtain their recommendations in respect of GNSS

Interference.

(d) Develop Contingency procedures to mitigate GNSS Interference on aircraft,

including actions to be taken by flight crew experiencing the interference.

(e) Remain updated by studying various circulars issued by CAAs, ICAO and other
international bodies, NOTAMs by ANSPs, case studies, etc.

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(f) Timely brief flight crew and flight operations personnel of latest information on
GNSS Interference, including:
(i) its potential impact
(ii) affected areas and air routes, and
(iii) reporting obligations.

(g) Include topic of GNSS Interference in recurrent training of flight crew and flight
operational personnel.

(h) Ensure while flight planning, availability of critical nav aids on intended route of
operation, and alternate conventional instrument approach procedures in case of an
aerodrome in affected areas with only GNSS based approaches.

(i) Report the events of GNSS interference (actual or suspected). Refer Para 8.

(j) Analyse reports of GNSS interference in coordination with OEM and ANSP to
determine root cause analysis.

7.1.2 Action by Pilots

(a) Understand possibility of GNSS Interference and its impact.

(b) Closely monitor aircraft position and cross-check the same using information
from conventional navigation aids, cross-check GNSS time with non-GNSS time
sources, and observe flight instruments for discrepancies or GNSS anomalies.

(c) Actively monitor ATC frequency including distress frequency 121.5 MHz.

(d) Be prepared to revert to conventional navigation instruments and procedures.

(e) In case of suspected or actual GNSS Interference,

(i) notify ATC as soon as practicable and request assistance as required.
(ii) implement contingency procedures as appropriate.

(f) Report the event to appropriate authorities. Refer Para 8.

7.2 Air Navigation Service Provider

7.2.1 Action by ANSP

(a) Understand the impact of GNSS Interference on ATM/CNS Systems including

SBAS (GAGAN), surveillance systems (ADS-B) and GNSS based timing systems.

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(b) Conduct a safety risk assessment by assessing risks and hazards that may
occur due to loss of SBAS (GAGAN), GNSS based surveillance or timing systems on
aircraft operations in specific airspace.

(c) Develop contingency procedures to mitigate GNSS interference in airspace,

including actions to be taken by air traffic controllers receiving reports of interference
or experiencing loss of or unreliable GNSS-based surveillance system (ADS-B).

(d) Issue NOTAMs as appropriate to disseminate information about affected areas

or air routes.

(e) Coordinate with military authorities on activities potentially hazardous to civil

aircraft like use of GNSS jammers during military exercises and operations close to
civil aerodrome or airspace, and notify airspace users using NOTAMs.

(f) Consider impact of GNSS interference during planning for rationalization of

conventional navigation and surveillance infrastructure.

(g) Maintain essential conventional navigation aid infrastructure (VOR, DME, ILS)
and procedures based on them, and GNSS impact-resilient surveillance infrastructure.

(h) Sensitize Air traffic controllers of GNSS Interference, and include the topic in
their refresher trainings.

(i) Establish mechanism to collect and analyse reports of GNSS interference, and
notify to airspace users and DGCA. Refer Para 9.

(j) Establish procedures to identify and locate the source of GNSS interference, if
possible, and eliminate the same in cooperation with local regulatory and law
enforcement authorities.

7.2.2 Action by Air Traffic Controllers

(a) Closely monitor aircraft traffic for unauthorized deviations from intended track
or route, if in surveillance environment.

(b) Actively monitor distress frequency 121.5 MHz.

(c) In case of loss of or unreliable GNSS-based surveillance system like ADS-B,

implement contingency procedures as appropriate.

(d) In case of suspected or actual GNSS Interference by flight crew,

(i) provide positioning and navigation assistance to affected aircraft.
(ii) cross-check with other aircraft in vicinity.
(iii) broadcast interference report to other aircraft, as necessary.

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(iv) implement contingency procedures as appropriate.

(e) Report the event to appropriate authorities. Refer Para 8.

