Inland
Inland
May 1998
Abstract1
This chapter examines the allocation of land and other productive resources within rural
households of poor countries. Building upon the existing literature, it provides a consistent
framework from which to study productive efficiency and intrahousehold equity. The topics dis-
cussed include: returns to scale and household centralization; specialization and gender casting;
separate spheres and commitment failure; and labor market cartelization and discrimination.
Implications for intrahousehold access to land are discussed in detail. We show that intrahouse-
hold productive inefficiency should not arise unless household members are prevented from
entering into enforceable contracts with each other. Our analysis predicts that intrahousehold
inefficiency increases with factors that exacerbate commitment failure such as short time horizon,
low assets, unequal stakes in the household, and poor external enforcement. Granting plots of
land to dependents appears to be a response to commitment problems. Patrimonial laws and cus-
toms regarding inheritance and divorce can similarly be understood as efforts to mitigate commit-
ment failure within the household although, possibly, at the expense of women and young adults.
________________
† Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6072. Tel.: (650) 723-3251.
[email protected].
1 I benefitted from comments on earlier drafts from Agnes Quisumbing, Lawrence Haddad, Chris Udry, Elisabeth
Sadoulet, and participants to WIDER conferences on access to land held in May 1997 in Helsinki and April 1998 in
Santiago de Chile.
Intrahousehold Access to Land and Sources of Inefficiency:
The literature on women and development has documented women’s lack of access to land,
credit, and farm inputs in many developing countries (e.g., Boserup (1970), Gladwin and McMil-
lan (1989), von Braun and Webb (1989)). It also have provided evidence of gender casting and
other restrictions on female labor (e.g., Brown and Haddad (1995), Fafchamps and Quisumbing
(1998)). This situation has been identified as a source of inequality between men and women, and
as encouraging abuse (e.g., Jones (1983, 1986)). In addition, it has been claimed to be inefficient
(e.g., Jiggins (1989), Udry (1996b)). In response to these claims, aid agencies have set up target-
ted programs to deliver credit and inputs to women and, to a lesser extent, to open their access to
land. The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework that integrates efficiency and equity
issues and to identify conditions under which intrahousehold allocation of resources can be
inefficient.
Implicit in much of the lay literature is the assumption that women’s unequal access to land
is a source not only of inequality but also of inefficiency. For instance, it is often claimed that
poor countries cannot develop unless women are granted equal access to productive resources
(e.g., Boserup (1970)).2 The rationale behind these claims is not entirely clear, however.3 The
main objective of this paper is to clarify the debate by identifying conditions under which ine-
quality is indeed a source of inefficiency. To do so, we must distinguish between access to land
within households and across households. Although the two are often discussed interchangeably,
________________
2 Calls for better female access to land have been strongest in Sub-Saharan Africa (Gladwin and McMillan
(1989)). This is somewhat surprising because, relative to other regions of the world such as South Asia or Latin
America, women in Sub-Saharan Africa have a comparatively easier -- though by no means equal -- access to land.
3 Some claim that women produce ’all the food’ and thus should be given more land (e.g., Gladwin and McMillan
(1989), Jiggins (1989)). Jiggins (1989), for instance, claims that in Sub-Saharan Africa ’[women] produce
approximatively 60% of the food that is consumed by rural households’. It is unclear how women could produce this
much food if they do not have access to land. Others argue that women should be given better access to credit so that
they can hire enough manpower to cultivate their fields. Egyir (1998), for instance, points out that Ghanaian women
who farm independently ’[hire] male labor to take on strenuous activities’. But the fact that these women must hire
outsiders to farm suggests that they have more land than they can cultivate -- i.e., that they were given too much land
for an efficient allocation of factors of production, not too little.
2
conceptually they are quite separate. Access to land for male and female dependents is deter-
mined within the household; access to land for female headed and female operated households is
determined outside the household.4 The processes for allocating resources vary between the two.
Allocation within the household resembles what takes place within a firm. Most households
have a hierarchical structure, with much of the control over household resources such as land and
capital concentrated into the hands of the head (e.g., Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997),
Egyir (1998)). Conflicts over the division of welfare between dependents and the head are some-
what reminiscent of labor disputes between workers and employers -- and potentially as bitter
division of labor together with systems of delegation of authority (e.g., Cleave (1974), Egyir
(1998), Shapiro (1990), Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998)). This is particularly true of rural
households in poor economies where self-provision of food, shelter, water, fuel, child and elderly
care, and most services is the rule -- and thus where the tasks undertaken by households are both
In contrast, the allocation of land across households typically takes either the form of gift or
of market transaction, with occasional hybrid combinations of the two (e.g., Egyir (1998), Table
2).5 Land sales, rentals, and sharecropping are market transactions: they involve two-way con-
tractual obligations that are mutually balancing. Inheritance, transfer at marriage, and other
transfers inter vivos are example of allocation mechanisms based on the gift principle. In this
in other chapters of this volume. As we shall argue in the conclusion, access to land by female
headed and operated households can be fully understood only after making sense of intrahouse-
hold allocation issues. This is important because, the proportion of such households appears to be
________________
4 For the purpose of this chapter, female headed households are defined as households headed by widows,
divorced, and single women; female operated households are those where the male head is absent and participates
little or not at all to household production activities.
5 E.g., rental to a friend at below market price.
3
on the rise in certain African countries (for Ghana, see Egyir (1998)).
This chapter is organized as follows. After a brief review of the literature, we construct a
model of intrahousehold allocation of labor and land and we derive conditions for allocative
efficiency. We show that, depending on returns to scale, specialization and experience, efficiency
in production may require land and other productive inputs to be centrally managed and individu-
als to specialize in certain tasks or activities. Intrahousehold equity in welfare, however, need not
be achieved. We also propose an explanation for the observed heterogeneity in the allocation of
tasks by age and gender across regions. We then explore conditions under which commitment
failure arise, that is, when household members are unable to pre-commit their future actions and
hence find it difficult to enforce intrahousehold agreements regarding land and labor. In this case,
we show that imperfect factor markets prevent households from achieving allocative efficiency
and that access to land and other productive resources is likely to be conflictual. We argue that
the West African practice of letting female and male dependents cultivate their own plots of land
can be understood as a way of motivating dependents to work harder and of resolving commit-
ment failure between head and dependents. Implications for empirical research are summarized
at the end.
Much of the economic literature on intrahousehold issues has focused on the distribution of
consumption among household members (e.g, McElroy and Horney (1981), Manser and Brown
(1980), Haddad and Kanbur (1990), Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997), Browning et al.
(1994)). Production decisions are often ignored and, with the exception of Becker (1981), the
emphasis is exclusively put on gender issues, with little consideration for intergenerational
issues. Such treatment may suffice for developed countries where small nuclear households dom-
inate, most people work for a wage, and children go to school and leave their parents afterwards.
