THE KEYCONFLICTS AND OPERATIONS FROM HISTORY’S BLOODIEST WARhad dAdaAdadadaddaddAdddsaddadaaa.DEFINING BATTLES OF WORLD WAR Il ‘On11September 1939, Hitler's army marched into Poland. Two days later Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany. Just ‘over20 yearsafter the end ofthe Great War, in which 20 million people died the world wasbuackin the clutches of global confit ‘that would become the deadliest in history. For over ive years battles raged around the globe, from Europe and Asiato the ‘Alanticand Pacific. In Defining Battles of World War we takean {in-depth lookat some ofthe mos significant campaignsand key battles of the conflict, from early German manoeuvres in Western Europe and Hitler’ fateful decision toinvade the Soviet Union to the Japanese attacks on Perl Harbor and Singapore. We discover how the US took control a Midway, the Soviets stood firm at Stalingrad andthe British won the day a El Alamein, as wellas the Allo’ final decisive victories asthe war drew to close. In dition tothe fascinating features, wealso bring youstunning ‘ttle maps iconic imagery. and explore the key events and ‘defining moments that led the world to war once again.4 L FUTURE 4 rCONTENTS Ce COCR ea The defining moments and key Sere ene Ra UU PCR at aS ny Invasion of Poland, few expected Pree) 8 month Poe a Care eee eer ig emer rears Pa aaa eer Cece ces nace ns aan Era a re Ce ey Se Roo eet EU cGy y Cod eee Pane cece ret Cre ec eee ee ALLIES TAKE CONTROL ora ag Pre ad ey Poe Preteen CO a) Crees ee eee ee a ead peared Pea uid Cae Pee nd Ponce eCe an peti rer ea) ray Pon acd rere Paerenber renee tame face to face in the largest Pn eT cry a a eC ee ra ean ery panna EU Ly ee ry oe een eae kris rey aay Pree ut mlag eis re pee eres as ec cua eerie pC uta a ane Pe eee defended Bastogne alone during the Panne oe ‘Armored Onision got there before them ert Pee an LY ee eg rs eee eae ae etc) Pee pe eRe the Pacific required an arduous 82 days er ees Pea hy oes aS Soviet Red Army brought Hite's Third PaneerSN ODOR OR OR aT] Pam oRe ces ecm Ele of the ene a aR ma Aan e shadow of the*Nazi Party — Cys aaa and Pea M ec mm Coys) oles erica tatein (cleo cS ia rae] Allied tactics of Eyelet reid Le hcele) 1216 Ber arlene Acca me PeaceRISE And the road to | World War ITSa OD RCO ROR aT 28 une 1919 __ VERSAILLES TREATY SIGNED The verses Tealy os Ne ere Fan ON ee ons of en are pepper iS in he Hal of Mirrs the Palace of Versallos on the Gittins of Pars, the maior worng pares Si ace vest end Wok! Sor | though the terms are Vnevourable to Germany end the oer former cohorts of the Cental Powers he defeated rotns’represertaes af amped to camph. The fh tems impose monetary teparatons on Germany tet tmontualy exceed 132 biion Acamart, oF the equivalent F599 billon, Arise 231, how os the war gult cause, fine forces Germany to 2cceDt {il resportaty for ain te {Joba conti. “he treaty requres Geen to Vocals apronmate ten Det tent of ts tern, nus ; the euler fo Ae fh te Mineord. The German | fim is ined to only 100,000 tran, wi raval vessols ate festicted to maximum of 24 February 1920 NAZI PARTY FOUNDED ‘The Nationalist German Workers Party meets Emerging on the potical ferigh ‘a product of nationalism, economic discontent, and bbttemass over the terms ofthe Vorsalles Treaty, the German Workers Party meets in the ovarian city of Munich and adopts a new name, the National Sorlalist German Workers Party, Popularly known as the Nazis, the grou is intial @ tinge ‘movement but gains popularity ‘rong former members of the German army who develop a paramilitary cukure, wale the leadership begins a systematic programme of biaming Jews, Communists, and other elements in the back” that resulted defeat during World War |. The Nazis further promote the notion thatthe Germanic peopies are ‘ryan of master race, Adit Hie, ‘ordered by the Relohswehr to intitrate the party, is inluenced by Anton Drover leading member, and actualy Joins the organisation ‘5 ts S5th member, sing to of German society for the “stab 8-9 November 1923 BEER HALL PUTSC An ill-fated attempt to seize power leads to prison for Hitler Led by Alf Hier ac General Ech Ludendort, a hero of World War | the Nazis attempt a cou cota t see over in Munch and Bavaria, intending eventual to oust the weak government ofthe Weimar Repub. Nazi morchars ‘are confontes ty 130 policemen, and 16 Nals ore hiled fr wounded, while four police ofers le dead flowing an exchange of gun. Hier is injited, andthe abortive attemot fais. The Nas eed become marty, and the Boer Hall Pusch is the lig ofthe revered ‘Bloc Fag. rested ard te for high treason, Hier uses the cout roceedngs a5 8 plairm to launch a trade against the essing goverment. Rather than boing deported to his native Austria, Hier ls sentenced {0 fhe years in risen actualy serving about eight months.18 July 1925 MEIN KAMPF PUBLISHED Released through the Nazi central publishing house During his confinement in Landsberg Prison in Bavaria following carvicion on charges of high ‘reason stemming ffom the falled Munich Beer Hal Putech, Adal Hier citates the text of Main Kamp, his manifesto and autobiographical discourse of fe ‘events that have led him to personal conclusions Supporting the Nazi world view, to associate Rudott future Deputy Futwer of Germany. Mein Kempt lume | sels fewer than 10,000 copies In ts first. years however, Volume i follows in 2927. The basis for the Nazi Party's poltical and ideological fut, Maln Kempt rails against the forces Hil beloves have brought suffering to postWord War | Germany particulary he influences of international Jewry, France, Germany's traditional enemy; the communists ‘ond other poltieal partes: and the need for Lebensraum, of ling space; in the ast. Hier further promotes the noon ofthe Ayan, ang toaltaran National Socialist government. [a 41033, the year Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germary, the ook sells ver 2 milion copies. 1928-1932 San aOR ORR ORT 30 June ~ 2 July 1934 NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES Ssppor. ofthe German A wen tho strength of te Strmatielung roup of Nazi thugs led by Emst Rahm When geaty outnambers the army though alone aly of Hier whose SA has pliyed @ hey role i sehen ip on Germany, Ath is suspected Mal for party leaershp Therefore, Hier authorises Operation Humming, populary calles the Na of the Long Knives, sondng SS (Sehtztal land Gestapo personnal to accomplish 38 blood purge ofthe SA. The murders fr cariea ux sword eter polica fnemes, ncadng former Charelor Kurt von Seheleney, ar also eliminated. Many ofthe Sk leaders are arrested at the resort of Bad Wessse snd summary vested. Rohm fe among the 30 January 1933, A PROBLEMATIC Ina dramatic shift of power, the German establishment offers Hitler to office Party in recent elections and mao in the Rens, rnmending the apporiment of Aco Hitler 98 ehanelor in the goverment of President Pou von Hincenburs pament Is an atempt to exert oltical control over Hitler and minimise Nac influee ‘Of Germany. Papen comments to case aavsars, “Wav two moths we wil ave pushed Wer ao far na comer that he wil squeak” On the canton le Her who upes the potcal establishment with a ruthoss rise to power that eventually resuks in absolute rule In Germary. Eventhough party inftng led by a spirter movement Under Gregor Sasser conrbutes te some losses in the 1932 Relcntag election NAZI ELECTORAL TIDE The Nazis gain political influence during critical national elections defining the future of Germany AC frst, the Nazi Party exists as 8 fringe greup on the polteal, exphery of post werd War Germany. However, ding 3 series of rational elections the party advances from vitally no representation inthe Reichstag, the national assembly, to a majorty in just four years. During the Reichstag election of 1928, the Nac Paty receives three per cent ofthe vote and gains the attention of other German polticl parties. In 1930, the Nazis receive six milion votes, increasing their number of seatsin the Reichstag from 12 to 407, Hier chalenges Werld Wer | hero Paul von Hindenburg in the 1932 presidental election and loses, However, the Naz! candidate Fecoies 37 per cent of the vote In the Reichstag elections in July the Nazis garner 13.7 milion votes, ining malerty wth 230 seatsSN OD Rann ORT] 2 August 1934 EATH OF HINDENBURG ; ident, Hitler ith the death of Germany's presi Gass ‘to consolidate power in himself as dictator The death of 6yearold Paul on 415 September 1835 stan ndenburg, president of Germany and hero of Wedd War I feoves 4 (Staunton barr to Hes NUREMBERG LAWS th avon of power 25 Nex Atala ENACTED So scope ot te German ered Me coud folowing te NE of Be tog tomes, ier ates 2 The Reichstag passes laws restricting lia wo aie he aes rights of German Jews and fuelling Nazi Trident Te Geman people anrove 5 ideology as state policy esmemse resoundrly wi 90 9° : a ofthe vote te fms, tos of he Jovi ponlton fn Sd Her assumes the tte of Bre ical tensor te Ne persion of he nations Joe Furr For errr is 2utrty tre ther mreton a a ti of poly, Tu ae trou te Ear Love, tequatons Nou te Law Or te Potten of Geman Blood Soncons and energies te sae thu Geman