Remittances Slowed in 2023,

Expected to Grow Faster in 2024

Migration and Development Brief 40

June 2024

i
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ii
Migration and Development Briefs report updates on migration and remittance flows as well as salient
policy developments in the area of international migration and development. The Global Knowledge
Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) is a global hub of knowledge and policy expertise
on migration and development. It aims to create and synthesize multidisciplinary knowledge and
evidence; generate a menu of policy options for migration policy makers; and provide technical assistance
and capacity building for pilot projects, evaluation of policies, and data collection. KNOMAD is supported
by a multidonor trust fund established by the World Bank. The European Commission and Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, commissioned by and on behalf of the
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC), are the contributors to the trust fund. The views expressed in this
paper do not represent the views of the World Bank or the sponsoring organizations.
All queries should be addressed to [email protected]. KNOMAD working papers, policy briefs, and
a host of other resources on migration are available at www.KNOMAD.org.

iii
Contents
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ iv
Overview........................................................................................................................................................ v
1. Trends in Remittance Flows ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Remittances Continued to Grow in 2023 ........................................................................................... 1
1.2 Remittances Outlook for 2024 and 2025 ........................................................................................... 5
1.3 Remittance Costs ............................................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Improving Data on Remittances....................................................................................................... 10
2. Migration Trends .................................................................................................................................... 13
Appendix A. Regional Trends in Migration and Remittance Flows ............................................................ 17
A.1 East Asia and Pacific ......................................................................................................................... 17
A.2 Europe and Central Asia................................................................................................................... 21
A.3 Latin America and the Caribbean ..................................................................................................... 27
A.4 Middle East and North Africa........................................................................................................... 31
A.5 South Asia ........................................................................................................................................ 36
A.6 Sub-Saharan Africa ........................................................................................................................... 41
References .................................................................................................................................................. 45

List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Remittances Larger than FDI and ODA in 2023 ........................................................................... 2
Figure 1.2 Top Recipients of Remittances among Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 2023 .................... 2
Figure 1.3 Employment Levels of Foreign and Native Born in the United States ........................................ 3
Figure 1.4 Outward Remittances from GCC Countries, 2000–23 ................................................................. 4
Figure 1.5 Remittance Flows by Region, 2023–25 ....................................................................................... 6
Figure B.1.1 Global Economic Outlook from the IMF and World Bank ........................................................ 7
Figure 1.6 Average Cost of Sending Remittances from G20 Countries, 2023Q4 ......................................... 9
Figure 1.7 How Much Does It Cost to Send $200? Regional Remittance Costs, 2022–23 ......................... 10
Figure 1.8 Global Asymmetry in Remittance Data Has Increased since 2000 ............................................ 11
Figure 1.9 Top Destination Countries 2023 ................................................................................................ 14
Figure 1.10 Largest Source Countries ......................................................................................................... 14
Figure 1.11 US Southwest Border Apprehensions/Inadmissibles, FY15–FY24........................................... 16
Figure A.1.1 Resource Flows to the East Asia and Pacific Region Excluding China, 2000–2024f ............... 17
Figure A.1.2 Top 10 Remittance Recipients in East Asia and Pacific, 2023 ................................................ 18
Figure A.1.3 Cost of Sending Money in East Asia and Pacific Region Rose Slightly in 2023Q4 .................. 20

ii
Figure A.2.1 The Depreciation of the Ruble against the US Dollar is Associated with a Slowdown of Russian
Remittances ................................................................................................................................................ 22
Figure A.2.2 Resource Flows to Europe and Central Asia, 2000–2024f ..................................................... 23
Figure A.2.3 Share of Russian Remittances to Central Asian Countries, 2021–23 ..................................... 23
Figure A.2.4 Top 10 Remittance Recipients in Europe and Central Asia, 2023 .......................................... 24
Figure A.2.5 Remittance Growth in Europe and Central Asia Remained Subdued in 2024 ....................... 25
Figure A.2.6 Cost of Sending Money in Europe and Central Asia Rose Slightly in 2023Q4 ........................ 26
Figure A.3.1 Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development Assistance Flows to Latin
America and the Caribbean, 2000–24f....................................................................................................... 27
Figure A.3.2 Top Remittance Recipients in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2023 ................................. 28
Figure A.3.3 Remittance Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean Returned to Pre-Pandemic Levels during
2024Q1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 29
Figure A.3.4 The Cost of Sending Money to Latin America and the Caribbean Has Remained Stable ...... 30
Figure A.4.1 Remittances to Middle East and North Africa offer Support against High Volatility of Other Flows,
2000–24f..................................................................................................................................................... 32
Figure A.4.2 Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa, 2023................................. 33
Figure A.4.3 Remittance Flows to the Middle East and North Africa to Recover in 2024 and 2025 ......... 35
Figure A.4.4 Sending Money within the Region is Less Expensive than Sending Money from Outside .... 35
Figure A.5.1 Resource Flows to South Asia, 2000–24f ............................................................................... 37
Figure A.5.2 Top Remittance Recipients in South Asia, 2023..................................................................... 38
Figure A.5.3 The Cost of Sending Remittances to South Asia Increased Sharply for the Most Expensive Corridors
between 2022Q4 and 2023Q4 ................................................................................................................... 39
Figure A.6.1 Resource Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–24f ................................................................. 41
Figure A.6.2 Top Remittance Recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023 ........................................................ 42
Figure A.6.3 The Costs of Sending Remittances to African Countries Vary Widely across Corridors .......... 43

List of Tables
Table 1.1 Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Regions, 2017–25 .............................................. 1
Table 2.1 Typology of Global Migration ..................................................................................................... 13

List of Boxes
Box 1.1 Global Economic Outlook in 2024 and 2025 ................................................................................... 6

iii
Acknowledgments

This brief was prepared by Dilip Ratha (lead author), Vandana Chandra, Eung Ju Kim, and Akhtar Mahmood of the
Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, and Sonia Plaza of the Finance, Competitiveness, and Innovation Global
Practice. Thanks to Iffath Sharif and Loli Arribas-Banos for support and guidance. Comments from Pablo Ariel
Acosta, Sara B. Alnashar, Oya Pinar Ardic Alper, Laurent Loic Yves Bossavie, Andrew Dabalen, Cyril Desponts, Nur
Nasser Eddin, Fatma Elashmawy, Nelly Elmallakh, Roberta Gatti, Nathalie Gonzales-Prieto, Ergys Islamaj, Ivailo V.
Izvorski, William Maloney, Aaditya Mattoo, Harish Natarajan, Franziska Ohnsorge, Rully Prassetya, Michal
Rutkowski, Indhira Vanessa Santos, Mauro Testaverde, and Zoe Leiyu Xie are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks to
Min Cao and Baran Pradhan for research assistance. The contributions of Rebecca Ong and Swati Mishra in
communications support, and Fayre Makeig in editing are especially recognized.

iv
Overview

Remittances remain a crucial source of external finance for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). In 2023,
officially recorded remittance flows to LMICs reached an estimated $656 billion. Despite a growth rate of 0.7
percent, remittances outperformed FDI, which registered negative growth, and official development assistance
(ODA), which posted modest growth.

In 2023, remittance flows to LMICs were supported by strong labor markets in the advanced economies,
particularly in the United States, which stands as the largest source country for remittances and the primary
destination country for migrants. However, reduced remittances from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries (where the oil GDP slowed) and the Russian Federation negatively impacted the growth of remittances
to the Middle East and North Africa and Europe and Central Asia. In several countries, a divergence between
market exchange rates and official rates discouraged remittance flows through official channels.

By region, remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean saw the highest increase, at 7.7 percent. South
Asia’s remittances grew by 5.2 percent, largely driven by robust flows to India, while the East Asia and Pacific
region experienced 1.8 percent growth, supported by remittances to the Philippines. In contrast, Sub-Saharan
Africa saw a slight decline of 0.3 percent in remittance flows, yet remittances continued to bolster the current
accounts of several countries grappling with food insecurity and debt issues. Remittances to the Middle East and
Africa dropped by nearly 15 percent, primarily due to reduced flows to the Arab Republic of Egypt, and flows to
Europe and Central Asia fell by 10 percent, mainly stemming from diminished transfers from Russia to neighboring
countries.

Looking ahead, remittances are expected to grow by 2.3 percent in 2024 and 2.8 percent in 2025, to reach $690
billion by 2025. In contrast, FDI flows, which have steadily decreased since 2012, are unlikely to recover strongly.
The gap between remittances and FDI is therefore expected to widen further in the coming years. Potential
downside risks to these projections are influenced by the economic stability of high-income migrant-hosting
countries and ongoing headwinds, including an escalation of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East and
disruptions of energy and financial markets that could push inflation up and reduce growth.

Sending remittances remains too costly due to limited competition among providers and inadequate cross-border
inter-operability. In the fourth quarter of 2023, the global average cost of sending $200 was 6.4 percent of the
amount being sent, slightly up from 6.2 percent a year earlier and well above the Sustainable Development Goal
target of 3 percent. Digital remittances had a lower cost of 5 percent, compared with 7 percent for non-digital
methods, highlighting the benefits of technological advancements in reducing migrants’ financial burden.

Based on new census data and national statistics, the stock of international migrants is estimated to have been
302 million in 2023. The top destination countries are the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the
United Kingdom. The largest origin countries are India, Ukraine, China, Mexico, and República Bolivariana de
Venezuela. The largest migration corridor is from Mexico to the United States. According to the UNHCR, by
December 2023, the number of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing war, violence, and persecution had reached
50 million. Strong migration pressures facing tighter borders in many destination countries seem to have increased
the number of transit migrants, for example, in Mexico and in countries bordering Europe.

v
Regional Trends

Following a strong recovery in 2022, remittances to the East Asia and Pacific region grew by 1.8 percent to $134
billion in 2023. Remittances to East Asia excluding China increased by 4.8 percent to $85 billion in 2023.
Remittances are crucial for Pacific Island economies such as Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Notably, Tonga
was the most dependent globally, with remittances amounting to a 41 percent share of gross domestic product.
Remittance flows to the region, excluding China, are projected to grow 3.2 percent in 2024. The cost of sending
$200 to the region averaged 5.8 percent in late 2023, with costs as high as 17.1 percent in the most expensive
corridor.

After a sharp 18 percent increase in 2022, remittances to Europe and Central Asia fell by 10 percent to $71 billion
in 2023. The decline was driven by reduced transfers from Russia to the Central Asian countries, exacerbated by
a sharp (39 percent) depreciation of the Russian ruble against the US dollar. Additionally, the ongoing war
contributed to weaker-than-expected remittances to Ukraine and Russia. Remittance flows to Europe and Central
Asia are projected to decline by 1.9 percent in 2024. Sending $200 to the region (excluding Russia) cost on average
6.7 percent (up from 6.4 percent the previous year), the second-highest cost among developing-country regions.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, remittance growth slowed to 8 percent in 2023, reaching $155 billion,
supported by a strong US labor market. Mexico received $66.2 billion, a 7.8 percent increase, maintaining its
position as the top recipient in the region. Growth rates varied widely, from a 44.5 percent increase in Nicaragua
to a 13.4 percent decline in Argentina. Flows are expected to grow by 2.7 percent in 2024. The cost of sending
$200 averaged 5.9 percent, largely unchanged from the previous year.

Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa fell by 15 percent to $55 billion in 2023, primarily due to a sharp
decline in flows to Egypt, where the divergence between official and parallel foreign exchange rates likely diverted
remittances to unofficial channels. After the unification of exchange rates in March 2024, there are signs of
recovery in flows through official channels. Flows are projected to recover by 4.3 percent in 2024. The cost of
sending $200 to the region averaged 5.9 percent, down from 6.7 percent the previous year.

Remittances to South Asia grew by 5.2 percent in 2023, reaching $186 billion, tapering off from a 12 percent
increase in 2022. Growth was driven by India, which saw a 7.5 percent increase to $120 billion, supported by
strong labor markets in the United States and Europe. Reduced outflows from the GCC countries, amid declining
oil prices and production cuts, contributed to the slowdown. Flows are projected to grow by 4.2 percent in 2024.
The cost of sending $200 averaged 5.8 percent, up from 4.2 percent the previous year.

Remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa reached $54 billion in 2023, a slight decrease of 0.3 percent. The projected
moderate growth in remittances reflects the expected slower growth in the United States while a feeble rebound
is expected in flows from Europe. Remittances supported the current accounts of several African countries that
were dealing with food insecurity, drought, supply chain disruptions, floods, and debt-servicing difficulties.
Countries heavily dependent on remittances include the Gambia, Lesotho, Comoros, Liberia, and Cabo Verde.
Flows are projected to grow by 1.5 percent in 2024. Sending $200 to the region cost an average of 7.9 percent,
almost unchanged from a year before.

vi
1. Trends in Remittance Flows
1.1 Remittances Continued to Grow in 2023
Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) grew by 0.7 percent to reach $656 billion in 2023
(table 1.1). Remittances continued to be the premier source of external finance for LMICs during 2023, surpassing
foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) (figure 1.1). The moderation in
remittances’ growth rate in 2023 reflects a normalization of trends after the post-pandemic increase of 8.3
percent in 2021–22. By comparison, FDI declined sharply, thus widening the gap between the two flows.1
The top five recipient countries for remittances in 2023 are India, with an estimated inflow of $120 billion,
followed by Mexico ($66 billion), China ($50 billion), the Philippines ($39 billion), and Pakistan ($27 billion) (figure
1.2a). In smaller economies, remittance inflows represent very large shares of gross domestic product (GDP),
highlighting the importance of remittances for funding the current account and fiscal shortfalls. Topping the list is
Tonga (41 percent of GDP), followed by Tajikistan (39 percent), Lebanon (31 percent), Samoa (28 percent), and
Nicaragua (27 percent) (figure 1.2b).
Table 1.1 Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Regions, 2017–25
$ billion 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f
Low- and middle-income countries 475 522 548 542 601 651 656 671 690
East Asia and Pacific 129 137 143 132 128 132 134 136 137
excluding China 65 70 75 72 75 81 85 88 90
Europe and Central Asia 52 59 62 58 67 79 71 69 72
Latin America and Caribbean 81 89 96 104 131 144 155 160 162
Middle East and North Africa 54 55 57 59 67 65 55 58 61
South Asia 117 132 140 147 157 176 186 193 201
Sub-Saharan Africa 42 49 50 43 51 55 54 55 56
High-income countries 165 174 180 174 193 192 202 212 223
World 641 696 728 717 794 843 857 883 913
Growth rate (%)
Low- and middle-income countries 9.2 9.7 5.0 -1.1 10.8 8.3 0.7 2.3 2.8
East Asia and Pacific 5.3 6.9 4.0 -8.0 -2.5 2.8 1.8 0.9 1.4
excluding China 5.8 8.3 6.4 -3.4 4.5 7.4 4.8 3.2 3.4
Europe and Central Asia 21.1 12.9 5.2 -7.0 15.4 18.1 -10.3 -1.9 3.6
Latin America and Caribbean 10.9 9.9 8.2 7.4 26.2 10.5 7.7 2.7 1.6
Middle East and North Africa 13.4 1.8 3.9 4.1 12.8 -3.2 -14.8 4.3 5.5
South Asia 6.0 12.3 6.1 5.2 6.7 12.4 5.2 4.2 4.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.6 17.1 0.9 -13.8 18.7 6.8 -0.3 1.5 1.5
Source: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates.
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast.
The 2023 data for remittances and FDI flows are based on the Balance of Payment statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
supplemented by data from central banks. Where full-year data are not yet available, estimates are used. ODA data and estimates are
based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database, and consist of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net
of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral
institutions, and by non-DAC countries to countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. Some countries, such as China and
Vietnam, have gaps in data following the transition from BPM5 to BPM6. Past data and some current trends are used to arrive at estimates

1
FDI data are taken from IMF BOP data and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Missing data for 2023 are filled using UNCTAD
data. In 2023, according to World Bank staff estimates, FDI flows to LMICs declined by 30 percent. According to UNCTAD (2024), the decline
was smaller (8.8 percent).

1
in such cases. The projections for 2024 and 2025 are guided by an estimated model of remittances as a function of income in migrants’
countries of destination and origin.

Figure 1.1 Remittances Larger than FDI and ODA in 2023

($ billion)
900

750
FDI 656

600

450
Remittances 382
300
256
150
ODA
0

Source: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates.

Note: f = forecast; FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance.

Figure 1.2 Top Recipients of Remittances among Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 2023
A. By Total Amount ($ billion) B. By Share of GDP (%)
120
41 39

31
28 27
66 26 26
24 23 22
50
39
27 22
20 20 20 15

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

The United States has continued to be the largest source of remittances in the world, followed by Saudi Arabia
and Switzerland. As a share of GDP, however, Saudi Arabia has a significantly larger volume of outward

2
remittances than the United States. The top remittance source countries include members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). However, data on outward remittances tend to overstate the size of the flows in countries that are
offshore financial centers.

In 2023, remittance flows were affected by a combination of structural and cyclical factors in the source and
recipient countries. Foremost among these factors were the job markets for migrant workers in the source
countries, immigration policies that affect the flow of migrant workers, their transit routes, and their employment
prospects; exchange rate movements of major source-country currencies against the US dollar (which affects the
valuation of remittances in US dollar terms); the prevalence of multiple exchange rates in recipient countries; and
war and conflict.

The recovery of the job markets in the high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, has been the key driver of remittances,
particularly as employment growth during the recovery was more rapid for immigrants than for the native born
(figure 1.3 for these trends in the United States). The relative strength of remittances to Latin America and the
Caribbean compared with other regions can be explained by strong growth in the US labor market, the region’s
main source of remittances (for further details, see the appendix to this brief).

Figure 1.3 Employment Levels of Foreign and Native Born in the United States
Index (Feb. 2020 =100)
115

105

95

85

75 Native born Hispanic

65
Jan-13
Jan-09

Jan-10

Jan-11

Jan-12

Jan-14

Jan-15

Jan-16

Jan-17

Jan-18

Jan-19
Jul-19
Jan-20

Jan-21

Jan-22

Jan-23

Jan-24
Jul-08

Jul-09

Jul-10

Jul-11

Jul-12

Jul-13

Jul-14

Jul-15

Jul-16

Jul-17

Jul-18

Jul-20

Jul-21

Jul-22

Jul-23

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Outward remittances from the GCC countries to destination countries decreased by 13 percent in 2023 compared
with a year earlier (figure 1.4). Notably, outward remittances from the GCC countries showed an upward trend
from 2010 to 2019, with some fluctuations, but a declining trend seems to have set in after 2019. The decline
likely reflects post-COVID adjustments, as well as Saudi Arabia’s recent policy allowing foreign migrant workers to
bring their families to the country when they work, possibly resulting in fewer remittances being sent to their
home countries. This could have negative implications for remittance flows to Pakistan and some North African
countries.

3
Figure 1.4 Outward Remittances from GCC Countries, 2000–23
(US$ billion)
130

120

110

100

90

80
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Source: International Monetary Fund.

Note: The figure shows the sum for the countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Building on the robust recovery of 2022, remittances to the East Asia and Pacific region, excluding China, grew
further at about 5 percent to $85 billion in 2023. While still positive, the pace of growth was slower relative to
2022 in most East Asian economies except China, which was rebounding from low growth. Remittance flows to
the Philippines—the largest recipient after China in the East Asia and Pacific region—reached $39 billion in 2023,
growing at 2.8 percent compared with 3.7 percent in 2022. The sustained growth in remittance flows to the
Philippines was an outcome of a well-diversified set of host destinations across the world.

After growing sharply by 18 percent in 2022, remittance flows to Europe and Central Asia declined by 10 percent
to reach about $71 billion in 2023. However, flows have remained much higher than prewar levels. The sharp
decrease in remittances last year, from the high 2022 baseline, was driven mainly by a slowdown of money
transfers from the Russian Federation to its neighboring countries, especially to Central Asian countries. A 39
percent depreciation of the Russian ruble against the US dollar in 2023 decreased the value of money transfers
from Russia. Furthermore, remittance flows to Ukraine and Russia remained weaker than expected in 2023 due
to negative effects from the ongoing war. Migration from Russia, significant in 2022, has been slowing, with some
migrants electing to return home.

After a 10.5 percent increase in remittances in 2022, remittance growth slowed in 2023 for Latin America and the
Caribbean but still remained significant, at 7.7 percent, to reach $155 billion. Remittances’ growth rate returned
to the pre-pandemic level of 2019 supported by a strong US labor market. Remittances to Mexico reached $66.2
billion in 2023, an increase of 7.8 percent. Mexico receives the most remittances in the region by far, and is the
world’s second-largest recipient of remittances. The growth of remittances varied widely across countries in 2023,
ranging from an increase of 44.5 percent in Nicaragua to a decline of 13.4 percent in Argentina.

Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa fell by 15 percent to $55 billion in 2023, accentuating the impact
of the 3.2 percent decline seen in 2022. The substantial drop of 2023 was largely driven by a sharp decline in flows
to the Arab Republic of Egypt, by far the region’s largest remittance recipient. It is likely that remittances have
been diverted toward unofficial channels given the wide gap between exchange rates in the official and parallel
foreign exchange markets. In 2023, Egypt suffered from a severe lack of foreign currency due to a fixed exchange

4
system and overvalued local currency. This led to the emergence of a parallel market, with the Egyptian pound
exceeding LE 70 per US dollar at one point, and significantly cut official remittances from Egyptian expatriates.

Remittances to South Asia grew 5.2 percent in 2023 to reach $186 billion, tapering off from the more than 12
percent increase of 2022. The increase is attributable entirely to remittance flows to India, which increased by 7.5
percent to reach $120 billion in 2023. The key drivers of remittance growth in 2023 are a historically tight labor
market in the United States, high employment growth in Europe, reflecting extensive leveraging of worker
retention programs, and a dampening of inflation in high-income countries. The slackening in remittance growth
relative to 2022 is attributable to a decrease in growth in 2023 in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the halving of
growth in the remaining GCC countries triggered by the drop in oil prices and production cuts in the OPEC+
countries. The sharp drop in remittance flows to Pakistan and a slowdown in Bangladesh in 2023 reflected the
primacy of informal channels of money transfer triggered by exchange-rate-related challenges in the domestic
economy, while the sharp rise in Sri Lanka reflected migrants’ renewed confidence in an ongoing economic
recovery.

Remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa reached $54 billion in 2023, a slight decrease of 0.3 percent from the
previous year. Remittance flows to the region are projected to rise by 1.5 percent in 2024. The projected moderate
growth in remittances reflects the expected slower growth in the United States while a feeble rebound is expected
in flows from Europe. The increase in remittance flows to the region supported the current accounts of several
African countries that were dealing with food insecurity, drought, supply chain disruptions, floods, and debt-
servicing difficulties.

1.2 Remittances Outlook for 2024 and 2025

The outlook for remittance flows for 2024 and 2025 is based on the trajectory of economic activities in major
migrant-hosting countries (box 1.1). It is also affected by many country-specific factors. The growth rate of
remittance flows to LMICs is expected to recover to 2.3 percent in 2024 and 2.8 percent in 2025, to reach $690
billion in 2025 (table 1.1, above, and figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5 provides a snapshot of regional growth patterns for 2023–25. Flows are expected to strengthen in all
six regions. However, the growth patterns and magnitudes vary. Regional trends in remittance flows are discussed
in detail in appendix A.

5
Figure 1.5 Remittance Flows by Region, 2023–25
Growth rate (percent, year-on-year)
10 7.7
5.5 5.2 4.8
4.3 3.6 4.2 4.1
5 2.7 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.4
1.6 0.7 1.5 1.5
0
-0.3
-1.9
-5

-10
2023e 2024f 2025f
-10.3
-15
-14.8
-20
Latin America Middle East Europe and South Asia LMICs Sub-Saharan East Asia and
and the and North Centra Asia Africa Pacific (excl.
Caribbean Africa China)

Source: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates.

Note: e= estimate; f = forecast; LMICs = low- and middle-income countries.

The most important factors driving the modest growth in remittances in 2024 are expected to be steady economic
growth and stable labor markets in several high-income migrant-hosting countries, particularly the United States
and Euro area countries (box 1.1). But downside risks, including a further deterioration in the war in Ukraine and
the conflict in the Middle East, volatile oil prices and currency exchange rates, and a deeper-than-expected
economic downturn in major high-income countries, are potentially significant.

Box 1.1 Global Economic Outlook in 2024 and 2025

Global growth is expected to remain steady despite elevated interest rates and heightened geopolitical tensions.
Global real GDP is projected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024 before going up to 2.7 percent in 2025 which is well
below the 3.1 percent average in the decade before COVID pandemic, according to the latest Global Economic
Prospects from the World Bank (June 2024). The 2024 GDP growth rate for advanced economies is expected to be
1.5 percent, unchanged from 2023 (figure B1.1). Among regions, growth forecasts for 2024 are generally strongest
in South Asian economies (6.2 percent), and weakest in Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8 percent). Key
remittance source countries in the euro area posted small gains (0.7 percent compared with 0.5 percent in 2023),
while the growth rate for the United States remained steady at 2.5 percent. The overall outlook is expected to
remain balanced over the next two years, but downside risks to the outlook remain relatively high despite the
possibility of some upsides. An escalation of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East and disruptions of energy
and financial markets could push inflation up and reduce growth.

Global inflation has declined since 2022 as relative price shocks—especially those related to energy prices—have
faded amid ongoing effects of continued monetary tightening. Global headline inflation is projected to fall steadily,
averaging 3.5 percent in 2024, but at a slower pace than previously expected. Core inflation (excluding food and

6
energy) is generally projected to decline more gradually than headline inflation, with services price inflation
remaining stubbornly high in many economies.