Indeed, thanks to household equipment and public utilities, the time devoted to household chores
4
has drastically been reduced. Meal preparation and child care services are increasingly pur-
This fundamental transformation of family life has yet failed to reach much of the Third
World, especially rural areas. There, households are large, occasionally encompassing several
couples with their children. Household members are engaged in a multiplicity of income generat-
ing activities, both on their own account and in collaboration with others. Self-employment is the
rule -- in farming, livestock raising, crafts, trade, and services. Household chores are many and
time-consuming; they fall overwhelmingly on the shoulders of women. Children, whom there are
plenty, spend less time in school and more time helping around the house or the farm. It is cus-
tomary for young adult males to remain on their father’s farm until they are allowed to marry --
and often to stay after marriage in the case of vertically integrated households (e.g., Binswanger
and McIntire (1987), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985)). Third World households are thus more
complex than present day households in developed economies. A proper understanding of their
much of social tension and political activism -- focuses on access to productive resources such as
land, capital, and farm inputs (e.g., Kumar (1994), Groote and Kebe (1995), Goetz and Gupta
(1996), Smith (1994)). This is hardly surprising given that the predominant avenue to financial
independence -- and thus to the freedom to choose one’s consumption and privately enjoy it -- is
Egyir (1998)). Third World societies have evolved detailed laws and customs governing the
transfer and use of productive resources such as land and capital, and assign specific tasks and
roles to household members according to their status (e.g., Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998)).
These rules restrict individual choice and impose financial and work obligations to contribute to
ties. In many Sahelian villages, for instance, the head of the household manages the main cereal
fields and disposes of the output, but is responsible for feeding the family. Married wives often
are granted small plots that they cultivate on their own, but they must provide the ’sauce’, that is,
the vegetables and condiments that spice up family meals. Unmarried sons may earn pocket
money by cultivating their own field, but they must first work on the household’s main fields.
Tension between household members therefore results regarding the allocation of labor among
competing income-generating activities with distinct residual claimants (e.g., Jones (1983, 1986),
Boe (1996)). Some suspect that tension over labor allocation may even be the source of
economic inefficiency (e.g., Udry (1996a), Balsvik (1995)). Gender inequality in the acquisition
of schooling, experience and skills opening the door to wage employment is also widespread
(e.g., Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Adams and He (1995), Alderman and Christi (1990),
Khandker (1988), Jacoby (1992), Filmer (1996)), together with occasional accusations that male
heads of household collude to exclude women or young adults from remunerative activities (see
Kevane (1996), Anderson and Francois (1996)). Domestic violence and social stigma are cited as
additional pressure certain heads of household bring to bear on recalcitrant members. Jones
(1986), for instance, reports that if a wife refuses to work on her husband’s farm, the husband is
allowed by custom to beat her (see also Lilja (1996), Lilja et al. (1996), Kevane (1996)).
While some of the themes that run through the intrahousehold literature in developing
countries are similar to those that animate the feminist discourse in developed economies, the
emphasis on access to productive resources and on the allocation of household labor to indivi-
dual income earning activities is original (e.g., Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997)). Issues
of welfare equity within Third World household are also not limited to gender distinctions (e.g.,
Haddad and Kanbur (1990, 1993), Kanbur and Haddad (1994), Quisumbing, Haddad and Peña
(1995), Dercon and Krishnan (1997)). They encompass adult dependents, mostly young males.
6
the household (e.g., Becker (1965)). Labor supply response and nutrition outcomes are inter-
preted as results of the maximization of a single utility function. The works of Rosenzweig
(1986), Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Pollack and Wachter (1975), Jacoby (1992), and
Skoufias (1993) fall within this category. If applied wisely, this approach can yield interesting
results, even if the underlying assumptions can be criticised as unrealistic. For instance, it can
explain why parents prefer to send boys to school because returns to education is higher than for
girls (e.g. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1987)); why food, when it is scarce, goes to adult males
because they are the prime income earners of the household (e.g., Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan
(1990)); or why women concentrate on house chores because their wage outside the household is
lower than that of men (e.g., Evenson (1978), Becker (1965), Low (1994)).
Seminal contributions by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) chal-
lenged the unitary model of the household and proposed its replacement with a collective model
in which household members bargain over the distribution of consumption among themselves.
They show that the bargaining power of individuals depends on the resources they command, and
thus on their individual incomes. Consumption thus depends not only on the household’s total
income but also on which member earns it. Individual payoffs in case of breakdown of coopera-
tion serve as threat points in the negotiation over household expenditures, thereby helping to
shape the allocation of leisure and consumption among household members. Several possible
determinants of these threat points have been suggested in the literature, such as land ownership,
education, entitlement programs, laws and customs about the sharing of household assets in case
of divorce, and social norms regarding gender-specific tasks and parenting responsibilities (e.g.,
McElroy (1990), Lundberg and Pollack (1993)). Tests of income pooling have usually rejected
Intrahousehold modeling has recently been rejuvenated by the work of Chiappori (1988,
7
1992, 1993) and coauthors (e.g., Browning et al. (1994), Bourguignon et al. (1993), Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori (1995)). Chiappori’s idea is a simple but powerful one. Even though
there is no commonly accepted model of bargaining, most such models discussed in the
economic literature -- whether cooperative or not -- generate Pareto efficient outcomes (as do uni-
tary models which are a special case of collective models; see Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman
(1997)). Efficient allocations within the household exhibit certain characteristics which can serve
as a basis for a test of allocative efficiency without assuming any particular form of bargaining.
The application of these ideas to household consumption data from developed countries has
failed to reject allocative efficiency while rejecting income pooling (e.g., Browning et al. (1994),
Bourguignon et al. (1993), Thomas (1993), Manser (1993), Fortin and Lacroix (1993)). Using
data from Taiwan, Thomas and Chen (1994) nevertheless reject Pareto efficiency for some alloca-
tions. Taken together, these results constitute evidence in favor of the collective model of the
household, leading Alderman et al. (1995) to urge analysts to think seriously about collective
Early work by Jones (1983, 1986) and a recent paper by Udry (1996a) nevertheless suggest
that farming households in Africa fail to efficiently allocate productive resources within the
household. Rather than relying on the complicated consumption-based tests proposed by Chiap-
pori and coauthors, Udry (1996a) focuses on the production side and tests whether yields are
equalized across plots managed by different household members. He finds conclusive evidence
that plots in the hands of women and young adult males have lower yields than those operated by
male heads of household. His results and those of Jones, obtained in African farming households
where individual members are known to operate in separate spheres (e.g., Lundberg and Pollack
(1994, 1993), Katz (1994), Carter and Katz (1993)), cast doubt on the efficient collective model
of the household.
The reason for allocative inefficiency is unclear, however. Balsvik (1995) suggests that it
8
may be due to commitment failure: because the head of the household is unwilling or unable to
credibly commit to reward the work of his wife and dependents after harvest, the latter prefer to
divert their labor to their own fields and income earning activities. Similar ideas permeate the
works of Jones (1983) and Lundberg and Pollack (1994). In a repeated long-run union, the threat
of future non-cooperation should in principle induce voluntary collaboration and solve the com-
mitment failure problem.6 If, however, certain promises are not credible and certain Pareto
improving trades are not feasible, the achievement of allocative efficiency may be prevented.
One of the objectives of this paper is to examine the precise conditions under which a commit-
ment failure may arise. We leave for future work the enforcement difficulties arising from the
presence of multiple wives or nuclear households within the production unit, as in the case of
To capture the essence of the allocative issue, consider the following stylized model of a
members, each of whom is endowed with total time Ti , land Ai 8 and labor efficiency ei --
representing schooling, skills, and experience (e.g., Becker (1981)). For the moment, individual
land endowments and the mapping of individuals into households are taken as exogenously
given. Non-productive members of the household are ignored for simplicity. Individual house-
hold members allocate their time between work on their own account, work for other members of
the household, outside wage work, and leisure. They choose how to spend their income.9
________________
6 Indeed, in many societies, laziness is often an accepted motive for divorce.
7 It is immediately apparent that many concepts developed for firms can be applied to complex household
structures, such as multiple agents models, theory of hierarchies, information circulation issues, etc. Patrimonial law --
e.g., rules of devolution of assets upon death or dissolution -- also becomes more complicated in multiple households.