Hocu ad th Rach Chana Ln. Te it Serco rae ane Banu cereal seal roc oe SPamssemtsm, ands peeona omane end Jo end te eso efComen wien nary sors as te economic tndr 5 years o ago by evan household, Te second Roriships of te Great Dereon Foden Sat en hoe peste of Geman or eed ee cove tenet Frese freeze. Oto! ndwdule ae stove of tho Cana. rege cars to supress Detoepes eld ea tale pala enposton in Gemma consiees a Jon based upon ance, and te anf son Viner pepsres to evar on 2 tSponded tole oer ete popttons, The NUenbe een campo oF eH . {ate iw Hers 2505 erat» navel be Seonat te oF Cf Jewsh bureres end ter Nas evs feat ‘eaty of versales ‘onan poousten m Geman 16 March 1935 HITLER REPUDIATES VERSAILLES TREATY In a major foreign policy stroke, Hitler formally announces the renewal of military conscription in Germany [Athough the German armed forces have particular shall never make of the been conducting a covert progamme German natienal arms an instrument of of earmament for yoars, much of warlike aggression, but an insvument it withthe sssistance of the Soviet confined exclusively to defence and Union, Adolf Hitler announces ta the thereby the preservation of peace” German people and the world that the Hile’s proclamation rentroauces Thi Reich will no longer abide by the general military conserpton and its riltery disarmament restrictions of the the secretive vei ram miltary taining ‘eaty of Versailles. ‘and arms manufacture, For in ths very hour, the German The German Amy Is projected to Government renens resale before increase to 12 ears and 36 ahisions, the Germen people and before the _sgnieanty beyond the Versailes fentve word that will never step festrictions, The news is alarming, laeyond the bounds of preserving but the former Aled nations take no German honour and the freedom of __mearingil steps to cub the ineeasing the Reich,” Hier proclaims, “and in threat of German rearmamert.an aOR aOR OR ORT 13 March 1938 ANSCHLU WirH AUSTRIA GERMAN TROOPS: OCCUPY THE RHINELAND ____/ CHAMBERLAIN In direct wore of cs a of ; alles, German BECOMES PM Prime Minister Chamberlain presides over final drama leading to World War Il , is accomplished in 1830. although the German move is provocative and Hier Is prepared to pull tack repay Ifthe Aled nations respond with fore, ff. The Ales, partcuarly land embeldene the Fer to make further tetra Semands in Europe, 1 August 1036 THE 1936 OLYMPIC GA GAMES _ Berlin hosts the Games of the XI Olympiad ‘The eyes ofthe world focus on @ new and they view th ‘enparentiy prospercus Germany as Beri, propoganda eppor ami great pageantry, and foreign wstors ‘and dignitaries are tested th land deference. The Nazi persecution the Jews and other minoies has been fuly implemented, but all vestges of the * ‘Attough the Nats eve reputed the Verslles Treaty, reconstituted a stone ilar, and oocuped the Rhineland, wins four gold medals to Hitler's chaini SN OO RRR ORT 30 September 1938 MUNICH PACT Chamberlain of Britain and Daladier of France sign, away sovereign Czech territory to appease Hitler Inthe vain nope that another works war may be avoided, British Prime Minister Nevile Chamberlain ana French Primo Minister Edouard Daladler travel to Munich, Germany, to moet vith the Nazi Furor Adal Hiver and Benito Mussotin, the Fascist alan detator Hier ‘emands that the Sudetenland, @ region in western Czechoslovakia, be ceded from the sovereign Cechosiovak nation t greater Germany due to its German-speaking population. Czechoslovakia Is not Fepresented at tre conference. (Chamberlain and Dalador sign the "Munich Pact, ging in to Halers ‘demands and eventually sealing the fate ofall Cechoslovslia, whch the Nazis occupy the folowing sping without fring a shot. Chemberiain retums to Brain and receves @ ‘warm welcome, Addressing the ‘rowd and waving a document that boars the slgnstures of the various leaders, ne proclaims, “Peace for ‘our tine The Munich Pact stands 10 this ay as stark evidence of the failed Alied doctrine of appeasement ‘that contibuted to the outbreak ‘of World War I, Some observers, ‘among them future Bish Prime Minister Church, grouse that the ‘agjeement is @ dpiomatic detest ‘@.Noven = THE NIGHT OF BROKEN GLASS _ tte 2 wn estonacr, he Nt of Sake Gas. seas Ketan ne NON ce ents agaret Te ato vs scons Nex Somer ye tees, barca oe (ansace vag? Jone ae lea te aoa ae ‘Approximately 30,000 Jewish men ar rao camps be Nar ue He ‘Soman Pose, ab an excise ‘uthorities ignore the atrocities. 15 March 1939 GERMANY OCCUPIES CZECHOSLOVAKIA After annexing Sudeteniand, Nazi Germany extends its territorial gains as troops occupy all of Czechosiovakia Aor annexing Suetoians the previous autumn, Nasi Germany sends troops accoss the Frome to occupy al of Czochosiraha. Hier compote his blosioss conquest ofthe county afer intmiating Czech Prime Minister Er wh treats of bembing the eaptl ety of Prague. has previous offered concessions to Hier, but none ae eatstacten the evening, Hilr arte in Prague 1 3 Amy rendered ine, whe tremendous resources, inching substantia coal and on deposts and ste production feces, come into the poseesslen ofthe Nox goverment. The Shoda Works, which produce outstanding modem weapon is now a the disposal of the German mtn. Shovaia is declred independent, axnough ft ema a Naa! Puppet stat, whee Gonemia and Morava are designated 9 German Protectorate22 May 1939) PACT OF STEEL Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy sign an alliance that openly threatens peace in Europe ‘Atnough talian Fasclst dictator Brito Mussolini inital opposes tho rise of Hiter and the Nazis Germ, partiulry due to the Fire's agressive terror demands, the two leaders iseover common ound in ther us for empire. Intact, Hier Nas tonsidered Mussoli, is senior as something of 3 role model forthe emergence ofthe totaltaran state in Germany. By te spring of 1939, the two leaders have directed thelr forelgn ministers to conclude an ‘agjooment known popularly as the Pact of Steel and pectclly as the Pact of Friendship and Alkance Between Germany and italy. The agreement pledges diplomatic and multary cooperation between the ‘wo counties, talys Count Galeazzo Ciano and Germany's Joachim son Ribbentrop sign the treaty in Beran, and ‘he pact includes @ secret supplementary protocol ‘that provides exltional mutual covert econamc and maitary assurances. Original, Japan has been a probable signatory, but the European partners wah to forus on Bitain and France while the Japanese are preoccupied wth conelading an bgyeement ofeing securty agains the Soviet Union. Japan later joins Germ and aly in the Tipartte Foe near | 23 August 1939 NAZI-SOVIET _ an aOR CORR OR Ga 4 September 1939 GERMANY INVADES POLAND German forces invade Poland, and World War II erupts as Great Britain and France declare war After faticating a socalled border incident with the Poi miltary, Geman frcas rol nt Poland and unleash the Bliakig, oF Ugg Wor, a8 they press toward ‘bjetves incuding the capital ely of Warsaw. German troops, tank, erly. and ‘craft overwhelm te Posh Army, which mounts a heroic bu futle resistance Poland fom the east on 17 September, whe the German campaign of conquest is concioed in 38 das, Meanie, Bish Prime Minister Nevile Chambers adresses the nation on 3 September, Stang sombrey, This maming the Bish ambassador i Betin Nanded the German goverment a fal note statng that unless we head fen them by 11 otoek that they wore prepared at once to maw thei troops am Fold, 2 has been receved, and that consequerty his county is at war wih Germany Both Great Brin and Trance formal declare war on Nasi Germany on 3 September 1899, plunging Europe into Word War I NONAGGRESSION PACT Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the bastion of communism, shock the world withthe anqouncement of a nonageression pact that pledges peace between the two counties, The news is partculany starting in the West, whlen has understood that the communists or Hitlers swor ‘enemies. Actualy, the Soviet Union ‘and Nazi Germany have cooperated for years during the covert program of Geran miltary roarmament in violation of the Versailes Treaty. The counties have further engaged in substantial econamie ede. Signed In the Soviet capital of Moscow, the ‘agreement stipulates that etter country wil ally ise with or aid an enemy of the other Itai Includes & secret protocol, which acknowedges ‘ets the stage for each country's invasion of neighbourng Polar, triggering Word War I Hier sreds the agreement in June 4941, taking advantage of @ nave Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and launching an invasion ofthe Sovet UnionWORLD 18 SIEGE OF WARSAW 24 BATTLE OF ‘When Gormany launched THE ATLANTIC its Invasion of Poland, few Diecowr the kay role ‘expected the capital ly to played by the US In the fallin tess than & month longest campaign of World wart! AT WAR 28 THE FALL 32 BATTLE OF BRITAIN OF FRANCE Following the fall of France, Poland had falon quick, ‘Geman set its sights on Britain, and ony tho mon but everone expected France to Pit op ser ofthe Royal A Fore ‘food inthe way resistance ~ unit the Germans. sttacked36 OPERATION BARBAROSSA [Gormanys. invasion