Growth in employment and incomes has remained steady amid easing supply and demand imbalances in labor
markets and moderating inflation. Unemployment remained at or close to record lows, and labor participation
rates rose to a record high in the OECD in 2023. Labor markets remain tight, especially in the United States, where
there is persistent expansion in the prime-age labor force due to elevated real wages, as well as robust increases
in the working-age population. Meanwhile, nominal wage growth has moderated in most countries amid falling
inflation, except in Japan

Figure B.1.1 Global Economic Outlook from the IMF and World Bank

GDP growth (percent)

4.2 4.2
2024 2025
4.0 4.0

3.2 3.2

2.6 2.7

1.7 1.8 1.7

1.5

Global Advanced EMDE Global Advanced EMDE

economies economies

IMF, April 2024 World Bank, June 2024

Sources: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook April 2024 and World Bank Global Economic Prospects June 2024.
Note: EMDE = emerging markets and developing economies.

Remittance flows to the East Asia and Pacific region are likely to inch up to $136 billion in 2024. Excluding China,
the remittance growth rate is expected to drop from 5 percent in 2023 to 3 percent in 2024 (figure 1.5), leading
to remittance levels of $88 billion in 2024 and $90 billion in 2025. The downside risk to remittance flows in 2024–
2025 is related to dimmer prospects of demand for less-skilled migrant labor from within East Asia’s middle-
income countries, especially China.

Remittance flows to Europe and Central Asia are projected to decline by 2 percent in 2024 due to the continued
slowdown of outward remittances from Russia and a lingering weakness in flows to Ukraine and Russia. Money
transfers from Russia are expected to continue declining. The projections for 2024 are subject to downside risk,
including weaker-than-expected economic growth in major remittance-sending economies or a sharper-than-
expected drop in Russian outbound remittances. In 2025, remittances to the region are expected to grow by about
4 percent to $72 billion (see table 1.1).

7
Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean are returning to pre-pandemic growth rates. Growth in
remittances to the region is projected to slow down to 2.7 percent in 2024. Remittances will continue to flow due
to the considerable number of transit migrants stranded in Mexico and Guatemala, and good job prospects in the
United States and Spain. Transit migrants from Cuba, China, Ecuador, Haiti, India, Nicaragua, República Bolivariana
de Venezuela, and other nations passing through Guatemala and Mexico on their way to the United States account
for the large remittance flows to those two transit countries. However, there are downside risks to the projections,
including a projected softening of the US labor market and the upcoming election in that country, which could
lead to strengthened immigration regulations.

The prospects for remittances to the Middle East and North Africa will be affected by the difficult situation facing
the region’s oil-importing countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. In contrast, the
region’s oil exporters, such as Iraq and Algeria, will benefit from the rise in hydrocarbon prices. For Egypt, the
recent devaluation and rate hikes, the completion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reviews, and
investments from the United Arab Emirates have increased confidence that remittance inflows through formal
channels could rise. On balance, remittance flows to the region are projected to post a moderate rise of 4.3
percent in 2024, and another gain of 5.5 percent in 2025.

Remittances’ growth in South Asia is projected to be the highest among developing country regions in 2024, even
though it is projected to moderate to about 4 percent in 2024 and 2025. The overall projection for remittance
flows is likely to be driven by three factors: a slackening of growth and labor market conditions in South Asian
migrants’ high-income host economies; uncertainty related to ongoing global conflicts; and migrants’ preference
for informal over formal channels of money transfer to countries embroiled in economic crises.

The pace of remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to slightly recover from the negative growth in
2023 to reach 1.5 percent in 2024. Risks to the outlook include lower-than-expected growth in developed
countries that will lead to a decline in remittances sent by the African diaspora; an escalation of the conflict in
Israel-Gaza that could disrupt the supply chain; security risks in Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria; and climate risks including the pronounced drought in Southern Africa.

1.3 Remittance Costs

Remittance costs remained high in the fourth quarter of 2023 (2023Q4), at more than twice the Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG) target of 3 percent by 2030.2 According to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices
Worldwide (RPW) database, the global average cost of sending $200 was 6.4 percent in 2023Q4, up slightly from
6.2 percent a year earlier. The global average cost for digital remittances, which account for 30 percent of total
transactions collected in the RPW database, was 4.96 percent in 2023Q4, while the cost for nondigital remittances
was 7.0 percent. This trend suggests that remittance costs tend to be lower when remittances are sent through

2 As highlighted in previous briefs, lack of competition and cross-border interoperability are the main reasons for high costs.

8
digital channels or through money transmitters offering cash-to-cash services than through banks (Beck, Janfils,
and Kpodar 2022; Ratha and Riedberg 2005).

The cost of sending money from the G20 (Group of Twenty) countries, which represent a significant source of
remittances globally, remained nearly constant at 6.5 percent in 2023Q4 compared with a year earlier—and higher
than the global average cost. There is substantial variance in the cost of remitting from G20 countries (figure 1.6).
South Africa (12.8 percent) is the costliest source, followed by Japan (7.0 percent). The cost is lowest in the
Republic of Korea (5.3 percent) and Saudi Arabia (5.5 percent).

Figure 1.6 Average Cost of Sending Remittances from G20 Countries, 2023Q4
Average cost of sending $200 (percent)
14
12.8

12

10

8 6.9 7.0
6.4 6.5
5.7 5.8 6.0 6.0
5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6
6

Source: World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database.

Note: G20 = Group of Twenty.

Among developing-country regions, the average cost continued to be the lowest in South Asia at 5.8 percent and
the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa at 7.9 percent (figure 1.7). Notably, the average cost of sending remittances to
South Asia increased by 1.6 percentage points.3 In contrast, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean,
and the Middle East and North Africa regions posted a decrease in total average costs, with the Middle East and
North Africa posting the largest decrease. Remittance costs across many African corridors remain significantly
high; Tanzania is the costliest African source country from which to send remittances to another country in the
region.

3 Remittances from South Africa are dominated by commercial banks, which tend to be more expensive than money transfer agents.

9
Banks continue to be the costliest channel for sending remittances, at an average cost of 12 percent during
2023Q4. The average cost for post offices was 7.7 percent, for money transfer operators 5.5 percent, and for
mobile operators 4.4 percent. While mobile operations remain the cheapest type of service provider, they account
for less than 1 percent of total transaction volume.

Figure 1.7 How Much Does It Cost to Send $200? Regional Remittance Costs, 2022–23
(Percent)
9
Q4 2022 Q4 2023 7.8 7.9
8

7 6.7 6.7
6.2 6.4 6.4
6.0 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9
5.8
6

5
4.2
4
SDG target rate of 3% by 2030
3

0
Global Average SAR LAC EAP ECA(excl. Russia) MENA SSA

Source: World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database.

Note: Red dotted line represents the SDG 10 target of 3 percent. EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin
America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; SDG = Sustainable Development Goal; SSA = Sub-
Saharan Africa.

1.4 Improving Data on Remittances

With remittance transactions growing in importance over the past decades, it is imperative that accurate and
comprehensive data are collected on remittance flows in a timely manner. Accurate data help in identifying
trends, understanding the use of remittances, and developing targeted interventions to harness the positive
impact of remittances on poverty reduction, economic growth, and financial inclusion. Improved data on
remittances will directly support the SDG indicators on reducing remittance costs and increasing the volume of
remittances. They will also support the first objective of the Global Compact for Migration, to improve data.
Interest in remittance flows statistics has risen steadily over the past few decades, but the quality of statistics
requires further improvement.

Many countries have implemented direct reporting and dedicated models to obtain better estimates of
remittance flows. However, the quality of statistical data on remittances remains unsatisfactory due to challenges
in measuring and compiling remittance data accurately. Adopted concepts and definitions vary considerably

10
across countries, there are deficiencies in coverage and scope, and there are discrepancies in gross/net recordings
for components such as personal transfers and the compensation of employees.

At a global level, the difference between inward and outward flows of remittances reported by countries has
increased over time: in 2000, global outward flows were larger than global inward flows, but by 2023, they were
two-thirds of inward flows (figure 1.8). What is remarkable is that the split between personal transfers and
compensation of employees, the two major components of remittances, remained rather stable during the same
period: during 2000–23, the share of personal transfers in total remittances ranged 65–69 percent in the case of
inward flows and 52–59 percent in the case of outward flows.

Figure 1.8 Global Asymmetry in Remittance Data Has Increased since 2000
Global outward flows/global inward flows
100%

76%
66%

2000 2005 2023

Source: IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics.

A major reason for insufficient coverage and scope is the significant portion of remittances flowing through
informal channels, including cash hand-carried by migrants when they return home. Improved quality of statistics
about remittances requires a sound and proper improvement in the methodologies and approaches used to
estimate unregulated remittances flowing through informal channels. The treatment of refugees, transit migrants,
and remote workers in remittance data collection requires further clarification and practical guidelines to ensure
comprehensive coverage. Misclassification is another issue. Classifications used for the remittance statistics are
often not in conformity with guidelines outlined in the International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for
Compilers and Users (RCG) (IMF 2009a) and the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position
Manual, 6th edition (IMF 2009b).

While digitalization through Fintech solutions has significantly affected the remittance industry (such as by
increasing the speed and convenience with which people send and receive remittances), especially since the
COVID-19 pandemic, effects are hard to track. Compilers of remittance statistics need to adapt their measurement
methodologies to account for the increasing digitalization of remittance flows. This may involve collaborating with
digital service providers, leveraging advanced data analytics, and employing new technologies to ensure the
comprehensive and accurate collection and reporting of remittance data.

11
Improving the quality of remittance statistics will require a solid understanding of the various transaction
channels, payment instruments, and data sources involved in remittance transactions. There have been several
important developments in transaction channels, the institutional environment, data sources, and estimation
methods since the RCG was first published in 2009. New channels, as well as the changed use of existing channels,
need to be considered by compilers to keep the compilation of remittances up to date. With new data sources
and the change of existing ones, data validation has also become a crucial point that statistics compilers need to
pay attention to.

As reported in the earlier editions of the Migration and Development Brief, in 2022, the World Bank—through
KNOMAD and in collaboration with 46 top remittance source and recipient countries, Eurostat, and the IMF—
launched an International Working Group to Improve Data on Remittance Flows (RemitStat). After a series of
meetings and consultations, RemitStat is expected to publish its final report in fall 2024.

The latest initiative to address data issues relating to remittances (and to trade, FDI, and portfolio flows) is the
establishment of a Task Team on Global Asymmetries (TT-GA) by the IMF. During the October 2023 meeting of
the IMF’s Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPCOM), it was agreed to establish the TT-GA to take
stock of the existing initiatives to inform users and compilers and to identify existing gaps, document the reasons
for existing asymmetries (e.g., legal impediments, confidentiality concerns, methodological differences), and
suggest efforts in the short/medium/long term to reduce asymmetries. The TT-GA is expected to deliver a report
to BOPCOM in November 2024.

12
2. Migration Trends
Using new census data and national statistics, the stock of international migrants was estimated at 302.1 million
in 2023.4 Following a typology described in a 2019 World Bank report, the number of economic migrants is
estimated at 252 million (World Bank 2019). Refugees and asylum seekers, according to the UNHCR, numbered
50.3 million in 2023 (UNHCR 2024b).

Table 2.1 Typology of Global Migration

Internal International

Economic or voluntary Internal migrants International migrants

(760 million*) (252 million)

Disaster-driven IDPs Climate migrants

Forced (8 million) (Unknown number)

FCV-driven IDPs Refugees and asylum seekers

(68 million) (50 million)

Sources: IDMC, UNHCR, World Bank staff estimates
Note: The blue-shaded cells indicate migration types covered in the Global Compact for Migration. The beige-shaded cells indicate those
covered by the Global Compact on Refugees. FCV = fragility, conflict, and violence; IDPs = internally displaced persons
* This number is based on UNDP Human Development Report of 2009. No recent updates are available.

The top destination country remains the United States, followed by Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United
Kingdom (figure 1.8). The largest origin countries are India (18.7 million emigrants), Ukraine (11.9 million), China
(11.1 million), Mexico (11 million), and República Bolivariana de Venezuela (8.9 million). Ukraine and República
Bolivariana de Venezuela continue to experience an exodus of refugees and asylum seekers in the last two years.

4 This is larger than the previous estimate of 290 million for 2020 published by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(International Migrant Stock 2020). The UN has not published new data. To obtain new estimates, we used country by country data based
on censuses and latest available national statistics when available.

13
Figure 1.9 Top Destination Countries 2023
Thousands
60,000 53,227
50,000
40,000
30,000
18,189
20,000 13,456 12,857
9,901 9,469 9,273 8,716 8,404 8,176
10,000
0

Sources: UN Population Division, national censuses, UNDESA, OECD, UNHCR, Eurostat, World Bank staff calculations

Figure 1.10 Largest Source Countries

Thousands

20,000 18,742
18,000
16,000
14,000 11,889 11,184 11,053
12,000 8,927
10,000 8,622 8,354 7,598 7,551
8,000 6,486
6,000
4,000
2,000
0

Sources: UN Population Division, national censuses, UNDESA, OECD, UNHCR, Eurostat, World Bank staff calculations.