8 Without loss of generality, variable A can also be thought of as a vector of land qualities and productive assets
i
including farm equipment, working capital, and livestock.
9 In other words, we rule out paternalism, that is, the possibility that a particular household member may decide
the consumption of another member against his or her will. How individual consumption is decided is irrelevant, as
long as individual preferences dictate how money is spent on someone’s consumption bundle. The production and
consumption of household public goods singularly complicates the analysis without adding to our results; it is not
considered here (see, for instance, Bergstrom (1994)).
9
Individual consumption expenditures are financed through income from own production and
We begin by assuming that factor markets are totally absent. This assumption is lifted later
on. Formally, the decision problem facing each individual member of the household can be
denoted as follows:
and non-negativity constraints Lij ≥ 0 and gij ≥ 0. Variables ci stands for consumption (possibly a
vector); Lij is the labor time provided by individual i on j’s income earning activity; and gij is the
transfer from individual i to individual j. Utility is assumed non-altruistic and separable between
goods and leisure. Preferences may vary across individuals but all have access to the same pro-
duction technology F(.), which depends on total effective labor Σe j Lji and land Ai . Leisure li
j
equals total time Ti minus total labor ΣLij . When deciding their own labor and consumption,
j
individuals take transfers from others L ji and g ji as given. First order conditions yield the usual
∂U i
____ = λi p (3)
∂ci
∂V i
____ ∂F
____
= λi ei (4)
∂li ∂Li
where Li ≡ ΣL ji . Variable λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint; it
j
measures the marginal utility of income. Voluntary transfers of labor and money are against
individual’s self-interest since they subtract from own consumption. In equilibrium therefore,
In this world of isolated individuals, production efficiency is not achieved. Individuals with
low land Ai and thus low returns to labor would be better off exchanging labor for consumption
10
with better endowed individuals who would themselves benefit from hiring other people’s labor.
The absence of market implies that production decisions are a function not only of individual
assets Ai but also of tastes U i (.) and V i (.) and of individual efficiency of labor ei . This result is a
well known feature of unitary household models with missing markets (e.g., Singh, Squire and
Suppose now that a complete competitive market exists in which individuals can freely
exchange labor at the same wage w per unit of effective labor. The production and consumption
and the usual non-negativity constraints Lij ≥ 0. First order conditions yield the usual
∂F(Ai , Li )
_________
w= (7)
∂Li
Labor use and thus output no longer depend on individual preferences and labor efficiency, but
they still are a function of individual land endowments Ai . The wage rate w clears the market for
labor. Labor flows from resource-poor to resource-rich individuals. Everybody is at least as well
off and many are strictly better off, although better endowed individuals continue to enjoy a
higher level of welfare. How gains from trade are divided across buyers and sellers of labor
The existence of a competitive labor market implies that labor resources are allocated
efficiently within the household as well: since all household members face the same opportunity
cost for effective labor, workers are efficiently allocated to individual production units. There is
no need for intrahousehold bargaining. Intrahousehold labor transactions need not, however, take
the form of an explicit wage contract. Household members may be compensated for the work
11
they provided to others in an implicit manner, e.g., through gifts or a larger share of household
consumption expenditures. Formally, this situation can easily be represented in our model by let-
ting the size of the gifts from other household members to i be a function of the labor provided to
them, i.e.:
commensurate to the wage they would earn outside the household, their labor is allocated
efficiently within the household. In equilibrium, if households are sufficiently similar, labor tran-
sactions between households may be infrequent without necessarily implying that labor is not put
The existence of a labor market does not, by itself, ensure productive efficiency, however,
unless Ai is not a vector but a single land input and the production function F (A, L) exhibits con-
stant returns to scale (CRS). In this case, the existence of a competitive labor market ensures that
expected yields are the same for all individuals on all plots -- maintaining our assumption of
common technology. Evidence that yields differ then constitutes an indication that labor markets
are inefficient (e.g., Gavian and Fafchamps (1996), Udry (1996b)). When Ai is a vector of inputs,
however, markets for all factors of production except one must exist for production efficiency to
be achieved. Short of that, output will continue to depend on individual resource endowments.
If production is not CRS, efficiency in production requires that markets exist for all factors
of production.10 Exchange can take a variety of forms (e.g., rentals, sales, or partnerships) which,
for our purpose, are largely irrelevant so long as efficiency is achieved. Assume that it does. What
will efficient production look like? The answer depends on returns to scale. If they are decreas-
ing, the atomisation of production is optimal: each individual should be an independent producer.
________________
10 There are many reasons why production techniques may not be perfectly replicated from field to field and thus
why returns to scale in agriculture may not be constant. All ultimately have to do with the presence of imperfectly
traded inputs, such as credit, management, experience, and rental services of indivisible equipment and infrastructure
(e.g., Feder (1985), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986)).
12
If they are increasing, all production should be undertaken by a single individual who will buy
and rent all factors from the market. If returns to scale are first increasing then decreasing, the
optimal size of the production unit may require that several, though not all individuals pool their
These results, although hardly original, seem to have been overlooked in much of the lay
ment and gather control over land and other productive resources are customarily interpreted as a
devious ploy to deprive women of their rights. This may very well be the case, as we shall argue
when we discuss commitment failure. But one should also be open to the possibility that centrali-
zation is in fact efficient, especially, as von Braun and Webb (1989)’s work suggests, when new
technologies are introduced. Financial outlays for fertilizer, improved seeds, and pesticides raise
marginal returns to labor and increase the penalty for untimely performance of agricultural tasks,
especially if the household is risk averse. New agricultural technologies may also raise the
returns to education, and hence the comparative advantage of better educated household heads as
farm managers (e.g., Jamison and Lau (1982)). In these cases, technology adoption is expected to
trigger a concentration of control over household labor into the hands of a single individual, typi-
cally the head of household (e.g., von Braun and Webb (1989)).11 If concentration is efficient,
then it should be possible for household heads to improve everyone’s lot while at the same time
compensating other members for their loss of individual output. From an economic point of view,
such compensation can be regarded as a payment for the use of productive resources controled
Becker (1981)). Suppose that production requires that various tasks be performed, e.g., planting,
________________
11 This of course begs the issue of who in the household is most suitable person to assume management
responsibilities. For instance, if schooling and experience raise effectiveness in management, the better schooled and
most experienced member of the household ought to be the one to take over management duties. Some of these issues
are addressed below.