of the Sovlet Union was Hier ‘geatast gamble of WAIL, and the bloody realisation of his most ambitious dreams 42 PEARL HARBOR Imperial planning and preparation for the surprise Ssttack on Peart Harbor Degan ‘months before the Sunday ‘morning aera assault 50 THE FALL OF SINGAPORE British defences in Malaya and Singapore proved unable to stop the Japanese juggemaut, or even slow K downSIEGE OF WARSAW POLAND 1-27 SEPTEMBER 1939 When Germany launched its invasion of Poland, few expected the capital city to fall in less than a month ithe eaty hous of 1 September 1939, the German battleship Schleswig Holstein fed te first shot of Word War I, The German campaign pan, Fall Weiss (Case ite) swung ito action {and the wore was ntduced Yo @ new form of warfare that would later be recalls as ‘bitzwieg (lightning wa) Athough debate continues over how meaningful the term i, and how deeply rooted in Geman planing it was, there can be no doubt that speed was the defining characteristic of the Invasion of Pols. On the seventh day ofthe campaign, German tanks were approaching the Cuter of Warsaw andthe stage had been et fora bret yet btal siege. woRos oavo sini The seeds of World War had been planted at the end ofthe Great War, with Germany agarieved by terol losses to Poland, including the Pomeranian corridor, which split East Prussia from the rest of Germany, and te designation of the port of Danzig as a fee ty ‘y 1939, Poiana was counting on protection from France and Great Britain as Germany made increasingly belicose attempts to regain its territory. An initiative to pull the Soviet Union Into an ant.German aiance failed due to Polish mmisghvings over Russian Intent and on 25 August 1939, the stunning Molotov Ribbentrop non: ‘aggression pact placed Poland between two rapacious and suddenly cooperative powers. The invasion force ln 1939 Goran Army was not cut the sot runing machine itis usualy characterised as, beng. As war appracted only a actin ofthe ‘army had been mechanized and the bub oft stil relied on horses, bieyces and its awn fet. ‘By concentrating alo i's mechanised and motorised cvsions on Poland, however, Germany vas able to create massive local superiority ‘An aavantage in tanks of 2,511 to 615 would no doubt have proved decisive enough, but the German pian allowed them to enoy a beter than leigieto-one advantage at the points of attack, The tanks involved were nat the powerful behemoths ofthe later war years. Tanks woreLtlised in an antinfanty role and the majorty were Panzerkampfweten types | and I, armed with machine guns or 20mm cannon respectively. There were less than 100 of the more powerful Pkt, armed with a 37mm gun, while the ‘Tamm equipped PzKpfw IV was used as fre ‘suppor platform. ‘he Germans also enjoyed a significant ‘advantage in artiery, with 5,805 guns to 2.065 forthe Poles. What iferetiated the German use of armour was its massing in panzer divisions (combined ‘rms units with tanks 2s wel as motorised artlry and infantry), The use of high-quality ‘adios was of erteal importance, as it lowed for 2 great fexbilty in movement and rapid responses te problems. ‘The Germans also enjoyed an advantage in ‘manpower of at least 2.5: although in reality twas greater as Polish mobilisation was never really completed. The birth of ‘blitzkrieg’? Germany wanted, and needed, a quick victon. Wit Britain and France declaring their support for Poland, the campaign would need to be fought and won before the western powers could react. German divisions could then bo rushed westwards to face an antcipatod French offensive. Polish planning took this into account. Belleving ‘they needed only o buy enough tine forthe French to mobilise and launch a massive offensive ‘against Germany ter entre strategy was fawed from th start. Compouncing this flaw was the fact ‘that France believed Poland would be abie to nate ‘ut for atleast vee months. The Poles therefore called for an intial defence oftheir west tortor, flowed by a planned withdrawal to defensive positions along the Vistula River, Such a defence would not only signal that Poland was wing to int (and therefore worthy of its promised support om France and Britain, but aso glue time for mobilisation of ts forces tobe complete. ‘ho Gorman plan throw al ofthis into confusion. Whether or not there was a coherent acceptance ofthe concept of Bitzi the term itself was almost certainly coine by aural, not a teneral, German commanders accepted the need te move quichy. This paramount objective would ‘overwhelm Polish resistance in a matter of weeks. Invasion German forces aimed to converge on Warsaw ‘fom two rections. From the north, Army Group North, under Feder van Bock, marched with 25 divisions, From the southwest came Army Group South, 26 divisions stron, under Gera von Rundstet, With 630,000 and 888,000 men respectively, the two amy groups significantly ‘outnumbered the Posh defenders, Warsaw was a target from day one. The Luftwaffe was tasked with bombing the city, but weathor conditions on 4 September wore {ar from ieal andthe spinted defence ofthe Brygada Poscigowa, the ‘Pusult Brigade’, took the German airmen by surprise. The majority of Polanc's squadrons nad been allocated to support its varous field armies, but the 84 planes of the Pursuit Brigade, mostly obsolete PZL P14 fighters, ‘owned 16 uuttwatfe alcrat on the frst day ot the war. Losses inthe Polish Air Force were catastrophic, however, and against the vastly superior Messerschmitt 81 109 and the new introduced BF 110, as well as defensive fee trom bombers, the PAF was to lose around 85 percent of ts ‘aireraft during the short war ‘German propaganda insisted that the Polish planes had been destroyed on the ground in ‘the frst two days ofthe igting, but in fact the Poles nad wise scattered ther arratt anc only unserviceable wrecks had been caught on the syound atthe main arfelds. Nevertheless, air defence quickly became ited to antaierant uns as the PAF was riven fom the skies. The stage was set forthe sinister Stuka dve-bomber ta write ser into history Relatively stow (it would perform disastrousy in ‘the later Batl of rain against Huricanes and Spitfire} the 340 Stukas of the Luftwaffe reveled in the open shies above Poland, attacking nos of ‘communication ans, railway lines and other key tactical targets at wl and becoming in many ways ‘the symbol of bitzlrog. ‘The German plan was not runing as smoothly as their propaganda claimed, however ‘SIEGE OF WARSAW Coordination between the panzer and infantry ‘visions was patchy andthe Poles were enioving ‘success with their 37mm anttank weapons, even fempoying obsolescent armoured trains effectively Polish cavalry was sil useful due tots rapaity ‘of movement, butt was never use in full seale charges against pacers, as German propaganda claimed (a successful charge was mounted ‘aginst an infatry unt, but was then repalod by ‘advancing German tanks) Warsaw under attack Following the contusion of the early days of ‘the war, the Germans began to make serious ‘advances. Most worying forthe defending Poles was that they were unabe to retreat as quickly a the Germans were advancing. Pressure on two Polish armies, Army Lede an Army Prusy,resuited Ina gap developing between them, wide enough for the Germans to race through. By the afternoon (fT September, elements of 1st and ath Panzer Dhisions had reached Warsaw. ‘By now, Luftwaffe raids were having more of an eect. and the ubbie of destroyed bullaings dotted the landscape, Distessing ‘though this was for the evlian population, it ‘actualy helped wit the preparation of defences the bombed-out buildings provided excellont over for the placement of antitank guns and antler oleces. ‘In addition o this, ctehes were dug, ail tines ripped up and planed int the ground to fem rucimentary tank traps, and baricages bul. ram cars were toppled over to block roads “BY CONCENTRATING ITS MECHANISED AND MOTORISED DIVISIONS ON POLAND, GERMANY WAS ABLE TO CREATE HUGE LOCAL SUPERIORITY”20 WORLD AT WAR (0n 8 September, as the defenders waited the rumbling sound of advancing tanks began to buld as the rst units of 4th Panzer Ovsion advanced cautiously inte a hostile and unfamiliar environment. The tanks, mast Type | ang I panzers, were thinly armoured and unable to withstand anything more substantial than ‘machine-gun fre, The 37mm and 75mm shel fired at them, often at pont blank range from behind te imorovised defensive works onthe streets of Warsaw, easily tore through the thin armour. Many of th Panzer Division's tanks were destroyed in tis way before the attack was called of. “The Poles had served notice that they would not gee up their cty without 2 fit, but how determines that fg woud be wasup for abate, The evening befor, the Polish commander, Edward Ryde Smily (who nad defended Warsaw from the Bolsheviks in 1920), had taken a fateful ‘ecision. Convinced that Warsaw was about to be ‘surrounded by the rapidly advancing Germans, he ‘ordered the bulk ofthe army command apparatus to relocate to Brzesc-nad-Buglem (Brest Litovsk) {Ate worst possible moment, wit its armies reeling under the German onslaught, the Polish ‘command structure isntegrated The