Mexico to the United States is the largest migration corridor in the world, followed by Ukraine to Russia, and
Afghanistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The stock of Mexican immigrants increased by 1 million from March
2023 (11.6 million) to March 2024 (12.7 million).5 Current Population Survey (CPS) data released in March 2024
show that the foreign-born population living in the United States reached 51.6 million (without including the 1.8

5 US Current Population Survey.

14
million Puerto Ricans living in the United States).6 This represents an increase of 5.1 million between March 2022
and March 2024 (Camarota and Zeigler 2024).

Conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, Congo, and Myanmar resulted in large movements of people. After a decade of
conflict, there are around 5.5 million Syrian refugees living in Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt; Germany
is the largest non-neighboring host country, with more than 850,000 Syrian refugees.7

By March 2024, there were more than 6.5 million refugees from Ukraine being hosted globally while about 3.7
people were internally displaced (UNHCR 2024c). At the end of February 2024, 5,982,900 refugees from Ukraine
were recorded across Europe, with 5,688,000 registered for asylum, temporary protection, or similar national
protection schemes.

A significant number of migrants from Central Asia live and work in Russia, making the remittance flows to these
countries particularly vulnerable to adverse developments in that country. According to official figures, about 1.3
million Tajik nationals lived in Russia in 2023, but this number is believed to be an underestimate. In the past two
years more than 200,000 Tajik nationals received Russian citizenship. As of 2023, over 630,000 Uzbek nationals
were working in Russia as migrant workers, although anecdotal estimates tend to be much larger. Of the 328,458
Kyrgyz nationals living abroad, the majority (285,433) resided in Russia as of 2023.

Migration routes are changing in the face of strong migration pressures in many developing countries confronting
tighter borders in most destination countries. Record levels of attempts to enter the United States through its
southern border with Mexico are indicative of strong and perhaps rising migration pressures in the developing
regions. A decade ago, monthly enforcement encounters at the US southern border averaged under 50,000; in
recent months, that average has increased fourfold (figure 1.11).8 The profile of migrants arriving at the US borders
is also changing—the new arrivals include a significant number of migrants from China, India and other South
Asian countries, and Africa, whereas in the past migrants were almost exclusively from Latin America and the
Caribbean. As the United States grappled with the surge of border crossings, the foreign population with irregular
migratory status in Mexico increased to 782,176 in 2023, ten times the level of 2020. Nearly 360,000
undocumented migrants entered the country during the first quarter of 2024.

6 The World Bank Staff estimates include 1.8 million Puerto Ricans living in the United States.
7
To be updated on June 13, reflecting new data from UNHCR.
8
On June 5, 2024, a Presidential Proclamation was issued to temporarily suspend the entry of noncitizens across the southern border. The
executive order temporarily suspended the processing of asylum case at the southern US border when the seven-day average of
unauthorized crossings surpasses 2,500 migrants.

15
Figure 1.11 US Southwest Border Apprehensions/Inadmissibles, FY15–FY24
350000
Number of enforcement encounters
300000

250000

200000

150000

100000

50000

Jul-21
Jan-15

Jan-16

Jan-17

Jan-18

Jan-19

Jan-20

Jan-21

Jan-22

Jan-23

Jan-24
Jul-15

Jul-16

Jul-17

Jul-18

Apr-19
Jul-19

Jul-20

Jul-22

Jul-23
Apr-15

Apr-16

Apr-17

Apr-18

Apr-20

Apr-21

Apr-22

Apr-23

Apr-24
Oct-14

Oct-15

Oct-16

Oct-17

Oct-18

Oct-19

Oct-20

Oct-21

Oct-22

Oct-23
Source: US Customs and Border Protection.

During the first quarter of 2024, the West African and Atlantic routes to Spain were the busiest migratory routes
in the European Union. UNHCR recorded 16,648 new arrivals in various Spanish territories including mainland
Spain, Ceuta, Melilla, the Canary Islands, and the Balearic Islands. The three most represented countries of origin
among those arriving irregularly on the Spanish mainland or the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are Morocco,
Algeria, and Mali; Malians and Senegalese arrived at Canarias (Mixed Migration Centre 2024).

In the Middle East and North Africa region, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt are major destinations for people fleeing
from conflict and violence. According to the UNHCR, as of April 2024, Egypt hosted 575,000 registered refugees
and asylum seekers from 61 countries, nearly doubling the number from a year previous, with major conflicts
across its borders. Since the onset of the conflict in Sudan last year, UNHCR has observed a fivefold increase in
Sudanese individuals registering as refugees, mainly women and children. Sudan is host to 6.8 million internally
displaced persons and 1.9 million forcibly displaced in neighboring countries, such as Egypt, South Sudan, and
Chad. The Maghreb countries and Niger have become transit countries for many migrants and refugees from Sub-
Saharan Africa.

16
Appendix A. Regional Trends in Migration and Remittance Flows

A.1 East Asia and Pacific

Remittance trends. Growth in remittances slipped to 4.8 percent in 2023 from 7.4 percent in 2022 in East Asia
excluding China (for which recent official data are not available). Nonetheless, at $85 billion remittance flows once
again surpassed foreign direct investment (FDI) flows estimated at $69 billion in 2023 (figure A.1.1). The primacy
of remittances over FDI is not a permanent feature of the region’s capital flows landscape. In recent decades, the
generally steady and upward trend in remittances has contrasted sharply with an oscillating FDI trend. FDI
recorded $93 billion in 2021 and $86 billion in 2022 before plummeting in 2023 in response to increasing economic
policy uncertainty fueled by rising geopolitical tensions. Unpredictable market conditions in the region also played
a role.

Figure A.1.1 Resource Flows to the East Asia and Pacific Region Excluding China, 2000–2024f
($ million)
1,00,000 Remittances
90,000

80,000

70,000
FDI
60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000
ODA
10,000

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. See
appendix to the Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank/KNOMAD 2020).
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecast.

Remittances matter most for the region’s small and less diversified Pacific Island economies of Palau, Samoa,
Tonga, and Vanuatu, which have few sources of growth besides tourism. With remittances amounting to 41
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023, Tonga topped the list of countries most dependent on
remittances not only in the East Asia and Pacific region but also in the world. Samoa ranked fourth globally and

17
second in the region with a 28 percent share of remittances in GDP. The share of remittances in GDP in the
remaining Pacific Island countries ranged from 12 percent in Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands to 5 percent in
Kiribati and the Solomon Islands in 2023. The Pacific Island states less dependent on remittances rely on natural
resource rents, aid, tourism, and fishing. In recent decades, climate-change-related disasters have accelerated the
dependence of the Pacific Island economies on emigration as a means of survival and remittances as a source of
livelihood.

Figure A.1.2 Top 10 Remittance Recipients in East Asia and Pacific, 2023
($ billion, 2023) (Percentage of GDP, 2023)
40.6
49.5

39.1 28.4

12.4 12.1
14.5 14.0 10.4 9.1 9.0
9.6 6.6 5.4 5.2
2.8 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.3

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook April 2024, and IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

The main destinations for the East Asia and Pacific region’s mostly skilled migrants are the countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and high-income countries in the region
(Singapore; the Republic of Korea; Japan, Hong Kong, China; Australia; and China). Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries and dual economies (China, Malaysia, and Thailand) are popular destinations for the region’s less-skilled
migrants. Remittance flows to the region were enhanced by a favorable external economic environment shaped
by tight labor markets, and a deceleration in inflation, which boosts migrants’ savings in the OECD and GCC
countries, enhancing remittance flows to the East Asia and Pacific region. As noted in Migration and Development
Brief 39 (World Bank/KNOMAD 2023b), record-low unemployment rates in the United States paired with wage
hikes contributed positively to remittances sent by East Asia’s skilled migrants. However, growing uncertainty
related to conflict, challenging financial market conditions, and global trade dampened remittance growth in other
destination countries of regional migrants in 2023. The shrinking of trade among the region’s manufactured goods
exporters, including China, contributed to lower demand for less-skilled regional migrants. The tourism industry
affected remittance flows in multiple ways. The slow revival of tourism in China (which accounts for 10–40 percent
of total travelers) and Japan (reaching only half that of pre-pandemic levels) also slowed the demand for less-
skilled migrants. Higher airfare costs and exchange rate depreciation in some countries further dampened
demand. Airline seat capacities to regional destinations recovered slowly due to supply chain challenges while
countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia faced staffing shortages when workers did not return after the

18
pandemic. Evidently, training institutes in the region are struggling to fill positions in high-end establishments that
require semi-skilled workers, including pilots, maintenance crew, and air traffic controllers.

Remittance flows in the Philippines, the region’s largest remittance recipient barring China, were muted, growing
at 2.8 percent to reach $39 billion in 2023. Tourism recovered to pre-pandemic levels in the Philippines, giving
Filipinos domestic employment opportunities as an alternative to emigration, which dampened remittance
growth. In contrast, growth was strong at over 10 percent in Indonesia, boosting remittances to almost $14.5
billion. Remittances in Vietnam increased at over 6 percent, rising to $14 billion. Similar trends prevailed in
Cambodia, where remittances grew at 6 percent to $2.8 billion. Migrants from Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia
benefitted from the recovery in manufactured goods exports in China, Malaysia, and Thailand. The dual
economies, Malaysia and Thailand, also gained from the trade diversion effects caused by a drop in China’s share
of US electronics imports (between 2018 to 2023). As demand for electronics exports from Malaysia and Thailand
increased, it translated into higher demand for East Asia and Pacific migrants, resulting in remittance growth in
their source countries.

Remittance flows to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) stagnated at around $240 million while flows to
Myanmar declined by 13 percent to $1.1 billion in 2023. Flows to Mongolia are reported to have decreased by 30
percent to $280 million though this may be due to data revisions.

In Malaysia, a key destination for the region’s less-skilled migrants as well as a source of highly skilled emigrants
in high-income destinations, remittances grew at 5 percent to $1.7 billion. In Thailand (another dual economy like
Malaysia), remittances grew at 8 percent to $9.6 billion in 2023. Remittance inflows in both countries benefited
from the strong labor market conditions in the OECD countries.

Even though they faced similar external market conditions, remittance growth varied widely in the Pacific Island
countries depending upon individual country circumstances. Remittances grew at 9 percent in 2023 to $500
million in Fiji, where the number of tourist arrivals reached or surpassed pre-pandemic levels. In the Solomon
Islands, remittances grew at 4.2 percent to $85 billion in 2023. In Timor-Leste, remittance growth spiked 31
percent to $244 million. In several smaller countries, 2023 was not a good year for remittance growth. Growth
declined in Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. In Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and
the Federated States of Micronesia, no change in remittances flows is reported. The decline in remittances in
many of these countries was due to either the demand for workers in the domestic tourism industry, which
experienced a recovery in 2023, or in most cases, migrants remaining at home instead of emigrating to cope with
idiosyncratic shocks.

Remittance costs. The average cost of sending $200 to East Asia in the leading least-cost corridors was generally
5.8 percent in 2023Q4 and not too different than in 2022Q4 (figure A.1.3). The fees for sending money to the
Philippines from Kuwait were the lowest among the least expensive corridors. However, in the top five most
expensive corridors, the cost of money transfers increased between 0.6 and 2.6 percent. The highest growth was
in the Thailand to Myanmar corridor, where the costs of remitting increased by 2.6 percentage points between
2022Q4 and 2023Q4. The South Africa to China corridor remained the most expensive corridor at 17.1 percent,
up from 14.8 percent a year previous.

19
Remittance outlook. Despite a strengthened economic growth outlook in the region, the outlook for remittance
growth in East Asia excluding China is modest at between 3.2 and 3.4 percent for 2024 and 2025 even as the
economic growth outlook for the region has strengthened. Remittances to the region are forecast to grow to $88
billion in 2024 and $90 billion in 2025. Dissipating inflationary pressures and interest rates, and enduring strength
in the labor markets of the OECD countries, are expected to sustain remittance flows to the East Asia and Pacific
region. The positive outlook for oil prices will support remittance growth from the GCC countries. However, there
remain several downside risks, not least of which are the uncertain effects of China’s property market correction
that can spill over to the region, slowing economic growth and negatively affecting the regional demand for
workers from other East Asian countries. A return to industrial policy and trade-restricting policies across Asia and
the G20 in general could dampen demand for the region’s manufactured exports. The risk of global conflict is a
new threat to trade, as evidenced by the re-routing of ships around Africa to avoid the Red Sea, which hikes the
cost of East Asian exports destined for Europe. Any factor that disrupts global supply chains can dampen demand
for East Asian migrant workers and impact remittances. The demand for East Asia’s skilled migrants has been
buoyant but demographic factors are likely to curtail supply. Population aging and the rapid adoption of new
technologies such as artificial intelligence are emerging as new challenges that may restrict demand for technically
skilled workers from East Asia with attendant implications for remittances.