13
weeding, harvesting, threshing. Further suppose that, thanks to learning by doing, individuals
with a lot of experience in a certain task k are more proficient in that task, i.e., that:
∞
e tik = gk ( Σ Σ γ s L tijk−s ) (9)
s =1 j
where e tik denotes the labor efficiency of individual i in task k at time t, γ ≤ 1 is a depreciation fac-
tor, and gk (.) is some increasing function. In the presence of returns to experience, it is in
society’s interest to encourage individuals to specialize in particular tasks and to make sure that a
task is always performed by the person most experienced to undertake it. To achieve this result,
individuals may have to work on each other’s fields, e.g., men clearing women’s fields and
women weeding men’s fields. Alternatively, they may become exclusively responsible for partic-
ular activities involving closely connected tasks, such as food preparation or beer brewing, for
From the point of view of efficiency, how tasks are distributed among people is largely
irrelevant as long as gains from learning by doing are achieved. This may account for the
existence of extremely wide variations in the distribution of agricultural tasks by gender and age:
in northern Nigeria, for instance, women do not participate ia field work (e.g., Hill (1977),
Fafchamps (1986)); in much of Zaire, they perform almost all agricultural tasks with the excep-
tion of land clearing. Individual comparative advantage in learning and performing particular
tasks may nevertheless dictate who specializes in what. It would be unwise, for instance, to
assign children to tasks that require much physical strength, such as clearing fields. But they are
perfectly adapted to herding livestock. In countries where women bear many children and
breastfeed them for extended periods of time, one may argue that activities around the home con-
stitute their comparative advantage. In stable pre-industrial societies where the range of tasks and
activities to be undertaken does not change over time, the allocation of people to specific tasks is
achieved largely through age and gender casting. Gender-specific role models often reinforce
gender casting (e.g., Collier and Yanagisako (1987)). Certain societies push this principle even
14
caste (e.g., the caste system in India or Yemen; marabouts, griots, and blacksmith in Sub-Saharan
Africa.)
Age and gender casting to match individuals with particular tasks also dictates a particular
pattern of land allocation and, thus, of land inheritance and disposition inter vivos. For instance,
when men are responsible for clearing the land and do most of the land prepration while women
do most of the weeding, harvesting, and processing, as is true in parts of South Asia, there is no
need to allocate land by gender; it is optimal for men and women to farm together under the
management of a single head. In this case, inheritance customs are expected to ensure that house-
hold have a viable farm size, without much concern for gender. Of course if farm management
itself is a task that is the full responsibility of the household head, the devolution of land, either
by inheritance or inter vivos transfer, should be tightly linked to household formation: land will
be passed from heads of households to heads of households.12 To the extent that household heads
In contrast, when women are responsible for growing vegetable crops while men cultivate
staple food crops, as is the case in Burkina Faso for instance (e.g., Matlon and Fafchamps
(1988)), most land should go to men; women should only receive small vegetable gardens --
which is precisely what we observe. When women take care of producing the staple food while
men produce a cash crop, as occurs in Central Ghana for instance, then one would expect women
to have larger plots and a more equal access to land. The contrast that Egyir draws between Cen-
tral Ghana and Northern Ghana where little cash crop production takes place is consistent with
this pattern: women have less access to land and are more subordinated to their husbands in the
North. Finally, if women are not participating to crop production at all but look after livestock in
________________
12 It is so natural to think of a farm as being managed by the household head that survey questionnaires often
assumes this to be the case. This stands in sharp contrast with off-farm activities such as crafts and trade which are
often undertaken by dependents and are not linked to household formation: while the creation of a new farming unit
occurs simultaneously with the creation of a new household, the creation of a new trading or craft enterprise is not.
15
and around the house, as is the case in Ethiopia and Pakistan, for instance (e.g., Fafchamps and
Quisumbing (1998)), all cultivable land ought to go to men. Women may nevertheless hold graz-
ing rights as a result of their involvement in livestock production. The same is true for secondary
land rights that women derive from their responsibilities for firewood and water collection. What
gender casting cannot explain, however, is why male and female members of the same house-
holds would grow the same crops on different, individually managed plots -- as reported by Udry
(1996a).
In the presence of learning by doing, sorting people among multiple activities cannot easily
be achieved in a decentralized manner. Letting individuals decide what to specialize in may lead
to over or under provision of certain skills.13 Age and gender casting can thus can be seen as a
means of solving the coordination problem involved in achieving gains from specialization. It
nevertheless raises two serious objections. First, it seldom is equitable. Certain tasks are more
pleasant than others, and the return from certain skills higher than others. Those forced to under-
take unpleasant and undervalued tasks are likely to resent the allocation process and oppose it if
they can. Second, age and gender casting is unlikely to be fully efficient because it prevents many
individuals from expressing their full potential. The efficiency loss will be larger when new
economic opportunities arise and traditional casting rules no longer ensure a match between the
supply and demand for task specific skills. This may explain why age and gender casting have
gender roles, however. In many societies, a sizeable gap exists between ideal gender casting as
specified in the dominant ideology, and the actual division of tasks by gender. Local culture may,
________________
13 See Matsuyama (1991) for an illustration of how occupational decisions can lead to multiple Pareto ranked
equilibrium paths in the presence of sunk costs.
14 Gender casting may be less rigid than sometimes assumed. von Braun and Webb (1989) showed, for instance,
that the introduction of modern irrigation method along the Gambia river led men to rapidly replace women in rice
cultivation in spite of strong taboos regarding male involvement with rice.
16
for instance, stipulate that women should not work in the field because such work is thought
demeaning. Yet many poor households may fall short of the social ideal simply because they can-
not afford to abide by it (e.g., Hill (1977), Matlon (1977)). In such an environment, increased
prosperity is likely to result in a closer match between social ideals and social realities and thus
to reinforce gender casting in practice. Good examples of such processes can be found in many
Islamic countries where higher standards of living translate into a tighter separation of the sexes
(e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan).15 Efforts by trade unions and other progressive political forces to
have strenuous jobs declared unsuitable for women in turn-of-the-century Europe can be seen in
a similar light. A complete discussion of these issues is left for future work.
In Section 2 we argued that land and other productive resources are allocated efficiently
within the household if outside markets exist and are competitive. In practice, however, factor
markets are notoriously subject to transaction costs, information asymmetries and enforcement
problems. Can the household efficiently allocate resources within its confines even in the absence
of outside markets? The answer is yes, provided traditional gender casting rules ensure a perfect
match between the demand and supply of skills and rewards for work on household enterprises
equate the marginal return to labor. In the absence of an outside market to set clearly identifiable
wage rate w and factor prices ri , household members may, however, disagree as to how gains
To see this, consider the model presented in Section 2 and suppose for a moment that the
economy is limited to the household.16 Formally, nothing has changed. There exists, therefore, a
wage rate w and land price ri that equilibrate the household factor markets and ensure allocative
________________
15 I observed similar trends in rural Morocco and Northern Nigeria (see also Matlon (1977)).
16 The argument is by and large unchanged if certain goods can be bought from the market while others, such as
child care and food preparation, are produced directly by the household. That certain goods are not traded may be due
to transaction costs, imperfect information, or enforcement problems. The pattern of transactions costs would, in turn,
determine the optimal size and composition of the household (e.g., Binswanger and McIntire (1987)).