tanks of Ath Panzer Division attacked ‘again on 9 Soptomber, but were again repulsed. Polish defences had been strengtnered overnight ‘and the “Children of Warsaw Brigade’ had been recalled tothe city, launching series of smal righ time raids to keep the Germans off balance. The Polish counterattack (ne tea in which bitzrieg et the Germens vulerable was in ther susceptbity to counter ‘attacks on thelr exposed flanks AS ther dvsions raced along as fast as thoy could, twas inevitable that some would become strung ox and with thelr focus on what was immediately infront of them, a force on their flanks might be overlooked, “ust such a situation nad arisen with Army Poznan. Bypassed bythe aovancing German fri as they had streamed past to te north and south, ts commander, Tadeusz Kutzeba, had begged fr permission o hurt his fresh tuo0p8 against the fan ofthe avarcing sions. Repeatedly. Rycz Smigly had refused Dut ‘ow, wth the situation becoming desperate, he finaly cquiesced. ‘The German Eighth Army was the tart, ‘bist unaware ofthe danger as inteligence had mistakeniy reported Army Poznan retreating 10 Warsaw. As evening approached on 9 September, twee Polish infantry dsions, fanked by two cavalry brigades, attacked two German infantry sions along the Bzura River. After 24 hours of fighting, tho Germans wor frcod to withdraw and ‘around 1,500 men were taken prisoner. roto ster ‘ae derayes reamoges ‘on ngs ‘rovgnnt ey twas a small victory, butt achieved ts primary pal that of buying time forthe defences of Warsaw to be strengthened and for more units to ‘make it safely bac to the cy. Eptomising this was the real of 1st and Ath Panzer Divisions ‘rom Warsaw to Join n an encicing movement on ‘my Poznan The good news for Warsaw was, of course, bad news for Amy Poznan, which was quickly surrounded. Kutrzea had hopes of ting Fis way though tothe east, whien would have alloned the army to reach Warsaw, but instead was forced to tum northwares inte face of verwhelming enemy forces, (n 16 September the Luftwaffe sent 820 planos against the trapped Poles in tho "Baura Pocket’, who were also being ummeled by ‘arly re, while panzer forces closed in. Te fend was Inevitable, and although some units ‘id manage to break through a weak spot in the German cordon, amy Poznan was virtually ‘anniniated. A staggering 120,000 men were taken prisoner. had been @ brave aversion, but the inferior ‘communications systems ofthe Poles had proved tobe a major hancicap. It had also only hela up the German advance fram ane direction, Out of the north came the two armies of Amy Group ‘North, closing in once more on the utimate goa! of Warsaw. The city Worsan vas a city of 2.3 milion inhabitants, inctuging te argest Jewish popuation outside New York ~ 350,000 Jews called Warsaw home, fd most were to suffer @harendous fate in he Years that followed the German capture ofthe ci. Irnialy, the bei that France woud auchly launeh an offensive on the opening of the war had rot eny misled the Poles, it had also hampered German panning. Unwin io hove its forces commited 00 fr tothe east incase they needed to respond quick toa French attack, German commanders had been tentative about crossing the Vistula River By the mid of September realty was dawning the French were not about to move quicly and the armies engaged in Poland were free o roam at wil. Bock’ Amy Group North was theretore abe to move southwards on both Sides ofthe Vistula, posing a much more serious threat othe Polish defensive postions. Tid“AIR DEFENCE QUICKLY BECAME LIMITED TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AS THE PAF WAS DRIVEN FROM THE SKIES. THE STAGE WAS SET FOR THE STUKA DIVE-BOMBER TO WRITE ITSELF INTO HISTORY” ‘Amy was in the vanguard as German units again pushed down towards Warsaw. In the beleaguered city atthe time was an american journalist, Julien H Bryan, who remained to document the assault. Armed with 2 stil camera and a Bell & Howell ine camer, he captured images ofthe city under the hammer fof the German war machine. n particu, the incessant air attacks Nad become a monotonous terror. “By the 12th day.” Bryan reported in his documentary fm ‘Siege, “it wes absurd even to ‘und alarms, for there was always an air raid.” Bryan's film, smuggled out after the cy tl, gave a limpse ofthe work undertaken to construct defences and the devastating etfects ‘of German incendiary bombs, whieh turned whole blocs into inferno. The siege of Warsaw ‘The Polish plan was stilt hang on uni help ‘arrved fom France, so keeping fed armies intact was of paramount importance. On the same dy that Ryde Smily had shifts the Polish command ‘antes fom Warsaw, he hag issued an ominous ‘order - men within @ certain age range were also to leave the oty The inevitable conclusion was that Warsaw was being ett its fate, wth manpower shifted further eastwards, out of rach ofthe advancing German. The order was £0 frightening, in fact, that it was ignored, with the general in charge of ‘he defence of Warsaw, Waleran Czuma, ageeing withthe mayor, Stan Sterns thatthe men \Wete needed 10 defend the cy. For the population, it was a teiying time. ‘There was no doubt that the war was going badly, leven eisastrously, Alexander Polonus, tapped in the subutbs of the cty as the noose tightened, ‘old later ofthe hopelessness experienced in ‘the face of German miltary superiority: “At the boginning ofthe war,” he noted, on 8 September, wo wore always trying to distinguish the colours and markings ofthe planes to see which were the enemy; but now few even took the tovble: whatever aeroplanes wore heard We 100k for ‘ranted that they were German, (nthe same day, Ryd Smiglyhad issued an cordor that resistance was to continue Posters appeared in the ct, urging the atizens to arms (06 Bron) and declaring that it would be defended ‘to the last man, Retresting units were fncing tele way Into the ity and there was ite doubt that events wore reaching thee ertcal pont. ‘The city was net yet surrounded, however. German forces were closing in from the nortn, bt to the west, the Bzura counterattack was sil ying up Rundsted’s armies. To the south, there was hope inthe form of four frtcations, Forts Szczesivicki Mokotoweki, Dabrowski and Cenmiakowsi. The forts were old, though, and Mokotowshi had been paral ismantied in propaation for being converted to a storage facity. They were a comforting presence forthe vlan population, but they could not hope to old back modern German forces for lone. Keeping the civitan population under control was becoming increasingly dificult as the righimarih realty ofa siege began to sink in Polonius wrote of bakeries being roken Into by hungry mobs, while Bryan, the American journalist stuck in the city filmed the bodies of women ‘machine-gunned by German panes wile freeing for potatoes. “Sleeping is a peacetime prejud Polonius wrote in his lary on 10 September." spent the night in hearing the stunning dn of heavy vehicles on the road, a8 the cons of lies and armoured cars passed through the vilage.” Later he would wite ofthe teroras his house was bombed and strafed By 19 September the cy was flooded with refugees, begging inthe steets and beg ‘rected to ai stations which were, in Poonius's words, “sheer mockery. There is invariably an enormous quove but no food or drink.” The stench of ting corpses began to fil the ait, The fall Fitingly enough, in what Polonus desorbed “this speedtest of al wars, the endfor Warsaw camo quichiy. As the Bzura counterattack fzled ‘out, German forces completed the encirclement of the ety by 24 September, commiting 12 aivisions tothe task The shot, shar lessons learned by the panzer forces in the eariersret nti. Mad nelped persuade the German command that the capture ofthe city would be best let inthe hands ofthe alWORLD AT WAR antiery and Lutwate.