Figure A.1.3 Cost of Sending Money in East Asia and Pacific Region Rose Slightly in 2023Q4
a. Five Least Expensive Corridors b. Five Most Expensive Corridors
(Percent)
20
17.1
2022Q4 2023Q4 14.8
15
12.7
11.7 12.1
11.4 11.011.6 11.0
10 9.1

5
2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5
3.2 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.3

0
Kuwait to Malaysia to Malaysia to United Malaysia to Thailand to Thailand to Thailand to Thailand to South
Philippines Nepal Vietnam Arab Philippines Lao PDR China Myanmar Indonesia Africa to
Emirates to China
Philippines
Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff calculations and Remittance Prices Worldwide.
Note: Cost of sending $200 or equivalent.

Against this uncertain background, remittance flows to the Philippines, which accounts for about 48 percent of
regional remittances excluding China, are forecasted to grow at about 3 percent to $40 billion in 2024 and $41
billion in 2025. Remittance growth to Vietnam is expected to slow down to about 4 percent reaching $14.5 billion

20
in 2024 and $15 billion in 2025. In Indonesia, remittance growth is also forecasted to be about 4 percent, clocking
in remittance flows at $15 billion in 2024 and $15.6 billion in 2025.

In Cambodia, growth in remittances is expected to slow down to 4 percent in 2024, with flows reaching $2.9 billion
in 2024 and $3 billion in 2025. Remittance levels in Lao PDR are expected to remain unchanged at $240 million in
2024–25. In Myanmar, remittances are expected to grow at around 4.5 percent to $1.1 billion in 2024 and $1.2
billion in 2025. In Mongolia, remittance growth is expected to recover to 4 percent, reaching $290 million in 2024
and $300 million in 2025. In addition to the GCC countries, much of this growth will be supported by destinations
within the East Asia and Pacific region, including China.

Remittances to Thailand are forecasted to grow modestly at about 2 percent reaching $9.8 billion in 2024 and $10
billion in 2025. In Malaysia, growth of about 5 percent is expected to increase remittance flows to $1.8 billion in
2024. In 2025, remittance growth is expected to slow to 4 percent, supporting remittance flows of $1.9 billion.

Remittance flows to all Pacific Island countries are projected to be flat in 2024 and 2025 with two exceptions. In
Fiji, remittance growth is expected to slow to 7 percent with flows reaching $546 million in 2024 and $571 million
in 2025. In the Solomon Islands, remittances are expected to grow at 5 percent in 2024 to $89 million, and at 4
percent in 2025 to $93 million.

A.2 Europe and Central Asia

Remittance trends. After growing sharply by 18 percent in 2022, remittance flows to Europe and Central Asia
declined by 10 percent to reach about $71 billion in 2023. But flows have remained much higher than prewar
levels. The sharp decrease in remittances in 2023, from the high 2022 base, was driven mainly by a slowdown of
money transfers from the Russian Federation to its neighboring countries, especially to Central Asian economies.
A 39 percent depreciation of the Russian ruble against the US dollar in 2023 decreased the value of money
transfers from Russia (figure A.2.1). Furthermore, remittance flows to Ukraine and Russia remained weaker than
expected in 2023 due to negative effects from the ongoing war. An exodus of migrants from Russia to its
neighboring countries, significant in 2022, has been slowing, with some of them electing to return home.
Moreover, financial institutions in some destination countries have restricted transfers from Russia over concerns
of additional sanctions. These factors may have diverted remittance flows to informal channels.

Remittances remained the biggest source of external financing for the region in 2023, providing an important
buffer for current account deficits across a number of subregional economies (figure A.2.2). After tumbling to
negative flows of about $5 billion in 2022, due mainly to negative flows of $40 billion for Russia, FDI bounced back
to about $31 billion in 2023, supported by a sharp rise in flows to Ukraine (an increase of nearly $4 billion from
2022) and to some extent to Bulgaria. Nonetheless, overall FDI inflow for the region is about $30 billion less than
the prewar (2017–21) average of $59 billion. This is mostly due to the stoppage of investments from Western
companies in Russia. Many Central Asian countries also experienced declines in FDI.

21
Figure A.2.1 The Depreciation of the Ruble against the US Dollar is Associated with a Slowdown of Russian
Remittances
Russian money transfers, Index (2021Q1 = 100) Exchange rate (Russian ruble/US$, inverted)
1,200 55
Georgia
Armenia 60
1,000 Kyrgyz Republic
Azerbaijan 65

800 Russian Ruble/US$ (Right Axis) 70

75
600
80

400 85

90
200
95

0 100

Sources: Respective central banks, World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates.

Several Central Asian countries, such as the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, are heavily dependent on
remittances (which accounted for 22, 39, and 15 percent, respectively, of their GDP in 2023), coming largely from
Russia. The share of Russian remittances in total flows to these countries declined last year after surging to record
highs in 2022 (figure A.2.3). Uzbekistan had a more diverse range of remittance sources prior to Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, with Russia accounting for only around half of the remittance flows in 2019–21. However, this share
surged to 87 percent in 2022 and remained relatively high at 78 percent in 2023, leaving Uzbek labor migrants still
vulnerable to changes in the Russian economy and its migration policy.

Wage gaps between Russia and these three Central Asian economies are significant. Despite the sharp weakening
of the ruble in 2023, average US dollar monthly wages as a percentage of Russian levels were only 41.9 percent in
Uzbekistan, 38.8 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic, and 19.6 percent in Tajikistan. This encouraged migration from
these countries to Russia and may explain why the growth of migrant workers from Central Asian to Russia did
not decelerate in 2023. In the first quarter of 2023, for example, 630,000 registered Uzbeks were working in Russia
as migrant laborers, up 72 percent from the previous year.9 The Russian Interior Ministry estimates that there are
about 10.5 million migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic working in Russia. This may be a
major undercount, though, since many migrant workers are potentially unregistered. The number of migrants not
captured in official data might suggest that a decrease in remittances from Russia to Central Asian countries last
year was partly due to an increase in remittance transactions through informal channels.

9 According to the Caspian Policy Center, a nongovernmental organization in Washington, DC.

22
Figure A.2.2 Resource Flows to Europe and Central Asia, 2000–2024f
($ million)
1,60,000

1,40,000

1,20,000

1,00,000 FDI
Remittances
80,000

60,000

40,000
ODA
20,000

-20,000

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates, International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook April
2024, and IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics.
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance.

Figure A.2.3 Share of Russian Remittances to Central Asian Countries, 2021–23

(Russian remittances as % of total remittances received)
98 95 2021 2022 2023
100 94
87
90 82
78
80
69 69
70 63
60 55
47 50
50 41
37
40
30
18
20
10
0
Azerbaijan Kyrgyz Rep. Georgia Armenia Uzebekistan

Sources: Central banks of the countries listed and World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates.

Flows to Ukraine, the region’s largest recipient of remittances last year, declined from $16.8 billion (about 10.5
percent of GDP) in 2022 to $15.1 billion (about 8.5 percent of GDP) in 2023 (figure A.2.4). Remittances to Ukraine
have not bounced back to the prewar (2019–21) levels and are expected to remain subdued in 2024. The decline
can be mostly ascribed by the change in remittance compilation methodology used by the National Bank of
Ukraine. Since February 2023, the central bank started to classify Ukraine migrants (including refugees) who
moved to neighboring and other European countries in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the “resident”
category instead of “nonresident.” Thus, any money transfers from these migrants are no longer recorded as

23
cross-border remittance activities by nonresident migrants. Remittances have also declined in the second largest
recipient in the region, Uzbekistan, from $16.7 billion in 2022 to $13.9 billion in 2023. This drop can partly be
ascribed to a slowdown of money transfers from Russia amid higher inflation in Russia and the appreciation of the
Uzbek son against the Russian ruble, which could have diverted remittances to informal channels. The slowing of
remittances from Russia in 2023 also led to a decline in remittances to Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which
are highly dependent on Russian remittances. Money transfers from the United States to these economies have
declined significantly as well, contributing to further weakness in overall remittances.

Figure A.2.4 Top 10 Remittance Recipients in Europe and Central Asia, 2023
($ billion, 2023) (Percentage of GDP, 2023)
15.1
13.9 39.1

22.3
5.8 5.8 17.6
15.313.8
4.6 4.2 11.810.910.4
2.9 2.8 2.5 9.0 8.5
2.0

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates and IMF World Economic Outlook April 2024.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

Many other countries in the region experienced sharp declines: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan posted at
least a 29 percent drop in 2023. In contrast, remittances to Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Türkiye posted double-
digit growth in 2023. Monthly data indicate that remittance growth for many countries in the region remained
subdued as normalization of Russian money transfers continued throughout the first three months of 2024 (figure
A.2.5).

24
Figure A.2.5 Remittance Growth in Europe and Central Asia Remained Subdued in 2024
Percent (year-over-year growth, 3-month movign average)
250 Georgia Kyrgyz Republic
Serbia Ukraine
Moldova Kosovo
200 Armenia

150

100

50

-50

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates and respective central banks.

Remittance outlook. Remittance flows to Europe and Central Asia are projected to decline by 2 percent in 2024
due to normalization of outward remittances from Russia to its neighboring countries and lingering weakness in
flows to Ukraine and Russia. Money transfers from Russia are expected to continue declining without major shocks
or incidents that could prompt capital outflows from the country. Furthermore, restriction of money transfers
from Russia to Türkiye that took place as of January 2024 could also have an impact on remittances into and out
of Russia. The projections for 2024 are subject to downside risk, including a weaker-than-expected economic
growth in major remittance-sending economies or sharper-than-expected drop in Russian outward remittances.
For 2025, it is forecasted that remittances to the region will grow by about 4 percent to reach about $72 billion as
flows to Ukraine and Russia are expected to rebound close to pre-war levels assuming that there will be greater
clarity regarding the course of the ongoing war.

Remittance costs. The average cost of sending $200 to Europe and Central Asia climbed by 26 basis points to 6.7
percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 from 6.4 percent a year earlier, in large part reflecting a sharp increase of
costs in the Türkiye to Bulgaria corridor. Amid the ongoing war, the average cost for the region excludes data on
corridors originating in Russia, which used to be one of the lowest-cost senders of remittances globally. The
differences in cost across corridors in the region, as well as their changes over time, are substantial. The highest
cost for sending remittances is from Türkiye to Bulgaria, where costs have been high and increased from 36.7
percent to 47.6 percent between 2022Q4 and 2023Q4 due to high transaction fees for bank account transfers,
while the lowest cost is from Germany to Ukraine (figure A.2.6). Notably, the cost of sending money to Ukraine in
the fourth quarter of 2023 remained lower than the prewar level, ranging from 3.3 percent in Germany and 3.7
percent in the United States to 4.8 percent in the Czech Republic and 4.8 percent in Italy.

25
Figure A.2.6 Cost of Sending Money in Europe and Central Asia Rose Slightly in 2023Q4
b. Five Least Expensive Corridors b. Five Most Expensive Corridors
(Percent)
50

40

30
2022Q4 2023Q4

20

10

0
Germany to United Spain to Italy to Austria to Germany to Germany to Switzerland United Turkey to
Ukraine States to Bulgaria Moldova Kosovo Bosnia and Kyrgyz to Albania Kingdom to Bulgaria
Ukraine Herzegovina Republic Albania
Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff calculations and Remittance Prices Worldwide.
Note: Cost of sending $200 or equivalent

Migration trends. According to official figures, about 1.3 million Tajik nationals lived in Russia in 2023, but this
number is likely to be an underestimate given that many are potentially unrecorded in the official data. Since Tajik
nationals do not need visas to enter Russia, it is common for workers from Tajikistan to enter the country for
seasonal work. It is reported that employment contracts for migrant workers are often nonexistent, and it is
common for workers to be hired off the books. The migration data are further complicated by the fact that a
growing number of Tajik nationals are obtaining Russian citizenship. In 2022, 174,000 Tajik nationals received
Russian citizenship, up from 104,000 in 2021. Another 87,000 Tajik nationals got Russian citizenship in the first
half of 2023.10

As of 2023, over 630,000 Uzbek nationals were working in Russia as migrant workers, but some estimates suggest
that the real number could be closer to 4–8 million, including those working illegally. For many years, most migrant
laborers from Uzbekistan have headed to Russia, working mostly as low-paying manual laborers in the
construction and agriculture sectors. Uzbekistan’s government has been working with governments in Europe,
East Asia, and the Middle East to find new job opportunities for Uzbek nationals in places other than Russia. As a
result, as of early 2024, new employment opportunities for Uzbek nationals specifically have opened in Germany
and Korea. It was announced that some 50,000 jobs in Germany are available to Uzbek nationals through the
Agency for External Labor Migration. The available jobs are mainly in construction, restaurants and hotels,
trucking, and mechanical repairs and maintenance for trucks and agricultural vehicles. Korea is offering 100,000
work placements for Uzbek nationals.