17
efficiency within the household. Given the small number of people involved, however, it is
unlikely that the household will resort to explicit wage labor transactions. It can, in principle,
achieve the same outcome through implicit contracts. Furthermore, the household economy being
small, perfect competition is unlikely; there is scope for parties to bargain over the distribution of
the gains from resource reallocation. If bargaining is efficient, however, productive resources will
nevertheless be allocated such that their marginal returns are equalized across all activities
Thanks to the second welfare theorem, any Pareto efficient resource allocation can be
represented as a price system combined with lumpsum transfers. Any efficient bargained outcome
can thus be written as the solution to a series of individual maximization problems of the form:
and the usual non-negativity constraints Lij ≥ 0, Gij ≥ 0, and Âi ≥ 0. Variable Âij denotes a tem-
porary transfer of productive resource Ai from i to j and Gij is a lumpsum transfer from i to j. The
wage rate w and the rental price r can be thought as the shadow cost of labor and resource Ai that
individuals face in their bargaining over consumption with other household members.17
For a bargaining equilibrium to be both efficient and voluntary, individuals must internalize
the true opportunity cost of the land and labor they command. This is achieved by providing
rewards or transfers w ei Lij and r Âij for labor and land contributed to other members’ produc-
tive activities, and by demanding rewards and transfers equivalent to w e j Lji and r  ji for labor
and land contributed by others to i. In practice, of course, these transfers are netted out, so that
________________
17 Âi , Lij , w and r can be vectors without affecting the argument.
18
they are not separately observed.18 What matters is simply that household members perceive
that, at the margin, an additional unit of labor or resource that they provide to others or receive
work, differences in bargaining power only determine the size of lumpsum transfers Gij between
Without specifying the bargaining process, we now examine the conditions under which
individual household members will voluntarily agree to an incentive scheme {w, r, Gij , G ji }. For
readers familiar with general equilibrium or cooperative game theory, this is akin to constructing
the core of the household economy (e.g., Hildenbrand (1974), Friedman (1990)). We consider
three possible threat points: (1) non-cooperation within the household; (2) separation from the
household; and (3) domestic violence (e.g., Lundberg and Pollack (1993), Kevane (1996)). In the
case of non-cooperation within the household, we assume that individual members can refuse to
exchange labor and land with others and choose to rely on their own labor and land Ai . In the
case of separation from the household, we allow for the possibility that laws and customs may
request that land Ai and other resources be redistributed20 and that compulsory transfers be
imposed on one of the parties.21 Finally, we examine how the threat of domestic violence may
induce someone to ’voluntarily’ agree to a distribution of the gains from resource reallocation
T
W ai = Σ δ ti U i (c ai ) + V i (Ti − Laii ) (12)
t =0
________________
18 Jones (1983, 1986) nevertheless reports that Cameroonian women who work in their husband’s field customarily
receive a share of the harvest that is proportional to the work they have contributed. In Papoua-New Guinea, it is
customary for all household members to receive a share of crop revenue that is commensurate to their contribution to
output (private communication from John Gibson).
19 The size of lumpsum transfers may nevertheless affect the supply of labor and thus the equilibrium wage rate w.
20 E.g., some customs specify that the bride price must be returned in case of repudiation.
21 E.g., alimony and child support.
19
where c ai and L aij are the levels of consumption and labor that solve equations (1-2) and δi is the
member:
T
W ci = Σ δ ti U i (c ci ) + V i (Ti − ΣLcij ) (13)
t =0 j
where c ci and L cij are the solution to the individual’s optimization problem when facing incentive
scheme {w, r, Gij , G ji }. Individual i will voluntarily agree to the incentive scheme if:
W ci ≥ W ai (14)
This condition, called the household participation constraint, sets limits to the redistribution of
ones, individuals can be made to cooperate to incentive schemes that specify lumpsum transfers
to others. Lumpsum transfers can be thought of as an entry fee that individuals have to pay to join
the cooperating entity. Some household members may be able to capture most of the gains from
better resource allocation even if participation by others is voluntary. The maximum size of
voluntary transfers is large when gains from cooperation are large, e.g., in the presence of returns
Individuals may object to transfers Gij that would make them worse off than what they
could guarantee themselves by leaving the household. For this reason, rules regarding access to
land are likely to have a paramount effect on the intrahousehold distribution of welfare. Let W li
represent the discounted payoff after separation. Depending on current asset endowments Ai
(themselves a function of patterns of inheritance and inter vivos land transfers) and on laws and
customs regarding the rights and obligations of separating households members (e.g., laws
regarding divorce, minors, support to the elderly; see Egyir (1998))), W li may be larger or smaller
than W ai . If W li > W ai , individual i can credibly threaten to separate from the household unless the
the household member credibly threaten to refuse to cooperate without leaving the household?
This depends on what happens upon separation. Suppose that separation only entails a redistribu-
tion of household land Ai and direct transfer obligations. In this case, W lj > W aj for some j when-
ever W li < W ai : taking resources away from one must make the other better off. Consequently, any
threat by household member i to refuse to cooperate without leaving the household will be met
by j’s threat to leave the household. In this case, all that matters are the W ai payoffs. Threats to
The situation is different if household members must relinquish control over some of their
land Ai and other assets upon household separation. For example, upon repudiation the bride
price may have to be returned to the wife’s parents, not to the wife herself. Court fees in case of
divorce also subtract from the household assets.22 In these cases, it is possible that W ai > W li for
all i’s in the household. If this condition is satisfied, no household member can credibly threaten
to separate from the household; W ai payoffs are the relevant bounds to the household participation
constraints. If, however, W ai < W li for any household members, then the relevant payoffs are the
W li ’s.
Household members may also try to affect the distribution of gains from cooperation
through the threat or use of verbal and physical violence (e.g., Egyir (1998), Kevane (1996)).
Domestic violence is unfortunately too common for this possibility to be discounted. Let Pij
denote the pain and suffering that i can inflict to j and let W ai − ΣP ji be the payoff of a non-
j
cooperating household member who is ’punished’ by the others through domestic violence.
Whether or not the threat of violence is credible depends on social attitudes and on the legal pro-
tection (or lack thereof) that is granted to victims. Clearly, if the threat of violence is credible,
W ai − ΣP ji < W ai and the threatened household member is more amenable to intrahousehold dis-
j
________________
22 Another example would be if a young adult who has received land from the chief must return it to the
community in case of dispute with his father.
21
Depending on the social context,23 a household member may be able to escape violence by
leaving the household, provided of course that violence ceases once the victim leaves. This is not
always true, as numerous cases of ineffective restraining orders against violent spouses amply
demonstrate in the U.S. If the threat of violence after separation is credible, the payoff upon
runaway household members is not credible, perhaps because of physical distance, it is then pos-
sible that W li > W ai − ΣP ji . If the above inequality holds, the threat of violence to non-
j
cooperating household members is ineffective -- provided individuals can flee the household fast
Given that most domestic violence takes place behind closed doors, deterrence by outside
institutions is only feasible if victims choose to report it. Reporting is not problematic after
members within the household, however, complaining to an external agency may not be indivi-
dually rational if it leads to the dissolution of the household (e.g., husband or father arrested) and
if life after separation is not an attractive option, i.e., if W ci > W li . As a corollary of this principle,
a poor wife might optimally choose not to report a beating rather than starve. If this is the case,
the threat of domestic violence is credible and effective even though external deterrence is avail-
able at no cost. In other words, household members can only be protected against the threat of
physical violence if their outside payoff W li is high enough. This reasoning explains why domes-
tic violence might be more readily tolerated by poor, illiterate women in environments character-
________________
23 In some societies runaway wives are hunted down and brought back to their husband (e.g., Kevane (1996)). The
same treatment is reserved to runaway children almost anywhere.