& thousand guns wore ‘amassed around Warsaw to pure! the ct, while the airforce continued its ar acs. (On 23 September, @ major assault was beaten bake by the desperate Polish defenders, but two ays later resistance appeared futile in the face ‘of @ huge arilery bombardment, accompanied by bombing rads featuring 1,200 planes, Warsaw isappeared under a pall of smoke, which actually made it dificult for Luftwaffe panes to spot their targets, resuiting in numerous “friendly tre casualties among German ground units. The forts to the south of he cty fel the next ay, ater determined infantry assaults. For. Mokotowshi, ome tothe Polish Broadcasting Station, had kept transmiting upto the 25th espt being repeatedly targeted from above by German Bombers, Resistance was stil an ‘option, as fresh eserves of ammunition nad been ‘wanspered into the city via locomotive, but the cost was becoming to high. “feel that |am growing abnormal,” Polonius wrote as the siege neared its inevitable conclusion. “When the guns ar fring fee! quite ‘assured and light of heart, but lam afraid ofthe ‘ience” Posh troops had arved at his house on the 26th setting up @ new defensive perimeter as the Germans closed in, but the folowing day the soldiers were ust ae euddony withdrawn. The city had surrendered. ‘The aftermath ‘As many a8 40,000 civilians had died curing the sige of Warsaw. Following its capture, the Jewish population was to suffer most tthe hands ofthe ‘German occupers, fst forced to Ive in a cramped hetto (where an estimated 63,000 would die of tisease and starvation) and later transported to ‘death camps for more organised extermination. “Warsaw's capture had never boon in doubt from the moment it was fe as the target ofthe German offensive, and events elsennere haa ensured asin fate forthe ene county. ‘The Ribbentrop Molotov pact, signed just before the opening ofthe war na called forthe partition of Poiand between Germany athe Soviet Union ‘As Poland hung gry on, wating forthe promised ‘assistance from tales in the west, Russian forces massed along its eastem border, Tis army was fa inferior othe one that had rolled aver Poland's westem borers 2 few woeks earer. The Soviet army was badly led and coxganised, butt id not need to do much more than occupy the teritory alloted to it under the terms ofthe Molotov Ribbentrop pact - Poland had shited almost alts forces to the west: face the Garmans. The two great arigs, unaware that they would shorty be pitted against each other, calmly vied Poland between themselves. The cost of defeat fr Warsaw was immen ‘nt the end ofthe war, when Soviet forces ‘verted’ the city, they woud find @ popuation of just 174,000. ‘THE NORTHERN APPROACH 15 Septenterthe Gemans aback, stn sprucing fam art Stougbambsnis othe suai he abu ot Pagan the estar te beso east he ts sore by 12 German dios. 0125 September ange artery emanate we tombe rads ‘THE FLIGHT OF ARMY POZNAN Fed xing saga ove tt donned cota, theromntt Amy Pan es nyt Wan Te oacs bug pecs dre rgnestn ot fences ate youth state eng espet,ONO BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC Discover tHe key role played by the US in the @. om Poeaeec aa en a 4 ad Perr rear eee eer eee oe yea ed ern art cette) one eprrr aan anees eee eet eee eee et eee Pee ete eee ee ark eee] eet ree neeateehene eaters anes ind Eee eae nee ern cee et aony beac errant eat Cr Dray aveUy Port) ra SOSEPTEMBER 1940 a aan atte) Cerone eer ered eed elie pices beeen Sota ship, was carrying general cargo when pert errr Peesrvenrer neta crear pen ane tery Reena ain eo paleo arenas ene eee etry eee heated renee ted PerensBATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC eS vre /> WAVE AFTER WAVE OF NEW TYPE Pras fF _ IXSUBMARINES FOLLOWED UNTIL + US DEFENCES IMPROVED WITH THE }, INTRODUCTION OF DESTROYERS AND NAVAL CONVOYS” CRE Srp te a a ie ibeWORLD AT WAR eee react errs Seen ttt center ne ores Peter erent ett rem eat te ome eC tech ay et ere ; pea a Teatro eet rs porierben nearer reeset Pret opanrost sti) en se ren eer romantica eet pameetceioey pene ee errr td Pocerireetme ecto tn a See oer eerie upeestee rer Perrot rer res Pee ere ns Error ennrtenrecsenrten Emenee eet ore teeter etn) Cer ey epee) eer hee) prereset ea Recreate ra a eres een errors eee CTL Tor) Se cy Peers Cnet preaneennei este Morena terpenes peat parece eoever start ere re peetieny Tote Premera omer eset neared Set tee et cea oe cee ae pa ener eee eee ee ae eee ae Peer ee cee tg eee et nearedBATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC eto” rat ae) . rm oy ag : ‘econ mon Eemaitenerseey ficial ond te longest coer Cer ee) rea png eper une soaemetr peranoneenrees ters rr eee eee tte oa eceueneny te ener tien Ponrerectrtry Peer croatia 7 Preetoncerscmeeriny M Seem ies Peery potential ereenen cern irmronenenrey Pee oeeeetene Yc) Poe eperennt ote fichieeteaneer ean eas Liescoiretanaeterny peste see ret LAST ACTION IN sit NSS RC cy a a al eel c a) eer err Tat eneareiniiaentameinint arr any pecentnetyennereeasin {ial American merchant ship was sunk in the war when eee vere iny ec oereacee peaier ar team neby peeing io ene eee oemeenrremer tel in irene ena Se ee Ey Releeseroper niet neenoen Alig iberators as they ee erry Pheer rena etl psa ee pec cet cmenisarsy alieeteponteercamnenny eae pie rarer Ce ey | Ceti ener eres ei ecco eee ee Paerisrieth enti ieeer irons Peete eereretes Perr nrretere ern ooops aes por tery ease eee ee eee err ferececnene eons perenne penn spre Poe ern trace of the ship mained ptt Lica eernesTHE FALL OF FRANCE 10 MAY - 25 JUNE 1940 Poland had fallen quickly, but everyone expected France to put Up stiffer resistance ~ until the Germans attacked 28ho syle of warfare unleashed by Naat Germany atthe start of Wort Wari was not new. The shocking demolition of Poland's armed forces had been breathtaking ‘and bole but it followed long-established German strategie princiles. ‘Germany could not atford to engage in protracted wars of attrition. World War | had rowed what the outcome of sucha confict was likely oe. The nation cid not have the natural resources requted fo a war etfor lasting years, hie is mtd coastline made blockades easy twenforce. Germany had always needed to seek ‘2 quick knock-out bow, and the plans fr Works War had conformed to that need, before it had become bogged down in static trench warfare. Nevertheless, the world saw Germany's tactics ‘8 something new, and would enisten it ltanrieg ~‘ightong war Folowig the fll of Poland, Europe braced itso forthe next blow. When ft came, i would bbe on a scale unseen before, What was most remarkable, however, was not the methods ‘empioyed by the Germans, but the sheer audacity (ofa small group of commenders. Men lke Heinz CGucerian simply ignored the misgivings (and sometimes the direct orders) oftheir superiors. Tho Gorman Army as a whole had ne faith In or understanding ofthe tactics championed by Guderan, Repeatedly, the commanders of Germany's massive army groups would caution ‘against advancing too quicy or stretching ines (ef communication too thinly. Men ike Gera von Fundstest, commander af Army Group A, were ot aisopies of itzieg, and were openly hostile tothe plans put forward by Guderian, Their misgivings seem misplaced in hindsight, but atthe ‘ime there were soli reasons for their doubts. ‘The plan to smash the Alles in the opening phases of the imasion of France was breathtaking ints scale. An entire amy gro, Army Group B, was o be used asa dersion, attacking ‘through northem Belgum and the Netnerands and drawing the Alles northwards to meet them. Meanwhile, Army Group A would move through the ‘Ardennes into Belgium and Luxembourg, Tore wore reasons why tho Altes were likly to fal or tis ruse. Fst, an attack through northern Belgium was anticipated. Seconaly ‘the Germans would devote much of ther ir power tothe fein, to both destroy Alle ai forces and reinforce the deception. Thirdly, the Ardennes wore believed tobe impassable to large ‘armoured formations, The German troops that opened the German campaign, Case Yellow, on 10 May 1940, were not the unstoppable war machine of common perception. Oly ten ofthe 135 divisions allocated to the offensive were mechanised, The vast bul aa Seen) eee oe ey Cr ea Te d the THE FALL OF FRANCE ‘ofthe men wore placing infantry, marching on {oct or on horse-crawn cars, Where Guderin’s plan excelled was ints concentration of force. The cutting edge of the newly formed armoured divisions were the panzer, but they equied infantry support, Rather than allowing the infantry to slow his tanks down, ‘Guserian mounted them ln vehicles ofthe own, {0 the entre dvsion could move at high speed ‘There were limited resources, ten armoured visions would make up the spearhead of Army (Group forthe thrust through the Ardennes, witha corps commanded by Guderian inset, comprising three parzer dvsions, the tp of the spearhead. ‘Superd communications would be key (German tanks were equipped with excolnt radio systems), a8 Would the inate allowed junior ‘commanders. Rather than sticking to rig orders, ‘they would be free to thnk onthe feet and react to developments ‘Speed of movement would be the Germans! secret weapon. Army Group A planned to cover the 4100 mies from Geemany’s border tothe banks 2330 ofthe Meuse River in just threo days. It was Seheduled to crass the next eay and then kee ‘moving, pushing al the way tothe Channel Senior amy commanders either smirked at the ambition of sucha pian, or expressed genuine concer, but Guderian had the utmost faith in his ov tactics. Reserve panzer crews, were carted on vericies to make sure the tanks {id not need to stop. Refueling depots were set up along the route of march and suppbes wore caried bythe vehicles themselves. Amphetamines wor liberally supplied tothe ‘men whe would be expected to remain awake and ‘able to fight for tree consecutive nights after crossing the Meuse. The Ales were well equipped, in terms of men and matorel, to counter the German offensive. There were less than 2,500 tanks in the German armies, while the Alles had over 4,000. Importantly, the Aled tanks wer often superior In terms of armour and weaponry. ‘A power was fay equal. The Luftwaffe had 2,500 planes availabe atthe opening of the teampaign. The French had 900 and the British ‘added 500, in aston tothe ai forces of Belgium and the Netherands. Where the Germans held the advantage was ln choosing tel pint of attack. With the ‘lies eispersed to guard against many diferent Seenarios, there was a window