10
However, Tajik migrant workers have faced some difficulties in the wake of the March 2024 terrorist attack in Crocus City
Hall, Moscow, including entry denials and deportations by Russian authorities.

26
Of the 328,458 Kyrgyz nationals living abroad, the majority (285,433) resided in Russia as of 2023 (IOM 2024),
making up a large proportion of Russia’s migrant workforce along with those from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The
high numbers are due to the Kyrgyz Republic’s visa-free agreement with Russia, which provides economic
opportunities that are not available at home. The country’s economy has high exposure to Russia’s economy,
particularly through significant reliance on remittances. However, the lack of diversification of destination
countries and employment sectors makes migrant workers from the Kyrgyz Republic vulnerable to changes in the
Russian economy and in its migration policy.

A.3 Latin America and the Caribbean

Remittance trends. After a significant increase in remittances in 2022 (11 percent), remittance growth into Latin
America and the Caribbean slowed in 2023, increasing by about 8 percent to reach $155 billion (figure A.3.1). The
growth rate of remittances returned to the pre-pandemic levels of 2019, supported by the strong US labor market,
which had a positive impact on remittance flows during 2023. However, growth in remittances to the region is
expected to slow down to 2.7 percent in 2024. In 2023, remittance flows were larger than FDI flows. According to
UNCTAD, FDI inflows to Brazil decreased by 22 percent while Mexico reported an increase in FDI and in new
greenfield project announcements (UNCTAD 2024).

Figure A.3.1 Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment, and Official Development Assistance Flows to Latin
America and the Caribbean, 2000–24f
($ million)
2,00,000 FDI

1,80,000

1,60,000

1,40,000

1,20,000

1,00,000
Remittances
80,000

60,000

40,000
ODA
20,000

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. See the appendix in
Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecast methods (World Bank/KNOMAD 2020).
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecast.

The growth of remittances varied widely across countries in 2023, ranging from a 44.5 percent increase in

27
Nicaragua to a decline of 13.4 percent in Argentina. Remittances to transit countries in Central America increased
by 9.7 percent in Guatemala and by 17.8 percent in Honduras. Remittances sent from the United States and Spain
to Colombia increased by 6.7 percent. By contrast Brazil, Bolivia, and Jamaica saw negative growth of 10.9 percent,
0.7 percent, and 3.3 percent, respectively. 11 Remittances to Mexico reached $66.2 billion in 2023, representing
an increase of 7.8 percent. Mexico receives the most remittances in the region by far, and is the world’s second-
largest recipient of remittances (figure A.3.2, panel a).12 Remittances constitute a large share of GDP in a number
of countries in the Caribbean and Central America (figure A.3.2, panel b).

Figure A.3.2 Top Remittance Recipients in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2023
(Percentage of GDP, 2023)
($ billion, 2023)
66.2 26.8 25.7
24.1
19.7 19.6 18.9

8.9 8.8
20.0
6.2 5.2
10.6 10.1 9.0 8.2
5.5 4.7 4.4 4.4

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

The increase in employment in the US sectors where migrants work, such as food and beverage services, health
services, and construction, contributed to the growth in remittances to Latin America (figure 1.3 in chapter 1).
According to the US Census Bureau report, the foreign-born population from Latin America was 23.2 million out
of 46.2 million foreign-born living in the United States in 2022. Of these, Mexico and Central America alone
accounted for 14.6 million (United States Census Bureau 2024).
Recent data released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the unemployment rate of Hispanics declined
across three years, from 18.5 percent in April 2020 to 4.5 percent in April 2024 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics
2024). Employment of foreign workers and Hispanics has surpassed pre-pandemic levels and has continued to
increase (figure 1.3), while employment of US nationals returned to such levels in April 2023 and has remained so

11 Other countries with an increase include Paraguay (25.9 percent), Peru (19.9 percent), Honduras (17.8 percent), Ecuador (14.8 percent),
Guatemala (9.7 percent), and Colombia (6.7 percent). Countries experiencing a decline include Brazil (10.9 percent) and Jamaica (3.3
percent).
12 The growth of remittances to Peru and Ecuador surged to 19.8 and 9.7 percent, respectively, during this period, since migration flows

from these countries to Mexico, the United States, and Spain increased, driven by the countries’ economic and political situation.

28
since.

The strong US labor market contributed to a significant increase in remittances during the first four months of
2024: 12 percent in Nicaragua, 14 percent in Colombia, 9 percent in Guatemala, 6 percent in Dominican Republic,
3 percent in Mexico, and 2 percent in El Salvador compared with the same period in 2023 (figure A.3.3).
Remittances to Nicaragua remain strong although they normalized after a surge following large-scale emigration
in 2022–23.

Figure A.3.3 Remittance Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean Returned to Pre-Pandemic Levels during
2024Q1
90%
80% Mexico El Salvador
70% Colombia Dominican Rep.
Guatemala Nicaragua
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
Apr-19

Apr-20

Apr-21

Apr-22

Apr-23

Apr-24
Jan-19

Jul-21
Oct-19
Jan-20

Oct-20
Jan-21

Oct-21
Jan-22

Oct-22
Jan-23

Oct-23
Jan-24
Jul-19

Jul-20

Jul-22

Jul-23

Sources: Central banks of the respective countries.

Remittance costs. Remittance corridors from the United States are among the least costly to the Latin American
region. According to the Remittance Prices Worldwide database, the costs of sending remittances to Latin America
averaged 5.8 percent in 2023Q4. However, costs have remained at the same level since 2015 and are much higher
in the smaller remittance corridors. For example, the cost of sending money from Canada to Guyana was 11
percent in 2023Q4, increasing by 2 percentage points from one year previous; that from France to Haiti increased
from 8.4 percent in 2022Q4 to 9.4 percent in 2023Q4. The corridors from Spain have seen a cost reduction. The
cost of sending money from the United States to Cuba remained high but decreased from 23.5 percent in 2022Q4
to 19.3 percent in 2023Q4 (figure A.3.4).

29
Figure A.3.4 The Cost of Sending Money to Latin America and the Caribbean Has Remained Stable
a. Five Least Expensive Corridors b. Five Most Expensive Corridors
(Percent)
24

20 2022Q4 2023Q4

16

12

0
United United Spain to United United Japan to France to Canada to United United
States to States to Peru States to El States to Brazil Haiti Guyana States to States to
Honduras Peru Salvador Ecuador Guyana Cuba

Source: World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database.

Note: Cost of sending $200 or equivalent.

Remittance outlook. Growth in remittances to the region is returning to pre-pandemic rates. Remittance growth
is projected to slow down to 2.7 percent in 2024, with US GDP growth forecasted at 2.5 percent in 2024 and 1.8
percent in 2025 (GEP, 2024). US job openings are declining since a mid-2022 peak, a trend that could have an
impact on remittances to the region. Remittances will continue to flow due to the considerable number of transit
migrants stranded in Mexico and Guatemala. Transit migrants from Cuba, China, Ecuador, Haiti, India, Nicaragua,
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and other nations passing through Guatemala and Mexico on the way to the
United States account for the large remittance flows to those two transit countries. As noted in Migration and
Development Brief 36 (World Bank/KNOMAD 2022a), migrants are staying longer in Mexico, which could increase
remittances to the country. However, there are downside risks to the projections. Remittances to Latin America
will be impacted by the projected softening of the US labor market and the upcoming election in the United States,
which could lead to strengthened immigration regulations.

Migration trends. According to the US Customs and Border Protection Agency, monthly border apprehensions
increased by 6 percent from October to April 2024 compared with the same period of 2023. There was a big jump
in December 2023 after which apprehensions started declining starting in January 2024 (figure 1.11 above). The
US Border Patrol recorded an average of 3,700 apprehensions per day during the first 21 days of May (Isacson
2024b). The profile of migrants arriving at the US borders is changing. The number of encounters of Chinese
nationals increased by 8,500 percent between March 2021 and March 2023, reaching 24,214 individuals at the
southern border (Homeland Security 2024a). People arriving at the US border illegally would not be eligible for
asylum and would face a five-year ban on reentry and potential criminal prosecution. More than 404,000 Cubans,
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans have entered the United States under a new program (Homeland Security

30
2024b). About 720,000 migrants have been returned from the United States amid the termination of Title 42
between May 2023 and April 30, 2024 (CBP 2024).

To deter migrants from crossing to the United States, Mexico started sending migrants by bus to its southern
states. According to the National Mexican Institute of Migration, about 7,721 migrants crossed into Mexico during
the first twelve days of May 2024. In addition, Mexico began requiring visas for Peruvians in May 2024. The foreign
population with irregular migratory status in Mexico increased to 782,176 in 2023, ten times the level of 2020.
During the first quarter of 2024, there were 359,697 undocumented migrants that had entered the country.
Venezuelans are the largest group of migrants in an irregular situation in 2023, followed by migrants from
Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador, Haiti, Cuba, Colombia, El Salvador, and Senegal. The profile of undocumented
migrants changed in 2023. For example, the number of undocumented migrants from Ecuador increased from
1,384 in 2021 to 70,790. Undocumented Chinese and Indian nationals entering Mexico increased from less than
300 in 2021 to more than 12,000. Similarly, the influx of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, a trickle in the past,
has now substantially increased. These are mostly from the West Coast of Africa (Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania).

According to the government of Panama, migrants crossing through the Darien Gap decreased from a daily
average of 2,643 to 947 crossings in April 2024. Crossing through Honduras has also decreased—from a daily
average of 3,290 in October 2023 to 1,281 in April 2024 (Isacson 2024a). On May 7, 2024, Guatemala hosted the
third Los Angeles Declaration Ministerial.13 Costa Rica and the United States signed a memorandum of
understanding to cooperate in countering the trafficking of persons and sharing biometric data (The White House
2024). Visa restrictions have been imposed on executives of several Colombian maritime transportation
companies for facilitating undocumented migration to the United States.

A.4 Middle East and North Africa

Remittance trends. Remittances to countries of the Middle East and North Africa fell by 15 percent to $55 billion
in 2023, accentuating the impact of the 3.2 percent drop in 2022. This substantial drop in 2023 was largely driven
by a sharp decline in flows to Egypt, by far the region’s largest remittance recipient. It is likely that remittances
have been diverted toward unofficial channels given the wide gap between exchange rates in the official and
parallel foreign exchange markets. In 2023, Egypt suffered from a severe lack of foreign currency due to the fixed
exchange system and overvalued local currency. This led to the emergence of a parallel market, with the Egyptian
pound exceeding 70 LE per US dollar at one point, and a significant cut in official remittances from Egyptian
expatriates.

Other factors also contributed to the decline in remittances to the region in 2023. Outward remittances from
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates slowed, reflecting some correction from the pandemic-related
distortion. Flows to Jordan and Tunisia thinned amid weak economic growth in the euro area, the key remittance
source for these countries, while the ongoing conflict in the Middle East has negatively impacted remittance flows

13Participants include the Government of the Argentine Republic, Barbados, Belize, the Federative Republic of Brazil, Canada, the Republic
of Chile, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Costa Rica, the Republic of Ecuador, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of
Guatemala, the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, the Republic of Honduras, Jamaica, the United Mexican States, the
Republic of Panama, the Republic of Paraguay, the Republic of Peru, the United States of America, and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay.

31
to the West Bank and Gaza. In contrast, remittances to Algeria and Lebanon posted positive gains, supported by
gains in flows from France and the United States, respectively. Algeria has only averaged about $1.8 billion
annually for the past decade, but the existence of a parallel exchange rate market that could offer a 30-40 percent
premium suggests that significant volume of remittances might be channeled through informal channels (mostly
in the form of cash carried by travelers). Morocco also posted gains, reaching another record high, underscoring
the impact of the September 2023 earthquake on the country’s remittances.

Remittances have been the largest and relatively most steady source of external resource flows for the region,
outstripping the sum of FDI and official development assistance (ODA) since 2010 (figure A.4.1). In 2023,
remittance inflows were more than twice the sum of these flows to the region, which saw a sharp drop in FDI
flows, highlighting the importance of remittances to both the private and public sectors. With significant fiscal and
current account deficits creating external financing concerns for oil-importing countries in the Middle East and
North Africa, remittances are likely to remain a vital financing source for the region in the near and medium term.

Figure A.4.1 Remittances to Middle East and North Africa offer Support against High Volatility of Other Flows,
2000–24f
($ million)
80,000
Remittances
70,000

60,000

50,000
ODA
40,000

30,000

20,000
FDI
10,000

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. See appendix to the
Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank/KNOMAD 2020).
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f =
forecast.