22
We have seen that bargaining power partly determine intrahousehold transfers and thus the
relative influence that household members have on household decisions. Credible threats thus
affect whose preferences have the largest weight in consumption choices (what Chiappori calls
the sharing rule). This idea is implicitly behind much of the discourse about the potentially
beneficial consequence of empowering women. For instance, it is often argued that women are
more concerned about child nutrition and education than men. If true, this implies that child
nutrition and education can be improved by raising the bargaining power of women within the
household. Women have similarly be assumed to care more about vegetables and less about beer
and cigarettes than men. To the extent that policy makers identify more readily with (supposed)
female preferences, they may choose to increase women’s bargaining power even if they do not
In Section 2 we argued that age and gender casting are a convenient way of capturing gains
from specialization but that, judging from the wide diversity of rules encountered in practice, the
allocation of tasks by age and gender is largely arbitrary. In other words, in any given society,
there are many different ways of dividing tasks among men and women, the young and the old,
all of which capture returns to specialization and are equally efficient. We also pointed out that
the choice of age and gender casting rule dictates a particular set of rules regarding access to
land. The arguments presented in this section indicated that access to land (and other income
welfare. Putting the two sections together implies that combinations of rules of gender casting
and access to land that are equivalent from an efficiency point of view need not yield the same
intrahousehold distribution of welfare. An immediate policy implication is that the relative wel-
fare of a particular group, e.g., women or young adults, can be modified by redefining rules of
role casting and access to land (and other income earning opportunities). To be successful, how-
ever, efforts to challenge the status quo need to satisfy two requirements. First, rules regarding
23
role casting and access to land must remain ’in sync’: there is little point insisting that women
inherit land if they are not allowed to cultivate it, and vice versa. Second, the new rules must
ensure that returns to specialization are achieved. In this respect, efforts to eliminate age and
gender casting altogether and replace it with a Jeffersonian ideal of equal opportunity for all may
be ill suited to traditional societies with little economic progress. Replacing one role casting sys-
tem by another that is more beneficial to the target group may be more acceptable by all than the
Throughout the previous section, we assumed that markets do not exist for labor, land, and
other productive resources so that the only way efficiency gains from resource reallocation can be
achieved is for individuals to form households.24 In this section we investigate the effect of vari-
markets exist and there are no household public goods, there are no efficiency gains to be made
from the formation of households.25 There is, therefore, no room for the cooperative payoff W ci to
be higher than the non-cooperative payoff W ai for all i. The only way W ci can be greater than W ai
for some i is for W cj to be below W aj for some j. In this case, if separation is costless26 and domes-
tic violence cannot be exerted on separated household members, cooperative payoffs must equal
autarky payoffs:
W ci = W li (15)
for all i’s. If separation is costly for the household, there is room left for negotiation on the distri-
bution of household leisure and consumption. But if it is not, individual welfare is entirely dic-
________________
24 Or other, looser structures such as co-residence units (e.g., compounds) and social networks.
25 This simple but powerful observation may account for the erosion of the family in developed countries. See
Binswanger and McIntire (1987) on vertically integrated households.
26 i.e., if household members do not have to incur costs to separate (e.g., legal costs), they do not have to relinquish
household assets to non-household members (e.g., brideprice returned to wife family), and they do not loose
entitlement benefits (e.g., tax break).
24
tated by factor prices and the distribution of household resources after separation.
The above suggests that legal provisions governing the attribution of household assets and
providing for alimony and child support should have a direct effect on the relative welfare of
household members (see Egyir (1998) for a description of these provisions in Ghana). In a world
of complete markets, however, individuals should refuse to voluntarilly join households unless
they are guaranteed a payoff after separation that is equivalent to their expected payoff, should
they remain on their own. Once laws and customs affecting intrahousehold welfare are fully anti-
cipated, they should result in side payments (e.g., bride price, dowry) at the onset of the union
itself, making it difficult for an equity-minded policy maker to durably affect the intrahousehold
We just saw that the existence of perfect markets makes it harder for a particular household
members, e.g., the male head of household, to appropriate the efficiency gains from the redistri-
bution of land and productive resources. It may, therefore, be tempting for, say, male heads to
collude and deny their wives and dependents the right to get land of their own and to work out-
side the household (e.g., Kevane (1996), Egyir (1998), Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998)). So
doing, they lower females’ W ai and W li and more easily extract transfers from them. The prohibi-
tion to get land and work outside the home or farm further raises the bargaining power of house-
hold heads if the members who specialize in domestic or household-based chores become less
well informed about possible exit option, less able to secure a job through job market contacts,
The allocation of labor resulting from collusion among male heads need not be inefficient,
however, provided that heads of household spend at least part of their time on their own farm or
________________
27 Formally, the lack of information about job market opportunities translates into flat (i.e., high variance) priors
which, if the person is risk averse, lower the expected utility of exit. The lack of network contacts has the same effect
by reducing the probability of finding a job. See also Schaffner (1995) for evidence that servility shifts preferences
against exit.
25
business.28 Indeed, as long as captive and non-captive workers work together on the same pro-
duction activity, the opportunity cost of captive labor is the same as the market wage. Aggregate
labor resources can thus be allocated efficiently by ensuring that captive workers are given an
implicit incentive to work equivalent to w ei . Only when non-captive workers spend all their time
outside the household is the allocation of labor inefficient: the household no longer is at an inte-
rior solution and the marginal return to captive labor falls below the market wage. In this case, all
could be made better of by letting underemployed captive workers rent in land or hire themselves
out for a wage. If Pareto gains from letting women and children work for other households are
large enough, the redistributive gain that household heads obtain by colluding not to rent land or
hire each others’ dependents is smaller the efficiency gain that they could achieve by letting them
work as laborers or independent farmers. Such a situation is likely to arise in villages and regions
with lots of landless workers and sub-marginal farmers. Collusion to keep dependents out of the
land and labor markets then loses much of its attraction and can reasonably be expected to col-
lapse or take another form. Heads of household may, however, continue to extract transfers from
dependents by colluding to restrict access to the best land and to pay women and dependents a
low wage. Formally, the situation is akin to forming a cartel of employers and is discussed in
Akerlof (1976).
Both types of collusive arrangements among heads of household -- captive labor or lower
wage and bad land -- are, of course, vulnerable to free riding. In both cases, it is in the interest of
a single employer or landlord to circumvent the collusive arrangement. Employers could attract
captive workers by paying them a wage below the market rate or by renting them land at higher
than market price because, by securing an independent source of income, captive workers would
avoid paying the lumpsum ’tax’ imposed by the household29 and could thus be better off.
________________
28 As Basu and Van (1996) argues in the case of child labor, prohibiting certain household members from working
outside the household may also be efficient if the withdrawal of their labor raises total wages. See also Anderson and
Francois (1996).
29 Either directly by leaving the household, or indirectly by renegotiating their obligations within the household.
26
Similarly, by raising the wage paid to women and children slightly above that paid by others,
employers could attract a larger number of low wage but equally productive workers and thus
make more profit. Cartel-like arrangements are thus not self-enforcing and require a meta-
punishment to be sustained. The form that the meta-punishment may take is unclear, although
one can imagine things like social ostracism by other male heads, sabotage, violence, poisening,
etc (e.g., Platteau (1997), Kevane (1996)). Women and children who work in violation of social
prohibition may also face various forms of harrassment, including sexual harrassment by co-
workers.30
Another, more subtle way to lower the wage of dependents and thus their exit payoff is to
lower their ei by restricting their access to education and by inciting them to learn tasks with low
potential for wage employment, such as household chores. As we have argued in section 2, age
and gender casting of this type need not be inefficient,31 even though they clearly have detrimen-
tal effects on equity. Finally, in places where income earning opportunities mostly take the form
of farming and self-employment, access to individual income requires personal finances. In that
case, another way of lowering the compensation for dependents’ labor is to restrict their access to
credit and hence to remunerative uses of their time other than collaboration to household produc-
tion (e.g., Egyir (1998), Groote and Kebe (1995), Goetz and Gupta (1996), Smith (1994)). Udry
(1996a) gives yet another example in which it is access to organic fertilizer which is the key fac-
In the two preceding sections we argued that individual household members will object to a
________________
30 In such a setting, non-discriminatory employment opportunities for women can be created by setting up rural
public works programs open to all (e.g., Deolalikar and Gaiha (1992) and the references cited therein show that
women often constitute an important proportion of public works employees).