of opartunty. I “AIR STRIKES BEGAN ON THE MORNING OF 10 MAY. EQUALLY MATCHED IN THE AIR, THE GERMANS CONCENTRATED ON DESTROYING ALLIED PLANES ON THE GROUND” the German advance stalled for any reason, the ponderous Alied armies could converge and stop itinits tracks, Arstkos began on the moming of 10 May. Equally matched inte ar, the Germans concentrated on destroying Aled planes onthe round, wiping out the bulk ofthe Dutch A Foxe In this manner. By 13 May, the Germans had reached the coast of the Netherlands. othe south, the move through the Ardennes: hag become a near farcical mess a8 cvisions crossed each other and got caught in a 170smle uate jam, Criealy, enough of the armoured ‘sions haa got through to reach the Meuse and ‘make a crossing ahead of schedule. Gudrian ‘ow pushed on logging his men and machines ina race to the coast. was risky in the extreme, {she was moving past the Duk of the French ‘my and was highly vulnerable to a flank attack, but the French moved with agonising slowness, \Where they ai get close enough o engage the GGormans, they were badly mauled. The French 4st ‘Armoured Dvsion, with 370 tanks, found sell reduced to just 36 tanks in one cay of ightng. ‘tough the French often had superior machines, the Germans integroted thelr ant-tank guns far more effectively with thei pancers, effectively running ccles around the French isolating their tanks and destroying them in huge numbers. Total disaster soan raced the British Expeditionary Force, enclosed ina shrinking pocket around the port of Dunkirk. Tens of thousands of French soldiers were trapped as well, but now the German high command betrayed Guderian and his exhausted men. Hiter's Infornous “Halt Orde’, delvered on 24 May, forced the panzers to stop. Guserian could ignore the ‘orders of his commanding general, But not the Ftror himself. A mistaken belie thatthe terain round Dunkick was unsuitable for tanks, and the boasts of Hermann Garin that e could fish off the Alles at Dunkirk with his Luftwatfe, persuaded Hitler to cal off the tanks. The Brtsh were able to evacuate the but of their men, as wel as 122,000 French solders, but the Battle of France as far from ove.‘There were stil thousands of British troops In France, as well as a significant airforce, and ‘a new defensive line was established, hs time ‘unning along the Somme and Aisne rivers. [Almost incredibly, Britain sent more troops back ‘over to France just days after plucking men from Dunkirk. Almost alof the rescued French were also repatiiated But France was @ spent force. Germany ‘sitened to Case Red, which planned forthe compete destruction of France's armed forces, tho job was already mostly done. Having lost ‘more than a milion men, dead, wounded or taken prisoner, France was staggering, wth just 6 sions left to face the German invaders. Many ofthe units were also ina tebe state as far as ‘orale wos concerned, “wo days ator the Germans occupied Paris, (14 June, Brain staged a second major ‘evacution, iting 124,000 men from France. A desperate plan to merge Britain and France as @ ‘singe united country to continue the fig came te nothing and France signed an armistice with (Germany on 22 June ‘The fal of France had happened more quickly than anyone had dreamed possibe. Anyone, ‘that is, excep the visionary commanders Ihe Guderian, who had proved that blitzkrieg could bring a major power ots knees in a mattor of weeks, THE FALL OF FRANCE [ABOVE 1 Ben Expatonary Fores was ama a th ar of he capa bat wal canned aPeaBATTLE OF BRITAIN, BATTLE OF BRITAIN JULY - OCTOBER 1940 Following the fall of France, Germany set its sights on Britain, and only the men of the Royal Air Force stood in the way ‘ew battles have names that resonate as much a tha attaches to the fgting over the skies of Bain atthe end of 1940. Rt the ‘time, the pubic Wewed the actions ‘ofthe Royal Air Force both as sting testament to the git ofthe nation, and as alst stand against tho might of Nazi Gormary. “he fighting between Messerschmitt and Spite, ang between Hurricane and Heinkel, {id rot take place a vacuum. Both the Germans and Ertish knew that it was just the preliminary stag ofthe planned invasion of England. if the RAF cracked, Britain faced the same fate as Poland, Belglum, the Netherands ‘end France. A few hundred fighter planes were fl that held the German war machine at bay ‘108s the Channel, Despite its importance, the dates encompassing the Batl of Britain ae cifcut to pin down. Debate continues aver when it sterted and when i finished, Tis s partly because it blew up and then petered out tke a ‘Storm, withthe most intense and recognisable ‘2eton taking plac through August, Soptombor ‘and October of 1940, But Germany’ ar ‘campaign ha started before then, and would continue afterwards. Further confusion is added by the shifting nature ofthe campaign As the Germans locked fora weak spot, they continually change thoir emphasis, ving the battle several distinct ‘hases, Battle of Britain Day is commemorated ‘on 15 September, but setting on a cefntve ‘Start an enc date is al but impossible, In duly, Hitler was stil hoping that Brain vould come tothe negotiating tale and thrash ‘ut the terms for peace. RAF planes were bombing Germany ina disjointed and haphazard ‘manner (missions were mounted in July, but the period was mostly devoted to recovery. Following ts exertions in the Battle of France ‘and the retreat fom Dune, Fighter Command ‘WoRDs Davo sum was gathering its forthe next test. This was ‘expected to come in August. For the campaign, the Luftwaffe amassed 3,358 planes, wth more than @ ousand of ‘them fgters. The RAF could counter with snilar rumbers, but the Germans had a slight ecg in readyto‘y fighter planes, with 805 compared to tho RAF 715. Tho resonant phrase ‘the fo’ could fay be attributed to both soes. ‘German plans anticipate that the campaign proper would stat on 13 August. Hermann Géring spoke ofthe ‘attack ofthe Eagles in ominous tones, but missions had actualy started the previous month, ad 10 July is often put forward 2s the real stat ofthe battle. It was an uncertain ‘and tentative start, The Luftwatfe tok tee to {ee out Britain's defences, launching exploratory raids on the coast in daylight and venturing further nine undercover of darkness, ‘The Germans undoubtedly gathered useful Inteligence frm this opening ahase ofthe bot, but the RAF arguably learned more. Most importantly, British plots dlscovered that ther octine of fying in threes was to rgd when pitted against the lose, two plane formations ‘ofthe Germans. Luftwaffe pilots hunted in pairs. with ane plane hanging back and covering its partner. The RAF plots qucky adjusted. Intum, the Germans leared that thelr lant formations were faut. The bombers intl went in witha fghter ume above and behind them. ‘Tis created the opportunity forthe bombers to be mauled before the German fighters closed in, 0 they eventually drew closer to ther bombers, Until they actually ew infront and on the flanks ‘oftheir formations. These wore just the frst ‘of mary moves and countermoves that would punctuate the bate In August, the Luftwatfe was tasked wth {degrading Fenter Commana's combat ality by concentrating attacks on its bases, rather ‘than on the pines inthe ar. It was a potertially dovastating tactic, but one that was swiftly countered by the RAF. Bad weather prevented the ‘wholesale implementation ofthe intative unt 18 August but 12 August to 6 September saw some ofthe most intense fighting ofthe battle ‘Atotal of 32 raids were mounted agonst Fighter Command bases during that period ‘The results wore surprising. Only 56 British figtors wore destroyed on tho ground. Initial successes quichy promoted the RAF to disperse the planes, adopt improved camoutlage techniques and even house planes at remote airfields. A signicant portion ofthe available fightorstrongth was also dedicated to protecting, the bases, with patrols mounted tot the possioity of surprise attacks (the planes of 10 {and 12 Groups were held back to guard ‘the airfields, wile those of 14 Group tacked the raiders Important, the Germans boeved their attacks had been far more effective than they actualy had, with an invasion date of 15 September in ‘min, they congratulated themselves on putting ght Fighter Command bases out of action. In realty although several bases were damaged be ede 33WORLD AT WAR Ieee ios eres and forced to cease operations fr short periods, rane were permanently knocked out. ‘Overestimating ther successes porhaps lod the Germans to persevere witha fang tactic for too long By September, they believed they had whittied Betisn fgter numbers down to ust 100. Intuth, there wee 704 fighters avaiable on 1 September, and this number was steadily ing. t reached 738 on the 6th of that month In reality, neither sie found it possible to accurately tack enemy losses, but British ‘overestimations were @ boost to morale, while German erors obscured the futility ofthe methods. In fac, was a remarkably even Contest, and bath sides were finding themsetves worn down bythe ceaseless fighting. RAF fgnter umber may have been sing, but that was only because production of new planes was