Remittances to Egypt declined by about 31 percent in 2023 to reach $19.5 billion (figure A.4.2, panel a). This is
largely explained by the sharp drop in remittances through official channels triggered by the significant gap
between exchange rates in the official and parallel foreign exchange markets. The central bank of Egypt reverted
to a fixed exchange rate in March last year. This, combined with hard currency shortages, resulted in a
reemergence and surge of the parallel market rate, fueling high and rising inflation, delaying first and second

32
reviews of the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility, and triggering rating downgrades by the three major rating agencies,
which reflected the country’s worsening debt affordability and foreign currency shortfall. A parallel foreign
exchange market offered more attractive rates to the Egyptian diaspora. Consequently, many Egyptians abroad
appear to be choosing to send their money through informal channels. The recent devaluation and rate hikes, the
completion of the IMF reviews, and investments from the United Arab Emirates have increased confidence that
remittance inflows could rise. The government announced earlier this year that remittances from Egyptian
expatriates are gradually returning to their pre-shock levels, particularly as the parallel-market premium was
eliminated.

Figure A.4.2 Top Remittance Recipients in the Middle East and North Africa, 2023
($ billion, 2023)* (Percentage of GDP, 2023)*

30.7
19.5

11.8 18.8

6.7
8.8 8.2
4.5
3.6 5.2 5.0
2.7 1.9
0.9 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.3

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff ; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
* The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Yemen are excluded due to data availability

To encourage the growth of the remittance market, the Egyptian government has undertaken several initiatives
including: (1) the use of digital channels for money transfers in the formal sector; (2) a launch of savings products
and funds by banks that exempt commissions for the benefit of the Egyptian diaspora, and (3) the Central Bank of
Egypt’s announced liberalization of the exchange rate in March 2024. The move encouraged US$2 billion of foreign
portfolio inflows into the domestic market in April (JPMorgan’s Global Data Watch), helping to constrain monetary
conditions to maintain a consistent path to achieve the inflation target.

Morocco’s remittances increased by 5.2 percent to $11.8 billion in 2023, and the country remains the second
largest recipient of remittances in the region, after Egypt. Remittance inflows to the country have consistently
exceeded FDI inflows, and have been a vital part of Morocco’s economy, accounting for 8.2 percent of the
country’s GDP (figure A.4.2, panel b). The pace of remittances from Moroccans abroad remained strong

33
throughout 2023, especially after the earthquake in September. This is in line with findings of studies that
demonstrate the counter-cyclical nature of remittance flows, which tend to increase in the aftermath of natural
disasters in migrants’ home countries (Bettin, Presbitero, and Spatafora 2017).

The regional economies where remittance flows constitute a large proportion of GDP include Lebanon, the West
Bank and Gaza, and Jordan (figure A.4.2). In Lebanon, remittance receipts represent 30.7 percent of GDP and
account for more than 80 percent of total external resource flows (sum of remittances, FDI, and ODA), highlighting
the importance of the Lebanese diaspora’s impact on the country’s macroeconomy. The West Bank and Gaza
experienced a sharp drop in flows in 2023, carrying the ratio of remittances to GDP to about 19 percent. The
negative impacts of the conflict in the Middle East worsened the financial health of these already fragile
economies. Remittances to Jordan fell modestly to $4.5 billion in 2023, which represented 9 percent of the
country’s GDP.

Remittance outlook. The prospects for remittances to the Middle East and North Africa will be affected by the
difficult situation facing the region’s oil-importing countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and
Tunisia. Uncertain regional prospects amid the conflict in the Middle East may lead to increases in their fiscal and
current account deficits and could impair political stability. Particularly in Lebanon, the twin deficits have
heightened pressure on currencies and foreign currency reserves.

In contrast, the region’s oil exporters, such as Iraq and Algeria, will benefit from the rise in hydrocarbon prices.
For Egypt, the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, significant investments from the United Arab Emirates (the Ras
El Hekma deal), and an $8 billion agreement with the IMF are likely to trigger increased inflow of portfolio
investments and remittances from workers abroad this year (figure A.4.3). A strong influx of remittances to the
West Bank and Gaza may be expected later this year as Palestinians may need a revamped payment system. Along
with signs of a rebound in outward remittances from GCC countries in the early months of 2024, on balance, we
forecast a moderate gain of 4.3 percent in remittance flows in 2024, and another gain of 5.5 percent in 2025
(figure A.4.3). The outlook is differentiated across regional subgroups, depending on dominant host countries, the
degree of exposure to higher energy/food prices, and fiscal and external financial difficulties.

Remittance costs. The cost of sending $200 in remittances to the Middle East and North Africa eased to an average
5.9 percent in 2023Q4 from 6.7 percent a year earlier, reflecting a 73-basis point decline. However, costs vary
greatly across corridors. The cost of sending money within the region (including GCC countries) remains low,
ranging below 3 percent in some corridors (figure A.4.4, panel a) while the cost of sending money from high-
income OECD countries to the Middle East and North Africa remains high and in double digits (figure A.4.4, panel
b).

34
Figure A.4.3 Remittance Flows to the Middle East and North Africa to Recover in 2024 and 2025
Growth in remittance receipts (percent)
15

10

-5

-10

-15

-20 2023 2024 2025

-25

-30
Aggregate MENA Maghreb Egypt, Arab Rep. Morocco

Source: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates and projections.

Note: MENA = Middle East and North Africa.

Figure A.4.4 Sending Money within the Region is Less Expensive than Sending Money from Outside
a. Five Least Expensive Corridors b. Five Most Expensive Corridors

(Percent)
15

2022Q2 2023Q2
12

0
Saudi Jordan to United Arab Oman to Kuwait to Jordan to United France to Australia to Israel to
Arabia to Egypt, Arab Emirates to Jordan Egypt, Arab Syrian Arab States to Algeria Lebanon Morocco
Yemen, Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Republic Lebanon
Rep. Rep.

Source: World Bank Remittance Prices Worldwide database.

Note: Cost of sending $200 or equivalent.

35
Migration trends. According to the UNHCR, as of April 2024, Egypt hosted 575,000 registered refugees and asylum
seekers from 61 countries, nearly double the number from a year previous, due to major conflicts across its
borders. The main countries of origin for migrants in Egypt are Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Republic of
Yemen, and Libya, reflecting political crises in the Middle East and North Africa. Refugees in Egypt live in urban
areas of Cairo and the North Coast, with most new arrivals coming from Sudan. More than 500,000 Sudanese and
third-country nationals forced to flee the Sudanese crisis have entered Egypt since fighting broke out in April 2023.
Since the onset of the conflict in Sudan last year, UNHCR has observed a fivefold increase in Sudanese individuals
registering as refugees, mainly women and children. The UN expects this number to increase due to the escalating
violence in Sudan in recent months and the limited prospects of a near-term ceasefire. In response to the
Sudanese crisis, the UNHCR is scaling up the delivery of cash assistance and registration to address the urgent
needs of the most vulnerable.

A.5 South Asia

Remittance trends. In 2023, the South Asia region, home to three out of the top remittance receiving countries
in the world, was once again the leading remittance recipient. However, reflecting the unwinding of the post-
COVID-19 rebound, remittances grew at 5.2 percent in 2023, reaching US$186 billion, down from the more than
12 percent growth achieved in 2022.

The primacy of remittances as the leading capital flow to South Asia relative to FDI and ODA in 2023 was intact
(figure A.5.1), underscoring their critical role in augmenting the incomes of a large proportion of poorer
households, as well as serving as a source of foreign exchange for migrants’ countries of origin. In 2023, at US$186
billion, remittances to South Asia measured more than 5.6 times as much as FDI (US$33 billion), compared with
only 2.5 times in 2019. This trend is explained by several factors that are critical for sustaining an increasing flow
of remittances to the region. The acceleration in remittance growth is related to strong demand in migrants’
destination countries and global market conditions, but this trend is easily reversed by large external shocks as
happened during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stability and growth in remittances is tied to job security that is usually
related to migrants’ human capital/skills, as evident from the generally sustained remittance flows from
technically skilled South Asian migrants in the United States and other OECD countries. In addition to rapid growth,
the dominance of remittances in South Asia is also explained by declining FDI flows, signaling distortions in the
investment climate that point to a critical and outstanding policy reform agenda that South Asian governments
need to address. The recent economic crises in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka demonstrated that reform
delays were not only a deterrent to FDI, but also equally penalized formal remittance flows to these countries
until their governments undertook corrective actions.14

14See the South Asian region section in the Migration and Development Brief 38 for a discussion of how the parallel market exchange rate
premium affects the flow of remittances to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (World Bank/KNOMAD 2023a).

36
Figure A.5.1 Resource Flows to South Asia, 2000–24f
($ million)
2,25,000

2,00,000
Remittances
1,75,000

1,50,000

1,25,000

1,00,000
FDI
75,000

50,000

25,000 ODA

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. See
appendix to the Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank/KNOMAD 2020).
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance.

Growing at 7.5 percent, remittance flows to India touched US$120 billion in 2023, reflecting the benefits of a
deceleration in inflation and strong labor markets in the United States, the largest destination for India’s skilled
migrants, and other OECD destinations,15 as well as positive demand for skilled and less-skilled workers in the GCC
countries (which, together, are the second largest destination for Indian migrants).16 While the same external
demand conditions could have favored remittance flows to Pakistan, weak internal conditions due to a balance of
payments crisis and economic difficulties triggered remittances to plummet 12 percent to US$27 billion in 2023
compared with more than US$30 billion in 2022 (figure A.5.2, panel a). Considering robust labor market conditions
in destination countries, it is likely that a significant share of remittances flowed to Pakistan through informal
channels in 2023, leading to the drop in formal remittances.17 Formal remittance flows to Bangladesh grew
modestly at 3 percent to US$22 billion in 2023, underpinned by financial and balance of payments related
concerns stoked by insufficient exchange rate depreciation and other reforms. As in Pakistan, it is possible that
there was also a diversion of remittances from formal to informal channels in Bangladesh. In a renewed vote of

15 The United States, United Kingdom, and Singapore, which collectively account for 36 percent of total remittance flows to India (RBI 2022;
World Bank/KNOMAD 2022b, box A.1), are the primary destinations for highly skilled Indian migrants in the IT and business services
industries.
16 Remittance flows to India from the United Arab Emirates, which account for 18 percent and are the second largest source of India’s

remittances after the United States, benefited from the February 2023 agreement. The latter established a framework to promote the use
of local currencies for cross-border transactions and cooperation for interlinking payment and messaging systems between India and the
United Arab Emirates. The use of dirhams and rupees in cross-border transactions is instrumental in channeling more remittances through
formal channels. In addition to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar account for 11 percent of India’s total
remittances (RBI 2022).
17 See World Bank/KNOMAD (2023a) for a discussion of how the parallel market exchange rate premium affects the flow of remittances to

Pakistan.

37
confidence in Sri Lanka’s economic recovery—following ongoing reforms in the areas of debt, fiscal management,
monetary policy, exchange rate, trade, investment, and state-owned enterprises in response to the acute balance
of payments and fiscal crisis in 2022—formal remittance flows to Sri Lanka rebounded sharply by 57 percent to
US$6 billion in 2023, inching closer to pre-COVID levels.

Inward remittances grew at 17 percent to US$10.8 billion in Nepal, where jobs overseas that fetch three times as
much income as a domestic job remain the preferred option for most Nepalis. Nepali migrants also benefited from
strong labor markets in the GCC countries, which together compose their primary destination. In Bhutan,
remittances grew at over 12 percent to US$108 million, reflecting the benefits of record emigration to India and
Australia amid limited domestic employment opportunities despite robust economic growth. Remittance flows to
the Maldives declined marginally to US$5 million in 2023.

Figure A.5.2 Top Remittance Recipients in South Asia, 2023

(Percentage of GDP, 2023)
($ billion, 2023)

119.5 26.5

8.0 7.9
26.6 5.0
22.2 3.7 3.3
10.9 2.2
6.0 0.1
0.3 0.1 0.0

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff and International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook April 2024.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

In 2023, with a share of 26.5 percent of GDP, Nepal was ranked as the country that is most dependent on
remittances in South Asia (figure A.5.2, panel b). Nepal’s overt dependence on remittances has been a true lifeline
for its citizens. The sustained share of remittances, at around 25 percent of GDP for over a decade, contributed to
an estimated 32 percent reduction in poverty (World Bank 2024). Nepal was also the sixth most dependent
country globally (figure 1.2). With a share of 8 percent of GDP, Sri Lanka and Pakistan tied for the second position
in South Asia, with Bangladesh following at third place with a share of remittances at 5 percent of GDP.
Remittances as a share of GDP scored significantly lower in the remaining South Asian countries, including India
with a share of 3.3 percent.