31 With the same caveat as before, namely that age and gender casting are restrictions to the freedom of
opportunity and prevent individuals from achieving their full economic potential, e.g., as entrepreneurs, leaders,
researchers, inventors, and the like.
27
distribution of gains from resource reallocation that makes them worse off than what they could
guarantee themselves by leaving the household or refusing to cooperate. This idea was captured
in a household participation constraint of the form W ci ≥ W ki where W ki denotes the credible threat
circumstances (see Section 3). We now examine how participation constraints are affected by the
passage of time between the reallocation of land and other productive resources, and the enjoy-
ment of consumption. Throughout this section we assume that household first allocate labor,
land, and other productive resources to production (period one). Output is then realized and the
Consider the following arrangement between household members: i agrees to work on j’s
field in period one in exchange for a share of output in period two -- i.e., a "gift" at harvest time
(e.g., Jones (1986), Boe (1996)). As we have seen in the preceding section, it is rational for i to
ment must be self-supporting, that is, it must also be rational for j to fulfill his or her promise in
period two:
wards. As the above equation shows, j will do so only if the short term loss from having to com-
pensate i is smaller than the long term gain from a continued relationship.32 This is unlikely to be
true if the promised compensation ei L ji + Gij − G ji is large, the gain from cooperation W ci − W ki
is small, or j’s time horizon is short, i.e., δ is low. If equation (16) is not satisfied, j is unable to
credibly commit to compensate i and the agreement will not be fulfilled. Anticipating this, i
should refuse to cooperate. There is commitment failure: a Pareto improving transaction does not
take place because one party cannot credibly commit to honor the contract (e.g., Coate and
________________
32 We have implicitly assumed that if j fails to pay i, individual i responds by not transfering Gij and refusing to
cooperate in the future.
28
Clearly, the possibility of commitment failure puts additional constraints on the type of
resource reallocation and compensation schemes that are self-supporting (e.g., Pollack (1985)).
First, for a household member to credibly commit to any ex post payment, that member must not
have been pushed to his or her exit payoff; he or she must derive some benefit from participating
to the household. Put differently, for the household head to credibly commit to compensate
dependents for participating to farming or household chores, the head must be strictly better off in
a functional household than outside of it. If the welfare gains from household formation are
small, this may require that most if not all these gains go to the head for intrahousehold labor
transfers to take place. When this condition is not satisfied, members are likely to insist on
operating in strictly separate spheres with little or no labor exchange -- a feature that many would
associate with dysfunctional households. Of course, the refusal to collaborate on a common pro-
ject further reduces the gains from household formation and fragilizes the household even more.
Second, for any distribution of the gains from collaboration W ci − W ai , there are limits to the
may be impossible to achieve: i may refuse to work more than a certain number of days Lij on j’s
field because any promise of payment in excess of w ei Lij is not credible. Of course, it may be
possible to redistribute the gains from cooperation differently and raise W cj − W kj so as to satisfy
equation (16). But this would mean taking something away from i, a prospect i is likely to object
to.
mechanism. One possible mechanism is for household members to pass among themselves
market transactions that are at least theoretically enforceable by courts.33 One conceivable
________________
33 Market transactions among spouses are common in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, notably the coastal areas of
Ghana and Nigeria. It is, for instance, frequent for women traders to purchase the output of their husband farmers or
fishermen.
29
agreements, joint ownership of assets, joint holding of bank accounts, etc. When small amounts
are involved, however, court action is seldom attractive because it is too costly and time consum-
ing. Alternative legal institutions at the village or community level -- such as chiefs and mara-
bouts -- may exist that have jurisdiction to adjudicate matrimonial disputes and can put pressure
on a recalcitrant spouse to honor a promise. Proving that a promise has been breached and that
one spouse is at fault is often difficult to verify, given that households often engage in complex
implicit arrangements. If breach of promise cannot be established, external agents may choose to
rely on general standards of fairness instead. Given the paucity of data on these issues, providing
empirical evidence of what these standards are and how matrimonial disputes are adjudicated in
Fourth, agreements are more difficult to enforce if compensation is promised only in a dis-
tant future (i.e., δ low). In some cases, compensation may be delayed until the death of the
spouse or until dissolution of the marriage (e.g., Egyir (1998)). In this case, rules and customs
about the devolution of assets limit the forms that compensation may take, while at the same time
making some forms of credible commitments possible. For instance, if laws and customs stipulate
that the wife inherits half of the household assets upon death or divorce, it will be easier for the
husband to convince his wife to help build up joint assets than if the wife has no right upon them.
In this case, asset devolution rules can be seen as providing a crude commitment mechanism. For
such a commitment mechanism to be effective, husbands must have no discretion to change the
devolution of joint assets; efforts to circumvent rules must be regarded as a form of fraud and
punished accordingly.
Credit constraints also matter. Household members who are credit constrained may be
unable to promptly pay for labor services and may have to wait until sufficient output has been
generated before doing so (e.g., Egyir (1998)). Their production activity may also be subject to
30
shocks, in which case they may be unable to pay in period two. One would therefore expect com-
mitment problems to be more severe and the intrahousehold allocation of resources to be less
efficient in poor, credit constrained households. Finally, commitment failure is more likely when
j’s time horizon is short, as would be the case if j expects to leave the household in the near
future. Implicit agreements among household members are thus less likely to be made and more
For the same reason, commitment failure is more problematic for individuals who expect to
migrate, exit, or marry out of the household: these individuals are more likely to free-ride and
less likely to take a long-term interest in the prosperity of the household. Laws and customs
about inheritance, brideprice and dowry, etc, can be regarded as an effort to mitigate this form of
free riding. Societies in which daughters marry before they are old enough to rationally choose to
free-ride, also typically deny daughters a right to inherit. In contrast, sons often continue to con-
tribute to household production until they are much older and are typically given, through cus-
toms regarding inheritance and inter vivos transfers, a stake in their father’s farm (e.g., Egyir
(1998)).34
Another possible way that commitment problems can be solved is by trading labor against
land or other productive resources.35 Suppose j tries to convince i to work full time on his field
but i objects that she does not believe she will be fully compensated for her effort -- i.e., equation
(16) is violated. Given this state of affairs, it may be in j’s interest to let i cultivate part of his land
and keep the proceeds in exchange for a payment after harvest r ji . The transfer of user right
over land can then be seen as a way of giving an immediate payment and thus of bypassing com-
mitment failure (see Egyir (1998) for an illustration). Since the land transfer partly or fully can-
________________
34 For a discussion of how the concentration of land into the hands of the elder affect family organization and
sectoral employment, see for instance St-Amour and Vencatachellum (1996).