hola, at an impressive level New plots were also funneled ina the maelstrom a the rate of more than 300 per month By the end of August, twas German pots who were showing sigs of nervous exhaustion Their losses were also harder to make good. A Gorman pilot shot down over Britain would either dio 0: spend the est ofthe war ina POW camp. 4 faring ae while an RAF plot had a fighting chance of being back in a plane the nextday This realty led tothe practice of German pilots machine gunning their RAF counterparts 3s they parachuted down to earth Though an unpleasant facet ofthe batt, both sides agreed that it was acceptable under the rules of wa. "Much has been written onthe superiority of Brhish planes to those empoyed by the Germans. ‘an eaty casualty of the battle had been the fearsome Stuka. A propagancist’s dream, the screaming dvebomber had been the scourge of continental Europe, but was unsuited to tacking RAF fighters. Devastating losses saw it pull out of te ray in August Elsewhere, things werent 90 clearcut. The Spite was certainly an exceptional avcrat, but ‘uring these early stages ofthe war it had its weaknesses. Most vious was it reliance an ‘303 machine guns. Packing fur in each wing ‘sounds formidabe, but such small bullets often had ite effect ona target, especial if fre from lone range. To make matters worse, a Spite ony carried enough for around 15 seconds of ring, The Messerschmit Bf 109, by omparison, had ‘a par of 20mm cannons, as well as machine guns Hamann Gig he mat soi sla Ie Germany, promised AS hier ht anesof fgnters than the Lutwaff, but he Germans se were fighters, while the “Targets were ited to legitimate ina military installations, but 2 with the technoiegy ofthe da ‘the Brtish population began to climb, (0n 15 Septem of Britain Day, the Luftwat raid, wth 200 bombers andl an arma escorts. The RAF claimed to have sh ‘may simply have been made up for purposes, In fac, 60 German pl fighter the greatest 39 ofthe Lutwatfe became Germany's medium bombers lacked the iting ould unleash 1 Defiant and the 3) Blenneim, the Bouton By this point, however, the Battle of Britain hag been won and lost. jon plans wer Germary had . th the nthe Luttwate je, but Hitler would oc by his plans is great effort to war had fae Ta Cane Co aue Peas Cree eer Cong) Ce een pilots as the Battle of Brain opened. No eee ne proce ea es ees Pre een) eer er ery pee eee ee as Peer Ano e Wn eet ene Cee ced Pere ene eee ee Cer cet enn eas Coe nore rete eee rer36 A wonmaen sls tke ovr dura te OPERATION RBAROSSA SOVIET UNION 22 JUNE - 5 DECEMBER 1941 Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union was Hitler's greatest gamble of WWII and the bloody realisation of his most ambitious dreams ‘the summer of 1940, with much of Europe crushed beneath the boot of @ rampant Wenrmacrt, Hitler had every reason tobe euphoric. His pact wth the Soviet Union, signed in August 11938, nad hei, enabling his forces to sweep ‘tvough Poland before surging into Western rope. By late June of 1940, only the British remained to stand against them, the narrow teecape of aver 300,000 troops frm Dunkirk scarred into the national consciousness. And yet despite o torret of vetories that ed Fila ‘Marshal Wines Keitel to label Htler as “the greatest warlord in history’ the Fuhrer was not central satis. Brain's refusal to acknowledge Germany's trumph and submit to peace talks puzzied Hitler After all, he had always been open about his desire for peace, going so far as to “appeal to reason” during his annual speech in the Reichstag on 19 July 1940. To Hitler's chagrin, Churchill and the Bish people remained resolute, leading Hitler to surmise thet Britain \was pining It hopes on the Sovlet Union. Hits delusions fed him to reason that only the complete annihilation ofthe Soviets would force Britain to recognise that her cause was lst. During a conference with his military ‘commanders at his la in Berchtesgaden, Bavaria, on 31 July 1940, Hitler outined his ‘most ambitious plans yet: Germary would invade the Soviet Union the following year. "The sooner Fussia is crushed, the better,” he explained. “itwe wore to startin May 1941, we would have fve ‘months to fish the 1b, However, while there wore strategic motives behind Hitler's determination to destroy the USSR, arguably the more pressing desires behing Hitler's greatest gambie were ofan ideological nature. While the summer of 1940 may have witnessed the germination of an idea that would become Operation Barbarossa, a cataclysmic ‘showdown with ‘ludeo Bolshevism was ‘Something that Hier had first mentioned while writing Moin Kamot in 1924 25. When discussing the apparently pressing need for Germany to secure Lebensraum living Space) inorder to ensure a future in which the nation would have ample space and resources, Hitler was characteristially blunt when outlining his Intended targets. “ifwe speak of soll in Europe tocay, we can primarly have in ming only Russia ‘and her border states.” Describing the Slavs of Russia as “an inferior race", Hitler warned that the end of Jewish rule in Russia wil also be the lend of Russia asa state.” Hitler viewes the fate of the human race as an tenaless struggle for resources in atte space, ‘one that would end in is twisted view, n the eventual triumph of “inferior races (namely the Jews) unless a “pure” race was wing to fight te provont them. In his primal opinion, “nature ‘knows no boundaries. She places lifeforms on this globe and then sets them free in a play for power." Believing that every evil on Earth could be placed atthe feet of Jews, Hier sought ta tear down anything that he perceived as being 2 Jewish entity or system. Communism, ne claimed, was one such policy, and it was this tstorted belief that led him ta state that itwas Germany's duty to defeat the nation that hac kiven communism a home: the Soviet Union. ‘Unswerving in is confidence that Btn was ‘aeady beaten and thereby would not present ‘8 second front, Hitler dveoted the German High Command to begin planning the invasion. The ‘operation was tobe codenamed Barbarossa, in honour ofthe Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, a talented miltary commander. ‘Scheduled for 15 May 1941, the operation would see three army groups (North, Centre ‘and South) pouring across the Polish Soviet border under the respective leadership of. Wilneim Ritter von Leeb, Feodor von Bock and (Gerd von Runstedt. von Leed's forces were tasked with taking the Baltics and Leningrad Bock’s men were to head fist to Smolensk and then onto Moscow; and Runstedt was to race ta secure the "breachasket” of Ukraine and the oitich Caucasus. Certain of victory, Hitler proudly boasted, "We only have to Kek the door In and the whole rotten structure wil come crashing down” While Germany began to make the necessary preparations for Barbarossa, the target of ks Impending assaut sat paralysed, Inthe wake ‘of Stalin's ruthiess purges inthe fate 19306, which saw three-quarters ofthe Red Army's leadership executed or imprisoned, the forces of the USSR were woefully short on bth morale and ‘efficiency. To compound its already signicant probiems, Stalin insisted on controling the lacement of his divisions, further hamstringing the Red acy. Labouring under the false belief that Hitler Could ony attack the USSR once he had dealt ‘ith Britain, Stalin was sure that any invasion was at least a year away. His obstinate refusal to accept the threat massing on his borders was turther emboldened in Apil 1941 when Stalin received latter from Winston Churchill warning OPERATION BARBAROSSA ‘ofthe Germans’ intentions, Instead of heeding the British Prime Minister, Stain ascardea CChuccit's correspondence as an Aled attempt to provoke the Soviets into launching a pre lemptivestrke against their German ais. Although Stalin's suspicions about Church's {tue motives may be understandable, his ‘lsmissal of the warnings of another, closer Source were nothing short of eatastropic. In May of 1944, Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy working in Japan informed Moscow that Germany was indeod planning to attack, information that he had receive trom nane other than Colonel Eugen Ott, the military attache at the German lembassy in Tokyo. “STALIN INSISTED ON CONTROLLING THE PLACEMENT OF HIS ‘nina armani nh os cple [fst ares of 2 mes. DIVISIONS, FURTHER HAMSTRINGING THE RED ARMY”WORLD AT WAR Amazingly, even when Sorge provided a (ate of 20 June 1941 (ust two days off the factual launch date of 22 June, Stain remained implacable, the Soviet ruler insisting that Hitler was not “such an idiot” as to risk a war on two fonts, Less than a month after receiving Sorge's report, Stalin would be proven spectacularly wrong ‘five-week dolay due to Hitler's decision to Invade Yugostavia in May 1941 after its pro-Nazi government had been toppled meant Germany was not ready to unleash its eastern campaign Lunt June, Barbarossa was to be a campaign of extermination, with the uthiess removal of the eltas and mass starvation employed a: @ ‘method of subjugating Soviet cities. Infact, the German High Command went so far as to dovise ‘Hunger Pian’ that would see foad taken