8. Reporting

8.1 Reporting Requirement

It is mandatory for all operators, flight crew, Air navigation service provider and air
traffic controllers to report any event of actual or suspected GNSS Interference leading
to a safety occurrence, in accordance with the Aircraft Rules 1937, Rule 29E and CAR
Sec 5 Series C Part 1.

8.2 Reporting Format

(a) A reporting form for pilots is given in eAIP India ENR 4.3 Para 10.
(b) A general reporting format for all is also given in Appendix 1 to this circular.

8.3 Reporting Channel

All reports are to be sent via email to Director (Air Safety) and Director (AS & ANSS),
DGCA HQ with a copy to GM CNS, GAGAN, AAI. The email addresses are given in
Appendix 3.

9. Threat Monitoring and Analysis Network

9.1 ANSP should establish an internal mechanism in coordination with relevant

stakeholders and subject matter experts of industry, academia, etc., for preventive as
well as reactive threat monitoring, and analysis of all reports of GNSS Interference.

9.2 Relevant data should be maintained to obtain insight into emerging trends,
threats, and geographical areas of concern.

9.3 Periodic updates should be shared with DGCA using the reporting channel
given in Para 8.3 on bi-monthly basis, for further action as appropriate.

9.4 Any significant finding or outcome may be brought to immediate attention of

DGCA and airspace users, as necessary.

10. Safety Risk Assessment

10.1 Airlines should assess risks and operational limitations that may occur due to
loss of on-board GNSS based systems.

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10.2 ANS providers should complete a risk assessment by determining the residual
likelihood of service outages and the impact of an outage on aircraft operations in
specific airspace. It should also consider the type of airspace, traffic levels and the
availability of independent surveillance and communications services.

10.3 All operators should conduct the risk assessment and submit the same to FSD
dte, DGCA HQ.

10.4 ANSP should conduct the risk assessment and submit the same to AS & ANSS
dte, DGCA HQ.

10.5 A sample risk assessment table is provided in Appendix 2 to this circular.

Sd/-
Vikram Dev Dutt
Director General of Civil Aviation

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Appendix 1

Reporting Format GNSS Interference Occurrence

Originator of Report
[] Aircraft Operator
[] Flight Crew
Report Filed by [] Air Navigation Service Provider
[] Air traffic Controller
[] Any other
Date and Time of Report (dd/mm/yyyy) and
UTC
Aircraft Operator Details
Name
Email address
Flight Details
Call sign of Aircraft (Flight No.)
Flight Sector
Airway/ Route of occurrence
FIR code
Flight Level or Altitude during event
Phase of flight
Aircraft Type
Aircraft Registration
ATS Details
Location of ATS Station (Location identifier)
Surveillance Systems details
Affected airspace Details
Event Details
[] GPS
[] GLONASS
Affected GNSS Element
[] GAGAN
[] Any other. Pls Specify:
Coordinates of the first point of occurrence
UTC: Lat: Long:
/ Time (UTC):
Coordinates of the last point of occurrence
UTC: Lat: Long:
/ Time (UTC):
Duration of Observed Interference/outage:

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Impact Details
List of impacted systems:
Observation of a “time shift” on clock
(details of shift and recovery, if any)
Observation of a “map shift” on navigation
display (details of shift and recovery, if any)
Enhanced ground proximity warning alerts:
Degraded EPU (Estimated Position
Uncertainity)/ Estimated Position Error
Loss of automatic dependent surveillance
(ADS) reporting capabilities (ADS-B out,
ADSB-in, ADS-C) (details)
Loss of GNSS-based landing capability.
Large position errors (details):
Loss of integrity (RAIM warning/alert):
Complete outage (Both receivers):
Loss of GPS1 or Loss of GPS 2
Loss of satellites in view/details:
Lateral indicated performance level
From: To:
change
Vertical indicated performance level
From: To:
change
Indicated Dilution of Precision changed From: To:
information on PRN of affected satellites (if
applicable)
Low Signal-to-Noise (Density) ratio:
Degraded PBN capability
Switching to an alternate navigation mode
(such as IRS updating or
DME/DME)
Any other observed impact:
Automatic GNSS Systems Recovery (y/n)
Other
Any other relevant details:

Note: All available details should be provided. Separate sheet may be attached for
additional information/pictures, etc, if any.