38
Remittance costs. In 2023Q4, South Asia could still boast the lowest remittance costs of all regions in the world.
However, relative to 2022Q4, the cost of remitting $200 to South Asia increased substantially by 158 basis points
in 2023Q4 (figure 1.7). In 2022Q4, it cost 4.2 percent to send $200 to South Asia but in 2023Q4, the cost had risen
and was only slightly less than the global average of 6.4 percent. The cost of sending $200 to South Asia was nearly
two times higher than the SDG target of 3 percent (figure 1.7). Among the five lowest-cost corridors, the costs
declined marginally in four. Malaysia to India remained the cheapest corridor, clocking in 2.2 percent in 2023Q4
relative to 2.9 percent in 2022Q4 (figure A.5.3). However, the cost of sending $200 in 2023Q4 relative to 2022Q4
increased significantly in all five most expensive corridors, ranging between 11.7 and 13.6 percent. The sharpest
increase was along the United Arab Emirates to Bangladesh corridor, where the cost increased by 172 percent,
from 5 percent in 2022Q4 to 13.6 percent in 2023Q4. During the same period, the cost of remitting increased by
18 percent along the United Kingdom to Afghanistan corridor and by 46 percent along the Singapore to
Bangladesh corridor.

Figure A.5.3 The Cost of Sending Remittances to South Asia Increased Sharply for the Most Expensive Corridors
between 2022Q4 and 2023Q4

a. Five Least Expensive Corridors b. Five Most Expensive Corridors

(Percent)
15
13.6
12.1 12.3
11.7 11.8
2022Q4 2023Q4 10.4
9.7
10
8.5
8.0

5.0
5
2.9 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.8
2.2 2.3 2.6

0
Malaysia to Malaysia to United Arab Singapore to United Singapore to South Africa Malaysia to United United Arab
India Nepal Emirates to India Kingdom to Bangladesh to India Bangladesh Kingdom to Emirates to
Sri Lanka Pakistan Afghanistan Bangladesh

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff calculations and Remittance Prices Worldwide.

Note: Cost of sending $200 or equivalent.

Remittance outlook. While South Asia’s remittance growth outlook for 2024–25 is still well above the forecast for
all other regions, significant downside risks point to a slowdown as strong labor market conditions in key migrant
destinations stabilize after a peak in 2023. The downside risks hinge on forecasts of subdued GDP growth,
persistence of high commodity prices, and risk of a conflict-driven persistence in inflation, especially related to
elevated food prices. Besides external factors, the domestic economy conditions prevailing in South Asia’s three
largest recipients—India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, that collectively receive 91 percent of the total remittance

39
flows to South Asia—will play a fundamental role in driving remittance growth. The single most important risk on
the downside is from a weak economic recovery from the recent crises in Pakistan and Bangladesh that would
motivate migrants to opt for informal over formal money transfer channels, resulting in lower remittance growth.
Remittance growth in Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives has also been associated with large-scale
emigration of less-skilled economic migrants in the recent past. This trend is unlikely to continue unabated as
South Asian migrants compete for the same jobs as climate-change-affected and economic migrants from other
migrant-sending countries. Unbounded and illegal emigration from South Asia is already encountering resistance
at the United States’ southern border and in Europe.

The 2024 outlook for remittance growth in South Asia is 4.2 percent, driving remittances to US$193 billion. By
2025, remittances are expected to reach over $200 billion. Remittances to India are forecasted to grow at 3.7
percent to $124 billion in 2024, and at 4 percent to reach $129 billion in 2025. India’s efforts to link its Unified
Payments Interface with source countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore are expected to reduce
costs and speed up remittances. Most importantly, the diversification of India’s migrant pool between a large
share of highly skilled migrants employed mostly in high-income OECD markets and the less-skilled migrants
employed in the GCC markets is likely to lend stability to migrants’ remittances in the event of external shocks.

Remittance flows to Pakistan are forecasted to recover and grow at about 7 percent to reach $28 billion in 2024
and increase at 4 percent to about $30 billion in 2025. In addition to the favorable external environment, this
forecast assumes that the government will successfully implement the IMF’s Stand-By Arrangement, exercise
fiscal restraint, and obtain external financing.

The outlook for remittances in Bangladesh faces considerable downside risks, muting remittance growth at less
than 3 percent to under $23 billion in 2024. Remittances are forecasted to recover marginally to $23.5 billion in
2025, growing at just over 3 percent. Despite ongoing reforms, there is a risk that the pace of the monetary and
exchange rate reforms may not be sufficient to motivate migrants to channel remittances through formal
channels.

Remittance growth in Sri Lanka is expected to settle at close to 7 percent in 2024, with remittance levels reaching
$6.4 billion. In 2025, remittances are forecasted to grow at 8 percent to $7 billion. This outlook is predicated on
solid progress in the ongoing macroeconomic reforms including fiscal reforms and debt restructuring and
structural reforms in 2024–25, notwithstanding the upcoming elections.

Remittance growth in Nepal is forecasted to grow between 4.6 and 5 percent in 2024 to reach $11.4 billion and
around $12 billion in 2025. Given Nepal’s overt dependence on remittances as a lifeline for a large proportion of
households, the downside risks are mostly from changes in labor demand conditions in migrants’ destination
countries, and natural disaster-related risks. Growth in remittance flows to Bhutan is expected to slow to between
2.7 and 3 percent, with remittances reaching $111 million in 2024 and $114 million in 2025. Considering the
country’s small population size, the emigration of skilled migrants takes a toll on Bhutan’s development prospects.
Improvements in domestic employment opportunities due to new hydropower projects, a pickup in tourism, and
a special economic zone known as the Gelephu megacity project (intended to attract FDI) are expected to ease
the pressure on Bhutanese workers to emigrate in search of livelihoods. Remittance growth in the Maldives is

40
expected to maintain remittances at around $5 million in 2024–25. Any deterioration in the domestic economy
could trigger macro instability with its attendant impact on remittances.

A.6 Sub-Saharan Africa

Remittance trends. Remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa reached $54 billion in 2023, a slight decrease of -0.3
percent from the previous year. Remittance flows to the region are projected to rise by 1.3 percent in 2024. The
projected moderate growth in remittances reflects the expected slower growth in the United States while a feeble
rebound is expected for Europe. Overall, the economic growth rate in Canada, Europe, and the United States,
where large shares of remittance senders live, will decrease from 1.6 percent in 2023 to 1.5 percent in 2024.

The increase in remittance flows to the region supported the current accounts of several African countries that
were dealing with food insecurity, drought, supply chain disruptions, floods, and debt-servicing difficulties. For
example, in Ghana, the current account recorded a surplus in 2023Q3 due in part to strong growth in remittances.
Most of these factors were intensified following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict.18
Sub-Saharan Africa is facing a funding squeeze that it is amplified by a reduction of ODA as a percentage of GDP.

Figure A.6.1 Resource Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–24f

($ million)
1,00,000

80,000

ODA
60,000
Remittances

40,000
FDI

20,000

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff estimates; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
See the appendix to Migration and Development Brief 32 for forecasting methods (World Bank/KNOMAD 2020).
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance; e = estimate; f = forecast.

18 Over 60 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries stand in “debt distress” or at “high risk” of debt distress—scores resulting from
application of the World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework and empirical tool. These circumstances, especially with
further deterioration in global economic and financial conditions on the horizon, heighten the risk of default and/or debt workouts for a
number of countries.

41
Remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa were nearly 1.5 times the size of FDI flows in 2023, and relatively more
stable (figure A.6.1). FDI flows to the region reached $38.6 billion in 2023, driven primarily by greenfield project
announcements in Kenya and Nigeria (UNCTAD 2024).

The largest recipients of remittances in the region during 2023—measured in US dollar terms—include Nigeria,
Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe (figure A.6.2, panel a). Remittances have become the most important foreign
exchange earner in several countries. For example, for Kenya remittances are larger than the country’s key
exports, including tourism, tea, coffee, and horticulture.19 Countries more dependent on receipts as a proportion
of GDP include the Gambia, Lesotho, Comoros, Liberia, and Cabo Verde (figure A.6.2, panel b), with remittances
contributing more than a fifth of GDP in the first three countries.

The regional growth in remittances in 2023 was largely driven by strong remittance growth in Uganda (15 percent
to $1.4 billion), Rwanda (9.3 percent to $0.5 billion), Kenya (2.6 percent to $4.2 billion), and Tanzania (4 percent
to $0.7 billion). Remittances to Nigeria, accounting for around 35 percent of total remittance inflows to the region,
decreased by 2.9 percent to $19.5 billion.

Figure A.6.2 Top Remittance Recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023

a. ($ billion, 2023e) b. (Percentage of GDP, 2023e)

19.5 23.3
21.9
21.0
18.2

12.5
10.5
9.6 9.3
4.6 4.2 8.2
7.2
3.1 2.9
1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0

Sources: World Bank/KNOMAD staff; World Development Indicators; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
*South Sudan is excluded due to issues related to data validity.

High-frequency remittance data for the first four months of 2024 in Kenya show an increase of 21 percent in
remittance growth compared with the same period in 2023. The largest inflows are from the United States and
Canada as well as from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Italy.

19According to the Central Bank of Kenya, remittances reached $4,027 billion in 2022, while tea exports earned the country $1.2 billion,
horticulture $901 million, chemicals $521 million, coffee $301 million, and petroleum products $77 million.

42
Fixed exchange rates and capital controls continue to have an impact on foreign exchange markets and channels
of remittance flows. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has started to unify the foreign exchange market windows
by introducing operational changes in the Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market. The CBN has also outlined new
operational modalities for commercial banks, Bureau de Change operators, and international money transfer
operators. The CBN just licensed 14 such operators to increase competition in remittance transactions.

Remittance costs. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the highest remittance costs. Senders had to pay
an average of 7.9 percent to send $200 to African countries during 2023Q4, compared with 7.4 percent in 2022Q4.
Costs vary substantially across the region, ranging from 2.1–4.0 percent in the lowest-cost corridors to 18–36
percent in the highest (figure A.6.3). Intraregional remittances costs are still very high. For example, sending $200
in remittances from Tanzania to neighboring Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda cost a migrant more than 33 percent in
2023Q4.

Figure A.6.3 The Costs of Sending Remittances to African Countries Vary Widely across Corridors
a. Five Least Expensive Corridors b. Five Most Expensive Corridors
(Percent)

40

35

30 2022Q4 2023Q4

25

20

15

10

0
Senegal to Cote France to France to United South South Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania
Mali d'Ivoire to Sengeal Cote States to Africa to Africa to to Rwanda to Uganda to Kenya
Mali Divoire South Botswana Angola
Sudan
Source: World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database.
Note: Cost of sending $200 or equivalent.

Banks charge the highest costs, underlining the importance of cross-border mobile money transactions. In Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, such transactions are constrained by limited interoperability among
telecommunications and money transfer operators. Welcome developments include an agreement signed in April
2024 between M-PESA and Onafriq, Africa’s largest digital payments network, which operates in 40 countries; this
will facilitate remittances to Ethiopia.

43
Remittance outlook. Growth of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to recover slightly from negative
growth of -0.3 percent in 2023 to +1.5 percent in 2024. Risks to the outlook include lower-than-expected growth
in developed countries that will lead to a decline in remittances sent by the African diaspora; an escalation of the
conflict in Israel-Gaza that could disrupt the supply chain; security risks in Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria; and climate risks including a pronounced drought in southern
Africa.

Migration trends. Conflicts in the region have increased cross-border movements. The conflict in Sudan created
a large flow of cross-border population movements. The country is host to 6.8 million internally displaced persons
and 1.9 million forcibly displaced in neighboring countries.20 Several Sudanese refugees are moving to neighboring
countries that are already hosting a large number of refugees (UNHCR 2024a). The latest numbers reported by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on May 26, 2024, indicate large numbers of new arrivals in
South Sudan (675,169), Chad (595,346), Egypt (500,000), the Central African Republic (30,108), and Ethiopia
(54,688). These include refugees from Sudan, among other nations.

The Maghreb countries and Niger have become transit countries for many migrants and refugees from Sub-
Saharan Africa. The reopening of Agadez (Niger) after the abrogation of the law of 2015, which criminalized
migrant transport from Agadez to Libya, has increased migration departures. About 5,000 migrants have passed
through the city on their way to Libya and Algeria, and migrant convoys are departing the city without hiding
(Douce 2024; Africa News 2024). However, several migrants are deported daily from Algeria.

Since the Libyan revolution in 2011, Tunisia has also become a transit country for many African migrants en route to
Europe. To reduce the number of irregular migrants, the government of Tunisia continues to enforce deportation
of undocumented migrants and is sending migrants in buses to the Algerian border (Al Jazeera 2024). According
to the Tunisian coast guard, about 21,500 migrants were intercepted and rescued trying to reach Italy during the
first four months of 2024 (InfoMigrants 2024).

South Africa recently published amendments to its immigration regulations, which went into effect on May 20,
2024. Some of the measures include the introduction of a points-based system for the general work visa and for
long-term business visas, and a requirement for an applicant to register with an accredited relevant professional
body, council, or board recognized by the South Africa Qualification Authority (Ernst and Young 2024).

20 Data updated on April 30, 2024 (UNHCR 2024a, 2024b).

44
References
Africa News. 2024. “Niger: Agadez Re-Emerges as Migration Hub to Europe.” Africa News, May 1, 2024.
https://www.africanews.com/2024/05/01/niger-agadez-re-emerges-as-migration-hub-to-europe//.

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