trom the Soviet Union and ven to German solders ‘ane etzens. (According to historian Timothy Snyder, approximately 4.2 milion Soviet civilians were starved to death between 1941 and 1944.) No quarter was tobe given. ‘A 3.15am on 22 un, thousands of Luftwaffe engines burst into ie to signal the begining ‘of Barbarossa, the fleet sailing hgh ove the German assault boats bobbing onthe River ‘Bug in anticipation. As the planes zeroed in on thir targets (airfields ined with neat rows of statlonary Soviet planes) thousands of German artlery pieces began to belch flame into the sy. Hitler was finaly attacking the entity he loathed the most, and he'd gathered 3.8 milion soldiers (including Romarians,tallans and Slavaks) for “MANY BORDER GUARDS WERE GUNNED DOWN IN THEIR NIGHTWEAR, THEIR HOMES AND FAMILIES ENGULFED IN FLAMES” the job, welltained men supported by 600,000, Vehicles, 3,350 armoured vehicles, 3,000 areratt and 500,000 horses. As milions of troops raced into the USSR, ther counterparts radioed ther superiors demancing to know what to do, Suen was the shock of the ‘assault that many border guards were gunned ‘wn in ther nghtwear, their homes and families ‘engulfed inthe ames of the bombarament Despite ths, Stalin wae stil inexplicably ~ wary ‘of some Allies tick and ordered that nating be ‘one to provoke the Germans. inal their widest dreams, the German ‘commanders could never have dared to hope to find thei adversaries so woeful off guard Many ofthe Savets' defensive positions lacked the weaponry needed to counter a concentrated Panzer attack, and they could nt hope t rely ‘on any ad rom above: onthe fst day ofthe ‘operation the Soviets lost spproximately 1,800 planes tothe Lutwatfo's 35, Within two days ofthe start of the attack ‘many of the 49 German Panzer battalions selected forthe invasion were 50 mies ineide the USSR. By 28 June over 400,000 Soviet "Woops were encircled outside of Minsk asthe ‘Second Parzer Group, under the command of General Heinz Guderan, linked up with Hermann Mott's Third Panzer Group. To the north, Genera von Leeb was faring just 238 well his troops halled as emancipators by ‘he violently suppressed peoples of the Baltics, many of them actively helping the Germans by attacking Red Army positions. However, the invaders certain didn't nave ial tei way ‘Army Group South, charged with taking Kiev ‘and then hurrying on tothe priceless ol elds ‘ofthe Caucasus, was finding the going dificult in the face of determined resistance. Rundstact was doubly unfortunate as he was not only ‘marching onthe most heavily defended region of, the frontlines, but his men were doing 8028 KV ‘and T-34 tanks (the latter the best alFround tank ‘ofthe entire war led towards them. While the ‘central and northern thrusts ofthe German acm Continued to slice into Soviet tectry, Rundstedt found himself increasingly bogged down. His, failure to keep up with the rest would utimately rove fatal fr Hitler's hopes ofa tepid victory Yet a July approached, the ovral picture from a German perspective seemed unexpectedly rsey. Upon finaly realising that Hiller had betrayed him, Stalin nad fallen into a stupor of despair that lasted fr over a week. Now, with machinery being evacuated from Ukraine, Stalin aly began to emerge fom his trance, and on 3 July he addressed the Soviet people as his comrades” as he called on them to “seessiy Join our patviote war ofiveration against the Tasest ensiavers While the idea the Soviet people were fighting to defend a communist utopia that upheld their rights and shunned the violence so freely used by the Wehrmacht (especially the 85 divisions attached tit) fs laughable, Stalin was not ‘exaggerating when he referred tothe tveat of ‘enslavement. From the outset of the war, Hier had expressed his desire to carve Germany's new easter teritries into a series of statesseri ing Sere hry ar Fos Snape 2 hayrte fe filed with Soviet slaves. A cruel and manipulative tyrant he may have been, but in his speech at the start of July Stalin was, for once, telling his people at least some ofthe truth, ‘On the same day that Stalin addressed the ration, German General Franz Holder, Chet of Staff of Army High Command, cone in his ary that it was "no overstatement to say that the Russian campaign has been won inthe space of two weeks". In hindsight this statement reeks of hubris, but atthe time German confidence was mote than justified. By 13 July the German armies hed advanced between 300 ‘and 600 kilometres, incapacitated (ether by king, injuring or eapturing) ever $89,000 enemy Soldiers and obliterated aver 6,850 aircraft. The Wehrmacht was edging ever closer to Moscow, {and the First Battle of Smolensk was about to finish with the entrapment of almost 760,000 ‘Soviet troops. A glorious triumph loomed. Then ‘came a High Command directive that would charge everything (On Saturday, 19 July 1941, Hitter issued an ‘orcer thatthe Soviet semies trapped around ‘Smolensk (the 16th, 19th and 20th) were to be uttery destroyed before Army Group Cente ‘advanced, not towards Moscow, but Sout) to the outahirts of Kiev to ald Army Group South, which was stil 50 miles outside ofthe Ukrainian capital. Longing to continue the drive for Moscow, ‘both Halder and von Bock were adamant that OPERATION BARBAROSSA Ua Cee my ars se) Mee ae) 33WORLD AT WAR, the city nad to remain thei priority, but Hitler was unmoved. And 9, on 23 August, Army ‘Group Centre smung south. Thee weeks later its southern counterpart started to cive north, and ‘0n 16 September two more Soviet amis were ‘annihilated as the pincer closed east of Kev Stalin's order thatthe city be held at al costs had condemned over 700.000 Soviet troops tw enexclement. Sil progressing steady Inthe north, the forces under the command of von Leeb hac sealed off the city of Leningrad elght days prox to the encirclement of Kie. Hitler had selected ‘the city asa primary target during the planing ‘of Barbarossa, and now his armies (with the support of Finnish troops sent to retake lands lost tothe Soviets during the Winter War of 11939-1940) hae provided him withthe chance te put his hunger plan nto action once mor. Instead of bombarding the ety, its people were ‘oe starved into submission in a siege that, ‘would last until January 1944 and claim over £300,000 ves, Now thatthe resistance shielding Kie had boon romoved, Army Group Centre could once ‘again tun Its gaz0 on Moscow. Despite the Panic that had spread thoughout the city, ‘ed Amy raps iat ‘nie cig he i Lit [% vf 0 Stalin had chosen to stay and invigorate the natives with his presence. He had placed the defence ofthe city inthe hands of General Geotgy Zhukov, @ formidable gue who nad overseen the desperate efforts to counter the Siege of Leningrad. Zhukov wasted Ile tine inputting the men ‘and women of Moscow to work excavating Getensive trenches and ant-tank itches (neatly $3 milion evbie meves of earth was moved by hang). Te factories that continued to function (rruch ofthe Soviets industry nad been evacuated east) were also turned to military tasks (a clack maker was asked to begin bulding mine detonator). the Germans were to take Moscow, Zhukov was determined they would ay dearly for every street Codenamed Operation Typhoon, the assault lon Moscow began on 2 October 1941. atthe ‘outset of the attack the Germans enjoyed a 2:1 superinty in tanks and oops and a 3:1 ‘vantage in alrcrat t seemed that it would only be a matter of time before the Soviet capital fell, But there was one enemy the Germans failed to account fr: Mother Nature, Known as the rasputsta (the time without roads), on & October 2 yearly deluge began, churning the roads into sucking quagmires thet ‘ramatically slowed the German advance. By ‘the end ofthe month the Wehrmacht was stl 50 miles fom its target Yt while the ain was as a frustration, the teezing temperatures that followed in December were a death sentence. ‘By 5 December the Germans were forced to halt 19 miles shart of Mascow as the conditions freze both men and machines, the lack of proper winter clothing (a result of Hitler's assurances. that the campaign would be over in a matter of wooks) condemning thousands to death. (On the same day as the Germans stopped thelr advance the Soviet armies behind Moscow (carefully husbanded by Zhukov and reinforced by soldiers transfered rom Siberia once it had become clear that Japan was not planning to attack the region) wore readying to unleash a ‘merciless counteraensive. Certain tat the Rea ‘Amy was all ut beaten, the unfortunate German ‘woops dug in around Moscow didnot know what hit them when the Soviets began thei attack with a massive bombardment. The moment the guns settled waves of 34s poured across the trozen earth towats the German positions accompanied by a tatal force of over 1 milion men and a resurgent Red Army Air Force. ‘Stunned by the sudden change in fortunes, Hitor domanded that every patch of ground Be fought for, ard in time the retreating German forces steadied themselves and consolidated ‘ther lines, but the threat to Moscow, bult over ‘months of fighting, had been eradicated in a ‘matter of days. Now it was the Red Army's turn to advance