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Appendix 2

Sample Risk Assessment Format

The following tables have been adopted from ICAO Guidance Material related to
GNSS Vulnerability for MID region (Doc Ref. RSA-14)

1. Sample Risk Assessment Table:

It could be used to identify and capture the threats, select the risk rating based on the
risk matrix above considering the existing controls. In addition, recommended actions
could be selected to minimize the risk.

Here, L denotes Likelihood, C denotes Consequence, and R denotes Risk.

Threat Initial Existing Accept/Reduce Recommended Residual Risk

Risk controls controls
L C R L C R

2. Likelihood (L) of an identified risk occurring:

Event is expected to occur

1 More frequently than hourly

2 Between hourly and daily
3 Between daily and yearly
4 Between yearly and 5 yearly
5 Between 5 and 50 years
6 Less frequently than once every 50 years

3. Consequence (C)/impact of risk occurring:

Category Effect on Aircrew and Overall ATM System effect

Passengers

Catastrophic Multiple fatalities due to collision Sustained inability to provide any service.
1 with other aircraft, obstacles or
terrain

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Major Large reduction in safety Inability to provide any degree of service

2 margin; serious or fatal injury to (includingcontingency measures) within one or
small number; serious physical more airspace sectors for a significant time.
distress toair crew.
Moderate Significant reduction in safety The ability to provide a service is severely
3 margin. compromised within one or more airspace
sectors without warning for a significant time.
Minor Slight reduction in safety margin. The ability to provide a service is impaired
4 within one or more airspace sectors without
warning for a significant time
Negligible Potential for some inconvenience. No effect on the ability to provide a service in
5 the short term, but the situation needs to be
monitored and reviewed for the need to apply
some form of contingency measures if the
condition prevails.

4. Risk Assessment Matrix

The following matrix provides for an overall risk ranking based on L and C criteria:

Likelihood Criteria Consequence Criteria

Event expected to occur: Catastrophi Major Moderate Minor Negligible

c1 2 3 4 5
1 More frequently A A A A C
than hourly
2 Between hourly A A A B D
anddaily
3 Between daily A A B C D
andyearly
4 Between yearly A B C C D
and 5yearly
5 Between 5 A B C D D
and 50years
6 Less frequently B C D D D
than once every
50 years

5. Risk (R) Tolerability:

Based on the risk assessment matrix, risks are categories from ‘A’ to ‘D’, with ‘A’
being unacceptable and ‘D’ being acceptable.

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Risk Index Range Description Recommended Action

A Unacceptable Stop or cut back operation promptly if necessary.
Perform priority/immediate risk mitigation to ensure
that additional orenhanced preventive controls are put
in place to bring down the risk index to the moderate or
low range
B High Risk Urgent action. Perform priority/immediate risk
mitigation to ensure that additional or enhanced
preventive controls are putin place to bring down the
risk index to the moderate or low range
C Moderate Risk Countermeasures actions to mitigate these risks
should beimplemented.
D Low Risk Acceptable as is. No further risk mitigation required

ICAO Doc 9849 Appendix F Para 5.3.2 provides additional guidance on risk
assessment.

Further guidance on risk assessment may be obtained from FSD dte, DGCA HQ.

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Appendix 3

Email Addresses of Reporting Channel

S.N. Designation Email Address

1 Director of Air Safety, DGCA [email protected]
2 Director of Operations, AS & ANSS, DGCA [email protected]
3 General Manager (CNS), GAGAN, AAI [email protected]

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