35 Other give-and-take arrangements can be found as well, e.g., letting women take some of the grain to brew it
into beer and sell it (e.g., Haggblade (1987)).
31
cels out the implicit wage payment wei Lij , equation (16) is more easily satisfied and the
Whether or not this arrangement is efficient depends on returns to scale and specialization:
if returns to scale are increasing, it is inefficient to divide the farm into distinct units. Even so, the
efficiency gain from a better allocation of labor may compensate the efficiency loss from a worse
allocation of land, so that the net effect of the arrangement is beneficial. Udry’s (1996a) finding
that women work harder on their fields than on their husband’s is consistent with the existence of
incentive problems such as the ones generated by imperfect commitment. Other features
described by Udry are also more consistent with commitment problems than role casting. For
instance, Udry finds that dependents often grow, on their individual fields, the same crop as the
head on the household fields; this is inconsistent with a pure role casting rationale for depen-
dents’ plots. Descriptive accounts also point out that dependents who cultivate their own plots
are entitled to use the money as they wish -- provided they contribute to household expenditures.
This is in line with the role of dependents’ plots as financial compensation devices: capturing
gains from specialization does not require financial independence but commitment failure does.
Finally, the fact that dependents’ plots are only granted on a temporary basis, mostly by the
household head himself, is further indication that commitment failure is the motivation. If role
casting was the rationale, there would be little reason for dependents’ plots not to be allocated on
a permanent basis. All in all, the preliminary evidence is thus highly suggestive that the practice
of dependents’ plots, which is widespread in much of Western and Central Africa, is primarily an
effort to overcome commitment failure within the household. More work is nevertheless needed
This paper has examined the conditions under which land, labor, and other productive
resources might not be allocated efficiently within (and across) households. We noted that,
32
depending on returns to scale, specialization and experience, efficiency may require the centrali-
zation of production -- and thus land -- under the authority of the head, and the specialization of
individual household members in certain tasks and activities. In this context, age and gender
casting can be understood as an institution meant to resolve the allocation of tasks among house-
hold members. Because gender and age seldom confer a strong comparative advantage in any
particular task, role casting is largely arbitrary, as indicated by the wide variety of task allocation
Role casting can thus be seen as an efficiency enhancing institution that attempts to capture
gains from specialization by providing a focal point for intrahousehold task allocation. So doing,
however, it introduces a potential mismatch between the tasks allocated to particular individuals
and their innate talent. The welfare loss from such a mismatch is probably low in unspecialized,
undifferentiated societies such as poor rural areas of the Third World. But it is likely to be high in
highly diversified, rapidly evolving societies. Consequently, we expect role casting to become
increasingly costly and ill-adapted as societies become more differentiated -- and thus to be pro-
gressively repealed as development takes place. More work is needed on this issue.
A good grasp of role casting is necessary before one can make sense of rules of access to
land because role casting often dictates a particular pattern of land allocation across individuals
and, thus, of land inheritance and disposition inter vivos. For instance, when women are respon-
sible for certain crops such as vegetables or food crops, it is natural that they be granted access to
a comensurate piece of land. In contrast, when women do not participate in crop production -- or
where their participation is restricted to certain agricultural tasks, not certain crops -- then female
access to land is not required to capture returns from specialization. In that case, one would
Role casting and access to land do not only affect intrahousehold efficiency, they also are
important determinants of intrahousehold welfare through their effect on exit options and bar-
33
gaining power within the household. Combinations of rules of gender casting and access to land
that are equivalent from an efficiency point of view need not yield the same intrahousehold distri-
bution of welfare. An immediate policy implication is that the relative welfare of a particular
group, e.g., women or young adults, can be modified by redefining role casting and rules of
access to land (and other income earning opportunities). To be successful, however, efforts to
challenge the status quo need to ensure that returns to specialization are still achieved.
participation constraints, efficiency, and equity and showed that commitment failure within the
household may lead to inefficiency. Granting dependents temporary rights to cultivate their own
plot of land, as discussed for instance in Udry (1996a), may be used to mitigate intrahousehold
commitment problems. If this is the case, women and other dependents are expected to apply
more labor to their farm and business than is efficient. Udry (1996b)’s results are consistent with
this prediction. Second, the head of household is expected to mitigate commitment problems by
allocating individual plots and other productive resources on a discretionary basis, as docu-
mented by Egyir (1998). Third, inefficiency is expected to be fostered by factors that exacerbate
commitment failure, such as short time horizon (sons and daughters who expect to leave the
household; dysfunctional families), low assets (low gains from intrahousehold exchange),
unequal stakes in the household (some members have low welfare gains from household partici-
pation), and poor external enforcement. This is consistent with the observation that adult depen-
dents work in general less hard than the household head and his wife (e.g., Cleave (1974),
Fafchamps (1986), Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998)). Finally, our framework predicts that the
allocation of consumption and leisure should reflect participation constraints. It therefore pro-
vides the basis for a test of the effect of determinants of exit options -- such as access to land --
on the intrahousehold allocation of leisure and nutrition. Providing empirical verification for
We finish with a few words about a topic that was ignored here, that of female headed
households. As pointed out by many authors (e.g., Egyir (1998), Gladwin and McMillan (1989),
Jiggins (1989), female headed households have unequal access to land and credit. Similar prob-
lems, although not as severe, afflict female operated households. The question is: why? One pos-
sible answer is that denying women access to land and credit is a way to lower their exit payoff.
Making exit less attractive for women has two effects. First, it reduces their bargaining power
within the household, and thus is likely to affect women’s welfare even in male headed house-
holds. This issue was discussed in Section 4. Second, it also makes commitment failure less
likely and thus mitigates incentive problems and inefficiency within households. This is because
allocating most of the welfare gains from household formation to male heads gives them a stake
in the preservation of the household. As a result, household heads have an incentive to honor
their commitment to redistribute part of the joint output to dependents in exchange for their parti-
If the above interpretation is correct, denying women access to land and credit indirectly
serves to stabilize households -- although it does so, arguably, at women’s expense.36 This opens
another question, namely, what is the reason for the existence of female headed households and
for the apparent rise in the proportion of female headed and female operated households in some
tion to cities, mines, and plantations? These issues deserve empirical investigation as they
undoubtedly have serious implications on the welfare of children and other social issues (see
Akerlof et al. (1996), Korenman and Neumark (1991), and Akerlof (1998) for a similar emphasis
in the U.S.). Before encouraging equal access to land and credit for women, one would like to
To make this clear, consider the following stylized example: suppose that all land goes to
male heads of household, that heads marry to get access to female and child labor, and that they
can credibly commit to compensate their dependents because they gain from marriage. Suppose
further that a reform grants women half of their husband land upon divorce. While this reform
would probably raise the welfare of wives in existing households, its net long term effect may be
null or negative. For instance, men may respond by refusing to marry and by hiring women and
children as wage workers instead. In this case, the long-term net welfare impact of the reform on
women is essentially zero,37 but its effect on out-of-wedlock birth and thus on illegitimate chil-
dren is likely to be very negative. Only by simultaneously ensuring that daughters gain equal
access to land through inheritance and transfers inter vivos can this negative effect be avoided.
This example serves to illustrate that tampering with family law should not be attempted without
________________
37 In equilibrium, the wage women get as workers is equal to the intrahousehold compensation they get when their
only asset is labor.
36
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